id
int64
673k
4.14M
tag
stringlengths
1
39.7k
cite
stringlengths
1
8.39k
fullcite
stringlengths
1
50.9k
summary
stringlengths
1
47k
spoken
stringlengths
1
13.9k
fulltext
stringlengths
1
138k
textLength
float64
0
138k
markup
stringlengths
10
139k
pocket
stringlengths
1
863
hat
stringlengths
1
5.45k
block
stringlengths
1
16.5k
bucketId
int64
37
1.65M
duplicateCount
int64
1
3.81k
fileId
int64
14k
129k
filePath
stringlengths
60
188
roundId
int64
565k
915k
side
stringclasses
2 values
tournament
stringlengths
1
62
round
stringclasses
34 values
opponent
stringlengths
1
57
judge
stringlengths
1
87
report
stringlengths
1
612k
opensourcePath
stringlengths
48
176
caselistUpdatedAt
float64
teamId
int64
48.4k
77.9k
teamName
stringlengths
3
5
teamDisplayName
stringlengths
8
31
notes
float64
debater1First
stringclasses
164 values
debater1Last
stringclasses
183 values
debater2First
stringclasses
151 values
debater2Last
stringclasses
186 values
schoolId
int64
18.7k
26.1k
schoolName
stringclasses
306 values
schoolDisplayName
stringclasses
306 values
state
float64
chapterId
float64
caselistId
int64
1k
1.04k
caselistName
stringclasses
10 values
caselistDisplayName
stringclasses
10 values
year
int64
2.01k
2.02k
event
stringclasses
2 values
level
stringclasses
2 values
teamSize
int64
1
2
741,305
Legalization is a façade to increase profits for white people while leaving the prison industrial complex intact
Kunichoff 13
Kunichoff 13 (Yana Kunichoff, independent journalist, “Do new marijuana legalization laws only benefit white people?” June 7, 2013, KB)
Possession of marijuana is not the only drug-related crime that lands people behind bars Distribution charges account for a large portion of drug arrests and will likely continue “Legalizing marijuana is not likely to have much effect on the prison population,” It would probably help at least some people of color who might otherwise get picked up for marijuana possession, but in terms of the dynamics of incarceration, it doesn’t change much.” Way, of Colorado, said some people in Washington and his state are concerned that legalizing some distribution could actually mean an increase in arrests for illegal distribution. “Law enforcement usually find a way to circumvent reforms,” a drop in arrests could hurt police departments’ budgets. states that receive federal funding to fight the war on drugs could see a drop in their overall budget if arrests drop Legalization doesn’t challenge the prison industrial complex legalization movement fails to take up broader issues of criminalization. “The marijuana movement has traditionally been a white movement,” and [people in the movement] have not incorporated racial justice into their politics The racial disparities seen throughout the drug war will not end through the marijuana prohibition ending.” “The marijuana legalization movement … doesn’t really address the problem of mass incarceration in any kind of direct way.”
Possession is not the only drug-related crime that lands people behind bars Distribution charges account for a large portion of arrests Legalizing is not likely to have much effect on the prison population,” it doesn’t change much.” legalizing distribution could mean an increase in arrests for illegal distribution Law enforcement find a way to circumvent reforms,” a drop in arrests could hurt police departments’ budgets. Legalization doesn’t challenge the prison industrial complex “The marijuana movement has traditionally been a white movement,” The racial disparities seen throughout the drug war will not end through the marijuana prohibition ending.”
But possibly more arrests for distribution Possession of marijuana is not the only drug-related crime that lands people behind bars. Distribution charges account for a large portion of drug arrests and will likely continue, according to Marc Mauer, executive director of the Washington, D.C.-based Sentencing Project, an advocacy group that advocates for reforms in sentencing policy. “Legalizing marijuana is not likely to have much effect on the prison population,” Mauer said. “It would probably help at least some people of color who might otherwise get picked up for marijuana possession, but in terms of the dynamics of incarceration, it doesn’t change much.” Way, of Colorado, said some people in Washington and his state are concerned that legalizing some distribution could actually mean an increase in arrests for illegal distribution. “Law enforcement usually find a way to circumvent reforms,” he said, noting that a drop in arrests could hurt police departments’ budgets. In particular, states that receive federal funding to fight the war on drugs could see a drop in their overall budget if arrests drop, Way said. The Colorado and Washington legislation look to regulate the distribution of marijuana--either through licenses for growing or only allowing growing within designated spaces. Legalization doesn’t challenge the prison industrial complex Mauer and Way do agree with Simon’s argument that the marijuana legalization movement fails to take up broader issues of criminalization. “The marijuana movement has traditionally been a white movement,” Way said, “and [people in the movement] have not incorporated racial justice into their politics. The racial disparities seen throughout the drug war will not end through the marijuana prohibition ending.” Mauer agreed: “The marijuana legalization movement … doesn’t really address the problem of mass incarceration in any kind of direct way.” For Simon, a former reporter who also served as head writer for “The Wire,” drug policy can’t be separated from the larger socioeconomic issues affecting communities that grapple with high incarceration and unemployment rates. “Drugs are the only industry left in places such as Baltimore and East St. Louis, [Ill.]"--an industry that employs "children, old people, people who've been shooting drugs for 20 years, it doesn't matter,” he said at the Observer event. “It's the only factory that's still open.
2,420
<h4><u><strong>Legalization is a façade to increase profits for white people while leaving the prison industrial complex intact</h4><p>Kunichoff 13</p><p></u></strong>(Yana Kunichoff, independent journalist, “Do new marijuana legalization laws only benefit white people?” June 7, 2013, KB)</p><p>But possibly more arrests for distribution <u><mark>Possession</mark> of marijuana <mark>is not the only drug-related crime that lands people behind bars</u></mark>. <u><mark>Distribution charges account for a large portion of</mark> drug <mark>arrests</mark> and will likely continue</u>, according to Marc Mauer, executive director of the Washington, D.C.-based Sentencing Project, an advocacy group that advocates for reforms in sentencing policy. <u><strong>“<mark>Legalizing</mark> marijuana <mark>is not likely to have much effect on the prison population,”</u></strong></mark> Mauer said. “<u>It would probably help at least some people of color who might otherwise get picked up for marijuana possession, but in terms of the dynamics of incarceration, <strong><mark>it doesn’t change much.”</mark> </strong>Way, of Colorado, said some people in Washington and his state are concerned that <strong><mark>legalizing</mark> some <mark>distribution could</mark> actually <mark>mean an increase in arrests for illegal distribution</mark>. “<mark>Law enforcement</mark> usually <mark>find a way to circumvent reforms,”</u></strong></mark> he said, noting that <u><strong><mark>a drop in arrests could hurt police departments’ budgets.</mark> </u></strong>In particular, <u>states that receive federal funding to fight the war on drugs could see a drop in their overall budget if arrests drop</u>, Way said. The Colorado and Washington legislation look to regulate the distribution of marijuana--either through licenses for growing or only allowing growing within designated spaces. <u><strong><mark>Legalization doesn’t challenge the prison industrial complex</mark> </u></strong>Mauer and Way do agree with Simon’s argument that the marijuana <u>legalization movement fails to take up broader issues of criminalization.<strong> <mark>“The marijuana movement has traditionally been a white movement,”</u></strong></mark> Way said, “<u>and [people in the movement] have not incorporated racial justice into their politics</u>. <u><strong><mark>The racial disparities seen throughout the drug war will not end through the marijuana prohibition ending.”</mark> </u></strong>Mauer agreed: <u>“The marijuana legalization movement … doesn’t really address the problem of mass incarceration in any kind of direct way.”</u> For Simon, a former reporter who also served as head writer for “The Wire,” drug policy can’t be separated from the larger socioeconomic issues affecting communities that grapple with high incarceration and unemployment rates. “Drugs are the only industry left in places such as Baltimore and East St. Louis, [Ill.]"--an industry that employs "children, old people, people who've been shooting drugs for 20 years, it doesn't matter,” he said at the Observer event. “It's the only factory that's still open.</p>
1NR
Neolib
Link
65,306
28
17,003
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
564,710
N
UNLV
1
Whitman DL
Justin Kirk
1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,306
Appeals to experience precludes questioning of ideological systems, locks subjects into static and immutable representational positions without critique
Scott 1992
Scott 1992 (Joan, “Experience”, Feminists Theorize the Political, Ed. Judith Butler and Joan Scott, pp 25, KEL) Ableist language modified.
the evidence of experience assume that the facts of history speak for themselves the project of making experience [known] visible precludes critical examination of the workings of the ideological system itself, its categories of representation (homosexual/heterosexual, man/woman, black/white as fixed immutable identities), its premises about what these categories mean and how they operate, its notions of subjects, origin, and cause.
experience assume history speak for themselves making experience [known precludes examination of the system itself, its categories its premises about what these mean and how they operate
To put it another way, the evidence of experience, whether conceived through a metaphor of visibility or in any other way that takes meaning as transparent, reproduces rather than contests given ideological systems-those that assume that the facts of history speak for themselves and, in the case of histories of gender, those that rest on notions of a natural or established opposition between sexual practices and social conventions, and between homosexuality and heterosexuality. Histories that document the "hidden" world of homosexuality, for example, show the impact of silence and repression on the lives of those affected by it and bring to light the history of their suppression and exploitation. But the project of making experience [known] visible precludes critical examination of the workings of the ideological system itself, its categories of representation (homosexual/heterosexual, man/woman, black/white as fixed immutable identities), its premises about what these categories mean and how they operate, its notions of subjects, origin, and cause.
1,065
<h4>Appeals to experience precludes questioning of ideological systems, locks subjects into static and immutable representational positions without critique</h4><p><u><strong>Scott 1992</u></strong> (Joan, “Experience”, Feminists Theorize the Political, Ed. Judith Butler and Joan Scott, pp 25, KEL) Ableist language modified.</p><p>To put it another way, <u>the evidence of <mark>experience</u></mark>, whether conceived through a metaphor of visibility or in any other way that takes meaning as transparent, reproduces rather than contests given ideological systems-those that <u><mark>assume</mark> that the facts of <mark>history speak for themselves</u></mark> and, in the case of histories of gender, those that rest on notions of a natural or established opposition between sexual practices and social conventions, and between homosexuality and heterosexuality. Histories that document the "hidden" world of homosexuality, for example, show the impact of silence and repression on the lives of those affected by it and bring to light the history of their suppression and exploitation. But <u>the project of <mark>making experience [known</mark>] visible <mark>precludes</mark> critical <mark>examination of the</mark> workings of the ideological <mark>system itself, its categories</mark> of representation (homosexual/heterosexual, man/woman, black/white as fixed immutable identities), <mark>its premises about what these</mark> categories <mark>mean and how they operate</mark>, its notions of subjects, origin, and cause.</p></u>
1NC
null
Case
430,181
2
17,008
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,714
N
UNLV
Quarters
Iowa KL
Shooter, Jason Russel, Michael Eisenstadt
1ac was black mothering 1nc was damage centrism k faciality k and case 2nc was damage and case 1nr was faciality 2nr was faciality
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,307
The aff is an unauthentic engagement with Native American culture which commodifies tribes for the New Age - takes out solvency and turns their impact
Sheldon 2006
Sheldon 2006
Indian spirituality is not based on the individual but rather on the community. Spiritual ties are completely dependent on the local culture and taken outside that cultural context, lose their meaning. There is no single "Indian spirituality" but each community would develop its own culturally-dependant ties to the spirit world. In this light, adopting Indian spirituality in a Western culture is not only cultural theft, but also simply nonsensical It would be like stealing a bottle of spice from a master chef and believing that you then had the secret to greatcooking , the fixation on self-discovery and self-healing articulate the very Western ideologies of bourgeois individualism. At the same time, the teacher’s selling of ‘Indian’ knowledge and experiences manifests a profoundly capitalist mindset. . . Because it distorts Native traditions and turns them into consumer goods, the New Age represents another, newer phase in European America’s colonization of Native America It is not surprising, given this information to learn that the predominant market for New Age Indian spirituality is middle class, white and wanting to escape modernity’s ills via individual transformation (rather than political action) and the only way they know how to do this is as Aldred says, “through commercialization and purchase. This cycle does not end their alienation. They are still so removed from any recognition of social relations (much less historical conflict) that they cannot understand why Native American peoples themselves would object to their appropriations”
Indian spirituality is not based on the individual but the community completely dependent on the local culture and taken outside that cultural context, lose their meaning adopting Indian spirituality in a Western culture is not only cultural theft, but also nonsensical the selling of ‘Indian’ knowledge and experiences distorts Native traditions and turns them into consumer goods the New Age represents another phase in European America’s colonization of Native America. the predominant market is middle class, white and wanting to escape modernity’s ills via individual transformation (rather than political action) through commercialization and purchase
(Stacie, Bachelor of Arts, English; Bachelor of Science, Anthropology; Michigan State University, President, Native American Student Organization, Eastern Michigan University, Board of Directors, American Indian Services, Inc."The Invisible Indian", devilspaw.com/stacie/resume/writing/TheInvisibleIndian.pdf) In addition, Snyder's commentary includes a fundamentally Western concept: that spirituality is a universal, objective thing that all humans can experience equally, in an individual fashion. For example, Christianity often speaks of a "personal relationship with Jesus." Since in Western cultures, spirituality is woven almost exclusively into religion, Westerners have the concept of a "one true way." Indeed, if such a thing existed, it would be inhuman to deny that knowledge to all people; however, Indian spirituality is not based on the individual but rather on the community. Spiritual ties are completely dependent on the local culture and taken outside that cultural context, lose their meaning. There is no single "Indian spirituality" but each community would develop its own culturally-dependant ties to the spirit world. In this light, adopting Indian spirituality in a Western culture (or any culture outside of where it was created) is not only cultural theft, but also simply nonsensical. It would be like stealing a bottle of spice from a master chef and believing that you then had the secret to greatcooking. Looking closely at the Western mindset at the root of this issue in Going Native, Huhndorf writes: In New Age practices, ‘Native’ traditions generally reflect a heavily European ethos. In this particular case, the fixation on self-discovery and self-healing 9 articulate the very Western ideologies of bourgeois individualism. At the same time, the teacher’s selling of ‘Indian’ knowledge and experiences manifests a profoundly capitalist mindset. . . Because it distorts Native traditions and turns them into consumer goods, the New Age represents another, newer phase in European America’s colonization of Native America. This is true despite the movement’s claims to have freed itself from this troubling history. In fact, New Agers’ desire to go native reproduces, even as it extends, the history of colonization, shown in this case by the compulsion to own Native cultures and even Native identities (Hundorf 2001). It is not surprising, given this information to learn that the predominant market for New Age Indian spirituality is middle class, white and wanting to escape modernity’s ills via individual transformation (rather than political action) and the only way they know how to do this is as Aldred says, “through commercialization and purchase. This cycle does not end their alienation. They are still so removed from any recognition of social relations (much less historical conflict) that they cannot understand why Native American peoples themselves would object to their appropriations” (Aldred 2000).
2,958
<h4><strong>The aff is an unauthentic engagement with Native American culture which commodifies tribes for the New Age - takes out solvency and turns their impact</h4><p><u>Sheldon 2006</u> </p><p></strong>(Stacie, Bachelor of Arts, English; Bachelor of Science, Anthropology; Michigan State University, President, Native American Student Organization, Eastern Michigan University, Board of Directors, American Indian Services, Inc."The Invisible Indian", devilspaw.com/stacie/resume/writing/TheInvisibleIndian.pdf)</p><p>In addition, Snyder's commentary includes a fundamentally Western concept: that spirituality is a universal, objective thing that all humans can experience equally, in an individual fashion. For example, Christianity often speaks of a "personal relationship with Jesus." Since in Western cultures, spirituality is woven almost exclusively into religion, Westerners have the concept of a "one true way." Indeed, if such a thing existed, it would be inhuman to deny that knowledge to all people; however, <u><mark>Indian spirituality is not based on the individual but</mark> rather on <mark>the community</mark>. Spiritual ties are <mark>completely dependent on the local culture</mark> <mark>and</mark> <mark>taken outside that cultural context, lose their meaning</mark>. There is no single "Indian spirituality" but each community would develop its own culturally-dependant ties to the spirit world. In this light, <mark>adopting Indian spirituality in a Western culture</u></mark> (or any culture outside of where it was created) <u><mark>is not only cultural theft, but also</mark> simply <mark>nonsensical</u></mark>. <u>It would be like stealing a bottle of spice from a master chef and believing that you then had the secret to greatcooking</u>. Looking closely at the Western mindset at the root of this issue in Going Native, Huhndorf writes: In New Age practices, ‘Native’ traditions generally reflect a heavily European ethos. In this particular case<u>, the fixation on self-discovery and self-healing</u> 9 <u>articulate the very Western ideologies of bourgeois individualism. At the same time, <mark>the </mark>teacher’s <mark>selling of ‘Indian’ knowledge</mark> <mark>and experiences </mark>manifests a profoundly capitalist mindset. . . Because it <mark>distorts Native traditions <strong>and turns them into consumer goods</strong></mark>, <mark>the New Age represents another</mark>, newer <mark>phase in European America’s colonization of Native America</u>.</mark> This is true despite the movement’s claims to have freed itself from this troubling history. In fact, New Agers’ desire to go native reproduces, even as it extends, the history of colonization, shown in this case by the compulsion to own Native cultures and even Native identities (Hundorf 2001). <u>It is not surprising, given this information to learn that <mark>the predominant market</mark> for New Age Indian spirituality <mark>is middle class, white and wanting to escape</mark> <mark>modernity’s ills via individual transformation (rather than political action)</mark> and the only way they know how to do this is as Aldred says, “<mark>through commercialization and purchase</mark>. This cycle does not end their alienation. They are still so removed from any recognition of social relations (much less historical conflict) that they cannot understand why Native American peoples themselves would object to their appropriations”</u> (Aldred 2000).</p>
1NR
Case
Ballots
430,182
3
17,009
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round2.docx
564,719
N
USC
2
ASU CaRe
Ralph Paone
1ac was online gambling decolonization 1nc was university k decolonization metaphors k and case 2nc was university k 1nr was decolonization metaphors k and case 2nr was university k decolonization metaphors k and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,308
Suicide as escape is a necessary transgression within the cycle of eternal recurrence. Accepting death through the option for suicide imparts meaning onto life’s suffering.
Loeb 08
Loeb 08
eternal recurrence, which Nietzsche describes as ‘the highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable’ turns out to be the new counter-ideal and the means whereby the human can for the first time will a life-affirming meaning for its past and thereby for its entire existence However, this invocation of eternal recurrence does nothing whatsoever to eliminate the irreversibility of time the human has nostalgically willed the return, and even eternal repetition, of its most treasured and joyous past moments When Nietzsche describes eternal recurrence as the highest formulation of life-affirmation that is at all attainable, his point is not that the human animal should aim to will this eternal recurrence and thereby achieve the highest life-affirmation possible his point is that the human can never will this and that therefore the human can never achieve such life-affirmation. Nietzsche found himself unable to will his life’s eternal recurrence. rather than conferring meaning upon the human animal’s past, the thought of eternal recurrence actually multiplies and intensifies the meaninglessness of this past to a new and devastating degree. Eternal recurrence, he writes, is the most extreme form of nihilism because it is the ‘thought of existence as it is, without meaning or goal, but inevitably recurring, without any finale into nothingness’ everything becomes and recurs eternally— escape is impossible the thought of death as escape keeps humans from giving in to their pre-existing death-wish by imparting meaning to life’s suffering and offering the hope of a different or better life.
eternal recurrence Nietzsche describes as ‘the¶ highest affirmation attainable’ the counter-ideal and means whereby the human can will a life-affirming meaning for its past However, invocation of eternal recurrence does not eliminate the irreversibility of time , the human has willed the eternal repetition, of its most joyous past moments When Nietzsche describes eternal recurrence as the highest¶ formulation of life-affirmation his point is not that¶ the human should aim to will this eternal recurrence his point i the human can never will this and that therefore the human can never achieve such life-affirmation. the thought of eternal recurrence multiplies and intensifies the meaninglessness of this past everything becomes and recurs eternally— escape¶ is impossible the thought of death as escape¶ keeps humans from giving in to their pre-existing death-wish by imparting¶ meaning to life’s suffering and offering the hope of a different or¶ better life.
Paul, Dr. of philosophy at University of Puget Sound, Ph.D from Cal Berkeley, “Suicide, Meaning, and Redemption,” Nietzsche on Time and History, Ed. Manuel Dries, p. 163-189 SJE Although Zarathustra does not explicitly introduce his teaching of eternal¶ recurrence in his redemption speech, he obviously points in this direction¶ when he concludes by asking how the creative will might be taught to will¶ backwards so that it might will something higher than any reconciliation¶ with time. According to the consensus reading I have been concerned to¶ criticize, what Zarathustra means by this is that my affirmation of my present¶ state should teach me how to ‘will backwards’—that is, to will the¶ exact repetition of my entire past. And I would not be able to will in this¶ way unless I had successfully redescribed my past as directed inevitably¶ towards my present state. As Nehamas writes: ‘If I am even for a moment¶ such as I would want to be again, then I would accept all my past actions,¶ which, essential to and constitutive of the self I want to repeat, are now¶ newly redescribed’ (1985, p. 160, my emphasis). Or, as Julian Young¶ writes, the key is to ‘“write” my life so that I not merely like it, but like it¶ so much that I can will its recurrence for ever and ever, down to every last¶ detail’ (2003, p. 91), and to do this we must be able to see the kind of personal¶ providence in things that Nietzsche describes in Gay Science 277.¶ Hence eternal recurrence, which Nietzsche describes in Ecce Homo as ‘the¶ highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable’ (EH III Z 1), turns¶ out to be the new counter-ideal and the means whereby the human animal¶ can for the first time will a life-affirming meaning for its past and thereby¶ for its entire existence.¶ However, this invocation of eternal recurrence does nothing whatsoever¶ to eliminate the kind of self-deception pointed out by Nietzsche himself¶ in Gay Science 277. Saying to my past, ‘Thus I will it to be repeated’,¶ or, ‘Thus I will it to be repeated eternally’, does not add any¶ more meaning to my past than saying to it merely, ‘Thus I will it.’ Just as¶ my present willing can do nothing whatsoever to direct my past inevitably¶ towards my present state, so too my present willing can do nothing whatsoever¶ to ensure the repetition of my vanished past. Indeed, this is precisely¶ Nietzsche’s point about the irreversibility of time: ever since its¶ acquisition of a faculty of memory, the human animal has nostalgically¶ willed the return, and even eternal repetition, of its most treasured and¶ joyous past moments. The problem is not that the human animal has never¶ before willed this, and that it should start doing so now. The problem, rather,¶ is that the human animal has always willed this, and that this willing¶ has been of no avail whatsoever. Indeed, it is precisely this impotence, this¶ confrontation with the immovable stone ‘it was’, that has caused the human¶ animal to find its existence and suffering devoid of meaning, to take revenge on life, to formulate the ascetic ideal, and to live its life against¶ life.¶ When, therefore, Nietzsche describes eternal recurrence as the highest¶ formulation of life-affirmation that is at all attainable, his point is not that¶ the human animal should aim to will this eternal recurrence and thereby¶ achieve the highest life-affirmation possible.12 Instead, his point is that the human animal can never will this and that therefore the human animal can never achieve such life-affirmation. Indeed, no matter how strong and healthy¶ he deemed himself, perhaps the strongest and healthiest of all of his¶ contemporaries, Nietzsche found himself unable to will his life’s eternal¶ recurrence. Writing in his notebooks in 1883, Nietzsche exclaims: ‘I do not¶ want life again. How have I borne it? What has made me endure the sight?¶ the vision of the superhuman who affirms life. I have tried to affirm it¶ myself —alas!’ (Nachlaß November 1882–February 1883, KSA 10,¶ 4[81]).13¶ So, rather than conferring meaning upon the human animal’s past, the thought of eternal recurrence actually multiplies and intensifies the meaninglessness of this past to a new and devastating degree. This is why Nietzsche¶ writes in his 1887 notes that the thought of eternal recurrence builds¶ upon the nihilism that follows the demise of the ascetic ideal—that is, upon¶ the most paralysing thought of ‘continuing with an “in vain”, without aim¶ and purpose’. Eternal recurrence, he writes, is the most extreme form of¶ nihilism because it is the ‘thought of existence as it is, without meaning or¶ goal, but inevitably recurring, without any finale into nothingness’ (Nachla߶ Summer 1886–Autumn 1887, KSA 12, 5[71], my emphasis). It is not¶ just the thought of meaninglessness, but the thought of meaninglessness¶ eternally. Previously the human animal sought solace in the idea of death¶ and nothingness as an escape from the meaninglessness of its life and suffering.¶ But the thought of eternal recurrence closes off all such escape and¶ condemns the human animal to eternal meaninglessness. As Nietzsche¶ writes in his 1883 notes: ‘everything becomes and recurs eternally— escape¶ is impossible!” (Nachlaß Winter 1883–1884, KSA 10, 24[7]).14¶ Nor can it be replied to this that, because death no longer affords an escape¶ to life’s suffering, there is actually less point to suicide. For in the third essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche argues that the thought of death as escape¶ keeps humans from giving in to their pre-existing death-wish by imparting¶ meaning to life’s suffering and offering the hope of a different or¶ better life. Because eternal recurrence undermines both this meaning and¶ this hope, nothing remains to keep humans from giving in to their inherent¶ suicidal instincts.
5,829
<h4>Suicide as escape is a necessary transgression within the cycle of eternal recurrence. Accepting death through the option for<u><strong> suicide imparts meaning onto life’s suffering.</h4><p>Loeb 08</p><p></u></strong>Paul, Dr. of philosophy at University of Puget Sound, Ph.D from Cal Berkeley, “Suicide, Meaning, and Redemption,” Nietzsche on Time and History, Ed. Manuel Dries, p. 163-189 SJE</p><p>Although Zarathustra does not explicitly introduce his teaching of eternal¶ recurrence in his redemption speech, he obviously points in this direction¶ when he concludes by asking how the creative will might be taught to will¶ backwards so that it might will something higher than any reconciliation¶ with time. According to the consensus reading I have been concerned to¶ criticize, what Zarathustra means by this is that my affirmation of my present¶ state should teach me how to ‘will backwards’—that is, to will the¶ exact repetition of my entire past. And I would not be able to will in this¶ way unless I had successfully redescribed my past as directed inevitably¶ towards my present state. As Nehamas writes: ‘If I am even for a moment¶ such as I would want to be again, then I would accept all my past actions,¶ which, essential to and constitutive of the self I want to repeat, are now¶ newly redescribed’ (1985, p. 160, my emphasis). Or, as Julian Young¶ writes, the key is to ‘“write” my life so that I not merely like it, but like it¶ so much that I can will its recurrence for ever and ever, down to every last¶ detail’ (2003, p. 91), and to do this we must be able to see the kind of personal¶ providence in things that Nietzsche describes in Gay Science 277.¶ Hence <u><mark>eternal recurrence</mark>, which <mark>Nietzsche</u> <u>describes</u></mark> in Ecce Homo <u><mark>as ‘the</u>¶<u> highest</mark> formula of <mark>affirmation</mark> that is at all <mark>attainable’</mark> </u>(EH III Z 1), <u>turns</u>¶<u> out to be <mark>the</mark> <strong>new <mark>counter-ideal</strong> and</mark> the <strong><mark>means whereby the human</strong></mark> </u>animal¶<u> <strong><mark>can</strong></mark> for the first time <strong><mark>will a life-affirming meaning</strong> for its past</mark> and thereby</u>¶<u> for its entire existence</u>.¶ <u><mark>However, <strong></mark>this <mark>invocation of eternal recurrence does not</strong></mark>hing whatsoever</u>¶<u> to <strong><mark>eliminate the</u></strong></mark> kind of self-deception pointed out by Nietzsche himself¶ in Gay Science 277. Saying to my past, ‘Thus I will it to be repeated’,¶ or, ‘Thus I will it to be repeated eternally’, does not add any¶ more meaning to my past than saying to it merely, ‘Thus I will it.’ Just as¶ my present willing can do nothing whatsoever to direct my past inevitably¶ towards my present state, so too my present willing can do nothing whatsoever¶ to ensure the repetition of my vanished past. Indeed, this is precisely¶ Nietzsche’s point about the <u><strong><mark>irreversibility of time</u></strong></mark>: ever since its¶ acquisition of a faculty of memory<mark>, <u>the human</u></mark> animal <u><mark>has</mark> nostalgically</u>¶<u> <mark>willed the</mark> return, and even <mark>eternal repetition, of its most</mark> treasured and</u>¶<u> <mark>joyous past moments</u></mark>. The problem is not that the human animal has never¶ before willed this, and that it should start doing so now. The problem, rather,¶ is that the human animal has always willed this, and that this willing¶ has been of no avail whatsoever. Indeed, it is precisely this impotence, this¶ confrontation with the immovable stone ‘it was’, that has caused the human¶ animal to find its existence and suffering devoid of meaning, to take revenge on life, to formulate the ascetic ideal, and to live its life against¶ life.¶ <u><mark>When</u></mark>, therefore, <u><mark>Nietzsche describes eternal recurrence as the highest</u>¶<u> formulation of life-affirmation</mark> that is at all attainable, <mark>his point is not that</u>¶<u> the human</mark> animal <mark>should aim to will this eternal recurrence</mark> and thereby</u>¶<u> achieve the highest life-affirmation possible</u>.12 Instead, <u><mark>his point i</mark>s that <strong><mark>the human</mark> </u></strong>animal<u><strong> <mark>can never will this and that therefore the human </u></strong></mark>animal<u><strong><mark> can never achieve such life-affirmation.</u></strong></mark> Indeed, no matter how strong and healthy¶ he deemed himself, perhaps the strongest and healthiest of all of his¶ contemporaries, <u>Nietzsche found himself unable to will his life’s eternal</u>¶<u> recurrence.</u> Writing in his notebooks in 1883, Nietzsche exclaims: ‘I do not¶ want life again. How have I borne it? What has made me endure the sight?¶ the vision of the superhuman who affirms life. I have tried to affirm it¶ myself —alas!’ (Nachlaß November 1882–February 1883, KSA 10,¶ 4[81]).13¶ So, <u>rather than conferring meaning upon the human animal’s past, <strong><mark>the thought of eternal recurrence</mark> actually <mark>multiplies and intensifies the meaninglessness of this past</strong></mark> to a new and devastating degree.</u> This is why Nietzsche¶ writes in his 1887 notes that the thought of eternal recurrence builds¶ upon the nihilism that follows the demise of the ascetic ideal—that is, upon¶ the most paralysing thought of ‘continuing with an “in vain”, without aim¶ and purpose’. <u>Eternal recurrence, he writes, is the most extreme form of</u>¶<u> nihilism because it is the ‘thought of existence as it is, without meaning or</u>¶<u> goal, but inevitably recurring, without any finale into nothingness’</u> (Nachla߶ Summer 1886–Autumn 1887, KSA 12, 5[71], my emphasis). It is not¶ just the thought of meaninglessness, but the thought of meaninglessness¶ eternally. Previously the human animal sought solace in the idea of death¶ and nothingness as an escape from the meaninglessness of its life and suffering.¶ But the thought of eternal recurrence closes off all such escape and¶ condemns the human animal to eternal meaninglessness. As Nietzsche¶ writes in his 1883 notes: ‘<u><mark>everything becomes and recurs eternally— escape</u>¶<u> is impossible</u></mark>!” (Nachlaß Winter 1883–1884, KSA 10, 24[7]).14¶ Nor can it be replied to this that, because death no longer affords an escape¶ to life’s suffering, there is actually less point to suicide. For in the third essay of the Genealogy Nietzsche argues that <u><strong><mark>the thought of death as escape</u></strong>¶<u><strong> keeps humans from giving in to their pre-existing death-wish by imparting</u></strong>¶<u><strong> meaning to life’s suffering and offering the hope of a different or</u></strong>¶<u><strong> better life.</u></strong></mark> Because eternal recurrence undermines both this meaning and¶ this hope, nothing remains to keep humans from giving in to their inherent¶ suicidal instincts.</p>
null
null
EZ 1AC 4.0
430,014
3
17,007
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-USC-Round1.docx
564,697
A
USC
1
OU CY
R Cheek
null
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-USC-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,309
Third – The perm “solving” impacts is the problem- reform only allows capitalism to promote the belief that it can fix itself.
Luxemburg 99
Luxemburg 99 Rosa, Polish-Jewish-German Marxist theorist, socialist philosopher, and revolutionary. “Reform or Revolution.” Chapter VI. Conquest of Political Power..
Legislative reform and revolution are not different methods of historic developmen Legislative reform and revolution are different factors in the development of class society. are at the same time reciprocally exclusive, as are the north and south poles, the bourgeoisie and proletariat Every legal constitution is the product of a revolution work for reforms is carried on only in the framework of the social form created by the last revolution. It is contrary to history to represent work for reforms as a long-drawn out revolution and revolution as a condensed series of reforms. A social transformation and a legislative reform do not differ according to their duration but according to their content. That is why people who pronounce themselves in favour of the method of legislative reform in place and in contradistinction to the conquest of political power and social revolution, do not really choose a more tranquil, calmer and slower road to the same goal, but a different goal. Instead of taking a stand for the establishment of a new society they take a stand for surface modifications of the old society.
Legislative reform and revolution are reciprocally exclusive as are the north and south poles, the bourgeoisie and proletariat legal constitution is the product of revolution work for reforms is carried on only in the framework of the social form created by the last revolution It is contrary to history to represent work for reforms as a long-drawn out revolution and revolution as a condensed series of reforms transformation and reform do not differ according to duration but content people who pronounce themselves in favour of legislative reform in place do not choose a more tranquil road to the same goal, but a different goal Instead of taking a stand for the establishment of a new society they take a stand for surface modifications of the old society
Legislative reform and revolution are not different methods of historic development that can be picked out at the pleasure from the counter of history, just as one chooses hot or cold sausages. Legislative reform and revolution are different factors in the development of class society. They condition and complement each other, and are at the same time reciprocally exclusive, as are the north and south poles, the bourgeoisie and proletariat. Every legal constitution is the product of a revolution. In the history of classes, revolution is the act of political creation, while legislation is the political expression of the life of a society that has already come into being. Work for reform does not contain its own force independent from revolution. During every historic period, work for reforms is carried on only in the direction given to it by the impetus of the last revolution and continues as long as the impulsion from the last revolution continues to make itself felt. Or, to put it more concretely, in each historic period work for reforms is carried on only in the framework of the social form created by the last revolution. Here is the kernel of the problem. It is contrary to history to represent work for reforms as a long-drawn out revolution and revolution as a condensed series of reforms. A social transformation and a legislative reform do not differ according to their duration but according to their content. The secret of historic change through the utilisation of political power resides precisely in the transformation of simple quantitative modification into a new quality, or to speak more concretely, in the passage of an historic period from one given form of society to another. That is why people who pronounce themselves in favour of the method of legislative reform in place and in contradistinction to the conquest of political power and social revolution, do not really choose a more tranquil, calmer and slower road to the same goal, but a different goal. Instead of taking a stand for the establishment of a new society they take a stand for surface modifications of the old society. If we follow the political conceptions of revisionism, we arrive at the same conclusion that is reached when we follow the economic theories of revisionism. Our program becomes not the realisation of socialism, but the reform of capitalism; not the suppression of the wage labour system but the diminution of exploitation, that is, the suppression of the abuses of capitalism instead of suppression of capitalism itself.
2,546
<h4>Third – The perm “solving” impacts is the problem- reform only allows capitalism to promote the belief that it can fix itself.</h4><p><strong><mark>Luxemburg 99</strong></mark> Rosa, Polish-Jewish-German Marxist theorist, socialist philosopher, and revolutionary. “Reform or Revolution.” Chapter VI. Conquest of Political Power<u>..</p><p>Legislative reform and revolution are not different methods of historic developmen</u>t that can be picked out at the pleasure from the counter of history, just as one chooses hot or cold sausages. <u><strong><mark>Legislative reform and revolution</strong></mark> are different <strong>factors</strong> in the development of class society. </u>They condition and complement each other, and<u> <strong><mark>are</strong></mark> at the same time <strong><mark>reciprocally exclusive</strong></mark>,</u> <u><strong><mark>as are the north and south poles, the bourgeoisie and proletariat</u></strong></mark>. <u>Every <mark>legal constitution is the product of</mark> a <mark>revolution</u></mark>. In the history of classes, revolution is the act of political creation, while legislation is the political expression of the life of a society that has already come into being. Work for reform does not contain its own force independent from revolution. During every historic period, work for reforms is carried on only in the direction given to it by the impetus of the last revolution and continues as long as the impulsion from the last revolution continues to make itself felt. Or, to put it more concretely, in each historic period <u><mark>work for reforms is carried on only in the framework of the social form created by the last revolution</mark>.</u> Here is the kernel of the problem. <u><strong><mark>It is contrary to history to represent work for reforms as a long-drawn out revolution and revolution as a condensed series of reforms</mark>. </strong>A social <mark>transformation and</mark> a legislative <mark>reform do not differ according to</mark> their <mark>duration but</mark> according to their <mark>content</mark>. </u>The secret of historic change through the utilisation of political power resides precisely in the transformation of simple quantitative modification into a new quality, or to speak more concretely, in the passage of an historic period from one given form of society to another.<u> That is why <mark>people who pronounce themselves in favour of</mark> the method of <mark>legislative reform</mark> <strong><mark>in place</mark> and in contradistinction to</strong> the conquest of political power and social revolution, <mark>do not</mark> really <mark>choose a more tranquil</mark>, calmer and slower <mark>road to the <strong>same</strong> goal, but a <strong>different</strong> goal</mark>. <strong><mark>Instead of taking a stand for the establishment of a new society they take a stand for surface modifications of the old society</strong></mark>. </u>If we follow the political conceptions of revisionism, we arrive at the same conclusion that is reached when we follow the economic theories of revisionism. Our program becomes not the realisation of socialism, but the reform of capitalism; not the suppression of the wage labour system but the diminution of exploitation, that is, the suppression of the abuses of capitalism instead of suppression of capitalism itself.</p>
1NR
Neolib
Perm
102,593
7
17,003
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
564,710
N
UNLV
1
Whitman DL
Justin Kirk
1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,310
This takes out the whole aff by continuing an endless process of exchange which destroys the possibility of politics
Baudrillard 92
Jean Baudrillard 1992 (Jean, Pataphysics of Year 2000)
Every atom dissolves in space. This is what we are living occupied with the acceleration of all bodies, all messages, all processes each event, each narrative, each image gets endowed with the simulation of an infinite trajectory Every political fact is invested with a kinetic energy which spreads over its own space and thrusts these facts into a hyperspace where they lose all meaning by way of an inability to attain their meaning. the narrative has become impossible it is the potential re-narrativization No meaning stands a chance once offered the means of its own acceleration. history slows down as it brushes up against the astral body of the "silent majorities". Our societies are governed by a "critical mass going beyond a point of no-return. This inert matter of the social is not due to a lack of exchanges, of information or of communication; it is the result of the multiplication and saturation of exchanges the hyperdensity of messages Successive events attain their annihilation in indifference. Neutralized and bullet-sprayed by information, the masses neutralise history retrospect and act as a screen of absorption. no meaning, no conscience, no desire. All social, historical and temporal transcendence is absorbed via this mass's silent immanence. We are obsessed with high fidelity the console of our channels subjected to factual sophistication, history ceases to exist interference of an event with its diffusion short-circuit cause and effect, as of a certain point", nothing is true anymore.
occupied with the acceleration of all bodies, all messages, all processes each event, each narrative, each image gets endowed with the simulation of an infinite trajectory Every political fact is invested with a kinetic energy which spreads over its own space and thrusts these facts into a hyperspace where they lose all meaning by way of an inability to attain their meaning. the narrative has become impossible it is the potential re-narrativization No meaning stands a chance once offered the means of its own acceleration. Our societies are governed by a "critical mass going beyond a point of no-return. This inert matter of the social is not due to a lack of exchanges, information or communication; it is the result of the multiplication and saturation of exchanges the hyperdensity of messages events attain their annihilation in indifference. Neutralized and bullet-sprayed by information, the masses neutralise history retrospect and act as a screen of absorption. no meaning, no conscience, no desire. All social, historical and temporal transcendence is absorbed via this mass's silent immanence. subjected to factual sophistication, history ceases to exist interference of an event with its diffusion short-circuit cause and effect, as of a certain point", nothing is true anymore.
Outside of this gravitational pull which keeps bodies in orbit, all the atoms of meaning lose themselves or self-absolve in space. Every single atom follows its own trajectory towards infinity and dissolves in space. This is precisely what we are living in our present societies occupied with the acceleration of all bodies, all messages, all processes in all possible senses and wherein, via modern media, each event, each narrative, each image gets endowed with the simulation of an infinite trajectory. Every political, historical, cultural fact is invested with a kinetic energy which spreads over its own space and thrusts these facts into a hyperspace where they lose all meaning by way of an inability to attain their meaning. It is useless to turn to science-fiction: from this point on, from the here and now, through our computer science, our circuits and our channels, this particle accelerator has definitively disrupted and broken the referential orbit of things. With respect to history, the narrative has become impossible since by definition it is the potential re-narrativization of a sequence of meaning. Through the impulse of total diffusion and circulation each event is liberated for itself only — each event becomes atomized and nuclear as it follows its trajectory into the void. In order to diffuse itself ad infinitum, it has to be fragmented like a particle. This is the way it attains a speed of no-return, distancing it from history once and for all. Every cultural, eventual group needs to be fragmented, disarticulated to allow for its entry into the circuits, each language must be absolved into a binary mechanism or device to allow for its circulation to take place — not in our memory, but in the electronic and luminous memory of the computers. There is no human language or speech (langage) that could compete with the speed of light. There is no event that could withstand its own diffusion across the planet. No meaning stands a chance once offered the means of its own acceleration. There is no history that will resist the centrifugal pull of facts or its short-circuiting in real time (in the same order of ideas: no sexuality will resist its own liberation, not a single culture will foreclose its own advancement, no truth will defy its own verification, etc.). Even theory is no longer in the state of "reflecting" on anything anymore. All it can do is to snatch concepts from their critical zone of reference and transpose them to the point of no return, in the process of which theory itself too, passes into the hyperspace of simulation as it loses all "objective" validity, while it makes significant gains by acquiring real affinity with the current system. The second hypothesis, with respect to the vanishing of history, is the opposite of the first, i.e., it pertains not to the acceleration but to the slowing down of processes. This too is derived directly from physics. Matter slows the passage of time. More precisely, time seems to pass very slowly upon the surface of a very dense body of matter. The phenomenon increases in proportion to growth in density. The effect of this slowing down (ralentissement) will raise the wavelength of light emitted by this body in a way that will allow the observer to record this phenomenon. Beyond a certain limit, time stops, the length of the wave becomes infinite. The wave no longer exists. Light extinguishes itself. The analogy is apparent in the way history slows down as it brushes up against the astral body of the "silent majorities". Our societies are governed by this process of the mass, and not only in the sociological or demographical sense of the word, but also in the sense of a "critical mass", of going beyond a certain point of no-return. That is where the crucially significant event of these societies is to be found: the advent of their revolutionary process along the lines of their mobility, (they are all revolutionary with respect to the centuries gone by), of their equivalent force of inertia, of an immense indifference, and of the silent power of this indifference. This inert matter of the social is not due to a lack of exchanges, of information or of communication; on the contrary, it is the result of the multiplication and saturation of exchanges. It is borne of the hyperdensity of cities, of merchandise, messages and circuits. It is the cold star of the social, a mass at the peripheries of which history cools out. Successive events attain their annihilation in indifference. Neutralized and bullet-sprayed by information, the masses neutralise history retrospect and act as a screen of absorption. They themselves have no history, no meaning, no conscience, no desire. They are potential residues of all history, of all meaning, of all desire. By inserting themselves into modernity, all these wonderful things managed to invoke a mysterious counterpart, the misappreciation of which has unleashed all current political and social strategies. This time, it's the opposite: history, meaning, progress are no longer able to find their speed or tempo of liberation. They can no longer pull themselves out of this much too dense body which slows down their trajectory, slows down their time to the point from whereon perception and imagination of the future escapes us. All social, historical and temporal transcendence is absorbed via this mass's silent immanence. Already, political events no longer conduct sufficient autonomous energy to rouse us and can only run their course as a silent movie in front of which we all sit collectively irresponsible. That is where history reaches its end, not because of the lack of actors or participants, not due to a lack of violence (with respect to violence, there is always an increasing amount), not due to a lack of events (as for events, there will always be more of them thanks to the role of the media and information!) — but because of a slowing down or deceleration, because of indifference and stupefaction. History can no longer go beyond itself, it can no longer envisage its own finality or dream of its own end, it shrouds or buries itself in its immediate effect, it self-exhausts in special effects, it implodes in current events. Essentially, one can no longer speak of the end of history since it has no time to rejoin its own end. As its effects accelerate, its meaning inexorably decelerates. It will end up stopping and extinguishing itself like light and time at the peripheries of an infinitely dense mass... Humanity too, had its big-bang: a certain critical density, a certain concentration of people and exchanges that compel this explosion we call history and which is none other than the dispersal of dense and hieratic cores of earlier civilizations. Today, we are living an effect of reversal: we have overstepped the threshold of critical mass with respect to populations, events, information, control of the inverse process of inertia of history and politics. At the cosmic level of things, we don't know anymore whether we have reached this speed of liberation wherein we would be partaking of a permanent or final expansion (this, no doubt, will remain forever uncertain). At the human level, where prospects are more limited, it is possible that the energy itself employed for the liberation of the species (acceleration of birthrates, of techniques and exchanges in the course of the centuries) have contributed to an excess of mass and resistance that bear on the initial energy as it drags us along a ruthless movement of contraction and inertia. Whether the universe infinitely expands or retracts to an infinitely dense and infinitely small core will hinge upon its critical mass (with respect to which speculation itself is infinite in view of the discovery of newer particles). Following the analogy, whether our human history will be evolutionary or involuted will presumably depend upon the critical mass of humanity. Are we to see ourselves, like the galaxies, on a definitive orbit that distances us from each other under the impact of a tremendous speed, or is this dispersal to infinity itself destined to reach an end, and the human molecules bound to draw closer to each other by way of an inverse effect of gravitation? The question is whether a human mass that grows day by day is able to control a pulsation of this genre? Third hypothesis, third analogy. But we are still dealing with a point of disappearance, a point of evanescence, a vanishing-point, this time however along the lines of music. This is what I call the stereophonic effect. We are all obsessed with high fidelity, with the quality of musical "transmission" (rendu). On the console of our channels, equipped with our tuners, our amplifiers and our baffles, we mix, regulate and multiply soundtracks in search of an infallible or unerring music. Is this, though, still music? Where is the threshold of high fidelity beyond the point of which music as such would disappear? Disappearance would not be due to the lack of music, it would disappear for having stepped beyond this boundary, it would disappear into the perfection of its materiality, into its own special effect. Beyond this point, neither judgement nor aesthetic pleasure could be found anymore. Ecstasy of musicality procures its own end. The disappearance of history is of the same order: there too, we have gone beyond this limit or boundary where, subjected to factual and informational sophistication, history as such ceases to exist. Large doses of immediate diffusion, of special effects, of secondary effects, of fading — and this famous Larsen effect produced in acoustics by an excessive proximity between source and receiver, in history via an excessive proximity, and therefore the disastrous interference of an event with its diffusion — create a short-circuit between cause and effect, similarly to what takes place between the object and the experimenting subject in microphysics (and in the human sciences!). All things entailing a certain radical uncertainty of the event, like excessive high fidelity, lead to a radical uncertainty with respect to music. Elias Canetti says it well: "as of a certain point", nothing is true anymore. This is also why the soft music of history escapes us, it disappears under the microscope or into the stereophony of information.
10,341
<h4>This takes out the whole aff by continuing an endless process of exchange which destroys the possibility of politics</h4><p>Jean <u><strong>Baudrillard</u> </strong>19<u><strong>92</u></strong> (Jean, Pataphysics of Year 2000)</p><p>Outside of this gravitational pull which keeps bodies in orbit, all the atoms of meaning lose themselves or self-absolve in space. <u><strong>Every</u></strong> single <u><strong>atom</u></strong> follows its own trajectory towards infinity and <u><strong>dissolves in space.</u></strong> <u><strong>This is</u></strong> precisely <u><strong>what we are living</u></strong> in our present societies <u><strong><mark>occupied with the acceleration of all bodies, all messages, all processes</mark> </u></strong>in all possible senses and wherein, via modern media, <u><strong><mark>each event, each narrative, each image gets endowed with the simulation of an infinite trajectory</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Every political</u></strong></mark>, historical, cultural <u><strong><mark>fact is invested with a kinetic energy which spreads over its own space and thrusts these facts into a hyperspace where they lose all meaning by way of an inability to attain their meaning.</u></strong></mark> It is useless to turn to science-fiction: from this point on, from the here and now, through our computer science, our circuits and our channels, this particle accelerator has definitively disrupted and broken the referential orbit of things. With respect to history, <u><strong><mark>the narrative has become impossible</u></strong></mark> since by definition <u><strong><mark>it is the potential re-narrativization</mark> </u></strong>of a sequence of meaning. Through the impulse of total diffusion and circulation each event is liberated for itself only — each event becomes atomized and nuclear as it follows its trajectory into the void. In order to diffuse itself ad infinitum, it has to be fragmented like a particle. This is the way it attains a speed of no-return, distancing it from history once and for all. Every cultural, eventual group needs to be fragmented, disarticulated to allow for its entry into the circuits, each language must be absolved into a binary mechanism or device to allow for its circulation to take place — not in our memory, but in the electronic and luminous memory of the computers. There is no human language or speech (langage) that could compete with the speed of light. There is no event that could withstand its own diffusion across the planet. <u><strong><mark>No meaning stands a chance once offered the means of its own acceleration.</u></strong></mark> There is no history that will resist the centrifugal pull of facts or its short-circuiting in real time (in the same order of ideas: no sexuality will resist its own liberation, not a single culture will foreclose its own advancement, no truth will defy its own verification, etc.). Even theory is no longer in the state of "reflecting" on anything anymore. All it can do is to snatch concepts from their critical zone of reference and transpose them to the point of no return, in the process of which theory itself too, passes into the hyperspace of simulation as it loses all "objective" validity, while it makes significant gains by acquiring real affinity with the current system. The second hypothesis, with respect to the vanishing of history, is the opposite of the first, i.e., it pertains not to the acceleration but to the slowing down of processes. This too is derived directly from physics. Matter slows the passage of time. More precisely, time seems to pass very slowly upon the surface of a very dense body of matter. The phenomenon increases in proportion to growth in density. The effect of this slowing down (ralentissement) will raise the wavelength of light emitted by this body in a way that will allow the observer to record this phenomenon. Beyond a certain limit, time stops, the length of the wave becomes infinite. The wave no longer exists. Light extinguishes itself. The analogy is apparent in the way <u><strong>history slows down as it brushes up against the astral body of the "silent majorities". <mark>Our societies are governed by</u></strong></mark> this process of the mass, and not only in the sociological or demographical sense of the word, but also in the sense of <u><strong><mark>a "critical mass</u></strong></mark>", of <u><strong><mark>going beyond a</mark> </u></strong>certain <u><strong><mark>point of no-return.</mark> </u></strong>That is where the crucially significant event of these societies is to be found: the advent of their revolutionary process along the lines of their mobility, (they are all revolutionary with respect to the centuries gone by), of their equivalent force of inertia, of an immense indifference, and of the silent power of this indifference. <u><strong><mark>This inert matter of the social is not due to a lack of exchanges, </mark>of <mark>information or </mark>of <mark>communication;</u></strong></mark> on the contrary, <u><strong><mark>it is the result of the multiplication and saturation of exchanges</u></strong></mark>. It is borne of <u><strong><mark>the hyperdensity</u></strong></mark> of cities, <u><strong><mark>of</u></strong></mark> merchandise, <u><strong><mark>messages</u></strong></mark> and circuits. It is the cold star of the social, a mass at the peripheries of which history cools out. <u><strong>Successive <mark>events attain their annihilation in indifference.</mark> <mark>Neutralized and bullet-sprayed by information, the masses neutralise history retrospect and act as a screen of absorption.</mark> </u></strong>They themselves have no history, <u><strong><mark>no meaning, no conscience, no desire.</u></strong></mark> They are potential residues of all history, of all meaning, of all desire. By inserting themselves into modernity, all these wonderful things managed to invoke a mysterious counterpart, the misappreciation of which has unleashed all current political and social strategies. This time, it's the opposite: history, meaning, progress are no longer able to find their speed or tempo of liberation. They can no longer pull themselves out of this much too dense body which slows down their trajectory, slows down their time to the point from whereon perception and imagination of the future escapes us. <u><strong><mark>All social, historical and temporal transcendence is absorbed via this mass's silent immanence.</u></strong></mark> Already, political events no longer conduct sufficient autonomous energy to rouse us and can only run their course as a silent movie in front of which we all sit collectively irresponsible. That is where history reaches its end, not because of the lack of actors or participants, not due to a lack of violence (with respect to violence, there is always an increasing amount), not due to a lack of events (as for events, there will always be more of them thanks to the role of the media and information!) — but because of a slowing down or deceleration, because of indifference and stupefaction. History can no longer go beyond itself, it can no longer envisage its own finality or dream of its own end, it shrouds or buries itself in its immediate effect, it self-exhausts in special effects, it implodes in current events. Essentially, one can no longer speak of the end of history since it has no time to rejoin its own end. As its effects accelerate, its meaning inexorably decelerates. It will end up stopping and extinguishing itself like light and time at the peripheries of an infinitely dense mass... Humanity too, had its big-bang: a certain critical density, a certain concentration of people and exchanges that compel this explosion we call history and which is none other than the dispersal of dense and hieratic cores of earlier civilizations. Today, we are living an effect of reversal: we have overstepped the threshold of critical mass with respect to populations, events, information, control of the inverse process of inertia of history and politics. At the cosmic level of things, we don't know anymore whether we have reached this speed of liberation wherein we would be partaking of a permanent or final expansion (this, no doubt, will remain forever uncertain). At the human level, where prospects are more limited, it is possible that the energy itself employed for the liberation of the species (acceleration of birthrates, of techniques and exchanges in the course of the centuries) have contributed to an excess of mass and resistance that bear on the initial energy as it drags us along a ruthless movement of contraction and inertia. Whether the universe infinitely expands or retracts to an infinitely dense and infinitely small core will hinge upon its critical mass (with respect to which speculation itself is infinite in view of the discovery of newer particles). Following the analogy, whether our human history will be evolutionary or involuted will presumably depend upon the critical mass of humanity. Are we to see ourselves, like the galaxies, on a definitive orbit that distances us from each other under the impact of a tremendous speed, or is this dispersal to infinity itself destined to reach an end, and the human molecules bound to draw closer to each other by way of an inverse effect of gravitation? The question is whether a human mass that grows day by day is able to control a pulsation of this genre? Third hypothesis, third analogy. But we are still dealing with a point of disappearance, a point of evanescence, a vanishing-point, this time however along the lines of music. This is what I call the stereophonic effect. <u><strong>We are</u></strong> all <u><strong>obsessed with high fidelity</u></strong>, with the quality of musical "transmission" (rendu). On <u><strong>the console of our channels</u></strong>, equipped with our tuners, our amplifiers and our baffles, we mix, regulate and multiply soundtracks in search of an infallible or unerring music. Is this, though, still music? Where is the threshold of high fidelity beyond the point of which music as such would disappear? Disappearance would not be due to the lack of music, it would disappear for having stepped beyond this boundary, it would disappear into the perfection of its materiality, into its own special effect. Beyond this point, neither judgement nor aesthetic pleasure could be found anymore. Ecstasy of musicality procures its own end. The disappearance of history is of the same order: there too, we have gone beyond this limit or boundary where, <u><strong><mark>subjected to factual </u></strong></mark>and informational <u><strong><mark>sophistication, history</u></strong></mark> as such <u><strong><mark>ceases to exist</u></strong></mark>. Large doses of immediate diffusion, of special effects, of secondary effects, of fading — and this famous Larsen effect produced in acoustics by an excessive proximity between source and receiver, in history via an excessive proximity, and therefore the disastrous <u><strong><mark>interference of an event with its diffusion</u></strong></mark> — create a <u><strong><mark>short-circuit</u></strong></mark> between <u><strong><mark>cause and effect,</mark> </u></strong>similarly to what takes place between the object and the experimenting subject in microphysics (and in the human sciences!). All things entailing a certain radical uncertainty of the event, like excessive high fidelity, lead to a radical uncertainty with respect to music. Elias Canetti says it well: "<u><strong><mark>as of a certain point", nothing is true anymore.</u></strong></mark> This is also why the soft music of history escapes us, it disappears under the microscope or into the stereophony of information. </p>
2NC
Undercommons
OV
151,731
29
17,008
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,714
N
UNLV
Quarters
Iowa KL
Shooter, Jason Russel, Michael Eisenstadt
1ac was black mothering 1nc was damage centrism k faciality k and case 2nc was damage and case 1nr was faciality 2nr was faciality
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,311
Political subjects under the state are ahistorical fabrications of being – our praxis of counter-memory exposes the illusion of subjectivity and, through a process of cutting, opens up space for radical becoming. Michael Clifford explains
ondon, Great Britain. pp. 134-7
Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy with the Institute for the Humanities and the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Mississippi State University, 2001, “Political Genealogy After Foucault”. Routledge, London, Great Britain. pp. 134-7
counter-memory is very close to the Nietzschean idea of “active forgetfulness” Counter-memory consists of essentially forgetting who we are. It is a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of the moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity. Counter-memory holds us at a remove, a distance, from ourselves; not in the traditional sense of self reflection, but of wrenching the self—this identity—apart, through an incision, a cutting that makes the self stand naked and strange before us across an unbridgeable divide, a gap of difference. The self, as a coherent identity, becomes foreign through counter-memory. We cannot remember what it was that compelled us to act, believe, be a given way. Counter-memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination, this subjection. The power of identity is suspended through a forgetfulness of its necessity—a freedom is opened within the space of a difference that no identity can constrain. Counter-memory bears directly on processes of subjectivation “Counter-discourses” anticipate a subjectival freedom of open possibilities by opposing themselves to the discourses of truth through which we recognize ourselves as subjects. These counter-discourses, the discourses of genealogy, lift the burdensome obligations imposed on us by such a recognition. counter-memory always takes the form of a transgression. Yet there is freedom in this refusal, Counter-memory counters, or suspends, the power of identity through genealogical accounts of its constitution. Genealogy effects “the systematic dissociation of identity” by revealing its radical contingency, its historicality and utter lack of essentiality. The purpose of genealogy is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation.” Genealogical critique is an exposition of our history as subjects that has the effect of disposing subjectival constraints by exposing the contingency of their imposition Wherever “the self fabricates a coherent identity,” genealogy puts into play a subversive counter-analysis that “permits the dissociation of the self Genealogy disturbs, fragments, displaces the unity of subjectivity. It cuts through the oppressive, assimilating density of Truth and discovers in this beguiling haze that subjectivity is nothing more than a colorful mask. Behind it there is no essential identity, no unified spirit or will, no naked subject stripped of its colorful dress. there is only a matrix of intersecting lines and heterogenous congruities, an arbitrary and historically contingent complex of discursive and nondiscursive practices. Unity is a mask for an interplay of anonymous forces and historical accidents that permits us to identify subjects identity—is imposed on subjects as the mask of their fabrication. Subjectivity is the carceral and incarcerating expression of this imposition, of the limitations drawn around us by discourses of truth and practices of individualization; but seen through the “differential knowledge” of genealogy, the identity of subjectivity collapses Counter-memory through genealogical critique is a transgression of limits. As such, it opens onto a possibility of freedom. genealogy gives “new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.” It is not a freedom against the office of government, but against governmentality—against a rationality that imprisons us in the cellular space of our own self-government. the freedom of/through counter-memory is a form of mimetic play with the notion of positive freedom whereby citizenship is unwrapped like a cloak from the politicized body. by exposing the nonessentiality of the limits imposed on us through the constitution of a self, it opens the possibility of going beyond those limits. a kind of fracture, at once an open space and a breaking free of the constraining power inherent in identity and identification. Freedom, concrete freedom, is a space of possible transformation. Even the most violent forms of resistance against subjection accomplish nothing if they do not gain this freedom, do not open a space of possible transformation—which means nothing more, and nothing less, than the possibility of being otherwise what is being required here is not a freedom to transform ourselves in accordance with some global or teleological model of a more “genuine” form of subjectivity. Rather, the freedom opened by counter-memory is a freedom of permanent transformation, of always being able to become other than what we are.
Counter-memory consists of forgetting who we are a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity Counter-memory holds us at a distance, from ourselves wrenching the self apart, through an incision, a cutting that makes the self stand naked and strange The self becomes foreign We cannot remember what it was that compelled us to act, believe, be a given way. Counter-memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination, this subjection identity is suspended through forgetfulness of its necessity Counter-discourses” anticipate a subjectival freedom by opposing discourses of truth the discourses of genealogy, lift obligations imposed on us by such a recognition counter-memory takes the form of a transgression there is freedom in refusal Counter-memory suspends identity through genealogical accounts of its constitution The purpose of genealogy is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit to its dissipation Genealogical critique is an exposition of our history as subjects disposing subjectival constraints by exposing contingency Genealogy cuts through the oppressive density of Truth and discovers that subjectivity is nothing more than a colorful mask there is no essential identity, no unified spirit or will, no naked subject stripped of its colorful dress only a matrix of intersecting lines and heterogenous congruities Subjectivity is the carceral and incarcerating expression of this imposition but seen through the “differential knowledge” of genealogy, the identity of subjectivity collapses It is not a freedom against the government, but against governmentality a rationality that imprisons us in the cellular space of our own self-government a form of mimetic play with the notion of positive freedom whereby citizenship is unwrapped from the politicized body Even the most violent forms of resistance accomplish nothing if they do not open a space of possible transformation a freedom of permanent transformation, of always being able to become other than what we are
Foucault’s counter-memory is very close to the Nietzschean idea of “active forgetfulness” (aktive Vergesslichkeit).21 Counter-memory consists of essentially forgetting who we are. It is a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of the moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity. There is freedom in forgetfulness. Counter-memory holds us at a remove, a distance, from ourselves; not in the traditional sense of self reflection, but of wrenching the self—this identity—apart, through an incision, a cutting that makes the self stand naked and strange before us across an unbridgeable divide, a gap of difference. Counter-memory dislodges the propriety of our-selves. The self, as a coherent identity, becomes foreign through counter-memory. We cannot remember what it was that compelled us to act, believe, be a given way. Counter-memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination, this subjection. The power of identity is suspended through a forgetfulness of its necessity—a freedom is opened within the space of a difference that no identity can constrain. This difference always plays outside the limits, outside any delimitation of being. Counter-memory thrusts us into this uncharted world, where a memory makes no sense, where play is the order of the day, where lightening and chance disintegrate the heavy and solid, the identical. Counter-memory bears directly on processes of subjectivation, on the techniques of the self through which we constitute for ourselves an identity. “Counter-discourses” anticipate a subjectival freedom of open possibilities by opposing themselves to the discourses of truth through which we recognize ourselves as subjects.22 These counter-discourses, the discourses of genealogy, lift the burdensome obligations imposed on us by such a recognition. As a forgetfulness of these obligations, counter-memory always takes the form of a transgression. It invites condemnation even as it refuses to be held accountable. Yet there is freedom in this refusal, in this transgression—for those who have the stomach for it.23 There is always an essential risk involved in refusing, in forgetting, one’s identity.24 Counter-memory is not a form of consciousness. It is nothing, really, except the effect of a certain kind of description of ourselves, a description of the historical ontology of ourselves as subjects. This description has been closed off and denied by power/knowledge relations, excluded and made peripheral by certain dominant discourses and entrenched scientific-philosophical enterprises that bind us to a conception of what we are in truth. Counter-memory counters, or suspends, the power of identity through genealogical accounts of its constitution. Genealogy effects “the systematic dissociation of identity” by revealing its radical contingency, its historicality and utter lack of essentiality. The purpose of genealogy, says Foucault, “is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation.”25 Genealogical critique is an exposition of our history as subjects that has the effect of disposing subjectival constraints by exposing the contingency of their imposition. Genealogy turns the firm posture of the self-identical subject into the mere posing of a pretentious display. Genealogy proceeds through “dissension” and “disparity.” Wherever “the self fabricates a coherent identity,” genealogy puts into play a subversive counter-analysis that “permits the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis.”26 Genealogy disturbs, fragments, displaces the unity of subjectivity. It cuts through the oppressive, assimilating density of Truth and discovers in this beguiling haze that subjectivity is nothing more than a colorful mask. Who we are, what we are, is a mask displayed for public viewing and examination, for person-al subjection and ethical subjugation. Genealogy cuts through this mask, only to make another discovery. Behind it there is no essential identity, no unified spirit or will, no naked subject stripped of its colorful dress. Rather, there is only a matrix of intersecting lines and heterogenous congruities, an arbitrary and historically contingent complex of discursive and nondiscursive practices. Asserts Foucault, “If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is ‘something altogether different’ behind things; not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”27 Contrary to what René Descartes or John Locke would contend, unity (whether of consciousness proper or the continuity of personal experience) is not the essence of subjectivity. Unity is a mask for an interplay of anonymous forces and historical accidents that permits us to identify subjects, to identify ourselves, as specific human beings. Unity—identity—is imposed on subjects as the mask of their fabrication. Subjectivity is the carceral and incarcerating expression of this imposition, of the limitations drawn around us by discourses of truth and practices of individualization; but seen through the “differential knowledge” of genealogy, the identity of subjectivity collapses. Counter-memory through genealogical critique is a transgression of limits. As such, it opens onto a possibility of freedom. Genealogy permits us “to separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, thinking what we are, do, or think.” In this sense, genealogy gives “new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.”28 The freedom offered by counter-memory is a kind of parodic reversal of negative freedom: it is not a freedom from interference, but for it—for disruption, for displacement, for violating those inviolable spheres of liberty that serve as the limits of our subjection. It is not a freedom for individuality, but from it—a freedom from individualization, from the practices and discourses which bind us to our own identity as individuals. It is not a freedom against the office of government, but against governmentality—against a rationality that imprisons us in the cellular space of our own self-government. At the same time, the freedom of/through counter-memory is a form of mimetic play with the notion of positive freedom whereby citizenship is unwrapped like a cloak from the politicized body. In simple terms, it can be said that genealogy “enables one to get free of oneself.”29 That is, by exposing the nonessentiality of the limits imposed on us through the constitution of a self, it opens the possibility of going beyond those limits.30 This opening is a kind of fracture, at once an open space and a breaking free of the constraining power inherent in identity and identification. In this sense, genealogy opens up “a space of concrete freedom, i.e., of possible transformation.”31 This notion of fracture allows us to define freedom more precisely, to gauge whether or not a genuine space of freedom has been opened for us. Freedom, concrete freedom, is a space of possible transformation. Unless we are free to transform ourselves, to be other than the identity dictated for us by some extraneous rationality, we have no freedom. Even the most violent forms of resistance against subjection accomplish nothing if they do not gain this freedom, do not open a space of possible transformation—which means nothing more, and nothing less, than the possibility of being otherwise. Something very like this point is made by Dennis Altman with regard to the Stonewall riots of 1969 and the militant Gay Liberation Front that emerged from them in the early 1970s. In one of the seminal texts of what would later become known as Queer Theory, Altman rails against the limited vision of a political movement that sought for gay and lesbian people little more than an expansion of rights and the “liberal tolerance” of the homophile community: “Homosexuals can win acceptance as distinct from tolerance only by a transformation of society, one that is based on a ‘new human’ who is able to accept the multifaceted and varied nature of his or her sexual identity. That such a society can be founded is the gamble upon which gay and women’s liberation are based; like all radical movements they hold to an optimistic view of human nature, above all to its mutability.”32 This requirement that we are only genuinely free if we able to transform ourselves is recalcitrant.33 It is crucial to understand, however, that what is being required here is not a freedom to transform ourselves in accordance with some global or teleological model of a more “genuine” form of subjectivity. This freedom does not consist (as it does in On Liberty) in replacing one form of subjectivity for another that is supposedly “truer” or more fulfilling to human nature. Not only is this illusory and unobtainable, it would also amount to a cancellation of freedom, a reimposition of subjectival limitations and expectations. Rather, the freedom opened by counter-memory is a freedom of permanent transformation, of always being able to become other than what we are.
9,241
<h4>Political subjects under the state are ahistorical fabrications of being – our praxis of counter-memory exposes the illusion of subjectivity and, through a process of cutting, opens up space for radical becoming. Michael Clifford explains</h4><p>Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy with the Institute for the Humanities and the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Mississippi State University, 2001, “Political Genealogy After Foucault”. Routledge, L<u><strong>ondon, Great Britain. pp. 134-7</p><p></u></strong>Foucault’s <u>counter-memory is very close to the Nietzschean idea of “active forgetfulness”</u> (aktive Vergesslichkeit).21 <u><mark>Counter-memory consists of</mark> essentially <mark>forgetting who we are</mark>. It is <mark>a forgetfulness of essence, of necessity, of</mark> the <mark>moral and ontological obligations that bind us to an identity</mark>.</u> There is freedom in forgetfulness. <u><mark>Counter-memory holds us at</mark> a remove, <mark>a distance, from ourselves</mark>; not in the traditional sense of self reflection, but of <mark>wrenching the self</mark>—this identity—<mark>apart, through an incision, a cutting that makes the self stand naked and strange</mark> before us across an unbridgeable divide, a gap of difference.</u> Counter-memory dislodges the propriety of our-selves. <u><mark>The self</mark>, as a coherent identity, <mark>becomes foreign</mark> through counter-memory. <mark>We cannot remember what it was that compelled us to act, believe, be a given way. Counter-memory dissolves this compulsion, this determination, this subjection</mark>. The power of <mark>identity is suspended through</mark> a <mark>forgetfulness of its necessity</mark>—a freedom is opened within the space of a difference that no identity can constrain.</u> This difference always plays outside the limits, outside any delimitation of being. Counter-memory thrusts us into this uncharted world, where a memory makes no sense, where play is the order of the day, where lightening and chance disintegrate the heavy and solid, the identical. <u>Counter-memory bears directly on processes of subjectivation</u>, on the techniques of the self through which we constitute for ourselves an identity. <u>“<mark>Counter-discourses” anticipate a subjectival freedom</mark> of open possibilities <mark>by opposing</mark> themselves to the <mark>discourses of truth</mark> through which we recognize ourselves as subjects.</u>22 <u>These counter-discourses, <mark>the discourses of genealogy, lift</mark> the burdensome <mark>obligations imposed on us by such a recognition</mark>.</u> As a forgetfulness of these obligations, <u><mark>counter-memory</mark> always <mark>takes the form of a transgression</mark>.</u> It invites condemnation even as it refuses to be held accountable. <u>Yet <mark>there is freedom in</mark> this <mark>refusal</mark>,</u> in this transgression—for those who have the stomach for it.23 There is always an essential risk involved in refusing, in forgetting, one’s identity.24 Counter-memory is not a form of consciousness. It is nothing, really, except the effect of a certain kind of description of ourselves, a description of the historical ontology of ourselves as subjects. This description has been closed off and denied by power/knowledge relations, excluded and made peripheral by certain dominant discourses and entrenched scientific-philosophical enterprises that bind us to a conception of what we are in truth. <u><mark>Counter-memory</mark> counters, or <mark>suspends</mark>, the power of <mark>identity through genealogical accounts of its constitution</mark>. Genealogy effects “the systematic dissociation of identity” by revealing its radical contingency, its historicality and utter lack of essentiality. <mark>The purpose of genealogy</u></mark>, says Foucault, “<u><mark>is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit </mark>itself <mark>to its dissipation</mark>.”</u>25 <u><mark>Genealogical critique is</mark> <mark>an exposition of our history as subjects</mark> that has the effect of <mark>disposing subjectival constraints by exposing</mark> the <mark>contingency</mark> of their imposition</u>. Genealogy turns the firm posture of the self-identical subject into the mere posing of a pretentious display. Genealogy proceeds through “dissension” and “disparity.” <u>Wherever “the self fabricates a coherent identity,” genealogy puts into play a subversive counter-analysis that “permits the dissociation of the self</u>, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis.”26 <u><mark>Genealogy</mark> disturbs, fragments, displaces the unity of subjectivity. It <mark>cuts through the oppressive</mark>, assimilating <mark>density of Truth and discovers</mark> in this beguiling haze <mark>that subjectivity is nothing more than a colorful mask</mark>.</u> Who we are, what we are, is a mask displayed for public viewing and examination, for person-al subjection and ethical subjugation. Genealogy cuts through this mask, only to make another discovery. <u>Behind it <mark>there is no essential identity, no unified spirit or will, no naked subject stripped of its colorful dress</mark>.</u> Rather, <u>there is <mark>only a matrix of intersecting lines and heterogenous congruities</mark>, an arbitrary and historically contingent complex of discursive and nondiscursive practices.</u> Asserts Foucault, “If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is ‘something altogether different’ behind things; not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms.”27 Contrary to what René Descartes or John Locke would contend, unity (whether of consciousness proper or the continuity of personal experience) is not the essence of subjectivity. <u>Unity is a mask for an interplay of anonymous forces and historical accidents that permits us to identify subjects</u>, to identify ourselves, as specific human beings. Unity—<u>identity—is imposed on subjects as the mask of their fabrication.</u> <u><mark>Subjectivity is the carceral and incarcerating expression of this imposition</mark>, of the limitations drawn around us by discourses of truth and practices of individualization; <mark>but seen through the “differential knowledge” of genealogy, the identity of subjectivity collapses</u></mark>. <u>Counter-memory through genealogical critique is a transgression of limits. As such, it opens onto a possibility of freedom.</u> Genealogy permits us “to separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, thinking what we are, do, or think.” In this sense, <u>genealogy gives “new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.”</u>28 The freedom offered by counter-memory is a kind of parodic reversal of negative freedom: it is not a freedom from interference, but for it—for disruption, for displacement, for violating those inviolable spheres of liberty that serve as the limits of our subjection. It is not a freedom for individuality, but from it—a freedom from individualization, from the practices and discourses which bind us to our own identity as individuals. <u><mark>It is not a freedom against the</mark> office of <mark>government, but against governmentality</mark>—against <mark>a rationality that imprisons us in the cellular space of our own self-government</mark>.</u> At the same time, <u>the freedom of/through counter-memory is <mark>a form of mimetic play with the notion of positive freedom whereby citizenship is unwrapped</mark> like a cloak <mark>from the politicized body</mark>.</u> In simple terms, it can be said that genealogy “enables one to get free of oneself.”29 That is, <u>by exposing the nonessentiality of the limits imposed on us through the constitution of a self, it opens the possibility of going beyond those limits.</u>30 This opening is <u>a kind of fracture, at once an open space and a breaking free of the constraining power inherent in identity and identification.</u> In this sense, genealogy opens up “a space of concrete freedom, i.e., of possible transformation.”31 This notion of fracture allows us to define freedom more precisely, to gauge whether or not a genuine space of freedom has been opened for us. <u>Freedom, concrete freedom, is a space of possible transformation.</u> Unless we are free to transform ourselves, to be other than the identity dictated for us by some extraneous rationality, we have no freedom. <u><mark>Even the most violent forms of resistance</mark> against subjection <mark>accomplish nothing if they do not</mark> gain this freedom, do not <mark>open a space of possible transformation</mark>—which means nothing more, and nothing less, than the possibility of being otherwise</u>. Something very like this point is made by Dennis Altman with regard to the Stonewall riots of 1969 and the militant Gay Liberation Front that emerged from them in the early 1970s. In one of the seminal texts of what would later become known as Queer Theory, Altman rails against the limited vision of a political movement that sought for gay and lesbian people little more than an expansion of rights and the “liberal tolerance” of the homophile community: “Homosexuals can win acceptance as distinct from tolerance only by a transformation of society, one that is based on a ‘new human’ who is able to accept the multifaceted and varied nature of his or her sexual identity. That such a society can be founded is the gamble upon which gay and women’s liberation are based; like all radical movements they hold to an optimistic view of human nature, above all to its mutability.”32 This requirement that we are only genuinely free if we able to transform ourselves is recalcitrant.33 It is crucial to understand, however, that <u>what is being required here is not a freedom to transform ourselves in accordance with some global or teleological model of a more “genuine” form of subjectivity.</u> This freedom does not consist (as it does in On Liberty) in replacing one form of subjectivity for another that is supposedly “truer” or more fulfilling to human nature. Not only is this illusory and unobtainable, it would also amount to a cancellation of freedom, a reimposition of subjectival limitations and expectations. <u>Rather, the freedom opened by counter-memory is <mark>a freedom of permanent transformation, of always being able to become other than what we are</mark>.</p></u>
null
null
EZ 1AC 4.0
221,971
16
17,007
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-USC-Round1.docx
564,697
A
USC
1
OU CY
R Cheek
null
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-USC-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,312
A total negation of capital from outside its epistemological structure is key to solve. relying on the system’s spatial fixes to its own problems causes extinction.
Meszaros 8
Meszaros 8 Istvan Meszaros, Professor at the University of Sussex, “The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time.” P 251-252,
introducing significant social changes in order to overcome some major contradictions but also to some partial successes in the originally envisaged direction. The primary reason for such developments was the fateful inertia of structural inequality reproduced in one form or another throughout history, despite some change in personnel from time to time at the apex of society. For structural inequality acted as an anchor, with shorter or longer chains attached to it, invariably dragging the ship back to a position from which there seemed to be no possibility of further progress in the journey, no matter how well intentioned might have been some of the personnel of the ship during a major historical tempest. this historically determinate and humanly alterable predicament of the people dominated by the existing order was on a regular basis conceptualized and ideologically rationalized as a fatality of nature, even when it had to be conceded that the prevailing structural inequality was very far from being an all-round beneficial one. human historical time is not measurable in terms of the permanence of nature) not to mention the fact that the lasting temporality of nature itself on our planet is being catastrophically undermined by the ongoing destructive intervention in nature by perverse socioeconomic forces, the whole reasoning of anti-historical justification collapses. At that point, it becomes imperative to orient our- selves well within the potentialities and limitations of real historical time, with a view to radically overcoming the perilous social antagonisms that point in the direction of putting an end to human history , the elaboration of the required remedies in the form of a sustainable alternative social order, together with appropriate safeguards to make that order irreversible, becomes an unavoidable historical challenge without successfully meeting that challenge, given the urgency of a unique historical time when the survival of humanity is at stake-under the shadow of both the apparently uncontrollable accumulation and deployment of the "real" and not cynically and self-servingly fictionalized weapons of mass destruction, and of capital's devastating encroachment on nature, humankind cannot risk relapsing into an ever more destructive social order, as if we had the infinity of time at our disposal before we have to undertake some corrective action.
structural inequality acted as an anchor, with shorter or longer chains attached to it, invariably dragging the ship back to a position from which there seemed to be no possibility of further progress in the journey, no matter how well intentioned might have been some of the personnel of the ship during a major historical tempest ideologically rationalized as a fatality of nature, even when it had to be conceded that the prevailing structural inequality was very far from being an all-round beneficial one. human historical time is not measurable in terms of the permanence of nature) not to mention the fact that the lasting temporality of nature itself on our planet is being catastrophically undermined by the ongoing destructive intervention in nature by perverse socioeconomic forces it becomes imperative to orient our- selves well within the potentialities and limitations of real historical time, with a view to radically overcoming the perilous social antagonisms that point in the direction of putting an end to human histor without successfully meeting that challenge, given the urgency of a unique historical time when the survival of humanity is at stake-under the shadow of both the apparently uncontrollable accumulation and deployment of the "real weapons of mass destruction, and of capital's devastating encroachment on nature, humankind cannot risk relapsing into an ever more destructive social order, as if we had the infinity of time at our disposal before we have to undertake some corrective action
Past history testifies to many instances of not only noble efforts dedicated to introducing significant social changes in order to overcome some major contradictions but also to some partial successes in the originally envisaged direction. All too often, however) the successes have been sooner or later rolled back by the subsequent restoration of the dependency relations of the earlier status quo. The primary reason for such developments was the fateful inertia of structural inequality reproduced in one form or another throughout history, despite some change in personnel from time to time at the apex of society. For structural inequality acted as an anchor, with shorter or longer chains attached to it, invariably dragging the ship back to a position from which there seemed to be no possibility of further progress in the journey, no matter how well intentioned might have been some of the personnel of the ship during a major historical tempest. And to make things worse, this historically determinate and humanly alterable predicament of the people dominated by the existing order was on a regular basis conceptualized and ideologically rationalized as a fatality of nature, even when it had to be conceded that the prevailing structural inequality was very far from being an all-round beneficial one. The necessary corollary of this kind of rationalization-and justification of the unjustifiable-was that social iniquity as an allegedly unalterable determination of nature (said to be well in tune with "human nature") is permanent and tenable. But what if the notion of permanence as such is put into question by evidence of a clearly identifiable and menacing historical change? For as soon as it must be admitted that human historical time is not measurable in terms of the permanence of nature) not to mention the fact that the lasting temporality of nature itself on our planet is being catastrophically undermined by the ongoing destructive intervention in nature by perverse socioeconomic forces, the whole reasoning of anti-historical justification collapses. At that point, it becomes imperative to orient our- selves well within the potentialities and limitations of real historical time, with a view to radically overcoming the perilous social antagonisms that point in the direction of putting an end to human history. MARKED At that point in time, exactly where we stand today, the elaboration of the required remedies in the form of a sustainable alternative social order, together with appropriate safeguards to make that order irreversible, becomes an unavoidable historical challenge. For without successfully meeting that challenge, given the urgency of a unique historical time when the survival of humanity is at stake-under the shadow of both the apparently uncontrollable accumulation and deployment of the "real" and not cynically and self-servingly fictionalized weapons of mass destruction, and of capital's devastating encroachment on nature, humankind cannot risk relapsing into an ever more destructive social order, as if we had the infinity of time at our disposal before we have to undertake some corrective action.
3,159
<h4>A total negation of capital from outside its epistemological structure is key to solve. relying<u><strong> on the system’s spatial fixes to its own problems causes extinction.</h4><p>Meszaros 8</p><p></u></strong>Istvan Meszaros, Professor at the University of Sussex, “The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time.” P 251-252,</p><p>Past history testifies to many instances of not only noble efforts dedicated to <u>introducing significant social changes in order to overcome some major contradictions but also to some partial successes in the originally envisaged direction.</u> All too often, however) the successes have been sooner or later rolled back by the subsequent restoration of the dependency relations of the earlier status quo. <u>The primary reason for such developments was the fateful inertia of structural inequality reproduced in one form or another throughout history, despite some change in personnel from time to time at the apex of society. For <mark>structural inequality acted as an anchor, with shorter or longer chains attached to it, invariably dragging the ship back to a position from which there seemed to be no possibility of further progress in the journey, no matter how well intentioned might have been some of the personnel of the ship during a major historical tempest</mark>.</u> And to make things worse, <u>this historically determinate and humanly alterable predicament of the people dominated by the existing order was on a regular basis conceptualized and <mark>ideologically rationalized as a fatality of nature, even when it had to be conceded that the prevailing structural inequality was very far from being an all-round beneficial one.</u> </mark>The necessary corollary of this kind of rationalization-and justification of the unjustifiable-was that social iniquity as an allegedly unalterable determination of nature (said to be well in tune with "human nature") is permanent and tenable. But what if the notion of permanence as such is put into question by evidence of a clearly identifiable and menacing historical change? For as soon as it must be admitted that <u><mark>human historical time is not measurable in terms of the permanence of nature) not to mention the fact that the lasting temporality of nature itself on our planet is being catastrophically undermined by the ongoing destructive intervention in nature by perverse socioeconomic forces</mark>, the whole reasoning of anti-historical justification collapses. At that point, <mark>it becomes imperative to orient our- selves well within the potentialities and limitations of real historical time, with a view to radically overcoming the perilous social antagonisms that point in the direction of putting an end to human histor</mark>y</u>.</p><p>MARKED</p><p> At that point in time, exactly where we stand today<u>, the elaboration of the required remedies in the form of a sustainable alternative social order, together with appropriate safeguards to make that order irreversible, becomes an unavoidable historical challenge</u>. For <u><mark>without successfully meeting that challenge, given the urgency of a unique historical time when the survival of humanity is at stake-under the shadow of both the apparently uncontrollable accumulation and deployment of the "real</mark>" and not cynically and self-servingly fictionalized <mark>weapons of mass destruction, and of capital's devastating encroachment on nature, humankind cannot risk relapsing into an ever more destructive social order, as if we had the infinity of time at our disposal before we have to undertake some corrective action</mark>. </p></u>
1NR
Neolib
Perm
429,842
3
17,003
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
564,710
N
UNLV
1
Whitman DL
Justin Kirk
1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,313
Zombies
Sexton ‘11
Sexton ‘11 (Jared, “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism” http://www.yorku.ca/intent/issue5/articles/pdfs/jaredsextonarticle.pdf) [M Leap]
To speak of black social life and black social death is to find oneself in the midst of an argument that is also a profound agreement Black optimism is not the negation of the negation that is afro-pessimism, just as black social life does not negate black social death by inhabiting it and vitalizing it A living death is as much a death as it is a living. Nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society, of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of people and place, of history and heritage, of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonized, of all that capital has in common with labor—the modern world system Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space black life is not social black life is lived in social death Double emphasis, on lived and on death. That’s the whole point of the enterprise at some level. It is all about the implications of this agreed-upon point where arguments (should) begin, but they cannot (yet) proceed.
Black optimism is not the negation of the negation that is afro-pessimism, just as black social life does not negate black social death by inhabiting it and vitalizing it. A living death is as much a death as it is a living. Nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society citizen and subject, nation and culture people and place history and heritage the modern world system Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space black life is lived in social death Double emphasis, on lived and on death
[24] To speak of black social life and black social death, black social life against black social death, black social life as black social death, black social life in black social death—all of this is to find oneself in the midst of an argument that is also a profound agreement, an agreement that takes shape in (between) meconnaissance and (dis)belief. Black optimism is not the negation of the negation that is afro-pessimism, just as black social life does not negate black social death by inhabiting it and vitalizing it. A living death is as much a death as it is a living. Nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society, of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of people and place, of history and heritage, of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonized, of all that capital has in common with labor—the modern world system. Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space. This is agreed. That is to say, what Moten asserts against afro-pessimism is a point already affirmed by afro-pessimism, is, in fact, one of the most polemical dimensions of afro-pessimism as a project: namely, that black life is not social, or rather that black life is lived in social death. Double emphasis, on lived and on death. That’s the whole point of the enterprise at some level. It is all about the implications of this agreed-upon point where arguments (should) begin, but they cannot (yet) proceed.
1,612
<h4>Zombies</h4><p><u><strong>Sexton ‘11</u></strong> (Jared, “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism” http://www.yorku.ca/intent/issue5/articles/pdfs/jaredsextonarticle.pdf) [M Leap]</p><p>[24] <u>To speak of black social life and black social death</u>, black social life against black social death, black social life as black social death, black social life in black social death—all of this <u>is to find oneself in the midst of an argument that is also a profound agreement</u>, an agreement that takes shape in (between) meconnaissance and (dis)belief. <u><mark>Black optimism is not the negation of the negation that is afro-pessimism, just as <strong>black social life does not negate black social death by inhabiting it and vitalizing it</u></strong>. <u><strong>A living death is as much a death as it is a living</strong>. <strong>Nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life</strong>, only that <strong>black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society</strong></mark>, of <strong><mark>citizen and subject</strong>, </mark>of <mark>nation and culture</mark>, of <mark>people and place</mark>, of <mark>history and heritage</mark>, of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonized, of all that capital has in common with labor—<strong><mark>the modern world system</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space</u></strong></mark>. This is agreed. That is to say, what Moten asserts against afro-pessimism is a point already affirmed by afro-pessimism, is, in fact, one of the most polemical dimensions of afro-pessimism as a project: namely, that <u>black life is not social</u>, or rather that <u><strong><mark>black life is lived in social death</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Double emphasis, on lived and on death</mark>. That’s the whole point of the enterprise at some level. It is all about the implications of this agreed-upon point where arguments (should) begin, but they cannot (yet) proceed.</u> </p>
2NC
Undercommons
Alt
40,272
236
17,008
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,714
N
UNLV
Quarters
Iowa KL
Shooter, Jason Russel, Michael Eisenstadt
1ac was black mothering 1nc was damage centrism k faciality k and case 2nc was damage and case 1nr was faciality 2nr was faciality
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,314
Neolib is the worst for understanding difference – it’s the root cause of racism
Young 6
Young 6 [Robert, Asst Prof of English at Univ of Alabama, Putting Materialism Back into Race Theory, http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2006/puttingmaterialismbackintoracetheory.htm //liam]
discourse of the subject operates as an ideological strategy for fetishizing the black experience and it positions black subjectivity beyond the reach of Marxism Asante dismisses Marxism because it is Eurocentric (8), but are the core concepts of Marxism, such as class and mode of production, only relevant for European social formations? Are African and African-American social histories/relations unshaped by class structures? this reveals the class politics of Afrocentricity: it makes class invisible. ). In the realm of African-American philosophy McGary Jr deploys the discourse of the (black) subject to mark the limits of Marxism. McGary confuses causes and effects and then misreads Marxism as a descriptive modality. Marxism is not concerned as much with descriptive accounts, the effects, as much as it is with explanatory accounts. it is concerned with the cause of social alienation because such an explanatory account acts as a guide for praxis Social alienation is an historical effect and its explanation does not reside in the experience itself; therefore, it needs explanation and such an explanation emerges from the transpersonal space of concepts. reveals his contradictory ideological coordinates he argues that black alienation results from cultural "beliefs". Then, he suggests that these cultural "norms" and "practices" develop from slavery and Jim Crow, which are fundamentally economic relations If these cultural norms endogenously emerge from the economic systems of slavery and Jim Crow then black alienation is very much rooted in economic relations. McGary remains silent on the contemporary economic system structuring black alienation: capitalism. Apparently, it is legitimate to foreground and critique the historical connection between economics and alienation but any inquiry into the present day connection between economics and alienation is off limits capitalism—remains the unsaid in McGary's discourse, and consequently he provides ideological support for capitalism we see the ideological connection between the superstructure (philosophy) and the base (capitalism). Philosophy provides ideological support for capitalism we can also see how philosophy carries out class politics at the level of theory ). McGary points out "that Black people have been used in ways that white people have not" (91). His observation may be true, but it does not mean that whites have not also been "used"; yes, whites may be "used" differently, but they are still "used" because that is the logic of exploitative regimes This view disconnects black alienation from other social relations; hence, it ultimately reifies race, and, in doing so, suppresses materialist inquiries into the class logic of race If race is the "identity around which whites have usually closed ranks" (138), then why is the case? Without an explanation, it seems as if white solidarity reflects some kind of metaphysical alliance. White racial solidarity is an historical articulation that operates to defuse class antagonism within white society, and it is maintained and reproduced through discourses of ideology. The race contract provides whites with an imaginary resolution of actual social contradictions, which are not caused by blacks, but by an exploitative economic structure. the race contract provides a political cover which ensures the ideological reproduction of the conditions of exploitation
discourse of the subject operates as an ideological fetishizing black experience it positions black subjectivity beyond Marxism Are African American social histories unshaped by class structures? this reveals the class politics of Afrocentricity: it makes class invisible cultural "norms" and "practices" develop from slavery which are fundamentally economic relations If these cultural norms endogenously emerge from the economic systems of slavery black alienation is rooted in economic relations contemporary economic system structuring black alienation: capitalism. Black people have been used in ways that white people have not" but it does not mean that whites have not also been "used whites may be "used" differently, but they are still "used This view disconnects black alienation from other social relations it ultimately reifies race and suppresses materialist inquiries into the class logic of race the race contract provides a political cover which ensures the ideological reproduction of the conditions of exploitation
Indeed, the discourse of the subject operates as an ideological strategy for fetishizing the black experience and, consequently, it positions black subjectivity beyond the reach of Marxism. For example, in the Afrocentric Idea, Asante dismisses Marxism because it is Eurocentric (8), but are the core concepts of Marxism, such as class and mode of production, only relevant for European social formations? Are African and African-American social histories/relations unshaped by class structures? Asante assumes that class hierarchies do not structure African or the African-American social experiences, and this reveals the class politics of Afrocentricity: it makes class invisible. Asante's assumption, which erases materialism, enables him to offer the idealist formulation that the "word creates reality" (70). The political translation of such idealism is not surprisingly very conservative. Asante directs us away from critiquing capitalist institutions, in a manner similar to the ideological protocol of the Million Man March, and calls for vigilance against symbolic oppression. As Asante tellingly puts it, "symbol imperialism, rather than institutional racism, is the major social problem facing multicultural societies" (56). In the realm of African-American philosophy, Howard McGary Jr. also deploys the discourse of the (black) subject to mark the limits of Marxism. For instance, in a recent interview, McGary offers this humanist rejection of Marxism: "I don't think that the levels of alienation experienced by Black people are rooted primarily in economic relations" (Interview 90). For McGary, black alienation exceeds the logic of Marxist theory and thus McGary's idealist assertion that "the sense of alienation experienced by Black people in the US is also rooted in the whole idea of what it means to be a human being and how that has been understood" (Interview 90). McGary confuses causes and effects and then misreads Marxism as a descriptive modality. Marxism is not concerned as much with descriptive accounts, the effects, as much as it is with explanatory accounts. That is, it is concerned with the cause of social alienation because such an explanatory account acts as a guide for praxis. Social alienation is an historical effect and its explanation does not reside in the experience itself; therefore, it needs explanation and such an explanation emerges from the transpersonal space of concepts. In theorizing the specificity of black alienation, McGary reveals his contradictory ideological coordinates. First, he argues that black alienation results from cultural "beliefs". Then, he suggests that these cultural "norms" and "practices" develop from slavery and Jim Crow, which are fundamentally economic relations for the historically specific exploitation of black people. If these cultural norms endogenously emerge from the economic systems of slavery and Jim Crow, as McGary correctly suggests, then and contrary to McGary's expressed position, black alienation is very much rooted in economic relations. McGary's desire to place black subjectivity beyond Marxism creates contradictions in his text. McGary asserts that the economic structures of slavery and Jim Crow shape cultural norms. Thus in a post-slavery, post-Jim Crow era, there would still be an economic structure maintaining contemporary oppressive norms—from McGary's logic this must be the case. However, McGary remains silent on the contemporary economic system structuring black alienation: capitalism. MARKED Apparently, it is legitimate to foreground and critique the historical connection between economics and alienation but any inquiry into the present day connection between economics and alienation is off limits. This other economic structure—capitalism—remains the unsaid in McGary's discourse, and consequently he provides ideological support for capitalism—the exploitative infrastructure which produces and maintains alienation for blacks as well as for all working people. In a very revealing moment, a moment that confirms my reading of McGary's pro-capitalist position, he asserts that "it is possible for African-Americans to combat or overcome this form of alienation described by recent writers without overthrowing capitalism" (20). Here, in a most lucid way, we see the ideological connection between the superstructure (philosophy) and the base (capitalism). Philosophy provides ideological support for capitalism, and, in this instance, we can also see how philosophy carries out class politics at the level of theory (Althusser Lenin 18). McGary points out "that Black people have been used in ways that white people have not" (91). His observation may be true, but it does not mean that whites have not also been "used"; yes, whites may be "used" differently, but they are still "used" because that is the logic of exploitative regimes—people are "used", that is to say, their labor is commodified and exchanged for profit. McGary's interview signals what I call an "isolationist" view. This view disconnects black alienation from other social relations; hence, it ultimately reifies race, and, in doing so, suppresses materialist inquiries into the class logic of race. That is to say, the meaning of race is not to be found within its own internal dynamics but rather in dialectical relation to and as an ideological justification of the exploitative wage-labor economy. This isolationist position finds a fuller and, no less problematic, articulation in Charles W. Mills' The Racial Contract, a text which undermines the possibility for a transracial transformative political project. Mills evinces the ideological assumptions and consequent politics of the isolationist view in a long endnote to chapter 1. Mills privileges race oppression, but, in doing so, he must suppress other forms of oppression, such as gender and class. Mills acknowledges that there are gender and class relations within the white population, but he still privileges race, as if the black community is not similarly divided along gender and class lines. Hence, the ideological necessity for Mills to execute a double move: he must marginalize class difference within the white community and suppress it within the black community. Consequently, Mills removes the possibility of connecting white supremacy, a political-cultural structure, to its underlying economic base. Mills empiricist framework mystifies our understanding of race. If "white racial solidarity has overridden class and gender solidarity" (138), as he proposes, then what is needed is an explanation of this racial formation. If race is the "identity around which whites have usually closed ranks" (138), then why is the case? Without an explanation, it seems as if white solidarity reflects some kind of metaphysical alliance. White racial solidarity is an historical articulation that operates to defuse class antagonism within white society, and it is maintained and reproduced through discourses of ideology. The race contract provides whites with an imaginary resolution of actual social contradictions, which are not caused by blacks, but by an exploitative economic structure. The race contract enables whites to scapegoat blacks and such an ideological operation displaces any understanding of the exploitative machinery. Hence, the race contract provides a political cover which ensures the ideological reproduction of the conditions of exploitation, and this reproduction further deepens the social contradictions—the economic position of whites becomes more and more depressed by the very same economic system that they help to ideologically reproduce.
7,645
<h4>Neolib is the worst for understanding difference – it’s the root cause of racism</h4><p><u><strong><mark>Young 6</u></strong></mark> [Robert, Asst Prof of English at Univ of Alabama, Putting Materialism Back into Race Theory, http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2006/puttingmaterialismbackintoracetheory.htm //liam]</p><p>Indeed, the <u><strong><mark>discourse of the subject operates as an ideological</mark> strategy for <mark>fetishizing</mark> the <mark>black experience</mark> and</u></strong>, consequently, <u><strong><mark>it positions black subjectivity beyond</mark> the reach of <mark>Marxism</u></strong></mark>. For example, in the Afrocentric Idea,<u><strong> Asante dismisses Marxism because it is Eurocentric (8), but are the core concepts of Marxism, such as class and mode of production, only relevant for European social formations? <mark>Are African </mark>and African-<mark>American</mark> <mark>social histories</mark>/relations <mark>unshaped by class structures?</mark> </u></strong>Asante assumes that class hierarchies do not structure African or the African-American social experiences, and <u><strong><mark>this reveals the class politics of Afrocentricity: it makes class invisible</mark>.</u></strong> Asante's assumption, which erases materialism, enables him to offer the idealist formulation that the "word creates reality" (70). The political translation of such idealism is not surprisingly very conservative. Asante directs us away from critiquing capitalist institutions, in a manner similar to the ideological protocol of the Million Man March, and calls for vigilance against symbolic oppression. As Asante tellingly puts it, "symbol imperialism, rather than institutional racism, is the major social problem facing multicultural societies" (56<u><strong>). In the realm of African-American philosophy</u></strong>, Howard <u><strong>McGary Jr</u></strong>. also <u><strong>deploys the discourse of the (black) subject to mark the limits of Marxism.</u></strong> For instance, in a recent interview, McGary offers this humanist rejection of Marxism: "I don't think that the levels of alienation experienced by Black people are rooted primarily in economic relations" (Interview 90). For McGary, black alienation exceeds the logic of Marxist theory and thus McGary's idealist assertion that "the sense of alienation experienced by Black people in the US is also rooted in the whole idea of what it means to be a human being and how that has been understood" (Interview 90). <u><strong>McGary confuses causes and effects and then misreads Marxism as a descriptive modality. Marxism is not concerned as much with descriptive accounts, the effects, as much as it is with explanatory accounts.</u></strong> That is, <u><strong>it is concerned with the cause of social alienation because such an explanatory account acts as a guide for praxis</u></strong>. <u><strong>Social alienation is an historical effect and its explanation does not reside in the experience itself; therefore, it needs explanation and such an explanation emerges from the transpersonal space of concepts.</u></strong> In theorizing the specificity of black alienation, McGary <u><strong>reveals his contradictory ideological coordinates</u></strong>. First, <u><strong>he argues that black alienation results from cultural "beliefs". Then, he suggests that these <mark>cultural "norms" and "practices" develop from slavery</mark> and Jim Crow, <mark>which are fundamentally economic relations</u></strong></mark> for the historically specific exploitation of black people. <u><strong><mark>If these cultural norms endogenously emerge from the economic systems of slavery</mark> and Jim Crow</u></strong>, as McGary correctly suggests, <u><strong>then</u></strong> and contrary to McGary's expressed position, <u><strong><mark>black alienation is</mark> very much <mark>rooted in economic relations</mark>. </u></strong>McGary's desire to place black subjectivity beyond Marxism creates contradictions in his text. McGary asserts that the economic structures of slavery and Jim Crow shape cultural norms. Thus in a post-slavery, post-Jim Crow era, there would still be an economic structure maintaining contemporary oppressive norms—from McGary's logic this must be the case. However, <u><strong>McGary remains silent on the <mark>contemporary economic system structuring black alienation: capitalism.</mark> </p><p></u></strong>MARKED</p><p><u><strong>Apparently, it is legitimate to foreground and critique the historical connection between economics and alienation but any inquiry into the present day connection between economics and alienation is off limits</u></strong>. This other economic structure—<u><strong>capitalism—remains the unsaid in McGary's discourse, and consequently he provides ideological support for capitalism</u></strong>—the exploitative infrastructure which produces and maintains alienation for blacks as well as for all working people. In a very revealing moment, a moment that confirms my reading of McGary's pro-capitalist position, he asserts that "it is possible for African-Americans to combat or overcome this form of alienation described by recent writers without overthrowing capitalism" (20). Here, in a most lucid way, <u><strong>we see the ideological connection between the superstructure (philosophy) and the base (capitalism). Philosophy provides ideological support for capitalism</u></strong>, and, in this instance, <u><strong>we can also see how philosophy carries out class politics at the level of theory</u></strong> (Althusser Lenin 18<u><strong>). McGary points out "that <mark>Black people have been used in ways that white people have not"</mark> (91). His observation may be true, <mark>but it does not mean that whites have not also been "used</mark>"; yes, <mark>whites</mark> <mark>may be "used" differently, but they are still "used</mark>" because that is the logic of exploitative regimes</u></strong>—people are "used", that is to say, their labor is commodified and exchanged for profit. McGary's interview signals what I call an "isolationist" view. <u><strong><mark>This view disconnects black alienation from other social relations</mark>; hence, <mark>it ultimately reifies race</mark>, <mark>and</mark>, in doing so, <mark>suppresses materialist inquiries into the class logic of race</u></strong></mark>. That is to say, the meaning of race is not to be found within its own internal dynamics but rather in dialectical relation to and as an ideological justification of the exploitative wage-labor economy. This isolationist position finds a fuller and, no less problematic, articulation in Charles W. Mills' The Racial Contract, a text which undermines the possibility for a transracial transformative political project. Mills evinces the ideological assumptions and consequent politics of the isolationist view in a long endnote to chapter 1. Mills privileges race oppression, but, in doing so, he must suppress other forms of oppression, such as gender and class. Mills acknowledges that there are gender and class relations within the white population, but he still privileges race, as if the black community is not similarly divided along gender and class lines. Hence, the ideological necessity for Mills to execute a double move: he must marginalize class difference within the white community and suppress it within the black community. Consequently, Mills removes the possibility of connecting white supremacy, a political-cultural structure, to its underlying economic base. Mills empiricist framework mystifies our understanding of race. If "white racial solidarity has overridden class and gender solidarity" (138), as he proposes, then what is needed is an explanation of this racial formation. <u><strong>If race is the "identity around which whites have usually closed ranks" (138), then why is the case? Without an explanation, it seems as if white solidarity reflects some kind of metaphysical alliance. White racial solidarity is an historical articulation that operates to defuse class antagonism within white society, and it is maintained and reproduced through discourses of ideology.</u></strong> <u><strong>The race contract provides whites with an imaginary resolution of actual social contradictions, which are not caused by blacks, but by an exploitative economic structure.</u></strong> The race contract enables whites to scapegoat blacks and such an ideological operation displaces any understanding of the exploitative machinery. Hence, <u><strong><mark>the race contract provides a political cover which ensures the ideological reproduction</mark> <mark>of the conditions of exploitation</u></strong></mark>, and this reproduction further deepens the social contradictions—the economic position of whites becomes more and more depressed by the very same economic system that they help to ideologically reproduce.</p>
1NR
Neolib
A2: Liberalism good
72,085
92
17,003
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
564,710
N
UNLV
1
Whitman DL
Justin Kirk
1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,315
Stealing
Hartman ‘97
Hartman ‘97 (Saidiya, Scenes of Subjection, p. 65-7) [m leap]
When the enslaved slipped away to have secret meetings, they would call it "stealing the meeting Just as runaway slaves were described as "stealing themselves," so, too, even shortlived "flights" from captivity were referred to as "stealing away." "Stealing away" designated a wide range of activities It encompassed an assortment of popular illegalities focused on contesting the authority of the slave-owning class and contravening the status of the enslaved as possession. The very phrase "stealing away" played upon the paradox of property's agency and the idea of property as theft, thus alluding to the captive's condition as a legal form of unlawful or amoral seizure, what Spillers describes as ''the violent seizing of the captive body from its motive will, its active desire.'' "property is theft," Bibb put the matter simply: "Property can't steal property." It is the play upon this originary act of theft that yields the possibilities of transport, as one was literally and figuratively carried away by one's desire. The appropriation of dominant space in itinerant acts of defiance contests the spatial confinement and surveillance of slave life and, ironically, reconsiders the meaning of property, theft, and agency.
When the enslaved slipped away to have secret meetings, they would call it "stealing the meeting Just as runaway slaves were described as "stealing themselves," so, too, even shortlived "flights" from captivity were referred to as "stealing away." "Stealing away" designated a wide range of activities It encompassed an assortment of illegalities focused on contesting the authority of the slave-owning class and contravening the status of the enslaved as possession. The very phrase "stealing away" played upon the paradox of property's agency and the idea of property as theft, thus alluding to the captive's condition as a legal form of unlawful or amoral seizure, what Spillers describes as ''the violent seizing of the captive body from its motive will, its active desire "property is theft," "Property can't steal property." The appropriation of dominant space in itinerant acts of defiance contests the spatial confinement and surveillance of slave life and, ironically, reconsiders the meaning of property, theft, and agency.
When the enslaved slipped away to have secret meetings, they would call it "stealing the meeting," as if to highlight the appropriation of space and the expropriation of the object of property necessary to make these meetings possible. Just as runaway slaves were described as "stealing themselves," so, too, even shortlived "flights" from captivity were referred to as "stealing away." "Stealing away" designated a wide range of activities, from praise meetings, quilting parties, and dances to illicit visits with lovers and family on neighboring plantations. It encompassed an assortment of popular illegalities focused on contesting the authority of the slave-owning class and contravening the status of the enslaved as possession. The very phrase "stealing away" played upon the paradox of property's agency and the idea of property as theft, thus alluding to the captive's condition as a legal form of unlawful or amoral seizure, what Hortense Spillers describes as ''the violent seizing of the captive body from its motive will, its active desire.'' 49 Echoing Proudhon's "property is theft," Henry Bibb put the matter simply: "Property can't steal property." It is the play upon this originary act of theft that yields the possibilities of transport, as one was literally and figuratively carried away by one's desire.5o The appropriation of dominant space in itinerant acts of defiance contests the spatial confinement and surveillance of slave life and, ironically, reconsiders the meaning of property, theft, and agency.
1,535
<h4>Stealing</h4><p><u><strong>Hartman ‘97</u></strong> (Saidiya, Scenes of Subjection, p. 65-7) [m leap]</p><p><u><mark>When the enslaved slipped away to have secret meetings, they would call it "stealing the meeting</u></mark>," as if to highlight the appropriation of space and the expropriation of the object of property necessary to make these meetings possible. <u><mark>Just as runaway slaves were described as "stealing themselves," so, too, even shortlived "flights" from captivity were referred to as "stealing away." "Stealing away" designated a <strong>wide range of activities</u></strong></mark>, from praise meetings, quilting parties, and dances to illicit visits with lovers and family on neighboring plantations. <u><mark>It encompassed an <strong>assortment of</strong> </mark>popular<mark> <strong>illegalities</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>focused on contesting the authority of the slave-owning class and contravening the status of the enslaved as possession. The very phrase "stealing away" played upon the paradox of property's agency and the idea of property as theft, thus alluding to the captive's condition as a legal form of unlawful or amoral seizure, what</u></strong> </mark>Hortense<mark> <u><strong>Spillers describes as ''the violent seizing of the captive body from its motive will, its active desire</mark>.''</u></strong> 49 Echoing Proudhon's <u><strong><mark>"property is theft,"</u></strong></mark> Henry <u>Bibb put the matter simply: <strong><mark>"Property can't steal property."</u></strong> <u></mark>It is the play upon this originary act of theft that yields the possibilities of transport, as one was literally and figuratively carried away by one's desire.</u>5o <u><strong><mark>The appropriation of dominant space in itinerant acts of defiance contests the spatial confinement and surveillance of slave life and, ironically, reconsiders the meaning of property, theft, and agency.</u></strong></mark> </p>
2NC
Undercommons
Alt
220,804
12
17,008
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,714
N
UNLV
Quarters
Iowa KL
Shooter, Jason Russel, Michael Eisenstadt
1ac was black mothering 1nc was damage centrism k faciality k and case 2nc was damage and case 1nr was faciality 2nr was faciality
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,316
Empirically not true and no way that aff can change corporate calculus
Sethi ‘3 xdi
Sethi ‘3 S. Prakash, University Distinguished Professor of Management, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, CUNY “Globalization and the Good Corporation: A Need for Proactive Co-existence” Journal of Business Ethics 43: 21–31, 2003, xdi
the editors of Business and Society Review, a leading scholarly journal in the area of corporate social responsibility, solicited the views of a selected group of scholars, activists and government leaders on the future good corporation most of them characterized the good corporation as doing more for its workers, consumers, and other groups representing a variety of community interests good business conduct cannot be examined and evaluated outside the context of prevailing competitive economic structures and inter- and intra-institutional corporate and industry frameworks forces of globalization have delinked, to a large extent, the connection between market imperfections, the ethnocentric notions of inter-dependent communities, and their connection to corporate social responsibility and good corporate citizenship Nothing can make this situation more apparent than the co-existence of sweatshop like working conditions with enormous power and profitability of multinational corporations The inconsistencies of conduct on the part of large corporations – whether in their home countries or in overseas operations – and their treatment of workers and shareholders as against corporate managers, makes it all too apparent that our hitherto socially responsible corporations are no longer willing or able to provide the wherewithal of a good life to their various constituencies how might one explain the conduct of the managers of some of our largest corporations over the last three years where they have cumulatively laid off hundreds of thousands of workers, unilaterally reduced their pensions and health care benefits, while at the same time managing to increase their salaries and stock options The real reasons for the historical conduct of the good corporations are to be found in imperfect markets that yield above-normal profits to corporations under conditions of oligopolistic market power What should one then make of this new bad corporation, which has been surfacing all over the world during the last few years? The increasing globalization and resulting competition in the marketplace makes the re-emergence of the older version of the benevolent good corporation highly improbable.
