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No impact to bioterror

Mueller 10

Mueller 10

Center for International Security Studies and a Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University, A.B. from the University of Chicago, M.A. and Ph.D. @ UCLA, Atomic Obsession – Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, Oxford University Press] Properly developed and deployed could potentially kill hundreds of thousands The remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used. For the most destructive results, they need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Since aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax have to be sprayed near nose level 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, while their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight smog humidity and temperature changes dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties-as an aerosol that could be inhaled-requires a delivery system of enormous sophistication, and even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteorological conditions.

biological weapons need to be dispersed in low-altitude aerosol clouds. aerosols have to be sprayed near nose level 90 percent of the microorganisms die during aerosolization, while effectiveness could be reduced further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes dispersion may destroy the organisms storage of lethal organisms is difficult most organisms have a limited lifetime weapons can take weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with defense measures delivering microbes suitable for inflicting casualties requires a delivery system of enormous sophistication, and even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable meteorological conditions

[John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and a Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University, A.B. from the University of Chicago, M.A. and Ph.D. @ UCLA, Atomic Obsession – Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, Oxford University Press] Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could potentially, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used. For the most destructive results, they need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Since aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, while their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. Such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. In the summary judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties-as an aerosol that could be inhaled-requires a delivery system of enormous sophistication, and even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteorological conditions.

<h4><strong>No impact to bioterror</h4><p>Mueller 10</strong> </p><p>[John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon<u> Center for International Security Studies and a Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University, A.B. from the University of Chicago, M.A. and Ph.D. @ UCLA, Atomic Obsession – Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, Oxford University Press]</p><p>Properly developed and deployed</u>, biological weapons <u>could potentially</u>, if thus far only in theory, <u>kill hundreds of thousands</u>, perhaps even millions, of people. <u>The </u>discussion <u>remains <strong>theoretical</strong> because <mark>biological weapons </mark>have scarcely ever been used. For the most destructive results, they <mark>need to be <strong>dispersed</strong> in</mark> very <strong><mark>low-altitude</strong> aerosol clouds. </mark>Since <mark>aerosols </mark>do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax</u> (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably <u><mark>have to be sprayed <strong>near nose level</u></strong></mark>. Moreover, <u><strong><mark>90 percent</strong> of the microorganisms</mark> are likely to <strong><mark>die</strong> during</mark> the process of <mark>aerosolization, while</mark> their <mark>effectiveness could be reduced</mark> still <mark>further by <strong>sunlight</u></strong>,<u> <strong>smog</u></strong>,<u> <strong>humidity</u></strong>,<u> and <strong>temperature changes</u></strong></mark>. Explosive methods of <u><mark>dispersion may destroy the organisms</mark>, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term <strong><mark>storage</strong> of lethal organisms</mark> in bombs or warheads <mark>is difficult</mark>: even if refrigerated, <mark>most</mark> of the <mark>organisms have a <strong>limited lifetime</u></strong></mark>. Such <u><mark>weapons can take</mark> days or <strong><mark>weeks</strong> to have <strong>full effect</strong>, during which time they can be <strong>countered</strong> with</mark> medical and civil <mark>defense measures</mark>.</u> In the summary judgment of two careful analysts, <u><mark>delivering microbes</mark> and toxins over a wide area in the form most <mark>suitable for inflicting</mark> mass <mark>casualties</mark>-as an aerosol that could be inhaled-<mark>requires a delivery system of <strong>enormous sophistication</strong>, and <strong>even then</strong> effective dispersal could <strong>easily be disrupted</strong> by unfavorable</mark> environmental and <mark>meteorological conditions</mark>.</p></u>

1NC

Biotech

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx

N

Wake

7

UNLV GV

Calum Matheson

1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

Sa.....

Ev.....

Gr.....

Zo.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

This biological and scientific understanding of death ensures a constant slavery to the myth of the subject

Baudrillard ’76

Baudrillard ’76 (Jean, Professor at the European Graduate School, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications, pg.158-160)

The irreversibility of biological death is a modern fact of science specific to our culture Every other culture says that death begins before death, that life goes on after life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death we must try to see the radical indeterminacy of life and death the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order Death is not a due payment it is a nuance of life; or, life is a nuance of death our modern idea of death is controlled by representations of the machine and the function A machine either works or it does not the biological machine is either dead or alive The symbolic order is ignorant of this And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself There is no longer any objective progress here: the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane death articulates life, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither life nor death can any longer be assigned a given end: there is no possible definition of death. We are living within evolutionist thought, which states that we go from Life to death: this is the illusion of the subject that sustains both biology and metaphysics The subject's identity is continually falling apart But this death is not at all biological. At the symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual conscious subject does death take on an irreversible meaning. Even here, death is not an event, but a myth experienced as anticipation. The subject needs a myth of its end to form its identity. In reality, the subject is never there it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution, an end­less cycle impelled by death This death, everywhere in life, must be conjured up and localised in a precise point of time and a precise place: the body In biological death, death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition. this duality is death itself, since it objectifies the body as residual, as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying It is according to the mind that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death Biology lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics but it no longer declares this it has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and on the world; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism

The irreversibility of biological death is a modern fact of science specific to our culture. Every other culture says death begins before death life goes on after we must try to see the radical indeterminacy Death is a nuance of life our modern idea is controlled by representations death articulates life it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death life nor death can be assigned a given end there is no definition of death We are living within evolutionist thought this is the illusion of the subject Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual subject does death take on irreversible meaning. death is not an event, but a myth The subject needs a myth of its end to form its identity. the subject is never there it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution an end­less cycle impelled by death This death must be conjured up and localised in a precise point death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. death objectifies the body as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying Biology has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and world

The irreversibility of biological death, its objective and punctual character, is a modern fact of science. It is specific to our culture. Every other culture says that death begins before death, that life goes on after life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death. Against the representation which sees in one the term of the other, we must try to see the radical indeterminacy of life and death, and the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order. Death is not a due payment [echeance], it is a nuance of life; or, life is a nuance of death. But our modern idea of death is controlled by a very different system of representations: that of the machine and the function. A machine either works or it does not. Thus the biological machine is either dead or alive. The symbolic order is ignorant of this digital abstraction. And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth, but this remains with the category of a functional definition.25 [25: It is, moreover, curious to see how, technically, death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself: heart failure, then a level encephalogram; but then what? There is no longer any objective progress here: something of the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane.] It is quite another thing to say that death articulates life, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life: for then it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither life nor death can any longer be assigned a given end: there is therefore no punctuality nor any possible definition of death. We are living entirely within evolutionist thought, which states that we go from Life to death: this is the illusion of the subject that sustains both biology and metaphysics (biology wishes to reverse metaphysics, but merely prolongs it). But there is no longer even a subject who dies at a given moment. It is more real to say that whole parts of 'ourselves' (of our bodies, our language) fall from life to death, while the living are subjected to the work of mourning. In this way, a few of the living manage to forget them gradually, as God managed to forget the drowned girl who was carried away by the stream of water in Brecht's song: Und es geschah, dass Gott sie allmiihlich vergass,(zuerst das Gesicht, dann die Hiinde, und zuletzt das Haar([It happened (very slowly) that it gently slid from God's thoughts: (First her face, then her hands, and right at the end her hair.]('The Drowned Girl' in Bertolt Brecht: Poems and Songs, ed and tr John Willett, London: Methuen, 1990, p. 14] The subject's identity is continually falling apart, falling into God's forgetting. But this death is not at all biological. At one pole, biochemistry, asexual protozoa are not affected by death, they divide and branch out (nor is the genetic code, for its part, ever affected by death: it is transmitted unchanged beyond individual fates). At the other, symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible. Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual conscious subject does death take on an irreversible meaning. Even here, death is not an event, but a myth experienced as anticipation. The subject needs a myth of its end, as of its origin, to form its identity. In reality, the subject is never there: like the face, the hands and the hair, and even before no doubt, it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution, an end­less cycle impelled by death. This death, everywhere in life, must be conjured up and localised in a precise point of time and a precise place: the body. In biological death, death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other. The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition. In a certain sense, this duality is death itself, since it objectifies the body as residual, as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying. It is according to the mind that the body becomes the brute, objective fact, fated for sex, anguish and death. It is according to the mind, this imaginary schizz, that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death. Therefore the mortal body is no more 'real' than the immortal soul: both result simultaneously from the same abstraction, and with them the two great complementary metaphysics: the idealism of the soul (with all its moral metamorphoses) and the 'materialist' idealism of the body, prolonged in biology. Biology lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics, but it no longer declares this. The mind or soul is not mentioned any more: as an ideal principle, it has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and on the world; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism. In the Middle Ages, those who practised the discourse of the mind or soul were closer to the 'bodily signs' (Octavio Paz, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [tr Helen Lane, New York: Arcade, 1990] ) than biological science, which, techniques and axioms, has passed entirely over to the side of the 'non-body.'

<h4><u><strong>This biological and scientific understanding of death ensures a constant slavery to the myth of the subject </h4><p>Baudrillard ’76</u></strong> (Jean, Professor at the European Graduate School, Symbolic Exchange and Death, Sage Publications, pg.158-160)</p><p><u><mark>The irreversibility of biological death</u></mark>, its objective and punctual character, <u><mark>is a modern fact of science</u></mark>. It is <u><mark>specific to our culture</u>. <u>Every other culture says</mark> that <mark>death begins before death</mark>, that <mark>life goes on after</mark> life, and that it is impossible to distinguish life from death</u>. Against the representation which sees in one the term of the other, <u><mark>we must try to see the radical indeterminacy</mark> of life and death</u>, and <u>the impossibility of their autonomy in the symbolic order</u>. <u><mark>Death</mark> is not a due payment</u> [echeance], <u>it <mark>is a nuance of life</mark>; or, life is a nuance of death</u>. But <u><mark>our modern idea</mark> of death <mark>is controlled by</u></mark> a very different system of <u><mark>representations</u></mark>: that <u>of the machine and the function</u>. <u>A machine either works or it does not</u>. Thus <u>the biological machine is either dead or alive</u>. <u>The symbolic order is ignorant of this</u> digital abstraction. <u>And even biology acknowledges that we start dying at birth</u>, but this remains with the category of a functional definition.25 [25: It is, moreover, curious to see how, technically, <u>death becomes increasingly undecidable for science itself</u>: heart failure, then a level encephalogram; but then what? <u>There is no longer any objective progress here: </u>something of <u>the indeterminacy and undecidability of death in the heart of science itself is reflected on the symbolic plane</u>.] It is quite another thing to say that <u><strong><mark>death articulates life</strong></mark>, is exchanged with life and is the apogee of life</u>: for then <u><mark>it becomes absurd to make life a process which expires with death</mark>, and more absurd still to make death equivalent to a deficit and an accelerated repayment. Neither <strong><mark>life nor death can</strong></mark> any longer <strong><mark>be assigned a given end</strong></mark>: <strong><mark>there is</u></strong></mark> therefore <u><mark>no</u></mark> punctuality nor any <u>possible <mark>definition of death</mark>.</u> <u><mark>We are living</u></mark> entirely <u><mark>within evolutionist thought</mark>, which states that we go from Life to death: <mark>this is the illusion of the subject</mark> that sustains both biology and metaphysics</u> (biology wishes to reverse metaphysics, but merely prolongs it). But there is no longer even a subject who dies at a given moment. It is more real to say that whole parts of 'ourselves' (of our bodies, our language) fall from life to death, while the living are subjected to the work of mourning. In this way, a few of the living manage to forget them gradually, as God managed to forget the drowned girl who was carried away by the stream of water in Brecht's song: Und es geschah, dass Gott sie allmiihlich vergass,(zuerst das Gesicht, dann die Hiinde, und zuletzt das Haar([It happened (very slowly) that it gently slid from God's thoughts: (First her face, then her hands, and right at the end her hair.]('The Drowned Girl' in Bertolt Brecht: Poems and Songs, ed and tr John Willett, London: Methuen, 1990, p. 14] <u>The subject's identity is continually falling apart</u>, falling into God's forgetting. <u>But this death is not at all biological.</u> At one pole, biochemistry, asexual protozoa are not affected by death, they divide and branch out (nor is the genetic code, for its part, ever affected by death: it is transmitted unchanged beyond individual fates). <u>At the</u> other, <u>symbolic, pole, death and nothingness no longer exist, since in the symbolic, life and death are reversible</u>. <u><mark>Only in the infinitesimal space of the individual </mark>conscious <mark>subject does death take on</mark> an <mark>irreversible meaning.</mark> Even here, <mark>death is not an event, but a myth</mark> experienced as anticipation. <mark>The <strong>subject needs a myth of its end</u></strong></mark>, as of its origin, <u><strong><mark>to form</strong> its <strong>identity</strong>.</u></mark> <u>In reality, <strong><mark>the subject is never there</u></strong></mark>: like the face, the hands and the hair, and even before no doubt, <u><strong><mark>it is always already somewhere else, trapped in a senseless distribution</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>an end­less cycle impelled by death</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>This death</mark>, everywhere in life, <mark>must be <strong>conjured up and localised in a precise point</strong></mark> of time and a precise place: the body</u>. <u>In biological death, <mark>death and the body neutralise instead of stimulating each other.</mark> The mind-body duality is biology's fundamental presupposition.</u> In a certain sense, <u>this duality is <mark>death</mark> itself, since it <mark>objectifies the body</mark> as residual, <strong><mark>as a bad object which takes its revenge by dying</u></strong></mark>. It is according to the mind that the body becomes the brute, objective fact, fated for sex, anguish and death. <u>It is according to the mind</u>, this imaginary schizz, <u>that the body becomes the 'reality' that exists only in being condemned to death</u>. Therefore the mortal body is no more 'real' than the immortal soul: both result simultaneously from the same abstraction, and with them the two great complementary metaphysics: the idealism of the soul (with all its moral metamorphoses) and the 'materialist' idealism of the body, prolonged in biology. <u><mark>Biology</mark> lives on as much by the separation of mind and body as from any other Christian or Cartesian metaphysics</u>, <u>but it no longer declares this</u>. The mind or soul is not mentioned any more: as an ideal principle, <u>it <mark>has entirely passed into the moral discipline of science; into the legitimating principle of technical operations on the real and</mark> on the <mark>world</mark>; into the principles of an 'objective' materialism</u>. In the Middle Ages, those who practised the discourse of the mind or soul were closer to the 'bodily signs' (Octavio Paz, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [tr Helen Lane, New York: Arcade, 1990] ) than biological science, which, techniques and axioms, has passed entirely over to the side of the 'non-body.'</p>

2NC

K

2NC Link

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx

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Wake

2

Emory KL

Brian Delong

1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Marijuana legalization is merely a palliative which obscures the broader structures of classist and racialized subjectivity which ensure mass violence – the aff is a neoliberal ruse which benefits only the economic elite

Calhoun 14

Calhoun 14 (Ryan Calhoun, philosophy student at the University of Buffalo, 1-12-14, “Weed Legalization As Privatization, Disempowerment,” http://c4ss.org/content/23632) gz

Marijuana’s legalization seems much more like neoliberal privatization of markets than true liberation of them the decency of these even as weed is legalized, those in prison for the crime of possessing or selling marijuana will remain there those who formerly tried to compete in this market remain locked up in cages. it has always been particularly racialized and classist. This leaves many black, Hispanic and poor individuals with a permanent hex affixed to them that these laws do not address. legalization picks the winners of the weed market from those who were lucky enough to not find themselves on the wrong side of the law and who already have access to the capital to invest into this expensive business many remain shackled both by the pre-existing landscape of the market and by new regulations which prohibit them from participating in it. now facing the age of Big Marijuana

Marijuana’s legalization seems more like neoliberal privatization of markets as weed is legalized, those in prison will remain there those who formerly tried to compete remain locked in cages it has always been particularly racialized and classist. This leaves many black, Hispanic and poor individuals with a permanent hex affixed to them that these laws do not address legalization picks the winners from those lucky enough to not find themselves on the wrong side of the law and who already have access to capital

Marijuana’s legalization seems much more like neoliberal privatization of markets than true liberation of them. While I do not question the decency of these first major marijuana retailers, there are legitimate concerns. Those most victimized by the state’s rabid oppression of marijuana markets will find themselves very often out of luck, as extensive background checks are required by law, and any drug felony charge is enough to exclude individuals from operating as vendors. TakePart magazine notes in an article that even as weed is legalized, those in prison for the crime of possessing or selling marijuana will remain there. While new businesses boom with customers, those who formerly tried to compete in this market remain locked up in cages. The drug war has affected millions during its hellish tear through Americans’ lives and culture, but it has always been particularly racialized and classist. This leaves many black, Hispanic and poor individuals with a permanent hex affixed to them that these laws do not address. Like with the beltway libertarian conception of privatization, legalization picks the winners of the weed market from those who were lucky enough to not find themselves on the wrong side of the law and who already have access to the capital to invest into this expensive business. Legalization, at its best, functions as an opposition to continued state violence against drug users and possessors. It is therefore troubling that we find even after this so-called legalization, many remain shackled both by the pre-existing landscape of the market and by new regulations which prohibit them from participating in it. It is never by the political means we realize our freedom, but only a hold-back of even worse oppression. We fight an uphill battle against the incredible damage the state does. And now facing the age of Big Marijuana, we might be shocked to find the sorts of restrictions many established pot shops favor. In order to delegitimize street dealers, we have to treat them as inherently dangerous and volatile.

<h4>Marijuana legalization is merely a palliative which obscures the broader structures of classist and racialized subjectivity which ensure mass violence – the aff<u><strong> is a neoliberal ruse which benefits only the economic elite</h4><p>Calhoun 14 </p><p></u></strong>(Ryan Calhoun, philosophy student at the University of Buffalo, 1-12-14, “Weed Legalization As Privatization, Disempowerment,” http://c4ss.org/content/23632) gz</p><p><u><mark>Marijuana’s legalization seems</mark> much <mark>more like <strong>neoliberal privatization of markets</strong></mark> than true liberation of them</u>. While I do not question <u><strong>the decency of these</u></strong> first major marijuana retailers, there are legitimate concerns. Those most victimized by the state’s rabid oppression of marijuana markets will find themselves very often out of luck, as extensive background checks are required by law, and any drug felony charge is enough to exclude individuals from operating as vendors. TakePart magazine notes in an article that <u>even <mark>as weed is legalized, <strong>those in prison</mark> for the crime of possessing or selling marijuana <mark>will remain there</u></strong></mark>. While new businesses boom with customers, <u><mark>those who formerly tried to compete</mark> in this market <mark>remain <strong>locked</mark> up <mark>in cages</strong></mark>. </u>The drug war has affected millions during its hellish tear through Americans’ lives and culture, but <u><mark>it has always been particularly <strong>racialized and classist</strong>. This leaves many black, Hispanic and poor individuals with a <strong>permanent hex affixed to them that these laws do not address</strong></mark>.</u> Like with the beltway libertarian conception of privatization, <u><mark>legalization <strong>picks the winners</strong></mark> of the weed market <mark>from those</mark> who were <mark>lucky enough to not find themselves on the wrong side of the law and who <strong>already have access to</mark> the <mark>capital</mark> to invest into this expensive business</u></strong>. Legalization, at its best, functions as an opposition to continued state violence against drug users and possessors. It is therefore troubling that we find even after this so-called legalization, <u>many remain shackled both by the pre-existing landscape of the market and by new regulations which prohibit them from participating in it.</u> It is never by the political means we realize our freedom, but only a hold-back of even worse oppression. We fight an uphill battle against the incredible damage the state does. And <u>now facing the age of <strong>Big Marijuana</u></strong>, we might be shocked to find the sorts of restrictions many established pot shops favor. In order to delegitimize street dealers, we have to treat them as inherently dangerous and volatile.</p>

1NC

Off

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx

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USC

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Cornell LL

Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

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college

Biocrude fuels take 30 million years to develop

Nesbit 14

Nesbit 14

. Newer techniques are also emerging which mean products are not limited to biodiesel Hydrothermal liquefaction puts whole unprocessed algal material under pressure and temperatures of 250-350°C with water to produce ‘biocrude’ gas Producing oil this way takes about 30 million years

Rebecca, press officer at the Society of Biology and Tom Ireland, “ALGAL BIOFUELS FULL BLOOM OR DEAD IN THE WATER?,” http://www.labnews.co.uk/features/algal-biofuels-full-bloom-or-dead-in-the-water/ SJE Mixing algal biomass with a solvent and catalyst produces a diesel-like substance called biodiesel, plus glycerol. Newer techniques are also emerging which mean products are not limited to biodiesel. Pyrolysis involves heating algae to very high temperatures (500-700°C) in the absence of oxygen to produce a bio-char (charcoal) and a wider range of fuel products. Hydrothermal liquefaction puts whole unprocessed algal material under pressure and temperatures of 250-350°C with water to produce ‘biocrude’ and hydrogen gas.¶ These processes essentially mimic the natural production of oil. Crude oil itself is formed from ancient algae, as well as other marine plankton. Algaenan, a tough hydrocarbon polymer found in algal cell walls, is turned to oil when layers of plankton are buried under the seabed and subjected to extreme heat and pressure.¶ Producing oil this way takes about 30 million years. Replicating the process in real time, at a scale vast enough to contribute to global demand, is the challenge.

<h4>Biocrude<u><strong> fuels take 30 million years to develop</h4><p>Nesbit 14</p><p></u></strong>Rebecca, press officer at the Society of Biology and Tom Ireland, “ALGAL BIOFUELS FULL BLOOM OR DEAD IN THE WATER?,” http://www.labnews.co.uk/features/algal-biofuels-full-bloom-or-dead-in-the-water/ SJE</p><p>Mixing algal biomass with a solvent and catalyst produces a diesel-like substance called biodiesel, plus glycerol<u>. Newer techniques are also emerging which mean products are not limited to biodiesel</u>. Pyrolysis involves heating algae to very high temperatures (500-700°C) in the absence of oxygen to produce a bio-char (charcoal) and a wider range of fuel products. <u>Hydrothermal liquefaction puts whole unprocessed algal material under pressure and temperatures of 250-350°C with water to produce ‘biocrude’</u> and hydrogen <u>gas</u>.¶ These processes essentially mimic the natural production of oil. Crude oil itself is formed from ancient algae, as well as other marine plankton. Algaenan, a tough hydrocarbon polymer found in algal cell walls, is turned to oil when layers of plankton are buried under the seabed and subjected to extreme heat and pressure.¶ <u><strong>Producing oil this way takes about 30 million years</u></strong>. Replicating the process in real time, at a scale vast enough to contribute to global demand, is the challenge.</p>

1NC

Biotech

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx

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UNLV GV

Calum Matheson

1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

Sa.....

Ev.....

Gr.....

Zo.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

this form of prolonging life indefinitely prevents an understanding of finality which is necessary for us to enjoy the subjective pleasures and vibrancy of life

McGowan 13

McGowan 13 (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 223-227)

What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death. Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims We must imagine that for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself. death is the source of value. The fact that life has an end means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite it depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject The struggle to assert the importance of death – the act of being in love with death is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns. This is why Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us. But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. They simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life. Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist. The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. The limit of this project is its own infinitude. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. the space for the creation of value disappears. But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate. Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.

We must imagine there is an appeal in death itself. death is the source of value. Without the value that death provides, neither love ice cream friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have worth Having infinite time we have no incentive to opt for these experiences We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. experience depends on the limits of finitude The struggle to assert the importance of death is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself They privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death which But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation death provides life becomes bereft of value The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from not from scarcity or death. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object We seek satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the structure this infinite universe is established through repression Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate.

On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims of imperialist power.
 4 We must imagine that for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself. Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because death is the source of value.5 The fact that life has an end, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth whatsoever. Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, it nonetheless depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. The struggle to assert the importance of death – the act of being in love with death, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are – is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns.6 This is exactly why Martin Heidegger attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us. But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. They simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death MARKED which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value.8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity – science and capitalism. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.9 Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.10 The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much. The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility. The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. The limit of this project is, paradoxically, its own infinitude. It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite – an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite -the infinite of modernity- depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, the space for the creation of value disappears. Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate. As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.”15 Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.

<h4><u>this form of prolonging life indefinitely prevents an understanding of finality which is necessary for us to enjoy the subjective pleasures and vibrancy of life </h4><p><strong>McGowan 13</u></strong> (Todd, Assoc. Prof. of Film and Television Studies @ U. of Vermont, Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis, pp. 223-227)</p><p>On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. <u>What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.</u>3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. <u>Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims</u> of imperialist power.
 4 <u><mark>We must imagine</mark> that for subjects such as these <mark>there is an appeal in death itself.</mark> </u>Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because <u><mark>death is the source of value.</u></mark>5 <u>The fact that life has an end</u>, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, <u>means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. <strong><mark>Without the value that death provides, neither love</mark> </strong>nor <strong><mark>ice cream</strong></mark> nor <strong><mark>friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have</strong></mark> any special <strong><mark>worth</u></strong></mark> whatsoever. <u><mark>Having</mark> an <mark>infinite</mark> amount of <mark>time</mark>, <mark>we</mark> would <mark>have no incentive to opt for these experiences</mark> rather than other ones. <mark>We would be left <strong>unable to enjoy</strong> what seems to make life most worth living.</mark> Even though enjoyment itself is an <mark>experience</mark> of the infinite</u>, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, <u>it</u> nonetheless <u><strong><mark>depends on the limits of finitude</strong></mark>. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject</u>, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. <u><mark>The struggle to assert the importance of death</mark> – the act of being in love with death</u>, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are – <u><mark>is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the <strong>infinite enjoyment</strong> that <strong>death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns</strong>.</u></mark>6 <u>This is</u> exactly <u>why</u> Martin <u>Heidegger</u> attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger <u>sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us.</u> As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. <u><mark>By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims <strong>life as the only value</strong> creates a <strong>valueless world where nothing matters</strong></mark> to us. But of course the <strong><mark>partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself</strong></mark>. <mark>They</mark> simply <strong><mark>privilege life over death</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and see the world in terms of life</mark> <strong><mark>rather than death</p><p></u></strong></mark>MARKED</p><p><u><mark>which</mark> would seem to leave the value-creating <strong>power of death intact</strong>. <mark>But <strong>this is not what happens</strong>.</mark> <mark>By privileging life and seeing death <strong>only in terms of life</strong>, <strong>we change the way we experience the world</strong>.</mark> <mark>Without the mediation</mark> that <mark>death provides</mark>, the system of pure <strong><mark>life becomes</strong></mark> a system utterly <strong><mark>bereft of value</strong></mark>.</u>8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity – science and capitalism. <u>Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.</u>9 <u>Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion.</u> The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. <u>After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.</u>10 <u>The same dynamic is visible with capitalism.</u> As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 <u>Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much.</u> The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. <u><mark>The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from</mark> excess, <mark>not from scarcity or death.</u></mark> Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility. The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. <u>The limit of this project is</u>, paradoxically, <u>its own infinitude.</u> It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite – an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. <u><mark>We succumb to the bad infinite when <strong>we pursue an unattainable object</strong></mark> and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite</u> -the infinite of modernity- <u>depends on a fundamental misrecognition.</u> We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. <u><mark>We seek</mark> the commodity that would finally bring us complete <mark>satisfaction, but <strong>dissatisfaction is built into the</strong></mark> commodity <strong><mark>structure</u></strong></mark>, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, <u>scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory</u>, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, <u>the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies</u>; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. <u>The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death.</u> As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, <u>the space for the creation of value disappears.</u> Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 <u>But <mark>this infinite universe is established through</mark> the <mark>repression</mark> of finitude. <mark>Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate.</u></mark> As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.”15 <u>Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.</u> </p>

2NC

K

2NC Link

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx

N

Wake

2

Emory KL

Brian Delong

1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

Sa.....

Ev.....

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Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Not even an 80% cut is enough

AP 9

AP 9 (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168)

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions China alone adds 2 degrees to the projections Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050 the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century Global warming is speeding up that means top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago seas should rise a foot every 20 years

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees even if every country cuts emissions projections take into account 80 percent cuts from the U.S. and Europe developing nations aren't cutting their emissions China alone adds 2 degrees Even if the world cuts its emissions by 80 percent the world is still facing a 3-degree increase Global warming is speeding up that means projections from 2007 are overly optimistic

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years.

<h4>Not even an 80% cut is enough</h4><p><u><strong>AP 9</u></strong> (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168)</p><p><u><mark>Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees</mark> between now and the end of the century <mark>even if every country cuts</mark> greenhouse gas <mark>emissions</u></mark> as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. <u>The <mark>projections take into account 80 percent</mark> emission <mark>cuts from the U.S. and Europe </mark>by 2050, which are not sure things</u>. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. <u>Much of projected rise in temperature is because of <mark>developing nations</mark>, which <mark>aren't</mark> talking much about <mark>cutting their emissions</u></mark>, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. <u><mark>China alone adds</u></mark> nearly <u><mark>2 degrees</mark> to the projections</u>. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. <u><mark>Even if the </mark>developed<mark> world cuts its emissions by 80 percent </mark>and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050</u>, as some experts propose, <u><mark>the world is still facing a 3-degree increase</mark> by the end of the century</u>, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. <u><mark>Global warming is speeding up</u></mark>, especially in the Arctic, and <u><mark>that means</u></mark> that some <u>top-level science <mark>projections from 2007 are</mark> already out of date and <mark>overly optimistic</u></mark>. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." <u>Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought</u>, it looks like the <u>seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago</u>, Corell said. He said <u>seas should rise</u> about <u>a foot every 20</u> to 25 <u>years</u>.</p>

1NC

Biotech

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx

N

Wake

7

UNLV GV

Calum Matheson

1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx

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ndtceda14

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college

Capitalism causes destroys value to life

Robinson 14

Robinson 14 (William I. Robinson, professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism Is In the Midst of Its Most Severe Crisis” 02 Jul 2014, KB)

US intervention entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001. This should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism. Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in a century the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states. global inequalities have never been as acute and grotesque we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings about including the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy as a response by the US-led transnational state and capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. There is currently a global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly across countries and has not taken any clear form or direction. We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits 80 percent experience of insecurity, impoverishment, and increasingly inhabiting a “planet of slums.” apologists of capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful. But 300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps. Foxcomm makes your iPads and iPhones. We are headed towards a global police state organized by global elites and led by the US state to contain the potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms because they have been pressured from below to do so the natural tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been escalation of worldwide inequalities Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.” this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. We cannot understand intensified militarization and the rise of this complex outside of the crisis of global capitalism. It is a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy extreme inequality and social polarization means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus? Unloading the surplus through financial speculation aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. the mass production and distribution of vaccines and medications for diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases tuberculosis, measles, etc that previously were under control. Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent. capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable which is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. it becomes profitable to turn to wars the surplus that the global economy has been and is producing but that cannot be absorbed by the world market, has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies. The US occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital. The prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes is enormously profitable for private corporations we are now living in a global war economy in which the threat of stagnation is offset by the militarization of global economy and society and the spread of systems of mass social control A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts and the spread of social control systems, from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants in the United States and Europe, must be ideologically legitimated. This is where bogus “wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where enemies must be conjured up, in which populations must be led to believe they are threatened So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is the devil, and so on. One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply of raw materials, machinery and service inputs come from other global corporations the global economy is kept running through violence and conflict the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global econom with the petroleum complex that is coming under pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. This is a new transnational power bloc this complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc. the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent. All this and much more are part of the militarization and “securitization” of global society We face doctrines, ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state the “war on drugs,” the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then the US state is the world’s leading terrorist.

capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the ability to sustain life global inequalities have never been as grotesque we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings as a response by the capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. There is global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly and has not taken any clear direction There have been countless studies documenting the escalation of inequalities 80 percent experience insecurity impoverishment and inhabit a “planet of slums.” We are headed towards a global police state The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for obedience States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms because they have been pressured from below to do so the tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been escalation of worldwide inequalities billions have been thrown off the land or out of employment relegated to migration We cannot understand intensified militarization outside of capitalism extreme inequality and social polarization means that the global market cannot absorb expanding output The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and absorb is growing this leads to a crisis of overproduction Unloading the surplus aggravates the solution as we saw with the collapse of 08 it becomes profitable to turn to wars the surplus cannot be absorbed has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction we are living in a global war economy in which the threat of stagnation is offset by militarization A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants must be ideologically legitimated This is where enemies must be conjured up populations must believe they are threatened One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance the economy is kept running through violence and conflict This is a new transnational power bloc the polarization of the world population generates new social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and controlled while guards protect that 20 percent this and more are part of the “securitization” of global society We face doctrines ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state the “war on drugs,”

However, and this is the key point I wish to highlight here, US intervention around the world clearly entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001. This new period should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism. Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in close to a century, and in many ways the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is also extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states. On the other hand, global inequalities have never been as acute and grotesque as they are today. So, in simplified terms, we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings about, including what you mention – the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy – as a response by the US-led transnational state and the transnational capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. You ask me who is going to compensate for these losses. That will depend on how the world’s people respond. There is currently a global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly across countries and has not taken any clear form or direction. Can the popular majority of humanity force the transnational capitalist class and the US/transnational state to be accountable for its crimes? Mao Zedong once said that “power flows through the barrel of a gun.” What he meant by this, in a more abstract than literal way, I believe, is that in the end it is the correlation of real forces that will determine outcomes. Because the United States has overwhelming and “full spectrum” military dominance, it can capture, execute, or bring to trial people anywhere around the world… it has “free license”, so to speak, to act as an international outlaw. We don’t even have to take the more recent examples. In December 1989 the United States undertook an illegal and criminal invasion of Panama, kidnapped Manuel Noriega – whether or not he was a dictator is not the point, as the United States puts in power and defends dictators that defend US and transnational elite interests, and brought him back to US territory for trial. What country in the world now has the naked power “flowing through the barrel of a gun” to invade the United States, capture George Bush, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other war criminals, and bring them somewhere to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Q: In your writings, you’ve warned against the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the slant accumulation of the global wealth in the hands of an affluent few and the impoverishment of the suppressed majority. What do you think are the reasons for this stark inequality and the disturbing dispossession of millions of people in the capitalist societies? You wrote that the participants of the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos were worried that the current situation raises the specter of worldwide instability and civil wars. Is it really so? A: We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots, such grotesque levels of inequality, within and among countries. There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities, among them, the current bestseller by Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” The pattern we see is that the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth that humanity produces and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits, but as well that some 20 percent of the population in each countries has integrated into the global economy as middle class and affluent consumers while the remaining 80 percent has experienced rising levels of insecurity, impoverishment, and precariousness, increasingly inhabiting what some have called a “planet of slums.” The apologists of global capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful. But in China, 300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. Such is this exploitation that a couple years ago, you may remember, Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps. This is the Foxcomm that makes your iPads and iPhones. The 80 percent is then subject to all sorts of sophisticated systems of social control and repression. We are headed in this regard towards a global police state, organized by global elites and led by the US state, to contain the real or potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority. Such structures of inequality and exploitation cannot be contained over time without both ideological and coercive apparatuses; conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence, organized by states and private security forces. Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which we are now living in a global social control state, a global panoptical surveillance state. George Orwell wrote about such a state in his famous novel “1984.” The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. How do we explain such stark inequality? Capitalism is a system that by its very internal dynamic generates wealth yet polarizes and concentrates that wealth. Historically a de-concentration of wealth through redistribution has come about by state intervention to offset the natural tendency for capital accumulation to result in such polarization. States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms both because they have been pressured from below to do so – whether by trade unions, social movements, socialist struggles, or so on – or because states must do so in order to retain legitimacy and preserve at least enough social peace for the reproduction of the system. A great variety of redistributive models emerged in the 20th century around the world, and went by a great many names – socialism, communism, social democracy, New Deal, welfare states, developmental states, populism, the social wage, and so on. All these models shared two things in common. One was state intervention in the economy to regulate capital accumulation and thus to bring under some control the most anarchic and most destructive elements of unrestrained capitalism. The other was redistribution through numerous policies, ranging from minimum legal wages and unemployment insurance, to public enterprises, the social wages of public health, education, transportation, and housing, welfare programs, land reform in agrarian countries, low cost credit, and so on. But capital responded to the last major crisis of the system, that of the 1970s, by “going global,” by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation and undermining models of state regulation and redistribution. Neo-liberalism is a set of policies that facilitate the rise of transnational capital. As transnational capital has broken free of the confine of the nation-state, the natural tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been this dizzying escalation of worldwide inequalities as wealth concentrates within the transnational capitalist class and, to a much lesser extent, the better off strata of middle classes and professionals. There are other related factors that account for the intensification of worldwide inequalities. One is the defeat of the worldwide left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led the ruling groups to declare that global neo-liberal capitalism was “The End of History.” A second is the rise of a globally integrated financial system in which capital in its liquid, that is money, form can move frictionless across the planet with no controls whatsoever. Transnational finance capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a global scale, and it engages in unfathomable levels of speculation, turning the global economy into one giant casino. Transnational finance capital has come to control the levers of the global economy, to get around and to undermine any effort at regulation, and to concentrate wealth in its liquid form in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. A third factor is the rise of a mass of surplus humanity. Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.” In turn, this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. Q: In one of your articles, you talked of an “ever-expanding military-prison-industrial-security-financial complex” that generates enormous profits through waging wars, selling weapons and then taking part in reconstruction activities in the war-torn countries. How does this complex operate? Is it really reliant on waging wars? A: We cannot understand intensified militarization and the rise of this complex outside of the crisis of global capitalism. This crisis is structural, in the first instance. It is what we call a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy driven by new technologies, especially computer, information, and communications technologies, but also by the revolution in transportation and containerization, by robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and more recently, by 3D printing, among other aspects, has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy, and to bring about a huge increase in productivity worldwide and an enormous expansion of the capacity of the global economy to churn out goods and services. But extreme inequality and social polarization in the global system means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus? How can transnational capital continue to accumulate and generate profits if this output is not unloaded, that is, profitably marketed? Unloading the surplus through financial speculation, which has skyrocketed in recent years, only aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. Now, if only 20 percent of humanity can consume in any significant quantity it is not very profitable to go into the business of mass, inexpensive public transportation, health and education, or the production of practical goods that the world’s population needs because very simply even if people need these things they do not have the income to purchase them. A global civilian economy geared to the basic needs of humanity is simply not profitable for the transnational capitalist class. Look at it like this: the mass production and distribution of vaccines and other medications for communicable and treatable diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are simply not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases – tuberculosis, measles, etc. – that previously were under control. Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry, including the giant pharmaceutical, biotechnology and related branches to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent. The lesson here is that capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable, according to the structure of the market and of income, which in turn is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. It is in this context that it becomes quite profitable to turn to wars, conflicts, systems of repression and social control to generate profit, to produce goods and systems that can repress that 80 percent of humanity that is not your consumer, not your customer so to say, because they do not have the purchasing power to sustain your drive to accumulate by producing goods and services for them that they actually need. Global capitalism is a perverted and irrational system. Putting aside geo-political considerations, the surplus that the global economy has been and is producing but that cannot be absorbed by the world market, has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction, and new systems of social control and repression, independent of geo-political considerations, that is, simply as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies. The US invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan – although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital. The prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes in the United States – and let us recall that the United States holds some 25-30 percent of the world’s prisoners – is enormously profitable for private corporations that run almost all of the immigrant detention centers, some of the general prisons, supply everything from guards to food, build the installations, erect border walls, and so on. Let us recall that the US National Security Agency – and we now know from Edward Snowden just how vast are its operations – subcontracts out its activities to private corporations, as do the CIA, the Pentagon, and so on. Global security corporations are one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and there are now more private security guards in the world than police officers. All of this is to say that we are now living in a global war economy, in which the threat of stagnation is offset in part by the militarization of global economy and society and the introduction and spread of systems of mass social control. Of course this involves all kinds of cultural, ideological, and political dimensions as well. A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts and the spread of social control systems, from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants in the United States and Europe, must be ideologically legitimated. This is where bogus and farcical “wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where enemies must be conjured up, in which populations must be led to believe they are threatened, and so on. So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is now the devil, and so on. One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy has involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation, towards those global corporate conglomerates involved in the production of war materials, of security, of engineering (for example, Bechtel and Halliburton), and other activities that involve making profit out of conflict and control. Remember by way of example that each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on and so forth, is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply, in turn, of raw materials, machinery and service inputs in turn come from other global corporations or local firms. So the whole global economy is kept running through violence and conflict. But the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global economy, together with the petroleum complex that is coming under much pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. This is a new transnational power bloc – this complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control, together with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc. Remember also that the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent. All this and much more are part of the militarization and “securitization” of global society by the powers that be. We face new doctrines, ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state – “fourth generation warfare,” “humanitarian intervention,” the “war on drugs,” among others, and above all, the so-called “war on terror.” I say so-called because, the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They indeed do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then the US state is the world’s leading terrorist. The powers that be in global society and that control the global political discourse attach the label “terrorist” to violence that they do not approve of, and they attach the label of “freedom and democracy and security” to violence that they do approve of, or that they commit themselves. Moreover, increasingly “terrorism” is used to simply describe political dissent, so that legitimate social movements and political struggles against global capitalism become labeled as “terrorism” in order to justify their suppression.

