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Prohibition leads to the use of harder drugs – non-uniques their cartel shift and public health arguments

BOETTKE et. al – 2013. Ph.D. Fellow and Ph.D. student at George Mason University, Oregon Law Review, “Keep off the Grass: The Economics of Prohibition and U.S. Drug Policy,” 2013, Accessed via LexisNexis on 7/29/2014) \

PETER J. BOETTKE et. al – 2013. (Professor of Economics and Philosophy, George Mason University; Ph.D., Economics, George Mason University; CHRISTOPHER J. COYNE, Professor of Economics, George Mason University; Ph.D., Economics, George Mason University; and ABIGAIL R. HALL, Mercatus Ph.D. Fellow and Ph.D. student at George Mason University, Oregon Law Review, “Keep off the Grass: The Economics of Prohibition and U.S. Drug Policy,” 2013, Accessed via LexisNexis on 7/29/2014) \

The first unintended consequence of prohibition is that individuals are more likely to consume poisonous substances and overdose with the increase in drug prices. As the price of a given drug rises, it creates additional profit opportunities for those willing to enter the drug trade. Since the drug market is illegal, and therefore, conducted underground, quality control is reduced compared to "above ground" markets. Drug users have few means available to determine which drugs are "pure" and have no recourse should they purchase a substance of inferior quality. Further, the underground market allows for less information sharing about products and vendors because transactions take place secretly to avoid authorities Consequently, more poor-quality drug products enter the market, which leads to a greater potential for poisoning and overdose. The illegality of drug use generates unintended "potency effects," On the supply side, prohibition results in drug dealers carrying and selling more potent drugs. under prohibition, suppliers prefer to transport cocaine, as compared to marijuana, because cocaine is more potent and therefore more valuable per unit. On the demand side, drug prices are driven up by prohibition, which causes drug users to seek "more bang for their buck." That is, since the overall cost of obtaining drugs is higher, more potent drugs are relatively cheaper than "weak" drugs. Because drug users must act illegally to obtain drugs, they seek to maximize the satisfaction or "high" from each dollar spent. drug users may switch from substances like marijuana to "harder" drugs like cocaine and heroin. Finally, drug users may employ more intense methods of drug use, such as injection. prohibition leads to a greater use of more potent substances, which increases the likelihood of overdose and drug-related death. these effects may be seen in the rate of unintended overdose deaths in the United States. In 1971, Nixon declared drugs to be a public menace Between 1990 and 2007 alone, overdose rates increased five-fold. n55 The most common sources of overdose deaths are higher potency drugs – mainly cocaine, heroin, and opioid painkillers. n56

The first unintended consequence of prohibition is that individuals are more likely to consume poisonous substances and overdose with the increase in drug prices. prohibition results in drug dealers carrying and selling more potent drugs suppliers prefer to transport cocaine because cocaine is more potent and therefore more valuable per unit drug prices are driven up by prohibition, which causes drug users to seek "more bang for their buck. since the overall cost of obtaining drugs is higher, more potent drugs are relatively cheaper than "weak" drugs. drug users may switch to "harder" drugs like cocaine and heroin. Between 1990 and 2007 alone, overdose rates increased five-fold The most common sources of overdose deaths are higher potency drugs – mainly cocaine, heroin, and opioid painkillers

The first unintended consequence of prohibition is that individuals are more likely to consume poisonous substances and overdose with the increase in drug prices. As the price of a given drug rises, it creates additional profit opportunities for those willing to enter the drug trade. Since the drug market is illegal, and therefore, conducted underground, quality control is reduced compared to "above ground" markets. Drug users have few means available to determine which drugs are "pure" and have no recourse should they purchase a substance of inferior quality. Further, the underground market allows for less information sharing about products and vendors because transactions take place secretly to avoid authorities. Consequently, more poor-quality drug products enter the market, which leads to a greater potential for poisoning and overdose.¶ The greater prevalence of poor-quality drugs is not the sole mechanism through which overdoses increase. The illegality of drug use generates unintended "potency effects," which affect both the supply and demand sides of the drug market. On the supply side, prohibition results in drug dealers carrying and selling more potent drugs. Because drug laws increase the risk of selling low potency drugs, suppliers tend to substitute toward higher potency drugs. For example, under prohibition, suppliers prefer to transport cocaine, as compared to marijuana, because cocaine is more potent and therefore more valuable per unit.¶ On the demand side, drug prices are driven up by prohibition, which causes drug users to seek "more bang for their buck." That is, since the overall cost of obtaining drugs is higher, more potent drugs are relatively cheaper than "weak" drugs. Because drug users must act illegally to obtain drugs, they seek to maximize the satisfaction or "high" from each dollar spent. This dynamic manifests itself in [*1079] several ways. Drug users may switch from lower potency to higher potency within a given drug (for example, from marijuana with lower levels of THC to marijuana with higher levels of THC). Alternatively, drug users may switch from substances like marijuana to "harder" drugs like cocaine and heroin. Finally, drug users may employ more intense methods of drug use, such as injection.¶ Taking both sides of the market together, prohibition leads to a greater use of more potent substances, which increases the likelihood of overdose and drug-related death. Indeed, these effects may be seen in the rate of unintended overdose deaths in the United States. In 1971, two years before the creation of the DEA and the year President Nixon declared drugs to be a public menace, just over one death per 100,000 deaths was due to an overdose. n53 By the year 2007, over 27,500 people died as a result of a drug overdose, which translates to almost ten per 100,000 deaths. n54 Between 1990 and 2007 alone, overdose rates increased five-fold. n55 The most common sources of overdose deaths are higher potency drugs – mainly cocaine, heroin, and opioid painkillers. n56

<h4><strong>Prohibition leads to the use of harder drugs – non-uniques their cartel shift and public health arguments </h4><p></strong>PETER J. <strong>BOETTKE et. al – 2013.</strong> (Professor of Economics and Philosophy, George Mason University; Ph.D., Economics, George Mason University; CHRISTOPHER J. COYNE, Professor of Economics, George Mason University; Ph.D., Economics, George Mason University; and ABIGAIL R. HALL, Mercatus<u><strong> Ph.D. Fellow and Ph.D. student at George Mason University, Oregon Law Review, “Keep off the Grass: The Economics of Prohibition and U.S. Drug Policy,” 2013, Accessed via LexisNexis on 7/29/2014) \</p><p><mark>The first unintended consequence of prohibition is that individuals are more likely to consume poisonous substances and overdose with the increase in drug prices.</mark> As the price of a given drug rises, it creates additional profit opportunities for those willing to enter the drug trade.</u></strong> <u><strong>Since the drug market is illegal, and therefore, conducted underground, quality control is reduced compared to "above ground" markets. Drug users have few means available to determine which drugs are "pure" and have no recourse should they purchase a substance of inferior quality. Further, the underground market allows for less information sharing about products and vendors because transactions take place secretly to avoid authorities</u></strong>. <u><strong>Consequently, more poor-quality drug products enter the market, which leads to a greater potential for poisoning and overdose.</u></strong>¶ The greater prevalence of poor-quality drugs is not the sole mechanism through which overdoses increase. <u><strong>The illegality of drug use generates unintended "potency effects,"</u></strong> which affect both the supply and demand sides of the drug market. <u><strong>On the supply side, <mark>prohibition results in drug dealers carrying and selling more potent drugs</mark>.</u></strong> Because drug laws increase the risk of selling low potency drugs, suppliers tend to substitute toward higher potency drugs. For example, <u><strong>under prohibition, <mark>suppliers prefer to transport cocaine</mark>, as compared to marijuana, <mark>because cocaine is more potent and therefore more valuable per unit</mark>.</u></strong>¶<u><strong> On the demand side, <mark>drug prices are driven up by prohibition, which causes drug users to seek "more bang for their buck.</mark>" That is, <mark>since the overall cost of obtaining drugs is higher, more potent drugs are relatively cheaper than "weak" drugs.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Because drug users must act illegally to obtain drugs, they seek to maximize the satisfaction or "high" from each dollar spent.</u></strong> This dynamic manifests itself in [*1079] several ways. Drug users may switch from lower potency to higher potency within a given drug (for example, from marijuana with lower levels of THC to marijuana with higher levels of THC). Alternatively, <u><strong><mark>drug users may switch</mark> from substances like marijuana <mark>to "harder" drugs like cocaine and heroin.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Finally, drug users may employ more intense methods of drug use, such as injection.</u></strong>¶ Taking both sides of the market together, <u><strong>prohibition leads to a greater use of more potent substances, which increases the likelihood of overdose and drug-related death.</u></strong> Indeed, <u><strong>these effects may be seen in the rate of unintended overdose deaths in the United States. In 1971,</u></strong> two years before the creation of the DEA and the year President <u><strong>Nixon declared drugs to be a public menace</u></strong>, just over one death per 100,000 deaths was due to an overdose. n53 By the year 2007, over 27,500 people died as a result of a drug overdose, which translates to almost ten per 100,000 deaths. n54 <u><strong><mark>Between 1990 and 2007 alone, overdose rates increased five-fold</mark>. n55 <mark>The most common sources of overdose deaths are higher potency drugs – mainly cocaine, heroin, and opioid painkillers</mark>. n56</p></u></strong>

Drug Cartels

./documents/ndtceda14/Butler/ToSc/Butler-Tock-Schmidt-Aff-JCCC-Round3.docx

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ndtceda14/Butler/ToSc/Butler-Tock-Schmidt-Aff-JCCC-Round3.docx

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

‘The pharmacopronographic regime is parasitic on the sexual Affect of living bodies. Orgasmic force or the potential for excitation, erection, ejaculation, and frustration is the new raw material for control. At stake is the total control of subjectivity and life itself through molecular management.

Preciado 13

Preciado 13 [Paul (formerly Beatriz), Prof of Political History of the Body, Gender Theory, and History of Performance at Paris VIII, Testo Junkie, trans. Bruce Benderson, p.41-6]

To understand how and why sexuality and the body became the objects of a minute governmental and industrial management, we must first elaborate a new concept in the pharmacopornographic domain that is equivalent to the force of work in the domain of classical economics. I call or “orgasmic force,” the (real or virtual) strength of a body’s (total) excitation.33 This strength is of indeterminate capacity; it has no gender; it is neither male nor female, neither human nor animal, neither animated nor inanimate. Its orientation emphasizes neither the feminine nor the masculine and creates no boundary between heterosexuality and homosexuality or between object and subject It favors no organ over any other, so that the penis possesses no more orgasmic force than the vagina, the eye, or the toe. Orgasmic force is the sum of the potential for excitation inherent in every material molecule. the twenty-first-century body is a technoliving system, the result of an irreversible implosion of modern binaries (female/male, animal/ human, nature/culture). Every technobody, including a dead technobody, can unleash orgasmic force, thus becoming a carrier of the power of production of sexual capital. necropolitics function as pharmacoporno politics, as planetary managements of [orgasmic force]. Sex, the so-called sexual organs, pleasure and impotence, joy and horror are moved to the center of technopolitical management as soon as the possibility of drawing profit from orgasmic force comes into play. we theorists of pharmacopornographic capitalism are interested in sexual work as a process of subjectivization, in the possibility of making the subject an inexhaustible supply of planetary ejaculation that can be transformed into abstraction and digital data—into capital.

To understand how sexuality and the body became the objects of governmental and industrial management, we must first elaborate a new concept in the domain of economics. “orgasmic force,” the (real or virtual) strength of a body’s (total) excitation has no gender; it is neither male nor female, neither human nor animal Its orientation creates no boundary between heterosexuality and homosexuality Orgasmic force is the sum of the potential for excitation inherent in every material molecule. the twenty-first-century body is the result of an irreversible implosion of modern binaries (female/male, animal/ human, nature/culture). Every technobody can unleash orgasmic force, becoming a carrier of the power of production of sexual capital. necropolitics function as planetary managements of [orgasmic force]. the sexual organs are moved to the center of technopolitical management as soon as drawing profit from orgasmic force comes into play. as a process of making the subject an inexhaustible supply of planetary ejaculation that can be transformed into capital.

To understand how and why sexuality and the body, the excitable body, at the end of the nineteenth century raided the heart of political action and became the objects of a minute governmental and industrial management, we must first elaborate a new philosophical concept in the pharmacopornographic domain that is equivalent to the force of work in the domain of classical economics. I call potentia gaudendi, or “orgasmic force,” the (real or virtual) strength of a body’s (total) excitation.33 This strength is of indeterminate capacity; it has no gender; it is neither male nor female, neither human nor animal, neither animated nor inanimate. Its orientation emphasizes neither the feminine nor the masculine and creates no boundary between heterosexuality and homosexuality or between object and subject; neither does it know the difference between being excited, being exciting, or being-excited-with. It favors no organ over any other, so that the penis possesses no more orgasmic force than the vagina, the eye, or the toe. Orgasmic force is the sum of the potential for excitation inherent in every material molecule. Orgasmic force is not seeking any immediate resolution, and it aspires only to its own extension in space and time, toward everything and everyone, in every place and at every moment. It is a force of transformation for the world in pleasure—“in pleasure with.” Potentia gaudendi [orgasmic force] unites all material, somatic, and psychic forces and seeks all biochemical resources and all the structures of the mind. In pharmacopornographic capitalism, the force of work reveals its actual substratum: orgasmic force, or potentia gaudendi. Current capitalism tries to put to work the potentia gaudendi [orgasmic force] in whatever form in which it exists, whether this be in its pharmacological form (a consumable molecule and material agency that will operate within the body of the person who is digesting it), as a pornographic representation (a semiotechnical sign that can be converted into numeric data or transferred into digital, televisual, or telephonic media), or as a sexual service (a live pharmacopornographic entity whose orgasmic force and emotional volume are put in service to a consumer during a specified time, according to a more or less formal contract of sale of sexual services). Potentia gaudendi [Orgasmic force] is characterized not only by its impermanence and great malleability, but also and above all by the impossibility of possessing and retaining it. Potentia gaudendi [Orgasmic force], as the fundamental energetics of pharmacopornism, does not allow itself to be reified or transformed into private property. I can neither possess nor retain another’s potentia gaudendi, but neither can one possess or retain what seems to be one’s own. Potentia gaudendi [Orgasmic force] exists exclusively as an event, a relation, a practice, or an evolutionary process. Orgasmic force is both the most abstract and the most material of all workforces. It is inextricably carnal and digital, viscous yet representational by numerical values, a phantasmatic or molecular wonder that can be transformed into capital. The living pansexual body is the bioport of the orgasmic force. Thus, it cannot be reduced to a prediscursive organism; its limits do not coincide with the skin capsule that surrounds it. This life cannot be understood as a biological given; it does not exist outside the interlacing of production and culture that belongs to technoscience. This body is a technoliving, multiconnected entity incorporating technology.34 Neither an organism nor a machine, but “the fluid, dispersed, networking techno-organic-textualmythic system.”35 This new condition of the body blurs the traditional modern distinction between art, performance, media, design, and architecture. The new pharmacological and surgical techniques set in motion tectonic construction processes that combine figurative representations derived from cinema and from architecture (editing, 3-D modeling, 3-D printing, etc.), according to which the organs, the vessels, the fluids (techno-blood, techno-sperm, etc.), and the molecules are converted into the prime material from which our pharmacopornographic corporality is manufactured. Technobodies are either not-yet-alive or already-dead: we are half fetuses, half zombies. Thus, every politics of resistance is a monster politics. Marshall McLuhan, Buckminster Fuller, and Norbert Wiener had an intuition about it in the 1950s: the technologies of communication function like an extension of the body. Today, the situation seems a lot more complex—the individual body functions like an extension of global technologies of communication. “Embodiment is significant prosthesis.”36 To borrow the terms of the American feminist Donna J. Haraway, the twenty-first-century body is a technoliving system, the result of an irreversible implosion of modern binaries (female/male, animal/ human, nature/culture). Even the term life has become archaic for identifying the actors in this new technology. For Foucault’s notion of “biopower,” Donna J. Haraway has substituted “techno-biopower.” It’s no longer a question of power over life, of the power to manage and maximize life, as Foucault wanted, but of power and control exerted over a technoliving and connected whole.37 In the circuit in which excitation is technoproduced, there are neither living bodies nor dead bodies, but present or missing, actual or virtual connectors. Images, viruses, computer programs, techno-organic fluids, Net surfers, electronic voices that answer phone sex lines, drugs and living dead animals in the laboratory on which they are tested, frozen embryos, mother cells, active alkaloid molecules . . . display no value in the current global economy as being “alive” or “dead,” but only to the extent that they can or can’t be integrated into a bioelectronics of global excitation. Haraway reminds us that “cyborg figures—such as the end-of-the-millennium seed, chip gene, database, bomb, fetus, race, brain, and ecosystem—are the offspring of implosions of subjects and objects and of the natural and artificial.”38 Every technobody, including a dead technobody, can unleash orgasmic force, thus becoming a carrier of the power of production of sexual capital. The force that lets itself be converted into capital lies neither in bios nor in soma, in the way that they have been conceived from Aristotle to Darwin, but in techno-eros, the technoliving enchanted body and its potentia gaudendi [orgasmic force]. And from this it follows that biopolitics (the politics of the control and production of life) as well as necropolitics (the politics of the control and production of death) function as pharmacoporno politics, as planetary managements of potentia gaudendi [orgasmic force]. Sex, the so-called sexual organs, pleasure and impotence, joy and horror are moved to the center of technopolitical management as soon as the possibility of drawing profit from orgasmic force comes into play. If the theorists of post-Fordism were interested in immaterial work, in cognitive work, in “non-objectifiable work,”39 in “affective work,”40 we theorists of pharmacopornographic capitalism are interested in sexual work as a process of subjectivization, in the possibility of making the subject an inexhaustible supply of planetary ejaculation that can be transformed into abstraction and digital data—into capital.