The inconsistencies of conduct on the part of large corporations – whether in their home countries or in overseas operations – and their treatment of workers and shareholders as against corporate managers, makes it all too apparent that our hitherto socially responsible corporations are no longer willing or able to provide the wherewithal of a good life to their various constituencies The real reasons for the historical conduct of the good corporations are to be found in imperfect markets under conditions of oligopolistic market power globalization and resulting competition in the marketplace makes the re-emergence of the older version of the benevolent good corporation highly improbable.
To go even a step further, the boundaries of corporate citizenship appear constrained only by the proclivities of various stakeholders who seek ever-larger share of corporate resources because they are deserving of this largesse, and that the corporation can afford it. Sometime ago, the editors of Business and Society Review, a leading scholarly journal in the area of corporate social responsibility, solicited the views of a selected group of scholars, activists and government leaders on the future good corporation (Chappell, 1993; Kanter, 1993; Moskowitz, 1993; Reich, 1993). The views of these commentators ranged all over the map. However, most of them characterized the good corporation as doing more for its workers, consumers, and other groups representing a variety of community interests, e.g., animal rights, environment, and the poor, to name a few. Professor Rosabeth Moss Kanter of Harvard Business School describes a good corporation that is committed to its workers, investing in human resources via a continuous process of training and development, and, developing a pool of skilled workers to support future activities of the firm. Moving from employees to customers, Tom Chappell, president of Tom’s of Maine and author of The Soul of a Business: Managing for Profit and the Common Good, suggests that respect for customers generates needed feedback on company products and services, and that competition should be balanced by goodness, which he defines as a demonstration of care and concern for people, nature and the community. Another contributor, former U.S. Secretary of Labor, Robert B. Reich, emphasizes the long-term benefits of good corporate citizenship, particularly vis a vis employees, over the shorter-term payoffs of downsizing strategies. The above-mentioned description of a good corporation that tries to help all deserving groups and social needs is quite unsatisfactory because the corporation cannot possibly serve all groups and all causes that seek its support. This description also fails to provide us with a cogent rationale with which to determine the deservedness of various groups and the adequacy of corporate response. An alternate approach is presented in this paper. We assert that good business conduct cannot be examined and evaluated outside the context of prevailing competitive economic structures and inter- and intra-institutional corporate and industry frameworks. One has only to look at the current trends in globalization that have drastically changed these historical assertions. The new forces of globalization have delinked, to a large extent, the connection between market imperfections, the ethnocentric notions of inter-dependent communities, and their connection to corporate social responsibility and good corporate citizenship (Sethi, 2002a). Nothing can make this situation more apparent than the co-existence of sweatshop like working conditions with enormous power and profitability of multinational corporations (Sethi, 2003). The inconsistencies of conduct on the part of large corporations – whether in their home countries or in overseas operations – and their treatment of workers and shareholders as against corporate managers, makes it all too apparent that our hitherto socially responsible corporations are no longer willing or able to provide the wherewithal of a good life to their various constituencies. Otherwise, how might one explain the conduct of the managers of some of our largest corporations over the last three years where they have cumulatively laid off hundreds of thousands of workers, unilaterally reduced their pensions and health care benefits, while at the same time managing to increase their salaries and stock options (Sethi, 2002a). An historical analysis of economic and competitive market conditions would suggest a radically different rationale for good corporate behavior where ethical values of individuals and social norms of institutions play only a small part. The real reasons for the historical conduct of the good corporations are to be found in imperfect markets that yield above-normal profits to corporations under conditions of oligopolistic market power, and market domination created through government regulations, patent laws, brand loyalty, and other means by which corporations can insulate themselves from the rigors of market-based competition (Sethi, 1994). Although, at the micro level, it is the individual conduct acting in a business context that gets reflected in the adverse social impact of the business institution, this conduct is seriously circumscribed by its macro-structural context. As economic activity increases in complexity and technological orientation, it requires collective action where each individual and institution contributes but a tiny fraction to the whole. The corporation can be either good or bad depending on who is making the trade-offs, at whose expense these trade-offs are being made, and the extent of discretionary resources available to the corporation and its managers to voluntarily (a) ameliorate some of the second-order effects, i.e., externalities, of their normal business activities; and, (b) to meet other societal needs (Sethi, 1996). What should one then make of this new bad corporation, which has been surfacing all over the world during the last few years? The increasing globalization and resulting competition in the marketplace makes the re-emergence of the older version of the benevolent good corporation highly improbable.
5,520
<h4>Empirically not true and no way that aff can change corporate calculus</h4><p><u><strong>Sethi ‘3</u></strong> S. Prakash, University Distinguished Professor of Management, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, CUNY “Globalization and the Good Corporation: A Need for Proactive Co-existence” Journal of Business Ethics 43: 21–31, 2003, <u><strong>xdi</p><p></u></strong>To go even a step further, the boundaries of corporate citizenship appear constrained only by the proclivities of various stakeholders who seek ever-larger share of corporate resources because they are deserving of this largesse, and that the corporation can afford it. Sometime ago, <u><strong>the editors of Business and Society Review, a leading scholarly journal in the area of corporate social responsibility, solicited the views of a selected group of scholars, activists and government leaders on the future good corporation</u></strong> (Chappell, 1993; Kanter, 1993; Moskowitz, 1993; Reich, 1993). The views of these commentators ranged all over the map. However, <u><strong>most of them characterized the good corporation as doing more for its workers, consumers, and other groups representing a variety of community interests</u></strong>, e.g., animal rights, environment, and the poor, to name a few. Professor Rosabeth Moss Kanter of Harvard Business School describes a good corporation that is committed to its workers, investing in human resources via a continuous process of training and development, and, developing a pool of skilled workers to support future activities of the firm. Moving from employees to customers, Tom Chappell, president of Tom’s of Maine and author of The Soul of a Business: Managing for Profit and the Common Good, suggests that respect for customers generates needed feedback on company products and services, and that competition should be balanced by goodness, which he defines as a demonstration of care and concern for people, nature and the community. Another contributor, former U.S. Secretary of Labor, Robert B. Reich, emphasizes the long-term benefits of good corporate citizenship, particularly vis a vis employees, over the shorter-term payoffs of downsizing strategies. The above-mentioned description of a good corporation that tries to help all deserving groups and social needs is quite unsatisfactory because the corporation cannot possibly serve all groups and all causes that seek its support. This description also fails to provide us with a cogent rationale with which to determine the deservedness of various groups and the adequacy of corporate response. An alternate approach is presented in this paper. We assert that <u><strong>good business conduct cannot be examined and evaluated outside the context of prevailing competitive economic structures and inter- and intra-institutional corporate and industry frameworks</u></strong>. One has only to look at the current trends in globalization that have drastically changed these historical assertions. The new <u><strong>forces of globalization have delinked, to a large extent, the connection between market imperfections, the ethnocentric notions of inter-dependent communities, and their connection to corporate social responsibility and good corporate citizenship</u></strong> (Sethi, 2002a). <u><strong>Nothing can make this situation more apparent than the co-existence of sweatshop like working conditions with enormous power and profitability of multinational corporations</u></strong> (Sethi, 2003). <u><strong><mark>The inconsistencies of conduct on the part of large corporations – whether in their home countries or in overseas operations – and their treatment of workers and shareholders as against corporate managers, makes it all too apparent that our hitherto socially responsible corporations are no longer willing or able to provide the wherewithal of a good life to their various constituencies</u></strong></mark>. Otherwise, <u><strong>how might one explain the conduct of the managers of some of our largest corporations over the last three years where they have cumulatively laid off hundreds of thousands of workers, unilaterally reduced their pensions and health care benefits, while at the same time managing to increase their salaries and stock options</u></strong> (Sethi, 2002a). An historical analysis of economic and competitive market conditions would suggest a radically different rationale for good corporate behavior where ethical values of individuals and social norms of institutions play only a small part. <u><strong><mark>The real reasons for the historical conduct of the good corporations are to be found in imperfect markets</mark> that yield above-normal profits to corporations <mark>under conditions of oligopolistic market power</u></strong></mark>, and market domination created through government regulations, patent laws, brand loyalty, and other means by which corporations can insulate themselves from the rigors of market-based competition (Sethi, 1994). Although, at the micro level, it is the individual conduct acting in a business context that gets reflected in the adverse social impact of the business institution, this conduct is seriously circumscribed by its macro-structural context. As economic activity increases in complexity and technological orientation, it requires collective action where each individual and institution contributes but a tiny fraction to the whole. The corporation can be either good or bad depending on who is making the trade-offs, at whose expense these trade-offs are being made, and the extent of discretionary resources available to the corporation and its managers to voluntarily (a) ameliorate some of the second-order effects, i.e., externalities, of their normal business activities; and, (b) to meet other societal needs (Sethi, 1996). <u><strong>What should one then make of this new bad corporation, which has been surfacing all over the world during the last few years? The increasing <mark>globalization and resulting competition in the marketplace makes the re-emergence of the older version of the benevolent good corporation highly improbable.</p></u></strong></mark>
1NR
Neolib
A2: Neolib s Violence
430,183
1
17,003
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
564,710
N
UNLV
1
Whitman DL
Justin Kirk
1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,317
Nope
Isaki ‘13
Isaki ‘13 / Bianca, Lecturer of the Women’s Studies Programme and doctoral student at the William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, Honolulu, USA, where she received her PhD in Political Science. She worked as a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA. Her forthcoming book is entitled A Decolonial Archive: The History Space of Asian Settler Politics in a Time of Hawaiian Nationhood “Colourblind Colonialism in the ‘50th State of America’” in Deleuze and Race Edited by Arun Saldanha and Jason Michael Adams, Deleuze Connections, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, Kindle Edition/
null
null
Deleuze points to what is difficult about the ahistorical racist fantasy of colourblindness: it is recalcitrant to the real and the historical-material. Instead of insisting that racists have their history wrong or that they dream the wrong dreams, Deleuze allows that neither racial difference nor the place that it is presumed to inhabit can cross an epistemic gap. In the same way that race is not something to be rediscovered, the Orient is not something to be imitated:it only exists in the construction of a smooth space, just as race only exists in the constitution of a tribe that peoples and traverses a smooth space. (ibid.) I am not suggesting that lived realities of racial identity are not historically constituted, or that racialised spaces are only ideas. I am suggesting that colourblind racism trades on a concept of racial difference as opaque and unknowable in order to propose its own ontology that, in turn, abolishes racefrom public, especially legal, spheres. Put otherwise, while colourblind conservatives abolish what is unruly about race, Deleuze and Guattari turn that same unruliness into evidence of a multiplicity to be cultivated.
1,161
<h4>Nope</h4><p><u><strong>Isaki ‘13</u></strong> / Bianca, Lecturer of the Women’s Studies Programme and doctoral student at the William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa, Honolulu, USA, where she received her PhD in Political Science. She worked as a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA. Her forthcoming book is entitled A Decolonial Archive: The History Space of Asian Settler Politics in a Time of Hawaiian Nationhood “Colourblind Colonialism in the ‘50th State of America’” in Deleuze and Race Edited by Arun Saldanha and Jason Michael Adams, Deleuze Connections, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, Kindle Edition/</p><p>Deleuze points to what is difficult about the ahistorical racist fantasy of colourblindness: it is recalcitrant to the real and the historical-material. Instead of insisting that racists have their history wrong or that they dream the wrong dreams, Deleuze allows that neither racial difference nor the place that it is presumed to inhabit can cross an epistemic gap. In the same way that race is not something to be rediscovered, the Orient is not something to be imitated:it only exists in the construction of a smooth space, just as race only exists in the constitution of a tribe that peoples and traverses a smooth space. (ibid.) I am not suggesting that lived realities of racial identity are not historically constituted, or that racialised spaces are only ideas. I am suggesting that colourblind racism trades on a concept of racial difference as opaque and unknowable in order to propose its own ontology that, in turn, abolishes racefrom public, especially legal, spheres. Put otherwise, while <strong>colourblind conservatives abolish what is unruly</strong> <strong>about race,</strong> <strong>Deleuze and Guattari turn that</strong> <strong>same</strong> <strong>unruliness into evidence of</strong> <strong>a</strong> <strong>multiplicity</strong> <strong>to be cultivated</strong>.</p>
1NR
Faciality
A2: Colorblind
421,984
2
17,008
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,714
N
UNLV
Quarters
Iowa KL
Shooter, Jason Russel, Michael Eisenstadt
1ac was black mothering 1nc was damage centrism k faciality k and case 2nc was damage and case 1nr was faciality 2nr was faciality
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,318
Survivalism is slavery to a future of meaningless consumption that we must pay a lifetime of boredom to receive. The logic of the affirmative is the alarmism that authorizes an endless repetition of the same in the name of an abstract freedom, a freedom only to do what we're told. This logic ensures endless global war justified through survival
Vaneigem ‘79
Vaneigem ‘79, Raoul, situationist philosopher, leading thinker in the Situationist International “The Book of Pleasures” trans. John Fullerton, 1983 http://www.scenewash.org/lobbies/chainthinker/situationist/vaneigem/bop/bop.html
The factory has invaded the territory of everyday life Our apparent freedom to do whatever we like shows how whatever we choose serves the economy. Just as bread earned by work tastes acidly of sweat and wages, marketable pleasures are more tedious than the boredom it costs to produce them. The survival pleasures swindle is part of the lie of abstract freedom. The history we lead with every turn of the wheel is not the history of our desires but rather of a lifeless civilization which is about to bury us under its dead weight. The transformation, by constraint and work, of actions and behaviour which have long remained outside the immediate orbit of the economy, shows clearly enough that the mercantile process evolves only by appropriating life, and uncovering only what it can exploit. Nothing will escape its voracious appetite if humanity becomes increasingly strange to itself. We are stricken with survival sickness in a world totally upside down. Man is the only creature capable of realising his desires by changing the world. Yet, until now, all he has realized has been the exchange of his life-force for the production and accumulation of goods.
Our apparent freedom to do whatever we like shows how whatever we choose serves the economy. The history we lead with every turn of the wheel is not the history of our desires but rather of a lifeless civilization which is about to bury us under its dead weight The transformation, by constraint and work shows clearly enough that the mercantile process evolves only by appropriating life, and uncovering only what it can exploit. Nothing will escape its voracious appetite if humanity becomes increasingly strange to itself
The factory has invaded the territory of everyday life. For years the privileged zone of alienation, factory walls simultaneously bounded the proletariat's prisons and the bourgeoisie's liberties. Those who escaped at nightfall briefly revived in the merrymaking of love and alcohol that vitality which labour's daily constraints had failed to break. Ten hours a day of noise, exhaustion and humiliation were unable entirely to wear them out. It was society's sinister curse which forced them to match their energies to the rhythms and wear and tear of machines. But the employers' profit-seeking and foetid nets of exploitation did not poison their fundamental welling of desire, their sexual exuberance in life itself and for themselves. The economic crisis still experienced as specifically economic encouraged the proletariat to acquire the means to accede to the pleasures the bourgeoisie had previously reserved for itself. The constant threat of hunger made them overlook the fact that life bought with wealth and power was fundamentally life reduced to economics. The right to pleasure thus appeared as a conquest, although pleasure had just been taken over as an object of trade. Illicit pleasures are banned until they become profitable. Capitalism's need to expand has transformed the world into one gigantic market in which every one of life's myriad manifestations is reduced to just another sales pitch. In so doing, capitalism grows but digs its own grave by killing off the producers who make the expansion possible . We all know in what contempt the aristocracy held the work which guaranteed its survival. Where feudalism cared only to see theomorphic shit the bourgeoisie has erected its nutrition centre out of the basic substance of economics, and the bourgeoisie has forcibly exposed the true excrement in both religion and economics. The bourgeoisie redeem work, thanks to which they seize power, but the right they arrogate to themselves, to rank manual below intellectual work, profitably repeats the hierarchical ritual. Knowledge establishes a new temple of power. Pleasures which over-stepped the limits had previously been expiated with penances, masses and mortification: the bourgeoisie are the first to propose redemption through work. Sin is cheerfully desacralised, given a cash value, and identified with a right to profit. The crime of idleness is absolved when it acts as a stimulus to consume. This ancient antidote to work is here seen transformed back into work what could be more efficient in getting the workers back to the bench than improving access to the factories of "choose your-own-consumer-goods"? Making pleasure democratically accessible coincides - though it is scarcely coincidence - with the conquest of new markets where simple enjoyment is called comfort and happiness possession. In so doing, however, the bourgeoisie crystallise the inexpiable sin: refusal to pay. So enjoyment outside a transaction is the absolute economic crime. Our apparent freedom to do whatever we like shows how whatever we choose serves the economy. Just as bread earned by work tastes acidly of sweat and wages, marketable pleasures are more tedious than the boredom it costs to produce them. The survival pleasures swindle is part of the lie of abstract freedom. The history we lead with every turn of the wheel is not the history of our desires but rather of a lifeless civilization which is about to bury us under its dead weight. For pleasure has only ever existed by default. To begin with it was shoved into the decent obscurity of night, into the cupboard, into your dreams, the inner world which is not abroad in the light of day, which is the measured light of work-time. But production quotas have ended up subjecting the secret world of desire to the scanners of their self-seeking science and, since it is impossible to abolish desire, economic necessity is instructed to obtain maximum profitable usage. The transformation, by constraint and work, of actions and behaviour which have long remained outside the immediate orbit of the economy, shows clearly enough that the mercantile process evolves only by appropriating life, and uncovering only what it can exploit. Nothing will escape its voracious appetite if humanity becomes increasingly strange to itself. We are stricken with survival sickness in a world totally upside down. Man is the only creature capable of realising his desires by changing the world. Yet, until now, all he has realized has been the exchange of his life-force for the production and accumulation of goods. For thousands of years the system governing history has operated on the social need to transform our sexual potential into the energy for work. For as long as there have been kings and priests, in a process as invariable as the inequalities between classes and as progressive as the history of trade, power and economy, like a pair of vampires, have sucked fresh blood to warm their frozen veins. If we are to believe what we're told, the pressure of a hostile natural environment inexorably pushed a fledgling humanity towards exchange, division of labour, class society and mercantile civilization. What a pretty kettle of fish! As far as we are concerned that road stops here, where the killing joke pointing the irony is that amidst all this wealth that could feed every desire for life passion is utterly absent.
5,402
<h4>Survivalism is slavery to a future of meaningless consumption that we must pay a lifetime of boredom to receive. The logic of the affirmative is the alarmism that authorizes an endless repetition of the same in the name of an abstract freedom, a freedom only to do what we're told. This logic ensures endless global war justified through survival</h4><p><u><strong>Vaneigem ‘79</u></strong>, Raoul, situationist philosopher, leading thinker in the Situationist International “The Book of Pleasures” trans. John Fullerton, 1983 http://www.scenewash.org/lobbies/chainthinker/situationist/vaneigem/bop/bop.html</p><p><u><strong>The factory has invaded the territory of everyday life</u></strong>. For years the privileged zone of alienation, factory walls simultaneously bounded the proletariat's prisons and the bourgeoisie's liberties. Those who escaped at nightfall briefly revived in the merrymaking of love and alcohol that vitality which labour's daily constraints had failed to break. Ten hours a day of noise, exhaustion and humiliation were unable entirely to wear them out. It was society's sinister curse which forced them to match their energies to the rhythms and wear and tear of machines. But the employers' profit-seeking and foetid nets of exploitation did not poison their fundamental welling of desire, their sexual exuberance in life itself and for themselves. The economic crisis still experienced as specifically economic encouraged the proletariat to acquire the means to accede to the pleasures the bourgeoisie had previously reserved for itself. The constant threat of hunger made them overlook the fact that life bought with wealth and power was fundamentally life reduced to economics. The right to pleasure thus appeared as a conquest, although pleasure had just been taken over as an object of trade. Illicit pleasures are banned until they become profitable. Capitalism's need to expand has transformed the world into one gigantic market in which every one of life's myriad manifestations is reduced to just another sales pitch. In so doing, capitalism grows but digs its own grave by killing off the producers who make the expansion possible . We all know in what contempt the aristocracy held the work which guaranteed its survival. Where feudalism cared only to see theomorphic shit the bourgeoisie has erected its nutrition centre out of the basic substance of economics, and the bourgeoisie has forcibly exposed the true excrement in both religion and economics. The bourgeoisie redeem work, thanks to which they seize power, but the right they arrogate to themselves, to rank manual below intellectual work, profitably repeats the hierarchical ritual. Knowledge establishes a new temple of power. Pleasures which over-stepped the limits had previously been expiated with penances, masses and mortification: the bourgeoisie are the first to propose redemption through work. Sin is cheerfully desacralised, given a cash value, and identified with a right to profit. The crime of idleness is absolved when it acts as a stimulus to consume. This ancient antidote to work is here seen transformed back into work what could be more efficient in getting the workers back to the bench than improving access to the factories of "choose your-own-consumer-goods"? Making pleasure democratically accessible coincides - though it is scarcely coincidence - with the conquest of new markets where simple enjoyment is called comfort and happiness possession. In so doing, however, the bourgeoisie crystallise the inexpiable sin: refusal to pay. So enjoyment outside a transaction is the absolute economic crime. <u><strong><mark>Our apparent freedom to do whatever we like shows how whatever we choose serves the economy.</mark> Just as bread earned by work tastes acidly of sweat and wages, marketable pleasures are more tedious than the boredom it costs to produce them. The survival pleasures swindle is part of the lie of abstract freedom.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The history we lead with every turn of the wheel is not the history of our desires but rather of a lifeless civilization which is about to bury us under its dead weight</mark>.</u></strong> For pleasure has only ever existed by default. To begin with it was shoved into the decent obscurity of night, into the cupboard, into your dreams, the inner world which is not abroad in the light of day, which is the measured light of work-time. But production quotas have ended up subjecting the secret world of desire to the scanners of their self-seeking science and, since it is impossible to abolish desire, economic necessity is instructed to obtain maximum profitable usage. <u><strong><mark>The transformation, by constraint and work</mark>, of actions and behaviour which have long remained outside the immediate orbit of the economy, <mark>shows clearly enough that the mercantile process evolves only by appropriating life, and uncovering only what it can exploit.</mark> <mark>Nothing will escape its voracious appetite if humanity becomes increasingly strange to itself</mark>. We are stricken with survival sickness in a world totally upside down. Man is the only creature capable of realising his desires by changing the world. Yet, until now, all he has realized has been the exchange of his life-force for the production and accumulation of goods.</u></strong> For thousands of years the system governing history has operated on the social need to transform our sexual potential into the energy for work. For as long as there have been kings and priests, in a process as invariable as the inequalities between classes and as progressive as the history of trade, power and economy, like a pair of vampires, have sucked fresh blood to warm their frozen veins. If we are to believe what we're told, the pressure of a hostile natural environment inexorably pushed a fledgling humanity towards exchange, division of labour, class society and mercantile civilization. What a pretty kettle of fish! As far as we are concerned that road stops here, where the killing joke pointing the irony is that amidst all this wealth that could feed every desire for life passion is utterly absent. </p>
1NR
Neolib
A2: Extinction first
430,184
1
17,003
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
564,710
N
UNLV
1
Whitman DL
Justin Kirk
1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,319
The affirmative’s radical knowledge will only be funneled into the increasing legitimacy of the contemporary university – that makes regimes of social death inevitable
Occupied UC Berkeley in 2010
Occupied UC Berkeley in 2010 (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620)
Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the socia a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect the power of knowledge, objectified the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university semiotic insurrectionaries blasted their way out so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything
Universities may serve as progressive this does not detract from the military and corporate research and social conditioning within their walls they serve as machines for concentration of privilege a hyper educated society can only exist by the intense exploitation of the third world liberal seminars obfuscate that they are complicit in death and destruction Social death is banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our lack of meaning the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy modern cities are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are enrolling in a cemetery the cemeteries of a nation which has an absolute fixation with zombies The event is counter-offensive it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by perfecting its critiques, has generated its own antithesis zombies mark the dead end of capitalism’s accumulation because they embody this to excess they are the ideal resistance a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic Liberal student activists are most invested in the fate of the university they are insistent on saving the University when life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living Zombie Politics are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains knowledge, objectified the living dead awaken a passion for vertiginous disidentification at the core of our culture is the exclusion of the dead we risk failing to see that our lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates semiotic insurrectionaries burst into reality like a scream an anti-discourse that cannot be caught they resist every interpretation no longer denoting anything
Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other.¶ Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47]¶ ¶ Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations.¶ Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50]¶ In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw:¶ "at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53]¶ ¶ In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice:¶ ¶ "They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56]
7,659
<h4>The affirmative’s radical knowledge will only be funneled into the increasing legitimacy of the contemporary university – that makes regimes of social death inevitable</h4><p><u><strong>Occupied UC Berkeley in 2010</strong><mark> (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620) </p><p>Universities may serve as progressive </mark>sites of inquiry in some cases, yet <mark>this does not detract from the</mark> great deal of <strong><mark>military and corporate research</strong></mark>, economic planning <mark>and</mark>, perhaps most importantly, <strong><mark>social conditioning</strong></mark> occurring <mark>within their walls</u></mark>. Furthermore, <u><mark>they serve as</mark> intense <mark>machines for</mark> the <strong><mark>concentration of privilege</strong></mark>; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts</u>, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since <u><mark>a hyper educated</mark>, stable <mark>society</mark> along Western lines <mark>can only exist by the <strong>intense exploitation of</mark> labor and resources in <mark>the third world</u></strong></mark>. <u>Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; <mark>liberal seminars</mark> only serve to <mark>obfuscate</mark> the fact <mark>that <strong>they are</mark> themselves <mark>complicit in</mark> the <mark>death and destruction</strong></mark> waged on a daily basis</u>. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “<u><strong><mark>Social death</strong> is</mark> our <strong><mark>banal acceptance</strong> of an institution’s meaning for our</mark> own <strong><mark>lack of meaning</u></strong></mark>.”[43] Our conception of the <u>social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication,</u> <u><strong><mark>the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy</u></strong></mark>. Baudrillard writes that “<u>The cemetery no longer exists because <strong><mark>modern cities</mark> have entirely taken over their function</strong>: they <mark>are <strong>ghost towns, cities of death</u></strong></mark>. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, <u><strong><mark>ours is a culture of death</u></strong></mark>.”[44] <u><mark>By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are</mark> resigning ourselves to <mark>enrolling in</u></mark> what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls <u><strong><mark>a cemetery</mark>, a necropolis to rival no other</u></strong>.¶ Yet <u>herein lies the punch line. We are studying in <mark>the cemeteries of a nation which has</mark> a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; <strong><mark>an absolute fixation with zombies</strong></mark>.</u> So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “<u><mark>The event</mark> itself <mark>is <strong>counter-offensive</strong></mark> and comes from a strange source: in <strong>every system</strong> at its apex, at its point of perfection, <mark>it <strong>reintroduces negativity and death</u></strong></mark>.”[45] <u><mark>The University, by</mark> totalizing itself and <mark>perfecting its critiques, has</mark> spontaneously <strong><mark>generated its own antithesis</strong></mark>. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent.</u> According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “<u><strong><mark>zombies mark the dead end</mark> or zero degree <mark>of capitalism’s</mark> logic of endless consumption and ever expanding <mark>accumulation</strong></mark>, precisely <mark>because they embody this</mark> logic so literally and <mark>to</mark> such <mark>excess</u></mark>.”[46] In that sense, <u><mark>they are</mark> almost identical to the mass, <strong>the silent majorities</strong> that Baudrillard describe as <mark>the <strong>ideal</mark> form of <mark>resistance</strong></mark> to the socia</u>l: “they know that there is no liberation, and that <u><mark>a system is abolished only by <strong>pushing it into hyperlogic</strong></mark>, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization</u>.”[47]¶ ¶ Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, <u>students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction</u>; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations.¶ Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] <u><strong><mark>Liberal student activists</strong></mark> fear the incursions the most, as they <mark>are</mark> in many ways the <strong><mark>most invested in the fate of the</mark> contemporary <mark>university</u></strong></mark>; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For <u><mark>they are insistent on <strong>saving the University</mark>, on staying ‘alive’</strong>, even <mark>when</mark> their version of <mark>life has been <strong>stripped of all that makes life worth living</strong></mark>, when it is as good as social death</u>. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, <u>human survivors act so repugnantly that <strong>we celebrate their infection or demise</u></strong>.[50]¶ In reality, “<u><mark>Zombie Politics</mark> are something to be championed, because <strong>they <mark>are the politics of a multitude</u></strong></mark>, an inclusive mass of political subjects, <u><mark>seeking to <strong>consume brains</u></strong></mark>. Yet <u>brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect</u>”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “<u>the power of <mark>knowledge, objectified</u></mark>.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that <u><mark>the living dead</mark> are not radically Other so much as they serve to <mark>awaken a passion</mark> for otherness and <mark>for vertiginous disidentification</mark> that is already latent within our own selves</u>.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw:¶ "<u><mark>at the</mark> very <mark>core</mark> of the 'rationality' <mark>of our culture</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>is</mark> an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: <strong><mark>the exclusion of the dead</mark> and of death</u></strong>."[53]¶ ¶ In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that <u>power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence</u>. If we are to continue to use this conception, <u><mark>we risk failing to see that our</mark> very <mark>lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: <strong>the banal simulation of existence</u></strong></mark>. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] <u>Perhaps the reevaluation of <mark>zombie politics will serve as the <strong>messianic shift that blasts open the gates</mark> of hell, the cemetery-university</u></strong>. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about <u><mark>semiotic insurrectionaries</u></mark> might suffice:¶ ¶ "They <u><strong>blasted their way out</u></strong> however, <u>so as to <mark>burst into reality like a scream</mark>, an interjection, <mark>an anti-discourse</mark>, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element <mark>that <strong>cannot be caught</mark> by any organized discourse</u></strong>. Invincible due to their own poverty, <u><mark>they resist every interpretation</mark> and every connotation, <strong><mark>no longer denoting</mark> anyone or <mark>anything</u></strong></mark>."[56]</p>
1NC
null
Off
3,953
266
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,320
Only the alt solves - Thinking blackness through ontology and structural antagonism traps blackness in the prison of history
Koerner ‘12
Koerner ‘12 /Michelle, Professor of Comparative Literature @ UC-Berkeley, “Line of Escape: Gilles Deleuze’s Encounter with George Jackson” Genre, Vol. 44, No. 2 Summer 2011 DOI 10.1215/00166928-1260183/
What is inadequate to blackness is already given ontologies to think of blackness as a name for an ontology of becoming might transform our understanding of the relation of blackness to history and its specific capacity to “think [its] way out of the exclusionary constructions” of history Existing ontologies tend to reduce blackness to a historical condition, a “lived experience,” and in doing so effectively eradicate its unruly character as a transformative force. Deleuze and Guattari think this unruliness What History grasps of the event is lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency escapes History” To bring this relation between blackness and becoming — toward an affirmation of the unexpected event in its becoming we constantly encounter unexpected injections of ideas lines that appear all of sudden as though propelled by their own force. Many names schizoanalysis micropolitics pragmatics rhizomatics cartography but the crucial issue is to affirm an experimental practice that opposes itself to the interpretation proposing instead that we think of what it functions with or does it not transmit intensities?” This method can be seen as an effort to disrupt the hierarchical opposition between theory and practice to analyze the ways capitalism has developed makes three crucial distinctions with traditional theoretical approaches a “consideration of minorities rather than classes” the study of social “lines of flight” rather than the interpretation and critique of social contradictions the “line of flight” emerges directly in connection with Soledad Brother The concept affirms those social constructions that would neither be determined by preexisting structures nor caught in a dialectical contradiction. It names a force that is radically autonomous from existing ontologies, structures, and historical accounts It is for this reason D and G insist that society be thought of not as a “structure” but as a “machine,” because such a concept enables the thinking of the movements, energies, and intensities the lines of flight) that such machines transmit. The thinking of machines forces us not only to consider the social and historical labor involved in producing society but also the ongoing potentials of constructing new types of assemblages One of the key adversaries of this machinic approach is structuralist interpretations of society in terms of contradictions structuralism persisted in the “submission of the line to the point” and as a result produced a theory of subjectivity, and also an account of language and the unconscious, that could not think in terms of movement and construction Defining lines only in relation to finite points produces a calculable grid, determining structure of subjectivity is the extreme gridlocked position Opposed to this theoretical approach, diagrammatism maps vectors that generate an open space and the potentials rather than tracing the hidden structures of an intolerable system, D and G ’s method aims to map the ways out of it.
What is inadequate to blackness is already given ontologies to think of blackness as a name for an ontology of becoming might transform our understanding of the relation of blackness to history and its specific capacity to “think [its] way out of the exclusionary constructions” of history Existing ontologies tend to reduce blackness to a historical condition and effectively eradicate its unruly character What History grasps of the event is lived experience, but the event in its becoming escapes History” To bring this relation toward an affirmation of the unexpected the crucial issue is to affirm an experimental practice that opposes itself to the interpretation proposing instead that we think of what it functions with or does it not transmit intensities?” to analyze the ways capitalism has developed makes three crucial distinctions with traditional theoretical approaches a “consideration of minorities rather than classes”; the study of social “lines of flight” rather than interpretation The concept affirms those social constructions that would neither be determined by preexisting structures nor caught in a dialectical contradiction. It names a force that is radically autonomous from existing ontologies, structures, and historical accounts. society be thought of not as a “structure” but as a “machine,” because such a concept enables the thinking of movements and intensities that such machines transmit. The thinking forces us not only to consider labor involved in producing society but also ongoing potentials of constructing new assemblages One of the key adversaries is structuralist interpretations of society in terms of contradictions. structuralism produced a theory of subjectivity, and an account of language and unconscious, that could not think in terms of movement and construction. Defining lines only in relation to finite points produces a calculable grid determining structure is the extreme gridlocked position diagrammatism maps vectors that generate an open space rather than tracing the hidden structures of an intolerable system to map the ways out of it.
In “The Case of Blackness” Moten (2008b: 187) perceptively remarks, “What is inadequate to blackness is already given ontologies.” What if we were to think of blackness as a name for an ontology of becoming? How might such a thinking transform our understanding of the relation of blackness to history and its specific capacity to “think [its] way out of the exclusionary constructions” of history and the thinking of history (Moten 2008a: 1744)? Existing ontologies tend to reduce blackness to a historical condition, a “lived experience,” and in doing so effectively eradicate its unruly character as a transformative force. Deleuze and Guattari, I think, offer a compelling way to think of this unruliness when they write, “What History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its self- positing as concept, escapes History” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 110). To bring this relation between blackness and becoming further into the open — toward an affirmation of the unexpected insinuation of blackness signaled by the use of Jackson’s line as an “event in its becoming” — a few more words need be said about Deleuze’s method. The use of Jackson’s writing is just one instance of a procedure that we find repeated throughout Capitalism and Schizophrenia, where we constantly encounter unexpected injections of quotations, names, and ideas lifted from other texts, lines that appear all of sudden as though propelled by their own force. One might say they are deployed rather than explained or interpreted; as such, they produce textual events that readers may choose to ignore or pick up and run with. Many names are proposed for this method — “schizoanalysis, micropolitics, pragmatics, diagrammatism, rhizomatics, cartography” (Deleuze and Parnet [1977] 2006: 94) — but the crucial issue is to affirm an experimental practice that opposes itself to the interpretation of texts, proposing instead that we think of a book as “a little machine” and ask “what it functions with, in connection with what other things does it or does it not transmit intensities?” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987: 4).8 Studying how Soledad Brother functions in Deleuze’s books, connecting Jackson’s line to questions and historical issues that are not always explicitly addressed in those books, involves one in this action. And further, it opens new lines where the intensities transmitted in Jackson’s book make a claim on our own practice. This method can be seen as an effort to disrupt the hierarchical opposition between theory and practice and to challenge some of the major assumptions of Western Marxism. In an interview with Antonio Negri in the 1990s, Deleuze (1997: 171) clarifies that he and Guattari have “remained Marxists” in their concern to analyze the ways capitalism has developed but that their political philosophy makes three crucial distinctions with respect to more traditional theoretical approaches: first, a thinking of “war machines” as opposed to state theory; second, a “consideration of minorities rather than classes”; and finally, the study of social “lines of flight” rather than the interpretation and critique of social contradictions. Each of these distinctions, as we will see, resonates with Jackson’s political philosophy, but as the passage from Anti-Oedipus demonstrates, the concept of the “line of flight” emerges directly in connection to Deleuze and Guattari’s encounter with Soledad Brother. The concept affirms those social constructions that would neither be determined by preexisting structures nor caught in a dialectical contradiction. It names a force that is radically autonomous from existing ontologies, structures, and historical accounts. It is above all for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari insist that society be thought of not as a “structure” but as a “machine,” because such a concept enables the thinking of the movements, energies, and intensities (i.e., the lines of flight) that such machines transmit. The thinking of machines forces us not only to consider the social and historical labor involved in producing society but also the ongoing potentials of constructing new types of assemblages (agencement). One of the key adversaries of this machinic approach is “interpretation” and more specifically structuralist interpretations of society in terms of contradictions. According to Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987: 293), structuralism persisted in the “submission of the line to the point” and as a result produced a theory of subjectivity, and also an account of language and the unconscious, that could not think in terms of movement and construction. Defining lines only in relation to finite points (the subject, the signifier) produces a calculable grid, a structure that then appears as the hidden intelligibility of the system and of society generally. Louis Althusser’s account of the “ideological State apparatus” as the determining structure of subjectivity is perhaps the extreme expression of this gridlocked position (an example we will come back to in a later section). Opposed to this theoretical approach, diagrammatism (to invoke one of the terms given for this method) maps vectors that generate an open space and the potentials for giving consistency to the latter.9 In other words, rather than tracing the hidden structures of an intolerable system, Deleuze and Guattari’s method aims to map the ways out of it.
5,500
<h4>Only the alt solves - Thinking blackness through ontology and structural antagonism traps blackness in the prison of history</h4><p><u><strong>Koerner ‘12</u></strong> /Michelle, Professor of Comparative Literature @ UC-Berkeley, “Line of Escape: Gilles Deleuze’s Encounter with George Jackson” Genre, Vol. 44, No. 2 Summer 2011 DOI 10.1215/00166928-1260183/</p><p>In “The Case of Blackness” Moten (2008b: 187) perceptively remarks, “<u><mark>What is inadequate to blackness is already given ontologies</u></mark>.” What if we were <u><mark>to think of blackness as a name for an ontology of becoming</u></mark>? How <u><mark>might</u></mark> such a thinking <u><mark>transform our understanding of the relation of blackness to history and its specific capacity to “think [its] way out of the exclusionary constructions” of history</u></mark> and the thinking of history (Moten 2008a: 1744)? <u><mark>Existing ontologies tend to reduce blackness to a historical condition</mark>,</u> <u>a “lived experience,” <mark>and</mark> in doing so <mark>effectively eradicate its unruly character</mark> as a transformative force.</u> <u>Deleuze and Guattari</u>, I think, offer a compelling way to <u>think</u> of <u>this unruliness</u> when they write, “<u><mark>What History grasps of the event is</u></mark> its effectuation in states of affairs or in <u><mark>lived experience, but the event in its becoming</mark>, in its specific consistency</u>, in its self- positing as concept, <u><mark>escapes History”</u></mark> (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 110). <u><mark>To bring this relation</mark> between blackness and becoming</u> further into the open <u>— <mark>toward an affirmation</u> <u>of the unexpected</u></mark> insinuation of blackness signaled by the use of Jackson’s line as an “<u>event in its becoming</u>” — a few more words need be said about Deleuze’s method. The use of Jackson’s writing is just one instance of a procedure that we find repeated throughout Capitalism and Schizophrenia, where <u>we constantly encounter unexpected injections of</u> quotations, names, and <u>ideas</u> lifted from other texts, <u>lines that appear all of sudden as though propelled by their own force.</u> One might say they are deployed rather than explained or interpreted; as such, they produce textual events that readers may choose to ignore or pick up and run with. <u>Many names</u> are proposed for this method — “<u>schizoanalysis</u>, <u>micropolitics</u>, <u>pragmatics</u>, diagrammatism, <u>rhizomatics</u>, <u>cartography</u>” (Deleuze and Parnet [1977] 2006: 94) — <u>but <mark>the crucial issue is to affirm an experimental practice that opposes itself to the interpretation</u></mark> of texts, <u><mark>proposing instead that we think of</u></mark> a book as “a little machine” and ask “<u><mark>what it functions with</u></mark>, in connection with what other things does it <u><mark>or does it not transmit intensities?”</u></mark> (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987: 4).8 Studying how Soledad Brother functions in Deleuze’s books, connecting Jackson’s line to questions and historical issues that are not always explicitly addressed in those books, involves one in this action. And further, it opens new lines where the intensities transmitted in Jackson’s book make a claim on our own practice. <u>This method can be seen as an effort to disrupt the hierarchical opposition between theory and practice</u> and to challenge some of the major assumptions of Western Marxism. In an interview with Antonio Negri in the 1990s, Deleuze (1997: 171) clarifies that he and Guattari have “remained Marxists” in their concern <u><mark>to analyze the ways capitalism has developed</u></mark> but that their political philosophy <u><mark>makes three crucial distinctions with</u></mark> respect to more <u><mark>traditional theoretical approaches</u></mark>: first, a thinking of “war machines” as opposed to state theory; second, <u><mark>a “consideration of minorities rather than classes”</u>;</mark> and finally, <u><mark>the study of social “lines of flight” rather than</mark> the <mark>interpretation</mark> and critique of social contradictions</u>. Each of these distinctions, as we will see, resonates with Jackson’s political philosophy, but as the passage from Anti-Oedipus demonstrates, the concept of <u>the “line of flight” emerges directly in connection</u> to Deleuze and Guattari’s encounter <u>with Soledad Brother</u>. <u><mark>The concept affirms those social constructions that would neither be determined by preexisting structures nor caught in a dialectical contradiction. It names a force that is radically autonomous from existing ontologies, structures, and historical accounts</u>.</mark> <u>It is</u> above all <u>for this reason</u> that <u>D</u>eleuze <u>and G</u>uattari <u>insist that <mark>society be thought of not as a “structure” but as a “machine,”</u> <u>because such a concept enables the thinking of</mark> the <mark>movements</mark>, energies, <mark>and intensities</u></mark> (i.e., <u>the lines of flight) <mark>that such machines transmit. The thinking</mark> of machines <mark>forces us not only to consider</mark> the social and historical <mark>labor involved in producing society but also</mark> the <mark>ongoing potentials of constructing new</mark> types of <mark>assemblages</u></mark> (agencement). <u><mark>One of the key adversaries</mark> of this machinic approach <mark>is</mark> </u>“interpretation” and more specifically <u><mark>structuralist interpretations of society in terms of contradictions</u>.</mark> According to Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987: 293), <u><mark>structuralism</mark> persisted in the “submission of the line to the point” and as a result <mark>produced a theory of subjectivity, and</mark> also <mark>an account of language and</mark> the <mark>unconscious, that could not think in terms of movement and construction</u>.</mark> <u><mark>Defining lines only in relation to finite points</u></mark> (the subject, the signifier) <u><mark>produces a calculable grid</mark>,</u> a structure that then appears as the hidden intelligibility of the system and of society generally. Louis Althusser’s account of the “ideological State apparatus” as the <u><mark>determining structure</mark> of subjectivity</u> <u><mark>is</u></mark> perhaps <u><mark>the extreme</u></mark> expression of this <u><mark>gridlocked position</u></mark> (an example we will come back to in a later section). <u>Opposed to this theoretical approach, <mark>diagrammatism</u></mark> (to invoke one of the terms given for this method) <u><mark>maps vectors that generate an open space</mark> and the potentials</u> for giving consistency to the latter.9 In other words, <u><mark>rather than tracing the hidden structures of an intolerable system</mark>, D</u>eleuze <u>and G</u>uattari<u>’s method aims <mark>to map the ways out of it.</p></u></mark>
1NR
Faciality
Alt
5,056
33
17,008
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
564,714
N
UNLV
Quarters
Iowa KL
Shooter, Jason Russel, Michael Eisenstadt
1ac was black mothering 1nc was damage centrism k faciality k and case 2nc was damage and case 1nr was faciality 2nr was faciality
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,321
350 ppm is the red-line threshold – fast-forcing and positive feedbacks mean anything above that is catastrophic
McKibben 7
McKibben 7 (Bill McKibben, Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College, American environmentalist, author, and journalist who has written extensively on the impact of global warming, no date, but website was founded in 2007 so whatever, http://www.350.org/en/node/48)
The question of what target to aim for against global warming has always been vexed, and for one simple reason: filling the atmosphere with carbon is at base a huge experiment, one we've never conducted before. in the late 1980s we used 550 parts per million CO2—mostly because it was double the pre-Industrial Revolution concentrations and hence easy to model. As time went on, it became clearer that the dangerous thresholds lay somewhere lower, and we began to use 450 parts per million, or 2 degrees Celsius. Science doesn't actually know if 450 ppm and 2 degrees are the same thing these were guesses not based on actual experience In the summer of 2007, though, with the rapid melt of Arctic ice, it became clear that we had already crossed serious thresholds. A number of other signs pointed in the same direction: the spike in methane emissions, likely from thawing permafrost; the melt of high-altitude glacier systems and perennial snowpack in Asia, Europe, South America and North America; the rapid and unexpected acidification of seawater. All of these implied the same thing: wherever the red line for danger was, we were already past it Jim Hansen gave us a new number, verified for the first time by real-time observation (and new paleo-climatic data). They said that 350 parts per million CO2 was the upper limit if we wished to have a planet "similar to the one on which civilization developed and to which life on earth is adapted." That number is unrefuted; indeed, a constant flow of additional evidence supports it from many directions. Just this week, for instance, oceanographers reported that longterm atmospheric levels above 360 ppm would doom coral reefs worldwide. It is no longer possible to defend higher targets as a bulwark against catastrophic change. climate change was already claiming 300,000 lives per year If the Arctic melts at less than one degree, then two degrees can't be a real target. This is simply how science works. New information drives out the old. targets like 450 implies—to policy makers that we still have atmosphere left in which to put more carbon We don't—not with feedback loops like methane release starting to kick in with a vengeance It's the difference between a doctor telling you that you really should think about changing your diet and a doctor telling you your cholesterol is already too high and a heart attack is imminent. small island nations and less developed country governments have joined leaders like Al Gore in enunciating firmly the 350 target, and equating it with survival. arguing for 350 is not making "the perfect the enemy of the good." It's making the necessary the enemy of the convenient. Physics and chemistry have laid their cards on the table: above 350 the world doesn't work. They are not going to negotiate further. It's up to us to figure out, this year and in the years ahead, how to meet their bottom line.
550 and 450 p p m were guesses the rapid melt of Arctic ice spike in methane emissions melt of high-altitude glacier systems acidification of seawater. All implied a new number, verified by real-time observation (and paleo-climatic data 350 p p m was the upper limit if we wished to have a planet That number is unrefuted a constant flow of additional evidence supports it It is no longer possible to defend higher targets as a bulwark against catastrophic change This is simply how science works. New information drives out the old governments have joined 350 equating it with survival not making "the perfect the enemy of the good." It's making the necessary the enemy of the convenient Physics and chemistry have laid their cards on the table: above 350 the world doesn't work. They are not going to negotiate further
The question of what target to aim for in the fight against global warming has always been vexed, and for one simple reason: filling the atmosphere with carbon is at base a huge experiment, one we've never conducted before. It's always been tough to judge exactly where the danger lies. At first in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the number we routinely used was 550 parts per million CO2—mostly because it was double the pre-Industrial Revolution concentrations and hence easy to model. But it became something of a red line through dint of sheer repetition—I remember writing an op-ed for the New York Times excoriating the Clinton administration for hinting that it might be okay to go past a 550 ceiling. As time went on, it became clearer that the dangerous thresholds lay somewhere lower, and we began to use—almost interchangeably—450 parts per million, or 2 degrees Celsius. Science doesn't actually know if 450 ppm and 2 degrees are the same thing, and no one knows how much change they would produce. Again, these were guesses for the point at which catastrophic damage would begin—they were more plausible, but still not based on actual experience. They also reflected guesses of what was politically possible to achieve. They were completely defensible, given the lack of data (though the 2C target was always problematic strategically since Americans don't use centigrade measurements and hence have no real idea what 2 degrees Celsius means.) In the summer of 2007, though, with the rapid melt of Arctic ice, it became clear that we had already crossed serious thresholds. A number of other signs pointed in the same direction: the spike in methane emissions, likely from thawing permafrost; the melt of high-altitude glacier systems and perennial snowpack in Asia, Europe, South America and North America; the rapid and unexpected acidification of seawater. All of these implied the same thing: wherever the red line for danger was, we were already past it, even though the atmospheric concentration of CO2 was only 390 parts per million, and the temperature increase still a shade below 1 degree C. In early 2008, Jim Hansen and a team of researchers gave us a new number, verified for the first time by real-time observation (and also by reams of new paleo-climatic data). They said that 350 parts per million CO2 was the upper limit if we wished to have a planet "similar to the one on which civilization developed and to which life on earth is adapted." That number is unrefuted; indeed, a constant flow of additional evidence supports it from many directions. Just this week, for instance, oceanographers reported that longterm atmospheric levels above 360 ppm would doom coral reefs worldwide. It is, therefore, no longer possible to defend higher targets as a bulwark against catastrophic change. The Global Humanitarian Forum reported recently that climate change was already claiming 300,000 lives per year—that should qualify as catastrophic. A new Oxfam report makes very clear the degree of suffering caused by the warming we've already seen, and adds "Warming of 2 degrees C entails a devastating future for at least 600 million people," almost all of them innocent of any role in causing this trouble. If the Arctic melts at less than one degree, then two degrees can't be a real target. This is simply how science works. New information drives out the old. You could, logically, defend targets like 450 or 2 degrees C as the best we could hope for politically, especially if you add that they represent absolute upper limits that we must bounce back below as quickly as possible. But even that is politically problematic, because it implies—to policy makers and the general public—that we still have atmosphere left in which to put more carbon, and time to gradually adjust policies. We don't—not with feedback loops like methane release starting to kick in with a vengeance. It is, we think, far wiser to tell people the best science, in part because it motivates action. It's the difference between a doctor telling you that you really should think about changing your diet and a doctor telling you your cholesterol is already too high and a heart attack is imminent. The second scenario is the one that gets your attention. A number of small island nations and less developed country governments have joined leaders like Al Gore in enunciating firmly the 350 target, and equating it with survival. Climate coalition groups like TckTckTck have also endorsed the target, as have a growing coalition of hundreds of organizational allies. Here's the important thing to remember: arguing for 350 is not making "the perfect the enemy of the good." It's making the necessary the enemy of the convenient. We were aware that we wouldn't get an agreement in Copenhagen that rapidly returns us to 350—even if we do everything right it will take decades for the world's oceans and forests to absorb the excess carbon we've already poured into the atmosphere. But that's why we've got to get going now—and at the very least we have a number to explain why the agreement that did emerge is insufficient and needs to be revised quickly and regularly. We can use it to make Copenhagen a real beginning, not an end for years to come the way Kyoto was. In the end, everyone needs to remember that the goal at Copenhagen was not to get a "victory," not to sign an agreement. It's to actually take steps commensurate with the problem. And those steps are dictated, in the end, by science. This negotiation, on the surface, is between America and China and the EU and India and the developing world; between industry and environmentalists; between old and new technology. But at root the real negotiation is between human beings on the one hand, and physics and chemistry on the other. Physics and chemistry have laid their cards on the table: above 350 the world doesn't work. They are not going to negotiate further. It's up to us to figure out, this year and in the years ahead, how to meet their bottom line.
6,025
<h4>350 ppm is the red-line threshold – fast-forcing and positive feedbacks mean anything above that is catastrophic</h4><p><u><strong>McKibben 7</u></strong> (Bill McKibben, Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury College, American environmentalist, author, and journalist who has written extensively on the impact of global warming, no date, but website was founded in 2007 so whatever, http://www.350.org/en/node/48<u>)</p><p>The question of what target to aim for</u> in the fight <u>against global warming has always been vexed, and for one simple reason: filling the atmosphere with carbon is at base a huge experiment, one we've never conducted before.</u> It's always been tough to judge exactly where the danger lies. At first <u>in the late 1980s</u> and early 1990s, the number <u>we</u> routinely <u>used</u> was <u><mark>550 </mark>parts per million CO2—mostly because it was double the pre-Industrial Revolution concentrations and hence easy to model.</u> But it became something of a red line through dint of sheer repetition—I remember writing an op-ed for the New York Times excoriating the Clinton administration for hinting that it might be okay to go past a 550 ceiling. <u>As time went on, it became clearer that the dangerous thresholds lay somewhere lower, <mark>and </mark>we began to use</u>—almost interchangeably—<u><mark>450 p</mark>arts <mark>p</mark>er <mark>m</mark>illion, or 2 degrees Celsius. Science doesn't actually know if 450 ppm and 2 degrees are the same thing</u>, and no one knows how much change they would produce. Again, <u>these <mark>were guesses</u> </mark>for the point at which catastrophic damage would begin—they were more plausible, but still <u>not based on actual experience</u>. They also reflected guesses of what was politically possible to achieve. They were completely defensible, given the lack of data (though the 2C target was always problematic strategically since Americans don't use centigrade measurements and hence have no real idea what 2 degrees Celsius means.) <u>In the summer of 2007, though, with <mark>the rapid melt of Arctic ice</mark>, it became clear that we had already crossed serious thresholds. A number of other signs pointed in the same direction: the <mark>spike in methane emissions</mark>, likely from thawing permafrost; the <mark>melt of high-altitude glacier systems </mark>and perennial snowpack in Asia, Europe, South America and North America; the rapid and unexpected <mark>acidification of seawater. All </mark>of these <mark>implied </mark>the same thing: <strong>wherever the red line for danger was, we were already past it</u></strong>, even though the atmospheric concentration of CO2 was only 390 parts per million, and the temperature increase still a shade below 1 degree C. In early 2008, <u>Jim Hansen </u>and a team of researchers <u>gave us <mark>a new number, <strong>verified </mark>for the first time <mark>by real-time observation (and</u></strong></mark> also by reams of <u><strong>new <mark>paleo-climatic data</mark>). They said that <mark>350 p</mark>arts <mark>p</mark>er <mark>m</mark>illion CO2 <mark>was the upper limit if we wished to have a planet</strong> </mark>"similar to the one on which civilization developed and to which life on earth is adapted." <strong><mark>That number is unrefuted</mark>; indeed, <mark>a constant flow of additional evidence supports it </mark>from many directions</strong>. Just this week, for instance, oceanographers reported that longterm atmospheric levels above 360 ppm would doom coral reefs worldwide. <mark>It is</u></mark>, therefore, <u><strong><mark>no longer possible to defend higher targets as a bulwark against catastrophic change</mark>. </u></strong>The Global Humanitarian Forum reported recently that <u>climate change was already claiming 300,000 lives per year</u>—that should qualify as catastrophic. A new Oxfam report makes very clear the degree of suffering caused by the warming we've already seen, and adds "Warming of 2 degrees C entails a devastating future for at least 600 million people," almost all of them innocent of any role in causing this trouble. <u>If the Arctic melts at less than one degree, then two degrees can't be a real target. <strong><mark>This is simply how science works</strong>. New information drives out the old</mark>. </u>You could, logically, defend <u>targets like 450</u> or 2 degrees C as the best we could hope for politically, especially if you add that they represent absolute upper limits that we must bounce back below as quickly as possible. But even that is politically problematic, because it <u>implies—to policy makers</u> and the general public—<u>that we still have atmosphere left in which to put more carbon</u>, and time to gradually adjust policies. <u>We don't—not with feedback loops like methane release starting to kick in with a vengeance</u>. It is, we think, far wiser to tell people the best science, in part because it motivates action. <u>It's the difference between a doctor telling you that you really should think about changing your diet and a doctor telling you your cholesterol is already too high and a heart attack is imminent. </u>The second scenario is the one that gets your attention. A number of <u>small island nations and less developed country <mark>governments have joined </mark>leaders like Al Gore in enunciating firmly the <mark>350 </mark>target, and <strong><mark>equating it with survival</mark>.</u></strong> Climate coalition groups like TckTckTck have also endorsed the target, as have a growing coalition of hundreds of organizational allies. Here's the important thing to remember: <u>arguing for 350 is <mark>not making "the perfect the enemy of the good." It's making the necessary the enemy of the convenient</mark>. </u>We were aware that we wouldn't get an agreement in Copenhagen that rapidly returns us to 350—even if we do everything right it will take decades for the world's oceans and forests to absorb the excess carbon we've already poured into the atmosphere. But that's why we've got to get going now—and at the very least we have a number to explain why the agreement that did emerge is insufficient and needs to be revised quickly and regularly. We can use it to make Copenhagen a real beginning, not an end for years to come the way Kyoto was. In the end, everyone needs to remember that the goal at Copenhagen was not to get a "victory," not to sign an agreement. It's to actually take steps commensurate with the problem. And those steps are dictated, in the end, by science. This negotiation, on the surface, is between America and China and the EU and India and the developing world; between industry and environmentalists; between old and new technology. But at root the real negotiation is between human beings on the one hand, and physics and chemistry on the other. <u><strong><mark>Physics and chemistry have laid their cards on the table: above 350 the world doesn't work. They are not going to negotiate further</strong></mark>. It's up to us to figure out, this year and in the years ahead, how to meet their bottom line.</p></u>
1NR
Hemp
Too late sry
138,074
42
17,003
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
564,710
N
UNLV
1
Whitman DL
Justin Kirk
1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,322
But actually we’re at 400 ppm
Thompson 6-14
Thompson 6-14
SJE June will be the third month in a row with average carbon dioxide levels above 400 p p m it serves to show how much carbon dioxide has been put into the atmosphere since preindustrial times prominent climate scientists have said that amount of warming will still be too much.
null
Andrea, Climate Central reporter, “New CO2 Milestone: 3 Months Above 400 PPM” http://www.climatecentral.org/news/co2-milestone-400-ppm-climate-17692 SJE April fell first. It lasted through May. Now June will be the third month in a row with average carbon dioxide levels above 400 parts per million.¶ Atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gas, which helps drive global warming, haven’t been this high in somewhere between 800,000 and 15 million years.¶ Click image to enlarge.¶ And while the 400 ppm mark is somewhat symbolic (as the increase in warming between 399 ppm and 400 ppm is small), it serves to show how much carbon dioxide has been put into the atmosphere since preindustrial times, when concentrations were around 280 ppm. The increase in this and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has warmed Earth’s average temperature by 1.6°F since the beginning of the 20th century. World leaders agreed at a UN summit in 2009 to limit warming to 3.6°F, but prominent climate scientists like James Hansen have said that amount of warming will still be too much.
1,076
<h4><u><strong>But actually we’re at 400 ppm</h4><p>Thompson 6-14</p><p></u></strong>Andrea, Climate Central reporter, “New CO2 Milestone: 3 Months Above 400 PPM” http://www.climatecentral.org/news/co2-milestone-400-ppm-climate-17692<u> SJE</p><p></u>April fell first. It lasted through May. Now <u>June will be the third month in a row with average carbon dioxide levels above 400</u> <u>p</u>arts <u>p</u>er <u>m</u>illion.¶ Atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gas, which helps drive global warming, haven’t been this high in somewhere between 800,000 and 15 million years.¶ Click image to enlarge.¶ And while the 400 ppm mark is somewhat symbolic (as the increase in warming between 399 ppm and 400 ppm is small), <u>it serves to show how much carbon dioxide has been put into the atmosphere since preindustrial times</u>, when concentrations were around 280 ppm. The increase in this and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has warmed Earth’s average temperature by 1.6°F since the beginning of the 20th century. World leaders agreed at a UN summit in 2009 to limit warming to 3.6°F, but <u>prominent climate scientists</u> like James Hansen <u>have said that amount of warming will still be too much.</p></u>
1NR
Hemp
Too late sry
429,990
4
17,003
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
564,710
N
UNLV
1
Whitman DL
Justin Kirk
1ac was marijuana with cartels and hemp 1nc was t legalization spec security k neolib k and case 2nc was security and case 1nr was neolib and case 2nr was neolib and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round1.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,323
Damage-centered research produces an affective economy of paternalism that creates a model of personhood for the subaltern where to be human, they must be in pain and they dare not resist or suffer the consequences – such a colonial subjectivity re-inscribes the primacy of state power
Tuck and Yang 14. ) //MD
Tuck and Yang 14. (Eve Tuck – professor of educational studies and coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz, K Wayne Yang – professor of ethnic studies at UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf) //MD Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that educational research and much of social science research has been concerned with documenting damage, or empirically substantiating the oppression and pain of Native communities, urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be recorded or proven in order to convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These reparations presumably take the form of additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this theory of change1 as both colonial and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated, and because it requires disenfranchised communities to position themselves as both singularly defective and powerless to make change (2010). Finally, Eve has observed that “won” reparations rarely become reality, and that in many cases, communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they are broken.
at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demonstrated fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised” is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related fields. much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. many individual scholars have chosen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the academy is about. No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain” The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars Hartman discusses how recognizing the personhood of slaves enhanced the power of the Southern slaveowning class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human new laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous with injury” while simultaneously authorizing necessary violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection” Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. “[T]he recognition of humanity require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person” slave-as-victim as human accordingly establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence. “Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of subjugation and pained existence?”
at the center is the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s fascination with retelling pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and consumptive implacability. . pain narratives are what the academy is about. No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. in such a way that it has become mine, my own. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. the forces say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak your pain” new laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous with injury” while simultaneously authorizing necessary violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection” Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. slave-as-victim as human accordingly establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence.
Similarly, at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demonstrated fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised” (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related fields. We observe that much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. At first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while many individual scholars have chosen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the academy is about. In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990) portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus: No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. (p. 343) Hooks’s words resonate with our observation of how much of social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. Further, this passage describes the ways in which the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain” (hooks, 1990, p. 343). The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars (Hartman, 1997, 2007; Tuck, 2009). In Scenes of Subjection, Sadiya Hartman (1997) discusses how recognizing the personhood of slaves enhanced the power of the Southern slaveowning class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human (Hartman, 2007). In response, new laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous with injury” (Hartman, 1997, p. 93), while simultaneously authorizing necessary violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection” (p. 55). Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his abjection. You are in pain, therefore you are. “[T]he recognition of humanity require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person” (p. 55). Furthermore, Hartman describes how slave-as-victim as human accordingly establishes slave-as-agent as criminal. Applying Hartman’s analysis, we note how the agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as outsider violence that humane society must reject while simultaneously upholding the legitimated violence of the state to punish such outsider violence. Hartman asks, “Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of subjugation and pained existence?” (p. 55).
4,711
<h4><u>Damage-centered research produces an affective economy of paternalism that creates a model of personhood for the subaltern where to be human, they must be in pain and they dare not resist or suffer the consequences – such a colonial subjectivity re-inscribes the primacy of state power</h4><p><strong>Tuck and Yang 14. </u></strong>(Eve Tuck – professor of educational studies and coordinator of Native American Studies at the State University of New York at New Paltz, K Wayne Yang – professor of ethnic studies at UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf<u><strong>) //MD</p><p></u></strong>Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that <u><mark>educational </mark>research <mark>and</mark> much of <mark>social science research has been concerned with documenting damage, or empirically substantiating the </mark>oppression and <mark>pain of</mark> Native communities, urban communities, and other <mark>disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be recorded</mark> or proven <mark>in order to convince an <strong>outside adjudicator</strong> that reparations are deserved. These </mark>reparations presumably <mark>take the form of</mark> additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, <mark>political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this </mark>theory of change1 <mark>as</mark> both <mark>colonial </mark>and flawed, <mark>because it relies upon <strong>Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated</strong>, and </mark>because it <mark>requires disenfranchised communities to <strong>position themselves</strong> as</mark> both singularly defective and <mark>powerless to make change</u></mark> (2010). Finally, <u>Eve has observed that “won” <mark>reparations rarely become reality, and</mark> that</u> in many cases, <u><mark>communities are left with a narrative that <strong></mark>tells them that they are broken.</p><p></u></strong>Similarly, <u><mark>at the center </mark>of the analysis in this chapter <mark>is </mark>a concern with <mark>the fixation social science research has exhibited in <strong>eliciting pain stories</strong> from communities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s </mark>demonstrated <mark>fascination with <strong></mark>telling and <mark>retelling</strong> </mark>narratives of <mark>pain is troubling, both for its <strong>voyeurism</strong> and </mark>for its <strong><mark>consumptive implacability.</strong> </mark>Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised”</u> (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) <u>is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related fields.</u> We observe that <u>much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice<mark>.</u></mark> At first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while <u>many individual scholars have chosen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of <mark>pain narratives </mark>and the theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they <mark>are </mark>indeed <strong><mark>what the academy is about.</p><p></u></strong></mark>In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990) portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus: <u><mark>No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself.</mark> <strong>No need to hear your voice.</strong> <strong><mark>Only tell me about your pain.</strong> I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. </mark>Tell it back to you <mark>in such a way that it has become mine, my own. </mark>Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. <mark>I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk.</mark> </u>(p. 343)</p><p>Hooks’s words resonate with our observation of how much of <u>social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain.</u> Further, this passage describes the ways in which <u>the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by <strong>the voices on the margins.</u></strong> <u>The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet <mark>the forces </mark>that invite those on the margins to speak also <mark>say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. </mark>Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. <strong><mark>Only speak your pain”</u></strong></mark> (hooks, 1990, p. 343).</p><p><u>The costs of a politics of recognition that is rooted in naming pain have been critiqued by recent decolonizing and feminist scholars</u> (Hartman, 1997, 2007; Tuck, 2009). In Scenes of Subjection, Sadiya <u>Hartman</u> (1997) <u>discusses how recognizing the personhood of slaves <strong>enhanced the power</strong> of the Southern slaveowning class. Supplicating narratives of former slaves were deployed effectively by abolitionists, mainly White, well-to-do, Northern women, to generate portraits of abuse that ergo recognize slaves as human</u> (Hartman, 2007). In response, <u><mark>new laws afforded minimal standards of existence, “making personhood coterminous with injury”</u></mark> (Hartman, 1997, p. 93), <u><mark>while simultaneously authorizing necessary violence to suppress slave agency. The slave emerges as a legal person only when seen as criminal or “a violated body in need of limited forms of protection”</u></mark> (p. 55). <u><mark>Recognition “humanizes” the slave, but is predicated upon her or his abjection. <strong>You are in pain, therefore you are.</u></strong> <u></mark>“[T]he recognition of humanity require[s] the event of excessive violence, cruelty beyond the limits of the socially tolerable, in order to acknowledge and protect the slave’s person”</u> (p. 55). Furthermore, Hartman describes how <u><strong><mark>slave-as-victim as human accordingly establishes slave-as-agent as criminal.</u></strong></mark> Applying Hartman’s analysis, we note how the <u><mark>agency of Margaret Garner or Nat Turner can only be viewed as <strong>outsider violence</strong> that humane society must <strong>reject</strong> while simultaneously upholding the <strong>legitimated violence</strong> of the state to punish such outsider violence.</u></mark> Hartman asks, <u>“Is it possible that such recognition effectively forecloses agency as the object of punishment . . . Or is this limited conferral of humanity merely a reinscription of subjugation and pained existence?”</u> (p. 55).</p>
1NC
null
Off
20,541
516
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,324
We must exhaust the 1AC through an act of radical passivity which forces the system to commit suicide – such a project is necessary to prevent the absorption of all resistance into the furthering of the sovereign juridical matrix
Bifo 11
Bifo 11 Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, pg. 104-108
Time is in the mind The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level we are here touching upon a crucial point Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide So hostages are taken On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity No need for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it it was party to its own destruction . The West has become suicidal, and declared war on itself In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism adopt the mode of passivity A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years the most powerful weapon has been suicide 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal The exchange between life and money could be deserted exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.
Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as energetic mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization The prolif of simulacra has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising have submitted the energies permanent mobilization exhaustion is the only way of escape:¶ Nothing, can avoid the symbolic obligation, The system must itself commit suicide in response to the challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken , from which every moral consideration victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial ac No need for a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects The West has become suicidal exhaustion is seen as the inability body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: exhaustion could become a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much , and outrageously too much during the last thirty years is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa The exchange between life and money could be deserted, exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out economic growth the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth
Time is in the mind. The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level. I think that we are here touching upon a crucial point. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions. But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.¶ Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction. It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]¶ The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)¶ Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality. And the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely.
 The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape:¶ Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed.¶ The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
 I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.
9,709
<h4><u><strong>We must exhaust the 1AC through an act of radical passivity which forces the system to commit suicide – such a project is necessary to prevent the absorption of all resistance into the furthering of the sovereign juridical matrix</h4><p>Bifo 11</p><p></u></strong>Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, <u>pg. 104-108</p><p>Time is in the mind</u>. <u>The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level</u>. I think that <u>we are here touching upon a crucial point</u>. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. <u><mark>Modern radical thought has always <strong>seen the process of subjectivation</strong></mark> <mark>as</mark> an <strong><mark>energetic</mark> process</strong>: <strong><mark>mobilization</strong>, social <strong>desire</strong> and political <strong>activism</strong>, expression, <strong>participation</strong> have been the modes of conscious collective</mark> subjectivation in the age of the revolutions</u>. <u>But in our age <strong><mark>energy is running out</strong>, and <strong>desire</strong> which has given soul to modern social dynamics is <strong>absorbed in the black hole of virtualization</mark> and financial games</u></strong>, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.¶ Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, <u>the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction</u>. <u>It becomes reality for its own sake, the <strong>fetishism of the lost object</u></strong>: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]¶ The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. <u>Today the whole system is <strong>swamped by indeterminacy</strong>, and every reality is <strong>absorbed by the hyperreality</strong> of the code and simulation</u>. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. <u>We must therefore <strong>reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value</strong> and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system</u>. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. <u>The entire apparatus of <strong>the commodity law of value</strong> is <strong>absorbed and recycled</strong> in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra</u>. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)¶ Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. <u><strong>The brain is the market</strong>, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality</u>. And <u>the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely</u>.
 The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. <u><mark>The <strong>prolif</mark>eration <mark>of simulacra</strong></mark> in the info-sphere <mark>has <strong>saturated</strong> the space of <strong>attention and imagination</u></strong>.</mark> <u><mark>Advertising</mark> and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), <mark>have <strong>submitted the energies</strong></mark> of the social psyche to <strong><mark>permanent mobilization</u></strong></mark>. <u>Exhaustion follows, and <strong><mark>exhaustion is the only way of escape</u></strong>:¶ <u>Nothing, </mark>not even the system, <strong><mark>can avoid the symbolic obligation</strong>, </mark>and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains</u>. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. <u><mark>The system <strong>must itself commit suicide</strong> in response to the</mark> multiplied <strong><mark>challenge of death and suicide</u></strong>. <u><strong>So hostages are taken</u></strong></mark>. <u>On the symbolic or sacrificial plane<mark>, from which every moral consideration</mark> of the innocence of the <mark>victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute</mark>, the alter-ego of the terrorist, <mark>the hostage’s death for the terrorist. <strong>Hostage and terrorist</strong> may thereafter become <strong>confused</strong> in the same sacrificial ac</mark>t</u>. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. <u>Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ <u><mark>No need</u></mark>, then, <u><mark>for a</mark> death drive or a <mark>destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects</mark>.</u> Very logically – inexorably – <u>the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it</u>. And <u>it was party to its own destruction</u>. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can<u>. <mark>The West</u></mark>, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), <u><mark>has become suicidal</mark>, and declared war on itself</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ <u>In the activist view <mark>exhaustion is seen as the inability</mark> of the social <mark>body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared:</mark> deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle</u>. But <u><strong><mark>exhaustion</strong> could</mark> also <mark>become </mark>the beginning of <strong>a slow movement</strong> towards <mark>a “wu wei” civilization, based on the <strong>withdrawal</strong>, and frugal expectations of life and consumption</u>. <u>Radicalism could abandon</mark> the mode of <mark>activism</u>, and <u><strong>adopt the mode of passivity</u></strong>. <u>A <strong>radical passivity</strong> would</mark> definitely <strong><mark>threaten the ethos</strong> of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed</u></mark>.¶ <u>The mother of all the bubbles, <mark>the work bubble, would finally deflate</u>. <u>We have been <strong>working too much</strong></mark> during the last three or four centuries<mark>, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years</u></mark>. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that <u>the most powerful weapon has been suicide</u>. <u>9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony</u>. And <u>they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ </u>The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. <u><strong>Suicide</strong> has became <strong>a form of political action</strong> everywhere</u>. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
 I think that <u>it <mark>is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa</mark>l</u>. <u><mark>The exchange between life and money could be <strong>deserted</u></strong>,</mark> and <u><mark>exhaustion could give way to <strong>a huge wave of withdrawal</strong></mark> from the sphere of economic exchange</u>. <u><mark>A new refrain could <strong>emerge in that moment</strong>, and wipe out</mark> the law of <mark>economic growth</u></mark>. <u>The self-organization of <mark>the general intellect could <strong>abandon the law of accumulation and growth</u></strong></mark>, and <u>start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.</p></u>
1NC
null
Off
174,846
274
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,325
We affirm a politics of stealing away – we must abuse the university’s openness to give power back to the undercommons
Moten and Harney 04.
Moten and Harney 04. Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, The University and the Undercommons, SEVEN THESES Social Text 79, Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 2004. Copyright © 2004 by Duke University Press
To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal This is the only possible relationship to the American university today. it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment one can only sneak into the university and steal what one can To abuse its hospitality, to spite its mission, to join its refugee colony, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university Call out to it as it calls to you But for the subversive intellectual, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome She disappears into the underground, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, into the Undercommons of Enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong teaching would be performing the work of the university Teaching is merely a profession and an operation of what Jacques Derrida calls the onto-/auto-encyclopedic circle of the Universitas it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby erased by it it is teaching that brings us in The moment of teaching for food is therefore often mistakenly taken to be a stage, as if eventually, one should not teach for food if the teaching is successfully passed on, the stage is surpassed, and teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university But what would it mean if the beyond of teaching” is precisely what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance And what of those minorities who refuse, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects, as minority the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste their collective labor will always call into question who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes with hands full into the underground of the university, into the Undercommons—this will be regarded as theft, as a criminal act it is at the same time, the only possible act In that Undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the individualization of research. To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching
To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal one can only sneak into the university and steal what one can. To abuse its hospitality spite its mission join its refugee colony the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love She disappears into the underground into the Undercommons Teaching is a profession an operation what Derrida calls the auto-encyclopedic circle of the Universitas it is teaching that brings us in what would it mean if the beyond of teaching” is what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance And what of those minorities who refuse as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects, as minority their collective labor will always call into question who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes into the Undercommons this will be regarded as theft, as a criminal act it is the only possible act To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural the criminal, matricidal, queer on the stroll of the stolen life the life stolen by enlightenment stolen back it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others
“To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal,” to borrow from Pistol at the end of Henry V, as he would surely borrow from us. This is the only possible relationship to the American university today. This may be true of universities everywhere. It may have to be true of the university in general. But certainly, this much is true in the United States: it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment. In the face of these conditions one can only sneak into the university and steal what one can. To abuse its hospitality, to spite its mission, to join its refugee colony, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university. Worry about the university. This is the injunction today in the United States, one with a long history. Call for its restoration like Harold Bloom or Stanley Fish or Gerald Graff. Call for its reform like Derek Bok or Bill Readings or Cary Nelson. Call out to it as it calls to you. But for the subversive intellectual, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men. After all, the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love. Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome. The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings. And on top of all that, she disappears. She disappears into the underground, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, into the Undercommons of Enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong. What is that work and what is its social capacity for both reproducing the university and producing fugitivity? If one were to say teaching, one would be performing the work of the university. Teaching is merely a profession and an operation of what Jacques Derrida calls the onto-/auto-encyclopedic circle of the Universitas. But it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters. The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby erased by it. It is not teaching then that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side of teaching, a thinking through the skin of teaching toward a collective orientation to the knowledge object as future project, and a commitment to what we want to call the prophetic organization. But it is teaching that brings us in. Before there are grants, research, conferences, books, and journals there is the experience of being taught and of teaching. Before the research post with no teaching, before the graduate students to mark the exams, before the string of sabbaticals, before the permanent reduction in teaching load, the appointment to run the Center, the consignment of pedagogy to a discipline called education, before the course designed to be a new book, teaching happened. The moment of teaching for food is therefore often mistakenly taken to be a stage, as if eventually, one should not teach for food. If the stage persists, there is a social pathology in the university. But if the teaching is successfully passed on, the stage is surpassed, and teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university. Kant interestingly calls such a stage “self-incurred minority.” He tries to contrast it with having the “determination and courage to use one’s intelligence without being guided by another.” “Have the courage to use your own intelligence.” But what would it mean if teaching or rather what we might call “the beyond of teaching” is precisely what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance? And what of those minorities who refuse, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects, as minority? Certainly, the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste. But their collective labor will always call into question who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment. The waste lives for those moments 102 Moten/Harneybeyond2 teaching when you give away the unexpected beautiful phrase— unexpected, no one has asked, beautiful, it will never come back. Is being the biopower of the Enlightenment truly better than this? Perhaps the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must. But even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional. And one may be given one last chance to be pragmatic—why steal when one can have it all, they will ask. But if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes with hands full into the underground of the university, into the Undercommons—this will be regarded as theft, as a criminal act. And it is at the same time, the only possible act. In that Undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the individualization of research. To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons. What the beyond2 of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching.
6,216
<h4>We affirm a politics of stealing away – we must abuse the university’s openness to give power back to the undercommons</h4><p><u><strong>Moten and Harney 04.</u></strong> Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, The University and the Undercommons, SEVEN THESES Social Text 79, Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 2004. Copyright © 2004 by Duke University Press</p><p>“<u><strong><mark>To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal</u></strong></mark>,” to borrow from Pistol at the end of Henry V, as he would surely borrow from us. <u>This is the only possible relationship to the American university today.</u> This may be true of universities everywhere. It may have to be true of the university in general. But certainly, this much is true in the United States: <u>it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment</u>. In the face of these conditions <u><mark>one can only <strong>sneak into the university</strong> and <strong>steal what one can</u></strong>. <u><strong>To abuse its hospitality</strong></mark>, to <mark>spite its mission</mark>, to <mark>join its refugee colony</mark>, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university</u>. Worry about the university. This is the injunction today in the United States, one with a long history. Call for its restoration like Harold Bloom or Stanley Fish or Gerald Graff. Call for its reform like Derek Bok or Bill Readings or Cary Nelson. <u><strong>Call out to it as it calls to you</u></strong>. <u>But for the <strong>subversive intellectual</strong>, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men</u>. After all, <u><mark>the subversive intellectual <strong>came under false pretenses</strong>, with <strong>bad documents</strong>, <strong>out of love</u></strong></mark>. <u>Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome</u>. The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings. And on top of all that, she disappears. <u><mark>She disappears into the underground</mark>, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, <mark>into the Undercommons</mark> of Enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong</u>. What is that work and what is its social capacity for both reproducing the university and producing fugitivity? If one were to say <u>teaching</u>, one <u>would be performing the work of the university</u>. <u><strong><mark>Teaching</strong> is</mark> merely <mark>a <strong>profession</strong></mark> and <strong><mark>an operation</strong></mark> of <mark>what</mark> Jacques <mark>Derrida calls <strong>the</mark> </strong>onto-<strong>/<mark>auto-encyclopedic</strong> circle of the Universitas</u></mark>. But <u>it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters</u>. <u>The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby <strong>erased by it</u></strong>. It is not teaching then that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side of teaching, a thinking through the skin of teaching toward a collective orientation to the knowledge object as future project, and a commitment to what we want to call the prophetic organization. But <u><mark>it is teaching that brings us in</u></mark>. Before there are grants, research, conferences, books, and journals there is the experience of being taught and of teaching. Before the research post with no teaching, before the graduate students to mark the exams, before the string of sabbaticals, before the permanent reduction in teaching load, the appointment to run the Center, the consignment of pedagogy to a discipline called education, before the course designed to be a new book, teaching happened. <u>The moment of teaching for food is therefore often mistakenly taken to be a stage, as if eventually, one should not teach for food</u>. If the stage persists, there is a social pathology in the university. But <u>if the teaching is successfully passed on, the stage is surpassed, and teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university</u>. Kant interestingly calls such a stage “self-incurred minority.” He tries to contrast it with having the “determination and courage to use one’s intelligence without being guided by another.” “Have the courage to use your own intelligence.” <u>But <mark>what would it mean if</u></mark> teaching or rather what we might call “<u><mark>the <strong>beyond of teaching</strong>” is</mark> precisely <mark>what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance</u></mark>? <u><mark>And what of those minorities who refuse</mark>, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), <mark>as if <strong>they will not be subjects</strong>, as if <strong>they want to think as objects</strong>, as <strong>minority</u></strong></mark>? Certainly, <u>the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste</u>. But <u><mark>their collective labor will always call into question <strong>who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment</u></strong></mark>. The waste lives for those moments 102 Moten/Harneybeyond2 teaching when you give away the unexpected beautiful phrase— unexpected, no one has asked, beautiful, it will never come back. Is being the biopower of the Enlightenment truly better than this? Perhaps <u>the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must</u>. But <u>even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional</u>. And one may be given one last chance to be pragmatic—why steal when one can have it all, they will ask. But <u><mark>if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes</mark> with hands full into the underground of the university, <mark>into the Undercommons</mark>—<mark>this will be <strong>regarded as theft</strong>, as a <strong>criminal act</u></strong></mark>. And <u><mark>it is</mark> at the same time, <strong><mark>the only possible act</u></strong></mark>. <u>In that Undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the individualization of research. <mark>To enter this space is to <strong>inhabit the ruptural</strong></mark> and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, <strong><mark>the criminal</strong>, <strong>matricidal</strong>, <strong>queer</strong></mark>, in the cistern, <strong><mark>on the stroll of the stolen life</strong></mark>, <mark>the life stolen by enlightenment</mark> and <strong><mark>stolen back</strong></mark>, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons</u>. What the beyond2 of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; <u><mark>it’s about <strong>allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others</strong></mark>, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching</u>.</p>
1NC
null
Off
1,240,567
424
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,326
Academia is a pollution of the affirmative project—an inoculation and re-scripting of the very terms of contestation such that nothing is left but the continued propagation of social death
Occupied UC Berkeley ‘9
Occupied UC Berkeley ‘9 (“The Necrosocial – Civic Life, Social Death, and the University of California,” November 2009, Craccum Magazine – University of Auckland Student Magazine. Iss. 4, 2012. http://craccum.ausa.auckland.ac.nz/?p=286) [m leap]
here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict. Who knew that behind so much civic life (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether—that is, meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of—when we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us Each day passes in this way, the administration out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless The university steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also steals and homogenizes meaning. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. Social death is, of course, simply the power source, the generator, of civic life with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death the university is a graveyard, but it is also a factory: a factory of meaning which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; which everywhere reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property). Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, discourse designed to make our very moments here together into a set of legible and fruitless demands. Totally managed death. A machine for administering death As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations. This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us. We form teams, schools ideologies, identities each group gets its own designated burial plot Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard? In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination. It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never feel terrible to diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying, completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this same dream of domination. After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this. We are convinced, owned, broken. The values create popular images and ideals (healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education) while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. They sell the practice through the image. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice. Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just how dead we are willing to play, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous. Each bulging institutional value longing to become more than its sentiment through us, each of our empty gestures of feigned-anxiety to appear under pressure, or of cool-ambivalence to appear accustomed to horror, every moment of student life, is the management of our consent to social death. Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. It’s the positions we thoughtlessly enact. It’s the particular nature of being owned. Social rupture is the initial divorce between the owners and the owned. A social movement is a function of war. War contains the ability to create a new frame, to build a new tension for the agents at play, new dynamics in the battles both for the meaning and the material. When we move without a return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war. For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures We are an antagonistic dead.
the university manages our social death, translating what we once knew into acceptable forms of social conflict. the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where meaning is ripped from action to perpetually deliberate when we push the boundaries they reconfigure themselves to contain us the administration out to shape student discourse It becomes banal, thoughtless The university steals and homogenizes meaning the university is a graveyard a factory of meaning which reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students discourse designed to make our moments together into a set of legible and fruitless demands Totally managed death. A machine for administering death each which seek to absorb more of our energy they perpetuate the inertia of meaning detached from social context these discourses and research programs play their role, co-opting and containing radical potential The university gladly permits precautionary lectures A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us the university’s ghosts are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs We form teams, identities each group gets its own designated burial plot . Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures We are an antagonistic dead.
Yes, very much a cemetery. Only here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict. Who knew that behind so much civic life (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether—that is, meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of—when we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us: the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension. Each day passes in this way, the administration on the look out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history. This accumulation—every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life. A dead but restless and desirous life. The university steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also steals and homogenizes meaning. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. Social death is, of course, simply the power source, the generator, of civic life with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death: its garrulous slogans of freedom and democracy designed to obscure the shit and decay in which our feet are planted. Yes, the university is a graveyard, but it is also a factory: a factory of meaning which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; which everywhere reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property). Everywhere the same whimsical ideas of the future. Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, discourse designed to make our very moments here together into a set of legible and fruitless demands. Totally managed death. A machine for administering death, for the proliferation of technologies of death. As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place. With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the blind inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential. And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter. The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism. And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls. There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth. The university is a graveyard– así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations. This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us. Here we are at odds with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty, staff, homebums, activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/ staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be. That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders—each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning. We form teams, clubs, fraternities, majors, departments, schools, unions, ideologies, identities, and subcultures—and thankfully each group gets its own designated burial plot. Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard? In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination. We spend money and energy trying to convince ourselves we’re brighter than everyone else. Somehow, we think, we possess some trait that means we deserve more than everyone else. We have measured ourselves and we have measured others. It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never feel terrible to diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying, completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this same dream of domination. After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this. We are convinced, owned, broken. We know their values better than they do: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. This triumvirate of sacred values are ours of course, and in this moment of practiced theater—the fight between the university and its own students—we have used their words on their stages: Save public education! When those values are violated by the very institutions which are created to protect them, the veneer fades, the tired set collapses: and we call it injustice, we get indignant. We demand justice from them, for them to adhere to their values. What many have learned again and again is that these institutions don’t care for those values, not at all, not for all. And we are only beginning to understand that those values are not even our own. The values create popular images and ideals (healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education) while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. They sell the practice through the image. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice. In this crisis the Chancellors and Presidents, the Regents and the British Petroleums, the politicians and the managers, they all intend to be true to their values and capitalize on the university economically and socially—which is to say, nothing has changed, it is only an escalation, a provocation. Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just how dead we are willing to play, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous. Every institution has of course our best interest in mind, so much so that we’re willing to pay, to enter debt contracts, to strike a submissive pose in the classroom, in the lab, in the seminar, in the dorm, and eventually or simultaneously in the workplace to pay back those debts. Each bulging institutional value longing to become more than its sentiment through us, each of our empty gestures of feigned-anxiety to appear under pressure, or of cool-ambivalence to appear accustomed to horror, every moment of student life, is the management of our consent to social death. Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. It’s the positions we thoughtlessly enact. It’s the particular nature of being owned. Social rupture is the initial divorce between the owners and the owned. A social movement is a function of war. War contains the ability to create a new frame, to build a new tension for the agents at play, new dynamics in the battles both for the meaning and the material. When we move without a return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war. It is November 2009. For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures and self-propelled, unmanaged movements of wild bodies. We need, we desire occupations. We are an antagonistic dead.
11,993
<h4>Academia is a pollution of the affirmative project—an inoculation and re-scripting of the very terms of contestation such that nothing is left but the continued propagation of social death</h4><p><u><strong>Occupied UC Berkeley ‘9</u></strong> (“The Necrosocial – Civic Life, Social Death, and the University of California,” November 2009, Craccum Magazine – University of Auckland Student Magazine. Iss. 4, 2012. http://craccum.ausa.auckland.ac.nz/?p=286) [m leap]</p><p>Yes, very much a cemetery. Only <u>here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like <mark>the university </mark>just like the state just like the economy <strong><mark>manages our social death</strong>, translating what we once knew</mark> from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, <mark>into acceptable forms of social conflict.</mark> Who knew that behind so much civic life</u> <u>(electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam)</u> <u>was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. </u>When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. <u>He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, <mark>the <strong>release valve</strong> of the university plunges us into an abyss where</mark> ideas are wisps of ether—that is, <strong><mark>meaning is ripped from action</strong></mark>. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: <mark>to <strong>perpetually deliberate</strong></mark>, the endless fleshing-out-of—<mark>when we push the boundaries</mark> of this form <mark>they </mark>are quick <strong>to <mark>reconfigure themselves to contain us</u></strong></mark>: the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension.<u> Each day passes in this way, <mark>the administration</mark> </u>on the look<u> <mark>out to shape student discourse</mark>—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. <mark>It becomes <strong>banal, thoughtless</u></strong></mark>. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history. This accumulation—every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life. A dead but restless and desirous life. <u><mark>The university</mark> steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also <strong><mark>steals and homogenizes meaning</strong></mark>. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. <strong>Social death is</strong>, of course, simply the power source, <strong>the generator, of civic life</strong> with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death</u>: its garrulous slogans of freedom and democracy designed to obscure the shit and decay in which our feet are planted. Yes, <u><strong><mark>the university is a graveyard</strong></mark>, but it is also a factory: <strong><mark>a factory of meaning</strong> </mark>which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; <mark>which </mark>everywhere <mark>reproduces the <strong>empty reactionary behavior of students</strong> </mark>based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property).</u> Everywhere the same whimsical ideas of the future. <u>Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, <strong><mark>discourse designed to make our </mark>very <mark>moments </mark>here <mark>together into a set of legible and fruitless demands</strong></mark>. <mark>Totally managed death. A machine for administering death</u></mark>, for the proliferation of technologies of death. <u>As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, <strong>it matters little what face one puts on the university</u></strong>—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—<u><mark>each </mark>one the product of some exploitation—<mark>which seek to absorb more of our </mark>work, more tuition, more <mark>energy</mark>.</u> The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place.<u> With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, <mark>they perpetuate the </u></mark>blind <u><strong><mark>inertia of meaning</strong></mark> ostensibly <strong><mark>detached from</strong></mark> its <strong><mark>social context</strong></mark>. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, <mark>these discourses and research programs play their</mark> own <mark>role, <strong>co-opting and containing radical potential</u></strong></mark>. And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter. <u><mark>The university gladly permits</mark> the <strong><mark>precautionary lectures</strong></mark> on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. <strong><mark>A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us</strong></mark> against any confrontational radicalism.</u> And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls. There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth. The university is a graveyard– así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. <u>Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to <strong><mark>the university’s ghosts</strong></mark>, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They <mark>are<strong> summoned forth and banished</strong> by a few well-meaning <strong>phrases and research programs</strong></mark>, given their book titles, their <strong>citations</strong>. <strong>This is our gothic</strong>—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us.</u> Here we are at odds with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty, staff, homebums, activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/ staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be. That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders—each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning. <u><mark>We form teams,</u></mark> clubs, fraternities, majors, departments, <u>schools</u>, unions, <u>ideologies, <mark>identities</u></mark>, and subcultures—and thankfully <u><strong><mark>each group gets its own designated burial plot</u></strong></mark>. <u>Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard? In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination<mark>.</mark> </u>We spend money and energy trying to convince ourselves we’re brighter than everyone else. Somehow, we think, we possess some trait that means we deserve more than everyone else. We have measured ourselves and we have measured others.<u> It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never <strong>feel terrible</strong> to <strong>diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital</strong> as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying, completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this <strong>same dream of domination.</strong> After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this. We are <strong>convinced, owned, broken.</u></strong> We know their values better than they do: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. This triumvirate of sacred values are ours of course, and in this moment of practiced theater—the fight between the university and its own students—we have used their words on their stages: Save public education! When those values are violated by the very institutions which are created to protect them, the veneer fades, the tired set collapses: and we call it injustice, we get indignant. We demand justice from them, for them to adhere to their values. What many have learned again and again is that these institutions don’t care for those values, not at all, not for all. And we are only beginning to understand that those values are not even our own. <u>The values create popular images and ideals</u> <u>(healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education)</u> <u>while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. <strong>They sell the practice through the image</strong>. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice.</u> In this crisis the Chancellors and Presidents, the Regents and the British Petroleums, the politicians and the managers, they all intend to be true to their values and capitalize on the university economically and socially—which is to say, nothing has changed, it is only an escalation, a provocation. <u>Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just <strong>how dead we are willing to play</strong>, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous. </u>Every institution has of course our best interest in mind, so much so that we’re willing to pay, to enter debt contracts, to strike a submissive pose in the classroom, in the lab, in the seminar, in the dorm, and eventually or simultaneously in the workplace to pay back those debts.<u> Each bulging institutional value longing to become more than its sentiment through us, each of our empty gestures of feigned-anxiety to appear under pressure, or of cool-ambivalence to appear accustomed to horror, every moment of student life, is the management of our consent to social death. <strong><mark>Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. </mark>It’s the positions we thoughtlessly enact</strong>.</u> <u>It’s the particular nature of being owned. <strong>Social rupture</strong> is the initial divorce between the owners and the owned. A social movement is a <strong>function of war</strong>. War contains the ability to create a <strong>new frame</strong>, to build a <strong>new tension</strong> for the agents at play, <strong>new dynamics</strong> in the battles both for the meaning and the material. When we move without a return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.</u> It is November 2009. <u><mark>For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures </u></mark>and self-propelled, unmanaged movements of wild bodies. We need, we desire occupations. <u><strong><mark>We are an antagonistic dead.</p></u></strong></mark>
1NC
null
Off
1,058
366
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,327
Their critique of state power in the context of the prohibition on prostitution is hijacked by anti-state neoliberalism
Gupta 12
Gupta 12
Feminism needs to recapture the state from the neoliberal project It must guard against atomisation and recover its transformative aspirations to shape the new social order The current phase of capitalism – neo-liberalism promotes privatisation and deregulation to safeguard the freedom of the individual to compete without interference from a state capitalism co-opts the opposition to its own ends part of the project of neoliberalism is to shrink the size of the state, it serves its purpose to co-opt the feminist critique that the state is both paternalistic and patriarchal the right has little to say about patriarchy The critique of the state mounted by feminists when state capitalism was at the height of its powers suited neoliberal capitalists seeking deregulation and a reduced role for the state. neoliberal values created a space for a bright, brassy and ultimately fake feminism This transitional period between second wave and the current wave of feminism represented the archetypal appropriation of the feminist agenda by neoliberalism If the culture of neoliberalism had something to offer women, it was the idea of agency free even of patriarchal restraints It emphasised self-sufficiency of the individual while undermining those collective struggles or institutions which make self-sufficiency possible. The world was your oyster – all you needed to do was compete successfully in the marketplace liberal capitalism is committed to what she calls the ‘fetishism of choice’ If women choose things that disadvantage them and entrench differences, it legitimates inequality because the inequality arises from the choices they make prostitution is seen as a liberation Choice is their weapon against feminist objections. In their so-called free expression of their sexuality they are challenging nothing in the neoliberal schema because the work reduces women to the status of meat and commodity.
Feminism needs to recapture the state from the neoliberal project neo-liberalism promotes privatisation and deregulation to safeguard the individual to compete without interference from a state capitalism co-opts the opposition neoliberalism serves to co-opt the feminist critique The critique of the state mounted by feminists neoliberal values created a space for fake feminism This period represented appropriation of the feminist agenda, by neoliberalism. If the culture of neoliberalism had something to offer women it was the idea of agency free even of patriarchal restraints It emphasised self-sufficiency undermining struggles The world was your oyster all you needed to do was compete capitalism is committed to the ‘fetishism of choice’ If women choose things that disadvantage them it legitimates inequality because the inequality arises from the choices they make prostitution is seen as a liberation Choice is their weapon their so-called free expression they are challenging nothing in the neoliberal schema because the work reduces women to the status of meat and commodity.
Rahila is a freelance journalist and published author, January 4th, https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/rahila-gupta/has-neoliberalism-knocked-feminism-sideways, “Has neoliberalism knocked feminism sideways?”, AB Feminism needs to recapture the state from the neoliberal project to which it is in hock in order to make it deliver for women. It must guard against atomisation and recover its transformative aspirations to shape the new social order that is hovering on the horizon, says Rahila Gupta How should feminists read our current times? A major economic crisis rocks the developed world. While austerity measures don’t appear to be working across Europe, the mildly Keynesian efforts of Obama to kick-start the US economy have had only a marginal effect. The Occupy movement has gone global and the public disorder in the summer, with more disorder being predicted by the police, are an indication of deep discontent with the system. Yet we have seen an enthusiastic and vibrant third wave of youthful feminism emerge in the past decade. At the rate at which these waves arise, it will be some time before the rock of patriarchy will be worn smooth. The current phase of capitalism – neo-liberalism – which began with Thatcher and Reagan in the 1970s, promotes privatisation and deregulation in order to safeguard the freedom of the individual to compete and consume without interference from a bloated state. According to David Harvey, a Marxist academic, the world stumbled towards neo-liberalism in response to the last major recession in the 70s when ‘the uneasy compact between capital and labour brokered by an interventionist state’ broke down. The UK government, for example, was obliged by the International Monetary Fund to cut expenditure on the welfare state in order to balance the books. The post-war settlement had given labour more than its due, and it was time for the upper classes to claw these gains back. The fact that second wave feminism and neoliberalism flourished from the 1970s onwards has led some to argue, notably Nancy Fraser, that feminism ‘served to legitimate a structural transformation of capitalist society’. I am with Nancy Fraser in so far as she says that there is a convergence, a coinciding of second wave feminism and neo-liberalism, even that feminism thrived in these conditions. It is well known that in an attempt to renew and survive, capitalism co-opts the opposition to its own ends. If part of the project of neoliberalism is to shrink the size of the state, it serves its purpose to co-opt the feminist critique that the state is both paternalistic and patriarchal. Critiques of the nanny state from the right may chime with feminist concerns. However, the right has little to say about patriarchy. What is left out of the co-option process is equally significant. The critique of the state mounted by feminists such as Elizabeth Wilson when state capitalism was at the height of its powers suited neoliberal capitalists seeking deregulation and a reduced role for the state. Fraser’s analysis does not explain the current resurgence of feminism at a time when the shine of neoliberalism has faded. It is not so much that feminism legitimised neoliberalism, but that neoliberal values created a space for a bright, brassy and ultimately fake feminism - the ‘I really, really want’ girl-power ushered in by the Spice Girls. This transitional period between second wave and the current wave of feminism (which some commentators characterised as post-feminist) represented the archetypal appropriation of the feminist agenda, shorn of its political context, by neoliberalism. Incidentally, many of us rejected the label post-feminist because it felt like an attempt to chuck feminism into the dustbin of history and to deny the continuing need for it. In hindsight, there was something different going on in that lull between the two waves in the 70s and 80s and today; the voice of feminism was being drowned out by its loud, brassy sisters. If the culture of neoliberalism had something to offer women, it was the idea of agency, of choice freely exercised, free even of patriarchal restraints. It emphasised self-sufficiency of the individual while at the same time undermining those collective struggles or institutions which make self-sufficiency possible. The world was your oyster – all you needed to do was compete successfully in the marketplace. The flexible worker, in order to make herself acceptable to the world of work, may even go so far as to remodel herself through cosmetic surgery, all the while under the illusion that she was in control of her life. In her essay on ‘Feminism’ in a forthcoming book, Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, Clare Chambers argues that liberal capitalism is committed to what she calls the ‘fetishism of choice’. If women choose things that disadvantage them and entrench differences, it legitimates inequality because the inequality arises from the choices they make. The few women who do well out of the sex industry do not believe that their work entrenches inequality because it is freely chosen, because prostitution is seen as a liberation from the drudgery of cleaning jobs. Choice is their weapon against feminist objections. In their so-called free expression of their sexuality, they are challenging nothing in the neoliberal schema because the work reduces women to the status of meat and commodity.
5,419
<h4><u><strong>Their critique of state power in the context of the prohibition on prostitution is hijacked by anti-state neoliberalism </h4><p>Gupta 12</p><p></u></strong>Rahila is a freelance journalist and published author, January 4th, https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/rahila-gupta/has-neoliberalism-knocked-feminism-sideways, “Has neoliberalism knocked feminism sideways?”, AB </p><p><u><strong><mark>Feminism needs to recapture the state from the neoliberal project</u></strong></mark> to which it is in hock in order to make it deliver for women. <u>It must guard against atomisation and recover its transformative aspirations to shape the new social order</u> that is hovering on the horizon, says Rahila Gupta How should feminists read our current times? A major economic crisis rocks the developed world. While austerity measures don’t appear to be working across Europe, the mildly Keynesian efforts of Obama to kick-start the US economy have had only a marginal effect. The Occupy movement has gone global and the public disorder in the summer, with more disorder being predicted by the police, are an indication of deep discontent with the system. Yet we have seen an enthusiastic and vibrant third wave of youthful feminism emerge in the past decade. At the rate at which these waves arise, it will be some time before the rock of patriarchy will be worn smooth. <u>The current phase of capitalism – <mark>neo-liberalism</u></mark> – which began with Thatcher and Reagan in the 1970s, <u><mark>promotes privatisation and deregulation</mark> </u>in order <u><mark>to</mark> <mark>safeguard</u></mark> <u><mark>the</mark> freedom of the <mark>individual to compete</u></mark> and consume <u><mark>without interference from a</u> </mark>bloated <u><mark>state</u></mark>. According to David Harvey, a Marxist academic, the world stumbled towards neo-liberalism in response to the last major recession in the 70s when ‘the uneasy compact between capital and labour brokered by an interventionist state’ broke down. The UK government, for example, was obliged by the International Monetary Fund to cut expenditure on the welfare state in order to balance the books. The post-war settlement had given labour more than its due, and it was time for the upper classes to claw these gains back. The fact that second wave feminism and neoliberalism flourished from the 1970s onwards has led some to argue, notably Nancy Fraser, that feminism ‘served to legitimate a structural transformation of capitalist society’. I am with Nancy Fraser in so far as she says that there is a convergence, a coinciding of second wave feminism and neo-liberalism, even that feminism thrived in these conditions. It is well known that in an attempt to renew and survive, <u><mark>capitalism co-opts the opposition</mark> to its own ends</u>. If <u>part of the project of <mark>neoliberalism</mark> is to shrink the size of the state, it <mark>serves</mark> its purpose <mark>to co-opt the feminist critique</mark> that the state is both paternalistic and patriarchal</u>. Critiques of the nanny state from the right may chime with feminist concerns. However, <u>the right has little to say about patriarchy</u>. What is left out of the co-option process is equally significant. <u><strong><mark>The critique of the state mounted by feminists</u></strong></mark> such as Elizabeth Wilson <u>when state capitalism was at the height of its powers <strong>suited neoliberal capitalists seeking deregulation and a reduced role for the state. </u></strong>Fraser’s analysis does not explain the current resurgence of feminism at a time when the shine of neoliberalism has faded. It is not so much that feminism legitimised neoliberalism, but that <u><mark>neoliberal values created a space for </mark>a bright, brassy and ultimately <mark>fake feminism</u></mark> - the ‘I really, really want’ girl-power ushered in by the Spice Girls. <u><mark>This</mark> transitional <mark>period</mark> between second wave and the current wave of feminism</u> (which some commentators characterised as post-feminist) <u><mark>represented</mark> the archetypal <strong><mark>appropriation of the feminist agenda</u></strong>, </mark>shorn of its political context, <u><strong><mark>by neoliberalism</u></strong>. </mark>Incidentally, many of us rejected the label post-feminist because it felt like an attempt to chuck feminism into the dustbin of history and to deny the continuing need for it. In hindsight, there was something different going on in that lull between the two waves in the 70s and 80s and today; the voice of feminism was being drowned out by its loud, brassy sisters. <u><mark>If the culture of neoliberalism had something to offer women</mark>, <mark>it was the idea of agency</u></mark>, of choice freely exercised, <u><mark>free even of patriarchal restraints</u></mark>. <u><mark>It emphasised self-sufficiency</mark> of the individual while</u> at the same time <u><mark>undermining</mark> those collective <mark>struggles</mark> or institutions which make self-sufficiency possible. <mark>The</mark> <mark>world was your oyster</mark> – <mark>all you needed to do was compete</mark> successfully in the marketplace</u>. The flexible worker, in order to make herself acceptable to the world of work, may even go so far as to remodel herself through cosmetic surgery, all the while under the illusion that she was in control of her life. In her essay on ‘Feminism’ in a forthcoming book, Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, Clare Chambers argues that <u>liberal <mark>capitalism is committed to</mark> what she calls <mark>the ‘fetishism of choice’</u></mark>. <u><mark>If women</mark> <mark>choose things that disadvantage them</mark> and entrench differences, <mark>it legitimates inequality because the inequality arises from the choices they make</u></mark>. The few women who do well out of the sex industry do not believe that their work entrenches inequality because it is freely chosen, because <u><mark>prostitution is seen as a liberation</u></mark> from the drudgery of cleaning jobs. <u><mark>Choice is</mark> <mark>their weapon</mark> against feminist objections. In <mark>their <strong>so-called free expression</strong></mark> of their sexuality</u>, <u><strong><mark>they are challenging nothing in the neoliberal schema because the work reduces women to the status of meat and commodity.</mark> </p></u></strong>
1NC
null
Off
189,342
34
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,328
The affirmative is part of an economy of victimized subjection which formulates Western identity in relation to the subaltern – this process destroys the agency of subalternity by trapping it within a matrix of pain and suffering, never to be escaped
Spivak 88
Spivak 88 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Indian literary theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, 1988 “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Online, azp)
SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, fareflung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity Let us now move to consider the margins the silent, silenced center the lowest strata According to Foucault and Deleuze the oppressed, if given the chance can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak? . . .
radical criticism coming out of the West is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while providing a cover for this subject of knowledge this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The critique of the sovereign subject inaugurates a Subject This subject sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side It is impossible for contemporary intellectuals to imagine the Power and Desire that would inhabit the subject of the Other in the constitution of that Other great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could occupy its itinerary the intellectual is complicit in the constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow The clearest example is the remotely orchestrated heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other This project is the obliteration of the trace of that Other We must now confront the following question can the subaltern speak?
SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The much publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side of the international division of labor. It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary — not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified. The clearest available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated, fareflung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redefinition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged pans ofa vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narra- tive of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insuffi- ciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity‘ (Foucault I980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. . . . Let us now move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) can speak and know their conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern speak? . . .