<h4><u><strong>Capitalism causes destroys value to life </h4><p>Robinson 14</p><p></u></strong>(William I. Robinson, professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism Is In the Midst of Its Most Severe Crisis” 02 Jul 2014, KB)</p><p>However, and this is the key point I wish to highlight here, <u><strong>US intervention</u></strong> around the world clearly <u><strong>entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001.</u></strong> <u>This</u> new period <u>should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism.</u> <u>Global <mark>capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis </mark>in</u> close to <u>a century</u>, and in many ways <u>the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s <mark>because we are on <strong>the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the</mark> very earth system and the <mark>ability to sustain life</strong></mark>, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is</u> also <u>extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states.</u> On the other hand, <u><strong><mark>global inequalities have never been as</mark> acute and <mark>grotesque</u></strong></mark> as they are today. So, in simplified terms, <u><mark>we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings</mark> about</u>, <u>including</u> what you mention – <u>the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy</u> – <u><mark>as a response by the</mark> US-led transnational state and</u> the transnational<u> <mark>capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis.</mark> </u>You ask me who is going to compensate for these losses. That will depend on how the world’s people respond. <u><strong><mark>There is</mark> currently a <mark>global revolt from below underway</strong>, but it is spread unevenly</mark> across countries <mark>and has not taken any clear</mark> form or <mark>direction</mark>.</u> Can the popular majority of humanity force the transnational capitalist class and the US/transnational state to be accountable for its crimes? Mao Zedong once said that “power flows through the barrel of a gun.” What he meant by this, in a more abstract than literal way, I believe, is that in the end it is the correlation of real forces that will determine outcomes. Because the United States has overwhelming and “full spectrum” military dominance, it can capture, execute, or bring to trial people anywhere around the world… it has “free license”, so to speak, to act as an international outlaw. We don’t even have to take the more recent examples. In December 1989 the United States undertook an illegal and criminal invasion of Panama, kidnapped Manuel Noriega – whether or not he was a dictator is not the point, as the United States puts in power and defends dictators that defend US and transnational elite interests, and brought him back to US territory for trial. What country in the world now has the naked power “flowing through the barrel of a gun” to invade the United States, capture George Bush, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other war criminals, and bring them somewhere to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Q: In your writings, you’ve warned against the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the slant accumulation of the global wealth in the hands of an affluent few and the impoverishment of the suppressed majority. What do you think are the reasons for this stark inequality and the disturbing dispossession of millions of people in the capitalist societies? You wrote that the participants of the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos were worried that the current situation raises the specter of worldwide instability and civil wars. Is it really so? A: <u><strong>We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots</u></strong>, such grotesque levels of inequality, within and among countries. <u><mark>There have been countless studies</mark> in recent years <mark>documenting the escalation of inequalities</u></mark>, among them, the current bestseller by Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” The pattern we see is that <u>the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth</u> that humanity produces <u>and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits</u>, but as well that some 20 percent of the population in each countries has integrated into the global economy as middle class and affluent consumers while the remaining <u><mark>80 percent</u></mark> has <u><mark>experience</u></mark>d rising levels <u>of <mark>insecurity</mark>, <mark>impoverishment</mark>, <mark>and</u></mark> precariousness, <u>increasingly <mark>inhabit</mark>ing</u> what some have called <u><strong><mark>a “planet of slums.”</u></strong></mark> The <u>apologists of</u> global <u>capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful.</u> <u>But</u> in China, <u>300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. </u>Such is this exploitation that a couple years ago, you may remember, <u>Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps.</u> This is the <u>Foxcomm</u> that <u>makes your iPads and iPhones.</u> The 80 percent is then subject to all sorts of sophisticated systems of social control and repression. <u><strong><mark>We are headed</u></strong></mark> in this regard <u><strong><mark>towards a global police state</u></strong></mark>, <u>organized by global elites and led by the US</u> <u>state</u>, <u>to contain the</u> real or <u>potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority</u>. Such structures of inequality and exploitation cannot be contained over time without both ideological and coercive apparatuses; <u>conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence</u>, organized by states and private security forces. Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which we are now living in a global social control state, a global panoptical surveillance state. George Orwell wrote about such a state in his famous novel “1984.” <u><strong><mark>The Orwellian society has arrived.</u></strong> <u>Yet it is worse</mark> than Orwell imagined, <mark>because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for</mark> their <mark>obedience</mark> and conformity. </u>How do we explain such stark inequality? Capitalism is a system that by its very internal dynamic generates wealth yet polarizes and concentrates that wealth. Historically a de-concentration of wealth through redistribution has come about by state intervention to offset the natural tendency for capital accumulation to result in such polarization. <u><mark>States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms</u></mark> both <u><strong><mark>because they have been pressured from below to do so</u></strong></mark> – whether by trade unions, social movements, socialist struggles, or so on – or because states must do so in order to retain legitimacy and preserve at least enough social peace for the reproduction of the system. A great variety of redistributive models emerged in the 20th century around the world, and went by a great many names – socialism, communism, social democracy, New Deal, welfare states, developmental states, populism, the social wage, and so on. All these models shared two things in common. One was state intervention in the economy to regulate capital accumulation and thus to bring under some control the most anarchic and most destructive elements of unrestrained capitalism. The other was redistribution through numerous policies, ranging from minimum legal wages and unemployment insurance, to public enterprises, the social wages of public health, education, transportation, and housing, welfare programs, land reform in agrarian countries, low cost credit, and so on. But capital responded to the last major crisis of the system, that of the 1970s, by “going global,” by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation and undermining models of state regulation and redistribution. Neo-liberalism is a set of policies that facilitate the rise of transnational capital. As transnational capital has broken free of the confine of the nation-state, <u><mark>the</mark> natural <mark>tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. <strong>The result has been</u></strong></mark> this dizzying <u><strong><mark>escalation of worldwide inequalities</u></strong></mark> as wealth concentrates within the transnational capitalist class and, to a much lesser extent, the better off strata of middle classes and professionals. There are other related factors that account for the intensification of worldwide inequalities. One is the defeat of the worldwide left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led the ruling groups to declare that global neo-liberal capitalism was “The End of History.” A second is the rise of a globally integrated financial system in which capital in its liquid, that is money, form can move frictionless across the planet with no controls whatsoever. Transnational finance capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a global scale, and it engages in unfathomable levels of speculation, turning the global economy into one giant casino. Transnational finance capital has come to control the levers of the global economy, to get around and to undermine any effort at regulation, and to concentrate wealth in its liquid form in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. A third factor is the rise of a mass of surplus humanity. <u>Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps <mark>billions</mark>, <mark>have been</mark> made “superfluous”, <mark>thrown off the land or out of</mark> productive <mark>employment</mark>, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and <mark>relegated to migration</mark> and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.”</u> In turn, <u>this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. </u>Q: In one of your articles, you talked of an “ever-expanding military-prison-industrial-security-financial complex” that generates enormous profits through waging wars, selling weapons and then taking part in reconstruction activities in the war-torn countries. How does this complex operate? Is it really reliant on waging wars? A: <u><strong><mark>We cannot understand intensified militarization</mark> and the rise of this complex <mark>outside of</mark> the crisis of global <mark>capitalism</mark>.</u></strong> This crisis is structural, in the first instance. <u>It is</u> what we call <u>a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy</u> driven by new technologies, especially computer, information, and communications technologies, but also by the revolution in transportation and containerization, by robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and more recently, by 3D printing, among other aspects, <u>has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy</u>, and to bring about a huge increase in productivity worldwide and an enormous expansion of the capacity of the global economy to churn out goods and services. But <u><mark>extreme inequality and social polarization</u></mark> in the global system <u><mark>means that the global market cannot absorb</mark> the <mark>expanding output</mark> of the global economy. <strong><mark>The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>The gap between what the global economy can produce and </mark>what the global market can <mark>absorb is growing</mark> and <mark>this leads to a crisis of overproduction</mark>: where and how to unload the surplus?</u> How can transnational capital continue to accumulate and generate profits if this output is not unloaded, that is, profitably marketed? <u><mark>Unloading the surplus</mark> through financial speculation</u>, which has skyrocketed in recent years, only <u><mark>aggravates the solution</mark>, <mark>as we saw with the collapse of</mark> 20<mark>08</mark>. </u>Now, if only 20 percent of humanity can consume in any significant quantity it is not very profitable to go into the business of mass, inexpensive public transportation, health and education, or the production of practical goods that the world’s population needs because very simply even if people need these things they do not have the income to purchase them. A global civilian economy geared to the basic needs of humanity is simply not profitable for the transnational capitalist class. Look at it like this: <u>the mass production and distribution of vaccines and</u> other <u>medications for</u> communicable and treatable <u>diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are</u> simply <u>not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases</u> – <u>tuberculosis, measles, etc</u>. – <u>that previously were under control.</u> <u>Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry</u>, including the giant pharmaceutical, biotechnology and related branches <u>to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent.</u> The lesson here is that <u>capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable</u>, according to the structure of the market and of income, <u>which</u> in turn <u>is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. </u>It is in this context that <u><strong><mark>it becomes</u></strong></mark> quite <u><strong><mark>profitable to turn to wars</u></strong></mark>, conflicts, systems of repression and social control to generate profit, to produce goods and systems that can repress that 80 percent of humanity that is not your consumer, not your customer so to say, because they do not have the purchasing power to sustain your drive to accumulate by producing goods and services for them that they actually need. Global capitalism is a perverted and irrational system. Putting aside geo-political considerations, <u><mark>the</u> <u>surplus</mark> that the global economy has been and is producing but that <mark>cannot be absorbed</mark> by the world market, <mark>has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction</u></mark>, and new systems of social control and repression, independent of geo-political considerations, that is, simply <u>as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies.</u> <u>The US </u>invasions and <u>occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan</u> – <u>although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital.</u> <u>The prison-industrial</u> <u>and immigrant-detention complexes</u> in the United States – and let us recall that the United States holds some 25-30 percent of the world’s prisoners – <u>is enormously profitable for private corporations</u> that run almost all of the immigrant detention centers, some of the general prisons, supply everything from guards to food, build the installations, erect border walls, and so on. Let us recall that the US National Security Agency – and we now know from Edward Snowden just how vast are its operations – subcontracts out its activities to private corporations, as do the CIA, the Pentagon, and so on. Global security corporations are one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and there are now more private security guards in the world than police officers. All of this is to say that <u><strong><mark>we are </mark>now <mark>living in a global war economy</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>in which the threat of stagnation is offset</u></mark> in part <u><mark>by</mark> the <mark>militarization</mark> of global economy and society and the</u> introduction and <u>spread of systems of mass social control</u>. Of course this involves all kinds of cultural, ideological, and political dimensions as well. <u><mark>A global war economy based on <strong>a multitude of endless conflicts</u></strong></mark> <u>and the spread of social control systems, <strong><mark>from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants</mark> in the United States and Europe</strong>, <mark>must be ideologically legitimated</mark>.</u> <u><mark>This is where</mark> bogus</u> and farcical <u>“wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where <mark>enemies must be conjured up</mark>, in which <mark>populations must </mark>be led to <mark>believe they are threatened</u></mark>, and so on. <u>So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is</u> now <u>the devil, and so on.</u> <u><strong><mark>One “threat” replaces another</u></strong> <u>but the system needs to keep a population <strong>in permanent compliance</strong></mark> through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy</u> has <u>involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation</u>, towards those global corporate conglomerates involved in the production of war materials, of security, of engineering (for example, Bechtel and Halliburton), and other activities that involve making profit out of conflict and control. Remember by way of example that <u>each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on</u> and so forth, <u>is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply</u>, in turn, <u>of raw materials, machinery and service inputs</u> in turn <u>come from other global corporations</u> or local firms. So <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> whole <u><strong>global <mark>economy is kept running through violence and conflict</u></strong></mark>. But <u>the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global econom</u>y, together <u>with the petroleum complex that is coming under</u> much <u>pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. <strong><mark>This is a new transnational power bloc</u></strong></mark> – <u>this</u> <u>complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control</u>, together <u>with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc.</u> Remember also that <u><mark>the polarization of the world population</mark> into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated <mark>generates new</mark> spatial <mark>social relations, <strong>so that the privileged occupy gated communities</strong> and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and</mark> carefully <mark>controlled</mark>, <mark>while</mark> surveillance systems and security <mark>guards</mark> must patrol and <mark>protect</mark> <mark>that 20 percent</mark>.</u> <u>All <mark>this</mark> <mark>and</mark> much <mark>more are part of the</mark> militarization and <strong><mark>“securitization” of global society</u></strong></mark> by the powers that be. <u><mark>We face</u></mark> new <u><mark>doctrines</mark>, <mark>ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state</u></mark> – “fourth generation warfare,” “humanitarian intervention,” <u><strong><mark>the “war on drugs,”</u></strong></mark> among others, and above all, the so-called “war on terror.” I say so-called because, <u>the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They</u> indeed <u>do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then <strong>the US state is the world’s leading terrorist.</u></strong> The powers that be in global society and that control the global political discourse attach the label “terrorist” to violence that they do not approve of, and they attach the label of “freedom and democracy and security” to violence that they do approve of, or that they commit themselves. Moreover, increasingly “terrorism” is used to simply describe political dissent, so that legitimate social movements and political struggles against global capitalism become labeled as “terrorism” in order to justify their suppression.</p>

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This is the foundation for all violence

Snoek 12

Snoek 12 (Anke, PhD in Philosophy Dept @ Macquarie U, Agamben’s Joyful Kafka, GENDER MODIFIED)//CNM

the questions arise: what ought we to do now? What form of resistance is possible for us? How should we act? What can we do? when read superficially, Agamben nowhere seems to formulate any explicit answer to the question of resistance. Negri sees this as a great lack in his philosophy.' Agamben's work is often described as a radical passivity Agamben's passivity is not a regular powerlessness, but seems to come close to an exercise in doing nothing Agamben is fundamentally opposed to the tendency of metaphysical politics to attribute an identity to the human being If the human being has no identity of his [or her] own this has consequences for our traditional view of actions as being fundamentally embedded within end-means relationships, as goal oriented in essence. Our views of activities and activism must therefore be thoroughly revised the contemporary human, yielding to every demand by society, is cut off from his [or her] impotentiality, from his ability to do nothing politics is a politics of the act, of the human individual being at work. The irresponsible motto of the contemporary individual, 'No problem, I can do it', comes precisely at the moment 'when he [or she] should instead realize that he [or she] has been consigned to forces and processes over which he [or she] has lost all control' people are no longer in touch with their inability evil does not have the form of the demonic but that of being separated from our lack of power. Nothing makes us more impoverished and less free than this estrangement from impotentiality. Those who are separated from what they can do, can, however, still resist; they can still not do. Those who are separated from their own impotentiality lose, on the other hand, first of all the capacity to resist Eichmann was not so much separated from his power as from his lack of power, tempted to evil precisely by the powers of right and law Foucault thought of power no longer as an attribute that a certain group had over another, but as a relation that was constantly shifting The subject itself, its identity, is always formed within a power relation the state attempts to form the subject via disciplinary techniques and the subject responds via subjectivization techniques: it internalizes the expectations of the state in the formation of its own identity. That is why Foucault rejects the idea of a subject and the idea of actorship, of attributing an act to a subject. Hence, as long as we continue to think in terms of a subject resisting oppressive power via deliberate action, we cannot liberate ourselves from power relations MARKED new possibilities can arise that are not dependent on a subject. Many activists ask what his theory entailed concretely with respect to the direction in which they should go. Agamben's constant reply was that anyone who poses this question has not understood the problem at all. I always find it out of place to go and ask someone what to do, what is there to be done? ... If someone asks me what action, it shows they missed the point because they still want me to say: go out in the streets and do this? It has nothing to do with that Inactivity as active resistance to the state was hardly conceivable Although the state acknowledges the anti-law tendencies in the writings the activists failed to recognize this specific form of resistance the power of the T'iqqun collective lay precisely in the fact that they did not prescribe any concrete actions but sought unexpected possibilities in 'being thus'. In that same sense, Agamben's analysis should not be seen as a manual for activist freedom but as a description of small opportunities, of examples in which the power relation is diffuse and that we must attempt to recognize, create and use Agamben shows us means for resistance, but not regular acts with a goal; rather, they are means without end there are other strategies, aside from active resistance, to reverse political situations.

the questions arise How should we act? What can we do? Agamben's work is often described as a radical passivity not a regular powerlessness, but an exercise in doing nothing the contemporary human is cut off from his [or her] impotentiality politics is a politics of the act he [or she] has been consigned to forces over which he [or she] has lost all control' Nothing makes us less free than this estrangement from impotentiality. Those separated from what they can do, can still resist Those separated from impotentiality lose all capacity to resist Eichmann was not so much separated from power as from lack of power, tempted to evil precisely by right and law Foucaults thought of power as constantly shifting the state attempts to form the subject via disciplinary techniques and the subject responds via subjectivization it internalizes the expectations of the state in the formation of its own identity Foucault rejects the idea of attributing an act to a subject as long as we think in terms of a subject resisting power via deliberate action, we cannot liberate ourselves from power relations If someone asks what action they missed the point Inactivity as active resistance to the state was hardly conceivable activists failed to recognize this form of resistance the power of the collective lay precisely in the fact that they did not prescribe any concrete actions Agamben's analysis should not be a manual for activist freedom but means for resistance not regular acts with a goal; rather means without end there are other strategies, aside active resistance, to reverse political situations.

Given the preceding sketch Agamben gives of power and possibilities (the law's being in force without significance, the subtle reverse found in Kafka's work of this situation, Againben's praise of creatures without work), the questions arise: what ought we to do now? What form of resistance is possible for us? How should we act? What can we do? This is actually one of the major criti- cisms on Agamben's work, that in it, at least when read superficially, Agamben nowhere seems to formulate any explicit answer to the question of resistance. The Italian political philosopher Antonio Negri, also one of Agamben's close friends, points out that Agamben was never directly involved in political struggles and he sees this as a great lack in his philosophy.' Agamben's work is often described as a radical passivity.1 This passivity can be seen both as a strength and a weakness of his work. Agamben's passivity is not a regular powerlessness, but seems to come close to (Mahayana) Buddhism, an exercise in doing nothing.4 This passivity also shows evidence of a radical paradigm shift in thinking about power and resistance, a movement that is often attributed to Foucault and whose traces can be found in Kafka avant la leltre. As is evident from the above, Agamben is fundamentally opposed to the tendency of metaphysical politics to attribute an identity to the human being, to allocate to him [or her] a work of his [or her] own. If the human being has no identity of his [or her] own and no activity of his [or her] own, then this also has consequences for our traditional view of actions as being fundamentally embedded within end-means relationships, as goal oriented in essence. Our views of activities and activism must therefore be thoroughly revised in line with our revision of the possibility of a transcendent work of man. Kafka's opera singing executioners or questioners Deleuze once defined power as the act in which the human being is cut off from its potentiality. But, Agamben states, 'There is, nevertheless, another and more insidious operation of power that does not immediately affect what humans can do - their potentiality - but rather their "impotentiality", that is, what they cannot do, or better, can nor do' (N, 13). Given that flexibility is the primary quality the market requires from us, the contemporary human, yielding to every demand by society, is cut off from his [or her] impotentiality, from his ability to do nothing. Just as we saw previously, politics is a politics of the act, of the human individual being at work. The irresponsible motto of the contemporary individual, 'No problem, I can do it', comes precisely at the moment 'when he [or she] should instead realize that he [or she] has been consigned in unheard of measure to forces and processes over which he [or she] has lost all control' (N, 44). This flexibility also leads to a confusion of professions and callings, of professional identities and social roles, because people are no longer in touch with their inability. Agamben sees an example of this in Kafka's Vie Trial. In the last chapter, just before his death, two men enter through Joseph K.'s door. They are his questioners/executioners, but Joseph K. does not recognize them as such and thinks that they are *[o)ld second-rate actors or opera singers?'5 Agamben argues that, in Katka's world, evil is presented as an inadequate reaction to impotentiality (CC, 31). Instead of making use of our possibility of 'not being', we fail it, we flee from our lack of power, 'our fearful retreat from it in order to exercise ... some power of being' (CC, 32). But this power we try to exercise turns into a malevolent power that oppresses the persons who show us their weakness. In Kafka's world, evil does not have the form of the demonic but that of being separated from our lack of power. Nothing makes us more impoverished and less free than this estrangement from impotentiality. Those who are separated from what they can do, can, however, still resist; they can still not do. Those who are separated from their own impotentiality lose, on the other hand, first of all the capacity to resist. (X, 15) And it is evident, according to Agamben, from the example of Hichmann how right Kafka was in this (CC, 32). Eichmann was not so much separated from his power as from his lack of power, tempted to evil precisely by the powers of right and law (CC, 32). What should one do? A clash with activists At the end of 2009, Agamben gave a lecture in honour of the presentation of a collection of texts written by the T'iqqun collective. This French collective has written several political manifestoes and in 200S their compound was raided by the anti terrorist brigades. The charges were quite vague: belonging to an ultra left and the anarcho-autonomous milieu; using a radical discourse; having links with foreign groups; participating regularly in political demonstrations. The evidence that was found was not weapons, but documents, for example a train schedule. Although Agamben calls these charges a tragicomedy and accuses French politics of barbarism6, in his lecture he emphasizes another important political value of the T'iqqun collective. This collective embodies Foucaults idea of the non subject. One of the latter's greatest merits is that he thought of power no longer as an attribute that a certain group had over another, but as a relation that was constantly shifting. A second merit of Foucaults thinking was the idea of non authorship. The subject itself, its identity, is always formed within a power relation, a process that Foucault termed 'subjectivization techniques' In Foucault, the state attempts to form the subject via disciplinary techniques and the subject responds via subjectivization techniques: it internalizes the expectations of the state in the formation of its own identity. That is why Foucault rejects the idea of a subject and the idea of actorship, of attributing an act to a subject. Hence, as long as we continue to think in terms of a subject resisting oppressive power via deliberate action, we cannot liberate ourselves from power relations. MARKED The gesture Tiqqun instead is making is, according to Agamben, not one of looking for a subject that can assume the role of saviour or revolutionary. Rather, they begin with investigating the force fields that are operative in our society (instead of focusing on the subject). In describing these fields of force and the moment they become diffuse, new possibilities can arise that are not dependent on a subject. The discussion that followed this lecture provides a very clear picture of Agamben's position. Many activists present at the lecture asked what his theory entailed concretely with respect to the direction in which they should go. Agamben's constant reply was that anyone who poses this question has not understood the problem at all. I always find it out of place to go and ask someone what to do, what is there to be done? ... If someone asks me what action, it shows they missed the point because they still want me to say: go out in the streets and do this? It has nothing to do with that. (OT) Inactivity as active resistance to the state was hardly conceivable for many of the left wing activists present at Agamben's lecture at Tiqqun. Although the state acknowledges the anti-law tendencies in the writings of the Tiqqun collective, the activists present at Agamben's lecture failed to recognize this specific form of resistance. What Agamben attempted to show was that the power of the T'iqqun collective lay precisely in the fact that they did not prescribe any concrete actions but sought unexpected possibilities in 'being thus'. In that same sense, Agamben's analysis of Kafka's work should not be seen as a manual for activist freedom but as a description of small opportunities, of examples in which the power relation is diffuse and that we must attempt to recognize, create and use. Agamben shows us different possibilities and means for resistance, but these are not regular acts with a goal; rather, they are means without end. As Kishik pointed out, Agamben's work is an attempt to "*make means meet" (not with their ends, but with each other)'.7 One way to achieve this is through gestures. The gestures of the people in the Oklahoma theatre and elsewhere in Kafka's work, the shame of Joseph K. and the 'as not' in Kafka's 'On Parables' show us that there are other strategies, aside from active resistance, to reverse political situations.

<h4>This is the foundation for all violence</h4><p><u><strong>Snoek 12</u></strong> (Anke, PhD in Philosophy Dept @ Macquarie U, Agamben’s Joyful Kafka, GENDER MODIFIED)//CNM </p><p>Given the preceding sketch Agamben gives of power and possibilities (the law's being in force without significance, the subtle reverse found in Kafka's work of this situation, Againben's praise of creatures without work), <u><mark>the questions arise</mark>: what ought we to do now? What form of resistance is possible for us? <strong><mark>How should we act? What can we do?</u></strong></mark> This is actually one of the major criti- cisms on Agamben's work, that in it, at least <u>when read superficially, Agamben nowhere seems to formulate any explicit answer to the question of resistance.</u> The Italian political philosopher Antonio <u>Negri</u>, also one of Agamben's close friends, points out that Agamben was never directly involved in political struggles and he <u>sees this as a great lack in his philosophy.' <mark>Agamben's work is often described as a <strong>radical passivity</u></strong></mark>.1 This passivity can be seen both as a strength and a weakness of his work. <u>Agamben's passivity is <mark>not a regular powerlessness, but</mark> seems to come close to</u> (Mahayana) Buddhism, <u><mark>an exercise in doing nothing</u></mark>.4 This passivity also shows evidence of a radical paradigm shift in thinking about power and resistance, a movement that is often attributed to Foucault and whose traces can be found in Kafka avant la leltre. As is evident from the above, <u>Agamben is fundamentally opposed to the tendency of metaphysical politics to attribute an identity to the human being</u>, to allocate to him [or her] a work of his [or her] own. <u>If the human being has no identity of his [or her] own</u> and no activity of his [or her] own, then <u>this</u> also <u>has consequences for our traditional view of actions as being fundamentally embedded within end-means relationships, as goal oriented in essence. Our views of activities and activism must therefore be thoroughly revised</u> in line with our revision of the possibility of a transcendent work of man. Kafka's opera singing executioners or questioners Deleuze once defined power as the act in which the human being is cut off from its potentiality. But, Agamben states, 'There is, nevertheless, another and more insidious operation of power that does not immediately affect what humans can do - their potentiality - but rather their "impotentiality", that is, what they cannot do, or better, can nor do' (N, 13). Given that flexibility is the primary quality the market requires from us, <u><mark>the contemporary human</mark>, yielding to every demand by society, <mark>is cut off from his [or her] impotentiality</mark>, from his ability to do nothing</u>. Just as we saw previously, <u><strong><mark>politics is a politics of the act</strong></mark>, of the human individual being at work. The irresponsible motto of the contemporary individual, 'No problem, I can do it', comes precisely at the moment 'when he [or she] should instead realize that <mark>he [or she] has been consigned</u></mark> in unheard of measure <u><mark>to forces </mark>and processes <mark>over which he [or she] has lost all control'</u></mark> (N, 44). This flexibility also leads to a confusion of professions and callings, of professional identities and social roles, because <u>people are no longer in touch with their inability</u>. Agamben sees an example of this in Kafka's Vie Trial. In the last chapter, just before his death, two men enter through Joseph K.'s door. They are his questioners/executioners, but Joseph K. does not recognize them as such and thinks that they are *[o)ld second-rate actors or opera singers?'5 Agamben argues that, in Katka's world, evil is presented as an inadequate reaction to impotentiality (CC, 31). Instead of making use of our possibility of 'not being', we fail it, we flee from our lack of power, 'our fearful retreat from it in order to exercise ... some power of being' (CC, 32). But this power we try to exercise turns into a malevolent power that oppresses the persons who show us their weakness. In Kafka's world, <u>evil does not have the form of the demonic but that of being separated from our lack of power. <strong><mark>Nothing makes us</mark> more impoverished and <mark>less free than this estrangement from impotentiality</strong>. Those</mark> who are <mark>separated from what they can do, can</mark>, however, <mark>still resist</mark>; they can still not do. <mark>Those</mark> who are <mark>separated from</mark> their own <mark>impotentiality lose</mark>, on the other hand, first of <mark>all</mark> the <mark>capacity to resist</u></mark>. (X, 15) And it is evident, according to Agamben, from the example of Hichmann how right Kafka was in this (CC, 32). <u><strong><mark>Eichmann</strong> was not so much separated from</mark> his <mark>power as from</mark> <strong>his <mark>lack of power</strong>, tempted to evil precisely by</mark> the powers of <mark>right and law</u></mark> (CC, 32). What should one do? A clash with activists At the end of 2009, Agamben gave a lecture in honour of the presentation of a collection of texts written by the T'iqqun collective. This French collective has written several political manifestoes and in 200S their compound was raided by the anti terrorist brigades. The charges were quite vague: belonging to an ultra left and the anarcho-autonomous milieu; using a radical discourse; having links with foreign groups; participating regularly in political demonstrations. The evidence that was found was not weapons, but documents, for example a train schedule. Although Agamben calls these charges a tragicomedy and accuses French politics of barbarism6, in his lecture he emphasizes another important political value of the T'iqqun collective. This collective embodies <u><mark>Foucault</u>s</mark> idea of the non subject. One of the latter's greatest merits is that he <u><mark>thought of power</mark> no longer as an attribute that a certain group had over another, but <mark>as </mark>a relation that was <strong><mark>constantly shifting</u></strong></mark>. A second merit of Foucaults thinking was the idea of non authorship. <u>The subject itself, its identity, is always formed within a power relation</u>, a process that Foucault termed 'subjectivization techniques' In Foucault, <u><mark>the state attempts to <strong>form the subject via disciplinary techniques</strong> and the subject responds via subjectivization</mark> techniques: <strong><mark>it internalizes the expectations of the state</strong> in the formation of its own identity</mark>. That is why <mark>Foucault rejects the idea of</mark> a subject and the idea of actorship, of <strong><mark>attributing an act to a subject</strong></mark>. Hence, <mark>as long as we</mark> continue to <mark>think in terms of a subject resisting</mark> oppressive <mark>power via deliberate action, we cannot liberate ourselves from power relations</u></mark>. </p><p><u>MARKED</p><p></u>The gesture Tiqqun instead is making is, according to Agamben, not one of looking for a subject that can assume the role of saviour or revolutionary. Rather, they begin with investigating the force fields that are operative in our society (instead of focusing on the subject). In describing these fields of force and the moment they become diffuse, <u>new possibilities can arise that are not dependent on a subject.</u> The discussion that followed this lecture provides a very clear picture of Agamben's position. <u>Many activists</u> present at the lecture <u>ask</u>ed <u>what his theory entailed concretely with respect to the direction in which they should go. Agamben's constant reply was that anyone who poses this question has not understood the problem at all. I always find it out of place to go and ask someone what to do, what is there to be done? ... <mark>If someone asks</mark> me <mark>what action</mark>, it shows <mark>they missed the point</mark> because they still want me to say: go out in the streets and do this? It has nothing to do with that</u>. (OT) <u><strong><mark>Inactivity as active resistance</strong> to the state was hardly conceivable</u></mark> for many of the left wing activists present at Agamben's lecture at Tiqqun. <u>Although the state acknowledges the anti-law tendencies in the writings</u> of the Tiqqun collective, <u>the <mark>activists</u></mark> present at Agamben's lecture <u><mark>failed to recognize this</mark> specific <mark>form of resistance</u></mark>. What Agamben attempted to show was that <u><mark>the power of the</mark> T'iqqun <mark>collective lay precisely in the fact that they <strong>did not prescribe any concrete actions</strong></mark> but sought unexpected possibilities in 'being thus'. In that same sense, <mark>Agamben's analysis</u></mark> of Kafka's work <u><strong><mark>should not be</mark> seen as <mark>a manual for activist freedom</strong> but</mark> as a description of small opportunities, of examples in which the power relation is diffuse and that we must attempt to recognize, create and use</u>. <u>Agamben shows us</u> different possibilities and <u><mark>means for resistance</mark>, but</u> these are <u><mark>not regular acts with a goal; rather</mark>, they are <mark>means without end</u></mark>. As Kishik pointed out, Agamben's work is an attempt to "*make means meet" (not with their ends, but with each other)'.7 One way to achieve this is through gestures. The gestures of the people in the Oklahoma theatre and elsewhere in Kafka's work, the shame of Joseph K. and the 'as not' in Kafka's 'On Parables' show us that <u><mark>there are other strategies, aside</mark> from <mark>active resistance, to reverse political situations.</p></u></mark>

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Emory KL

Brian Delong

1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k

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Our alternative is pedagogical resistance to neoliberalism – the failure of traditional politics demands creation of resistant educational spaces – exposing epistemic cracks within neoliberal apparatuses provides the conditions of possibility for radical politics

Giroux 11/6

Giroux 11/6 (Henry Giroux, PhD from Carnegie-Mellon University, professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, distinguished visiting professor at Ryerson University, 11-6-14, “Capitalism Is a Tumor on the Body Politic: What's the Alternative? Beyond Mid-Election Babble,” http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/27273-henry-a-giroux-capitalism-is-a-tumor-on-the-body-politic-what-s-the-alternative) gz

The biggest challenge facing those who believe in social justice is to provide an alternative discourse, educational apparatuses and vision that can convince US citizens that a real democracy is worth fighting for The right-wing Republican sweep of Congress testifies to a massive memory and educational deficit among the US public and a failure among progressives and the left regarding how to think about politics outside of the established boundaries of liberal reform. The educative nature of politics has never been more crucial than it is now and testifies to the need for a new politics in which culture and education are as important as economic forces in shaping individual and social agency, if not resistance itself. The cultural apparatuses owned by the financial elite are largely responsible for the political and social darkness that engulfs the American public Americans are inhabiting a new moment in history in which the symbiosis among cultural institutions, power and everyday life has shaped the very nature of politics and the broader collective public consciousness with an influence unlike anything we have seen in the past Economics drives politics and its legitimating apparatuses have become the great engines of manufactured ignorance. This suggests the need for the left and their allies to take seriously how identities, desires and modes of agency are produced, struggled over and taken up the left "has underestimated the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle and have not always forged appropriate weapons to fight on this front" and in doing so have failed in its responsibility to address the educative nature of politics by challenging modes of domination "that lie on the side of the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle Couple that understanding with the need for a more comprehensive vision of change and the necessity for broad-based social movements, and it may become possible once again to develop new opportunities for a new political language, forms of collective struggle and a politics for radical change rather than cravenly center-right reforms. The financial state promotes a form of ideological terrorism and the key issue is how to expose it, and dismantle its cultural apparatuses with the use of the social media, diverse apparatuses of communication, new political formations, and ongoing collective educational and political struggles.