<h4>‘The pharmacopronographic regime is parasitic on the sexual Affect of living bodies. Orgasmic force or the potential for excitation, erection, ejaculation, and frustration is the new raw material for control. At stake is the total control of subjectivity and life itself through molecular management. </h4><p><strong>Preciado 13 </strong>[Paul (formerly Beatriz), Prof of Political History of the Body, Gender Theory, and History of Performance at Paris VIII, Testo Junkie, trans. Bruce Benderson, p.41-6]</p><p><u><strong><mark>To understand how </mark>and why<mark> sexuality and the body</u></strong></mark>, the excitable body, at the end of the nineteenth century raided the heart of political action and <u><strong><mark>became the objects of </mark>a minute <mark>governmental and industrial management, we must first elaborate a new</u></strong></mark> philosophical <u><strong><mark>concept</mark> in the pharmacopornographic domain that is equivalent to the force of work <mark>in the domain of</mark> classical <mark>economics.</mark> I call</u></strong> potentia gaudendi, <u><strong>or <mark>“orgasmic force,” the (real or virtual) strength of a body’s (total) excitation</mark>.33 This strength is of indeterminate capacity; it <mark>has no gender; it is neither male nor female, neither human nor animal</mark>, neither animated nor inanimate. <mark>Its orientation </mark>emphasizes neither the feminine nor the masculine and <mark>creates no boundary between heterosexuality and homosexuality</mark> or between object and subject</u></strong>; neither does it know the difference between being excited, being exciting, or being-excited-with. <u><strong>It favors no organ over any other, so that the penis possesses no more orgasmic force than the vagina, the eye, or the toe. <mark>Orgasmic force is the sum of the potential for excitation inherent in every material molecule.</mark> </u></strong>Orgasmic force is not seeking any immediate resolution, and it aspires only to its own extension in space and time, toward everything and everyone, in every place and at every moment. It is a force of transformation for the world in pleasure—“in pleasure with.” Potentia gaudendi [orgasmic force] unites all material, somatic, and psychic forces and seeks all biochemical resources and all the structures of the mind. In pharmacopornographic capitalism, the force of work reveals its actual substratum: orgasmic force, or potentia gaudendi. Current capitalism tries to put to work the potentia gaudendi [orgasmic force] in whatever form in which it exists, whether this be in its pharmacological form (a consumable molecule and material agency that will operate within the body of the person who is digesting it), as a pornographic representation (a semiotechnical sign that can be converted into numeric data or transferred into digital, televisual, or telephonic media), or as a sexual service (a live pharmacopornographic entity whose orgasmic force and emotional volume are put in service to a consumer during a specified time, according to a more or less formal contract of sale of sexual services). Potentia gaudendi [Orgasmic force] is characterized not only by its impermanence and great malleability, but also and above all by the impossibility of possessing and retaining it. Potentia gaudendi [Orgasmic force], as the fundamental energetics of pharmacopornism, does not allow itself to be reified or transformed into private property. I can neither possess nor retain another’s potentia gaudendi, but neither can one possess or retain what seems to be one’s own. Potentia gaudendi [Orgasmic force] exists exclusively as an event, a relation, a practice, or an evolutionary process. Orgasmic force is both the most abstract and the most material of all workforces. It is inextricably carnal and digital, viscous yet representational by numerical values, a phantasmatic or molecular wonder that can be transformed into capital. The living pansexual body is the bioport of the orgasmic force. Thus, it cannot be reduced to a prediscursive organism; its limits do not coincide with the skin capsule that surrounds it. This life cannot be understood as a biological given; it does not exist outside the interlacing of production and culture that belongs to technoscience. This body is a technoliving, multiconnected entity incorporating technology.34 Neither an organism nor a machine, but “the fluid, dispersed, networking techno-organic-textualmythic system.”35 This new condition of the body blurs the traditional modern distinction between art, performance, media, design, and architecture. The new pharmacological and surgical techniques set in motion tectonic construction processes that combine figurative representations derived from cinema and from architecture (editing, 3-D modeling, 3-D printing, etc.), according to which the organs, the vessels, the fluids (techno-blood, techno-sperm, etc.), and the molecules are converted into the prime material from which our pharmacopornographic corporality is manufactured. Technobodies are either not-yet-alive or already-dead: we are half fetuses, half zombies. Thus, every politics of resistance is a monster politics. Marshall McLuhan, Buckminster Fuller, and Norbert Wiener had an intuition about it in the 1950s: the technologies of communication function like an extension of the body. Today, the situation seems a lot more complex—the individual body functions like an extension of global technologies of communication. “Embodiment is significant prosthesis.”36 To borrow the terms of the American feminist Donna J. Haraway, <u><strong><mark>the twenty-first-century body is </mark>a technoliving system, <mark>the result of an irreversible implosion of modern binaries (female/male, animal/ human, nature/culture).</mark> </u></strong>Even the term life has become archaic for identifying the actors in this new technology. For Foucault’s notion of “biopower,” Donna J. Haraway has substituted “techno-biopower.” It’s no longer a question of power over life, of the power to manage and maximize life, as Foucault wanted, but of power and control exerted over a technoliving and connected whole.37 In the circuit in which excitation is technoproduced, there are neither living bodies nor dead bodies, but present or missing, actual or virtual connectors. Images, viruses, computer programs, techno-organic fluids, Net surfers, electronic voices that answer phone sex lines, drugs and living dead animals in the laboratory on which they are tested, frozen embryos, mother cells, active alkaloid molecules . . . display no value in the current global economy as being “alive” or “dead,” but only to the extent that they can or can’t be integrated into a bioelectronics of global excitation. Haraway reminds us that “cyborg figures—such as the end-of-the-millennium seed, chip gene, database, bomb, fetus, race, brain, and ecosystem—are the offspring of implosions of subjects and objects and of the natural and artificial.”38 <u><strong><mark>Every technobody</mark>, including a dead technobody, <mark>can unleash orgasmic force, </mark>thus <mark>becoming a carrier of the power of production of sexual capital.</mark> </u></strong>The force that lets itself be converted into capital lies neither in bios nor in soma, in the way that they have been conceived from Aristotle to Darwin, but in techno-eros, the technoliving enchanted body and its potentia gaudendi [orgasmic force]. And from this it follows that biopolitics (the politics of the control and production of life) as well as<u><strong> <mark>necropolitics</u></strong></mark> (the politics of the control and production of death) <u><strong><mark>function as</mark> pharmacoporno politics, as <mark>planetary managements of</u></strong></mark> potentia gaudendi <u><strong><mark>[orgasmic force]. </mark>Sex,<mark> the </mark>so-called <mark>sexual organs</mark>, pleasure and impotence, joy and horror <mark>are moved to the center of technopolitical management as soon as </mark>the possibility of <mark>drawing profit from orgasmic force comes into play.</mark> </u></strong>If the theorists of post-Fordism were interested in immaterial work, in cognitive work, in “non-objectifiable work,”39 in “affective work,”40 <u><strong>we theorists of pharmacopornographic capitalism are interested in sexual work <mark>as a process of</mark> subjectivization, in the possibility of <mark>making the subject an inexhaustible supply of planetary ejaculation that can be transformed</mark> into abstraction and digital data—<mark>into capital.</u></strong></mark> </p>

1AC

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Evans, Denney, Weitz

ndtceda14/Concordia/SnSh/Concordia-Snelling-Shields-Aff-NDT-Round5.docx

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

The pornification of the economy is the paradigm for all types of work – addiction stimulated by cycles of sexual excitation and frustration. All bodies become part of the pharmacopornographic circuit, as penetrable or penetrating, as a secretion facilitator or a secretor, or both

Preciado 13

Preciado 13 [Paul (formerly Beatriz), Prof of Political History of the Body, Gender Theory, and History of Performance at Paris VIII, Testo Junkie, trans. Bruce Benderson, p.265-77]

In its capacity as a cinematic industry, the goal of pornography is planetary multimedia masturbation. The pornographic image is characterized by its capacity to stimulate—independently of the spectator’s will—the biochemical and muscular mechanisms that regulate the production of pleasure. Pornography is sexuality transformed into spectacle, virtual, digital information. It is sexuality transformed into public representation, where public refers directly or indirectly to becoming “marketable.” Given the conditions of post-Fordist capitalism, a public representation implies an ability for exchange on the global market in a digital form that can be transformed into capital. A representation acquires pornographic status when it transforms into “public” that which is supposed to remain private. The word pornographic refers to an economic-political characterization of representation. The globalization of the pharmacoporno economy generates a butterfly effect in the global management of the cycles of excitation-frustration-excitation Pornography has the same characteristics as any other spectacle of the culture industry: performance, virtuosity, dramatization, spectacularization, technical reproducibility, digital transformation, and audiovisual distribution. The only difference for the moment rests in its underground status. The relationship of the pornographic industry to the industry of culture and the spectacle is equivalent to the relationship of traffic in illegal drugs to the pharmaceutical industry. It represents two of the covert engines of capitalism of the twenty-first century. it is a marginal and hidden aspect of the contemporary cultural industry, but it is also a paradigm for all other types of post-Fordist production. Within übermaterial capitalism, all forms of production offer benefits to the extent to which they approach the model of pharmacopornographic production. the sex industry reveals the truth about all other aspects of the communications and entertainment industry. Literature, film, television, the Internet, comics, video games, and so on want pornography, wish to produce pleasure and pornographic surplus value without having to suffer the marginalization that comes with pornographic representations, in the same way that contemporary producers of the legal pharmaceutical industry want to produce pleasure and sexual (addiction) and toxicological surplus value without suffering the marginalization and criminalization that come with doing business in illegal drugs. Pornography it reveals that sexuality is always performance, the public practice of a regulated repetition, a staging as well as an involuntary mechanism of connection to the global circuit of excitation-frustration-excitation. Today’s entertainment industry, with its division of representation into categories, such as “G” or “NC- 17” denies the performative value of pornography by reducing it to “hardcore sex,” as if—from a theatrical point of view—there were an ontological difference between a kiss, a brawl, and anal penetration. The current hegemony of the non-pornographic cultural industry stems from this moral axiom that labels organs considered sexual as extra-cinematic objects whose value as “truth” cannot be absorbed by representation and transformed into performance. But behind this hegemony hides the cultural industry’s wish to affect the techno-organic centers of the production of subjectivity with the same efficiency as pornography. The cultural industry is porn envy. Pornography isn’t simply a cultural industry like others; it’s [it is] the paradigm for all cultural industries. Pornography and its closed circuit of excitation-capital-frustration-excitation-capital provide in a particularly clear way a key to understanding any other type of post-Fordist cultural production. the province of sex is not the individual body or the private domain or any domestic space not the individual body, or the space called private, or domestic space escape political regulation. Sex, excitation, the demand for erection and ejaculation are at the center of pharmacopornographic political production and economy. the material process of work depends on a collection of sexual tractions, psychosomatic instincts, hormonal escalations, the establishment of synaptic connections, and the emission of chemical excretions. Sex is work. the object of work is not to satisfy, but to excite: setting in motion the somatic mechanism that regulates the excitation-frustration-excitation cycle. We are working at the porn factory: a technosomatic industry fueled by sperm, blood, urine, adrenalin, testosterone, insulin, silicone, psychostimulants, and estrogens, but also the digitized signs that can be transmitted at high speed, whether number, text, sound, or image. We call the pornification of labor the capture of sex and sexuality by economy, the process by which sex becomes work. The power of drugs, pornographic audiovisual material, sexual services—for the production of capital rests in their ability to function as prostheses of subjectivity. What’s being designed here is the logic of a general pharmacopornographic economy at the heart of which circulate organs, pills, financial codes, communication links, images, texts, jerk-off sessions, liters of silicone, chemical compounds, dollars, and so on. The theorists of this new conception of labor as excitation will no longer be classical economists (Ricardo, Marx, Keynes) but sex workers the crystal lines snaking from fashion runways to television sound stages or to the corridors of the stock exchange, the hundreds of thousands of doses of estrogen and progesterone prescribed for the past forty years as a contraceptive for cis-females of reproductive age, biotech laboratory animals and the ones that are slaughtered by the agrifood industry, the pharaonic volume of antidepressants swallowed by menopausal cis-females, the trafficking of illegal sex workers across European borders, Armstrong’s doping, the liters of sperm poured out each year during the making of porn films, the silent spread of the human immunodeficiency virus, the millions of senior citizens’ stomachs lined with omeprazole, the deaths of teenagers who took part in clinical trials of growth hormone, the syringe that produced the sheep Dolly by insemination, the synthetic guilelessness of weight-lifters’ muscles—these teach us more about current models of capitalist production than do all the classical economic treatises with their obsolete notions of work as mercantile production.

the goal of pornography is planetary multimedia masturbation. The pornographic image is characterized by its capacity to stimulate—independently of the spectator’s will—the biochemical and muscular mechanisms that regulate the production of pleasure. The word pornographic refers to an economic-political characterization of representation. The globalization of the pharmacoporno economy generates a butterfly effect in the global management of the cycles of excitation-frustration-excitation Pornography has the same characteristics as any other spectacle of the culture industry The only difference for the moment rests in its underground status it is a marginal and hidden aspect of the contemporary cultural industry, but it is also a paradigm for all other types of post-Fordist production. Within übermaterial capitalism, all forms of production offer benefits to the extent to which they approach the model of pharmacopornographic production. the sex industry reveals the truth about all other aspects of the communications and entertainment industry. sexuality is always performance, the public practice of a regulated repetition, a staging as well as an involuntary mechanism of connection to the global circuit of excitation-frustration-excitation The current hegemony of the non-pornographic cultural industry stems from this moral axiom that labels organs considered sexual as extra-cinematic objects whose value as “truth” cannot be absorbed by representation and transformed into performance. But behind this hegemony hides the cultural industry’s wish to affect the techno-organic centers of the production of subjectivity with the same efficiency as pornography. The cultural industry is porn envy. Pornography is] the paradigm for all cultural industries Sex, excitation, the demand for erection and ejaculation are at the center of pharmacopornographic political production and economy. the object of work is not to satisfy, but to excite: setting in motion the somatic mechanism that regulates the excitation-frustration-excitation cycle. We are working at the porn factory We call the pornification of labor the capture of sex and sexuality by economy, the process by which sex becomes work. The power of sexual services—for the production of capital rests in their ability to function as prostheses of subjectivity. The theorists of this new conception of labor as excitation will no longer be classical economists (Ricardo, Marx, Keynes) but sex workers the crystal lines snaking from fashion runways to television sound stages teach us more about current models of capitalist production than do all the classical economic treatises with their obsolete notions of work as mercantile production.