4,106
<h4>The affirmative is part of an economy of victimized subjection which formulates Western identity in relation to the subaltern – this process destroys the agency of subalternity by trapping it within a matrix of pain and suffering, never to be escaped</h4><p><u><strong>Spivak 88</u></strong> (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Indian literary theorist, philosopher and University Professor at Columbia University, Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, 1988 “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Online, azp)</p><p><u>SOME OF THE most <mark>radical criticism coming out of the West</mark> today <mark>is the result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized ‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty while</mark> often <mark>providing a cover for this subject of knowledge</u></mark>. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, <u><mark>this concealed Subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations.’ The</u></mark> much publicized <u><mark>critique of the sovereign subject</mark> thus actually <mark>inaugurates a Subject</mark>. . . . <mark>This</mark> S/<mark>subject</mark>, curiously <mark>sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters’ side</mark> of the international division of labor. <mark>It is impossible for contemporary</u></mark> French <u><mark>intellectuals to imagine the</mark> kind of <mark>Power and Desire that would inhabit the</mark> unnamed <mark>subject of the Other</u></mark> of Europe. It is not only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject as Europe. It is also that, <u><mark>in the constitution of that Other</mark> of Europe, <mark>great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could</mark> cathect, could <mark>occupy</mark> (invest?) <mark>its itinerary</u></mark> — not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In the face of the possibility that <u><mark>the intellectual is complicit in the</mark> persistent <mark>constitution of Other as the Self’s shadow</mark>, a possibility of political practice for the intel- lectual would be to put the economic ‘under erasure,’ to see the economic factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be the final determinant or the transcendental signified. <mark>The clearest</mark> available <mark>example </mark>of such epistemic violence <mark>is the remotely orchestrated</mark>, fareflung, and <mark>heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other</u></mark>. <u><mark>This project is</mark> also <mark>the</mark> asymetrical <mark>obliteration of the trace of that Other</mark> in its precarious Subjectivity</u>. It is well known that Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular redefinition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged pans ofa vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narra- tive of imperialism be recognized as ‘subjugated knowledge,’ ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insuffi- ciently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity‘ (Foucault I980: 82). This is not to describe ‘the way things really were’ or to privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and narrative of reality was established as the normative one. . . . <u>Let us now move to consider the margins</u> (one can just as well say <u>the silent, silenced center</u>) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, <u>the lowest strata</u> of the urban subproletariat. <u>According to Foucault and Deleuze</u> (in the First World, under the standardization and regimentation of socialized capital, though they do not seem to recognize this) <u>the oppressed, if given the chance</u> (the problem of representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) <u>can speak and know their conditions. <mark>We must now confront the following question</mark>: On the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, <mark>can the subaltern speak?</mark> . . . </p></u>
1NC
null
Off
199,199
19
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,329
Capitalism causes extinction and destroys value to life
Robinson 14
Robinson 14 (William I. Robinson, professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism Is In the Midst of Its Most Severe Crisis” 02 Jul 2014, KB)
US intervention entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001. This should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism. Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in a century the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states. global inequalities have never been as acute and grotesque we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings about including the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy as a response by the US-led transnational state and capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. There is currently a global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly across countries and has not taken any clear form or direction. We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits 80 percent experience of insecurity, impoverishment, and increasingly inhabiting a “planet of slums.” apologists of capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful. But 300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps. Foxcomm makes your iPads and iPhones. We are headed towards a global police state organized by global elites and led by the US state to contain the potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms because they have been pressured from below to do so the natural tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been escalation of worldwide inequalities Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.” this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. We cannot understand intensified militarization and the rise of this complex outside of the crisis of global capitalism. It is a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy extreme inequality and social polarization means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus? Unloading the surplus through financial speculation aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. the mass production and distribution of vaccines and medications for diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases tuberculosis, measles, etc that previously were under control. Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent. capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable which is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. it becomes profitable to turn to wars the surplus that the global economy has been and is producing but that cannot be absorbed by the world market, has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies. The US occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital. The prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes is enormously profitable for private corporations we are now living in a global war economy in which the threat of stagnation is offset by the militarization of global economy and society and the spread of systems of mass social control A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts and the spread of social control systems, from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants in the United States and Europe, must be ideologically legitimated. This is where bogus “wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where enemies must be conjured up, in which populations must be led to believe they are threatened So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is the devil, and so on. One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply of raw materials, machinery and service inputs come from other global corporations the global economy is kept running through violence and conflict the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global econom with the petroleum complex that is coming under pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. This is a new transnational power bloc this complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc. the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent. All this and much more are part of the militarization and “securitization” of global society We face doctrines, ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state the “war on drugs,” the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then the US state is the world’s leading terrorist.
capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the ability to sustain life global inequalities have never been as grotesque we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings as a response by the capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. There is global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly and has not taken any clear direction There have been countless studies documenting the escalation of inequalities 80 percent experience insecurity impoverishment and inhabit a “planet of slums.” We are headed towards a global police state The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for obedience States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms because they have been pressured from below to do so the tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been escalation of worldwide inequalities billions have been thrown off the land or out of employment relegated to migration We cannot understand intensified militarization outside of capitalism extreme inequality and social polarization means that the global market cannot absorb expanding output The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and absorb is growing this leads to a crisis of overproduction Unloading the surplus aggravates the solution as we saw with the collapse of 08 it becomes profitable to turn to wars the surplus cannot be absorbed has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction we are living in a global war economy in which the threat of stagnation is offset by militarization A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants must be ideologically legitimated This is where enemies must be conjured up populations must believe they are threatened One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance the economy is kept running through violence and conflict This is a new transnational power bloc the polarization of the world population generates new social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and controlled while guards protect that 20 percent this and more are part of the “securitization” of global society We face doctrines ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state the “war on drugs,”
However, and this is the key point I wish to highlight here, US intervention around the world clearly entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001. This new period should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism. Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in close to a century, and in many ways the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is also extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states. On the other hand, global inequalities have never been as acute and grotesque as they are today. So, in simplified terms, we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings about, including what you mention – the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy – as a response by the US-led transnational state and the transnational capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. You ask me who is going to compensate for these losses. That will depend on how the world’s people respond. There is currently a global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly across countries and has not taken any clear form or direction. Can the popular majority of humanity force the transnational capitalist class and the US/transnational state to be accountable for its crimes? Mao Zedong once said that “power flows through the barrel of a gun.” What he meant by this, in a more abstract than literal way, I believe, is that in the end it is the correlation of real forces that will determine outcomes. Because the United States has overwhelming and “full spectrum” military dominance, it can capture, execute, or bring to trial people anywhere around the world… it has “free license”, so to speak, to act as an international outlaw. We don’t even have to take the more recent examples. In December 1989 the United States undertook an illegal and criminal invasion of Panama, kidnapped Manuel Noriega – whether or not he was a dictator is not the point, as the United States puts in power and defends dictators that defend US and transnational elite interests, and brought him back to US territory for trial. What country in the world now has the naked power “flowing through the barrel of a gun” to invade the United States, capture George Bush, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other war criminals, and bring them somewhere to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Q: In your writings, you’ve warned against the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the slant accumulation of the global wealth in the hands of an affluent few and the impoverishment of the suppressed majority. What do you think are the reasons for this stark inequality and the disturbing dispossession of millions of people in the capitalist societies? You wrote that the participants of the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos were worried that the current situation raises the specter of worldwide instability and civil wars. Is it really so? A: We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots, such grotesque levels of inequality, within and among countries. There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities, among them, the current bestseller by Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” The pattern we see is that the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth that humanity produces and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits, but as well that some 20 percent of the population in each countries has integrated into the global economy as middle class and affluent consumers while the remaining 80 percent has experienced rising levels of insecurity, impoverishment, and precariousness, increasingly inhabiting what some have called a “planet of slums.” The apologists of global capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful. But in China, 300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. Such is this exploitation that a couple years ago, you may remember, Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps. This is the Foxcomm that makes your iPads and iPhones. The 80 percent is then subject to all sorts of sophisticated systems of social control and repression. We are headed in this regard towards a global police state, organized by global elites and led by the US state, to contain the real or potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority. Such structures of inequality and exploitation cannot be contained over time without both ideological and coercive apparatuses; conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence, organized by states and private security forces. Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which we are now living in a global social control state, a global panoptical surveillance state. George Orwell wrote about such a state in his famous novel “1984.” The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. How do we explain such stark inequality? Capitalism is a system that by its very internal dynamic generates wealth yet polarizes and concentrates that wealth. Historically a de-concentration of wealth through redistribution has come about by state intervention to offset the natural tendency for capital accumulation to result in such polarization. States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms both because they have been pressured from below to do so – whether by trade unions, social movements, socialist struggles, or so on – or because states must do so in order to retain legitimacy and preserve at least enough social peace for the reproduction of the system. A great variety of redistributive models emerged in the 20th century around the world, and went by a great many names – socialism, communism, social democracy, New Deal, welfare states, developmental states, populism, the social wage, and so on. All these models shared two things in common. One was state intervention in the economy to regulate capital accumulation and thus to bring under some control the most anarchic and most destructive elements of unrestrained capitalism. The other was redistribution through numerous policies, ranging from minimum legal wages and unemployment insurance, to public enterprises, the social wages of public health, education, transportation, and housing, welfare programs, land reform in agrarian countries, low cost credit, and so on. But capital responded to the last major crisis of the system, that of the 1970s, by “going global,” by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation and undermining models of state regulation and redistribution. Neo-liberalism is a set of policies that facilitate the rise of transnational capital. As transnational capital has broken free of the confine of the nation-state, the natural tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been this dizzying escalation of worldwide inequalities as wealth concentrates within the transnational capitalist class and, to a much lesser extent, the better off strata of middle classes and professionals. There are other related factors that account for the intensification of worldwide inequalities. One is the defeat of the worldwide left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led the ruling groups to declare that global neo-liberal capitalism was “The End of History.” A second is the rise of a globally integrated financial system in which capital in its liquid, that is money, form can move frictionless across the planet with no controls whatsoever. Transnational finance capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a global scale, and it engages in unfathomable levels of speculation, turning the global economy into one giant casino. Transnational finance capital has come to control the levers of the global economy, to get around and to undermine any effort at regulation, and to concentrate wealth in its liquid form in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. A third factor is the rise of a mass of surplus humanity. Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.” In turn, this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. Q: In one of your articles, you talked of an “ever-expanding military-prison-industrial-security-financial complex” that generates enormous profits through waging wars, selling weapons and then taking part in reconstruction activities in the war-torn countries. How does this complex operate? Is it really reliant on waging wars? A: We cannot understand intensified militarization and the rise of this complex outside of the crisis of global capitalism. This crisis is structural, in the first instance. It is what we call a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy driven by new technologies, especially computer, information, and communications technologies, but also by the revolution in transportation and containerization, by robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and more recently, by 3D printing, among other aspects, has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy, and to bring about a huge increase in productivity worldwide and an enormous expansion of the capacity of the global economy to churn out goods and services. But extreme inequality and social polarization in the global system means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus? How can transnational capital continue to accumulate and generate profits if this output is not unloaded, that is, profitably marketed? Unloading the surplus through financial speculation, which has skyrocketed in recent years, only aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. Now, if only 20 percent of humanity can consume in any significant quantity it is not very profitable to go into the business of mass, inexpensive public transportation, health and education, or the production of practical goods that the world’s population needs because very simply even if people need these things they do not have the income to purchase them. A global civilian economy geared to the basic needs of humanity is simply not profitable for the transnational capitalist class. Look at it like this: the mass production and distribution of vaccines and other medications for communicable and treatable diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are simply not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases – tuberculosis, measles, etc. – that previously were under control. Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry, including the giant pharmaceutical, biotechnology and related branches to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent. The lesson here is that capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable, according to the structure of the market and of income, which in turn is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. It is in this context that it becomes quite profitable to turn to wars, conflicts, systems of repression and social control to generate profit, to produce goods and systems that can repress that 80 percent of humanity that is not your consumer, not your customer so to say, because they do not have the purchasing power to sustain your drive to accumulate by producing goods and services for them that they actually need. Global capitalism is a perverted and irrational system. Putting aside geo-political considerations, the surplus that the global economy has been and is producing but that cannot be absorbed by the world market, has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction, and new systems of social control and repression, independent of geo-political considerations, that is, simply as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies. The US invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan – although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital. The prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes in the United States – and let us recall that the United States holds some 25-30 percent of the world’s prisoners – is enormously profitable for private corporations that run almost all of the immigrant detention centers, some of the general prisons, supply everything from guards to food, build the installations, erect border walls, and so on. Let us recall that the US National Security Agency – and we now know from Edward Snowden just how vast are its operations – subcontracts out its activities to private corporations, as do the CIA, the Pentagon, and so on. Global security corporations are one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and there are now more private security guards in the world than police officers. All of this is to say that we are now living in a global war economy, in which the threat of stagnation is offset in part by the militarization of global economy and society and the introduction and spread of systems of mass social control. Of course this involves all kinds of cultural, ideological, and political dimensions as well. A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts and the spread of social control systems, from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants in the United States and Europe, must be ideologically legitimated. This is where bogus and farcical “wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where enemies must be conjured up, in which populations must be led to believe they are threatened, and so on. So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is now the devil, and so on. One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy has involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation, towards those global corporate conglomerates involved in the production of war materials, of security, of engineering (for example, Bechtel and Halliburton), and other activities that involve making profit out of conflict and control. Remember by way of example that each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on and so forth, is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply, in turn, of raw materials, machinery and service inputs in turn come from other global corporations or local firms. So the whole global economy is kept running through violence and conflict. But the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global economy, together with the petroleum complex that is coming under much pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. This is a new transnational power bloc – this complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control, together with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc. Remember also that the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent. All this and much more are part of the militarization and “securitization” of global society by the powers that be. We face new doctrines, ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state – “fourth generation warfare,” “humanitarian intervention,” the “war on drugs,” among others, and above all, the so-called “war on terror.” I say so-called because, the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They indeed do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then the US state is the world’s leading terrorist. The powers that be in global society and that control the global political discourse attach the label “terrorist” to violence that they do not approve of, and they attach the label of “freedom and democracy and security” to violence that they do approve of, or that they commit themselves. Moreover, increasingly “terrorism” is used to simply describe political dissent, so that legitimate social movements and political struggles against global capitalism become labeled as “terrorism” in order to justify their suppression.
18,951
<h4><u><strong>Capitalism causes extinction and destroys value to life </h4><p>Robinson 14</p><p></u></strong>(William I. Robinson, professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism Is In the Midst of Its Most Severe Crisis” 02 Jul 2014, KB)</p><p>However, and this is the key point I wish to highlight here, <u><strong>US intervention</u></strong> around the world clearly <u><strong>entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001.</u></strong> <u>This</u> new period <u>should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism.</u> <u>Global <mark>capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis </mark>in</u> close to <u>a century</u>, and in many ways <u>the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s <mark>because we are on <strong>the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the</mark> very earth system and the <mark>ability to sustain life</strong></mark>, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is</u> also <u>extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states.</u> On the other hand, <u><strong><mark>global inequalities have never been as</mark> acute and <mark>grotesque</u></strong></mark> as they are today. So, in simplified terms, <u><mark>we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings</mark> about</u>, <u>including</u> what you mention – <u>the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy</u> – <u><mark>as a response by the</mark> US-led transnational state and</u> the transnational<u> <mark>capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis.</mark> </u>You ask me who is going to compensate for these losses. That will depend on how the world’s people respond. <u><strong><mark>There is</mark> currently a <mark>global revolt from below underway</strong>, but it is spread unevenly</mark> across countries <mark>and has not taken any clear</mark> form or <mark>direction</mark>.</u> Can the popular majority of humanity force the transnational capitalist class and the US/transnational state to be accountable for its crimes? Mao Zedong once said that “power flows through the barrel of a gun.” What he meant by this, in a more abstract than literal way, I believe, is that in the end it is the correlation of real forces that will determine outcomes. Because the United States has overwhelming and “full spectrum” military dominance, it can capture, execute, or bring to trial people anywhere around the world… it has “free license”, so to speak, to act as an international outlaw. We don’t even have to take the more recent examples. In December 1989 the United States undertook an illegal and criminal invasion of Panama, kidnapped Manuel Noriega – whether or not he was a dictator is not the point, as the United States puts in power and defends dictators that defend US and transnational elite interests, and brought him back to US territory for trial. What country in the world now has the naked power “flowing through the barrel of a gun” to invade the United States, capture George Bush, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other war criminals, and bring them somewhere to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Q: In your writings, you’ve warned against the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the slant accumulation of the global wealth in the hands of an affluent few and the impoverishment of the suppressed majority. What do you think are the reasons for this stark inequality and the disturbing dispossession of millions of people in the capitalist societies? You wrote that the participants of the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos were worried that the current situation raises the specter of worldwide instability and civil wars. Is it really so? A: <u><strong>We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots</u></strong>, such grotesque levels of inequality, within and among countries. <u><mark>There have been countless studies</mark> in recent years <mark>documenting the escalation of inequalities</u></mark>, among them, the current bestseller by Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” The pattern we see is that <u>the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth</u> that humanity produces <u>and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits</u>, but as well that some 20 percent of the population in each countries has integrated into the global economy as middle class and affluent consumers while the remaining <u><mark>80 percent</u></mark> has <u><mark>experience</u></mark>d rising levels <u>of <mark>insecurity</mark>, <mark>impoverishment</mark>, <mark>and</u></mark> precariousness, <u>increasingly <mark>inhabit</mark>ing</u> what some have called <u><strong><mark>a “planet of slums.”</u></strong></mark> The <u>apologists of</u> global <u>capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful.</u> <u>But</u> in China, <u>300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. </u>Such is this exploitation that a couple years ago, you may remember, <u>Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps.</u> This is the <u>Foxcomm</u> that <u>makes your iPads and iPhones.</u> The 80 percent is then subject to all sorts of sophisticated systems of social control and repression. <u><strong><mark>We are headed</u></strong></mark> in this regard <u><strong><mark>towards a global police state</u></strong></mark>, <u>organized by global elites and led by the US</u> <u>state</u>, <u>to contain the</u> real or <u>potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority</u>. Such structures of inequality and exploitation cannot be contained over time without both ideological and coercive apparatuses; <u>conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence</u>, organized by states and private security forces. Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which we are now living in a global social control state, a global panoptical surveillance state. George Orwell wrote about such a state in his famous novel “1984.” <u><strong><mark>The Orwellian society has arrived.</u></strong> <u>Yet it is worse</mark> than Orwell imagined, <mark>because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for</mark> their <mark>obedience</mark> and conformity. </u>How do we explain such stark inequality? Capitalism is a system that by its very internal dynamic generates wealth yet polarizes and concentrates that wealth. Historically a de-concentration of wealth through redistribution has come about by state intervention to offset the natural tendency for capital accumulation to result in such polarization. <u><mark>States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms</u></mark> both <u><strong><mark>because they have been pressured from below to do so</u></strong></mark> – whether by trade unions, social movements, socialist struggles, or so on – or because states must do so in order to retain legitimacy and preserve at least enough social peace for the reproduction of the system. A great variety of redistributive models emerged in the 20th century around the world, and went by a great many names – socialism, communism, social democracy, New Deal, welfare states, developmental states, populism, the social wage, and so on. All these models shared two things in common. One was state intervention in the economy to regulate capital accumulation and thus to bring under some control the most anarchic and most destructive elements of unrestrained capitalism. The other was redistribution through numerous policies, ranging from minimum legal wages and unemployment insurance, to public enterprises, the social wages of public health, education, transportation, and housing, welfare programs, land reform in agrarian countries, low cost credit, and so on. But capital responded to the last major crisis of the system, that of the 1970s, by “going global,” by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation and undermining models of state regulation and redistribution. Neo-liberalism is a set of policies that facilitate the rise of transnational capital. As transnational capital has broken free of the confine of the nation-state, <u><mark>the</mark> natural <mark>tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. <strong>The result has been</u></strong></mark> this dizzying <u><strong><mark>escalation of worldwide inequalities</u></strong></mark> as wealth concentrates within the transnational capitalist class and, to a much lesser extent, the better off strata of middle classes and professionals. There are other related factors that account for the intensification of worldwide inequalities. One is the defeat of the worldwide left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led the ruling groups to declare that global neo-liberal capitalism was “The End of History.” A second is the rise of a globally integrated financial system in which capital in its liquid, that is money, form can move frictionless across the planet with no controls whatsoever. Transnational finance capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a global scale, and it engages in unfathomable levels of speculation, turning the global economy into one giant casino. Transnational finance capital has come to control the levers of the global economy, to get around and to undermine any effort at regulation, and to concentrate wealth in its liquid form in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. A third factor is the rise of a mass of surplus humanity. <u>Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps <mark>billions</mark>, <mark>have been</mark> made “superfluous”, <mark>thrown off the land or out of</mark> productive <mark>employment</mark>, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and <mark>relegated to migration</mark> and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.”</u> In turn, <u>this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. </u>Q: In one of your articles, you talked of an “ever-expanding military-prison-industrial-security-financial complex” that generates enormous profits through waging wars, selling weapons and then taking part in reconstruction activities in the war-torn countries. How does this complex operate? Is it really reliant on waging wars? A: <u><strong><mark>We cannot understand intensified militarization</mark> and the rise of this complex <mark>outside of</mark> the crisis of global <mark>capitalism</mark>.</u></strong> This crisis is structural, in the first instance. <u>It is</u> what we call <u>a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy</u> driven by new technologies, especially computer, information, and communications technologies, but also by the revolution in transportation and containerization, by robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and more recently, by 3D printing, among other aspects, <u>has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy</u>, and to bring about a huge increase in productivity worldwide and an enormous expansion of the capacity of the global economy to churn out goods and services. But <u><mark>extreme inequality and social polarization</u></mark> in the global system <u><mark>means that the global market cannot absorb</mark> the <mark>expanding output</mark> of the global economy. <strong><mark>The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>The gap between what the global economy can produce and </mark>what the global market can <mark>absorb is growing</mark> and <mark>this leads to a crisis of overproduction</mark>: where and how to unload the surplus?</u> How can transnational capital continue to accumulate and generate profits if this output is not unloaded, that is, profitably marketed? <u><mark>Unloading the surplus</mark> through financial speculation</u>, which has skyrocketed in recent years, only <u><mark>aggravates the solution</mark>, <mark>as we saw with the collapse of</mark> 20<mark>08</mark>. </u>Now, if only 20 percent of humanity can consume in any significant quantity it is not very profitable to go into the business of mass, inexpensive public transportation, health and education, or the production of practical goods that the world’s population needs because very simply even if people need these things they do not have the income to purchase them. A global civilian economy geared to the basic needs of humanity is simply not profitable for the transnational capitalist class. Look at it like this: <u>the mass production and distribution of vaccines and</u> other <u>medications for</u> communicable and treatable <u>diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are</u> simply <u>not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases</u> – <u>tuberculosis, measles, etc</u>. – <u>that previously were under control.</u> <u>Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry</u>, including the giant pharmaceutical, biotechnology and related branches <u>to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent.</u> The lesson here is that <u>capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable</u>, according to the structure of the market and of income, <u>which</u> in turn <u>is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. </u>It is in this context that <u><strong><mark>it becomes</u></strong></mark> quite <u><strong><mark>profitable to turn to wars</u></strong></mark>, conflicts, systems of repression and social control to generate profit, to produce goods and systems that can repress that 80 percent of humanity that is not your consumer, not your customer so to say, because they do not have the purchasing power to sustain your drive to accumulate by producing goods and services for them that they actually need. Global capitalism is a perverted and irrational system. Putting aside geo-political considerations, <u><mark>the</u> <u>surplus</mark> that the global economy has been and is producing but that <mark>cannot be absorbed</mark> by the world market, <mark>has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction</u></mark>, and new systems of social control and repression, independent of geo-political considerations, that is, simply <u>as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies.</u> <u>The US </u>invasions and <u>occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan</u> – <u>although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital.</u> <u>The prison-industrial</u> <u>and immigrant-detention complexes</u> in the United States – and let us recall that the United States holds some 25-30 percent of the world’s prisoners – <u>is enormously profitable for private corporations</u> that run almost all of the immigrant detention centers, some of the general prisons, supply everything from guards to food, build the installations, erect border walls, and so on. Let us recall that the US National Security Agency – and we now know from Edward Snowden just how vast are its operations – subcontracts out its activities to private corporations, as do the CIA, the Pentagon, and so on. Global security corporations are one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and there are now more private security guards in the world than police officers. All of this is to say that <u><strong><mark>we are </mark>now <mark>living in a global war economy</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>in which the threat of stagnation is offset</u></mark> in part <u><mark>by</mark> the <mark>militarization</mark> of global economy and society and the</u> introduction and <u>spread of systems of mass social control</u>. Of course this involves all kinds of cultural, ideological, and political dimensions as well. <u><mark>A global war economy based on <strong>a multitude of endless conflicts</u></strong></mark> <u>and the spread of social control systems, <strong><mark>from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants</mark> in the United States and Europe</strong>, <mark>must be ideologically legitimated</mark>.</u> <u><mark>This is where</mark> bogus</u> and farcical <u>“wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where <mark>enemies must be conjured up</mark>, in which <mark>populations must </mark>be led to <mark>believe they are threatened</u></mark>, and so on. <u>So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is</u> now <u>the devil, and so on.</u> <u><strong><mark>One “threat” replaces another</u></strong> <u>but the system needs to keep a population <strong>in permanent compliance</strong></mark> through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy</u> has <u>involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation</u>, towards those global corporate conglomerates involved in the production of war materials, of security, of engineering (for example, Bechtel and Halliburton), and other activities that involve making profit out of conflict and control. Remember by way of example that <u>each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on</u> and so forth, <u>is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply</u>, in turn, <u>of raw materials, machinery and service inputs</u> in turn <u>come from other global corporations</u> or local firms. So <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> whole <u><strong>global <mark>economy is kept running through violence and conflict</u></strong></mark>. But <u>the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global econom</u>y, together <u>with the petroleum complex that is coming under</u> much <u>pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. <strong><mark>This is a new transnational power bloc</u></strong></mark> – <u>this</u> <u>complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control</u>, together <u>with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc.</u> Remember also that <u><mark>the polarization of the world population</mark> into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated <mark>generates new</mark> spatial <mark>social relations, <strong>so that the privileged occupy gated communities</strong> and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and</mark> carefully <mark>controlled</mark>, <mark>while</mark> surveillance systems and security <mark>guards</mark> must patrol and <mark>protect</mark> <mark>that 20 percent</mark>.</u> <u>All <mark>this</mark> <mark>and</mark> much <mark>more are part of the</mark> militarization and <strong><mark>“securitization” of global society</u></strong></mark> by the powers that be. <u><mark>We face</u></mark> new <u><mark>doctrines</mark>, <mark>ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state</u></mark> – “fourth generation warfare,” “humanitarian intervention,” <u><strong><mark>the “war on drugs,”</u></strong></mark> among others, and above all, the so-called “war on terror.” I say so-called because, <u>the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They</u> indeed <u>do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then <strong>the US state is the world’s leading terrorist.</u></strong> The powers that be in global society and that control the global political discourse attach the label “terrorist” to violence that they do not approve of, and they attach the label of “freedom and democracy and security” to violence that they do approve of, or that they commit themselves. Moreover, increasingly “terrorism” is used to simply describe political dissent, so that legitimate social movements and political struggles against global capitalism become labeled as “terrorism” in order to justify their suppression.</p>
1NC
null
Off
145,658
20
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,330
We must exhaust the 1ac through a parasitic act which dooms the system to crumble under its own weight – otherwise, logics of incorporation ensures the recuperation of juridical domination
Bifo 11
Bifo 11 Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, pg. 104-108
Time is in the mind The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level we are here touching upon a crucial point Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide So hostages are taken On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity No need for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it it was party to its own destruction . The West has become suicidal, and declared war on itself In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years the most powerful weapon has been suicide 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal The exchange between life and money could be deserted exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.
Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as energetic mobilization, social desire and political activism energy is running out, and desire is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization The proliferation of simulacra has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising have submitted the energies to permanent mobilization exhaustion is the only escape:¶ Nothing, can avoid the symbolic obligation, The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does The system must itself commit suicide in response to the challenge of death So hostages are taken the hostage is the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may become confused in the same sacrificial ac The West has become suicidal exhaustion could become withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon activism, and adopt passivity radical passivity would threaten the ethos of relentless productivity We have been working too much is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa The exchange between life and money could be deserted,
Time is in the mind. The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level. I think that we are here touching upon a crucial point. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions. But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.¶ Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction. It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]¶ The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)¶ Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality. And the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely.
 The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape:¶ Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed.¶ The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
 I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.
9,709
<h4><u><strong>We must exhaust the 1ac through a parasitic act which dooms the system to crumble under its own weight – otherwise, logics of incorporation ensures the recuperation of juridical domination</h4><p>Bifo 11</p><p></u></strong>Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, <u>pg. 104-108</p><p>Time is in the mind</u>. <u>The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level</u>. I think that <u>we are here touching upon a crucial point</u>. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. <u><mark>Modern radical thought has always <strong>seen the process of subjectivation</strong></mark> <mark>as</mark> an <strong><mark>energetic</mark> process</strong>: <strong><mark>mobilization</strong>, social <strong>desire</strong> and political <strong>activism</strong></mark>, expression, <strong>participation</strong> have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions</u>. <u>But in our age <strong><mark>energy is running out</strong>, and <strong>desire</strong> </mark>which has given soul to modern social dynamics <mark>is <strong>absorbed in the black hole of virtualization</mark> and financial games</u></strong>, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.¶ Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, <u>the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction</u>. <u>It becomes reality for its own sake, the <strong>fetishism of the lost object</u></strong>: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]¶ The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. <u>Today the whole system is <strong>swamped by indeterminacy</strong>, and every reality is <strong>absorbed by the hyperreality</strong> of the code and simulation</u>. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. <u>We must therefore <strong>reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value</strong> and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system</u>. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. <u>The entire apparatus of <strong>the commodity law of value</strong> is <strong>absorbed and recycled</strong> in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra</u>. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)¶ Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. <u><strong>The brain is the market</strong>, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality</u>. And <u>the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely</u>.
 The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. <u><mark>The <strong>proliferation of simulacra</strong></mark> in the info-sphere <mark>has <strong>saturated</strong> the space of <strong>attention and imagination</u></strong>.</mark> <u><mark>Advertising</mark> and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), <mark>have <strong>submitted the energies</strong></mark> of the social psyche <mark>to <strong>permanent mobilization</u></strong></mark>. <u>Exhaustion follows, and <strong><mark>exhaustion is the only </mark>way of <mark>escape</u></strong>:¶ <u>Nothing, </mark>not even the system, <strong><mark>can avoid the symbolic obligation</strong>, </mark>and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. <strong><mark>The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does</u></strong></mark> when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. <u><mark>The system <strong>must itself commit suicide</strong> in response to the</mark> multiplied <strong><mark>challenge of death </mark>and suicide</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>So hostages are taken</u></strong></mark>. <u>On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out <strong><mark>the hostage is the</mark> substitute, the <mark>alter-ego of the terrorist</strong>, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. <strong>Hostage and terrorist</strong> may </mark>thereafter <mark>become <strong>confused</strong> in the same sacrificial ac</mark>t</u>. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. <u>Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ <u>No need</u>, then, <u>for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects.</u> Very logically – inexorably – <u>the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it</u>. And <u>it was party to its own destruction</u>. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can<u>. <mark>The West</u></mark>, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), <u><mark>has become suicidal</mark>, and declared war on itself</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ <u>In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle</u>. But <u><strong><mark>exhaustion</strong> could</mark> also <mark>become </mark>the beginning of <strong>a slow movement</strong> towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the <strong><mark>withdrawal</strong>, and frugal expectations of life and consumption</u>. <u>Radicalism could abandon</mark> the mode of <mark>activism, and</u> <u><strong>adopt </mark>the mode of <mark>passivity</u></strong></mark>. <u>A <strong><mark>radical passivity</strong> would</mark> definitely <strong><mark>threaten the ethos</strong> of relentless productivity </mark>that neoliberal politics has imposed</u>.¶ <u>The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate</u>. <u><mark>We have been <strong>working too much</strong></mark> during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years</u>. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that <u>the most powerful weapon has been suicide</u>. <u>9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony</u>. And <u>they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ </u>The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. <u><strong>Suicide</strong> has became <strong>a form of political action</strong> everywhere</u>. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
 I think that <u>it <mark>is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa</mark>l</u>. <u><mark>The exchange between life and money could be <strong>deserted</u></strong>,</mark> and <u>exhaustion could give way to <strong>a huge wave of withdrawal</strong> from the sphere of economic exchange</u>. <u>A new refrain could <strong>emerge in that moment</strong>, and wipe out the law of economic growth</u>. <u>The self-organization of the general intellect could <strong>abandon the law of accumulation and growth</u></strong>, and <u>start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.</p></u>
1NC
null
Off
174,846
274
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,331
Our alternative is pedagogical resistance to neoliberalism – the failure of traditional politics demands creation of resistant educational spaces – exposing epistemic cracks within neoliberal apparatuses provides the conditions of possibility for radical politics
Giroux 11/6
Giroux 11/6 (Henry Giroux, PhD from Carnegie-Mellon University, professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, distinguished visiting professor at Ryerson University, 11-6-14, “Capitalism Is a Tumor on the Body Politic: What's the Alternative? Beyond Mid-Election Babble,” http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/27273-henry-a-giroux-capitalism-is-a-tumor-on-the-body-politic-what-s-the-alternative) gz
The biggest challenge facing those who believe in social justice is to provide an alternative discourse, educational apparatuses and vision that can convince US citizens that a real democracy is worth fighting for The right-wing Republican sweep of Congress testifies to a massive memory and educational deficit among the US public and a failure among progressives and the left regarding how to think about politics outside of the established boundaries of liberal reform. The educative nature of politics has never been more crucial than it is now and testifies to the need for a new politics in which culture and education are as important as economic forces in shaping individual and social agency, if not resistance itself. The cultural apparatuses owned by the financial elite are largely responsible for the political and social darkness that engulfs the American public Americans are inhabiting a new moment in history in which the symbiosis among cultural institutions, power and everyday life has shaped the very nature of politics and the broader collective public consciousness with an influence unlike anything we have seen in the past Economics drives politics and its legitimating apparatuses have become the great engines of manufactured ignorance. This suggests the need for the left and their allies to take seriously how identities, desires and modes of agency are produced, struggled over and taken up the left "has underestimated the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle and have not always forged appropriate weapons to fight on this front" and in doing so have failed in its responsibility to address the educative nature of politics by challenging modes of domination "that lie on the side of the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle Couple that understanding with the need for a more comprehensive vision of change and the necessity for broad-based social movements, and it may become possible once again to develop new opportunities for a new political language, forms of collective struggle and a politics for radical change rather than cravenly center-right reforms. The financial state promotes a form of ideological terrorism and the key issue is how to expose it, and dismantle its cultural apparatuses with the use of the social media, diverse apparatuses of communication, new political formations, and ongoing collective educational and political struggles.
The biggest challenge facing social justice is to provide an alternative discourse, educational apparatuses and vision that can convince citizens that democracy is worth fighting for The right-wing sweep of Congress testifies to a educational deficit among the public and failure to think politics outside established boundaries The educative nature of politics has never been more crucial and testifies to the need for a new politics in which culture and education are important in shaping social agency, if not resistance Economics drives politics and its apparatuses have become engines of manufactured ignorance. This suggests the need to take seriously how identities, desires and agency are produced the left "has underestimated the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle and have not forged appropriate weapons to fight on this front Couple that with broad-based social movements, and it may become possible to develop a new political language and a politics for radical change The financial state promotes ideological terrorism and the key is how to expose and dismantle its cultural apparatuses
The biggest challenge facing those who believe in social justice is to provide an alternative discourse, educational apparatuses and vision that can convince US citizens that a real democracy is worth fighting for. The right-wing Republican sweep of Congress testifies to a massive memory and educational deficit among the US public and a failure among progressives and the left regarding how to think about politics outside of the established boundaries of liberal reform. The educative nature of politics has never been more crucial than it is now and testifies to the need for a new politics in which culture and education are as important as economic forces in shaping individual and social agency, if not resistance itself. The cultural apparatuses owned by the financial elite are largely responsible for the political and social darkness that engulfs the American public. Americans are inhabiting a new moment in history in which the symbiosis among cultural institutions, power and everyday life has shaped the very nature of politics and the broader collective public consciousness with an influence unlike anything we have seen in the past. Economics drives politics and its legitimating apparatuses have become the great engines of manufactured ignorance. This suggests the need for the left and their allies to take seriously how identities, desires and modes of agency are produced, struggled over and taken up. The left and other progressives need to rethink Pierre Bourdieu's insistence that the left "has underestimated the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle and have not always forged appropriate weapons to fight on this front" and in doing so have failed in its responsibility to address the educative nature of politics by challenging modes of domination "that lie on the side of the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle." (1) Couple that understanding with the need for a more comprehensive vision of change and the necessity for broad-based social movements, and it may become possible once again to develop new opportunities for a new political language, forms of collective struggle and a politics for radical change rather than cravenly center-right reforms. As Hannah Arendt and others told us many years ago, there is no democracy without an informed public. This is a lesson the right wing took very seriously after the democratic uprisings of the 1960s. This is not a matter of blaming the public but of trying to understand the role of culture and power as a vital force in politics and how it is linked to massive inequities in wealth and income. The financial state promotes a form of ideological terrorism and the key issue is how to expose it, and dismantle its cultural apparatuses with the use of the social media, diverse apparatuses of communication, new political formations, and ongoing collective educational and political struggles.
2,899
<h4>Our alternative is pedagogical resistance to neoliberalism – the failure of traditional politics demands creation of resistant educational spaces – exposing epistemic cracks within neoliberal apparatuses provides the conditions of possibility for radical politics</h4><p><u><strong>Giroux 11/6</u></strong> (Henry Giroux, PhD from Carnegie-Mellon University, professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, distinguished visiting professor at Ryerson University, 11-6-14, “Capitalism Is a Tumor on the Body Politic: What's the Alternative? Beyond Mid-Election Babble,” http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/27273-henry-a-giroux-capitalism-is-a-tumor-on-the-body-politic-what-s-the-alternative) gz</p><p><u><mark>The biggest challenge facing </mark>those who believe in <mark>social justice is to provide <strong>an alternative discourse, educational apparatuses and vision</strong> that can convince</mark> US <mark>citizens that</mark> a real <mark>democracy is worth fighting for</u></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>The right-wing</mark> Republican <mark>sweep of Congress testifies to a</mark> massive <strong>memory and <mark>educational deficit among the</mark> US <mark>public</strong> and</mark> a <mark>failure</mark> among progressives and the left regarding how <mark>to think </mark>about <mark>politics outside</mark> of the <mark>established boundaries </mark>of liberal reform. <strong><mark>The educative nature of politics</strong> has never been more crucial</mark> than it is now <mark>and testifies to <strong>the need for a new politics in which culture and education are</mark> as <mark>important</strong></mark> as economic forces <mark>in shaping</mark> <strong>individual and <mark>social agency, if not resistance</mark> itself</strong>.</p><p>The cultural apparatuses owned by the financial elite are largely responsible for the <strong>political and social darkness that engulfs the American public</u></strong>. <u>Americans are inhabiting a new moment in history in which the <strong>symbiosis among cultural institutions, power and everyday life</strong> has shaped the very nature of politics and the broader collective public consciousness with an influence unlike anything we have seen in the past</u>. <u><strong><mark>Economics drives politics </strong>and its</mark> legitimating <mark>apparatuses have become</mark> the great <strong><mark>engines of manufactured ignorance</strong>. This suggests the need</mark> for the left and their allies <mark>to <strong>take seriously how identities, desires and</mark> modes of <mark>agency are produced</strong></mark>, struggled over and taken up</u>. The left and other progressives need to rethink Pierre Bourdieu's insistence that <u><mark>the left "has <strong>underestimated the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle</strong> and have not</mark> always <mark>forged appropriate <strong>weapons to fight on this front</mark>"</strong> and in doing so have failed in its responsibility to address the educative nature of politics by challenging modes of domination "that lie on the side of the <strong>symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle</u></strong>." (1) <u><mark>Couple that</mark> understanding <mark>with</mark> the need for a more comprehensive vision of change and the <strong>necessity for <mark>broad-based social movements</strong>, and it may become possible</mark> once again <mark>to develop</mark> new opportunities for <mark>a <strong>new political language</strong></mark>, forms of collective struggle <mark>and a <strong>politics for radical change</mark> rather than cravenly center-right reforms.</p><p></u></strong>As Hannah Arendt and others told us many years ago, there is no democracy without an informed public. This is a lesson the right wing took very seriously after the democratic uprisings of the 1960s. This is not a matter of blaming the public but of trying to understand the role of culture and power as a vital force in politics and how it is linked to massive inequities in wealth and income. <u><mark>The financial state promotes</mark> a form of <strong><mark>ideological terrorism</strong> and the key</mark> issue <mark>is how to <strong>expose</mark> it, <mark>and dismantle its cultural apparatuses</strong></mark> with the use of the social media, diverse apparatuses of communication, new political formations, and ongoing collective educational and political struggles.</p></u>
1NC
null
Off
429,935
6
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,332
We do this through a politics of stealing away – we must refuse interpellation and take back what belongs to the undercommons
Moten and Harney ‘13
Moten and Harney ‘13 (Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Modern Poetry at Duke, “The University and the Undercommons,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 26-28) [m leap]
The Only Possible Relationship to the University Today is a Criminal One To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal This is the only possible relationship to the American university today. certainly, this much is true in the United States: it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment one can only sneak into the university and steal what one can To abuse its hospitality, to spite its mission, to join its refugee colony, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings She disappears into the underground, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, into the Undercommons of Enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong teaching would be performing the work of the university Teaching is merely a profession and an operation of what Jacques Derrida calls the onto-/auto-encyclopedic circle of the Universitas it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby erased by it it is teaching that brings us in teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university But what would it mean if the beyond of teaching” is precisely what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance And what of those minorities who refuse, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects, as minority the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste their collective labor will always call into question who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes with hands full into the underground of the university, into the Undercommons—this will be regarded as theft, as a criminal act it is at the same time, the only possible act . To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. The prophecy that predicts its own organization and has therefore passed, as commons, and the prophecy that exceeds its own organization and therefore as yet can only be organized. Against the prophetic organization of the Undercommons is arrayed its own deadening labor for the university, and beyond that, the negligence of professionalization, and the professionalization of the critical academic. The Undercommons is therefore always an unsafe neighborhood.
The Only Possible Relationship to the University Today is a Criminal One To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal one can sneak into the university and steal what one can. abuse its hospitality spite its mission join its refugee colony the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings She disappears into the Undercommons where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted Teaching is a profession an operation of the auto-encyclopedic circle of the Universitas And what of those minorities who refuse as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes into the Undercommons this will be regarded as theft a criminal act the only possible act To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and fugitive the criminal, matricidal, queer on the stroll of the stolen life the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others a radical passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood
The Only Possible Relationship to the University Today is a Criminal One. “To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal,” to borrow from Pistol at the end of Henry V, as he would surely borrow from us. This is the only possible relationship to the American university today. This may be true of universities everywhere. It may have to be true of the university in general. But certainly, this much is true in the United States: it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment. In the face of these conditions one can only sneak into the university and steal what one can. To abuse its hospitality, to spite its mission, to join its refugee colony, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university. Worry about the university. This is the injunction today in the United States, one with a long history. Call for its restoration like Harold Bloom or Stanley Fish or Gerald Graff. Call for its reform like Derek Bok or Bill Readings or Cary Nelson. Call out to it as it calls to you. But for the subversive intellectual, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men. After all, the subversive intellectual came under false pretenses, with bad documents, out of love. Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome. The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings. And on top of all that, she disappears. She disappears into the underground, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, into the Undercommons of Enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted, where the revolution is still black, still strong. What is that work and what is its social capacity for both reproducing the university and producing fugitivity? If one were to say teaching, one would be performing the work of the university. Teaching is merely a profession and an operation of what Jacques Derrida calls the onto-/auto-encyclopedic circle of the Universitas. But it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters. The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby erased by it. It is not teaching then that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side of teaching, a thinking through the skin of teaching toward a collective orientation to the knowledge object as future project, and a commitment to what we want to call the prophetic organization. But it is teaching that brings us in. Before there are grants, research, conferences, books, and journals there is the experience of being taught and of teaching. Before the research post with no teaching, before the graduate students to mark the exams, before the string of sabbaticals, before the permanent reduction in teaching load, the appointment to run the Center, the consignment of pedagogy to a discipline called education, before the course designed to be a new book, teaching happened. The moment of teaching for food is therefore often mistakenly taken to be a stage, as if eventually, one should not teach for food. If the stage persists, there is a social pathology in the university. But if the teaching is successfully passed on, the stage is surpassed, and teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university. Kant interestingly calls such a stage “self-incurred minority.” He tries to contrast it with having the “determination and courage to use one’s intelligence without being guided by another.” “Have the courage to use your own intelligence.” But what would it mean if teaching or rather what we might call “the beyond of teaching” is precisely what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance? And what of those minorities who refuse, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), as if they will not be subjects, as if they want to think as objects, as minority? Certainly, the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste. But their collective labor will always call into question who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment. The waste lives for those moments 102 Moten/Harneybeyond2 teaching when you give away the unexpected beautiful phrase— unexpected, no one has asked, beautiful, it will never come back. Is being the biopower of the Enlightenment truly better than this? Perhaps the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must. But even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional. And one may be given one last chance to be pragmatic—why steal when one can have it all, they will ask. But if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes with hands full into the underground of the university, into the Undercommons—this will be regarded as theft, as a criminal act. And it is at the same time, the only possible act. In that Undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the individualization of research. To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons. What the beyond2 of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. The prophecy that predicts its own organization and has therefore passed, as commons, and the prophecy that exceeds its own organization and therefore as yet can only be organized. Against the prophetic organization of the Undercommons is arrayed its own deadening labor for the university, and beyond that, the negligence of professionalization, and the professionalization of the critical academic. The Undercommons is therefore always an unsafe neighborhood.
6,752
<h4>We do this through a politics of stealing away – we must refuse interpellation and take back what belongs to the undercommons</h4><p><u><strong>Moten and Harney ‘13</u></strong> (Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at the Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University and a co-founder of the School for Study and Fred Moten, Helen L. Bevington Professor of Modern Poetry at Duke, “The University and the Undercommons,” The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pg. 26-28)<u> [m leap]</p><p><mark>The Only Possible Relationship to the University Today is a Criminal One</u></mark>. “<u><strong><mark>To the university I’ll steal, and there I’ll steal</u></strong></mark>,” to borrow from Pistol at the end of Henry V, as he would surely borrow from us. <u>This is the only possible relationship to the American university today.</u> This may be true of universities everywhere. It may have to be true of the university in general. But <u>certainly, this much is true in the United States:</u> <u>it cannot be denied that the university is a place of refuge, and it cannot be accepted that the university is a place of enlightenment</u>. In the face of these conditions <u><mark>one can </mark>only <strong><mark>sneak into the university</strong> and <strong>steal what one can</u></strong>. <u><strong></mark>To <mark>abuse its hospitality</strong></mark>, to <strong><mark>spite its mission</strong></mark>, to <strong><mark>join its refugee colony</strong></mark>, its gypsy encampment, to be in but not of—this is the path of the subversive intellectual in the modern university</u>. Worry about the university. This is the injunction today in the United States, one with a long history. Call for its restoration like Harold Bloom or Stanley Fish or Gerald Graff. Call for its reform like Derek Bok or Bill Readings or Cary Nelson. Call out to it as it calls to you. But for the subversive intellectual, all of this goes on upstairs, in polite company, among the rational men. After all, <u><mark>the subversive intellectual <strong>came under false pretenses</strong>, with <strong>bad documents</strong>, <strong>out of love</u></strong></mark>. <u>Her labor is as necessary as it is unwelcome</u>. <u><strong><mark>The university needs what she bears but cannot bear what she brings</u></strong></mark>. And on top of all that, she disappears. <u><mark>She disappears </mark>into the underground, the downlow lowdown maroon community of the university, <mark>into the <strong>Undercommons</strong></mark> of Enlightenment, <mark>where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted</mark>, where the revolution is <strong>still black, still strong</u></strong>. What is that work and what is its social capacity for both reproducing the university and producing fugitivity? If one were to say <u>teaching</u>, one <u>would be performing the work of the university</u>. <u><strong><mark>Teaching</strong> is</mark> merely <mark>a <strong>profession</strong></mark> and <strong><mark>an operation</strong> of</mark> what Jacques Derrida calls<mark> <strong>the</mark> </strong>onto-<strong>/<mark>auto-encyclopedic circle</strong> of the Universitas</u></mark>. But <u>it is useful to invoke this operation to glimpse the hole in the fence where labor enters, to glimpse its hiring hall, its night quarters</u>. <u>The university needs teaching labor, despite itself, or as itself, self-identical with and thereby <strong>erased by it</u></strong>. It is not teaching then that holds this social capacity, but something that produces the not visible other side of teaching, a thinking through the skin of teaching toward a collective orientation to the knowledge object as future project, and a commitment to what we want to call the prophetic organization. But <u>it is teaching that brings us in</u>. Before there are grants, research, conferences, books, and journals there is the experience of being taught and of teaching. Before the research post with no teaching, before the graduate students to mark the exams, before the string of sabbaticals, before the permanent reduction in teaching load, the appointment to run the Center, the consignment of pedagogy to a discipline called education, before the course designed to be a new book, teaching happened. The moment of teaching for food is therefore often mistakenly taken to be a stage, as if eventually, one should not teach for food. If the stage persists, there is a social pathology in the university. But if the teaching is successfully passed on, the stage is surpassed, and<u> teaching is consigned to those who are known to remain in the stage, the sociopathological labor of the university</u>. Kant interestingly calls such a stage “self-incurred minority.” He tries to contrast it with having the “determination and courage to use one’s intelligence without being guided by another.” “Have the courage to use your own intelligence.” <u>But what would it mean if</u> teaching or rather what we might call “<u>the beyond of teaching” is precisely what one is asked to get beyond, to stop taking sustenance</u>? <u><mark>And what of those minorities who refuse</mark>, the tribe of moles who will not come back from beyond2 (that which is beyond “the beyond of teaching”), <mark>as if <strong>they will not be subjects</strong>, as if <strong>they want to think as objects</strong></mark>, as <strong>minority</u></strong>? Certainly, <u>the perfect subjects of communication, those successfully beyond teaching, will see them as waste</u>. But <u>their collective labor will always call into question <strong>who truly is taking the orders of the Enlightenment</u></strong>. The waste lives for those moments 102 Moten/Harneybeyond2 teaching when you give away the unexpected beautiful phrase— unexpected, no one has asked, beautiful, it will never come back. Is being the biopower of the Enlightenment truly better than this? Perhaps <u>the biopower of the Enlightenment know this, or perhaps it is just reacting to the objecthood of this labor as it must</u>. But <u>even as it depends on these moles, these refugees, they will call them uncollegial, impractical, naive, unprofessional</u>. And one may be given one last chance to be pragmatic—why steal when one can have it all, they will ask. But <u><strong><mark>if one hides from this interpellation, neither agrees nor disagrees but goes</strong></mark> with hands full into the underground of the university, <strong><mark>into the Undercommons</strong></mark>—<mark>this will be <strong>regarded as theft</strong></mark>, as <mark>a <strong>criminal act</u></strong></mark>. And <u>it is at the same time, <strong><mark>the only possible act</u></strong></mark>. In that Undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching versus the individualization of research<u>. <mark>To enter this space is to <strong>inhabit the ruptural</strong></mark> <mark>and</mark> enraptured disclosure of the commons that <strong><mark>fugitive</strong></mark> enlightenment enacts, <strong><mark>the criminal</strong>, <strong>matricidal</strong>, <strong>queer</strong></mark>, in the cistern, <strong><mark>on the stroll of the stolen life</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back</strong></mark>, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons</u>. What the beyond2 of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; <u><mark>it’s about <strong>allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>a radical</strong></mark> passion and <strong><mark>passivity</strong></mark> <mark>such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood</mark>, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. The prophecy that predicts its own organization and has therefore passed, as commons, and the prophecy that exceeds its own organization and therefore as yet can only be organized. Against the prophetic organization of the Undercommons is arrayed its own deadening labor for the university, and beyond that, the negligence of professionalization, and the professionalization of the critical academic. The Undercommons is therefore always an <strong>unsafe neighborhood</strong>.</p></u>
1NC
null
Off
1,240,567
424
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,333
The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt assuasion
Chow 1993
Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993
While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in an opposition against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed) but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words The predicament we face in the West Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper?
The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in oppositional against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return claims of oppression and victimization are used to guilt-trip and to control; affirmations of diversities that are made in the name of righteousness create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is not their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed but the privilege that accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper
(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can resist, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?
5,388
<h4>The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt <strong>assuasion</h4><p><u>Chow</u> </strong>– Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown -<strong> <u>1993</p><p></u></strong>(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) </p><p><u>While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary</u> for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. <u><mark>The question</u></mark> for me <u><mark>is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony</u></mark> (a question that positions them <u><mark>in</mark> an <mark>opposition</u>al</mark> light <u><mark>against dominant power</u></mark> and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), <u><mark>but <strong>how they can resist</u></strong></mark>, as Michel Foucault said, “<u><mark>the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse</u></mark>.’ “ Putting it another way, <u><mark>how do intellectuals struggle against <strong>a hegemony which already includes them</u></strong></mark> and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? <u>As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,”</u> <u>and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and <mark>as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, <strong>many</strong> deep-rooted, <strong>politically reactionary forces return</u></strong></mark> <u>to haunt us.</u> <u>Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested <strong><mark>claims</strong></mark> <strong><mark>of oppression and victimization</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>are used</u></strong></mark> merely <u><strong><mark>to guilt-trip and to control</strong>; </mark>sexist and racist re<mark>affirmations of </mark>sexual and racial <mark>diversities that are made</mark> merely <mark>in the name of righteousness</mark>—all these forces <mark>create new “solidarities whose ideological premises <strong>remain unquestioned</u></strong></mark>. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. <u>The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense,</u> <u>We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are <strong>battles of words</u></strong>. <u><mark>Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are</mark> </u>most certainly <u><strong><mark>not</u></strong></mark> directly<u> <strong><mark>changing the</strong></mark> </u>downtrodden<u> <strong><mark>lives of those who seek</strong></mark> </u>their<u> <strong><mark>survival</strong></mark> </u>in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike.<u> <mark>What academic intellectuals must confront is</mark> thus <mark>not their</mark> </u>victimization by society at large (<u>or their <mark>victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed</mark>)</u>, <u><mark>but the</mark> power, wealth, and <mark>privilege that</mark> Ironically <mark>accumulate <strong>from their</strong> “oppositional” <strong>viewpoint</strong></mark>, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words</u>. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) <u>The predicament we face in the West</u>, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, <u>Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business</u>, . . . <u>he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen.</u> “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? <u><mark>How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses</u></mark>, <u><mark>when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper</mark>?</u> How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?</p>
1NC
null
Case
323,208
67
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,334
Their counter-hegemony cannot actually mobilize, it only functions as one more act of protest which actually smooths capitalist relations.
Swyngedouw 08
Erik Swyngedouw. “Where is the Political?” IBG/RGS Conference. March 2008.
For him, radical transformation resides in political activism, the obsessive desire for becoming His emancipatory politics adheres to activism that asks the polity of state and of economy to change It is political acting that aims at changing the elites not at their replacement it is the obsessive activist that holds the promise for radical change for Holloway such politics of resistance has accepted the inevitability of capitalism’s global hegemony and retreats in the bulwark of localised political activism and acts around the provision of a space for the multitude of new subjectivities The demonstrations in Washington against the US attack on Iraq offer an exemplary case of this symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear they don’t agree with the government Those in power profited the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus Bush’s reaction ‘You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here will be possible in Iraq
For him, radical transformation resides in political activism emancipatory politics adheres to activism that asks the polity of state and of economy to change it is the obsessive activist that holds the promise for radical change such politics of resistance has accepted the inevitability of capitalism’s global hegemony and retreats in the bulwark of localised political activism and acts around the provision of a space for the multitude of new subjectivities demonstrations in Washington offer an exemplary case The protesters saved their beautiful souls Those in power profited the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision they also served to legitimise it
I situate my argument of what constitutes the political in the interstices between two great, but radically opposed, perspectives that have galvanised much of progressive and leftist energies over the past few years. The first one is Hardt and Negri’s Empire and the immanent force of the multitude whose energies are liberated through the vicissitudes of empire, which in its womb, already harbours and nurtures the free reign of the multitude that will transgress and revolutionise the very disempowering and unequally constituted constellation of Empire (Hardt and Negri 2001). Indeed, as they could claim at the end of their book, there is an unbearable lightness in being communist as the immanent force of the multitude will realise itself through some sort of mythical energetic force. The multitude as political agent, from their perspective, grows out of and supplants Empire as a necessary, teleological, revolutionary gesture; political subjectivity is barred, annulled; the forces of empire will just do the trick. In this sense, the observation that Hardt and Negri have written the Communist Manifesto for the 21st Century is correct; it breathes the same unrelenting belief in the immanence of the multitude as it will emerge from the debris of a transcended imperial order, and a politics of egalibertarian emancipation is already structurally fermenting within the interstices of rhizomatic and decentred imperial reign. Second, and at the other side of the spectre stands, symbolically speaking, John Holloway’s Change the world without taking power (Holloway 2002). For him, radical transformation resides in continuous political activism, the obsessive desire for becoming that supplants the need for being, for spatialisation. His emancipatory politics adheres to the sort of activism that asks the constituent oligarchic polity of state and of economy to change, to take the demands seriously. It is political acting that aims at changing the elites not at their transformation, let alone their replacement in a different constituent order. While the political is an immanent process borne out of the configurations of empire for Negri, it is the obsessive activist, driven by a desire for justice and an analytical toolkit that situates injustices within the contours of the politico-economic and socio-cultural order that holds the promise for radical change for Holloway. Simon Critchley offers an ethico-philosophical foundation for such anarchic ‘politics of resistance’ (Critchley 2007). For Slavoj Žižek, such politics of resistance has de facto accepted the inevitability of capitalism’s global hegemony and retreats in the bulwark of localised political activism, centred on a critique of what is and acts around the provision of a space for the multitude of new subjectivities. In a review of this position, Zizek (Žižek 2007) states:¶ “The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don’t agree with the government’s policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus George Bush’s reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: ‘You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here – protesting against their government policy – will be possible also in Iraq!’”
3,672
<h4>Their counter-hegemony cannot actually mobilize, it only functions as one more act of protest which actually smooths capitalist relations.</h4><p>Erik <u><strong>Swyngedouw</u></strong>. “Where is the Political?” IBG/RGS Conference. March 20<u><strong>08</u></strong>.</p><p>I situate my argument of what constitutes the political in the interstices between two great, but radically opposed, perspectives that have galvanised much of progressive and leftist energies over the past few years. The first one is Hardt and Negri’s Empire and the immanent force of the multitude whose energies are liberated through the vicissitudes of empire, which in its womb, already harbours and nurtures the free reign of the multitude that will transgress and revolutionise the very disempowering and unequally constituted constellation of Empire (Hardt and Negri 2001). Indeed, as they could claim at the end of their book, there is an unbearable lightness in being communist as the immanent force of the multitude will realise itself through some sort of mythical energetic force. The multitude as political agent, from their perspective, grows out of and supplants Empire as a necessary, teleological, revolutionary gesture; political subjectivity is barred, annulled; the forces of empire will just do the trick. In this sense, the observation that Hardt and Negri have written the Communist Manifesto for the 21st Century is correct; it breathes the same unrelenting belief in the immanence of the multitude as it will emerge from the debris of a transcended imperial order, and a politics of egalibertarian emancipation is already structurally fermenting within the interstices of rhizomatic and decentred imperial reign. Second, and at the other side of the spectre stands, symbolically speaking, John Holloway’s Change the world without taking power (Holloway 2002). <u><mark>For him, radical transformation resides in</u></mark> continuous <u><mark>political activism</mark>, the obsessive desire for becoming</u> that supplants the need for being, for spatialisation. <u>His <mark>emancipatory politics adheres to</u></mark> the sort of <u><mark>activism that asks the</u></mark> constituent oligarchic <u><mark>polity of state and of economy to change</u></mark>, to take the demands seriously. <u>It is political acting that aims at changing the elites not at their</u> transformation, let alone their <u>replacement</u> in a different constituent order. While the political is an immanent process borne out of the configurations of empire for Negri, <u><mark>it is the obsessive activist</u></mark>, driven by a desire for justice and an analytical toolkit that situates injustices within the contours of the politico-economic and socio-cultural order <u><mark>that holds the promise for radical change</mark> for Holloway</u>. Simon Critchley offers an ethico-philosophical foundation for such anarchic ‘politics of resistance’ (Critchley 2007). For Slavoj Žižek, <u><mark>such politics of resistance has</u></mark> de facto <u><mark>accepted the inevitability of capitalism’s global hegemony and retreats in the bulwark of localised political activism</u></mark>, centred on a critique of what is <u><mark>and acts around the provision of a space for the multitude of new subjectivities</u></mark>. In a review of this position, Zizek (Žižek 2007) states:¶ “<u>The</u> big <u><mark>demonstrations in</u></mark> London and <u><mark>Washington</mark> against the US attack on Iraq</u> a few years ago <u><mark>offer an exemplary case</mark> of this</u> strange <u>symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their</u> paradoxical <u>outcome was that both sides were satisfied. <mark>The protesters saved their beautiful souls</mark>: they made it clear</u> that <u>they don’t agree with the government</u>’s policy on Iraq. <u><mark>Those in power</u></mark> calmly accepted it, even <u><mark>profited</u></mark> from it: not only did <u><mark>the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision</mark> to attack Iraq; <mark>they also served to legitimise it</mark>. Thus</u> George <u>Bush’s reaction</u> to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: <u>‘You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here</u> – protesting against their government policy – <u>will be possible</u> also <u>in Iraq</u>!’”</p>
1NC
null
Off
430,185
1
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,335
The attempt to make structural suffering accessible with scenes of particular people individuates systemic harms in order to make them manageable – The 1AC packaging facilitates analytic passivity by narrowing the means for legitimate calls to action, deferring structural transformations in exchange for handing off the burden of articulating oppression to those who most directly experience it.
Berlant 1996
Berlant – Professor of English @ the University of Chicago – 1996
The double humiliation of protest in the mainstream media subtracts personhood from activists In contrast, political suffering is still palatable when expressed as a trauma or injury to a particular person. This narrowing in the means for making a legitimate claim on public sympathy has had a significant effect in a certain strain of U.S. legal theory But more than this gossip media have helped to make scenes of personal witnessing the only political testimony that counts. It is not that just everybody loves a good sob story. Trauma makes good storytelling and puts a "face" on an otherwise abstract issue.17 Moreover, the sheer scale of the systematically brutal hierarchies that structure national capitalist culture can be overwhelming, leading to a kind of emotional and analytic paralysis [stagnation] in a public that cannot imagine a world without poverty or violence: here too, the facialization of U.S. injustice makes it manageable and enables further deferral of considerations that might force structural transformations of public life. In the meantime the personal complaint form now bears a huge burden for vocalizing and embodying injustice in the United States
The double humiliation of protest in the mainstream media subtracts personhood from activists , political suffering is still palatable when expressed as a trauma or injury to a particular person. This narrowing in the means for making a legitimate claim on public sympathy has had a significant effect in a certain strain of U.S. legal theory gossip media have helped to make scenes of personal witnessing the only political testimony that counts the sheer scale of the systematically brutal hierarchies that structure national capitalist culture can be overwhelming, leading to a kind of emotional and analytic [stagnation] in a public that cannot imagine a world without poverty or violence the personal complaint form now bears a huge burden for vocalizing and embodying injustice in the United States.
(Lauren, “The Face of American and the State of Emergency,” in Disciplinarity and Dissent in Cultural Studies, Cary Nelson and Dilip Gaonkar (Eds.), pp. 397-440 @ 406-7) Modified for ableist language The double humiliation of protest in the mainstream media, making it both silly and dangerous, subtracts personhood from activists, making their very gestures of citizenship seem proof that their claims arc illegitimate. This is especially germane in the portrayal of pro-life and gay collective actions. In contrast, political suffering is still palatable when expressed as a trauma or injury to a particular person. This narrowing in the means for making a legitimate claim on public sympathy has had a significant effect in a certain strain of U.S. legal theory, where some are arguing that words and images can produce harms to a person as substantial as those made by physical acts of violence, such that violent and cruel talk should be actionable the way physical assault is (Matsuda 1993). But more than this, talk shows and other forms of gossip media have helped to make scenes of personal witnessing the only political testimony that counts. It is not that just everybody loves a good sob story. Trauma makes good storytelling and, as journalistic common sense constantly reminds us, it puts a "face" on an otherwise abstract issue.17 Moreover, the sheer scale of the systematically brutal hierarchies that structure national capitalist culture can be overwhelming, leading to a kind of emotional and analytic paralysis [stagnation] in a public that cannot imagine a world without poverty or violence: here too, the facialization of U.S. injustice makes it manageable and enables further deferral of considerations that might force structural transformations of public life. In the meantime, while the embodied activities of anonymous citizens have taken on the odor of the abject, the personal complaint form now bears a huge burden for vocalizing and embodying injustice in the United States.
2,009
<h4>The attempt to make structural suffering accessible with scenes of particular people individuates systemic harms in order to make them manageable – The 1AC packaging facilitates analytic passivity by narrowing the means for legitimate calls to action, deferring structural transformations in exchange for handing off the burden of articulating oppression to those who most directly experience it.</h4><p><u><strong>Berlant</u></strong> – Professor of English @ the University of Chicago – <u><strong>1996</p><p></u></strong>(Lauren, “The Face of American and the State of Emergency,” in Disciplinarity and Dissent in Cultural Studies, Cary Nelson and Dilip Gaonkar (Eds.), pp. 397-440 @ 406-7) </p><p>Modified for ableist language</p><p><u><mark>The double humiliation of protest in the mainstream media</u></mark>, making it both silly and dangerous, <u><mark>subtracts personhood from activists</u></mark>, making their very gestures of citizenship seem proof that their claims arc illegitimate. This is especially germane in the portrayal of pro-life and gay collective actions. <u>In contrast<mark>, political suffering is still palatable when expressed as a trauma or injury to a particular person. This narrowing in the means for making a legitimate claim on public sympathy has had a significant effect in a certain strain of U.S. legal theory</u></mark>, where some are arguing that words and images can produce harms to a person as substantial as those made by physical acts of violence, such that violent and cruel talk should be actionable the way physical assault is (Matsuda 1993). <u>But more than this</u>, talk shows and other forms of <u><mark>gossip media have helped to make scenes of personal witnessing the only political testimony that counts</mark>. It is not that just everybody loves a good sob story. Trauma makes good storytelling and</u>, as journalistic common sense constantly reminds us, it <u>puts a "face" on an otherwise abstract issue.17 Moreover, <mark>the sheer scale of the systematically brutal hierarchies that structure national capitalist culture can be overwhelming, leading to a kind of emotional and analytic </mark>paralysis <mark>[stagnation] in a public that cannot imagine a world without poverty or violence</mark>: here too, the facialization of U.S. injustice makes it manageable and enables further deferral of considerations that might force structural transformations of public life. In the meantime</u>, while the embodied activities of anonymous citizens have taken on the odor of the abject, <u><mark>the personal complaint form now bears a huge burden for vocalizing and embodying injustice in the United States</u>.</p></mark>
1NC
null
Case
158,095
2
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,336
All the aff does is transform resistance into a form of “transgression” which props up the neo-liberal order.
Swyngedouw 08
Erik Swyngedouw. “Where is the Political?” IBG/RGS Conference. March 2008.
politicization cuts directly against radical politics that characterize resistance. Rather than embracing the multitude of singularities and the plurality of possible modes of becoming rather than reveling in immanence rather than the micropolitics of dispersed resistances, alternative practices, and affects this contribution foregrounds division and exclusion and emphases the ‘passage to the act’ Politics understood as rituals of resistance is doomed to fail politically Radical political practices is conceived as an unending process which can destabilize the power structure, without ever being able to undermine it the goal is to displace the limit of social exclusions, empowering the excluded agents (sexual and ethnic minorities) by creating marginal spaces in which they can articulate and question their identity such tactics not only leave the symbolic order intact and at best ‘tickle’ the police order, they are conducive to the flows of global capital the very field of such ‘transgressions’ are engendered by the hegemomic form
politicization cuts directly against radical politics that characterize resistance. Rather than embracing the multitude of singularities and the plurality of possible modes of becoming rather than the micropolitics of dispersed resistances this contribution foregrounds division and exclusion and emphases the ‘passage to the act’ Politics understood as rituals of resistance is doomed to fail politically conceived as an unending process which can destabilize the power structure, without ever being able to undermine it the goal is to displace the limit of social exclusions, such tactics leave the symbolic order intact they are conducive to the flows of global capital the very field of such ‘transgressions’ are engendered by the hegemomic form”
Badiou defines ‘le passage à l’acte’ as an intervention in the state of the situation that transforms and transgresses the symbolic orders of the existing condition and marks a shift from the old to a new situation, one that cannot any longer be thought of in terms of the old symbolic framings. Žižek insists that such a political act does not start ‘from the art of the possible, but from the art of the impossible’ (Žižek 1999b). Proper politics is thus about enunciating demands that lie beyond the symbolic order of the police; demands that cannot be symbolized within the frame of reference of the police and, therefore, would necessitate a transformation in and of the police to permit symbolization to occur. Yet, these are demands that are eminently sensible and feasible when the frame of the symbolic order is shifted, when the parallax gap between what is (the constituted symbolic order of the police) and what can be (the reconstituted symbolic order made possible through a shift in vantage points, one that starts from the partisan universalizing principle of equality). This is the actual political process through which those that have no part claim their place within the symbolic edifice of the police, become part of the state of the situation. This is were the impossible egalitarian demands are formulated and fought for that express and transgress the partition of the sensible, that require a transformation of socio-physical space and the institution of a radically different partition of the sensible. It is the sort of demands that ‘restructure the entire social space’ (Žižek 1999b: 208), that are impossible to be symbolized within the existing police order. The form of politicization predicated upon universalizing egalibertarian demands cuts directly against the radical politics that characterize so much of the current forms and theorizations of resistance. Rather than embracing the multitude of singularities and the plurality of possible modes of becoming, this approach starts from the suturing attempts of the existing police order and its associated social relations; rather than reveling in the immanence of imperial transformation, an immanence to which there is no outside (à la Hardt and Negri), rather than the micropolitics of dispersed resistances, alternative practices, and affects (à la Holloway or Critchley), the view explored in this contribution foregrounds division and exclusion and emphases the ‘passage to the act’ through a political truth procedure that necessitates taking sides (see (Dean 2006: 115). Politics understood as rituals of resistance is, according to Zizek, doomed to fail politically:¶ “Radical political practices itself is conceived as an unending process which can destabilize, displace, and so on, the power structure, without ever being able to undermine it effectively – the ultimate goal of radical politics is ultimately to displace the limit of social exclusions, empowering the excluded agents (sexual and ethnic minorities) by creating marginal spaces in which they can articulate and question their identity” (Žižek 2002b: 101).¶ The problem with such tactics is not only that they leave the symbolic order intact and at best ‘tickle’ the police order, they are actually conducive to the flows of global capital and can be fully subsumed within it. As Žižek puts it, “these practices of performative reconfiguration/displacement ultimately support what they intend to subvert, since the very field of such ‘transgressions’ are already taken into account, even engendered by the hegemomic form” (Žižek 1999b: 264).
3,601
<h4>All the aff does is transform resistance into a form of “transgression” which props up the neo-liberal order.</h4><p>Erik <u><strong>Swyngedouw</u></strong>. “Where is the Political?” IBG/RGS Conference. March 20<u><strong>08</u></strong>.</p><p>Badiou defines ‘le passage à l’acte’ as an intervention in the state of the situation that transforms and transgresses the symbolic orders of the existing condition and marks a shift from the old to a new situation, one that cannot any longer be thought of in terms of the old symbolic framings. Žižek insists that such a political act does not start ‘from the art of the possible, but from the art of the impossible’ (Žižek 1999b). Proper politics is thus about enunciating demands that lie beyond the symbolic order of the police; demands that cannot be symbolized within the frame of reference of the police and, therefore, would necessitate a transformation in and of the police to permit symbolization to occur. Yet, these are demands that are eminently sensible and feasible when the frame of the symbolic order is shifted, when the parallax gap between what is (the constituted symbolic order of the police) and what can be (the reconstituted symbolic order made possible through a shift in vantage points, one that starts from the partisan universalizing principle of equality). This is the actual political process through which those that have no part claim their place within the symbolic edifice of the police, become part of the state of the situation. This is were the impossible egalitarian demands are formulated and fought for that express and transgress the partition of the sensible, that require a transformation of socio-physical space and the institution of a radically different partition of the sensible. It is the sort of demands that ‘restructure the entire social space’ (Žižek 1999b: 208), that are impossible to be symbolized within the existing police order. The form of <u><mark>politicization</u></mark> predicated upon universalizing egalibertarian demands <u><mark>cuts directly against</u></mark> the <u><mark>radical politics that characterize</u></mark> so much of the current forms and theorizations of <u><mark>resistance. Rather than embracing the multitude of singularities and the plurality of possible modes of becoming</u></mark>, this approach starts from the suturing attempts of the existing police order and its associated social relations; <u>rather than reveling in</u> the <u>immanence</u> of imperial transformation, an immanence to which there is no outside (à la Hardt and Negri), <u><mark>rather than the micropolitics of dispersed resistances</mark>, alternative practices, and affects</u> (à la Holloway or Critchley), the view explored in <u><mark>this contribution foregrounds division and exclusion and emphases the ‘passage to the act’</u></mark> through a political truth procedure that necessitates taking sides (see (Dean 2006: 115). <u><mark>Politics understood as rituals of resistance is</u></mark>, according to Zizek, <u><mark>doomed to fail politically</u></mark>:¶ “<u>Radical political practices</u> itself <u>is <mark>conceived as an unending process which can destabilize</u></mark>, displace, and so on, <u><mark>the power structure, without ever being able to undermine it</u></mark> effectively – <u><mark>the</u></mark> ultimate <u><mark>goal</u></mark> of radical politics <u><mark>is</u></mark> ultimately <u><mark>to displace the limit of social exclusions,</mark> empowering the excluded agents (sexual and ethnic minorities) by creating marginal spaces in which they can articulate and question their identity</u>” (Žižek 2002b: 101).¶ The problem with <u><mark>such tactics</u></mark> is <u>not only</u> that they <u><mark>leave the symbolic order intact</mark> and at best ‘tickle’ the police order, <mark>they are</u></mark> actually <u><strong><mark>conducive to the flows of global capital</u></strong></mark> and can be fully subsumed within it. As Žižek puts it, “these practices of performative reconfiguration/displacement ultimately support what they intend to subvert, since <u><mark>the very field of such ‘transgressions’ are</u></mark> already taken into account, even <u><mark>engendered by the hegemomic form</u>”</mark> (Žižek 1999b: 264).</p>
1NC
null
Off
16,032
5
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,337
They define themselves entirely in opposition, positing all violence traceable to an injury enacted by the White Man on all manner of others. This mode of identification ensures ressentiment which means that we are always obsessively concerned with the Male and are never able to live life on our own terms.
null
Rebecca Stringer. "A Nietzschean Breed': Feminism, Victimology, Ressentiment." Why Nietzsche Still? Reflections on Drama, Culture, Politics. Edited by Alan Schrift. 2000. pages 264-265.
ressentiment is always the product of "interaction" between injured forces and injuring forces and it produces a reactive desire to exact retribution ressentiment "makes sense to a subject who is systematically brutalized and exploited Ressentiment is an economy of negative affect rather than an affect in itself: it is a configuration of emotions wherein pain is constantly remembered and desire for revenge are constantly renewed Ressentiment feminism forms its identity with the tactic of inversion, and its opposition to at the birth of feminist morals when this feminism comes to equate women's powerlessness with women's goodness This feminism will attempt to forge a separation by casting patriarchy as the blameworthy cause of injury, as a force that must be separated from its manifestations (the doer posited beyond the deed) and made accountable for its effects. With the introduction of accountability through accusation, this feminism casts itself and its constituency as the deserving creditors the less obvious companion of this credit claim is an investment in the power relationship from which it is elaborated ressentiment "requires a hostile world to exist" the evils of patriarchy buttress this feminism's moral identity and serve as a necessary resource for its "survival" this indebtedness 'preserv[es] the identity of the oppressed subject it redraw[s] the very configurations and effects of power that [it] seek[s] to vanquish
ressentiment is the product of "interaction" between injured forces and injuring forces it produces a reactive desire to exact retribution Ressentiment is an economy of negative affect rather than an affect in itself configuration of emotions wherein pain is constantly remembered Ressentiment feminism forms its identity with inversion This feminism will attempt to forge separation by casting patriarchy as the blameworthy cause of injury, as a force that must be separated from its manifestations With the introduction of accountability through accusation, this feminism casts itself and its constituency as the deserving creditors ressentiment "requires a hostile world to exist": the evils of patriarchy buttress this feminism's moral identity and serve as a necessary resource for its "survival" this indebtedness 'preserv[es] the identity of the oppressed subject it redraw[s] the very configurations and effects of power that [it] seek[s] to vanquish
The French word ressentiment, from which the English resentment was derived, commonly denotes a state of vengeful rancor produced as an effect of an injurious encounter. The word resent conjugates the prefix re-, which designates both repetition and backward motion, with sent, which comes from the Latin verb sentire, "to feel." Thus ressentiment pertains to reactive feelings repeatedly felt and designates a psychological state that is always and only relational: resentment is always the product of "interaction" between injured forces and injuring forces (from the harmful actions of a tyrannical person the more general condition of human suffering), and it always produces in turn a reactive desire on the part of the injured to exact retribution from the injuring (their assailant, "life"). As Anna Yeatrnan notes, ressentiment "makes sense to a subject who is systematically brutalized and exploited by more powerful forces." Ressentiment is an economy of negative affect rather than an affect in itself: it is a configuration of emotions wherein pain is constantly remembered and revisited, and in which hatred and the desire for revenge are constantly renewed. What is most important for our purposes is the point at which ressentiment becomes "creative": that is, the point at which it becomes a "condition of possibility" and ceases to be simply a "condition."¶ Ressentiment gives birth to morals at the same time that it comes to serve as a means of identity formation, and on the plane of the political the concept can be used to discern the process through which negative and nontransformative political identities are achieved. The feeling of powerlessness and the experience of suffering are always at the root of ressentiment —whether incurred as a result of a loss of power (the noble forced to slavery) or a perpetual state of powerlessness (the "original" slave). In the case of feminism, the "danger" of ressentiment presents itself with the desire to counter the forces that have caused women's oppression historically. Ressentiment feminism can be understood, to use Yeatman's term, as a "reactive project of survival." As such, this feminism forms its political identity in accordance with the tactic of inversion, and its opposition to the sociocultural configurations that have proved injurious to women is motivated by the will to reverse these configurations. This reversal occurs, at an imagined or discursive level— which is not to say that it does not have "real" effects—at the birth of feminist morals or, more specifically, when this feminism comes to equate women's powerlessness with women's goodness. As Yeatman describes, echoing the concerns of the popular press feminists dealt with above, "Such a feminism is committed to discovering what is good in women's distinctive ways of relating and doing things [and] ends up celebrating as virtues all those aspects of the identity of the oppressed which are associated with strategic self-preservation in a condition of weakness.” Similarly, Brown comments that this feminism maneuvers toward attaining "singular purchase on 'the good.'"¶ For this feminism, patriarchy assumes the appearance of a system that enjoys the privilege of unhindered activity: patriarchy is a "force which does not separate itself from its effect or its manifestations." This feminism will attempt to forge such a separation by casting the activity of patriarchy as the blameworthy cause of injury, as a force that must be separated from its manifestations (the doer posited beyond the deed) and made accountable for its effects. With the introduction of accountability through accusation, this feminism casts itself and its constituency as the deserving creditors. However, the less obvious companion of this credit claim is an investment in, or indebtedness to, the power relationship from which it is elaborated. Nietzsche notes that the creature of ressentiment "requires a hostile world in order to exist": here this means that the evils of patriarchy buttress this feminism's moral identity and serve as a necessary resource for its "survival" (GM I:io). In this sense, this feminism is indebted to the configuration of power against which it is situated, an indebtedness that has two effects: for Yeatman, it 'preserv[es] the identity of the oppressed subject"; for Brown, it "inadvertently redraw[s] the very configurations and effects of power that [it] seek[s] to vanquish.” As with the previous set of writers I discussed, Brown, Yeatman, and Tapper share the concern that the politics of ressentiment leads feminists to position themselves "politically" in a morally superior realm outside of power. In this realm—the margins, the bottom of the hierarchy—participating in power is admonished as an unfeminist act that is equated with "undemocratic domination." One of the primary points found in each of their critiques is that this realm is no less implicated in a will to power and no less prone to the desire to dominate than is the center, the top of the hierarchy.
5,045
<h4>They define themselves entirely in opposition, positing all violence traceable to an injury enacted by the White Man on all manner of others. This mode of identification ensures ressentiment which means that we are always obsessively concerned with the Male and are never able to live life on our own terms.</h4><p>Rebecca <u>Stringer</u>. "A Nietzschean Breed': Feminism, Victimology, Ressentiment." Why Nietzsche Still? Reflections on Drama, Culture, Politics. Edited by Alan Schrift. <u>2000</u>. pages 264-265.</p><p>The French word ressentiment, from which the English resentment was derived, commonly denotes a state of vengeful rancor produced as an effect of an injurious encounter. The word resent conjugates the prefix re-, which designates both repetition and backward motion, with sent, which comes from the Latin verb sentire, "to feel." Thus <u><mark>ressentiment</mark> </u>pertains to reactive feelings repeatedly felt and designates a psychological state that is always and only relational: resentment <u><mark>is</mark> always <mark>the product of "interaction" between injured forces and injuring forces</mark> </u>(from the harmful actions of a tyrannical person the more general condition of human suffering), <u>and <mark>it</u></mark> always <u><mark>produces</u></mark> in turn <u><mark>a reactive desire</u></mark> on the part of the injured <u><mark>to exact retribution</u></mark> from the injuring (their assailant, "life"). As Anna Yeatrnan notes, <u>ressentiment "makes sense to a subject who is systematically brutalized and exploited</u> by more powerful forces." <u><mark>Ressentiment is an economy of negative affect rather than an affect in itself</mark>: it is a <mark>configuration of emotions wherein pain is constantly remembered</u></mark> and revisited, <u>and</u> in which hatred and the <u>desire for revenge are constantly renewed</u>. What is most important for our purposes is the point at which ressentiment becomes "creative": that is, the point at which it becomes a "condition of possibility" and ceases to be simply a "condition."¶ Ressentiment gives birth to morals at the same time that it comes to serve as a means of identity formation, and on the plane of the political the concept can be used to discern the process through which negative and nontransformative political identities are achieved. The feeling of powerlessness and the experience of suffering are always at the root of ressentiment —whether incurred as a result of a loss of power (the noble forced to slavery) or a perpetual state of powerlessness (the "original" slave). In the case of feminism, the "danger" of ressentiment presents itself with the desire to counter the forces that have caused women's oppression historically. <u><mark>Ressentiment feminism</u></mark> can be understood, to use Yeatman's term, as a "reactive project of survival." As such, this feminism <u><mark>forms its</u></mark> political <u><mark>identity</u></mark> in accordance <u><mark>with</mark> the tactic of <mark>inversion</mark>, and its opposition to</u> the sociocultural configurations that have proved injurious to women is motivated by the will to reverse these configurations. This reversal occurs, at an imagined or discursive level— which is not to say that it does not have "real" effects—<u>at the birth of feminist morals</u> or, more specifically, <u>when this feminism comes to equate women's powerlessness with women's goodness</u>. As Yeatman describes, echoing the concerns of the popular press feminists dealt with above, "Such a feminism is committed to discovering what is good in women's distinctive ways of relating and doing things [and] ends up celebrating as virtues all those aspects of the identity of the oppressed which are associated with strategic self-preservation in a condition of weakness.” Similarly, Brown comments that this feminism maneuvers toward attaining "singular purchase on 'the good.'"¶ For this feminism, patriarchy assumes the appearance of a system that enjoys the privilege of unhindered activity: patriarchy is a "force which does not separate itself from its effect or its manifestations." <u><mark>This feminism will attempt to forge</u></mark> such <u>a <mark>separation by casting</u></mark> the activity of <u><mark>patriarchy as the blameworthy cause of injury, as a force that must be separated from its manifestations</mark> (the doer posited beyond the deed) and made accountable for its effects. <mark>With the introduction of accountability through accusation, this feminism casts itself and its constituency as the deserving creditors</u></mark>. However, <u>the less obvious companion of this credit claim is an investment in</u>, or indebtedness to, <u>the power relationship from which it is elaborated</u>. Nietzsche notes that the creature of <u><mark>ressentiment "requires a hostile world</u></mark> in order <u><mark>to exist"</u>:</mark> here this means that <u><mark>the evils of patriarchy buttress this feminism's moral identity and serve as a necessary resource for its "survival"</u></mark> (GM I:io). In this sense, <u><mark>this</u></mark> feminism is indebted to the configuration of power against which it is situated, an <u><mark>indebtedness</u></mark> that has two effects: for Yeatman, it <u><mark>'preserv[es] the identity of the oppressed subject</u></mark>"; for Brown, <u><mark>it</u></mark> "inadvertently <u><mark>redraw[s] the very configurations and effects of power that [it] seek[s] to vanquish</u></mark>.” As with the previous set of writers I discussed, Brown, Yeatman, and Tapper share the concern that the politics of ressentiment leads feminists to position themselves "politically" in a morally superior realm outside of power. In this realm—the margins, the bottom of the hierarchy—participating in power is admonished as an unfeminist act that is equated with "undemocratic domination." One of the primary points found in each of their critiques is that this realm is no less implicated in a will to power and no less prone to the desire to dominate than is the center, the top of the hierarchy.</p>
1NC
null
Case
430,186
1
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,338
Narrative appeals to experience weakens critical thrust of the histories of difference, reaffirms the epistemological frame of hegemonic history, naturalizes difference, displaces resistance outside of discourse and decontextualizes agency, and forecloses any critical examination of the constructiveness of our experience
Scott 1992
Scott 1992 (Joan, “Experience”, Feminists Theorize the Political, Ed. Judith Butler and Joan Scott, pp 24-25, KEL) Ableist language modified.
Documenting the experience of others in this way has been at once a highly successful and limiting strategy for historians of difference. It has been successful because it remains so comfortably within the disciplinary framework of history, working according to rules which permit calling old narratives into question when new evidence is discovered. When the evidence offered is the evidence of "experience," the claim for referentiality is further buttressed – what could be truer It is precisely this kind of appeal to experience as uncontestable evidence and as an originary point of explanation-as a foundation that weakens the critical thrust of histories of difference. By remaining within the epistemological frame of orthodox history, these studies lose the possibility of examining those assumptions and practices that excluded considerations of difference in the first place. They take as self-evident the identities of those whose experience is being documented and thus naturalize their difference. They locate resistance outside its discursive construction, and reify agency as an inherent attribute of individuals, thus decontextualizing it. Questions about the constructed nature of experience, about how subjects are constituted as different in the first place, about how one's vision is structured are left aside evidence of experience then becomes evidence for the fact of difference, rather than a way of exploring how difference is established, how it operates, how and in what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the world.
Documenting experience has been limiting it remains comfortably within disciplinary history, working according to rule When the evidence is experience referentiality is buttressed this appeal weakens the critical thrust of difference. By remaining within epistemological orthodox history studies lose possibility of examining assumptions that excluded difference They take as self-evident identities of those being documented and naturalize difference. They locate resistance outside and reify agency as inherent thus decontextualizing it. Questions about constructed experience are left aside experience becomes evidence for difference, rather than exploring how difference is established how it constitutes subjects
Documenting the experience of others in this way has been at once a highly successful and limiting strategy for historians of difference. It has been successful because it remains so comfortably within the disciplinary framework of history, working according to rules which permit calling old narratives into question when new evidence is discovered. The status of evidence is, of course, ambiguous for historians. On the one hand, they acknowledge that "evidence only counts as evidence and is only recognized as such in relation to a potential narrative, so that the narrative can be said to determine the evidence as much as the evidence determines the narrative.”4 On the other hand, their rhetorical treatment of evidence and their use of it to falsify prevailing interpretations, depends on a referential notion of evidence which denies that it is anything but a reflection of the real. 5 When the evidence offered is the evidence of "experience," the claim for referentiality is further buttressed – what could be truer, after all, than a subject's own account of what he or she has lived through? It is precisely this kind of appeal to experience as uncontestable evidence and as an originary point of explanation-as a foundation upon which analysis is based – that weakens the critical thrust of histories of difference. By remaining within the epistemological frame of orthodox history, these studies lose the possibility of examining those assumptions and practices that excluded considerations of difference in the first place. They take as self-evident the identities of those whose experience is being documented and thus naturalize their difference. They locate resistance outside its discursive construction, and reify agency as an inherent attribute of individuals, thus decontextualizing it. When experience is taken as the origin of knowledge, the vision of the individual subject (the person who had the experience or the historian who recounts it) becomes the bedrock of evidence upon which explanation is built. Questions about the constructed nature of experience, about how subjects are constituted as different in the first place, about how one's vision is structured – about language (or discourse) and history – are left aside. The evidence of experience then becomes evidence for the fact of difference, rather than a way of exploring how difference is established, how it operates, how and in what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the world.
2,485
<h4>Narrative appeals to experience weakens critical thrust of the histories of difference, reaffirms the epistemological frame of hegemonic history, naturalizes difference, displaces resistance outside of discourse and decontextualizes agency, and forecloses any critical examination of the constructiveness of our experience</h4><p><u><strong>Scott 1992</u></strong> (Joan, “Experience”, Feminists Theorize the Political, Ed. Judith Butler and Joan Scott, pp 24-25, KEL) Ableist<u> language modified.</p><p><mark>Documenting</mark> the <mark>experience</mark> of others in this way <mark>has been</mark> at once a highly successful and <mark>limiting</mark> strategy for historians of difference. It has been successful because <mark>it remains</mark> so <mark>comfortably within</mark> the <mark>disciplinary</mark> framework of <mark>history, working according to rule</mark>s which permit calling old narratives into question when new evidence is discovered.</u> The status of evidence is, of course, ambiguous for historians. On the one hand, they acknowledge that "evidence only counts as evidence and is only recognized as such in relation to a potential narrative, so that the narrative can be said to determine the evidence as much as the evidence determines the narrative.”4 On the other hand, their rhetorical treatment of evidence and their use of it to falsify prevailing interpretations, depends on a referential notion of evidence which denies that it is anything but a reflection of the real. 5 <u><mark>When the evidence</mark> offered <mark>is</mark> the evidence of "<mark>experience</mark>," the claim for <mark>referentiality is</mark> further <mark>buttressed</mark> – what could be truer</u>, after all, than a subject's own account of what he or she has lived through? <u>It is precisely <mark>this</mark> kind of <mark>appeal</mark> to experience as uncontestable evidence and as an originary point of explanation-as a foundation</u> upon which analysis is based – <u>that <mark>weakens the critical thrust of</mark> histories of <mark>difference. By remaining within</mark> the <mark>epistemological</mark> frame of <mark>orthodox history</mark>, these <mark>studies lose</mark> the <mark>possibility of examining</mark> those <mark>assumptions</mark> and practices <mark>that excluded</mark> considerations of <mark>difference</mark> in the first place. <mark>They take as self-evident</mark> the <mark>identities of those</mark> whose experience is <mark>being documented and</mark> thus <mark>naturalize</mark> their <mark>difference. They locate resistance outside</mark> its discursive construction, <mark>and reify agency as</mark> an <mark>inherent</mark> attribute of individuals, <mark>thus decontextualizing it.</u></mark> When experience is taken as the origin of knowledge, the vision of the individual subject (the person who had the experience or the historian who recounts it) becomes the bedrock of evidence upon which explanation is built. <u><mark>Questions about</mark> the <mark>constructed</mark> nature of <mark>experience</mark>, about how subjects are constituted as different in the first place, about how one's vision is structured</u> – about language (or discourse) and history – <u><mark>are left aside</u></mark>. The <u>evidence of <mark>experience </mark>then <mark>becomes evidence for</mark> the fact of <mark>difference, rather than</mark> a way of <mark>exploring how difference is established</mark>, how it operates, <mark>how</mark> and in what ways <mark>it constitutes subjects</mark> who see and act in the world.</p></u>
1NC
null
Case
14,670
26
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,339
Capitalism causes endless warfare and destroys value to life
Robinson 14
Robinson 14 (William I. Robinson, professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism Is In the Midst of Its Most Severe Crisis” 02 Jul 2014, KB)
US intervention entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001. This should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism. Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in a century the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states. global inequalities have never been as acute and grotesque we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings about including the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy as a response by the US-led transnational state and capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. There is currently a global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly across countries and has not taken any clear form or direction. We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits 80 percent experience of insecurity, impoverishment, and increasingly inhabiting a “planet of slums.” apologists of capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful. But 300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps. Foxcomm makes your iPads and iPhones. We are headed towards a global police state organized by global elites and led by the US state to contain the potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms because they have been pressured from below to do so the natural tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been escalation of worldwide inequalities Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.” this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. We cannot understand intensified militarization and the rise of this complex outside of the crisis of global capitalism. It is a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy extreme inequality and social polarization means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus? Unloading the surplus through financial speculation aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. the mass production and distribution of vaccines and medications for diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases tuberculosis, measles, etc that previously were under control. Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent. capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable which is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. it becomes profitable to turn to wars the surplus that the global economy has been and is producing but that cannot be absorbed by the world market, has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies. The US occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital. The prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes is enormously profitable for private corporations we are now living in a global war economy in which the threat of stagnation is offset by the militarization of global economy and society and the spread of systems of mass social control A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts and the spread of social control systems, from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants in the United States and Europe, must be ideologically legitimated. This is where bogus “wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where enemies must be conjured up, in which populations must be led to believe they are threatened So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is the devil, and so on. One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply of raw materials, machinery and service inputs come from other global corporations the global economy is kept running through violence and conflict the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global econom with the petroleum complex that is coming under pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. This is a new transnational power bloc this complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc. the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent. All this and much more are part of the militarization and “securitization” of global society We face doctrines, ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state the “war on drugs,” the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then the US state is the world’s leading terrorist.
global inequalities have never been as grotesque we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings There is global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly and has not taken any clear direction 80 percent experience insecurity impoverishment and inhabit a “planet of slums.” States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms because they have been pressured from below to do so the tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been escalation of worldwide inequalities We cannot understand intensified militarization outside of capitalism it becomes profitable to turn to wars the surplus cannot be absorbed has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction we are living in a global war economy in which the threat of stagnation is offset by militarization A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants must be ideologically legitimated This is where enemies must be conjured up populations must believe they are threatened One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance the economy is kept running through violence and conflict “securitization” of global society We face doctrines ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state the “war on drugs,”
However, and this is the key point I wish to highlight here, US intervention around the world clearly entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001. This new period should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism. Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in close to a century, and in many ways the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is also extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states. On the other hand, global inequalities have never been as acute and grotesque as they are today. So, in simplified terms, we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings about, including what you mention – the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy – as a response by the US-led transnational state and the transnational capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. You ask me who is going to compensate for these losses. That will depend on how the world’s people respond. There is currently a global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly across countries and has not taken any clear form or direction. Can the popular majority of humanity force the transnational capitalist class and the US/transnational state to be accountable for its crimes? Mao Zedong once said that “power flows through the barrel of a gun.” What he meant by this, in a more abstract than literal way, I believe, is that in the end it is the correlation of real forces that will determine outcomes. Because the United States has overwhelming and “full spectrum” military dominance, it can capture, execute, or bring to trial people anywhere around the world… it has “free license”, so to speak, to act as an international outlaw. We don’t even have to take the more recent examples. In December 1989 the United States undertook an illegal and criminal invasion of Panama, kidnapped Manuel Noriega – whether or not he was a dictator is not the point, as the United States puts in power and defends dictators that defend US and transnational elite interests, and brought him back to US territory for trial. What country in the world now has the naked power “flowing through the barrel of a gun” to invade the United States, capture George Bush, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other war criminals, and bring them somewhere to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Q: In your writings, you’ve warned against the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the slant accumulation of the global wealth in the hands of an affluent few and the impoverishment of the suppressed majority. What do you think are the reasons for this stark inequality and the disturbing dispossession of millions of people in the capitalist societies? You wrote that the participants of the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos were worried that the current situation raises the specter of worldwide instability and civil wars. Is it really so? A: We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots, such grotesque levels of inequality, within and among countries. There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities, among them, the current bestseller by Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” The pattern we see is that the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth that humanity produces and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits, but as well that some 20 percent of the population in each countries has integrated into the global economy as middle class and affluent consumers while the remaining 80 percent has experienced rising levels of insecurity, impoverishment, and precariousness, increasingly inhabiting what some have called a “planet of slums.” The apologists of global capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful. But in China, 300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. Such is this exploitation that a couple years ago, you may remember, Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps. This is the Foxcomm that makes your iPads and iPhones. The 80 percent is then subject to all sorts of sophisticated systems of social control and repression. We are headed in this regard towards a global police state, organized by global elites and led by the US state, to contain the real or potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority. Such structures of inequality and exploitation cannot be contained over time without both ideological and coercive apparatuses; conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence, organized by states and private security forces. Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which we are now living in a global social control state, a global panoptical surveillance state. George Orwell wrote about such a state in his famous novel “1984.” The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. How do we explain such stark inequality? Capitalism is a system that by its very internal dynamic generates wealth yet polarizes and concentrates that wealth. Historically a de-concentration of wealth through redistribution has come about by state intervention to offset the natural tendency for capital accumulation to result in such polarization. States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms both because they have been pressured from below to do so – whether by trade unions, social movements, socialist struggles, or so on – or because states must do so in order to retain legitimacy and preserve at least enough social peace for the reproduction of the system. A great variety of redistributive models emerged in the 20th century around the world, and went by a great many names – socialism, communism, social democracy, New Deal, welfare states, developmental states, populism, the social wage, and so on. All these models shared two things in common. One was state intervention in the economy to regulate capital accumulation and thus to bring under some control the most anarchic and most destructive elements of unrestrained capitalism. The other was redistribution through numerous policies, ranging from minimum legal wages and unemployment insurance, to public enterprises, the social wages of public health, education, transportation, and housing, welfare programs, land reform in agrarian countries, low cost credit, and so on. But capital responded to the last major crisis of the system, that of the 1970s, by “going global,” by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation and undermining models of state regulation and redistribution. Neo-liberalism is a set of policies that facilitate the rise of transnational capital. As transnational capital has broken free of the confine of the nation-state, the natural tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been this dizzying escalation of worldwide inequalities as wealth concentrates within the transnational capitalist class and, to a much lesser extent, the better off strata of middle classes and professionals. There are other related factors that account for the intensification of worldwide inequalities. One is the defeat of the worldwide left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led the ruling groups to declare that global neo-liberal capitalism was “The End of History.” A second is the rise of a globally integrated financial system in which capital in its liquid, that is money, form can move frictionless across the planet with no controls whatsoever. Transnational finance capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a global scale, and it engages in unfathomable levels of speculation, turning the global economy into one giant casino. Transnational finance capital has come to control the levers of the global economy, to get around and to undermine any effort at regulation, and to concentrate wealth in its liquid form in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. A third factor is the rise of a mass of surplus humanity. Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.” In turn, this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. Q: In one of your articles, you talked of an “ever-expanding military-prison-industrial-security-financial complex” that generates enormous profits through waging wars, selling weapons and then taking part in reconstruction activities in the war-torn countries. How does this complex operate? Is it really reliant on waging wars? A: We cannot understand intensified militarization and the rise of this complex outside of the crisis of global capitalism. This crisis is structural, in the first instance. It is what we call a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy driven by new technologies, especially computer, information, and communications technologies, but also by the revolution in transportation and containerization, by robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and more recently, by 3D printing, among other aspects, has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy, and to bring about a huge increase in productivity worldwide and an enormous expansion of the capacity of the global economy to churn out goods and services. But extreme inequality and social polarization in the global system means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus? How can transnational capital continue to accumulate and generate profits if this output is not unloaded, that is, profitably marketed? Unloading the surplus through financial speculation, which has skyrocketed in recent years, only aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. Now, if only 20 percent of humanity can consume in any significant quantity it is not very profitable to go into the business of mass, inexpensive public transportation, health and education, or the production of practical goods that the world’s population needs because very simply even if people need these things they do not have the income to purchase them. A global civilian economy geared to the basic needs of humanity is simply not profitable for the transnational capitalist class. Look at it like this: the mass production and distribution of vaccines and other medications for communicable and treatable diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are simply not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases – tuberculosis, measles, etc. – that previously were under control. Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry, including the giant pharmaceutical, biotechnology and related branches to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent. The lesson here is that capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable, according to the structure of the market and of income, which in turn is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. It is in this context that it becomes quite profitable to turn to wars, conflicts, systems of repression and social control to generate profit, to produce goods and systems that can repress that 80 percent of humanity that is not your consumer, not your customer so to say, because they do not have the purchasing power to sustain your drive to accumulate by producing goods and services for them that they actually need. Global capitalism is a perverted and irrational system. Putting aside geo-political considerations, the surplus that the global economy has been and is producing but that cannot be absorbed by the world market, has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction, and new systems of social control and repression, independent of geo-political considerations, that is, simply as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies. The US invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan – although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital. The prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes in the United States – and let us recall that the United States holds some 25-30 percent of the world’s prisoners – is enormously profitable for private corporations that run almost all of the immigrant detention centers, some of the general prisons, supply everything from guards to food, build the installations, erect border walls, and so on. Let us recall that the US National Security Agency – and we now know from Edward Snowden just how vast are its operations – subcontracts out its activities to private corporations, as do the CIA, the Pentagon, and so on. Global security corporations are one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and there are now more private security guards in the world than police officers. All of this is to say that we are now living in a global war economy, in which the threat of stagnation is offset in part by the militarization of global economy and society and the introduction and spread of systems of mass social control. Of course this involves all kinds of cultural, ideological, and political dimensions as well. A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts and the spread of social control systems, from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants in the United States and Europe, must be ideologically legitimated. This is where bogus and farcical “wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where enemies must be conjured up, in which populations must be led to believe they are threatened, and so on. So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is now the devil, and so on. One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy has involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation, towards those global corporate conglomerates involved in the production of war materials, of security, of engineering (for example, Bechtel and Halliburton), and other activities that involve making profit out of conflict and control. Remember by way of example that each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on and so forth, is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply, in turn, of raw materials, machinery and service inputs in turn come from other global corporations or local firms. So the whole global economy is kept running through violence and conflict. But the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global economy, together with the petroleum complex that is coming under much pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. This is a new transnational power bloc – this complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control, together with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc. Remember also that the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent. All this and much more are part of the militarization and “securitization” of global society by the powers that be. We face new doctrines, ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state – “fourth generation warfare,” “humanitarian intervention,” the “war on drugs,” among others, and above all, the so-called “war on terror.” I say so-called because, the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They indeed do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then the US state is the world’s leading terrorist. The powers that be in global society and that control the global political discourse attach the label “terrorist” to violence that they do not approve of, and they attach the label of “freedom and democracy and security” to violence that they do approve of, or that they commit themselves. Moreover, increasingly “terrorism” is used to simply describe political dissent, so that legitimate social movements and political struggles against global capitalism become labeled as “terrorism” in order to justify their suppression.
18,951
<h4>Capitalism causes endless warfa<u><strong>re and destroys value to life</h4><p>Robinson 14</p><p></u></strong>(William I. Robinson, professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism Is In the Midst of Its Most Severe Crisis” 02 Jul 2014, KB)</p><p>However, and this is the key point I wish to highlight here, <u><strong>US intervention</u></strong> around the world clearly <u><strong>entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001.</u></strong> <u>This</u> new period <u>should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism.</u> <u>Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in</u> close to <u>a century</u>, and in many ways <u>the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on <strong>the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life</strong>, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is</u> also <u>extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states.</u> On the other hand, <u><strong><mark>global inequalities have never been as</mark> acute and <mark>grotesque</u></strong></mark> as they are today. So, in simplified terms, <u><mark>we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings</mark> about</u>, <u>including</u> what you mention – <u>the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy</u> – <u>as a response by the US-led transnational state and</u> the transnational<u> capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. </u>You ask me who is going to compensate for these losses. That will depend on how the world’s people respond. <u><strong><mark>There is</mark> currently a <mark>global revolt from below underway</strong>, but it is spread unevenly</mark> across countries <mark>and has not taken any clear</mark> form or <mark>direction</mark>.</u> Can the popular majority of humanity force the transnational capitalist class and the US/transnational state to be accountable for its crimes? Mao Zedong once said that “power flows through the barrel of a gun.” What he meant by this, in a more abstract than literal way, I believe, is that in the end it is the correlation of real forces that will determine outcomes. Because the United States has overwhelming and “full spectrum” military dominance, it can capture, execute, or bring to trial people anywhere around the world… it has “free license”, so to speak, to act as an international outlaw. We don’t even have to take the more recent examples. In December 1989 the United States undertook an illegal and criminal invasion of Panama, kidnapped Manuel Noriega – whether or not he was a dictator is not the point, as the United States puts in power and defends dictators that defend US and transnational elite interests, and brought him back to US territory for trial. What country in the world now has the naked power “flowing through the barrel of a gun” to invade the United States, capture George Bush, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other war criminals, and bring them somewhere to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Q: In your writings, you’ve warned against the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the slant accumulation of the global wealth in the hands of an affluent few and the impoverishment of the suppressed majority. What do you think are the reasons for this stark inequality and the disturbing dispossession of millions of people in the capitalist societies? You wrote that the participants of the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos were worried that the current situation raises the specter of worldwide instability and civil wars. Is it really so? A: <u><strong>We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots</u></strong>, such grotesque levels of inequality, within and among countries. <u>There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities</u>, among them, the current bestseller by Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” The pattern we see is that <u>the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth</u> that humanity produces <u>and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits</u>, but as well that some 20 percent of the population in each countries has integrated into the global economy as middle class and affluent consumers while the remaining <u><mark>80 percent</u></mark> has <u><mark>experience</u></mark>d rising levels <u>of <mark>insecurity</mark>, <mark>impoverishment</mark>, <mark>and</u></mark> precariousness, <u>increasingly <mark>inhabit</mark>ing</u> what some have called <u><strong><mark>a “planet of slums.”</u></strong></mark> The <u>apologists of</u> global <u>capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful.</u> <u>But</u> in China, <u>300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. </u>Such is this exploitation that a couple years ago, you may remember, <u>Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps.</u> This is the <u>Foxcomm</u> that <u>makes your iPads and iPhones.</u> The 80 percent is then subject to all sorts of sophisticated systems of social control and repression. <u><strong>We are headed</u></strong> in this regard <u><strong>towards a global police state</u></strong>, <u>organized by global elites and led by the US</u> <u>state</u>, <u>to contain the</u> real or <u>potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority</u>. Such structures of inequality and exploitation cannot be contained over time without both ideological and coercive apparatuses; <u>conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence</u>, organized by states and private security forces. Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which we are now living in a global social control state, a global panoptical surveillance state. George Orwell wrote about such a state in his famous novel “1984.” <u><strong>The Orwellian society has arrived.</u></strong> <u>Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. </u>How do we explain such stark inequality? Capitalism is a system that by its very internal dynamic generates wealth yet polarizes and concentrates that wealth. Historically a de-concentration of wealth through redistribution has come about by state intervention to offset the natural tendency for capital accumulation to result in such polarization. <u><mark>States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms</u></mark> both <u><strong><mark>because they have been pressured from below to do so</u></strong></mark> – whether by trade unions, social movements, socialist struggles, or so on – or because states must do so in order to retain legitimacy and preserve at least enough social peace for the reproduction of the system. A great variety of redistributive models emerged in the 20th century around the world, and went by a great many names – socialism, communism, social democracy, New Deal, welfare states, developmental states, populism, the social wage, and so on. All these models shared two things in common. One was state intervention in the economy to regulate capital accumulation and thus to bring under some control the most anarchic and most destructive elements of unrestrained capitalism. The other was redistribution through numerous policies, ranging from minimum legal wages and unemployment insurance, to public enterprises, the social wages of public health, education, transportation, and housing, welfare programs, land reform in agrarian countries, low cost credit, and so on. But capital responded to the last major crisis of the system, that of the 1970s, by “going global,” by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation and undermining models of state regulation and redistribution. Neo-liberalism is a set of policies that facilitate the rise of transnational capital. As transnational capital has broken free of the confine of the nation-state, <u><mark>the</mark> natural <mark>tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. <strong>The result has been</u></strong></mark> this dizzying <u><strong><mark>escalation of worldwide inequalities</u></strong></mark> as wealth concentrates within the transnational capitalist class and, to a much lesser extent, the better off strata of middle classes and professionals. There are other related factors that account for the intensification of worldwide inequalities. One is the defeat of the worldwide left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led the ruling groups to declare that global neo-liberal capitalism was “The End of History.” A second is the rise of a globally integrated financial system in which capital in its liquid, that is money, form can move frictionless across the planet with no controls whatsoever. Transnational finance capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a global scale, and it engages in unfathomable levels of speculation, turning the global economy into one giant casino. Transnational finance capital has come to control the levers of the global economy, to get around and to undermine any effort at regulation, and to concentrate wealth in its liquid form in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. A third factor is the rise of a mass of surplus humanity. <u>Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.”</u> In turn, <u>this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. </u>Q: In one of your articles, you talked of an “ever-expanding military-prison-industrial-security-financial complex” that generates enormous profits through waging wars, selling weapons and then taking part in reconstruction activities in the war-torn countries. How does this complex operate? Is it really reliant on waging wars? A: <u><strong><mark>We cannot understand intensified militarization</mark> and the rise of this complex <mark>outside of</mark> the crisis of global <mark>capitalism</mark>.</u></strong> This crisis is structural, in the first instance. <u>It is</u> what we call <u>a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy</u> driven by new technologies, especially computer, information, and communications technologies, but also by the revolution in transportation and containerization, by robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and more recently, by 3D printing, among other aspects, <u>has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy</u>, and to bring about a huge increase in productivity worldwide and an enormous expansion of the capacity of the global economy to churn out goods and services. But <u>extreme inequality and social polarization</u> in the global system <u>means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. <strong>The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic.</u></strong> <u>The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus?</u> How can transnational capital continue to accumulate and generate profits if this output is not unloaded, that is, profitably marketed? <u>Unloading the surplus through financial speculation</u>, which has skyrocketed in recent years, only <u>aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. </u>Now, if only 20 percent of humanity can consume in any significant quantity it is not very profitable to go into the business of mass, inexpensive public transportation, health and education, or the production of practical goods that the world’s population needs because very simply even if people need these things they do not have the income to purchase them. A global civilian economy geared to the basic needs of humanity is simply not profitable for the transnational capitalist class. Look at it like this: <u>the mass production and distribution of vaccines and</u> other <u>medications for</u> communicable and treatable <u>diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are</u> simply <u>not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases</u> – <u>tuberculosis, measles, etc</u>. – <u>that previously were under control.</u> <u>Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry</u>, including the giant pharmaceutical, biotechnology and related branches <u>to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent.</u> The lesson here is that <u>capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable</u>, according to the structure of the market and of income, <u>which</u> in turn <u>is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. </u>It is in this context that <u><strong><mark>it becomes</u></strong></mark> quite <u><strong><mark>profitable to turn to wars</u></strong></mark>, conflicts, systems of repression and social control to generate profit, to produce goods and systems that can repress that 80 percent of humanity that is not your consumer, not your customer so to say, because they do not have the purchasing power to sustain your drive to accumulate by producing goods and services for them that they actually need. Global capitalism is a perverted and irrational system. Putting aside geo-political considerations, <u><mark>the</u> <u>surplus</mark> that the global economy has been and is producing but that <mark>cannot be absorbed</mark> by the world market, <mark>has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction</u></mark>, and new systems of social control and repression, independent of geo-political considerations, that is, simply <u>as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies.</u> <u>The US </u>invasions and <u>occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan</u> – <u>although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital.</u> <u>The prison-industrial</u> <u>and immigrant-detention complexes</u> in the United States – and let us recall that the United States holds some 25-30 percent of the world’s prisoners – <u>is enormously profitable for private corporations</u> that run almost all of the immigrant detention centers, some of the general prisons, supply everything from guards to food, build the installations, erect border walls, and so on. Let us recall that the US National Security Agency – and we now know from Edward Snowden just how vast are its operations – subcontracts out its activities to private corporations, as do the CIA, the Pentagon, and so on. Global security corporations are one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and there are now more private security guards in the world than police officers. All of this is to say that <u><strong><mark>we are </mark>now <mark>living in a global war economy</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>in which the threat of stagnation is offset</u></mark> in part <u><mark>by</mark> the <mark>militarization</mark> of global economy and society and the</u> introduction and <u>spread of systems of mass social control</u>. Of course this involves all kinds of cultural, ideological, and political dimensions as well. <u><mark>A global war economy based on <strong>a multitude of endless conflicts</u></strong></mark> <u>and the spread of social control systems, <strong><mark>from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants</mark> in the United States and Europe</strong>, <mark>must be ideologically legitimated</mark>.</u> <u><mark>This is where</mark> bogus</u> and farcical <u>“wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where <mark>enemies must be conjured up</mark>, in which <mark>populations must </mark>be led to <mark>believe they are threatened</u></mark>, and so on. <u>So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is</u> now <u>the devil, and so on.</u> <u><strong><mark>One “threat” replaces another</u></strong> <u>but the system needs to keep a population <strong>in permanent compliance</strong></mark> through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy</u> has <u>involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation</u>, towards those global corporate conglomerates involved in the production of war materials, of security, of engineering (for example, Bechtel and Halliburton), and other activities that involve making profit out of conflict and control. Remember by way of example that <u>each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on</u> and so forth, <u>is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply</u>, in turn, <u>of raw materials, machinery and service inputs</u> in turn <u>come from other global corporations</u> or local firms. So <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> whole <u><strong>global <mark>economy is kept running through violence and conflict</u></strong></mark>. But <u>the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global econom</u>y, together <u>with the petroleum complex that is coming under</u> much <u>pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. <strong>This is a new transnational power bloc</u></strong> – <u>this</u> <u>complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control</u>, together <u>with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc.</u> Remember also that <u>the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, <strong>so that the privileged occupy gated communities</strong> and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent.</u> <u>All this and much more are part of the militarization and <strong><mark>“securitization” of global society</u></strong></mark> by the powers that be. <u><mark>We face</u></mark> new <u><mark>doctrines</mark>, <mark>ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state</u></mark> – “fourth generation warfare,” “humanitarian intervention,” <u><strong><mark>the “war on drugs,”</u></strong></mark> among others, and above all, the so-called “war on terror.” I say so-called because, <u>the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They</u> indeed <u>do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then <strong>the US state is the world’s leading terrorist.</u></strong> The powers that be in global society and that control the global political discourse attach the label “terrorist” to violence that they do not approve of, and they attach the label of “freedom and democracy and security” to violence that they do approve of, or that they commit themselves. Moreover, increasingly “terrorism” is used to simply describe political dissent, so that legitimate social movements and political struggles against global capitalism become labeled as “terrorism” in order to justify their suppression.</p>
1NC
null
Off
145,658
20
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,340
You should reject the aff - participation ensures the system is reproduced. Our withdrawal clears the way for revolutionary activity.