The biggest challenge facing social justice is to provide an alternative discourse, educational apparatuses and vision that can convince citizens that democracy is worth fighting for The right-wing sweep of Congress testifies to a educational deficit among the public and failure to think politics outside established boundaries The educative nature of politics has never been more crucial and testifies to the need for a new politics in which culture and education are important in shaping social agency, if not resistance Economics drives politics and its apparatuses have become engines of manufactured ignorance. This suggests the need to take seriously how identities, desires and agency are produced the left "has underestimated the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle and have not forged appropriate weapons to fight on this front Couple that with broad-based social movements, and it may become possible to develop a new political language and a politics for radical change The financial state promotes ideological terrorism and the key is how to expose and dismantle its cultural apparatuses

The biggest challenge facing those who believe in social justice is to provide an alternative discourse, educational apparatuses and vision that can convince US citizens that a real democracy is worth fighting for. The right-wing Republican sweep of Congress testifies to a massive memory and educational deficit among the US public and a failure among progressives and the left regarding how to think about politics outside of the established boundaries of liberal reform. The educative nature of politics has never been more crucial than it is now and testifies to the need for a new politics in which culture and education are as important as economic forces in shaping individual and social agency, if not resistance itself. The cultural apparatuses owned by the financial elite are largely responsible for the political and social darkness that engulfs the American public. Americans are inhabiting a new moment in history in which the symbiosis among cultural institutions, power and everyday life has shaped the very nature of politics and the broader collective public consciousness with an influence unlike anything we have seen in the past. Economics drives politics and its legitimating apparatuses have become the great engines of manufactured ignorance. This suggests the need for the left and their allies to take seriously how identities, desires and modes of agency are produced, struggled over and taken up. The left and other progressives need to rethink Pierre Bourdieu's insistence that the left "has underestimated the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle and have not always forged appropriate weapons to fight on this front" and in doing so have failed in its responsibility to address the educative nature of politics by challenging modes of domination "that lie on the side of the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle." (1) Couple that understanding with the need for a more comprehensive vision of change and the necessity for broad-based social movements, and it may become possible once again to develop new opportunities for a new political language, forms of collective struggle and a politics for radical change rather than cravenly center-right reforms. As Hannah Arendt and others told us many years ago, there is no democracy without an informed public. This is a lesson the right wing took very seriously after the democratic uprisings of the 1960s. This is not a matter of blaming the public but of trying to understand the role of culture and power as a vital force in politics and how it is linked to massive inequities in wealth and income. The financial state promotes a form of ideological terrorism and the key issue is how to expose it, and dismantle its cultural apparatuses with the use of the social media, diverse apparatuses of communication, new political formations, and ongoing collective educational and political struggles.

<h4>Our alternative is pedagogical resistance to neoliberalism – the failure of traditional politics demands creation of resistant educational spaces – exposing epistemic cracks within neoliberal apparatuses provides the conditions of possibility for radical politics</h4><p><u><strong>Giroux 11/6</u></strong> (Henry Giroux, PhD from Carnegie-Mellon University, professor of English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, distinguished visiting professor at Ryerson University, 11-6-14, “Capitalism Is a Tumor on the Body Politic: What's the Alternative? Beyond Mid-Election Babble,” http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/27273-henry-a-giroux-capitalism-is-a-tumor-on-the-body-politic-what-s-the-alternative) gz</p><p><u><mark>The biggest challenge facing </mark>those who believe in <mark>social justice is to provide <strong>an alternative discourse, educational apparatuses and vision</strong> that can convince</mark> US <mark>citizens that</mark> a real <mark>democracy is worth fighting for</u></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>The right-wing</mark> Republican <mark>sweep of Congress testifies to a</mark> massive <strong>memory and <mark>educational deficit among the</mark> US <mark>public</strong> and</mark> a <mark>failure</mark> among progressives and the left regarding how <mark>to think </mark>about <mark>politics outside</mark> of the <mark>established boundaries </mark>of liberal reform. <strong><mark>The educative nature of politics</strong> has never been more crucial</mark> than it is now <mark>and testifies to <strong>the need for a new politics in which culture and education are</mark> as <mark>important</strong></mark> as economic forces <mark>in shaping</mark> <strong>individual and <mark>social agency, if not resistance</mark> itself</strong>.</p><p>The cultural apparatuses owned by the financial elite are largely responsible for the <strong>political and social darkness that engulfs the American public</u></strong>. <u>Americans are inhabiting a new moment in history in which the <strong>symbiosis among cultural institutions, power and everyday life</strong> has shaped the very nature of politics and the broader collective public consciousness with an influence unlike anything we have seen in the past</u>. <u><strong><mark>Economics drives politics </strong>and its</mark> legitimating <mark>apparatuses have become</mark> the great <strong><mark>engines of manufactured ignorance</strong>. This suggests the need</mark> for the left and their allies <mark>to <strong>take seriously how identities, desires and</mark> modes of <mark>agency are produced</strong></mark>, struggled over and taken up</u>. The left and other progressives need to rethink Pierre Bourdieu's insistence that <u><mark>the left "has <strong>underestimated the symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle</strong> and have not</mark> always <mark>forged appropriate <strong>weapons to fight on this front</mark>"</strong> and in doing so have failed in its responsibility to address the educative nature of politics by challenging modes of domination "that lie on the side of the <strong>symbolic and pedagogical dimensions of struggle</u></strong>." (1) <u><mark>Couple that</mark> understanding <mark>with</mark> the need for a more comprehensive vision of change and the <strong>necessity for <mark>broad-based social movements</strong>, and it may become possible</mark> once again <mark>to develop</mark> new opportunities for <mark>a <strong>new political language</strong></mark>, forms of collective struggle <mark>and a <strong>politics for radical change</mark> rather than cravenly center-right reforms.</p><p></u></strong>As Hannah Arendt and others told us many years ago, there is no democracy without an informed public. This is a lesson the right wing took very seriously after the democratic uprisings of the 1960s. This is not a matter of blaming the public but of trying to understand the role of culture and power as a vital force in politics and how it is linked to massive inequities in wealth and income. <u><mark>The financial state promotes</mark> a form of <strong><mark>ideological terrorism</strong> and the key</mark> issue <mark>is how to <strong>expose</mark> it, <mark>and dismantle its cultural apparatuses</strong></mark> with the use of the social media, diverse apparatuses of communication, new political formations, and ongoing collective educational and political struggles.</p></u>

1NC

Off

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Cornell LL

Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case

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No impact to disease – they either burn out or don’t spread

Posner 05

Posner 05

the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease in 200,000 years is a source of comfort none has come close to destroying the entire human race Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause extinction is less today than in the past The reason is improvements in medical science.

Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease none has come close to destroying the entire human race Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause extinction is less today than in the past The reason is improvements in medical science.

(Richard A, judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, and senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Winter. “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them.” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_kmske/is_3_11/ai_n29167514/pg_2?tag=content;col1) Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.

<h4><u><strong>No impact to disease – they either burn out or don’t spread</h4><p>Posner 05</u></strong> </p><p>(Richard A, judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, and senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Winter. “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them.” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_kmske/is_3_11/ai_n29167514/pg_2?tag=content;col1)</p><p>Yet <u>the fact that <mark>Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease</u></mark> to assail it <u>in</u> the <u>200,000</u> <u>years</u> or so of its existence <u>is a source of</u> genuine <u>comfort</u>, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but <u><mark>none has come close to destroying the entire human race</u></mark>. There is a biological reason. <u><mark>Natural</u> <u>selection favors germs of limited lethality</u>; </mark>they are fitter in an evolutionary sense <u><mark>because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly</mark>.</u> The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. <u><mark>The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause</u></mark> the <u><mark>extinction</u></mark> of the human race <u><mark>is</u></mark> probably even <u><mark>less today than in the past</u></mark> (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. <u><mark>The reason is improvements in medical science.</u></mark> But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.</p>

1NC

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UNLV GV

Calum Matheson

1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k

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People will choose poorly -- humans are psychologically wired to lie to themselves about the pain and suffering of the world- life is not alright, and we must destroy the future

Ligotti ‘12

Ligotti ‘12 (Thomas (2012-06-23). The Conspiracy against the Human Race: A Contrivance of Horror (Kindle Locations 111-126). Hippocampus Press. Kindle Edition)

consciousness would long past have proved fatal for human beings if we did not do something about it. Most people learn to save themselves by artificially limiting the content of consciousness consciousness was a blunder that required corrections for its effects. Because of consciousness, parent of all horrors, we became susceptible to thoughts that were startling and dreadful to us, thoughts that have never been equitably balanced by those that are collected and reassuring. Our minds now began dredging up horrors, flagrantly joyless possibilities, enough of them to make us drop to the ground in paroxysms of self-soiling consternation should they go untrammeled. This potentiality necessitated that certain defense mechanisms be put to use to keep us balanced on the knife-edge of vitality as a species. this faculty soon enough became a seditious agent working against us. we need to hamper our consciousness for all we are worth or it will impose upon us a too clear vision of what we do not want to see, which, as the Norwegian philosopher saw it, along with every other pessimist, is “the brotherhood of suffering between everything alive.” That we can conceive of the phenomenon of suffering, our own as well as that of other organisms, is a property unique to us as a dangerously conscious species. We are preoccupied with the good life, and step by step are working toward a better life. What we do, as a conscious species, is set markers for ourselves. Once we reach one marker, we advance to the next— as if we were playing a board game we think will never end, despite the fact that it will, like it or not we know too much to content ourselves with surviving, reproducing, dying— and nothing else. We know we are alive and know we will die. We also know we will suffer during our lives before suffering— slowly or quickly— as we draw near to death. This is the knowledge we “enjoy We want there to be more to it than that, or to think there is. This is the tragedy: Consciousness has forced us into the paradoxical position of striving to be unself-conscious of what we are— hunks of spoiling flesh on disintegrating bones. Nonhuman occupants of this planet are unaware of death. But we are susceptible to startling and dreadful thoughts, and we need some fabulous illusions to take our minds off them. For us, then, life is a confidence trick we must run on ourselves, To end this self-deception, to free our species of the paradoxical imperative to be and not to be conscious, our backs breaking by degrees upon a wheel of lies, we must cease reproducing. Nothing less will do human extinction The sooner the better And this means to willingly withdraw in contempt for its worldly terms, just as the heat-craving species went extinct when temperatures dropped. no future triumph or metamorphosis can justify the pitiful blighting of a human being It is upon a pavement of battered destinies that the survivors storm ahead toward new bland sensations and mass deaths. While commentators on Schopenhauer’s thought have seized upon it as a philosophical system ripe for academic analysis, they do not emphasize that its ideal endpoint— the denial of the Will-to-live—is a construct for the end of human existence. even Schopenhauer himself did not push this as aspect of his philosophy to its ideal endpoint

consciousness would long past have proved fatal for human beings if we did not do something about it. Most people learn to save themselves by artificially limiting the content of consciousness a blunder that required corrections for its effects. Because of consciousness, parent of all horrors, we became susceptible to thoughts that were startling and dreadful thoughts that have never been equitably balanced by those that are collected Our minds now began dredging up horrors , enough to make us drop to the ground in paroxysms of self-soiling consternation This potentiality necessitated certain defense mechanisms to keep us on the knife-edge of vitality as a species. we need to hamper our consciousness or it will impose upon us a too clear vision of what we do not want to see, which, is “the brotherhood of suffering between everything alive.” We are preoccupied with the good life we set markers for ourselves. we know too much to content ourselves with surviving, reproducing, dying We know we are alive We also know we will suffer during our lives before suffering We want there to be more This is the tragedy: Consciousness has forced us into the paradoxical position of striving to be unself-conscious of what we are— hunks of spoiling flesh on disintegrating bones. life is a confidence trick To end this self-deception, to free our species of the paradoxical imperative to be our backs breaking by degrees upon a wheel of lies, we must cease reproducing human extinction The sooner the better. this means to willingly withdraw no future triumph can justify the pitiful blighting of a human being It is upon a pavement of battered destinies that the survivors storm ahead toward new mass deaths. the end of human existence even Schopenhauer did not push this to its ideal endpoint

Established: Consciousness is not often viewed as being an instrument of tragedy in human life. But to Zapffe, consciousness would long past have proved fatal for human beings if we did not do something about it. “Why,” Zapffe asked, “has mankind not long ago gone extinct during great epidemics of madness? Why do only a fairly minor number of individuals perish because they fail to endure the strain of living— because cognition gives them more than they can carry?” Zapffe’s answer: “Most people learn to save themselves by artificially limiting the content of consciousness.” From an evolutionary viewpoint, in Zapffe’s observation, consciousness was a blunder that required corrections for its effects. It was an adventitious outgrowth that made us into a race of contradictory beings— uncanny things that have nothing to do with the rest of creation. Because of consciousness, parent of all horrors, we became susceptible to thoughts that were startling and dreadful to us, thoughts that have never been equitably balanced by those that are collected and reassuring. Our minds now began dredging up horrors, flagrantly joyless possibilities, enough of them to make us drop to the ground in paroxysms of self-soiling consternation should they go untrammeled. This potentiality necessitated that certain defense mechanisms be put to use to keep us balanced on the knife-edge of vitality as a species. While a modicum of consciousness may have had survivalist properties during an immemorial chapter of our evolution— so one theory goes— this faculty soon enough became a seditious agent working against us. As Zapffe concluded, we need to hamper our consciousness for all we are worth or it will impose upon us a too clear vision of what we do not want to see, which, as the Norwegian philosopher saw it, along with every other pessimist, is “the brotherhood of suffering between everything alive.” Whether or not one agrees that there is a “brotherhood of suffering between everything alive,” we can all agree that human beings are the only organisms that can have such a conception of existence, or any conception period. That we can conceive of the phenomenon of suffering, our own as well as that of other organisms, is a property unique to us as a dangerously conscious species. We know there is suffering, and we do take action against it, which includes downplaying it by “artificially limiting the content of consciousness.” Between taking action against and downplaying suffering, mainly the latter, most of us do not worry that it has overly sullied our existence. As a fact, we cannot give suffering precedence in either our individual or collective lives. We have to get on with things, and those who give precedence to suffering will be left behind. They fetter us with their sniveling. We have someplace to go and must believe we can get there, wherever that may be. And to conceive that there is a “brotherhood of suffering between everything alive” would disable us from getting anywhere. We are preoccupied with the good life, and step by step are working toward a better life. What we do, as a conscious species, is set markers for ourselves. Once we reach one marker, we advance to the next— as if we were playing a board game we think will never end, despite the fact that it will, like it or not. And if you are too conscious of not liking it, then you may conceive of yourself as a biological paradox that cannot live with its consciousness and cannot live without it. And in so living and not living, you take your place with the undead and the human puppet. Undoing I For the rest of the earth’s organisms, existence is relatively uncomplicated. Their lives are about three things: survival, reproduction, death— and nothing else. But we know too much to content ourselves with surviving, reproducing, dying— and nothing else. We know we are alive and know we will die. We also know we will suffer during our lives before suffering— slowly or quickly— as we draw near to death. This is the knowledge we “enjoy” as the most intelligent organisms to gush from the womb of nature . And being so, we feel shortchanged if there is nothing else for us than to survive, reproduce, and die. We want there to be more to it than that, or to think there is. This is the tragedy: Consciousness has forced us into the paradoxical position of striving to be unself-conscious of what we are— hunks of spoiling flesh on disintegrating bones. Nonhuman occupants of this planet are unaware of death. But we are susceptible to startling and dreadful thoughts, and we need some fabulous illusions to take our minds off them. For us, then, life is a confidence trick we must run on ourselves, hoping we do not catch on to any monkey business that would leave us stripped of our defense mechanisms and standing stark naked before the silent, staring void. To end this self-deception, to free our species of the paradoxical imperative to be and not to be conscious, our backs breaking by degrees upon a wheel of lies, we must cease reproducing. Nothing less will do, per Zapffe, although in “The Last Messiah” the character after whom the essay is named does all the talking about human extinction. Elsewhere Zapffe speaks for himself on the subject. The sooner humanity dares to harmonize itself with its biological predicament, the better. And this means to willingly withdraw in contempt for its worldly terms, just as the heat-craving species went extinct when temperatures dropped. To us, it is the moral climate of the cosmos that is intolerable, and a two-child policy could make our discontinuance a pain-free one. Yet instead we are expanding and succeeding everywhere, as necessity has taught us to mutilate the formula in our hearts. Perhaps the most unreasonable effect of such invigorating vulgarization is the doctrine that the individual “has a duty” to suffer nameless agony and a terrible death if this saves or benefits the rest of his group. Anyone who declines is subjected to doom and death, instead of revulsion being directed at the world-order engendering of the situation. To any independent observer, this plainly is to juxtapose incommensurable things; no future triumph or metamorphosis can justify the pitiful blighting of a human being against his will. It is upon a pavement of battered destinies that the survivors storm ahead toward new bland sensations and mass deaths. (“ Fragments of an Interview,” Aftenposten, 1959) More provocative than it is astonishing, Zapffe’s thought is perhaps the most elementary in the history of philosophical pessimism. As penetrable as it is cheerless, it rests on taboo commonplaces and outlawed truisms while eschewing the recondite brain-twisters of his forerunners, all of whom engaged in the kind of convoluted cerebration that for thousands of years has been philosophy’s stock in trade. For example, The World as Will and Representation (two volumes, 1819 and 1844) by the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer lays out one of the most absorbingly intricate metaphysical systems ever contrived— a quasi-mystical elaboration of a “Will-to-live” as the hypostasis of reality, a mindless and untiring master of all being, a directionless force that makes everything do what it does, an imbecilic puppeteer that sustains the ruckus of our world. But Schopenhauer’s Will-to-live, commendable as it may seem as a hypothesis, is too overwrought in the proving to be anything more than another intellectual labyrinth for specialists in perplexity. Comparatively, Zapffe’s principles are non-technical and could never arouse the passion of professors or practitioners of philosophy, who typically circle around the minutiae of theories and not the gross facts of our lives. If we must think, it should be done only in circles, outside of which lies the unthinkable. Evidence: While commentators on Schopenhauer’s thought have seized upon it as a philosophical system ripe for academic analysis, they do not emphasize that its ideal endpoint— the denial of the Will-to-live—is a construct for the end of human existence. But even Schopenhauer himself did not push this as aspect of his philosophy to its ideal endpoint, which has kept him in fair repute as a philosopher.

<h4>People will choose poorly -- humans are psychologically wired to lie to themselves about the pain and suffering of the world- life is not alright, and we must destroy the future</h4><p><u><strong>Ligotti ‘12</u></strong> (Thomas (2012-06-23). The Conspiracy against the Human Race: A Contrivance of Horror (Kindle Locations 111-126). Hippocampus Press. Kindle Edition)</p><p>Established: Consciousness is not often viewed as being an instrument of tragedy in human life. But to Zapffe, <u><mark>consciousness would long past have proved fatal for human beings if we did not do something about it.</u></mark> “Why,” Zapffe asked, “has mankind not long ago gone extinct during great epidemics of madness? Why do only a fairly minor number of individuals perish because they fail to endure the strain of living— because cognition gives them more than they can carry?” Zapffe’s answer: “<u><mark>Most people learn to save themselves by artificially limiting the content of consciousness</u></mark>.” From an evolutionary viewpoint, in Zapffe’s observation, <u>consciousness was <mark>a blunder that required corrections for its effects.</u></mark> It was an adventitious outgrowth that made us into a race of contradictory beings— uncanny things that have nothing to do with the rest of creation. <u><mark>Because of consciousness, parent of all horrors, we became susceptible to thoughts that were startling and dreadful</mark> to us, <mark>thoughts that have never been equitably balanced by those that are collected</mark> and reassuring. <mark>Our minds now began dredging up horrors</mark>, flagrantly joyless possibilities<mark>, enough</mark> of them <mark>to make us drop to the ground in paroxysms of self-soiling consternation</mark> should they go untrammeled. <mark>This potentiality necessitated</mark> that <mark>certain defense mechanisms</mark> be put to use <mark>to keep us</mark> balanced <mark>on the knife-edge of vitality as a species.</u></mark> While a modicum of consciousness may have had survivalist properties during an immemorial chapter of our evolution— so one theory goes— <u>this faculty soon enough became a seditious agent working against us.</u> As Zapffe concluded, <u><mark>we need to hamper our consciousness</mark> for all we are worth <mark>or it will impose upon us a too clear vision of what we do not want to see, which,</mark> as the Norwegian philosopher saw it, along with every other pessimist, <mark>is “the brotherhood of suffering between everything alive.”</u></mark> Whether or not one agrees that there is a “brotherhood of suffering between everything alive,” we can all agree that human beings are the only organisms that can have such a conception of existence, or any conception period. <u>That we can conceive of the phenomenon of suffering, our own as well as that of other organisms, is a property unique to us as a dangerously conscious species.</u> We know there is suffering, and we do take action against it, which includes downplaying it by “artificially limiting the content of consciousness.” Between taking action against and downplaying suffering, mainly the latter, most of us do not worry that it has overly sullied our existence. As a fact, we cannot give suffering precedence in either our individual or collective lives. We have to get on with things, and those who give precedence to suffering will be left behind. They fetter us with their sniveling. We have someplace to go and must believe we can get there, wherever that may be. And to conceive that there is a “brotherhood of suffering between everything alive” would disable us from getting anywhere. <u><mark>We are preoccupied with the good life</mark>, and step by step are working toward a better life. What <mark>we</mark> do, as a conscious species, is <mark>set markers for ourselves.</mark> Once we reach one marker, we advance to the next— as if we were playing a board game we think will never end, despite the fact that it will, like it or not</u>. And if you are too conscious of not liking it, then you may conceive of yourself as a biological paradox that cannot live with its consciousness and cannot live without it. And in so living and not living, you take your place with the undead and the human puppet. Undoing I For the rest of the earth’s organisms, existence is relatively uncomplicated. Their lives are about three things: survival, reproduction, death— and nothing else. But <u><mark>we know too much to content ourselves with surviving, reproducing, dying</mark>— and nothing else. <mark>We know we are alive</mark> and know we will die. <mark>We also know we will suffer during our lives before suffering</mark>— slowly or quickly— as we draw near to death. This is the knowledge we “enjoy</u>” as the most intelligent organisms to gush from the womb of nature . And being so, we feel shortchanged if there is nothing else for us than to survive, reproduce, and die. <u><mark>We want there to be more</mark> to it than that, or to think there is. <mark>This is the tragedy: Consciousness has forced us into the paradoxical position of striving to be unself-conscious of what we are— hunks of spoiling flesh on disintegrating bones.</mark> Nonhuman occupants of this planet are unaware of death. But we are susceptible to startling and dreadful thoughts, and we need some fabulous illusions to take our minds off them. For us, then, <strong><mark>life is a confidence trick</strong></mark> we must run on ourselves,</u> hoping we do not catch on to any monkey business that would leave us stripped of our defense mechanisms and standing stark naked before the silent, staring void. <u><mark>To end this <strong>self-deception</strong>, to free our species of the paradoxical imperative to be</mark> and not to be conscious, <mark>our backs breaking by degrees upon a wheel of lies, we must cease reproducing</mark>. Nothing less will do</u>, per Zapffe, although in “The Last Messiah” the character after whom the essay is named does all the talking about <u><strong><mark>human</mark> <mark>extinction</u></strong></mark>. Elsewhere Zapffe speaks for himself on the subject. <u><strong><mark>The sooner</u></strong></mark> humanity dares to harmonize itself with its biological predicament, <u><strong><mark>the better</u></strong>.<u> </mark>And <mark>this means to willingly withdraw</mark> in contempt for its worldly terms, just as the heat-craving species went extinct when temperatures dropped.</u> To us, it is the moral climate of the cosmos that is intolerable, and a two-child policy could make our discontinuance a pain-free one. Yet instead we are expanding and succeeding everywhere, as necessity has taught us to mutilate the formula in our hearts. Perhaps the most unreasonable effect of such invigorating vulgarization is the doctrine that the individual “has a duty” to suffer nameless agony and a terrible death if this saves or benefits the rest of his group. Anyone who declines is subjected to doom and death, instead of revulsion being directed at the world-order engendering of the situation. To any independent observer, this plainly is to juxtapose incommensurable things; <u><mark>no future triumph</mark> or metamorphosis <mark>can justify the pitiful blighting of a human being</u></mark> against his will. <u><mark>It is upon a pavement of battered destinies that the survivors storm ahead toward new</mark> bland sensations and <mark>mass deaths.</u></mark> (“ Fragments of an Interview,” Aftenposten, 1959) More provocative than it is astonishing, Zapffe’s thought is perhaps the most elementary in the history of philosophical pessimism. As penetrable as it is cheerless, it rests on taboo commonplaces and outlawed truisms while eschewing the recondite brain-twisters of his forerunners, all of whom engaged in the kind of convoluted cerebration that for thousands of years has been philosophy’s stock in trade. For example, The World as Will and Representation (two volumes, 1819 and 1844) by the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer lays out one of the most absorbingly intricate metaphysical systems ever contrived— a quasi-mystical elaboration of a “Will-to-live” as the hypostasis of reality, a mindless and untiring master of all being, a directionless force that makes everything do what it does, an imbecilic puppeteer that sustains the ruckus of our world. But Schopenhauer’s Will-to-live, commendable as it may seem as a hypothesis, is too overwrought in the proving to be anything more than another intellectual labyrinth for specialists in perplexity. Comparatively, Zapffe’s principles are non-technical and could never arouse the passion of professors or practitioners of philosophy, who typically circle around the minutiae of theories and not the gross facts of our lives. If we must think, it should be done only in circles, outside of which lies the unthinkable. Evidence: <u>While commentators on Schopenhauer’s thought have seized upon it as a philosophical system ripe for academic analysis, they do not emphasize that its ideal endpoint— the denial of the Will-to-live—is a construct for <mark>the end of human existence</mark>. </u>But<u> <mark>even Schopenhauer</mark> himself <mark>did not push this</mark> as aspect of his philosophy <mark>to its ideal endpoint</u></mark>, which has kept him in fair repute as a philosopher.</p>

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1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k

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Adaptation solves

Gladwell, 1999

Gladwell, 1999 Malcolm Gladwell, The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 29

As humans and new microorganisms interact, they accommodate each other populations build resistance to infections. What were once virulent infections become attenuated. Over time, diseases of adults become limited to children, whose immune systems are still naïve.

As humans and new microorganisms interact, they accommodate each other populations build resistance to infections. What were once virulent infections attenuated. Over time, diseases become limited to children, whose immune systems are still naïve

In Plagues and Peoples, which appeared in 1977. William MeNeill pointed out that…while man’s efforts to “remodel” his environment are sometimes a source of new disease. they are seldom a source of serious epidemic disease. Quite the opposite. As humans and new microorganisms interact, they begin to accommodate each other. Human populations slowly build up resistance to circulating infections. What were once virulent infections, such as syphilis become attenuated. Over time, diseases of adults, such as measles and chicken pox, become limited to children, whose immune systems are still naïve.

<h4><u>Adaptation solves</h4><p></u><strong>Gladwell, 1999</p><p><u>Malcolm Gladwell, The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 29</p><p></u></strong>In Plagues and Peoples, which appeared in 1977. William MeNeill pointed out that…while man’s efforts to “remodel” his environment are sometimes a source of new disease. they are seldom a source of serious epidemic disease. Quite the opposite. <u><strong><mark>As humans and new microorganisms interact, they</u></strong></mark> begin to <u><strong><mark>accommodate each other</u></strong></mark>. Human <u><strong><mark>populations</u></strong></mark> slowly <u><strong><mark>build</u></strong></mark> up <u><strong><mark>resistance to</u></strong></mark> circulating <u><strong><mark>infections. What were once virulent infections</u></strong></mark>, such as syphilis <u><strong>become<mark> attenuated. Over time, diseases</mark> of adults</u></strong>, such as measles and chicken pox, <u><strong><mark>become limited to children, whose immune systems are still naïve</mark>. </p></u></strong>

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Environmental apocalypticism is a profoundly conservative force which shuts down deliberation and stultifies environmental movements

Coward 14

Coward 14 (Jonathan Coward, MSc in Environment, Culture, and Society from the University of Edinburgh, 2014, “‘How’s that for an Ending?’ Apocalyptic Narratives and Environmental Degradation: Foreclosing Genuine Solutions, or Rhetorical Necessity?”) gz

What, then, is the function of the ‘environmental apocalypse’ The inclusion of an apocalyptic tone says implicitly or explicitly: Either the status quo must change, or humanity and nature will end the implementation of the apocalyptic narrative is employed both to increase the saliency of environmental issues in the minds of the public and to encourage change on an individual or collective level although awareness of environmental issues is now very high, they continue to be low priority for many although the role of apocalypse in environmentalism appears to be useful in theory, this is not necessarily translated into reality the intended consequences of framing environmental degradation in an apocalyptic manner do not always materialize Instead, the result is not that of transformation, but of a perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation, and thus the possibility of change becomes its opposite empirical evidence shows that the criticism is valid and that apocalyptic rhetoric can disengages the wider public from partaking in environmental activism In Feinberg and Willer’s study, individuals who were primed with just-world statements, followed by exposure to dire messages of the severity of global warming, reported higher levels of climate change skepticism participants were also less likely to change their lifestyle to reduce their carbon footprint ecology has been perceived as having quasireligious qualities a prophetic ecology cannot espouse radical change because, like religion, it in fact holds an inherently conservative worldview the opposition is to a highly political ideology of progress based upon the technological domination of organic life in the name of capitalist productivism and economic growth it is acknowledged that natural limits and environmental tipping points exist. Despite this knowledge, production and consumption continue at increasing rates, while natural resources are depleted, and natural habitats are polluted It relates to the reality perceived by humankind in present day capitalism the physical world is no longer as real to us as the economic world our politicians gear every decision to speeding further its growth.” This is the phenomenon of ‘capitalist realism where economy assumes the role of reality everything in existence is “organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute It is the failure to see capitalist social relations as what they truly are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and ultimately to Earth’s environmental system It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism environmental problems are “commonly staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind,” and that the apocalyptic environmental narratives that stem from this, are populist, resisting a proper political framing in the traditional left-right sense This results in the insistence that the fear-inducing threat is merely a technical problem, requiring techno-managers to take charge a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral any problem, environmental or otherwise is managed upon economic terms to ultimately serve capital Klein describes numerous examples of this tendency, such as the mass privatization of the public school system in New Orleans, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina the pervasiveness of capitalist realism in the context of catastrophe is evident the framing of catastrophe as crisis implies that total (environmental) devastation is something to be managed within current social, political and economic institutions crisis is a conjunctural condition that requires particular techno-managerial attention using the apocalyptic imaginary to frame issues of environmental degradation isn’t only futile, rather the solutions it intends are foreclosed by the co-option of the narrative by capitalist institutions Wall-E, premised upon on a lonely robot, charged with the task of cleaning up an abandoned Earth following the global rule of the ‘Buy 'N Large’ corporatio we’re left in no doubt that consumer capitalism and corporations[… are] responsible for this depredation the film also espouses the idea of there being a technological fix to Earth’s ecological tribulations, in the form of Wall-E himself

environmental apocalypse’ says Either the status quo must change, or humanity will end although awareness of environmental issues is very high, they continue to be low priority although the role of apocalypse appears to be useful this is not translated into reality the result is perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation apocalyptic rhetoric disengages the public from environmental activism In Willer’s study, individuals primed with just-world statements, followed by dire messages reported higher levels of skepticism participants were less likely to change their lifestyle it is acknowledged that natural limits exist. Despite this production and consumption continue This is the phenomenon of ‘capitalist realism’ capitalist social relations are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and Earth’s environment It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism environmental narratives are populist, resisting a proper political framing in the traditional left-right sense This results in the insistence that the fear-inducing threat is a technical problem a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral such as privatization of the school system in the wake of Hurricane Katrina the framing of catastrophe implies devastation is to be managed within current institutions the solutions are foreclosed by co-option by capitalist institutions