1. Pornography is a masturbatory virtual device (literary, audiovisual, cybernetic . . . ). In its capacity as a cinematic industry, the goal of pornography is planetary multimedia masturbation. The pornographic image is characterized by its capacity to stimulate—independently of the spectator’s will—the biochemical and muscular mechanisms that regulate the production of pleasure. Emphasizing the pornographic image’s capacity to become activated in the body of the spectator, Linda Williams defined pornography as “embodied image,” an image that incorporates itself as body and captures the body at the “encounter with an eroticized technological apparatus.”1 2. Pornography is sexuality transformed into spectacle, virtual, digital information. It is sexuality transformed into public representation, where public refers directly or indirectly to becoming “marketable.” Given the conditions of post-Fordist capitalism, a public representation implies an ability for exchange on the global market in a digital form that can be transformed into capital. A representation acquires pornographic status when it transforms into “public” that which is supposed to remain private. Therefore, we will speak of pornography as a device for the publication of the private. Or, even better, a device that, representing part of public space, thereby defines it as private while loading it with an added masturbatory value. The word pornographic refers to an economic-political characterization of representation. 3. Pornography is tele-techno-masturbation. The globalization of the pharmacoporno economy by means of audiovisual digitization and its ultrafast transmission, using a host of technical media (television, computer, telephone, external data storage devices such as pods, pads, etc.), generates a butterfly effect in the global management of the cycles of excitation-frustration-excitation: a pussy opening in one place, a mouth sucking in another, producing hundreds of releasings of pleasure at the other end of the world as their virtual displacement emits a living flow of capital. 4. Pornography has the same characteristics as any other spectacle of the culture industry: performance, virtuosity, dramatization, spectacularization, technical reproducibility, digital transformation, and audiovisual distribution. The only difference for the moment rests in its underground status. The porn producer David Friedman remarked that contemporary pornographic exploitation, conceived as a performative practice and audiovisual consumption, is an extension of the popular circus, the freak shows at fairs, and the amusement parks of the pre-cinematic era.2 Pornography and prostitution could be regarded as fields of the industry of the spectacle, condemned to ostracism and illegality during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The modification of the aberrant, perverse, or deviant (disabled, freak, homosexual, nymphomaniac, whore . . . ) body from the status of carnival attraction to that of the mentally ill or criminal typical of the disciplinary biopolitical regime will accentuate this process of exclusion from public and economic domains. 5. The relationship of the pornographic industry to the industry of culture and the spectacle is equivalent to the relationship of traffic in illegal drugs to the pharmaceutical industry. It represents two of the covert engines of capitalism of the twenty-first century. Pharmacopornographic production functions on ambivalence: it is a marginal and hidden aspect of the contemporary cultural industry, but it is also a paradigm for all other types of post-Fordist production. Within übermaterial capitalism, all forms of production offer benefits to the extent to which they approach the model of pharmacopornographic production. 6. As an underground sector, the sex industry reveals the truth about all other aspects of the communications and entertainment industry. Literature, film, television, the Internet, comics, video games, and so on want pornography, wish to produce pleasure and pornographic surplus value without having to suffer the marginalization that comes with pornographic representations, in the same way that contemporary producers of the legal pharmaceutical industry want to produce pleasure and sexual (addiction) and toxicological surplus value without suffering the marginalization and criminalization that come with doing business in illegal drugs. 7. In pornography, sex is performance, which is to say that it is composed of public representations and processes of repetition that are socially and politically regulated. Let’s look again at the relationship between the industry of culture and the industry of sex. Judith Butler defined gender, masculinity, and femininity in terms of performances, regulated processes of repetition, norms internalized in the form of bodily style, representation, and public dramatization.3 In a parallel vein, in the 1980s, Annie Sprinkle introduced a new performative shift in the understanding of identity by defining not only gender, but also sexuality, in terms of performance.4 For Sprinkle, the truth of sexuality that pornographic representation claims to capture is merely the effect of a system of representation, an array of corporal choreographies regulated by gender codes of representation that are comparable to those that prevail in dance, traditional cinematic action, and classical theater. It follows that, for Sprinkle, pornography has no empirical or documentary value outside of a given system of representation. 8. The distinctive feature of pornography as image has more to do with issues of scenography, dramatization, and light than with content; it’s enough for a body (whether natural or artificial, “living” or “dead,” human or animal) to be very well lit,5 and as desirable as it is inaccessible, possessing a masturbatory value directly proportional to its ability to act as an abstract and dazzling fantasy. 9. The popular view of pornography as degree zero of representation is based on a sexotranscendental sovereign necro-political principle that we could call “spermatic Platonism,” and for which ejaculation (and death) is the only real thing. Foucault pointed out that sovereign (masculine, theological, monarchic) power was characterized by not the power of giving life but the power of giving death. From that standpoint, snuff is the ontocinematic model of this type of pornographic production: filming the real, the ejaculation, death in real time, and even better, making ontocinematic death and ejaculation coincide. The peculiarity of the dominant form of pornography is its tendency to produce the visual illusion of irruption within the purely real. Pornographic excitation is structured according to the boomerang: pleasure-in-the-desubjectification-of-the-other/pleasure-in-the-desubjectification-of-the-self: watching a subject that can’t control the force of its sexual production (potentia gaudendi) and seeing it at the very moment it renounces that force, to the benefit of an all-powerful spectator (oneself, the person who is watching) who, in turn, and through the representation, sees him- or herself desubjectified, reduced to a masturbatory response. The one watching is pleasured by his or her own process of desubjectification. If we consider the fact that the goal of all pornographic visual material is to make represented ejaculation coincide with the spectator’s ejaculation (understood in the abstract as a cis-male, the universal visual ejaculator), we should be able to conclude that the pleasure of the pornographic eye resides in a cruel contradiction. On one hand, the spectator receives the impression—by means of the desubjectification of the porn actors—that he’s the one who possesses the potentia gaudendi [orgasmic force] of the actors; on the other hand, the body of the spectator is being reduced to an involuntary receiver of ejaculatory stimuli, thereby putting him in a position deprived of any power to make sexual decisions. The distinctive feature of pornographic subjectivity is the visual swallowing of its own sperm, the fact of simultaneously being both a universal erect cock and a universal receiving anus; and this is something that points us toward a pornosophic precept: pornete ipsum. 10. Pornography tells the performative truth about sexuality. It is not the degree zero of representation. Rather, it reveals that sexuality is always performance, the public practice of a regulated repetition, a staging as well as an involuntary mechanism of connection to the global circuit of excitation-frustration-excitation. Today’s entertainment industry, with its division of representation into categories, such as “G” (general audience—all ages admitted) or “NC- 17” (no children under seventeen admitted) denies the performative value of pornography by reducing it to “hardcore sex,” as if—from a theatrical point of view—there were an ontological difference between a kiss, a brawl, and anal penetration. The current hegemony of the non-pornographic cultural industry stems from this moral axiom that labels organs considered sexual (in particular, the cock, pussy, and anus) as extra-cinematic objects (literally ob-scene, or “outside the scene”) whose value as “truth” cannot be absorbed by representation and transformed into performance. But behind this hegemony hides the cultural industry’s wish to affect the techno-organic centers of the production of subjectivity (centers for the production of pleasure, affect, a feeling of omnipotence and comfort) with the same efficiency as pornography. The cultural industry is porn envy. Pornography isn’t simply a cultural industry like others; it’s [it is] the paradigm for all cultural industries.6 Pornography— which sexualizes production and converts the body into information—and its closed circuit of excitation-capital-frustration-excitation-capital provide in a particularly clear way a key to understanding any other type of post-Fordist cultural production. I have no need to remind you—not you, who are reading this book—that the province of sex (and I mean your sex) is not the individual body (your body) or the private domain (your private domain) or any domestic space (your domestic space). That not the individual body, or the space called private, or domestic space escape political regulation. Sex, excitation, the demand for erection and ejaculation are at the center of pharmacopornographic political production and economy. Accordingly, the situation can be defined in the following terms: labor sexus est. In the cyberextended pharmacopornographic city, the material process of work depends on a collection of sexual tractions, psychosomatic instincts, hormonal escalations, the establishment of synaptic connections, and the emission of chemical excretions. Sex is work. Nevertheless, the object of work is not to satisfy, but to excite: setting in motion the somatic mechanism that regulates the excitation-frustration-excitation cycle. We are working at the porn factory: a technosomatic industry fueled by sperm, blood, urine, adrenalin, testosterone, insulin, silicone, psychostimulants, and estrogens, but also the digitized signs that can be transmitted at high speed, whether number, text, sound, or image. We call the pornification of labor the capture of sex and sexuality by economy, the process by which sex becomes work. Thus, in order to understand the praxis of post-Fordist labor, it is necessary to study in detail three domains that, until now, were considered peripheral or marginal to capitalist cycles of production and consumption: 1. The production, trafficking, and consumption of (legal or illegal) drugs. By drug, in this case, I mean what Derrida calls pharmakon: not only every chemical substance of natural or synthetic origin that typically affects the functions of the central nervous system of the living organism, but also, in a larger sense, all biologically active legal or illegal substances that are able to modify the metabolism of the cells on which they work. Texts and visual signs are also pharmakon.7 2. The production, circulation, and consumption of audiovisual pornographic materials. By pornography, I mean, in this case, any sexually active audiovisual technique capable of modifying the sensibility and production of desire, of activating cycles of excitation-frustration and the production of psychosomatic pleasure, in fine, of capturing the body’s system of affect production. 3. Sexual labor. The transformation of a body’s potentia gaudendi into a commodity by a contract (more or less formal) of service. The power of these three platforms—drugs, pornographic audiovisual material, sexual services—for the production of capital rests in their ability to function as prostheses of subjectivity. What’s being designed here is the logic of a general pharmacopornographic economy at the heart of which circulate organs, pills, financial codes, communication links, images, texts, jerk-off sessions, liters of silicone, chemical compounds, dollars, and so on. The theorists of this new conception of labor as excitation will no longer be classical economists (Ricardo, Marx, Keynes) but the pornographers (Candida Royale, Narcis Bosch, Nacho Vidal, HPG, etc.), porn actors and actresses (Annie Sprinkle, Nina Roberts, Coralie Trinh Thi, etc.), sex workers (Michelle Tea, Norma Jane Almodovar, Claire Carthonnet, etc.), and members of drug trafficking networks, from the producers of coke and the state mafias to the impoverished workers on opium plantations, as well as herbalists adept at ancestral traditions of witchcraft, pharmaceutical laboratories, petty traffickers, and junkies. Negri with Rocco Siffredi; Judith Butler with Jenna Jameson. Freud and his hits of coke, the life and death of Escobar, Sartre’s amphetamine consumption, the androgen-antidepressant cocktail now operational for the American soldiers in Iraq, Russian athletes’ cancers after taking high doses of concentrated testosterone in the form of Oral-Turinabol pills, the rise and fall of Linda Lovelace from Deep Throat, the crystal lines snaking from fashion runways to television sound stages or to the corridors of the stock exchange, the hundreds of thousands of doses of estrogen and progesterone prescribed for the past forty years as a contraceptive for cis-females of reproductive age, biotech laboratory animals and the ones that are slaughtered by the agrifood industry, the pharaonic volume of antidepressants swallowed by menopausal cis-females, the trafficking of illegal sex workers across European borders, Armstrong’s doping, the liters of sperm poured out each year during the making of porn films, the silent spread of the human immunodeficiency virus, the millions of senior citizens’ stomachs lined with omeprazole, the deaths of teenagers who took part in clinical trials of growth hormone, the syringe that produced the sheep Dolly by insemination, the synthetic guilelessness of weight-lifters’ muscles—these teach us more about current models of capitalist production than do all the industrial directories of the International Monetary Fund and their trivial indexes of growth or decline in unemployment. The international guide of pharmacological production of Viagra and its underground counterfeiting market will tell us more about the production of excitation-frustration-excitation values in post-Fordist society than will all the classical economic treatises with their obsolete notions of work as mercantile production.