Zizek ‘4
Zizek ‘4 [Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, 2004, Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle, p. 71-72]
If today’s ‘post-politics’ is opportunistic pragmatism with no principles, then the predominant leftist reaction to it can be aptly characterized as ‘principle opportunism’: one simply sticks to old formulae and calls them ‘principles’, The inherent stupidity of the ‘principled’ Left is clearly discernable in it standard criticism of any analysis which proposes a more complex picture of the situation, in a situation like today’s, the only way really to remain open to a revolutionary opportunity is to renounce facile calls to direct action, which necessarily involve us in an activity where things change so that the totality remains the same. if we succumb to the urge of directly ‘doing something’ we will certainly and undoubtedly contribute to the reproduction of the existing order. The only way to lay the foundations for a true, radical change is to withdraw from the compulsion to act, to ‘do nothing’ – thus opening up the space for a different kind of activity.
If today’s ‘post-politics’ is opportunistic pragmatism with no principles, then the predominant reaction to it can be aptly characterized as ‘principle opportunism’ in a situation like today’s, the only way really to remain open to a revolutionary opportunity is to renounce facile calls to direct action, which involve us in an activity where things change so that the totality remains the same. if we succumb to the urge of directly ‘doing something’ we will certainly contribute to the reproduction of the existing order. The only way to lay the foundations for a true, radical change is to withdraw from the compulsion to act, to ‘do nothing’
The stance of simply condemning the postmodern Left for its accommodation, however, is also false, since one should ask the obvious difficult question: what, in fact, was the alternative? If today’s ‘post-politics’ is opportunistic pragmatism with no principles, then the predominant leftist reaction to it can be aptly characterized as ‘principle opportunism’: one simply sticks to old formulae (defence of the welfare state, and so on) and calls them ‘principles’, dispensing with the detailed analysis of how the situation has changed – and thus retaining one’s position of Beautiful Soul. The inherent stupidity of the ‘principled’ Left is clearly discernable in it standard criticism of any analysis which proposes a more complex picture of the situation, renouncing any simple prescriptions on how to act: ‘there is no clear political stance involved in your theory’ – and this from people with no stance but their ‘principled opportunism’. Against such a stance, one should have the courage to affirm that, in a situation like today’s, the only way really to remain open to a revolutionary opportunity is to renounce facile calls to direct action, which necessarily involve us in an activity where things change so that the totality remains the same. Today’s predicament is that, if we succumb to the urge of directly ‘doing something’ (engaging in the anti-globalist struggle, helping the poor…) we will certainly and undoubtedly contribute to the reproduction of the existing order. The only way to lay the foundations for a true, radical change is to withdraw from the compulsion to act, to ‘do nothing’ – thus opening up the space for a different kind of activity.
1,675
<h4>You should reject the aff - p<u><strong>articipation ensures the system is reproduced. Our withdrawal clears the way for revolutionary activity.</h4><p>Zizek ‘4</p><p></u></strong>[Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, 2004, <u>Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle</u>, p. 71-72]</p><p>The stance of simply condemning the postmodern Left for its accommodation, however, is also false, since one should ask the obvious difficult question: what, in fact, was the alternative? <u><mark>If today’s ‘post-politics’ is opportunistic pragmatism with no principles, then the predominant</mark> leftist <mark>reaction to it can be aptly characterized as ‘principle opportunism’</mark>: one simply sticks to old formulae</u> (defence of the welfare state, and so on) <u>and calls them ‘principles’, </u>dispensing with the detailed analysis of how the situation has changed – and thus retaining one’s position of Beautiful Soul. <u>The inherent stupidity of the ‘principled’ Left is clearly discernable in it standard criticism of any analysis which proposes a more complex picture of the situation,</u> renouncing any simple prescriptions on how to act: ‘there is no clear political stance involved in your theory’ – and this from people with no stance but their ‘principled opportunism’. Against such a stance, one should have the courage to affirm that, <u><mark>in a situation like today’s, the only way really to remain open to a revolutionary opportunity is to renounce facile calls to direct action, which</mark> necessarily <mark>involve us in an activity where things change so that the totality remains the same.</mark> </u>Today’s predicament is that, <u><mark>if we succumb to the urge of directly ‘doing something’</u></mark> (engaging in the anti-globalist struggle, helping the poor…) <u><mark>we will certainly</mark> and undoubtedly <mark>contribute to the reproduction of the existing order. The only way to lay the foundations for a true, radical change is to withdraw from the compulsion to act, to ‘do nothing’</mark> – thus opening up the space for a different kind of activity.</p></u>
1NC
null
Off
52,631
5
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,341
This form of politics provides the conditions of possibility for violence – only our recognition of the futility of productive knowledge in the university is capable of a radical politics
Hartman and Wilderson ‘3
Hartman and Wilderson ‘3 (Saidiya V. Hartman and Frank B. Wilderson, III, “THE POSITION OF THE UNTHOUGHT,” Qui Parle, Vol. 13, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2003, pp. 183-201, University of Nebraska Press, www.jstor.org/stable/20686156, Accessed: 17/10/2012 16:55) [m leap]
so often in black scholarship, people consciously or unconsciously peel away from the strength and the terror of their evidence in order to propose some kind of coherent, hopeful solution to things at the level of methodology and analysis. a lot of the work in the social sciences organizes itself around preconscious interest; it assumes a subject of consent a subject of exploitation the subject of accumulation when this sort of social science engages the issue of positionality – it assumes that it can do so in an un-raced multiculturalism that assumes we all have analogous identities that can be put into a basket of stories, and can lead to similar interests the whole issue of empathic identification is central Because every attempt to employ the slave in a narrative ultimately resulted in his or her obliteration, regardless of whether it was a leftist narrative of political agency or whether it was actually finding oneself in that position I was trying to narrate a certain impossibility, to illuminate those practices that speak to the limits of most available narratives to explain the position of the enslaved. On one hand, the slave is the foundation of the national order, and, on the other, the slave occupies the position of the unthought try to bring that position into view without making it a locus of positive value without trying to fill in the void So much of our political vocabulary/imaginary/desires have been implicitly integrationist even when we imagine our claims are more radical ultimately the metanarrative thrust is always towards an integration into the national project, and particularly when that project is in crisis, black people are called upon to affirm it. language of freedom no longer becomes that which rescues the slave from his or her former condition, but the site of the re-elaboration of that condition, rather than its transformation that project is something I consider obscene the attempt to make the narrative of defeat into an opportunity for celebration, the desire to look at the ravages and the brutality of the last few centuries, but to still find a way to feel good about ourselves trying to locate the agency of dominated groups, resulted in celebratory narratives of the oppressed as if there was a space you could carve out of the terrorizing state apparatus in order to exist outside its clutches and forge some autonomy My project is a different one an argument against the notion of hegemony that has been taken up in the context of looking at the status of the slave.
people propose some kind of coherent, hopeful solution at the level of methodology and analysis. it assumes a subject of consent a subject of exploitation the subject of accumulation empathic identification is central every attempt to employ the slave in a narrative ultimately resulted in his or her obliteration, regardless of whether it was a leftist narrative of political agency or whether it was actually finding oneself in that position I was trying to narrate a certain impossibility, to illuminate those practices to explain the position of the enslaved the slave is the foundation of the national order, and occupies the position of the unthought try to bring that position into view without trying to fill in the void the metanarrative thrust is always towards an integration into the national project when that project is in crisis, black people are called upon to affirm it that project is something I consider obscene: the attempt to make the narrative of defeat into an opportunity for celebration desire to look at the ravages and the brutality of the last few centuries, but to still find a way to feel good about ourselves
Frank B. Wilderson, Ill- One of the first things I want to say is how thankful I am that you wrote Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America. And I want to say a little bit about how meaningful the book is to me as a black graduate student- a so-called aspiring academic - and as someone caught in the machine but not of it. Because in general, when one reads the work of black scholars – if one is another black scholar or a black student- one prepares oneself for a disappointment, or works a disappointment into the reading. And one doesn't have to do that with this particular book. What I mean, is that so often in black scholarship, people consciously or unconsciously peel away from the strength and the terror of their evidence in order to propose some kind of coherent, hopeful solution to things. Your book, in moving through these scenes of subjection as they take place in slavery, refuses to do that. And just as importantly, it does not allow the reader to think that there was a radical enough break to reposition the black body after Jubilee. That is a tremendous and courageous move. And I think what's important about it, is that it corroborates the experience of ordinary black people today, and of strange black people like you and me in the academy [Iaughter]. But there's something else that the book does, and I want to talk about this at the level of methodology and analysis. If we think about the registers of subjectivity as being preconscious interest, unconscious identity or identifications, and positionality, then a lot of the work in the social sciences organizes itself around preconscious interest; it assumes a subject of consent, and as you have said, a subject of exploitation, which you reposition as the subject of accumulation.2 Now when this sort of social science engages the issue of positionality – if and when it does – it assumes that it can do so in an un-raced manner. That's the best of the work. The worst of the work is a kind of multiculturalism that assumes we all have analogous identities that can be put into a basket of stories, and then that basket of stories can lead to similar interests. For me, what you've done in this book is to split the hair here. In other words, this is not a book that celebrates an essential Afrocentrism that could be captured by the multicultural discourse. And yet it's not a book that remains on the surface of preconscious interest, which so much history and social science does. Instead, it demands a radical racialization of any analysis of positionality. So. Why don't we talk about that? Saidiya V Hartman - Well! That's a lot, and a number of things come to mind. I think for me the book is about the problem of crafting a narrative for the slave as subject, and in terms of positionality, asking, "Who does that narrative enable?" That's where the whole issue of empathic identification is central for me. Because it just seems that every attempt to employ the slave in a narrative ultimately resulted in his or her obliteration, regardless of whether it was a leftist narrative of political agency - the slave stepping into someone else's shoes and then becoming a political agent- or whether it was about being able to unveil the slave's humanity by actually finding oneself in that position. In many ways, what I was trying to do as a cultural historian was to narrate a certain impossibility, to illuminate those practices that speak to the limits of most available narratives to explain the position of the enslaved. On one hand, the slave is the foundation of the national order, and, on the other, the slave occupies the position of the unthought. So what does it mean to try to bring that position into view without making it a locus of positive value, or without trying to fill in the void? So much of our political vocabulary/imaginary/desires have been implicitly integrationist even when we imagine our claims are more radical. This goes to the second part of the book - that ultimately the metanarrative thrust is always towards an integration into the national project, and particularly when that project is in crisis, black people are called upon to affirm it. So certainly it's about more than the desire for inclusion with in the limited set of possibilities that the national project provides. What then does this language - the given language of freedom- enable? And once you realize its limits and begin to see its inexorable investment in certain notions of the subject and subjection, then that language of freedom no longer becomes that which rescues the slave from his or her former condition, but the site of the re-elaboration of that condition, rather than its transformation.¶ F.W - This is one of the reasons why your book has been called "pessimistic" by Anita Patterson.3 But it's interesting that she doesn't say what I said when we first started talking, that it's enabling.¶ I'm assuming that she's white - I don't know, but it certainly sounds like it.¶ S.VH. - But I think there's a certain integrationist rights agenda¶ that subjects who are variously positioned on the color line can take up. And that project is something I consider obscene: the attempt to make the narrative of defeat into an opportunity for celebration, the desire to look at the ravages and the brutality of the last few centuries, but to still find a way to feel good about ourselves. That's not my project at all, though I think it's actually the project of a number of people. Unfortunately, the kind of social revisionist history undertaken by many leftists in the 1970s, who were trying to locate the agency of dominated groups, resulted in celebratory narratives of the oppressed. 4 Ultimately, it bled into this¶ celebration, as if there was a space you could carve out of the terrorizing state apparatus in order to exist outside its clutches and forge some autonomy. My project is a different one. And in particular, one of my hidden polemics in the book was an argument against the notion of hegemony, and how that notion has been taken up in the context of looking at the status of the slave.
6,160
<h4>This form of politics provides the conditions of possibility for violence – only our recognition of the futility of productive knowledge in the university is capable of a radical politics</h4><p><u><strong>Hartman and Wilderson ‘3</u></strong> (Saidiya V. Hartman and Frank B. Wilderson, III, “THE POSITION OF THE UNTHOUGHT,” Qui Parle, Vol. 13, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2003, pp. 183-201, University of Nebraska Press, www.jstor.org/stable/20686156, Accessed: 17/10/2012 16:55) [m leap]</p><p>Frank B. Wilderson, Ill- One of the first things I want to say is how thankful I am that you wrote Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America. And I want to say a little bit about how meaningful the book is to me as a black graduate student- a so-called aspiring academic - and as someone caught in the machine but not of it. Because in general, when one reads the work of black scholars – if one is another black scholar or a black student- one prepares oneself for a disappointment, or works a disappointment into the reading. And one doesn't have to do that with this particular book. What I mean, is that <u>so often in black scholarship, <mark>people</mark> consciously or unconsciously <strong>peel away from the strength and the terror of their evidence</strong> in order to <strong><mark>propose</strong> some kind of <strong>coherent, hopeful solution</strong></mark> to things</u>. Your book, in moving through these scenes of subjection as they take place in slavery, refuses to do that. And just as importantly, it does not allow the reader to think that there was a radical enough break to reposition the black body after Jubilee. That is a tremendous and courageous move. And I think what's important about it, is that it corroborates the experience of ordinary black people today, and of strange black people like you and me in the academy [Iaughter]. But there's something else that the book does, and I want to talk about this <u><mark>at the level of <strong>methodology and analysis.</u></strong></mark> If we think about the registers of subjectivity as being preconscious interest, unconscious identity or identifications, and positionality, then <u>a lot of the work in the social sciences organizes itself around preconscious interest; <mark>it assumes a subject of consent</u></mark>, and as you have said, <u><strong><mark>a subject of exploitation</u></strong></mark>, which you reposition as <u><strong><mark>the subject of accumulation</u></strong></mark>.2 Now <u>when this sort of social science engages the issue of positionality </u>– if and when it does <u>– it assumes that it can do so in an un-raced</u> manner. That's the best of the work. The worst of the work is a kind of <u>multiculturalism that assumes we all have analogous identities that can be put into a basket of stories, and</u> then that basket of stories <u>can lead to similar interests</u>. For me, what you've done in this book is to split the hair here. In other words, this is not a book that celebrates an essential Afrocentrism that could be captured by the multicultural discourse. And yet it's not a book that remains on the surface of preconscious interest, which so much history and social science does. Instead, it demands a radical racialization of any analysis of positionality. So. Why don't we talk about that? Saidiya V Hartman - Well! That's a lot, and a number of things come to mind. I think for me the book is about the problem of crafting a narrative for the slave as subject, and in terms of positionality, asking, "Who does that narrative enable?" That's where <u>the whole issue of <mark>empathic identification is central</u></mark> for me. <u>Because</u> it just seems that <u><strong><mark>every attempt to employ the slave in a narrative ultimately resulted in his or her obliteration</strong>, regardless of whether it was a leftist narrative of political agency</u></mark> - the slave stepping into someone else's shoes and then becoming a political agent- <u><mark>or whether it was</u></mark> about being able to unveil the slave's humanity by <u><strong><mark>actually finding oneself in that position</u></strong></mark>. In many ways, what <u><mark>I was trying to</mark> </u>do as a cultural historian was to <u><mark>narrate a certain <strong>impossibility</strong>, to illuminate those practices</mark> that speak to the limits of most available narratives <mark>to explain the position of the enslaved<strong></mark>. On one hand, <mark>the slave is the foundation of the national order, and</mark>, on the other, the slave <mark>occupies the position of the unthought</u></strong></mark>. So what does it mean to<u> <mark>try to bring that position into view</mark> without making it a locus of positive value</u>, or<u> <strong><mark>without trying to fill in the void</u></strong></mark>? <u>So much of our political vocabulary/imaginary/desires have been implicitly integrationist <strong>even when we imagine our claims are more radical</u></strong>. This goes to the second part of the book - that <u><strong>ultimately <mark>the metanarrative thrust </strong>is always towards an<strong> integration into the national project</strong></mark>, and particularly<strong> <mark>when that project is in crisis, black people are called upon to affirm it</mark>. </u></strong>So certainly it's about more than the desire for inclusion with in the limited set of possibilities that the national project provides. What then does this language - the given language of freedom- enable? And once you realize its limits and begin to see its inexorable investment in certain notions of the subject and subjection, then that <u>language of freedom no longer becomes that which rescues the slave from his or her former condition, but the site of the <strong>re-elaboration</strong> of that condition, <strong>rather than its transformation</u></strong>.¶ F.W - This is one of the reasons why your book has been called "pessimistic" by Anita Patterson.3 But it's interesting that she doesn't say what I said when we first started talking, that it's enabling.¶ I'm assuming that she's white - I don't know, but it certainly sounds like it.¶ S.VH. - But I think there's a certain integrationist rights agenda¶ that subjects who are variously positioned on the color line can take up. And <u><strong><mark>that project is something </strong>I consider<strong> obscene</u></strong>: <u>the attempt to make the<strong> narrative of defeat </strong>into an<strong> opportunity for celebration</strong></mark>, the <mark>desire to look at <strong>the ravages and the brutality</strong> of the last few centuries, but to still find a way to <strong>feel good about ourselves</u></strong></mark>. That's not my project at all, though I think it's actually the project of a number of people. Unfortunately, the kind of social revisionist history undertaken by many leftists in the 1970s, who were <u>trying to locate the agency of dominated groups, resulted in celebratory narratives of the oppressed</u>. 4 Ultimately, it bled into this¶ celebration, <u><strong>as if there was a space you could carve out of the terrorizing state apparatus in order to exist outside its clutches and forge some autonomy</u></strong>. <u>My project is a different one</u>. And in particular, one of my hidden polemics in the book was <u>an argument against the notion of hegemony</u>, and how <u>that</u> notion <u>has been taken up in the context of looking at the status of the slave. </p></u>
2NC
University
Damage
40,239
63
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,342
We affirm the entirety of the 1ac except for the plan text.
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>We affirm the entirety of the 1ac except for the plan text.</h4>
1NC
null
Off
430,187
1
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,343
Hartman
Hartman ‘97
Hartman ‘97 (Saidiya, Scenes of Subjection, p. 65-7) [m leap]
When the enslaved slipped away to have secret meetings, they would call it "stealing the meeting Just as runaway slaves were described as "stealing themselves," so, too, even shortlived "flights" from captivity were referred to as "stealing away." "Stealing away" designated a wide range of activities It encompassed an assortment of popular illegalities focused on contesting the authority of the slave-owning class and contravening the status of the enslaved as possession. The very phrase "stealing away" played upon the paradox of property's agency and the idea of property as theft, thus alluding to the captive's condition as a legal form of unlawful or amoral seizure, what Spillers describes as ''the violent seizing of the captive body from its motive will, its active desire.'' "property is theft," Bibb put the matter simply: "Property can't steal property." It is the play upon this originary act of theft that yields the possibilities of transport, as one was literally and figuratively carried away by one's desire. The appropriation of dominant space in itinerant acts of defiance contests the spatial confinement and surveillance of slave life and, ironically, reconsiders the meaning of property, theft, and agency.
When the enslaved slipped away to have secret meetings, they would call it "stealing the meeting Just as runaway slaves were described as "stealing themselves," so, too, even shortlived "flights" from captivity were referred to as "stealing away." "Stealing away" designated a wide range of activities It encompassed an assortment of illegalities focused on contesting the authority of the slave-owning class and contravening the status of the enslaved as possession. The very phrase "stealing away" played upon the paradox of property's agency and the idea of property as theft, thus alluding to the captive's condition as a legal form of unlawful or amoral seizure, what Spillers describes as ''the violent seizing of the captive body from its motive will, its active desire "property is theft," "Property can't steal property." The appropriation of dominant space in itinerant acts of defiance contests the spatial confinement and surveillance of slave life and, ironically, reconsiders the meaning of property, theft, and agency.
When the enslaved slipped away to have secret meetings, they would call it "stealing the meeting," as if to highlight the appropriation of space and the expropriation of the object of property necessary to make these meetings possible. Just as runaway slaves were described as "stealing themselves," so, too, even shortlived "flights" from captivity were referred to as "stealing away." "Stealing away" designated a wide range of activities, from praise meetings, quilting parties, and dances to illicit visits with lovers and family on neighboring plantations. It encompassed an assortment of popular illegalities focused on contesting the authority of the slave-owning class and contravening the status of the enslaved as possession. The very phrase "stealing away" played upon the paradox of property's agency and the idea of property as theft, thus alluding to the captive's condition as a legal form of unlawful or amoral seizure, what Hortense Spillers describes as ''the violent seizing of the captive body from its motive will, its active desire.'' 49 Echoing Proudhon's "property is theft," Henry Bibb put the matter simply: "Property can't steal property." It is the play upon this originary act of theft that yields the possibilities of transport, as one was literally and figuratively carried away by one's desire.5o The appropriation of dominant space in itinerant acts of defiance contests the spatial confinement and surveillance of slave life and, ironically, reconsiders the meaning of property, theft, and agency.
1,535
<h4>Hartman</h4><p><u><strong>Hartman ‘97</u></strong> (Saidiya, Scenes of Subjection, p. 65-7) [m leap]</p><p><u><mark>When the enslaved slipped away to have secret meetings, they would call it "stealing the meeting</u></mark>," as if to highlight the appropriation of space and the expropriation of the object of property necessary to make these meetings possible. <u><mark>Just as runaway slaves were described as "stealing themselves," so, too, even shortlived "flights" from captivity were referred to as "stealing away." "Stealing away" designated a <strong>wide range of activities</u></strong></mark>, from praise meetings, quilting parties, and dances to illicit visits with lovers and family on neighboring plantations. <u><mark>It encompassed an <strong>assortment of</strong> </mark>popular<mark> <strong>illegalities</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>focused on contesting the authority of the slave-owning class and contravening the status of the enslaved as possession. The very phrase "stealing away" played upon the paradox of property's agency and the idea of property as theft, thus alluding to the captive's condition as a legal form of unlawful or amoral seizure, what</u></strong> </mark>Hortense<mark> <u><strong>Spillers describes as ''the violent seizing of the captive body from its motive will, its active desire</mark>.''</u></strong> 49 Echoing Proudhon's <u><strong><mark>"property is theft,"</u></strong></mark> Henry <u>Bibb put the matter simply: <strong><mark>"Property can't steal property."</u></strong> <u></mark>It is the play upon this originary act of theft that yields the possibilities of transport, as one was literally and figuratively carried away by one's desire.</u>5o <u><strong><mark>The appropriation of dominant space in itinerant acts of defiance contests the spatial confinement and surveillance of slave life and, ironically, reconsiders the meaning of property, theft, and agency.</u></strong></mark> </p>
2NC
University
Alt
220,804
12
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,344
It’s net beneficial – it solves better because it doesn’t start at the place of the state or include the pretended fiated action we will get links to.
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>It’s net beneficial – it solves better because it doesn’t start at the place of the state or include the pretended fiated action we will get links to.</h4>
1NC
null
Off
430,188
1
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,345
Zombies
Sexton ‘11
Sexton ‘11 (Jared, “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism” http://www.yorku.ca/intent/issue5/articles/pdfs/jaredsextonarticle.pdf) [M Leap]
To speak of black social life and black social death is to find oneself in the midst of an argument that is also a profound agreement Black optimism is not the negation of the negation that is afro-pessimism, just as black social life does not negate black social death by inhabiting it and vitalizing it A living death is as much a death as it is a living. Nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society, of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of people and place, of history and heritage, of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonized, of all that capital has in common with labor—the modern world system Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space black life is not social black life is lived in social death Double emphasis, on lived and on death. That’s the whole point of the enterprise at some level. It is all about the implications of this agreed-upon point where arguments (should) begin, but they cannot (yet) proceed.
Black optimism is not the negation of the negation that is afro-pessimism, just as black social life does not negate black social death by inhabiting it and vitalizing it. A living death is as much a death as it is a living. Nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society citizen and subject, nation and culture people and place history and heritage the modern world system Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space black life is lived in social death Double emphasis, on lived and on death
[24] To speak of black social life and black social death, black social life against black social death, black social life as black social death, black social life in black social death—all of this is to find oneself in the midst of an argument that is also a profound agreement, an agreement that takes shape in (between) meconnaissance and (dis)belief. Black optimism is not the negation of the negation that is afro-pessimism, just as black social life does not negate black social death by inhabiting it and vitalizing it. A living death is as much a death as it is a living. Nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society, of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of people and place, of history and heritage, of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonized, of all that capital has in common with labor—the modern world system. Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space. This is agreed. That is to say, what Moten asserts against afro-pessimism is a point already affirmed by afro-pessimism, is, in fact, one of the most polemical dimensions of afro-pessimism as a project: namely, that black life is not social, or rather that black life is lived in social death. Double emphasis, on lived and on death. That’s the whole point of the enterprise at some level. It is all about the implications of this agreed-upon point where arguments (should) begin, but they cannot (yet) proceed.
1,612
<h4>Zombies</h4><p><u><strong>Sexton ‘11</u></strong> (Jared, “The Social Life of Social Death: On Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism” http://www.yorku.ca/intent/issue5/articles/pdfs/jaredsextonarticle.pdf) [M Leap]</p><p>[24] <u>To speak of black social life and black social death</u>, black social life against black social death, black social life as black social death, black social life in black social death—all of this <u>is to find oneself in the midst of an argument that is also a profound agreement</u>, an agreement that takes shape in (between) meconnaissance and (dis)belief. <u><mark>Black optimism is not the negation of the negation that is afro-pessimism, just as <strong>black social life does not negate black social death by inhabiting it and vitalizing it</u></strong>. <u><strong>A living death is as much a death as it is a living</strong>. <strong>Nothing in afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life</strong>, only that <strong>black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society</strong></mark>, of <strong><mark>citizen and subject</strong>, </mark>of <mark>nation and culture</mark>, of <mark>people and place</mark>, of <mark>history and heritage</mark>, of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonized, of all that capital has in common with labor—<strong><mark>the modern world system</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Black life is not lived in the world that the world lives in, but it is lived underground, in outer space</u></strong></mark>. This is agreed. That is to say, what Moten asserts against afro-pessimism is a point already affirmed by afro-pessimism, is, in fact, one of the most polemical dimensions of afro-pessimism as a project: namely, that <u>black life is not social</u>, or rather that <u><strong><mark>black life is lived in social death</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Double emphasis, on lived and on death</mark>. That’s the whole point of the enterprise at some level. It is all about the implications of this agreed-upon point where arguments (should) begin, but they cannot (yet) proceed.</u> </p>
2NC
University
Alt
40,272
236
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,346
No internal link between the plan text and the solvency
Schlag 90 (Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis)
Schlag 90 (Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis)
normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it. Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.
normative legal thought will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it doesn't seem concerned with worldly questions about effectiveness of its own discourse It just goes along and proposes prescribes and resolves despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects legal thought remains unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics persons who are never in a position to put any of its advice into effect.
In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it. For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle n31 into effect, or to restructure [*179] the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should. . . ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students -- persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.
1,125
<h4>No internal link between the plan text and the solvency</h4><p><u><strong>Schlag 90</u> <u>(Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis)</p><p></u></strong>In fact, <u><mark>normative legal thought </mark>is so much in a hurry that it <mark>will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it</mark>.</u> For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle n31 into effect, or to restructure [*179] the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should. . . ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? <u>Normative legal thought <mark>doesn't seem</mark> overly <mark>concerned with</mark> such <mark>worldly</mark> <mark>questions</mark> <mark>about</mark> the character and the <mark>effectiveness of its own discourse</mark>. <mark>It just goes along and proposes</mark>, recommends, <mark>prescribes</mark>, solves, <mark>and resolves</mark>. Yet <mark>despite its</mark> <mark>obvious</mark> <mark>desire</mark> <mark>to have worldly effects</mark>, worldly consequences, normative <mark>legal thought remains</mark> seemingly <mark>unconcerned that for all practical purposes,</mark> <mark>its only consumers are legal academics</u></mark> and perhaps a few law students -- <u><mark>persons who are</mark> virtually <mark>never in a position to put any of its</mark> wonderful normative <mark>advice into effect.</p></u></mark>
1NC
null
Off
131,345
83
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,347
Mirroring disad – they revert the ballot to normalcy and continue metastasized exchange
Zupancic ‘3
Zupancic ‘3 (Alenka, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, pp. 13-14) [Henry]
A very good example of this kind of doubleness would be the famous “play scene Obviously, the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as it would have, for instance, as a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play Not only is it the case that “two are enough,” but further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to an entirely different configuration—that of an endless metonymic illusion The logic of the “two” that we will pursue in different contexts, and in diverse conceptual formations, implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth The fact that the truth has its temporality does not simply mean that truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent
A very good example of doubleness would be the play scene the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play two are enough,” further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to an endless metonymic illusion The logic of the “two” implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth The fact that the truth has its temporality does not mean truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent
A very good example of this kind of doubleness would be the famous “play scene” (or “mousetrap”) in Shakespeare’s Hamlet. Obviously, the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as it would have, for instance, as a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play. . . .Not only is it the case that “two are enough,” but further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to an entirely different configuration—that of an endless metonymic illusion. In Hamlet, the redoubling of fiction, far from avoiding or lacking the Real, functions as the very “trap” (the “mousetrap”) of the Real. One could also say that the “mousetrap” in Hamlet has exactly the status of the “declaration of declaration.” Through the staging of the “Murder of Gonzago,” Hamlet declares what was declared to him by his father’s Ghost. At the same time, this “declaration of declaration,” taking the form of a stage performance, succeeds precisely because it produces a dimension of: “I, the Real, am speaking.” This is what throws the murderous king off balance. Nietzsche is often praised for his insistence on multiplicity against the ontology of the One. Yet his real invention is not multiplicity, but a certain figure of the Two. The logic of the “two” that we will pursue in different contexts, and in diverse conceptual formations, implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth. For Nietzsche, truth is bound up with a certain notion of temporality, rather than being atemporal. The temporality at stake here, however, is not the one usually opposed to eternal truths. The fact that the truth has its temporality does not simply mean that truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent. Or, to use Lacan’s formula (which is quite Nietzschean in this respect), “the truth, in this sense, is that which runs after truth.”14 This temporal mode of antecedence is correlative to the temporal mode of the (notion of) subject, caught in a “loop” wherein the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real which inaugurated her in some “other time.” Or, to put it slightly differently, the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real where she is inaugurated as if “from elsewhere.”
2,486
<h4>Mirroring disad – they revert the ballot to normalcy and continue metastasized exchange</h4><p><u><strong>Zupancic ‘3</u></strong> (Alenka, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, pp. 13-14) [Henry]</p><p><u><mark>A very good example of</mark> this kind of <mark>doubleness would be the</mark> famous “<mark>play scene</u></mark>” (or “mousetrap”) in Shakespeare’s Hamlet. <u>Obviously, <mark>the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as</mark> it would have, for instance, as <mark>a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play</u></mark>. . . .<u>Not only is it the case that “<mark>two are enough,”</mark> but <mark>further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to</mark> an entirely different configuration—<strong>that of <mark>an endless metonymic illusion</u></strong></mark>. In Hamlet, the redoubling of fiction, far from avoiding or lacking the Real, functions as the very “trap” (the “mousetrap”) of the Real. One could also say that the “mousetrap” in Hamlet has exactly the status of the “declaration of declaration.” Through the staging of the “Murder of Gonzago,” Hamlet declares what was declared to him by his father’s Ghost. At the same time, this “declaration of declaration,” taking the form of a stage performance, succeeds precisely because it produces a dimension of: “I, the Real, am speaking.” This is what throws the murderous king off balance. Nietzsche is often praised for his insistence on multiplicity against the ontology of the One. Yet his real invention is not multiplicity, but a certain figure of the Two. <u><mark>The logic of the “two”</mark> that we will pursue in different contexts, and in diverse conceptual formations, <mark>implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth</u></mark>. For Nietzsche, truth is bound up with a certain notion of temporality, rather than being atemporal. The temporality at stake here, however, is not the one usually opposed to eternal truths. <u><mark>The fact that the truth has its temporality does not </mark>simply <mark>mean </mark>that <mark>truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent</u></mark>. Or, to use Lacan’s formula (which is quite Nietzschean in this respect), “the truth, in this sense, is that which runs after truth.”14 This temporal mode of antecedence is correlative to the temporal mode of the (notion of) subject, caught in a “loop” wherein the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real which inaugurated her in some “other time.” Or, to put it slightly differently, the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real where she is inaugurated as if “from elsewhere.”</p>
2NC
University
Perm
421,930
14
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,348
The assumption of 1AC solvency papers over reality with normative legal talk, emotionally disconnecting them from the implications of the speech act
Delgado 91
Delgado 91 (richard delgado , colorado law professor, 139 pa. L. Rev. 933, april)
Are we better off for engaging in normative talk, either as speakers or listeners? Schlag, has described normativity as a zero -- as a vacuous, self-referential system of talk, all form and no substance, meaning nothing, and about itself. This description may be too generous. Normativity may be more than a harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles. intense immersion in at least certain types of normative system is no guarantee against cruelty, intolerance or superstition. Normativity enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world, to tune out or redefine what would otherwise make a claim on us.
Are we better off for engaging in normative talk Schlag described normativity as a vacuous, self-referential system form and no substance meaning nothing Normativity enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world to redefine what would make a claim on us
But what is the cash value of all this priest-talk in the law reviews, in the classrooms of at least the "better" schools, and in the opinions of at least some judges? Are normativos better than other people? Are we better off for engaging in normative talk, either as speakers or listeners? Pierre Schlag, for example, has described normativity as a zero -- as a vacuous, self-referential system of talk, all [*954] form and no substance, meaning nothing, and about itself. n82 This description may be too generous. Normativity may be more than a harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles. 1. Permission to Ignore Suffering The history of organized religion shows that intense immersion in at least certain types of normative system is no guarantee against cruelty, intolerance or superstition. n83 In modern times, social scientists have tried to find a correlation between religious belief and altruistic behavior. In most studies, the correlation is nonexistent or negative. In one study, seminary students were observed as they walked past a well-dressed man lying moaning on the sidewalk. n84 Most ignored the man, even though they had just heard a sermon about the Good Samaritan. The proportion who stopped to offer aid was lower than that of passersby in general. The researchers, commenting on this and other studies of religion and helping behavior, hypothesized that religious people feel less need to act because of a sense that they are "chosen" people. n85 I believe this anesthetizing effect extends beyond religion. We confront a starving beggar and immediately translate the concrete duty we feel into a normative (i.e., abstract) question. And once we see the beggar's demand in general, systemic terms, it is easy for us to pass him by without rendering aid. n86 Someone else, perhaps society (with my tax dollars), will take care of that problem. Normativity thus enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world, to tune out or redefine what would otherwise make a claim on us. In the legal system, the clearest [*955] examples of this are found in cases where the Supreme Court has been faced with subsistence claims.
2,162
<h4>The assumption of 1AC solvency papers over reality with normative legal talk, emotionally disconnecting them from the implications of the speech act</h4><p><u><strong>Delgado 91</u></strong> (richard delgado , colorado law professor, 139 pa. L. Rev. 933, april)</p><p>But what is the cash value of all this priest-talk in the law reviews, in the classrooms of at least the "better" schools, and in the opinions of at least some judges? Are normativos better than other people? <u><mark>Are we better off for engaging in normative talk</mark>, either as speakers or listeners?</u><strong> </strong>Pierre<strong> <u></strong><mark>Schlag</mark>, </u>for example,<u> has <mark>described</mark> <mark>normativity</mark> as a zero -- <mark>as</mark> <mark>a vacuous, self-referential system</mark> of talk, all </u>[*954] <u><mark>form</mark> <mark>and no substance</mark>, <mark>meaning nothing</mark>, and about itself. </u>n82 <u>This description may be too generous. Normativity may be more than a harmless tic prevalent only in certain circles.</u> 1. Permission to Ignore Suffering The history of organized religion shows that <u>intense immersion in at least certain types of normative system is no guarantee against cruelty, intolerance or superstition. </u>n83 In modern times, social scientists have tried to find a correlation between religious belief and altruistic behavior. In most studies, the correlation is nonexistent or negative. In one study, seminary students were observed as they walked past a well-dressed man lying moaning on the sidewalk. n84 Most ignored the man, even though they had just heard a sermon about the Good Samaritan. The proportion who stopped to offer aid was lower than that of passersby in general. The researchers, commenting on this and other studies of religion and helping behavior, hypothesized that religious people feel less need to act because of a sense that they are "chosen" people. n85 I believe this anesthetizing effect extends beyond religion. We confront a starving beggar and immediately translate the concrete duty we feel into a normative (i.e., abstract) question. And once we see the beggar's demand in general, systemic terms, it is easy for us to pass him by without rendering aid. n86 Someone else, perhaps society (with my tax dollars), will take care of that problem. <u><mark>Normativity</u></mark> thus <u><mark>enables us to ignore and smooth over the rough edges of our world</mark>, <mark>to</mark> tune out or <mark>redefine what would</mark> otherwise <mark>make a claim on</mark> <mark>us</mark>.</u> In the legal system, the clearest [*955] examples of this are found in cases where the Supreme Court has been faced with subsistence claims.</p>
1NC
null
Off
429,910
11
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,349
The affirmative’s role as peddler of suffering ensures that they become addicted to their colonial praxis, ensuring an endless cycle of appropriation as their make their way into the upper echelons of the academy
Nayar 13
Nayar 13 (Jayan Nayar, PhD from the University of Cambridge, Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001975) gz
Suffering, as a witnessed condition of others, serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of (still colonial) theory production, both individually for the theory-producer as s/he progresses through professional and academic career paths, and institutionally as policy, educational and civil society markets are sought to be captured these are mega-industries whose reach covers vast spans of the (neo/post)colonised/integrated/globalised, world where the desires of civil-isation in the form of expertise accumulation and accreditation are peddled in the name of education and training Suffering does indeed generate surplus value. Both the academic and the policy-maker may invoke the suffering condition of the Other fearlessly as we product-place our suffering-based theoretical/policy merchandise – those variously conjured up designs for the various exteriorites of suffering to be redeemed in totality - within global epistemological markets. There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer seeking payment over their ownership of their suffering, or for royalties for the use of their suffering, in the production of either the printed word of the theory-producers, or in teaching/research programmes as marketable products for global consumption Neither do we have to suffer the inconvenience of the material nature of bodies that suffer contaminating the sanitised conditions within which our production takes place, or even the repercussion that these suffering bodies may rise-up and expect the theories thought in the name of suffering to deliver the promised transformations of totality! suffering-based theory production is a marketing god-send for its non-polluting nature - what is more pristine in its emissions than (the promise) of global human welfare out of suffering? Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account in any way, to any one real embodiment of suffering (in)Humanity; the suffering-Other plays her part well in this, and importantly, remains in her place compliantly. Suffering is indeed plentiful for our productive plunder, and how profitably we, thinkers of hope, suffer in this respect.
Suffering serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of colonial) theory for the theory-producer as s/he progresses through academic career paths these are mega-industries whose reach covers the colonised world Suffering does indeed generate surplus value There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer Neither¶ do we have to suffer the material nature of bodies that suffer Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account to any real embodiment of suffering the suffering-Other remains in her place compliantly
Suffering, as a witnessed condition of others, serves as a renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of (still colonial) theory production, both individually for the theory-producer as s/he progresses through professional and academic career paths, and institutionally as policy, educational and civil society markets are sought to be captured.15 And these are mega-industries whose reach covers vast spans of the (neo/post)colonised/integrated/globalised, world where the desires of civil-isation in the form of expertise accumulation and accreditation are peddled in the name of education and training. There are no losses in this economic enterprise of exploiting the suffering condition as commodity, only profits. Suffering does indeed generate surplus value. Both the academic and the policy-maker may invoke the suffering condition of the Other fearlessly as we product-place our suffering-based theoretical/policy merchandise – those variously conjured up designs for the various exteriorites of suffering to be redeemed in totality - within global epistemological markets. There is no danger that we may be confronted by any sufferer seeking payment over their ownership of their suffering, or for royalties for the use of their suffering, in the production of either the printed word of the theory-producers, or in teaching/research programmes as marketable products for global consumption.16 Neither¶ do we have to suffer the inconvenience of the material nature of bodies that suffer contaminating the sanitised conditions within which our production takes place, or even the repercussion that these suffering bodies may rise-up and expect the theories thought in the name of suffering to deliver the promised transformations of totality! And most advantageously, suffering-based theory production is a marketing god-send for its non-polluting nature - what is more pristine in its emissions than (the promise) of global human welfare out of suffering? Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account in any way, to any one real embodiment of suffering (in)Humanity; the suffering-Other plays her part well in this, and importantly, remains in her place compliantly. Suffering is indeed plentiful for our productive plunder, and how profitably we, thinkers of hope, suffer in this respect.
2,397
<h4>The affirmative’s role as peddler of suffering ensures that they become addicted to their colonial praxis, ensuring an endless cycle of appropriation as their make their way into the upper echelons of the academy</h4><p><u><strong>Nayar 13</u></strong> (Jayan Nayar, PhD from the University of Cambridge, Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001975) <u>gz</p><p><mark>Suffering</mark>, as a witnessed condition of others, <mark>serves as a <strong>renewable, inexhaustible and non-polluting commodity for the insatiable industries of</mark> (still <mark>colonial) theory</mark> production</strong>, both individually <mark>for the theory-producer as s/he <strong>progresses through</mark> professional and <mark>academic career paths</strong></mark>, and institutionally as policy, educational and civil society markets are sought to be captured</u>.15 And <u><mark>these are <strong>mega-industries</strong> whose reach covers</mark> vast spans of <mark>the</mark> (neo/post)<mark>colonised</mark>/integrated/globalised, <mark>world </mark>where the desires of civil-isation in the form of <strong>expertise accumulation and accreditation </strong>are peddled in the name of education and training</u>. There are no losses in this economic enterprise of exploiting the suffering condition as commodity, only profits. <u><strong><mark>Suffering does indeed generate surplus value</strong></mark>. Both the academic and the policy-maker may invoke the suffering condition of the Other fearlessly as we product-place our suffering-based theoretical/policy merchandise – those variously conjured up designs for the various exteriorites of suffering to be redeemed in totality - within global epistemological markets. <mark>There is <strong>no danger that we may be confronted</strong> by any sufferer</mark> seeking payment over their ownership of their suffering, or for royalties for the use of their suffering, in the production of either the printed word of the theory-producers, or in teaching/research programmes as marketable products for global consumption</u>.16 <u><mark>Neither</u>¶ <u>do we have to suffer</mark> the inconvenience of <mark>the material nature of bodies that suffer</mark> contaminating the sanitised conditions within which our production takes place, or even the repercussion that these suffering bodies may rise-up and expect the theories thought in the name of suffering to deliver the promised transformations of totality!</u> And most advantageously, <u>suffering-based theory production is a marketing god-send for its non-polluting nature - what is more pristine in its emissions than (the promise) of global human welfare out of suffering? <strong><mark>Few of us who exploit the suffering condition in our intellectual-economic production stand to account</mark> in any way, <mark>to any</mark> one <mark>real embodiment of suffering</mark> (in)Humanity</strong>; <mark>the suffering-Other</mark> plays her part well in this, and importantly, <strong><mark>remains in her place compliantly</strong></mark>. Suffering is indeed plentiful for our productive plunder, and how profitably we, thinkers of hope, suffer in this respect.</p></u>
1NR
Case
Ballots
319,242
13
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,350
The preoccupation with pretending to be policymakers traps them in a spectator position and bars them from recognizing the bureaucratic violence of legal praxis
Schlag 90
Schlag 90 (Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis)
normative legal thought takes place in a field of pain and death normative legal thought is playing language games -- utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays, and thus, utterly uninterested in considering its own rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death. To be sure, normative legal thinkers are often genuinely concerned with reducing the pain and the death What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have to the field of pain and death. normative legal thought is the pattern, is the operation of the bureaucratic distribution and the institutional allocation of the pain and the death. the normative appeal of normative legal thought systematically turns us away from recognizing that normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is that normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in the way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices
normative legal thought takes place in a field of pain and death playing language games utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays uninterested in considering its own normative thinkers are often genuinely concerned with reducing pain What is missing is any serious questioning of the routine of normative thought have to the field of pain and death the pattern of the bureaucratic distribution of pain and the death the normative appeal turns us away from recognizing that thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate normative legal thought rather than assisting stands in the way.
All of this can seem very funny. That's because it is very funny. It is also deadly serious. It is deadly serious, because all this normative legal thought, as Robert Cover explained, takes place in a field of pain and death. n56 And in a very real sense Cover was right. Yet as it takes place, normative legal thought is playing language games -- utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays, and thus, utterly uninterested in considering its own rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death. To be sure, normative legal thinkers are often genuinely concerned with reducing the pain and the death. However, the problem is not what normative legal thinkers do with normative legal thought, but what normative legal thought does with normative legal thinkers. What is missing in normative legal thought is any serious questioning, let alone tracing, of the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, the routine of normative legal thought have (or do not have) to the field of pain and death. And there is a reason for that: Normative legal thought misunderstands its own situation. Typically, normative legal thought understands itself to be outside the field of pain and death and in charge of organizing and policing that field. It is as if the action of normative legal thought could be separated from the background field of pain and death. This theatrical distinction is what allows normative legal thought its own self-important, self-righteous, self-image -- its congratulatory sense of its own accomplishments and effectiveness. All this self-congratulation works very nicely so long as normative legal [*188] thought continues to imagine itself as outside the field of pain and death and as having effects within that field. n57 Yet it is doubtful this image can be maintained. It is not so much the case that normative legal thought has effects on the field of pain and death -- at least not in the direct, originary way it imagines. Rather, it is more the case that normative legal thought is the pattern, is the operation of the bureaucratic distribution and the institutional allocation of the pain and the death. n58 And apart from the leftover ego-centered rationalist rhetoric of the eighteenth century (and our routine), there is nothing at this point to suggest that we, as legal thinkers, are in control of normative legal thought. The problem for us, as legal thinkers, is that the normative appeal of normative legal thought systematically turns us away from recognizing that normative legal thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate. The problem for us is that normative legal thought, rather than assisting in the understanding of present political and moral situations, stands in the way. It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. n59Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation, it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices -- academic and otherwise.
3,392
<h4>The preoccupation with pretending to be policymakers traps them in a spectator position and bars them from recognizing the bureaucratic violence of legal praxis</h4><p><u><strong>Schlag 90</u> </strong>(Pierre Schlag, professor of law@ univ. Colorado, stanford law review, november, page lexis)</p><p>All of this can seem very funny. That's because it is very funny. It is also deadly serious. It is deadly serious, because all this <u><mark>normative legal thought</u></mark>, as Robert Cover explained,<u> <mark>takes place in a field of pain and death</u></mark>. n56 And in a very real sense Cover was right. Yet as it takes place, <u>normative legal thought is <mark>playing language games</mark> -- <mark>utterly oblivious to the character of the language games it plays</mark>, and thus, utterly <mark>uninterested in considering its own</mark> rhetorical and political contributions (or lack thereof) to the field of pain and death.</u> <u>To be sure, <mark>normative</mark> legal <mark>thinkers are often genuinely concerned with</mark> <mark>reducing</mark> the <mark>pain</mark> and the death</u>. However, the problem is not what normative legal thinkers do with normative legal thought, but what normative legal thought does with normative legal thinkers. <u><mark>What is missing</mark> in normative legal thought <mark>is any serious questioning</mark>, let alone tracing, <mark>of</mark> the relations that the practice, the rhetoric, <mark>the routine of normative </mark>legal <mark>thought have</u></mark> (or do not have) <u><mark>to the field of pain and death</mark>.</u> And there is a reason for that: Normative legal thought misunderstands its own situation. Typically, normative legal thought understands itself to be outside the field of pain and death and in charge of organizing and policing that field. It is as if the action of normative legal thought could be separated from the background field of pain and death. This theatrical distinction is what allows normative legal thought its own self-important, self-righteous, self-image -- its congratulatory sense of its own accomplishments and effectiveness. All this self-congratulation works very nicely so long as normative legal [*188] thought continues to imagine itself as outside the field of pain and death and as having effects within that field. n57 Yet it is doubtful this image can be maintained. It is not so much the case that normative legal thought has effects on the field of pain and death -- at least not in the direct, originary way it imagines. Rather, it is more the case that <u>normative legal thought is <mark>the pattern</mark>, is the operation <mark>of the bureaucratic distribution</mark> and the institutional allocation <mark>of</mark> the <mark>pain</mark> <mark>and the death</mark>.</u> n58 And apart from the leftover ego-centered rationalist rhetoric of the eighteenth century (and our routine), there is nothing at this point to suggest that we, as legal thinkers, are in control of normative legal thought. The problem for us, as legal thinkers, is that <u><mark>the normative appeal </mark>of normative legal thought systematically <mark>turns us away from recognizing that</mark> normative legal <mark>thought is grounded on an utterly unbelievable re-presentation of the field it claims to describe and regulate</mark>. The problem for us is that <mark>normative legal thought</mark>, <mark>rather than assisting</mark> in the understanding of present political and moral situations, <mark>stands in the way.</mark> It systematically reinscribes its own aesthetic -- its own fantastic understanding of the political and moral scene. </u>n59Until normative legal thought begins to deal with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation,<strong> <u></strong>it will remain something of an irresponsible enterprise. In its rhetorical structure, it will continue to populate the legal academic world with individual humanist subjects who think themselves empowered Cartesian egos, but who are largely the manipulated constructions of bureaucratic practices</u> -- academic and otherwise.</p>
1NC
null
Off
194,419
36
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,351
faith in debate’s continual processes of agonistic contestation produces a bullet-spraying of information which 1) destroys political efficacy through addiction to debate simulation and 2) continues the investment of energy into the academic industrial complex
Baudrillard 92
Jean Baudrillard 1992 (Jean, Pataphysics of Year 2000)
Every atom dissolves in space. This is what we are living occupied with the acceleration of all bodies, all messages, all processes each event, each narrative, each image gets endowed with the simulation of an infinite trajectory Every political fact is invested with a kinetic energy which spreads over its own space and thrusts these facts into a hyperspace where they lose all meaning by way of an inability to attain their meaning. the narrative has become impossible it is the potential re-narrativization No meaning stands a chance once offered the means of its own acceleration. history slows down as it brushes up against the astral body of the "silent majorities". Our societies are governed by a "critical mass going beyond a point of no-return. This inert matter of the social is not due to a lack of exchanges, of information or of communication; it is the result of the multiplication and saturation of exchanges the hyperdensity of messages Successive events attain their annihilation in indifference. Neutralized and bullet-sprayed by information, the masses neutralise history retrospect and act as a screen of absorption. no meaning, no conscience, no desire. All social, historical and temporal transcendence is absorbed via this mass's silent immanence. We are obsessed with high fidelity the console of our channels subjected to factual sophistication, history ceases to exist interference of an event with its diffusion short-circuit cause and effect, as of a certain point", nothing is true anymore.
occupied with the acceleration of all bodies, all messages, all processes each event, each narrative, each image gets endowed with the simulation of an infinite trajectory Every political fact is invested with a kinetic energy which spreads over its own space and thrusts these facts into a hyperspace where they lose all meaning by way of an inability to attain their meaning. the narrative has become impossible it is the potential re-narrativization No meaning stands a chance once offered the means of its own acceleration. Our societies are governed by a "critical mass going beyond a point of no-return. This inert matter of the social is not due to a lack of exchanges, information or communication; it is the result of the multiplication and saturation of exchanges the hyperdensity of messages events attain their annihilation in indifference. Neutralized and bullet-sprayed by information, the masses neutralise history retrospect and act as a screen of absorption. no meaning, no conscience, no desire. All social, historical and temporal transcendence is absorbed via this mass's silent immanence. subjected to factual sophistication, history ceases to exist interference of an event with its diffusion short-circuit cause and effect, as of a certain point", nothing is true anymore.
Outside of this gravitational pull which keeps bodies in orbit, all the atoms of meaning lose themselves or self-absolve in space. Every single atom follows its own trajectory towards infinity and dissolves in space. This is precisely what we are living in our present societies occupied with the acceleration of all bodies, all messages, all processes in all possible senses and wherein, via modern media, each event, each narrative, each image gets endowed with the simulation of an infinite trajectory. Every political, historical, cultural fact is invested with a kinetic energy which spreads over its own space and thrusts these facts into a hyperspace where they lose all meaning by way of an inability to attain their meaning. It is useless to turn to science-fiction: from this point on, from the here and now, through our computer science, our circuits and our channels, this particle accelerator has definitively disrupted and broken the referential orbit of things. With respect to history, the narrative has become impossible since by definition it is the potential re-narrativization of a sequence of meaning. Through the impulse of total diffusion and circulation each event is liberated for itself only — each event becomes atomized and nuclear as it follows its trajectory into the void. In order to diffuse itself ad infinitum, it has to be fragmented like a particle. This is the way it attains a speed of no-return, distancing it from history once and for all. Every cultural, eventual group needs to be fragmented, disarticulated to allow for its entry into the circuits, each language must be absolved into a binary mechanism or device to allow for its circulation to take place — not in our memory, but in the electronic and luminous memory of the computers. There is no human language or speech (langage) that could compete with the speed of light. There is no event that could withstand its own diffusion across the planet. No meaning stands a chance once offered the means of its own acceleration. There is no history that will resist the centrifugal pull of facts or its short-circuiting in real time (in the same order of ideas: no sexuality will resist its own liberation, not a single culture will foreclose its own advancement, no truth will defy its own verification, etc.). Even theory is no longer in the state of "reflecting" on anything anymore. All it can do is to snatch concepts from their critical zone of reference and transpose them to the point of no return, in the process of which theory itself too, passes into the hyperspace of simulation as it loses all "objective" validity, while it makes significant gains by acquiring real affinity with the current system. The second hypothesis, with respect to the vanishing of history, is the opposite of the first, i.e., it pertains not to the acceleration but to the slowing down of processes. This too is derived directly from physics. Matter slows the passage of time. More precisely, time seems to pass very slowly upon the surface of a very dense body of matter. The phenomenon increases in proportion to growth in density. The effect of this slowing down (ralentissement) will raise the wavelength of light emitted by this body in a way that will allow the observer to record this phenomenon. Beyond a certain limit, time stops, the length of the wave becomes infinite. The wave no longer exists. Light extinguishes itself. The analogy is apparent in the way history slows down as it brushes up against the astral body of the "silent majorities". Our societies are governed by this process of the mass, and not only in the sociological or demographical sense of the word, but also in the sense of a "critical mass", of going beyond a certain point of no-return. That is where the crucially significant event of these societies is to be found: the advent of their revolutionary process along the lines of their mobility, (they are all revolutionary with respect to the centuries gone by), of their equivalent force of inertia, of an immense indifference, and of the silent power of this indifference. This inert matter of the social is not due to a lack of exchanges, of information or of communication; on the contrary, it is the result of the multiplication and saturation of exchanges. It is borne of the hyperdensity of cities, of merchandise, messages and circuits. It is the cold star of the social, a mass at the peripheries of which history cools out. Successive events attain their annihilation in indifference. Neutralized and bullet-sprayed by information, the masses neutralise history retrospect and act as a screen of absorption. They themselves have no history, no meaning, no conscience, no desire. They are potential residues of all history, of all meaning, of all desire. By inserting themselves into modernity, all these wonderful things managed to invoke a mysterious counterpart, the misappreciation of which has unleashed all current political and social strategies. This time, it's the opposite: history, meaning, progress are no longer able to find their speed or tempo of liberation. They can no longer pull themselves out of this much too dense body which slows down their trajectory, slows down their time to the point from whereon perception and imagination of the future escapes us. All social, historical and temporal transcendence is absorbed via this mass's silent immanence. Already, political events no longer conduct sufficient autonomous energy to rouse us and can only run their course as a silent movie in front of which we all sit collectively irresponsible. That is where history reaches its end, not because of the lack of actors or participants, not due to a lack of violence (with respect to violence, there is always an increasing amount), not due to a lack of events (as for events, there will always be more of them thanks to the role of the media and information!) — but because of a slowing down or deceleration, because of indifference and stupefaction. History can no longer go beyond itself, it can no longer envisage its own finality or dream of its own end, it shrouds or buries itself in its immediate effect, it self-exhausts in special effects, it implodes in current events. Essentially, one can no longer speak of the end of history since it has no time to rejoin its own end. As its effects accelerate, its meaning inexorably decelerates. It will end up stopping and extinguishing itself like light and time at the peripheries of an infinitely dense mass... Humanity too, had its big-bang: a certain critical density, a certain concentration of people and exchanges that compel this explosion we call history and which is none other than the dispersal of dense and hieratic cores of earlier civilizations. Today, we are living an effect of reversal: we have overstepped the threshold of critical mass with respect to populations, events, information, control of the inverse process of inertia of history and politics. At the cosmic level of things, we don't know anymore whether we have reached this speed of liberation wherein we would be partaking of a permanent or final expansion (this, no doubt, will remain forever uncertain). At the human level, where prospects are more limited, it is possible that the energy itself employed for the liberation of the species (acceleration of birthrates, of techniques and exchanges in the course of the centuries) have contributed to an excess of mass and resistance that bear on the initial energy as it drags us along a ruthless movement of contraction and inertia. Whether the universe infinitely expands or retracts to an infinitely dense and infinitely small core will hinge upon its critical mass (with respect to which speculation itself is infinite in view of the discovery of newer particles). Following the analogy, whether our human history will be evolutionary or involuted will presumably depend upon the critical mass of humanity. Are we to see ourselves, like the galaxies, on a definitive orbit that distances us from each other under the impact of a tremendous speed, or is this dispersal to infinity itself destined to reach an end, and the human molecules bound to draw closer to each other by way of an inverse effect of gravitation? The question is whether a human mass that grows day by day is able to control a pulsation of this genre? Third hypothesis, third analogy. But we are still dealing with a point of disappearance, a point of evanescence, a vanishing-point, this time however along the lines of music. This is what I call the stereophonic effect. We are all obsessed with high fidelity, with the quality of musical "transmission" (rendu). On the console of our channels, equipped with our tuners, our amplifiers and our baffles, we mix, regulate and multiply soundtracks in search of an infallible or unerring music. Is this, though, still music? Where is the threshold of high fidelity beyond the point of which music as such would disappear? Disappearance would not be due to the lack of music, it would disappear for having stepped beyond this boundary, it would disappear into the perfection of its materiality, into its own special effect. Beyond this point, neither judgement nor aesthetic pleasure could be found anymore. Ecstasy of musicality procures its own end. The disappearance of history is of the same order: there too, we have gone beyond this limit or boundary where, subjected to factual and informational sophistication, history as such ceases to exist. Large doses of immediate diffusion, of special effects, of secondary effects, of fading — and this famous Larsen effect produced in acoustics by an excessive proximity between source and receiver, in history via an excessive proximity, and therefore the disastrous interference of an event with its diffusion — create a short-circuit between cause and effect, similarly to what takes place between the object and the experimenting subject in microphysics (and in the human sciences!). All things entailing a certain radical uncertainty of the event, like excessive high fidelity, lead to a radical uncertainty with respect to music. Elias Canetti says it well: "as of a certain point", nothing is true anymore. This is also why the soft music of history escapes us, it disappears under the microscope or into the stereophony of information.
10,341
<h4>faith in debate’s continual processes of agonistic contestation produces a bullet-spraying of information which 1) destroys political efficacy through addiction to debate simulation and 2) continues the investment of energy into the academic industrial complex</h4><p>Jean <u><strong>Baudrillard</u> </strong>19<u><strong>92</u></strong> (Jean, Pataphysics of Year 2000)</p><p>Outside of this gravitational pull which keeps bodies in orbit, all the atoms of meaning lose themselves or self-absolve in space. <u><strong>Every</u></strong> single <u><strong>atom</u></strong> follows its own trajectory towards infinity and <u><strong>dissolves in space.</u></strong> <u><strong>This is</u></strong> precisely <u><strong>what we are living</u></strong> in our present societies <u><strong><mark>occupied with the acceleration of all bodies, all messages, all processes</mark> </u></strong>in all possible senses and wherein, via modern media, <u><strong><mark>each event, each narrative, each image gets endowed with the simulation of an infinite trajectory</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Every political</u></strong></mark>, historical, cultural <u><strong><mark>fact is invested with a kinetic energy which spreads over its own space and thrusts these facts into a hyperspace where they lose all meaning by way of an inability to attain their meaning.</u></strong></mark> It is useless to turn to science-fiction: from this point on, from the here and now, through our computer science, our circuits and our channels, this particle accelerator has definitively disrupted and broken the referential orbit of things. With respect to history, <u><strong><mark>the narrative has become impossible</u></strong></mark> since by definition <u><strong><mark>it is the potential re-narrativization</mark> </u></strong>of a sequence of meaning. Through the impulse of total diffusion and circulation each event is liberated for itself only — each event becomes atomized and nuclear as it follows its trajectory into the void. In order to diffuse itself ad infinitum, it has to be fragmented like a particle. This is the way it attains a speed of no-return, distancing it from history once and for all. Every cultural, eventual group needs to be fragmented, disarticulated to allow for its entry into the circuits, each language must be absolved into a binary mechanism or device to allow for its circulation to take place — not in our memory, but in the electronic and luminous memory of the computers. There is no human language or speech (langage) that could compete with the speed of light. There is no event that could withstand its own diffusion across the planet. <u><strong><mark>No meaning stands a chance once offered the means of its own acceleration.</u></strong></mark> There is no history that will resist the centrifugal pull of facts or its short-circuiting in real time (in the same order of ideas: no sexuality will resist its own liberation, not a single culture will foreclose its own advancement, no truth will defy its own verification, etc.). Even theory is no longer in the state of "reflecting" on anything anymore. All it can do is to snatch concepts from their critical zone of reference and transpose them to the point of no return, in the process of which theory itself too, passes into the hyperspace of simulation as it loses all "objective" validity, while it makes significant gains by acquiring real affinity with the current system. The second hypothesis, with respect to the vanishing of history, is the opposite of the first, i.e., it pertains not to the acceleration but to the slowing down of processes. This too is derived directly from physics. Matter slows the passage of time. More precisely, time seems to pass very slowly upon the surface of a very dense body of matter. The phenomenon increases in proportion to growth in density. The effect of this slowing down (ralentissement) will raise the wavelength of light emitted by this body in a way that will allow the observer to record this phenomenon. Beyond a certain limit, time stops, the length of the wave becomes infinite. The wave no longer exists. Light extinguishes itself. The analogy is apparent in the way <u><strong>history slows down as it brushes up against the astral body of the "silent majorities". <mark>Our societies are governed by</u></strong></mark> this process of the mass, and not only in the sociological or demographical sense of the word, but also in the sense of <u><strong><mark>a "critical mass</u></strong></mark>", of <u><strong><mark>going beyond a</mark> </u></strong>certain <u><strong><mark>point of no-return.</mark> </u></strong>That is where the crucially significant event of these societies is to be found: the advent of their revolutionary process along the lines of their mobility, (they are all revolutionary with respect to the centuries gone by), of their equivalent force of inertia, of an immense indifference, and of the silent power of this indifference. <u><strong><mark>This inert matter of the social is not due to a lack of exchanges, </mark>of <mark>information or </mark>of <mark>communication;</u></strong></mark> on the contrary, <u><strong><mark>it is the result of the multiplication and saturation of exchanges</u></strong></mark>. It is borne of <u><strong><mark>the hyperdensity</u></strong></mark> of cities, <u><strong><mark>of</u></strong></mark> merchandise, <u><strong><mark>messages</u></strong></mark> and circuits. It is the cold star of the social, a mass at the peripheries of which history cools out. <u><strong>Successive <mark>events attain their annihilation in indifference.</mark> <mark>Neutralized and bullet-sprayed by information, the masses neutralise history retrospect and act as a screen of absorption.</mark> </u></strong>They themselves have no history, <u><strong><mark>no meaning, no conscience, no desire.</u></strong></mark> They are potential residues of all history, of all meaning, of all desire. By inserting themselves into modernity, all these wonderful things managed to invoke a mysterious counterpart, the misappreciation of which has unleashed all current political and social strategies. This time, it's the opposite: history, meaning, progress are no longer able to find their speed or tempo of liberation. They can no longer pull themselves out of this much too dense body which slows down their trajectory, slows down their time to the point from whereon perception and imagination of the future escapes us. <u><strong><mark>All social, historical and temporal transcendence is absorbed via this mass's silent immanence.</u></strong></mark> Already, political events no longer conduct sufficient autonomous energy to rouse us and can only run their course as a silent movie in front of which we all sit collectively irresponsible. That is where history reaches its end, not because of the lack of actors or participants, not due to a lack of violence (with respect to violence, there is always an increasing amount), not due to a lack of events (as for events, there will always be more of them thanks to the role of the media and information!) — but because of a slowing down or deceleration, because of indifference and stupefaction. History can no longer go beyond itself, it can no longer envisage its own finality or dream of its own end, it shrouds or buries itself in its immediate effect, it self-exhausts in special effects, it implodes in current events. Essentially, one can no longer speak of the end of history since it has no time to rejoin its own end. As its effects accelerate, its meaning inexorably decelerates. It will end up stopping and extinguishing itself like light and time at the peripheries of an infinitely dense mass... Humanity too, had its big-bang: a certain critical density, a certain concentration of people and exchanges that compel this explosion we call history and which is none other than the dispersal of dense and hieratic cores of earlier civilizations. Today, we are living an effect of reversal: we have overstepped the threshold of critical mass with respect to populations, events, information, control of the inverse process of inertia of history and politics. At the cosmic level of things, we don't know anymore whether we have reached this speed of liberation wherein we would be partaking of a permanent or final expansion (this, no doubt, will remain forever uncertain). At the human level, where prospects are more limited, it is possible that the energy itself employed for the liberation of the species (acceleration of birthrates, of techniques and exchanges in the course of the centuries) have contributed to an excess of mass and resistance that bear on the initial energy as it drags us along a ruthless movement of contraction and inertia. Whether the universe infinitely expands or retracts to an infinitely dense and infinitely small core will hinge upon its critical mass (with respect to which speculation itself is infinite in view of the discovery of newer particles). Following the analogy, whether our human history will be evolutionary or involuted will presumably depend upon the critical mass of humanity. Are we to see ourselves, like the galaxies, on a definitive orbit that distances us from each other under the impact of a tremendous speed, or is this dispersal to infinity itself destined to reach an end, and the human molecules bound to draw closer to each other by way of an inverse effect of gravitation? The question is whether a human mass that grows day by day is able to control a pulsation of this genre? Third hypothesis, third analogy. But we are still dealing with a point of disappearance, a point of evanescence, a vanishing-point, this time however along the lines of music. This is what I call the stereophonic effect. <u><strong>We are</u></strong> all <u><strong>obsessed with high fidelity</u></strong>, with the quality of musical "transmission" (rendu). On <u><strong>the console of our channels</u></strong>, equipped with our tuners, our amplifiers and our baffles, we mix, regulate and multiply soundtracks in search of an infallible or unerring music. Is this, though, still music? Where is the threshold of high fidelity beyond the point of which music as such would disappear? Disappearance would not be due to the lack of music, it would disappear for having stepped beyond this boundary, it would disappear into the perfection of its materiality, into its own special effect. Beyond this point, neither judgement nor aesthetic pleasure could be found anymore. Ecstasy of musicality procures its own end. The disappearance of history is of the same order: there too, we have gone beyond this limit or boundary where, <u><strong><mark>subjected to factual </u></strong></mark>and informational <u><strong><mark>sophistication, history</u></strong></mark> as such <u><strong><mark>ceases to exist</u></strong></mark>. Large doses of immediate diffusion, of special effects, of secondary effects, of fading — and this famous Larsen effect produced in acoustics by an excessive proximity between source and receiver, in history via an excessive proximity, and therefore the disastrous <u><strong><mark>interference of an event with its diffusion</u></strong></mark> — create a <u><strong><mark>short-circuit</u></strong></mark> between <u><strong><mark>cause and effect,</mark> </u></strong>similarly to what takes place between the object and the experimenting subject in microphysics (and in the human sciences!). All things entailing a certain radical uncertainty of the event, like excessive high fidelity, lead to a radical uncertainty with respect to music. Elias Canetti says it well: "<u><strong><mark>as of a certain point", nothing is true anymore.</u></strong></mark> This is also why the soft music of history escapes us, it disappears under the microscope or into the stereophony of information. </p>
1NR
Case
Narratives
151,731
29
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,352
It’s legit – they get 100% of the plan to generate offense versus the cp, this is a necessary test against critical affirmatives.
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>It’s legit – they get 100% of the plan to generate offense versus the cp, this is a necessary test against critical affirmatives.</h4>
1NC
null
Off
430,189
1
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,353
Appeals to experience precludes questioning of ideological systems, locks subjects into static and immutable representational positions without critique
Scott 1992
Scott 1992 (Joan, “Experience”, Feminists Theorize the Political, Ed. Judith Butler and Joan Scott, pp 25, KEL) Ableist language modified.
the evidence of experience assume that the facts of history speak for themselves the project of making experience [known] visible precludes critical examination of the workings of the ideological system itself, its categories of representation (homosexual/heterosexual, man/woman, black/white as fixed immutable identities), its premises about what these categories mean and how they operate, its notions of subjects, origin, and cause.
experience assume history speak for themselves making experience [known precludes examination of the system itself, its categories its premises about what these mean and how they operate
To put it another way, the evidence of experience, whether conceived through a metaphor of visibility or in any other way that takes meaning as transparent, reproduces rather than contests given ideological systems-those that assume that the facts of history speak for themselves and, in the case of histories of gender, those that rest on notions of a natural or established opposition between sexual practices and social conventions, and between homosexuality and heterosexuality. Histories that document the "hidden" world of homosexuality, for example, show the impact of silence and repression on the lives of those affected by it and bring to light the history of their suppression and exploitation. But the project of making experience [known] visible precludes critical examination of the workings of the ideological system itself, its categories of representation (homosexual/heterosexual, man/woman, black/white as fixed immutable identities), its premises about what these categories mean and how they operate, its notions of subjects, origin, and cause.
1,065
<h4>Appeals to experience precludes questioning of ideological systems, locks subjects into static and immutable representational positions without critique</h4><p><u><strong>Scott 1992</u></strong> (Joan, “Experience”, Feminists Theorize the Political, Ed. Judith Butler and Joan Scott, pp 25, KEL) Ableist language modified.</p><p>To put it another way, <u>the evidence of <mark>experience</u></mark>, whether conceived through a metaphor of visibility or in any other way that takes meaning as transparent, reproduces rather than contests given ideological systems-those that <u><mark>assume</mark> that the facts of <mark>history speak for themselves</u></mark> and, in the case of histories of gender, those that rest on notions of a natural or established opposition between sexual practices and social conventions, and between homosexuality and heterosexuality. Histories that document the "hidden" world of homosexuality, for example, show the impact of silence and repression on the lives of those affected by it and bring to light the history of their suppression and exploitation. But <u>the project of <mark>making experience [known</mark>] visible <mark>precludes</mark> critical <mark>examination of the</mark> workings of the ideological <mark>system itself, its categories</mark> of representation (homosexual/heterosexual, man/woman, black/white as fixed immutable identities), <mark>its premises about what these</mark> categories <mark>mean and how they operate</mark>, its notions of subjects, origin, and cause.</p></u>
1NR
Case
Narratives
430,181
2
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,354
Appeals to experience foreclose critical examination of subjectivity
Scott 1992
Scott 1992 (Joan, “Experience”, Feminists Theorize the Political, Ed. Judith Butler and Joan Scott, pp 28, KEL) Gender modified.
The concepts of experience preclude inquiry into processes of subject construction; and they avoid examining the relationships between discourse, cognition, and reality, the relevance of the position or situatedness of subjects to the knowledge they produce, and the effects of difference on knowledge. the authority of the 'subject of knowledge' [is established] by the elimination of everything concerning the speaker." 14 [their] His knowledge, reflecting as it does something apart from him, is legitimated and presented as universal, accessible to all. There is no power or politics in these notions of knowledge and experience.
experience preclude inquiry into subject construction they avoid relationships between discourse and reality, the relevance of situatedness and the effects of difference authority of 'subject of knowledge' [is established] by elimination of the speaker [their] knowledge is legitimated presented as universal, accessible There is no power or politics in these notions
The concepts of experience described by Williams preclude inquiry into processes of subject construction; and they avoid examining the relationships between discourse, cognition, and reality, the relevance of the position or situatedness of subjects to the knowledge they produce, and the effects of difference on knowledge. Questions are not raised about, for example, whether it matters for the history they write that historians are men, women, white, black, straight, or gay; instead "the authority of the 'subject of knowledge' [is established] by the elimination of everything concerning the speaker." 14 [their] His knowledge, reflecting as it does something apart from him, is legitimated and presented as universal, accessible to all. There is no power or politics in these notions of knowledge and experience.
819
<h4>Appeals to experience foreclose critical examination of subjectivity</h4><p><u><strong>Scott 1992</u></strong> (Joan, “Experience”, Feminists Theorize the Political, Ed. Judith Butler and Joan Scott, pp 28, KEL) Gender modified.</p><p><u>The concepts of <mark>experience</u></mark> described by Williams <u><mark>preclude inquiry into</mark> processes of <mark>subject construction</mark>; and <mark>they avoid</mark> examining the <mark>relationships between discourse</mark>, cognition, <mark>and reality, the relevance of</mark> the position or <mark>situatedness</mark> of subjects to the knowledge they produce, <mark>and the effects of difference</mark> on knowledge.</u> Questions are not raised about, for example, whether it matters for the history they write that historians are men, women, white, black, straight, or gay; instead "<u>the <mark>authority of</mark> the <mark>'subject of knowledge' [is established] by</mark> the <mark>elimination of</mark> everything concerning <mark>the speaker</mark>." 14 <mark>[their]</mark> His <mark>knowledge</mark>, reflecting as it does something apart from him, <mark>is legitimated</mark> and <mark>presented as universal, accessible</mark> to all. <mark>There is no power or politics in these notions</mark> of knowledge and experience.</u> </p>
1NR
Case
Narratives
153,222
4
17,010
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
564,715
N
Wake
4
GMU JT
Max Bugrov
1ac was feminist rage 1nc was university k cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was case 2nr was case and the university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round4.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,355
The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt assuasion
Chow 1993
Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993
While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in an opposition against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed) but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words The predicament we face in the West Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper?
The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in oppositional against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return claims of oppression and victimization are used to guilt-trip and to control; affirmations of diversities that are made in the name of righteousness create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is not their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed but the privilege that accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper
(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can resist, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?
5,388
<h4><strong>The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt assuasion</h4><p><u>Chow</u> </strong>– Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown -<strong> <u>1993</p><p></u></strong>(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) </p><p><u>While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary</u> for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. <u><mark>The question</u></mark> for me <u><mark>is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony</u></mark> (a question that positions them <u><mark>in</mark> an <mark>opposition</u>al</mark> light <u><mark>against dominant power</u></mark> and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), <u><mark>but <strong>how they can resist</u></strong></mark>, as Michel Foucault said, “<u><mark>the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse</u></mark>.’ “ Putting it another way, <u><mark>how do intellectuals struggle against <strong>a hegemony which already includes them</u></strong></mark> and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? <u>As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,”</u> <u>and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and <mark>as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, <strong>many</strong> deep-rooted, <strong>politically reactionary forces return</u></strong></mark> <u>to haunt us.</u> <u>Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested <strong><mark>claims</strong></mark> <strong><mark>of oppression and victimization</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>are used</u></strong></mark> merely <u><strong><mark>to guilt-trip and to control</strong>; </mark>sexist and racist re<mark>affirmations of </mark>sexual and racial <mark>diversities that are made</mark> merely <mark>in the name of righteousness</mark>—all these forces <mark>create new “solidarities whose ideological premises <strong>remain unquestioned</u></strong></mark>. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. <u>The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense,</u> <u>We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are <strong>battles of words</u></strong>. <u><mark>Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are</mark> </u>most certainly <u><strong><mark>not</u></strong></mark> directly<u> <strong><mark>changing the</strong></mark> </u>downtrodden<u> <strong><mark>lives of those who seek</strong></mark> </u>their<u> <strong><mark>survival</strong></mark> </u>in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike.<u> <mark>What academic intellectuals must confront is</mark> thus <mark>not their</mark> </u>victimization by society at large (<u>or their <mark>victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed</mark>)</u>, <u><mark>but the</mark> power, wealth, and <mark>privilege that</mark> Ironically <mark>accumulate <strong>from their</strong> “oppositional” <strong>viewpoint</strong></mark>, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words</u>. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) <u>The predicament we face in the West</u>, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, <u>Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business</u>, . . . <u>he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen.</u> “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? <u><mark>How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses</u></mark>, <u><mark>when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper</mark>?</u> How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?</p>
1NC
null
Case
323,208
67
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,356
Legalization of organ sales sustains neoliberal violence -- the poor are coerced into deconstructing and commodifying their biological assemblage to allow for the wealthy to live indefinitely
Dillard-Wright 12
Dillard-Wright 12
, 20(2), 138-153, AB Very few studies have been made in to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries the Journal of the American Medical Association JAMA study found that nearly all of the study participants had sold a kidney to pay off debts The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization At an average elapsed time most families reported worsened economic conditions with annual incomes dropping pro-market perspectives dogmatically ignore the realities faced by many kidney sellers around the world living kidney donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons face extraordinary threats to their health through violence and infectious disease As the use of live kidney donors has moved to areas of high risk in the developing world surgeons have become complicit in the needless suffering of a hidden population Asking the world’s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an unconscionable exacerbation of an already unjust set of global relations Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from the ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs available for first-world people Such motives instrumentalize the poor turning their suffering into an opportunity The “quantification of suffering” misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans and animal subjects If the “supply side” has been distorted the recipient side has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude towards medicine that views all conditions as treatable classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation including those over 70 years This new category of patients does not stand to benefit from transplantation because their conditions make rejection likely As if it weren’t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized and labor are gutted by the trend towards globalizatio the world’s most vulnerable are now asked to surrender their very bodies so that the world’s elite can have longer, more comfortable lives such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others.
The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription” resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization pro-market perspectives dogmatically ignore realities faced by sellers kidney face extraordinary threats to their health through violence and disease surgeons become complicit in suffering of a hidden population Asking the world’s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an exacerbation of already unjust global relations Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs for first-world people motives instrumentalize the poor, “turning their suffering into an opportunity The “quantification of suffering misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses: this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans subjects the “supply side” has been distorted the recipient side has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude towards medicine that views all conditions as treatable the world’s most vulnerable are asked to surrender their bodies so the elite can have longer, more comfortable lives
David, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ University of South Carolina, “Life, Transferable: Questioning the Commodity Based Approach to Transplantation Ethics”, Journal of Society & Animals, 20(2), 138-153, AB Very few studies have been made in order to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries. The existing information comes from the Goyal et al study in Chennai, India published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) and the ethnographic studies published by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, founder of Organ Watch at the University of California- Berkeley. The JAMA study found that nearly all of the study participants (96%) had sold a kidney to pay off debts and that the average amount received was $1070 (Goyal, 2002, p. 1589). The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription” resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization (Rajan, 2006, p. 80). At an average elapsed time of 6 years after the nephrectomy, most families reported worsened economic conditions since the surgery, with annual incomes dropping from “$660 at the time of nephrectomy to $420 at the time of the survey, a decrease of one third” (Goyal et al, 2002, pp. 1590-1591). Half of the participants complained of pain at the surgery site and a third said that they suffered from ongoing back pain (p. 1591). While some bioethicists may characterize a kidney as “redundant” or a “spare part,” using the language of “vendor” or “seller” to refer to victims of organ traders (Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006), these pro-market perspectives, though perhaps not blindly, dogmatically pro-market (as in neo-liberalism), ignore the realities faced by many kidney sellers around the world: Organs Watch has found that living kidney donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons face extraordinary threats to their health and personal safety through violence, accidents and infectious disease that can all too readily compromise their remaining kidney. As the use of live kidney donors has moved from the industrialized West, where it takes place among kin and under highly privileged circumstances, to areas of high risk in the developing world, transplant surgeons [and, I would add, aftercare physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and others in Western nations] have become complicit in the needless suffering of a hidden population (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 77). Here another asymmetry asserts itself, in that organ recipients have widely available aftercare, where organ donors from third world countries do not have access to care. Scheper-Hughes has also found that social stigma attaches itself to organ sales. The predominately young men who sell organs to support their families find themselves unable to marry or find a job because of a perception that they are “weak” and incapable (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 76). No serious bioethicists argue that the current black market in human organs can be morally justified, but many do argue that a legalized and regulated market would be able to set a fair price, one that could compensate sellers for the many trials that they endure both during and after the donation process. Such a solution must not be dismissed out of hand, but a large degree of suspicion should be applied to market-based solutions. The mere fact of cash changing hands does not excuse or exempt organ recipients and other stakeholders from caring about the people who served as sources for those organs. Asking the world’s poor to bear the brunt of first-world medical conditions is an unconscionable exacerbation of an already unjust set of global relations. Systematic wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales, and advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor arising from the ulterior motive of increasing the supply of organs available for first-world people. Such motives instrumentalize the poor, “turning their suffering into an opportunity” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 78). The “quantification of suffering” assumed in a recent spate of bioethics books on transplants (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006) misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses: this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans and animal subjects (Donovan, 2007, 64). If the “supply side” has been distorted by this distributive paradigm, the recipient side also has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life. Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude towards medicine that views any and all conditions as treatable, and now new classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation, including “those over 70 years, infants, those with hepatitis C and HIV seropositivity, and those proven to be immunilogically prone to organ rejection” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 66). This new category of patients does not stand to benefit much from transplantation because their ages and medical conditions make rejection likely: this is not a matter of discriminating among patients but simply taking into account the viability of the procedure. As transplant technology advances, this demand from a broadened patient pool will likely increase, along with the persistent lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries. Meanwhile, viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 67). Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs, but this solution requires more work than allowing the black market to flourish. Scheper-Hughes notes that many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them (2002). While I do not think that those who need organs should just be allowed to die, it does make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world’s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism. As if it weren’t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized and that labor and environmental standards are gutted by the trend towards globalization, the world’s most vulnerable are now asked to surrender their very bodies so that the world’s elite can have longer, more comfortable lives. While I might be accused of a lack of compassion for those suffering from medical difficulties, such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others.
6,774
<h4>Legalization of organ sales sustains neoliberal violence -- the poor are coerced into deconstructing and commodifying their biological assemblage to allow for the wealthy to live indefinitely <u><strong> </h4><p>Dillard-Wright 12</p><p></u></strong>David, Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ University of South Carolina, “Life, Transferable: Questioning the Commodity Based Approach to Transplantation Ethics”, Journal of Society & Animals<u><strong>, 20(2), 138-153, AB </p><p></strong>Very few studies have been made in</u> order <u>to determine the long-term effects of organ donation on the poor in third world countries</u>. The existing information comes from the Goyal et al study in Chennai, India published in <u>the Journal of the American Medical Association</u> (<u>JAMA</u>) and the ethnographic studies published by anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes, founder of Organ Watch at the University of California- Berkeley. The JAMA <u>study found that <strong>nearly all</strong> of the study <strong>participants</u></strong> (96%) <u>had sold a kidney to pay off debts</u> and that the average amount received was $1070 (Goyal, 2002, p. 1589). <u><strong><mark>The decision to sell an organ amounts to economic “conscription</u></strong>” <u><strong>resulting from the heightened disparities of neoliberal globalization</u></strong></mark> (Rajan, 2006, p. 80). <u>At an average elapsed time</u> of 6 years after the nephrectomy, <u>most families reported <strong>worsened economic conditions</strong> </u>since the surgery, <u>with annual incomes dropping</u> from “$660 at the time of nephrectomy to $420 at the time of the survey, a decrease of one third” (Goyal et al, 2002, pp. 1590-1591). Half of the participants complained of pain at the surgery site and a third said that they suffered from ongoing back pain (p. 1591). While some bioethicists may characterize a kidney as “redundant” or a “spare part,” using the language of “vendor” or “seller” to refer to victims of organ traders (Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006), these <u><strong><mark>pro-market perspectives</u></strong></mark>, though perhaps not blindly, <u><strong><mark>dogmatically</u></strong></mark> pro-market (as in neo-liberalism), <u><strong><mark>ignore</mark> the <mark>realities faced by</mark> many kidney <mark>sellers</mark> around the world</u></strong>: Organs Watch has found that <u>living <mark>kidney</mark> donors from shantytowns, inner cities, or prisons <mark>face</u> <u><strong>extraordinary threats to their health</u></strong></mark> and personal safety <u><strong><mark>through violence</u></strong></mark>, accidents <u><strong><mark>and</mark> infectious <mark>disease</u></strong></mark> that can all too readily compromise their remaining kidney. <u>As the use of live kidney donors has moved </u>from the industrialized West, where it takes place among kin and under highly privileged circumstances,<u> to areas of high risk in the developing world</u>, transplant <u><mark>surgeons</u></mark> [and, I would add, aftercare physicians, pharmaceutical companies, and others in Western nations] <u>have <mark>become <strong>complicit in</mark> the needless <mark>suffering of a hidden population</u></strong></mark> (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 77). Here another asymmetry asserts itself, in that organ recipients have widely available aftercare, where organ donors from third world countries do not have access to care. Scheper-Hughes has also found that social stigma attaches itself to organ sales. The predominately young men who sell organs to support their families find themselves unable to marry or find a job because of a perception that they are “weak” and incapable (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 76). No serious bioethicists argue that the current black market in human organs can be morally justified, but many do argue that a legalized and regulated market would be able to set a fair price, one that could compensate sellers for the many trials that they endure both during and after the donation process. Such a solution must not be dismissed out of hand, but a large degree of suspicion should be applied to market-based solutions. The mere fact of cash changing hands does not excuse or exempt organ recipients and other stakeholders from caring about the people who served as sources for those organs. <u><mark>Asking the world’s poor to <strong>bear the brunt</strong> of first-world medical</mark> <mark>conditions is an</mark> <strong>unconscionable <mark>exacerbation of</mark> an <mark>already unjust</mark> set of <mark>global relations</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Systematic</mark> <mark>wrongs cannot be addressed by piecemeal solutions like organ sales</u></strong></mark>, and <u><strong><mark>advocating for organ sales is a disingenuous form of concern for the poor</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>arising from <strong></mark>the <mark>ulterior motive</strong> of increasing the supply</mark> <mark>of organs</mark> available <mark>for first-world</mark> <mark>people</u></mark>. <u>Such <mark>motives <strong>instrumentalize the poor</u></strong>, “<u><strong>turning their suffering into an opportunity</u></strong></mark>” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 78). <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>“quantification of suffering</mark>”</u></strong> assumed in a recent spate of bioethics books on transplants (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Wilkinson, 2003; Cherry, 2005; Baron, 2006) <u><strong><mark>misses this suffering by making it into a unit in an equation of benefits and losses</u></strong>: <u><strong>this distributive paradigm must itself be questioned before people can begin to care about marginalized humans </mark>and animal <mark>subjects</u></strong></mark> (Donovan, 2007, 64). <u>If <mark>the “supply side” has been distorted</u></mark> by this distributive paradigm, <u><mark>the recipient side</u></mark> also <u><strong><mark>has been manipulated by the technoscientific insistence on the extension of life</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Transplant lists have been artificially inflated by a consumerist attitude</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>towards medicine</u></mark> <u><mark>that views</u></mark> any and<u> <mark>all conditions as treatable</u></mark>, and now new <u>classes of patients are increasingly considered eligible for transplantation</u>, <u>including</u> “<u>those over 70 years</u>, infants, those with hepatitis C and HIV seropositivity, and those proven to be immunilogically prone to organ rejection” (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 66). <u>This new category of patients does not stand to benefit</u> much <u>from transplantation</u> <u>because</u> <u>their</u> ages and medical <u>conditions make rejection likely</u>: this is not a matter of discriminating among patients but simply taking into account the viability of the procedure. As transplant technology advances, this demand from a broadened patient pool will likely increase, along with the persistent lack of regard for those who must bear the cost of these surgeries. Meanwhile, viable organs around the world go unused because the infrastructure to extract them does not exist (Scheper-Hughes, 2002, p. 67). Making technology available to more hospitals worldwide would help to increase the supply of organs, but this solution requires more work than allowing the black market to flourish. Scheper-Hughes notes that many available organs worldwide rot in dumpsters because the hospitals do not have access to the technology to preserve them (2002). While I do not think that those who need organs should just be allowed to die, it does make sense to maximize other sources of organs before mining the bodies of the world’s poor, since they already must bear the brunt of first-world resource extraction and the legacy of colonialism. <u>As if it weren’t already enough that land and water are increasingly privatized</u> <u>and</u> that <u>labor</u> and environmental standards <u>are gutted by the trend towards globalizatio</u>n, <u><mark>the world’s most vulnerable are</mark> now <mark>asked to surrender their</mark> very <mark>bodies</mark> <mark>so</mark> that <mark>the</mark> world’s <strong><mark>elite</mark> <mark>can have longer, more comfortable lives</u></strong></mark>. While I might be accused of a lack of compassion for those suffering from medical difficulties, <u>such compassion is misplaced if its exercise comes at the expense of vulnerable others. </p></u>
1NC
null
Off
429,532
8
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,357
The term “marij[h]uana” recreates historically racist
Leafly 14
Leafly 14
The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in cannabis culture Many organizations publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of cannabis why has the word gained publicity as a racist term? Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist as a word in American culture. Rather, “cannabis” was used in Between the years of 1910 and 1920 890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war. Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption The idea of smoking cannabis entered mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. Aftermath 1930s: The Great Depression hit the United States, Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants in the South Americans began to treat cannabis and the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals. 29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” Anslinger spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences Anslinger testified Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” Anslinger specifically used the term “marijuana” when campaigning against the plant, adding to the development of the herb’s new “foreign” identity Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines Though the word “marijuana” is the most common name for cannabis its history is deeply steeped in race, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction to the American lexicon
The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in culture. organizations denounced the M word” in favor of cannabis the word gained publicity as a racist term Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist in American culture Rather cannabis” was used in 1920 Mexicans immigrated into the U S seeking refuge Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history the idea of smoking recreationally was not common smoking entered American consciousness after immigrants brought smoking with them After The Depression hit Americans were searching for someone to blame Americans began to treat cannabis and Blacks and immigrants who consumed it as a foreign substance used to corrupt individuals Anslinger spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences Anslinger used the term “marijuana adding to the herb’s new “foreign” identity Though the word marijuana is common its history is deeply steeped in race the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction
http://www.leafly.com/knowledge-center/cannabis-101/where-did-the-word-marijuana-come-from-anyway-01fb, “The Origin of the Word "Marijuana", last updated August 9th 2014, AB The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in cannabis culture. Many well-known organizations such as Oakland’s Harborside Heath Center have publicly denounced “the M word” in favor of our favorite plant’s Latinate name, cannabis. Even Salon Magazine, a major press outlet outside of the cannabis industry, published an article titled “Is the word ‘Marijuana’ racist?” last year. As mainstream culture becomes a little more herb-friendly, the terminology used by the industry is coming to center stage. But, why exactly does the term “marijuana” cause so much debate? Even worse, why has the word gained publicity as a racist term? To save you from reading those lengthy history books or some boring academic articles, we’ve created this brief timeline to give you the low-down on “marijuana"’s rise to popularity in the United States. Here’s what you need to know: The Mexican Revolution 1840-1900: Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t exist as a word in American culture. Rather, “cannabis” was used, most often in reference to medicines and remedies for common household ailments. In the early 1900s, what have now become pharmaceutical giants—Bristol-Meyer’s Squib and Eli Lilly—used to include cannabis and cannabis extracts in their medicines. During this time, Americans (particularly elite Americans) were going through a hashish trend. Glamorized by literary celebrities such as Alexander Dumas, experimenting with cannabis products became a fad among those wealthy enough to afford imported goods. 1910: Between the years of 1910 and 1920, over 890,000 Mexicans legally immigrated into the United States seeking refuge from the wreckage of civil war. Though cannabis had been a part of U.S. history since the country’s beginnings, the idea of smoking the plant recreationally was not as common as other forms of consumption. The idea of smoking cannabis entered mainstream American consciousness after the arrival of immigrants who brought the smoking habit with them. 1913: The first bill criminalizing the cultivation of “locoweed” was passed in California. The bill was a major push from the Board of Pharmacy as a way to regulate opiates and psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and seemingly did not stem from the “reefer madness” or racialized understanding of “marijuana” that paved the way to full-on prohibition in the 1930s. The Aftermath 1930s: The Great Depression had just hit the United States, and Americans were searching for someone to blame. Due to the influx of immigrants (particularly in the South) and the rise of suggestive jazz music, many white Americans began to treat cannabis (and, arguably, the Blacks and Mexican immigrants who consumed it) as a foreign substance used to corrupt the minds and bodies of low-class individuals. In the time just before the federal criminalization of the plant, 29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” Harry Anslinger: It would not be an overstatement to say that Harry Anslinger was one of the primary individuals responsible for creating the stigma surrounding cannabis. Hired as the first director of the recently created Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930, Anslinger launched a vigilant campaign against cannabis that would hold steady for the three decades he remained in office. A very outspoken man, Anslinger used the recent development of the movie theater to spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences. In one documented incident, Anslinger testified before Congress, explaining: "Marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind… Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." In another statement, Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” In retrospect, Anslinger’s efforts with the Bureau of Narcotics were the reason “marijuana” became a word known by Americans all over the country. When making public appearances and crafting propaganda films such as Reefer Madness, Anslinger specifically used the term “marijuana” when campaigning against the plant, adding to the development of the herb’s new “foreign” identity. Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines and consumed unanimously by American’s all over the country. 1937: The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was the culmination of Anslinger’s work and the first step to all-out prohibition. The bill federally criminalized the cannabis plant in every U.S. state. In order to discourage the production of cannabis use, the Tax Act of 1937 placed a one dollar tax on anyone who sold or cultivated the cannabis plant. On top of the tax itself, the bill mandated that all individuals comply with certain enforcement provisions. Violation of the provisions would result in imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $2,000. Though the word “marijuana” is the most common name for cannabis in the United States today, its history is deeply steeped in race, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution. Some argue that using the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans, while others insist that the term has now lost its prejudiced bite. Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word yourself, it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications of its introduction to the American lexicon.
5,661
<h4><u><strong>The term “marij[h]uana” recreates historically racist </h4><p>Leafly 14</p><p></u></strong>http://www.leafly.com/knowledge-center/cannabis-101/where-did-the-word-marijuana-come-from-anyway-01fb, “The Origin of the Word "Marijuana", last updated August 9th 2014, AB </p><p><u><mark>The word “marijuana” plays a controversial role in</mark> cannabis <mark>culture</u>.</mark> <u>Many</u> well-known <u><mark>organizations</u></mark> such as Oakland’s Harborside Heath Center have <u>publicly <mark>denounced</mark> “<mark>the M word” in favor of</u></mark> our favorite plant’s Latinate name, <u><mark>cannabis</u></mark>. Even Salon Magazine, a major press outlet outside of the cannabis industry, published an article titled “Is the word ‘Marijuana’ racist?” last year. As mainstream culture becomes a little more herb-friendly, the terminology used by the industry is coming to center stage. But, why exactly does the term “marijuana” cause so much debate? Even worse, <u>why has <mark>the word</mark> <mark>gained publicity as a racist term</mark>? </u>To save you from reading those lengthy history books or some boring academic articles, we’ve created this brief timeline to give you the low-down on “marijuana"’s rise to popularity in the United States. Here’s what you need to know: The Mexican Revolution 1840-1900: <u><strong><mark>Prior to 1910, “marijuana” didn’t</mark> <mark>exist</mark> as a word <mark>in American</mark> <mark>culture</mark>. <mark>Rather</mark>, “<mark>cannabis” was used</u></strong></mark>, most often <u><mark>in</u></mark> reference to medicines and remedies for common household ailments. In the early 1900s, what have now become pharmaceutical giants—Bristol-Meyer’s Squib and Eli Lilly—used to include cannabis and cannabis extracts in their medicines. During this time, Americans (particularly elite Americans) were going through a hashish trend. Glamorized by literary celebrities such as Alexander Dumas, experimenting with cannabis products became a fad among those wealthy enough to afford imported goods. 1910: <u>Between the years of 1910 and <mark>1920</u></mark>, over <u>890,000 <mark>Mexicans</mark> legally <mark>immigrated</mark> <mark>into the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>seeking refuge</mark> from the wreckage of civil war.</u> <u><mark>Though cannabis had</mark> <mark>been a part of U.S. history </mark>since the country’s beginnings, <mark>the idea of smoking</mark> the plant <mark>recreationally was not</mark> as <mark>common</mark> as other forms of consumption</u>. <u>The idea of <mark>smoking</mark> cannabis <mark>entered</u></mark> <u>mainstream <mark>American consciousness after</mark> the arrival of <mark>immigrants</mark> who <mark>brought</mark> the <mark>smoking</mark> habit <mark>with them</mark>. </u>1913: The first bill criminalizing the cultivation of “locoweed” was passed in California. The bill was a major push from the Board of Pharmacy as a way to regulate opiates and psychoactive pharmaceuticals, and seemingly did not stem from the “reefer madness” or racialized understanding of “marijuana” that paved the way to full-on prohibition in the 1930s. The <u><mark>After</mark>math</u> <u>1930s: <mark>The </mark>Great <mark>Depression</u></mark> had just <u><mark>hit</mark> the United States,</u> and <u><mark>Americans were <strong>searching for someone to blame</strong></mark>. Due to the influx of immigrants</u> (particularly <u>in the South</u>) and the rise of suggestive jazz music, many white <u><mark>Americans began to treat cannabis</u></mark> (<u><mark>and</u></mark>, arguably, <u><strong>the <mark>Blacks and </mark>Mexican <mark>immigrants who consumed it</mark>) <mark>as a foreign substance used to corrupt</mark> the minds and bodies of low-class <mark>individuals</mark>. </u></strong>In the time just before the federal criminalization of the plant, <u>29 states independently banned the herb that came to be known as “marijuana.” </u>Harry Anslinger: It would not be an overstatement to say that Harry Anslinger was one of the primary individuals responsible for creating the stigma surrounding cannabis. Hired as the first director of the recently created Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930, Anslinger launched a vigilant campaign against cannabis that would hold steady for the three decades he remained in office. A very outspoken man, <u><mark>Anslinger</u></mark> used the recent development of the movie theater to <u><mark>spread messages that racialized the plant for white audiences</u></mark>. In one documented incident, <u>Anslinger</u> <u>testified</u> before Congress, explaining: "Marijuana is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind… <u>Most marijuana smokers are Negroes, Hispanics, Filipinos and entertainers. Their satanic music, jazz and swing, result from marijuana usage." </u>In another statement, <u>Anslinger articulated: “Reefer makes darkies think they’re as good as white men…the primary reason to outlaw marijuana is its effect on the degenerate races.” </u>In retrospect, Anslinger’s efforts with the Bureau of Narcotics were the reason “marijuana” became a word known by Americans all over the country. When making public appearances and crafting propaganda films such as Reefer Madness, <u><mark>Anslinger</mark> specifically <mark>used the <strong>term “marijuana</mark>”</strong> when campaigning against the plant, <mark>adding to the</mark> development of the <mark>herb’s</mark> <strong><mark>new “foreign” identity</u></strong></mark>. <u>Cannabis was no longer the plant substance found in medicines</u> and consumed unanimously by American’s all over the country. 1937: The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was the culmination of Anslinger’s work and the first step to all-out prohibition. The bill federally criminalized the cannabis plant in every U.S. state. In order to discourage the production of cannabis use, the Tax Act of 1937 placed a one dollar tax on anyone who sold or cultivated the cannabis plant. On top of the tax itself, the bill mandated that all individuals comply with certain enforcement provisions. Violation of the provisions would result in imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $2,000. <u><mark>Though the word</mark> “<mark>marijuana</mark>” <mark>is</mark> the most <mark>common</mark> name for cannabis</u> in the United States today, <u><strong><mark>its history is deeply steeped in race</strong></mark>, politics, and a complicated cultural revolution</u>. Some argue that using <u><strong><mark>the word ignores a history of oppression against Mexican immigrants and African Americans</u></strong></mark>, while others insist that the term has now lost its prejudiced bite. <u><strong><mark>Regardless of whether or not you decide to use the word</mark> yourself, <mark>it's impossible to deny the magnitude and racial implications</mark> <mark>of its introduction</mark> to the American lexicon</u></strong>. </p>
1NC
null
Case
429,593
6
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,358
This capitalist regime based on consumption is predicated off of the desire to prolong life indefinitely -- that’s the root cause of violence and warfare
Robinson 12
Robinson 12 (Andrew, Political Theorist, Activist Based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, “Jean Baudrillard: The Rise of Capitalism & the Exclusion of Death”, March 30, http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk(in-theory-baudrillard-2)
Symbolic exchange suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism Regimes based on symbolic exchange are replaced by regimes based on equivalence Ceremony gives way to spectacle Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same. Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value. To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value. capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation But this is bound to fail. General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic. What is fatal to it is reversibility Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’ . Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with monstrosity, with radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups it did the same thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange Gift-exchange is radically subversive of the system This is because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to that of the dominant system the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed Death plays a central role what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death. Death should not be seen here in purely literal terms , but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and of value which returns things to a state of indeterminacy Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, as well as physical death indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify. the west’s idea of a biological, material death is actually an idealist illusion, ignoring the sociality of death. the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women and so on – to particular segregated situations The original exclusion was of the dead – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies” This first split and exclusion forms the basis, or archetype, for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death. death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. The modern view of death is constructed on the model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The human body is treated as a machine The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity This requires an idea of death as an end. It is counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. Modern systems, especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. The internalisation of the idea of the subject or the soul alienates us from our bodies, It creates a split between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. It also individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others. The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death. The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. In the case of death, we still ‘exchange’ with the dead through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. We no longer have living, mortal relationships with objects either. They are reduced to the instrumental. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us Symbolic exchange is based on a game, When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existenc Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations; the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. “We all” become dead, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited. The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life. People are compelled to survive so as to become useful. capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production In modern societies, death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society. People no longer expect their own death. As a result, it becomes unintelligible Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way. We may only die if law and medicine allow it. murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value. this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies there is not a social improvement here. People are effectively being killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value. even when capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as ‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination
Symbolic exchange suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism. symbolic exchange are replaced by equivalence It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same. capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. this is bound to fail. The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’ Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups it did the same thing to itself first Gift-exchange is radically subversive because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to the dominant system what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death Death should not be seen in purely literal terms. but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and value Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility as well as physical death indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. the west’s idea of a biological death is an idealist illusion the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women The original exclusion was of the dead This first split and exclusion forms the basis for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. The modern view is constructed on the model of the human body as a machine This requires an idea of death as an end counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. Modern systems no longer know how to die The internalisation of the idea of the subject alienates us It individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. we still ‘exchange’ with the dead We no longer have living relationships with objects They are reduced to the instrumental Symbolic exchange is based on a game When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development. “We all” become dead The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life People are compelled to survive so as to become useful. death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society People no longer expect their own death. it becomes unintelligible This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must only die if law allow it. People are killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value. capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for life or death serves the reproduction of domination.
Symbolic exchange – or rather, its suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism. Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. Regimes based on symbolic exchange (differences are exchangeable and related) are replaced by regimes based on equivalence (everything is, or means, the same). Ceremony gives way to spectacle, immanence to transcendence. Baudrillard’s view of capitalism is derived from Marx’s analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marx’s view that capitalism is based on a general equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract labour-time is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour can be compared. Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same. Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value. To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value. This creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this social exchange has little in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself being unexchangeable. Capital must be endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse. Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation. According to Baudrillard, capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation. It tries to ward off ambivalence (associated with death) through value (associated with life). But this is bound to fail. General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death. The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. The idea of progress, and linear time, comes from the accumulation of time, and of stockpiles of the past. The idea of truth comes from the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living. According to Baudrillard, such accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of the past is undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved – otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the residue or remainder of an incomplete symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value, and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always based on negotiation, even when it is violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or calculation. And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity – Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins’ argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian “death drive”, which is actually an effect of the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is that they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study – the economy and the unconscious. It is the separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire, including those of Deleuze, Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic. Liberated energies always leave a new remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live naturally or by their desires – they simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can come about through the liberation of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes which operate collectively in indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It is only after this repression has occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable. He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from fixed categories and encouraging flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. What is fatal to it is, rather, reversibility. Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead. Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’, which is present in excess over the ‘scene’ of what is imagined. This is different from theories of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillard’s remainder is an excess rather than a lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it. The energy of production, the unconscious, and signification all in fact come from the repressed remainder. Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with monstrosity, with radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups. But for Baudrillard, it did the same thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange. Indigenous groups have also increasingly lost the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been imported or imposed. This according to Baudrillard produces chronic confusion and instability. Gift-exchange is radically subversive of the system. This is not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks the system can survive defections or exodus. It is because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to that of the dominant system. According to Baudrillard, the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed, but not with the ‘properly symbolic rhythm’ of immediate retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what he takes to be a cult of suffering, solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard seems to think that earlier forms of the state and capitalism retained some degree of symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the imaginary of the ‘social contract’ was based on the idea of a sacrifice – this time of liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the relationship to the master-signifier. I haven’t seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its intensity and energy. Art, theatre and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of the present. It is easy to read certain passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillard’s work. But on closer inspection, this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential. He is nostalgic for the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated social groups. Death Death plays a central role in Baudrillard’s theory, and is closely related to symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death. Death should not be seen here in purely literal terms. Baudrillard specifies early on that he does not mean an event affecting a body, but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and of value – which returns things to a state of indeterminacy. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so on. But he also sees death figuratively, in relation to the decomposition of existing relations, the “death” of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life across different categories. For instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death, because it leads to fusion and communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction carries shades of death because one generation replaces another. Baudrillard’s concept of death is thus quite similar to Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque. Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, as well as physical death. According to Baudrillard, indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify. Such a non-signifying event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard, the west’s idea of a biological, material death is actually an idealist illusion, ignoring the sociality of death. Poststructuralists generally maintain that the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions. For Baudrillard, the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded. After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women and so on – to particular segregated situations. The definition of the ‘normal human’ has been narrowed over time. Today, nearly everyone belongs to one or another marked or deviant category. The original exclusion was of the dead – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies”. This first split and exclusion forms the basis, or archetype, for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death. Baudrillard suggests that death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. The modern view of death is constructed on the model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The human body is treated as a machine which similarly, either functions or does not. For Baudrillard, this misunderstands the nature of life and death. The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity. The subject needs a beginning and an end, so as to be reducible to the story it tells. This requires an idea of death as an end. It is counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. In relation to individuals, ideas of religious immortality is simply an ideological cover for the real exclusion of the dead. But institutions try to remain truly immortal. Modern systems, especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. The internalisation of the idea of the subject or the soul alienates us from our bodies, voices and so on. It creates a split, as Stirner would say, between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. It also individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others. The symbolic haunts the code as the threat of its own death. The society of the code works constantly to ward off the danger of irruptions of the symbolic. The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death. The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. In the case of death, we still ‘exchange’ with the dead through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. We no longer have living, mortal relationships with objects either. They are reduced to the instrumental. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us. Symbolic exchange is based on a game, with game-like rules. When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existence. Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations; the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development. In separation, the other exists only as an imaginary object. Yet the resultant purity is illusory. For Baudrillard, any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. “We all” become dead, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited. The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life. People are compelled to survive so as to become useful. For Baudrillard, capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production, and its ends. It only becomes fully visible now this system is collapsing, and production is reduced to operation. In modern societies, death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society. For example, elderly people are excluded from society. People no longer expect their own death. As a result, it becomes unintelligible. It keeps returning as ‘nature which will not abide by objective laws’. It can no longer be absorbed through ritual. Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way. We may only die if law and medicine allow it. Hence for instance the spread of health and safety regulations. On the other hand, murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value. Baudrillard sees this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies. For Baudrillard, there is not a social improvement here. People are effectively being killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value. On the other hand, even when capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette. This appears as a constant fear of being manipulated. The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as ‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination.