What, then, is the function of the ‘environmental apocalypse’, and how might it be perceived as a rhetorical necessity? I perceive it to have two core functions. The first is that apocalypse acts as a teleological-critical tool and second, that it indeed has a political role in environmentalism. First, environmental literatures, such as those specified above, can be seen to have traditionally served the two primary functions of criticism: diagnostic, and remedial. The inclusion of an apocalyptic tone adds a third aspect, oriented to the future. Put simply, this teleological-critical function says implicitly or explicitly: Either the status quo must change, or humanity and nature will end. Second, in uncovering this desire or need to change, the implementation of the apocalyptic narrative in environmental literature is political. It is employed both to increase the saliency of environmental issues in the minds of the public and to encourage change on an individual or collective level. The technique recognizes the fact that although awareness of environmental issues is now very high, they continue to be low priority for many (Whitmarsh 2011, 691). Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 22) succinctly observe that for political change to actually occur, a transformation in consciousness is required to translate awareness into action. This is achieved through the teleological-critical function of apocalypse, thus indicating the link between its two facets. From theory to reality?: Criticisms and capitalism’s co-option It is important, however, to state that although the role of apocalypse in environmentalism appears to be useful in theory, this is not necessarily translated into reality. Ultimately, the intended consequences of framing environmental degradation in an apocalyptic manner do not always materialize. Instead, the result is not that of transformation, but of a perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation, and thus the possibility of change becomes its opposite. Criticisms of the apocalyptic tendency in environmentalism go some way towards explaining its failings. I argue that these are: alarmism; quasi-religious undertones, and anti-progressivism. The accusation that certain environmental texts—or even that environmentalism itself—tends to exaggerate to the point of alarmism is a common criticism put forward (Bailey 1993; Simon 1995, 23; Risbey 2008). Arguably, exaggeration has its merits. In a broad, philosophical sense, Adorno (2003) claims it to be the contemporary “medium of truth,” while in terms of apocalyptic narratives specifically, Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 41) claim that, “if the “predicted devastation is extreme in the apocalyptic narrative, then the change in consciousness of political agenda recommended by the narrator is correspondingly extreme or radical.” In other words, exaggeration is required, because anything less would result in mere reformism and this simply isn’t enough to protect what’s under threat. And although this is a fair rebuttal, empirical evidence shows that the criticism is valid and that apocalyptic rhetoric can disengages the wider public from partaking in environmental activism. In Feinberg and Willer’s (2011) study, individuals who were primed with just-world statements, followed by exposure to dire messages of the severity of global warming, reported higher levels of climate change skepticism (ibid, 36). These participants were also less likely to change their lifestyle to reduce their carbon footprint. This indicates a problem with the public perception of environmental apocalypticism. Furthermore, through its use of apocalyptic narratives, ecology has been perceived as having quasireligious qualities. While it is worth questioning some of the ecology-as-religion arguments made by critics such as Simon (1995, 23), the possibility that the religious qualities of ecology are more than superficial should not be dismissed. One view is that a prophetic ecology cannot espouse radical change because, like religion, it in fact holds an inherently conservative worldview. This conservatism comes in two forms. One, of lesser concern, which is neo-luddite in character, and seeks the return to a less technologically demanding time, and the other which looks to conserve present economic and political systems because change is perceived as being inherently bad. As Žižek states, although ecologists are all the time demanding that we change radically our way of life, underlying this demand is its opposite, a deep distrust of change, of development, of progress: every radical change can have the unintended consequence of triggering a catastrophe. (Žižek 2008) Instead, I would argue that ecological movements that are framed by catastrophic rhetoric do not distrust progress generally, and where radical change is argued to be necessary—i.e. Kovel’s (2002) eco-socialist agenda—that there is a genuine commitment to this change. Rather the opposition is to a highly political ideology of progress based upon the technological domination of organic life in the name of capitalist productivism and economic growth. What explains the continuing pervasiveness of the ideology of progress over ecologies which warn of its fatal dangers? It’s worth considering for a moment, the fact that it is acknowledged that natural limits and environmental tipping points exist. Despite this knowledge, production and consumption continue at increasing rates, while natural resources are depleted, and natural habitats are polluted. This is not merely a case of knowing ignorance, or Orwellian doublethink, but something greater. It relates to the reality perceived by humankind in present day capitalism. As Bill McKibben states: “[I]n some sense, the physical world is no longer as real to us as the economic world - we cosset and succor to the economy; our politicians gear every decision to speeding further its growth.” This is the phenomenon of ‘capitalist realism’ (Fisher 2009), where economy assumes the role of reality. In capitalist realism, everything in existence is “organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute.” (Swyngedouw 2013, 13) It is the failure to see capitalist social relations as what they truly are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and ultimately to Earth’s environmental system1. Applying this to apocalyptic environmental narratives, it’s clear that even with the criticalteleological function bringing to light the ultimate choice between the end of capitalism and the end of nature, capitalist realism denies the existence of the teleology, hence the oft repeated statement: It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. But, having recognized the failure and futility in using imaginaries of apocalypse to bring about change, the question remains, as to how the rhetoric of catastrophe might serve to foreclose genuine solutions. A persuasive case is put forward in the article Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures by Swyngedouw (2013). His argument consists of two central points. The first is that environmental problems are “commonly staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind,” and that the apocalyptic environmental narratives that stem from this, are populist, resisting a proper political framing in the traditional left-right sense (ibid., 11,13). This results in the insistence that the fear-inducing threat is merely a technical problem, requiring techno-managers to take charge. Of course, a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral. Therefore any problem, environmental or otherwise is managed upon economic terms to ultimately serve capital (ibid., 13). Naomi Klein’s Shock Doctrine (2008) describes numerous examples of this tendency, such as the mass privatization of the public school system in New Orleans, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina: “The administration of George W. Bush[… provided] tens of millions of dollars to convert New Orleans schools into[…] publicly funded institutions run by private entities.” (Klein 2008, 5) Here, the pervasiveness of capitalist realism in the context of catastrophe is evident. Additionally, the framing of catastrophe as crisis implies that total (environmental) devastation is something to be managed within current social, political and economic institutions: While catastrophe denotes the irreversible radical transformation of the existing into a spiralling abyssal decline, crisis is a conjunctural condition that requires particular techno-managerial attention. (Klein 2008, 10) This has been especially clear in attempts to manage parts of nature that are likely to be subject to - or subject of - some degree of catastrophe, such as ecosystems, valorized for the purposes of conservation (i.e. UK National Ecosystems Assessment 2011), and carbon, commodified as permits to be freely traded within a carbon-market (ibid, 13). Thus, it should be clear that using the apocalyptic imaginary to frame issues of environmental degradation isn’t only futile, rather the solutions it intends are foreclosed by the co-option of the narrative by capitalist institutions. Finally, could it even be argued that the aforementioned mass-culture of armageddon—an expression of the ongoing, popular fascination with the end—is free from capitalist realism? I would agree with Fisher (2009) in saying that perhaps it isn’t. Take for example, Disney Pixar’s 2008 film, Wall-E, premised upon on a lonely robot, charged with the task of cleaning up an abandoned Earth following the global rule of the ‘Buy 'N Large’ corporation2. Fisher (ibid.) argues that “we’re left in no doubt that consumer capitalism and corporations[… are] responsible for this depredation[…] but the film performs our anti-capitalism for us, allowing us to continue to consume with impunity.” Moreover, in relation to the ideology of progress, the film also espouses the idea of there being a technological fix to Earth’s ecological tribulations, in the form of Wall-E himself. Even in post-apocalyptic drama, The Road (2009), motifs of capitalist ideology are present. Despite the fall of society and the wrecking of nature, ideas of self-interested behavior persist, in the strikingly Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’, for human flesh.3

<h4>Environmental apocalypticism is a profoundly conservative force which shuts down deliberation and stultifies environmental movements</h4><p><u><strong>Coward 14</u></strong> (Jonathan Coward, MSc in Environment, Culture, and Society from the University of Edinburgh, 2014, “‘How’s that for an Ending?’ Apocalyptic Narratives and Environmental Degradation: Foreclosing Genuine Solutions, or Rhetorical Necessity?”) gz</p><p><u>What, then, is the function of the ‘<mark>environmental apocalypse’</u></mark>, and how might it be perceived as a rhetorical necessity? I perceive it to have two core functions. The first is that apocalypse acts as a teleological-critical tool and second, that it indeed has a political role in environmentalism.</p><p>First, environmental literatures, such as those specified above, can be seen to have traditionally served the two primary functions of criticism: diagnostic, and remedial. <u>The inclusion of an apocalyptic tone</u> adds a third aspect, oriented to the future. Put simply, this teleological-critical function <u><mark>says</mark> implicitly or explicitly: <mark>Either the status quo must change, or humanity</mark> and nature <mark>will end</u></mark>. Second, in uncovering this desire or need to change, <u>the implementation of the apocalyptic narrative</u> in environmental literature is political. It <u>is employed both to increase the saliency of environmental issues in the minds of the public and to encourage change on an individual or collective level</u>. The technique recognizes the fact that <u><mark>although awareness of environmental issues is</mark> <strong>now <mark>very high</strong>, they continue to be <strong>low priority</strong></mark> for many</u> (Whitmarsh 2011, 691). Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 22) succinctly observe that for political change to actually occur, a transformation in consciousness is required to translate awareness into action. This is achieved through the teleological-critical function of apocalypse, thus indicating the link between its two facets.</p><p>From theory to reality?: Criticisms and capitalism’s co-option</p><p>It is important, however, to state that <u><mark>although the role of apocalypse</mark> in environmentalism <mark>appears to be useful</mark> in theory, <strong><mark>this is not</mark> necessarily <mark>translated into reality</u></strong></mark>. Ultimately, <u>the intended consequences of framing environmental degradation in an apocalyptic manner <strong>do not always materialize</u></strong>. <u>Instead, <mark>the result is</mark> not that of transformation, but of a <strong><mark>perpetuation of the political and economic forces that underlie environmental degradation</strong></mark>, and thus the possibility of change becomes its opposite</u>. Criticisms of the apocalyptic tendency in environmentalism go some way towards explaining its failings. I argue that these are: alarmism; quasi-religious undertones, and anti-progressivism.</p><p>The accusation that certain environmental texts—or even that environmentalism itself—tends to exaggerate to the point of alarmism is a common criticism put forward (Bailey 1993; Simon 1995, 23; Risbey 2008). Arguably, exaggeration has its merits. In a broad, philosophical sense, Adorno (2003) claims it to be the contemporary “medium of truth,” while in terms of apocalyptic narratives specifically, Killingsworth and Palmer (1996, 41) claim that, “if the “predicted devastation is extreme in the apocalyptic narrative, then the change in consciousness of political agenda recommended by the narrator is correspondingly extreme or radical.” In other words, exaggeration is required, because anything less would result in mere reformism and this simply isn’t enough to protect what’s under threat. And although this is a fair rebuttal, <u>empirical evidence shows that the criticism is valid and that <mark>apocalyptic rhetoric</mark> can <strong><mark>disengages the </mark>wider <mark>public from</mark> partaking in <mark>environmental activism</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>In </mark>Feinberg and <mark>Willer’s</u></mark> (2011) <u><mark>study, individuals</mark> who were <mark>primed with just-world statements, followed by</mark> exposure to <mark>dire messages</mark> of the severity of global warming, <mark>reported <strong>higher levels of </mark>climate change <mark>skepticism</u></strong></mark> (ibid, 36). These <u><mark>participants were</mark> also <strong><mark>less likely to change their lifestyle</strong></mark> to reduce their carbon footprint</u>. This indicates a problem with the public perception of environmental apocalypticism.</p><p>Furthermore, through its use of apocalyptic narratives, <u>ecology has been perceived as having quasireligious qualities</u>. While it is worth questioning some of the ecology-as-religion arguments made by critics such as Simon (1995, 23), the possibility that the religious qualities of ecology are more than superficial should not be dismissed. One view is that <u>a prophetic ecology <strong>cannot espouse radical change</strong> because, like religion, it in fact holds an inherently conservative worldview</u>. This conservatism comes in two forms. One, of lesser concern, which is neo-luddite in character, and seeks the return to a less technologically demanding time, and the other which looks to conserve present economic and political systems because change is perceived as being inherently bad. As Žižek states, although ecologists are all the time demanding that we change radically our way of life, underlying this demand is its opposite, a deep distrust of change, of development, of progress: every radical change can have the unintended consequence of triggering a catastrophe. (Žižek 2008) Instead, I would argue that ecological movements that are framed by catastrophic rhetoric do not distrust progress generally, and where radical change is argued to be necessary—i.e. Kovel’s (2002) eco-socialist agenda—that there is a genuine commitment to this change. Rather <u>the opposition is to a highly political ideology of progress based upon the technological domination of organic life in the name of capitalist productivism and economic growth</u>.</p><p>What explains the continuing pervasiveness of the ideology of progress over ecologies which warn of its fatal dangers? It’s worth considering for a moment, the fact that <u><mark>it is acknowledged that natural limits</mark> and environmental tipping points <mark>exist. Despite this</mark> knowledge, <mark>production and consumption continue</mark> at increasing rates, while natural resources are depleted, and natural habitats are polluted</u>. This is not merely a case of knowing ignorance, or Orwellian doublethink, but something greater. <u>It relates to the reality perceived by humankind in present day capitalism</u>.</p><p>As Bill McKibben states: “[I]n some sense, <u><strong>the physical world is no longer as real to us as the economic world</u></strong> - we cosset and succor to the economy; <u>our politicians gear every decision to speeding further its growth.” <mark>This is the phenomenon of ‘capitalist realism</u>’</mark> (Fisher 2009), <u>where <strong>economy assumes the role of reality</u></strong>. In capitalist realism, <u>everything in existence is “organized within the horizons of a capitalist order that is beyond dispute</u>.” (Swyngedouw 2013, 13) <u>It is the failure to see <mark>capitalist social relations</mark> as what they truly <mark>are: a social construct answerable to humankind, and</mark> ultimately to <mark>Earth’s environment</mark>al system</u>1.</p><p>Applying this to apocalyptic environmental narratives, it’s clear that even with the criticalteleological function bringing to light the ultimate choice between the end of capitalism and the end of nature, capitalist realism denies the existence of the teleology, hence the oft repeated statement: <u><strong><mark>It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism</u></strong></mark>. But, having recognized the failure and futility in using imaginaries of apocalypse to bring about change, the question remains, as to how the rhetoric of catastrophe might serve to foreclose genuine solutions.</p><p>A persuasive case is put forward in the article Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures by Swyngedouw (2013). His argument consists of two central points. The first is that <u>environmental problems are “commonly staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind,” and that the apocalyptic <mark>environmental narratives</mark> that stem from this, <mark>are <strong>populist</strong>, resisting a proper political framing in the traditional left-right sense</u></mark> (ibid., 11,13). <u><mark>This results in the insistence that the fear-inducing threat is</mark> <strong>merely <mark>a technical problem</strong></mark>, requiring techno-managers to take charge</u>. Of course, <u><strong><mark>a technocracy in capitalist society is not politically neutral</u></strong></mark>. Therefore <u>any problem, environmental or otherwise is managed upon economic terms to ultimately serve capital</u> (ibid., 13). Naomi <u>Klein</u>’s Shock Doctrine (2008) <u>describes numerous examples of this tendency, <mark>such as</mark> the mass <mark>privatization of the</mark> public <mark>school system</mark> in New Orleans, <mark>in the wake of Hurricane Katrina</u></mark>: “The administration of George W. Bush[… provided] tens of millions of dollars to convert New Orleans schools into[…] publicly funded institutions run by private entities.” (Klein 2008, 5) Here, <u>the pervasiveness of capitalist realism in the context of catastrophe is evident</u>.</p><p>Additionally, <u><mark>the framing of catastrophe</mark> as crisis <mark>implies</mark> that total (environmental) <mark>devastation is</mark> something <mark>to be managed within current</mark> social, political and economic <mark>institutions</u></mark>: While catastrophe denotes the irreversible radical transformation of the existing into a spiralling abyssal decline, <u>crisis is a conjunctural condition that requires particular techno-managerial attention</u>. (Klein 2008, 10) This has been especially clear in attempts to manage parts of nature that are likely to be subject to - or subject of - some degree of catastrophe, such as ecosystems, valorized for the purposes of conservation (i.e. UK National Ecosystems Assessment 2011), and carbon, commodified as permits to be freely traded within a carbon-market (ibid, 13). Thus, it should be clear that <u>using the apocalyptic imaginary to frame issues of environmental degradation isn’t only futile, rather <mark>the solutions </mark>it intends <mark>are <strong>foreclosed by </mark>the <mark>co-option </mark>of the narrative <mark>by capitalist institutions</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Finally, could it even be argued that the aforementioned mass-culture of armageddon—an expression of the ongoing, popular fascination with the end—is free from capitalist realism? I would agree with Fisher (2009) in saying that perhaps it isn’t. Take for example, Disney Pixar’s 2008 film, <u>Wall-E, premised upon on a lonely robot, charged with the task of cleaning up an abandoned Earth following the global rule of the ‘Buy 'N Large’ corporatio</u>n2. Fisher (ibid.) argues that “<u>we’re left in no doubt that consumer capitalism and corporations[… are] responsible for this depredation</u>[…] but the film performs our anti-capitalism for us, allowing us to continue to consume with impunity.” Moreover, in relation to the ideology of progress, <u>the film also espouses the idea of there being a technological fix to Earth’s ecological tribulations, in the form of Wall-E himself</u>. Even in post-apocalyptic drama, The Road (2009), motifs of capitalist ideology are present. Despite the fall of society and the wrecking of nature, ideas of self-interested behavior persist, in the strikingly Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’, for human flesh.3</p>

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1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case

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3. Their Western conception of death is incompatible with the alt

Butterfield 2002

Butterfield 2002 (Bradley. University of Wisconsin, La Crosse M.A. and Ph.D. in Comparative Literature, University of Oregon. The Baudrillardian Symbolic, 9(11, and the War of Good and Evil. PMC 13.1 2002. Project Muse.)

The anagram in Saussure, the Witz in Freud, graffiti in New York, the Accident in the media are all treated by Baudrillard as symbolic events wherein death, denied and repressed, poses a challenge to life. From the standpoint of 9(11, his theory of death in primitive and modern cultures is most pertinent. Like Foucault, Baudrillard sees the history of Western culture in terms of a genealogy of discrimination and exclusion: At the very core of the "rationality" of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death. the dead in primitive societies played integral roles in the lives of the living by serving as partners in symbolic exchange. A gift to the dead was believed to yield a return, and by exchanging with the dead through ritual sacrifices, celebrations and feasts, they managed to absorb the rupturing energy of death back into the group. But there is an irreversible evolution from savage societies to our own: little by little, the dead cease to exist They are thrown out of the group's symbolic circulation. They are no longer beings with a full role to play, worthy partners in exchange....Today it is not normal to be dead, and this is new. . . . Death is a delinquency, and an incurable deviancy. Modern Western cultures have largely ceased to exchange with the dead collectively, partly because we no longer believe in their continued existence, and partly because we no longer value that which cannot be accumulated or consumed. The dead have no value by our measurements. We give them nothing and expect nothing from them in return, and yet they remain with us, in our memories, obligating our recognition and response The primitives, Baudrillard maintains, responded to this challenge collectively through symbolic exchanges with their dead and deities. Their belief in the sign's transparency, its symbolic singularity, can be seen in animistic practices such as voodoo, where the enemy's hair is thought to contain his or her spirit. If the dead are only humans of a different nature, and if the sign is what it stands for, then a symbolic sacrifice to a dead person is every bit as binding as a gift to a living person . But Americans are not "primitives"--we do not value death symbolically, but rather only as a subtraction from life. Capitalism's implicit promise, in every ad campaign and marketing strategy, is that to consume is to live. Because we devalue death and thereby the dead, we view them only as a dreaded caste of unfortunates, and not as continuing partners in exchange. Ultimately, however, it is not so much the dead but our own deaths, our negative doubles, that we insult by denying their value. When we posit death as the negation of life, we bifurcate our identities and begin a process of mourning over our own eventual deaths, a process which lasts our whole lives. The more we devalue our death-images, that is, the greater they become, until they haunt our every moment, as in Don DeLillo's darkest comedy, White Noise. This leads us, according to Baudrillard, to an obsession with death that can be felt in the media fascination with catastrophes like 9(11. Death "becomes the object of a perverse desire.

by exchanging with the dead through ritual they managed to absorb the rupturing energy of death back into the group. little by little, the dead cease to exist They are thrown out of circulation. Today it is not normal to be dead, and this is new. . . . Death is a delinquency we no longer value that which cannot be accumulated or consumed. The dead have no value We give them nothing and expect nothing from them in return If the dead are only humans of a different nature then a symbolic sacrifice is every bit as binding as a gift to a living person Americans do not value death symbolically, but as a subtraction from life to consume is to live When we posit death as the negation of life we bifurcate our identities and begin mourning over our own eventual deaths, a process which lasts our whole lives. The more we devalue our death-images the greater they become, until they haunt our every moment, This leads us to an obsession with death that can be felt in the media fascination with catastrophes like 9(11. Death "becomes the object of a perverse desire.

Despite this transparent warning, in Symbolic Exchange and Death (1976) Baudrillard went on to sketch several examples of symbolic exchange in relation to death in today's political economy. The anagram in Saussure, the Witz in Freud, graffiti in New York, the Accident in the media are all treated by Baudrillard as symbolic events wherein death, denied and repressed, poses a challenge to life. From the standpoint of 9(11, his theory of death in primitive and modern cultures is most pertinent. Like Foucault, Baudrillard sees the history of Western culture in terms of a genealogy of discrimination and exclusion: At the very core of the "rationality" of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death. (Symbolic 126) According to Baudrillard, the dead in primitive societies played integral roles in the lives of the living by serving as partners in symbolic exchange. A gift to the dead was believed to yield a return, and by exchanging with the dead through ritual sacrifices, celebrations and feasts, they managed to absorb the rupturing energy of death back into the group. But there is an irreversible evolution from savage societies to our own: little by little, the dead cease to exist. They are thrown out of the group's symbolic circulation. They are no longer beings with a full role to play, worthy partners in exchange....Today it is not normal to be dead, and this is new. . . . Death is a delinquency, and an incurable deviancy. (126) Modern Western cultures have largely ceased to exchange with the dead collectively, partly because we no longer believe in their continued existence, and partly because we no longer value that which cannot be accumulated or consumed. The dead have no value by our measurements. We give them nothing and expect nothing from them in return, and yet they remain with us, in our memories, obligating our recognition and response. How do we respond to the symbolic challenge of death and the dead, the challenge they pose to our conscious experience? This is the question of 9(11. The primitives, Baudrillard maintains, responded to this challenge collectively through symbolic exchanges with their dead and deities. Their belief in the sign's transparency, its symbolic singularity, can be seen in animistic practices such as voodoo, where the enemy's hair is thought to contain his or her spirit. If the dead are only humans of a different nature, and if the sign is what it stands for, then a symbolic sacrifice to a dead person is every bit as binding as a gift to a living person. The obligation to return is placed upon the dead, and they reciprocate by somehow honoring or benefiting the living. Most Christians believe in and employ this same mechanism when they pray to the resurrected Christ, but even they do not believe that their symbolic gestures are anything but metaphors. We no longer believe in the one to one correspondence of signifier and signified, and we know the loved one is not really contained in the lock of hair. Americans will doubtless commemorate the deaths of those killed on 9(11 as long as our nation exists, but we know that our gifts to the dead are only symbolic, which for us means imaginary. Baudrillard's postmodern-primitive symbolic, on the other hand, aimed to obliterate the difference in value between the imaginary and the real, the signifier and the signified, and to expose the metaphysical prejudice at the heart of all such valuations. His wager was that this would be done through aesthetic violence and not real violence, but having erased the difference between the two, there was never any guarantee that others wouldn't take such theoretical "violence" to its literal ends. Graffiti art, scarification and tattooing are just the benign counterparts of true terrorism, which takes ritual sacrifice and initiation to their extremes. Literalists and extremists, fundamentalists of all sorts, find their logic foretold in Baudrillard's references to the primitives. What the terrorists enacted on 9(11 was what Baudrillard would call a symbolic event of the first order, and they were undeniably primitive in their belief that God, the dead, and the living would somehow honor and benefit them in the afterlife. Unable to defeat the U.S. in economic or military terms, they employ the rule of prestation in symbolic exchange with the gift of their own deaths. But Americans are not "primitives"--we do not value death symbolically, but rather only as a subtraction from life. Capitalism's implicit promise, in every ad campaign and marketing strategy, is that to consume is to live. We score up life against death as gain against loss, as if through accumulation we achieve mastery over the qualitative presence of death that haunts life. Our official holidays honoring the dead serve no other function than to encourage consumption. When it comes to actually dealing with death and the dead, even in public, we do so in private. As Baudrillard points out, "This entails a considerable difference in enjoyment: we trade with our dead in a kind of melancholy, while the primitives live with their dead under the auspices of the ritual and the feast" (134-35). Because we devalue death and thereby the dead, we view them only as a dreaded caste of unfortunates, and not as continuing partners in exchange. Ultimately, however, it is not so much the dead but our own deaths, our negative doubles, that we insult by denying their value. When we posit death as the negation of life, we bifurcate our identities and begin a process of mourning over our own eventual deaths, a process which lasts our whole lives. The more we devalue our death-images, that is, the greater they become, until they haunt our every moment, as in Don DeLillo's darkest comedy, White Noise. This leads us, according to Baudrillard, to an obsession with death that can be felt in the media fascination with catastrophes like 9(11. Death "becomes the object of a perverse desire. Desire invests the very separation of life and death" (147). Political economy's inability to absorb the rupturing energy of death is thus compensated by the symbolic yield of the media catastrophe. In these events we experience an artificial death which fascinates us, bored as we are by the routine order of the system and the "natural" death it prescribes for us. Natural death represents an unnegotiable negation of life and the tedious certainty of an unwanted end. It therefore inspires insurrection, until "reason itself is pursued by the hope of a universal revolt against its own norms and privileges" (162). The terrorist spectacle is an example of such a revolt, in which death gains symbolic distinction and becomes more than simply "natural." We may not think we identify with the terrorists' superstitions about honor in the next life, but in events like 9(11, Baudrillard would suggest, we nevertheless identify despite ourselves with both with the terrorists and their victims: We are all hostages, and that's the secret of hostage-taking, and we are all dreaming, instead of dying stupidly working oneself to the ground, of receiving death and of giving death. Giving and receiving constitute one symbolic act (the symbolic act par excellence), which rids death of all the indifferent negativity it holds for us in the "natural" order of capital. (166)

<h4>3. Their Western conception of death is incompatible with the alt </h4><p><strong>Butterfield 2002</strong> (Bradley. University of Wisconsin, La Crosse M.A. and Ph.D. in Comparative Literature, University of Oregon. The Baudrillardian Symbolic, 9(11, and the War of Good and Evil. PMC 13.1 2002. Project Muse.) </p><p>Despite this transparent warning, in Symbolic Exchange and Death (1976) Baudrillard went on to sketch several examples of symbolic exchange in relation to death in today's political economy. <u>The anagram in Saussure, the Witz in Freud, graffiti in New York, the Accident in the media are all treated by Baudrillard as symbolic events wherein death, denied and repressed, poses a challenge to life. From the standpoint of 9(11, his theory of death in primitive and modern cultures is most pertinent. Like Foucault, Baudrillard sees the history of Western culture in terms of a genealogy of discrimination and exclusion: At the very core of the "rationality" of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: <strong>the exclusion of the dead and of death</strong>.</u> (Symbolic 126) According to Baudrillard, <u><strong>the dead</strong> in primitive societies <strong>played integral roles in the lives of the living</strong> by serving as partners in symbolic exchange. A gift to the dead was believed to yield a return, and <mark>by exchanging with the dead through ritual </mark>sacrifices, celebrations and feasts, <mark>they managed to absorb the rupturing energy of death back into the group.</mark> But</u> <u>there is an irreversible evolution from savage societies to our own: <strong><mark>little by little, the dead cease to exist</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>They are thrown out of</mark> the group's symbolic <mark>circulation.</mark> They are no longer beings with a full role to play, worthy partners in exchange....<mark>Today it is not normal to be dead, and this is new. . . . Death is a <strong>delinquency</strong></mark>, and an <strong>incurable deviancy</strong>.</u> (126) <u>Modern Western cultures have largely ceased to exchange with the dead collectively, partly because we no longer believe in their continued existence, and partly because <mark>we no longer value that which cannot be accumulated or consumed. The dead have no value</mark> by our measurements. <mark>We <strong>give them nothing</strong> and <strong>expect nothing</strong> from them in return</mark>, and yet they remain with us, in our memories, obligating our recognition and response</u>. How do we respond to the symbolic challenge of death and the dead, the challenge they pose to our conscious experience? This is the question of 9(11. <u>The primitives, Baudrillard maintains, responded to this challenge collectively through symbolic exchanges with their dead and deities. Their belief in the sign's transparency, its symbolic singularity, can be seen in animistic practices such as voodoo, where the enemy's</u> <u>hair is thought to contain his or her spirit. <mark>If the dead are only humans of a different nature</mark>, and if the sign is what it stands for, <mark>then a symbolic sacrifice </mark>to a dead person <mark>is every bit as binding as a gift to a living person</u></mark>. The obligation to return is placed upon the dead, and they reciprocate by somehow honoring or benefiting the living. Most Christians believe in and employ this same mechanism when they pray to the resurrected Christ, but even they do not believe that their symbolic gestures are anything but metaphors. We no longer believe in the one to one correspondence of signifier and signified, and we know the loved one is not really contained in the lock of hair. Americans will doubtless commemorate the deaths of those killed on 9(11 as long as our nation exists, but we know that<u> </u>our gifts to the dead are only symbolic, which for us means imaginary. Baudrillard's postmodern-primitive symbolic, on the other hand, aimed to obliterate the difference in value between the imaginary and the real, the signifier and the signified, and to expose the metaphysical prejudice at the heart of all such valuations. His wager was that this would be done through aesthetic violence and not real violence, but having erased the difference between the two, there was never any guarantee that others wouldn't take such theoretical "violence" to its literal ends. Graffiti art, scarification and tattooing are just the benign counterparts of true terrorism, which takes ritual sacrifice and initiation to their extremes. Literalists and extremists, fundamentalists of all sorts, find their logic foretold in Baudrillard's references to the primitives. What the terrorists enacted on 9(11 was what Baudrillard would call a symbolic event of the first order, and they were undeniably primitive in their belief that God, the dead, and the living would somehow honor and benefit them in the afterlife. Unable to defeat the U.S. in economic or military terms, they employ the rule of prestation in symbolic exchange with the gift of their own deaths<u>. But <mark>Americans</mark> are not "primitives"--we <mark>do not value death symbolically, but </mark>rather only <mark>as a subtraction from life</mark>. Capitalism's implicit promise, in every ad campaign and marketing strategy, is that <mark>to consume is to live</mark>.</u> We score up life against death as gain against loss, as if through accumulation we achieve mastery over the qualitative presence of death that haunts life. Our official holidays honoring the dead serve no other function than to encourage consumption. When it comes to actually dealing with death and the dead, even in public, we do so in private. As Baudrillard points out, "This entails a considerable difference in enjoyment: we trade with our dead in a kind of melancholy, while the primitives live with their dead under the auspices of the ritual and the feast" (134-35). <u>Because we devalue death and thereby the dead, we view them only as a dreaded caste of unfortunates, and not as continuing partners in exchange. Ultimately, however, it is not so much the dead but our own deaths, our negative doubles, that we insult by denying their value. <mark>When we posit death as the negation of life</mark>, <mark>we bifurcate our identities and begin </mark>a process of <mark>mourning over our own eventual deaths, a process which lasts our whole lives.</mark> <mark>The more we devalue our death-images</mark>, that is, <mark>the greater they become, until they haunt our every moment,</mark> as in Don DeLillo's darkest comedy, White Noise. <mark>This leads us</mark>, according to Baudrillard, <mark>to an obsession with death that can be felt in the media fascination with catastrophes like 9(11. Death "becomes the object of a perverse desire. </u></mark>Desire invests the very separation of life and death" (147). Political economy's inability to absorb the rupturing energy of death is thus compensated by the symbolic yield of the media catastrophe. In these events we experience an artificial death which fascinates us, bored as we are by the routine order of the system and the "natural" death it prescribes for us. Natural death represents an unnegotiable negation of life and the tedious certainty of an unwanted end. It therefore inspires insurrection, until "reason itself is pursued by the hope of a universal revolt against its own norms and privileges" (162). The terrorist spectacle is an example of such a revolt, in which death gains symbolic distinction and becomes more than simply "natural." We may not think we identify with the terrorists' superstitions about honor in the next life, but in events like 9(11, Baudrillard would suggest, we nevertheless identify despite ourselves with both with the terrorists and their victims: We are all hostages, and that's the secret of hostage-taking, and we are all dreaming, instead of dying stupidly working oneself to the ground, of receiving death and of giving death. Giving and receiving constitute one symbolic act (the symbolic act par excellence), which rids death of all the indifferent negativity it holds for us in the "natural" order of capital. (166)</p>

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Brian Delong

1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx

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Asian war is unlikely - all potential conflicts are solved by regional stability initiatives

Bitzinger & Desker ‘8

Bitzinger & Desker ‘8

despite all the potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, is stable the region has been free of warfare. the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is contained. North Korea is moving toward a denuclearisation Tensions between China and Taiwan seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict given efforts to re-open consultation as well as institutional relationships , there are many multilateral organisations and initiatives dedicated to enhancing stability countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation which is dedicated the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia is unlikely.

) the Asia-Pacific is stable the break-up of states is unlikely Tensions between China and Taiwan seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict given efforts to re-open consultation as well as institutional relationships there are many multilateral organisations and initiatives dedicated to enhancing stability countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation All this suggests that war in Asia is unlikely.

senior fellow and dean of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies respectively (Richard A. Bitzinger, Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival, December 2008, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com-/678328_731200556_906256449.pdf) The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnationa terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely.

<h4><u><strong>Asian war is unlikely - all potential conflicts are solved by regional stability initiatives </h4><p>Bitzinger & Desker ‘8 </p><p></u></strong> senior fellow and dean of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies respectively (Richard A. Bitzinger, Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival, December 2008, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com-/678328_731200556_906256449.pdf<mark>)</p><p></mark>The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnationa terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet<u> despite all the</u>se<u> potential crucibles of conflict, <mark>the Asia-Pacific</mark>, </u>if not an area of serenity and calm,<u> <mark>is </u></mark>certainly more<u> <mark>stable </u></mark>than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however,<u> the region has been </u>relatively<u> free of </u>open armed<u> warfare. </u>Separatism remains a challenge, but<u> <mark>the break-up of states is unlikely</mark>. Terrorism is </u>a nuisance, but its<u> </u>impact is<u> contained. </u>The<u> North Korea</u>n nuclear issue, while not fully resolved,<u> is </u>at least<u> moving toward a </u>conclusion with the likely<u> denuclearisation </u>of the peninsula.<u> <mark>Tensions between China and Taiwan</u></mark>, while always just beneath the surface,<u> <mark>seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict </u></mark>any time<u> </u>soon, especially<u> <mark>given </u></mark>recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and<u> <mark>efforts </u></mark>by<u> </u>Taiwan and China<u> <mark>to re-open </u></mark>informal channels of<u> <mark>consultation as well as institutional relationships </u></mark>between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union<u>, <mark>there are many multilateral organisations and</u></mark> international <u><mark>initiatives dedicated to enhancing </u></mark>peace and <u><mark>stability</u></mark>, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, <u><mark>countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation</mark> </u>– the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – <u>which is dedicated </u>to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to<u> the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit,</u> ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) <u>and the ASEAN Regional Forum. <mark>All this suggests that war in Asia </u></mark>– while not inconceivable –<u> <mark>is unlikely.</u> </p></mark>

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The war in Afghanistan is an extension of the narrative of the Western savior—the discursive construction of Afghanistan as a state in desperate need of US help makes war inevitable and results in bankrupt policy

Crowe 7

Crowe 7—Researcher, York Centre for International and Security Studies. PhD candidate in pol sci, York U (Lori, The “Fuzzy Dream”: Discourse, Historical myths, and Militarized (in)Security - Interrogating dangerous myths of Afghanistan and the ‘West’, http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/Crowe-loricrowe.pdf)

the media have become central to the constitution of social identity In pop culture it appears that war has become ‘in style’ celebrating images that glorify war while the aftereffects are invisible the media has the exceptional ability to generate myth through military jargon, the severing of causal connections, banishment of bodies, and the cool demeanor of third-person-reporter-speak We are faced with “pseudo concrete images” Žizek’s “plague of fantasies” which blur our view Because of the irrepresentability of the ‘real’ there is just surplus-obedience; we obey rather than confront.” 56 The historical production of myths of Afghanistan have relied on representations that are largely simplistic, ahistorical, and politically motivated. Afghanistan is a “fuzzy dream” for the West: embodied in de-contextualized photos numbers and graphs claiming statistical quantification, and disjointed metaphors The vigor with which particular discourses have materialized are representative of their link to the War on Terror’ and the relationship between policies and militarized discourses which legitimate the West’s military engagement Afghanistan serves as an example of the very real power of discourse and myth-making which affect the form that international engagement takes; this in turn reproduces those myths in a cycle of destructive imperial engagement. In trying to understand Afghanistan it is vital that we are aware of the dominant narratives that are being produced, who is producing them and for what purpose, and what is at stake in failing to interrogate them. Any policy that does not take the role of deliberately constructed narratives and the mediums throough which they are disseminated into account will not only continue to replicate them but any “peacebuilding” and “development” efforts built on these terms can never result in long-term success. The emancipatory possibilities of such a critical project lie in uncovering militarization embedded within these myths, and the recognition of the detrimental effect of the West’s ‘myths’ and configuring the reconceptualisation of policy alternatives through its contestation. By looking critically at the language of foreign engagement the foundation of historical narratives or ‘myths’ that perpetuate a certain image of Afghanistan, and which results in attitudes that imbue foreign policy, begin to be revealed. The ‘heroism’ narrative can be called the ‘saviour syndrome’, “foreign aid”, “humanitarian intervention”, etc. This narrative constructs foreign engagement in a region as spectacle and as prized commodities to be admired and ‘sold’ to the public; it constructs the West as ‘saviours’ and the ‘Other’, in this case Afghanistan, as the victim in need of saving, accomplished through images and tales of passion that pathologize the other and valorize the West as reconstruction and ‘peace-building’ efforts are saturated with the necessary and benevolent role the West must play in instilling ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ and ‘democracy’ in the war-torn and poverty stricken region humanitarian NGO’s simulate “heroism, sentiment, and compassion”; medical catastrophes and civil conflicts have become prized commodities for globalizing neoliberal policies of Western states to sell to ‘myth readers’: “They give Western states the opportunity to put their humanistic policies into practice There are several repercusions of this myth First, this has resulted in real humanitarian and moral issues being overlooked; Second, images are being purged of their content Myth has thus becom the very real enemy of true humanitarianism; we’ve become so inundates with superhero mythologization of real world events that the embedded paternalism and unrealistic goals go unnoticed this narrative reinforces a victimology of the ‘Other’ and capitalises on it, while simultaneously hiding the paternalistic and neo-colonialist ideologies in humanitarian garb. passion and spectacle are valued in the commodification of images over content and history Words such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘justice’, and ‘women’s rights’ have become permanent variables in the mantra that has been used as part of the un-stated, assumptions that intervention will improve the lives of Afghanistan people over ‘there’ and increase security for us over ‘here’ we are continually told that Afghan women have been “liberated” from an oppressive regime by the West. This is bolstered by the assumption that the Afghan people support the US-backed government There is a dominant assumption that the West can “win” the “war on terror” and that military measures in the Middle East are necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks. embedded in these images is the assumption that reconstruction can coesist alongside military efforts to fight off insurgents and “pacify” the opposition reports on the increasing numbers of casualties of the war does not appear incongruous with claims of ‘peace-making’ and ‘development’

war s aftereffects are invisible the media has the ability to generate myth through military jargon, “pseudo images blur our view Because of the irrepresentability of the ‘real’ we obey rather than confront myths of Afghanistan reli on representations that are ahistorical, and politically motivated Afghanistan serves as an example of the power of discourse which reproduces destructive imperial engagement. Any policy that does not take the role of deliberately constructed narratives into account will not only replicate them but “development” efforts built on these terms can never result in success. The possibilities of such a critical project lie in uncovering militarization and configuring the reconceptualisation of policy alternatives through its contestation By looking critically at the language of engagement ‘myths begin to be revealed The ‘heroism’ narrative constructs the West as ‘saviours’ and the ‘Other’, Afghanistan, as the victim in need of saving, accomplished through tales of passion that pathologize the other catastrophes have become prized commodities for neoliberal policies this myth resulted in real humanitarian issues being overlooked images are purged of their content. Myth has thus becom the enemy of humanitarianism we’ve become so inundates with superhero mythologization that paternalism go unnoticed , this reinforces victimology while hiding the paternalistic ideologies in humanitarian garb There is a assumption that the West can “win” the “war on terror” increasing casualties does not appear incongruous with peace-making’