<h4>The pornification of the economy is the paradigm for all types of work – addiction stimulated by cycles of sexual excitation and frustration. All bodies become part of the pharmacopornographic circuit, as penetrable or penetrating, as a secretion facilitator or a secretor, or both</h4><p><strong>Preciado 13 </strong>[Paul (formerly Beatriz), Prof of Political History of the Body, Gender Theory, and History of Performance at Paris VIII, Testo Junkie, trans. Bruce Benderson, p.265-77]</p><p>1. Pornography is a masturbatory virtual device (literary, audiovisual, cybernetic . . . ). <u><strong>In its capacity as a cinematic industry, <mark>the goal of pornography is planetary multimedia masturbation. The pornographic image is characterized by its capacity to stimulate—independently of the spectator’s will—the biochemical and muscular mechanisms that regulate the production of pleasure.</u></strong></mark> Emphasizing the pornographic image’s capacity to become activated in the body of the spectator, Linda Williams defined pornography as “embodied image,” an image that incorporates itself as body and captures the body at the “encounter with an eroticized technological apparatus.”1 2. <u><strong>Pornography is sexuality transformed into spectacle, virtual, digital information. It is sexuality transformed into public representation, where public refers directly or indirectly to becoming “marketable.” Given the conditions of post-Fordist capitalism, a public representation implies an ability for exchange on the global market in a digital form that can be transformed into capital. A representation acquires pornographic status when it transforms into “public” that which is supposed to remain private.</u></strong> Therefore, we will speak of pornography as a device for the publication of the private. Or, even better, a device that, representing part of public space, thereby defines it as private while loading it with an added masturbatory value. <u><strong><mark>The word pornographic refers to an economic-political characterization of representation.</u></strong></mark> 3. Pornography is tele-techno-masturbation. <u><strong><mark>The globalization of the pharmacoporno economy</u></strong></mark> by means of audiovisual digitization and its ultrafast transmission, using a host of technical media (television, computer, telephone, external data storage devices such as pods, pads, etc.), <u><strong><mark>generates a butterfly effect in the global management of the cycles of excitation-frustration-excitation</u></strong></mark>: a pussy opening in one place, a mouth sucking in another, producing hundreds of releasings of pleasure at the other end of the world as their virtual displacement emits a living flow of capital. 4. <u><strong><mark>Pornography has the same characteristics as any other spectacle of the culture industry</mark>: performance, virtuosity, dramatization, spectacularization, technical reproducibility, digital transformation, and audiovisual distribution. <mark>The only difference for the moment rests in its underground status</mark>.</u></strong> The porn producer David Friedman remarked that contemporary pornographic exploitation, conceived as a performative practice and audiovisual consumption, is an extension of the popular circus, the freak shows at fairs, and the amusement parks of the pre-cinematic era.2 Pornography and prostitution could be regarded as fields of the industry of the spectacle, condemned to ostracism and illegality during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The modification of the aberrant, perverse, or deviant (disabled, freak, homosexual, nymphomaniac, whore . . . ) body from the status of carnival attraction to that of the mentally ill or criminal typical of the disciplinary biopolitical regime will accentuate this process of exclusion from public and economic domains. 5. <u><strong>The relationship of the pornographic industry to the industry of culture and the spectacle is equivalent to the relationship of traffic in illegal drugs to the pharmaceutical industry. It represents two of the covert engines of capitalism of the twenty-first century.</u></strong> Pharmacopornographic production functions on ambivalence: <u><strong><mark>it is a marginal and hidden aspect of the contemporary cultural industry, but it is also a paradigm for all other types of post-Fordist production. Within übermaterial capitalism, all forms of production offer benefits to the extent to which they approach the model of pharmacopornographic production.</u></strong></mark> 6. As an underground sector, <u><strong><mark>the sex industry reveals the truth about all other aspects of the communications and entertainment industry. </mark>Literature, film, television, the Internet, comics, video games, and so on want pornography, wish to produce pleasure and pornographic surplus value without having to suffer the marginalization that comes with pornographic representations, in the same way that contemporary producers of the legal pharmaceutical industry want to produce pleasure and sexual (addiction) and toxicological surplus value without suffering the marginalization and criminalization that come with doing business in illegal drugs.</u></strong> 7. In pornography, sex is performance, which is to say that it is composed of public representations and processes of repetition that are socially and politically regulated. Let’s look again at the relationship between the industry of culture and the industry of sex. Judith Butler defined gender, masculinity, and femininity in terms of performances, regulated processes of repetition, norms internalized in the form of bodily style, representation, and public dramatization.3 In a parallel vein, in the 1980s, Annie Sprinkle introduced a new performative shift in the understanding of identity by defining not only gender, but also sexuality, in terms of performance.4 For Sprinkle, the truth of sexuality that pornographic representation claims to capture is merely the effect of a system of representation, an array of corporal choreographies regulated by gender codes of representation that are comparable to those that prevail in dance, traditional cinematic action, and classical theater. It follows that, for Sprinkle, pornography has no empirical or documentary value outside of a given system of representation. 8. The distinctive feature of pornography as image has more to do with issues of scenography, dramatization, and light than with content; it’s enough for a body (whether natural or artificial, “living” or “dead,” human or animal) to be very well lit,5 and as desirable as it is inaccessible, possessing a masturbatory value directly proportional to its ability to act as an abstract and dazzling fantasy. 9. The popular view of pornography as degree zero of representation is based on a sexotranscendental sovereign necro-political principle that we could call “spermatic Platonism,” and for which ejaculation (and death) is the only real thing. Foucault pointed out that sovereign (masculine, theological, monarchic) power was characterized by not the power of giving life but the power of giving death. From that standpoint, snuff is the ontocinematic model of this type of pornographic production: filming the real, the ejaculation, death in real time, and even better, making ontocinematic death and ejaculation coincide. The peculiarity of the dominant form of pornography is its tendency to produce the visual illusion of irruption within the purely real. Pornographic excitation is structured according to the boomerang: pleasure-in-the-desubjectification-of-the-other/pleasure-in-the-desubjectification-of-the-self: watching a subject that can’t control the force of its sexual production (potentia gaudendi) and seeing it at the very moment it renounces that force, to the benefit of an all-powerful spectator (oneself, the person who is watching) who, in turn, and through the representation, sees him- or herself desubjectified, reduced to a masturbatory response. The one watching is pleasured by his or her own process of desubjectification. If we consider the fact that the goal of all pornographic visual material is to make represented ejaculation coincide with the spectator’s ejaculation (understood in the abstract as a cis-male, the universal visual ejaculator), we should be able to conclude that the pleasure of the pornographic eye resides in a cruel contradiction. On one hand, the spectator receives the impression—by means of the desubjectification of the porn actors—that he’s the one who possesses the potentia gaudendi [orgasmic force] of the actors; on the other hand, the body of the spectator is being reduced to an involuntary receiver of ejaculatory stimuli, thereby putting him in a position deprived of any power to make sexual decisions. The distinctive feature of pornographic subjectivity is the visual swallowing of its own sperm, the fact of simultaneously being both a universal erect cock and a universal receiving anus; and this is something that points us toward a pornosophic precept: pornete ipsum. 10. <u><strong>Pornography</u></strong> tells the performative truth about sexuality. It is not the degree zero of representation. Rather,<u><strong> it reveals that <mark>sexuality is always performance, the public practice of a regulated repetition, a staging as well as an involuntary mechanism of connection to the global circuit of excitation-frustration-excitation</mark>. Today’s entertainment industry, with its division of representation into categories, such as “G”</u></strong> (general audience—all ages admitted) <u><strong>or “NC- 17”</u></strong> (no children under seventeen admitted) <u><strong>denies the performative value of pornography by reducing it to “hardcore sex,” as if—from a theatrical point of view—there were an ontological difference between a kiss, a brawl, and anal penetration. <mark>The current hegemony of the non-pornographic cultural industry stems from this moral axiom that labels organs considered sexual</u></strong></mark> (in particular, the cock, pussy, and anus) <u><strong><mark>as extra-cinematic objects</mark> </u></strong>(literally ob-scene, or “outside the scene”) <u><strong><mark>whose value as “truth” cannot be absorbed by representation and transformed into performance. But behind this hegemony hides the cultural industry’s wish to affect the techno-organic centers of the production of subjectivity</u></strong></mark> (centers for the production of pleasure, affect, a feeling of omnipotence and comfort) <u><strong><mark>with the same efficiency as pornography. The cultural industry is porn envy. Pornography</mark> isn’t simply a cultural industry like others; it’s [it <mark>is] the paradigm for all cultural industries</mark>.</u></strong>6 <u><strong>Pornography</u></strong>— which sexualizes production and converts the body into information—<u><strong>and its closed circuit of excitation-capital-frustration-excitation-capital provide in a particularly clear way a key to understanding any other type of post-Fordist cultural production.</u></strong> I have no need to remind you—not you, who are reading this book—that <u><strong>the province of sex</u></strong> (and I mean your sex) <u><strong>is not the individual body</u></strong> (your body) <u><strong>or the private domain</u></strong> (your private domain) <u><strong>or any domestic space</u></strong> (your domestic space). That <u><strong>not the individual body, or the space called private, or domestic space escape political regulation. <mark>Sex, excitation, the demand for erection and ejaculation are at the center of pharmacopornographic political production and economy.</u></strong></mark> Accordingly, the situation can be defined in the following terms: labor sexus est. In the cyberextended pharmacopornographic city, <u><strong>the material process of work depends on a collection of sexual tractions, psychosomatic instincts, hormonal escalations, the establishment of synaptic connections, and the emission of chemical excretions. Sex is work.</u></strong> Nevertheless, <u><strong><mark>the object of work is not to satisfy, but to excite: setting in motion the somatic mechanism that regulates the excitation-frustration-excitation cycle. We are working at the porn factory</mark>: a technosomatic industry fueled by sperm, blood, urine, adrenalin, testosterone, insulin, silicone, psychostimulants, and estrogens, but also the digitized signs that can be transmitted at high speed, whether number, text, sound, or image. <mark>We call the pornification of labor the capture of sex and sexuality by economy, the process by which sex becomes work.</u></strong></mark> Thus, in order to understand the praxis of post-Fordist labor, it is necessary to study in detail three domains that, until now, were considered peripheral or marginal to capitalist cycles of production and consumption: 1. The production, trafficking, and consumption of (legal or illegal) drugs. By drug, in this case, I mean what Derrida calls pharmakon: not only every chemical substance of natural or synthetic origin that typically affects the functions of the central nervous system of the living organism, but also, in a larger sense, all biologically active legal or illegal substances that are able to modify the metabolism of the cells on which they work. Texts and visual signs are also pharmakon.7 2. The production, circulation, and consumption of audiovisual pornographic materials. By pornography, I mean, in this case, any sexually active audiovisual technique capable of modifying the sensibility and production of desire, of activating cycles of excitation-frustration and the production of psychosomatic pleasure, in fine, of capturing the body’s system of affect production. 3. Sexual labor. The transformation of a body’s potentia gaudendi into a commodity by a contract (more or less formal) of service. <u><strong><mark>The power of</u></strong></mark> these three platforms—<u><strong>drugs, pornographic audiovisual material, <mark>sexual services—for the production of capital rests in their ability to function as prostheses of subjectivity.</mark> What’s being designed here is the logic of a general pharmacopornographic economy at the heart of which circulate organs, pills, financial codes, communication links, images, texts, jerk-off sessions, liters of silicone, chemical compounds, dollars, and so on. <mark>The theorists of this new conception of labor as excitation will no longer be classical economists (Ricardo, Marx, Keynes) but</mark> </u></strong>the pornographers (Candida Royale, Narcis Bosch, Nacho Vidal, HPG, etc.), porn actors and actresses (Annie Sprinkle, Nina Roberts, Coralie Trinh Thi, etc.), <u><strong><mark>sex workers</u></strong></mark> (Michelle Tea, Norma Jane Almodovar, Claire Carthonnet, etc.), and members of drug trafficking networks, from the producers of coke and the state mafias to the impoverished workers on opium plantations, as well as herbalists adept at ancestral traditions of witchcraft, pharmaceutical laboratories, petty traffickers, and junkies. Negri with Rocco Siffredi; Judith Butler with Jenna Jameson. Freud and his hits of coke, the life and death of Escobar, Sartre’s amphetamine consumption, the androgen-antidepressant cocktail now operational for the American soldiers in Iraq, Russian athletes’ cancers after taking high doses of concentrated testosterone in the form of Oral-Turinabol pills, the rise and fall of Linda Lovelace from Deep Throat, <u><strong><mark>the crystal lines snaking from fashion runways to television sound stages </mark>or to the corridors of the stock exchange, the hundreds of thousands of doses of estrogen and progesterone prescribed for the past forty years as a contraceptive for cis-females of reproductive age, biotech laboratory animals and the ones that are slaughtered by the agrifood industry, the pharaonic volume of antidepressants swallowed by menopausal cis-females, the trafficking of illegal sex workers across European borders, Armstrong’s doping, the liters of sperm poured out each year during the making of porn films, the silent spread of the human immunodeficiency virus, the millions of senior citizens’ stomachs lined with omeprazole, the deaths of teenagers who took part in clinical trials of growth hormone, the syringe that produced the sheep Dolly by insemination, the synthetic guilelessness of weight-lifters’ muscles—these <mark>teach us more about current models of capitalist production than do all the</mark> </u></strong>industrial directories of the International Monetary Fund and their trivial indexes of growth or decline in unemployment. The international guide of pharmacological production of Viagra and its underground counterfeiting market will tell us more about the production of excitation-frustration-excitation values in post-Fordist society than will all the <u><strong><mark>classical economic treatises with their obsolete notions of work as mercantile production.</p></u></strong></mark>

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The control of orgasmic power is the basis of extreme violence against those marked as other. All bodies are capable of sucking or being sucked, but lines of gender, race, ability, and humanity position some as global anuses and others as universal penetrators. They become the carnal resource that fuels the engines of post-industrial democracy.

Preciado 13

Preciado 13 [Paul (formerly Beatriz), Prof of Political History of the Body, Gender Theory, and History of Performance at Paris VIII, Testo Junkie, trans. Bruce Benderson, p.46-50]

the market isn’t an outside power coming to expropriate, repress, or control the sexual instincts of the individual. Orgasmic force in its role as the workforce finds itself progressively regulated by a strict techno-biopolitical control. The sexual body is the product of a sexual division of flesh according to which each organ is defined by its function. A sexuality always implies a precise governing of the mouth, hand, anus, vagina. Until recently, the relationship between buying/selling and dependence that united the capitalist to the worker also governed the relationship between the genders, which was conceived as a relationship between the ejaculator and the facilitator of ejaculation. Femininity is the quality of the orgasmic force when it can be converted into merchandise, into an object of economic exchange, into work. a male body can occupy (and in fact already does occupy) a position of female gender in the market of sex work and see its orgasmic power reduced to a capacity for work. The control of orgasmic power not only defines the difference between genders, the female/male dichotomy, it also governs, in a more general way, the techno-biopolitical difference between heterosexuality and homosexuality. The technical restriction of masturbation and the invention of homosexuality as a pathology are of a pair with the composition of a disciplinary regime at the heart of which the collective orgasmic force is put to work as a function of the heterosexual reproduction of the species. Heterosexuality must be understood as a politically assisted procreation technology. But after the 1940s, the moleculized sexual body was introduced into the machinery of capital and forced to mutate its forms of production. Biopolitical conditions change drastically when it becomes possible to derive benefits from masturbation through the mechanism of pornography and the employment of techniques for the control of sexual reproduction by means of contraceptives and artificial insemination. every human or animal, real or virtual, female or male body possesses this masturbatory potentiality, the power to produce molecular joy, and therefore also possesses productive power without being consumed and depleted in the process. Until now, we’ve been aware of the direct relationship between the pornification of the body and the level of oppression. Throughout history, the most pornified bodies have been those of non-human animals, women and children, the racialized bodies of the slave, and the homosexual body. But there is no ontological relationship between anatomy and [orgasmic force] The new hegemonic subject is a body (often codified as male, white, and heterosexual) supplemented pharmacopornographically and a consumer of pauperized sexual services (often in bodies codified as female, childlike, or racialized) Power is located not only in the (“female,” “childlike,” or “nonwhite”) body as a space traditionally imagined as prediscursive and natural, but also in the collection of representations that render it sexual and desirable. the distinctive feature of a body stripped of all legal or political status is that its use is intended as a source of production of potentia gaudendi [orgasmic force]. The distinctive feature of a body reduced to naked technolife, in both democratic societies and fascist regimes, is precisely the power to be the object of maximum pharmacopornographic exploitation. All these bodies are already functioning, in an inexhaustible manner, as carnal and digital sources of ejaculatory capital. For the Aristotelian distinction between zōē and bios we must today substitute the distinction between raw and biotech Biotechnological reality deprived of all civic context (the body of the migrant, the deported, the colonized, the porn actress/ actor, the sex worker, the laboratory animal, etc.) becomes that of the corpus pornographicus whose life lacking any right to citizenship, authorship, and right to work, is composed by and subject to self-surveillance and global mediatization. No need to resort to the dystopian model of the concentration or extermination camp in order to discover naked techno-life, because it’s [is] at the center of postindustrial democracies, forming part of a global, integrated multimedia laboratory-brothel, where the control of the flow of affect begins under the pop form of excitation-frustration.

Orgasmic force finds itself progressively regulated by techno-biopolitical control. The control of orgasmic power defines the difference between genders, the female/male dichotomy, it governs the techno-biopolitical difference between heterosexuality and homosexuality. Biopolitical conditions change drastically when it becomes possible to derive benefits from masturbation through the mechanism of pornography and the employment of techniques for the control of sexual reproduction by means of contraceptives and artificial insemination every human or animal, possesses masturbatory potentiality the power to produce molecular joy the most pornified bodies have been non-human animals, women the racialized bodies of the slave, and the homosexual body The new hegemonic subject is a body (often codified as male, white, and heterosexual) and a consumer of pauperized sexual services (often in bodies codified as female, childlike, or racialized): Power is located not only in the (“female,” or “nonwhite”) body as a space traditionally imagined as prediscursive but also in the collection of representations that render it sexual the feature of a body stripped of all legal or political status is its use is intended as a source of production of [orgasmic force]. The distinctive feature of a body reduced to naked technolife, in both democratic societies and fascist regimes, is precisely the power to be the object of maximum pharmacopornographic exploitation All these bodies are already functioning, in an inexhaustible manner, as carnal and digital sources of ejaculatory capital. Biotechnological reality deprived of all civic context (the body of the migrant, the deported, the colonized, the porn actress/ actor, the sex worker, the laboratory animal, etc.) becomes that of the corpus whose life lacking citizenship, authorship, and right to work, is composed by and subject to self-surveillance and global mediatization. naked techno-life [is] at the center of postindustrial democracies, forming part of a global, integrated multimedia laboratory-brothel, where the control of the flow of affect begins under excitation-frustration.