16,223
<h4><u><strong>This capitalist regime based on consumption is predicated off of the desire to prolong life indefinitely -- that’s the root cause of violence and warfare </h4><p>Robinson 12</u></strong> (Andrew, Political Theorist, Activist Based in the UK and research fellow affiliated to the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice (CSSGJ), University of Nottingham, “Jean Baudrillard: The Rise of Capitalism & the Exclusion of Death”, March 30, http://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk(in-theory-baudrillard-2)</p><p><u><mark>Symbolic exchange</mark> </u>– or rather, its <u><mark>suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism</u>.</mark> Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. <u>Regimes based on <mark>symbolic exchange</u></mark> (differences are exchangeable and related) <u><mark>are <strong>replaced by</strong></mark> regimes based on <strong><mark>equivalence</u></strong></mark> (everything is, or means, the same). <u>Ceremony gives way to spectacle</u>, immanence to transcendence. Baudrillard’s view of capitalism is derived from Marx’s analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marx’s view that capitalism is based on a general equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract labour-time is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour can be compared. <u>Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of <strong>sorcery</strong>, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. <mark>It subtly shifts the social world <strong>from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same</strong>.</mark> Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value.</u> <u>To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value.</u> This creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this social exchange has little in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself being unexchangeable. Capital must be endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse. Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation. According to Baudrillard, <u><mark>capitalism rests on an <strong>obsession with the abolition of death</strong>.</mark> Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation</u>. It tries to ward off ambivalence (associated with death) through value (associated with life). <u>But <mark>this is <strong>bound to fail</strong>.</u></mark> <u>General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death</u>. <u><mark>The more the system <strong>runs from death</strong>, the more it places everyone in <strong>solitude, facing their own death</strong>.</mark> Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly</u>. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. The idea of progress, and linear time, comes from the accumulation of time, and of stockpiles of the past. The idea of truth comes from the accumulation of scientific knowledge. <u><strong><mark>Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living</u></strong></mark>. According to Baudrillard, such accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of the past is undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved – otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the residue or remainder of an incomplete symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value, and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always based on negotiation, even when it is violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or calculation. <u>And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a <strong>non-reversible</strong> aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which <strong>produces scarcity</u></strong> – Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins’ argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian “death drive”, which is actually an effect of the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is that they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study – the economy and the unconscious. It is the separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire, including those of Deleuze, Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes <u>desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic.</u> Liberated energies always leave a new remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live naturally or by their desires – they simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can come about through the liberation of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes which operate collectively in indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It is only after this repression has occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable. He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from fixed categories and encouraging flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. <u>What is fatal to it is</u>, rather, <u>reversibility</u>. <u>Capitalism continues to be <strong>haunted by the forces it has repressed</u></strong>. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. <u>The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead</u>. <u><mark>Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as <strong>uncanny and threatening</strong>. It becomes the ‘<strong>obscene’</u></strong></mark>, which is present in excess over the ‘scene’ of what is imagined. This is different from theories of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillard’s remainder is an excess rather than a lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it. The energy of production, the unconscious, and signification all in fact come from the repressed remainder<u>. <strong><mark>Our culture is dead</strong> from having broken the pact with</mark> monstrosity, with <mark>radical difference. The West continues to <strong>perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups</u></strong></mark>. But for Baudrillard, <u><strong><mark>it did the same thing to itself first</mark> </strong>– destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange</u>. Indigenous groups have also increasingly lost the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been imported or imposed. This according to Baudrillard produces chronic confusion and instability. <u><mark>Gift-exchange is <strong>radically subversive</strong></mark> of the system</u>. <u>This is</u> not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks the system can survive defections or exodus. It is <u><mark>because it <strong>counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to</strong></mark> that of <strong><mark>the dominant system</u></strong></mark>. According to Baudrillard, <u>the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at</u> <u>bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed</u>, but not with the ‘properly symbolic rhythm’ of immediate retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what he takes to be a cult of suffering, solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard seems to think that earlier forms of the state and capitalism retained some degree of symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the imaginary of the ‘social contract’ was based on the idea of a sacrifice – this time of liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the relationship to the master-signifier. I haven’t seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its intensity and energy. Art, theatre and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of the present. It is easy to read certain passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillard’s work. But on closer inspection, this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential. He is nostalgic for the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated social groups. Death <u>Death plays a central role</u> in Baudrillard’s theory, and is closely related to symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, <u><mark>what we have <strong>lost</strong> above all in the transition to <strong>alienated society</strong> is the ability to <strong>engage in exchanges with death</strong></mark>. <strong><mark>Death should not be seen</strong></mark> here <strong><mark>in purely literal terms</u>.</strong></mark> Baudrillard specifies early on that he does not mean an event affecting a body<u>, <strong><mark>but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and</strong></mark> of <strong><mark>value</u></strong></mark> – <u>which returns things to a state of indeterminacy</u>. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so on. But he also sees death figuratively, in relation to the decomposition of existing relations, the “death” of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life across different categories. For instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death, because it leads to fusion and communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction carries shades of death because one generation replaces another. Baudrillard’s concept of death is thus quite similar to Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque. <u><mark>Death refers to <strong>metamorphosis, reversibility</strong></mark>, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, <mark>as well as physical death</u></mark>. According to Baudrillard, <u><mark>indigenous groups see <strong>death as social, not natural or biological</strong></mark>. They see it as <mark>an effect of an adversarial will, which they must <strong>absorb</strong>.</mark> And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify.</u> Such a non-signifying event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard, <u><mark>the west’s idea of a biological</mark>, material <mark>death is</mark> actually <mark>an <strong>idealist illusion</strong></mark>, ignoring the sociality of death.</u> Poststructuralists generally maintain that <u><strong><mark>the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions</u></strong></mark>. For Baudrillard, <u>the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded</u>. <u><mark>After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – <strong>the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women </strong></mark>and so on – to particular segregated situations</u>. The definition of the ‘normal human’ has been narrowed over time. Today, nearly everyone belongs to one or another marked or deviant category. <u><strong><mark>The original exclusion was of the dead</strong></mark> – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies”</u>. <u><strong><mark>This first split and exclusion forms the basis</strong></mark>, or archetype, <strong><mark>for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>This discrimination against the dead <strong>brings into being the modern experience of death</mark>. </u></strong>Baudrillard suggests that <u><strong><mark>death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead</strong>.</u> <u>The modern view</mark> of death <mark>is constructed on the model of the</mark> machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The <mark>human body</mark> is treated <mark>as a machine</u></mark> which similarly, either functions or does not. For Baudrillard, this misunderstands the nature of life and death. <u>The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity</u>. The subject needs a beginning and an end, so as to be reducible to the story it tells. <u><mark>This requires an <strong>idea of death as an end</strong></mark>. It is <mark>counterposed to the immortality of social institutions.</u></mark> In relation to individuals, ideas of religious immortality is simply an ideological cover for the real exclusion of the dead. But institutions try to remain truly immortal. <u><mark>Modern systems</mark>, especially bureaucracies, <strong><mark>no longer know how to die</strong></mark> – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. <mark>The internalisation of the idea of the subject</mark> or the soul <mark>alienates us</mark> from our bodies,</u> voices and so on. <u>It creates a split</u>, as Stirner would say, <u>between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. <mark>It</mark> also <mark>individualises people, by <strong>destroying their actual connections to others</strong></mark>.</u> The symbolic haunts the code as the threat of its own death. The society of the code works constantly to ward off the danger of irruptions of the symbolic. <u>The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death.</u> <u><mark>The split <strong>never actually stops exchanges</strong> across the categories.</u></mark> <u>In the case of death, <mark>we still ‘exchange’ with the dead</mark> through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. <mark>We no longer have living</mark>, mortal <mark>relationships with objects </mark>either. <strong><mark>They are reduced to the instrumental</strong></mark>. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us</u>. <u><strong><mark>Symbolic exchange is based on a game</strong></mark>,</u> with game-like rules. <u><strong><mark>When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place.</strong></mark> It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existenc</u>e. <u>Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, <mark>westerners invest the “Third World” with <strong>racist fantasies</strong></mark> and revolutionary aspirations; <mark>the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational <strong>fantasies of development</u></strong>.</mark> In separation, the other exists only as an imaginary object. Yet the resultant purity is illusory. For Baudrillard, <u>any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. <strong><mark>“We all” become dead</strong></mark>, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. <strong><mark>The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power.</mark> <mark>Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited</strong></mark>. <mark>The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life</mark>. <strong><mark>People are compelled to survive so as to become useful</strong>.</u></mark> For Baudrillard, <u>capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production</u>, and its ends. It only becomes fully visible now this system is collapsing, and production is reduced to operation. <u>In modern societies, <mark>death is made invisible, denied, and <strong>placed outside society</strong></mark>.</u> For example, elderly people are excluded from society. <u><mark>People <strong>no longer expect their own death</strong>.</mark> As a result, <mark>it becomes <strong>unintelligible</u></strong></mark>. It keeps returning as ‘nature which will not abide by objective laws’. It can no longer be absorbed through ritual. <u>Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. <mark>This creates a <strong>bureaucratic, judicial regime of death</strong>, of which the <strong>concentration camp</strong> is the <strong>ultimate symbol</strong>. The system now <strong>commands that we must </strong></mark>not die – at least not in any old way. We may <strong><mark>only die if law </mark>and medicine <mark>allow it</strong>.</u></mark> Hence for instance the spread of health and safety regulations. On the other hand, <u>murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value.</u> Baudrillard sees <u>this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies</u>. For Baudrillard, <u>there is not a social improvement here. <strong><mark>People are </strong></mark>effectively being<strong><mark> killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value.</u></strong></mark> On the other hand, <u>even when <mark>capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant</mark>, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette</u>. This appears as a constant fear of being manipulated. <u><mark>The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for</mark> as long as ‘his’ <mark>life or death serves the reproduction of domination</u>.</p></mark>
1NC
null
Off
3,987
258
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,359
The aff is a quick fix to maintain the coherence of civil society- legalization can only be anti-black. We must abandon the passive affirmation of legal reform in favor of a critique of the antagonism that structures modernity- only the alt solves
Enojado ’13 ”, [SG])
Enojado ’13 (Opaque Critical Theorist, “Three Good Reasons Why People of Color Should Question the Drug Legalization Movement”, [SG])
the United States has “a nearly fanatical desire to cling to the myth that we as a nation have ‘moved beyond’ race” and, indirectly, that drug legalization may address criminal justice inequalities people of color experience. Predictably, drug legalization advocates back assertions of racism and the drug war. But is the drug legalization movement really a solution to a problem that is at the root of such examples, namely ongoing racism, which is seldom addressed? There are three good reasons for people of color to question the drug legalization movement. 1.) Drug legalization does not change the nature of policing. there are problems with budgets and prisons. No one disputes this issue. A pathological obsession with mandating long sentences and death penalties in the U.S. has reached unmanageable proportions. Everything from the law of parties to legalized brutality such as castration shore up the public’s basest desires for justice at any cost. For people of color, however, the issue is not merely out-of-control drug policy, but a racist criminal justice system few are simply willing to say is racist and needs immediate redress. The drug legalization movement, for people of color, represents a classic quandary as far as long term political strategy: focusing on dealing with symptoms of a problem rather than taking on the problem (in this case, white racism and, more broadly, white supremacy and neocolonialism) directly. Sovereignty, and even states, are older than the police Organized police forces arose specifically when traditional, informal, or community-maintained means of social control broke down. This breakdown was always prompted by a larger social change, often by a change which some part of the community resisted with violence, such as the creation of a state, colonization, or the enslavement of a subject people. In other words, it was at the point where authority was met with resistance that the organized application of force became necessary. social control always approximately reflect the anxieties of elites. In times of crisis or pronounced social change, as the concerns of elites shift, the mechanisms of social control are adapted accordingly Moreover, while serious crime was on the decline, the demand for order was on the rise owing to the needs of the new economic regime and the ideology that supported it. In response to these conditions, American cities created a distinctive brand of police. Every drug legalization advocacy argument implies by omission that liberalizing drug laws to the nth degree tomorrow will free people of color from overpolicing, racial profiling and institutional violence. Law enforcement has been guilty of atrocious behavior during the drug war. Yet is anyone in a community of color sincerely of the belief police will not abuse people of color, railroad us or continue to treat people of color like criminals because someone can smoke pot or shoot heroin up without legal sanction? Drug legalization advocates, by failing to address the epidemic of police violence as a whole visited on communities of color, live in an illusion if they believe other justifications won’t be created. Drug legalization movements avoid larger problems faced by people of color. The drug-law process is broken, but, as profound as the criminalization may be, people of color face institutional problems far more deep, including the criminal justice system itself. Disenfranchisement of people of color is on display in many instances. Issues such as economics are creating an “ethnic recession” for people of color, while health care, legislation or not, is a crisis for people of color. Globalization is decimating the Third World, and what U.S. companies and comprador elements have wrought there — lack of opportunities and transnational migration as a result — is now appearing in immigration fights. Unemployment and an imposed drug economy, the ongoing theft of value through home foreclosure and other means, reveal the use of our people as a reserve labor force as well as a reserve source of capital accumulation. The police murder of our young men and the denial of any meaningful health care – all of these factors contribute to our ability to characterize our status in the U.S. as subjects rather than citizens. Drug legalization movements seek to involve people of color by citing criminal justice statistics, but such movements do not genuinely address institutional racism that is at hand Money is spent on outreach, but little seems to be invested in the communities of color affected by these issues. The problem with drug legalization for people of color is such a movement is a single-issue matter and, like most single-issue stuff, is intended to get a large number of people to stand with its cause, without much consideration to the realities potential supporters face. large corporations who do nothing for the Black and Brown community heavily marketing alcohol, cigarettes and various medications to communities of color all over the United States. A characteristic feature of class and racial oppression is the ruling class policy of brainwashing the oppressed into accepting their oppression. Initially, this program is carried out by viciously implanting fear into the minds and sowing the seeds of inferiority in the souls of the oppressed. But as the objective conditions and the balance of forces become more favorable for the oppressed and more adverse to the oppressor, it becomes necessary for the oppressor to modify his program and adopt more subtle and devious methods to maintain his rule. The oppressor attempts to throw the oppressed psychologically off-balance by combining a policy of vicious repression with spectacular gestures of good-will and service Do drug legalization movements offer anything to people of color? It’s positive to have the public talking about policing. It is also good to see a larger dialog about criminal justice. However, drug legalization movements must consider the bigger picture for communities of color to be truly relevant. What is needed is a more clear movement — one that isn’t positioned, as so many tragically are, on the presumption that one’s freedom is predicated on legal sanctions and tax breaks for small businesspeople. We also must be honest that a mass anti-racist movement will mean an end to abuses against people of color more than a drug legalization movement ever will. People of color need to look critically at these movements. What are they practically doing for the community? What will such advocacy, if it comes to pass, mean for communities of color under the current system of law and politics? Pressing ourselves with harder questions, rather than passively supporting relaxed drug laws without considering who profits, is a good start.
the U St has “a desire to cling to the myth that we have ‘moved beyond’ race people of color to question the drug legalization movement Drug legalization does not change the nature of policing A pathological obsession with mandating long sentences and death penalties in the U.S. has reached unmanageable proportions the issue is not merely out-of-control drug policy, but a racist criminal justice system The legalization movement represents focusing o symptoms rather than taking on the problem directly. the creation of a state, colonization, or the enslavement of a subject people was the point where authority was met with resistance that the organized application of force became necessary social control reflect the anxieties of elites. In times of crisis the mechanisms of social control are adapted accordingly Every drug legalization advocacy implies that liberalizing drug laws will free people of color from overpolicing, racial profiling and institutional violence by failing to address the epidemic of police violence as a whole visited on communities of color, live in an illusion if they believe other justifications won’t be created movements avoid larger problems faced by people of color. The problem with drug legalization for people of color is such a movement is a single-issue matter and, is intended to get a large number of people to stand with its cause, without much consideration to realities A feature of racial oppression is the brainwashing the oppressed into accepting their oppression The oppressor attempts to throw the oppressed psychologically off-balance by combining a policy of vicious repression with spectacular gestures of good-will and service drug legalization movements must consider the bigger picture for communities of color What is needed is a more clear movement — one that isn’t positioned, on the presumption that one’s freedom is predicated on legal sanctions People of color need to look critically at these movements ? Pressing ourselves with harder questions, rather than passively supporting relaxed drug laws without considering who profits, is a good start
Michelle Alexander’s “The New Jim Crow: How the War on Drugs Gave Birth to a Permanent American Undercaste” has been making the rounds of late. In the essay, based on her book of the same name, Alexander makes two key posits: that the United States has “a nearly fanatical desire to cling to the myth that we as a nation have ‘moved beyond’ race” and, indirectly, that drug legalization may address criminal justice inequalities people of color experience. Predictably, drug legalization advocates back assertions of racism and the drug war. Over-the-top, hyper-violent police conduct related to drug arrests and MTV covering Tupac Shakur’s motherAfeni Shakur’s recent drug arrest are just two recent though disparate examples that cast further aspersions on drug prohibition. But is the drug legalization movement really a solution to a problem that is at the root of such examples, namely ongoing racism, which is seldom addressed? Though Alexander is most certainly right the United States promotes post-racialism when racial justice clashes remain prominent in the news and elsewhere, the crimes committed upon communities of color do not necessarily reach a legalization conclusion. Drug laws may be draconian, but to use examples of abuse is rather easy. The animal rights movement, for instance, uses horrible images of mistreatment to advocate for equality between humans and other creatures. Such is old rhetorical sleight of hand, yet it’s still just that — sleight of hand. There are three good reasons for people of color to question the drug legalization movement. 1.) Drug legalization does not change the nature of policing. As tom dispatch and many others acknowledge, there are problems with budgets and prisons. No one disputes this issue. A pathological obsession with mandating long sentences and death penalties in the U.S. has reached unmanageable proportions. Everything from the law of parties to legalized brutality such as castration shore up the public’s basest desires for justice at any cost. For people of color, however, the issue is not merely out-of-control drug policy, but a racist criminal justice system few are simply willing to say is racist and needs immediate redress. The drug legalization movement, for people of color, represents a classic quandary as far as long term political strategy: focusing on dealing with symptoms of a problem rather than taking on the problem (in this case, white racism and, more broadly, white supremacy and neocolonialism) directly. Most of these good, sincere efforts are not grounded in history, or recognize people of color faced mass criminalization before prohibition. Of policing, Kristan Williams, author of Our Enemies in Blue: Police and Power in America, says: Sovereignty, and even states, are older than the police. “European kingdoms in the Middle Ages became ‘law states’ before they became ‘police states,’” meaning that they made laws and adjudicated claims before they established an independent mechanism for enforcing them. Organized police forces arose specifically when traditional, informal, or community-maintained means of social control broke down. This breakdown was always prompted by a larger social change, often by a change which some part of the community resisted with violence, such as the creation of a state, colonization, or the enslavement of a subject people. In other words, it was at the point where authority was met with resistance that the organized application of force became necessary. The aims and means of social control always approximately reflect the anxieties of elites. In times of crisis or pronounced social change, as the concerns of elites shift, the mechanisms of social control are adapted accordingly. So, in the South, following real or rumored slave revolts, the institution of the slave patrol emerged. White men were required to take shifts riding between plantations, apprehending runaways and breaking up slave gatherings. Later, complex factors conspired to produce the modern police force. Industrialization changed the system of social stratification and added a new set of threats, subsumed under the title of the “dangerous classes.” Moreover, while serious crime was on the decline, the demand for order was on the rise owing to the needs of the new economic regime and the ideology that supported it. In response to these conditions, American cities created a distinctive brand of police. They borrowed heavily from the English model already in place, but also took ideas from the office of the constable, the militia, and the semi-professional, part-time enforcement bodies like the night watch and the slave patrols. Every drug legalization advocacy argument implies by omission that liberalizing drug laws to the nth degree tomorrow will free people of color from overpolicing, racial profiling and institutional violence. Law enforcement has been guilty of atrocious behavior during the drug war. Yet is anyone in a community of color sincerely of the belief police will not abuse people of color, railroad us or continue to treat people of color like criminals because someone can smoke pot or shoot heroin up without legal sanction? Drug legalization advocates, by failing to address the epidemic of police violence as a whole visited on communities of color, live in an illusion if they believe other justifications won’t be created. Consider some of the more famous police brutality cases outside of Rodney King — Abner Louima, Sean Bell, Ida Lee Delaney… the list goes on. 2.) Drug legalization movements avoid larger problems faced by people of color. The drug-law process is broken, but, as profound as the criminalization may be, people of color face institutional problems far more deep, including the criminal justice system itself. Disenfranchisement of people of color is on display in many instances. Issues such as economics are creating an “ethnic recession” for people of color, while health care, legislation or not, is a crisis for people of color. Globalization is decimating the Third World, and what U.S. companies and comprador elements have wrought there — lack of opportunities and transnational migration as a result — is now appearing in immigration fights. The Black is Back Coalition frames the political terrain this way: Unemployment and an imposed drug economy, the ongoing theft of value through home foreclosure and other means, reveal the use of our people as a reserve labor force as well as a reserve source of capital accumulation. The police murder of our young men and the denial of any meaningful health care – all of these factors contribute to our ability to characterize our status in the U.S. as subjects rather than citizens. Drug legalization movements seek to involve people of color by citing criminal justice statistics, but such movements do not genuinely address institutional racism that is at hand. In that sense, groups like the Drug Policy Foundation of Texas are not uncommon. Money is spent on outreach, but little seems to be invested in the communities of color affected by these issues. When was the last time, if ever, you saw a drug-law group unite with communities of color around education, housing, employment discrimination or any of a number of issues people of color deal with day-to-day? Virtually all drug legalization advocacy groups post on their websites how felony drug laws disenfranchise Black men. How many of them are in the communities providing jobs for these men, or helping families fighting to meet basic needs when these men face employment discrimination, can’t find jobs, etc.? The problem with drug legalization for people of color is such a movement is a single-issue matter and, like most single-issue stuff, is intended to get a large number of people to stand with its cause, without much consideration to the realities potential supporters face. Such an observation is not solely one of drug legalization groups, but needs discussion. 3.) The potential impact of drug legalization on poor communities of color needs to be openly debated. Carefully chosen language (“drug policy reform,” “opposed to the drug war” by drug legalization groups should not mask the endgame for many organizations of legalization of marijuana and, in some cases, all drugs. Many sell a libertarian-capitalist’s wet dream, in which government can regulate and tax narcotics like alcohol and cigarettes and underground businesses can be legitimized. Mom and pop dope dealers get to set up shop and everyone gets to be an entrepreneur. And the forest animals even come out for a big singing number at the end. Does anyone really believe that ideal? I make no bones about my dog in this fight: I have no interest backing anyone’s profit-making pangs coming at the expense of poor people. One need only walk through a community of color to see the spoils of capitalism: large corporations who do nothing for the Black and Brown community heavily marketing alcohol, cigarettes and various medications to communities of color all over the United States. If you live in or have lived in a community of color, you know what it is like to live in the nursery of Adam Smith and Ayn Rand’s love child: profiteering gone amok, unchecked and with tacit support of the majority population who believe it is okay for the poor to have crap they don’t need piled into their communities, that people wanting to make a buck off them can do what they please so long as they don’t promise to cure anything or give them something that makes an arm fall off, and everyone else pretends like this is the way it is supposed to be. In a capitalist framework, those with the money and resources — in the case of drug legalization, most assuredly Big Pharma or whatever industry moves first — can swing the campaign donations, lobbyists, advertising and favorable regulations to ensure they and they alone maintain hegemony over an industry while those without the resources can be criminalized and swept aside. We see this today in every market, from alcohol to medicinal treatments, and it is naive to think legalized marijuana and other drugs would be any different. That means economically disadvantaged people of color will remain an incarcerated underclass and those with power, generally white, will not face the same sanction, while the streets of communities of color face another flood of marketing and unnecessary products. More importantly, drug legalization speaks to larger questions of political objectives. The Black Panther Party, in pamphlets like Capitalism Plus Dope Equals Genocide, called the drug culture a result of social pressures on people of color to seek escapes from the racism and discrimination faced. A characteristic feature of class and racial oppression is the ruling class policy of brainwashing the oppressed into accepting their oppression. Initially, this program is carried out by viciously implanting fear into the minds and sowing the seeds of inferiority in the souls of the oppressed. But as the objective conditions and the balance of forces become more favorable for the oppressed and more adverse to the oppressor, it becomes necessary for the oppressor to modify his program and adopt more subtle and devious methods to maintain his rule. The oppressor attempts to throw the oppressed psychologically off-balance by combining a policy of vicious repression with spectacular gestures of good-will and service. Moreover, the Party pointed out drug use was provided as an option to people of color as a means of numbing them to the hardships they faced, and to keep them distracted from fighting against their own oppression. In speaking about Timothy Leary, Eldridge Cleaver acknowledged occasional marijuana use by Panthers, but called the drug culture a counterrevolutionary betrayal of the goals of Black liberation. The concept of the period was that drug use had a tendency to weaken users and made them less intellectually and physically capable of defending themselves and their communities. Do drug legalization movements offer anything to people of color? It’s positive to have the public talking about policing. It is also good to see a larger dialog about criminal justice. However, drug legalization movements must consider the bigger picture for communities of color to be truly relevant. What is needed is a more clear movement — one that isn’t positioned, as so many tragically are, on the presumption that one’s freedom is predicated on legal sanctions and tax breaks for small businesspeople. We also must be honest that a mass anti-racist movement will mean an end to abuses against people of color more than a drug legalization movement ever will. People of color need to look critically at these movements. What are they practically doing for the community? What will such advocacy, if it comes to pass, mean for communities of color under the current system of law and politics? Pressing ourselves with harder questions, rather than passively supporting relaxed drug laws without considering who profits, is a good start.
13,082
<h4>The aff is a quick fix to maintain the coherence of civil society- legalization can only be anti-black. We must abandon the passive affirmation of legal reform in favor of a critique of the antagonism that structures modernity- only the alt solves </h4><p><strong>Enojado ’13 </strong>(Opaque Critical Theorist, “Three Good Reasons Why People of Color Should Question the Drug Legalization Movement<u><strong>”, [SG]) </p><p></u></strong>Michelle Alexander’s “The New Jim Crow: How the War on Drugs Gave Birth to a Permanent American Undercaste” has been making the rounds of late. In the essay, based on her book of the same name, Alexander makes two key posits: that <u><strong><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>St</mark>ates <mark>has “a</mark> nearly fanatical <mark>desire to cling to the myth that we</mark> as a nation <mark>have ‘moved beyond’ race</mark>” and, indirectly, that drug legalization may address criminal justice inequalities people of color experience. Predictably, drug legalization advocates back assertions of racism and the drug war.</u></strong> Over-the-top, hyper-violent police conduct related to drug arrests and MTV covering Tupac Shakur’s motherAfeni Shakur’s recent drug arrest are just two recent though disparate examples that cast further aspersions on drug prohibition. <u><strong>But is the drug legalization movement really a solution to a problem that is at the root of such examples, namely ongoing racism, which is seldom addressed?</u></strong> Though Alexander is most certainly right the United States promotes post-racialism when racial justice clashes remain prominent in the news and elsewhere, the crimes committed upon communities of color do not necessarily reach a legalization conclusion. Drug laws may be draconian, but to use examples of abuse is rather easy. The animal rights movement, for instance, uses horrible images of mistreatment to advocate for equality between humans and other creatures. Such is old rhetorical sleight of hand, yet it’s still just that — sleight of hand. <u><strong>There are three good reasons for <mark>people of color to question the drug legalization movement</mark>. 1.) <mark>Drug legalization does not change the nature of policing</mark>.</u></strong> As tom dispatch and many others acknowledge, <u><strong>there are problems with budgets and prisons. No one disputes this issue. <mark>A pathological obsession with mandating long sentences and death penalties in the U.S. has reached unmanageable proportions</mark>. Everything from the law of parties to legalized brutality such as castration shore up the public’s basest desires for justice at any cost. For people of color, however, <mark>the issue is not merely out-of-control drug policy, but a racist criminal justice system</mark> few are simply willing to say is racist and needs immediate redress. <mark>The</mark> drug <mark>legalization movement</mark>, for people of color, <mark>represents</mark> a classic quandary as far as long term political strategy: <mark>focusing o</mark>n dealing with <mark>symptoms</mark> of a problem <mark>rather than taking on the problem</mark> (in this case, white racism and, more broadly, white supremacy and neocolonialism) <mark>directly.</u></strong></mark> Most of these good, sincere efforts are not grounded in history, or recognize people of color faced mass criminalization before prohibition. Of policing, Kristan Williams, author of Our Enemies in Blue: Police and Power in America, says: <u><strong>Sovereignty, and even states, are older than the police</u></strong>. “European kingdoms in the Middle Ages became ‘law states’ before they became ‘police states,’” meaning that they made laws and adjudicated claims before they established an independent mechanism for enforcing them. <u><strong>Organized police forces arose specifically when traditional, informal, or community-maintained means of social control broke down. This breakdown was always prompted by a larger social change, often by a change which some part of the community resisted with violence, such as <mark>the creation of a state, colonization, or the enslavement of a subject people</mark>. In other words, it <mark>was</mark> at <mark>the point where authority was met with resistance that the organized application of force became necessary</mark>.</u></strong> The aims and means of <u><strong><mark>social control</mark> always approximately <mark>reflect the anxieties of elites. In times of crisis</mark> or pronounced social change, as the concerns of elites shift, <mark>the mechanisms of social control are adapted accordingly</u></strong></mark>. So, in the South, following real or rumored slave revolts, the institution of the slave patrol emerged. White men were required to take shifts riding between plantations, apprehending runaways and breaking up slave gatherings. Later, complex factors conspired to produce the modern police force. Industrialization changed the system of social stratification and added a new set of threats, subsumed under the title of the “dangerous classes.” <u><strong>Moreover, while serious crime was on the decline, the demand for order was on the rise owing to the needs of the new economic regime and the ideology that supported it. In response to these conditions, American cities created a distinctive brand of police.</u></strong> They borrowed heavily from the English model already in place, but also took ideas from the office of the constable, the militia, and the semi-professional, part-time enforcement bodies like the night watch and the slave patrols. <u><strong><mark>Every drug legalization advocacy</mark> argument <mark>implies</mark> by omission <mark>that liberalizing drug laws</mark> to the nth degree tomorrow <mark>will free people of color from overpolicing, racial profiling and institutional violence</mark>. Law enforcement has been guilty of atrocious behavior during the drug war. Yet is anyone in a community of color sincerely of the belief police will not abuse people of color, railroad us or continue to treat people of color like criminals because someone can smoke pot or shoot heroin up without legal sanction? Drug legalization advocates, <mark>by failing to address the epidemic of police violence as a whole visited on communities of color, live in an illusion if they believe other justifications won’t be created</mark>.</u></strong> Consider some of the more famous police brutality cases outside of Rodney King — Abner Louima, Sean Bell, Ida Lee Delaney… the list goes on. 2.) <u><strong>Drug legalization <mark>movements avoid larger problems faced by people of color.</mark> The drug-law process is broken, but, as profound as the criminalization may be, people of color face institutional problems far more deep, including the criminal justice system itself. Disenfranchisement of people of color is on display in many instances. Issues such as economics are creating an “ethnic recession” for people of color, while health care, legislation or not, is a crisis for people of color. Globalization is decimating the Third World, and what U.S. companies and comprador elements have wrought there — lack of opportunities and transnational migration as a result — is now appearing in immigration fights.</u></strong> The Black is Back Coalition frames the political terrain this way: <u><strong>Unemployment and an imposed drug economy, the ongoing theft of value through home foreclosure and other means, reveal the use of our people as a reserve labor force as well as a reserve source of capital accumulation. The police murder of our young men and the denial of any meaningful health care – all of these factors contribute to our ability to characterize our status in the U.S. as subjects rather than citizens. Drug legalization movements seek to involve people of color by citing criminal justice statistics, but such movements do not genuinely address institutional racism that is at hand</u></strong>. In that sense, groups like the Drug Policy Foundation of Texas are not uncommon. <u><strong>Money is spent on outreach, but little seems to be invested in the communities of color affected by these issues.</u></strong> When was the last time, if ever, you saw a drug-law group unite with communities of color around education, housing, employment discrimination or any of a number of issues people of color deal with day-to-day? Virtually all drug legalization advocacy groups post on their websites how felony drug laws disenfranchise Black men. How many of them are in the communities providing jobs for these men, or helping families fighting to meet basic needs when these men face employment discrimination, can’t find jobs, etc.? <u><strong><mark>The problem with drug legalization for people of color is such a movement is a single-issue matter and,</mark> like most single-issue stuff, <mark>is intended to get a large number of people to stand with its cause, without much consideration to</mark> the <mark>realities</mark> potential supporters face.</u></strong> Such an observation is not solely one of drug legalization groups, but needs discussion. 3.) The potential impact of drug legalization on poor communities of color needs to be openly debated. Carefully chosen language (“drug policy reform,” “opposed to the drug war” by drug legalization groups should not mask the endgame for many organizations of legalization of marijuana and, in some cases, all drugs. Many sell a libertarian-capitalist’s wet dream, in which government can regulate and tax narcotics like alcohol and cigarettes and underground businesses can be legitimized. Mom and pop dope dealers get to set up shop and everyone gets to be an entrepreneur. And the forest animals even come out for a big singing number at the end. Does anyone really believe that ideal? I make no bones about my dog in this fight: I have no interest backing anyone’s profit-making pangs coming at the expense of poor people. One need only walk through a community of color to see the spoils of capitalism: <u><strong>large corporations who do nothing for the Black and Brown community heavily marketing alcohol, cigarettes and various medications to communities of color all over the United States.</u></strong> If you live in or have lived in a community of color, you know what it is like to live in the nursery of Adam Smith and Ayn Rand’s love child: profiteering gone amok, unchecked and with tacit support of the majority population who believe it is okay for the poor to have crap they don’t need piled into their communities, that people wanting to make a buck off them can do what they please so long as they don’t promise to cure anything or give them something that makes an arm fall off, and everyone else pretends like this is the way it is supposed to be. In a capitalist framework, those with the money and resources — in the case of drug legalization, most assuredly Big Pharma or whatever industry moves first — can swing the campaign donations, lobbyists, advertising and favorable regulations to ensure they and they alone maintain hegemony over an industry while those without the resources can be criminalized and swept aside. We see this today in every market, from alcohol to medicinal treatments, and it is naive to think legalized marijuana and other drugs would be any different. That means economically disadvantaged people of color will remain an incarcerated underclass and those with power, generally white, will not face the same sanction, while the streets of communities of color face another flood of marketing and unnecessary products. More importantly, drug legalization speaks to larger questions of political objectives. The Black Panther Party, in pamphlets like Capitalism Plus Dope Equals Genocide, called the drug culture a result of social pressures on people of color to seek escapes from the racism and discrimination faced. <u><strong><mark>A</mark> characteristic <mark>feature of</mark> class and <mark>racial oppression is the</mark> ruling class policy of <mark>brainwashing the oppressed into accepting their oppression</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>Initially, this program is carried out by viciously implanting fear into the minds and sowing the seeds of inferiority in the souls of the oppressed. But as the objective conditions and the balance of forces become more favorable for the oppressed and more adverse to the oppressor, it becomes necessary for the oppressor to modify his program and adopt more subtle and devious methods to maintain his rule. <mark>The oppressor attempts to throw the oppressed psychologically off-balance by combining a policy of vicious repression with spectacular gestures of good-will and service</u></strong></mark>. Moreover, the Party pointed out drug use was provided as an option to people of color as a means of numbing them to the hardships they faced, and to keep them distracted from fighting against their own oppression. In speaking about Timothy Leary, Eldridge Cleaver acknowledged occasional marijuana use by Panthers, but called the drug culture a counterrevolutionary betrayal of the goals of Black liberation. The concept of the period was that drug use had a tendency to weaken users and made them less intellectually and physically capable of defending themselves and their communities. <u><strong>Do drug legalization movements offer anything to people of color? It’s positive to have the public talking about policing. It is also good to see a larger dialog about criminal justice. However, <mark>drug legalization movements must consider the bigger picture for communities of color</mark> to be truly relevant. <mark>What is needed is a more clear movement — one that isn’t positioned, </mark>as so many tragically are, <mark>on the presumption that one’s freedom is predicated on legal sanctions</mark> and tax breaks for small businesspeople. We also must be honest that a mass anti-racist movement will mean an end to abuses against people of color more than a drug legalization movement ever will. <mark>People of color need to look critically at these movements</mark>. What are they practically doing for the community? What will such advocacy, if it comes to pass, mean for communities of color under the current system of law and politics<mark>? Pressing ourselves with harder questions, rather than passively supporting relaxed drug laws without considering who profits, is a good start</mark>.</p></u></strong>
1NC
null
Case
430,156
3
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,360
The justification for organ sales is based on the indefinite extension of a productive, able-bodied life that views death as an ultimate evil which is the underlying cause of worst forms of capitalist violence
Meilaender 6
Meilaender 6 (Gilbert Meilaender, holds the Richard and Phyllis Duesenberg Chair in Theological Ethics at Valparaiso University and is a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, "Gifts of the Body," The New Atlantis, Number 13, Summer 2006, pp. 25-35, KB)
Death as a Problem to Be Solved If a man is dying of kidney failure his life might be prolonged by a transplanted kidney We are heirs of a tradition of thought that teaches us each person’s life as irreplaceable These feelings fuel the belief that it is imperative to make more organs available for transplant the feelings of urgency and desperation make it difficult to think critically about assumptions driving the transplant system in general To take a very different example, we may also be experiencing a “shortage” of gasoline In the face of such a shortage, we could permit drilling or we could ease the general demand for oil We could also learn to moderate our desires and demands for gasoline altering our lives there are ways to deal with the shortage that would teach us to modify our desires in a way that we no longer think in terms of a shortage, but would entail accepting certain limits on how we live when the subject is organ transplantation we attend only to the search for new ways to procure organs We look for “opportunities for action.” If we were to moderate the demands we make on medicine we might be less pressured to think of an organ shortage Alongside our desperation at the impending death of one who cannot be replaced alongside our natural tendency to see death as an evil to be combated we must set another angle of vision about what it means to be human Each of us is unique and irreplaceable But each of us shares in the limits of our finite condition we are mortals The receiving of an organ does not rescue the living from the need to die It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying We should not deny the existential anguish we should not deny the homely truth that each of our names can and will find its place in the syllogism To refuse to acknowledge that truth would turn medicine into nothing more than a crusade against death plagued constantly by a “shortage” of cures for one or another deadly ailment recognition of our mortality ought to elicit caution when speaking about a shortage of organs for transplant The survival of society is not threatened when we do not conquer disease as long as one irreplaceable person dies there will always be an organ shortage that is just the truth of the human condition. If we turn organ procurement into a crusade we make death simply a problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured we will undermine the needed wisdom and care if we think of this person’s death as only primarily a problem which it is imperative that we solve. Freed of the sense that we are under some imperative to secure more organs we may be able to think again of the price we would pay to increase the supply of organs If our problem is fear, or limited altruism, financial incentives might “solve” the problem But there are deeper reasons at work we pay a considerable price if we seize upon means to increase the supply of organs for transplant. we should start with the disquieting possibility we might prefer to pass by Forget the issue that arises whether some kind of market could be morally acceptable For certain purposes we may try to “reduce” the embodied person simply to a collection of parts, thinking of the person simply as the sum total of these parts 8+
These feelings fuel the belief it is imperative to make organs available the feelings of urgency and desperation make it difficult to think critically about assumptions driving the transplant system we may also be experiencing a “shortage” of gasoline In the face of shortage, we could permit drilling or modify our desires in a way that we no longer think of a shortage accepting certain limits on how we live we only search for ways to procure organs We look for action Alongside our desperation at impending death our tendency to see death as an evil to be combated we must set another angle of vision about what it means to be human each of us shares in the limits of our finite condition we are mortals The receiving of an organ does not rescue the living from the need to die. It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying We should not deny existential anguish we should not deny the each of our names will find its place in the syllogism To refuse to acknowledge that would turn medicine into a crusade against death, plagued by a “shortage” of cures for a deadly ailment The survival of society is not threatened there will always be an organ shortage that is just the truth of the human condition. If we turn organ procurement into a crusade, we make death simply a problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured we undermine wisdom and care if we think of death as only a problem which it is imperative we solve Freed of the imperative to secure organs we may be able to think again
Death as a Problem to Be Solved If a man is dying of kidney failure, and if his life might be prolonged by a transplanted kidney but none is available for him, those connected to him by special bonds of love or loyalty may quite naturally and appropriately feel grief, frustration, even outrage. We are heirs of a tradition of thought that teaches us to honor each person’s life as unique and irreplaceable (even though we may not be able really to make sense of this inherited belief apart from reference to the God-relation, which is uniquely individuating for each of us). Although the sympathy any of us feels is inevitably proportioned to the closeness of our bond with one who dies, we are right to honor the grief, frustration, and outrage of those who experience a loved one’s death as uniquely powerful. These quite natural feelings fuel the belief, widely shared in our society, that it is imperative to make more organs available for transplant; however, the same feelings of urgency and desperation also make it difficult to think critically about assumptions driving the transplant system in general. To take a very different example, we may also be experiencing a “shortage” of gasoline in this country. Relative to the demand, the supply is scarcer than we would like. In the face of such a shortage, we could permit drilling in heretofore protected lands or we could ease the general demand for oil by developing alternative energy sources such as nuclear power. We could also learn to moderate our desires and demands for gasoline, altering the pattern of our lives. So there are ways to deal with the gasoline shortage that might work but would — at least in the eyes of some — exact too high a moral price. And there are ways to deal with the shortage that would teach us to modify our desires in such a way that we no longer think in terms of a shortage, but they would entail accepting certain limits on how we live. Upon reflection, we may well decide that neither of these answers to the gasoline shortage is a wise direction to take, but it would be a frivolous person who continued to speak of a “shortage” without considering carefully both sorts of alternatives: exploring new sources of energy, or moderating our demands and expectations. Most of the time, though, when the subject is organ transplantation, we attend only to the search for new ways to procure organs. We look, as the subtitle of the IOM report puts it, for “opportunities for action.” If, however, we were to moderate the demands we make on medicine, we might be less pressured to think in terms of an organ shortage. Alongside our natural desperation at the impending death of one who cannot be replaced, alongside our natural tendency to see death as an evil to be combated, we must set another angle of vision about what it means to be human. Each of us is unique and irreplaceable; that is true. But each of us also shares in the limits of our finite condition; we are mortals. “The receiving of an organ does not,” as William F. May once put it, “rescue the living from the need to die. It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying.” Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich knew well the relentless logic of the syllogism: if all men are mortal, and if Caius is a man, then Caius is mortal. But that logic seemed both absurd and unjust when he tried to slot his own name, Ivan, into the syllogism in place of Caius. Yet, there is truth in each angle of vision. We should not deny the existential anguish; we should also not deny the homely truth that each of our names can and will find its place in the syllogism. To refuse to acknowledge that second truth would turn medicine into nothing more than a crusade against death, plagued constantly by a “shortage” of cures for one or another deadly ailment. In other areas of medicine we are ready to brand that approach as inadequate, and recognition of our mortality ought to elicit similar caution when speaking about a shortage of organs for transplant. As Hans Jonas argued in one of the seminal articles of the bioethics movement in this country, progress in curing disease is not an unconditional or sacred commitment. The survival of society is not threatened when we do not conquer disease, however sad this may be for those who suffer. From one angle, as long as one irreplaceable person dies whose life might have been prolonged through transplantation, there will always be an organ shortage. From another angle, that is just the truth of the human condition. If we turn organ procurement into a crusade, we make of death simply a problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured as best we can, with whatever resources of mind and spirit are available to us. To be sure, when a particular person — Ivan — faces death, we confront a problem that calls for our attention and our attempts to cure. But not only that. We also face the human condition that calls for wisdom and care. Sometimes, at least, we will undermine the needed wisdom and care if we think of this person’s death as only or primarily a problem which it is imperative that we solve. Recovering the Meaning of the Body Freed of the sense that we are under some imperative to secure more organs, we may be able to think again of the price we would pay — perhaps, to be sure, a justified price — to increase the supply of organs for transplant. It may be that the limited supply of organs is due to thoughtlessness, selfishness, fear, or simply limited altruism. But it may also be based on weighty — if difficult to articulate — beliefs about the meaning of human bodily life. If our problem is thoughtlessness, selfishness, fear, or limited altruism, financial incentives might “solve” the problem. But if there are deeper reasons at work, reasons that have to do with what we may even call the sacredness of human life in the body, we pay a considerable price if we seize upon certain means to increase the supply of organs for transplant. Perhaps, then, we should start with the disquieting possibility we might prefer to pass by. Forget the issue that arises farther along the way, whether some kind of market in bodily organs could be morally acceptable. Start farther back with the now widely shared presumption that it is morally acceptable — indeed, praiseworthy — freely to give an organ when this donation may be lifesaving. In the 1930 encyclical letter, Casti Connubii, Pope Pius XI wrote: “Private individuals ... are not free to destroy or mutilate their members, or in any other way render themselves unfit for their natural functions, except when no other provision can be made for the good of the whole body.” How does one get from that to Pope John Paul II’s words sixty-five years later in Evangelium Vitae?: “There is an everyday heroism, made up of gestures of sharing, big or small, which build up an authentic culture of life. A particularly praiseworthy example of such gestures is the donation of organs, performed in an ethically acceptable manner, with a view to offering a chance of health and even of life itself to the sick who sometimes have no other hope.” John Paul’s words notwithstanding, we would not ordinarily want a physician whose “treatment” harmed us in order to bring benefit to someone else. And ordinarily a surgeon would not think of operating on a person in order to help someone other than that person himself. For we know a person only in his or her embodied presence. In and through that body the person is a living whole. For certain purposes we may try to “reduce” the embodied person simply to a collection of parts, thinking of the person (from below) simply as the sum total of these parts. 8+. The very idea of organ transplantation upsets these standard assumptions in a way that is problematic and that calls for justification.
7,819
<h4><u><strong>The justification for organ sales is based on the indefinite extension of a productive, able-bodied life that views death as an ultimate evil which is the underlying cause of worst forms of capitalist violence </h4><p>Meilaender 6</p><p></u></strong>(Gilbert Meilaender, holds the Richard and Phyllis Duesenberg Chair in Theological Ethics at Valparaiso University and is a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, "Gifts of the Body," The New Atlantis, Number 13, Summer 2006, pp. 25-35, KB)</p><p><u><strong>Death as a Problem to Be Solved </strong>If a man is dying of kidney failure</u>, and if <u>his life might be prolonged by a transplanted kidney</u> but none is available for him, those connected to him by special bonds of love or loyalty may quite naturally and appropriately feel grief, frustration, even outrage. <u>We are heirs of a tradition of thought that teaches us</u> to honor <u>each person’s life as</u> unique and <u>irreplaceable</u> (even though we may not be able really to make sense of this inherited belief apart from reference to the God-relation, which is uniquely individuating for each of us). Although the sympathy any of us feels is inevitably proportioned to the closeness of our bond with one who dies, we are right to honor the grief, frustration, and outrage of those who experience a loved one’s death as uniquely powerful. <u><mark>These</u></mark> quite natural<u> <mark>feelings</mark> <mark>fuel the belief</u></mark>, widely shared in our society, <u>that <mark>it is imperative to make</mark> more <mark>organs available</mark> for transplant</u>; however, <u><mark>the</u></mark> same <u><strong><mark>feelings of urgency and desperation</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>make it difficult to think critically about assumptions driving the transplant system</mark> in general</u></strong>. <u>To take a very different example, <mark>we may also be experiencing a “shortage” of gasoline</u></mark> in this country. Relative to the demand, the supply is scarcer than we would like. <u><mark>In the face of</mark> such a <mark>shortage, we could permit drilling</u></mark> in heretofore protected lands <u><mark>or</u></mark> <u>we could ease the general demand for oil</u> by developing alternative energy sources such as nuclear power. <u>We could also learn to moderate our desires and demands for gasoline</u>, <u>altering</u> the pattern of <u>our lives</u>. So there are ways to deal with the gasoline shortage that might work but would — at least in the eyes of some — exact too high a moral price. And <u>there are ways to deal with the shortage that would teach us to <mark>modify our desires</u> <u>in</u></mark> such <u><mark>a way that we no longer</mark> <mark>think</mark> in terms <mark>of a shortage</mark>, but</u> they <u>would</u> <u>entail <strong><mark>accepting certain limits on how we live</u></strong></mark>. Upon reflection, we may well decide that neither of these answers to the gasoline shortage is a wise direction to take, but it would be a frivolous person who continued to speak of a “shortage” without considering carefully both sorts of alternatives: exploring new sources of energy, or moderating our demands and expectations. Most of the time, though, <u>when the subject is organ transplantation</u>, <u><mark>we</u></mark> <u>attend <strong><mark>only</mark> to the <mark>search for</mark> new <mark>ways to procure organs</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>We look</u></mark>, as the subtitle of the IOM report puts it, <u><mark>for</mark> “opportunities for <mark>action</mark>.”</u><strong> <u></strong>If</u>, however, <u>we were to moderate the demands we make on medicine</u>, <u>we might be <strong>less pressured</u></strong> <u>to think</u> in terms <u>of an organ shortage</u>. <u><mark>Alongside our</u></mark> natural <u><mark>desperation at</mark> the <mark>impending death</mark> of one who cannot be replaced</u>, <u>alongside <mark>our</mark> natural <mark>tendency to see <strong>death as an evil to be combated</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>we must set another angle of vision about what it means to be human</u></strong></mark>. <u>Each of us is unique and irreplaceable</u>; that is true. <u><strong>But <mark>each of us</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>shares in the limits of our finite condition</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>we are mortals</u></strong></mark>. “<u><mark>The</u> <u>receiving of an organ does not</u></mark>,” as William F. May once put it, “<u><mark>rescue the living from the need to die</u>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>It only defers the day when they will have to do their own dying</u></strong></mark>.” Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilyich knew well the relentless logic of the syllogism: if all men are mortal, and if Caius is a man, then Caius is mortal. But that logic seemed both absurd and unjust when he tried to slot his own name, Ivan, into the syllogism in place of Caius. Yet, there is truth in each angle of vision. <u><strong><mark>We should not deny</mark> the <mark>existential anguish</u></strong></mark>; <u><mark>we should</u></mark> also <u><mark>not deny the</mark> homely truth that <mark>each of our names</mark> can and <mark>will find its place in the syllogism</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>To refuse to acknowledge that</u></strong></mark> second <u><strong>truth <mark>would turn medicine into</mark> nothing more than <mark>a crusade against death</u></strong>, <u><strong>plagued</mark> constantly <mark>by a “shortage” of cures for</mark> one or <mark>a</mark>nother <mark>deadly ailment</u></strong></mark>. In other areas of medicine we are ready to brand that approach as inadequate, and <u>recognition of our mortality ought to elicit</u> similar <u>caution when speaking about a shortage of organs for transplant</u>. As Hans Jonas argued in one of the seminal articles of the bioethics movement in this country, progress in curing disease is not an unconditional or sacred commitment. <u><mark>The survival of society is not threatened</mark> when we do not conquer disease</u>, however sad this may be for those who suffer. From one angle, <u>as long as one irreplaceable person dies</u> whose life might have been prolonged through transplantation, <u><strong><mark>there will always be an organ shortage</u></strong></mark>. From another angle, <u><strong><mark>that is just the truth of the human condition.</u></strong> <u>If we turn organ procurement into a crusade</u>, <u><strong>we make</u></strong></mark> of <u><strong><mark>death simply a problem to be solved rather than an event to be endured</u></strong></mark> as best we can, with whatever resources of mind and spirit are available to us. To be sure, when a particular person — Ivan — faces death, we confront a problem that calls for our attention and our attempts to cure. But not only that. We also face the human condition that calls for wisdom and care. Sometimes, at least, <u><mark>we</mark> will <strong><mark>undermine</strong></mark> the needed <strong><mark>wisdom and care</strong></mark> <mark>if we think of</mark> this person’s <mark>death as</u> <u>only</u></mark> or <u>primarily <strong><mark>a problem which it is imperative</mark> that <mark>we solve</strong></mark>. </u>Recovering the Meaning of the Body <u><mark>Freed of the</mark> sense that we are under some <mark>imperative to secure</mark> more <mark>organs</u></mark>, <u><mark>we</mark> <mark>may be able to think again</mark> of the price we would pay</u> — perhaps, to be sure, a justified price — <u>to increase the supply of organs</u> for transplant. It may be that the limited supply of organs is due to thoughtlessness, selfishness, fear, or simply limited altruism. But it may also be based on weighty — if difficult to articulate — beliefs about the meaning of human bodily life. <u>If our problem is</u> thoughtlessness, selfishness, <u>fear, or limited altruism, financial incentives might “solve” the problem</u>. <u><strong>But</u></strong> if <u><strong>there are deeper reasons at work</u></strong>, reasons that have to do with what we may even call the sacredness of human life in the body, <u>we pay a considerable price if we seize upon</u> certain <u>means to increase the supply of organs for transplant. </u>Perhaps, then, <u><strong>we should start with the disquieting possibility we might prefer to pass by</u></strong>. <u>Forget the issue that arises</u> farther along the way, <u>whether some kind of market</u> in bodily organs <u>could be morally acceptable</u>. Start farther back with the now widely shared presumption that it is morally acceptable — indeed, praiseworthy — freely to give an organ when this donation may be lifesaving. In the 1930 encyclical letter, Casti Connubii, Pope Pius XI wrote: “Private individuals ... are not free to destroy or mutilate their members, or in any other way render themselves unfit for their natural functions, except when no other provision can be made for the good of the whole body.” How does one get from that to Pope John Paul II’s words sixty-five years later in Evangelium Vitae?: “There is an everyday heroism, made up of gestures of sharing, big or small, which build up an authentic culture of life. A particularly praiseworthy example of such gestures is the donation of organs, performed in an ethically acceptable manner, with a view to offering a chance of health and even of life itself to the sick who sometimes have no other hope.” John Paul’s words notwithstanding, we would not ordinarily want a physician whose “treatment” harmed us in order to bring benefit to someone else. And ordinarily a surgeon would not think of operating on a person in order to help someone other than that person himself. For we know a person only in his or her embodied presence. In and through that body the person is a living whole. <u>For certain purposes we may try to “reduce” the embodied person simply to a collection of parts, thinking of the person</u> (from below) <u>simply as the sum total of these parts</u>. <u>8+</u>. The very idea of organ transplantation upsets these standard assumptions in a way that is problematic and that calls for justification.</p>
1NC
null
Off
429,533
2
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,361
Environmental apocalypticism is a profoundly conservative force which shuts down deliberation and stultifies environmental movements
Coward 14
Coward 14 (Jonathan Coward, MSc in Environment, Culture, and Society from the University of Edinburgh, 2014, “‘How’s that for an Ending?’ Apocalyptic Narratives and Environmental Degradation: Foreclosing Genuine Solutions, or Rhetorical Necessity?”) gz
What, then, is the function of the ‘environmental apocalypse’ The inclusion of an apocalyptic tone says implicitly or explicitly: Either the status quo must change, or humanity and nature will end the implementation of the apocalyptic narrative is employed both to increase the saliency of environmental issues in the minds of the public and to encourage change on an individual or collective level although awareness of environmental issues is now very high, they continue to be low priority for many although the role of apocalypse in environmentalism appears to be useful in theory, this is not necessarily translated into reality the intended consequences of framing environmental degradation in an apocalyptic manner do not always materialize Instead, the result is not that of transformation, but of a perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation, and thus the possibility of change becomes its opposite empirical evidence shows that the criticism is valid and that apocalyptic rhetoric can disengages the wider public from partaking in environmental activism In Feinberg and Willer’s study, individuals who were primed with just-world statements, followed by exposure to dire messages of the severity of global warming, reported higher levels of climate change skepticism participants were also less likely to change their lifestyle to reduce their carbon footprint ecology has been perceived as having quasireligious qualities a prophetic ecology cannot espouse radical change because, like religion, it in fact holds an inherently conservative worldview the opposition is to a highly political ideology of progress based upon the technological domination of organic life in the name of capitalist productivism and economic growth it is acknowledged that natural limits and environmental tipping points exist. Despite this knowledge, production and consumption continue at increasing rates, while natural resources are depleted, and natural habitats are polluted It relates to the reality perceived by humankind in present day capitalism the physical world is no longer as real to us as the economic world our politicians gear every decision to speeding further its growth.” This is the phenomenon of ‘capitalist realism where economy assumes the role of reality everything in existence is “organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute It is the failure to see capitalist social relations as what they truly are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and ultimately to Earth’s environmental system It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism environmental problems are “commonly staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind,” and that the apocalyptic environmental narratives that stem from this, are populist, resisting a proper political framing in the traditional left-right sense This results in the insistence that the fear-inducing threat is merely a technical problem, requiring techno-managers to take charge a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral any problem, environmental or otherwise is managed upon economic terms to ultimately serve capital Klein describes numerous examples of this tendency, such as the mass privatization of the public school system in New Orleans, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina the pervasiveness of capitalist realism in the context of catastrophe is evident the framing of catastrophe as crisis implies that total (environmental) devastation is something to be managed within current social, political and economic institutions crisis is a conjunctural condition that requires particular techno-managerial attention using the apocalyptic imaginary to frame issues of environmental degradation isn’t only futile, rather the solutions it intends are foreclosed by the co-option of the narrative by capitalist institutions Wall-E, premised upon on a lonely robot, charged with the task of cleaning up an abandoned Earth following the global rule of the ‘Buy 'N Large’ corporatio we’re left in no doubt that consumer capitalism and corporations[… are] responsible for this depredation the film also espouses the idea of there being a technological fix to Earth’s ecological tribulations, in the form of Wall-E himself
environmental apocalypse’ says Either the status quo must change, or humanity will end although awareness of environmental issues is very high, they continue to be low priority although the role of apocalypse appears to be useful this is not translated into reality the result is perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation apocalyptic rhetoric disengages the public from environmental activism In Willer’s study, individuals primed with just-world statements, followed by dire messages reported higher levels of skepticism participants were less likely to change their lifestyle it is acknowledged that natural limits exist. Despite this production and consumption continue This is the phenomenon of ‘capitalist realism’ capitalist social relations are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and Earth’s environment It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism environmental narratives are populist, resisting a proper political framing in the traditional left-right sense This results in the insistence that the fear-inducing threat is a technical problem a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral such as privatization of the school system in the wake of Hurricane Katrina the framing of catastrophe implies devastation is to be managed within current institutions the solutions are foreclosed by co-option by capitalist institutions
What, then, is the function of the ‘environmental apocalypse’, and how might it be perceived as a rhetorical necessity? I perceive it to have two core functions. The first is that apocalypse acts as a teleological-critical tool and second, that it indeed has a political role in environmentalism. First, environmental literatures, such as those specified above, can be seen to have traditionally served the two primary functions of criticism: diagnostic, and remedial. The inclusion of an apocalyptic tone adds a third aspect, oriented to the future. Put simply, this teleological-critical function says implicitly or explicitly: Either the status quo must change, or humanity and nature will end. Second, in uncovering this desire or need to change, the implementation of the apocalyptic narrative in environmental literature is political. It is employed both to increase the saliency of environmental issues in the minds of the public and to encourage change on an individual or collective level. The technique recognizes the fact that although awareness of environmental issues is now very high, they continue to be low priority for many (Whitmarsh 2011, 691). Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 22) succinctly observe that for political change to actually occur, a transformation in consciousness is required to translate awareness into action. This is achieved through the teleological-critical function of apocalypse, thus indicating the link between its two facets. From theory to reality?: Criticisms and capitalism’s co-option It is important, however, to state that although the role of apocalypse in environmentalism appears to be useful in theory, this is not necessarily translated into reality. Ultimately, the intended consequences of framing environmental degradation in an apocalyptic manner do not always materialize. Instead, the result is not that of transformation, but of a perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation, and thus the possibility of change becomes its opposite. Criticisms of the apocalyptic tendency in environmentalism go some way towards explaining its failings. I argue that these are: alarmism; quasi-religious undertones, and anti-progressivism. The accusation that certain environmental texts—or even that environmentalism itself—tends to exaggerate to the point of alarmism is a common criticism put forward (Bailey 1993; Simon 1995, 23; Risbey 2008). Arguably, exaggeration has its merits. In a broad, philosophical sense, Adorno (2003) claims it to be the contemporary “medium of truth,” while in terms of apocalyptic narratives specifically, Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 41) claim that, “if the “predicted devastation is extreme in the apocalyptic narrative, then the change in consciousness of political agenda recommended by the narrator is correspondingly extreme or radical.” In other words, exaggeration is required, because anything less would result in mere reformism and this simply isn’t enough to protect what’s under threat. And although this is a fair rebuttal, empirical evidence shows that the criticism is valid and that apocalyptic rhetoric can disengages the wider public from partaking in environmental activism. In Feinberg and Willer’s (2011) study, individuals who were primed with just-world statements, followed by exposure to dire messages of the severity of global warming, reported higher levels of climate change skepticism (ibid, 36). These participants were also less likely to change their lifestyle to reduce their carbon footprint. This indicates a problem with the public perception of environmental apocalypticism. Furthermore, through its use of apocalyptic narratives, ecology has been perceived as having quasireligious qualities. While it is worth questioning some of the ecology-as-religion arguments made by critics such as Simon (1995, 23), the possibility that the religious qualities of ecology are more than superficial should not be dismissed. One view is that a prophetic ecology cannot espouse radical change because, like religion, it in fact holds an inherently conservative worldview. This conservatism comes in two forms. One, of lesser concern, which is neo-luddite in character, and seeks the return to a less technologically demanding time, and the other which looks to conserve present economic and political systems because change is perceived as being inherently bad. As Žižek states, although ecologists are all the time demanding that we change radically our way of life, underlying this demand is its opposite, a deep distrust of change, of development, of progress: every radical change can have the unintended consequence of triggering a catastrophe. (Žižek 2008) Instead, I would argue that ecological movements that are framed by catastrophic rhetoric do not distrust progress generally, and where radical change is argued to be necessary—i.e. Kovel’s (2002) eco-socialist agenda—that there is a genuine commitment to this change. Rather the opposition is to a highly political ideology of progress based upon the technological domination of organic life in the name of capitalist productivism and economic growth. What explains the continuing pervasiveness of the ideology of progress over ecologies which warn of its fatal dangers? It’s worth considering for a moment, the fact that it is acknowledged that natural limits and environmental tipping points exist. Despite this knowledge, production and consumption continue at increasing rates, while natural resources are depleted, and natural habitats are polluted. This is not merely a case of knowing ignorance, or Orwellian doublethink, but something greater. It relates to the reality perceived by humankind in present day capitalism. As Bill McKibben states: “[I]n some sense, the physical world is no longer as real to us as the economic world - we cosset and succor to the economy; our politicians gear every decision to speeding further its growth.” This is the phenomenon of ‘capitalist realism’ (Fisher 2009), where economy assumes the role of reality. In capitalist realism, everything in existence is “organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute.” (Swyngedouw 2013, 13) It is the failure to see capitalist social relations as what they truly are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and ultimately to Earth’s environmental system1. Applying this to apocalyptic environmental narratives, it’s clear that even with the criticalteleological function bringing to light the ultimate choice between the end of capitalism and the end of nature, capitalist realism denies the existence of the teleology, hence the oft repeated statement: It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. But, having recognized the failure and futility in using imaginaries of apocalypse to bring about change, the question remains, as to how the rhetoric of catastrophe might serve to foreclose genuine solutions. A persuasive case is put forward in the article Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures by Swyngedouw (2013). His argument consists of two central points. The first is that environmental problems are “commonly staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind,” and that the apocalyptic environmental narratives that stem from this, are populist, resisting a proper political framing in the traditional left-right sense (ibid., 11,13). This results in the insistence that the fear-inducing threat is merely a technical problem, requiring techno-managers to take charge. Of course, a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral. Therefore any problem, environmental or otherwise is managed upon economic terms to ultimately serve capital (ibid., 13). Naomi Klein’s Shock Doctrine (2008) describes numerous examples of this tendency, such as the mass privatization of the public school system in New Orleans, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina: “The administration of George W. Bush[… provided] tens of millions of dollars to convert New Orleans schools into[…] publicly funded institutions run by private entities.” (Klein 2008, 5) Here, the pervasiveness of capitalist realism in the context of catastrophe is evident. Additionally, the framing of catastrophe as crisis implies that total (environmental) devastation is something to be managed within current social, political and economic institutions: While catastrophe denotes the irreversible radical transformation of the existing into a spiralling abyssal decline, crisis is a conjunctural condition that requires particular techno-managerial attention. (Klein 2008, 10) This has been especially clear in attempts to manage parts of nature that are likely to be subject to - or subject of - some degree of catastrophe, such as ecosystems, valorized for the purposes of conservation (i.e. UK National Ecosystems Assessment 2011), and carbon, commodified as permits to be freely traded within a carbon-market (ibid, 13). Thus, it should be clear that using the apocalyptic imaginary to frame issues of environmental degradation isn’t only futile, rather the solutions it intends are foreclosed by the co-option of the narrative by capitalist institutions. Finally, could it even be argued that the aforementioned mass-culture of armageddon—an expression of the ongoing, popular fascination with the end—is free from capitalist realism? I would agree with Fisher (2009) in saying that perhaps it isn’t. Take for example, Disney Pixar’s 2008 film, Wall-E, premised upon on a lonely robot, charged with the task of cleaning up an abandoned Earth following the global rule of the ‘Buy 'N Large’ corporation2. Fisher (ibid.) argues that “we’re left in no doubt that consumer capitalism and corporations[… are] responsible for this depredation[…] but the film performs our anti-capitalism for us, allowing us to continue to consume with impunity.” Moreover, in relation to the ideology of progress, the film also espouses the idea of there being a technological fix to Earth’s ecological tribulations, in the form of Wall-E himself. Even in post-apocalyptic drama, The Road (2009), motifs of capitalist ideology are present. Despite the fall of society and the wrecking of nature, ideas of self-interested behavior persist, in the strikingly Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’, for human flesh.3
10,347
<h4>Environmental apocalypticism is a profoundly conservative force which shuts down deliberation and stultifies environmental movements</h4><p><u><strong>Coward 14</u></strong> (Jonathan Coward, MSc in Environment, Culture, and Society from the University of Edinburgh, 2014, “‘How’s that for an Ending?’ Apocalyptic Narratives and Environmental Degradation: Foreclosing Genuine Solutions, or Rhetorical Necessity?”) gz</p><p><u>What, then, is the function of the ‘<mark>environmental apocalypse’</u></mark>, and how might it be perceived as a rhetorical necessity? I perceive it to have two core functions. The first is that apocalypse acts as a teleological-critical tool and second, that it indeed has a political role in environmentalism.</p><p>First, environmental literatures, such as those specified above, can be seen to have traditionally served the two primary functions of criticism: diagnostic, and remedial. <u>The inclusion of an apocalyptic tone</u> adds a third aspect, oriented to the future. Put simply, this teleological-critical function <u><mark>says</mark> implicitly or explicitly: <mark>Either the status quo must change, or humanity</mark> and nature <mark>will end</u></mark>. Second, in uncovering this desire or need to change, <u>the implementation of the apocalyptic narrative</u> in environmental literature is political. It <u>is employed both to increase the saliency of environmental issues in the minds of the public and to encourage change on an individual or collective level</u>. The technique recognizes the fact that <u><mark>although awareness of environmental issues is</mark> <strong>now <mark>very high</strong>, they continue to be <strong>low priority</strong></mark> for many</u> (Whitmarsh 2011, 691). Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 22) succinctly observe that for political change to actually occur, a transformation in consciousness is required to translate awareness into action. This is achieved through the teleological-critical function of apocalypse, thus indicating the link between its two facets.</p><p>From theory to reality?: Criticisms and capitalism’s co-option</p><p>It is important, however, to state that <u><mark>although the role of apocalypse</mark> in environmentalism <mark>appears to be useful</mark> in theory, <strong><mark>this is not</mark> necessarily <mark>translated into reality</u></strong></mark>. Ultimately, <u>the intended consequences of framing environmental degradation in an apocalyptic manner <strong>do not always materialize</u></strong>. <u>Instead, <mark>the result is</mark> not that of transformation, but of a <strong><mark>perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation</strong></mark>, and thus the possibility of change becomes its opposite</u>. Criticisms of the apocalyptic tendency in environmentalism go some way towards explaining its failings. I argue that these are: alarmism; quasi-religious undertones, and anti-progressivism.</p><p>The accusation that certain environmental texts—or even that environmentalism itself—tends to exaggerate to the point of alarmism is a common criticism put forward (Bailey 1993; Simon 1995, 23; Risbey 2008). Arguably, exaggeration has its merits. In a broad, philosophical sense, Adorno (2003) claims it to be the contemporary “medium of truth,” while in terms of apocalyptic narratives specifically, Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 41) claim that, “if the “predicted devastation is extreme in the apocalyptic narrative, then the change in consciousness of political agenda recommended by the narrator is correspondingly extreme or radical.” In other words, exaggeration is required, because anything less would result in mere reformism and this simply isn’t enough to protect what’s under threat. And although this is a fair rebuttal, <u>empirical evidence shows that the criticism is valid and that <mark>apocalyptic rhetoric</mark> can <strong><mark>disengages the </mark>wider <mark>public from</mark> partaking in <mark>environmental activism</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>In </mark>Feinberg and <mark>Willer’s</u></mark> (2011) <u><mark>study, individuals</mark> who were <mark>primed with just-world statements, followed by</mark> exposure to <mark>dire messages</mark> of the severity of global warming, <mark>reported <strong>higher levels of </mark>climate change <mark>skepticism</u></strong></mark> (ibid, 36). These <u><mark>participants were</mark> also <strong><mark>less likely to change their lifestyle</strong></mark> to reduce their carbon footprint</u>. This indicates a problem with the public perception of environmental apocalypticism.</p><p>Furthermore, through its use of apocalyptic narratives, <u>ecology has been perceived as having quasireligious qualities</u>. While it is worth questioning some of the ecology-as-religion arguments made by critics such as Simon (1995, 23), the possibility that the religious qualities of ecology are more than superficial should not be dismissed. One view is that <u>a prophetic ecology <strong>cannot espouse radical change</strong> because, like religion, it in fact holds an inherently conservative worldview</u>. This conservatism comes in two forms. One, of lesser concern, which is neo-luddite in character, and seeks the return to a less technologically demanding time, and the other which looks to conserve present economic and political systems because change is perceived as being inherently bad. As Žižek states, although ecologists are all the time demanding that we change radically our way of life, underlying this demand is its opposite, a deep distrust of change, of development, of progress: every radical change can have the unintended consequence of triggering a catastrophe. (Žižek 2008) Instead, I would argue that ecological movements that are framed by catastrophic rhetoric do not distrust progress generally, and where radical change is argued to be necessary—i.e. Kovel’s (2002) eco-socialist agenda—that there is a genuine commitment to this change. Rather <u>the opposition is to a highly political ideology of progress based upon the technological domination of organic life in the name of capitalist productivism and economic growth</u>.</p><p>What explains the continuing pervasiveness of the ideology of progress over ecologies which warn of its fatal dangers? It’s worth considering for a moment, the fact that <u><mark>it is acknowledged that natural limits</mark> and environmental tipping points <mark>exist. Despite this</mark> knowledge, <mark>production and consumption continue</mark> at increasing rates, while natural resources are depleted, and natural habitats are polluted</u>. This is not merely a case of knowing ignorance, or Orwellian doublethink, but something greater. <u>It relates to the reality perceived by humankind in present day capitalism</u>.</p><p>As Bill McKibben states: “[I]n some sense, <u><strong>the physical world is no longer as real to us as the economic world</u></strong> - we cosset and succor to the economy; <u>our politicians gear every decision to speeding further its growth.” <mark>This is the phenomenon of ‘capitalist realism</u>’</mark> (Fisher 2009), <u>where <strong>economy assumes the role of reality</u></strong>. In capitalist realism, <u>everything in existence is “organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute</u>.” (Swyngedouw 2013, 13) <u>It is the failure to see <mark>capitalist social relations</mark> as what they truly <mark>are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and</mark> ultimately to <mark>Earth’s environment</mark>al system</u>1.</p><p>Applying this to apocalyptic environmental narratives, it’s clear that even with the criticalteleological function bringing to light the ultimate choice between the end of capitalism and the end of nature, capitalist realism denies the existence of the teleology, hence the oft repeated statement: <u><strong><mark>It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism</u></strong></mark>. But, having recognized the failure and futility in using imaginaries of apocalypse to bring about change, the question remains, as to how the rhetoric of catastrophe might serve to foreclose genuine solutions.</p><p>A persuasive case is put forward in the article Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures by Swyngedouw (2013). His argument consists of two central points. The first is that <u>environmental problems are “commonly staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind,” and that the apocalyptic <mark>environmental narratives</mark> that stem from this, <mark>are <strong>populist</strong>, resisting a proper political framing in the traditional left-right sense</u></mark> (ibid., 11,13). <u><mark>This results in the insistence that the fear-inducing threat is</mark> <strong>merely <mark>a technical problem</strong></mark>, requiring techno-managers to take charge</u>. Of course, <u><strong><mark>a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral</u></strong></mark>. Therefore <u>any problem, environmental or otherwise is managed upon economic terms to ultimately serve capital</u> (ibid., 13). Naomi <u>Klein</u>’s Shock Doctrine (2008) <u>describes numerous examples of this tendency, <mark>such as</mark> the mass <mark>privatization of the</mark> public <mark>school system</mark> in New Orleans, <mark>in the wake of Hurricane Katrina</u></mark>: “The administration of George W. Bush[… provided] tens of millions of dollars to convert New Orleans schools into[…] publicly funded institutions run by private entities.” (Klein 2008, 5) Here, <u>the pervasiveness of capitalist realism in the context of catastrophe is evident</u>.</p><p>Additionally, <u><mark>the framing of catastrophe</mark> as crisis <mark>implies</mark> that total (environmental) <mark>devastation is</mark> something <mark>to be managed within current</mark> social, political and economic <mark>institutions</u></mark>: While catastrophe denotes the irreversible radical transformation of the existing into a spiralling abyssal decline, <u>crisis is a conjunctural condition that requires particular techno-managerial attention</u>. (Klein 2008, 10) This has been especially clear in attempts to manage parts of nature that are likely to be subject to - or subject of - some degree of catastrophe, such as ecosystems, valorized for the purposes of conservation (i.e. UK National Ecosystems Assessment 2011), and carbon, commodified as permits to be freely traded within a carbon-market (ibid, 13). Thus, it should be clear that <u>using the apocalyptic imaginary to frame issues of environmental degradation isn’t only futile, rather <mark>the solutions </mark>it intends <mark>are <strong>foreclosed by </mark>the <mark>co-option </mark>of the narrative <mark>by capitalist institutions</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Finally, could it even be argued that the aforementioned mass-culture of armageddon—an expression of the ongoing, popular fascination with the end—is free from capitalist realism? I would agree with Fisher (2009) in saying that perhaps it isn’t. Take for example, Disney Pixar’s 2008 film, <u>Wall-E, premised upon on a lonely robot, charged with the task of cleaning up an abandoned Earth following the global rule of the ‘Buy 'N Large’ corporatio</u>n2. Fisher (ibid.) argues that “<u>we’re left in no doubt that consumer capitalism and corporations[… are] responsible for this depredation</u>[…] but the film performs our anti-capitalism for us, allowing us to continue to consume with impunity.” Moreover, in relation to the ideology of progress, <u>the film also espouses the idea of there being a technological fix to Earth’s ecological tribulations, in the form of Wall-E himself</u>. Even in post-apocalyptic drama, The Road (2009), motifs of capitalist ideology are present. Despite the fall of society and the wrecking of nature, ideas of self-interested behavior persist, in the strikingly Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’, for human flesh.3</p>
1NC
null
Off
83,814
22
17,011
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
564,718
N
Wake
7
UNLV GV
Calum Matheson
1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,362
Reject the affirmatives system of commodification -- this rejection allows for a radically passive politics to alter practices of consumption by forcing the system to commit self-sacrifice
Bifo 11
Bifo 11 Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, pg. 104-108
Time is in the mind The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level we are here touching upon a crucial point Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide So hostages are taken On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity No need for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it it was party to its own destruction . The West has become suicidal, and declared war on itself In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism adopt the mode of passivity A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years the most powerful weapon has been suicide 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal The exchange between life and money could be deserted exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.
Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as energetic mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization The prolif of simulacra has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising have submitted the energies permanent mobilization exhaustion is the only way of escape:¶ Nothing, can avoid the symbolic obligation, The system must itself commit suicide in response to the challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken from which every moral consideration victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial ac No need for a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects The West has become suicidal exhaustion is seen as the inability body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: exhaustion could become a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much , and outrageously too much during the last thirty years is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa The exchange between life and money could be deserted, exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out economic growth the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth
Time is in the mind. The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level. I think that we are here touching upon a crucial point. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. Modern radical thought has always seen the process of subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions. But in our age energy is running out, and desire which has given soul to modern social dynamics is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.¶ Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction. It becomes reality for its own sake, the fetishism of the lost object: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]¶ The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. The entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)¶ Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. The brain is the market, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality. And the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely.
 The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. The proliferation of simulacra in the info-sphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only way of escape:¶ Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist, the hostage’s death for the terrorist. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically – inexorably – the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ In the activist view exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement towards a “wu wei” civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations of life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed.¶ The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. 9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
 I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be deserted, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment, and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.
9,709
<h4><u><strong>Reject the affirmatives system of commodification -- this rejection allows for a radically passive politics to alter practices of consumption by forcing the system to commit self-sacrifice </h4><p>Bifo 11</p><p></u></strong>Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, After the Future, <u>pg. 104-108</p><p>Time is in the mind</u>. <u>The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to enhance time (Cybertime) beyond a certain level</u>. I think that <u>we are here touching upon a crucial point</u>. The process of re-composition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new – paradoxical – way. <u><mark>Modern radical thought has always <strong>seen the process of subjectivation</strong></mark> <mark>as</mark> an <strong><mark>energetic</mark> process</strong>: <strong><mark>mobilization</strong>, social <strong>desire</strong> and political <strong>activism</strong>, expression, <strong>participation</strong> have been the modes of conscious collective</mark> subjectivation in the age of the revolutions</u>. <u>But in our age <strong><mark>energy is running out</strong>, and <strong>desire</strong> which has given soul to modern social dynamics is <strong>absorbed in the black hole of virtualization</mark> and financial games</u></strong>, as Jean Baudrillard (1993a) argues in his book Symbolic Exchange and Death, first published in 1976. In this book Baudrillard analyzes the hyper-realistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation.¶ Reality itself founders in hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another, reproductive medium, such as photography. From medium to medium, <u>the real is volatilized, becoming an allegory of death. But it is also, in a sense, reinforced through its own destruction</u>. <u>It becomes reality for its own sake, the <strong>fetishism of the lost object</u></strong>: no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denial and of its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. [...]¶ The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. <u>Today the whole system is <strong>swamped by indeterminacy</strong>, and every reality is <strong>absorbed by the hyperreality</strong> of the code and simulation</u>. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. <u>We must therefore <strong>reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value</strong> and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system</u>. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. <u>The entire apparatus of <strong>the commodity law of value</strong> is <strong>absorbed and recycled</strong> in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra</u>. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 2)¶ Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced the process of exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (Cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. <u><strong>The brain is the market</strong>, in semiocapitalist hyper-reality</u>. And <u>the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely</u>.
 The process of collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection which is essentially happening in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semio-flow. <u><mark>The <strong>prolif</mark>eration <mark>of simulacra</strong></mark> in the info-sphere <mark>has <strong>saturated</strong> the space of <strong>attention and imagination</u></strong>.</mark> <u><mark>Advertising</mark> and stimulated hyper-expression (“just do it”), <mark>have <strong>submitted the energies</strong></mark> of the social psyche to <strong><mark>permanent mobilization</u></strong></mark>. <u>Exhaustion follows, and <strong><mark>exhaustion is the only way of escape</u></strong>:¶ <u>Nothing, </mark>not even the system, <strong><mark>can avoid the symbolic obligation</strong>, </mark>and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains</u>. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. <u><mark>The system <strong>must itself commit suicide</strong> in response to the</mark> multiplied <strong><mark>challenge of death and suicide</u></strong>. <u><strong>So hostages are taken</u></strong></mark>. <u>On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, <mark>from which every moral consideration</mark> of the innocence of the <mark>victims is ruled out the hostage is the substitute</mark>, the alter-ego of the terrorist, <mark>the hostage’s death for the terrorist. <strong>Hostage and terrorist</strong> may thereafter become <strong>confused</strong> in the same sacrificial ac</mark>t</u>. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37)¶ In these impressive pages Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action which will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled The Spirit of Terrorism where he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy the only strategy can be catastrophic:¶ all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. <u>Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6)¶ This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. This malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order’s benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order:¶ <u><mark>No need</u></mark>, then, <u><mark>for a</mark> death drive or a <mark>destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects</mark>.</u> Very logically – inexorably – <u>the increase in the power heightens the will to destroy it</u>. And <u>it was party to its own destruction</u>. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that “Even God cannot declare war on Himself.” Well, He can<u>. <mark>The West</u></mark>, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimacy), <u><mark>has become suicidal</mark>, and declared war on itself</u>. (Baudrillard 2003: 6-7)¶ In Baudrillard’s catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the 20th century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion.¶ <u>In the activist view <mark>exhaustion is seen as the inability</mark> of the social <mark>body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared:</mark> deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle</u>. But <u><strong><mark>exhaustion</strong> could</mark> also <mark>become </mark>the beginning of <strong>a slow movement</strong> towards <mark>a “wu wei” civilization, based on the <strong>withdrawal</strong>, and frugal expectations of life and consumption</u>. <u>Radicalism could abandon</mark> the mode of <mark>activism</u>, and <u><strong>adopt the mode of passivity</u></strong>. <u>A <strong>radical passivity</strong> would</mark> definitely <strong><mark>threaten the ethos</strong> of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed</u></mark>.¶ <u>The mother of all the bubbles, <mark>the work bubble, would finally deflate</u>. <u>We have been <strong>working too much</strong></mark> during the last three or four centuries<mark>, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years</u></mark>. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and of dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade – the struggle between Western domination and jihadist Islam – we recognize that <u>the most powerful weapon has been suicide</u>. <u>9/11 is the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony</u>. And <u>they won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, and defeating the hyper-technological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan.¶ </u>The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. <u><strong>Suicide</strong> has became <strong>a form of political action</strong> everywhere</u>. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, towards a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life?
 I think that <u>it <mark>is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawa</mark>l</u>. <u><mark>The exchange between life and money could be <strong>deserted</u></strong>,</mark> and <u><mark>exhaustion could give way to <strong>a huge wave of withdrawal</strong></mark> from the sphere of economic exchange</u>. <u><mark>A new refrain could <strong>emerge in that moment</strong>, and wipe out</mark> the law of <mark>economic growth</u></mark>. <u>The self-organization of <mark>the general intellect could <strong>abandon the law of accumulation and growth</u></strong></mark>, and <u>start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.</p></u>
1NC
null
Off
174,846
274
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,363
Legalization doesn’t solve racial profiling- it only increases minority targeting
Booth ‘14
Booth ‘14 (Quincy Booth University of Pittsburgh School of Law. “THE IMPACTS OF MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION AND DECRIMINALIZATION ON HISTORICALLY TARGETED MINORITY GROUPS” April 4, 2014 Lawyers Journal 16 Lawyers J. 12, Lexis, TSW)
a more pressing question is whether legalizing marijuana will actually benefit African-American indigent communities. This note predicts that the impact will be more adverse than positive. though there is no racial difference regarding the use of marijuana, arrests for its possession are still disproportionate within the criminal justice system. Therefore, the legalization of marijuana does not necessarily mean that police will cease targeting African-Americans. Instead, marijuana acts as a tool to usher minorities into the system. If marijuana was legal, possession may not result in an arrest, but the police officer will have the ability to go further and essentially search for more problematic substances. Allowing a broad interpretation of "attendant circumstances" and "an articulable basis for suspicion" will forever keep the door open for racial profiling because of either cultural incompetence or an insurmountable core belief that minorities are predisposed to criminal behavior.
a pressing question is whether legalizing marijuana will benefit African-American communities the impact will be more adverse than positive though there is no racial difference regarding the use of marijuana, arrests for its possession are still disproportionate legalization does not mean that police will cease targeting African-Americans marijuana acts as a tool to usher minorities into the system possession may not result in an arrest, but the police officer will have the ability to go further Allowing a broad interpretation of "attendant circumstances" and suspicion" will forever keep the door open for racial profiling
In a 2014 interview with David Remnick from The New Yorker, President Barack Obama stated: "African-American kids and Latino kids are more likely to be poor and less likely to have the resources and the support to avoid unduly harsh penalties; we should not be locking up kids or individual users for long stretches of jail time when some of the folks who are writing those laws have probably done the same thing." Legalizing marijuana provides for the opportunity to re-purpose federal and state funding, spur economic development, and proactively provide safer "drugs" in our society. However, a more pressing question is whether legalizing marijuana will actually benefit African-American indigent communities. This note predicts that the impact will be more adverse than positive. Negative Impact According to the American Civil Liberties Union, African-Americans are 3.73 times more likely than whites to be arrested for marijuana, despite roughly equal usage. This statistic is revealing because even though there is no racial difference regarding the use of marijuana, arrests for its possession are still disproportionate within the criminal justice system. Therefore, the legalization of marijuana does not necessarily mean that police will cease targeting African-Americans. Instead, marijuana acts as a tool to usher minorities into the system. For example, New York City is known for its "Stop and Frisk" program, wherein police officers can intrude upon the liberty of persons in public places for investigative purposes consisting of a "stop" to demand identification and an explanation, followed by a frisk where there is an articulable basis for suspecting the person is armed with a weapon. If marijuana was legal, possession may not result in an arrest, but the police officer will have the ability to go further and essentially search for more problematic substances. Allowing a broad interpretation of "attendant circumstances" and "an articulable basis for suspicion" will forever keep the door open for racial profiling because of either cultural incompetence or an insurmountable core belief that minorities are predisposed to criminal behavior. Federal Focus In terms of federal enforcement, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that state laws, which legalize or permit certain marijuana-related activity, do not preclude federal enforcement of the controlled substance. Recently, the Obama administration has taken a stance that will allow states to move forward with their own legalization or decriminalization laws, but has indicated that distribution of marijuana to minors will necessarily entail special attention and a vigorous federal response. Federal Funding Legalization can have the positive effect of directing the allocation of funds--received by federal programs such as the Edward Byrnes Justice Assistance Program--toward more devastating and detrimental substances, such as heroine and methamphetamines. Elimination of performance measure-based criminal justice programs geared toward drug enforcement should be a focal point of the Justice Assistance Program that works with state and municipality applicants seeking funding. States hoping to legalize marijuana can be enticed into helping the federal government achieve its goals of prohibiting distribution to minors and sales across state lines. This might be accomplished by making funding available only to those states which provide legalization plans that detail as much, but that also include periodic reporting that correlates race with drug-related arrests.
3,556
<h4>Legalization doesn’t solve racial profiling- it only increases minority targeting </h4><p><u><strong>Booth ‘14 </u></strong>(Quincy Booth University of Pittsburgh School of Law. “THE IMPACTS OF MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION AND DECRIMINALIZATION ON HISTORICALLY TARGETED MINORITY GROUPS” April 4, 2014 Lawyers Journal 16 Lawyers J. 12, Lexis, TSW)</p><p>In a 2014 interview with David Remnick from The New Yorker, President Barack Obama stated: "African-American kids and Latino kids are more likely to be poor and less likely to have the resources and the support to avoid unduly harsh penalties; we should not be locking up kids or individual users for long stretches of jail time when some of the folks who are writing those laws have probably done the same thing." Legalizing marijuana provides for the opportunity to re-purpose federal and state funding, spur economic development, and proactively provide safer "drugs" in our society. However, <u><mark>a</mark> more <mark>pressing question is whether legalizing marijuana will</mark> actually <mark>benefit African-American</mark> indigent <mark>communities</mark>. This note predicts that <mark>the impact will be more adverse than positive</mark>.</u> Negative Impact According to the American Civil Liberties Union, African-Americans are 3.73 times more likely than whites to be arrested for marijuana, despite roughly equal usage. This statistic is revealing because even <u><mark>though there is no racial difference regarding the use of marijuana, arrests for its possession are still disproportionate</mark> within the criminal justice system. Therefore, the <mark>legalization</mark> of marijuana <mark>does not</mark> necessarily <mark>mean that police will cease targeting African-Americans</mark>. Instead, <mark>marijuana acts as a tool to usher minorities into the system</mark>. </u>For example, New York City is known for its "Stop and Frisk" program, wherein police officers can intrude upon the liberty of persons in public places for investigative purposes consisting of a "stop" to demand identification and an explanation, followed by a frisk where there is an articulable basis for suspecting the person is armed with a weapon. <u>If marijuana was legal, <mark>possession may not result in an arrest, but the police officer will have the ability to go further</mark> and essentially search for more problematic substances. <mark>Allowing a broad interpretation of "attendant circumstances" and</mark> "an articulable basis for <mark>suspicion" will forever keep the door open for racial profiling</mark> because of either cultural incompetence or an insurmountable core belief that minorities are predisposed to criminal behavior.</u> Federal Focus In terms of federal enforcement, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that state laws, which legalize or permit certain marijuana-related activity, do not preclude federal enforcement of the controlled substance. Recently, the Obama administration has taken a stance that will allow states to move forward with their own legalization or decriminalization laws, but has indicated that distribution of marijuana to minors will necessarily entail special attention and a vigorous federal response. Federal Funding Legalization can have the positive effect of directing the allocation of funds--received by federal programs such as the Edward Byrnes Justice Assistance Program--toward more devastating and detrimental substances, such as heroine and methamphetamines. Elimination of performance measure-based criminal justice programs geared toward drug enforcement should be a focal point of the Justice Assistance Program that works with state and municipality applicants seeking funding. States hoping to legalize marijuana can be enticed into helping the federal government achieve its goals of prohibiting distribution to minors and sales across state lines. This might be accomplished by making funding available only to those states which provide legalization plans that detail as much, but that also include periodic reporting that correlates race with drug-related arrests. </p>
1NC
null
Case
430,191
11
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,364
The United States should:--implement a modified mandated choice program for organ donation based on the Illinois model,--increase public outreach for organ donation including methods such as social media,--and create training programs for doctors and nurses in best practices regarding discussion of organ donation with family members.
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>The United States should:--implement a modified mandated choice program for organ donation based on the Illinois model,--increase public outreach for organ donation including methods such as social media,--and create training programs for doctors and nurses in best practices regarding discussion of organ donation with family members.</h4>
1NC
null
Off
430,190
1
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,365
The affirmative’s discourse of disease securitizes the alien body of the infected – justifies ethnic cleansing in pursuit of the “perfect human”
Gomel 2000
Gomel 2000 (Elana Gomel, English department head at Tel Aviv University, Winter 2000, published in Twentieth Century Literature Volume 46, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0403/is_4_46/ai_75141042)
In the secular apocalyptic visions that have proliferated wildly in the last 200 years, the world has been destroyed by nuclear wars, alien invasions, climatic changes, social upheavals, meteor strikes, and technological shutdowns. These baroque scenarios are shaped by the eroticism of disaster The apocalyptic desire that finds satisfaction in elaborating fictions of the End is double-edged. On the one hand, its ultimate object is some version of the crystalline New Jerusalem, an image of purity so absolute that it denies the organic messiness of life. [1] On the other hand, apocalyptic fictions typically linger on pain and suffering The end result of apocalyptic purification often seems of less importance than the narrative pleasure derived from the bizarre and opulent tribulations of the bodies being burnt by fire and brimstone, tormented by scorpion stings, trodden like grapes in the winepress In this interplay the apocalyptic body is born. It is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health, whose grotesque and excessive sexuality issues in angelic sexlessness, and whose torture underpins a painless--and lifeless--millennium Any apocalypse strikes the body politic like a disease, progressing from the first symptoms of a large-scale disaster through the crisis of the tribulation to the recovery of the millennium. But of all the Four Horsemen, the one whose ride begins most intimately, in the private travails of individual flesh, and ends in the devastation of the entire community, is the last one, Pestilence. The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality along the lines of Sontag's classic delineation and many subsequent attempts to develop a poetics of AIDS , my focus is on the general narrativity of contagion and on the way the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall plot of apocalyptic millennialism, which is a powerful ideological current in twentieth-century political history, embracing such diverse manifestations as religious fundamentalism, Nazism, and other forms of "radical desperation" All apocalyptic and millenarian ideologies ultimately converge on the utopian transformation of the body (and the body politic) through suffering , it may be appropriated to the standard plot of apocalyptic purification as a singularly atrocious technique of separating the damned from the saved. Thus the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning as such both in Mein Kampf and in Camus's The Plague On the other hand, the experience of a pandemic undermines the giddy hopefulness of Endism. Since everybody is a potential victim, the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision. Contemporary plague narratives, including the burgeoning discourse of AIDS, are caught between two contrary textual impulses: acquiescence in a (super) natural judgment and political activism. Their impossible combination produces a clash of two distinct plot modalities. In his contemporary incarnations the Fourth Horseman vacillates between the voluptuous entropy of indiscriminate killing and the genocidal energy directed at specific categories of victims. As Richard Dellamora points out in his gloss on Derrida, apocalypse may be used "in order to validate violence done to others
apocalyptic fictions linger on pain and suffering. The end result the apocalyptic body is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall plot of apocalyptic millennialism a powerful ideological current embracing fundamentalism, Nazism, and desperation the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning in Mein Kampf the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision apocalypse may be used "in order to validate violence done to others
In the secular apocalyptic visions that have proliferated wildly in the last 200 years, the world has been destroyed by nuclear wars, alien invasions, climatic changes, social upheavals, meteor strikes, and technological shutdowns. These baroque scenarios are shaped by the eroticism of disaster. The apocalyptic desire that finds satisfaction in elaborating fictions of the End is double-edged. On the one hand, its ultimate object is some version of the crystalline New Jerusalem, an image of purity so absolute that it denies the organic messiness of life. [1] On the other hand, apocalyptic fictions typically linger on pain and suffering. The end result of apocalyptic purification often seems of less importance than the narrative pleasure derived from the bizarre and opulent tribulations of the bodies being burnt by fire and brimstone, tormented by scorpion stings, trodden like grapes in the winepress. In this interplay between the incorporeal purity of the ends and the violent corporeality of the means the apocalyptic body is born. It is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health, whose grotesque and excessive sexuality issues in angelic sexlessness, and whose torture underpins a painless--and lifeless--millennium.The apocalyptic body is perverse, points out Tina Pippin, unstable and mutating from maleness to femaleness and back again, purified by the sadomasochistic "bloodletting on the cross," trembling in abject terror while awaiting an unearthly consummation (122). But most of all it is a suffering body, a text written in the script of stigmata, scars, wounds, and sores. Any apocalypse strikes the body politic like a disease, progressing from the first symptoms of a large-scale disaster through the crisis of the tribulation to the recovery of the millennium. But of all the Four Horsemen, the one whose ride begins most intimately, in the private travails of individual flesh, and ends in the devastation of the entire community, is the last one, Pestilence. The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality. At the same time, I will argue, it contains a counterapocalyptic potential, resisting the dangerous lure of Endism, the ideologically potent combination of "apocalyptic terror", a nd "millennial perfection" (Quinby 2). This essay, a brief sketch of the poetics and politics of the contagious body, does not attempt a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the trope of pestilence. Nor does it limit itself to a particular disease, along the lines of Susan Sontag's classic delineation of the poetics of TB and many subsequent attempts to develop a poetics of AIDS. Rather, my focus is on the general narrativity of contagion and on the way the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall plot of apocalyptic millennialism, which is a powerful ideological current in twentieth-century political history, embracing such diverse manifestations as religious fundamentalism, Nazism, and other forms of "radical desperation" (Quinby 4--5). Thus, I consider both real and imaginary diseases, focusing on the narrative construction of the contagious body rather than on the precise epidemiology of the contagion. All apocalyptic and millenarian ideologies ultimately converge on the utopian transformation of the body (and the body politic) through suffering. But pestilence offers a uniquely ambivalent modality of corporeal apocalypse. On the one hand, it may be appropriated to the standard plot of apocalyptic purification as a singularly atrocious technique of separating the damned from the saved. Thus, the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning as such both in Mein Kampf and in Camus's The Plague.[2] On the other hand, the experience of a pandemic undermines the giddy hopefulness of Endism. Since everybody is a potential victim, the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision. Instead of delivering the climactic moment of the Last Judgment, pestilence lingers on, generating a limbo of common suffering in which a tenuous and moribund but all-embracing body politic springs into being. The end is indefinitely postponed and the disease becomes a metaphor for the process of livi ng. The finality of mortality clashes with the duration of morbidity. Pestilence is poised on the cusp between divine punishment and manmade disaster. On the one hand, unlike nuclear war or ecological catastrophe, pandemic has a venerable historical pedigree that leads back from current bestsellers such as Pierre Quellette's The Third Pandemic (1996) to the medieval horrors of the Black Death and indeed to the Book of Revelation itself. On the other hand, disease is one of the central tropes of biopolitics, shaping much of the twentieth-century discourse of power, domination, and the body. Contemporary plague narratives, including the burgeoning discourse of AIDS, are caught between two contrary textual impulses: acquiescence in a (super) natural judgment and political activism. Their impossible combination produces a clash of two distinct plot modalities. In his contemporary incarnations the Fourth Horseman vacillates between the voluptuous entropy of indiscriminate killing and the genocidal energy directed at specific categories of victims. As Richard Dellamora points out in his gloss on Derrida, apocalypse in general may be used "in order to validate violence done to others" while it may also function as a modality of total resistance to the existing order (3). But my concern here is not so much with the difference between "good" and "bad" apocalypses (is total extinction "better" than selective genocide?) as with the interplay of eschatology and politics in the construction of the apocalyptic body.
5,783
<h4>The affirmative’s discourse of disease securitizes the alien body of the infected – justifies ethnic cleansing in pursuit of the “perfect human”</h4><p><u><strong>Gomel 2000</u> </strong>(Elana Gomel, English department head at Tel Aviv University, Winter 2000, published in Twentieth Century Literature Volume 46, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0403/is_4_46/ai_75141042)</p><p><u>In the secular apocalyptic visions that have proliferated wildly in the last 200 years, the world has been destroyed by nuclear wars, alien invasions, climatic changes, social upheavals, meteor strikes, and technological shutdowns. These baroque scenarios are shaped by the eroticism of disaster</u>. <u>The apocalyptic desire that finds satisfaction in elaborating fictions of the End is double-edged. On the one hand, its ultimate object is some version of the crystalline New Jerusalem, an image of purity so absolute that it denies the organic messiness of life. [1] On the other hand, <mark>apocalyptic fictions</mark> typically <mark>linger on pain and suffering</u>. <u>The end result</mark> of apocalyptic purification often seems of less importance than the narrative pleasure derived from the bizarre and opulent tribulations of the bodies being burnt by fire and brimstone, tormented by scorpion stings, trodden like grapes in the winepress</u>. <u>In this interplay</u> between the incorporeal purity of the ends and the violent corporeality of the means <u><mark>the apocalyptic body</mark> is born. It <mark>is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health</mark>, whose grotesque and excessive sexuality issues in angelic sexlessness, and whose torture underpins a painless--and lifeless--millennium</u>.The apocalyptic body is perverse, points out Tina Pippin, unstable and mutating from maleness to femaleness and back again, purified by the sadomasochistic "bloodletting on the cross," trembling in abject terror while awaiting an unearthly consummation (122). But most of all it is a suffering body, a text written in the script of stigmata, scars, wounds, and sores. <u>Any apocalypse strikes the body politic like a disease, progressing from the first symptoms of a large-scale disaster through the crisis of the tribulation to the recovery of the millennium. But of all the Four Horsemen, the one whose ride begins most intimately, in the private travails of individual flesh, and ends in the devastation of the entire community, is the last one, Pestilence. <mark>The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality</u></mark>. At the same time, I will argue, it contains a counterapocalyptic potential, resisting the dangerous lure of Endism, the ideologically potent combination of "apocalyptic terror", a nd "millennial perfection" (Quinby 2). This essay, a brief sketch of the poetics and politics of the contagious body, does not attempt a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the trope of pestilence. Nor does it limit itself to a particular disease, <u>along the lines of</u> Susan <u>Sontag's classic delineation</u> of the poetics of TB <u>and many subsequent attempts to develop a poetics of AIDS</u>. Rather<u>, my focus is on the general narrativity of contagion and on the way <mark>the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall plot of apocalyptic millennialism</mark>, which is <mark>a powerful ideological current</mark> in twentieth-century political history, <mark>embracing</mark> such diverse manifestations as religious <mark>fundamentalism, Nazism, and</mark> other forms of "radical <mark>desperation</mark>"</u> (Quinby 4--5). Thus, I consider both real and imaginary diseases, focusing on the narrative construction of the contagious body rather than on the precise epidemiology of the contagion. <u>All apocalyptic and millenarian ideologies ultimately converge on the utopian transformation of the body (and the body politic) through suffering</u>. But pestilence offers a uniquely ambivalent modality of corporeal apocalypse. On the one hand<u>, it may be appropriated to the standard plot of apocalyptic purification as a singularly atrocious technique of separating the damned from the saved. Thus</u>, <u><mark>the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning</mark> as such both <mark>in Mein Kampf</mark> and in Camus's The Plague</u>.[2] <u>On the other hand, the experience of a pandemic undermines the giddy hopefulness of Endism. Since everybody is a potential victim,</u> <u><mark>the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision</mark>.</u> Instead of delivering the climactic moment of the Last Judgment, pestilence lingers on, generating a limbo of common suffering in which a tenuous and moribund but all-embracing body politic springs into being. The end is indefinitely postponed and the disease becomes a metaphor for the process of livi ng. The finality of mortality clashes with the duration of morbidity. Pestilence is poised on the cusp between divine punishment and manmade disaster. On the one hand, unlike nuclear war or ecological catastrophe, pandemic has a venerable historical pedigree that leads back from current bestsellers such as Pierre Quellette's The Third Pandemic (1996) to the medieval horrors of the Black Death and indeed to the Book of Revelation itself. On the other hand, disease is one of the central tropes of biopolitics, shaping much of the twentieth-century discourse of power, domination, and the body. <u>Contemporary plague narratives, including the burgeoning discourse of AIDS, are caught between two contrary textual impulses: acquiescence in a (super) natural judgment and political activism. Their impossible combination produces a clash of two distinct plot modalities.</u> <u>In his contemporary incarnations the Fourth Horseman vacillates between the voluptuous entropy of indiscriminate killing and the genocidal energy directed at specific categories of victims. As Richard Dellamora points out in his gloss on Derrida, <mark>apocalypse</mark> </u>in general<u> <mark>may be used "in order to validate violence done to others</u></mark>" while it may also function as a modality of total resistance to the existing order (3). But my concern here is not so much with the difference between "good" and "bad" apocalypses (is total extinction "better" than selective genocide?) as with the interplay of eschatology and politics in the construction of the apocalyptic body.</p>
1NC
null
Off
91,430
20
17,011
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
564,718
N
Wake
7
UNLV GV
Calum Matheson
1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,366
Movements fail motivation for legalization comes from pragmatism that doesn’t remedy moral concerns
W.W. ‘13
W.W. ‘13 (W.W. “Leveraging racism” Jun 11th 2013, 16:55 by http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/06/marijuana-legalisation)
Galston and Dionne scholars at the Brookings Institution warn legalisers not to get too excited Support for legalization is not as intense as opposition, and is likely to remain relatively shallow support comes from the belief that benefits of prohibition have not outweighed the costs. Such pragmatism rarely generates the moral passion necessary to overwhelm fervent moral opposition and bring about lasting change
scholars at the Brookings Institution warn legalisers not to get too excited Support for legalization is not as intense as opposition, and is likely to remain relatively shallow support comes from the belief that benefits of prohibition have not outweighed the costs. pragmatism rarely generates the moral passion necessary to overwhelm fervent moral opposition and bring about lasting change.
A MAJORITY of Americans now favour the legalisation of marijuana. Two decades ago, 80% opposed it. Remarkably, about a third of the swing in public opinion came in just the past three years. It seems the tide has turned. However, William Galston and E.J. Dionne, scholars at the Brookings Institution, warn legalisers not to get too excited. MARKED "Support for legalization, though growing markedly", they write, "is not as intense as opposition, and is likely to remain relatively shallow so long as marijuana itself is not seen as a positive good." The trend in favour of legal weed, they observe, is not as inexorable as the trend toward the legal recognition of same-sex marriages. Much of the support for legalisation comes from the increasingly widespread belief that the benefits of prohibition have not outweighed the costs. Such pragmatism may be enough to shift opinions about the wisdom of legalisation, but it rarely generates the moral passion necessary to overwhelm fervent moral opposition and bring about lasting change.
1,037
<h4><u><strong>Movements fail motivation for legalization comes from pragmatism that doesn’t remedy moral concerns </h4><p>W.W. ‘13</p><p></u></strong>(W.W. “Leveraging racism” Jun 11th 2013, 16:55 by http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/06/marijuana-legalisation)</p><p>A MAJORITY of Americans now favour the legalisation of marijuana. Two decades ago, 80% opposed it. Remarkably, about a third of the swing in public opinion came in just the past three years. It seems the tide has turned. However, William <u>Galston</u> <u>and</u> E.J. <u>Dionne</u>, <u><mark>scholars at the Brookings Institution</u></mark>, <u><strong><mark>warn legalisers not to get too excited</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>MARKED</p><p> "<u><strong><mark>Support for legalization</u></strong></mark>, though growing markedly", they write, "<u><strong><mark>is not as intense as opposition,</mark> <mark>and is likely to remain relatively shallow</u></strong></mark> so long as marijuana itself is not seen as a positive good." The trend in favour of legal weed, they observe, is not as inexorable as the trend toward the legal recognition of same-sex marriages. Much of the <u><strong><mark>support</u></strong></mark> for legalisation <u><strong><mark>comes from the</u></strong></mark> increasingly widespread <u><strong><mark>belief that</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>benefits of prohibition have not outweighed the costs. </mark>Such <mark>pragmatism</u></strong></mark> may be enough to shift opinions about the wisdom of legalisation, but it <u><strong><mark>rarely generates the moral passion necessary to overwhelm fervent moral opposition and bring about lasting change</u></strong>.</p></mark>
1NC
null
Case
430,192
2
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,367
Mandated choice solves the case
Thaler 9
Thaler 9 (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz
Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular many people consider it “repugnant,” they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter there is another possibility, called “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference this system has been in use since 2006 and doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers. When you go to renew your driver’s license and update your photograph, you are required to answer this question: “Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state now has a 60 percent donor signup rate That is much higher than the national rate of 38 percent There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission the First-Person Consent Law makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding mandated choice may achieve a higher rate of donations than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination
a market allowing the selling of organs The idea is spectacularly unpopular people consider it “repugnant,” they object to rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell kidneys a legal market for organs is a political nonstarter “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers When you renew your driver’s license you are required to answer Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state has a 60 percent donor signup rate much higher than the national rate of 38 the First-Person Consent Law makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding mandated choice may achieve a higher rate than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent
Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply.¶ The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many people consider it “repugnant,” mainly for two reasons. First, they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys.¶ These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney?¶ Still, whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily.¶ Nationwide, roughly 12,000 to 15,000 people fall into this category each year, but only half end up as donors. Because each such donor could supply an average of three organs, having another thousand donors could save 3,000 lives. We need more people to agree to be donors in advance.¶ One strategy is to alter the default rules for signup. Most states, as well as many other countries, use an “opt in” or “explicit consent” rule, meaning that people must take a concrete action, like going to a public library or requesting and mailing in a form, to declare they want to be donors. But many who are willing to donate organs never get around to such steps.¶ An alternative approach, used in several European countries, is an “opt out” rule, often called “presumed consent,” in which citizens are presumed to be consenting donors unless they act to register their unwillingness.¶ In the world of traditional economics, it shouldn’t matter whether you use an opt-in or opt-out system. So long as the costs of registering as a donor or a nondonor are low, the results should be similar. But many findings of behavioral economics show that tiny disparities in such rules can make a big difference.¶ By comparing the consent rates in European countries, the psychologists Eric Johnson and Dan Goldstein have shown that the choice of opting in or opting out is a major factor.¶ Consider the difference in consent rates between two similar countries, Austria and Germany. In Germany, which uses an opt-in system, only 12 percent give their consent; in Austria, which uses opt-out, nearly everyone (99 percent) does.¶ Although presumed consent is generally accepted in countries that have adopted it, the idea can bring strong opposition. Many people object to anyone presuming anything about their organs, even if the costs of opting out are low. In Britain, a proposal by the Labour government to adopt an opt-out system was opposed by Muslims who objected to organ removal on religious grounds.¶ Fortunately, there is another possibility, called “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference. In Illinois, where I live, this system has been in use since 2006 and doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers. ¶ Here is how it works: When you go to renew your driver’s license and update your photograph, you are required to answer this question: “Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state now has a 60 percent donor signup rate, according to Donate Life Illinois, a coalition of agencies. That is much higher than the national rate of 38 percent reported by Donate Life America¶ The Illinois system has another advantage. There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission. In France, for example, although there is technically a presumed-consent law, in practice doctors still seek relatives’ approval. In Illinois, the First-Person Consent Law, which created this system, makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding. Thus, mandated choice may achieve a higher rate of donations than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination.