The medium for the dissemination of myth is not, however, limited to TV or radio news broadcasts, particularly in the technologically infused new media culture where movies, cartoons, comics, music vidoes, and the internet have saturated pop culture so thoroughly that it has become easier than ever to propagate myth to viewers/listeners around the globe. In contemporary culture, the media have become central to the constitution of social identity. It is not just that media messages have become important forms of influence on individuals. We also identify and construct ourselves as social beings through the mediation of images. This is not simply a case of people being dominated by images, but of people seeking and obtaining pleasure through the experience of the consumption of these images. An understanding of contemporary culture involves a focus both on the phenomenology of watching and the cultural form of images. 52 Consider, for example, the increase in films infused with US militarized patriotism or the recent obsession with Internet blogs and now videos posted on UTube from soldiers stationed in Afghanistan. Hunt explores the political racist/sexist currency of a cartoon circulating on the internet post9/11 of five Taliban leaders looking horrified after reading a document that states, “To the Taliban: Give us Osama bin Laden or we’ll send your women to college”. 53 I similarly encountered an image via email of beloved cultural cartoon icon Homer Simpson in front of an American flag holding a shotgun with Osama bin Laden in the target site. In pop culture it appears that war has become back ‘in style’ celebrating images that glorify heroic soldiers and valorize war while the aftereffects are often invisible. Consider an article in Rolling Stone magazine which lists the results of a poll of some of the most popular songs soldiers listen to in order to get ‘pumped up’ for a mission. Hard rock, heavy metal, and rap such as 2Pac’s “Hit ‘Em Up” and Drowning Pool’s “Bodies” apparently helps soldiers “get ready to kill” and “haul balls down the road”. 54 The problem is that the media and pop culture has the exceptional ability to generate myth through, for example, ambiguous wording, military jargon, the severing of causal connections, banishment of bodies, and the cool demeanor of third-person-reporter-speak 55 : We are faced with “pseudo concrete images” explains Eisenstein, “Žizek’s “plague of fantasies” which blur our viewings. Because of the irrepresentability of the ‘real’ there is just surplus-obedience; we obey rather than confront.” 56 Afghanistan The historical production of particular myths of Afghanistan have relied on representations of the country in the West that are largely simplistic, ahistorical, and politically motivated. Afghanistan is a sort of “fuzzy dream” for most in the West: embodied in a series of fabricated images of war and poverty, de-contextualized photos without names or places, numbers and graphs claiming statistical quantification, and disjointed yet often repeated phrases and metaphors. A particular mythic representation of Afghanistan is being (and has been) proliferated in the international community, through media, history books, foreign policy documents, political commentators, academia, and virtually any other body of communication. The vigor with which particular discourses have materialized since 9/11 are representative of their link to the Wests militarized ‘War on Terror’ and more generally of the embedded relationship between political policies and militarized discourses which legitimate the West’s military engagement and development policies. That is, Afghanistan serves as an unfortunate example of the very real power of discourse and myth-making which affect the form that international engagement takes; this in turn reproduces those myths in a cycle of destructive imperial engagement. In trying to understand the current political situation in Afghanistan, and in attempting to formulate international policy in the region, it is vital that we are aware of the dominant narratives or ‘myths’ that are being produced, who it is that is producing them and for what purpose, and what is at stake in failing to interrogate them. Any policy that does not take the role of deliberately constructed narratives and the mediums throough which they are disseminated into account will not only continue to replicate them, perhaps unknowingly, but any “securitizing”, “peacebuilding” and “development” efforts built on these terms can never result in long-term success. The emancipatory possibilities of such a critical project of discourse deconstruction lie in: 1) understanding the raced/classed/gendered power hierarchies that are their foundation; 2) uncovering the nationalized militarization and the hypermasculinized and hyperfeminized normativities that are are embedded within these myths, and; 3) the recognition of the detrimental effect of the West’s ‘myths’ and configuring the reconceptualisation of policy alternatives through its contestation. By looking critically at what has become the common language of foreign engagement in Afghanistan, the foundation of historical narratives or ‘myths’ that perpetuate a certain image of Afghanistan, and which in turn results in very particular attitudes that imbue foreign policy, begin to be revealed. I will utilize two broad (and inextricably linked) categorizations which most accurately encapsulate the dominant strains of discourse to help clarify how this relationship is constructed and by thus identifying them as such attempt to de-bunk the myths they create. These ‘myths’ which have become normalized and banal in foreign policy, media, and some academic discourse I define as the ‘heroism’ discourse/myth and the ‘militarization’ discourse/myth. Superman and G.I. Joe “When we read the history books given to children in the United States, it all starts with heroic adventure – there is no bloodshed – and Columbus Day is a celebration.” 57 The ‘heroism’ narrative can be called by several names: the ‘saviour syndrome’, “mediatically generated” or “hybrid techno-medical” humanitarianism 58 , “foreign aid”, “humanitarian intervention”, etc. This narrative constructs foreign engagement in a region as spectacle and as prized commodities to be admired and ‘sold’ to the public; it constructs the West as ‘saviours’ and the ‘Other’, in this case Afghanistan, as the victim in need of saving, accomplished through images and tales of passion and fervour that often pathologize the other and valorize the Western interveener. When the US, with the support of the UN, bombed Afghanistan in 2001in response to the events of September 11 th , the mission was entitled “Operation Enduring Freedom”. Today, as reconstruction and ‘peace-building’ efforts are underway in Afghanistan in tandem with military operations, political conversations and media productions are saturated with calls to “win the hearts and minds” of the people of Afghanistan and of the necessary and benevolent role the West must play in instilling ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ and ‘democracy’ in the war-torn and poverty stricken region. Debrix, offers an analysis of what he calls “the global humanitarian spectacle” to demonstrate how medical and humanitarian NGO’s simulate “heroism, sentiment, and compassion”; medical catastrophes and civil conflicts, he explains, have indeed become prized commodities for globalizing neoliberal policies of Western states and international organizations to sell to ‘myth readers’: “They give Western states and the UN the opportunity to put their liberal humanistic policies into practice, while, for Western media, humanitarianism simply sells”. 59 There are several repercusions of this myth, explains Debrix. First, this has resulted in real humanitarian and moral issues being overlooked; Second, images are being purged of their content. Myth has thus becoming the very real enemy of true humanitarianism; that is, we’ve become so inundates with superhero mythologization of real world events that the embedded paternalism and unrealistic goals go unnoticed. 60 Additionally, this narrative reinforces a victimology of the ‘Other’ and in fact capitalises on it, while simultaneously hiding the paternalistic and neo-colonialist ideologies in humanitarian garb. The role of the media and consciously generated and disseminated images is particularly pronounced here, as passion and spectacle are valued in the commodification of images over content and history. Jean Baudrillard states “There is no possible distinction, at the level of images and information, between the spectacular and the symbolic, no possible distinction between the ‘crime’ and the crackdown”. 61 The militarization narrative, in contrast to the ‘objective benevolence’ of the heroism myth, utilizes constructed and one-dimensional conceptions of militaries, security, and defense. This narrative relies on the myth that militarization is always a useful tool in securitization. For example: Following the NATO air strikes in October of this year that killed at least 50 civilians and an augmentation of Taliban suicide attacks, Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai called on the need for more military operations, an international air force, and an increase in Afghan soldiers and police as mechanisms necessary to “tackle the root causes of terrorism”. 62 Words such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘justice’, and ‘women’s rights’ have become permanent variables in the mantra that has been used liberally and repeatedly as part of the common and often un-stated, assumptions that intervention by NATO, American, Canadian, and British forces will improve the lives of Afghanistan people over ‘there’ and increase security for us over ‘here’. Thus, as the military continues to occupy the region, we in the West are continually told that Afghan women and men have now been “liberated” from an oppressive regime by the West. This is bolstered by the assumption that the Afghan people support the US-backed government and want the military there for security (That is, that they are better off now than before). There is a dominant assumption that the West can “win” the “war on terror” and that military measures in the Middle East are necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks. If prospects look dim in the region, this narrative implies the appropriate response is to increase combat troops and artillery. Finally, embedded in these images is the assumption that reconstruction, delivery of humanitarian aid and development can coesist alongside military efforts to fight off insurgents/terrorists and “pacify” the opposition. Thus, reports on the increasing numbers of casualties of the war does not appear incongruous with claims of ‘peace-making’ and ‘development’ - therefore we must protect it the puppet government and fight the insurgents. 6

<h4>The war in Afghanistan is an extension of the narrative of the Western savior—the discursive construction of Afghanistan as a state in desperate need of US help makes war inevitable and results in bankrupt policy </h4><p><u><strong>Crowe 7</u></strong>—Researcher, York Centre for International and Security Studies. PhD candidate in pol sci, York U (Lori, The “Fuzzy Dream”: Discourse, Historical myths, and Militarized (in)Security - Interrogating dangerous myths of Afghanistan and the ‘West’, http://turin.sgir.eu/uploads/Crowe-loricrowe.pdf)</p><p>The medium for the dissemination of myth is not, however, limited to TV or radio news broadcasts, particularly in the technologically infused new media culture where movies, cartoons, comics, music vidoes, and the internet have saturated pop culture so thoroughly that it has become easier than ever to propagate myth to viewers/listeners around the globe. In contemporary culture, <u>the media have become central to the constitution of social identity</u>. It is not just that media messages have become important forms of influence on individuals. We also identify and construct ourselves as social beings through the mediation of images. This is not simply a case of people being dominated by images, but of people seeking and obtaining pleasure through the experience of the consumption of these images. An understanding of contemporary culture involves a focus both on the phenomenology of watching and the cultural form of images. 52 Consider, for example, the increase in films infused with US militarized patriotism or the recent obsession with Internet blogs and now videos posted on UTube from soldiers stationed in Afghanistan. Hunt explores the political racist/sexist currency of a cartoon circulating on the internet post9/11 of five Taliban leaders looking horrified after reading a document that states, “To the Taliban: Give us Osama bin Laden or we’ll send your women to college”. 53 I similarly encountered an image via email of beloved cultural cartoon icon Homer Simpson in front of an American flag holding a shotgun with Osama bin Laden in the target site. <u>In pop culture it appears that <mark>war</mark> ha<mark>s </mark>become</u> back <u>‘in style’</u> <u>celebrating images that glorify</u> heroic soldiers and valorize <u>war while <strong>the <mark>aftereffects are</mark> </u></strong>often<u><strong> <mark>invisible</u></strong></mark>. Consider an article in Rolling Stone magazine which lists the results of a poll of some of the most popular songs soldiers listen to in order to get ‘pumped up’ for a mission. Hard rock, heavy metal, and rap such as 2Pac’s “Hit ‘Em Up” and Drowning Pool’s “Bodies” apparently helps soldiers “get ready to kill” and “haul balls down the road”. 54 The problem is that <u><mark>the media</u></mark> and pop culture <u><mark>has the</mark> <strong>exceptional <mark>ability to generate myth</u></strong> <u>through</u></mark>, for example, ambiguous wording, <u><strong><mark>military jargon</strong>,</mark> the severing of causal connections, banishment of bodies, and the cool demeanor of third-person-reporter-speak </u>55 : <u>We are faced with <mark>“pseudo</mark> concrete <mark>images</mark>”</u> explains Eisenstein, “<u>Žizek’s “plague of fantasies” which <mark>blur our view</u></mark>ings. <u><strong><mark>Because of the irrepresentability of the ‘real’ </mark>there is just surplus-obedience; <mark>we obey rather than confront</mark>.” </strong>56 </p><p></u>Afghanistan <u>The historical production of</u> particular <u><mark>myths of Afghanistan </mark>have <mark>reli</mark>ed <mark>on representations</u></mark> of the country in the West <u><mark>that are</mark> <strong>largely simplistic, <mark>ahistorical, and politically motivated</strong></mark>. Afghanistan is a</u> sort of <u>“fuzzy dream” for</u> most in <u>the West: embodied in</u> a series of fabricated images of war and poverty, <u>de-contextualized photos</u> without names or places, <u>numbers and graphs claiming statistical quantification, and disjointed</u> yet often repeated phrases and <u>metaphors</u>. A particular mythic representation of Afghanistan is being (and has been) proliferated in the international community, through media, history books, foreign policy documents, political commentators, academia, and virtually any other body of communication. <u>The vigor with which particular discourses have materialized</u> since 9/11 <u>are representative of their link to the</u> Wests militarized ‘<u>War on Terror’</u> <u>and</u> more generally of <u>the</u> embedded <u>relationship between</u> political <u>policies and militarized discourses which legitimate the West’s military engagement</u> and development policies. That is, <u><strong><mark>Afghanistan serves as an</mark> </u></strong>unfortunate <u><strong><mark>example of the</mark> very real <mark>power of discourse</u></strong></mark> <u>and myth-making <mark>which </mark>affect the form that international engagement takes; this in turn <mark>reproduces</mark> those myths in a cycle of <mark>destructive imperial engagement.<strong></mark> </p><p></strong>In trying to understand </u>the current political situation in <u>Afghanistan</u>, and in attempting to formulate international policy in the region, <u>it is vital that we are aware of the dominant narratives</u> or ‘myths’ <u>that are being produced, who</u> it is that <u>is producing them and for what purpose, and what is at stake in failing to interrogate them. <strong><mark>Any policy that does not take the role of deliberately constructed narratives </mark>and the mediums throough which they are disseminated <mark>into account will not only</mark> continue to <mark>replicate them</u></strong></mark>, perhaps unknowingly, <u><strong><mark>but </mark>any</u></strong> “securitizing”, <u><strong>“peacebuilding” and <mark>“development” efforts built on these terms can never result in </mark>long-term <mark>success.</u></strong> <u>The </mark>emancipatory <mark>possibilities</u> <u>of such a critical project</u></mark> of discourse deconstruction <u><mark>lie in</u></mark>: 1) understanding the raced/classed/gendered power hierarchies that are their foundation; 2) <u><mark>uncovering</u></mark> the nationalized <u><mark>militarization</u></mark> and the hypermasculinized and hyperfeminized normativities that are are <u>embedded within these myths, and</u>; 3) <u>the recognition of the detrimental effect of the West’s ‘myths’ <mark>and <strong>configuring</mark> <mark>the reconceptualisation of policy alternatives through its contestation</mark>.</p><p></strong><mark>By looking critically at</mark> </u>what has become<u> <mark>the</u></mark> common <u><mark>language of</u></mark> <u>foreign <mark>engagement</u></mark> in Afghanistan, <u>the foundation of historical narratives or <mark>‘myths</mark>’ that perpetuate a certain image of Afghanistan, and which </u>in turn<u> results in </u>very particular<u> attitudes that imbue foreign policy, <mark>begin to be revealed</mark>.</u> I will utilize two broad (and inextricably linked) categorizations which most accurately encapsulate the dominant strains of discourse to help clarify how this relationship is constructed and by thus identifying them as such attempt to de-bunk the myths they create. These ‘myths’ which have become normalized and banal in foreign policy, media, and some academic discourse I define as the ‘heroism’ discourse/myth and the ‘militarization’ discourse/myth. </p><p>Superman and G.I. Joe “When we read the history books given to children in the United States, it all starts with heroic adventure – there is no bloodshed – and Columbus Day is a celebration.” 57 <u><mark>The ‘heroism’ narrative </mark>can be called</u> by several names: <u>the ‘saviour syndrome’,</u> “mediatically generated” or “hybrid techno-medical” humanitarianism 58 , <u>“foreign aid”, “humanitarian intervention”, etc.</u> <u>This narrative constructs foreign engagement in a region as spectacle and as prized commodities to be admired and ‘sold’ to the public;</u> <u><strong>it <mark>constructs the West as ‘saviours’ and the ‘Other’</strong>,</mark> in this case <mark>Afghanistan, as the victim in need of saving, accomplished through</mark> images and <mark>tales of passion</mark> </u>and fervour<u> <mark>that</mark> </u>often<u> <mark>pathologize the other</mark> and valorize the West</u>ern interveener. When the US, with the support of the UN, bombed Afghanistan in 2001in response to the events of September 11 th , the mission was entitled “Operation Enduring Freedom”. Today, <u>as reconstruction and ‘peace-building’ efforts are </u>underway in Afghanistan in tandem with military operations, political conversations and media productions are <u>saturated with</u> calls to “win the hearts and minds” of the people of Afghanistan and of <u>the necessary and benevolent role the West must play in instilling ‘freedom’, ‘justice’ and ‘democracy’ in the war-torn and poverty stricken region</u>. Debrix, offers an analysis of what he calls “the global humanitarian spectacle” to demonstrate how medical and <u>humanitarian NGO’s simulate “heroism, sentiment, and compassion”; medical <mark>catastrophes</mark> and civil conflicts</u>, he explains, <u><mark>have</u></mark> indeed <u><mark>become <strong>prized commodities for </mark>globalizing <mark>neoliberal policies </mark>of Western states</strong> </u>and international organizations<u> to sell to ‘myth readers’:</u> <u>“They give Western states </u>and the UN<u> the opportunity to put their </u>liberal<u> humanistic policies into practice</u>, while, for Western media, humanitarianism simply sells”. 59 </p><p><u>There are several repercusions of <mark>this myth</u></mark>, explains Debrix. <u>First,</u> <u>this has <mark>resulted in real humanitarian</mark> and moral <mark>issues being overlooked</mark>; Second, <mark>images are </mark>being <mark>purged of their content</u>. <u><strong>Myth has thus becom</u></strong></mark>ing<u><strong> <mark>the</mark> very real <mark>enemy of </mark>true <mark>humanitarianism</mark>;</u></strong> that is, <u><strong><mark>we’ve become so inundates with superhero</mark> <mark>mythologization</mark> of real world events <mark>that</mark> the embedded <mark>paternalism</mark> and unrealistic goals <mark>go unnoticed</u></strong></mark>. 60 Additionally<mark>, <u>this </mark>narrative <mark>reinforces</mark> a <mark>victimology</mark> of the ‘Other’ and</u> in fact <u>capitalises on it, <mark>while </mark>simultaneously <strong><mark>hiding the paternalistic</mark> and neo-colonialist <mark>ideologies in humanitarian garb</strong></mark>.</u> The role of the media and consciously generated and disseminated images is particularly pronounced here, as <u>passion and spectacle are valued in the commodification of images over content and history</u>. Jean Baudrillard states “There is no possible distinction, at the level of images and information, between the spectacular and the symbolic, no possible distinction between the ‘crime’ and the crackdown”. 61 </p><p>The militarization narrative, in contrast to the ‘objective benevolence’ of the heroism myth, utilizes constructed and one-dimensional conceptions of militaries, security, and defense. This narrative relies on the myth that militarization is always a useful tool in securitization. For example: Following the NATO air strikes in October of this year that killed at least 50 civilians and an augmentation of Taliban suicide attacks, Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai called on the need for more military operations, an international air force, and an increase in Afghan soldiers and police as mechanisms necessary to “tackle the root causes of terrorism”. 62 <u>Words such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘justice’, and ‘women’s rights’ have become permanent variables in the mantra that has been used </u>liberally and repeatedly<u> as part of the </u>common and often<u> un-stated, assumptions that intervention </u>by NATO, American, Canadian, and British forces<u> will improve the lives of Afghanistan people over ‘there’ and increase security for us over ‘here’</u>. Thus, as the military continues to occupy the region, <u>we</u> in the West <u>are continually told that Afghan women</u> and men <u>have </u>now<u> been</u> <u>“liberated” from an oppressive regime by the West. This is bolstered by the assumption that the Afghan people support the US-backed government</u> and want the military there for security (That is, that they are better off now than before). <u><strong><mark>There is a</mark> dominant <mark>assumption that the West can “win” the “war on terror”</strong></mark> and that military measures in the Middle East are necessary to prevent future terrorist attacks.</u> If prospects look dim in the region, this narrative implies the appropriate response is to increase combat troops and artillery. Finally, <u>embedded in these images is the assumption that reconstruction</u>, delivery of humanitarian aid and development <u>can coesist alongside military efforts to fight off insurgents</u>/terrorists <u>and “pacify” the opposition</u>. Thus, <u>reports on the <mark>increasing </mark>numbers of <mark>casualties</mark> of the war <mark>does not appear incongruous with </mark>claims of ‘<mark>peace-making’</mark> and ‘development’</u> - therefore we must protect it the puppet government and fight the insurgents. 6 </p>

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1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx

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Regimes of legalization cannot be divorced from neoliberal violence -- the poor are coerced into deconstructing their biological assemblage to prop up the consumptive lifestyles of the wealthy -- disregard their claims of “upward mobility” and “autonomy”, they are both ruses by the capitalist system to justify commodification of the body

Scheper-Hughes 03

Scheper-Hughes 03

Amidst the neo-liberal readjustments of societies, North and South we are experiencing rapid depletion of traditional values New relations between capital and labor bodies and the state between biotechnological inclusions and exclusions are taking shape our discussion is tethered to material grounds on which those modernist values have shifted today almost beyond recognition the 'second coming' capitalism has facilitated a rapid dissemination to all corners of the world of advanced medical procedures alongside strange markets and 'occult economies'. these have incited new desires for the organs of others Nowhere are these processes more transparent than in the field of organ transplant which takes place in a transnational space with both donors and recipients following paths of capital in the global economy The spread of transplant capabilities created scarcity of organs economic globalization released an exodus of displaced persons and a appetite for foreign bodies to do the shadow work of production and to provide ‘fresh’ organs for medical consumption The conditions of an ‘open’ market economy have put into circulation mortally sick bodies traveling in one direction and ‘healthy’ organs in another direction creating a kula ring’ of international body trade. The emergence of strange markets excess capital, renegade surgeons and slave workers has produced transplant tourism This confluence in the flows of kidney sellers fall into the hands of ruthless brokers These transplant transactions are a blend of altruism and commerce consent and coercion gifts and theft care and human sacrifice developments in 'transplant tourism' exacerbated divisions between North and South spawning commodity fetishism in demands by medical consumers for a quality product Commercialized transplant a practice in the domain of post- modern biopolitics with its values of disposability, individuality exemplifies biomedical technology gifts of life and death surpass all previous 'natural' limits and restrictions the uninhibited circulation of purchased kidneys exemplifies the neo-liberal episteme a political discourse based on juridical concepts of the autonomous individual subject, equality of opportunity freedom and expansion of medical rights The commodified kidney is the primary currency invented scarcities within fetishized ‘fresh’ organs. the rhetoric of altruism masking real demands for human sacrifice surplus empathy We have found a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’ about whom almost nothing is known the commodified kidney has become the poor man’s and woman’s collateral against debt Condemned prisoners are prepped for ‘harvesting’ minutes before execution the circulation of kidneys follows the established routes of capital from South to North, from poorer to more affluent bodies, from black and brown bodies to white ones, and from females to males, or from poor males to more affluent males.

New relations between capital and labor and taking shape our discussion is tethered to material grounds capitalism incited desires for th organs of others organ transplant takes place in a transnational space with donors and recipients following paths of capital transplant capabilities created scarcity of organs economic globalization released an exodus of displaced persons and appetite for foreign bodies to do shadow work of production to provide ‘fresh’ organs for consumption 'transplant tourism' exacerbated divisions between North and South spawning commodity fetishism Commercialized transplant in the domain of biopolitics with disposability exemplifies biomedical technology gifts of life and death surpass all previous 'natural' limits and restrictions the circulation of purchased kidneys exemplifies the neo-liberal episteme, a discourse based on concepts of the autonomous individual subject equality of opportunity freedom and rights The commodified kidney is currency apartheid medicine’ privileges one class of patients, over invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’ circulation of kidneys follows routes of capital from South to North poorer to affluent black and brown to white from females to males, or

Nancy, Professor @ UC Berkeley, “Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking”, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2, June, 197–226, AB Amidst the neo-liberal readjustments of societies, North and South, we are experiencing today a rapid depletion, an ‘emptying out’ even, of traditional modernist, humanist and pastoral ideologies, values and practices. New relations between capital and labor, bodies and the state, belonging and extra-territoriality, and between medical and biotechnological inclusions and exclusions are taking shape. But rather than a conventional story of the lamentable decline of humanistic social values and social relations, our discussion is tethered to a frank recognition that the material grounds on which those modernist values and practices were based have shifted today almost beyond recognition. What the Comaroffs (2001) refer to as millennial or 'second coming' capitalism has facilitated a rapid dissemination to virtually all corners of the world of advanced medical procedures and biotechnologies alongside strange markets and 'occult economies'. Together, these have incited new tastes and desires for the skin, bone, blood, organs, tissue and reproductive and genetic material of others. Nowhere are these processes more transparent than in the field of organ transplant, which now takes place in a transnational space with both donors and recipients following new paths of capital and medical technology in the global economy. The spread of transplant capabilities created a global scarcity of transplantable organs at the same time that economic globalization released an exodus of displaced persons and a voracious appetite for foreign bodies to do the shadow work of production and to provide ‘fresh’ organs for medical consumption. The ideal conditions of an ‘open’ market economy have thereby put into circulation mortally sick bodies traveling in one direction and ‘healthy’ organs (encased in their human packages) in another direction, creating a bizarre ‘kula ring’ of international body trade. The emergence of strange markets, excess capital, renegade surgeons,1 local ‘kidney hunters’ with links to an international Mafia (Lobo and Maierovitch 2002) (and thereby to a parallel traffic in slave workers, babies, drugs and small arms) has produced a small but spectacularly lucrative practice of transplant tourism, much of it illegal and clandestine. This confluence in the flows of immigrant workers and itinerant kidney sellers who fall into the hands of ruthless brokers and unscrupulous, notorious, but simultaneously rewarded, protected and envied outlaw transplant surgeons is a troubling sub-text in the story of late twentieth and early twenty-first century globalization, one that combines and juxtaposes elements of pre- and postmodernity. These new transplant transactions are a strange blend of altruism and commerce; consent and coercion; gifts and theft; science and sorcery; care and human sacrifice. On the one hand, the phenomenal spread of transplant technologies, even in the murky context of black markets in medicine, has given the possibility of new, extended or improved quality of life to a select population of mobile kidney patients from the deserts of Oman to the rain forests of the Amazon Basin.2 On the other hand, new developments in 'transplant tourism' have exacerbated older divisions between North and South, core and periphery, haves and have-nots, spawning a new form of commodity fetishism in demands by medical consumers for a quality product: 'fresh' and 'healthy' kidneys purchased from living bodies. In these radical exchanges of body parts and somatic information, life-saving measures for the one demands a bodily sacrifice of self-mutilation by the other. And one man's bio- sociality (Rabinow 1996) is another woman's biopiracy, depending on whether one is speaking from a Silicon Valley biotech laboratory or from a sewage-infested banguay in Manila. Commercialized transplant, a practice that trades comfortably in the domain of post- modern biopolitics with its values of disposability, individuality, free and transparent circu- lation, exemplifies better than any other biomedical technology the reach and the limits of economic liberalism. In transplant gifts of life and death (Parsons et al. 1969) promise to surpass all previous 'natural' limits and restrictions. And the uninhibited circulation of purchased kidneys exemplifies the neo-liberal episteme, a political discourse based on juridical concepts of the autonomous individual subject, equality (at least equality of opportunity), radical freedom, accumulation and universality (the expansion of medical rights and medical citizenship3). The commodified kidney is, to date, the primary currency in transplant tourism; it represents the gold standard of organ sales worldwide. In the past year, however, markets in part-livers and single corneas from living vendors are beginning to emerge in Southeast Asia. This paper continues my discussion (Scheper-Hughes 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) of the darker side of transplant practice. In all, three crucial points about the organs trade have emerged. The first is about invented scarcities and artificial needs within a new context of highly fetishized ‘fresh’ organs. The scarcity of cadaver organs has evolved into an active trade in ‘surplus’ organs from living ‘ suppliers’ as well as in new forms of ‘biopiracy’. The second point concerns the transplant rhetoric of altruism masking real demands for human sacrifice. The third point concerns surplus empathy and the relative visibility of two distinct populations – excluded and invisible organ givers and included and highly visible organ receivers. We have found almost everywhere a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients, over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’, about whom almost nothing is known – an excellent place for a critical medical anthropologist (Scheper-Hughes 1990) to begin. Here I will focus on the networks of organized crime (and so called ‘body mafia’) that are putting into circulation ambulatory organ buyers, itinerant kidney hunters, outlaw surgeons, medical technicians, makeshift transplant units and clandestine laboratories in what economist Jagddish Bhagwati (2002) refers to as ‘rotten trade’. By this Bhagwati means all kinds of trade in ‘bads’ – arms, drugs, stolen goods, hazardous and toxic products as well as traffic in babies, bodies and slave labor – as opposed to ordinary and normative trade in ‘goods’. In this instance, the rotten traffic in human organs brings together buyers and sellers from distant locations for fleeting, intimate and illicit bodily exchanges occasioned by a dual waiting list, one formed by mortal sickness, the other by human misery. Like any other business, the kidney trade is driven by a simple market calculus of supply and demand. For example, in the Middle East, from the Gulf States to Israel, transplantable cadaver organs are extremely scarce owing to religious reservations, both Jewish and Islamic, about the ontological status of the brain-dead donor, and to the elaborate religious protocol for the proper treatment and burial of the dead. Both orthodox Judaism and Islam permit organ transplantation, however, and their religious scholars and ethicists generally treat living donation as a meritorious act, even if the donor has been paid (Steinberg 1996). Consequently, one solution to the problem of long waiting lists of frustrated kidney patients in this region was found in transplant abroad, in some cases (as in Israel) with the support of government-sponsored medical insurance. For the last twenty years organized programs have carried affluent patients from Israel, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait initially to India for transplant and later to Turkey, Iran and Iraq and, most recently, to Russia, Romania and Moldova where kidney sellers are recruited (sometimes coercively) from army barracks, prisons, unemployment offices, flea markets, shopping malls and bars. So we can even speak of organ-donor vs. organ-recipient nations. In India, trading a kidney for a dowry has become a common strategy for parents to arrange marriage for an otherwise economically disadvantaged daughter (Cohen 1999). And, ‘one-kidney’ shantytowns have sprung up in the peripheries of Manila and Thailand to service the needs of Saudi and Japanese transplant patients and, in recent years, a growing number of North Americans ( Jimenez and Bell 2001). Indeed, the commodified kidney has become the poor man’s and woman’s ultimate collateral against debt and penury in many parts of the world. Meanwhile, transplant package tours are arranged in Europe, North America and Japan, to take transplant patients to China where their surgery is arranged, with the complicity of Chinese doctors and surgeons, to coincide with public executions that provide the primary source of highly lucrative transplant organs. Condemned prisoners are reportedly intubated and surgically prepped for ‘harvesting’ minutes before execution.4 ‘Transplant tourism’ has become a vital asset to the medical economies of rapidly privatizing hospitals and clinics in poorer countries struggling to stay afloat. The ‘global cities’ (Sassen 1991) in this nether economy are not London, New York and Tokyo but Istanbul, Lima, Lvov, Tel Aviv, Chisenau, Bombay, Johannesburg and Manila. In general, the circulation of kidneys follows the established routes of capital from South to North, from poorer to more affluent bodies, from black and brown bodies to white ones, and from females to males, or from poor males to more affluent males. Women are rarely the recipients of purchased or purloined organs anywhere in the world.