This theory of “orgasmic force” should not be read through a Hegelian paranoid or Rousseauist utopian/dystopian prism; the market isn’t an outside power coming to expropriate, repress, or control the sexual instincts of the individual. On the other hand, we are being confronted by the most depraved of political situations: the body isn’t aware of its potentia gaudendi as long as it does not put it to work. Orgasmic force in its role as the workforce finds itself progressively regulated by a strict techno-biopolitical control. The sexual body is the product of a sexual division of flesh according to which each organ is defined by its function. A sexuality always implies a precise governing of the mouth, hand, anus, vagina. Until recently, the relationship between buying/selling and dependence that united the capitalist to the worker also governed the relationship between the genders, which was conceived as a relationship between the ejaculator and the facilitator of ejaculation. Femininity, far from being nature, is the quality of the orgasmic force when it can be converted into merchandise, into an object of economic exchange, into work. Obviously, a male body can occupy (and in fact already does occupy) a position of female gender in the market of sex work and, as a result, see its orgasmic power reduced to a capacity for work. The control of orgasmic power (puissance) not only defines the difference between genders, the female/male dichotomy, it also governs, in a more general way, the techno-biopolitical difference between heterosexuality and homosexuality. The technical restriction of masturbation and the invention of homosexuality as a pathology are of a pair with the composition of a disciplinary regime at the heart of which the collective orgasmic force is put to work as a function of the heterosexual reproduction of the species. Heterosexuality must be understood as a politically assisted procreation technology. But after the 1940s, the moleculized sexual body was introduced into the machinery of capital and forced to mutate its forms of production. Biopolitical conditions change drastically when it becomes possible to derive benefits from masturbation through the mechanism of pornography and the employment of techniques for the control of sexual reproduction by means of contraceptives and artificial insemination. If we agree with Marx that “workforce is not actual work carried out but the simple potential or ability for work,” then it must be said that every human or animal, real or virtual, female or male body possesses this masturbatory potentiality, a potentia gaudendi, the power to produce molecular joy, and therefore also possesses productive power without being consumed and depleted in the process. Until now, we’ve been aware of the direct relationship between the pornification of the body and the level of oppression. Throughout history, the most pornified bodies have been those of non-human animals, women and children, the racialized bodies of the slave, the bodies of young workers and the homosexual body. But there is no ontological relationship between anatomy and potentia gaudendi [orgasmic force]. The credit goes to the French writer Michel Houellebecq for having understood how to build a dystopian fable about this new capacity of global capitalism, which has manufactured the megaslut and the megaletch. The new hegemonic subject is a body (often codified as male, white, and heterosexual) supplemented pharmacopornographically (by Viagra, coke, pornography) and a consumer of pauperized sexual services (often in bodies codified as female, childlike, or racialized): “When he can, a westerner works; he often finds his work frustrating or boring, but he pretends to find it interesting: this much is obvious. At the age of fifty, weary of teaching, of math, of everything, I decided to see the world. I had just been divorced for the third time; as far as sex was concerned, I wasn’t expecting much. My first trip was to Thailand, and immediately after that I left for Madagascar. I haven’t fucked a white woman since. I’ve never even felt the desire to do so. Believe me,” he added, placing a firm hand on Lionel’s forearm, “you won’t find a white woman with a soft, submissive, supple, muscular pussy anymore. That’s all gone now.”41 Power is located not only in the (“female,” “childlike,” or “nonwhite”) body as a space traditionally imagined as prediscursive and natural, but also in the collection of representations that render it sexual and desirable. In every case it remains a body that is always pharmacopornographic, a technoliving system that is the effect of a widespread cultural mechanism of representation and production. The goal of contemporary critical theory would be to unravel our condition as pharmacopornographic workers/ consumers. If the current theory of the feminization of labor omits the cum shot, conceals videographic ejaculation behind the screen of cooperative communication, it’s because, unlike Houellebecq, the philosophers of biopolitics prefer not to reveal their position as customers of the global pharmacopornomarket. In the first volume of Homo Sacer, Giorgio Agamben reclaims Walter Benjamin’s concept of the “naked life” in order to define the biopolitical status of the subject after Auschwitz, a subject whose paradigm would be the concentration camp prisoner or the illegal immigrant held in a temporary detention center, reduced to existing only physically and stripped of all legal status or citizenship. To such a notion of the “naked life,” we could add that of the pharmacopornographic life, or naked technolife; the distinctive feature of a body stripped of all legal or political status is that its use is intended as a source of production of potentia gaudendi [orgasmic force]. The distinctive feature of a body reduced to naked technolife, in both democratic societies and fascist regimes, is precisely the power to be the object of maximum pharmacopornographic exploitation. Identical codes of pornographic representation function in the images of the prisoners of Abu Ghraib,42 the eroticized images of Thai adolescents, advertisements for L’Oréal and McDonald’s, and the pages of Hot magazine. All these bodies are already functioning, in an inexhaustible manner, as carnal and digital sources of ejaculatory capital. For the Aristotelian distinction between zōē and bios, between animal life deprived of any intentionality and “exalted” life, that is, life gifted with meaning and self-determination that is a substrate of biopolitical government, we must today substitute the distinction between raw and biotech (biotechnoculturally produced); and the latter term refers to the condition of life in the pharmacopornographic era. Biotechnological reality deprived of all civic context (the body of the migrant, the deported, the colonized, the porn actress/ actor, the sex worker, the laboratory animal, etc.) becomes that of the corpus (and no longer that of homo) pornographicus whose life (a technical condition rather than a purely biological one), lacking any right to citizenship, authorship, and right to work, is composed by and subject to self-surveillance and global mediatization. No need to resort to the dystopian model of the concentration or extermination camp—which are easy to denounce as mechanisms of control— in order to discover naked techno-life, because it’s [is] at the center of postindustrial democracies, forming part of a global, integrated multimedia laboratory-brothel, where the control of the flow of affect begins under the pop form of excitation-frustration. CLIP

<h4>The control of orgasmic power is the basis of extreme violence against those marked as other. All bodies are capable of sucking or being sucked, but lines of gender, race, ability, and humanity position some as global anuses and others as universal penetrators. They become the carnal resource that fuels the engines of post-industrial democracy.</h4><p><strong>Preciado 13 </strong>[Paul (formerly Beatriz), Prof of Political History of the Body, Gender Theory, and History of Performance at Paris VIII, Testo Junkie, trans. Bruce Benderson, p.46-50]</p><p>This theory of “orgasmic force” should not be read through a Hegelian paranoid or Rousseauist utopian/dystopian prism; <u><strong>the market isn’t an outside power coming to expropriate, repress, or control the sexual instincts of the individual.</u></strong> On the other hand, we are being confronted by the most depraved of political situations: the body isn’t aware of its potentia gaudendi as long as it does not put it to work. <u><strong><mark>Orgasmic force</mark> in its role as the workforce <mark>finds itself progressively regulated by </mark>a strict <mark>techno-biopolitical control.</mark> The sexual body is the product of a sexual division of flesh according to which each organ is defined by its function. A sexuality always implies a precise governing of the mouth, hand, anus, vagina. Until recently, the relationship between buying/selling and dependence that united the capitalist to the worker also governed the relationship between the genders, which was conceived as a relationship between the ejaculator and the facilitator of ejaculation. Femininity</u></strong>, far from being nature, <u><strong>is the quality of the orgasmic force when it can be converted into merchandise, into an object of economic exchange, into work.</u></strong> Obviously, <u><strong>a male body can occupy (and in fact already does occupy) a position of female gender in the market of sex work and</u></strong>, as a result, <u><strong>see its orgasmic power reduced to a capacity for work. <mark>The control of orgasmic power</u></strong></mark> (puissance) <u><strong>not only <mark>defines the difference between genders, the female/male dichotomy, it </mark>also <mark>governs</mark>, in a more general way, <mark>the techno-biopolitical difference between heterosexuality and homosexuality.</mark> The technical restriction of masturbation and the invention of homosexuality as a pathology are of a pair with the composition of a disciplinary regime at the heart of which the collective orgasmic force is put to work as a function of the heterosexual reproduction of the species. Heterosexuality must be understood as a politically assisted procreation technology. But after the 1940s, the moleculized sexual body was introduced into the machinery of capital and forced to mutate its forms of production. <mark>Biopolitical conditions change drastically when it becomes possible to derive benefits from masturbation through the mechanism of pornography and the employment of techniques for the control of sexual reproduction by means of contraceptives and artificial insemination</mark>. </u></strong>If we agree with Marx that “workforce is not actual work carried out but the simple potential or ability for work,” then it must be said that <u><strong><mark>every human or animal, </mark>real or virtual, female or male body <mark>possesses </mark>this <mark>masturbatory potentiality</mark>,</u></strong> a potentia gaudendi, <u><strong><mark>the power to produce molecular joy</mark>, and therefore also possesses productive power without being consumed and depleted in the process. Until now, we’ve been aware of the direct relationship between the pornification of the body and the level of oppression. Throughout history, <mark>the most pornified bodies have been </mark>those of <mark>non-human animals, women </mark>and children, <mark>the racialized bodies of the slave, </u></strong></mark>the bodies of young workers<u><strong> <mark>and the homosexual body</mark>. But there is no ontological relationship between anatomy and </u></strong>potentia gaudendi<u><strong> [orgasmic force]</u></strong>. The credit goes to the French writer Michel Houellebecq for having understood how to build a dystopian fable about this new capacity of global capitalism, which has manufactured the megaslut and the megaletch. <u><strong><mark>The new hegemonic subject is a body (often codified as male, white, and heterosexual)</mark> supplemented pharmacopornographically</u></strong> (by Viagra, coke, pornography) <u><strong><mark>and a consumer of pauperized sexual services (often in bodies codified as female, childlike, or racialized)</u></strong>:</mark> “When he can, a westerner works; he often finds his work frustrating or boring, but he pretends to find it interesting: this much is obvious. At the age of fifty, weary of teaching, of math, of everything, I decided to see the world. I had just been divorced for the third time; as far as sex was concerned, I wasn’t expecting much. My first trip was to Thailand, and immediately after that I left for Madagascar. I haven’t fucked a white woman since. I’ve never even felt the desire to do so. Believe me,” he added, placing a firm hand on Lionel’s forearm, “you won’t find a white woman with a soft, submissive, supple, muscular pussy anymore. That’s all gone now.”41 <u><strong><mark>Power is located not only in the (“female,” </mark>“childlike,” <mark>or “nonwhite”) body as a space traditionally imagined as prediscursive</mark> and natural, <mark>but also in the collection of representations that render it sexual</mark> and desirable.</u></strong> In every case it remains a body that is always pharmacopornographic, a technoliving system that is the effect of a widespread cultural mechanism of representation and production. The goal of contemporary critical theory would be to unravel our condition as pharmacopornographic workers/ consumers. If the current theory of the feminization of labor omits the cum shot, conceals videographic ejaculation behind the screen of cooperative communication, it’s because, unlike Houellebecq, the philosophers of biopolitics prefer not to reveal their position as customers of the global pharmacopornomarket. In the first volume of Homo Sacer, Giorgio Agamben reclaims Walter Benjamin’s concept of the “naked life” in order to define the biopolitical status of the subject after Auschwitz, a subject whose paradigm would be the concentration camp prisoner or the illegal immigrant held in a temporary detention center, reduced to existing only physically and stripped of all legal status or citizenship. To such a notion of the “naked life,” we could add that of the pharmacopornographic life, or naked technolife; <u><strong><mark>the </mark>distinctive <mark>feature of a body stripped of all legal or political status is </mark>that <mark>its use is intended as a source of production of</mark> potentia gaudendi <mark>[orgasmic force]. The distinctive feature of a body reduced to naked technolife, in both democratic societies and fascist regimes, is precisely the power to be the object of maximum pharmacopornographic exploitation</mark>.</u></strong> Identical codes of pornographic representation function in the images of the prisoners of Abu Ghraib,42 the eroticized images of Thai adolescents, advertisements for L’Oréal and McDonald’s, and the pages of Hot magazine. <u><strong><mark>All these bodies are already functioning, in an inexhaustible manner, as carnal and digital sources of ejaculatory capital.</mark> For the Aristotelian distinction between zōē and bios</u></strong>, between animal life deprived of any intentionality and “exalted” life, that is, life gifted with meaning and self-determination that is a substrate of biopolitical government, <u><strong>we must today substitute the distinction between raw and biotech</u></strong> (biotechnoculturally produced); and the latter term refers to the condition of life in the pharmacopornographic era. <u><strong><mark>Biotechnological reality deprived of all civic context (the body of the migrant, the deported, the colonized, the porn actress/ actor, the sex worker, the laboratory animal, etc.) becomes that of the corpus</u></strong></mark> (and no longer that of homo) <u><strong>pornographicus <mark>whose life</u></strong></mark> (a technical condition rather than a purely biological one), <u><strong><mark>lacking </mark>any right to <mark>citizenship, authorship, and right to work, is composed by and subject to self-surveillance and global mediatization.</mark> No need to resort to the dystopian model of the concentration or extermination camp</u></strong>—which are easy to denounce as mechanisms of control— <u><strong>in order to discover <mark>naked techno-life</mark>, because it’s <mark>[is] at the center of postindustrial democracies, forming part of a global, integrated multimedia laboratory-brothel, where the control of the flow of affect begins under </mark>the pop form of <mark>excitation-frustration.</p><p></u></strong></mark>CLIP </p>

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‘Paul Preciado, a testosterone junkie trans terrorist, calls on us to recognize the sexual monster that resides within ourselves. This is not a call to assimilate sex work and sexual deviance within the structures of normality or the law. Rather, it is a call to disidentify – to de-recognize ourselves as subjects of those systems of social and legal representation that criminalize it. We affirm the “legalization” of prostitution that comes with the de-recognition of its criminalization. This disidentification does not ignore our positionality and embodiment. We are aware of the fact our bodies have marked us for many advantages and shape our ways of being in the world. De-recognition is way of de-naturalizing these bodies—not to claim that we are brothel workers or that we share the experiences of black or trans prostitutes—but to recognize that our bodies are also monstrous techno-political constructions.

Preciado 13 [

Preciado 13 [Paul (formerly Beatriz), Prof of Political History of the Body, Gender Theory, and History of Performance at Paris VIII, Testo Junkie, trans. Bruce Benderson, p.394-8]

The cis-males and cis-females as well as transsexuals, who have access to surgical, endocrinological, or legal techniques of the production of identity, are not simple economic classes in the Marxist sense but genuine “pharmacopornographic factories”—existing simultaneously as raw materials, producers of biocodes of gender, and pharmacopornographic consumers. Porn actors; whores; the transgender; genderqueers; and producers, traffickers, and consumers of illegal drugs inhabit different cultures, but all are used as living pharmacoporn laboratories. All of them sell, buy, or get access to their biocodes as pharmacopornographic property. The sudden emergence of new gender statuses is creating a novel type of conflict between owners and managers of the patents of the microtechnologies of subjectification and the producers and traffickers of these techno-biocodes. The pharmacopornographic entrepreneurs, who are among the contemporary leaders of global capitalism, are trying to restrict and privatize the biocodes of gender and convert them into rare and naturalized objects by means of legal and market techniques. The pharmacopornographic gendercopyleft movement has a technoliving platform the body Not the naked body, or the body as unchanging nature, but the technoliving body as a biopolitical archive and cultural prosthesis. Your memory, your desire, your sensibility, your skin, your cock, your dildo, your blood, your sperm, your vulva, your ova . . . are the tools of a potential gendercopyleft revolution. sex workers are master hackers of gender, genuine traffickers of semiotico-technological flux, producers and tinkers of copyleft biocodes. Gender copyleft strategies must be minor but decisive: the survival of life on the planet is at stake. there will be no single name that can be transformed into a brand. It will be our responsibility to shift the code to open the political practice to multiple possibilities. This book is a protocol for self-tests carried out with testosterone in gel form, exercises of controlled poisoning on my own body. I am infecting myself with a chemical signifier culturally branded as masculine. Vaccinating yourself with testosterone can be a technique of resistance for bodies that have been assigned the status of cis-females. , the administration of testosterone has ceased to be a simple political test and has molted into a discipline, an asceticism, a way of restoring my spirit by means of the down growing on my arms, an addiction, a form of gratification, an escape, a prison, a paradise. Hormones are chemical prostheses. Political drugs. the substance not only modifies the filter through which we decode and recodify the world; it also radically modifies the body and, as a result, the mode under which we are decoded by others. Six months of testosterone, and any cis-female at all, not a should-have-been-boy or a lesbian, but any girl, any neighborhood kid, a Jennifer Lopez or a Rihanna, can become a member of the male species who cannot be told apart from any other member of the hegemonic class. I refuse the medico-political dose, its regime, its regularity, its direction. there is no norm, merely a diversity of viable monstrosities. My gender does not belong to my family or to the state or to the pharmaceutical industry. My gender does not belong to feminism or to the lesbian community or to queer theory. Gender must be torn from the macro-discourse and diluted with a good dose of micropolitical hedonist psychedelics. political subjectivity emerges precisely when the subject does not recognize itself in its representation. It is fundamental not to recognize oneself. De-recognition, disidentification is a condition for the emergence of the political as the possibility of transforming reality. the techniques of political representation always entail programs of the somatic production of subjectivity. I’m not opting for any direct action against representation, but for a micropolitics of disidentification, a kind of experimentation that doesn’t have faith in representation as an exteriority that will bring truth or happiness. In order to accomplish the work of therapy for the multitudes that I have begun with these doses of testosterone and with writing, I now need only to convince you, all of you, that you are like me, and not the opposite. I am not going to claim that I’m like you, your equal, or ask you to allow me to participate in your laws or to admit me as a part of your social normality. My ambition is to convince you that you are like me. Tempted by the same chemical abuse. You have it in you: you think that you’re cis-females, but you take the Pill; or you think you’re cis-males, but you take Viagra; you’re normal, and you take Prozac or Paxil in the hope that something will free you from your problems of decreased vitality, and you’ve shot cortisone and cocaine, taken alcohol and Ritalin and codeine . . . You, you as well, you are the monster that testosterone is awakening in me.