4,578
<h4>Mandated choice solves the case</h4><p><u><strong>Thaler 9</u></strong> (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz</p><p><u>Some economists have come up with a simple solution: <mark>a market allowing the</mark> buying and <mark>selling of organs</u></mark>. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply.¶ <u><mark>The idea</mark> may have some merit, but it <mark>is <strong>spectacularly unpopular</u></strong></mark>. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, <u><strong>many <mark>people consider it “repugnant,”</u></strong></mark> mainly for two reasons. First, <u><mark>they object to</mark> the possibility of <mark>rich people buying their way to the front of the line</u></mark>. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, <u><mark>they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell</mark> their <mark>kidneys</u></mark>.¶ These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney?¶ Still, <u>whether you think <mark>a legal market for organs is</mark> a brilliant or a dreadful idea, <strong>it’s <mark>a political nonstarter</u></strong></mark>, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily.¶ Nationwide, roughly 12,000 to 15,000 people fall into this category each year, but only half end up as donors. Because each such donor could supply an average of three organs, having another thousand donors could save 3,000 lives. We need more people to agree to be donors in advance.¶ One strategy is to alter the default rules for signup. Most states, as well as many other countries, use an “opt in” or “explicit consent” rule, meaning that people must take a concrete action, like going to a public library or requesting and mailing in a form, to declare they want to be donors. But many who are willing to donate organs never get around to such steps.¶ An alternative approach, used in several European countries, is an “opt out” rule, often called “presumed consent,” in which citizens are presumed to be consenting donors unless they act to register their unwillingness.¶ In the world of traditional economics, it shouldn’t matter whether you use an opt-in or opt-out system. So long as the costs of registering as a donor or a nondonor are low, the results should be similar. But many findings of behavioral economics show that tiny disparities in such rules can make a big difference.¶ By comparing the consent rates in European countries, the psychologists Eric Johnson and Dan Goldstein have shown that the choice of opting in or opting out is a major factor.¶ Consider the difference in consent rates between two similar countries, Austria and Germany. In Germany, which uses an opt-in system, only 12 percent give their consent; in Austria, which uses opt-out, nearly everyone (99 percent) does.¶ Although presumed consent is generally accepted in countries that have adopted it, the idea can bring strong opposition. Many people object to anyone presuming anything about their organs, even if the costs of opting out are low. In Britain, a proposal by the Labour government to adopt an opt-out system was opposed by Muslims who objected to organ removal on religious grounds.¶ Fortunately, <u>there is another possibility, called <mark>“mandated choice,” under which people <strong>must indicate their preference</u></strong></mark>. In Illinois, where I live, <u>this system has been in use since 2006 and <strong><mark>doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers</strong></mark>.</u> ¶ Here is how it works: <u><mark>When you</mark> go to <mark>renew your driver’s license</mark> and update your photograph, <mark>you are required to answer</mark> this question: “<mark>Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state</mark> now <mark>has a <strong>60 percent donor signup rate</u></strong></mark>, according to Donate Life Illinois, a coalition of agencies. <u>That is <strong><mark>much higher than the national rate of 38</mark> percent</u></strong> reported by Donate Life America¶ The Illinois system has another advantage. <u>There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission</u>. In France, for example, although there is technically a presumed-consent law, in practice doctors still seek relatives’ approval. In Illinois, <u><mark>the First-Person Consent Law</u></mark>, which created this system, <u><mark>makes one’s wishes to be a donor <strong>legally binding</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u><mark>mandated choice may achieve a <strong>higher rate</mark> of donations <mark>than presumed consent</strong>, and <strong>avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent</strong></mark> for whatever reasons. <strong>This is a winning combination</u></strong>.</p>
1NC
null
Off
429,528
11
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,368
This drive for certainty constitutes a violent political subjectivity which makes warfare and catastrophe inevitable
Burke 7
Burke 7 (Anthony Burke, associate professor of international and political studies at the University of New South Wales, PhD in political science and international relations from the Australian National University, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Theory and Event Volume 10 Issue 2, modified) gz
This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes' I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth' in its most sweeping and powerful form I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt' The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction In the era of a 'war on terror' the arguments that violence collapses ends into means and that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them' take on added significance they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of humanity as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects 'we are ready for the next war' 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined being implies action, the action that is war This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth without interrogating more deeply our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made. we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political. While Morgenthau defined security relatively narrowly what was revealing about his formulation was not merely the ontological centrality it had, but the sense of urgency and priority he accorded to it: it must be defended 'without compromise' When this is combined with the way in which security was conceived in modern political thought as an existential condition -- a sine qua non of life and sovereign political existence -- and then married to war and instrumental action, it provides a basic underpinning for either the limitless resort to strategic violence without effective constraint, or the perseverance of limited war (with its inherent tendencies to escalation) as a permanent feature of politics
war cuts beneath the play of institutional, economic or political interests they flow over a deeper bedrock of reason 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses are truth-systems ontologies which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained ontology as a claim to an underlying foundation for truth not timeless, but contingent a drive for ontological certainty amounts to a drive for ideational closure that limits debate within a closed system of logic an epistemology of violence joined to an ontology of violence both quicken the resort to war and lead to its escalation they reinforce a norm of war -- and enact an 'enframing' in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use and destruction force produces neither the linear effects imagined nor security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction techniques of military action use force to achieve a desired end supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order violence becomes an essential predicate of its perpetuation humans have no essence outside their value as objects 'the next war is seen as natural being implies action, the action that is war without interrogating our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue we are far from powerless The need is to critique dominant images of political being and ways of securing that being When security was conceived as a sine qua non of life and sovereign existence -- and married to war and instrumental action, it provides limitless violence without constraint war as a permanent feature of politics
This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man [humanity] ' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22 The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made. The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political. Friend and Enemy: Violent Ontologies of the Nation-State In his Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau stated that 'the national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, which is the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power and without compromise'. While Morgenthau defined security relatively narrowly -- as the 'integrity of the national territory and its institutions' -- in a context where security was in practice defined expansively, as synonymous with a state's broadest geopolitical and economic 'interests', what was revealing about his formulation was not merely the ontological centrality it had, but the sense of urgency and priority he accorded to it: it must be defended 'without compromise'.27 Morgenthau was a thoughtful and complex thinker, and understood well the complexities and dangers of using armed force. However his formulation reflected an influential view about the significance of the political good termed 'security'. When this is combined with the way in which security was conceived in modern political thought as an existential condition -- a sine qua non of life and sovereign political existence -- and then married to war and instrumental action, it provides a basic underpinning for either the limitless resort to strategic violence without effective constraint, or the perseverance of limited war (with its inherent tendencies to escalation) as a permanent feature of politics. While he was no militarist, Morgenthau did say elsewhere (in, of all places, a far-reaching critique of nuclear strategy) that the 'quantitative and qualitative competition for conventional weapons is a rational instrument of international politics'.28
12,539
<h4>This drive for certainty constitutes a violent political subjectivity which makes warfare and catastrophe inevitable</h4><p><u><strong>Burke 7</u></strong> (Anthony Burke, associate professor of international and political studies at the University of New South Wales, PhD in political science and international relations from the Australian National University, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Theory and Event Volume 10 Issue 2, modified) <u>gz</p><p>This essay develops a theory about the causes of <mark>war</mark> -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that <strong><mark>cuts beneath</strong></mark> analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or <mark>the play of institutional, economic or political interests</mark> (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but <mark>they flow over a <strong>deeper bedrock of</mark> modern <mark>reason</strong></mark> that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself</u>. In this light, <u>the two <mark>'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses</mark> of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are <strong>more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses</u></strong>. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. <u>They <mark>are truth-systems</mark> of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: <mark>ontologies</mark>, statements about truth and being <mark>which claim a <strong>rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained</mark> as it is</strong>.</p><p></u>I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: <u>ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being</u> (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), <u>and as a statement of <strong>epistemological truth and certainty</strong>, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty</u> (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). <u>These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a <strong>solid metaphysical account</strong> of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'</u>.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, <u>I see <mark>ontology as</mark> a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: <mark>a claim to</mark> the status of <mark>an <strong>underlying</mark> systemic <mark>foundation for truth</mark>, identity, existence and action</strong>; one that is <mark>not</mark> essential or <mark>timeless, but</mark> is thoroughly <strong>historical and <mark>contingent</strong></mark>, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, <strong>ontology is the 'politics of truth'</u></strong>18 <u>in its most sweeping and powerful form</u>.</p><p><u>I see such <mark>a <strong>drive for ontological certainty</mark> and completion</strong> as particularly problematic for a number of reasons</u>. Firstly, <u>when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it <mark>amounts to</mark> <strong>a hard and exclusivist claim</strong>: <mark>a drive for ideational</mark> hegemony and <mark>closure that <strong>limits debate</mark> and questioning</strong>, that confines it <mark>within</mark> the boundaries of<mark> a </mark>particular, <mark>closed system of logic</mark>, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the <strong>truth of truth as such</u></strong>. The second is its intimate relation with violence: <u>the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to <strong><mark>an epistemology of violence</strong></mark> (strategy) <strong><mark>joined to an ontology of violence</strong></mark> (the national security state).</u> When we consider their relation to war, <u>the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends <mark>both</mark> to <strong><mark>quicken the resort to war and</mark> to <mark>lead to its escalation</strong></mark> either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects</u>. In such a context <u>violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being</u>.</p><p>This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. <u>This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- <mark>they</mark> <strong>embody and <mark>reinforce a norm of war</strong> -- and</mark> because they <mark>enact</mark> what Martin Heidegger calls <strong><mark>an 'enframing'</mark> image of technology</strong> and being <mark>in which <strong>humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use</mark>, control <mark>and destruction</mark>, and force</strong> -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'</u>.19 <u>The pragmatic problem arises because <mark>force</mark> so often <mark>produces <strong>neither the linear</mark> system of <mark>effects imagined</mark> in strategic theory <mark>nor</mark> anything we could meaningfully call <mark>security</strong>, but rather turns in upon itself in a <strong>nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction</u></strong></mark>. <u>In the era of a 'war on terror'</u> dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 <u>the arguments</u> of Hannah Arendt (<u>that violence <strong>collapses ends into means</u></strong>) <u>and</u> Emmanuel Levinas (<u>that 'every war employs <strong>arms that turn against those that wield them'</u></strong>) <u>take on added significance</u>. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21</p><p>What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather <u>they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply <strong>an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action</strong>, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity</u>. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action.</p><p><u>The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about <mark>techniques of military</mark> and geopolitical <mark>action</mark> which <mark>use force</mark> and coercion <mark>to achieve a desired end</mark>, an end that is <mark>supplied by the <strong>ontological claim to national existence, security, or order</u></strong></mark>. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, <u>instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and <strong>the resort to <mark>violence becomes an </mark>equally <mark>essential predicate of its perpetuation</u></strong></mark>. In this way <u>knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of </u>'man [<u>humanity</u>] '<u> as a maker and user of things, including other <mark>humans</mark>, which <mark>have <strong>no essence</mark> or integrity <mark>outside their value as objects</u></strong></mark>. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: <u>'we are ready for the next war'</u>. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, <u><strong><mark>'the next war is seen as</mark> a <mark>natural</mark> phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise</u></strong>.' 22</p><p>The danger obviously raised here is that <u>these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose <strong>very process of construction cannot be examined</u></strong>. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, <u><mark>being implies action, <strong>the action that is war</u></strong></mark>. <u>This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues</u>, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, <u>that <strong>'the only path to safety is the path of action',</strong> which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state</u>.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that <u>obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing <strong>'problematizations' of truth</u></strong>.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However <u><mark>without interrogating</mark> more deeply</u> how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in <u><mark>our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue </mark>to be made.</p><p></u>The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, <u><strong><mark>we are far from powerless</strong></mark> in the face of them. <strong><mark>The need is to critique dominant images of political being and</mark> dominant <mark>ways of securing that being</strong></mark> at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.</p><p></u>Friend and Enemy: Violent Ontologies of the Nation-State</p><p>In his Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau stated that 'the national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, which is the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power and without compromise'. <u>While Morgenthau defined security relatively narrowly</u> -- as the 'integrity of the national territory and its institutions' -- in a context where security was in practice defined expansively, as synonymous with a state's broadest geopolitical and economic 'interests', <u>what was revealing about his formulation was not merely the ontological centrality it had, but the sense of urgency and priority he accorded to it: it must be <strong>defended 'without compromise'</u></strong>.27 Morgenthau was a thoughtful and complex thinker, and understood well the complexities and dangers of using armed force. However his formulation reflected an influential view about the significance of the political good termed 'security'. <u><mark>When</mark> this is combined with the way in which <mark>security was conceived</mark> in modern political thought <mark>as</mark> an existential condition -- <strong><mark>a sine qua non of life and sovereign</mark> political <mark>existence</strong> -- and</mark> then <strong><mark>married to war and instrumental action</strong>, it provides</mark> a basic underpinning for either the <strong><mark>limitless</mark> resort to strategic <mark>violence without</mark> effective <mark>constraint</strong></mark>, or the perseverance of limited <mark>war</mark> (with its inherent tendencies to escalation) <mark>as <strong>a permanent feature of politics</u></strong></mark>. While he was no militarist, Morgenthau did say elsewhere (in, of all places, a far-reaching critique of nuclear strategy) that the 'quantitative and qualitative competition for conventional weapons is a rational instrument of international politics'.28</p>
1NC
null
Off
74,766
131
17,011
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
564,718
N
Wake
7
UNLV GV
Calum Matheson
1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,369
Thus the alternative is a form of acceleration of hegemonic practices to the level of the inane – we will concede their argument that we play into counterhegemony
Occupied UC Berkeley in 2010
Occupied UC Berkeley in 2010 (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620)
Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the socia a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect the power of knowledge, objectified the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university semiotic insurrectionaries blasted their way out so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything
Universities may serve as progressive this does not detract from the military and corporate research and social conditioning within their walls they serve as machines for concentration of privilege a hyper educated society can only exist by the intense exploitation of the third world liberal seminars obfuscate that they are complicit in death and destruction Social death is banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our lack of meaning the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy modern cities are ghost towns, cities of death ours is a culture of death By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are enrolling in a cemetery the cemeteries of a nation which has an absolute fixation with zombies The event is counter-offensive it reintroduces negativity and death The University, by perfecting its critiques, has generated its own antithesis zombies mark the dead end of capitalism’s accumulation because they embody this to excess they are the ideal resistance a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic Liberal student activists are most invested in the fate of the university they are insistent on saving the University when life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living Zombie Politics are the politics of a multitude seeking to consume brains knowledge, objectified the living dead awaken a passion for vertiginous disidentification at the core of our culture is the exclusion of the dead we risk failing to see that our lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates semiotic insurrectionaries burst into reality like a scream an anti-discourse that cannot be caught they resist every interpretation no longer denoting anything
Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other.¶ Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47]¶ ¶ Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations.¶ Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50]¶ In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw:¶ "at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53]¶ ¶ In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice:¶ ¶ "They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56]
7,659
<h4>Thus the alternative is a form of acceleration of hegemonic practices to the level of the inane – we will concede their argument that we play into counterhegemony</h4><p><u><strong>Occupied UC Berkeley in 2010</strong><mark> (anonymous graduate student in philosophy, “The University, Social Death and the Inside Joke,” http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620) </p><p>Universities may serve as progressive </mark>sites of inquiry in some cases, yet <mark>this does not detract from the</mark> great deal of <strong><mark>military and corporate research</strong></mark>, economic planning <mark>and</mark>, perhaps most importantly, <strong><mark>social conditioning</strong></mark> occurring <mark>within their walls</u></mark>. Furthermore, <u><mark>they serve as</mark> intense <mark>machines for</mark> the <strong><mark>concentration of privilege</strong></mark>; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts</u>, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since <u><mark>a hyper educated</mark>, stable <mark>society</mark> along Western lines <mark>can only exist by the <strong>intense exploitation of</mark> labor and resources in <mark>the third world</u></strong></mark>. <u>Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; <mark>liberal seminars</mark> only serve to <mark>obfuscate</mark> the fact <mark>that <strong>they are</mark> themselves <mark>complicit in</mark> the <mark>death and destruction</strong></mark> waged on a daily basis</u>. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “<u><strong><mark>Social death</strong> is</mark> our <strong><mark>banal acceptance</strong> of an institution’s meaning for our</mark> own <strong><mark>lack of meaning</u></strong></mark>.”[43] Our conception of the <u>social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication,</u> <u><strong><mark>the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy</u></strong></mark>. Baudrillard writes that “<u>The cemetery no longer exists because <strong><mark>modern cities</mark> have entirely taken over their function</strong>: they <mark>are <strong>ghost towns, cities of death</u></strong></mark>. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, <u><strong><mark>ours is a culture of death</u></strong></mark>.”[44] <u><mark>By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are</mark> resigning ourselves to <mark>enrolling in</u></mark> what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls <u><strong><mark>a cemetery</mark>, a necropolis to rival no other</u></strong>.¶ Yet <u>herein lies the punch line. We are studying in <mark>the cemeteries of a nation which has</mark> a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; <strong><mark>an absolute fixation with zombies</strong></mark>.</u> So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “<u><mark>The event</mark> itself <mark>is <strong>counter-offensive</strong></mark> and comes from a strange source: in <strong>every system</strong> at its apex, at its point of perfection, <mark>it <strong>reintroduces negativity and death</u></strong></mark>.”[45] <u><mark>The University, by</mark> totalizing itself and <mark>perfecting its critiques, has</mark> spontaneously <strong><mark>generated its own antithesis</strong></mark>. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent.</u> According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “<u><strong><mark>zombies mark the dead end</mark> or zero degree <mark>of capitalism’s</mark> logic of endless consumption and ever expanding <mark>accumulation</strong></mark>, precisely <mark>because they embody this</mark> logic so literally and <mark>to</mark> such <mark>excess</u></mark>.”[46] In that sense, <u><mark>they are</mark> almost identical to the mass, <strong>the silent majorities</strong> that Baudrillard describe as <mark>the <strong>ideal</mark> form of <mark>resistance</strong></mark> to the socia</u>l: “they know that there is no liberation, and that <u><mark>a system is abolished only by <strong>pushing it into hyperlogic</strong></mark>, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization</u>.”[47]¶ ¶ Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, <u>students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction</u>; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations.¶ Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] <u><strong><mark>Liberal student activists</strong></mark> fear the incursions the most, as they <mark>are</mark> in many ways the <strong><mark>most invested in the fate of the</mark> contemporary <mark>university</u></strong></mark>; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For <u><mark>they are insistent on <strong>saving the University</mark>, on staying ‘alive’</strong>, even <mark>when</mark> their version of <mark>life has been <strong>stripped of all that makes life worth living</strong></mark>, when it is as good as social death</u>. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, <u>human survivors act so repugnantly that <strong>we celebrate their infection or demise</u></strong>.[50]¶ In reality, “<u><mark>Zombie Politics</mark> are something to be championed, because <strong>they <mark>are the politics of a multitude</u></strong></mark>, an inclusive mass of political subjects, <u><mark>seeking to <strong>consume brains</u></strong></mark>. Yet <u>brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect</u>”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “<u>the power of <mark>knowledge, objectified</u></mark>.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that <u><mark>the living dead</mark> are not radically Other so much as they serve to <mark>awaken a passion</mark> for otherness and <mark>for vertiginous disidentification</mark> that is already latent within our own selves</u>.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw:¶ "<u><mark>at the</mark> very <mark>core</mark> of the 'rationality' <mark>of our culture</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>is</mark> an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: <strong><mark>the exclusion of the dead</mark> and of death</u></strong>."[53]¶ ¶ In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that <u>power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence</u>. If we are to continue to use this conception, <u><mark>we risk failing to see that our</mark> very <mark>lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: <strong>the banal simulation of existence</u></strong></mark>. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] <u>Perhaps the reevaluation of <mark>zombie politics will serve as the <strong>messianic shift that blasts open the gates</mark> of hell, the cemetery-university</u></strong>. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about <u><mark>semiotic insurrectionaries</u></mark> might suffice:¶ ¶ "They <u><strong>blasted their way out</u></strong> however, <u>so as to <mark>burst into reality like a scream</mark>, an interjection, <mark>an anti-discourse</mark>, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element <mark>that <strong>cannot be caught</mark> by any organized discourse</u></strong>. Invincible due to their own poverty, <u><mark>they resist every interpretation</mark> and every connotation, <strong><mark>no longer denoting</mark> anyone or <mark>anything</u></strong></mark>."[56]</p>
2NC
University
Alt
3,953
266
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,370
Altruistic donation is increasing---solves the shortage but it depends on fragile public trust---the plan wipes that out and turns the case
Danovitch 8
Gabriel Danovitch 8, M.D., Prof of Clinical Medicine and Nephrology at UCLA, and Francis Delmonico, MD, Clinical Prof of Surgery at Massachusetts General Hospital, “The prohibition of kidney sales and organ markets should remain,” Current Opinion in Organ Transplantation Volume 13(4), August 2008, p 386–394
One of the arguments repeatedly made in favor of commercialized donation is that the current noncommercial system has stagnated and is impotent to address the shortage It is no longer true that rates of donation are static In the U S through the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative’, the donation rate has risen 30% since January 2001 innovative endeavors to increase other sources include living donor exchange, intended candidate donation, desensitization use of donors after circulatory determination of death, and use of extended-criteria donor kidneys. The waiting list number of candidates on that list who are deemed ‘active’ and hence transplantable has been stable over several years It is not ‘pie in the sky’ to look forward to reduction in the waiting list to acceptable levels if we continue Progress is being made in improved allocation All of these new endeavors expand and exploit the altruistic driving force of our success to date. They build on what we know rather than endanger what we have achieved. organ sales regulated’ or otherwise, will inevitably undermine the considerable gains in noncommercial organ donation transplant community will be best served by investing in public trust and not undermining it.
arguments made in favor of commercialized donation is that the current system has stagnated and is impotent to address the shortage It is no longer true that rates of donation are static. through the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative’ donation has risen 30% since 01 innovative endeavors include exchange, intended candidate desensitization use after circulatory determination of death, and extended-criteria kidneys. number of candidates deemed transplantable has been stable over several years It is not ‘pie in the sky’ to look forward to reduction in the waiting list to acceptable levels if we continue Progress is being made All of these expand and exploit the altruistic success to date organ sales regulated’ or otherwise, will inevitably undermine considerable gains in noncommercial organ donation transplant will be best served by investing in public trust not undermining it
One of the arguments repeatedly made in favor of commercialized living donation is that the current noncommercial system has stagnated and is impotent to address the organ donor shortage. We most certainly share the legitimate concern for the suffering of those waiting for an organ; we are motivated by it. That concern in itself, however, does not represent an argument in favor of commercialization, because it is quite unclear that a commercial system would be effective and it could well be destructive. It is no longer true that the rates of deceased donor organ donation are static. In the United States, largely through the efforts of so-called ‘Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative’, the 3-month average deceased kidney donation rate has risen approximately 30% since January 2001, and these increases have largely reflected increases in recovery of kidneys from standard criteria donors [28]. Multiple innovative endeavors to increase other sources of donor organs are available. These include living donor exchange, intended candidate donation, desensitization protocols for positive cross-match–and blood group–incompatible pairs, increased use of donors after circulatory determination of death, and increased use of extended-criteria donor kidneys. The kidney transplant waiting list continues to grow but the number of candidates on that list who are deemed ‘active’ and hence transplantable has been stable over the last several years (www.unos.org accessed 3 April 2008). It is not ‘pie in the sky’ to look forward to a reduction in the waiting list to acceptable levels if we continue to invest our best efforts, resources, and ingenuity. Progress is also being made in the development of an improved allocation system for deceased donor kidneys that will better exploit the life prolonging benefit of the procedure [37•]. All of these new endeavors expand and exploit the noncommercial and altruistic driving force of our success to date. They build on what we know rather than endanger what we have achieved.¶ Conclusion¶ We do not doubt that those of our colleagues who support the commercialization of organ sales abhor the venal exploitation of vulnerable populations as a source of organs. We argue, however, that organ sales and markets, ‘regulated’ or otherwise, will inevitably lead to the furtherance of such exploitation and in the process undermine the considerable gains that have been made in noncommercial organ donation both from the living and the deceased. Our arguments are based not principally on theoretical or abstract ethical grounds but on documented practical experience and lessons learned from other disciplines. The international transplant community will be best served by investing in public trust and not undermining it.
2,775
<h4>Altruistic donation is increasing---solves the shortage but it depends on <u>fragile public trust</u>---the plan wipes that out and turns the case</h4><p>Gabriel <u><strong>Danovitch 8</u></strong>, M.D., Prof of Clinical Medicine and Nephrology at UCLA, and Francis Delmonico, MD, Clinical Prof of Surgery at Massachusetts General Hospital, “The prohibition of kidney sales and organ markets should remain,” Current Opinion in Organ Transplantation Volume 13(4), August 2008, p 386–394</p><p><u>One of the <mark>arguments </mark>repeatedly <mark>made in favor of commercialized</u></mark> living <u><mark>donation is that the current</mark> noncommercial <mark>system has <strong>stagnated</u></strong> <u>and is <strong>impotent</strong> to address the</u></mark> organ donor <u><mark>shortage</u></mark>. We most certainly share the legitimate concern for the suffering of those waiting for an organ; we are motivated by it. That concern in itself, however, does not represent an argument in favor of commercialization, because it is quite unclear that a commercial system would be effective and it could well be destructive. <u><strong><mark>It is no longer true</u></strong> <u>that</u></mark> the <u><mark>rates of</mark> </u>deceased donor organ <u><mark>donation are static</u>. <u></mark>In the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, largely <u><mark>through the</u></mark> efforts of so-called ‘<u><mark>Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative’</mark>, the</u> 3-month average deceased kidney <u><mark>donation</u></mark> <u>rate <mark>has risen</u></mark> approximately <u><strong><mark>30% since </mark>January 20<mark>01</u></strong></mark>, and these increases have largely reflected increases in recovery of kidneys from standard criteria donors [28]. Multiple <u><strong><mark>innovative endeavors</strong></mark> to increase other sources</u> of donor organs are available. These <u><mark>include</u> <u></mark>living donor <mark>exchange, intended candidate </mark>donation, <mark>desensitization</u></mark> protocols for positive cross-match–and blood group–incompatible pairs, increased <u><mark>use</mark> of donors <mark>after circulatory determination of death, and</u></mark> increased <u>use of <mark>extended-criteria</mark> donor <mark>kidneys. </mark>The</u> kidney transplant <u>waiting list</u> continues to grow but the <u><mark>number of candidates</mark> on that list who are <mark>deemed</mark> ‘active’ and hence <mark>transplantable <strong>has been stable over</u></strong></mark> the last <u><strong><mark>several years</u></strong></mark> (www.unos.org accessed 3 April 2008). <u><strong><mark>It is not ‘pie in the sky’</u></strong> <u>to look forward to</u></mark> a <u><strong><mark>reduction in the waiting list to acceptable levels</u></strong> <u>if we continue</u></mark> to invest our best efforts, resources, and ingenuity. <u><strong><mark>Progress is</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>being made</u></strong></mark> <u>in</u> the development of an <u>improved allocation</u> system for deceased donor kidneys that will better exploit the life prolonging benefit of the procedure [37•]. <u><strong><mark>All of these</strong></mark> new endeavors <strong><mark>expand and exploit</strong> the</u></mark> noncommercial and <u><strong><mark>altruistic</strong></mark> driving force of our <mark>success to date</mark>. They build on what we know rather than <strong>endanger what we have achieved.</u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>Conclusion¶ We do not doubt that those of our colleagues who support the commercialization of organ sales abhor the venal exploitation of vulnerable populations as a source of organs. We argue, however, that <u><mark>organ sales</u></mark> and markets, ‘<u><strong><mark>regulated’ or otherwise</strong>, will <strong>inevitably</u></strong></mark> lead to the furtherance of such exploitation and in the process <u><mark>undermine</mark> the <strong><mark>considerable gains</u></strong></mark> that have been made <u><mark>in <strong>noncommercial organ donation</u></strong></mark> both from the living and the deceased. Our arguments are based not principally on theoretical or abstract ethical grounds but on documented practical experience and lessons learned from other disciplines. The international <u><mark>transplant </mark>community <mark>will be best served by <strong>investing in public trust </mark>and <mark>not undermining it</mark>.</p></u></strong>
1NC
null
Off
430,193
10
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,371
vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political
Spanos 8
Spanos 8 (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified)
We must think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. I do not simply mean “the nothing” “the ontological difference” “existence” “the absolutely other” “the differance” or “trace” “the differend” the “invisible” or “absent cause” that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking I also mean “the pariah” “the nomad” “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” “the nonbeings” the subaltern “the emigré” “the denizen” “the refugee” “the queer” “the multitude” and “the darkness” that haunt “white”/imperial culture politics images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency images of [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia to veritas
We must think the “ghostly” ontological exile a way of “errant” thinking able to resist the imperialism of technological logic with the displaced emigré by refusal to be answerable to the Occident focus on historical politics betrays indifference to imperial politics of representation praxisoriented discourse tends to separate praxis from the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being constitutes a continuum, which traverses its sites to sociopolitics This haunting suggests the complex and contradictory situation writers found themselves I have overdetermined the ontological of the the errant thinker in the interregnum to make visible the role ontological representation has played in the West’s imperial project I would suggest resuming the abandoned destructive genealogy of the post-Enlightenment Occident Such will show that American polity constitutes the fulfillment of the “ontotheological tradition
On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must, rather, think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do not simply mean “the nothing” (das Nichts) or “the ontological difference” (Heidegger), “existence” (Sartre), “the absolutely other” (Levinas), “the differance” or “trace” (Derrida), “the differend” (Lyotard), the “invisible” or “absent cause” (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean “the pariah” (Arendt), “the nomad” (Deleuze and Guattari), “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” (Bhabha), “the nonbeings” (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha), “the emigré” (Said), “the denizen” (Hammar), “the refugee” (Agamben), “the queer” (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), “the multitude” (Negri and Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, “the darkness” (Morrison) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/imperial culture politics: The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these images of blinding [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature.38 In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.
8,036
<h4>vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political</h4><p><u><strong>Spanos 8</u></strong> (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified)</p><p>On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. <u><mark>We must</u></mark>, rather, <u><mark>think</mark> the Abgeschiedene—<mark>the “ghostly” ontological exile</mark> evolving <mark>a way of “errant” thinking</mark> that would be <mark>able to resist the</mark> global <mark>imperialism of</mark> Occidental/<mark>technological logic</mark>—<mark>with</mark>, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: <mark>the displaced</mark> political <mark>emigré</mark> evolving, <mark>by</mark> way of his or her <mark>refusal to be answerable to the</mark> “Truth” of the <mark>Occident</mark>, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event</u>. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that <u>this Left’s <mark>focus on historical</mark>ly specific <mark>politics betrays</mark> a disabling <mark>indifference to</mark> the polyvalent <mark>imperial politics</mark> <mark>of</mark> ontological <mark>representation</mark>. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged <mark>praxisoriented discourse</mark>, that is, <mark>tends</mark>—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—<mark>to separate praxis from</mark> and to privilege it over theory, <mark>the political over the ontological</u></mark>. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this <u><mark>praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that</mark> <mark>being</mark>, however it is represented, <mark>constitutes a continuum, which</mark>, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless <mark>traverses its </mark>indissolubly related “<mark>sites</mark>” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), <mark>to sociopolitics</mark> (including the nation and the international or global sphere).</u> As a necessary result, <u>it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being.</u> By this relay of positively potential differences <u>I do not simply mean “the nothing”</u> (das Nichts) or <u>“the ontological difference” </u>(Heidegger), <u>“existence”</u> (Sartre), <u>“the absolutely other”</u> (Levinas), <u>“the differance” or “trace”</u> (Derrida), <u>“the differend”</u> (Lyotard), <u>the “invisible” or “absent cause”</u> (Althusser) <u>that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking</u>.36 <u>I also mean “the pariah” </u>(Arendt), <u>“the nomad”</u> (Deleuze and Guattari), <u>“the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin”</u> (Bhabha), <u>“the nonbeings”</u> (Dussel), <u>the subaltern</u> (Guha), <u>“the emigré”</u> (Said), <u>“the denizen”</u> (Hammar), <u>“the refugee”</u> (Agamben), <u>“the queer”</u> (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), <u>“the multitude”</u> (Negri and Hardt),37 <u>and</u>, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, <u>“the darkness”</u> (Morrison) <u>that</u> belong contradictorily to and <u>haunt “white”/imperial culture politics</u>: The <u>images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency</u>. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these <u>images of </u>blinding<u> [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. <mark>This haunting</mark>, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, <mark>suggests the complex and contradictory situation</mark> in which American <mark>writers found themselves</mark> during the formative years of the nation’s literature</u>.38 In this chapter, <u><mark>I have overdetermined the ontological</mark> perspective <mark>of the</mark> Abgeschiedene, <mark>the errant thinker in the interregnum</mark> who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about</u>,39 <u>not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been <mark>to make visible</mark> and operational <mark>the </mark>substantial and increasingly complex practical <mark>role</mark> that <mark>ontological representation has played</mark> and continues to play <mark>in the West’s</mark> perennial global <mark>imperial project</mark>, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. </u>In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, <u><mark>I would suggest</mark>, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of <mark>resuming the</mark> virtually <mark>abandoned destructive genealogy of</mark> the truth discourse of <mark>the post-Enlightenment Occident</mark>, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture</u>. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. <u><mark>Such</mark> a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, <mark>will show that</mark> this “triumphant” post-Cold War <mark>American polity constitutes the fulfillment</mark> (end) <mark>of</mark> the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary </u>(Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), <u>has called <mark>the “ontotheological tradition</mark>.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia</u> (unconcealment) <u>to veritas</u> (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.</p>
1NC
null
Off
112,192
50
17,011
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
564,718
N
Wake
7
UNLV GV
Calum Matheson
1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,372
Mirroring disad – they revert the ballot to normalcy and continue metastasized exchange
Zupancic ‘3
Zupancic ‘3 (Alenka, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, pp. 13-14) [Henry]
A very good example of this kind of doubleness would be the famous “play scene Obviously, the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as it would have, for instance, as a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play Not only is it the case that “two are enough,” but further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to an entirely different configuration—that of an endless metonymic illusion The logic of the “two” that we will pursue in different contexts, and in diverse conceptual formations, implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth The fact that the truth has its temporality does not simply mean that truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent
A very good example of doubleness would be the play scene the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play two are enough,” further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to an endless metonymic illusion The logic of the “two” implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth The fact that the truth has its temporality does not mean truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent
A very good example of this kind of doubleness would be the famous “play scene” (or “mousetrap”) in Shakespeare’s Hamlet. Obviously, the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as it would have, for instance, as a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play. . . .Not only is it the case that “two are enough,” but further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to an entirely different configuration—that of an endless metonymic illusion. In Hamlet, the redoubling of fiction, far from avoiding or lacking the Real, functions as the very “trap” (the “mousetrap”) of the Real. One could also say that the “mousetrap” in Hamlet has exactly the status of the “declaration of declaration.” Through the staging of the “Murder of Gonzago,” Hamlet declares what was declared to him by his father’s Ghost. At the same time, this “declaration of declaration,” taking the form of a stage performance, succeeds precisely because it produces a dimension of: “I, the Real, am speaking.” This is what throws the murderous king off balance. Nietzsche is often praised for his insistence on multiplicity against the ontology of the One. Yet his real invention is not multiplicity, but a certain figure of the Two. The logic of the “two” that we will pursue in different contexts, and in diverse conceptual formations, implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth. For Nietzsche, truth is bound up with a certain notion of temporality, rather than being atemporal. The temporality at stake here, however, is not the one usually opposed to eternal truths. The fact that the truth has its temporality does not simply mean that truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent. Or, to use Lacan’s formula (which is quite Nietzschean in this respect), “the truth, in this sense, is that which runs after truth.”14 This temporal mode of antecedence is correlative to the temporal mode of the (notion of) subject, caught in a “loop” wherein the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real which inaugurated her in some “other time.” Or, to put it slightly differently, the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real where she is inaugurated as if “from elsewhere.”
2,486
<h4>Mirroring disad – they revert the ballot to normalcy and continue metastasized exchange</h4><p><u><strong>Zupancic ‘3</u></strong> (Alenka, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two, pp. 13-14) [Henry]</p><p><u><strong><mark>A very good example of</mark> this kind of <mark>doubleness would be the</mark> famous “<mark>play scene</u></strong></mark>” (or “mousetrap”) in Shakespeare’s Hamlet. <u><strong>Obviously, <mark>the “play-within-the-play” does not have the same structure, logic, and impact as</mark> it would have, for instance, as <mark>a play-within-theplay- within-the-play-within- the-play</u></strong></mark>. . . .<u><strong>Not only is it the case that “<mark>two are enough,”</mark> but <mark>further multiplication or mirroring would clearly lead to</mark> an entirely different configuration—that of <mark>an endless metonymic illusion</u></strong></mark>. In Hamlet, the redoubling of fiction, far from avoiding or lacking the Real, functions as the very “trap” (the “mousetrap”) of the Real. One could also say that the “mousetrap” in Hamlet has exactly the status of the “declaration of declaration.” Through the staging of the “Murder of Gonzago,” Hamlet declares what was declared to him by his father’s Ghost. At the same time, this “declaration of declaration,” taking the form of a stage performance, succeeds precisely because it produces a dimension of: “I, the Real, am speaking.” This is what throws the murderous king off balance. Nietzsche is often praised for his insistence on multiplicity against the ontology of the One. Yet his real invention is not multiplicity, but a certain figure of the Two. <u><strong><mark>The logic of the “two”</mark> that we will pursue in different contexts, and in diverse conceptual formations, <mark>implies a specific temporal structure, a kind of “time loop” that introduces a singular temporality into the (Nietzschean) notion of truth</u></strong></mark>. For Nietzsche, truth is bound up with a certain notion of temporality, rather than being atemporal. The temporality at stake here, however, is not the one usually opposed to eternal truths. <u><strong><mark>The fact that the truth has its temporality does not </mark>simply <mark>mean </mark>that <mark>truths are transient “children of their Time”; it means that the very core of truth involves a temporal paradox in which the truth only “becomes what it is.” The temporal mode of truth is that of existing as its own antecedent</u></strong></mark>. Or, to use Lacan’s formula (which is quite Nietzschean in this respect), “the truth, in this sense, is that which runs after truth.”14 This temporal mode of antecedence is correlative to the temporal mode of the (notion of) subject, caught in a “loop” wherein the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real which inaugurated her in some “other time.” Or, to put it slightly differently, the subject will have to appear at the point of the Real where she is inaugurated as if “from elsewhere.”</p>
2NC
University
Perm
421,930
14
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,373
They can’t increase supply - population polls prove – aff aggravates alt causes like distrust in US healthcare
NKF ‘3
NKF ‘3, National Kidney Foundation. “Financial Incentives for Organ Donation.” Kidney.org. February 1, 2003. http://www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/positionpaper03.cfm.
payment for organs ability to increase the supply or organs for transplantation is questionable of families who refused to donate organs of their loved ones who have died, 92% said that payment would not have persuaded them to donate. Public opinion polls and focus groups have disclosed that many Americans are not inclined to be organ donors because they distrust the U. S. health care system and because they are concerned that the health care of potential organ do-nors might be compromised if their donor status were known financial incentives is not likely to change these perceptions and may aggravate mistrust Making financial incentives available at the time of death opens the possibility of creating new sources of tension and dissension between family members who are faced with the option of organ donation a program of financial incentives for organ donation could expose transplant recipients to unnecessary risks because living donors and donor families would have an incentive to withhold information concerning the donor's health status so that they can be assured a financial benefit
payment for organs ability to increase the supply is questionable of families who refused 92% said that payment would not have persuaded them many Americans are not inclined because they distrust the U. S. health care system financial incentives is not likely to change these perceptions and may aggravate mistrust Making incentives available opens the possibility of creating new sources
While payment for organs has real potential to undermine the transplant system in this country, its ability to increase the supply or organs for transplantation is questionable. In a recent survey of families who refused to donate organs of their loved ones who have died, 92% said that payment would not have persuaded them to donate. Public opinion polls and focus groups have disclosed that many Americans are not inclined to be organ donors because they distrust the U. S. health care system, in general, and, in particular, because they are concerned that the health care of potential organ do-nors might be compromised if their donor status were known. A program of financial incentives for organ donation is not likely to change these perceptions and, indeed, may aggravate mistrust. This is true even with the suggested subterfuge of paying the money to funeral homes. That strategy would most likely simply raise the price of a funeral without benefiting the family at all. Making financial incentives available at the time of death opens the possibility of creating new sources of tension and dissension between family members who are faced with the option of organ donation. Finally, a program of financial incentives for organ donation could expose transplant recipients to unnecessary risks because living donors and donor families would have an incentive to withhold information concerning the donor's health status so that they can be assured a financial benefit.
1,478
<h4>They can’t increase supply - population polls prove – aff aggravates alt causes like distrust in US healthcare</h4><p><u><strong>NKF ‘3</u></strong>, National Kidney Foundation. “Financial Incentives for Organ Donation.” Kidney.org. February 1, 2003. http://www.kidney.org/news/newsroom/positionpaper03.cfm. </p><p>While <u><mark>payment</u> <u>for organs</u></mark> has real potential to undermine the transplant system in this country, its <u><mark>ability to</mark> <mark>increase the supply</mark> or organs for transplantation <mark>is questionable</u></mark>. In a recent survey <u><mark>of</mark> <mark>families who refused</mark> to donate organs of their loved ones who have died, <strong><mark>92% said that payment would not have persuaded them </mark>to donate</strong>. Public opinion polls and focus groups have disclosed that <mark>many Americans are not inclined</mark> to be organ donors <mark>because they <strong>distrust the U. S. health care system</u></strong></mark>, in general, <u>and</u>, in particular, <u>because <strong>they are concerned that the health care of potential organ do-nors might be compromised</strong> if their donor status were known</u>. A program of <u><mark>financial incentives</u></mark> for organ donation <u><mark>is n<strong>ot likely to change these perceptions and</u></strong></mark>, indeed, <u><strong><mark>may aggravate mistrust</u></strong></mark>. This is true even with the suggested subterfuge of paying the money to funeral homes. That strategy would most likely simply raise the price of a funeral without benefiting the family at all. <u><mark>Making</mark> financial <mark>incentives available</mark> at the time of death <mark>opens the possibility of creating new sources</mark> of tension and dissension between family members who are faced with the option of organ donation</u>. Finally, <u>a program of financial incentives for organ donation could expose transplant recipients to unnecessary risks because living donors and donor families would have an incentive to withhold information concerning the donor's health status so that they can be assured a financial benefit</u>.</p>
1NC
null
Off
430,194
3
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,374
Legalization sustains neoliberal violence -- the poor are coerced into deconstructing their biological assemblage to prop up the consumptive lifestyles of the wealthy -- disregard their claims of “upward mobility” and “autonomy”, they are both ruses by the capitalist system to justify commodification of the body
Scheper-Hughes 03
Scheper-Hughes 03
Amidst the neo-liberal readjustments of societies, North and South we are experiencing rapid depletion of traditional values New relations between capital and labor bodies and the state between biotechnological inclusions and exclusions are taking shape our discussion is tethered to material grounds on which those modernist values have shifted today almost beyond recognition the 'second coming' capitalism has facilitated a rapid dissemination to all corners of the world of advanced medical procedures alongside strange markets and 'occult economies'. these have incited new desires for the organs of others Nowhere are these processes more transparent than in the field of organ transplant which takes place in a transnational space with both donors and recipients following paths of capital in the global economy The spread of transplant capabilities created scarcity of organs economic globalization released an exodus of displaced persons and a appetite for foreign bodies to do the shadow work of production and to provide ‘fresh’ organs for medical consumption The conditions of an ‘open’ market economy have put into circulation mortally sick bodies traveling in one direction and ‘healthy’ organs in another direction creating a kula ring’ of international body trade. The emergence of strange markets excess capital, renegade surgeons and slave workers has produced transplant tourism This confluence in the flows of kidney sellers fall into the hands of ruthless brokers These transplant transactions are a blend of altruism and commerce consent and coercion gifts and theft care and human sacrifice developments in 'transplant tourism' exacerbated divisions between North and South spawning commodity fetishism in demands by medical consumers for a quality product Commercialized transplant a practice in the domain of post- modern biopolitics with its values of disposability, individuality exemplifies biomedical technology gifts of life and death surpass all previous 'natural' limits and restrictions the uninhibited circulation of purchased kidneys exemplifies the neo-liberal episteme a political discourse based on juridical concepts of the autonomous individual subject, equality of opportunity freedom and expansion of medical rights The commodified kidney is the primary currency invented scarcities within fetishized ‘fresh’ organs. the rhetoric of altruism masking real demands for human sacrifice surplus empathy We have found a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’ about whom almost nothing is known the commodified kidney has become the poor man’s and woman’s collateral against debt Condemned prisoners are prepped for ‘harvesting’ minutes before execution the circulation of kidneys follows the established routes of capital from South to North, from poorer to more affluent bodies, from black and brown bodies to white ones, and from females to males, or from poor males to more affluent males.
New relations between capital and labor and taking shape our discussion is tethered to material grounds capitalism incited desires for th organs of others organ transplant takes place in a transnational space with donors and recipients following paths of capital transplant capabilities created scarcity of organs economic globalization released an exodus of displaced persons and appetite for foreign bodies to do shadow work of production to provide ‘fresh’ organs for consumption i 'transplant tourism' exacerbated divisions between North and South spawning commodity fetishism Commercialized transplant in the domain of biopolitics with disposability exemplifies biomedical technology gifts of life and death surpass all previous 'natural' limits and restrictions the circulation of purchased kidneys exemplifies the neo-liberal episteme, a discourse based on concepts of the autonomous individual subject equality of opportunity freedom and rights The commodified kidney is currency apartheid medicine’ privileges one class of patients, over invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’ circulation of kidneys follows routes of capital from South to North poorer to affluent black and brown to white from females to males, or
Nancy, Professor @ UC Berkeley, “Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking”, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2, June, 197–226, AB Amidst the neo-liberal readjustments of societies, North and South, we are experiencing today a rapid depletion, an ‘emptying out’ even, of traditional modernist, humanist and pastoral ideologies, values and practices. New relations between capital and labor, bodies and the state, belonging and extra-territoriality, and between medical and biotechnological inclusions and exclusions are taking shape. But rather than a conventional story of the lamentable decline of humanistic social values and social relations, our discussion is tethered to a frank recognition that the material grounds on which those modernist values and practices were based have shifted today almost beyond recognition. What the Comaroffs (2001) refer to as millennial or 'second coming' capitalism has facilitated a rapid dissemination to virtually all corners of the world of advanced medical procedures and biotechnologies alongside strange markets and 'occult economies'. Together, these have incited new tastes and desires for the skin, bone, blood, organs, tissue and reproductive and genetic material of others. Nowhere are these processes more transparent than in the field of organ transplant, which now takes place in a transnational space with both donors and recipients following new paths of capital and medical technology in the global economy. The spread of transplant capabilities created a global scarcity of transplantable organs at the same time that economic globalization released an exodus of displaced persons and a voracious appetite for foreign bodies to do the shadow work of production and to provide ‘fresh’ organs for medical consumption. The ideal conditions of an ‘open’ market economy have thereby put into circulation mortally sick bodies traveling in one direction and ‘healthy’ organs (encased in their human packages) in another direction, creating a bizarre ‘kula ring’ of international body trade. The emergence of strange markets, excess capital, renegade surgeons,1 local ‘kidney hunters’ with links to an international Mafia (Lobo and Maierovitch 2002) (and thereby to a parallel traffic in slave workers, babies, drugs and small arms) has produced a small but spectacularly lucrative practice of transplant tourism, much of it illegal and clandestine. This confluence in the flows of immigrant workers and itinerant kidney sellers who fall into the hands of ruthless brokers and unscrupulous, notorious, but simultaneously rewarded, protected and envied outlaw transplant surgeons is a troubling sub-text in the story of late twentieth and early twenty-first century globalization, one that combines and juxtaposes elements of pre- and postmodernity. These new transplant transactions are a strange blend of altruism and commerce; consent and coercion; gifts and theft; science and sorcery; care and human sacrifice. On the one hand, the phenomenal spread of transplant technologies, even in the murky context of black markets in medicine, has given the possibility of new, extended or improved quality of life to a select population of mobile kidney patients from the deserts of Oman to the rain forests of the Amazon Basin.2 On the other hand, new developments in 'transplant tourism' have exacerbated older divisions between North and South, core and periphery, haves and have-nots, spawning a new form of commodity fetishism in demands by medical consumers for a quality product: 'fresh' and 'healthy' kidneys purchased from living bodies. In these radical exchanges of body parts and somatic information, life-saving measures for the one demands a bodily sacrifice of self-mutilation by the other. And one man's bio- sociality (Rabinow 1996) is another woman's biopiracy, depending on whether one is speaking from a Silicon Valley biotech laboratory or from a sewage-infested banguay in Manila. Commercialized transplant, a practice that trades comfortably in the domain of post- modern biopolitics with its values of disposability, individuality, free and transparent circu- lation, exemplifies better than any other biomedical technology the reach and the limits of economic liberalism. In transplant gifts of life and death (Parsons et al. 1969) promise to surpass all previous 'natural' limits and restrictions. And the uninhibited circulation of purchased kidneys exemplifies the neo-liberal episteme, a political discourse based on juridical concepts of the autonomous individual subject, equality (at least equality of opportunity), radical freedom, accumulation and universality (the expansion of medical rights and medical citizenship3). The commodified kidney is, to date, the primary currency in transplant tourism; it represents the gold standard of organ sales worldwide. In the past year, however, markets in part-livers and single corneas from living vendors are beginning to emerge in Southeast Asia. This paper continues my discussion (Scheper-Hughes 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) of the darker side of transplant practice. In all, three crucial points about the organs trade have emerged. The first is about invented scarcities and artificial needs within a new context of highly fetishized ‘fresh’ organs. The scarcity of cadaver organs has evolved into an active trade in ‘surplus’ organs from living ‘ suppliers’ as well as in new forms of ‘biopiracy’. The second point concerns the transplant rhetoric of altruism masking real demands for human sacrifice. The third point concerns surplus empathy and the relative visibility of two distinct populations – excluded and invisible organ givers and included and highly visible organ receivers. We have found almost everywhere a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients, over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’, about whom almost nothing is known – an excellent place for a critical medical anthropologist (Scheper-Hughes 1990) to begin. Here I will focus on the networks of organized crime (and so called ‘body mafia’) that are putting into circulation ambulatory organ buyers, itinerant kidney hunters, outlaw surgeons, medical technicians, makeshift transplant units and clandestine laboratories in what economist Jagddish Bhagwati (2002) refers to as ‘rotten trade’. By this Bhagwati means all kinds of trade in ‘bads’ – arms, drugs, stolen goods, hazardous and toxic products as well as traffic in babies, bodies and slave labor – as opposed to ordinary and normative trade in ‘goods’. In this instance, the rotten traffic in human organs brings together buyers and sellers from distant locations for fleeting, intimate and illicit bodily exchanges occasioned by a dual waiting list, one formed by mortal sickness, the other by human misery. Like any other business, the kidney trade is driven by a simple market calculus of supply and demand. For example, in the Middle East, from the Gulf States to Israel, transplantable cadaver organs are extremely scarce owing to religious reservations, both Jewish and Islamic, about the ontological status of the brain-dead donor, and to the elaborate religious protocol for the proper treatment and burial of the dead. Both orthodox Judaism and Islam permit organ transplantation, however, and their religious scholars and ethicists generally treat living donation as a meritorious act, even if the donor has been paid (Steinberg 1996). Consequently, one solution to the problem of long waiting lists of frustrated kidney patients in this region was found in transplant abroad, in some cases (as in Israel) with the support of government-sponsored medical insurance. For the last twenty years organized programs have carried affluent patients from Israel, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait initially to India for transplant and later to Turkey, Iran and Iraq and, most recently, to Russia, Romania and Moldova where kidney sellers are recruited (sometimes coercively) from army barracks, prisons, unemployment offices, flea markets, shopping malls and bars. So we can even speak of organ-donor vs. organ-recipient nations. In India, trading a kidney for a dowry has become a common strategy for parents to arrange marriage for an otherwise economically disadvantaged daughter (Cohen 1999). And, ‘one-kidney’ shantytowns have sprung up in the peripheries of Manila and Thailand to service the needs of Saudi and Japanese transplant patients and, in recent years, a growing number of North Americans ( Jimenez and Bell 2001). Indeed, the commodified kidney has become the poor man’s and woman’s ultimate collateral against debt and penury in many parts of the world. Meanwhile, transplant package tours are arranged in Europe, North America and Japan, to take transplant patients to China where their surgery is arranged, with the complicity of Chinese doctors and surgeons, to coincide with public executions that provide the primary source of highly lucrative transplant organs. Condemned prisoners are reportedly intubated and surgically prepped for ‘harvesting’ minutes before execution.4 ‘Transplant tourism’ has become a vital asset to the medical economies of rapidly privatizing hospitals and clinics in poorer countries struggling to stay afloat. The ‘global cities’ (Sassen 1991) in this nether economy are not London, New York and Tokyo but Istanbul, Lima, Lvov, Tel Aviv, Chisenau, Bombay, Johannesburg and Manila. In general, the circulation of kidneys follows the established routes of capital from South to North, from poorer to more affluent bodies, from black and brown bodies to white ones, and from females to males, or from poor males to more affluent males. Women are rarely the recipients of purchased or purloined organs anywhere in the world.
9,863
<h4><u><strong>Legalization sustains neoliberal violence -- the poor are coerced into deconstructing their biological assemblage to prop up the consumptive lifestyles of the wealthy -- disregard their claims of “upward mobility” and “autonomy”, they are both ruses by the capitalist system to justify commodification of the body </h4><p>Scheper-Hughes 03</p><p></u></strong>Nancy, Professor @ UC Berkeley, “Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking”, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2, June, 197–226, AB</p><p><u>Amidst the neo-liberal readjustments of societies, North and South</u>, <u>we are experiencing</u> today a <u>rapid depletion</u>, an ‘emptying out’ even, <u>of traditional</u> modernist, humanist and pastoral ideologies, <u>values</u> and practices. <u><strong><mark>New relations between capital and labor</u></strong></mark>, <u>bodies and the state</u>, belonging and extra-territoriality, and <u>between</u> medical and <u>biotechnological inclusions <mark>and</mark> exclusions are <mark>taking shape</u></mark>. But rather than a conventional story of the lamentable decline of humanistic social values and social relations, <u><mark>our discussion is tethered to</mark> </u>a frank recognition that the <u><strong><mark>material</mark> <mark>grounds</u></strong></mark> <u>on which those modernist values</u> and practices were based <u>have shifted today almost beyond recognition</u>. What <u>the</u> Comaroffs (2001) refer to as millennial or <u>'second coming' <mark>capitalism</mark> has facilitated a rapid dissemination to</u> virtually <u>all corners of the world of advanced medical procedures</u> and biotechnologies <u>alongside strange markets and 'occult economies'.</u> Together, <u>these have <mark>incited</mark> new</u> tastes and <u><mark>desires for th</mark>e</u> skin, bone, blood, <u><mark>organs</u></mark>, tissue and reproductive and genetic material <u><mark>of others</u></mark>. <u><strong>Nowhere</strong> are these processes <strong>more transparent</strong> than in the field of <mark>organ transplant</u></mark>, <u>which</u> now <u><mark>takes place in a <strong>transnational space</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>with</u></mark> <u><strong>both <mark>donors and recipients</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>following</u></mark> new <u><strong><mark>paths of capital</u></strong></mark> and medical technology <u>in the global economy</u>. <u>The spread of <mark>transplant capabilities</u></mark> <u><mark>created</u></mark> a global <u><mark>scarcity of</u></mark> transplantable <u><mark>organs</u></mark> at the same time that <u><strong><mark>economic</mark> <mark>globalization released an exodus of displaced persons</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u>a</u> voracious <u><strong><mark>appetite for foreign bodies to do</mark> the <mark>shadow work of production</mark> and <mark>to provide ‘fresh’ organs for</mark> medical <mark>consumption</u></strong></mark>. <u>The</u> ideal <u>conditions of an ‘open’ market economy</u> <u>have</u> thereby <u>put</u> <u>into circulation</u> <u><strong>mortally sick bodies</u></strong> <u>traveling in one direction and ‘healthy’ organs</u> (encased in their human packages) <u>in another direction</u>, <u>creating</u> <u>a</u> bizarre ‘<u>kula ring’ of international body trade.</u> <u>The emergence of strange markets</u>, <u>excess capital, renegade surgeons</u>,1 local ‘kidney hunters’ with links to an international Mafia (Lobo and Maierovitch 2002) (<u>and</u> thereby to a parallel traffic in <u>slave workers</u>, babies, drugs and small arms) <u>has produced</u> a small but spectacularly lucrative practice of <u>transplant tourism</u>, much of it illegal and clandestine. <u>This confluence in the flows</u> <u>of</u> immigrant workers and itinerant <u>kidney sellers</u> who <u>fall into the hands of ruthless brokers </u>and unscrupulous, notor<mark>i</mark>ous, but simultaneously rewarded, protected and envied outlaw transplant surgeons is a troubling sub-text in the story of late twentieth and early twenty-first century globalization, one that combines and juxtaposes elements of pre- and postmodernity. <u>These</u> new <u>transplant transactions are a</u> strange <u>blend of altruism and commerce</u>; <u>consent and coercion</u>; <u>gifts and theft</u>; science and sorcery; <u>care and human sacrifice</u>. On the one hand, the phenomenal spread of transplant technologies, even in the murky context of black markets in medicine, has given the possibility of new, extended or improved quality of life to a select population of mobile kidney patients from the deserts of Oman to the rain forests of the Amazon Basin.2 On the other hand, new <u>developments in <mark>'transplant tourism'</u></mark> have <u><mark>exacerbated</u></mark> older <u><mark>divisions between North and South</u></mark>, core and periphery, haves and have-nots, <u><mark>spawning</u></mark> a new form of <u><mark>commodity fetishism</mark> in demands by medical consumers for a quality product</u>: 'fresh' and 'healthy' kidneys purchased from living bodies. In these radical exchanges of body parts and somatic information, life-saving measures for the one demands a bodily sacrifice of self-mutilation by the other. And one man's bio- sociality (Rabinow 1996) is another woman's biopiracy, depending on whether one is speaking from a Silicon Valley biotech laboratory or from a sewage-infested banguay in Manila. <u><mark>Commercialized transplant</u></mark>, <u>a practice</u> that trades comfortably <u><mark>in the domain of</mark> post- modern <mark>biopolitics with</mark> its values of <mark>disposability</mark>, individuality</u>, free and transparent circu- lation, <u><mark>exemplifies</u></mark> better than any other <u><mark>biomedical technology</u></mark> the reach and the limits of economic liberalism. In transplant <u><mark>gifts of life and death</u></mark> (Parsons et al. 1969) promise to <u><mark>surpass</u> <u>all previous 'natural' limits and restrictions</u></mark>. And <u><mark>the</mark> uninhibited <mark>circulation of <strong>purchased kidneys exemplifies the neo-liberal episteme</u></strong>, <u>a</mark> political <mark>discourse</mark> <mark>based on</mark> juridical <mark>concepts of the autonomous individual subject</mark>, </u>equality (at least <u><mark>equality of opportunity</u></mark>), radical <u><mark>freedom</u></mark>, accumulation <u><mark>and</u></mark> universality (the <u>expansion of medical <mark>rights</u></mark> and medical citizenship3). <u><mark>The commodified kidney is</u></mark>, to date, <u>the primary <mark>currency</u></mark> in transplant tourism; it represents the gold standard of organ sales worldwide. In the past year, however, markets in part-livers and single corneas from living vendors are beginning to emerge in Southeast Asia. This paper continues my discussion (Scheper-Hughes 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) of the darker side of transplant practice. In all, three crucial points about the organs trade have emerged. The first is about <u>invented scarcities</u> and artificial needs <u>within</u> a new context of highly <u>fetishized ‘fresh’ organs.</u> The scarcity of cadaver organs has evolved into an active trade in ‘surplus’ organs from living ‘ suppliers’ as well as in new forms of ‘biopiracy’. The second point concerns <u>the</u> transplant <u>rhetoric of altruism masking real demands for human sacrifice</u>. The third point concerns <u>surplus empathy</u> and the relative visibility of two distinct populations – excluded and invisible organ givers and included and highly visible organ receivers. <u>We have found</u> almost everywhere <u>a new form of globalized ‘<strong><mark>apartheid medicine’</strong></mark> that <mark>privileges <strong>one class of patients,</mark> organ recipients</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>over</strong></mark> another class of <strong><mark>invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’</u></strong></mark>, <u>about whom <strong>almost nothing is known</u></strong> – an excellent place for a critical medical anthropologist (Scheper-Hughes 1990) to begin. Here I will focus on the networks of organized crime (and so called ‘body mafia’) that are putting into circulation ambulatory organ buyers, itinerant kidney hunters, outlaw surgeons, medical technicians, makeshift transplant units and clandestine laboratories in what economist Jagddish Bhagwati (2002) refers to as ‘rotten trade’. By this Bhagwati means all kinds of trade in ‘bads’ – arms, drugs, stolen goods, hazardous and toxic products as well as traffic in babies, bodies and slave labor – as opposed to ordinary and normative trade in ‘goods’. In this instance, the rotten traffic in human organs brings together buyers and sellers from distant locations for fleeting, intimate and illicit bodily exchanges occasioned by a dual waiting list, one formed by mortal sickness, the other by human misery. Like any other business, the kidney trade is driven by a simple market calculus of supply and demand. For example, in the Middle East, from the Gulf States to Israel, transplantable cadaver organs are extremely scarce owing to religious reservations, both Jewish and Islamic, about the ontological status of the brain-dead donor, and to the elaborate religious protocol for the proper treatment and burial of the dead. Both orthodox Judaism and Islam permit organ transplantation, however, and their religious scholars and ethicists generally treat living donation as a meritorious act, even if the donor has been paid (Steinberg 1996). Consequently, one solution to the problem of long waiting lists of frustrated kidney patients in this region was found in transplant abroad, in some cases (as in Israel) with the support of government-sponsored medical insurance. For the last twenty years organized programs have carried affluent patients from Israel, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait initially to India for transplant and later to Turkey, Iran and Iraq and, most recently, to Russia, Romania and Moldova where kidney sellers are recruited (sometimes coercively) from army barracks, prisons, unemployment offices, flea markets, shopping malls and bars. So we can even speak of organ-donor vs. organ-recipient nations. In India, trading a kidney for a dowry has become a common strategy for parents to arrange marriage for an otherwise economically disadvantaged daughter (Cohen 1999). And, ‘one-kidney’ shantytowns have sprung up in the peripheries of Manila and Thailand to service the needs of Saudi and Japanese transplant patients and, in recent years, a growing number of North Americans ( Jimenez and Bell 2001). Indeed, <u>the commodified kidney has become the poor</u> <u>man’s and woman’s</u> ultimate <u>collateral against debt</u> and penury in many parts of the world. Meanwhile, transplant package tours are arranged in Europe, North America and Japan, to take transplant patients to China where their surgery is arranged, with the complicity of Chinese doctors and surgeons, to coincide with public executions that provide the primary source of highly lucrative transplant organs. <u>Condemned prisoners are</u> reportedly intubated and surgically <u>prepped for ‘harvesting’ minutes before execution</u>.4 ‘Transplant tourism’ has become a vital asset to the medical economies of rapidly privatizing hospitals and clinics in poorer countries struggling to stay afloat. The ‘global cities’ (Sassen 1991) in this nether economy are not London, New York and Tokyo but Istanbul, Lima, Lvov, Tel Aviv, Chisenau, Bombay, Johannesburg and Manila. In general, <u>the <mark>circulation of kidneys</mark> <mark>follows</mark> the established <mark>routes of capital from South to North</mark>, from <mark>poorer</mark> <mark>to</mark> more <mark>affluent</mark> bodies, from <mark>black and brown</mark> bodies <mark>to white</mark> ones, and <mark>from females to males, or</mark> from poor males to more affluent males.</u> Women are rarely the recipients of purchased or purloined organs anywhere in the world.</p>
1NC
null
Off
171,178
30
17,011
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
564,718
N
Wake
7
UNLV GV
Calum Matheson
1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,375
Metastasis DA – faith in debate’s continual processes of agonistic contestation produces a bullet-spraying of information which 1) destroys political efficacy through addiction to debate simulation and 2) continues the investment of energy into the academic industrial complex
Baudrillard 92
Jean Baudrillard 1992 (Jean, Pataphysics of Year 2000)
Every atom dissolves in space. This is what we are living occupied with the acceleration of all bodies, all messages, all processes each event, each narrative, each image gets endowed with the simulation of an infinite trajectory Every political fact is invested with a kinetic energy which spreads over its own space and thrusts these facts into a hyperspace where they lose all meaning by way of an inability to attain their meaning. the narrative has become impossible it is the potential re-narrativization No meaning stands a chance once offered the means of its own acceleration. history slows down as it brushes up against the astral body of the "silent majorities". Our societies are governed by a "critical mass going beyond a point of no-return. This inert matter of the social is not due to a lack of exchanges, of information or of communication; it is the result of the multiplication and saturation of exchanges the hyperdensity of messages Successive events attain their annihilation in indifference. Neutralized and bullet-sprayed by information, the masses neutralise history retrospect and act as a screen of absorption. no meaning, no conscience, no desire. All social, historical and temporal transcendence is absorbed via this mass's silent immanence. We are obsessed with high fidelity the console of our channels subjected to factual sophistication, history ceases to exist interference of an event with its diffusion short-circuit cause and effect, as of a certain point", nothing is true anymore.
occupied with the acceleration of all bodies, all messages, all processes each event, each narrative, each image gets endowed with the simulation of an infinite trajectory Every political fact is invested with a kinetic energy which spreads over its own space and thrusts these facts into a hyperspace where they lose all meaning by way of an inability to attain their meaning. the narrative has become impossible it is the potential re-narrativization No meaning stands a chance once offered the means of its own acceleration. Our societies are governed by a "critical mass going beyond a point of no-return. This inert matter of the social is not due to a lack of exchanges, information or communication; it is the result of the multiplication and saturation of exchanges the hyperdensity of messages events attain their annihilation in indifference. Neutralized and bullet-sprayed by information, the masses neutralise history retrospect and act as a screen of absorption. no meaning, no conscience, no desire. All social, historical and temporal transcendence is absorbed via this mass's silent immanence. subjected to factual sophistication, history ceases to exist interference of an event with its diffusion short-circuit cause and effect, as of a certain point", nothing is true anymore.
Outside of this gravitational pull which keeps bodies in orbit, all the atoms of meaning lose themselves or self-absolve in space. Every single atom follows its own trajectory towards infinity and dissolves in space. This is precisely what we are living in our present societies occupied with the acceleration of all bodies, all messages, all processes in all possible senses and wherein, via modern media, each event, each narrative, each image gets endowed with the simulation of an infinite trajectory. Every political, historical, cultural fact is invested with a kinetic energy which spreads over its own space and thrusts these facts into a hyperspace where they lose all meaning by way of an inability to attain their meaning. It is useless to turn to science-fiction: from this point on, from the here and now, through our computer science, our circuits and our channels, this particle accelerator has definitively disrupted and broken the referential orbit of things. With respect to history, the narrative has become impossible since by definition it is the potential re-narrativization of a sequence of meaning. Through the impulse of total diffusion and circulation each event is liberated for itself only — each event becomes atomized and nuclear as it follows its trajectory into the void. In order to diffuse itself ad infinitum, it has to be fragmented like a particle. This is the way it attains a speed of no-return, distancing it from history once and for all. Every cultural, eventual group needs to be fragmented, disarticulated to allow for its entry into the circuits, each language must be absolved into a binary mechanism or device to allow for its circulation to take place — not in our memory, but in the electronic and luminous memory of the computers. There is no human language or speech (langage) that could compete with the speed of light. There is no event that could withstand its own diffusion across the planet. No meaning stands a chance once offered the means of its own acceleration. There is no history that will resist the centrifugal pull of facts or its short-circuiting in real time (in the same order of ideas: no sexuality will resist its own liberation, not a single culture will foreclose its own advancement, no truth will defy its own verification, etc.). Even theory is no longer in the state of "reflecting" on anything anymore. All it can do is to snatch concepts from their critical zone of reference and transpose them to the point of no return, in the process of which theory itself too, passes into the hyperspace of simulation as it loses all "objective" validity, while it makes significant gains by acquiring real affinity with the current system. The second hypothesis, with respect to the vanishing of history, is the opposite of the first, i.e., it pertains not to the acceleration but to the slowing down of processes. This too is derived directly from physics. Matter slows the passage of time. More precisely, time seems to pass very slowly upon the surface of a very dense body of matter. The phenomenon increases in proportion to growth in density. The effect of this slowing down (ralentissement) will raise the wavelength of light emitted by this body in a way that will allow the observer to record this phenomenon. Beyond a certain limit, time stops, the length of the wave becomes infinite. The wave no longer exists. Light extinguishes itself. The analogy is apparent in the way history slows down as it brushes up against the astral body of the "silent majorities". Our societies are governed by this process of the mass, and not only in the sociological or demographical sense of the word, but also in the sense of a "critical mass", of going beyond a certain point of no-return. That is where the crucially significant event of these societies is to be found: the advent of their revolutionary process along the lines of their mobility, (they are all revolutionary with respect to the centuries gone by), of their equivalent force of inertia, of an immense indifference, and of the silent power of this indifference. This inert matter of the social is not due to a lack of exchanges, of information or of communication; on the contrary, it is the result of the multiplication and saturation of exchanges. It is borne of the hyperdensity of cities, of merchandise, messages and circuits. It is the cold star of the social, a mass at the peripheries of which history cools out. Successive events attain their annihilation in indifference. Neutralized and bullet-sprayed by information, the masses neutralise history retrospect and act as a screen of absorption. They themselves have no history, no meaning, no conscience, no desire. MARKED They are potential residues of all history, of all meaning, of all desire. By inserting themselves into modernity, all these wonderful things managed to invoke a mysterious counterpart, the misappreciation of which has unleashed all current political and social strategies. This time, it's the opposite: history, meaning, progress are no longer able to find their speed or tempo of liberation. They can no longer pull themselves out of this much too dense body which slows down their trajectory, slows down their time to the point from whereon perception and imagination of the future escapes us. All social, historical and temporal transcendence is absorbed via this mass's silent immanence. Already, political events no longer conduct sufficient autonomous energy to rouse us and can only run their course as a silent movie in front of which we all sit collectively irresponsible. That is where history reaches its end, not because of the lack of actors or participants, not due to a lack of violence (with respect to violence, there is always an increasing amount), not due to a lack of events (as for events, there will always be more of them thanks to the role of the media and information!) — but because of a slowing down or deceleration, because of indifference and stupefaction. History can no longer go beyond itself, it can no longer envisage its own finality or dream of its own end, it shrouds or buries itself in its immediate effect, it self-exhausts in special effects, it implodes in current events. Essentially, one can no longer speak of the end of history since it has no time to rejoin its own end. As its effects accelerate, its meaning inexorably decelerates. It will end up stopping and extinguishing itself like light and time at the peripheries of an infinitely dense mass... Humanity too, had its big-bang: a certain critical density, a certain concentration of people and exchanges that compel this explosion we call history and which is none other than the dispersal of dense and hieratic cores of earlier civilizations. Today, we are living an effect of reversal: we have overstepped the threshold of critical mass with respect to populations, events, information, control of the inverse process of inertia of history and politics. At the cosmic level of things, we don't know anymore whether we have reached this speed of liberation wherein we would be partaking of a permanent or final expansion (this, no doubt, will remain forever uncertain). At the human level, where prospects are more limited, it is possible that the energy itself employed for the liberation of the species (acceleration of birthrates, of techniques and exchanges in the course of the centuries) have contributed to an excess of mass and resistance that bear on the initial energy as it drags us along a ruthless movement of contraction and inertia. Whether the universe infinitely expands or retracts to an infinitely dense and infinitely small core will hinge upon its critical mass (with respect to which speculation itself is infinite in view of the discovery of newer particles). Following the analogy, whether our human history will be evolutionary or involuted will presumably depend upon the critical mass of humanity. Are we to see ourselves, like the galaxies, on a definitive orbit that distances us from each other under the impact of a tremendous speed, or is this dispersal to infinity itself destined to reach an end, and the human molecules bound to draw closer to each other by way of an inverse effect of gravitation? The question is whether a human mass that grows day by day is able to control a pulsation of this genre? Third hypothesis, third analogy. But we are still dealing with a point of disappearance, a point of evanescence, a vanishing-point, this time however along the lines of music. This is what I call the stereophonic effect. We are all obsessed with high fidelity, with the quality of musical "transmission" (rendu). On the console of our channels, equipped with our tuners, our amplifiers and our baffles, we mix, regulate and multiply soundtracks in search of an infallible or unerring music. Is this, though, still music? Where is the threshold of high fidelity beyond the point of which music as such would disappear? Disappearance would not be due to the lack of music, it would disappear for having stepped beyond this boundary, it would disappear into the perfection of its materiality, into its own special effect. Beyond this point, neither judgement nor aesthetic pleasure could be found anymore. Ecstasy of musicality procures its own end. The disappearance of history is of the same order: there too, we have gone beyond this limit or boundary where, subjected to factual and informational sophistication, history as such ceases to exist. Large doses of immediate diffusion, of special effects, of secondary effects, of fading — and this famous Larsen effect produced in acoustics by an excessive proximity between source and receiver, in history via an excessive proximity, and therefore the disastrous interference of an event with its diffusion — create a short-circuit between cause and effect, similarly to what takes place between the object and the experimenting subject in microphysics (and in the human sciences!). All things entailing a certain radical uncertainty of the event, like excessive high fidelity, lead to a radical uncertainty with respect to music. Elias Canetti says it well: "as of a certain point", nothing is true anymore. This is also why the soft music of history escapes us, it disappears under the microscope or into the stereophony of information.
10,348
<h4>Metastasis DA – faith in debate’s continual processes of agonistic contestation produces a bullet-spraying of information which 1) destroys political efficacy through addiction to debate simulation and 2) continues the investment of energy into the academic industrial complex</h4><p>Jean <u><strong>Baudrillard</u> </strong>19<u><strong>92</u></strong> (Jean, Pataphysics of Year 2000)</p><p>Outside of this gravitational pull which keeps bodies in orbit, all the atoms of meaning lose themselves or self-absolve in space. <u><strong>Every</u></strong> single <u><strong>atom</u></strong> follows its own trajectory towards infinity and <u><strong>dissolves in space.</u></strong> <u><strong>This is</u></strong> precisely <u><strong>what we are living</u></strong> in our present societies <u><strong><mark>occupied with the acceleration of all bodies, all messages, all processes</mark> </u></strong>in all possible senses and wherein, via modern media, <u><strong><mark>each event, each narrative, each image gets endowed with the simulation of an infinite trajectory</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Every political</u></strong></mark>, historical, cultural <u><strong><mark>fact is invested with a kinetic energy which spreads over its own space and thrusts these facts into a hyperspace where they lose all meaning by way of an inability to attain their meaning.</u></strong></mark> It is useless to turn to science-fiction: from this point on, from the here and now, through our computer science, our circuits and our channels, this particle accelerator has definitively disrupted and broken the referential orbit of things. With respect to history, <u><strong><mark>the narrative has become impossible</u></strong></mark> since by definition <u><strong><mark>it is the potential re-narrativization</mark> </u></strong>of a sequence of meaning. Through the impulse of total diffusion and circulation each event is liberated for itself only — each event becomes atomized and nuclear as it follows its trajectory into the void. In order to diffuse itself ad infinitum, it has to be fragmented like a particle. This is the way it attains a speed of no-return, distancing it from history once and for all. Every cultural, eventual group needs to be fragmented, disarticulated to allow for its entry into the circuits, each language must be absolved into a binary mechanism or device to allow for its circulation to take place — not in our memory, but in the electronic and luminous memory of the computers. There is no human language or speech (langage) that could compete with the speed of light. There is no event that could withstand its own diffusion across the planet. <u><strong><mark>No meaning stands a chance once offered the means of its own acceleration.</u></strong></mark> There is no history that will resist the centrifugal pull of facts or its short-circuiting in real time (in the same order of ideas: no sexuality will resist its own liberation, not a single culture will foreclose its own advancement, no truth will defy its own verification, etc.). Even theory is no longer in the state of "reflecting" on anything anymore. All it can do is to snatch concepts from their critical zone of reference and transpose them to the point of no return, in the process of which theory itself too, passes into the hyperspace of simulation as it loses all "objective" validity, while it makes significant gains by acquiring real affinity with the current system. The second hypothesis, with respect to the vanishing of history, is the opposite of the first, i.e., it pertains not to the acceleration but to the slowing down of processes. This too is derived directly from physics. Matter slows the passage of time. More precisely, time seems to pass very slowly upon the surface of a very dense body of matter. The phenomenon increases in proportion to growth in density. The effect of this slowing down (ralentissement) will raise the wavelength of light emitted by this body in a way that will allow the observer to record this phenomenon. Beyond a certain limit, time stops, the length of the wave becomes infinite. The wave no longer exists. Light extinguishes itself. The analogy is apparent in the way <u><strong>history slows down as it brushes up against the astral body of the "silent majorities". <mark>Our societies are governed by</u></strong></mark> this process of the mass, and not only in the sociological or demographical sense of the word, but also in the sense of <u><strong><mark>a "critical mass</u></strong></mark>", of <u><strong><mark>going beyond a</mark> </u></strong>certain <u><strong><mark>point of no-return.</mark> </u></strong>That is where the crucially significant event of these societies is to be found: the advent of their revolutionary process along the lines of their mobility, (they are all revolutionary with respect to the centuries gone by), of their equivalent force of inertia, of an immense indifference, and of the silent power of this indifference. <u><strong><mark>This inert matter of the social is not due to a lack of exchanges, </mark>of <mark>information or </mark>of <mark>communication;</u></strong></mark> on the contrary, <u><strong><mark>it is the result of the multiplication and saturation of exchanges</u></strong></mark>. It is borne of <u><strong><mark>the hyperdensity</u></strong></mark> of cities, <u><strong><mark>of</u></strong></mark> merchandise, <u><strong><mark>messages</u></strong></mark> and circuits. It is the cold star of the social, a mass at the peripheries of which history cools out. <u><strong>Successive <mark>events attain their annihilation in indifference.</mark> <mark>Neutralized and bullet-sprayed by information, the masses neutralise history retrospect and act as a screen of absorption.</mark> </u></strong>They themselves have no history, <u><strong><mark>no meaning, no conscience, no desire.</u></strong></mark> </p><p>MARKED</p><p>They are potential residues of all history, of all meaning, of all desire. By inserting themselves into modernity, all these wonderful things managed to invoke a mysterious counterpart, the misappreciation of which has unleashed all current political and social strategies. This time, it's the opposite: history, meaning, progress are no longer able to find their speed or tempo of liberation. They can no longer pull themselves out of this much too dense body which slows down their trajectory, slows down their time to the point from whereon perception and imagination of the future escapes us. <u><strong><mark>All social, historical and temporal transcendence is absorbed via this mass's silent immanence.</u></strong></mark> Already, political events no longer conduct sufficient autonomous energy to rouse us and can only run their course as a silent movie in front of which we all sit collectively irresponsible. That is where history reaches its end, not because of the lack of actors or participants, not due to a lack of violence (with respect to violence, there is always an increasing amount), not due to a lack of events (as for events, there will always be more of them thanks to the role of the media and information!) — but because of a slowing down or deceleration, because of indifference and stupefaction. History can no longer go beyond itself, it can no longer envisage its own finality or dream of its own end, it shrouds or buries itself in its immediate effect, it self-exhausts in special effects, it implodes in current events. Essentially, one can no longer speak of the end of history since it has no time to rejoin its own end. As its effects accelerate, its meaning inexorably decelerates. It will end up stopping and extinguishing itself like light and time at the peripheries of an infinitely dense mass... Humanity too, had its big-bang: a certain critical density, a certain concentration of people and exchanges that compel this explosion we call history and which is none other than the dispersal of dense and hieratic cores of earlier civilizations. Today, we are living an effect of reversal: we have overstepped the threshold of critical mass with respect to populations, events, information, control of the inverse process of inertia of history and politics. At the cosmic level of things, we don't know anymore whether we have reached this speed of liberation wherein we would be partaking of a permanent or final expansion (this, no doubt, will remain forever uncertain). At the human level, where prospects are more limited, it is possible that the energy itself employed for the liberation of the species (acceleration of birthrates, of techniques and exchanges in the course of the centuries) have contributed to an excess of mass and resistance that bear on the initial energy as it drags us along a ruthless movement of contraction and inertia. Whether the universe infinitely expands or retracts to an infinitely dense and infinitely small core will hinge upon its critical mass (with respect to which speculation itself is infinite in view of the discovery of newer particles). Following the analogy, whether our human history will be evolutionary or involuted will presumably depend upon the critical mass of humanity. Are we to see ourselves, like the galaxies, on a definitive orbit that distances us from each other under the impact of a tremendous speed, or is this dispersal to infinity itself destined to reach an end, and the human molecules bound to draw closer to each other by way of an inverse effect of gravitation? The question is whether a human mass that grows day by day is able to control a pulsation of this genre? Third hypothesis, third analogy. But we are still dealing with a point of disappearance, a point of evanescence, a vanishing-point, this time however along the lines of music. This is what I call the stereophonic effect. <u><strong>We are</u></strong> all <u><strong>obsessed with high fidelity</u></strong>, with the quality of musical "transmission" (rendu). On <u><strong>the console of our channels</u></strong>, equipped with our tuners, our amplifiers and our baffles, we mix, regulate and multiply soundtracks in search of an infallible or unerring music. Is this, though, still music? Where is the threshold of high fidelity beyond the point of which music as such would disappear? Disappearance would not be due to the lack of music, it would disappear for having stepped beyond this boundary, it would disappear into the perfection of its materiality, into its own special effect. Beyond this point, neither judgement nor aesthetic pleasure could be found anymore. Ecstasy of musicality procures its own end. The disappearance of history is of the same order: there too, we have gone beyond this limit or boundary where, <u><strong><mark>subjected to factual </u></strong></mark>and informational <u><strong><mark>sophistication, history</u></strong></mark> as such <u><strong><mark>ceases to exist</u></strong></mark>. Large doses of immediate diffusion, of special effects, of secondary effects, of fading — and this famous Larsen effect produced in acoustics by an excessive proximity between source and receiver, in history via an excessive proximity, and therefore the disastrous <u><strong><mark>interference of an event with its diffusion</u></strong></mark> — create a <u><strong><mark>short-circuit</u></strong></mark> between <u><strong><mark>cause and effect,</mark> </u></strong>similarly to what takes place between the object and the experimenting subject in microphysics (and in the human sciences!). All things entailing a certain radical uncertainty of the event, like excessive high fidelity, lead to a radical uncertainty with respect to music. Elias Canetti says it well: "<u><strong><mark>as of a certain point", nothing is true anymore.</u></strong></mark> This is also why the soft music of history escapes us, it disappears under the microscope or into the stereophony of information. </p>
2NC
University
Perm
151,731
29
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,376
Bioprinting solves the aff
Griggs 14
Griggs 14 (Brandon Griggs, reporter for CNN, 4-3-14, “The next frontier in 3-D printing: Human organs,” http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/03/tech/innovation/3-d-printing-human-organs/) gz
3-D printers may be spitting out something far more complex, and controversial: human organs 3-D printers because of their precise process can reproduce the vascular systems required to make organs viable. Scientists are already using the machines to print tiny strips of organ tissue bioprinting holds great promise. Authentic printed organs could be used for drug or vaccine testing, freeing researchers from less accurate methods such as tests on animals or on synthetic models. 3-D printers could someday produce much-needed organs for transplants The process already is seeing some success a 2-year-old girl in Illinois, born without a trachea, received a windpipe built with her own stem cells. a Virginia foundation that supports regenerative medicine research announced in December it will award a $1 million prize for the first organization to print a fully functioning liver Organovo is developing what it hopes will be authentic models of human organs, primarily livers, for drug testing. Organovo has also built models of human kidneys, bone, cartilage, muscle, blood vessels and lung tissue
3-D printers may be spitting out human organs printers can reproduce the vascular systems printed organs could be used for drug testing, freeing researchers from tests on animals printers could produce organs for transplants a 2-year-old received a windpipe built with her stem cells a foundation announced a prize for the first organization to print a fully functioning liver Organovo has built models of kidneys, bone, cartilage, muscle, blood vessels and lung tissue
¶ The emerging process of 3-D printing, which uses computer-created digital models to create real-world objects, has produced everything from toys to jewelry to food.¶ Soon, however, 3-D printers may be spitting out something far more complex, and controversial: human organs.¶ For years now, medical researchers have been reproducing human cells in laboratories by hand to create blood vessels, urine tubes, skin tissue and other living body parts. But engineering full organs, with their complicated cell structures, is much more difficult.¶ Enter 3-D printers, which because of their precise process can reproduce the vascular systems required to make organs viable. Scientists are already using the machines to print tiny strips of organ tissue. And while printing whole human organs for surgical transplants is still years away, the technology is rapidly developing.¶ "The mechanical process isn't all that complicated. The tricky part is the materials, which are biological in nature," said Mike Titsch, editor-in-chief of 3D Printer World, which covers the industry. "It isn't like 3-D printing plastic or metal. Plastic doesn't die if you leave it sitting on an open-air shelf at room temperature for too long."¶ The idea of printing a human kidney or liver in a lab may seem incomprehensible, even creepy. But to many scientists in the field, bioprinting holds great promise. Authentic printed organs could be used for drug or vaccine testing, freeing researchers from less accurate methods such as tests on animals or on synthetic models.¶ Then there's the hope that 3-D printers could someday produce much-needed organs for transplants. Americans are living longer, and as we get deeper into old age our organs are failing more. Some 18 people die in the United States each day waiting in vain for transplants because of a shortage of donated organs -- a problem that Anthony Atala, director of the Wake Forest Institute for Regenerative Medicine and a pioneer in bioprinting, calls "a major health crisis."¶ An 'exciting new area of medicine'¶ Bioprinting works like this: Scientists harvest human cells from biopsies or stem cells, then allow them to multiply in a petri dish. The resulting mixture, a sort of biological ink, is fed into a 3-D printer, which is programmed to arrange different cell types, along with other materials, into a precise three-dimensional shape. Doctors hope that when placed in the body, these 3-D-printed cells will integrate with existing tissues.¶ The process already is seeing some success. Last year a 2-year-old girl in Illinois, born without a trachea, received a windpipe built with her own stem cells. The U.S. government has funded a university-led "body on a chip" project that prints tissue samples that mimic the functions of the heart, liver, lungs and other organs. The samples are placed on a microchip and connected with a blood substitute to keep the cells alive, allowing doctors to test specific treatments and monitor their effectiveness.¶ "This is an exciting new area of medicine. It has the potential for being a very important breakthrough," said Dr. Jorge Rakela, a gastroenterologist at the Mayo Clinic in Phoenix and a member of the American Liver Foundation's medical advisory committee.¶ "Three-D printing allows you to be closer to what is happening in real life, where you have multiple layers of cells," he said. With current 2-D models, "if you grow more than one or two layers, the cells at the bottom suffocate from lack of oxygen."¶ To accelerate the development of bioprinted organs, a Virginia foundation that supports regenerative medicine research announced in December it will award a $1 million prize for the first organization to print a fully functioning liver.¶ One early contender for the prize is Organovo, a California start-up that has been a leader in bioprinting human body parts for commercial purposes. Using cells from donated tissue or stem cells, Organovo is developing what it hopes will be authentic models of human organs, primarily livers, for drug testing.¶ The company has printed strips of human liver tissue in its labs, although they are still very small: four by four by one millimeter, or about one-fourth the size of a dime. Each strip takes about 45 minutes to print, and it takes another two days for the cells to grow and mature, said Organovo CEO Keith Murphy. The models can then survive for about 40 days.¶ Organovo has also built models of human kidneys, bone, cartilage, muscle, blood vessels and lung tissue, he said.¶ "Basically what it allows you to do is build tissue the way you assemble something with Legos," Murphy said. "So you can put the right cells in the right places. You can't just pour them into a mold."
4,739
<h4>Bioprinting solves the aff</h4><p><u><strong>Griggs 14</u></strong> (Brandon Griggs, reporter for CNN, 4-3-14, “The next frontier in 3-D printing: Human organs,” http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/03/tech/innovation/3-d-printing-human-organs/) gz</p><p>¶ The emerging process of 3-D printing, which uses computer-created digital models to create real-world objects, has produced everything from toys to jewelry to food.¶ Soon, however, <u><mark>3-D printers may be spitting out</mark> something far more complex, and controversial: <strong><mark>human organs</u></strong></mark>.¶ For years now, medical researchers have been reproducing human cells in laboratories by hand to create blood vessels, urine tubes, skin tissue and other living body parts. But engineering full organs, with their complicated cell structures, is much more difficult.¶ Enter <u>3-D <mark>printers</u></mark>, which <u>because of their precise process <mark>can <strong>reproduce the vascular systems</strong></mark> required to make organs viable. Scientists are <strong>already using the machines</strong> to print tiny strips of organ tissue</u>. And while printing whole human organs for surgical transplants is still years away, the technology is rapidly developing.¶ "The mechanical process isn't all that complicated. The tricky part is the materials, which are biological in nature," said Mike Titsch, editor-in-chief of 3D Printer World, which covers the industry. "It isn't like 3-D printing plastic or metal. Plastic doesn't die if you leave it sitting on an open-air shelf at room temperature for too long."¶ The idea of printing a human kidney or liver in a lab may seem incomprehensible, even creepy. But to many scientists in the field, <u>bioprinting holds great promise. Authentic <mark>printed organs could be used for <strong>drug </mark>or vaccine <mark>testing, freeing researchers from</mark> less accurate methods such as <mark>tests on animals</strong></mark> or on synthetic models.</u><strong>¶<u></strong> </u>Then there's the hope that <u>3-D <mark>printers could</mark> someday <strong><mark>produce</mark> much-needed <mark>organs for transplants</u></strong></mark>. Americans are living longer, and as we get deeper into old age our organs are failing more. Some 18 people die in the United States each day waiting in vain for transplants because of a shortage of donated organs -- a problem that Anthony Atala, director of the Wake Forest Institute for Regenerative Medicine and a pioneer in bioprinting, calls "a major health crisis."¶ An 'exciting new area of medicine'¶ Bioprinting works like this: Scientists harvest human cells from biopsies or stem cells, then allow them to multiply in a petri dish. The resulting mixture, a sort of biological ink, is fed into a 3-D printer, which is programmed to arrange different cell types, along with other materials, into a precise three-dimensional shape. Doctors hope that when placed in the body, these 3-D-printed cells will integrate with existing tissues.¶ <u>The process already is seeing some success</u>. Last year <u><mark>a 2-year-old</mark> girl in Illinois, born without a trachea, <mark>received a windpipe built with her</mark> own <mark>stem cells</mark>.</u> The U.S. government has funded a university-led "body on a chip" project that prints tissue samples that mimic the functions of the heart, liver, lungs and other organs. The samples are placed on a microchip and connected with a blood substitute to keep the cells alive, allowing doctors to test specific treatments and monitor their effectiveness.¶ "This is an exciting new area of medicine. It has the potential for being a very important breakthrough," said Dr. Jorge Rakela, a gastroenterologist at the Mayo Clinic in Phoenix and a member of the American Liver Foundation's medical advisory committee.¶ "Three-D printing allows you to be closer to what is happening in real life, where you have multiple layers of cells," he said. With current 2-D models, "if you grow more than one or two layers, the cells at the bottom suffocate from lack of oxygen."¶ To accelerate the development of bioprinted organs, <u><mark>a </mark>Virginia <mark>foundation</mark> that supports regenerative medicine research <mark>announced</mark> in December it will award <strong><mark>a </mark>$1 million <mark>prize for the first organization to print a fully functioning liver</u></strong></mark>.¶ One early contender for the prize is Organovo, a California start-up that has been a leader in bioprinting human body parts for commercial purposes. Using cells from donated tissue or stem cells, <u>Organovo is developing what it hopes will be authentic models of human organs, primarily livers, for drug testing.</u><strong>¶<u></strong> </u>The company has printed strips of human liver tissue in its labs, although they are still very small: four by four by one millimeter, or about one-fourth the size of a dime. Each strip takes about 45 minutes to print, and it takes another two days for the cells to grow and mature, said Organovo CEO Keith Murphy. The models can then survive for about 40 days.¶ <u><mark>Organovo has</mark> also <mark>built models of</mark> <strong>human <mark>kidneys, bone, cartilage, muscle, blood vessels and lung tissue</u></strong></mark>, he said.¶ "Basically what it allows you to do is build tissue the way you assemble something with Legos," Murphy said. "So you can put the right cells in the right places. You can't just pour them into a mold."</p>
1NC
null
Organs
429,535
12
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,377
The CP solves best – criticizing their normative form opens up a space for reflection where true solvency becomes impossible
Winter 91
Winter 91 (Steven L. June, Prof of Law @ U. of Miami, Texas Law Review ”On Building Houses”)
the focus on the complex, systemic nature of affairs need condemn us neither to stasis nor to undecidability , there remains the quite substantial risk that decision makers will evaluate those dissenting arguments or counter-narratives unreflectively and, thus, will be disabled from appreciating, let alone adopting, the perspective that is being offered In contrast moving beyond mere critique to explore instead the role of cultural, cognitive, and socio-linguistic form in channelling, structuring, and configuring practice investigate the concrete ways in which animating form can and does have a distinctive politics This is what is meant by "the politics of form The idea is to examine the prevailing structures of thought , in an attempt to reveal the way in which normative precommitment are always already embedded in form , it is by opening a space for reflection in this way that legal theory can have a progressive political payoff. n68 Through these examinations of form and its practical-political consequences, we attempt to map the possibilities of a different, less empty frame for practice
there remains the substantial risk decision makers will evaluate dissenting arguments unreflectively and disabled from appreciating the perspective that is offered The idea is to examine the prevailing structures of thought in an attempt to reveal the way in which normative precommitment are embedded in form it is by opening a space for reflection that legal theory can have a progressive political payoff Through examinations of form we attempt to map the possibilities of a different, less empty frame for practice
As this last argument suggests, the focus on the complex, systemic nature of affairs need condemn us neither to stasis nor to undecidability. Rather, the insight that cultural forms both constrain and enable subjectivity provides an alternative way of thinking about the problems of law and social structure. If, as some suggest, "[c]ritique is all there is," n63 then we hazard the kind of political quandary so poignantly illustrated by the legal decisions examined by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic: no matter how eloquent the appeal to an alternative vision, there remains the quite substantial risk that decision makers will evaluate those dissenting arguments or counter-narratives unreflectively -- that is, through the prism of the dominant cultural assumptions and beliefs that make them who they are -- and, thus, will be disabled from appreciating, let alone adopting, the perspective that is being offered. n64 In contrast, the essays in this symposium offer a way of moving beyond mere critique to explore instead the role of cultural, cognitive, and socio-linguistic form in channelling, structuring, and configuring practice. We propose to investigate the concrete ways in which, both in the realm of thought and of action, animating form can and does have a distinctive politics. n65 This is what is meant by "the politics of form." n66 The idea is to [*1610] examine the prevailing structures of thought "on the bias," so to speak, in an attempt to reveal the way in which directionality, predilection, and normative precommitment are always already embedded in form. n67 As Jeremy Paul suggests, it is by opening a space for reflection in this way that legal theory can have a progressive political payoff. n68 Through these examinations of form and its practical-political consequences, we attempt to map the possibilities of a different, less empty frame for practice. n69 Sixty years ago, Karl Llewellyn put the challenge gravely: "Life struggling against form, or through form to its will -- 'pity and terror --.' Law means so pitifully little to life. Life is so terrifyingly dependent on law."
2,121
<h4>The CP solves best – criticizing their normative form opens up a space for reflection where true solvency becomes impossible</h4><p><u><strong>Winter 91</u> </strong>(Steven L. June, Prof of Law @ U. of Miami, Texas Law Review ”On Building Houses”) </p><p>As this last argument suggests, <u>the focus on the complex, systemic nature of affairs need condemn us neither to stasis nor to undecidability</u>. Rather, the insight that cultural forms both constrain and enable subjectivity provides an alternative way of thinking about the problems of law and social structure. If, as some suggest, "[c]ritique is all there is," n63 then we hazard the kind of political quandary so poignantly illustrated by the legal decisions examined by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic: no matter how eloquent the appeal to an alternative vision<u>, <mark>there remains</mark> <mark>the</mark> quite <mark>substantial risk</mark> that <mark>decision makers will evaluate</mark> those <mark>dissenting</u> <u>arguments</mark> or counter-narratives <mark>unreflectively</u><strong></mark> </strong>-- that is, through the prism of the dominant cultural assumptions and beliefs that make them who they are -- <u><mark>and</mark>, thus, will be <mark>disabled</mark> <mark>from appreciating</mark>, let alone adopting, <mark>the perspective that is</mark> being <mark>offered</u></mark>. n64 <u>In contrast</u>, the essays in this symposium offer a way of <u>moving beyond mere critique to explore instead the role of cultural, cognitive, and socio-linguistic form in channelling, structuring, and configuring practice</u>. We propose to <u>investigate the concrete ways in which</u>, both in the realm of thought and of action, <u>animating form can and does have a distinctive politics</u>. n65 <u>This is what is meant by "the politics of form</u>." n66 <u><mark>The idea is to</u></mark> [*1610] <u><mark>examine the prevailing</mark> <mark>structures of thought</u></mark> "on the bias," so to speak<u>, <mark>in an attempt to reveal the way in which</u></mark> directionality, predilection, and <u><mark>normative</mark> <mark>precommitment</mark> <mark>are</mark> always already <mark>embedded</mark> <mark>in</mark> <mark>form</u></mark>. n67 As Jeremy Paul suggests<u>, <mark>it is by opening a space for reflection</mark> in this way <mark>that legal theory can have a progressive</mark> <mark>political</mark> <mark>payoff</mark>. n68 <mark>Through</mark> these <mark>examinations</mark> <mark>of form</mark> and its practical-political consequences, <mark>we attempt to map the possibilities of a different, less empty frame for practice</u></mark>. n69 Sixty years ago, Karl Llewellyn put the challenge gravely: "Life struggling against form, or through form to its will -- 'pity and terror --.' Law means so pitifully little to life. Life is so terrifyingly dependent on law." </p>
1NR
PIK
OV
430,123
6
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,378
Capitalism causes extinction and destroys value to life
Robinson 14
Robinson 14 (William I. Robinson, professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism Is In the Midst of Its Most Severe Crisis” 02 Jul 2014, KB)
US intervention entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001. This should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism. Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in a century the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states. global inequalities have never been as acute and grotesque we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings about including the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy as a response by the US-led transnational state and capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. There is currently a global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly across countries and has not taken any clear form or direction. We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits 80 percent experience of insecurity, impoverishment, and increasingly inhabiting a “planet of slums.” apologists of capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful. But 300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps. Foxcomm makes your iPads and iPhones. We are headed towards a global police state organized by global elites and led by the US state to contain the potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms because they have been pressured from below to do so the natural tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been escalation of worldwide inequalities Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.” this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. We cannot understand intensified militarization and the rise of this complex outside of the crisis of global capitalism. It is a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy extreme inequality and social polarization means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus? Unloading the surplus through financial speculation aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. the mass production and distribution of vaccines and medications for diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases tuberculosis, measles, etc that previously were under control. Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent. capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable which is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. it becomes profitable to turn to wars the surplus that the global economy has been and is producing but that cannot be absorbed by the world market, has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies. The US occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital. The prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes is enormously profitable for private corporations we are now living in a global war economy in which the threat of stagnation is offset by the militarization of global economy and society and the spread of systems of mass social control A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts and the spread of social control systems, from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants in the United States and Europe, must be ideologically legitimated. This is where bogus “wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where enemies must be conjured up, in which populations must be led to believe they are threatened So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is the devil, and so on. One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply of raw materials, machinery and service inputs come from other global corporations the global economy is kept running through violence and conflict the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global econom with the petroleum complex that is coming under pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. This is a new transnational power bloc this complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc. the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent. All this and much more are part of the militarization and “securitization” of global society We face doctrines, ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state the “war on drugs,” the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then the US state is the world’s leading terrorist.
capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the ability to sustain life global inequalities have never been as grotesque we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings as a response by the capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. There is global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly and has not taken any clear direction There have been countless studies documenting the escalation of inequalities 80 percent experience insecurity impoverishment and inhabit a “planet of slums.” We are headed towards a global police state The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for obedience States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms because they have been pressured from below to do so the tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been escalation of worldwide inequalities billions have been thrown off the land or out of employment relegated to migration We cannot understand intensified militarization outside of capitalism extreme inequality and social polarization means that the global market cannot absorb expanding output The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and absorb is growing this leads to a crisis of overproduction Unloading the surplus aggravates the solution as we saw with the collapse of 08 it becomes profitable to turn to wars the surplus cannot be absorbed has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction we are living in a global war economy in which the threat of stagnation is offset by militarization A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants must be ideologically legitimated This is where enemies must be conjured up populations must believe they are threatened One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance the economy is kept running through violence and conflict This is a new transnational power bloc the polarization of the world population generates new social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and controlled while guards protect that 20 percent this and more are part of the “securitization” of global society We face doctrines ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state the “war on drugs,”
However, and this is the key point I wish to highlight here, US intervention around the world clearly entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001. This new period should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism. Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in close to a century, and in many ways the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is also extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states. On the other hand, global inequalities have never been as acute and grotesque as they are today. So, in simplified terms, we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings about, including what you mention – the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy – as a response by the US-led transnational state and the transnational capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. You ask me who is going to compensate for these losses. That will depend on how the world’s people respond. There is currently a global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly across countries and has not taken any clear form or direction. Can the popular majority of humanity force the transnational capitalist class and the US/transnational state to be accountable for its crimes? Mao Zedong once said that “power flows through the barrel of a gun.” What he meant by this, in a more abstract than literal way, I believe, is that in the end it is the correlation of real forces that will determine outcomes. Because the United States has overwhelming and “full spectrum” military dominance, it can capture, execute, or bring to trial people anywhere around the world… it has “free license”, so to speak, to act as an international outlaw. We don’t even have to take the more recent examples. In December 1989 the United States undertook an illegal and criminal invasion of Panama, kidnapped Manuel Noriega – whether or not he was a dictator is not the point, as the United States puts in power and defends dictators that defend US and transnational elite interests, and brought him back to US territory for trial. What country in the world now has the naked power “flowing through the barrel of a gun” to invade the United States, capture George Bush, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other war criminals, and bring them somewhere to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Q: In your writings, you’ve warned against the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the slant accumulation of the global wealth in the hands of an affluent few and the impoverishment of the suppressed majority. What do you think are the reasons for this stark inequality and the disturbing dispossession of millions of people in the capitalist societies? You wrote that the participants of the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos were worried that the current situation raises the specter of worldwide instability and civil wars. Is it really so? A: We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots, such grotesque levels of inequality, within and among countries. There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities, among them, the current bestseller by Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” The pattern we see is that the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth that humanity produces and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits, but as well that some 20 percent of the population in each countries has integrated into the global economy as middle class and affluent consumers while the remaining 80 percent has experienced rising levels of insecurity, impoverishment, and precariousness, increasingly inhabiting what some have called a “planet of slums.” The apologists of global capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful. But in China, 300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. Such is this exploitation that a couple years ago, you may remember, Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps. This is the Foxcomm that makes your iPads and iPhones. The 80 percent is then subject to all sorts of sophisticated systems of social control and repression. We are headed in this regard towards a global police state, organized by global elites and led by the US state, to contain the real or potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority. Such structures of inequality and exploitation cannot be contained over time without both ideological and coercive apparatuses; conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence, organized by states and private security forces. Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which we are now living in a global social control state, a global panoptical surveillance state. George Orwell wrote about such a state in his famous novel “1984.” The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. How do we explain such stark inequality? Capitalism is a system that by its very internal dynamic generates wealth yet polarizes and concentrates that wealth. Historically a de-concentration of wealth through redistribution has come about by state intervention to offset the natural tendency for capital accumulation to result in such polarization. States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms both because they have been pressured from below to do so – whether by trade unions, social movements, socialist struggles, or so on – or because states must do so in order to retain legitimacy and preserve at least enough social peace for the reproduction of the system. A great variety of redistributive models emerged in the 20th century around the world, and went by a great many names – socialism, communism, social democracy, New Deal, welfare states, developmental states, populism, the social wage, and so on. All these models shared two things in common. One was state intervention in the economy to regulate capital accumulation and thus to bring under some control the most anarchic and most destructive elements of unrestrained capitalism. The other was redistribution through numerous policies, ranging from minimum legal wages and unemployment insurance, to public enterprises, the social wages of public health, education, transportation, and housing, welfare programs, land reform in agrarian countries, low cost credit, and so on. But capital responded to the last major crisis of the system, that of the 1970s, by “going global,” by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation and undermining models of state regulation and redistribution. Neo-liberalism is a set of policies that facilitate the rise of transnational capital. As transnational capital has broken free of the confine of the nation-state, the natural tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been this dizzying escalation of worldwide inequalities as wealth concentrates within the transnational capitalist class and, to a much lesser extent, the better off strata of middle classes and professionals. There are other related factors that account for the intensification of worldwide inequalities. One is the defeat of the worldwide left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led the ruling groups to declare that global neo-liberal capitalism was “The End of History.” A second is the rise of a globally integrated financial system in which capital in its liquid, that is money, form can move frictionless across the planet with no controls whatsoever. Transnational finance capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a global scale, and it engages in unfathomable levels of speculation, turning the global economy into one giant casino. Transnational finance capital has come to control the levers of the global economy, to get around and to undermine any effort at regulation, and to concentrate wealth in its liquid form in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. A third factor is the rise of a mass of surplus humanity. Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.” In turn, this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. Q: In one of your articles, you talked of an “ever-expanding military-prison-industrial-security-financial complex” that generates enormous profits through waging wars, selling weapons and then taking part in reconstruction activities in the war-torn countries. How does this complex operate? Is it really reliant on waging wars? A: We cannot understand intensified militarization and the rise of this complex outside of the crisis of global capitalism. This crisis is structural, in the first instance. It is what we call a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy driven by new technologies, especially computer, information, and communications technologies, but also by the revolution in transportation and containerization, by robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and more recently, by 3D printing, among other aspects, has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy, and to bring about a huge increase in productivity worldwide and an enormous expansion of the capacity of the global economy to churn out goods and services. But extreme inequality and social polarization in the global system means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus? How can transnational capital continue to accumulate and generate profits if this output is not unloaded, that is, profitably marketed? Unloading the surplus through financial speculation, which has skyrocketed in recent years, only aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. Now, if only 20 percent of humanity can consume in any significant quantity it is not very profitable to go into the business of mass, inexpensive public transportation, health and education, or the production of practical goods that the world’s population needs because very simply even if people need these things they do not have the income to purchase them. A global civilian economy geared to the basic needs of humanity is simply not profitable for the transnational capitalist class. Look at it like this: the mass production and distribution of vaccines and other medications for communicable and treatable diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are simply not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases – tuberculosis, measles, etc. – that previously were under control. Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry, including the giant pharmaceutical, biotechnology and related branches to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent. The lesson here is that capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable, according to the structure of the market and of income, which in turn is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. It is in this context that it becomes quite profitable to turn to wars, conflicts, systems of repression and social control to generate profit, to produce goods and systems that can repress that 80 percent of humanity that is not your consumer, not your customer so to say, because they do not have the purchasing power to sustain your drive to accumulate by producing goods and services for them that they actually need. Global capitalism is a perverted and irrational system. Putting aside geo-political considerations, the surplus that the global economy has been and is producing but that cannot be absorbed by the world market, has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction, and new systems of social control and repression, independent of geo-political considerations, that is, simply as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies. The US invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan – although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital. The prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes in the United States – and let us recall that the United States holds some 25-30 percent of the world’s prisoners – is enormously profitable for private corporations that run almost all of the immigrant detention centers, some of the general prisons, supply everything from guards to food, build the installations, erect border walls, and so on. Let us recall that the US National Security Agency – and we now know from Edward Snowden just how vast are its operations – subcontracts out its activities to private corporations, as do the CIA, the Pentagon, and so on. Global security corporations are one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and there are now more private security guards in the world than police officers. All of this is to say that we are now living in a global war economy, in which the threat of stagnation is offset in part by the militarization of global economy and society and the introduction and spread of systems of mass social control. Of course this involves all kinds of cultural, ideological, and political dimensions as well. A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts and the spread of social control systems, from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants in the United States and Europe, must be ideologically legitimated. This is where bogus and farcical “wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where enemies must be conjured up, in which populations must be led to believe they are threatened, and so on. So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is now the devil, and so on. One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy has involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation, towards those global corporate conglomerates involved in the production of war materials, of security, of engineering (for example, Bechtel and Halliburton), and other activities that involve making profit out of conflict and control. Remember by way of example that each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on and so forth, is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply, in turn, of raw materials, machinery and service inputs in turn come from other global corporations or local firms. So the whole global economy is kept running through violence and conflict. But the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global economy, together with the petroleum complex that is coming under much pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. This is a new transnational power bloc – this complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control, together with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc. Remember also that the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent. All this and much more are part of the militarization and “securitization” of global society by the powers that be. We face new doctrines, ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state – “fourth generation warfare,” “humanitarian intervention,” the “war on drugs,” among others, and above all, the so-called “war on terror.” I say so-called because, the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They indeed do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then the US state is the world’s leading terrorist. The powers that be in global society and that control the global political discourse attach the label “terrorist” to violence that they do not approve of, and they attach the label of “freedom and democracy and security” to violence that they do approve of, or that they commit themselves. Moreover, increasingly “terrorism” is used to simply describe political dissent, so that legitimate social movements and political struggles against global capitalism become labeled as “terrorism” in order to justify their suppression.