<h4>Regimes of legalization cannot be divorced from<u><strong> neoliberal violence -- the poor are coerced into deconstructing their biological assemblage to prop up the consumptive lifestyles of the wealthy -- disregard their claims of “upward mobility” and “autonomy”, they are both ruses by the capitalist system to justify commodification of the body </h4><p>Scheper-Hughes 03</p><p></u></strong>Nancy, Professor @ UC Berkeley, “Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking”, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 2, No. 2, June, 197–226, AB</p><p><u>Amidst the neo-liberal readjustments of societies, North and South</u>, <u>we are experiencing</u> today a <u>rapid depletion</u>, an ‘emptying out’ even, <u>of traditional</u> modernist, humanist and pastoral ideologies, <u>values</u> and practices. <u><strong><mark>New relations between capital and labor</u></strong></mark>, <u>bodies and the state</u>, belonging and extra-territoriality, and <u>between</u> medical and <u>biotechnological inclusions <mark>and</mark> exclusions are <mark>taking shape</u></mark>. But rather than a conventional story of the lamentable decline of humanistic social values and social relations, <u><mark>our discussion is tethered to</mark> </u>a frank recognition that the <u><strong><mark>material</mark> <mark>grounds</u></strong></mark> <u>on which those modernist values</u> and practices were based <u>have shifted today almost beyond recognition</u>. What <u>the</u> Comaroffs (2001) refer to as millennial or <u>'second coming' <mark>capitalism</mark> has facilitated a rapid dissemination to</u> virtually <u>all corners of the world of advanced medical procedures</u> and biotechnologies <u>alongside strange markets and 'occult economies'.</u> Together, <u>these have <mark>incited</mark> new</u> tastes and <u><mark>desires for th</mark>e</u> skin, bone, blood, <u><mark>organs</u></mark>, tissue and reproductive and genetic material <u><mark>of others</u></mark>. <u><strong>Nowhere</strong> are these processes <strong>more transparent</strong> than in the field of <mark>organ transplant</u></mark>, <u>which</u> now <u><mark>takes place in a <strong>transnational space</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>with</u></mark> <u><strong>both <mark>donors and recipients</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>following</u></mark> new <u><strong><mark>paths of capital</u></strong></mark> and medical technology <u>in the global economy</u>. <u>The spread of <mark>transplant capabilities</u></mark> <u><mark>created</u></mark> a global <u><mark>scarcity of</u></mark> transplantable <u><mark>organs</u></mark> at the same time that <u><strong><mark>economic</mark> <mark>globalization released an exodus of displaced persons</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u>a</u> voracious <u><strong><mark>appetite for foreign bodies to do</mark> the <mark>shadow work of production</mark> and <mark>to provide ‘fresh’ organs for</mark> medical <mark>consumption</u></strong></mark>. <u>The</u> ideal <u>conditions of an ‘open’ market economy</u> <u>have</u> thereby <u>put</u> <u>into circulation</u> <u><strong>mortally sick bodies</u></strong> <u>traveling in one direction and ‘healthy’ organs</u> (encased in their human packages) <u>in another direction</u>, <u>creating</u> <u>a</u> bizarre ‘<u>kula ring’ of international body trade.</u> <u>The emergence of strange markets</u>, <u>excess capital, renegade surgeons</u>,1 local ‘kidney hunters’ with links to an international Mafia (Lobo and Maierovitch 2002) (<u>and</u> thereby to a parallel traffic in <u>slave workers</u>, babies, drugs and small arms) <u>has produced</u> a small but spectacularly lucrative practice of <u>transplant tourism</u>, much of it illegal and clandestine. <u>This confluence in the flows</u> <u>of</u> immigrant workers and itinerant <u>kidney sellers</u> who <u>fall into the hands of ruthless brokers </u>and unscrupulous, notorious, but simultaneously rewarded, protected and envied outlaw transplant surgeons is a troubling sub-text in the story of late twentieth and early twenty-first century globalization, one that combines and juxtaposes elements of pre- and postmodernity. <u>These</u> new <u>transplant transactions are a</u> strange <u>blend of altruism and commerce</u>; <u>consent and coercion</u>; <u>gifts and theft</u>; science and sorcery; <u>care and human sacrifice</u>. On the one hand, the phenomenal spread of transplant technologies, even in the murky context of black markets in medicine, has given the possibility of new, extended or improved quality of life to a select population of mobile kidney patients from the deserts of Oman to the rain forests of the Amazon Basin.2 On the other hand, new <u>developments in <mark>'transplant tourism'</u></mark> have <u><mark>exacerbated</u></mark> older <u><mark>divisions between North and South</u></mark>, core and periphery, haves and have-nots, <u><mark>spawning</u></mark> a new form of <u><mark>commodity fetishism</mark> in demands by medical consumers for a quality product</u>: 'fresh' and 'healthy' kidneys purchased from living bodies. In these radical exchanges of body parts and somatic information, life-saving measures for the one demands a bodily sacrifice of self-mutilation by the other. And one man's bio- sociality (Rabinow 1996) is another woman's biopiracy, depending on whether one is speaking from a Silicon Valley biotech laboratory or from a sewage-infested banguay in Manila. <u><mark>Commercialized transplant</u></mark>, <u>a practice</u> that trades comfortably <u><mark>in the domain of</mark> post- modern <mark>biopolitics with</mark> its values of <mark>disposability</mark>, individuality</u>, free and transparent circu- lation, <u><mark>exemplifies</u></mark> better than any other <u><mark>biomedical technology</u></mark> the reach and the limits of economic liberalism. In transplant <u><mark>gifts of life and death</u></mark> (Parsons et al. 1969) promise to <u><mark>surpass</u> <u>all previous 'natural' limits and restrictions</u></mark>. And <u><mark>the</mark> uninhibited <mark>circulation of <strong>purchased kidneys exemplifies the neo-liberal episteme</u></strong>, <u>a</mark> political <mark>discourse</mark> <mark>based on</mark> juridical <mark>concepts of the autonomous individual subject</mark>, </u>equality (at least <u><mark>equality of opportunity</u></mark>), radical <u><mark>freedom</u></mark>, accumulation <u><mark>and</u></mark> universality (the <u>expansion of medical <mark>rights</u></mark> and medical citizenship3). <u><mark>The commodified kidney is</u></mark>, to date, <u>the primary <mark>currency</u></mark> in transplant tourism; it represents the gold standard of organ sales worldwide. In the past year, however, markets in part-livers and single corneas from living vendors are beginning to emerge in Southeast Asia. This paper continues my discussion (Scheper-Hughes 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) of the darker side of transplant practice. In all, three crucial points about the organs trade have emerged. The first is about <u>invented scarcities</u> and artificial needs <u>within</u> a new context of highly <u>fetishized ‘fresh’ organs.</u> The scarcity of cadaver organs has evolved into an active trade in ‘surplus’ organs from living ‘ suppliers’ as well as in new forms of ‘biopiracy’. The second point concerns <u>the</u> transplant <u>rhetoric of altruism masking real demands for human sacrifice</u>. The third point concerns <u>surplus empathy</u> and the relative visibility of two distinct populations – excluded and invisible organ givers and included and highly visible organ receivers. <u>We have found</u> almost everywhere <u>a new form of globalized ‘<strong><mark>apartheid medicine’</strong></mark> that <mark>privileges <strong>one class of patients,</mark> organ recipients</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>over</strong></mark> another class of <strong><mark>invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’</u></strong></mark>, <u>about whom <strong>almost nothing is known</u></strong> – an excellent place for a critical medical anthropologist (Scheper-Hughes 1990) to begin. Here I will focus on the networks of organized crime (and so called ‘body mafia’) that are putting into circulation ambulatory organ buyers, itinerant kidney hunters, outlaw surgeons, medical technicians, makeshift transplant units and clandestine laboratories in what economist Jagddish Bhagwati (2002) refers to as ‘rotten trade’. By this Bhagwati means all kinds of trade in ‘bads’ – arms, drugs, stolen goods, hazardous and toxic products as well as traffic in babies, bodies and slave labor – as opposed to ordinary and normative trade in ‘goods’. In this instance, the rotten traffic in human organs brings together buyers and sellers from distant locations for fleeting, intimate and illicit bodily exchanges occasioned by a dual waiting list, one formed by mortal sickness, the other by human misery. Like any other business, the kidney trade is driven by a simple market calculus of supply and demand. For example, in the Middle East, from the Gulf States to Israel, transplantable cadaver organs are extremely scarce owing to religious reservations, both Jewish and Islamic, about the ontological status of the brain-dead donor, and to the elaborate religious protocol for the proper treatment and burial of the dead. Both orthodox Judaism and Islam permit organ transplantation, however, and their religious scholars and ethicists generally treat living donation as a meritorious act, even if the donor has been paid (Steinberg 1996). Consequently, one solution to the problem of long waiting lists of frustrated kidney patients in this region was found in transplant abroad, in some cases (as in Israel) with the support of government-sponsored medical insurance. For the last twenty years organized programs have carried affluent patients from Israel, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Kuwait initially to India for transplant and later to Turkey, Iran and Iraq and, most recently, to Russia, Romania and Moldova where kidney sellers are recruited (sometimes coercively) from army barracks, prisons, unemployment offices, flea markets, shopping malls and bars. So we can even speak of organ-donor vs. organ-recipient nations. In India, trading a kidney for a dowry has become a common strategy for parents to arrange marriage for an otherwise economically disadvantaged daughter (Cohen 1999). And, ‘one-kidney’ shantytowns have sprung up in the peripheries of Manila and Thailand to service the needs of Saudi and Japanese transplant patients and, in recent years, a growing number of North Americans ( Jimenez and Bell 2001). Indeed, <u>the commodified kidney has become the poor</u> <u>man’s and woman’s</u> ultimate <u>collateral against debt</u> and penury in many parts of the world. Meanwhile, transplant package tours are arranged in Europe, North America and Japan, to take transplant patients to China where their surgery is arranged, with the complicity of Chinese doctors and surgeons, to coincide with public executions that provide the primary source of highly lucrative transplant organs. <u>Condemned prisoners are</u> reportedly intubated and surgically <u>prepped for ‘harvesting’ minutes before execution</u>.4 ‘Transplant tourism’ has become a vital asset to the medical economies of rapidly privatizing hospitals and clinics in poorer countries struggling to stay afloat. The ‘global cities’ (Sassen 1991) in this nether economy are not London, New York and Tokyo but Istanbul, Lima, Lvov, Tel Aviv, Chisenau, Bombay, Johannesburg and Manila. In general, <u>the <mark>circulation of kidneys</mark> <mark>follows</mark> the established <mark>routes of capital from South to North</mark>, from <mark>poorer</mark> <mark>to</mark> more <mark>affluent</mark> bodies, from <mark>black and brown</mark> bodies <mark>to white</mark> ones, and <mark>from females to males, or</mark> from poor males to more affluent males.</u> Women are rarely the recipients of purchased or purloined organs anywhere in the world.</p>

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Brian Delong

1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k

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This drive for certainty constitutes a violent political subjectivity which makes warfare and catastrophe inevitable

Burke 7

Burke 7 (Anthony Burke, associate professor of international and political studies at the University of New South Wales, PhD in political science and international relations from the Australian National University, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Theory and Event Volume 10 Issue 2, modified) gz

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes' I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth' in its most sweeping and powerful form I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt' The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction In the era of a 'war on terror' the arguments that violence collapses ends into means and that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them' take on added significance they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of humanity as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects 'we are ready for the next war' 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined being implies action, the action that is war This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth without interrogating more deeply our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made. we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political. While Morgenthau defined security relatively narrowly what was revealing about his formulation was not merely the ontological centrality it had, but the sense of urgency and priority he accorded to it: it must be defended 'without compromise' When this is combined with the way in which security was conceived in modern political thought as an existential condition -- a sine qua non of life and sovereign political existence -- and then married to war and instrumental action, it provides a basic underpinning for either the limitless resort to strategic violence without effective constraint, or the perseverance of limited war (with its inherent tendencies to escalation) as a permanent feature of politics

war cuts beneath the play of institutional, economic or political interests they flow over a deeper bedrock of reason 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses are truth-systems ontologies which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained ontology as a claim to an underlying foundation for truth not timeless, but contingent a drive for ontological certainty amounts to a drive for ideational closure that limits debate within a closed system of logic an epistemology of violence joined to an ontology of violence both quicken the resort to war and lead to its escalation they reinforce a norm of war -- and enact an 'enframing' in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use and destruction force produces neither the linear effects imagined nor security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction techniques of military action use force to achieve a desired end supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order violence becomes an essential predicate of its perpetuation humans have no essence outside their value as objects 'the next war is seen as natural being implies action, the action that is war without interrogating our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue we are far from powerless The need is to critique dominant images of political being and ways of securing that being When security was conceived as a sine qua non of life and sovereign existence -- and married to war and instrumental action, it provides limitless violence without constraint war as a permanent feature of politics

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man [humanity] ' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22 The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made. The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political. Friend and Enemy: Violent Ontologies of the Nation-State In his Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau stated that 'the national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, which is the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power and without compromise'. While Morgenthau defined security relatively narrowly -- as the 'integrity of the national territory and its institutions' -- in a context where security was in practice defined expansively, as synonymous with a state's broadest geopolitical and economic 'interests', what was revealing about his formulation was not merely the ontological centrality it had, but the sense of urgency and priority he accorded to it: it must be defended 'without compromise'.27 Morgenthau was a thoughtful and complex thinker, and understood well the complexities and dangers of using armed force. However his formulation reflected an influential view about the significance of the political good termed 'security'. When this is combined with the way in which security was conceived in modern political thought as an existential condition -- a sine qua non of life and sovereign political existence -- and then married to war and instrumental action, it provides a basic underpinning for either the limitless resort to strategic violence without effective constraint, or the perseverance of limited war (with its inherent tendencies to escalation) as a permanent feature of politics. While he was no militarist, Morgenthau did say elsewhere (in, of all places, a far-reaching critique of nuclear strategy) that the 'quantitative and qualitative competition for conventional weapons is a rational instrument of international politics'.28

<h4>This drive for certainty constitutes a violent political subjectivity which makes warfare and catastrophe inevitable</h4><p><u><strong>Burke 7</u></strong> (Anthony Burke, associate professor of international and political studies at the University of New South Wales, PhD in political science and international relations from the Australian National University, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Theory and Event Volume 10 Issue 2, modified) <u>gz</p><p>This essay develops a theory about the causes of <mark>war</mark> -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that <strong><mark>cuts beneath</strong></mark> analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or <mark>the play of institutional, economic or political interests</mark> (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but <mark>they flow over a <strong>deeper bedrock of</mark> modern <mark>reason</strong></mark> that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself</u>. In this light, <u>the two <mark>'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses</mark> of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are <strong>more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses</u></strong>. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. <u>They <mark>are truth-systems</mark> of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: <mark>ontologies</mark>, statements about truth and being <mark>which claim a <strong>rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained</mark> as it is</strong>.</p><p></u>I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: <u>ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being</u> (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), <u>and as a statement of <strong>epistemological truth and certainty</strong>, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty</u> (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). <u>These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a <strong>solid metaphysical account</strong> of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'</u>.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, <u>I see <mark>ontology as</mark> a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: <mark>a claim to</mark> the status of <mark>an <strong>underlying</mark> systemic <mark>foundation for truth</mark>, identity, existence and action</strong>; one that is <mark>not</mark> essential or <mark>timeless, but</mark> is thoroughly <strong>historical and <mark>contingent</strong></mark>, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, <strong>ontology is the 'politics of truth'</u></strong>18 <u>in its most sweeping and powerful form</u>.</p><p><u>I see such <mark>a <strong>drive for ontological certainty</mark> and completion</strong> as particularly problematic for a number of reasons</u>. Firstly, <u>when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it <mark>amounts to</mark> <strong>a hard and exclusivist claim</strong>: <mark>a drive for ideational</mark> hegemony and <mark>closure that <strong>limits debate</mark> and questioning</strong>, that confines it <mark>within</mark> the boundaries of<mark> a </mark>particular, <mark>closed system of logic</mark>, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the <strong>truth of truth as such</u></strong>. The second is its intimate relation with violence: <u>the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to <strong><mark>an epistemology of violence</strong></mark> (strategy) <strong><mark>joined to an ontology of violence</strong></mark> (the national security state).</u> When we consider their relation to war, <u>the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends <mark>both</mark> to <strong><mark>quicken the resort to war and</mark> to <mark>lead to its escalation</strong></mark> either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects</u>. In such a context <u>violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being</u>.</p><p>This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. <u>This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- <mark>they</mark> <strong>embody and <mark>reinforce a norm of war</strong> -- and</mark> because they <mark>enact</mark> what Martin Heidegger calls <strong><mark>an 'enframing'</mark> image of technology</strong> and being <mark>in which <strong>humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use</mark>, control <mark>and destruction</mark>, and force</strong> -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'</u>.19 <u>The pragmatic problem arises because <mark>force</mark> so often <mark>produces <strong>neither the linear</mark> system of <mark>effects imagined</mark> in strategic theory <mark>nor</mark> anything we could meaningfully call <mark>security</strong>, but rather turns in upon itself in a <strong>nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction</u></strong></mark>. <u>In the era of a 'war on terror'</u> dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 <u>the arguments</u> of Hannah Arendt (<u>that violence <strong>collapses ends into means</u></strong>) <u>and</u> Emmanuel Levinas (<u>that 'every war employs <strong>arms that turn against those that wield them'</u></strong>) <u>take on added significance</u>. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21</p><p>What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather <u>they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply <strong>an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action</strong>, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity</u>. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action.</p><p><u>The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about <mark>techniques of military</mark> and geopolitical <mark>action</mark> which <mark>use force</mark> and coercion <mark>to achieve a desired end</mark>, an end that is <mark>supplied by the <strong>ontological claim to national existence, security, or order</u></strong></mark>. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, <u>instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and <strong>the resort to <mark>violence becomes an </mark>equally <mark>essential predicate of its perpetuation</u></strong></mark>. In this way <u>knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of </u>'man [<u>humanity</u>] '<u> as a maker and user of things, including other <mark>humans</mark>, which <mark>have <strong>no essence</mark> or integrity <mark>outside their value as objects</u></strong></mark>. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: <u>'we are ready for the next war'</u>. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, <u><strong><mark>'the next war is seen as</mark> a <mark>natural</mark> phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise</u></strong>.' 22</p><p>The danger obviously raised here is that <u>these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose <strong>very process of construction cannot be examined</u></strong>. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, <u><mark>being implies action, <strong>the action that is war</u></strong></mark>. <u>This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues</u>, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, <u>that <strong>'the only path to safety is the path of action',</strong> which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state</u>.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that <u>obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing <strong>'problematizations' of truth</u></strong>.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However <u><mark>without interrogating</mark> more deeply</u> how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in <u><mark>our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue </mark>to be made.</p><p></u>The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, <u><strong><mark>we are far from powerless</strong></mark> in the face of them. <strong><mark>The need is to critique dominant images of political being and</mark> dominant <mark>ways of securing that being</strong></mark> at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.</p><p></u>Friend and Enemy: Violent Ontologies of the Nation-State</p><p>In his Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau stated that 'the national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, which is the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power and without compromise'. <u>While Morgenthau defined security relatively narrowly</u> -- as the 'integrity of the national territory and its institutions' -- in a context where security was in practice defined expansively, as synonymous with a state's broadest geopolitical and economic 'interests', <u>what was revealing about his formulation was not merely the ontological centrality it had, but the sense of urgency and priority he accorded to it: it must be <strong>defended 'without compromise'</u></strong>.27 Morgenthau was a thoughtful and complex thinker, and understood well the complexities and dangers of using armed force. However his formulation reflected an influential view about the significance of the political good termed 'security'. <u><mark>When</mark> this is combined with the way in which <mark>security was conceived</mark> in modern political thought <mark>as</mark> an existential condition -- <strong><mark>a sine qua non of life and sovereign</mark> political <mark>existence</strong> -- and</mark> then <strong><mark>married to war and instrumental action</strong>, it provides</mark> a basic underpinning for either the <strong><mark>limitless</mark> resort to strategic <mark>violence without</mark> effective <mark>constraint</strong></mark>, or the perseverance of limited <mark>war</mark> (with its inherent tendencies to escalation) <mark>as <strong>a permanent feature of politics</u></strong></mark>. While he was no militarist, Morgenthau did say elsewhere (in, of all places, a far-reaching critique of nuclear strategy) that the 'quantitative and qualitative competition for conventional weapons is a rational instrument of international politics'.28</p>

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Threats of war in the Spratleys are posturing

Washington’s Blog 12

[http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2012/09/china-versus-japan-shooting-war-economic-war-or-war-of-words.html, mg] the Chinese and Japanese both have upcoming elections, and they are simply posturing to look tough for domestic consumption. He said that the Chinese and Japanese leadership both know where the “line” is, and that neither will cross the line and actually start a war. Chinese leadership also doesn’t want to appear as weak Japan’s actions are largely driven by political considerations of “not appearing weak”.

that the Chinese and Japanese both have upcoming elections, and that they are simply posturing to look tough for domestic consumption.¶ ¶ He said that the Chinese and Japanese leadership both know where the “line” is, and that neither will cross the line and actually start a war.¶ ¶ Chinese leadership also doesn’t want to appear as weak Japan’s actions are largely driven by political considerations of “not appearing weak”.¶

[http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2012/09/china-versus-japan-shooting-war-economic-war-or-war-of-words.html, mg] I spoke with a very smart friend who grew up in China, has lived in the United States for a number of years, and has a very sophisticated view of geopolitics. (He is a professional and an entrepreneur, and isn’t directly affiliated with the Chinese government).¶ ¶ He told me that the Chinese and Japanese have periodically argued over these islands, and reminded me that the Chinese people are still furious at Japanese imperial invasion and brutality during WWII, especially Nanking and Manchuria.¶ ¶ Most interestingly, he said that the Chinese and Japanese both have upcoming elections, and that they are simply posturing to look tough for domestic consumption.¶ ¶ He said that the Chinese and Japanese leadership both know where the “line” is, and that neither will cross the line and actually start a war.¶ ¶ Willy Lam, Adjunct Professor, China Studies, Chinese University Of Hong Kong agrees:¶ ¶ From the Beijing’s perspective there will be a major change of leadership coming up at the 18th Party Congress. At this stage the government also doesn’t want to appear as weak. Particularly given the rise of Chinese nationalism.¶ ¶ Likewise, Linus Hagström – associate professor of political science and a senior research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs – says that Japan’s actions are largely driven by political considerations of “not appearing weak”.¶

<h4>Threats of war in the Spratleys<u><strong> are posturing </h4><p></strong>Washington’s Blog 12</p><p><strong>[http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2012/09/china-versus-japan-shooting-war-economic-war-or-war-of-words.html, mg]</p><p></u></strong>I spoke with a very smart friend who grew up in China, has lived in the United States for a number of years, and has a very sophisticated view of geopolitics. (He is a professional and an entrepreneur, and isn’t directly affiliated with the Chinese government).¶ ¶ He told me that the Chinese and Japanese have periodically argued over these islands, and reminded me that the Chinese people are still furious at Japanese imperial invasion and brutality during WWII, especially Nanking and Manchuria.¶ ¶ Most interestingly, he said <mark>that <u><strong>the Chinese and Japanese both have upcoming elections, and</u></strong> that <u><strong>they are simply posturing to look tough for domestic consumption.</u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>¶<u><strong> He said that the Chinese and Japanese leadership both know where the “line” is, and that neither will cross the line and actually start a war.</u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>¶</mark> Willy Lam, Adjunct Professor, China Studies, <u><strong><mark>Chinese</u></strong></mark> University Of Hong Kong agrees:¶ ¶ From the Beijing’s perspective there will be a major change of <u><strong><mark>leadership</u></strong></mark> coming up at the 18th Party Congress. At this stage the government <u><strong><mark>also</u></strong> <u><strong>doesn’t want to appear as weak</u></strong></mark>. Particularly given the rise of Chinese nationalism.¶ ¶ Likewise, Linus Hagström – associate professor of political science and a senior research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs – says that <u><strong><mark>Japan’s actions are largely driven by political considerations of “not appearing weak”.</u></strong>¶<u><strong></mark> </p></u></strong>

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UNLV GV

Calum Matheson

1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k

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The CP increases public awareness, solves scarcity

Spital ‘98

Spital ‘98

Despite best efforts to educate the public many would remain ignorant of the policy a system that would increase the supply of organs without compromising individual autonomy Mandated choice is designed to accomplish just this this approach would eliminate the family-consent barrier Mandated choice would also take advantage of favourable public attitudes Mandated choice might also be the most effective method for increasing public awareness of the value of organ donation since all adults would have to consider the issue more than any other system, mandated choice would ensure that a person's wishes would be known and honoured

Despite efforts to educate the public many remain ignorant a system that would increase the supply of organs Mandated choice is designed to accomplish this this would eliminate the family-consent barrier Mandated choice would take advantage of favourable public attitudes Mandated choice might be the most effective method for increasing public awareness since all adults would have to consider the issue

Aaron (Genesee Hospital, University of Rochester School of Medicine )http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(98)85062-9/fulltext As has been emphasised by Veatch,2 because a significant minority of the public are opposed to organ donation, it is wrong to presume that everyone would consent. Despite our best efforts to educate the public, it is likely that many people would remain ignorant of the policy, and for these people presumed consent would be tantamount to secretive conscription of organs. Is there a system that would increase the supply of organs without compromising individual autonomy? Mandated choice is designed to accomplish just this: all competent adults would be required to consider and record their wishes about the use of their organs after death and their wishes would be binding.3 Like presumed consent this approach would eliminate the family-consent barrier and the added stress experienced by families and staff when forced to decide about organ donation. Mandated choice would also take advantage of favourable public attitudes, since the question of organ donation would be addressed in a relaxed setting. Mandated choice might also be the most effective method for increasing public awareness of the value of organ donation since all adults would have to consider the issue. Finally, unlike presumed consent, there would be no risk of unintended conscription; indeed, more than any other system, mandated choice would ensure that a person's wishes would be known and honoured.

<h4><u><strong>The CP increases public awareness, solves scarcity</h4><p>Spital ‘98</p><p></u></strong>Aaron (Genesee Hospital, University of Rochester School of Medicine )http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(98)85062-9/fulltext</p><p>As has been emphasised by Veatch,2 because a significant minority of the public are opposed to organ donation, it is wrong to presume that everyone would consent. <u><mark>Despite</u></mark> our <u>best <mark>efforts to educate the public</u></mark>, it is likely that <u><mark>many</u></mark> people <u>would <mark>remain ignorant</mark> of the policy</u>, and for these people presumed consent would be tantamount to secretive conscription of organs. Is there <u><mark>a system that would increase the supply of organs</mark> without compromising individual autonomy</u>? <u><mark>Mandated choice is designed to accomplish</mark> just <mark>this</u></mark>: all competent adults would be required to consider and record their wishes about the use of their organs after death and their wishes would be binding.3 Like presumed consent <u><mark>this</mark> approach <mark>would eliminate the family-consent barrier</u></mark> and the added stress experienced by families and staff when forced to decide about organ donation. <u><mark>Mandated choice would</u></mark> <u>also <mark>take advantage of favourable public attitudes</u></mark>, since the question of organ donation would be addressed in a relaxed setting. <u><mark>Mandated choice might</mark> also <mark>be <strong>the most effective method for increasing public awareness</strong></mark> of the value of organ donation <mark>since all adults would have to consider the issue</u></mark>. Finally, unlike presumed consent, there would be no risk of unintended conscription; indeed, <u>more than any other system, mandated choice would ensure that a person's wishes would be known and honoured</u>.</p>

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Emory KL

Brian Delong

1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k

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vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political

Spanos 8

Spanos 8 (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified)

We must think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. I do not simply mean “the nothing” “the ontological difference” “existence” “the absolutely other” “the differance” or “trace” “the differend” the “invisible” or “absent cause” that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking I also mean “the pariah” “the nomad” “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” “the nonbeings” the subaltern “the emigré” “the denizen” “the refugee” “the queer” “the multitude” and “the darkness” that haunt “white”/imperial culture politics images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency images of [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia to veritas

We must think the “ghostly” ontological exile a way of “errant” thinking able to resist the imperialism of technological logic with the displaced emigré by refusal to be answerable to the Occident focus on historical politics betrays indifference to imperial politics of representation praxisoriented discourse tends to separate praxis from the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being constitutes a continuum, which traverses its sites to sociopolitics This haunting suggests the complex and contradictory situation writers found themselves I have overdetermined the ontological of the the errant thinker in the interregnum to make visible the role ontological representation has played in the West’s imperial project I would suggest resuming the abandoned destructive genealogy of the post-Enlightenment Occident Such will show that American polity constitutes the fulfillment of the “ontotheological tradition

On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must, rather, think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do not simply mean “the nothing” (das Nichts) or “the ontological difference” (Heidegger), “existence” (Sartre), “the absolutely other” (Levinas), “the differance” or “trace” (Derrida), “the differend” (Lyotard), the “invisible” or “absent cause” (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean “the pariah” (Arendt), “the nomad” (Deleuze and Guattari), “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” (Bhabha), “the nonbeings” (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha), “the emigré” (Said), “the denizen” (Hammar), “the refugee” (Agamben), “the queer” (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), “the multitude” (Negri and Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, “the darkness” (Morrison) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/imperial culture politics: The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these images of blinding [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature.38 In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.

<h4>vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political</h4><p><u><strong>Spanos 8</u></strong> (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified)</p><p>On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. <u><mark>We must</u></mark>, rather, <u><mark>think</mark> the Abgeschiedene—<mark>the “ghostly” ontological exile</mark> evolving <mark>a way of “errant” thinking</mark> that would be <mark>able to resist the</mark> global <mark>imperialism of</mark> Occidental/<mark>technological logic</mark>—<mark>with</mark>, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: <mark>the displaced</mark> political <mark>emigré</mark> evolving, <mark>by</mark> way of his or her <mark>refusal to be answerable to the</mark> “Truth” of the <mark>Occident</mark>, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event</u>. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that <u>this Left’s <mark>focus on historical</mark>ly specific <mark>politics betrays</mark> a disabling <mark>indifference to</mark> the polyvalent <mark>imperial politics</mark> <mark>of</mark> ontological <mark>representation</mark>. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged <mark>praxisoriented discourse</mark>, that is, <mark>tends</mark>—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—<mark>to separate praxis from</mark> and to privilege it over theory, <mark>the political over the ontological</u></mark>. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this <u><mark>praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that</mark> <mark>being</mark>, however it is represented, <mark>constitutes a continuum, which</mark>, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless <mark>traverses its </mark>indissolubly related “<mark>sites</mark>” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), <mark>to sociopolitics</mark> (including the nation and the international or global sphere).</u> As a necessary result, <u>it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being.</u> By this relay of positively potential differences <u>I do not simply mean “the nothing”</u> (das Nichts) or <u>“the ontological difference” </u>(Heidegger), <u>“existence”</u> (Sartre), <u>“the absolutely other”</u> (Levinas), <u>“the differance” or “trace”</u> (Derrida), <u>“the differend”</u> (Lyotard), <u>the “invisible” or “absent cause”</u> (Althusser) <u>that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking</u>.36 <u>I also mean “the pariah” </u>(Arendt), <u>“the nomad”</u> (Deleuze and Guattari), <u>“the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin”</u> (Bhabha), <u>“the nonbeings”</u> (Dussel), <u>the subaltern</u> (Guha), <u>“the emigré”</u> (Said), <u>“the denizen”</u> (Hammar), <u>“the refugee”</u> (Agamben), <u>“the queer”</u> (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), <u>“the multitude”</u> (Negri and Hardt),37 <u>and</u>, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, <u>“the darkness”</u> (Morrison) <u>that</u> belong contradictorily to and <u>haunt “white”/imperial culture politics</u>: The <u>images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency</u>. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these <u>images of </u>blinding<u> [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. <mark>This haunting</mark>, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, <mark>suggests the complex and contradictory situation</mark> in which American <mark>writers found themselves</mark> during the formative years of the nation’s literature</u>.38 In this chapter, <u><mark>I have overdetermined the ontological</mark> perspective <mark>of the</mark> Abgeschiedene, <mark>the errant thinker in the interregnum</mark> who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about</u>,39 <u>not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been <mark>to make visible</mark> and operational <mark>the </mark>substantial and increasingly complex practical <mark>role</mark> that <mark>ontological representation has played</mark> and continues to play <mark>in the West’s</mark> perennial global <mark>imperial project</mark>, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. </u>In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, <u><mark>I would suggest</mark>, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of <mark>resuming the</mark> virtually <mark>abandoned destructive genealogy of</mark> the truth discourse of <mark>the post-Enlightenment Occident</mark>, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture</u>. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. <u><mark>Such</mark> a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, <mark>will show that</mark> this “triumphant” post-Cold War <mark>American polity constitutes the fulfillment</mark> (end) <mark>of</mark> the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary </u>(Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), <u>has called <mark>the “ontotheological tradition</mark>.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia</u> (unconcealment) <u>to veritas</u> (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.</p>

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Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case

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CP boosts available organs by hundreds of thousands

McArdle no date

McArdle no date (John F McArdle, PhD, member of the Center for Responsible Transplantation, no date given, “Xenotransplantation: An Opportunity to Promote Alternatives,” http://www.crt-online.org/organ.html) gz

In 1996, Sweden instituted a mandated choice law, in which all adults were required to choose between donating or not donating their organs. There was an immediate increase of 600,000 potential donors. A similar 1990 law in Denmark increased their donor registry by 150,000. Surveys of U.S. public opinion indicated that 90 percent would support such a mandated choice law and 93 percent would honor the wishes of the family member making the choice if the wishes were known

Sweden instituted mandated choice There was an immediate increase of 600,000 donors. A similar law in Denmark increased their registry by 150,000 Surveys of U.S. public opinion indicated 90 percent would support mandated choice and 93 percent would honor the wishes of the family member making the choice

Evidence from Egypt and India suggests such inducement works, involving a contract for sale of organs upon the donor's death. This is not to be confused with the sale of organs from living donors, which probably should remain unsupported. In 1996, Sweden instituted a mandated choice law, in which all adults were required to choose between donating or not donating their organs. There was an immediate increase of 600,000 potential donors. A similar 1990 law in Denmark increased their donor registry by 150,000. Surveys of U.S. public opinion indicated that 90 percent would support such a mandated choice law and 93 percent would honor the wishes of the family member making the choice if the wishes were known. As with other required choice options, a national donor registry would be necessary and have easy 24-hour access to transplant coordinators.

<h4>CP boosts available organs by hundreds of thousands </h4><p><u><strong>McArdle no date</u></strong> (John F McArdle, PhD, member of the Center for Responsible Transplantation, no date given, “Xenotransplantation: An Opportunity to Promote Alternatives,” http://www.crt-online.org/organ.html<u>) gz</p><p></u>Evidence from Egypt and India suggests such inducement works, involving a contract for sale of organs upon the donor's death. This is not to be confused with the sale of organs from living donors, which probably should remain unsupported. <u>In 1996, <mark>Sweden instituted</mark> a <mark>mandated choice</mark> law, in which all adults were required to choose between donating or not donating their organs. <mark>There was an immediate increase of 600,000</mark> potential <mark>donors. A similar</mark> 1990 <mark>law in Denmark increased their</mark> donor <mark>registry by 150,000</mark>.</p><p><mark>Surveys of U.S. public opinion indicated</mark> that <mark>90 percent would support</mark> such a <mark>mandated choice</mark> law <mark>and 93 percent would honor the wishes of the family member making the choice</mark> if the wishes were known</u>. As with other required choice options, a national donor registry would be necessary and have easy 24-hour access to transplant coordinators.</p>

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Brian Delong

1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k

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Vast scholarship proves our argument

Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 14

Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 14 – co-founders of The Breakthrough Institute a think tank specializing in environmental policy (TED NORDHAUS and MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER APRIL 8, 2014 “Global Warming Scare Tactics”http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/opinion/global-warming-scare-tactics.html?_r=0)

— IF you were looking for ways to increase public skepticism about global warming, you could hardly do better than images of melting glaciers, raging wildfires and rampaging floods. efforts to raise public concern about climate change by linking it to natural disasters will backfire. More than a decade’s worth of research suggests that fear-based appeals about climate change inspire denial, fatalism and polarization. Gore’s documentary An Inconvenient Truth, contributed to public backlash and division. Since 2006, the number of Americans telling Gallup that the media was exaggerating global warming grew to 42 percent today from about 34 percent. Meanwhile, the gap between Democrats and Republicans on whether global warming is caused by humans rose to 42 percent last year from 26 percent in 2006, according to the Pew Research Center. Still, environmental groups have known since 2000 that efforts to link climate change to natural disasters could backfire, after researchers at the Frameworks Institute studied public attitudes for its report “How to Talk About Global Warming.” Messages focused on extreme weather events, they found, made many Americans more likely to view climate change as an act of God something to be weathered, not prevented. people are likely to buy an SUV to help them through the erratic weather to come” , rather than support fuel-efficiency standards. evidence that a fear-based approach backfires has grown stronger. A frequently cited 2009 study in the journal Science Communication summed up “Although shocking, catastrophic, and large-scale representations of the impacts of climate change may well act as an initial hook for people’s attention and concern, they clearly do not motivate a sense of personal engagement with the issue and indeed may act to trigger barriers to engagement such as denial.” In a controlled laboratory experiment published in Psychological Science in 2010, researchers were able to use “dire messages to increase skepticism , turning down the rhetoric better serve efforts to slow global warming

efforts to raise concern about climate change by linking it to disasters will backfire a decade’s worth of research suggests fear-based appeals inspire denial, fatalism and polarization Gore’s documentary contributed to backlash Americans telling Gallup the media was exaggerating grew the gap between Dem s and Republicans rose according to Pew Research Center the Frameworks Institute studied attitudes for its report Messages on extreme events, they found, made Americans likely to view climate change as an act of God to be weathered, not prevented A study in the journal Science Communication summed up “Although large-scale repr s of climate change may act as a hook for attention they do not motivate engagement and act to trigger denial.” In a lab experiment published in Psychological Science researchers use “dire messages to increase skepticism

OAKLAND, Calif. — IF you were looking for ways to increase public skepticism about global warming, you could hardly do better than the forthcoming nine-part series on climate change and natural disasters, starting this Sunday on Showtime. A trailer for “Years of Living Dangerously” is terrifying, replete with images of melting glaciers, raging wildfires and rampaging floods. “I don’t think scary is the right word,” intones one voice. “Dangerous, definitely.” Showtime’s producers undoubtedly have the best of intentions. There are serious long-term risks associated with rising greenhouse gas emissions, ranging from ocean acidification to sea-level rise to decreasing agricultural output. But there is every reason to believe that efforts to raise public concern about climate change by linking it to natural disasters will backfire. More than a decade’s worth of research suggests that fear-based appeals about climate change inspire denial, fatalism and polarization. For instance, Al Gore’s 2006 documentary, “An Inconvenient Truth,” popularized the idea that today’s natural disasters are increasing in severity and frequency because of human-caused global warming. It also contributed to public backlash and division. Since 2006, the number of Americans telling Gallup that the media was exaggerating global warming grew to 42 percent today from about 34 percent. Meanwhile, the gap between Democrats and Republicans on whether global warming is caused by humans rose to 42 percent last year from 26 percent in 2006, according to the Pew Research Center. Other factors contributed. Some conservatives and fossil-fuel interests questioned the link between carbon emissions and global warming. And beginning in 2007, as the country was falling into recession, public support for environmental protection declined. Still, environmental groups have known since 2000 that efforts to link climate change to natural disasters could backfire, after researchers at the Frameworks Institute studied public attitudes for its report “How to Talk About Global Warming.” Messages focused on extreme weather events, they found, made many Americans more likely to view climate change as an act of God — something to be weathered, not prevented. Some people, the report noted, “are likely to buy an SUV to help them through the erratic weather to come” for example, rather than support fuel-efficiency standards. Since then, evidence that a fear-based approach backfires has grown stronger. A frequently cited 2009 study in the journal Science Communication summed up the scholarly consensus. “Although shocking, catastrophic, and large-scale representations of the impacts of climate change may well act as an initial hook for people’s attention and concern,” the researchers wrote, “they clearly do not motivate a sense of personal engagement with the issue and indeed may act to trigger barriers to engagement such as denial.” In a controlled laboratory experiment published in Psychological Science in 2010, researchers were able to use “dire messages” about global warming to increase skepticism about the problem. Many climate advocates ignore these findings, arguing that they have an obligation to convey the alarming facts. But claims linking the latest blizzard, drought or hurricane to global warming simply can’t be supported by the science. Our warming world is, according to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, increasing heat waves and intense precipitation in some places, and is likely to bring more extreme weather in the future. But the panel also said there is little evidence that this warming is increasing the loss of life or the economic costs of natural disasters. “Economic growth, including greater concentrations of people and wealth in periled areas and rising insurance penetration,” the climate panel noted, “is the most important driver of increasing losses.” Claims that current disasters are connected to climate change do seem to motivate many liberals to support action. But they alienate conservatives in roughly equal measure. What works, say environmental pollsters and researchers, is focusing on popular solutions. Climate advocates often do this, arguing that solar and wind can reduce emissions while strengthening the economy. But when renewable energy technologies are offered as solutions to the exclusion of other low-carbon alternatives, they polarize rather than unite. One recent study, published by Yale Law School’s Cultural Cognition Project, found that conservatives become less skeptical about global warming if they first read articles suggesting nuclear energy or geoengineering as solutions. Another study, in the journal Nature Climate Change in 2012, concluded that “communication should focus on how mitigation efforts can promote a better society” rather than “on the reality of climate change and averting its risks.” Nonetheless, virtually every major national environmental organization continues to reject nuclear energy, even after four leading climate scientists wrote them an open letter last fall, imploring them to embrace the technology as a key climate solution. Together with catastrophic rhetoric, the rejection of technologies like nuclear and natural gas by environmental groups is most likely feeding the perception among many that climate change is being exaggerated. After all, if climate change is a planetary emergency, why take nuclear and natural gas off the table? While the urgency that motivates exaggerated claims is understandable, turning down the rhetoric and embracing solutions like nuclear energy will better serve efforts to slow global warming.