The cis-males and cis-females as well as transsexuals, who have access to surgical, endocrinological, or legal techniques of the production of identity, are not simple economic classes but genuine “pharmacopornographic factories”—existing simultaneously as raw materials, producers and consumers. Porn actors; whores; the transgender; genderqueers all are used as living pharmacoporn laboratories. All of them sell, buy, or get access to their biocodes as pharmacopornographic property. leaders of global capitalism, are trying to restrict and privatize the biocodes of gender and convert them into rare and naturalized objects Your memory, your desire, your sensibility, your skin, your cock, your dildo, your blood, your sperm, your vulva, your ova . . . are the tools of a potential gendercopyleft revolution. sex workers are master hackers of gender producers and tinkers of copyleft biocodes. there will be no single name that can be transformed into a brand. It will be our responsibility to shift the code to open the political practice to multiple possibilities there is no norm, merely a diversity of viable monstrosities My gender does not belong to my family or to the state or to the pharmaceutical industry. My gender does not belong to feminism or to the lesbian community or to queer theory. Gender must be torn from the macro-discourse political subjectivity emerges precisely when the subject does not recognize itself in its representation. It is fundamental not to recognize oneself. De-recognition, disidentification is a condition for the emergence of the political as the possibility of transforming reality. the techniques of political representation always entail programs of the somatic production of subjectivity. I’m opting for a politics of disidentification, a kind of experimentation that doesn’t have faith in representation In order to accomplish the work of therapy for the multitudes that I have begun with these doses of testosterone and with writing, I now need only to convince you, all of you, that you are like me, and not the opposite. I am not going to claim that I’m like you, your equal, or ask you to allow me to participate in your laws or to admit me as a part of your social normality. My ambition is to convince you that you are like me. Tempted by the same chemical abuse. You have it in you: you think that you’re cis-females, but you take the Pill; or you think you’re cis-males, but you take Viagra; you’re normal, and you take Prozac or Paxil in the hope that something will free you from your problems of decreased vitality, and you’ve shot cortisone and cocaine, taken alcohol and Ritalin and codeine . . . You, you as well, you are the monster that testosterone is awakening in me.

The cis-males and cis-females (indiscriminately heterosexual or homosexual), as well as transsexuals, who have access to surgical, endocrinological, or legal techniques of the production of identity, are not simple economic classes in the Marxist sense of the term, but genuine “pharmacopornographic factories”—existing simultaneously as raw materials, producers (but rarely proprietors) of biocodes of gender, and pharmacopornographic consumers. Porn actors; whores; the transgender; genderqueers; and producers, traffickers, and consumers of illegal drugs inhabit different cultures, but all are used as living pharmacoporn laboratories. All of them sell, buy, or get access to their biocodes as pharmacopornographic property. The sudden emergence of new gender statuses is creating a novel type of conflict between owners and managers of the patents of the microtechnologies of subjectification (sex hormones, psychotropic molecules, audiovisual codes, etc.) and the producers and traffickers of these techno-biocodes. The pharmacopornographic entrepreneurs, who are among the contemporary leaders of global capitalism, are trying to restrict and privatize the biocodes of gender and convert them into rare and naturalized objects by means of legal and market techniques. Computer hackers use the web and copyleft programs as tools of free and horizontal distribution of information and claim that they should be in reach of everyone. The pharmacopornographic gendercopyleft movement has a technoliving platform that is a lot easier to gain access to than the Internet: the body, the somathèque. Not the naked body, or the body as unchanging nature, but the technoliving body as a biopolitical archive and cultural prosthesis. Your memory, your desire, your sensibility, your skin, your cock, your dildo, your blood, your sperm, your vulva, your ova . . . are the tools of a potential gendercopyleft revolution. The various producers of sexual biocodes are very different from one another. Some get off on economic and social privileges, such as the models through whose bodies the dominant codes of male and female beauty are produced. Others, such as porn actors or sex workers, suffer from the lack of regulations for the open market of their biocodes. But all of them depend on the pharmacopornographic industry and its local alliances with the police forces of the nation-states. One day, they will all become hackers. Agnes, mother of all the techno-lambs: Del LaGrace Volcano, Kate Bornstein, Jacob Hale, Dean Spade, Mauro Cabral, Susan Stryker, Sandy Stone, King Erik, Moises Martínez— all are master hackers of gender, genuine traffickers of semiotico-technological flux, producers and tinkers of copyleft biocodes. Gender copyleft strategies must be minor but decisive: the survival of life on the planet is at stake. For this movement, there will be no single name that can be transformed into a brand. It will be our responsibility to shift the code to open the political practice to multiple possibilities. We could call this movement, which has already begun, Postporn, Free Fuckware, BodyPunk, OpenGender, FuckYourFather, PentratedState, TotalDrugs, PornTerror, AnalInflation, UnitedUniversalTechnoPriapism . . . This book, a legacy of Agnes’s self-experimentation politics, is a protocol for self-tests carried out with testosterone in gel form, exercises of controlled poisoning on my own body. I am infecting myself with a chemical signifier culturally branded as masculine. Vaccinating yourself with testosterone can be a technique of resistance for bodies that have been assigned the status of cis-females. To acquire a certain political immunity of gender, to get roaring drunk on masculinity, to know that it is possible to look like the hegemonic gender. Little by little, the administration of testosterone has ceased to be a simple political test and has molted into a discipline, an asceticism, a way of restoring my spirit by means of the down growing on my arms, an addiction, a form of gratification, an escape, a prison, a paradise. Hormones are chemical prostheses. Political drugs. In this case, the substance not only modifies the filter through which we decode and recodify the world; it also radically modifies the body and, as a result, the mode under which we are decoded by others. Six months of testosterone, and any cis-female at all, not a should-have-been-boy or a lesbian, but any girl, any neighborhood kid, a Jennifer Lopez or a Rihanna, can become a member of the male species who cannot be told apart from any other member of the hegemonic class. I refuse the medico-political dose, its regime, its regularity, its direction. I demand a virtuosity of gender; to each one, its dose; for each context, its exact requirement. Here, there is no norm, merely a diversity of viable monstrosities. I take testosterone like Walter Benjamin took hashish, Freud cocaine, or Michaux mescaline. And that is not an autobiographical excuse but a radicalization (in the chemical sense of the term) of my theoretical writing. My gender does not belong to my family or to the state or to the pharmaceutical industry. My gender does not belong to feminism or to the lesbian community or to queer theory. Gender must be torn from the macro-discourse and diluted with a good dose of micropolitical hedonist psychedelics. I don’t recognize myself. Not when I’m on T, or when I’m not on T. I’m neither more nor less myself. Contrary to the Lacanian theory of the mirror state, according to which the child’s subjectivity is formed when it recognizes itself for the first time in its specular image, political subjectivity emerges precisely when the subject does not recognize itself in its representation. It is fundamental not to recognize oneself. De-recognition, disidentification is a condition for the emergence of the political as the possibility of transforming reality. The question posed by Deleuze and Guattari in 1972 in Anti-Oedipus remains stuck in our throat: “Why do the masses desire fascism?” It’s not a question here of opposing a politics of representation to a politics of experimentation, but of becoming aware of the fact that the techniques of political representation always entail programs of the somatic production of subjectivity. I’m not opting for any direct action against representation, but for a micropolitics of disidentification, a kind of experimentation that doesn’t have faith in representation as an exteriority that will bring truth or happiness. In order to accomplish the work of therapy for the multitudes that I have begun with these doses of testosterone and with writing, I now need only to convince you, all of you, that you are like me, and not the opposite. I am not going to claim that I’m like you, your equal, or ask you to allow me to participate in your laws or to admit me as a part of your social normality. My ambition is to convince you that you are like me. Tempted by the same chemical abuse. You have it in you: you think that you’re cis-females, but you take the Pill; or you think you’re cis-males, but you take Viagra; you’re normal, and you take Prozac or Paxil in the hope that something will free you from your problems of decreased vitality, and you’ve shot cortisone and cocaine, taken alcohol and Ritalin and codeine . . . You, you as well, you are the monster that testosterone is awakening in me.

<h4>‘Paul Preciado, a testosterone junkie trans terrorist, calls on us to recognize the sexual monster that resides within ourselves. This is not a call to assimilate sex work and sexual deviance within the structures of normality or the law. Rather, it is a call to disidentify – to de-recognize ourselves as subjects of those systems of social and legal representation that criminalize it. We affirm the “legalization” of prostitution that comes with the de-recognition of its criminalization. This disidentification does not ignore our positionality and embodiment. We are aware of the fact our bodies have marked us for many advantages and shape our ways of being in the world. De-recognition is way of de-naturalizing these bodies—not to claim that we are brothel workers or that we share the experiences of black or trans prostitutes—but to recognize that our bodies are also monstrous techno-political constructions. </h4><p><strong>Preciado 13 [</strong>Paul (formerly Beatriz), Prof of Political History of the Body, Gender Theory, and History of Performance at Paris VIII, Testo Junkie, trans. Bruce Benderson, p.394-8]</p><p><u><strong><mark>The cis-males and cis-females</u></strong></mark> (indiscriminately heterosexual or homosexual), <u><strong><mark>as well as transsexuals, who have access to surgical, endocrinological, or legal techniques of the production of identity, are not simple economic classes</mark> in the Marxist sense</u></strong> of the term, <u><strong><mark>but genuine “pharmacopornographic factories”—existing simultaneously as raw materials, producers</u></strong></mark> (but rarely proprietors) <u><strong>of biocodes of gender, <mark>and</mark> pharmacopornographic <mark>consumers. Porn actors; whores; the transgender; genderqueers</mark>; and producers, traffickers, and consumers of illegal drugs inhabit different cultures, but <mark>all are used as living pharmacoporn laboratories. All of them sell, buy, or get access to their biocodes as pharmacopornographic property.</mark> The sudden emergence of new gender statuses is creating a novel type of conflict between owners and managers of the patents of the microtechnologies of subjectification</u></strong> (sex hormones, psychotropic molecules, audiovisual codes, etc.) <u><strong>and the producers and traffickers of these techno-biocodes. The pharmacopornographic entrepreneurs, who are among the contemporary <mark>leaders of global capitalism, are trying to restrict and privatize the biocodes of gender and convert them into rare and naturalized objects</mark> by means of legal and market techniques.</u></strong> Computer hackers use the web and copyleft programs as tools of free and horizontal distribution of information and claim that they should be in reach of everyone. <u><strong>The pharmacopornographic gendercopyleft movement has a technoliving platform</u></strong> that is a lot easier to gain access to than the Internet: <u><strong>the body</u></strong>, the somathèque. <u><strong>Not the naked body, or the body as unchanging nature, but the technoliving body as a biopolitical archive and cultural prosthesis. <mark>Your memory, your desire, your sensibility, your skin, your cock, your dildo, your blood, your sperm, your vulva, your ova . . . are the tools of a potential gendercopyleft revolution.</u></strong></mark> The various producers of sexual biocodes are very different from one another. Some get off on economic and social privileges, such as the models through whose bodies the dominant codes of male and female beauty are produced. Others, such as porn actors or <u><strong><mark>sex workers</u></strong></mark>, suffer from the lack of regulations for the open market of their biocodes. But all of them depend on the pharmacopornographic industry and its local alliances with the police forces of the nation-states. One day, they will all become hackers. Agnes, mother of all the techno-lambs: Del LaGrace Volcano, Kate Bornstein, Jacob Hale, Dean Spade, Mauro Cabral, Susan Stryker, Sandy Stone, King Erik, Moises Martínez— all <u><strong><mark>are master hackers of gender</mark>, genuine traffickers of semiotico-technological flux, <mark>producers and tinkers of copyleft biocodes. </mark>Gender copyleft strategies must be minor but decisive: the survival of life on the planet is at stake.</u></strong> For this movement, <u><strong><mark>there will be no single name that can be transformed into a brand. It will be our responsibility to shift the code to open the political practice to multiple possibilities</mark>.</u></strong> We could call this movement, which has already begun, Postporn, Free Fuckware, BodyPunk, OpenGender, FuckYourFather, PentratedState, TotalDrugs, PornTerror, AnalInflation, UnitedUniversalTechnoPriapism . . . <u><strong>This book</u></strong>, a legacy of Agnes’s self-experimentation politics, <u><strong>is a protocol for self-tests carried out with testosterone in gel form, exercises of controlled poisoning on my own body. I am infecting myself with a chemical signifier culturally branded as masculine. Vaccinating yourself with testosterone can be a technique of resistance for bodies that have been assigned the status of cis-females. </u></strong>To acquire a certain political immunity of gender, to get roaring drunk on masculinity, to know that it is possible to look like the hegemonic gender. Little by little<u><strong>, the administration of testosterone has ceased to be a simple political test and has molted into a discipline, an asceticism, a way of restoring my spirit by means of the down growing on my arms, an addiction, a form of gratification, an escape, a prison, a paradise. Hormones are chemical prostheses. Political drugs.</u></strong> In this case, <u><strong>the substance not only modifies the filter through which we decode and recodify the world; it also radically modifies the body and, as a result, the mode under which we are decoded by others. Six months of testosterone, and any cis-female at all, not a should-have-been-boy or a lesbian, but any girl, any neighborhood kid, a Jennifer Lopez or a Rihanna, can become a member of the male species who cannot be told apart from any other member of the hegemonic class. I refuse the medico-political dose, its regime, its regularity, its direction.</u></strong> I demand a virtuosity of gender; to each one, its dose; for each context, its exact requirement. Here, <u><strong><mark>there is no norm, merely a diversity of viable monstrosities</mark>.</u></strong> I take testosterone like Walter Benjamin took hashish, Freud cocaine, or Michaux mescaline. And that is not an autobiographical excuse but a radicalization (in the chemical sense of the term) of my theoretical writing. <u><strong><mark>My gender does not belong to my family or to the state or to the pharmaceutical industry. My gender does not belong to feminism or to the lesbian community or to queer theory. Gender must be torn from the macro-discourse</mark> and diluted with a good dose of micropolitical hedonist psychedelics.</u></strong> I don’t recognize myself. Not when I’m on T, or when I’m not on T. I’m neither more nor less myself. Contrary to the Lacanian theory of the mirror state, according to which the child’s subjectivity is formed when it recognizes itself for the first time in its specular image, <u><strong><mark>political subjectivity emerges precisely when the subject does not recognize itself in its representation.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>It is fundamental not to recognize oneself.</mark> <mark>De-recognition, disidentification is a condition for the emergence of the political as the possibility of transforming reality.</u></strong></mark> The question posed by Deleuze and Guattari in 1972 in Anti-Oedipus remains stuck in our throat: “Why do the masses desire fascism?” It’s not a question here of opposing a politics of representation to a politics of experimentation, but of becoming aware of the fact that <u><strong><mark>the techniques of political representation always entail programs of the somatic production of subjectivity. I’m</mark> not <mark>opting for</mark> any direct action against representation, but for <mark>a</mark> micro<mark>politics of disidentification, a kind of experimentation that doesn’t have faith in representation</mark> as an exteriority that will bring truth or happiness. <mark>In order to accomplish the work of therapy for the multitudes that I have begun with these doses of testosterone and with writing, I now need only to convince you, all of you, that you are like me, and not the opposite. I am not going to claim that I’m like you, your equal, or ask you to allow me to participate in your laws or to admit me as a part of your social normality. My ambition is to convince you that you are like me. Tempted by the same chemical abuse. You have it in you: you think that you’re cis-females, but you take the Pill; or you think you’re cis-males, but you take Viagra; you’re normal, and you take Prozac or Paxil in the hope that something will free you from your problems of decreased vitality, and you’ve shot cortisone and cocaine, taken alcohol and Ritalin and codeine . . . You, you as well, you are the monster that testosterone is awakening in me.</p></u></strong></mark>