18,951
<h4><u><strong>Capitalism causes extinction and destroys value to life </h4><p>Robinson 14</p><p></u></strong>(William I. Robinson, professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism Is In the Midst of Its Most Severe Crisis” 02 Jul 2014, KB)</p><p>However, and this is the key point I wish to highlight here, <u><strong>US intervention</u></strong> around the world clearly <u><strong>entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001.</u></strong> <u>This</u> new period <u>should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism.</u> <u>Global <mark>capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis </mark>in</u> close to <u>a century</u>, and in many ways <u>the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s <mark>because we are on <strong>the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the</mark> very earth system and the <mark>ability to sustain life</strong></mark>, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is</u> also <u>extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states.</u> On the other hand, <u><strong><mark>global inequalities have never been as</mark> acute and <mark>grotesque</u></strong></mark> as they are today. So, in simplified terms, <u><mark>we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings</mark> about</u>, <u>including</u> what you mention – <u>the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy</u> – <u><mark>as a response by the</mark> US-led transnational state and</u> the transnational<u> <mark>capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis.</mark> </u>You ask me who is going to compensate for these losses. That will depend on how the world’s people respond. <u><strong><mark>There is</mark> currently a <mark>global revolt from below underway</strong>, but it is spread unevenly</mark> across countries <mark>and has not taken any clear</mark> form or <mark>direction</mark>.</u> Can the popular majority of humanity force the transnational capitalist class and the US/transnational state to be accountable for its crimes? Mao Zedong once said that “power flows through the barrel of a gun.” What he meant by this, in a more abstract than literal way, I believe, is that in the end it is the correlation of real forces that will determine outcomes. Because the United States has overwhelming and “full spectrum” military dominance, it can capture, execute, or bring to trial people anywhere around the world… it has “free license”, so to speak, to act as an international outlaw. We don’t even have to take the more recent examples. In December 1989 the United States undertook an illegal and criminal invasion of Panama, kidnapped Manuel Noriega – whether or not he was a dictator is not the point, as the United States puts in power and defends dictators that defend US and transnational elite interests, and brought him back to US territory for trial. What country in the world now has the naked power “flowing through the barrel of a gun” to invade the United States, capture George Bush, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other war criminals, and bring them somewhere to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Q: In your writings, you’ve warned against the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the slant accumulation of the global wealth in the hands of an affluent few and the impoverishment of the suppressed majority. What do you think are the reasons for this stark inequality and the disturbing dispossession of millions of people in the capitalist societies? You wrote that the participants of the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos were worried that the current situation raises the specter of worldwide instability and civil wars. Is it really so? A: <u><strong>We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots</u></strong>, such grotesque levels of inequality, within and among countries. <u><mark>There have been countless studies</mark> in recent years <mark>documenting the escalation of inequalities</u></mark>, among them, the current bestseller by Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” The pattern we see is that <u>the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth</u> that humanity produces <u>and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits</u>, but as well that some 20 percent of the population in each countries has integrated into the global economy as middle class and affluent consumers while the remaining <u><mark>80 percent</u></mark> has <u><mark>experience</u></mark>d rising levels <u>of <mark>insecurity</mark>, <mark>impoverishment</mark>, <mark>and</u></mark> precariousness, <u>increasingly <mark>inhabit</mark>ing</u> what some have called <u><strong><mark>a “planet of slums.”</u></strong></mark> The <u>apologists of</u> global <u>capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful.</u> <u>But</u> in China, <u>300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. </u>Such is this exploitation that a couple years ago, you may remember, <u>Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps.</u> This is the <u>Foxcomm</u> that <u>makes your iPads and iPhones.</u> The 80 percent is then subject to all sorts of sophisticated systems of social control and repression. <u><strong><mark>We are headed</u></strong></mark> in this regard <u><strong><mark>towards a global police state</u></strong></mark>, <u>organized by global elites and led by the US</u> <u>state</u>, <u>to contain the</u> real or <u>potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority</u>. Such structures of inequality and exploitation cannot be contained over time without both ideological and coercive apparatuses; <u>conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence</u>, organized by states and private security forces. Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which we are now living in a global social control state, a global panoptical surveillance state. George Orwell wrote about such a state in his famous novel “1984.” <u><strong><mark>The Orwellian society has arrived.</u></strong> <u>Yet it is worse</mark> than Orwell imagined, <mark>because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for</mark> their <mark>obedience</mark> and conformity. </u>How do we explain such stark inequality? Capitalism is a system that by its very internal dynamic generates wealth yet polarizes and concentrates that wealth. Historically a de-concentration of wealth through redistribution has come about by state intervention to offset the natural tendency for capital accumulation to result in such polarization. <u><mark>States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms</u></mark> both <u><strong><mark>because they have been pressured from below to do so</u></strong></mark> – whether by trade unions, social movements, socialist struggles, or so on – or because states must do so in order to retain legitimacy and preserve at least enough social peace for the reproduction of the system. A great variety of redistributive models emerged in the 20th century around the world, and went by a great many names – socialism, communism, social democracy, New Deal, welfare states, developmental states, populism, the social wage, and so on. All these models shared two things in common. One was state intervention in the economy to regulate capital accumulation and thus to bring under some control the most anarchic and most destructive elements of unrestrained capitalism. The other was redistribution through numerous policies, ranging from minimum legal wages and unemployment insurance, to public enterprises, the social wages of public health, education, transportation, and housing, welfare programs, land reform in agrarian countries, low cost credit, and so on. But capital responded to the last major crisis of the system, that of the 1970s, by “going global,” by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation and undermining models of state regulation and redistribution. Neo-liberalism is a set of policies that facilitate the rise of transnational capital. As transnational capital has broken free of the confine of the nation-state, <u><mark>the</mark> natural <mark>tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. <strong>The result has been</u></strong></mark> this dizzying <u><strong><mark>escalation of worldwide inequalities</u></strong></mark> as wealth concentrates within the transnational capitalist class and, to a much lesser extent, the better off strata of middle classes and professionals. There are other related factors that account for the intensification of worldwide inequalities. One is the defeat of the worldwide left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led the ruling groups to declare that global neo-liberal capitalism was “The End of History.” A second is the rise of a globally integrated financial system in which capital in its liquid, that is money, form can move frictionless across the planet with no controls whatsoever. Transnational finance capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a global scale, and it engages in unfathomable levels of speculation, turning the global economy into one giant casino. Transnational finance capital has come to control the levers of the global economy, to get around and to undermine any effort at regulation, and to concentrate wealth in its liquid form in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. A third factor is the rise of a mass of surplus humanity. <u>Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps <mark>billions</mark>, <mark>have been</mark> made “superfluous”, <mark>thrown off the land or out of</mark> productive <mark>employment</mark>, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and <mark>relegated to migration</mark> and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.”</u> In turn, <u>this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. </u>Q: In one of your articles, you talked of an “ever-expanding military-prison-industrial-security-financial complex” that generates enormous profits through waging wars, selling weapons and then taking part in reconstruction activities in the war-torn countries. How does this complex operate? Is it really reliant on waging wars? A: <u><strong><mark>We cannot understand intensified militarization</mark> and the rise of this complex <mark>outside of</mark> the crisis of global <mark>capitalism</mark>.</u></strong> This crisis is structural, in the first instance. <u>It is</u> what we call <u>a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy</u> driven by new technologies, especially computer, information, and communications technologies, but also by the revolution in transportation and containerization, by robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and more recently, by 3D printing, among other aspects, <u>has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy</u>, and to bring about a huge increase in productivity worldwide and an enormous expansion of the capacity of the global economy to churn out goods and services. But <u><mark>extreme inequality and social polarization</u></mark> in the global system <u><mark>means that the global market cannot absorb</mark> the <mark>expanding output</mark> of the global economy. <strong><mark>The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>The gap between what the global economy can produce and </mark>what the global market can <mark>absorb is growing</mark> and <mark>this leads to a crisis of overproduction</mark>: where and how to unload the surplus?</u> How can transnational capital continue to accumulate and generate profits if this output is not unloaded, that is, profitably marketed? <u><mark>Unloading the surplus</mark> through financial speculation</u>, which has skyrocketed in recent years, only <u><mark>aggravates the solution</mark>, <mark>as we saw with the collapse of</mark> 20<mark>08</mark>. </u>Now, if only 20 percent of humanity can consume in any significant quantity it is not very profitable to go into the business of mass, inexpensive public transportation, health and education, or the production of practical goods that the world’s population needs because very simply even if people need these things they do not have the income to purchase them. A global civilian economy geared to the basic needs of humanity is simply not profitable for the transnational capitalist class. Look at it like this: <u>the mass production and distribution of vaccines and</u> other <u>medications for</u> communicable and treatable <u>diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are</u> simply <u>not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases</u> – <u>tuberculosis, measles, etc</u>. – <u>that previously were under control.</u> <u>Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry</u>, including the giant pharmaceutical, biotechnology and related branches <u>to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent.</u> The lesson here is that <u>capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable</u>, according to the structure of the market and of income, <u>which</u> in turn <u>is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. </u>It is in this context that <u><strong><mark>it becomes</u></strong></mark> quite <u><strong><mark>profitable to turn to wars</u></strong></mark>, conflicts, systems of repression and social control to generate profit, to produce goods and systems that can repress that 80 percent of humanity that is not your consumer, not your customer so to say, because they do not have the purchasing power to sustain your drive to accumulate by producing goods and services for them that they actually need. Global capitalism is a perverted and irrational system. Putting aside geo-political considerations, <u><mark>the</u> <u>surplus</mark> that the global economy has been and is producing but that <mark>cannot be absorbed</mark> by the world market, <mark>has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction</u></mark>, and new systems of social control and repression, independent of geo-political considerations, that is, simply <u>as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies.</u> <u>The US </u>invasions and <u>occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan</u> – <u>although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital.</u> <u>The prison-industrial</u> <u>and immigrant-detention complexes</u> in the United States – and let us recall that the United States holds some 25-30 percent of the world’s prisoners – <u>is enormously profitable for private corporations</u> that run almost all of the immigrant detention centers, some of the general prisons, supply everything from guards to food, build the installations, erect border walls, and so on. Let us recall that the US National Security Agency – and we now know from Edward Snowden just how vast are its operations – subcontracts out its activities to private corporations, as do the CIA, the Pentagon, and so on. Global security corporations are one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and there are now more private security guards in the world than police officers. All of this is to say that <u><strong><mark>we are </mark>now <mark>living in a global war economy</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>in which the threat of stagnation is offset</u></mark> in part <u><mark>by</mark> the <mark>militarization</mark> of global economy and society and the</u> introduction and <u>spread of systems of mass social control</u>. Of course this involves all kinds of cultural, ideological, and political dimensions as well. <u><mark>A global war economy based on <strong>a multitude of endless conflicts</u></strong></mark> <u>and the spread of social control systems, <strong><mark>from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants</mark> in the United States and Europe</strong>, <mark>must be ideologically legitimated</mark>.</u> <u><mark>This is where</mark> bogus</u> and farcical <u>“wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where <mark>enemies must be conjured up</mark>, in which <mark>populations must </mark>be led to <mark>believe they are threatened</u></mark>, and so on. <u>So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is</u> now <u>the devil, and so on.</u> <u><strong><mark>One “threat” replaces another</u></strong> <u>but the system needs to keep a population <strong>in permanent compliance</strong></mark> through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy</u> has <u>involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation</u>, towards those global corporate conglomerates involved in the production of war materials, of security, of engineering (for example, Bechtel and Halliburton), and other activities that involve making profit out of conflict and control. Remember by way of example that <u>each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on</u> and so forth, <u>is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply</u>, in turn, <u>of raw materials, machinery and service inputs</u> in turn <u>come from other global corporations</u> or local firms. So <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> whole <u><strong>global <mark>economy is kept running through violence and conflict</u></strong></mark>. But <u>the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global econom</u>y, together <u>with the petroleum complex that is coming under</u> much <u>pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. <strong><mark>This is a new transnational power bloc</u></strong></mark> – <u>this</u> <u>complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control</u>, together <u>with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc.</u> Remember also that <u><mark>the polarization of the world population</mark> into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated <mark>generates new</mark> spatial <mark>social relations, <strong>so that the privileged occupy gated communities</strong> and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and</mark> carefully <mark>controlled</mark>, <mark>while</mark> surveillance systems and security <mark>guards</mark> must patrol and <mark>protect</mark> <mark>that 20 percent</mark>.</u> <u>All <mark>this</mark> <mark>and</mark> much <mark>more are part of the</mark> militarization and <strong><mark>“securitization” of global society</u></strong></mark> by the powers that be. <u><mark>We face</u></mark> new <u><mark>doctrines</mark>, <mark>ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state</u></mark> – “fourth generation warfare,” “humanitarian intervention,” <u><strong><mark>the “war on drugs,”</u></strong></mark> among others, and above all, the so-called “war on terror.” I say so-called because, <u>the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They</u> indeed <u>do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then <strong>the US state is the world’s leading terrorist.</u></strong> The powers that be in global society and that control the global political discourse attach the label “terrorist” to violence that they do not approve of, and they attach the label of “freedom and democracy and security” to violence that they do approve of, or that they commit themselves. Moreover, increasingly “terrorism” is used to simply describe political dissent, so that legitimate social movements and political struggles against global capitalism become labeled as “terrorism” in order to justify their suppression.</p>
1NC
null
Off
145,658
20
17,011
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
564,718
N
Wake
7
UNLV GV
Calum Matheson
1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,379
Our alternative is pedagogical resistance to neoliberalism – the failure of traditional politics demands creation of resistant educational spaces – exposing epistemic cracks within neoliberal apparatuses provides the conditions of possibility for radical politics
Giroux 11/6
Giroux 11/6 (Henry Giroux, PhD from Carnegie-Mellon University, professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, distinguished visiting professor at Ryerson University, 11-6-14, “Capitalism Is a Tumor on the Body Politic: What's the Alternative? Beyond Mid-Election Babble,” http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/27273-henry-a-giroux-capitalism-is-a-tumor-on-the-body-politic-what-s-the-alternative) gz
The biggest challenge facing those who believe in social justice is to provide an alternative discourse, educational apparatuses and vision that can convince US citizens that a real democracy is worth fighting for The right-wing Republican sweep of Congress testifies to a massive memory and educational deficit among the US public and a failure among progressives and the left regarding how to think about politics outside of the established boundaries of liberal reform. The educative nature of politics has never been more crucial than it is now and testifies to the need for a new politics in which culture and education are as important as economic forces in shaping individual and social agency, if not resistance itself. The cultural apparatuses owned by the financial elite are largely responsible for the political and social darkness that engulfs the American public Americans are inhabiting a new moment in history in which the symbiosis among cultural institutions, power and everyday life has shaped the very nature of politics and the broader collective public consciousness with an influence unlike anything we have seen in the past Economics drives politics and its legitimating apparatuses have become the great engines of manufactured ignorance. This suggests the need for the left and their allies to take seriously how identities, desires and modes of agency are produced, struggled over and taken up the left "has underestimated the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle and have not always forged appropriate weapons to fight on this front" and in doing so have failed in its responsibility to address the educative nature of politics by challenging modes of domination "that lie on the side of the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle Couple that understanding with the need for a more comprehensive vision of change and the necessity for broad-based social movements, and it may become possible once again to develop new opportunities for a new political language, forms of collective struggle and a politics for radical change rather than cravenly center-right reforms. The financial state promotes a form of ideological terrorism and the key issue is how to expose it, and dismantle its cultural apparatuses with the use of the social media, diverse apparatuses of communication, new political formations, and ongoing collective educational and political struggles.
The biggest challenge facing social justice is to provide an alternative discourse, educational apparatuses and vision that can convince citizens that democracy is worth fighting for The right-wing sweep of Congress testifies to a educational deficit among the public and failure to think politics outside established boundaries The educative nature of politics has never been more crucial and testifies to the need for a new politics in which culture and education are important in shaping social agency, if not resistance Economics drives politics and its apparatuses have become engines of manufactured ignorance. This suggests the need to take seriously how identities, desires and agency are produced the left "has underestimated the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle and have not forged appropriate weapons to fight on this front Couple that with broad-based social movements, and it may become possible to develop a new political language and a politics for radical change The financial state promotes ideological terrorism and the key is how to expose and dismantle its cultural apparatuses
The biggest challenge facing those who believe in social justice is to provide an alternative discourse, educational apparatuses and vision that can convince US citizens that a real democracy is worth fighting for. The right-wing Republican sweep of Congress testifies to a massive memory and educational deficit among the US public and a failure among progressives and the left regarding how to think about politics outside of the established boundaries of liberal reform. The educative nature of politics has never been more crucial than it is now and testifies to the need for a new politics in which culture and education are as important as economic forces in shaping individual and social agency, if not resistance itself. The cultural apparatuses owned by the financial elite are largely responsible for the political and social darkness that engulfs the American public. Americans are inhabiting a new moment in history in which the symbiosis among cultural institutions, power and everyday life has shaped the very nature of politics and the broader collective public consciousness with an influence unlike anything we have seen in the past. Economics drives politics and its legitimating apparatuses have become the great engines of manufactured ignorance. This suggests the need for the left and their allies to take seriously how identities, desires and modes of agency are produced, struggled over and taken up. The left and other progressives need to rethink Pierre Bourdieu's insistence that the left "has underestimated the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle and have not always forged appropriate weapons to fight on this front" and in doing so have failed in its responsibility to address the educative nature of politics by challenging modes of domination "that lie on the side of the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle." (1) Couple that understanding with the need for a more comprehensive vision of change and the necessity for broad-based social movements, and it may become possible once again to develop new opportunities for a new political language, forms of collective struggle and a politics for radical change rather than cravenly center-right reforms. As Hannah Arendt and others told us many years ago, there is no democracy without an informed public. This is a lesson the right wing took very seriously after the democratic uprisings of the 1960s. This is not a matter of blaming the public but of trying to understand the role of culture and power as a vital force in politics and how it is linked to massive inequities in wealth and income. The financial state promotes a form of ideological terrorism and the key issue is how to expose it, and dismantle its cultural apparatuses with the use of the social media, diverse apparatuses of communication, new political formations, and ongoing collective educational and political struggles.
2,899
<h4>Our alternative is pedagogical resistance to neoliberalism – the failure of traditional politics demands creation of resistant educational spaces – exposing epistemic cracks within neoliberal apparatuses provides the conditions of possibility for radical politics</h4><p><u><strong>Giroux 11/6</u></strong> (Henry Giroux, PhD from Carnegie-Mellon University, professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, distinguished visiting professor at Ryerson University, 11-6-14, “Capitalism Is a Tumor on the Body Politic: What's the Alternative? Beyond Mid-Election Babble,” http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/27273-henry-a-giroux-capitalism-is-a-tumor-on-the-body-politic-what-s-the-alternative) gz</p><p><u><mark>The biggest challenge facing </mark>those who believe in <mark>social justice is to provide <strong>an alternative discourse, educational apparatuses and vision</strong> that can convince</mark> US <mark>citizens that</mark> a real <mark>democracy is worth fighting for</u></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>The right-wing</mark> Republican <mark>sweep of Congress testifies to a</mark> massive <strong>memory and <mark>educational deficit among the</mark> US <mark>public</strong> and</mark> a <mark>failure</mark> among progressives and the left regarding how <mark>to think </mark>about <mark>politics outside</mark> of the <mark>established boundaries </mark>of liberal reform. <strong><mark>The educative nature of politics</strong> has never been more crucial</mark> than it is now <mark>and testifies to <strong>the need for a new politics in which culture and education are</mark> as <mark>important</strong></mark> as economic forces <mark>in shaping</mark> <strong>individual and <mark>social agency, if not resistance</mark> itself</strong>.</p><p>The cultural apparatuses owned by the financial elite are largely responsible for the <strong>political and social darkness that engulfs the American public</u></strong>. <u>Americans are inhabiting a new moment in history in which the <strong>symbiosis among cultural institutions, power and everyday life</strong> has shaped the very nature of politics and the broader collective public consciousness with an influence unlike anything we have seen in the past</u>. <u><strong><mark>Economics drives politics </strong>and its</mark> legitimating <mark>apparatuses have become</mark> the great <strong><mark>engines of manufactured ignorance</strong>. This suggests the need</mark> for the left and their allies <mark>to <strong>take seriously how identities, desires and</mark> modes of <mark>agency are produced</strong></mark>, struggled over and taken up</u>. The left and other progressives need to rethink Pierre Bourdieu's insistence that <u><mark>the left "has <strong>underestimated the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle</strong> and have not</mark> always <mark>forged appropriate <strong>weapons to fight on this front</mark>"</strong> and in doing so have failed in its responsibility to address the educative nature of politics by challenging modes of domination "that lie on the side of the <strong>symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle</u></strong>." (1) <u><mark>Couple that</mark> understanding <mark>with</mark> the need for a more comprehensive vision of change and the <strong>necessity for <mark>broad-based social movements</strong>, and it may become possible</mark> once again <mark>to develop</mark> new opportunities for <mark>a <strong>new political language</strong></mark>, forms of collective struggle <mark>and a <strong>politics for radical change</strong></mark> rather than cravenly center-right reforms.</p><p></u>As Hannah Arendt and others told us many years ago, there is no democracy without an informed public. This is a lesson the right wing took very seriously after the democratic uprisings of the 1960s. This is not a matter of blaming the public but of trying to understand the role of culture and power as a vital force in politics and how it is linked to massive inequities in wealth and income. <u><mark>The financial state promotes</mark> a form of <strong><mark>ideological terrorism</strong> and the key</mark> issue <mark>is how to <strong>expose</mark> it, <mark>and dismantle its cultural apparatuses</strong></mark> with the use of the social media, diverse apparatuses of communication, new political formations, and ongoing collective educational and political struggles.</p></u>
1NC
null
Off
429,935
6
17,011
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
564,718
N
Wake
7
UNLV GV
Calum Matheson
1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,380
Regs would be ineffective and unenforceable
Danovitch 8
Gabriel Danovitch 8, M.D., Prof of Clinical Medicine and Nephrology at UCLA, and Francis Delmonico, MD, Clinical Prof of Surgery at Massachusetts General Hospital, “The prohibition of kidney sales and organ markets should remain,” Current Opinion in Organ Transplantation Volume 13(4), August 2008, p 386–394
Surely, in the United States, regulation would prevent abuse. But what kind of regulation would be required? Even if the destitute were somehow excluded from the process (and it is not clear how this could be legally achieved), the donors would still be those who are in dire need of money Consider a potential paid donor requested to repeat a urinalysis because of proteinuria a common request. Would the sample need to be monitored to ensure that the donor is indeed the source Whose responsibility will it be to ensure that the factors are not applicable to the donor and that the information provided is accurate large amounts of money are at play Whose responsibility will it be to check on citizenship or naturalization documents and establish identity theft? contention that a regulated system could be tacked on to our current UNOS) directed system is unrealistic. Physicians are not trained to be police or agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and they should not take this role
what kind would be required Even if the destitute were somehow excluded and it is not clear how this could be legally achieved), donors would still be in dire need Whose responsibility will it be to ensure factors are not applicable and info is accurate Whose responsibility will it be to check on citizenship documents contention that a regulated system could be tacked on to our current system is unrealistic. Physicians are not trained to be police or agents of I N S and should not take this role
It is true that much of the available data on exploitive commercialized donation come from countries where the process is unregulated [24••]. Surely, in the United States, regulation of the process would prevent such abuse. But what kind of regulation would be required? Even if the destitute, who donate in developing countries, were somehow excluded from the process (and it is not clear how this could be legally achieved), the donors would still be those who are in dire need of money and perhaps desperate to receive it. Consider, for example, a potential paid donor requested to repeat a urinalysis because of the finding of proteinuria or microscopic hematuria or borderline low renal function: a common request. Would the passage of the urine sample need to be monitored to ensure that the donor is indeed the source of the sample? Whose responsibility will it be to ensure that the factors listed above are not applicable to the donor and that the information that is provided is accurate? After all, large amounts of money are at play and the major incentive for the donor is financial? It has been suggested that abuse could be minimized by ensuring that paid donation will be regulated within geopolitical borders [24••]. Whose responsibility will it be to check on citizenship or naturalization documents and establish identity theft?¶ These examples (it would not be difficult to come up with more) are quite plausible, they belong to our ‘real’ world. The blithe contention [24••] that a regulated system could be tacked on to our current United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) directed system is unrealistic. Physicians are not trained to be policemen or private detectives or agents of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service and they should not take this role upon themselves. If kidney vending were to be permitted, it would seem that specially trained investigators would need to be included in the transplant team to ensure the accuracy of the paid donor's history and to ensure public safety. A medical process would perforce become a legal one. The assertion with respect to a ‘regulated’ market in organ sales in the United States that ‘the procedural framework would be virtually identical to the system currently used to evaluate altruistic living donors’ is both misleading and unrealistic [24••].
2,331
<h4>Regs would be ineffective and unenforceable</h4><p>Gabriel <u><strong>Danovitch 8</u></strong>, M.D., Prof of Clinical Medicine and Nephrology at UCLA, and Francis Delmonico, MD, Clinical Prof of Surgery at Massachusetts General Hospital, “The prohibition of kidney sales and organ markets should remain,” Current Opinion in Organ Transplantation Volume 13(4), August 2008, p 386–394</p><p>It is true that much of the available data on exploitive commercialized donation come from countries where the process is unregulated [24••]. <u><strong>Surely</strong>, in the United States, regulation</u> of the process <u>would prevent</u> such <u>abuse. But <strong><mark>what kind</strong></mark> of regulation <mark>would be required</mark>?</u> <u><mark>Even if the destitute</u></mark>, who donate in developing countries, <u><mark>were somehow excluded</mark> from the process (<strong><mark>and it is not clear how this could be legally achieved</strong>),</mark> the <mark>donors would still be</mark> those who are <mark>in dire need</mark> of money</u> and perhaps desperate to receive it. <u>Consider</u>, for example, <u>a potential paid donor requested to repeat a urinalysis because of</u> the finding of <u>proteinuria</u> or microscopic hematuria or borderline low renal function: <u>a common request. Would the</u> passage of the urine<u> sample need to be monitored to ensure that the donor is indeed the source</u> of the sample? <u><mark>Whose responsibility will it be to ensure</mark> that the <mark>factors</u></mark> listed above <u><strong><mark>are not applicable</strong></mark> to the donor <mark>and</mark> that the <mark>info</mark>rmation</u> that is <u>provided <mark>is accurate</u></mark>? After all, <u><strong>large amounts of money are at play</u></strong> and the major incentive for the donor is financial? It has been suggested that abuse could be minimized by ensuring that paid donation will be regulated within geopolitical borders [24••]. <u><strong><mark>Whose responsibility will it be to check on citizenship</mark> or naturalization <mark>documents</mark> and establish identity theft?</u>¶<u> </u></strong>These examples (it would not be difficult to come up with more) are quite plausible, they belong to our ‘real’ world. The blithe <u><mark>contention</u></mark> [24••] <u><mark>that a regulated system could be tacked on to our current</u></mark> United Network for Organ Sharing (<u>UNOS) directed <mark>system is <strong>unrealistic</strong>. Physicians are not trained to be <strong>police</u></strong></mark>men <u><mark>or</u></mark> private detectives or <u><mark>agents of</mark> the</u> US <u><strong><mark>I</strong></mark>mmigration and <strong><mark>N</strong></mark>aturalization <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>ervice <mark>and</mark> they <strong><mark>should not take this role</u></strong></mark> upon themselves. If kidney vending were to be permitted, it would seem that specially trained investigators would need to be included in the transplant team to ensure the accuracy of the paid donor's history and to ensure public safety. A medical process would perforce become a legal one. The assertion with respect to a ‘regulated’ market in organ sales in the United States that ‘the procedural framework would be virtually identical to the system currently used to evaluate altruistic living donors’ is both misleading and unrealistic [24••].</p>
1NC
null
Organs
430,196
9
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,381
The aff misreads the agonistic literature base – the point of counterhegemony is not to necessarily only utilize institutional spheres – “politics” means the ability of a set of individuals to exert agency which includes the form of micropolitics the CP engages in
Swyngedouw 14 Volume 18, Issue 2) gz
Swyngedouw 14 (Erik Swyngedouw, professor of geography at the University of Manchester, PhD in geography and environmental engineering, “Where is the Political? Insurgent Mobilisations and the Incipient ‘Return of the Political,’” Space and Polity Volume 18, Issue 2) gz
the political is not a reflection of something else, like the cultural, the social, or the economic. Instead, it is the affirmation of the capacity of each and everyone to act politically It is a site open for occupation by those who call it into being, render it visible, and stage its occupation, irrespective of the “place” they occupy within the social edifice an emergent property, articulated through “an event” understood as an interruption in the state of the situation An event can therefore only be discerned as political retroactively, when the truth of the new situation has been established the political emerges through the process of political subjectivation, the process of appearance of those who disrupt the state of the situation in the name of “equality”, “the people”, the “common” and “the democratic”. the paper proposes an intellectual foray into grappling with the emergence in public spaces of heterogeneous, but decidedly political, rebellious and insurrectional movements whereby the process of subjectivation – the act of participating in the politicising event – operates at a distance from both state and theory. This perspective focuses on the political as appearance, as an immanent practice
the political is the affirmation of the capacity to act politically open for those who call it into being irrespective of the “place” they occupy an interruption the political emerges through those who disrupt in the name of the democratic the paper proposes an intellectual foray into grappling with spaces of heterogeneous, but decidedly political, rebellious and insurrectional movements This perspective focuses on the political as an immanent practice
This sense of “the political” requires urgent attention again as a “relatively autonomous” (to use Althusser’s proposition) field. For Alain Badiou, for example, socio-economic “analysis and politics are absolutely disconnected”: the former is a matter for expertise and implies hierarchy; the latter is not. An absolute separation has to be maintained, he argues, between “science and politics, analytic description and political prescription” (Badiou, 1998, p. 2; see also Hallward, 2003a). For Badiou, the political is not a reflection of something else, like the cultural, the social, or the economic. Instead, it is the affirmation of the capacity of each and everyone to act politically. It is a site open for occupation by those who call it into being, render it visible, and stage its occupation, irrespective of the “place” they occupy within the social edifice. Badiou insists on the political as an emergent property, articulated through “an event” understood as an interruption in the state of the situation. A political sequence unfolds through a process of universalisation, the rhizomatic “declaration” of fidelity to the egalitarian truth expressed in the inaugural event. An event can therefore only be discerned as political retroactively, when the truth of the new situation has been established. Symbolisations of political events – like the proper names “October 1917” or “The Paris Commune” – only take place ex-post, they cannot be named in advance. It is the work of the political that inaugurates and names the truth of the event and forges symbolisations, practices and contents, and that provides substance to the political sequence. It is not philosophy or (critical social) theory that founds or inaugurates the political. On the contrary, the political emerges through the process of political subjectivation, the process of appearance of those who disrupt the state of the situation in the name of “equality”, “the people”, the “common” and “the democratic”. We seek to interrogate “the political” as understood above. While considerable intellectual effort has gone into excavating the practices of established policies and politics, very little attention is paid to what constitutes political democracy as a political configuration associated with a particular public space (Marchart, 2007, p. 36). The aim of this contribution is to re-centre political thought again by exploring the views of a series of political philosophers and interlocutors who share the view that “the political” needs urgent attention; particularly in a discursive context that is sutured by a view of the “end of politics” and intensifying practices of depoliticisation. This is not a claim to a “new” theorisation of what “the political” really is. Rather, the paper proposes an intellectual foray into grappling with the emergence in public spaces of heterogeneous, but decidedly political, rebellious and insurrectional movements whereby the process of subjectivation – the act of participating in the politicising event – operates at a distance from both state and theory. This perspective focuses on the political as appearance, as an immanent practice.
3,167
<h4>The aff misreads the agonistic literature base – the point of counterhegemony is not to necessarily only utilize institutional spheres – “politics” means the ability of a set of individuals to exert agency which includes the form of micropolitics the CP engages in</h4><p><u><strong>Swyngedouw 14</u></strong> (Erik Swyngedouw, professor of geography at the University of Manchester, PhD in geography and environmental engineering, “Where is the Political? Insurgent Mobilisations and the Incipient ‘Return of the Political,’” Space and Polity <u><strong>Volume 18, Issue 2) gz</p><p></u></strong>This sense of “the political” requires urgent attention again as a “relatively autonomous” (to use Althusser’s proposition) field. For Alain Badiou, for example, socio-economic “analysis and politics are absolutely disconnected”: the former is a matter for expertise and implies hierarchy; the latter is not. An absolute separation has to be maintained, he argues, between “science and politics, analytic description and political prescription” (Badiou, 1998, p. 2; see also Hallward, 2003a). For Badiou, <u><mark>the political</mark> is not a reflection of something else, like the cultural, the social, or the economic. Instead, <strong>it <mark>is the affirmation of the capacity</mark> of each and everyone <mark>to act politically</u></strong></mark>. <u>It is a site <mark>open for </mark>occupation by <mark>those who call it into being</mark>, render it visible, and stage its occupation, <mark>irrespective of the “place” they occupy</mark> within the social edifice</u>. Badiou insists on the political as <u>an emergent property, articulated through “an event” understood as <strong><mark>an interruption</strong></mark> in the state of the situation</u>. A political sequence unfolds through a process of universalisation, the rhizomatic “declaration” of fidelity to the egalitarian truth expressed in the inaugural event. <u>An event can therefore only be discerned as political retroactively, when the truth of the new situation has been established</u>. Symbolisations of political events – like the proper names “October 1917” or “The Paris Commune” – only take place ex-post, they cannot be named in advance. It is the work of the political that inaugurates and names the truth of the event and forges symbolisations, practices and contents, and that provides substance to the political sequence. It is not philosophy or (critical social) theory that founds or inaugurates the political. On the contrary, <u><mark>the political emerges through</mark> the process of political subjectivation, the process of appearance of <mark>those who <strong>disrupt</mark> the state of the situation <mark>in the name of</mark> “equality”, “the people”, the “common” and “<mark>the democratic</mark>”.</p><p></u></strong>We seek to interrogate “the political” as understood above. While considerable intellectual effort has gone into excavating the practices of established policies and politics, very little attention is paid to what constitutes political democracy as a political configuration associated with a particular public space (Marchart, 2007, p. 36). The aim of this contribution is to re-centre political thought again by exploring the views of a series of political philosophers and interlocutors who share the view that “the political” needs urgent attention; particularly in a discursive context that is sutured by a view of the “end of politics” and intensifying practices of depoliticisation. This is not a claim to a “new” theorisation of what “the political” really is. Rather, <u><mark>the paper proposes an intellectual foray into grappling with</mark> the emergence in public <mark>spaces of <strong>heterogeneous, but decidedly political, rebellious and insurrectional movements</strong></mark> whereby the process of subjectivation – the act of participating in the politicising event – operates at a distance from both state and theory. <mark>This perspective focuses on the political </mark>as appearance, <mark>as an <strong>immanent practice</u></strong></mark>. </p>
1NR
PIK
OV
430,197
1
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,382
The United States should:--implement a modified mandated choice program for organ donation based on the Illinois model,--increase public outreach for organ donation including methods such as social media,--and create training programs for doctors and nurses in best practices regarding discussion of organ donation with family members.
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>The United States should:--implement a modified mandated choice program for organ donation based on the Illinois model,--increase public outreach for organ donation including methods such as social media,--and create training programs for doctors and nurses in best practices regarding discussion of organ donation with family members.</h4>
1NC
null
Off
430,195
1
17,011
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
564,718
N
Wake
7
UNLV GV
Calum Matheson
1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,383
The illegal market is a sensationalist, anti-science myth – their reproduction of it collapses donation and causes violence
Leventhal 94
Leventhal 94 (Todd Leventhal, Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications at U.S. Department of State, December 1994, “THE CHILD ORGAN TRAFFICKING RUMOR: A MODERN 'URBAN LEGEND',” http://pascalfroissart.online.fr/3-cache/1994-leventhal.pdf) gz
rumors that children are being kidnapped so that they can be used as unwilling donors in organ transplants have been rampant in the world media. No government, international body, non-governmental organization, or investigative journalist has ever produced any credible evidence to substantiate this story, however there is every reason to believe that the child organ trafficking rumor is a modern "urban legend Organ transplant experts agree that it would be impossible to successfully conceal any clandestine murder-for-organ-trafficking ring. Because of the large number of people who must be involved in an organ transplant, the sophisticated medical technology needed to conduct such operations, the extremely short amount of time that organs remain viable for transplant, and the abhorrent nature of the alleged activities, such operations could neither be organized clandestinely nor be kept secret None of these sources contains any credible evidence of child organ trafficking, however.¶ The circulation of false reports of child organ trafficking has done enormous damage several U.S. citizens and citizens of other countries were attacked by mobs in Guatemala who believed the false rumor The rumor has also harmed and disrupted intercountry adoption, caused widespread, groundless fears in Latin America and elsewhere, and poses the danger of causing numerous premature deaths if it leads to a decrease in voluntary organ donation. This has already happened in the field of tissue donations. In early 1994, cornea donations in Colombia decreased by 90 percent after the false charges of cornea theft in "Organ Snatchers" were publicized in that country.¶ more innocent people may become victims of this deadly rumor.
rumors that children are being kidnapped so they can be unwilling donors have been rampant No body has ever produced evidence to substantiate this story the organ trafficking rumor is a urban legend experts agree it would be impossible to conceal murder-for-organ-trafficking Because of the large number of people involved the sophisticated technology needed the extremely short time organs remain viable and the abhorrent nature of the alleged activities, such operations could neither be organized nor kept secret false reports has done enormous damage citizens were attacked by mobs in Guatemala The rumor has harmed intercountry adoption, caused widespread fears in Latin America and poses the danger of causing numerous premature deaths if it leads to a decrease in donation In 1994, cornea donations in Colombia decreased 90 percent after false charges of cornea theft
Since January 1987, rumors that children are being kidnapped so that they can be used as unwilling donors in organ transplants have been rampant in the world media. No government, international body, non-governmental organization, or investigative journalist has ever produced any credible evidence to substantiate this story, however. Instead, there is every reason to believe that the child organ trafficking rumor is a modern "urban legend," a false story that is commonly believed because it encapsulates, in story form, widespread anxieties about modern life.¶ Organ transplant experts agree that it would be impossible to successfully conceal any clandestine murder-for-organ-trafficking ring. Because of the large number of people who must be involved in an organ transplant, the sophisticated medical technology needed to conduct such operations, the extremely short amount of time that organs remain viable for transplant, and the abhorrent nature of the alleged activities, such operations could neither be organized clandestinely nor be kept secret.¶ Despite the impossibility of such practices occurring, and the fact that no credible evidence has ever been produced to substantiate rumors of such activities, the child organ trafficking myth has attained unprecedented credibility during the past year. It was given credence in British/Canadian and French television documentaries, a book published in Spain, a paper by the director of the World Organization Against Torture, a resolution by the European Parliament, numerous press articles, and the January 14, 1994 report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography. None of these sources contains any credible evidence of child organ trafficking, however.¶ The British/Canadian television program "The Body Parts Business" contains numerous inaccuracies. It falsely claims that the only person who investigated child organ trafficking allegations in Guatemala was murdered. In fact, such allegations were investigated on several occasions by people who remain alive. They found no evidence of child organ trafficking.¶ "The Body Parts Business" cites the claim of Charlie Alvarado, an eight year-old Honduran child, that he was kidnapped for use in organ transplants. But it neglects to mention that the child's accusations were dismissed by a Honduran court and appear to have been a fabrication.¶ The program also includes the claim that Pedro Reggi had his corneas forcibly removed when he was a patient at the Montes de Oca mental institution in Argentina. Four days after this claim was broadcast, it was retracted by Mr. Reggi's family when an expert medical examination established that Mr. Reggi had lost his eyesight due to disease.¶ The French television program "Organ Snatchers" also cites the false Reggi claim. It also includes the claim that a Colombian boy named Jeison had his corneas forcibly removed. This claim was disproved when an examination of Jeison's medical records established that, as an infant, he had lost his eyesight due to disease.¶ A September 1993 European Parliament resolution also gave credence to allegations of child organ trafficking. It was unfortunately based on an August 1992 article in "Le Monde Diplomatique" that was full of inaccuracies, including many claims that had been disproved or repudiated years earlier.¶ A March 1994 paper by the director of the World Organization Against Torture also gave credence to the child organ trafficking rumors. Like the European Parliament resolution, it was based on inaccurate or unsubstantiated claims made by others, many of which had been shown to be groundless. It also contained glaring misstatements about the organ transplantation system in the United States.¶ A May 1994 book "Ninos de Repuesto" ("Spare-Parts Children") relied heavily on media accounts that included numerous misstatements. Like all other treatments of this issue, it contained no credible evidence of child organ trafficking.¶ In July 1994, a week-long series of articles in the Brazilian newspaper "Correio Braziliense" repeated the Pedro Reggi and Jeison stories, both of which had been discredited months earlier. It also included unsubstantiated charges that child organ trafficking had occurred in Brazil. The Brazilian government pledged to investigate but also announced that its investigation of previous charges of child organ trafficking had uncovered no evidence to support those charges.¶ In August 1994, international wire services reported that four Philippine doctors had been charged with murdering a man for his organs. Subsequent press articles in the Philippines, which were not reported by the wire services, stated that the man had been declared brain dead before his organs had been removed. [Addendum to report: On December 28, 1994, a Philippine court ruled in the doctors' favor, dismissing the charges against them.]¶ In September 1994, Italian Minister for the Family Antonio Guidi was mistakenly quoted as confirming the child organ trafficking rumor, in a story that spread to several countries.¶ The circulation of false reports of child organ trafficking has done enormous damage. Most dramatically, in March and April 1994, several U.S. citizens and citizens of other countries were attacked by mobs in Guatemala who believed the false rumor. One U.S. woman, June Weinstock, was severely injured and remains critically impaired.¶ The rumor has also harmed and disrupted intercountry adoption, caused widespread, groundless fears in Latin America and elsewhere, and poses the danger of causing numerous premature deaths if it leads to a decrease in voluntary organ donation. This has already happened in the field of tissue donations. In early 1994, cornea donations in Colombia decreased by 90 percent after the false charges of cornea theft in "Organ Snatchers" were publicized in that country.¶ Given the total lack of evidence for the child organ trafficking myth, its impossibility from a technical point of view, and the widespread, serious damage that it has already caused and is likely to cause in the future, the United States Information Agency respectfully requests that the U.N. Special Rapporteur give maximum attention and publicity to the information in this report, which demonstrates the groundlessness of reports of child organ trafficking and the impossibility of such practices occurring. Otherwise, more innocent people may become victims of this deadly rumor.
6,500
<h4>The illegal market is a sensationalist, anti-science myth – their reproduction of it collapses donation and causes violence</h4><p><u><strong>Leventhal 94</u></strong> (Todd Leventhal, Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications at U.S. Department of State, December 1994, “THE CHILD ORGAN TRAFFICKING RUMOR: A MODERN 'URBAN LEGEND',” http://pascalfroissart.online.fr/3-cache/1994-leventhal.pdf<u>) gz</p><p></u>Since January 1987, <u><mark>rumors that children are being kidnapped so</mark> that <mark>they can be</mark> used as <mark>unwilling donors</mark> in organ transplants <mark>have been rampant</mark> in the world media. <mark>No</mark> government, international <mark>body</mark>, non-governmental organization, or investigative journalist <mark>has ever produced</mark> any credible <mark>evidence to substantiate this story</mark>, however</u>. Instead, <u>there is every reason to believe that <mark>the</mark> child <mark>organ trafficking rumor is a</mark> modern "<mark>urban legend</u></mark>," a false story that is commonly believed because it encapsulates, in story form, widespread anxieties about modern life.¶ <u>Organ transplant <mark>experts agree</mark> that <mark>it would be impossible to </mark>successfully <mark>conceal</mark> any clandestine <mark>murder-for-organ-trafficking</mark> ring. <mark>Because of the large number of people</mark> who must be <mark>involved</mark> in an organ transplant, <mark>the sophisticated</mark> medical <mark>technology needed</mark> to conduct such operations, <mark>the extremely short </mark>amount of <mark>time</mark> that <mark>organs remain viable</mark> for transplant, <mark>and the abhorrent nature of the alleged activities, such operations could neither be organized</mark> clandestinely <mark>nor</mark> be <mark>kept secret</u></mark>.¶ Despite the impossibility of such practices occurring, and the fact that no credible evidence has ever been produced to substantiate rumors of such activities, the child organ trafficking myth has attained unprecedented credibility during the past year. It was given credence in British/Canadian and French television documentaries, a book published in Spain, a paper by the director of the World Organization Against Torture, a resolution by the European Parliament, numerous press articles, and the January 14, 1994 report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography. <u>None of these sources contains any credible evidence of child organ trafficking, however.¶ </u>The British/Canadian television program "The Body Parts Business" contains numerous inaccuracies. It falsely claims that the only person who investigated child organ trafficking allegations in Guatemala was murdered. In fact, such allegations were investigated on several occasions by people who remain alive. They found no evidence of child organ trafficking.¶ "The Body Parts Business" cites the claim of Charlie Alvarado, an eight year-old Honduran child, that he was kidnapped for use in organ transplants. But it neglects to mention that the child's accusations were dismissed by a Honduran court and appear to have been a fabrication.¶ The program also includes the claim that Pedro Reggi had his corneas forcibly removed when he was a patient at the Montes de Oca mental institution in Argentina. Four days after this claim was broadcast, it was retracted by Mr. Reggi's family when an expert medical examination established that Mr. Reggi had lost his eyesight due to disease.¶ The French television program "Organ Snatchers" also cites the false Reggi claim. It also includes the claim that a Colombian boy named Jeison had his corneas forcibly removed. This claim was disproved when an examination of Jeison's medical records established that, as an infant, he had lost his eyesight due to disease.¶ A September 1993 European Parliament resolution also gave credence to allegations of child organ trafficking. It was unfortunately based on an August 1992 article in "Le Monde Diplomatique" that was full of inaccuracies, including many claims that had been disproved or repudiated years earlier.¶ A March 1994 paper by the director of the World Organization Against Torture also gave credence to the child organ trafficking rumors. Like the European Parliament resolution, it was based on inaccurate or unsubstantiated claims made by others, many of which had been shown to be groundless. It also contained glaring misstatements about the organ transplantation system in the United States.¶ A May 1994 book "Ninos de Repuesto" ("Spare-Parts Children") relied heavily on media accounts that included numerous misstatements. Like all other treatments of this issue, it contained no credible evidence of child organ trafficking.¶ In July 1994, a week-long series of articles in the Brazilian newspaper "Correio Braziliense" repeated the Pedro Reggi and Jeison stories, both of which had been discredited months earlier. It also included unsubstantiated charges that child organ trafficking had occurred in Brazil. The Brazilian government pledged to investigate but also announced that its investigation of previous charges of child organ trafficking had uncovered no evidence to support those charges.¶ In August 1994, international wire services reported that four Philippine doctors had been charged with murdering a man for his organs. Subsequent press articles in the Philippines, which were not reported by the wire services, stated that the man had been declared brain dead before his organs had been removed. [Addendum to report: On December 28, 1994, a Philippine court ruled in the doctors' favor, dismissing the charges against them.]¶ In September 1994, Italian Minister for the Family Antonio Guidi was mistakenly quoted as confirming the child organ trafficking rumor, in a story that spread to several countries.¶ <u>The circulation of <mark>false reports</mark> of child organ trafficking <mark>has done enormous damage</u></mark>. Most dramatically, in March and April 1994, <u>several U.S. citizens and <mark>citizens</mark> of other countries <mark>were attacked by mobs in Guatemala</mark> who believed the false rumor</u>. One U.S. woman, June Weinstock, was severely injured and remains critically impaired.¶ <u><mark>The rumor has</mark> also <mark>harmed</mark> and disrupted <mark>intercountry adoption, caused widespread</mark>, groundless <mark>fears in Latin America</mark> and elsewhere, <mark>and poses the danger of causing numerous premature deaths if it leads to a decrease in</mark> voluntary organ <mark>donation</mark>. This has already happened in the field of tissue donations. <mark>In</mark> early <mark>1994, cornea donations in Colombia decreased</mark> by <strong><mark>90 percent</strong> after</mark> the <mark>false charges of cornea theft</mark> in "Organ Snatchers" were publicized in that country.¶ </u>Given the total lack of evidence for the child organ trafficking myth, its impossibility from a technical point of view, and the widespread, serious damage that it has already caused and is likely to cause in the future, the United States Information Agency respectfully requests that the U.N. Special Rapporteur give maximum attention and publicity to the information in this report, which demonstrates the groundlessness of reports of child organ trafficking and the impossibility of such practices occurring. Otherwise,<u> more innocent people may become victims of this deadly rumor.</p></u>
1NC
null
Organs
430,198
1
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,384
Cooption DA – the perm forces us to down the path of bureaucratic tyranny, once we’ve been assimilated escape is impossible.
Delgado 93
Delgado 93 (Richard, June 1993, Prof. of Law @ U. of Colorado, New York University Law Review, “Rodrigo’s Sixth Chronicle”)
"Normative discourse is always self-centered one should never adopt the perspective of the more powerful group, even strategically You think that you can jump nimbly aside before the inevitable setbacks, disappointments and double crosses set in. But you can't. You will march strongly and determinedly in the wrong direction, alienating yourself in the process any small suggestion for deviation in the agenda will bring quick denunciation
Normative discourse is always self-centered one should never adopt the perspective of the more powerful group even strategically You think you can jump nimbly aside But you can't You will march in the wrong direction, alienating yourself any small suggestion for deviation will bring quick denunciation
"Normative discourse is always self-centered," Rodrigo replied. "The critique of normativity shows that in a number of ways. n81 For example, society may tolerate or even inaugurate new rights for women or minorities. But then it will invariably declare that your and my exercise of those rights is not what they had in mind at all. When a low-income Black woman has an abortion, that will seem like lasciviousness and hypersexuality, an irresponsible exercise of the right. n82 When a right to nondiscriminatory treatment in employment is recognized, everyone celebrates. But when a Black man with credentials short of Albert Einstein's gets a job, that will seem troublesome and unprincipled." n83 "So, the conclusion you draw from all this is ... ?" "That one should never adopt the perspective of the more powerful group, even strategically. Adopting another's perspective is always a mistake. One starts out thinking one can go along with the more numerous, better organized, and more influential group - say, white women in the case of sisters of color - and reap some benefits. You think that you can jump nimbly aside before the inevitable setbacks, disappointments and double crosses set in. But you can't. You will march strongly and determinedly in the wrong direction, alienating yourself in the process. You'll end up having the newly deployed rights cut back in your case, perhaps being criticized as irresponsible when you try to exercise them. Moreover, any small suggestion for deviation in the agenda, any polite request that the larger group consider your own concerns, will bring quick denunciation. You are being divisive. You are weakening the movement."
1,676
<h4><u>Cooption DA</u> – the perm forces us to down the path of bureaucratic tyranny, once we’ve been assimilated escape is impossible. </h4><p><u><strong>Delgado 93</u> </strong>(Richard, June 1993, Prof. of Law @ U. of Colorado, New York University Law Review, “Rodrigo’s Sixth Chronicle”)</p><p><u>"<mark>Normative</mark> <mark>discourse is always self-centered</u></mark>," Rodrigo replied. "The critique of normativity shows that in a number of ways. n81 For example, society may tolerate or even inaugurate new rights for women or minorities. But then it will invariably declare that your and my exercise of those rights is not what they had in mind at all. When a low-income Black woman has an abortion, that will seem like lasciviousness and hypersexuality, an irresponsible exercise of the right. n82 When a right to nondiscriminatory treatment in employment is recognized, everyone celebrates. But when a Black man with credentials short of Albert Einstein's gets a job, that will seem troublesome and unprincipled." n83 "So, the conclusion you draw from all this is ... ?" "That <u><mark>one</mark> <mark>should never adopt the perspective of the more powerful group</mark>, <mark>even</mark> <mark>strategically</u></mark>. Adopting another's perspective is always a mistake. One starts out thinking one can go along with the more numerous, better organized, and more influential group - say, white women in the case of sisters of color - and reap some benefits. <u><mark>You</mark> <mark>think</mark> that <mark>you can jump nimbly</mark> <mark>aside</mark> before the inevitable setbacks, disappointments and double crosses set in. <mark>But you can't</mark>. <mark>You</mark> <mark>will march</mark> strongly and determinedly <mark>in the wrong direction,</mark> <mark>alienating</mark> <mark>yourself</mark> in the process</u>. You'll end up having the newly deployed rights cut back in your case, perhaps being criticized as irresponsible when you try to exercise them. Moreover, <u><mark>any small</mark> <mark>suggestion for</mark> <mark>deviation</mark> in the agenda</u>, any polite request that the larger group consider your own concerns, <u><mark>will bring quick denunciation</u><strong></mark>. You are being divisive. You are weakening the movement."</p></strong>
1NR
PIK
Perm
430,128
4
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,385
A. Legalize means regulate
Daily Koz ‘10
Daily Koz ‘10
First "legalize" MEANS "regulate", to make available according to certain enforceable rules
First "legalize" MEANS "regulate", to make available according to certain enforceable rules
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/03/24/850496/-CERTIFIED-The-End-is-near-er A couple objections to the wording: First "legalize" MEANS "regulate", to make available according to certain enforceable rules, just like the far more dangerous alcohol and tobacco. Also, it's misleading for rolled marijuana smokables to be called "cigarettes" as cigarettes mean rolled smokable filled with carcinogenic tobacco.
408
<h4><u><strong>A. Legalize means regulate</h4><p>Daily Koz ‘10</p><p></u></strong>http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/03/24/850496/-CERTIFIED-The-End-is-near-er</p><p>A couple objections to the wording: <u><mark>First "legalize" MEANS "regulate", to make available according to certain enforceable rules</u></mark>, just like the far more dangerous alcohol and tobacco. Also, it's misleading for rolled marijuana smokables to be called "cigarettes" as cigarettes mean rolled smokable filled with carcinogenic tobacco.</p>
1NC
null
Off
430,199
1
17,014
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx
564,720
N
USC
3
Cornell LL
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,386
Solves the aff
Thaler 9
Thaler 9 (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz
Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular many people consider it “repugnant,” they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter there is another possibility, called “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference this system has been in use since 2006 and doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers. When you go to renew your driver’s license and update your photograph, you are required to answer this question: “Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state now has a 60 percent donor signup rate That is much higher than the national rate of 38 percent There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission the First-Person Consent Law makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding mandated choice may achieve a higher rate of donations than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination
a market allowing the selling of organs The idea is spectacularly unpopular people consider it “repugnant,” they object to rich people buying their way to the front of the line they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell kidneys a legal market for organs is a political nonstarter “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers When you renew your driver’s license you are required to answer Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state has a 60 percent donor signup rate much higher than the national rate of 38 the First-Person Consent Law makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding mandated choice may achieve a higher rate than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent
Some economists have come up with a simple solution: a market allowing the buying and selling of organs. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply. The idea may have some merit, but it is spectacularly unpopular. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, many people consider it “repugnant,” mainly for two reasons. First, they object to the possibility of rich people buying their way to the front of the line. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell their kidneys. These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney? Still, whether you think a legal market for organs is a brilliant or a dreadful idea, it’s a political nonstarter, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily. Nationwide, roughly 12,000 to 15,000 people fall into this category each year, but only half end up as donors. Because each such donor could supply an average of three organs, having another thousand donors could save 3,000 lives. We need more people to agree to be donors in advance. One strategy is to alter the default rules for signup. Most states, as well as many other countries, use an “opt in” or “explicit consent” rule, meaning that people must take a concrete action, like going to a public library or requesting and mailing in a form, to declare they want to be donors. But many who are willing to donate organs never get around to such steps. An alternative approach, used in several European countries, is an “opt out” rule, often called “presumed consent,” in which citizens are presumed to be consenting donors unless they act to register their unwillingness. In the world of traditional economics, it shouldn’t matter whether you use an opt-in or opt-out system. So long as the costs of registering as a donor or a nondonor are low, the results should be similar. But many findings of behavioral economics show that tiny disparities in such rules can make a big difference. By comparing the consent rates in European countries, the psychologists Eric Johnson and Dan Goldstein have shown that the choice of opting in or opting out is a major factor. Consider the difference in consent rates between two similar countries, Austria and Germany. In Germany, which uses an opt-in system, only 12 percent give their consent; in Austria, which uses opt-out, nearly everyone (99 percent) does. Although presumed consent is generally accepted in countries that have adopted it, the idea can bring strong opposition. Many people object to anyone presuming anything about their organs, even if the costs of opting out are low. In Britain, a proposal by the Labour government to adopt an opt-out system was opposed by Muslims who objected to organ removal on religious grounds. Fortunately, there is another possibility, called “mandated choice,” under which people must indicate their preference. In Illinois, where I live, this system has been in use since 2006 and doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers. Here is how it works: When you go to renew your driver’s license and update your photograph, you are required to answer this question: “Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state now has a 60 percent donor signup rate, according to Donate Life Illinois, a coalition of agencies. That is much higher than the national rate of 38 percent reported by Donate Life America The Illinois system has another advantage. There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission. In France, for example, although there is technically a presumed-consent law, in practice doctors still seek relatives’ approval. In Illinois, the First-Person Consent Law, which created this system, makes one’s wishes to be a donor legally binding. Thus, mandated choice may achieve a higher rate of donations than presumed consent, and avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent for whatever reasons. This is a winning combination.
4,564
<h4>Solves the aff</h4><p><u><strong>Thaler 9</u></strong> (Richard H Thaler, Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago, 9-26-09, “Opting in vs. Opting Out,” http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html?_r=2&hpw&) gz</p><p><u>Some economists have come up with a simple solution: <mark>a market allowing the</mark> buying and <mark>selling of organs</u></mark>. Because people have two kidneys and need only one to live, a robust market could greatly increase supply.</p><p><u><mark>The idea</mark> may have some merit, but it <mark>is <strong>spectacularly unpopular</u></strong></mark>. As the Harvard economist Alvin Roth has noted, <u><strong>many <mark>people consider it “repugnant,”</u></strong></mark> mainly for two reasons. First, <u><mark>they object to</mark> the possibility of <mark>rich people buying their way to the front of the line</u></mark>. (The hospital where Mr. Jobs’s procedure took place said he received the liver transplant because he was the sickest person on its waiting list who matched the donor’s blood type.) Second, <u><mark>they object to incentives that would induce the poor to sell</mark> their <mark>kidneys</u></mark>.</p><p>These objections can lead to some logical quandaries. Why, for example, is it O.K. for a parent to donate a kidney to save a child’s life but not for her to sell her kidney, thereby also saving a life? And why is it acceptable to risk your life for money, say, by becoming a coal miner, but not by selling a kidney?</p><p>Still, <u>whether you think <mark>a legal market for organs is</mark> a brilliant or a dreadful idea, <strong>it’s <mark>a political nonstarter</u></strong></mark>, so it is important to obtain donors from another possible source: patients who have been declared “brain dead” but are being kept alive temporarily.</p><p>Nationwide, roughly 12,000 to 15,000 people fall into this category each year, but only half end up as donors. Because each such donor could supply an average of three organs, having another thousand donors could save 3,000 lives. We need more people to agree to be donors in advance.</p><p>One strategy is to alter the default rules for signup. Most states, as well as many other countries, use an “opt in” or “explicit consent” rule, meaning that people must take a concrete action, like going to a public library or requesting and mailing in a form, to declare they want to be donors. But many who are willing to donate organs never get around to such steps.</p><p>An alternative approach, used in several European countries, is an “opt out” rule, often called “presumed consent,” in which citizens are presumed to be consenting donors unless they act to register their unwillingness.</p><p>In the world of traditional economics, it shouldn’t matter whether you use an opt-in or opt-out system. So long as the costs of registering as a donor or a nondonor are low, the results should be similar. But many findings of behavioral economics show that tiny disparities in such rules can make a big difference.</p><p>By comparing the consent rates in European countries, the psychologists Eric Johnson and Dan Goldstein have shown that the choice of opting in or opting out is a major factor.</p><p>Consider the difference in consent rates between two similar countries, Austria and Germany. In Germany, which uses an opt-in system, only 12 percent give their consent; in Austria, which uses opt-out, nearly everyone (99 percent) does.</p><p>Although presumed consent is generally accepted in countries that have adopted it, the idea can bring strong opposition. Many people object to anyone presuming anything about their organs, even if the costs of opting out are low. In Britain, a proposal by the Labour government to adopt an opt-out system was opposed by Muslims who objected to organ removal on religious grounds.</p><p>Fortunately, <u>there is another possibility, called <mark>“mandated choice,” under which people <strong>must indicate their preference</u></strong></mark>. In Illinois, where I live, <u>this system has been in use since 2006 and <strong><mark>doesn’t seem to have ruffled many feathers</strong></mark>.</u> </p><p>Here is how it works: <u><mark>When you</mark> go to <mark>renew your driver’s license</mark> and update your photograph, <mark>you are required to answer</mark> this question: “<mark>Do you wish to be an organ donor?” The state</mark> now <mark>has a <strong>60 percent donor signup rate</u></strong></mark>, according to Donate Life Illinois, a coalition of agencies. <u>That is <strong><mark>much higher than the national rate of 38</mark> percent</u></strong> reported by Donate Life America</p><p>The Illinois system has another advantage. <u>There can be legal conflicts over whether registering intent is enough to qualify you as an organ donor or whether a doctor must still ask your family’s permission</u>. In France, for example, although there is technically a presumed-consent law, in practice doctors still seek relatives’ approval. In Illinois, <u><mark>the First-Person Consent Law</u></mark>, which created this system, <u><mark>makes one’s wishes to be a donor <strong>legally binding</u></strong></mark>. Thus, <u><mark>mandated choice may achieve a <strong>higher rate</mark> of donations <mark>than presumed consent</strong>, and <strong>avoid upsetting those who object to presumed consent</strong></mark> for whatever reasons. <strong>This is a winning combination</u></strong>.</p>
1NC
null
Off
429,528
11
17,011
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
564,718
N
Wake
7
UNLV GV
Calum Matheson
1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,387
Nesting DA – the perm conceals normative legal thought by presenting the illusion of compromise.
Schlag 91 (Pierre, April 1991, Prof. of Law @ Colorado U., University of Pennsylvania Law Review “Normativity and the Politics of Form” p. L/N)
Schlag 91 (Pierre, April 1991, Prof. of Law @ Colorado U., University of Pennsylvania Law Review “Normativity and the Politics of Form” p. L/N)
One of the classic ways the normative rhetoric extends and insulates itself from displacement is "nesting forces, and phenomena that could potentially destabilize the system of normative rhetoric are reconfigured within the rationalist form so that their disruptive potential is neutralized rationalist nesting process is to neutralize challenges to the orthodoxy by representing the challenges in much less salient or threatening forms -- The price of acceptance for any destabilizing intellectual movement in the legal academy is a kind of self-deformation in which the movement conforms to the existing matrices of the dominant rationalism. The very process of continuous and repetitive rationalist nesting of so many disparate intellectual currents reconfirms the universality of rationalism, and thus entrenches rationalism cognitively and rhetorically
One of the ways normative rhetoric extends and insulates itself from displacement is "nesting nesting process is to neutralize challenges to orthodoxy by representing challenges in much less threatening forms The price of acceptance is self-deformatio in which the movement conforms to existing matrices The process of repetitive rationalist nesting of intellectual currents reconfirms the universality of rationalism and entrenches rationalism
One of the classic ways the normative rhetoric extends and insulates itself from displacement is "nesting." In this nesting process, views, forces, and phenomena that could potentially destabilize the system of normative rhetoric are reconfigured within the rationalist form so that their disruptive potential is neutralized. We have already seen this process at work with neo-pragmatism, comparative institutional economics, and deconstruction: neo-pragmatism becomes formalized as a set of ideas, theories, or approaches to be applied; comparative institutional economics is deployed from a purportedly supra- institutional vantage point; and deconstruction becomes transformed into a set of operationalized techniques. In each case the various approaches are in effect reconfigured within the rationalist normative rhetoric and thereby stripped of their destabilizing potential. In effect, whatever is admitted within normative legal thought becomes encapsulated or [*912] enveloped within the rationalist rhetoric in a way that ensures compatibility. One effect of this rationalist nesting process is to neutralize challenges to the orthodoxy by representing the challenges in much less salient or threatening forms -- a kind of jurisprudential inoculation. n288 Hence, for instance, the social construction of the subject is often represented as an idea the normatively-constructed sovereign individual subject can accept or reject without having to confront it as the truth of her being. Likewise, deconstruction is represented as supporting a form of radical individual subjectivism that turns out to be at once untenable and politically harmless, or as a set of argumentative techniques that can be wielded at any time for any reason by any individual subject. The price of acceptance for any destabilizing intellectual movement in the legal academy is a kind of self-deformation in which the movement conforms to the existing matrices of the dominant rationalism. Not surprisingly, the effects of this rationalist nesting process are not confined to the intellectual plane. The very process of continuous and repetitive rationalist nesting of so many disparate intellectual currents reconfirms the universality of rationalism, and thus entrenches rationalism cognitively and rhetorically. Rationalism becomes the universal mode of discourse, confirming its validity each time it admits (and covertly neutralizes) the disruptive potential of any new approach. _
2,469
<h4><u>Nesting DA</u> – the perm conceals normative legal thought by presenting the illusion of compromise.</h4><p><u><strong>Schlag 91</u> (Pierre, April 1991, Prof. of Law @ Colorado U., University of Pennsylvania Law Review “Normativity and the Politics of Form” p. L/N)</p><p><u></strong><mark>One of the</mark> classic <mark>ways</mark> the <mark>normative</mark> <mark>rhetoric</mark> <mark>extends</mark> <mark>and</mark> <mark>insulates</mark> <mark>itself</mark> <mark>from</mark> <mark>displacement</mark> <mark>is "nesting</u></mark>." In this nesting process, views, <u>forces, and phenomena that could potentially destabilize the system of normative rhetoric are reconfigured within the rationalist form so that their disruptive potential is neutralized</u>. We have already seen this process at work with neo-pragmatism, comparative institutional economics, and deconstruction: neo-pragmatism becomes formalized as a set of ideas, theories, or approaches to be applied; comparative institutional economics is deployed from a purportedly supra- institutional vantage point; and deconstruction becomes transformed into a set of operationalized techniques. In each case the various approaches are in effect reconfigured within the rationalist normative rhetoric and thereby stripped of their destabilizing potential. In effect, whatever is admitted within normative legal thought becomes encapsulated or [*912] enveloped within the rationalist rhetoric in a way that ensures compatibility.<u> </u>One effect of this <u>rationalist <mark>nesting</mark> <mark>process</mark> <mark>is to neutralize challenges</mark> <mark>to</mark> the <mark>orthodoxy</mark> <mark>by</mark> <mark>representing</mark> the <mark>challenges</mark> <mark>in</mark> <mark>much</mark> <mark>less</mark> salient or <mark>threatening</mark> <mark>forms</mark> --</u> a kind of jurisprudential inoculation. n288 Hence, for instance, the social construction of the subject is often represented as an idea the normatively-constructed sovereign individual subject can accept or reject without having to confront it as the truth of her being. Likewise, deconstruction is represented as supporting a form of radical individual subjectivism that turns out to be at once untenable and politically harmless, or as a set of argumentative techniques that can be wielded at any time for any reason by any individual subject. <u><mark>The price of acceptance</mark> for any destabilizing intellectual movement in the legal academy <mark>is</mark> a kind of <mark>self-deformatio</mark>n <mark>in which the movement conforms to</mark> the <mark>existing matrices</mark> of the dominant rationalism. </u>Not surprisingly, the effects of this rationalist nesting process are not confined to the intellectual plane. <u><mark>The</mark> very <mark>process</mark> <mark>of</mark> continuous and <mark>repetitive rationalist</mark> <mark>nesting</mark> <mark>of</mark> so many disparate <mark>intellectual currents reconfirms the universality of rationalism</mark>, <mark>and</mark> thus <mark>entrenches rationalism</mark> cognitively and rhetorically</u>. Rationalism becomes the universal mode of discourse, confirming its validity each time it admits (and covertly neutralizes) the disruptive potential of any new approach. <strong>_</p></strong>
1NR
PIK
Perm
430,132
4
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,388
A clandestine illegal market is impossible – too many barriers to make it even close to feasible
Leventhal 94
Leventhal 94 (Todd Leventhal, Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications at U.S. Department of State, December 1994, “THE CHILD ORGAN TRAFFICKING RUMOR: A MODERN 'URBAN LEGEND',” http://pascalfroissart.online.fr/3-cache/1994-leventhal.pdf) gz
Health and organ transplant officials in the United States and other countries have stated emphatically that it would be impossible to successfully conceal any clandestine organ trafficking ring the sale or purchase of organs for transplants is expressly forbidden by law, with stiff penalties for violators the technical requirements that would be involved in arranging and operating an alleged murder-for-organ-transplantation scheme are so formidable that such clandestine activities are a practical impossibility a number of sophisticated medical procedures must be conducted to determine the suitability of various organs for transplantation and to permit a match with potential recipients An equally important consideration is histocompatibility, which measures the extent to which a donor organ and a recipient match. The importance of matching MHC antigens for transplanted organs is similar to the need to match blood types for blood transfusions This can only be accomplished in a laboratory designed to test histocompatibility, and requires individuals with specialized laboratory skills to conduct the testing. After the organs have been extracted from a donor, an extremely delicate procedure that involves a transplant surgeon and support staff including an anesthesiologist, attending surgeons, and operating room nurses, the organs must be transported as rapidly as possible, typically by helicopter or airplane, to the hospitals where the transplants will occur Absolute sterile conditions must be maintained for the organ to remain viable for transplant Organ transplants must be accomplished extremely rapidly because the time that organs can survive outside the body is severely limited Sophisticated surgical equipment and highly skilled medical personnel are necessary for a transplant to take place For all transplant surgery, a large area is needed for the operating table, instrument table, laboratory instruments, anesthesia equipment, monitoring equipment, spare supplies, gas sources, and personnel access a kidney machine must be available to perform dialysis Access to a blood bank is necessary because as many as 20 to 50 units of blood may be required for blood transfusions Thus, the daunting technical requirements of the transplant process make it impossible that transplants could occur clandestinely Such highly complex operations could not occur at hidden, makeshift facilities. It would not be possible to assemble a team of highly trained medical professionals who would all be willing to engage in such morally repugnant criminal acts and be willing to take the enormous personal risks that would be involved in performing a transplant operation clandestinely. Nor would it be possible to arrange such a procedure for purely logistical reasons alone because the technical resources required could not be assembled outside of major medical centers. Follow-up care of the transplant recipient is critical for short-term and long-term survival and well-being transplant surgeons and physicians are highly trained professionals who are handsomely compensated for their expertise. There would be no reason for them to engage in clandestine, illegal transplantations they would have every incentive not to participate in such activities. If such illegal activities were detected -- and they surely would be given the large number of people involved, the highly technical nature of the procedures, and the abhorrent nature of the alleged activities -- this would mean the effective end of the surgeon or physician's career, with catastrophic financial and personal implications organ transplantation is such an immensely complicated, highly technical, heavily regulated, extremely time-sensitive procedure, involving so many highly trained professional personnel and so much sophisticated medical equipment, that clandestine organ trafficking is, quite simply, an impossibility from a practical point of view
transplant officials have stated emphatically it would be impossible to conceal any organ trafficking ring the sale of organs is forbidden technical requirements are formidable matching MHC antigens for organs is similar to the need to match blood types This can only be accomplished in a lab and requires specialized skills an extremely delicate procedure that involves a staff will occur sterile conditions must be maintained transplants must be rapid a large area is needed a kidney machine must be available to perform dialysis a blood bank is necessary daunting technical requirements make it impossible that transplants could occur clandestinely Such operations could not occur at hidden, makeshift facilities. It would not be possible to assemble a team who would be willing to take enormous personal risks transplant surgeons are handsomely compensated There would be no reason for them to engage in clandestine transplantations they would have every incentive not to participate
Health and organ transplant officials in the United States and other countries have stated emphatically that it would be impossible to successfully conceal any clandestine organ trafficking ring.¶ In many countries, the sale or purchase of organs for transplants is expressly forbidden by law, with stiff penalties for violators. For example, organ sales for transplant have been illegal in the United States since 1984. In 1994, the sale or purchase of organs for transplant was outlawed in India, where previously many voluntary organ sales by adults had taken place, in which they had sold one of their kidneys, often to a foreigner.¶ In addition to the legal and moral deterrents to organ trafficking, the technical requirements that would be involved in arranging and operating an alleged murder-for-organ-transplantation scheme are so formidable that such clandestine activities are a practical impossibility¶ In order for an organ transplantation to have any chance of success, a number of sophisticated medical procedures must be conducted to determine the suitability of various organs for transplantation and to permit a match with potential recipients. In particular, correct tissue and blood typing is critical to matching donor organs and potential transplant recipients. Crossing the blood group barrier from transplant donor to recipient can result in death. An equally important consideration is histocompatibility, which measures the extent to which a donor organ and a recipient match.¶ The surface of all cells in the body carries proteins known as major histocompatibility complex (MHC) antigens. These proteins act as signals that identify what is uniquely self to our immune system. The importance of matching MHC antigens for transplanted organs is similar to the need to match blood types for blood transfusions. However, MHC matches are more complex, and excessive differences between a donor and a recipient will cause the recipient's immune system to attack and reject the transplanted organ. In humans, the MHC antigens are encoded by a set of linked genes, which are designated as Human Leukocyte Antigens (HLA). In transplantation, it is vital to the survival and well-being of the recipient to identify and match the donor's HLA types. This can only be accomplished in a laboratory designed to test histocompatibility, and requires individuals with specialized laboratory skills to conduct the testing.¶ After the organs have been extracted from a donor, an extremely delicate procedure that involves a transplant surgeon and support staff including an anesthesiologist, attending surgeons, and operating room nurses, the organs must be transported as rapidly as possible, typically by helicopter or airplane, to the hospitals where the transplants will occur. Before transporting the donor organ, special preservation solutions must be infused into it. Proper insulation and temperature controlled packaging including adequate ice or refrigeration must be used to protect the organ during shipment. Absolute sterile conditions must be maintained for the organ to remain viable for transplant.¶ Organ transplants must be accomplished extremely rapidly because the time that organs can survive outside the body is severely limited. Hearts must be transplanted within 5 hours, livers within 24 hours, pancreases within 6 to 12 hours, and lungs within 5 hours. Kidneys can survive the longest, but most surgeons will not transplant a kidney that was removed more than 48 hours ago.¶ Sophisticated surgical equipment and highly skilled medical personnel are necessary for a transplant to take place. At a minimum, one needs 20 individuals, including three members of a surgical team, one scrub nurse, one circulating nurse, one anesthesiologist, one perfusion technician, and one general function technician. For all transplant surgery, a large area is needed for the operating table, instrument table, laboratory instruments, anesthesia equipment, monitoring equipment, spare supplies, gas sources, and personnel access.¶ In addition, in order to prepare for a kidney recipient's surgery, a kidney machine must be available to perform dialysis. For a heart transplant, the patient must be placed on circulatory and respiratory bypass equipment during the entire length of the transplant procedure and constantly monitored by a pulmonary technologist. During a liver transplant, bleeding is extensive because the liver produces the substance that causes blood to coagulate. Access to a blood bank is necessary because as many as 20 to 50 units of blood may be required for blood transfusions.¶ Thus, the daunting technical requirements of the transplant process make it impossible that transplants could occur clandestinely, as the child organ trafficking rumor alleges. Such highly complex operations could not occur at hidden, makeshift facilities. It would not be possible to assemble a team of highly trained medical professionals who would all be willing to engage in such morally repugnant criminal acts and be willing to take the enormous personal risks that would be involved in performing a transplant operation clandestinely. Nor would it be possible to arrange such a procedure for purely logistical reasons alone because the technical resources required could not be assembled outside of major medical centers.¶ In addition, the transplant process does not end with the completion of the transplant operation. Follow-up care of the transplant recipient is critical for short-term and long-term survival and well-being. After the transplant operation, the organ recipient must be treated by a transplant physician, a separate individual, who monitors, medicates, and treats the transplant recipient for the rest of his life. No transplant physician would treat a person without knowing all the circumstances of their progressive organ disease, the details of their transplant operation, including the identity and health records of the donor of the organ, and a great deal of other information that would not be available if the transplant operation were performed clandestinely.¶ It is important to remember that transplant surgeons and physicians are highly trained professionals who are handsomely compensated for their expertise. There would be no reason for them to engage in clandestine, illegal transplantations. On the contrary, they would have every incentive not to participate in such activities. If such illegal activities were detected -- and they surely would be given the large number of people involved, the highly technical nature of the procedures, and the abhorrent nature of the alleged activities -- this would mean the effective end of the surgeon or physician's career, with catastrophic financial and personal implications.¶ In sum, organ transplantation is such an immensely complicated, highly technical, heavily regulated, extremely time-sensitive procedure, involving so many highly trained professional personnel and so much sophisticated medical equipment, that clandestine organ trafficking is, quite simply, an impossibility from a practical point of view. The charges that children are being kidnapped and murdered for such purposes make the allegations even more dubious.
7,243
<h4>A clandestine illegal market is impossible – too many barriers to make it even close to feasible</h4><p><u><strong>Leventhal 94</u></strong> (Todd Leventhal, Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications at U.S. Department of State, December 1994, “THE CHILD ORGAN TRAFFICKING RUMOR: A MODERN 'URBAN LEGEND',” http://pascalfroissart.online.fr/3-cache/1994-leventhal.pdf) gz</p><p><u>Health and organ <mark>transplant officials</mark> in the United States and other countries <mark>have stated emphatically</mark> that <mark>it would be impossible to</mark> successfully <mark>conceal any</mark> clandestine <mark>organ trafficking ring</u></mark>.¶ In many countries, <u><mark>the sale</mark> or purchase <mark>of organs</mark> for transplants <mark>is </mark>expressly <mark>forbidden</mark> by law, with stiff penalties for violators</u>. For example, organ sales for transplant have been illegal in the United States since 1984. In 1994, the sale or purchase of organs for transplant was outlawed in India, where previously many voluntary organ sales by adults had taken place, in which they had sold one of their kidneys, often to a foreigner.¶ In addition to the legal and moral deterrents to organ trafficking, <u>the <mark>technical requirements</mark> that would be involved in arranging and operating an alleged murder-for-organ-transplantation scheme <mark>are</mark> so <mark>formidable</mark> that such clandestine activities are a practical impossibility</u>¶ In order for an organ transplantation to have any chance of success, <u>a number of sophisticated medical procedures must be conducted to determine the suitability of various organs for transplantation and to permit a match with potential recipients</u>. In particular, correct tissue and blood typing is critical to matching donor organs and potential transplant recipients. Crossing the blood group barrier from transplant donor to recipient can result in death. <u>An equally important consideration is histocompatibility, which measures the extent to which a donor organ and a recipient match.</u><strong>¶<u></strong> </u>The surface of all cells in the body carries proteins known as major histocompatibility complex (MHC) antigens. These proteins act as signals that identify what is uniquely self to our immune system. <u>The importance of <mark>matching MHC antigens for</mark> transplanted <mark>organs is similar to the need to match blood types</mark> for blood transfusions</u>. However, MHC matches are more complex, and excessive differences between a donor and a recipient will cause the recipient's immune system to attack and reject the transplanted organ. In humans, the MHC antigens are encoded by a set of linked genes, which are designated as Human Leukocyte Antigens (HLA). In transplantation, it is vital to the survival and well-being of the recipient to identify and match the donor's HLA types. <u><mark>This can only be accomplished in a lab</mark>oratory designed to test histocompatibility, <mark>and requires</mark> individuals with <mark>specialized</mark> laboratory <mark>skills</mark> to conduct the testing.</u>¶ <u>After the organs have been extracted from a donor, <mark>an extremely delicate procedure that involves a</mark> transplant surgeon and support <mark>staff</mark> including an anesthesiologist, attending surgeons, and operating room nurses, the organs must be transported as rapidly as possible, typically by helicopter or airplane, to the hospitals where the transplants <mark>will occur</u></mark>. Before transporting the donor organ, special preservation solutions must be infused into it. Proper insulation and temperature controlled packaging including adequate ice or refrigeration must be used to protect the organ during shipment. <u>Absolute <mark>sterile conditions must be maintained</mark> for the organ to remain viable for transplant</u>.¶ <u>Organ <mark>transplants must be</mark> accomplished extremely <mark>rapid</mark>ly because the time that organs can survive outside the body is severely limited</u>. Hearts must be transplanted within 5 hours, livers within 24 hours, pancreases within 6 to 12 hours, and lungs within 5 hours. Kidneys can survive the longest, but most surgeons will not transplant a kidney that was removed more than 48 hours ago.¶ <u>Sophisticated surgical equipment and highly skilled medical personnel are necessary for a transplant to take place</u>. At a minimum, one needs 20 individuals, including three members of a surgical team, one scrub nurse, one circulating nurse, one anesthesiologist, one perfusion technician, and one general function technician. <u>For all transplant surgery, <mark>a large area is needed</mark> for the operating table, instrument table, laboratory instruments, anesthesia equipment, monitoring equipment, spare supplies, gas sources, and personnel access</u>.¶ In addition, in order to prepare for a kidney recipient's surgery, <u><mark>a kidney machine must be available to perform dialysis</u></mark>. For a heart transplant, the patient must be placed on circulatory and respiratory bypass equipment during the entire length of the transplant procedure and constantly monitored by a pulmonary technologist. During a liver transplant, bleeding is extensive because the liver produces the substance that causes blood to coagulate. <u>Access to <mark>a blood bank is necessary</mark> because as many as 20 to 50 units of blood may be required for blood transfusions</u>.¶ <u>Thus, the <mark>daunting technical requirements</mark> of the transplant process <mark>make it impossible that transplants could occur clandestinely</u></mark>, as the child organ trafficking rumor alleges. <u><mark>Such</mark> highly complex <mark>operations could not occur at hidden, makeshift facilities. It would not be possible to assemble a team</mark> of highly trained medical professionals <mark>who would</mark> all be willing to engage in such morally repugnant criminal acts and <mark>be willing to take</mark> the <mark>enormous personal risks</mark> that would be involved in performing a transplant operation clandestinely. Nor would it be possible to arrange such a procedure for purely logistical reasons alone because the technical resources required could not be assembled outside of major medical centers.</u><strong>¶<u></strong> </u>In addition, the transplant process does not end with the completion of the transplant operation. <u>Follow-up care of the transplant recipient is critical for short-term and long-term survival and well-being</u>. After the transplant operation, the organ recipient must be treated by a transplant physician, a separate individual, who monitors, medicates, and treats the transplant recipient for the rest of his life. No transplant physician would treat a person without knowing all the circumstances of their progressive organ disease, the details of their transplant operation, including the identity and health records of the donor of the organ, and a great deal of other information that would not be available if the transplant operation were performed clandestinely.¶ It is important to remember that <u><mark>transplant surgeons</mark> and physicians are highly trained professionals who <mark>are handsomely compensated</mark> for their expertise. <mark>There would be no reason for them to engage in clandestine</mark>, illegal <mark>transplantations</u></mark>. On the contrary, <u><mark>they would have every incentive not to participate</mark> in such activities. If such illegal activities were detected -- and they surely would be given the large number of people involved, the highly technical nature of the procedures, and the abhorrent nature of the alleged activities -- this would mean the effective end of the surgeon or physician's career, with catastrophic financial and personal implications</u>.¶ In sum, <u>organ transplantation is such an immensely complicated, highly technical, heavily regulated, extremely time-sensitive procedure, involving so many highly trained professional personnel and so much sophisticated medical equipment, that clandestine organ trafficking is, quite simply, an impossibility from a practical point of view</u>. The charges that children are being kidnapped and murdered for such purposes make the allegations even more dubious.</p>
1NC
null
Organs
430,200
1
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,389
B. Violation: Courts don’t legalize, they enjoin enforcement—aff is not legalization
Noble ‘13
Noble ‘13
Courts don’t “legalize” anything. They enjoin enforcement of laws passed by the people. There IS a difference.
Courts don’t “legalize” anything. They enjoin enforcement of laws passed by the people. There IS a difference.
Jim http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/3103630/posts Courts don’t “legalize” anything. They enjoin enforcement of laws passed by the people. There IS a difference.
167
<h4>B. Violation: Courts don’t legalize, they enjoin enforcement—aff<u><strong> is not legalization</h4><p>Noble ‘13</p><p></u></strong>Jim http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/3103630/posts</p><p><u><mark>Courts don’t “legalize” anything. They enjoin enforcement of laws passed by the people. There IS a difference<strong>.</p></u></strong></mark>
1NC
null
Off
430,201
1
17,014
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx
564,720
N
USC
3
Cornell LL
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,390
Courts won’t recognize property rights for bodily sale in the status quo
Nwabueze 11
Remigius N. Nwabueze 11, Senior Lecturer at Southampton Law School, Visiting Prof of Law at Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia, “Legal paradigms of human tissues,” Chapter 9 in Human Tissue Research: A European perspective on the ethical and legal challenges, p 92-3, google books
As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in human tissues Matthews observed that where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought that as with blood, hair and the like that person had the first and best right to possession, though presumably one might transfer that right Unfortunately, the courts have not generally treated kidneys and other non-renewable organs as property. The Colavito line of cases is illustrative There, the court held that no property right existed in a kidney Where human tissues are destined for research the courts are more likely to deny the property rights of sources against those of the users. This judicial inclination is evident in Moore and Greenberg A more recent example is Washington University v. Catalona
judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in tissues where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought that person had possession the courts have not treated non-renewable organs as property Colavito cases is illustrative the court held no property right existed in a kidney Where tissues are destined for research the courts are likely to deny the rights of sources This is evident in Moore and Greenberg more recent example is Catalona
As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in human tissues. However, non-property protection exposes an organ, such as a kidney, awaiting transplantation to unauthorized expropriation or destruction by third parties. Consider the case of an excised kidney donated to a done and awaiting lodgement in the body of the intended recipient.24 If the kidney is deliberately or negligently redirected to a third-party recipient, a wrong has been committed, but it is not clear that legal remedies are available to the donor and the done (Nwabueze 2008). In the absence of statutory and criminal law considerations, significant remedial problems arise. In the case of deliberate (or intentional) redirection or misdirection, the act in Wilkinson v. Downton25 might apply, but its utility is undermined by current controversy regarding the principle of the case; it is not yet clear whether Wilkinson actually established a cause of action for intentional tort. There are suggestions that Wilkinson established only a cause of action for negligence.26¶ A claim in negligence, on the other hand, suffers from problems relating to causation and proof of damage. Arguably, battery claims are not applicable to separated body parts or organs. In any case, the initial consent to the harvesting of the organ is likely to defeat an allegation of battery. Consent-based actions might not be of much avail since consent does not confer continuing control over human tissues (Laurie 2002; Price 2003). An action in unjust enrichment is unlikely to succeed unless the misdirection was for the benefit of the wrongdoer, for instance to benefit a relative of the transplant surgeon. A claim in privacy is probably unavailing. The complaint is that an organ donated for the benefit of a particular recipient is lost through its misdirection, not that the donor or donee’s privacy is infringed. Similarly, a claim in contract is hardly relevant. The misdirection is tortious but not contractual. Moreover, the statutory regulation of organs based on the principles of altruism (in most jurisdictions) militates against importing contractual principles into the context of organ transplantation. The above outline seems to leave property-based actions as the most opportune for the claimant in the hypothetical case under consideration. Interestingly, Matthews (1983) observed that where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘one would have thought that as with blood, hair and the like that person had the first and best right to possession, though presumably one might transfer that right, as blood donors transfer it to a hospital or blood bank’; accordingly, he concluded that ‘parts of the body once removed should be regarded as the “property”, at least in a possessory sense, of the person from whom taken’ (ibid.:227). Unfortunately, the courts have not generally treated kidneys and other non-renewable organs as property. The Colavito line of cases is illustrative.27 There, the court held that no property right existed in a misdirected, but histo-compatible, kidney.¶ 9.4.2 Human tissues for research¶ Where human tissues are destined for research or employed in the research process, the courts are more likely (probably on policy grounds) to deny the property rights of sources as against those of the users. This judicial inclination is evident in Moore and Greenberg above. A more recent example is Washington University v. Catalona,28 where Dr. Catalona, an established cancer researcher at Washington University, moved to Northwestern University and sought to take with him some (cancer research) tissues from Washington University’s biorepository. Tissues in the biorepository came from many sources, including participants in cancer research conducted by Dr Catalona. Before moving to Northwestern University, Dr. Catalona got some of his research participants to sign documents which purported to mandate Washington University to release their tissues to Dr Catalona or Northwestern University. The claim was resisted by Washington University. Interestingly, all the parties in the case based their claims on property. As Limbaugh, the Senior District Judge realized, the ‘sole issue determinative…of this lawsuit is the issue of ownership’ (ibid.994).
4,325
<h4>Courts won’t recognize property rights for bodily sale in the status quo</h4><p>Remigius N. <u><strong>Nwabueze 11</u></strong>, Senior Lecturer at Southampton Law School, Visiting Prof of Law at Thompson Rivers University in British Columbia, “Legal paradigms of human tissues,” Chapter 9 in Human Tissue Research: A European perspective on the ethical and legal challenges, p 92-3, google books</p><p><u>As regards non-regenerative transplantable organs, <strong><mark>judges tend to be reluctant to recognize property rights in </mark>human <mark>tissues</u></strong></mark>. However, non-property protection exposes an organ, such as a kidney, awaiting transplantation to unauthorized expropriation or destruction by third parties. Consider the case of an excised kidney donated to a done and awaiting lodgement in the body of the intended recipient.24 If the kidney is deliberately or negligently redirected to a third-party recipient, a wrong has been committed, but it is not clear that legal remedies are available to the donor and the done (Nwabueze 2008). In the absence of statutory and criminal law considerations, significant remedial problems arise. In the case of deliberate (or intentional) redirection or misdirection, the act in Wilkinson v. Downton25 might apply, but its utility is undermined by current controversy regarding the principle of the case; it is not yet clear whether Wilkinson actually established a cause of action for intentional tort. There are suggestions that Wilkinson established only a cause of action for negligence.26¶ A claim in negligence, on the other hand, suffers from problems relating to causation and proof of damage. Arguably, battery claims are not applicable to separated body parts or organs. In any case, the initial consent to the harvesting of the organ is likely to defeat an allegation of battery. Consent-based actions might not be of much avail since consent does not confer continuing control over human tissues (Laurie 2002; Price 2003). An action in unjust enrichment is unlikely to succeed unless the misdirection was for the benefit of the wrongdoer, for instance to benefit a relative of the transplant surgeon. A claim in privacy is probably unavailing. The complaint is that an organ donated for the benefit of a particular recipient is lost through its misdirection, not that the donor or donee’s privacy is infringed. Similarly, a claim in contract is hardly relevant. The misdirection is tortious but not contractual. Moreover, the statutory regulation of organs based on the principles of altruism (in most jurisdictions) militates against importing contractual principles into the context of organ transplantation. The above outline seems to leave property-based actions as the most opportune for the claimant in the hypothetical case under consideration. Interestingly, <u>Matthews</u> (1983) <u>observed that <mark>where non-renewable organs are removed from the body ‘<strong>one would have thought </mark>that as with blood, hair and the like</u></strong> <u><mark>that person had </mark>the first and best right to <mark>possession</mark>, though presumably one might transfer that right</u>, as blood donors transfer it to a hospital or blood bank’; accordingly, he concluded that ‘parts of the body once removed should be regarded as the “property”, at least in a possessory sense, of the person from whom taken’ (ibid.:227). <u>Unfortunately, <mark>the courts <strong>have not</mark> generally <mark>treated</mark> kidneys and other <mark>non-renewable organs as property</strong></mark>. The <mark>Colavito </mark>line of <mark>cases is <strong>illustrative</u></strong></mark>.27 <u>There, <mark>the court held</mark> that <strong><mark>no property right existed</strong> in a</u></mark> misdirected, but histo-compatible, <u><mark>kidney</u></mark>.¶ 9.4.2 Human tissues for research¶ <u><mark>Where </mark>human <mark>tissues are destined for <strong>research</u></strong></mark> or employed in the research process, <u><mark>the courts are <strong></mark>more <mark>likely</u></strong></mark> (probably on policy grounds) <u><mark>to deny the </mark>property <mark>rights of <strong>sources</u></strong></mark> as <u>against those of the users. <strong><mark>This </mark>judicial inclination <mark>is evident</strong> in Moore and Greenberg</mark> </u>above.<u> A <mark>more recent example is</mark> Washington University v. <mark>Catalona</u></mark>,28 where Dr. Catalona, an established cancer researcher at Washington University, moved to Northwestern University and sought to take with him some (cancer research) tissues from Washington University’s biorepository. Tissues in the biorepository came from many sources, including participants in cancer research conducted by Dr Catalona. Before moving to Northwestern University, Dr. Catalona got some of his research participants to sign documents which purported to mandate Washington University to release their tissues to Dr Catalona or Northwestern University. The claim was resisted by Washington University. Interestingly, all the parties in the case based their claims on property. As Limbaugh, the Senior District Judge realized, the ‘sole issue determinative…of this lawsuit is the issue of ownership’ (ibid.994).</p>
1NC
null
Off
429,524
21
17,011
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
564,718
N
Wake
7
UNLV GV
Calum Matheson
1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,391
Their conception of scarcity is artificially inflated to justify oppressive neoliberal policies of organ donation
Scheper-Hughes 03
Scheper-Hughes 03
The 'demand' for human organs, tissues, and body parts is driven, by the medical discourse on scarcity The specter of long transplant 'waiting lists' only virtual lists with little material basis in reality motivated questionable practices of organ harvesting with 'compensated gifting' doctors acting as brokers the very idea of organ 'scarcity' is an artificially created need invented by transplant technicians and dangled before the eyes of an ever- expanding sick, aging and dying population The resulting artificially created organs scarcity is 'misrecognized' as a natural medical phenomenon. In this 'survivalist' utilitarian pragmatics the ethics of transplantation is modeled after 'lifeboat' ethics There is little consciousness of the vulnerability of some social classes and ethnic groups who can be described as the 'designated donor' populations In the United States where cadaver transplant continues to be supported as the norm for donation the brain dead are drawn from a population that is disproportionately poor The poor and minorities are over-represented in ICUs due to their over-exposure to urban violence higher rates of homicide, suicide and vehicular death, as well as the cumulative effects of societal and medical neglect. The irony is that those lacking public insurance also comprise the greatest number of those whose family members are asked to behave altruistically and to donate the organs and tissues of loved ones They are being asked to support with the bodies of their loved ones a social and medical system that excludes them and within which they have a lower probability of receiving an organ, should that need arise The much commented upon refusal of African-Americans to donate organs should be seen as a political act of considered resistance Those who sell a kidney are normally from social and economic strata where access to basic medical care and necessary aftercare are most often lacking the only dissident voices raised against the dominant transplant narrative of life-saving come from unpalatable forms that are all too easily dismissed and discredited These alternative bioethical positions are expressed 'primitively' and from the social margins in the form of moral panics of body theft To those living on the fringes of the new global disorder the scramble for 'fresh' organs increases their profound sense of ontological insecurity in a world that values their bodies as a reservoir of spare parts While popular resistance led to revoking new laws of presumed consent Throughout these radical transformations, the voice of anthropology has been muted while the high-stake debates have been waged among transplant professionals, bioethicists, legal scholars and economists
The 'demand' for organs is driven by the medical discourse on scarcity The specter of virtual lists with little material basis in reality motivated questionable practices of harvesting with 'compensated gifting' doctors acting as brokers, the idea of 'scarcity' is an artificially created need invented by technicians dangled before the eyes of a dying population The artificially created organs scarcity is 'misrecognized' In cadaver transplant the brain dead are drawn from a population that is disproportionately poor minorities are over-represented in ICUs due to their over-exposure to urban violence higher rates of homicide as well as societal and medical neglect those lacking insurance comprise the greatest number of those whose family are asked to altruistically donate organs They are being asked to support a social and medical system that excludes them Those who sell a kidney are from economic strata where access to care are lacking To those living on the fringes of global disorder the scramble for 'fresh' organs increases ontological insecurity in a world that values bodies as a reservoir of spare parts the voice of anthropology has been muted while debates have been waged among bioethicists, legal scholars and economists
Nancy, Professor @ UC Berkeley, “Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking”, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2, June, 197–226, AB The 'demand' for human organs, tissues, and body parts — and the desperate search among wealthy transplant patients to purchase them — is driven, above all, by the medical discourse on scarcity. The specter of long transplant 'waiting lists' — sometimes only virtual lists with little material basis in reality I — has motivated and driven questionable practices of organ harvesting with blatant sales alongside 'compensated gifting', doctors acting as brokers, and fierce competition between public and private hospitals for patients of means. But the very idea of organ 'scarcity' is what Ivan Illich (1970) would call an artificially created need, invented by transplant technicians and dangled before the eyes of an ever- expanding sick, aging and dying population. The resulting artificially created organs scarcity is 'misrecognized' (Bourdieu 1977) as a natural medical phenomenon. In this environment of 'survivalist' utilitarian pragmatics, the ethics of transplantation is modeled after classical 'lifeboat' ethics (Koch 2001). With ethical presumptions of scarcity, there appear to be clear choices to be made, namely who gets into the lifeboat ('getting on the waiting list'); who will be shoved off the boat when it gets overcrowded (getting triaged while on the waiting list); and who will, in the end, be 'eaten' so that others may live (race and class disparities in organs procurement and distribution practices)? There is little consciousness of the vulnerability of some social classes and ethnic groups who can be described as the 'designated donor' populations, both living and brain dead. In the United States, for example, where cadaver transplant continues to be supported as the norm for donation (if not so, increasingly, in practice), the brain dead are drawn from a population that is disproportionately poor — including whites, Latinos and African- Americans. The poor and minorities are over-represented in the intensive care centers (ICUs) of large urban hospitals, due to their over-exposure to urban violence, higher rates of homicide, suicide and vehicular death, as well as the cumulative effects of societal and medical neglect. The great irony is that those lacking public insurance (44 million citizens) also comprise the greatest number of those whose family members are asked to behave altruistically and to donate the organs and tissues of loved ones. That a great many of these poor, African-American and Latino families refuse to donate should come as no surprise. They are being asked to support with the bodies of their loved ones a social and medical system that excludes them and within which they have a lower probability of receiving an organ, should that need arise. One needs to be relatively affluent and otherwise healthy and well looked after to be recommended for organ transplant. The much commented upon refusal of African-Americans to donate organs should be seen as a political act of considered resistance. As for living, paid donation, the social inequities are more transparent. Those who sell a kidney are normally from social and economic strata where access to basic medical care and necessary aftercare are most often lacking. But to date the only dissident voices raised against the dominant transplant narrative of life-saving come from far afield and are generally expressed in unpalatable forms that are all too easily dismissed and discredited. These alternative bioethical positions are often expressed 'primitively' and from the social margins in the form of rumors and moral panics of body theft and organ stealing, some of which turns out not to be so groundless after all. To a great many of those living on the fringes of the new global disorder, the scramble for 'fresh' organs and tissues increases their profound sense of ontological insecurity in a world that values their bodies as a reservoir of spare parts (Scheper-Hughes 1996). While popular resistance in Mexico and Brazil led to revoking new and progressivist laws of presumed consent for the purposes of harvesting organs, such resistance has been ineffectual or lacking with respect to the growth of the international organs market, as those on all sides of the transplant equation have began to accept as normal and routine these nonetheless still largely covert transactions protected by transplant medicine's coyly averted gaze. Throughout these radical transformations, the voice of anthropology has been muted while the high-stake debates have been waged among transplant professionals, bioethicists, legal scholars and economists. But what other human science and discipline is better suited than anthropology to interrogate values and practices from a position of epistemological openness and to offer radical alternatives to the limited pragmatic utilitarianism that dominates medical bioethical thinking today?
5,043
<h4><u><strong>Their conception of scarcity is artificially inflated to justify oppressive neoliberal policies of organ donation </h4><p>Scheper-Hughes 03</p><p></u></strong>Nancy, Professor @ UC Berkeley, “Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking”, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2, June, 197–226, AB</p><p><u><mark>The 'demand' for</mark> human <mark>organs</mark>, tissues, and body parts</u> — and the desperate search among wealthy transplant patients to purchase them — <u><mark>is driven</mark>,</u> above all, <u><mark>by the medical discourse on scarcity</u></mark>. <u><mark>The specter of</mark> long transplant 'waiting lists'</u> — sometimes <u>only <strong><mark>virtual lists with little material basis in reality</u></strong></mark> I — has <u><mark>motivated</u></mark> and driven <u><strong><mark>questionable practices</mark> <mark>of</mark> organ <mark>harvesting</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>with</u></mark> blatant sales alongside <u><mark>'compensated gifting'</u></mark>, <u><mark>doctors acting as brokers</u>,</mark> and fierce competition between public and private hospitals for patients of means. But <u><strong><mark>the</mark> very <mark>idea of</mark> organ <mark>'scarcity' is</u></strong></mark> what Ivan Illich (1970) would call <u><strong><mark>an artificially created need</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>invented by</mark> transplant <mark>technicians</u></strong></mark> <u>and <mark>dangled before the eyes of</mark> <mark>a</mark>n ever- expanding sick, aging and <mark>dying population</u></mark>. <u><mark>The</mark> resulting <strong><mark>artificially created organs scarcity is 'misrecognized'</u></strong></mark> (Bourdieu 1977) <u>as a natural medical phenomenon. In this</u> environment of <u>'survivalist' utilitarian pragmatics</u>, <u>the ethics of transplantation is modeled after</u> classical <u>'lifeboat' ethics</u> (Koch 2001). With ethical presumptions of scarcity, there appear to be clear choices to be made, namely who gets into the lifeboat ('getting on the waiting list'); who will be shoved off the boat when it gets overcrowded (getting triaged while on the waiting list); and who will, in the end, be 'eaten' so that others may live (race and class disparities in organs procurement and distribution practices)? <u>There is little consciousness of the vulnerability of some social classes and ethnic groups who can be described as the 'designated donor' populations</u>, both living and brain dead. <u><mark>In</mark> the United States</u>, for example, <u><strong>where <mark>cadaver</mark> <mark>transplant</mark> continues to be supported as the norm for donation </u></strong>(if not so, increasingly, in practice), <u><mark>the brain</mark> <mark>dead are drawn from a population that is <strong>disproportionately poor</u></strong></mark> — including whites, Latinos and African- Americans. <u>The poor and <mark>minorities</mark> <mark>are over-represented</mark> <mark>in</u></mark> the intensive care centers (<u><mark>ICUs</u></mark>) of large urban hospitals, <u><mark>due to their <strong>over-exposure to urban violence</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>higher rates of homicide</mark>, suicide and vehicular death, <mark>as well</mark> <mark>as</mark> the cumulative effects of <mark>societal and medical</mark> <mark>neglect</mark>.</u> <u>The</u> great <u>irony is that <mark>those lacking</mark> public <mark>insurance</mark> </u>(44 million citizens)<u> also <mark>comprise</mark> <mark>the greatest number of those whose family</mark> members <mark>are asked</mark> <mark>to</mark> behave <mark>altruistically</mark> and to <mark>donate</mark> the <mark>organs</mark> and tissues of loved ones</u>. That a great many of these poor, African-American and Latino families refuse to donate should come as no surprise. <u><mark>They are being asked to support</mark> with the bodies of their loved ones <strong><mark>a social and medical system that excludes them</u></strong></mark> <u>and within which they have a lower probability of receiving an organ, should that need arise</u>. One needs to be relatively affluent and otherwise healthy and well looked after to be recommended for organ transplant. <u>The much commented upon refusal of African-Americans to donate organs should be seen as a political act of considered resistance</u>. As for living, paid donation, the social inequities are more transparent. <u><mark>Those who sell a kidney</mark> <mark>are</mark> normally <mark>from</mark> social and <mark>economic</mark> <mark>strata where access to</mark> basic medical <mark>care</mark> and necessary aftercare <mark>are</mark> <strong>most often <mark>lacking</u></strong></mark>. But to date <u>the only dissident voices raised against</u> <u>the</u> <u>dominant transplant narrative of life-saving come</u> <u>from</u> far afield and are generally expressed in <u>unpalatable forms that are all too easily dismissed and discredited</u>. <u>These alternative</u> <u>bioethical positions are</u> often <u>expressed 'primitively' and from the social margins in the form of</u> rumors and <u>moral panics of body theft</u> and organ stealing, some of which turns out not to be so groundless after all. <u><mark>To</u></mark> a great many of <u><mark>those</mark> <strong><mark>living on the fringes of</mark> the new <mark>global disorder</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>the scramble for 'fresh' organs</u></mark> and tissues <u><mark>increases</mark> their profound sense of <strong><mark>ontological insecurity </strong>in a world that values</mark> their <mark>bodies as a reservoir of spare parts</u></mark> (Scheper-Hughes 1996). <u>While popular resistance</u> in Mexico and Brazil <u>led to revoking new</u> and progressivist <u>laws of presumed consent</u> for the purposes of harvesting organs, such resistance has been ineffectual or lacking with respect to the growth of the international organs market, as those on all sides of the transplant equation have began to accept as normal and routine these nonetheless still largely covert transactions protected by transplant medicine's coyly averted gaze. <u>Throughout these radical transformations, <strong><mark>the voice of anthropology has been</mark> <mark>muted</u></strong> <u>while</mark> the high-stake <mark>debates have been waged among</mark> transplant professionals, <mark>bioethicists, legal scholars and economists</u></mark>. But what other human science and discipline is better suited than anthropology to interrogate values and practices from a position of epistemological openness and to offer radical alternatives to the limited pragmatic utilitarianism that dominates medical bioethical thinking today? </p>
1NC
null
Organs
429,538
2
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,392
Externalizing ethics onto legal institutions trades off with personal ethics
Rozo 4
Rozo 4 (Diego, MA in philosophy and Cultural Analysis @ U of Amsterdam, Forgiving the Unforgivable: On Violence, Power, and the Possibility of Justice, p. 19-21, http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/tesis/colfuturo/Forgiving%20the%20Unforgivable.pdf)//LA ***We don’t endorse gendered language.