<h4>Vast scholarship proves our argument</h4><p><u><strong>Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 14</u></strong> – co-founders of The Breakthrough Institute a think tank specializing in environmental policy (TED NORDHAUS and MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER APRIL 8, 2014 “Global Warming Scare Tactics”http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/09/opinion/global-warming-scare-tactics.html?_r=0)</p><p>OAKLAND, Calif. <u>— IF you were looking for ways to increase public skepticism about global warming, you could hardly do better than </u>the forthcoming nine-part series on climate change and natural disasters, starting this Sunday on Showtime. A trailer for “Years of Living Dangerously” is terrifying, replete with <u>images of melting glaciers, raging wildfires and rampaging floods.</u> “I don’t think scary is the right word,” intones one voice. “Dangerous, definitely.” Showtime’s producers undoubtedly have the best of intentions. There are serious long-term risks associated with rising greenhouse gas emissions, ranging from ocean acidification to sea-level rise to decreasing agricultural output. But there is every reason to believe that <u><mark>efforts to raise </mark>public <mark>concern about climate change by linking it to</mark> natural <mark>disasters will backfire</mark>. <strong>More than <mark>a decade’s worth of research suggests </mark>that <mark>fear-based appeals</mark> about climate change <mark>inspire denial, fatalism and polarization</strong></mark>. </u>For instance, Al <u><mark>Gore’s</mark> </u>2006 <u><mark>documentary</u></mark>, “<u>An Inconvenient Truth,</u>” popularized the idea that today’s natural disasters are increasing in severity and frequency because of human-caused global warming. It also <u><mark>contributed to</mark> public <mark>backlash</mark> and division. Since 2006, the number of <mark>Americans telling Gallup</mark> that <mark>the media was exaggerating</mark> global warming <mark>grew</mark> to 42 percent today from about 34 percent. Meanwhile, <mark>the gap between Dem</mark>ocrat<mark>s and Republicans </mark>on whether global warming is caused by humans <mark>rose</mark> to 42 percent last year from 26 percent in 2006, <mark>according to</mark> the <mark>Pew Research Center</mark>.</u> Other factors contributed. Some conservatives and fossil-fuel interests questioned the link between carbon emissions and global warming. And beginning in 2007, as the country was falling into recession, public support for environmental protection declined. <u>Still, environmental groups have known since 2000 that efforts to link climate change to natural disasters could backfire, after researchers at <mark>the Frameworks Institute studied</mark> public <mark>attitudes for its report</mark> “How to Talk About Global Warming.” <mark>Messages</mark> focused <mark>on extreme</mark> weather <mark>events, they found, made</mark> many <mark>Americans </mark>more <mark>likely to view climate change as an act of God</u></mark> — <u>something <mark>to be weathered, not prevented</mark>. </u>Some <u>people</u>, the report noted, “<u>are likely to buy an SUV to help them through the erratic weather to come” </u>for example<u>, rather than support fuel-efficiency standards. </u>Since then, <u>evidence that a fear-based approach backfires has grown stronger. <mark>A</mark> frequently cited 2009 <mark>study in the journal Science Communication summed up</u></mark> the scholarly consensus. <u><mark>“Although</mark> shocking, catastrophic, and <mark>large-scale repr</mark>esentation<mark>s of</mark> the impacts of <mark>climate change may</mark> well <mark>act as a</mark>n initial <mark>hook for</mark> people’s <mark>attention</mark> and concern,</u>” the researchers wrote, “<u><mark>they </mark>clearly <mark>do not motivate</mark> a sense of personal <mark>engagement</mark> with the issue <mark>and</mark> indeed may <mark>act to trigger </mark>barriers to engagement such as <mark>denial.” In a </mark>controlled <mark>lab</mark>oratory <mark>experiment published in Psychological Science</mark> in 2010, <mark>researchers </mark>were able to <mark>use “dire messages</u></mark>” about global warming<u> <mark>to increase skepticism</u></mark> about the problem. Many climate advocates ignore these findings, arguing that they have an obligation to convey the alarming facts. But claims linking the latest blizzard, drought or hurricane to global warming simply can’t be supported by the science. Our warming world is, according to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, increasing heat waves and intense precipitation in some places, and is likely to bring more extreme weather in the future. But the panel also said there is little evidence that this warming is increasing the loss of life or the economic costs of natural disasters. “Economic growth, including greater concentrations of people and wealth in periled areas and rising insurance penetration,” the climate panel noted, “is the most important driver of increasing losses.” Claims that current disasters are connected to climate change do seem to motivate many liberals to support action. But they alienate conservatives in roughly equal measure. What works, say environmental pollsters and researchers, is focusing on popular solutions. Climate advocates often do this, arguing that solar and wind can reduce emissions while strengthening the economy. But when renewable energy technologies are offered as solutions to the exclusion of other low-carbon alternatives, they polarize rather than unite. One recent study, published by Yale Law School’s Cultural Cognition Project, found that conservatives become less skeptical about global warming if they first read articles suggesting nuclear energy or geoengineering as solutions. Another study, in the journal Nature Climate Change in 2012, concluded that “communication should focus on how mitigation efforts can promote a better society” rather than “on the reality of climate change and averting its risks.” Nonetheless, virtually every major national environmental organization continues to reject nuclear energy, even after four leading climate scientists wrote them an open letter last fall, imploring them to embrace the technology as a key climate solution. Together with catastrophic rhetoric, the rejection of technologies like nuclear and natural gas by environmental groups is most likely feeding the perception among many that climate change is being exaggerated. After all, if climate change is a planetary emergency, why take nuclear and natural gas off the table? While the urgency that motivates exaggerated claims is understandable<u>, turning down the rhetoric </u>and embracing solutions like nuclear energy will <u>better serve efforts to slow global warming</u>.</p>

2NC

Security

Warming

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UNLV GV

Calum Matheson

1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k

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1. Afghan stability is resolved by regional cooperation and institutions

PAN 4/27

PAN 4/27 (Pajhwok Afghanistan News, April 27, 2013, “Regional states underline Afghan stability”, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2013/04/27/regional-states-underline-afghan-stability, AB)

the international community and the region had a shared responsibility and common interest in working together for the sake of Afghanistan and the region as a whole. The support of non-regional countries and organisations is essential to the success Our shared interests are best served by cooperation, rather than competition in the Heart of Asia. The first priority and area of common concern is security Contemporary security threats have a global character and the only possible way to effectively counter them is for states to work together according to agreed principles and mechanisms of cooperation. we are determined to work together through the Istanbul Process to respond to our common security challenges and threats

the international community had a shared responsibility and common interest in working together for Afghanistan and the region interests are served by cooperation rather than competition The first concern is security. to effectively counter them is for mechanisms of cooperation we are determined to work together to respond to threats

It added the international community and the region had a shared responsibility and common interest in working together for the sake of Afghanistan and the region as a whole. The support of non-regional countries and organisations involved in the Istanbul Process is essential to the success of this shared effort. It welcomed efforts to promote a stable, independent, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. “Our shared interests are best served by cooperation, rather than competition, in the Heart of Asia. We will therefore use the Istanbul Process to build a common platform of shared regional interests, as well as a secure and prosperous ‘Heart of Asia’ region where Afghanistan has a crucial role as a land-bridge, connecting South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia, and the Middle East. “The first priority and area of common concern is security. Contemporary security challenges and threats have a global character and impact and the only possible way to effectively counter them is for states to work together according to agreed principles and mechanisms of cooperation. “In this context, as representatives of a region that is most affected by common security challenges, we are determined to work together through the Istanbul Process to respond to our common security challenges and threats,” the document said.

<h4>1. Afghan stability is resolved by regional cooperation and institutions </h4><p><u><strong><mark>PAN 4/27</u></strong></mark> (Pajhwok Afghanistan News, April 27, 2013, “Regional states underline Afghan stability”, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2013/04/27/regional-states-underline-afghan-stability, AB)</p><p>It added <u><mark>the international community</mark> and the region <mark>had a <strong>shared responsibility</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>common interest</mark> </strong><mark>in working together for</mark> the sake of <mark>Afghanistan</mark> <mark>and the region</mark> as a whole. The support of non-regional countries and organisations</u> involved in the Istanbul Process <u>is essential</u> <u>to the success</u> of this shared effort. It welcomed efforts to promote a stable, independent, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan. “<u>Our shared <mark>interests</mark> <mark>are</mark> best <mark>served by <strong>cooperation</mark>, <mark>rather than competition</u></strong></mark>, <u>in</u> <u>the Heart of Asia.</u> We will therefore use the Istanbul Process to build a common platform of shared regional interests, as well as a secure and prosperous ‘Heart of Asia’ region where Afghanistan has a crucial role as a land-bridge, connecting South Asia, Central Asia, Eurasia, and the Middle East. “<u><mark>The</mark> <mark>first</mark> priority and area of common <mark>concern is security</u>. <u></mark>Contemporary security</u> challenges and <u>threats have a global character and</u> impact and <u>the only possible way <mark>to effectively counter them is for</mark> states to work together according to agreed principles and <strong><mark>mechanisms of cooperation</strong></mark>. </u>“In this context, as representatives of a region that is most affected by common security challenges, <u><strong><mark>we are determined to work together</u></strong></mark> <u>through the Istanbul Process <mark>to</mark> <mark>respond to</mark> our common security challenges and <mark>threats</u></mark>,” the document said.</p>

1NC

Global Health

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3

Cornell LL

Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case

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causes north south war and extinction

Brzoska 8 , Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg; “The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security,” Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Convention, 2008)

Brzoska 8 (Michael Brzoska, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg; “The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security,” Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Convention, 2008)

when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem Securitization regularly leads to all-round ‘exceptionalism’ as well as to a shift in security experts’ Methods associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on ‘what to do’. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could cause the richer countries in the North to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the South It could also be used as a justification for improving their military preparedness leading to arms races.

Securitization leads to ‘exceptionalism’ arms, force and violence – will gain in importance the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the annihilation of humankind Climate change could meet a similar fate. A political problem might be perceived as intractable necessitating the build-up of military forces portrayal could cause richer countries to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the South leading to arms races

In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round ‘exceptionalism’ in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards ‘security experts’ (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on ‘what to do’. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus leading to arms races.

<h4>causes north south war and extinction</h4><p><u><strong>Brzoska 8</u></strong> (Michael Brzoska<u><strong>, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg; “The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security,” Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Convention, 2008)</p><p></u></strong>In the literature on securitization it is implied that <u>when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem</u> (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). <u><mark>Securitization </mark>regularly <mark>leads to </mark>all-round <mark>‘exceptionalism’</u></mark> in dealing with the issue <u>as well as to a shift in</u> institutional localization towards ‘<u>security experts’</u> (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. <u>Methods</u> and instruments <u>associated with these security organizations – such as more <strong>use of <mark>arms, force and violence – will gain in importance </mark>in the</strong> discourse on ‘what to do’. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War</u> (Guzzini 2004 ). <u>Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies</u>, in the late 1940s, <u><mark>the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict </mark>that was <mark>overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the </mark>potential <mark>annihilation of humankind</mark>. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were</u>, throughout most of the Cold War, <u>secondary to improving military capabilities. <strong><mark>Climate change could meet a similar fate</strong>.</u> <u>A</mark>n essentially <mark>political problem</mark> concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation</u> and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment <u><mark>might <strong>be perceived as intractable</mark>, thus <mark>necessitating</strong> the <strong>build-up of military</mark> and police <mark>forces</strong></mark> to prevent it from becoming a major security problem</u>. <u>The <mark>portrayal</mark> of climate change as a security problem <mark>could</u></mark>, in particular, <u><mark>cause</mark> the <mark>richer countries</mark> in the</u> global <u>North</u>, which are less affected by it, <u><strong><mark>to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them</mark> from</strong> the spillover of violent conflict</u> <u><mark>from</u></mark> the poorer countries in <u><mark>the</u></mark> global <u><mark>South</u></mark> that will be most affected by climate change. <u>It could also be used </u>by major powers <u>as a justification for improving their military preparedness</u> against the other major powers, thus <u><strong><mark>leading to arms races</mark>.</p></u></strong>

2NC

Security

Warming

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UNLV GV

Calum Matheson

1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k

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Public outreach and mandated choice solves organ trafficking

KELLY ’13

KELLY ’13 (Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review) Emily 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317

removing the causes of organ trafficking would be more effective than adopting a criminal law framework focusing on reducing demand while maintaining trafficking bans would more effectively address the unique contours of trafficking Shifting the presumption in favor of donation has produced desirable results when paired with comprehensive public outreach Mandated choice may be even more acceptable to most countries Forcing individuals to affirmatively indicate their preference effectively removes concerns about freedom of choice

removing the causes of organ trafficking would be more effective focusing on reducing demand would more effectively address the contours of trafficking Shifting presumption in favor of donation has produced desirable results Mandated choice may be more acceptable

Centering a new OTC-focused instrument on removing the causes of organ trafficking would be more effective than adopting a criminal law framework. n271 First, the criminal law framework has failed in the context of human trafficking, and accordingly will likely fail in the context of OTC trafficking. n272 OTC trafficking, like human trafficking, is a uniquely complex and globalized issue. n273 Yet just as the Trafficking Protocol fails to adequately address the underlying demand that drives human trafficking, focusing exclusively on criminalizing OTC would eclipse efforts to reduce the demand fueling the underground organ market. n274 Furthermore, national attempts to criminalize OTC trafficking have largely failed. n275 Criminalizing the sale of organs has only expanded the illegal underground market in most countries. n276 Even strict bans have not stopped traffickers from inventing loopholes and adapting their organ sale methods. n277 Commentators compare organ trafficking to other "demand-driven" activities such as gambling, prostitution, and drug use, arguing that the most harmful aspects of these [*1343] crimes actually stem from their illegality. n278 Some have proposed removing bans and instead regulating activities such as drug use and prostitution in order to remove violence and other harms associated with the black market. n279 This proposition would likely fail in the context of organ trafficking because donors who sell their organs experience negative outcomes that do not stem from prohibition alone. n280 Instead, focusing the instrument on reducing demand while maintaining trafficking bans would more effectively address the unique contours of organ trafficking. n281 The broad range of national organ procurement frameworks should be used to inform the instrument's requirements. n282 The proposed instrument should respect unique domestic cultural interests by giving countries a degree of flexibility in crafting an effective organ procurement system. n283 Instead of requiring a single framework, the proposed instrument should mandate that countries improve organ procurement using a variety of measures. n284 Although Iran has succeeded in reducing demand and eradicating the underground market, its model would likely fail on a global level. n285 Using financial incentives for organ donation violates religious, moral, and cultural norms and risks disadvantaging the poor. n286 Moreover, requiring [*1344] countries to abandon the almost universal prohibition of organ sales would inevitably result in low ratification rates. n287 Accordingly, the proposed instrument should require countries to use other means of incentivizing donation based on their unique cultural and religious priorities. n288 For example, the instrument can allow countries to adopt donor-priority systems modeled after the frameworks in Singapore and Israel. n289 It can also enable them to provide indirect monetary incentives such as tax deductions and burial reimbursement. n290 Because altruistic donation has not produced enough organs to meet demand, the proposed instrument should require countries to establish alternative frameworks based on soft presumed consent or mandated consent. n291 Shifting the presumption in favor of donation has produced desirable results when paired with comprehensive public outreach. n292 Although requiring a pure presumed-consent system may conflict with values such as privacy and freedom of choice, soft models would be more adaptable and acceptable. n293 Mandated choice may be even more acceptable to most countries. n294 Forcing individuals to affirmatively indicate their preference effectively removes concerns about freedom of choice. n295 Indeed, mandated choice increases individual autonomy by legally adhering to the individual's donation preference. n296

<h4>Public outreach and mandated choice solves organ trafficking</h4><p><u><strong>KELLY ’13</u></strong> (Executive Comment Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review) Emily 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1317</p><p>Centering a new OTC-focused instrument on <u><mark>removing the causes of organ trafficking</u> <u>would be more effective</mark> than adopting a criminal law framework</u>. n271 First, the criminal law framework has failed in the context of human trafficking, and accordingly will likely fail in the context of OTC trafficking. n272 OTC trafficking, like human trafficking, is a uniquely complex and globalized issue. n273 Yet just as the Trafficking Protocol fails to adequately address the underlying demand that drives human trafficking, focusing exclusively on criminalizing OTC would eclipse efforts to reduce the demand fueling the underground organ market. n274 Furthermore, national attempts to criminalize OTC trafficking have largely failed. n275 Criminalizing the sale of organs has only expanded the illegal underground market in most countries. n276 Even strict bans have not stopped traffickers from inventing loopholes and adapting their organ sale methods. n277 Commentators compare organ trafficking to other "demand-driven" activities such as gambling, prostitution, and drug use, arguing that the most harmful aspects of these [*1343] crimes actually stem from their illegality. n278 Some have proposed removing bans and instead regulating activities such as drug use and prostitution in order to remove violence and other harms associated with the black market. n279 This proposition would likely fail in the context of organ trafficking because donors who sell their organs experience negative outcomes that do not stem from prohibition alone. n280 Instead, <u><mark>focusing</u></mark> the instrument <u><mark>on reducing demand</mark> while maintaining trafficking bans <mark>would more effectively address the</mark> unique <mark>contours of</mark> </u>organ <u><mark>trafficking</u></mark>. n281 The broad range of national organ procurement frameworks should be used to inform the instrument's requirements. n282 The proposed instrument should respect unique domestic cultural interests by giving countries a degree of flexibility in crafting an effective organ procurement system. n283 Instead of requiring a single framework, the proposed instrument should mandate that countries improve organ procurement using a variety of measures. n284 Although Iran has succeeded in reducing demand and eradicating the underground market, its model would likely fail on a global level. n285 Using financial incentives for organ donation violates religious, moral, and cultural norms and risks disadvantaging the poor. n286 Moreover, requiring [*1344] countries to abandon the almost universal prohibition of organ sales would inevitably result in low ratification rates. n287 Accordingly, the proposed instrument should require countries to use other means of incentivizing donation based on their unique cultural and religious priorities. n288 For example, the instrument can allow countries to adopt donor-priority systems modeled after the frameworks in Singapore and Israel. n289 It can also enable them to provide indirect monetary incentives such as tax deductions and burial reimbursement. n290 Because altruistic donation has not produced enough organs to meet demand, the proposed instrument should require countries to establish alternative frameworks based on soft presumed consent or mandated consent. n291 <u><mark>Shifting</mark> the <mark>presumption</u> <u>in favor of donation has produced desirable results</mark> when paired with comprehensive public outreach</u>. n292 Although requiring a pure presumed-consent system may conflict with values such as privacy and freedom of choice, soft models would be more adaptable and acceptable. n293 <u><mark>Mandated choice may be</mark> even <mark>more acceptable</mark> to most countries</u>. n294 <u>Forcing individuals to affirmatively indicate their preference effectively removes concerns about freedom of choice</u>. n295 Indeed, mandated choice increases individual autonomy by legally adhering to the individual's donation preference. n296</p>

1NR

CP

A2: Trafficking

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Emory KL

Brian Delong

1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k

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2. Taliban are giving up AND political solutions solve

Ahbrimkhil 13

Ahbrimkhil 13 (hakeela Ahbrimkhil, Afghanistan news staff writer, http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/11143-political-solution-in-afghanistan-inevitable-but-caution-is-key-gen-dempsey, “Political Solution in Afghanistan Inevitable, But Caution is Key: Gen. Dempsey”, AB)

Dempsey argued for a cautious approach to peace negotiations claiming that all wars come to end through political solutions. at some point we would find reconciliation with the Taliban military efforts should be continued against the Taliban Taliban leaders told Karzai they don't want war in Afghanistan anymore and were ready to talk with the Afghan High Peace Council we will get the Afghan security forces to the point where they will be able to provide security across the country Much confidence has been expressed in the ability of the ANSF to continue the fight against the insurgency

wars come to end through political solutions. at some point we would find reconciliation with the Taliban military efforts should be continued Taliban leaders told Karzai they don't want war in Afghanistan anymore and were ready to talk Afghan security forces will be able to provide security confidence has been expressed

General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued in an interview with CNN for a cautious approach to peace negotiations with the Taliban, claiming that all wars come to end through political solutions. "It is always difficult to think about the losses that we've suffered and the idea that at some point we would find reconciliation with the Taliban," said Den. Dempsey. His comments suggest sympathy with those in the US who have regarded peace talks with the Taliban as sign of defeat in the war that has lasted over a decade. However, Gen. Dempsey emphasized that military efforts should be continued against the elements of the Taliban that are not ready for negotiations. "I think there's several flavours of the Taliban. I think there are some who are reconcilable and undoubtedly some that are not," he said. His comments reinforce an increasingly common line of thought within US and Afghan government ranks that suggests reconciliation may be possible with some Taliban leaders while not with others. In a statement on Saturday, Aimal Faizi, a spokesman for President Karzai, said that some Taliban leaders had been in contact with the government and spoken about their dissatisfaction with the Qatar office opening, and unlike other Taliban leaders, did in fact wish to meet with the High Peace Council (HPC). "After the opening of the Qatar office, a number of Taliban leaders told President Karzai that they don't want war in Afghanistan anymore and were ready to talk with the Afghan High Peace Council. They added that they did not support talks after the Qatar office opening," said Mr. Faizi. Gen. Dempsey also spoke about the security transition at length, sounding reservedly hopeful. "I mean we are working and have another year-and-a-half to fundamentally get the Afghan security forces where we think they need to be in order to maintain a stable security platform in Afghanistan. I think we will achieve that, meaning, I think that we will get the Afghan security forces to the point where they will be able to provide security generally across the country, but there will still be pockets of resistance..." The interview with Gen. Dempsey comes after a turbulent few weeks for the security transition and peace negotiations. Much confidence has been expressed in the ability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and other security branches to continue the fight against the insurgency since the beginning of the final stage in the transition between foreign and Afghan forces last month in Kabul. However, Taliban attacks have seemed to only increase in frequency and scale, with high-profile incidents at the Supreme Court, the international airport and the Presidential Palace in Kabul claiming scores of security personnel and civilian lives.

<h4>2. Taliban are giving up AND political solutions solve </h4><p><u><strong><mark>Ahbrimkhil 13</u></strong></mark> (hakeela Ahbrimkhil, Afghanistan news staff writer, http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/11143-political-solution-in-afghanistan-inevitable-but-caution-is-key-gen-dempsey, “Political Solution in Afghanistan Inevitable, But Caution is Key: Gen. Dempsey”, AB)</p><p>General Martin <u>Dempsey</u>, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>argued</u> in an interview with CNN <u>for a cautious approach to peace negotiations </u>with the Taliban, <u>claiming that all <mark>wars come to end through political solutions.</mark> </u>"It is always difficult to think about the losses that we've suffered and the idea that <u><mark>at some point we</mark> <mark>would find reconciliation</mark> <mark>with the Taliban</u></mark>," said Den. Dempsey. His comments suggest sympathy with those in the US who have regarded peace talks with the Taliban as sign of defeat in the war that has lasted over a decade. However, Gen. Dempsey emphasized that <u><mark>military efforts should be continued</mark> against the</u> elements of the <u>Taliban</u> that are not ready for negotiations. "I think there's several flavours of the Taliban. I think there are some who are reconcilable and undoubtedly some that are not," he said. His comments reinforce an increasingly common line of thought within US and Afghan government ranks that suggests reconciliation may be possible with some Taliban leaders while not with others. In a statement on Saturday, Aimal Faizi, a spokesman for President Karzai, said that some Taliban leaders had been in contact with the government and spoken about their dissatisfaction with the Qatar office opening, and unlike other Taliban leaders, did in fact wish to meet with the High Peace Council (HPC). "After the opening of the Qatar office, a number of <u><mark>Taliban leaders told</u></mark> President <u><mark>Karzai</u></mark> that <u><strong><mark>they don't want war in Afghanistan anymore</mark> </strong><mark>and were</u> <u><strong>ready to talk</u></strong></mark> <u>with the Afghan High Peace Council</u>. They added that they did not support talks after the Qatar office opening," said Mr. Faizi. Gen. Dempsey also spoke about the security transition at length, sounding reservedly hopeful. "I mean we are working and have another year-and-a-half to fundamentally get the Afghan security forces where we think they need to be in order to maintain a stable security platform in Afghanistan. I think we will achieve that, meaning, I think that <u>we will get the <mark>Afghan</mark> <mark>security</mark> <mark>forces</mark> to the point where they <mark>will be able to provide security</u></mark> generally <u>across the country</u>, but there will still be pockets of resistance..." The interview with Gen. Dempsey comes after a turbulent few weeks for the security transition and peace negotiations. <u>Much <mark>confidence has been expressed</mark> in the ability of the</u> Afghan National Security Forces (<u>ANSF</u>) and other security branches <u>to continue the fight against the insurgency</u> since the beginning of the final stage in the transition between foreign and Afghan forces last month in Kabul. However, Taliban attacks have seemed to only increase in frequency and scale, with high-profile incidents at the Supreme Court, the international airport and the Presidential Palace in Kabul claiming scores of security personnel and civilian lives.</p>

1NC

Global Health

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Cornell LL

Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case

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empirics prove lack of oversight kills effectiveness of regs

Rothman & Rothman 6

Rothman & Rothman 6 S. M. Rothman and D. J. Rothman. American Journal of Transplantation: The Hidden Cost of Organ Sales. http://www.societyandmedicine.columbia.edu/organs_challenge.shtml 13 February 2006 [AW]

Whatever the proposed system, regulation may not be readily accomplished , half-way measures that allow for sellers but not for buyers might prove inoperative. Effectively regulated markets typically involve so-called ‘natural monopolies’ wherein entry points can be effectively policed. in kidney sale, with almost everyone eligible to enter the market, oversight will not be easily established or maintained change almost inevitably carries unintended consequences. Deregulate the market in energy trading and Enron scandals occur; deregulate the telephone market and the communications industry is transformed; deregulate the savings and loan business and corruption breaks out , are we ready to live with a system that makes kidneys a commodity?

regulation may not be readily accomplished half-way measures might prove inope with almost everyone eligible to enter the market, oversight will not be easily established or maintained change inevitably carries unintended consequences Deregulate energy trading and Enron scandals occur; deregulate the savings and loan business and corruption breaks out. are we ready to live with a system that makes kidneys a commodity

Whatever the proposed system, regulation may not be readily accomplished. Once a market is lawful, half-way measures that allow for sellers but not for buyers might prove inoperative. Effectively regulated markets typically involve so-called ‘natural monopolies’ wherein entry points can be effectively policed. (Think of electric power, telephone service and railroads.) By contrast, in kidney sale, with almost everyone eligible to enter the market, oversight will not be easily established or maintained. So too, as most students of regulated markets are quick to admit, change almost inevitably carries unintended consequences. Deregulate the market in energy trading and Enron scandals occur; deregulate the telephone market and the communications industry is transformed; deregulate the savings and loan business and corruption breaks out. Hence, the question must be asked: since practices may develop in ways that cannot be predicted or controlled, are we ready to live with a system that makes kidneys a commodity?

<h4><u><strong>empirics prove lack of oversight kills effectiveness of regs</h4><p>Rothman & Rothman 6</p><p></u></strong>S. M. Rothman and D. J. Rothman. American Journal of Transplantation: The Hidden Cost of Organ Sales. http://www.societyandmedicine.columbia.edu/organs_challenge.shtml<u> 13 February 2006 [AW] </p><p>Whatever the proposed system, <mark>regulation may not be readily accomplished</u></mark>. Once a market is lawful<u>, <mark>half-way measures</mark> that allow for sellers but not for buyers <mark>might prove inope</mark>rative. Effectively regulated markets typically involve so-called ‘natural monopolies’ wherein entry points can be effectively policed.</u> (Think of electric power, telephone service and railroads.) By contrast, <u>in kidney sale, <mark>with almost everyone eligible to enter the market, oversight will not be easily established or maintained</u></mark>. So too, as most students of regulated markets are quick to admit, <u><mark>change</mark> almost <mark>inevitably carries unintended consequences</mark>. <mark>Deregulate</mark> the market in <mark>energy trading and Enron scandals occur;</mark> deregulate the telephone market and the communications industry is transformed; <mark>deregulate the savings and loan business and corruption breaks out</u>.</mark> Hence, the question must be asked: since practices may develop in ways that cannot be predicted or controlled<u>, <mark>are we ready to live with a system that makes</mark> <mark>kidneys a commodity</mark>?</p></u>

1NR

Organs

Regs

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Emory KL

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1ac was organ shortages are bad 1nc was death neoliberalization k mandated choice cp altruism da and case 2nc was the k 1nr was the cp and case 2nr was the k

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Discursive orderings constitute socio-political mediation

Carlos 14

Carlos 14 (Alfredo Carlos, PhD Candidate in Political Science at UC Irvine, former Q. A. Shaw McKean, Jr. Fellow with the School of Management and Labor Relations at Rutgers University, March 2014, “Mexico “Under Siege”: Drug Cartels or U.S. Imperialism?” Latin American Perspectives Volume 41 Number 2) gz

Foucault argues that “discourse serves to make possible a whole series of interventions, tactical and positive interventions of surveillance, circulation, control and so forth Discourses generate knowledge and “truth,” giving those who speak this “truth” social, cultural, and even political power This power “produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is . . . that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse power produces discourse that justifies, legitimates, and increases it Said says that literature as a cultural form is not just about literature. It is not autonomous; rather, it is about history and politics. literature supports, elaborates, and consolidates the practices of empire. Television, newspapers, magazines, journals, books, advertisements, and the Internet all help construct stories, creating cultures of “us” that differentiate us from “them” They all elaborate and consolidate the practices of empire in multiple overlapping discourses from which a dominant discourse emerges. Dominant discourses are constructed and perpetuated for particular reasons representations have very precise political consequences. They either legitimize or delegitimize power Said asserts that a narrative emerges that separates what is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Judeo/Christian from the acceptable Western ethos as a justification for imperialism and the resulting policies and practices and argues that discourse is manipulated in the struggle for dominance Discourses are advanced in the interest of exerting power over others; they tell a story that provides a justification for action there is always an intention or will to use power and therefore to perpetuate some discourses at the expense of others. It is this intentionality that makes them dangerous and powerful through repetition they become “regimes of truth and knowledge They do not actually constitute truth but become accepted as such through discursive practices, which put into circulation representations that are taken as truth. Dominant discourses, meta-narratives and cultural representations are important because they construct “realities” that are taken seriously and acted upon dominant narratives do ‘work’ even when they lack sufficient empirical evidence, to the degree that their conceptual foundations call upon or validate norms that are deemed intersubjectively legitimate.” They establish unquestioned “truths” and thus provide justification for those with power to act “accordingly.” They allow the production of specific relations of power. Powerful social actors are in a prime position to construct and perpetuate discourses that legitimize the policies they seek to establish. Narrative interpretations don’t arise out of thin air; they must be constantly articulated, promoted, legitimized, reproduced, and changed by actual people the formation of cultural identities can only be understood contrapuntally—that an identity cannot exist without an array of opposites Western powers, including the United States, have maintained hegemony by establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized are identities that have provided justifications for the white man’s civilizing mission and have created the myth of a benevolent imperialism The historical construction of this “other”’ identity produces current events and policies Through constant repetition, a racialized identity of the non-American, barbaric “other” is constructed, along with a U.S. identity considered civilized and democratic despite its engagement in the oppression, exploitation, and brutalization of that “other.” dominant discourses and meta-narratives provide a veil for “imperial encounters,” turning them into missions of salvation rather than conquests or, in Mexico’s case, economic control dominant discourses legitimize and authorize specific political actions

Discourses generate knowledge “truth,” power power “produces reality power produces discourse that legitimates it literature elaborates empire representations have precise political consequences. They legitimize or delegitimize power Discourses tell a story that provides a justification for action through repetition they become “regimes of truth which put into circulation representations are taken as truth. Dominant discourses construct “realities” that are acted upon dominant narratives even when they lack evidence call upon norms deemed intersubjectively legitimate Narrative interpretations must be constantly articulated dominant discourses provide a veil for “imperial encounters,”

Michel Foucault (1972–1977: 120) argues that “discourse serves to make possible a whole series of interventions, tactical and positive interventions of surveillance, circulation, control and so forth.” Discourses generate knowledge and “truth,” giving those who speak this “truth” social, cultural, and even political power. This power “produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Foucault, 1979: 194). For Foucault (1972–1977: 119), “what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is . . . that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.” In essence, power produces discourse that justifies, legitimates, and increases it. Similarly, Edward Said (1994: 14), speaking in reference to literary discourse, says that literature as a cultural form is not just about literature. It is not autonomous; rather, it is about history and politics. He says that literature supports, elaborates, and consolidates the practices of empire. Television, newspapers, magazines, journals, books, advertisements, and the Internet all help construct stories, creating cultures of “us” that differentiate us from “them” (Said, 1994: xiii). They all elaborate and consolidate the practices of empire in multiple overlapping discourses from which a dominant discourse emerges. Dominant discourses are constructed and perpetuated for particular reasons. As Kevin Dunn (2003: 6) points out, representations have very precise political consequences. They either legitimize or delegitimize power, depending on what they are and about whom (Said, 1994: 16). Said asserts that a narrative emerges that separates what is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Judeo/Christian from the acceptable Western ethos as a justification for imperialism and the resulting policies and practices and argues that discourse is manipulated in the struggle for dominance (36). Discourses are advanced in the interest of exerting power over others; they tell a story that provides a justification for action. For Said, there is always an intention or will to use power and therefore to perpetuate some discourses at the expense of others. It is this intentionality that makes them dangerous and powerful. As Roxanne Doty (1996: 2) suggests, through repetition they become “regimes of truth and knowledge.” They do not actually constitute truth but become accepted as such through discursive practices, which put into circulation representations that are taken as truth. Dominant discourses, meta-narratives (master frames that are often unquestioned [see Klotz and Lynch, 2007]), and cultural representations are important because they construct “realities” that are taken seriously and acted upon. Cecelia Lynch (1999: 13) asserts that “dominant narratives do ‘work’ even when they lack sufficient empirical evidence, to the degree that their conceptual foundations call upon or validate norms that are deemed intersubjectively legitimate.” They establish unquestioned “truths” and thus provide justification for those with power to act “accordingly.” They allow the production of specific relations of power. Powerful social actors are in a prime position to construct and perpetuate discourses that legitimize the policies they seek to establish. Narrative interpretations don’t arise out of thin air; they must be constantly articulated, promoted, legitimized, reproduced, and changed by actual people (Lynch, 1999). Social actors with this kind of power do this by what Doty (1996) calls self-definition by the “other.” Said (1994: 52) suggests that the formation of cultural identities can only be understood contrapuntally—that an identity cannot exist without an array of opposites. Western1 powers, including the United States, have maintained hegemony by establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized are identities that have provided justifications for the white man’s civilizing mission and have created the myth of a benevolent imperialism (Doty, 1996: 11; Said, 1994: 51). The historical construction of this “other”’ identity produces current events and policies (Dunn, 2003). Through constant repetition, a racialized identity of the non-American, barbaric “other” is constructed, along with a U.S. identity considered civilized and democratic despite its engagement in the oppression, exploitation, and brutalization of that “other.” Consequently, dominant discourses and meta-narratives provide a veil for “imperial encounters,” turning them into missions of salvation rather than conquests or, in Mexico’s case, economic control (Doty, 1996). Dunn (2003: 174) suggests that dominant discourses legitimize and authorize specific political actions, particularly economic ones.