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Disidentification is a reclamation of our bodies as the sites for the production of sexual affect – experimentation outside of normative modes of representation is the only way to resist self-extinction

Preciado 13

Preciado 13 [Paul (formerly Beatriz), Prof of Political History of the Body, Gender Theory, and History of Performance at Paris VIII, Testo Junkie, trans. Bruce Benderson, p.348-53]

The first principle of a trans-feminism movement capable of facing porno-punk modernity: the fact that your body, the body of the multitude and the pharmacopornographic networks that constitute them are political laboratories, both effects of the process of subjection and control and potential spaces for political agency and critical resistance to normalization. I am pleading here for an array of politics of physical experimentation and semiotechnology that will be regulated by the “principle of the auto-guinea pig.” Before all the existing fragile archives about feminism and black, queer, and trans culture have been reduced to a state of radioactive shades, it is indispensible to transform such minority knowledge into collective experimentation, into physical practice, into ways of life and forms of cohabitation. We are no longer pleading for an understanding of life and history as effects of different discursive regimes. We are pleading to use discursive productions as stakeholders in a wider process of the technical materialization of life that is occurring on the planet. A materialization that each day resembles more and more a total technical destruction of all animal, vegetable, and cultural forms of life and that will end, undoubtedly, in the annihilation of the planet and the self-extinction of most of its species. it will become a matter of finding ways to record a planetary suicide. “If you intend to be a doctor, you must try to become a laboratory animal.”14 In order to transform conventional frameworks of the “cultural intelligibility” of human bodies, it is necessary to evolve toward practices of voluntary autointoxication. it seems urgent today, from the perspective of a trans-feminist project, to use our living bodies as biopolitical platforms to test the pharmacopornopolitical effects of synthetic sex hormones in order to create and demarcate new frameworks of cultural intelligibility for gender and sexual subjects. In an era in which pharmaceutical laboratories and corporations and state medico-legal institutions are controlling and regulating the use of gender and sex biocodes as well as chemical prostheses, it seems anachronistic to speak of practices of political representation without going through performative and biotechnological experiments on sexual subjectivity and gender. We must reclaim the right to participate in the construction of biopolitical fictions. We have the right to demand collective and “common” ownership of the biocodes of gender, sex, and race. We must wrest them from private hands, from technocrats and from the pharmacoporn complex. Such a process of resistance and redistribution could be called technosomatic communism. As a mode of the production of “common” knowledge and political transformation, the auto–guinea pig principle would be critical in the construction of the practices and discourses of trans-feminism and the coming liberation movements of gender, sexual, racial, and somatic-political minorities. it will consist of a positioned, responsible corporal political practice, so that anyone wishing to be a political subject will begin by being the lab rat in her or his own laboratory.

your body, the body of the multitude and the pharmacopornographic networks that constitute them are political laboratories Before all the existing fragile archives about feminism and black, queer, and trans culture have been reduced to a state of radioactive shades, it is indispensible to transform such knowledge into collective experimentation, into physical practice, into ways of life and forms of cohabitation We are pleading to use discursive productions as stakeholders in a wider process of the technical materialization of life that is occurring on the planet. A materialization that each day resembles more and more a total technical destruction of all animal, vegetable, and cultural forms of life and that will end in the annihilation of the planet and the self-extinction of most of its species it will become a matter of finding ways to record a planetary suicide it seems urgent today, from the perspective of a trans-feminist project, to use our living bodies as platforms to test to create and demarcate new frameworks of cultural intelligibility for gender and sexual subjects it seems anachronistic to speak of practices of political representation without going through performative and biotechnological experiments on sexual subjectivity We have the right to demand collective and “common” ownership of the biocodes of gender, sex, and race. We must wrest them from private hands, from technocrats and from the pharmacoporn complex a process of resistance and redistribution could be called technosomatic communism. As a mode of the production of “common” knowledge and political transformation, the auto–guinea pig principle would be critical in the construction of the practices and discourses of trans-feminism and the coming liberation movements of gender, sexual, racial, and somatic-political minorities anyone wishing to be a political subject will begin by being the lab rat in her or his own laboratory

The first principle of a trans-feminism movement capable of facing porno-punk modernity: the fact that your body, the body of the multitude and the pharmacopornographic networks that constitute them are political laboratories, both effects of the process of subjection and control and potential spaces for political agency and critical resistance to normalization. I am pleading here for an array of politics of physical experimentation and semiotechnology that (in the face of the principle of political representation, which dominates our social life and is at the core of political mass movements, which can be as totalitarian as they are democratic) will be regulated by the principle that—in accordance with Peter Sloterdijk’s intuitions—I will call the “principle of the auto-guinea pig.”12 In China, in 213 BC, all books were burned by order of the emperor. In the fifth century, after a series of wars had ransacked and decimated the library at Alexandria, it was accused of harboring pagan teachings contrary to the Christian faith and was destroyed by the decree of Emperor Theodosius. The greatest center of research, translation, and reading disappeared. Between 1330 and 1730, thousands of human bodies were burned during the Inquisition, thousands of books were destroyed, and hundreds of works related to the expertise and production of subjectivity were relegated to oblivion or to the underground. In 1813, American soldiers took York (now Toronto) and burned the parliament and legislative library. A year later, the Library of Congress was razed. In 1933, one of the first actions of the Nazi government was the destruction of the Institut für Sexualwissenschaft (Institute for Sexual Research) in Berlin. Created in 1919 by Magnus Hirschfeld, this center had for years played a role in the research and dissemination of progressive ideas and practices concerning sex and sexuality. Twenty thousand books from the Hirschfeld Institute were burned on May 10, 1933, on Opernplatz on a gigantic pyre whose flashing flames were imprinted on the camera film of Hitler’s reporters. On the night of March 9, 1943, an air raid on a library in Aachen destroyed five hundred thousand books. In 1993, Croatian militia destroyed dozens of libraries (among them, those in Stolac). In 2003, American bombs and Saddam loyalists sacked and destroyed the National Library of Baghdad13 . . . The theorico-political innovations produced during the past forty years by feminism, the black liberation movement, and queer and transgender theory do seem to be lasting acquisitions. However, in the context of global war, this collection of scholarship could be destroyed also, as fast as a microchip melting under intense heat. Before all the existing fragile archives about feminism and black, queer, and trans culture have been reduced to a state of radioactive shades, it is indispensible to transform such minority knowledge into collective experimentation, into physical practice, into ways of life and forms of cohabitation. We are no longer pleading, like our predecessors in the 1970s and 1980s, for an understanding of life and history as effects of different discursive regimes. We are pleading to use discursive productions as stakeholders in a wider process of the technical materialization of life that is occurring on the planet. A materialization that each day resembles more and more a total technical destruction of all animal, vegetable, and cultural forms of life and that will end, undoubtedly, in the annihilation of the planet and the self-extinction of most of its species. Alas, it will become a matter of finding ways to record a planetary suicide. Until the end of the eighteenth century, self-experimentation was still a part of the research protocols of pharmacology. Animal experimentation was not yet called into question, but an ethical precept dictated that the researcher take on the risk of unknown effects on his or her own body before enacting any test on the body of another human. Relying on the rhetoric of objectivity, the subject of scientific learning would progressively attempt to generate knowledge outside him- or herself, to exempt his or her body from the agonies of self-experimentation. In 1790, the physician Samuel Hahnemann self-administered strong daily doses of quinine in order to observe its effects in fighting malaria. His body reacted by developing symptoms that resembled the remittent fever characteristic of malaria. The experiment would serve as the basis for the invention of the homeopathic movement, which, based on the law of similars, maintains that it is possible to treat illness using minute doses of a substance that, in much larger amounts, would provoke the same symptoms of that illness in a healthy body, in the manner of a therapeutic mirror. Peter Sloterdijk, inspired by Hahnemann, will call the process of controlled and intentional poisoning “voluntary auto-intoxication” and will sum it up as follows: “If you intend to be a doctor, you must try to become a laboratory animal.”14 In order to transform conventional frameworks of the “cultural intelligibility”15 of human bodies, it is necessary to evolve toward practices of voluntary autointoxication. From Novalis to Ritter, the romanticism from which Sloterdijk draws his inspiration for a counterproject to modernity will make autoexperimentation the central technique of the self in a dystopian society. Nevertheless, romantic autoexperimentation carries the risk of individualism and depolitization. On the other hand, two of the discourses around which the critique of modern European subjectivity will develop—those of Sigmund Freud and Walter Benjamin—will begin under the form of the invention of new techniques of the self and repertories of practices of voluntary intoxication. But the dominant discourse of disciplinary modernity will brush them aside; the process of institutionalization that both psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt School will experience will go hand in hand with the pathologizing of intoxication and the clinical industrialization of experimentation. “It would be a good thing if a doctor were able to test many more drugs on himself,” declared the young doctor Mikhail Bulgakov in 1914, in “Morphine,” a text in which the protagonist describes the effects of morphine on his own body.16 Likewise, it seems urgent today, from the perspective of a trans-feminist project, to use our living bodies as biopolitical platforms to test the pharmacopornopolitical effects of synthetic sex hormones in order to create and demarcate new frameworks of cultural intelligibility for gender and sexual subjects. In an era in which pharmaceutical laboratories and corporations and state medico-legal institutions are controlling and regulating the use of gender and sex biocodes (the active molecules of progesterone, estrogen, and testosterone) as well as chemical prostheses, it seems anachronistic to speak of practices of political representation without going through performative and biotechnological experiments on sexual subjectivity and gender. We must reclaim the right to participate in the construction of biopolitical fictions. We have the right to demand collective and “common” ownership of the biocodes of gender, sex, and race. We must wrest them from private hands, from technocrats and from the pharmacoporn complex. Such a process of resistance and redistribution could be called technosomatic communism. As a mode of the production of “common” knowledge and political transformation, the auto–guinea pig principle would be critical in the construction of the practices and discourses of trans-feminism and the coming liberation movements of gender, sexual, racial, and somatic-political minorities. To echo Donna J. Haraway’s expression, it will consist of a positioned, responsible corporal political practice, so that anyone wishing to be a political subject will begin by being the lab rat in her or his own laboratory.

<h4>Disidentification is a reclamation of our bodies as the sites for the production of sexual affect – experimentation outside of normative modes of representation is the only way to resist self-extinction</h4><p><strong>Preciado 13 </strong>[Paul (formerly Beatriz), Prof of Political History of the Body, Gender Theory, and History of Performance at Paris VIII, Testo Junkie, trans. Bruce Benderson, p.348-53]</p><p><u><strong>The first principle of a trans-feminism movement capable of facing porno-punk modernity: the fact that <mark>your body, the body of the multitude and the pharmacopornographic networks that constitute them are political laboratories</mark>, both effects of the process of subjection and control and potential spaces for political agency and critical resistance to normalization. I am pleading here for an array of politics of physical experimentation and semiotechnology that</u></strong> (in the face of the principle of political representation, which dominates our social life and is at the core of political mass movements, which can be as totalitarian as they are democratic) <u><strong>will be regulated by the</u></strong> principle that—in accordance with Peter Sloterdijk’s intuitions—I will call the <u><strong>“principle of the auto-guinea pig.”</u></strong>12 In China, in 213 BC, all books were burned by order of the emperor. In the fifth century, after a series of wars had ransacked and decimated the library at Alexandria, it was accused of harboring pagan teachings contrary to the Christian faith and was destroyed by the decree of Emperor Theodosius. The greatest center of research, translation, and reading disappeared. Between 1330 and 1730, thousands of human bodies were burned during the Inquisition, thousands of books were destroyed, and hundreds of works related to the expertise and production of subjectivity were relegated to oblivion or to the underground. In 1813, American soldiers took York (now Toronto) and burned the parliament and legislative library. A year later, the Library of Congress was razed. In 1933, one of the first actions of the Nazi government was the destruction of the Institut für Sexualwissenschaft (Institute for Sexual Research) in Berlin. Created in 1919 by Magnus Hirschfeld, this center had for years played a role in the research and dissemination of progressive ideas and practices concerning sex and sexuality. Twenty thousand books from the Hirschfeld Institute were burned on May 10, 1933, on Opernplatz on a gigantic pyre whose flashing flames were imprinted on the camera film of Hitler’s reporters. On the night of March 9, 1943, an air raid on a library in Aachen destroyed five hundred thousand books. In 1993, Croatian militia destroyed dozens of libraries (among them, those in Stolac). In 2003, American bombs and Saddam loyalists sacked and destroyed the National Library of Baghdad13 . . . The theorico-political innovations produced during the past forty years by feminism, the black liberation movement, and queer and transgender theory do seem to be lasting acquisitions. However, in the context of global war, this collection of scholarship could be destroyed also, as fast as a microchip melting under intense heat. <u><strong><mark>Before all the existing fragile archives about feminism and black, queer, and trans culture have been reduced to a state of radioactive shades, it is indispensible to transform such</mark> minority <mark>knowledge into collective experimentation, into physical practice, into ways of life and forms of cohabitation</mark>. We are no longer pleading</u></strong>, like our predecessors in the 1970s and 1980s, <u><strong>for an understanding of life and history as effects of different discursive regimes. <mark>We are pleading to use discursive productions as stakeholders in a wider process of the technical materialization of life that is occurring on the planet. A materialization that each day resembles more and more a total technical destruction of all animal, vegetable, and cultural forms of life and that will end</mark>, undoubtedly, <mark>in the annihilation of the planet and the self-extinction of most of its species</mark>.</u></strong> Alas, <u><strong><mark>it will become a matter of finding ways to record a planetary suicide</mark>.</u></strong> Until the end of the eighteenth century, self-experimentation was still a part of the research protocols of pharmacology. Animal experimentation was not yet called into question, but an ethical precept dictated that the researcher take on the risk of unknown effects on his or her own body before enacting any test on the body of another human. Relying on the rhetoric of objectivity, the subject of scientific learning would progressively attempt to generate knowledge outside him- or herself, to exempt his or her body from the agonies of self-experimentation. In 1790, the physician Samuel Hahnemann self-administered strong daily doses of quinine in order to observe its effects in fighting malaria. His body reacted by developing symptoms that resembled the remittent fever characteristic of malaria. The experiment would serve as the basis for the invention of the homeopathic movement, which, based on the law of similars, maintains that it is possible to treat illness using minute doses of a substance that, in much larger amounts, would provoke the same symptoms of that illness in a healthy body, in the manner of a therapeutic mirror. Peter Sloterdijk, inspired by Hahnemann, will call the process of controlled and intentional poisoning “voluntary auto-intoxication” and will sum it up as follows: <u><strong>“If you intend to be a doctor, you must try to become a laboratory animal.”14 In order to transform conventional frameworks of the “cultural intelligibility”</u></strong>15 <u><strong>of human bodies, it is necessary to evolve toward practices of voluntary autointoxication.</u></strong> From Novalis to Ritter, the romanticism from which Sloterdijk draws his inspiration for a counterproject to modernity will make autoexperimentation the central technique of the self in a dystopian society. Nevertheless, romantic autoexperimentation carries the risk of individualism and depolitization. On the other hand, two of the discourses around which the critique of modern European subjectivity will develop—those of Sigmund Freud and Walter Benjamin—will begin under the form of the invention of new techniques of the self and repertories of practices of voluntary intoxication. But the dominant discourse of disciplinary modernity will brush them aside; the process of institutionalization that both psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt School will experience will go hand in hand with the pathologizing of intoxication and the clinical industrialization of experimentation. “It would be a good thing if a doctor were able to test many more drugs on himself,” declared the young doctor Mikhail Bulgakov in 1914, in “Morphine,” a text in which the protagonist describes the effects of morphine on his own body.16 Likewise, <u><strong><mark>it seems urgent today, from the perspective of a trans-feminist project, to use our living bodies as</mark> biopolitical <mark>platforms to test</mark> the pharmacopornopolitical effects of synthetic sex hormones in order <mark>to create and demarcate new frameworks of cultural intelligibility for gender and sexual subjects</mark>. In an era in which pharmaceutical laboratories and corporations and state medico-legal institutions are controlling and regulating the use of gender and sex biocodes</u></strong> (the active molecules of progesterone, estrogen, and testosterone) <u><strong>as well as chemical prostheses, <mark>it seems anachronistic to speak of practices of political representation without going through performative and biotechnological experiments on sexual subjectivity </mark>and gender. We must reclaim the right to participate in the construction of biopolitical fictions. <mark>We have the right to demand collective and “common” ownership of the biocodes of gender, sex, and race. We must wrest them from private hands, from technocrats and from the pharmacoporn complex</mark>. Such <mark>a process of resistance and redistribution could be called technosomatic communism. As a mode of the production of “common” knowledge and political transformation, the auto–guinea pig principle would be critical in the construction of the practices and discourses of trans-feminism and the coming liberation movements of gender, sexual, racial, and somatic-political minorities</mark>.</u></strong> To echo Donna J. Haraway’s expression, <u><strong>it will consist of a positioned, responsible corporal political practice, so that <mark>anyone wishing to be a political subject will begin by being the lab rat in her or his own laboratory</mark>.</p></u></strong>

1AC

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Evans, Denney, Weitz

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Nopper 03 (6)The White Anti-Racist Is an Oxymoron: An Open Letter to “White Anti-Racists” By Tamara K.)

white anti-racism, is predicated on an economy of gratitude. …

Additionally, white activism, especially white anti-racism, is predicated on an economy of gratitude. We are supposed to be grateful that a white person is willing to work with non-white people. … Period. Finally, start thinking of what it would mean, in terms of actual structured social arrangements, for whiteness and white identity--even the white antiracist kind (because there really is no redeemable or reformed white identity)--to be destroyed.