Within the legal order the relations between individuals will resemble this logic where suffering is exchanged for more, but ‘legal’ suffering, because these relations are no longer regulated by the “culture of the heart” the “legal system tries to erect, in all areas where individual ends could be usefully pursued by violence, legal ends that can be realized only by legal power The individual is not to take law in his own hands; no conflict should be susceptible of being solved without the direct intervention of law, lest its authority will be undermined. Law has to present itself as indispensable The consequence of this infiltration of law throughout the whole of human life is paradoxical: the more inescapable the rule of law is, the less responsible the individual becomes Hence the responsibility of the person toward the others is now delegated on the authority and justness of the law MARKED . The legal institutions exonerate me from my essential responsibility towards the others, breaking the moral proximity that makes every ethics possible. Thus I am no longer obliged to an other because law, by seeking to regulate affairs between individuals, makes this other anonymous, virtual: his otherness is equaled to that of every possible other. The Other becomes faceless, making it all too easy for me to ignore his demands of justice, and even to exert on him violence just for the sake of legality state violence for the sake of the state’s survival. Hence, the ever-present possibility of the worst takes the form of my unconditional responsibility towards the other being delegated on the ideological and totalitarian institutions of a law gone astray in the (its) logic of self- preserving vengeance. The undecidability of the origin of law, and its consequent meddling all across human affairs makes it possible that the worst could be exerted in the name of law. the life of the population, can be overlooked by the state if it feels threatened by other states or by its own population From now on, my responsibility towards the Other is taken from me, at the price of my own existence being constantly threatened by the imminent and fatal possibility of being signaled as guilty of an (for me) indeterminate offence. In this picture, the modern state protects my existence while bringing on the terror of state violence – the law infiltrates into and seeks to rule our most private conflicts.
suffering is exchanged for more, but ‘legal’ suffering The individual is not to take law in his own hands Law has to present itself as indispensable The consequence is the more inescapable the law the less responsible the individual the responsibility of the person toward the other is now delegated on the law legal institutions exonerate me from my essential responsibility towards others, breaking the moral proximity that makes ethics possible my unconditional responsibility towards the other delegated on the totalitarian institutions of a law gone astray responsibility towards the Other is taken from me, at the price of my own existence constantly threatened by the modern state
Within the legal order the relations between individuals will resemble this logic where suffering is exchanged for more, but ‘legal’ suffering, because these relations are no longer regulated by the “culture of the heart” [Kultur des Herzens]. (CV 245) As Benjamin describes it, the “legal system tries to erect, in all areas where individual ends could be usefully pursued by violence, legal ends that can be realized only by legal power.” (CV 238) The individual is not to take law in his own hands; no conflict should be susceptible of being solved without the direct intervention of law, lest its authority will be undermined. Law has to present itself as indispensable for any kind of conflict to be solved. The consequence of this infiltration of law throughout the whole of human life is paradoxical: the more inescapable the rule of law is, the less responsible the individual becomes. Legal and judicial institutions act as avengers in the name of the individual. Even the possibility of forgiveness is monopolized by the state under the ‘right of mercy’. Hence the responsibility of the person toward the others is now delegated on the authority and justness of the law MARKED . The legal institutions, the very agents of (legal) vengeance exonerate me from my essential responsibility towards the others, breaking the moral proximity that makes every ethics possible.20 Thus I am no longer obliged to an other that by his/her very presence would demand me to be worthy of the occasion (of every occasion), because law, by seeking to regulate affairs between individuals, makes this other anonymous, virtual: his otherness is equaled to that of every possible other. The Other becomes faceless, making it all too easy for me to ignore his demands of justice, and even to exert on him violence just for the sake of legality. The logic of evil, then, becomes not a means but an end in itself:21 state violence for the sake of the state’s survival. Hence, the ever-present possibility of the worst takes the form of my unconditional responsibility towards the other being delegated on the ideological and totalitarian institutions of a law gone astray in the (its) logic of self- preserving vengeance. The undecidability of the origin of law, and its consequent meddling all across human affairs makes it possible that the worst could be exerted in the name of law. Even the very notion of crimes against humanity, which seeks to protect the life of the population, can be overlooked by the state if it feels threatened by other states or by its own population.22 From now on, my responsibility towards the Other is taken from me, at the price of my own existence being constantly threatened by the imminent and fatal possibility of being signaled as guilty of an (for me) indeterminate offence. In this picture, the modern state protects my existence while bringing on the terror of state violence – the law infiltrates into and seeks to rule our most private conflicts.
2,983
<h4><u>Externalizing ethics onto legal institutions trades off with personal ethics</h4><p><strong>Rozo 4 </strong>(Diego, MA in philosophy and Cultural Analysis @ U of Amsterdam, Forgiving the Unforgivable: On Violence, Power, and the Possibility of Justice, p. 19-21, http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/tesis/colfuturo/Forgiving%20the%20Unforgivable.pdf)//LA ***We don’t endorse gendered language.</p><p>Within the legal order the relations between individuals will resemble this logic where <mark>suffering is exchanged for more, but ‘legal’ suffering</mark>, because these relations are no longer regulated by the “culture of the heart”</u> [Kultur des Herzens]. (CV 245) As Benjamin describes it, <u>the “legal system tries to erect, in all areas where individual ends could be usefully pursued by violence, legal ends that can be realized only by legal power</u>.” (CV 238) <u><mark>The individual is not to take law in his own hands</mark>; no conflict should be susceptible of being solved without the direct intervention of law, lest its authority will be undermined. <mark>Law has to present itself as indispensable</u></mark> for any kind of conflict to be solved. <u><mark>The consequence</mark> of this infiltration of law throughout the whole of human life <mark>is</mark> paradoxical: <mark>the more inescapable the</mark> rule of <mark>law</mark> is, <mark>the less responsible the individual</mark> becomes</u>. Legal and judicial institutions act as avengers in the name of the individual. Even the possibility of forgiveness is monopolized by the state under the ‘right of mercy’. <u>Hence <mark>the responsibility of the person toward the other</mark>s <mark>is now delegated on</mark> the authority and justness of <mark>the law</p><p></mark>MARKED</p><p>. The <mark>legal institutions</u></mark>, the very agents of (legal) vengeance <u><mark>exonerate me from my essential responsibility towards</mark> the <mark>others, breaking the moral proximity that makes</mark> every <mark>ethics possible</mark>.</u>20 <u>Thus I am no longer obliged to an other</u> that by his/her very presence would demand me to be worthy of the occasion (of every occasion), <u>because law, by seeking to regulate affairs between individuals, makes this other anonymous, virtual: his otherness is equaled to that of every possible other. The Other becomes faceless, making it all too easy for me to ignore his demands of justice, and even to exert on him violence just for the sake of legality</u>. The logic of evil, then, becomes not a means but an end in itself:21 <u>state violence for the sake of the state’s survival. Hence, the ever-present possibility of the worst takes the form of <mark>my unconditional responsibility towards the other</mark> being <mark>delegated on the</mark> ideological and <mark>totalitarian institutions of a law gone astray</mark> in the (its) logic of self- preserving vengeance. The undecidability of the origin of law, and its consequent meddling all across human affairs makes it possible that the worst could be exerted in the name of law.</u> Even the very notion of crimes against humanity, which seeks to protect <u>the life of the population, can be overlooked by the state if it feels threatened by other states or by its own population</u>.22 <u>From now on, my <mark>responsibility towards the Other is taken from me, at the price of my own existence</mark> being <mark>constantly threatened by</mark> the imminent and fatal possibility of being signaled as guilty of an (for me) indeterminate offence. In this picture, <mark>the modern state</mark> protects my existence while bringing on the terror of state violence – the law infiltrates into and seeks to rule our most private conflicts.</p></u>
1NR
PIK
Ethics
123,629
39
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,393
C. Standards
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>C. Standards</h4>
1NC
null
Off
430,202
1
17,014
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx
564,720
N
USC
3
Cornell LL
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,394
The plan reverses that – necessitates bodily property rights
Siegel 2K, JD candidate @ Emory University School of Law, Sumer 2000 “RE-ENGINEERING THE LAWS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION,” 49 Emory L.J. 917, lexis
Laurel R. Siegel 2K, JD candidate @ Emory University School of Law, Sumer 2000 “RE-ENGINEERING THE LAWS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION,” 49 Emory L.J. 917, lexis
Compensation systems people may be more willing to provide organs if they receive compensation Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals Additionally, a compensation system could only go into effect if NOTA and the 1987 UAGA amendments are repealed or amended A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death. This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body allowing incentives to donors can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in live tissue and organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as common law and statutory law do not prohibit sales.
people provide organs if they receive compensation Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals compensation could only go into effect if NOTA and are repealed or amended This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body. allowing incentives to donors can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as law do not prohibit sales.
Compensation systems would change the nature of altruistic organ donation. The theory states that people may be more willing to provide organs if they receive compensation. n283 Several types of compensation systems have been proposed, each attacking the organ shortage in a slightly different way, but with the same ultimate goal - to provide remuneration. Compensation systems require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals after death. Additionally, a compensation system could only go into effect if NOTA and the 1987 UAGA amendments are repealed or amended. n284 NOTA, however, allows all other participants in the organ procurement and transplantation process, except the donor, to receive compensation. Arguably, the donor should receive compensation as well.¶ Compensation systems have several advantages. First, they help to make up for the organs wasted under the donative system. n285 Second, if a person sells his organs, there may be less emotion and tension involved than if an altruistic donation was made out of love or guilt. n286¶ Primarily, dissatisfaction with the proposed compensation systems concerns the lack of the customary altruism. n287 Critics fear that the lack of altruism would upset society as well as reduce the organ supply. n288 Selling organs would take away from the traditional notion of providing a generous act in the face of tragedy. n289 Allowing sales of organs encroaches into a sacred area where such sales are controversial. The notion of profiting from the sales of body parts is repulsive to many. Critics of compensation systems have a serious concern with coercion of the poor. n290 Destitute people, who otherwise might not chose to donate organs, might feel compelled to sell their organs. n291 Another concern involves the allocation of organs. Under a compensation [*951] system, those who could afford organs would have a greater chance of receiving them. n292 Finally, allowing sales of organs could promote family strife due to pressure to sell organs. n293¶ a. Inter Vivos Market for Organs¶ In an inter vivos organ market, organs would be considered an ordinary commodity to be sold for a profit. System regulators would have to decide where to draw the line - selling non-essential organs such as kidneys versus selling essential organs such as the heart. The theory for such a system is based on the notion that all parties in the organ donation process are compensated, thus the donor should be included as well. n294¶ Creating a market for organs may actually fail to increase the supply because otherwise altruistic donations may be curtailed. n295 It also risks offending many citizens and takes advantage of the poor who may not otherwise choose to donate or sell organs.¶ b. Futures Market¶ A less controversial version of a compensation system is a futures market. A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death. n296 Under this regime, if the donor's organs are successfully harvested and transplanted, the donor's estate would receive payment. n297 Like the current donation system, people would sign donor cards, but unlike the current system, the donor or vendor would receive compensation. n298 Proponents of this system claim it avoids ethical problems. First, by not using live donors, proponents claim it does not exploit the poor. n299 Second, the system does not deal with allocation so the [*952] rich will not have greater access to organs than the poor. n300 Third, people will be selling their own organs, so relatives will not have to participate. n301¶ This system requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body. This system is only hypothetical and has not yet been attempted in any jurisdiction. If implemented in the current system, it would clearly violate NOTA, because it involves sales of organs. In addition, it might exploit the poor because only the poor would have incentive to sell their organs, unless the price was high enough for moderately wealthy individuals to be interested. Even though the system does not deal with allocation, the poor will naturally be discriminated against because they may be unable to afford the organs if Medicaid or other government assistance does not cover them.¶ c. Death Benefits¶ A death benefits system, while not market-based, is a third type of compensation system. Such a system would merely provide incentives to relatives of the decedent in exchange for donating the decedent's organs. n302 Examples of incentives include estate tax deductions, funeral expense allow-ances, and college education benefits. n303 As illustrated above, Pennsylvania is experimenting with a death benefits system in its newly enacted legislation. n304¶ Proponents argue that a death benefits system does not conflict with the current altruistic system. n305 Proponents also assert that a death benefits system does not violate NOTA's prohibition of organ sales, because Congress did not intend to include this kind of compensation. n306 With respect to the Pen-nsylvania law, proponents claim funeral expenses could be a reasonable expense exempted from the NOTA prohibition. n307 They claim that because money does not go directly to donors or beneficiaries, the payment is not technically for organs. n308 Opponents claim that a death benefits system con-stitutes the sale of organs; indirect compensation is given in exchange for one's [*953] organs. This proposal, set up as a pilot program administered by individual states, is promising.¶ B. Suggestions¶ First, solutions must be found for the problems of the current system, in which an outright market is inappropriate, but in which incentive programs and public health education could serve as successful boosts to the organ supply. For the second stage, after technology alters the status and supply of organs, society can plan a solution for the future. Only at that point could a full-fledged market be an acceptable, ethical medium to exchange organs.¶ 1. The Current System¶ As illustrated above, problems are inherent in the current organ transplantation system. Society must cope with the problems as they exist today, using currently available technology and resources. The best way to address the immediate organ shortage is to administer pilot programs providing incentives for organ donations, following the lead of Pennsylvania. Congress should propose an Amendment to NOTA that would allow the Department of Health and Human Services to oversee pilot programs. Compensation would rise incrementally, beginning with small payments, such as funeral expenses or hospital bills. The prohibition of sales of organs should remain in place for live organs because allowing sales of live organs jeopardizes existing life and brings into play many ethical issues. Thus, the amendment would only apply to organs of decedents.¶ In addition to avoiding the ethical problems inherent in a market for organs, allowing an incentive system would probably increase awareness of donation, increase actual donation, and fairly and tactfully compensate the donor. The approach is an important bridge to the future when engineered organs will make compensation systems viable. Most importantly, more patients, who would otherwise die, will benefit from receiving life-saving organs.¶ Organ donation does not have to be perceived as a grim, avoidable topic; donating organs transforms death into a positive experience - essentially bestowing the gift of life. In addition to the pilot programs, governmental efforts should focus on public health education. If the public is made more aware of the plight, the decision to donate organs would be made prior to death. This tactic would avoid difficult, uncomfortable situations for families and doctors, which often prevent donation. Many states already have [*954] implemented organ donor awareness funds, funded through donations when renewing driver's licenses or filing taxes. n309 Similar programs must be established. Public health officials should talk to high school students about organ donation. Special task forces could explain the organ transplant system to people, in the form of television commercials or advertisements in magazines. The erection of billboards with organ donation messages would implant the seed in people's minds.¶ 2. The Future System¶ The current solution only affects organs from decedents. In the foreseeable future, technology will create live organs from existing cells and biodegradable scaffolds. When that occurs, the organ shortage will no longer be a problem. But in order to have potentially unlimited organs, cell donation must occur. This may eventually be done individually at birth, but phased in by adults contributing to a generic pool. Will these donors be compensated for their pre-organ donation? The donation of cells differs from a functioning organ and probably lies outside of organ transplantation laws. Most likely, providing compensation for this stage would be allowable and beneficial. An individual donating his cells would face no risk to his health by donating. Fewer ethical issues are involved. Therefore, for the organ system of the future, allowing incentives to donors is a sound idea. This can only become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a property right in live tissue and organs. This will be established in the marketplace as long as common law and statutory law do not prohibit sales.
9,548
<h4>The plan reverses that – necessitates bodily property rights</h4><p>Laurel R. <u><strong>Siegel 2K, JD candidate @ Emory University School of Law, Sumer 2000 “RE-ENGINEERING THE LAWS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION,” 49 Emory L.J. 917, lexis</p><p></strong>Compensation systems</u> would change the nature of altruistic organ donation. The theory states that <u><mark>people </mark>may be more willing to <mark>provide organs if they receive compensation</u></mark>. n283 Several types of compensation systems have been proposed, each attacking the organ shortage in a slightly different way, but with the same ultimate goal - to provide remuneration. <u><mark>Compensation systems <strong>require development of common law to increase the property rights of individuals</u></strong></mark> after death. <u>Additionally, a <mark>compensation</mark> system <strong><mark>could only go into effect</strong> if NOTA and</mark> the 1987 UAGA amendments <mark>are repealed or amended</u></mark>. n284 NOTA, however, allows all other participants in the organ procurement and transplantation process, except the donor, to receive compensation. Arguably, the donor should receive compensation as well.¶ Compensation systems have several advantages. First, they help to make up for the organs wasted under the donative system. n285 Second, if a person sells his organs, there may be less emotion and tension involved than if an altruistic donation was made out of love or guilt. n286¶ Primarily, dissatisfaction with the proposed compensation systems concerns the lack of the customary altruism. n287 Critics fear that the lack of altruism would upset society as well as reduce the organ supply. n288 Selling organs would take away from the traditional notion of providing a generous act in the face of tragedy. n289 Allowing sales of organs encroaches into a sacred area where such sales are controversial. The notion of profiting from the sales of body parts is repulsive to many. Critics of compensation systems have a serious concern with coercion of the poor. n290 Destitute people, who otherwise might not chose to donate organs, might feel compelled to sell their organs. n291 Another concern involves the allocation of organs. Under a compensation [*951] system, those who could afford organs would have a greater chance of receiving them. n292 Finally, allowing sales of organs could promote family strife due to pressure to sell organs. n293¶ a. Inter Vivos Market for Organs¶ In an inter vivos organ market, organs would be considered an ordinary commodity to be sold for a profit. System regulators would have to decide where to draw the line - selling non-essential organs such as kidneys versus selling essential organs such as the heart. The theory for such a system is based on the notion that all parties in the organ donation process are compensated, thus the donor should be included as well. n294¶ Creating a market for organs may actually fail to increase the supply because otherwise altruistic donations may be curtailed. n295 It also risks offending many citizens and takes advantage of the poor who may not otherwise choose to donate or sell organs.¶ b. Futures Market¶ A less controversial version of a compensation system is a futures market. <u>A futures market would allow healthy individuals during life to contract for the sale of their body tissue for delivery after their death.</u> n296 Under this regime, if the donor's organs are successfully harvested and transplanted, the donor's estate would receive payment. n297 Like the current donation system, people would sign donor cards, but unlike the current system, the donor or vendor would receive compensation. n298 Proponents of this system claim it avoids ethical problems. First, by not using live donors, proponents claim it does not exploit the poor. n299 Second, the system does not deal with allocation so the [*952] rich will not have greater access to organs than the poor. n300 Third, people will be selling their own organs, so relatives will not have to participate. n301¶ <u><mark>This system <strong>requires creating and legally enforcing property rights in the decedent's body</u></strong>.</mark> This system is only hypothetical and has not yet been attempted in any jurisdiction. If implemented in the current system, it would clearly violate NOTA, because it involves sales of organs. In addition, it might exploit the poor because only the poor would have incentive to sell their organs, unless the price was high enough for moderately wealthy individuals to be interested. Even though the system does not deal with allocation, the poor will naturally be discriminated against because they may be unable to afford the organs if Medicaid or other government assistance does not cover them.¶ c. Death Benefits¶ A death benefits system, while not market-based, is a third type of compensation system. Such a system would merely provide incentives to relatives of the decedent in exchange for donating the decedent's organs. n302 Examples of incentives include estate tax deductions, funeral expense allow-ances, and college education benefits. n303 As illustrated above, Pennsylvania is experimenting with a death benefits system in its newly enacted legislation. n304¶ Proponents argue that a death benefits system does not conflict with the current altruistic system. n305 Proponents also assert that a death benefits system does not violate NOTA's prohibition of organ sales, because Congress did not intend to include this kind of compensation. n306 With respect to the Pen-nsylvania law, proponents claim funeral expenses could be a reasonable expense exempted from the NOTA prohibition. n307 They claim that because money does not go directly to donors or beneficiaries, the payment is not technically for organs. n308 Opponents claim that a death benefits system con-stitutes the sale of organs; indirect compensation is given in exchange for one's [*953] organs. This proposal, set up as a pilot program administered by individual states, is promising.¶ B. Suggestions¶ First, solutions must be found for the problems of the current system, in which an outright market is inappropriate, but in which incentive programs and public health education could serve as successful boosts to the organ supply. For the second stage, after technology alters the status and supply of organs, society can plan a solution for the future. Only at that point could a full-fledged market be an acceptable, ethical medium to exchange organs.¶ 1. The Current System¶ As illustrated above, problems are inherent in the current organ transplantation system. Society must cope with the problems as they exist today, using currently available technology and resources. The best way to address the immediate organ shortage is to administer pilot programs providing incentives for organ donations, following the lead of Pennsylvania. Congress should propose an Amendment to NOTA that would allow the Department of Health and Human Services to oversee pilot programs. Compensation would rise incrementally, beginning with small payments, such as funeral expenses or hospital bills. The prohibition of sales of organs should remain in place for live organs because allowing sales of live organs jeopardizes existing life and brings into play many ethical issues. Thus, the amendment would only apply to organs of decedents.¶ In addition to avoiding the ethical problems inherent in a market for organs, allowing an incentive system would probably increase awareness of donation, increase actual donation, and fairly and tactfully compensate the donor. The approach is an important bridge to the future when engineered organs will make compensation systems viable. Most importantly, more patients, who would otherwise die, will benefit from receiving life-saving organs.¶ Organ donation does not have to be perceived as a grim, avoidable topic; donating organs transforms death into a positive experience - essentially bestowing the gift of life. In addition to the pilot programs, governmental efforts should focus on public health education. If the public is made more aware of the plight, the decision to donate organs would be made prior to death. This tactic would avoid difficult, uncomfortable situations for families and doctors, which often prevent donation. Many states already have [*954] implemented organ donor awareness funds, funded through donations when renewing driver's licenses or filing taxes. n309 Similar programs must be established. Public health officials should talk to high school students about organ donation. Special task forces could explain the organ transplant system to people, in the form of television commercials or advertisements in magazines. The erection of billboards with organ donation messages would implant the seed in people's minds.¶ 2. The Future System¶ The current solution only affects organs from decedents. In the foreseeable future, technology will create live organs from existing cells and biodegradable scaffolds. When that occurs, the organ shortage will no longer be a problem. But in order to have potentially unlimited organs, cell donation must occur. This may eventually be done individually at birth, but phased in by adults contributing to a generic pool. Will these donors be compensated for their pre-organ donation? The donation of cells differs from a functioning organ and probably lies outside of organ transplantation laws. Most likely, providing compensation for this stage would be allowable and beneficial. An individual donating his cells would face no risk to his health by donating. Fewer ethical issues are involved. Therefore, for the organ system of the future, <u><mark>allowing incentives to donors</u></mark> is a sound idea. This <u><mark>can <strong>only</strong> become a reality if the common law develops, allowing a <strong>property right in </mark>live tissue and <mark>organs</strong>. This will be established in the marketplace <strong>as long as </mark>common law and statutory <mark>law do not prohibit sales.</p></u></strong></mark>
1NC
null
Off
429,526
26
17,011
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
564,718
N
Wake
7
UNLV GV
Calum Matheson
1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,395
Fiat destroys agency
Mitchell 95
Mitchell 95 (Gordon, Univ. of Pittsburgh Communications prof, “REFLEXIVE FIAT: INCORPORATING THE OUTWARD ACTIVIST TURN INTO CONTEST STRATEGY”,paper presented to the 1995 SCA National Convention)
The power that backs a debaters' command that"we mandate the following. . . " is a mirage, a Debaters have no real authority over the actors they employ to implement their ideas in plans and counterplans, yet the simulation of such authority is recognized as an essential fiction necessary to allow the game of policy debate to unfold. One problem with approaches to fiat which feature such a structural separation between advocate and agent of change is that such approaches tend to instill political apathy by inculcating a spectator mentality. The function of fiat which gives debaters simulated political control over external actors coaxes students to gloss over consideration of their concrete roles as involved agents in the controversies they research. this sort of fiat tend to circumscribe active political involvement is through the containment of fiat action within the spatio-temporal boundaries of the contest round By cultivating an ethic of detachment of the actual polis, this view of advocacy introduces a politically regressive dynamic into the academic debate process.
The power that backs a debaters' command that we mandate the following " is a mirage Debaters have no authority over the actors they employ yet the simulation of such authority is recognized One problem with approaches to fiat which feature such a structural separation is that such approaches tend to instill political apathy by inculcating a spectator mentality fiat coaxes students to gloss over consideration of their concrete roles as involved agents By cultivating an ethic of detachment this view of advocacy introduces a politically regressive dynamic into debate
Advocacy, under this view of fiat, takes place on the plane of simulation. The power that backs a debaters' command that"we mandate the following. . . " is a mirage, a phantasm allowed to masquerade as genuine for the purpose of allowing the game of political simulation to take place. Debaters have no real authority over the actors they employ to implement their ideas in plans and counterplans, yet the simulation of such authority is recognized as an essential fiction necessary to allow the game of policy debate to unfold. One problem with approaches to fiat which feature such a structural separation between advocate and agent of change is that such approaches tend to instill political apathy by inculcating a spectator mentality. The function of fiat which gives debaters simulated political control over external actors coaxes students to gloss over consideration of their concrete roles as involved agents in the controversies they research. The construct of fiat, in this vein, serves as a political crutch by alleviatingthe burden of demonstrating a connection between in-round advocacy and the action by external actors defended in plan or counterplan mandates. A second manner in which the structural features of this sort of fiat tend to circumscribe active political involvement is through the containment of fiat action within the spatio-temporal boundaries of the contest round. The fiction of simulated authority evaporates when the judge issues his/her decision and the debaters disband and head to the next round. Advocacy, resting on the ephemeral foundation of simulation, is here a casual and fleeting phenomenon that carries with it few significant future ramifications or responsibilities. By cultivating an ethic of detachment of the actual polis, this view of advocacy introduces a politically regressive dynamic into the academic debate process.
1,876
<h4>Fiat destroys agency </h4><p><u><strong>Mitchell 95</u> </strong>(Gordon, Univ. of Pittsburgh Communications prof, “REFLEXIVE FIAT: INCORPORATING THE OUTWARD ACTIVIST TURN INTO CONTEST STRATEGY”,paper presented to the 1995 SCA National Convention)</p><p>Advocacy, under this view of fiat, takes place on the plane of simulation. <u><mark>The</u> <u>power that backs a debaters' command that</mark>"<mark>we mandate the following</mark>. . . <mark>"</mark> <mark>is a</mark> <mark>mirage</mark>,</u> <u>a </u>phantasm allowed to masquerade as genuine for the purpose of allowing the game of political simulation to take place.<u> <mark>Debaters</u> <u>have no</mark> real <mark>authority</mark> <mark>over the actors they</u> <u>employ</mark> to implement their ideas in plans</u> <u>and counterplans, <mark>yet the simulation of</u> <u>such authority is recognized</mark> as an essential</u> <u>fiction necessary to allow the game of policy debate to unfold.</u> <u><mark>One problem with approaches to fiat</u></mark> <u><mark>which feature such a structural separation</mark> between advocate and agent of change <mark>is that such approaches tend to instill political apathy by inculcating a spectator mentality</mark>. The function of <mark>fiat</mark> which gives debaters simulated political control over external actors <mark>coaxes students to gloss over consideration of their concrete roles as involved agents</mark> in the controversies they research. </u>The construct of fiat, in this vein, serves as a political crutch by alleviatingthe burden of demonstrating a connection between in-round advocacy and the action by external actors defended in plan or counterplan mandates. A second manner in which the structural features of <u>this sort of fiat tend to circumscribe</u> <u>active political involvement is</u> <u>through the containment of fiat action</u> <u>within the spatio-temporal boundaries of the</u> <u>contest round</u>. The fiction of simulated authority evaporates when the judge issues his/her decision and the debaters disband and head to the next round. Advocacy, resting on the ephemeral foundation of simulation, is here a casual and fleeting phenomenon that carries with it few significant future ramifications or responsibilities. <u><mark>By</u> <u>cultivating an ethic of detachment</mark> of the actual <strong>polis</strong>, <mark>this</mark> <mark>view of advocacy introduces a politically regressive dynamic into</mark> the academic <mark>debate</mark> process.</u> </p>
1NR
PIK
A2: fiat
430,204
10
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,396
The 1AC’s attempt to preemptively bracket out our argument functions as a normalization of the doctrine of preemption—the impact is biopolitics and the destruction of the right to life
Goh 6
Goh 6 (Irving, Harvard University and National University of Singapore, Disagreeing Preemptive/Prophylaxis: From Phillip K. Dick to Jacques Rancière, Fast Capitalism 2.1, http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/2_1/goh.html) LA
In the world of Philip K. Dick's Minority Report crime prevention approaches its absolute perfectibility. To free the world of crime, the solution has been but to preemptively arrest the criminal-to-be so that the crime-to-come will not arrive But crime is not at all erased in that world. The world remains mindful of the concept of crime through the mark of a prison architecture, a "detention camp full of would-be criminals" Instead of the disappearance of prison culture a total prison for those who essentially have not (yet) committed a crime has to be exchanged for the world of crime-prevention perfectibility. the spirit of the preemptive is no longer confined to the world of fiction The shadow of the preemptive shrouds the real world today. conjured up in the work of mourning by military and police measures to exorcise its trauma of the surprise of terror of 9/11. The preemptive is becoming the contemporary global condition for global security. Its global dissemination follows from the post-9/11 American directive of a preemptive military strike against any territory that presents itself as a possible state of terror it is the thinking of the right to be alive— without conditions—that is violently precluded in the act of the preemptive. Under the preemptive, the right to be alive risks its disappearance. And once the preemptive is on its way, one is seldom able to think outside of it to think of another possible (less violent) solution or a different outcome. To maintain a thought of an unconditional right to be alive, one has to get outside of the preemptive. One way is to dispute the breakneck rush of the preemptive as the normative condition of global peace and security there is no human right more sacred than the right to be alive. The chronology of the preemptive act the air marshals are deaf to any counter-hypothesis (i.e. the counterhypothesis that the man is not a terrorist). And so they preemptively take the man down with a series of bullets. if the acceleration of the absolute preemptive gets its way, if that becomes the way of contemporary life then it gets in the way of the right to be alive as a fact of freedom of existence As long as the preemptive is in place, as long as the preemptive is institutionally given a path of normalization, the right to be alive would slowly erode from being a given fact of freedom of any living being sharing the common space of the world to a condition only managed and decided from the side of either the military or police of the State. How does one get outside the State's biopolitical capture of the right to be alive, in the face of an impending preemptive? the preemptive in this speed sometimes leaves no proper consideration of the adequateness of its application or applicability. the hypothesis of it causing greater harm is not given time to be tested out. he desire to gain critical time only intensifies the speed of fatality. And it is as such that the prophylaxis acquires the aporetic turns of a poison-remedy not unlike the pharmakon. What is originally set out to be a life-maintaining or life-securing trajectory becomes a destructive projectile. The point is to avoid the prophylaxis becoming a death machine in overdrive The preemptive, as it stands today in the eyes of the military and police does not await the responsible response the fatal preemptive arrives in overdrive, too forcefully Its time of arrival would always be already denied as in the first case where the fatal preemptive has already been delivered in accelerated manner in the staging of the preemptive, there is no space for disagreement The rush of a preemptive is a sonic barrage that drowns out any (silent) voice that seeks to defer it. The law and its need to secure a terrifying peace cannot bear the widening or delaying of that interval by a further demand of a disagreeing counter-hypothesis or auto-prophylaxis. To allow the normalization of the fatal preemptive would be to institute the legitimization of an absolute or extreme biopolitics. the control and management of individual bodies by the State through technics of knowledge Should the preemptive become a force of reason of contemporary life, one would terribly risk submitting the freedom of life and therefore an unconditional right to be alive to a biopolitical capture as The preemptive reduces the body to a total space of absolute war.
crime prevention approaches its absolute perfectibility the spirit of the preemptive shrouds the real world conjured up by military and police measures the right to be alive is violently precluded in the act of the preemptive. one is seldom able to think of another less violent) solution as long as the preemptive is institutionally given a path of normalization, the right to be alive would slowly erode to a condition only managed from the State's biopolitical capture the desire to gain critical time only intensifies the speed of the machine The preemptive does not await response there is no space for disagreement To allow the normalization of the preemptive would be to institute the legitimization of biopolitics Should the preemptive become a force of reason of contemporary life, one would terribly risk submitting the freedom of life to biopolitical capture as a space of absolute war
1. In the world of Philip K. Dick's Minority Report (1956), a world that is also replicated in Steven Spielberg's film adaptation (2002), crime prevention approaches its absolute perfectibility. To free the world of crime, the solution has been but to preemptively arrest the criminal-to-be so that the crime-to-come will not arrive, sometimes even prior to the criminal-to-be premeditating his or her crime-to-come. That is the operational objective of "precrime" in the world of Minority Report. But the history or memory of crime is not at all erased in that world. The world remains mindful of the concept of crime through the mark of a prison architecture, a "detention camp full of would-be criminals" (Dick 1997:324). Instead of the disappearance of prison culture in this futuristic world, a total prison for those who essentially have not (yet) committed a crime has to be exchanged for the world of crime-prevention perfectibility. The "detention camp full of would-be criminals" marks out a space in the world that is the remainder of the preemptive act of "precrime." [1] There is no conventional methodology to the exceptional practice of "precrime." Something monstrous, something more or less human, has to intervene to bring about this perfectibility of noncrime. In Minority Report, it is the "precogs" that one looks to. Spielberg depicts these "precogs" as beings of higher human intelligence. But the original text refers to them rather as "deformed and retarded" (1997:325). The dreams of the "precogs" are always haunted by images of future violence. And a machine is plugged into the dream-works of the "precogs" to sieve out the respective names of the prospective victim and the criminal-to-be, and to reproduce the images of the crime-scene as dreamed out by the "precogs," which are all fragmentary and in disjunctive order of course, like in most dream-works. The intelligent work of interpreting these images, of deciding the order of the images, and analyzing the exact location of the crime scene through geographical memory, remains the reserve of the human. In the text proper, behind the machine is always Wally Page—the subordinate of the narrative's protagonist John Anderton—who has the "big responsibility" of using his subjective "judgment" to determine which names and their corresponding images of crime sequences constitute major crimes-to-come (1997:326). In Spielberg's filmic retelling, he has John Anderton himself commanding that scene of human interpretation, a scene that already presupposes a judgment that a crime will take place and that the criminal-to-be will be a perpetrator of violence, a scene that plays to the cool refrain of Schubert's 8th symphony, which is also known as the unfinished. Fifty years after the text of Minority Report, the spirit of the preemptive is no longer confined to the world of fiction (or film—as in the case of Spielberg's adaptation, which is set in 2054 and therefore in turn slightly less than fifty years from now). The shadow of the preemptive shrouds the real world today. It is the spirit that haunts the world today, conjured up in the work of mourning by military and police measures to exorcise its trauma of the surprise of terror of 9/11. The preemptive is becoming the contemporary global condition for global security. Its global dissemination follows from the post-9/11 American directive of a preemptive military strike against any territory that either deviates from the dictates of the American-led "war on terror," or presents itself as a possible state of terror or a state that will disseminate terror to other territories that have aligned themselves with the American political-economic-military complex. In 2005, the preemptive condition has but only reaffirmed itself in civil space in London, in which the police condition of "shoot-to-kill" is reiterated decisively not with one but seven bullets into the head (and another into the shoulder) of a migrant, delivered in a terrifying and traumatic spectacle visible to the London tube commuters at that time, just because he (supposedly) ran and because he just kept silent/silence. And just as the world of crime prevention perfectibility through the preemptive is not detached from the indelible presence of a prison world in Minority Report, we witness the refusal of the fortress of Guantanamo—that detention camp par excellence of largely undocumented and suspect military handling of its captives that simply goes against the good sense of human rights and democracy—to be conjured away. In the face of the imminent normalization of the preemptive, the critical question one should pose to it could perhaps take its cue from the above-mentioned scene of interpretation in Spielberg's adaptation of Minority Report, specifically the use of the particular soundtrack. What remains "unfinished" in the speed of a preemptive, notwithstanding the fact that there will be times when in the preemptive, a crime, or a terrifying surprise of violence, is short-circuited and the intended injury to the innocent leaves unexecuted for good? In this paper, I would like to argue that it is the thinking of the right to be alive— without conditions—that is violently precluded in the act of the preemptive. Under the preemptive, the right to be alive risks its disappearance. And once the preemptive is on its way, one is seldom able to think outside of it to think of another possible (less violent) solution or a different outcome. To maintain a thought of an unconditional right to be alive, one has to get outside of the preemptive. Or according to John Anderton in Minority Report, one has to "keep [one]self outside" (1997:334) in order to save one's own life against the preemptive. For the right to be alive, one has to get outside the normalization of it, or more urgently, get the idée fixe of the preemptive outside the procedures of normalization (without reserving it as an exceptional power on the side of the State and the law either), in order to secure a counterprophylaxis against the deadly preemptive. One way of getting outside is to project a force of what the French philosopher Jacques Rancière calls mésentente or "disagreement" to dispute the breakneck rush of the preemptive as the normative condition of global peace and security. 2. … there is no human right more sacred than the right to be alive. Without this human right all others are impossible. … protecting the human rights of others is also an inseparable part of realizing our wider foreign policy goals and of promoting our own security. —Ian Pearson, 21 July 2005 The right to be alive is a phrase uttered by U.K. Foreign Cabinet Office Minister Ian Pearson on the future imperative of life in a world visibly insecure of the threats of terror. But it arrives in an ironic time, arriving only hours before the preemptive London shooting—a police action that only deafened the right to be alive to an imminent disappearance, particularly the right to be alive of the innocent migrant. The chronology of the preemptive act coming after the enunciation only serves to suggest how little the chance of the right to be alive gets delivered and received in actuality in the looming shadow of the preemptive. The preemptive arrives at such great speed that in the chronology of events, it sends Pearson's utterance into a precession of meaninglessness. This deafening speed of the preemptive is echoed in another fatal case of the preemptive, this time in Miami in December 2005. This time, a bipolar man, onboard a plane, and who has forgotten to take his medication, hallucinates that he has a bomb in his backpack and makes a dash to get out of the aircraft. Air marshals immediately intervene. Meanwhile, the man's wife runs after her husband, at the same time shouting aloud her husband's medical condition. Witnesses onboard hear her, but somehow not the air marshals. The air marshals only see a risk of another terrorist threat. They are deaf to any counter-hypothesis (i.e. the counterhypothesis that the man is not a terrorist). And so they preemptively take the man down with a series of bullets. Like the Brazilian in the London shooting, this man is innocent. There has been no bomb or threat of terrorism involved in the entire incident. In the same speech of Pearson's in which the right to be alive is enunciated, Pearson also mentions other ways besides terrorism in which the right to be alive is taken away from life itself: "poverty, oppression, exploitation, and dictatorship." He has forgotten to add police action. Police preemptive action violently supplements that list. To be sure, there is no doubt that the phrase the right to be alive will continue to be reiterated again, re-amplified from the side of the State, in another situation, at another place. After all, according to Rancière, in contemporary democracy and its globalization, "We are effectively witnessing an active multiplying and redefining of rights, aimed at getting law, rights, the rule of law, and the legal ideal circulating throughout society, at adapting to and anticipating all the movements of society" (1999:111). But if the acceleration of the absolute preemptive gets its way, if that becomes the way of contemporary life, alongside the reiterations of the right to be alive, then it gets in the way of the right to be alive as a fact—as a fact of freedom of existence—and lets that fact slide into a logic of the simulacrum. According to Baudrillard, the simulacrum is what always needs to announce itself, always needs to amplify and reproduce its sign, in order to drown out the silent disappearance of the thing it seeks to articulate. As long as the preemptive is in place, as long as the preemptive is institutionally given a path of normalization, the right to be alive would slowly erode from being a given fact of freedom of any living being sharing the common space of the world to a condition only managed and decided from the side of either the military or police of the State. How does one get outside the State's biopolitical capture of the right to be alive, in the face of an impending preemptive? Minority Report offers a possible trajectory (not without its own aporia) that allows one to get, or keep, outside the preemptive. There exists, in the world of Minority Report, a countermeasure against the preemptive act of "precrime." And this counterpreemptive potentiality is lodged in the "minority report" of a "precog" who sees a different outcome from the other "precogs" (i.e. it sees the criminal-to-be not being a criminal). The problem with this "minority report" is that it gets shelved aside through a statistical consideration that a deviant vision from one "precog" cannot be more right than the consensual visions of the two other "precogs." That it should be otherwise is almost impossible, almost unthinkable. In that way, the "minority report" never gets delivered or read. The criminal-to-be, as interpreted and decided by "precrime," and who may just not be the criminal, and will never even be when arrested by "precrime," never sees the light of this information that he or she might indeed not even be the criminal-to-be after all in the first place. If this "minority report" were given a proper sending (and not a sending-off) in simultaneity with the dissemination of the preemptive "precrime" operation to "neutralize" the criminal-to-be, it would have been the prophylaxis against the preemptive that denies the right to be alive. It would be prophylactic in another way too, and certainly securing the right to be alive at the same time, should it be given a time of dissemination. According to John Anderton, the prophylaxis of the "minority report" would work by giving the criminal-to-be a space and time for a counter-hypothesis that will see to him or her not following through the crime as interpreted by the "precog"-"monkey machine"-human interpreter-"precrime" complex. It is only with the making possible the reading or readability of the "minority report" that "the preview of the [crime] had cancelled out the [crime]; prophylaxis had occurred simply in [John Anderton] being informed" (Dick 1997:340). To counter the preemptive, it is all a matter of sending out the prophylaxis. Prophylaxis, a medical term of modern times, denotes a preventive against a disease, against syphilis especially in the 1840s (incidentally the disease that took the life of the composer of the soundtrack to Spielberg's scene). And to be sure, there is no doubt of it being in the order of a preemptive. Like the preemptive, it needs to be sent out, as marked by its pro- prefix. It needs a sending-off of itself to the place where a preventive is needed against an impending life-destroying threat. And there is a speed to this sending-out or sending-off in its movement of a "towards" that approaches what needs it in order to live on. A prophylaxis delayed only leaves death(s) to remain. So more often than not, a fastness is attached to it in order to secure a critical time to complete its objective to secure life. But in this speed, it sometimes leaves no proper consideration of the adequateness of its application or applicability. As such, one is exposed to the risks of the prophylaxis failing to cure because it is ineffective—which still results in a fatality that it originally seeks to prevent; or worse, of it intensifying the fatality because the hypothesis of it causing greater harm is not given time to be tested out. In the fastness of its sending-out of itself in this case, the desire to gain critical time only intensifies the speed of fatality. And it is as such that the prophylaxis acquires the aporetic turns of a poison-remedy not unlike the pharmakon. What is originally set out to be a life-maintaining or life-securing trajectory becomes a destructive projectile. This is the sense one gets with the preemptive today. But perhaps this declension of the prophylaxis into a destructive preemptive is already etymologically marked in itself. For -phylaxis says "a watching, guarding after" according to the Oxford English Dictionary, and the senses of surveillance and sentry surely give it a militant edge that similarly surrounds the contemporary understanding of the preemptive. This is the aporia of the prophylaxis: it belongs to the order of the preemptive but only so because it seeks to prevent harm from arriving to life; but in the speed of its sending-out of itself, it risks lapsing into a fatal destructive projectile that only sends-off its life-securing prophylactic trace. The point is to avoid the prophylaxis becoming a death machine in overdrive. For Philip K. Dick in Minority Report, it is a matter of sending out the strategic information of the prophylaxis. And it is necessary that this sending-out must see to a time of receiving, understanding, and consideration of a prophylaxis that is in contradistinction to the act of a militant preemptive. This prophylaxis, even if it comes just after the preemptive that propels with a certain force, must be sent nonetheless, so that it can have at least a chance to negotiate with the latter. The preemptive, as it stands today in the eyes of the military and police, does not look towards the offering of the prophylaxis, and does not await the responsible response to the prophylaxis. In relation to such a force of the preemptive, the prophylaxis is always untimely. It either never arrives, because it is already made a non-event by the fatal preemptive. Or it arrives in overdrive, too forcefully, as the pharmakon-poison preemptive itself. Or more likely, the prophylaxis has no time. Its time of arrival would always be already denied as in the first case where the fatal preemptive has already been delivered in accelerated manner. Or else the prophylaxis as the destructive preemptive always already convinces itself that there is always not enough time for further contemplation or that there is no time for thought in its application. This results in the case of an always no time for a prophylaxis to be offered to the perpetrator-to-be to consider (just in case it puts the lives of others at risk and one would be faced with an even higher death count). In the opening scenes of "precrime" fighting in Spielberg's adaptation of Minority Report, the time on John Anderton's watch, as "precrime" is achieved if not perfected, reads 00:00:00: the no time of the preemptive/prophylaxis. 4. Wait At present, the time of the preemptive presents the targeted body without the chance, or the right, to offer a counter-hypothesis, so as to prove the preemptive erroneous. The targeted body of the preemptive is not offered, and cannot offer, a prophylaxis contra the preemptive so as to delay the elimination of the right to be alive. In other words, in the staging of the preemptive, there is no space for disagreement. His or her speech, phone or logos—the desperate cries (phone) of denial of any (future) wrongdoing; or the cries of injustice of a treatment towards another human being, articulated in a linguistic idiom rational and intelligible (logos); and the cries to surrender (including deferring one's own innocence for the sake of one's safety)—no longer matters. It is no longer heard, as in the case of the preemptive shooting in Miami. Even silence is not heard either, as in the case of the London shooting. The rush of a preemptive is a sonic barrage that drowns out any (silent) voice that seeks to defer it. The gap opened by a suspected body between itself and the law that promises the security of the territory is already too great. The law and its need to secure a terrifying peace cannot bear the widening or delaying of that interval by a further demand of a disagreeing counter-hypothesis or auto-prophylaxis. To allow the normalization of the fatal preemptive would be to institute the legitimization of an absolute or extreme biopolitics. According to Foucault, biopolitics is the control and management of individual bodies by the State through technics of knowledge (usually through surveillance) of those same bodies. In a biopolitical situation, the State holds the exceptional power to determine either the right to let live or make die the individual belonging to the State. Should the preemptive become a force of reason of contemporary life, one would terribly risk submitting the freedom of life and therefore an unconditional right to be alive to a biopolitical capture, handing over the right to let die to the State police and military powers. It would be a situation of abdicating the body as a totally exposed frontier of absolute war. For in the constant exposure of the imminent preemptive, the body at any time—when decided upon by military or police powers to be a security threat—becomes the point in which the space and time of conductibility of war collapse in a total manner. The preemptive reduces the body to a total space of absolute war. Virilio has suggested that the absolute destruction of an enemy in war is procured when the enemy can no longer hypothesize an alternate if not counter route or trajectory (of escape or counter-attack) from impending forces (1990: 17). In the sequence of executing the preemptive to its resolute end, the escaping body faces that same threat of zero hypothesis. There is no chance for that body to think (itself) outside the vortical preemptive. Preemptive bullets into the head would take away that chance of hypothesis.
19,502
<h4>The 1AC’s attempt to preemptively bracket out our argument functions as a normalization of the doctrine of preemption—the impact is biopolitics and the destruction of the right to life</h4><p><u><strong>Goh 6</u></strong> (Irving, Harvard University and National University of Singapore, Disagreeing Preemptive/Prophylaxis: From Phillip K. Dick to Jacques Rancière, Fast Capitalism 2.1, http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/2_1/goh.html) LA</p><p>1. <u>In the world of Philip K. Dick's Minority Report</u> (1956), a world that is also replicated in Steven Spielberg's film adaptation (2002), <u><mark>crime prevention approaches its absolute perfectibility</mark>. To free the world of crime, the solution has been but to preemptively arrest the criminal-to-be so that the crime-to-come will not arrive</u>, sometimes even prior to the criminal-to-be premeditating his or her crime-to-come. That is the operational objective of "precrime" in the world of Minority Report. <u>But</u> the history or memory of <u>crime is not at all erased in that world. The world remains mindful of the concept of crime through the mark of a prison architecture, a "detention camp full of would-be criminals"</u> (Dick 1997:324). <u>Instead of the disappearance of prison culture</u> in this futuristic world, <u>a total prison for those who essentially have not (yet) committed a crime has to be exchanged for the world of crime-prevention perfectibility.</u> The "detention camp full of would-be criminals" marks out a space in the world that is the remainder of the preemptive act of "precrime." [1] There is no conventional methodology to the exceptional practice of "precrime." Something monstrous, something more or less human, has to intervene to bring about this perfectibility of noncrime. In Minority Report, it is the "precogs" that one looks to. Spielberg depicts these "precogs" as beings of higher human intelligence. But the original text refers to them rather as "deformed and retarded" (1997:325). The dreams of the "precogs" are always haunted by images of future violence. And a machine is plugged into the dream-works of the "precogs" to sieve out the respective names of the prospective victim and the criminal-to-be, and to reproduce the images of the crime-scene as dreamed out by the "precogs," which are all fragmentary and in disjunctive order of course, like in most dream-works. The intelligent work of interpreting these images, of deciding the order of the images, and analyzing the exact location of the crime scene through geographical memory, remains the reserve of the human. In the text proper, behind the machine is always Wally Page—the subordinate of the narrative's protagonist John Anderton—who has the "big responsibility" of using his subjective "judgment" to determine which names and their corresponding images of crime sequences constitute major crimes-to-come (1997:326). In Spielberg's filmic retelling, he has John Anderton himself commanding that scene of human interpretation, a scene that already presupposes a judgment that a crime will take place and that the criminal-to-be will be a perpetrator of violence, a scene that plays to the cool refrain of Schubert's 8th symphony, which is also known as the unfinished. Fifty years after the text of Minority Report, <u><mark>the spirit</mark> of the preemptive is no longer confined to the world of fiction</u> (or film—as in the case of Spielberg's adaptation, which is set in 2054 and therefore in turn slightly less than fifty years from now). <u>The shadow <mark>of the preemptive shrouds the real world</mark> today.</u> It is the spirit that haunts the world today, <u><mark>conjured up</mark> in the work of mourning <mark>by military and police measures</mark> to exorcise its trauma of the surprise of terror of 9/11. The preemptive is becoming the contemporary global condition for global security. Its global dissemination follows from the post-9/11 American directive of a preemptive military strike against any territory that</u> either deviates from the dictates of the American-led "war on terror," or <u>presents itself as a possible state of terror</u> or a state that will disseminate terror to other territories that have aligned themselves with the American political-economic-military complex. In 2005, the preemptive condition has but only reaffirmed itself in civil space in London, in which the police condition of "shoot-to-kill" is reiterated decisively not with one but seven bullets into the head (and another into the shoulder) of a migrant, delivered in a terrifying and traumatic spectacle visible to the London tube commuters at that time, just because he (supposedly) ran and because he just kept silent/silence. And just as the world of crime prevention perfectibility through the preemptive is not detached from the indelible presence of a prison world in Minority Report, we witness the refusal of the fortress of Guantanamo—that detention camp par excellence of largely undocumented and suspect military handling of its captives that simply goes against the good sense of human rights and democracy—to be conjured away. In the face of the imminent normalization of the preemptive, the critical question one should pose to it could perhaps take its cue from the above-mentioned scene of interpretation in Spielberg's adaptation of Minority Report, specifically the use of the particular soundtrack. What remains "unfinished" in the speed of a preemptive, notwithstanding the fact that there will be times when in the preemptive, a crime, or a terrifying surprise of violence, is short-circuited and the intended injury to the innocent leaves unexecuted for good? In this paper, I would like to argue that <u>it is the thinking of <mark>the right to be alive</mark>— without conditions—that <mark>is violently precluded in the act of the preemptive. </mark>Under the preemptive, the right to be alive risks its disappearance. And once the preemptive is on its way, <mark>one is seldom able to think</mark> outside of it to think <mark>of another</mark> possible (<mark>less violent) solution</mark> or a different outcome. To maintain a thought of an unconditional right to be alive, one has to get outside of the preemptive.</u> Or according to John Anderton in Minority Report, one has to "keep [one]self outside" (1997:334) in order to save one's own life against the preemptive. For the right to be alive, one has to get outside the normalization of it, or more urgently, get the idée fixe of the preemptive outside the procedures of normalization (without reserving it as an exceptional power on the side of the State and the law either), in order to secure a counterprophylaxis against the deadly preemptive. <u>One way</u> of getting outside <u>is to</u> project a force of what the French philosopher Jacques Rancière calls mésentente or "disagreement" to <u>dispute the breakneck rush of the preemptive as the normative condition of global peace and security</u>. 2. … <u>there is no human right more sacred than the right to be alive.</u> Without this human right all others are impossible. … protecting the human rights of others is also an inseparable part of realizing our wider foreign policy goals and of promoting our own security. —Ian Pearson, 21 July 2005 The right to be alive is a phrase uttered by U.K. Foreign Cabinet Office Minister Ian Pearson on the future imperative of life in a world visibly insecure of the threats of terror. But it arrives in an ironic time, arriving only hours before the preemptive London shooting—a police action that only deafened the right to be alive to an imminent disappearance, particularly the right to be alive of the innocent migrant. <u>The chronology of the preemptive act</u> coming after the enunciation only serves to suggest how little the chance of the right to be alive gets delivered and received in actuality in the looming shadow of the preemptive. The preemptive arrives at such great speed that in the chronology of events, it sends Pearson's utterance into a precession of meaninglessness. This deafening speed of the preemptive is echoed in another fatal case of the preemptive, this time in Miami in December 2005. This time, a bipolar man, onboard a plane, and who has forgotten to take his medication, hallucinates that he has a bomb in his backpack and makes a dash to get out of the aircraft. Air marshals immediately intervene. Meanwhile, the man's wife runs after her husband, at the same time shouting aloud her husband's medical condition. Witnesses onboard hear her, but somehow not <u>the air marshals</u>. The air marshals only see a risk of another terrorist threat. They <u>are deaf to any counter-hypothesis (i.e. the counterhypothesis that the man is not a terrorist). And so they preemptively take the man down with a series of bullets.</u> Like the Brazilian in the London shooting, this man is innocent. There has been no bomb or threat of terrorism involved in the entire incident. In the same speech of Pearson's in which the right to be alive is enunciated, Pearson also mentions other ways besides terrorism in which the right to be alive is taken away from life itself: "poverty, oppression, exploitation, and dictatorship." He has forgotten to add police action. Police preemptive action violently supplements that list. To be sure, there is no doubt that the phrase the right to be alive will continue to be reiterated again, re-amplified from the side of the State, in another situation, at another place. After all, according to Rancière, in contemporary democracy and its globalization, "We are effectively witnessing an active multiplying and redefining of rights, aimed at getting law, rights, the rule of law, and the legal ideal circulating throughout society, at adapting to and anticipating all the movements of society" (1999:111). But <u>if the acceleration of the absolute preemptive gets its way, if that becomes the way of contemporary life</u>, alongside the reiterations of the right to be alive, <u>then it gets in the way of the right to be alive</u> as a fact—<u>as a fact of freedom of existence</u>—and lets that fact slide into a logic of the simulacrum. According to Baudrillard, the simulacrum is what always needs to announce itself, always needs to amplify and reproduce its sign, in order to drown out the silent disappearance of the thing it seeks to articulate. <u>As long as the preemptive is in place, <mark>as long as the preemptive is institutionally given a path of normalization, the right to be alive would slowly erode</mark> from being a given fact of freedom of any living being sharing the common space of the world <mark>to a condition only managed</mark> and decided <mark>from</mark> the side of either the military or police of the State. How does one get outside <mark>the State's biopolitical</mark> <mark>capture</mark> of the right to be alive, in the face of an impending preemptive?</u> Minority Report offers a possible trajectory (not without its own aporia) that allows one to get, or keep, outside the preemptive. There exists, in the world of Minority Report, a countermeasure against the preemptive act of "precrime." And this counterpreemptive potentiality is lodged in the "minority report" of a "precog" who sees a different outcome from the other "precogs" (i.e. it sees the criminal-to-be not being a criminal). The problem with this "minority report" is that it gets shelved aside through a statistical consideration that a deviant vision from one "precog" cannot be more right than the consensual visions of the two other "precogs." That it should be otherwise is almost impossible, almost unthinkable. In that way, the "minority report" never gets delivered or read. The criminal-to-be, as interpreted and decided by "precrime," and who may just not be the criminal, and will never even be when arrested by "precrime," never sees the light of this information that he or she might indeed not even be the criminal-to-be after all in the first place. If this "minority report" were given a proper sending (and not a sending-off) in simultaneity with the dissemination of the preemptive "precrime" operation to "neutralize" the criminal-to-be, it would have been the prophylaxis against the preemptive that denies the right to be alive. It would be prophylactic in another way too, and certainly securing the right to be alive at the same time, should it be given a time of dissemination. According to John Anderton, the prophylaxis of the "minority report" would work by giving the criminal-to-be a space and time for a counter-hypothesis that will see to him or her not following through the crime as interpreted by the "precog"-"monkey machine"-human interpreter-"precrime" complex. It is only with the making possible the reading or readability of the "minority report" that "the preview of the [crime] had cancelled out the [crime]; prophylaxis had occurred simply in [John Anderton] being informed" (Dick 1997:340). To counter the preemptive, it is all a matter of sending out the prophylaxis. Prophylaxis, a medical term of modern times, denotes a preventive against a disease, against syphilis especially in the 1840s (incidentally the disease that took the life of the composer of the soundtrack to Spielberg's scene). And to be sure, there is no doubt of it being in the order of a preemptive. Like <u>the preemptive</u>, it needs to be sent out, as marked by its pro- prefix. It needs a sending-off of itself to the place where a preventive is needed against an impending life-destroying threat. And there is a speed to this sending-out or sending-off in its movement of a "towards" that approaches what needs it in order to live on. A prophylaxis delayed only leaves death(s) to remain. So more often than not, a fastness is attached to it in order to secure a critical time to complete its objective to secure life. But<u> in this speed</u>, it <u>sometimes leaves no proper consideration of the adequateness of its application or applicability.</u> As such, one is exposed to the risks of the prophylaxis failing to cure because it is ineffective—which still results in a fatality that it originally seeks to prevent; or worse, of it intensifying the fatality because <u>the hypothesis of it causing greater harm is not given time to be tested out. </u>In the fastness of its sending-out of itself in this case, <mark>t<u>he desire to gain critical time only intensifies the speed of</mark> fatality. And it is as such that <mark>the</mark> prophylaxis acquires the aporetic turns of a poison-remedy not unlike the pharmakon. What is originally set out to be a life-maintaining or life-securing trajectory becomes a destructive projectile.</u> This is the sense one gets with the preemptive today. But perhaps this declension of the prophylaxis into a destructive preemptive is already etymologically marked in itself. For -phylaxis says "a watching, guarding after" according to the Oxford English Dictionary, and the senses of surveillance and sentry surely give it a militant edge that similarly surrounds the contemporary understanding of the preemptive. This is the aporia of the prophylaxis: it belongs to the order of the preemptive but only so because it seeks to prevent harm from arriving to life; but in the speed of its sending-out of itself, it risks lapsing into a fatal destructive projectile that only sends-off its life-securing prophylactic trace. <u>The point is to avoid the prophylaxis becoming a death <mark>machine</mark> in overdrive</u>. For Philip K. Dick in Minority Report, it is a matter of sending out the strategic information of the prophylaxis. And it is necessary that this sending-out must see to a time of receiving, understanding, and consideration of a prophylaxis that is in contradistinction to the act of a militant preemptive. This prophylaxis, even if it comes just after the preemptive that propels with a certain force, must be sent nonetheless, so that it can have at least a chance to negotiate with the latter. <u><mark>The preemptive</mark>, as it stands today in the eyes of the military and police</u>, does not look towards the offering of the prophylaxis, and <u><mark>does not await </mark>the responsible <mark>response</u></mark> to the prophylaxis. In relation to such a force of the preemptive, the prophylaxis is always untimely. It either never arrives, because it is already made a non-event by <u>the fatal preemptive</u>. Or it <u>arrives in overdrive, too forcefully</u>, as the pharmakon-poison preemptive itself. Or more likely, the prophylaxis has no time. <u>Its time of arrival would always be already denied as in the first case where the fatal preemptive has already been delivered in accelerated manner</u>. Or else the prophylaxis as the destructive preemptive always already convinces itself that there is always not enough time for further contemplation or that there is no time for thought in its application. This results in the case of an always no time for a prophylaxis to be offered to the perpetrator-to-be to consider (just in case it puts the lives of others at risk and one would be faced with an even higher death count). In the opening scenes of "precrime" fighting in Spielberg's adaptation of Minority Report, the time on John Anderton's watch, as "precrime" is achieved if not perfected, reads 00:00:00: the no time of the preemptive/prophylaxis. 4. Wait At present, the time of the preemptive presents the targeted body without the chance, or the right, to offer a counter-hypothesis, so as to prove the preemptive erroneous. The targeted body of the preemptive is not offered, and cannot offer, a prophylaxis contra the preemptive so as to delay the elimination of the right to be alive. In other words, <u>in the staging of the preemptive, <mark>there is no space for disagreement</u></mark>. His or her speech, phone or logos—the desperate cries (phone) of denial of any (future) wrongdoing; or the cries of injustice of a treatment towards another human being, articulated in a linguistic idiom rational and intelligible (logos); and the cries to surrender (including deferring one's own innocence for the sake of one's safety)—no longer matters. It is no longer heard, as in the case of the preemptive shooting in Miami. Even silence is not heard either, as in the case of the London shooting. <u>The rush of a preemptive is a sonic barrage that drowns out any (silent) voice that seeks to defer it<strong>.</u></strong> The gap opened by a suspected body between itself and the law that promises the security of the territory is already too great. <u>The law and its need to secure a terrifying peace cannot bear the widening or delaying of that interval by a further demand of a disagreeing counter-hypothesis or auto-prophylaxis. <mark>To allow the normalization of the</mark> fatal <mark>preemptive would be to institute the legitimization of</mark> an absolute or extreme <mark>biopolitics</mark>.</u> According to Foucault, biopolitics is <u>the control and management of individual bodies by the State through technics of knowledge</u> (usually through surveillance) of those same bodies. In a biopolitical situation, the State holds the exceptional power to determine either the right to let live or make die the individual belonging to the State. <u><mark>Should the preemptive become a force of reason of contemporary life, one would terribly risk submitting the freedom of life</mark> and therefore an unconditional right to be alive <mark>to</mark> a <mark>biopolitical capture</u></mark>, handing over the right to let die to the State police and military powers. It would be a situation of abdicating the body <u><mark>as</u></mark> a totally exposed frontier of absolute war. For in the constant exposure of the imminent preemptive, the body at any time—when decided upon by military or police powers to be a security threat—becomes the point in which the space and time of conductibility of war collapse in a total manner. <u>The preemptive reduces the body to <mark>a</mark> total <mark>space of absolute war</mark>.</u> Virilio has suggested that the absolute destruction of an enemy in war is procured when the enemy can no longer hypothesize an alternate if not counter route or trajectory (of escape or counter-attack) from impending forces (1990: 17). In the sequence of executing the preemptive to its resolute end, the escaping body faces that same threat of zero hypothesis. There is no chance for that body to think (itself) outside the vortical preemptive. Preemptive bullets into the head would take away that chance of hypothesis.</p>
1NC
null
Framing
1,248,104
49
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,397
Ground. Aff jacks the court CP, politics DA.
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Ground. Aff jacks the court CP, politics DA. </h4>
1NC
null
Off
430,203
1
17,014
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx
564,720
N
USC
3
Cornell LL
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,398
That wrecks the biomedical research
Gitter 4
Gitter 4 (Donna M Gitter, assistant professor of legal and ethical studies at Fordham University Schools of Business, JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2004, “Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in their Biological Material,” http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/61-1Gitter.pdf, Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 61 Issue 1) gz
Because biomedical research is a costly and financially risky endeavor Congress must consider carefully whether according human research participants property rights in their tissue will diminish the incentives to invest in this industry if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical scientists would face a significant increase in their transaction costs scientists would be obliged to compensate research participants for their genetic material, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. This obligation to remunerate research participants presents a particular risk to scientists in the nonprofit sector, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings researchers would face significant transaction costs in locating and then negotiating compensation arrangements with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide such negotiations could prove quite complex and protracted bargaining among scientists and research participants could prove impossible in cases where the identities of these participants are unknown the problems of increased financial and transaction costs reach their apex in the case of the potential holdout who refuses to participate in research unless she is compensated at a very high rate recognizing the research participant's right to share in the revenues may imply some right to control the products of that research research participants may demand widespread and affordable licensing of the intellectual property developed from their tissue thereby further decreasing the scientists' profits All of these factors combined would present significant disincentives to researchers, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise
Because biomedical research is financially risky according participants property rights in their tissue will diminish incentives to invest scientists would face significant transaction costs scientists would be obliged to compensate for genetic material This presents a particular risk in the nonprofit sector researchers would face significant costs in locating and negotiating arrangements negotiations could prove complex bargaining could prove impossible where identities are unknown the problems reach their apex in the holdout who refuses to participate unless she is compensated recognizing the right may imply some right to control research participants may demand licensing further decreasing profits these factors would present significant disincentives to researchers
Because biomedical research is a costly and financially risky endeavor,86 Congress must consider carefully whether according human research participants property rights in their tissue will diminish the incentives to invest in this industry. Certainly, if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical scientists would face a significant increase in their transaction costs. First, scientists would be obliged to compensate research participants for their genetic material, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. This obligation to remunerate research participants presents a particular risk to scientists in the nonprofit sector, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings. 87 Second, researchers would face significant transaction costs88 in locating and then negotiating compensation arrangements with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur considerable monitoring and enforcement costs in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide,89 such negotiations could prove quite complex and protracted. Furthermore, bargaining among scientists and research participants could prove impossible in cases where the identities of these participants are unknown, either because researchers obtained the tissue from another scientist, a tissue bank, or a repository without the tissue's identifying information,90 or because the participants remain anonymous. 91 Third, the problems of increased financial and transaction costs reach their apex in the case of the potential holdout who refuses to participate in research unless she is compensated at a very high rate.92 Finally, recognizing the research participant's right to share in the revenues may imply some right to control the products of that research; for example, research participants may demand widespread and affordable licensing of the intellectual property developed from their tissue, thereby further decreasing the scientists' profits.93 All of these factors combined would present significant disincentives to researchers, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise. On the other hand, countervailing arguments support the notion that compensating research participants might stimulate innovation.
2,544
<h4>That wrecks the biomedical research</h4><p><u><strong>Gitter 4</u></strong> (Donna M Gitter, assistant professor of legal and ethical studies at Fordham University Schools of Business, JD from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2004, “Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in their Biological Material,” http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/61-1Gitter.pdf, Washington and Lee Law Review Volume 61 Issue 1) gz</p><p><u><mark>Because biomedical research is</mark> a <strong>costly and <mark>financially risky</mark> endeavor</u></strong>,86 <u>Congress must consider carefully whether <mark>according</mark> human research <mark>participants property rights in their tissue will <strong>diminish </mark>the <mark>incentives to invest</strong></mark> in this industry</u>. Certainly, <u>if research participants were to enjoy property rights in their tissue, biomedical <mark>scientists would face</mark> a <strong><mark>significant </mark>increase in their <mark>transaction costs</u></strong></mark>. First, <u><mark>scientists would be obliged to compensate</mark> research participants <mark>for </mark>their <mark>genetic material</mark>, whether pursuant to a contract negotiated at the inception of the research or pursuant to a liability rule after the fact. <mark>This</mark> obligation to remunerate research participants <mark>presents a <strong>particular risk </mark>to scientists <mark>in the nonprofit sector</strong></mark>, who do not necessarily plan to commercialize their findings</u>. 87 Second, <u><mark>researchers would face<strong> significant</mark> transaction <mark>costs</u></strong></mark>88 <u><mark>in locating and</mark> then <mark>negotiating</mark> compensation <mark>arrangements </mark>with each individual participant involved in a given research effort, and research institutions would incur <strong>considerable monitoring and enforcement costs</strong> in ensuring the compliance of their staff. Because many biotechnological research studies involve numerous tissue samples from individuals worldwide</u>,89 <u>such <mark>negotiations could prove</mark> quite <strong><mark>complex</mark> and protracted</u></strong>. Furthermore, <u><mark>bargaining</mark> among scientists and research participants <mark>could prove impossible</mark> in cases <mark>where</mark> the <mark>identities</mark> of these participants <mark>are unknown</u></mark>, either because researchers obtained the tissue from another scientist, a tissue bank, or a repository without the tissue's identifying information,90 or because the participants remain anonymous. 91 Third, <u><mark>the problems</mark> of increased financial and transaction costs <strong><mark>reach their apex</strong> in the </mark>case of the potential <mark>holdout who <strong>refuses to participate</strong> </mark>in research <mark>unless she is compensated</mark> at a very high rate</u>.92 Finally, <u><mark>recognizing the</mark> research participant's <mark>right</mark> to share in the revenues <mark>may imply some right to <strong>control</mark> the products of that <mark>research</u></strong></mark>; for example, <u>research <mark>participants may demand</mark> <strong>widespread and affordable <mark>licensing</strong> </mark>of the intellectual property developed from their tissue</u>, <u>thereby</u> <u><strong><mark>further decreasing</mark> the scientists' <mark>profits</u></strong></mark>.93 <u>All of <mark>these factors</mark> combined <mark>would present <strong>significant disincentives to researchers</strong></mark>, who presumably would encounter these impediments well before they could ascertain the profitability of their research enterprise</u>. On the other hand, countervailing arguments support the notion that compensating research participants might stimulate innovation.</p>
1NC
null
Off
429,525
3
17,011
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
564,718
N
Wake
7
UNLV GV
Calum Matheson
1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,399
The drive for survival destroys the intensity of life and reduces life to its lowest common denominator.
Razinsky 9
Razinsky 9 (Liran, Lecturer, The Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies, Bar-llan University, Professor of Philosophy @ The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2), 2009, pp. 63-88)
The sacrificer both destroys and survives. sacrifice is not subterfuge. Sacrifice burns like a sun, spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. There is no sacrifice,” “unless the one performing it identifies, , with the victim” otherness that is partly sameness, , meeting death is a need, and we must remain as spectators. , critical revaluation of values renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Death cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped through a mirror, to use Perseus’s trick against Medusa. The safety that theater provides, knowing that we will remain alive, enables us to get a taste of death Life loses in interest, when the highest stake may not be risked. . We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but indispensable, paralyzed by the thought of disaster the tendency to exclude death from life brings many other renunciations and exclusions. Sacrifice, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators “The sacred horror “opens , like a theater curtain, and every limited meaning is transfigured The presence of death, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and (violence) melts, the mediation of the intellect , and life is felt at its fullest. intimacy: moments of excess and fusion of beings Survival, , has a price. It limits our life. the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. not so much a negation of life, as an affirmation of the intimate opposed to the normal order of things rejected. the economy of value and future-oriented calculations stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life The need for duration,” “conceals life from us to meet death is necessary if life is to have its full value, and is part of what makes us human.
The sacrificer both destroys and survives. . Sacrifice burns like a sun, We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. , meeting death we remain as spectators. revaluation of values renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Death cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped through a mirror, Perseus’s trick against Medusa. The safety that theater provides, knowing that we will remain alive, enables us to get a taste of death Life loses in interest, when the highest stake may not be risked. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but indispensable, paralyzed by the thought of disaster the tendency to exclude death from life brings many other renunciations and exclusions. Sacrifice brings together life in its fullness and annihilation “The sacred horror “opens , like a theater curtain, and every meaning is transfigured The presence of death, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and (violence) melts life is felt at its fullest. Survival limits our life. the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. Sacrifice is an affirmation of the intimate opposed to the normal order of things the economy of value and future-oriented calculations stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life to meet death is necessary if life is to have value, and is what makes us human.
Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One never dies in the first person. Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution to Hegel’s fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human truth as a “being unto death” (he uses Heidegger’s term). Sacrifice provides a clear manifestation of man’s fundamental negativity, in the form of death (Bataille, “Hegel” 335-36; 286). The sacrificer both destroys and survives. Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by Man. In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum? Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that sacrifice is not a simulacrum, not a mere subterfuge. In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror is cast upon the spectators. Sacrifice burns like a sun, spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, and calls for the negation of individuals as such (“The Festival” 313; 215). We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. Bataille’s idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freud’s paradox. It might be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an other’s death. Yet on some level this other’s death must be our own as well for it to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the element of identification: “In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287). “There is no sacrifice,” writes Denis Hollier, “unless the one performing it identifies, in the end, with the victim” (166). Thus it is through identification, through otherness that is partly sameness, that a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the act. If it were a complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death. Also noteworthy is Bataille’s stress on the involvement of sight: “and so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287), which brings him close to Freud’s view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining, perceiving. Bataille’s description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so. Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly, meeting death is a need, not uncalled-for. We must meet death, and we must remain as spectators. Thus it is through identification and through visual participation in the dying that a solution is achieved, accompanied by the critical revaluation of values, which renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.” Note that both possibilities of meeting death—in the sacrificial-ritual we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turn—are social. Thus Freud’s text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death, actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the paradox through turning to the other. Death perhaps cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped sideways, indirectly, vicariously through a mirror, to use Perseus’s ancient trick against Medusa. The introduction of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself. The safety that theater provides, of essentially knowing that we will remain alive, emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically enables us to really get a taste of death. Bataille radicalizes that possibility. Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a problem, as we have seen and shall see, theater is not a solution for him. With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that makes all the difference. The idea common to both authors—that we can meet death through the other and yet remain alive—is ambiguous. One can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive. 11 Freud SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 75 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together is that it invites us to that second reading. An Encounter with Death Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible, yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies. In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly a crucial point for Freud as well—one passage where death does not seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to death, as described above—namely that he wishes it in others but ignores it in himself. “But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided,” he continues. It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend […]. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission. (“Thoughts” 293) Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself, and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man. It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology and religion sprang. 12 I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, “A Struggle”) how Freud’s reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval man witnessed death, and “his whole being revolted against the admission.” ”Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294). Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death. Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present, there would be no acknowledgement of death, one’s own death always being, says Freud, one’s blind spot. 13 Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 76 I mentioned before Heidegger’s grappling with a problem similar to Bataille’s paradox. It is part of Heidegger’s claim, which he shares with Freud, that one’s death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would retain its otherness: the other’s death is necessarily the other’s and not mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with—that of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true apprehension of death possible, through real identification. 14 As Bataille says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and dance before the body of the deceased: “It is the death of an other, but in such instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own death” (“Hegel” 341; 291). Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in sacrifice, of the “fusion of beings” in these moments of intensity (“The Festival” 307-11; 210-13; La Littérature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his “whole being” is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it was clear—there is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject. When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits him, 15 while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same for other subjects as other subjects are for him—that is, they can wish him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence. The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really shakes him. 16 The Highest Stake in the Game of Living Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 77 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life. 17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. Life is impoverished, it loses in interest, when the highest stake in the game of living, life itself, may not be risked. It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us. We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but in fact indispensable, such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are paralyzed by the thought of who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a disaster should occur. Thus the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions. Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 78 thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear. 18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving, something of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. Sacrifice, Bataille says, brings together life in its fullness and the annihilation of life. We are not mere spectators in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. “The sacred horror,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It “opens itself, like a theater curtain, on to a realm beyond this world” and every limited meaning is transfigured in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist. The presence of death, which he interprets in a more earthly manner, is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and other related elements (violence) bring life closer to a state where individuality melts, the mediation of the intellect between us and the world lessens, and life is felt at its fullest. Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or intimacy: “immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are moments of excess and of fusion of beings (La Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 80 denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty. 19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. Survival, he tells us, has a price. It limits our life. As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for the threat of death: it ruins value where value is only assured through duration. It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). Sacrifice is the opposite of production and accumulation. Death is not so much a negation of life, as it is an affirmation of the intimate order of life, which is opposed to the normal order of things and is therefore rejected. “The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely the economy of value and future-oriented calculations that stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “The need for duration,” in the words of Bataille, “conceals life from us” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial. Another Look at Speculation Both authors, then, maintain that if elements associated with death invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity to meet death is not due to the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death is necessary if life is to have its full value, and is part of what makes us human. But the tension between the tendencies—to flee death or to embrace it—is not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always tries to assert itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed through death to other dimensions of life. But the exposure, he adds, is limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event: the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things.
23,294
<h4>The drive for survival destroys the intensity of life and reduces life to its lowest common denominator. </h4><p><u><strong>Razinsky 9</u></strong> (Liran, Lecturer, The Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies, Bar-llan University, Professor of Philosophy @ The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, “How to Look Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille” SubStance, Issue 119 (Volume 38, Number 2), 2009, pp. 63-88)</p><p>Thus we see that the stakes are high. What is at stake is the attempt of the subject to grasp itself in totality. This attempt necessitates bringing death into the account, but death itself hampers this very attempt. One never dies in the first person. Returning to Bataille, why does he believe sacrifice to be a solution to Hegel’s fundamental paradox? For him, it answers the requirements of the human, for Man meets death face to face in the sacrifice, he sojourns with it, and yet, at the same time, he preserves his life. In sacrifice, says Bataille, man destroys the animal within him and establishes his human truth as a “being unto death” (he uses Heidegger’s term). Sacrifice provides a clear manifestation of man’s fundamental negativity, in the form of death (Bataille, “Hegel” 335-36; 286). <u><mark>The sacrificer both destroys and survives. </u></mark>Moreover, in the sacrifice, death is approached voluntarily by Man. In this way the paradox is overcome, and yet remains open. We can approach death and yet remain alive, but, one might ask, is it really death that we encountered, or did we merely fabricate a simulacrum? Bataille insists elsewhere, however, that <u>sacrifice is not</u> a simulacrum, not a mere <u>subterfuge. </u>In the sacrificial ritual, a real impression of horror is cast upon the spectators<mark>.<u> Sacrifice burns like a sun, </mark>spreading radiation our eyes can hardly bear, </u>and calls for the negation of individuals as such (“The Festival” 313; 215). <u><mark>We did not fool death; we are burned in its fire. </u></mark>Bataille’s idea of the sacrifice also addresses Freud’s paradox. It might be impossible to imagine our own death directly, but it is possible to imagine it with the aid of some mediator, to meet death through an other’s death. Yet on some level this other’s death must be our own as well for it to be effective, and indeed this is the case, says Bataille. He stresses the element of identification: “In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287). “<u>There is no sacrifice,” </u>writes Denis Hollier,<u> “unless the one performing it identifies, </u>in the end<u>, with the victim”</u> (166). Thus it is through identification, through <u>otherness that is partly sameness, </u>that a solution is achieved. If it were us, we would die in the act. If it were a complete other, it would not, in any way, be our death. Also noteworthy is Bataille’s stress on the involvement of sight: “and so he dies in seeing himself die” (“Hegel” 336; 287), which brings him close to Freud’s view of the nature of the problem, for Freud insists on the visual, recasting the problem as one of spectatorship, imagining, perceiving. Bataille’s description recapitulates that of Freud, but renders it positive. Yes, we remain as a spectator, but it is essential that we do so. Without it, we cannot be said to have met death. Significantly<u><mark>, meeting death </mark>is a need, </u>not uncalled-for. We must meet death,<u> and <mark>we </mark>must <mark>remain as spectators. </u></mark>Thus it is through identification and through visual participation in the dying that a solution is achieved<u>,</u> accompanied by the <u>critical <mark>revaluation of values</u></mark>, which <u><mark>renders the meeting with death crucial for “humanness.”</u></mark> Note that both possibilities of meeting death—in the sacrificial-ritual we have just explored, and in theatre or art, to which we now turn—are social.<u> </u>Thus Freud’s text, although it insists on the irrepresentability of death, actually offers, unintentionally perhaps, a possible way out of the paradox through turning to the other. <u><mark>Death </u></mark>perhaps <u><mark>cannot be looked at directly, but it can be grasped</u></mark> sideways, indirectly, vicariously <u><mark>through a mirror, </mark>to use <mark>Perseus’s </u></mark>ancient <u><mark>trick against Medusa. </u></mark>The introduction of the other, both similar to and different from oneself, into the equation of death helps break out of the Cartesian circle with both its incontestable truth and its solipsism and affirmation of oneself. <u><mark>The safety that theater provides, </u></mark>of essentially <u><mark>knowing that we will remain alive, </u></mark>emerges as a kind of requirement for our ability to really identify with the other. In that, it paradoxically<u><mark> enables us to </u></mark>really <u><mark>get a taste of death</u></mark>. Bataille radicalizes that possibility. Although Freud deems the estrangement of death from psychic life a problem, as we have seen and shall see, theater is not a solution for him. With Bataille however, theater emerges as a much more compelling alternative. Again, it is a matter of a delicate nuance, but a nuance that makes all the difference. The idea common to both authors—that we can meet death through the other and yet remain alive—is ambiguous. One can lay stress on that encounter or on the fact of remaining alive. 11 Freud SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 75 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille tends to opt for the second possibility, but his text can also be read as supporting the first. The benefit in bringing Freud and Bataille together is that it invites us to that second reading. An Encounter with Death Death in Freud is often the death of the other. Both the fear of death and the death wish are often focused on the other as their object. But almost always it is as though through the discussion of the other Freud were trying to keep death at bay. But along with Bataille, we can take this other more seriously. Imagining our own death might be impossible, yet we can still get a glimpse of death when it is an other that dies. In one passage in his text, the death of the other seems more explicitly a crucial point for Freud as well—one passage where death does not seem so distant. Freud comments on the attitude of primeval Man to death, as described above—namely that he wishes it in others but ignores it in himself. “But there was for him one case in which the two opposite attitudes towards death collided,” he continues. It occurred when primeval man saw someone who belonged to him die—his wife, his child, his friend […]. Then, in his pain, he was forced to learn that one can die, too, oneself, and his whole being revolted against the admission. (“Thoughts” 293) Freud goes on to explain that the loved one was at once part of himself, and a stranger whose death pleased primeval man. It is from this point, Freud continues, that philosophy, psychology and religion sprang. 12 I have described elsewhere (Razinsky, “A Struggle”) how Freud’s reluctance to admit the importance of death quickly undermines this juncture of the existential encounter with death by focusing on the emotional ambivalence of primeval man rather than on death itself. However, the description is there and is very telling. Primeval man witnessed death, and “his whole being revolted against the admission.” ”Man could no longer keep death at a distance, for he had tasted it in his pain about the dead” (Freud, “Thoughts” 294). Once again, it is through the death of the other that man comes to grasp death. Once again, we have that special admixture of the other being both an other and oneself that facilitates the encounter with death. Something of myself must be in the other in order for me to see his death as relevant to myself. Yet his or her otherness, which means my reassurance of my survival, is no less crucial, for if it were not present, there would be no acknowledgement of death, one’s own death always being, says Freud, one’s blind spot. 13 Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 76 I mentioned before Heidegger’s grappling with a problem similar to Bataille’s paradox. It is part of Heidegger’s claim, which he shares with Freud, that one’s death is unimaginable. In a famous section Heidegger mentions the possibility of coming to grasp death through the death of the other but dismisses it, essentially since the other in that case would retain its otherness: the other’s death is necessarily the other’s and not mine (47:221-24). Thus we return to the problem we started with—that of the necessary subject-object duality in the process of the representation of death. Watching the dead object will no more satisfy me than imagining myself as an object, for the radical difference of both from me as a subject will remain intact. But the possibility that seems to emerge from the discussion of Freud and Bataille is that in-between position of the person both close and distant, both self and other, which renders true apprehension of death possible, through real identification. 14 As Bataille says, regarding the Irish Wake custom where the relatives drink and dance before the body of the deceased: “It is the death of an other, but in such instances, the death of the other is always the image of one’s own death” (“Hegel” 341; 291). Bataille speaks of the dissolution of the subject-object boundaries in sacrifice, of the “fusion of beings” in these moments of intensity (“The Festival” 307-11; 210-13; La Littérature 215; 70). Possibly, that is what happens to primeval man when the loved one dies and why his “whole being” is affected. He himself is no longer sure of his identity. Before, it was clear—there is the other, the object, whom one wants dead, and there is oneself, a subject. The show and the spectators. Possibly what man realized before the cadaver of his loved one was that he himself is also an object, taking part in the world of objects, and not only a subject. When he understood this, it seems to me, he understood death. For in a sense a subject subjectively never dies. Psychologically nothing limits him, 15 while an object implies limited existence: limited by other objects that interact with it, limited in space, limited in being the thought-content of someone else. Moreover, primeval man understood that he is the same for other subjects as other subjects are for him—that is, they can wish him dead or, which is pretty much the same, be indifferent to his existence. The encounter made primeval man step out of the psychological position of a center, transparent to itself, and understand that he is not only a spirit but also a thing, an object, not only a spectator; this is what really shakes him. 16 The Highest Stake in the Game of Living Thus far we have mainly discussed our first two questions: the limitation in imagining death and the possible solution through a form SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 77 Looking Death in the Eyes: Freud and Bataille of praxis, in either a channeled, ritualized or a spontaneous encounter with the death of an other, overcoming the paradox of the impossibility of representation by involving oneself through deep identification. We shall now turn to our third question, of the value of integrating death into our thoughts. We have seen that Bataille’s perspective continuously brings up the issue of the value of approaching death. The questions of whether we can grasp death and, if we can, how, are not merely abstract or neutral ones. The encounter with death, that we now see is possible, seems more and more to emerge as possessing a positive value, indeed as fundamental. What we shall now examine is Freud’s attempt to address that positive aspect directly, an attempt that betrays, however, a deep ambivalence. As mentioned, Freud’s text is very confused, due to true hesitation between worldviews (see Razinsky, “A Struggle”). One manifestation of this confusion is Freud’s position regarding this cultural-conventional attitude: on the one hand he condemns it, yet on the other hand he accepts it as natural and inevitable. For him, it results to some extent from death’s exclusion from unconscious thought (“Thoughts” 289, 296-97). Death cannot be represented and is therefore destined to remain foreign to our life. 17 But then Freud suddenly recognizes an opposite necessity: not to reject death but to insert it into life. Not to distance ourselves from it, but to familiarize ourselves with it: But this attitude [the cultural-conventional one] of ours towards death has a powerful effect on our lives. <u><strong><mark>Life</strong> </u></mark>is impoverished, it <u><strong><mark>loses in interest, when the highest stake</strong> </u></mark>in the game of living, life itself, <u><strong><mark>may not be risked.</strong> </u></mark>It becomes as shallow and empty as, let us say, an American flirtation, in which it is understood from the first that nothing is to happen, as contrasted with a Continental love-affair in which both partners must constantly bear its serious consequences in mind. Our emotional ties, the unbearable intensity of our grief, make us disinclined to court danger for ourselves and for those who belong to us<u>. <mark>We dare not contemplate a great many undertakings which are dangerous but</u></mark> in fact <u><mark>indispensable, </u></mark>such as attempts at artificial flight, expeditions to distant countries or experiments with explosive substances. We are <u><mark>paralyzed by the thought of </u></mark>who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children, if a <u><mark>disaster </u></mark>should occur. Thus <u><mark>the tendency to exclude death from</u></mark> our calculations in <u><mark>life brings </u></mark>in its train <u><mark>many other renunciations and exclusions. </u></mark>Yet the motto of the Hanseatic League ran: ‘Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse.’ (“It is necessary to sail the seas, it is not necessary to live.”) (“Thoughts” 290-91) Readers unfamiliar with Freud’s paper are probably shaking their heads in disbelief. Is it Freud who utters these words? Indeed, the oddity of this citation cannot be over-estimated. It seems not to belong to Freud’s Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 78 thought. One can hardly find any other places where he speaks of such an intensification of life and fascination with death, and praises uncompromising risk-taking and the neglect of realistic considerations. In addition to being unusual, the passage itself is somewhat unclear. 18 The examples—not experimenting with explosive substances—seem irrelevant and unconvincing. The meaning seems to slide. It is not quite clear if the problem is that we do not bring death into our calculations, as the beginning seems to imply, or that, rather, we actually bring it into our calculations too much, as is suggested at the end But what I wish to stress here is that the passage actually opposes what Freud says in the preceding passages, where he describes the cultural-conventional attitude and speaks of our inability to make death part of our thoughts. In both the current passage and later passages he advocates including death in life, but insists, elsewhere in the text, that embracing death is impossible. In a way, he is telling us that we cannot accept the situation where death is constantly evaded. Here again Bataille can be useful in rendering Freud’s position more intelligible. He seems to articulate better than Freud the delicate balance, concerning the place of death in psychic life, between the need to walk on the edge, and the flight into normalcy and safety. As I asserted above, where in Freud there are contradictory elements, in Bataille there is a dialectic. Bataille, as we have seen, presents the following picture: It might be that, guided by our instincts, we tend to avoid death. But we also seem to have a need to intersperse this flight with occasional peeps into the domain of death. When we invest all of our effort in surviving, something of the true nature of life evades us. It is only when the finite human being goes beyond the limitations “necessary for his preservation,” that he “asserts the nature of his being” (La Littérature 214; 68). The approaches of both Bataille and Freud are descriptive as well as normative. Bataille describes a tendency to distance ourselves from death and a tendency to get close to it. But he also describes Man’s need to approach death from a normative point of view, in order to establish his humanity: a life that is only fleeing death has less value. Freud carefully describes our tendency to evade death and, in the paragraph under discussion, calls for the contrary approach. This is stressed at the end of the article, where he encourages us to “give death the place in reality and in our thoughts which is its due” (“Thoughts” 299). Paradoxically, it might be what will make life “more tolerable for us once again” (299). But since Freud also insists not only on a tendency within us to evade death, but also on the impossibility of doing otherwise, and on how death simply cannot be the content of our thought, his sayings in favor of bringing death close are confusing and confused. Freud does not give us a reason for the need to approach death. He says that life loses in interest, but surely this cannot be the result of abstaining from carrying out “experiments with explosive substances.” In addition, his ideas on the shallowness of a life without death do not seem to evolve from anything in his approach. It is along the lines offered by Bataille’s worldview that I wish to interpret them here. <u><mark>Sacrifice</mark>, </u>Bataille says, <u><mark>brings together life in its fullness and </mark>the <mark>annihilation </mark>of life. We are not mere spectators </u>in the sacrificial ritual. Our participation is much more involved. Sacrificial ritual creates a temporary, exceptionally heightened state of living. <u><mark>“The sacred horror</u></mark>,” he calls the emotion experienced in sacrifice: “the richest and most agonizing experience.” It <u><mark>“opens </u></mark>itself<u><mark>, like a theater curtain, </u></mark>on to a realm beyond this world” <u><mark>and every </mark>limited <mark>meaning is transfigured</u></mark> in it (“Hegel” 338; 288). Bataille lays stress on vitality. Death is not humanizing only on the philosophical level, as it is for Hegel or Kojève. Bataille gives it an emotional twist.<u> <mark>The presence of death, </u></mark>which he interprets in a more earthly manner,<u> <mark>is stimulating, vivifying, intense. Death and </u></mark>other related elements <u><mark>(violence) </u></mark>bring life closer to a state where individuality <u><mark>melts</mark>, the mediation of the intellect </u>between us and the world lessens<u>, and <mark>life is felt at its fullest. </u></mark>Bataille calls this state, or aspect of the world, immanence or<u> intimacy: </u>“immanence between man and the world, between the subject and the object” (“The Festival” 307-311; 210-213). Moments of intensity are <u>moments of excess and </u>of <u>fusion of beings</u> (La Littérature 215; 70). They are a demand of life itself, even though they sometimes seem to contradict it. Death is problematic for us, but it opens up for us something in life. This line of thought seems to accord very well with the passage in Freud’s text with which we are dealing here, and to extend it. Life without death is life lacking in intensity, an impoverished, shallow and empty life. Moreover, the repression of death is generalized and extended: “the tendency to exclude death from our calculations in life brings in its train many other renunciations and exclusions.” Freud simply does not seem to have the conceptual tools to discuss these ideas. The intuition is even stronger in the passage that follows, where Freud discusses war (note that the paper is written in 1915): When war breaks out, he says, this cowardly, conservative, risk-rejecting attitude is broken at once. War eliminates this conventional attitude to death. “Death could no longer be Liran Razinsky SubStance #119, Vol. 38, no. 2, 2009 80 denied. We are forced to believe in it. People really die. . . . Life has, indeed, become interesting again; it has recovered its full content” (“Thoughts” 291). Thus what is needed is more than the mere accounting of consequences, taking death into consideration as a future possibility. What is needed is exposure to death, a sanguineous imprinting of death directly on our minds, through the “accumulation of deaths” of others. Life can only become vivid, fresh, and interesting when death is witnessed directly. Both authors speak of a valorization of death, and in both there is a certain snobbery around it. While the masses follow the natural human tendency to avoid death, like the American couple or those who are busy with the thought of “who is to take our place,” the individualists do not go with the herd, and by allowing themselves to approach death, achieve a fuller sense of life, neither shallow nor empty. 19 Yet again, Freud’s claims hover in the air, lacking any theoretical background. Bataille supplies us with such background. He contests, as we have seen, the sole focus on survival. <u><mark>Survival</mark>, </u>he tells us<u>, has a price. It <mark>limits our life.</u></mark> As if there were an inherent tension between preserving life and living it. Freud poses the same tension here. Either we are totally absorbed by the wish to survive, to keep life intact, and therefore limit our existence to the bare minimum, or else we are willing to risk it to some extent in order to make it more interesting, more vital and valuable. Our usual world, according to Bataille, is characterized by the duration of things, by the “future” function, rather than by the present. Things are constituted as separate objects in view of future time. This is one reason for <u><strong><mark>the threat of death</strong>: it</u> <u><strong>ruins value</strong> where value is only assured through duration.</u></mark> It also exposes the intimate order of life that is continuously hidden from us in the order of things where life runs its normal course. Man “is afraid of death as soon as he enters the system of projects that is the order of things” (“The Festival” 312; 214). <u><mark>Sacrifice is</mark> the opposite of production</u> <u>and</u> <u>accumulation. </u>Death is <u>not</u> <u>so much</u> <u>a negation of life, as </u>it is <u><mark>an affirmation of the intimate </u></mark>order of life, which is <u><mark>opposed to the normal order of things</u></mark> and is therefore <u>rejected. </u>“The power of death signifies that this real world can only have a neutral image of life […]. Death reveals life in its plenitude” (309; 212). Bataille’s “neutral image of life” is the equivalent of Freud’s “shallow and empty” life. What Freud denounces is a life trapped within the cowardly economical system of considerations. It is precisely <u><mark>the economy of value and future-oriented calculations </u></mark>that <u><mark>stand in opposition to the insertion of death into life</u></mark>. “Who is to take the son’s place with his mother, the husband’s with his wife, the father’s with his children.” Of course there is an emotional side to the story, but it is this insistence on replacement that leaves us on the side of survival and stops us sometimes from living the present. “<u>The need for duration,” </u>in the words of Bataille, <u>“conceals life from us</u>” (“The Festival” 309; 212). For both authors, when death is left out, life “as it is” is false and superficial. Another Look at Speculation Both authors, then, maintain that if elements associated with death invade our life anyway, we might as well succumb and give them an ordered place in our thoughts. The necessity <u><mark>to meet death</u></mark> is not due to the fact that we do not have a choice. Rather, familiarization with death <u><mark>is necessary if life is to have </mark>its full <mark>value, and is </mark>part of <mark>what makes us human.</u></mark> But the tension between the tendencies—to flee death or to embrace it—is not easily resolved, and the evasive tendency always tries to assert itself. As seen above, Bataille maintains that in sacrifice, we are exposed through death to other dimensions of life. But the exposure, he adds, is limited, for next comes another phase, performed post-hoc, after the event: the ensuing horror and the intensity are too high to maintain, and must be countered. Bataille speaks of the justifications of the sacrifice given by cultures, which inscribe it in the general order of things. </p>
2NC
K
Framework
84,158
43
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,400
Claiming to solve racism through legalization is both incorrect AND minimizes structural racism overall; legalization will simply shift resources to police communities in other ways AND will crowd SQ sellers out
Nakagwa ‘14
Nakagwa ‘14 (community organizer in 1980, and since then has worked in organizational management, social research, public policy analysis and advocacy, and philanthropy. He also has a background as a teacher and a service provider working with low-income communities to create accountable organizations that are responsive to community needs)
http://www.laprogressive.com/pot-legalization/ while I support legalization we are wrong to promote legalization as a means of achieving racial justice Making that claim minimizes the very real problem of structural racism that has made the war on drugs such a hugely devastating law enforcement strategy for Black people legalization would not lead to less over-policing, racial profiling, or over-incarceration of Black and brown people. What relief legalization would provide would be mostly temporary Times readers think law enforcement should focus its resources on graver problems Those “graver problems” bother me because folk turn to illegal means of making money when legal jobs aren’t available prison is a form of disguised unemployment Without a job people are forced to commit crimes Once convicted a criminal record can make you unemployable Those who’ve been to prison too often end up back and keeping them there is a way of managing unemployment Being excluded will drive some to drug dealing legalizing marijuana will only drive current, low-end marijuana dealers to “graver problems” for which there are often more stringent punishments From the perspective of a poor person dependent on the marijuana trade legalization is a dead-end Richer people with capital to invest will come in after ordinary drug dealers have suffered all the risk and squeeze them out
http://www.laprogressive.com/pot-legalization/ we are wrong to promote legalization as a means of achieving racial justice. Making that claim minimizes the very real problem of structural racism that has made the war on drugs hugely devastating legalization would not lead to less over-policing, racial profiling, or over-incarceration of Black and brown people. prison is a form of disguised unemployment. Without a job, people are forced to commit crimes a criminal record can make you unemployable. Being excluded will drive some to drug dealing legalizing marijuana will only drive current, low-end marijuana dealers to “graver problems” for which there are often more stringent punishments
Scott http://www.laprogressive.com/pot-legalization/ And, when you know so many people in the trade, you also know that the crackdown on marijuana has had grossly disproportionate impacts on poor people. Here in the continental U.S., people of color, especially African Americans (who use illegal drugs, including marijuana, at a lower rate than whites, yet are nonetheless more than three times more likely to be arrested for drug possession) have paid by far the highest price for marijuana enforcement. And this is true even when the lion’s share of the capital driving the marijuana trade is coming from white consumers. But, while I support legalization as an incremental step in the right direction, I think we are wrong to promote legalization as a means of achieving racial justice. Making that claim minimizes the very real problem of structural racism that has made the war on drugs such a hugely devastating law enforcement strategy for Black people. The legalization of marijuana, in my opinion, would not lead to less over-policing, racial profiling, or over-incarceration of Black and brown people. What relief legalization would provide, and I do believe there would be some immediate relief, would be mostly temporary. Why? The New York Times report on reader response to their legalization editorials sums it up nicely, Times readers favor legalization for the same reasons the Times editorial board does: They think the criminalization of marijuana has ruined lives; that the public health risks have been overstated; and that law enforcement should focus its resources on graver problems. Those “graver problems” bother me. They bother me because the illegal drug trade is as much an economic issue as it is public health issue. My experience growing up in a drug economy tells me that folk turn to illegal means of making money when legal jobs aren’t available. And decent paying legal jobs have rarely been harder to find than right now. As a sociologist friend of mine recently reminded me, prison is a form of disguised unemployment. That’s part of the reason programs meant to reduce recidivism so often don’t work. Without a job, people are often forced to commit crimes, like selling marijuana. Once convicted of that crime, a criminal record can make you unemployable. Those who’ve been to prison too often end up back in prison, and keeping them there is a way of managing unemployment, even if this effect is, perhaps, mostly incidental. If we added incarcerated Black people to the unemployment rolls, Black unemployment statistics would be noticeably higher (and it’s already twice that of whites). This would more accurately reflect the status of Black people in the U.S. labor market. Large numbers of poor Black people have been structurally excluded from the legitimate economy, ironically in part because Black people as a class won the right to ordinary worker protections nationwide via the Civil Rights Movement. This made other excluded workers, like undocumented migrants, cheaper, more compliant, and, following the logic of the market, more desirable. Being excluded from decent employment opportunities will drive some people to drug dealing. Unless we deal with this reality, legalizing marijuana will only drive current, low-end marijuana dealers to “graver problems” MARKED for which there are often more stringent punishments and less public sympathy. From the perspective of a poor person dependent on the marijuana trade for their living, legalization is a dead-end. Richer people with the capital to invest in grow operations, licensing, retail stores, etc., will come in after ordinary drug dealers have suffered all the risk involved in developing marijuana markets illegally and squeeze them out. Those of us concerned with racial justice must ask, “squeezed out to where?”
3,827
<h4>Claiming to solve racism through legalization is both incorrect AND minimizes structural racism overall; legalization will simply shift resources to police communities in other ways AND will crowd SQ sellers out</h4><p><u><strong>Nakagwa ‘14</u></strong> (community organizer in 1980, and since then has worked in organizational management, social research, public policy analysis and advocacy, and philanthropy. He also has a background as a teacher and a service provider working with low-income communities to create accountable organizations that are responsive to community needs)</p><p>Scott <u><mark>http://www.laprogressive.com/pot-legalization/</p><p></u></mark>And, when you know so many people in the trade, you also know that the crackdown on marijuana has had grossly disproportionate impacts on poor people. Here in the continental U.S., people of color, especially African Americans (who use illegal drugs, including marijuana, at a lower rate than whites, yet are nonetheless more than three times more likely to be arrested for drug possession) have paid by far the highest price for marijuana enforcement. And this is true even when the lion’s share of the capital driving the marijuana trade is coming from white consumers. But, <u>while I support legalization</u> as an incremental step in the right direction, I think <u><mark>we are wrong to promote legalization as a means of achieving racial justice</u>. <u>Making that <strong>claim minimizes the very real problem of structural racism</strong> that has made the war on drugs</mark> such a <mark>hugely devastating</mark> law enforcement strategy for Black people</u>. The <u><mark>legalization</u></mark> of marijuana, in my opinion, <u><strong><mark>would not lead to less over-policing, racial profiling, or over-incarceration of Black and brown people.</u></strong></mark> <u>What relief legalization would provide</u>, and I do believe there would be some immediate relief, <u>would be mostly temporary</u>. Why? The New York Times report on reader response to their legalization editorials sums it up nicely, <u>Times readers</u> favor legalization for the same reasons the Times editorial board does: They <u>think</u> the criminalization of marijuana has ruined lives; that the public health risks have been overstated; and that <u>law enforcement should focus its resources on graver problems</u>. <u>Those “graver problems” bother me</u>. They bother me <u>because</u> the illegal drug trade is as much an economic issue as it is public health issue. My experience growing up in a drug economy tells me that <u>folk turn to illegal means of making money when legal jobs aren’t available</u>. And decent paying legal jobs have rarely been harder to find than right now. As a sociologist friend of mine recently reminded me, <u><mark>prison is a form of disguised unemployment</u>.</mark> That’s part of the reason programs meant to reduce recidivism so often don’t work. <u><mark>Without a job</u>, <u>people are</u></mark> often <u><mark>forced to commit crimes</u></mark>, like selling marijuana. <u>Once convicted</u> of that crime, <u><mark>a criminal record can make you unemployable</u>.</mark> <u>Those who’ve been to prison too often end up back</u> in prison, <u>and keeping them there is a way of managing unemployment</u>, even if this effect is, perhaps, mostly incidental. If we added incarcerated Black people to the unemployment rolls, Black unemployment statistics would be noticeably higher (and it’s already twice that of whites). This would more accurately reflect the status of Black people in the U.S. labor market. Large numbers of poor Black people have been structurally excluded from the legitimate economy, ironically in part because Black people as a class won the right to ordinary worker protections nationwide via the Civil Rights Movement. This made other excluded workers, like undocumented migrants, cheaper, more compliant, and, following the logic of the market, more desirable. <u><mark>Being excluded</u></mark> from decent employment opportunities <u><mark>will drive some</u></mark> people <u><mark>to drug dealing</u></mark>. Unless we deal with this reality, <u><mark>legalizing marijuana will only drive current, low-end marijuana dealers to “graver problems” </p><p></u></mark>MARKED</p><p><u><mark>for which there are often more stringent punishments</u></mark> and less public sympathy. <u>From the perspective of a poor person dependent on the marijuana trade</u> for their living, <u>legalization is a dead-end</u>. <u>Richer people with</u> the <u>capital to invest</u> in grow operations, licensing, retail stores, etc., <u>will come in after ordinary drug dealers have suffered all the risk</u> involved in developing marijuana markets illegally <u>and squeeze them out</u>. Those of us concerned with racial justice must ask, “squeezed out to where?”</p>
1NR
Case
Legalization
45,016
32
17,012
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
564,717
N
Wake
6
Emory KS
Brian McBride
1ac was hyperincarceration 1nc was university k plan pik cap k and case 2nc was university 1nr was pik and case 2nr was university
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round6.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,401
Topic education. Limited neg ground on this topic means allowing the aff to skirt the bulk of it forces the neg to more exotic generics and cheater CPs, which reduces topic education.
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Topic education. Limited neg ground on this topic means allowing the aff to skirt the bulk of it forces the neg to more exotic generics and cheater CPs, which reduces topic education.</h4>
1NC
null
Off
430,205
1
17,014
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx
564,720
N
USC
3
Cornell LL
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,402
Squo solves bioprinting
EuroNews 9-4-14
EuroNews 9-4-14
Scientists could be one step closer to organs using 3D printing tech researchers from South Carolina together with Zhejiang Universit have made headway understanding how biological “inks” behave as they are dispensed scientists have made tremendous progress since research started ith our 3-D bio-printer, we’ve been able to create new micro-vascular networks that can grow in pancreas, liver and kidney,” said Michael Yost
Scientists could be one step closer to organs using 3D printing researchers have made headway understanding how biological “inks” behave With our 3-D bio-printer, we’ve been able to create new micro-vascular networks that can grow in pancreas, liver and kidney said Yost
http://www.euronews.com/2014/09/04/3-d-printed-organs-one-step-closer/ Scientists could be one step closer to creating organs for transplant using 3D printing technology. A group of researchers from South Carolina in the USA, together with their Chinese colleagues from Zhejiang University, have made headway in understanding how so-called biological “inks” behave as they are dispensed through the nozzle head of a 3-D printer. The printer drops the biological ink, composed of cells, in a precise way to build up the organ of choice. “The broad spectrum of what we’re doing is called biofabrication,” says Dr Michael Yost, who is heading the research. “Biofabrication just means using some basic techniques in engineering to create new tissues and tissue components,” he added. Scientists lower the bio-ink through a syringe into a Petri dish. The printer is equipped with UV rays to sterilise the cells, while two mounted lights hover above with electronic microscopes to allow a closer look at the cells. Although scientists admit that growing human organs is still a long way off, they have made tremendous progress since research started more than a decade ago. “With our 3-D bio-printer, we’ve been able to create new micro-vascular networks that we can then grow new tissues in very key areas such as pancreas, liver and kidney,” said Michael Yost. The idea is to eventually create functional 3D printed “self-made” organs, eliminating the risk of rejection by the patient’s immune system when receiving an organ from a donor.
1,534
<h4>Squo solves <u><strong>bioprinting</h4><p>EuroNews 9-4-14</p><p></u></strong>http://www.euronews.com/2014/09/04/3-d-printed-organs-one-step-closer/</p><p><u><mark>Scientists</mark> <mark>could be one step closer to</u></mark> creating <u><mark>organs</u></mark> for transplant <u><mark>using 3D printing</mark> tech</u>nology. A group of <u><mark>researchers</mark> from South Carolina</u> in the USA, <u>together with</u> their Chinese colleagues from <u>Zhejiang Universit</u>y,<u> <mark>have made headway</u></mark> in <u><mark>understanding</u></mark> <u><mark>how</u></mark> so-called <u><mark>biological “inks” behave</mark> as they are dispensed</u> through the nozzle head of a 3-D printer. The printer drops the biological ink, composed of cells, in a precise way to build up the organ of choice. “The broad spectrum of what we’re doing is called biofabrication,” says Dr Michael Yost, who is heading the research. “Biofabrication just means using some basic techniques in engineering to create new tissues and tissue components,” he added. Scientists lower the bio-ink through a syringe into a Petri dish. The printer is equipped with UV rays to sterilise the cells, while two mounted lights hover above with electronic microscopes to allow a closer look at the cells. Although <u>scientists</u> admit that growing human organs is still a long way off, they <u>have made tremendous progress since research started</u> more than a decade ago. “<mark>W<u>ith our 3-D bio-printer, we’ve been able to create new micro-vascular networks that</u></mark> we <u><mark>can</u></mark> then <u><mark>grow</u></mark> new tissues <u><mark>in</u></mark> very key areas such as <u><mark>pancreas, liver and kidney</mark>,” <mark>said</mark> Michael <mark>Yost</u><strong></mark>. The idea is to eventually create functional 3D printed “self-made” organs, eliminating the risk of rejection by the patient’s immune system when receiving an organ from a donor.</p></strong>
1NC
null
Biotech
430,207
1
17,011
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
564,718
N
Wake
7
UNLV GV
Calum Matheson
1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,403
Your politics are passive and lead to tyranny
Antonio 95
Antonio 95 (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,)
the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so Nietzsche considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. persons in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors – "The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape “Rather do anything than nothing,” this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming Social selves are fodder for the masses the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant
the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment and ultimate justification for slave morality "separates strength from expressions of strength Nietzsche considered "roles" as "external phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. persons in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors Integrity spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about causes and consequences of acts Nervous rotation of appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment this principle is a string to throttle all culture these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreachin paves the way for a new type of tyrant
According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors – "The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. “Rather do anything than nothing,” this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man [person] of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).
5,174
<h4><u><mark>Your politics are passive and lead to tyranny </h4><p><strong></mark>Antonio 95</u></strong> (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,)</p><p>According to Nietzsche, <u><mark>the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment</mark>, master reification, <mark>and ultimate justification for slave morality</mark> and mass discipline <mark>"separates strength from expressions of strength</mark>, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so</u>. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," <u><mark>Nietzsche</u></mark> said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He<u> <mark>considered "roles" as "external</mark>," "surface," or "foreground" <mark>phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as <strong>symptomatic of estrangement</strong>.</u></mark> While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that <u><mark>persons</u></mark> (especially male professionals) <u><mark>in specialized occupations <strong>overidentify with their positions</u></strong></mark> and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" <u><mark>They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors</mark> – "The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." <mark>Integrity</mark>, decisiveness, <mark>spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about</mark> possible <mark>causes</mark>, meanings, <mark>and consequences of acts</mark> and unending internal dialogue</u> about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). <u><mark>Nervous rotation of</mark> socially <mark>appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows</mark>," "abstracts," or simulacra. <mark>One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially</mark>" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play."</u> Nietzsche asked, <u>"Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? </u>. . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; <u>social selves "prefer the copies to the originals"</u> (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). <u><mark>Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment</mark> to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence</u>; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). <u>Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape</u>. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. <u>“Rather do anything than nothing,” <mark>this principle</mark>, too, <mark>is</mark> merely <mark>a string to throttle all culture</u></mark>. . . . <u>Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others</u>." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, <u><mark>these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming</u></mark>, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " <u>Social selves are fodder for the</u> "great man [person] of the <u>masses</u>." Nietzsche held that "<u>the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely</u>- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. <u><mark>The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreachin</mark>g and untrammeled ressentiment <mark>paves the way for a new type of tyrant</u></mark> (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).</p>
2NC
K
Framework
5,118
314
17,013
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
564,716
N
Wake
2
Emory KL
Brian Delong
1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2
741,404
Voter for fairness and education
null
null
null
null
null
null
<h4>Voter for fairness and education</h4>
1NC
null
Off
430,206
1
17,014
./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx
564,720
N
USC
3
Cornell LL
Jared Anderson
1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case
ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx
null
48,386
EvZo
Baylor EvZo
null
Sa.....
Ev.....
Gr.....
Zo.....
18,750
Baylor
Baylor
null
null
1,004
ndtceda14
NDT/CEDA 2014-15
2,014
cx
college
2