<h4>Discursive orderings constitute socio-political mediation</h4><p><u><strong>Carlos 14</u></strong> (Alfredo Carlos, PhD Candidate in Political Science at UC Irvine, former Q. A. Shaw McKean, Jr. Fellow with the School of Management and Labor Relations at Rutgers University, March 2014, “Mexico “Under Siege”: Drug Cartels or U.S. Imperialism?” Latin American Perspectives Volume 41 Number 2) gz</p><p>Michel <u>Foucault</u> (1972–1977: 120) <u>argues that “discourse serves to make possible a whole series of interventions, tactical and positive interventions of surveillance, circulation, control and so forth</u>.” <u><mark>Discourses generate knowledge </mark>and <mark>“truth,” </mark>giving those who speak this “truth” social, cultural, and even political <mark>power</u></mark>. <u>This <mark>power “produces</mark>; it produces <mark>reality</mark>; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth</u>” (Foucault, 1979: 194). For Foucault (1972–1977: 119), “<u>what makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is . . . that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse</u>.” In essence, <u><mark>power produces discourse that</mark> justifies, <mark>legitimates</mark>, and increases <mark>it</u></mark>. Similarly, Edward <u>Said</u> (1994: 14), speaking in reference to literary discourse, <u>says that literature as a cultural form is not just about literature. It is not autonomous; rather, it is about history and politics.</u> He says that <u><mark>literature <strong></mark>supports, <mark>elaborates</mark>, and consolidates the practices of <mark>empire</strong></mark>. Television, newspapers, magazines, journals, books, advertisements, and the Internet all help construct stories, <strong>creating cultures of “us” that differentiate us from “them”</u></strong> (Said, 1994: xiii). <u>They all elaborate and consolidate the practices of empire in multiple overlapping discourses from which a dominant discourse emerges.</p><p>Dominant discourses are constructed and perpetuated for particular reasons</u>. As Kevin Dunn (2003: 6) points out, <u><mark>representations have</mark> <strong>very <mark>precise political consequences</strong>.</u> <u>They</mark> either <mark>legitimize or delegitimize power</u></mark>, depending on what they are and about whom (Said, 1994: 16). <u>Said asserts that a narrative emerges that separates what is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Judeo/Christian from the acceptable Western ethos as a <strong>justification for imperialism</strong> and the resulting policies and practices and argues that discourse is manipulated in the struggle for dominance</u> (36). <u><mark>Discourses</mark> are advanced in the interest of exerting power over others; they <mark>tell a story that provides a justification for action</u></mark>. For Said, <u>there is always an intention or will to use power and therefore to perpetuate some discourses at the expense of others. It is this intentionality that makes them dangerous and powerful</u>. As Roxanne Doty (1996: 2) suggests, <u><mark>through repetition <strong>they become “regimes of truth</mark> and knowledge</u></strong>.” <u>They do not actually constitute truth but become accepted as such through discursive practices, <mark>which put into <strong>circulation representations</strong></mark> that <mark>are taken as truth.</p><p>Dominant discourses</mark>, meta-narratives</u> (master frames that are often unquestioned [see Klotz and Lynch, 2007]), <u>and cultural representations are important because they <strong><mark>construct “realities” that are</mark> taken seriously and <mark>acted upon</u></strong></mark>. Cecelia Lynch (1999: 13) asserts that “<u><mark>dominant narratives</mark> do ‘work’ <strong><mark>even when they lack</mark> sufficient empirical <mark>evidence</strong></mark>, to the degree that their conceptual foundations <strong><mark>call upon</mark> or validate <mark>norms</strong></mark> that are <mark>deemed intersubjectively legitimate</mark>.” They establish unquestioned “truths” and thus provide justification for those with power to act “accordingly.” They allow the production of specific relations of power. Powerful social actors are in a prime position to construct and perpetuate discourses that legitimize the policies they seek to establish. <mark>Narrative interpretations</mark> don’t arise out of thin air; they <mark>must be <strong>constantly articulated</mark>, promoted, legitimized, reproduced, and changed</strong> by actual people</u> (Lynch, 1999). Social actors with this kind of power do this by what Doty (1996) calls self-definition by the “other.” Said (1994: 52) suggests that <u>the formation of cultural identities can only be understood contrapuntally—that an identity cannot exist without an array of opposites</u>. <u>Western</u>1 <u>powers, including the United States, have maintained hegemony by establishing the “other”: North vs. South, core vs. periphery, white vs. native, and civilized vs. uncivilized are identities that have provided justifications for the white man’s civilizing mission and have created the myth of a benevolent imperialism</u> (Doty, 1996: 11; Said, 1994: 51). <u>The historical construction of this “other”’ identity produces current events and policies</u> (Dunn, 2003). <u>Through constant repetition, a racialized identity of the non-American, barbaric “other” is constructed, along with a U.S. identity considered civilized and democratic despite its engagement in the oppression, exploitation, and brutalization of that “other.”</u> Consequently, <u><mark>dominant discourses</mark> and meta-narratives <mark>provide <strong>a veil for “imperial encounters</strong>,”</mark> turning them into missions of salvation rather than conquests or, in Mexico’s case, economic control</u> (Doty, 1996). Dunn (2003: 174) suggests that <u>dominant discourses legitimize and authorize specific political actions</u>, particularly economic ones.</p>

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Calum Matheson

1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx

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No indo-pak war now but their representations make it inevitable – rejection solves.

Das 2

Das, 2002 (Runa, doctoral candidate and graduate instructor int eh Department of political science at Northern Arizona University, “Engendering post-colonial nuclear policies through the lens of Hinduta: Rethingking the security paradigm of India,” Comparative studies of Sourth Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 22.1-2)

the issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity continue to form the fundamental basis of India's national security interest, the term national security interest in the context of India today has become "imprecise in usage A textual analysis of India's contemporary national security discourse will reveal that not only has India's nuclear policy been justified on the grounds of Hindu nationalism, but it has also been conflated with the essence of a paternalistic chauvinism the Hindu nationalist discourse continues to define, justify, and enforce Indian nuclearization as something indispensable to maintain the militarized versions of India's national security interests nationalist discourse guiding India's nuclearization becomes so monolithic that it leaves little or no scope for the realist lobby to evaluate the consequences of this nuclearization Islam/Pakistan precludes possibilities of a fruitful dialogue between the two In a democracy, national interest is a set of shared priorities regarding relations of the country with the rest of the world.... It includes not only issues of military but also non-military forms of security such as human rights, democracy, gender, poverty, environment, and population Beyond the publicized consensus on the need to protect India's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity through nuclearization, there has been considerable debate within India's anti-nuclear groups concerning what is the definition of India's national security and what should be the parameters guiding India's security policy? The realities of India's security dilemma too necessitate a reconfiguration of India's traditional concept of national interest An active anti-nuclear movement in India reveals the presence of a well-informed public opposition to Indian nuclearization on political, social, economic, environmental, cultural, and gender grounds. Thus to deconstruct the Westphalian concept of a nationalistic security discourse, which has traditionally defined India's national interest, and to re-construct it along a more humanistic line is the most pragmatic need for India's realist lobby this requires that the present BJP government redefine its version of the national security discourse which is undergirded by communal versions of postcolonial insecurities, sustained through the politics of Hindutva Seen from this perspective, this article finds the critical constructivist perspective pragmatic in providing a more nuanced and complex interpretation of India's contemporary nuclear security dilemma

A textual analysis of India's contemporary national security discourse will reveal that not only has India's nuclear policy been justified on the grounds of nationalism, but it has also been conflated with the essence of a paternalistic chauvinism nationalist discourse continues to define nuclearization as indispensable Pakistan precludes possibilities of a fruitful dialogue between the two The realities of India's security dilemma too necessitate a reconfiguration of India's traditional concept of national interest An active anti-nuclear movement in India reveals the presence of a well-informed public opposition Thus to deconstruct the Westphalian concept of a nationalistic security discourse is the most pragmatic need for India's realist lobby this requires that the government redefine its version of the national security discourse

While it is true that under the current geostrategic conditions of the South Asian region maintaining a nuclear deterrence for India is a pragmatic requisite, the case of the Indian nuclearization raises concern in relation to the Hindu nationalist discourse of the BJP. As noted by the Indian security analyst, M. S. Rajan, although, the issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity continue to form the fundamental basis of India's national security interest, the term national security interest in the context of India today has become "imprecise in usage." This is because it is "undefined and indefinable" depending upon "who defines national interest, in whose interest, and at what time?" HYPERLINK "http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v022/22.1das.html" \l "FOOT84" 84 A textual analysis of India's contemporary national security discourse will reveal that not only has India's nuclear policy been justified on the grounds of Hindu nationalism, but it has also been conflated with the essence of a paternalistic chauvinism. Further, the Hindu nationalist discourse continues to define, justify, and enforce Indian nuclearization as something indispensable to maintain the militarized versions of India's national security interests. The nationalist discourse of the BJP apparently guiding India's nuclearization policies becomes so monolithic that it leaves little or no scope for the realist lobby to evaluate the consequences of this nuclearization. Neither does it enable them to analyze other possible alternatives—other than the ongoing process of nuclearization—to solve India's security concerns. For instance, thinking beyond realpolitiks and entering into a multilateral dialogue with China, Pakistan, and the US to comprehend a national, regional, and nondiscriminatory global disarmament [End Page 84] is not seriously contemplated by the realist lobby. HYPERLINK "http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v022/22.1das.html" \l "FOOT85" 85 Furthermore, a communal hue guiding contemporary India's postcolonial insecurities vis-a-vis Islam/Pakistan precludes possibilities of a fruitful dialogue between the two. Joseph Nye Jr. states: In a democracy, national interest is a set of shared priorities regarding relations of the country with the rest of the world.... It includes not only issues of military but also non-military forms of security such as human rights, democracy, gender, poverty, environment, and population.... Thus national interest is too important an issue to be left solely at the whims of the geo-politicians. It should also incorporate legitimate needs as forwarded by an informed public opinion. HYPERLINK "http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v022/22.1das.html" \l "FOOT86" 86 This is relevant especially in the case of India. Beyond the publicized consensus on the need to protect India's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity through nuclearization, there has been considerable debate within India's anti-nuclear groups concerning what is the definition of India's national security and what should be the parameters guiding India's security policy? As explained by Rajan, " a continuing problem concerning the content of national interest in India is that it is continually changing for a variety of reasons and circumstances. Among these are: changing policies of successive governments, changing aspirations of the successive governments, changing aspirations of the people, technological developments (including nuclear arms), and the impact of the globalization on international relations." HYPERLINK "http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v022/22.1das.html" \l "FOOT87" 87 The realities of India's security dilemma too necessitate a reconfiguration of India's traditional concept of national interest. India has transformed its nuclear posture from one of nuclear disarmament in the 1950s to an active nuclear power in the 1990s. Currently India must be ready to rethink its nuclear deterrence program in light of a broader, national and regional security agenda. An active anti-nuclear movement in India reveals the presence of a well-informed public opposition to Indian nuclearization on political, social, economic, environmental, cultural, and gender grounds. Thus to deconstruct the Westphalian concept of a nationalistic/militaristic security discourse, which has traditionally defined India's national interest, and to re-construct it along a more humanistic line is the most pragmatic need for India's realist lobby. However, this humanistic approach does not surrender altogether the needs for military power. Rather, it redefines the concept of India's national security beyond its militaristic focus, to make it meet the sustainable well-being of humans in economic, cultural, and political terms. Primarily, this requires that the present BJP government redefine its version of the national security discourse which is undergirded by communal versions of postcolonial insecurities, sustained through the politics of Hindutva, upholds a traditional definition of the security paradigm in India. Seen from this perspective, this article finds the critical constructivist perspective pragmatic in providing a more nuanced and complex interpretation of India's contemporary nuclear security dilemma. Rethinking India's national security agenda may help to settle tensions between the realist and the anti-nuclear groups within India's domestic politics and subsequently to reconfigure India's national interest in terms of a broader regional security agenda.

<h4>No indo-pak war now but their representations make it inevitable – rejection solves.</h4><p><u><strong>Das</u></strong>, 200<u><strong>2</u></strong> (Runa, doctoral candidate and graduate instructor int eh Department of political science at Northern Arizona University, “Engendering post-colonial nuclear policies through the lens of Hinduta: Rethingking the security paradigm of India,” Comparative studies of Sourth Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 22.1-2)</p><p>While it is true that under the current geostrategic conditions of the South Asian region maintaining a nuclear deterrence for India is a pragmatic requisite, the case of the Indian nuclearization raises concern in relation to the Hindu nationalist discourse of the BJP. As noted by the Indian security analyst, M. S. Rajan, although, <u>the issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity continue to form the fundamental basis of India's national security interest, the term national security interest in the context of India today has become "imprecise in usage</u>." This is because it is "undefined and indefinable" depending upon "who defines national interest, in whose interest, and at what time?" HYPERLINK "http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v022/22.1das.html" \l "FOOT84" 84 <u><mark>A textual analysis of India's contemporary national security discourse will reveal that not only has India's nuclear policy been justified on the grounds of </mark>Hindu <mark>nationalism, but it has also been conflated with the essence of a paternalistic chauvinism</u></mark>. Further, <u>the Hindu <mark>nationalist discourse continues to define</mark>, justify, and enforce Indian <mark>nuclearization as </mark>something <mark>indispensable </mark>to maintain the militarized versions of India's national security interests</u>. The <u>nationalist discourse</u> of the BJP apparently <u>guiding India's nuclearization</u> policies <u>becomes so monolithic that it leaves little or no scope for the realist lobby to evaluate the consequences of this nuclearization</u>. Neither does it enable them to analyze other possible alternatives—other than the ongoing process of nuclearization—to solve India's security concerns. For instance, thinking beyond realpolitiks and entering into a multilateral dialogue with China, Pakistan, and the US to comprehend a national, regional, and nondiscriminatory global disarmament [End Page 84] is not seriously contemplated by the realist lobby. HYPERLINK "http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v022/22.1das.html" \l "FOOT85" 85 Furthermore, a communal hue guiding contemporary India's postcolonial insecurities vis-a-vis <u>Islam/<mark>Pakistan precludes possibilities of a fruitful dialogue between the two</u></mark>. Joseph Nye Jr. states: <u>In a democracy, national interest is a set of shared priorities regarding relations of the country with the rest of the world.... It includes not only issues of military but also non-military forms of security such as human rights, democracy, gender, poverty, environment, and population</u>.... Thus national interest is too important an issue to be left solely at the whims of the geo-politicians. It should also incorporate legitimate needs as forwarded by an informed public opinion. HYPERLINK "http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v022/22.1das.html" \l "FOOT86" 86 This is relevant especially in the case of India. <u>Beyond the publicized consensus on the need to protect India's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity through nuclearization, there has been considerable debate within India's anti-nuclear groups concerning what is the definition of India's national security and what should be the parameters guiding India's security policy?</u> As explained by Rajan, " a continuing problem concerning the content of national interest in India is that it is continually changing for a variety of reasons and circumstances. Among these are: changing policies of successive governments, changing aspirations of the successive governments, changing aspirations of the people, technological developments (including nuclear arms), and the impact of the globalization on international relations." HYPERLINK "http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa_and_the_middle_east/v022/22.1das.html" \l "FOOT87" 87 <u><mark>The realities of India's security dilemma too necessitate a reconfiguration of India's traditional concept of national interest</u></mark>. India has transformed its nuclear posture from one of nuclear disarmament in the 1950s to an active nuclear power in the 1990s. Currently India must be ready to rethink its nuclear deterrence program in light of a broader, national and regional security agenda. <u><mark>An active anti-nuclear movement in India reveals the presence of a well-informed public opposition </mark>to Indian nuclearization on political, social, economic, environmental, cultural, and gender grounds. <mark>Thus to deconstruct the Westphalian concept of a nationalistic</u></mark>/militaristic <u><mark>security discourse</mark>, which has traditionally defined India's national interest, and to re-construct it along a more humanistic line <mark>is the most pragmatic need for India's realist lobby</u></mark>. However, this humanistic approach does not surrender altogether the needs for military power. Rather, it redefines the concept of India's national security beyond its militaristic focus, to make it meet the sustainable well-being of humans in economic, cultural, and political terms. Primarily, <u><mark>this requires that the </mark>present BJP <mark>government redefine its version of the national security discourse </mark>which is undergirded by communal versions of postcolonial insecurities, sustained through the politics of Hindutva</u>, upholds a traditional definition of the security paradigm in India. <u>Seen from this perspective, this article finds the critical constructivist perspective pragmatic in providing a more nuanced and complex interpretation of India's contemporary nuclear security dilemma</u>. Rethinking India's national security agenda may help to settle tensions between the realist and the anti-nuclear groups within India's domestic politics and subsequently to reconfigure India's national interest in terms of a broader regional security agenda. </p>

1NC

Global Health

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx

N

USC

3

Cornell LL

Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx

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they cede their imagination to the state which effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – independent reason to vote neg to confront your role in violence

Kappeler 95

Kappeler 95 (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)

'We are the war, I do not know what war is but I see it everywhere . I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords or upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the illusion of our 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon political disillusionment. our insight that indeed we are not responsible tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions we participate in 'organized irresponsibility' we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the president, the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

I do not know what war is but I see it everywhere we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make war possible universal responsibility becomes universal acquittal Decisions to unleash war are taken at particular levels of power focusing on the stage where major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our own competence leading to 'powerlessness' and disillusionment. it seems to absolve us from having to see any relation between our actions and events we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why those not yet disillusioned with politics engage in mental deputy politics, 'What would I do if I were the president we regard mega spheres as the only worthwhile ones we shape 'our values' according war and violence.

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia _ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

<h4>they cede their imagination to the state which effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – independent reason to vote neg to confront your role in violence</h4><p><u><strong>Kappeler 95</u></strong> (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs<u> 9-11)</p><p></u>War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all.<u> 'We are the war,</u>' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': <u><mark>I do not know what war is</u></mark>, I want to tell my friend, <u><mark>but I see it everywhere</mark> . </u>It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And <u>I am afraid that <mark>we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make</mark> this <mark>war possible</mark> , we permit it to happen</u>. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. '<u>We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords </u>and politicians and profiteers<u> or</u>, as Ulrich Beck says, <u>upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and</u> where the conception of<u> <mark>universal responsibility becomes</mark> the equivalent of a <mark>universal acquittal</u></mark>. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations.<u> <mark>Decisions to unleash</mark> a <mark>war are</mark> indeed <mark>taken at particular levels of power</mark> by those in a position to make them </u>and to command such collective action. <u>We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of <mark>focusing on the stage where</mark> the <mark>major dramas of power take place</mark> <mark>tends to obscure our</mark> sight in relation to our <mark>own</mark> sphere of <mark>competence</mark>, our own power and our own responsibility - <mark>leading to</mark> the </u>well- known<u> illusion of our </u>apparent<u> <mark>'powerlessness' and</mark> its accompanying phenomenon </u>- our so-called<u> political <mark>disillusionment.</mark> </u>Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia _ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet<u> our insight that indeed we are not responsible</u> for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president <u>tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action</u>. In particular, <u><mark>it seems to absolve us from having to</mark> try to <mark>see any relation between our</mark> own <mark>actions and</mark> those <mark>events</mark>, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions</u>. It not only shows that <u>we participate in</u> what Beck calls <u>'organized irresponsibility'</u>, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For<u> we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything</u> , say, <u>about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because <mark>we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why</mark> many of <mark>those not yet</mark> entirely <mark>disillusioned with politics</mark> tend to <mark>engage in</mark> a form of <mark>mental deputy politics,</mark> in the style of <mark>'What would I do if I were the</mark> general, </u>the prime minister,<u> the <mark>president</mark>, </u>the foreign minister or<u> the minister of defence?' Since <mark>we</mark> seem to <mark>regard</mark> their <mark>mega spheres</mark> of action <mark>as the only worthwhile</mark> and truly effective <mark>ones</mark>, </u>and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. <u>We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way <mark>we shape 'our</mark> feelings, our relationships, our <mark>values' according</mark> to the structures and the values of <mark>war and violence.</p></u></mark>

2NC

Security

Fw

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx

N

Wake

7

UNLV GV

Calum Matheson

1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

Sa.....

Ev.....

Gr.....

Zo.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Fear of Russian involvement in Ukraine reflects Western hypocrisy and only serves to divert attention from American aggression against Russia and Muslim states

DONOVAN 2014

DONOVAN 2014 (G Murphy Donovan is the former Director of Research for Russian (nee Soviet) Studies at USAF Intelligence, “Russophobia and Islamophobia,” American Thinker, 3-14, http://www.americanthinker.com/2014/03/russophobia_and_islamophilia.html)

American politicians, Right and Left, are trying to resuscitate the Cold War -- or something hotter. Recent events in the Ukraine seem to be giving the citizens of Europe and America deja-vu US policy has devolved to “regime change.” At the strategic level, US policy is simply incoherent, if not nihilistic; swapping corrupt oligarchs for neo-fascists or religious zealots with Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Egypt, and now the Ukraine, language needs to be coined to avoid words like coup By any other name, a coup is still a coup. And using a post-facto election to legitimize a coup is a little like putting a new hat on a dead cat. The Kerry/Obama team is giving subtlety and sovereignty bad names When Vladimir Putin, tongue in cheek, says there are no Russian troops in the Ukraine, he mocks John Kerry and Victoria Nuland who orchestrate dissidents in Maidan square, in some cases neo-fascists When Putin says he protects Crimean Russians he mocks Obama’s, humanitarian interventions. The fast track to imperialism is paved with words like “humanitarian.” The name of the game in the Crimea is not the Ukraine in any case. Maidan Square and the Crimea are merely board pieces Europe versus Russia redux The pillars of Obama foreign policies are now explicit; Russophobia on one hand and Islamophilia on the other. Indeed, a renewed Cold War with Russia allows Media shills to change the subject. With the Ukraine in the headlines, the domestic health care debacle and those failed Muslim wars fade to background noise

American politicians are trying to resuscitate the Cold War US policy is incoherent nihilistic; swapping corrupt oligarchs for neo-fascists or religious zealots a coup is still a coup Obama is giving subtlety and sovereignty bad names When Putin says there are no Russian troops in the Ukraine, he mocks dissidents in Maidan square, in some cases neo-fascists The fast track to imperialism is paved with words like “humanitarian.”¶ The pillars of Obama foreign policies are now explicit; Russophobia on one hand and Islamophilia on the other a renewed Cold War with Russia allows Media shills to change the subject those failed Muslim wars fade to background noise.

It’s hard to believe that it has been a quarter of a century since Ronald Reagan began to dismantle the ideological wall that divided Europe. Harder still to believe that American politicians, Right and Left, are trying to resuscitate the Cold War -- or something hotter. Recent events in the Ukraine seem to be giving the citizens of Europe and America hot flashes of deja-vu.¶ At the tactical level, US policy has devolved to “regime change.” At the strategic level, US policy is simply incoherent, if not nihilistic; swapping corrupt oligarchs for neo-fascists or religious zealots. The logic for supporting recent coups have little to do with common sense -- or democracy. And with Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Egypt, and now the Ukraine, language needs to be coined to avoid words like coup.¶ By any other name, a coup is still a coup. And using a post-facto election to legitimize a coup is a little like putting a new hat on a dead cat. The Kerry/Obama team is giving subtlety and sovereignty bad names.¶ When Vladimir Putin, tongue in cheek, says there are no Russian troops in the Ukraine, he mocks John Kerry and Victoria Nuland who orchestrate dissidents in Maidan square, in some cases neo-fascists who did not get their way on the bail-out treaty with the EU. ¶ The auction for the Ukraine is now closed. The price doubled overnight, from 16 to 35 billion dollars and counting. Politicians break it, now the taxpayer gets to pay for it. Kerry is now offering to buy the next Ukrainian election too.¶ Speaking of elections, Europe and America might need referendums at home on future bailouts, foreign and domestic. The EU and US look like the “two broke girls” of Capitalism. Angela Merkel might be the only European politician with any jingle left in her jeans these days.¶ When Putin says he protects Crimean Russians, again with a sneer, he mocks Samantha Power’s, now Barak Obama’s, humanitarian interventions. The fast track to imperialism is paved with words like “humanitarian.”¶ When Russia sponsors a referendum in the Crimea, the Kremlin pre-empts, indeed ridicules, the EU sponsored presidential election to be orchestrated by Kiev in May 2014.¶ When demagogues like Hillary Clinton compare Russian behavior to Nazi Germany, she mocks Allied history and the sacrifice of 5 million Russians in WWII. Russian blood chits, we might add, that made the Allied victory over Nazis possible in 1945. ¶ The name of the game in the Crimea is not the Ukraine in any case. Maidan Square and the Crimea are merely board pieces, according to Vicky Nuland at the State Department; moveable parts in another Great Game -- Europe versus Russia redux. Back to the future, indeed!¶ The pillars of Obama foreign policies are now explicit; Russophobia on one hand and Islamophilia on the other. Indeed, a renewed Cold War with Russia, sponsored by a lame duck, allows Media shills to change the subject. With the Ukraine in the headlines, the domestic health care debacle and those failed Muslim wars fade to background noise.

<h4>Fear of Russian involvement in Ukraine reflects Western hypocrisy and only serves to divert attention from American aggression against Russia and Muslim states</h4><p><u><strong>DONOVAN 2014</u> </strong>(G Murphy Donovan is the former Director of Research for Russian (nee Soviet) Studies at USAF Intelligence, “Russophobia and Islamophobia,” American Thinker, 3-14, http://www.americanthinker.com/2014/03/russophobia_and_islamophilia.html)</p><p>It’s hard to believe that it has been a quarter of a century since Ronald Reagan began to dismantle the ideological wall that divided Europe. Harder still to believe that <u><mark>American politicians</mark>, Right and Left, <mark>are trying to resuscitate the Cold War</mark> -- or something hotter. Recent events in the Ukraine seem to be giving the citizens of Europe and America</u> hot flashes of <u>deja-vu</u>.¶ At the tactical level, <u>US policy has devolved to “regime change.” At the strategic level, <mark>US policy is</mark> simply <mark>incoherent</mark>, if not <mark>nihilistic; swapping corrupt oligarchs for neo-fascists or religious zealots</u></mark>. The logic for supporting recent coups have little to do with common sense -- or democracy. And <u>with Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Egypt, and now the Ukraine, language needs to be coined to avoid words like coup</u>.¶ <u>By any other name, <mark>a coup is still a coup</mark>. And using a post-facto election to legitimize a coup is a little like putting a new hat on a dead cat. The Kerry/<mark>Obama</mark> team <mark>is giving subtlety and sovereignty bad names</u></mark>.¶ <u><mark>When</mark> Vladimir <mark>Putin</mark>, tongue in cheek, <mark>says there are no Russian troops in the Ukraine, he mocks</mark> John Kerry and Victoria Nuland who orchestrate <mark>dissidents in Maidan square, in some cases neo-fascists</u></mark> who did not get their way on the bail-out treaty with the EU. ¶ The auction for the Ukraine is now closed. The price doubled overnight, from 16 to 35 billion dollars and counting. Politicians break it, now the taxpayer gets to pay for it. Kerry is now offering to buy the next Ukrainian election too.¶ Speaking of elections, Europe and America might need referendums at home on future bailouts, foreign and domestic. The EU and US look like the “two broke girls” of Capitalism. Angela Merkel might be the only European politician with any jingle left in her jeans these days.¶ <u>When Putin says he protects Crimean Russians</u>, again with a sneer, <u>he mocks</u> Samantha Power’s, now Barak <u>Obama’s, humanitarian interventions. <mark>The fast track to imperialism is paved with words like “humanitarian.”</u>¶</mark> When Russia sponsors a referendum in the Crimea, the Kremlin pre-empts, indeed ridicules, the EU sponsored presidential election to be orchestrated by Kiev in May 2014.¶ When demagogues like Hillary Clinton compare Russian behavior to Nazi Germany, she mocks Allied history and the sacrifice of 5 million Russians in WWII. Russian blood chits, we might add, that made the Allied victory over Nazis possible in 1945. ¶ <u>The name of the game in the Crimea is not the Ukraine in any case. Maidan Square and the Crimea are merely board pieces</u>, according to Vicky Nuland at the State Department; moveable parts in another Great Game -- <u>Europe versus Russia redux</u>. Back to the future, indeed!¶ <u><mark>The pillars of Obama foreign policies are now explicit; Russophobia on one hand and Islamophilia on the other</mark>. Indeed, <mark>a renewed Cold War with Russia</u></mark>, sponsored by a lame duck, <u><mark>allows Media shills to change the subject</mark>. With the Ukraine in the headlines, the domestic health care debacle and <mark>those failed Muslim wars fade to background noise</u>.</p></mark>

1NC

International Law

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx

N

USC

3

Cornell LL

Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx

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Baylor EvZo

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Ev.....

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Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Her’es a card on that

Deudney, 90

Deudney, 90 (Daniel Deudney, assistant professor of political science at John Hopkins’; “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” Millenium – Journal of International Studies 1990, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-372-2011-S3_IEP/Syllabus/EReadings/07.2/07.2.Deudney1990The-Case.pdf, pg. 469)

environmental awareness need not depend upon co-opted national security thinking. Integrally woven into ecological concerns are a powerful set of interests and values—most notably human health and property values, religions and ethics, and natural beauty and concern for future generations. Efforts to raise awareness of environmental problems can thus connect directly with these strong, basic, and diverse human interests and values as sources of motivation and mobilization. Far from needing to be bolstered by national security mindsets, a "green" sensibility can make strong claim to being the master metaphor for an emerging postindustrial civilization. Instead of attempting to gain leverage by appropriating national security thinking, environmentalists can gain much more political leverage by continuing to develop and disseminate this immensely rich and powerful worldvie Transposing existing national security thinking and approaches to environmental politics is likely to be both ineffective, and to the extent effective, counterproductive. But the story should not end with this negative conclusion. Fully grasping the ramifications of the emerging environmental problems requires a radical rethinking environmentalists are recovering and redefining topophilia and geopiety in ways that subvert the state-constructed and state-supporting nation. Whether the bioregion is understood as a particular locality defined by ecological parameters . It also entails a powerful and fresh way to conceptualize environmental protection as the practice of national security

awareness need not depend upon co-opted security thinking. Integral into ecological concerns are powerful interests health and property religions and ethics Efforts to raise awareness can connect directly with strong, basic, and diverse values as sources of motivation and mobilization Transposing security thinking is ineffective, and counterproductive Fully grasping the ramifications requires radical rethinking environmentalists are redefining in ways that subvert ecological parameters It entails a powerful and fresh way to conceptualize environmental protection

Fortunately, environmental awareness need not depend upon co-opted national security thinking. Integrally woven into ecological concerns are a powerful set of interests and values—most notably human health and property values, religions and ethics, and natural beauty and concern for future generations. Efforts to raise awareness of environmental problems can thus connect directly with these strong, basic, and diverse human interests and values as sources of motivation and mobilization. Far from needing to be bolstered by national security mindsets, a "green" sensibility can make strong claim to being the master metaphor for an emerging postindustrial civilization. Instead of attempting to gain leverage by appropriating national security thinking, environmentalists can gain much more political leverage by continuing to develop and disseminate this immensely rich and powerful worldvie Earth Nationalism Transposing existing national security thinking and approaches to environmental politics is likely to be both ineffective, and to the extent effective, counterproductive. But the story should not end with this negative conclusion. Fully grasping the ramifications of the emerging environmental problems requires a radical rethinking and reconstitution of many of the major institutions of industrial modernity, including the nation. The nation and the national, as scholars on the topic emphasize, are complex phenomena because so many different components of identity have become conflated with or incorporated into national identities. Most important in Western constructions of national identity have been ethnicity, religion, language, and war memories. However, one dimension of the national—identification with place—has been underappreciated, and this dimension opens important avenues for reconstructing identity in ecologically appropriate ways. Identification with a particular physical place, what geographers of place awareness refer to as "geopiety" and "topophilia," has been an important component of national identity.35 As Edmund Burke, the great philosopher of nationalism, observed, the sentimental attachment to place is among the most elemental widespread and powerful of forces, both in humans and in animals. In the modern era the nation-state has sought to shape and exploit this sentimental attachment. With the growth of ecological problems, this sense of place and threat to place takes on a new character. In positing the "bioregion" as the appropriate unit for political identity, environmentalists are recovering and redefining topophilia and geopiety in ways that subvert the state-constructed and state-supporting nation. Whether the bioregion is understood as a particular locality defined by ecological parameters, or the entire planet as the only naturally autonomous bioregion, environmentalists are asserting what can appropriately be called "earth nationalism." 36 This construction of the nation has radical implications for existing state and international political communities. This emergent earth nationalism is radical both in the sense of returning to fundamental roots, and in posing a fundamental challenge to the state-sponsored and defined concept of nation now hegemonic in world politics. It also entails a powerful and fresh way to conceptualize environmental protection as the practice of national security.

<h4>Her’es a card on that</h4><p><u><strong>Deudney, 90</u></strong> (Daniel Deudney, assistant professor of political science at John Hopkins’; “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” Millenium – Journal of International Studies 1990, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-372-2011-S3_IEP/Syllabus/EReadings/07.2/07.2.Deudney1990The-Case.pdf, pg. 469)</p><p>Fortunately, <u>environmental <mark>awareness <strong>need not depend upon co-opted </mark>national <mark>security thinking</strong>. Integral</mark>ly woven <mark>into ecological concerns are</mark> a <mark>powerful</mark> set of <mark>interests</mark> and values—most notably human <mark>health and property</mark> values, <mark>religions and ethics</mark>, and natural beauty and concern for future generations. <mark>Efforts to raise awareness</mark> of environmental problems <mark>can</mark> thus <mark>connect directly with</mark> these <mark>strong, basic, and diverse</mark> human interests and <mark>values as <strong>sources of motivation and mobilization</strong></mark>. Far from needing to be bolstered by national security mindsets, a "green" sensibility can make strong claim to being the master metaphor for an emerging postindustrial civilization. Instead of attempting to gain leverage by appropriating national security thinking, environmentalists can gain much more political leverage by continuing to develop and disseminate this immensely rich and powerful worldvie</u> Earth Nationalism <u><mark>Transposing</mark> existing national <mark>security thinking</mark> and approaches to environmental politics <mark>is</mark> likely to be both <strong><mark>ineffective</strong>, and</mark> to the extent effective, <strong><mark>counterproductive</strong></mark>. But the story should not end with this negative conclusion. <mark>Fully grasping the ramifications</mark> of the emerging environmental problems <mark>requires</mark> a <strong><mark>radical rethinking</u></strong></mark> and reconstitution of many of the major institutions of industrial modernity, including the nation. The nation and the national, as scholars on the topic emphasize, are complex phenomena because so many different components of identity have become conflated with or incorporated into national identities. Most important in Western constructions of national identity have been ethnicity, religion, language, and war memories. However, one dimension of the national—identification with place—has been underappreciated, and this dimension opens important avenues for reconstructing identity in ecologically appropriate ways. Identification with a particular physical place, what geographers of place awareness refer to as "geopiety" and "topophilia," has been an important component of national identity.35 As Edmund Burke, the great philosopher of nationalism, observed, the sentimental attachment to place is among the most elemental widespread and powerful of forces, both in humans and in animals. In the modern era the nation-state has sought to shape and exploit this sentimental attachment. With the growth of ecological problems, this sense of place and threat to place takes on a new character. In positing the "bioregion" as the appropriate unit for political identity,<u> <mark>environmentalists are</mark> recovering and <mark>redefining</mark> topophilia and geopiety <mark>in ways that subvert</mark> the state-constructed and state-supporting nation. Whether the bioregion is understood as a particular locality defined by <mark>ecological parameters</u></mark>, or the entire planet as the only naturally autonomous bioregion, environmentalists are asserting what can appropriately be called "earth nationalism." 36 This construction of the nation has radical implications for existing state and international political communities. This emergent earth nationalism is radical both in the sense of returning to fundamental roots, and in posing a fundamental challenge to the state-sponsored and defined concept of nation now hegemonic in world politics<u>. <mark>It</mark> also <mark>entails a <strong>powerful and fresh way to conceptualize environmental protection</strong></mark> as the practice of national security</u>.</p>

2NC

Security

Alt

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx

N

Wake

7

UNLV GV

Calum Matheson

1ac was organ sales with biotech and shortages 1nc was ontological security k neolib k biotech da mandated choice cp and case 2nc was ontological security k 1nr was case 2nr was case and the k

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-Wake-Round7.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

Sa.....

Ev.....

Gr.....

Zo.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

No impact - threat overestimated and adaption solves

Mendelsohn 9

Mendelsohn 9

debate about climate change comes from warnings that climate change is an immediate threat to society These statements are alarmist and misleading society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences The severe impacts by alarmists require a century of no mitigation or little adaptation. the net impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and people will adapt

warnings that climate change is an immediate threat to society are alarmist and misleading society’s behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences impacts require a century of no mitigation or adaptation the impacts will take more than a millennium to unfold

(Robert O. the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of¶ Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and¶ Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/¶ gcwp060web.pdf The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006.) Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b) crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20-30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people. (Dasgupta et al. 2009) Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and wellbeing may be at risk (Stern 2006). These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the Case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. the net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses.

<h4>No impact - threat overestimated and adaption solves</h4><p><u><strong>Mendelsohn 9</p><p></u></strong>(Robert O. the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of¶ Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and¶ Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/¶ gcwp060web.pdf</p><p>The heart of the <u>debate about climate change comes from</u> a number of <u><mark>warnings</u></mark> from scientists and others that give the impression <u><mark>that</u></mark> human induced <u><mark>climate change is an immediate threat to society</u></mark> (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006.) Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b) crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20-30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people. (Dasgupta et al. 2009) Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and wellbeing may be at risk (Stern 2006). <u>These statements <mark>are</u></mark> largely <u><strong><mark>alarmist and misleading</u></strong></mark>. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, <u><mark>society’s</mark> immediate <mark>behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences</u></mark>. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear <u>that <mark>emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences</u></mark>. <u>The severe <mark>impacts</u></mark> predicted <u>by alarmists <mark>require a century</u></mark> (or two in the Case of Stern 2006) <u><mark>of no mitigation</u></mark>. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no <u><mark>or</mark> little <mark>adaptation</mark>. <mark>the</mark> net</u> economic <u><mark>impacts</u></mark> from climate change over the next 50 years <u><mark>will take more than a </mark>century or even a <mark>millennium to unfold</u></mark> <u>and</u> many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because <u>people will adapt</u>. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses. </p>

1NC

International Law

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx

N

USC

3

Cornell LL

Jared Anderson

1ac was marijuana courts 1nc was security k neolib k t legalize isnt courts and case 2nc was security k 1nr was case 2nr was security k and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round3.docx

EvZo