Spillers 78 I would make a distinction in this case between "body" and "flesh" and impose that distinction as the central one between captive and liberated subject-positions… Scott 10 , Extravagant Abjection: Blackness Power and Sexuality in the African American Literary Imagination) In Morrison’s “breakfast” tale this corporeality is rendered “passive.” The black man is kneeling; he is a repository for the white man’s seed; he is a mouth, at best he is merely teeth … But it is a figure suggesting that even in the abject there is something with which to work.

I would make a distinction in this case between "body" and "flesh" and impose that distinction as the central one between captive and liberated subject-positions The black man is he is a repository for the white man’s seed; he is a mouth, at best

Spillers 78 (hortense, “mamas baby, papas maybe”) But I would make a distinction in this case between "body" and "flesh" and impose that distinction as the central one between captive and liberated subject-positions…We might concede, at the very least, that sticks and bricks might break our bones, but words will most certainly kill US. Their claim to disidentify is inaccessible and violent to the black body Scott 10 (Darieck, Extravagant Abjection: Blackness Power and Sexuality in the African American Literary Imagination) In Morrison’s “breakfast” tale this corporeality is rendered “passive.” The black man is kneeling; he is a repository for the white man’s seed; he is a mouth, at best (“best” judged in terms of “action” and “power”) he is merely teeth, an orifice dentata.…The image is not justified by these excessive or ancillary meanings; it does not receive the author’s or the reader’s forgiveness. But it is a figure suggesting that even in the abject there is something with which to work. 1NR Perm Answer Although the radicality of queer futurity may be a method to subvert civil society, it subsists on and reifies the denial of black subjectivity. This is an independent disadvantage. Agathangelou 2013 (Anna M. “Neoliberal Geopolitical Order and Value: Queerness as a Speculative Economy and Anti-Blackness as Terror” in International Feminist Journal of Politics vol. 15 no. 4 p. 469-470) The call to protect the queer from Africans by ‘the West’ in Clinton’s speech and the queer from the savage Muslim in the Human Rights Report, then, is a violence that orders the world, constituting competing formations of value in these projects, while sublimating the empire’s ineluctable terrorization of blackness by analogizing (a major strategy of the redistribution of global and sexual power) the suffering of slaves with that of queers, the colonized subjects and queers, the US and Africa. … Mbembe comments: ‘It is in relation to Africa that the notion of absolute "otherness" has been taken farthest’ (Mbembe2001: 2). Africa not only ‘stands out as the supreme receptacle of the West’s obsession with, and circular discourse about, the facts of “absence”, “lack” and“non-being” of identity and difference’ (Mbembe 2001: 4); it has also been consigned:

<h4><u><strong>Nopper 03</u> (6)The White Anti-Racist Is an Oxymoron: An Open Letter to “White Anti-Racists” By Tamara K.)</h4><p></strong>Additionally, white activism, especially <u><strong>white anti-racism, is predicated on an economy of gratitude.</u></strong> We are supposed to be grateful that a white person is willing to work with non-white people. <u><strong>…</u></strong> Period. Finally, start thinking of what it would mean, in terms of actual structured social arrangements, for whiteness and white identity--even the white antiracist kind (because there really is no redeemable or reformed white identity)--to be destroyed.</p><p><u><strong>Spillers 78</u></strong> (hortense, “mamas baby, papas maybe”)</p><p>But <u><strong><mark>I would make a distinction in this case between "body" and "flesh" and impose that distinction as the central one between captive and liberated subject-positions</mark>…</u>We might concede, at the very least, that sticks and bricks might break our bones, but words will most certainly kill US.</p><p>Their claim to disidentify is inaccessible and violent to the black body</p><p><u>Scott 10</u></strong> (Darieck<u><strong>, Extravagant Abjection: Blackness Power and Sexuality in the African American Literary Imagination)</p><p>In Morrison’s “breakfast” tale this corporeality is rendered “passive.” <mark>The black man is</mark> kneeling; <mark>he is a repository for the white man’s seed; he is a mouth, at best</u></strong></mark> (“best” judged in terms of “action” and “power”) <u><strong>he is merely teeth</u></strong>, an orifice dentata.<u><strong>…</u></strong>The image is not justified by these excessive or ancillary meanings; it does not receive the author’s or the reader’s forgiveness. <u><strong>But it is a figure suggesting that even in the abject there is something with which to work. </p><p></u>1NR Perm Answer</p><p>Although the radicality of queer futurity may be a method to subvert civil society, it subsists on and reifies the denial of black subjectivity. This is an independent disadvantage.</p><p>Agathangelou 2013 </strong>(Anna M. “Neoliberal Geopolitical Order and Value: Queerness as a Speculative Economy and Anti-Blackness as Terror” in International Feminist Journal of Politics vol. 15 no. 4 p. 469-470)</p><p>The call to protect the queer from Africans by ‘the West’ in Clinton’s speech and the queer from the savage Muslim in the Human Rights Report, then, is a violence that orders the world, constituting competing formations of value in these projects, while sublimating the empire’s ineluctable terrorization of blackness by analogizing (a major strategy of the redistribution of global and sexual power) the suffering of slaves with that of queers, the colonized subjects and queers, the US and Africa. …</p><p>Mbembe comments: ‘It is in relation to Africa that the notion of absolute "otherness" has been taken farthest’ (Mbembe2001: 2). Africa not only ‘stands out as the supreme receptacle of the West’s obsession with, and circular discourse about, the facts of “absence”, “lack” and“non-being” of identity and difference’ (Mbembe 2001: 4); it has also been consigned:</p>

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Cheek, Denney, Poapst

1AC was an argument about queering and flipping the codes of criminality that are imposed on queer bodies

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The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs from those living in the United States, with payment in vouchers with a cash value set at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network.

<h4><strong>The United States Federal Government should amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit regulated sale of human organs. A government agency should be established to purchase organs from those living in the United States, with payment in vouchers with a cash value set at an adjusted market-clearing price. Organs should be placed in the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network.</h4></strong>

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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The ban on organ sales has created a large and growing shortage

Williams 14

Williams 14 Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver

Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the U S Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number requiring organs is likely higher This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains

many die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs more than 122,000 are waitlisted Due to other barriers actual number of requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap continues to widen. NOTA) prohibits valuable consideration in exchange for organs for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite these , a severe organ shortage remains

Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514 Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs.1 Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the United States.2 Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number of Americans requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen.4 The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains.

<h4>The ban on organ sales has created a large and growing shortage</h4><p><strong>Williams 14</strong> Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver </p><p>Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514</p><p><u>Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, <mark>many</mark> individuals <mark>die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs</u></mark>.1 <u>Currently, <mark>more than</mark> <mark>122,000 </mark>individuals <mark>are waitlisted</mark> for organs in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.2 <u><mark>Due to</mark> financial and <mark>other barriers</mark> to becoming waitlisted, the <mark>actual number </u>of</mark> Americans <u><mark>requiring organs is</mark> <mark>likely higher</u>.3</mark> <u><mark>This gap</mark> between available organs and the need for organs <mark>continues to widen</u>.</mark>4 <u>The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, </u>and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 <u>The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The</u> National Organ Transplantation Act <u>(<mark>NOTA) prohibits</mark> the receipt of any form of <mark>valuable consideration in exchange for organs</mark> to be used <mark>for transplantation</u></mark>.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, <u><mark>other methods have been</mark> <mark>employed in attempts to increase donations</u>.9 <u>Despite</mark> the implementation of <mark>these</mark> strategies<mark>, a severe organ shortage remains</u></mark>.</p>

Contention 1 – Shortage

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination

Beard 8

Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy

the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote At least seven such actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES ORGAN DONOR CARDS incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. REQUIRED REQUEST Some federal legislation requiring all hospitals to request organ donation REQUIRED REFERRAL additional legislation to refer potential organ donors COLLABORATION the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS Finally, i legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct costs incurred by onors We must conclude that none of the policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. . Rather, every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage

transplant industry adopted policy options designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, maintain the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remo seven actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES ORGAN DONOR CARDS REQUIRED REQUEST REQUIRED REFERRAL OLLABORATION Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative KIDNEY EXCHANGES REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS none of the policies resolve the transplant shortage it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage.

http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote. At least seven such actions have been implemented over the last two decades or so: ■ INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards. ■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, federal legislation was passed in 1987 requiring all hospitals receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) to request organ donation in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, additional legislation was passed that requires hospitals to refer potential organ donors to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been the so-called “Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS Finally, in another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct (explicit) costs incurred by such donors (e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. We must conclude that none of the above-listed policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount. Rather, our concern is that every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage.

<h4>voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination </h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p> Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, <u>the <mark>transplant industry</mark> has examined and <mark>adopted</mark> a series of <mark>policy options</mark> ostensibly <mark>designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these,</mark> however, continue to <mark>maintain the</mark> basic zero-price property of the <mark>altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remo</mark>te</u>. <u>At least <mark>seven</mark> such <mark>actions have been</mark> <mark>implemented</u></mark> over the last two decades or so: ■ <u><mark>INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES</u></mark> In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ <u><mark>ORGAN DONOR CARDS</u></mark> A related activity has been the process of <u>incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses.</u> The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards.<u> </u>■ <u><mark>REQUIRED REQUEST</mark> Some</u> survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, <u>federal legislation</u> was passed in 1987 <u>requiring all hospitals</u> receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) <u>to request organ donation</u> in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ <u><mark>REQUIRED REFERRAL</u></mark> While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, <u>additional legislation</u> was passed that requires hospitals<u> to refer potential organ donors </u>to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ <u>C<mark>OLLABORATION</mark> </u>A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been <u>the </u>so-called “<u><mark>Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative</mark>,” </u>which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. <u>■ <mark>KIDNEY</mark> <mark>EXCHANGES</u></mark> Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ <u><mark>REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS</u></mark> <u>Finally, i</u>n another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed <u>legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct </u>(explicit) <u>costs incurred by</u> such d<u>onors </u>(e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. <u>We must conclude that <mark>none of the</u></mark> above-listed <u><mark>policies</mark> should be expected to <mark>resolve the transplant</mark> organ <mark>shortage</mark>.</u> We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount<u>. Rather,</u> our concern is that <u>every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, <mark>it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage</u>.</p></mark>

Contention 1 – Shortage

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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The shortage means many die

Beard 8

Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy

our failure to adapt our organ procurement policy suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists We run the forecasts out 10 years a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.

failure to adapt organ procurement suggests more than 80,000 lives have been sacrificed of our so-called “altruistic” system the pain and suffering of those forced to wait unemployment, and declining health must be reckoned Nonetheless, the death imposed pales in comparison to what lies ahead if change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.

http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of our failure to adapt our cadaveric organ procurement policy to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists for each of our sample periods. We run the forecasts out 10 years from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage. Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.

<h4>The shortage means many die</h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of <u>our <mark>failure to adapt</mark> our</u> cadaveric <u><mark>organ</mark> <mark>procurement</mark> policy</u> to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, <u><mark>suggests</mark> that <mark>more than 80,000 lives have</mark> now <mark>been sacrificed</mark> on the altar <mark>of our so-called “altruistic” system</mark>. In addition, <mark>the</mark> unnecessary <mark>pain and</mark> <mark>suffering of those</mark> who have been <mark>forced to wait</mark> while undergoing dialysis, <mark>unemployment, and declining health must</mark> also <mark>be reckoned</mark> along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. <mark>Nonetheless, the</mark> pain, suffering, and <mark>death imposed</mark> on the innocents thus far <mark>pales in comparison to what lies ahead if</mark> more fundamental <mark>change is not forthcoming</u></mark>. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, <u><mark>we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists</u></mark> for each of our sample periods. <u>We run the forecasts out 10 years</u> from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, <u>a cumulative total of <mark>196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015</mark> <mark>as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.</u></mark> Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.</p>

Contention 1 – Shortage

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvAh/Dartmouth-Avendano-Ahmad-Aff-Binghamton-Round2.docx

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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cadavers cant solve

Fry-Revere 14

Fry-Revere 14 Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014

The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 6 Today the number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital. no matter how the process for retrieving organs from the dead improves, there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand.

number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand

The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 6 At the time, what Congress did seemed reasonable, but over the following three decades, no matter how efficient the U.S. cadaver organ procurement sys- tem became, it could not satisfy the demand. Medical innovations keep people alive longer, and the ever-growing diabetes and hypertension epidemics contin- ually increased the number of people who could benefit from a kidney transplant. Today the number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital. Patients who die in the hospital after a car accident or similar trauma are the best potential organ donors because the appropriate medical equip- ment is at hand to switch gears from saving the patient to preserving organs for transplantation. Nevertheless, given what we know now, no matter how the process for retrieving organs from the dead improves, there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand.

<h4>cadavers cant solve </h4><p><strong>Fry-Revere 14</strong> Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014 </p><p><u>The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 6</p><p></u>At the time, what Congress did seemed reasonable, but over the following three decades, no matter how efficient the U.S. cadaver organ procurement sys- tem became, it could not satisfy the demand. Medical innovations keep people alive longer, and the ever-growing diabetes and hypertension epidemics contin- ually increased the number of people who could benefit from a kidney transplant. <u>Today the <mark>number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital</mark>.</u> Patients who die in the hospital after a car accident or similar trauma are the best potential organ donors because the appropriate medical equip- ment is at hand to switch gears from saving the patient to preserving organs<u> </u>for transplantation. Nevertheless, given what we know now,<u> no matter how the process for retrieving organs from the dead improves, <mark>there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand</mark>.</p></u>

Contention 1 – Shortage

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artificial organs are infeasible and decades away

Adhikari 14

Adhikari 14 Richard Adhikari has written about high-tech for leading industry publications since the 1990s

http://www.technewsworld.com/story/80198.html According to Jordan Miller at Rice "Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away from reaching human patients," . "We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs." A 3D structure will require nearly 1 billion functioning cells to approximate the function of a liver or kidney, and "there are dozens of cell types in these organs," . "We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure."

According t Jordan Miller, at Rice Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs there are dozens of cell types in these organs We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure

03/26/14 Bioprinting, Part 1: The Promise and the Pitfalls http://www.technewsworld.com/story/80198.html [According to Jordan Miller, assistant professor of bioengineering at Rice University]. "Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away from reaching human patients," Miller said. "We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs." A 3D structure will require nearly 1 billion functioning cells to approximate the function of a liver or kidney, and "there are dozens of cell types in these organs," Miller pointed out. "We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure." NOTE SOURCE WITH QUALS EDITED INTO BEGINNING OF CARD

<h4>artificial organs are infeasible and decades away</h4><p><strong>Adhikari 14</strong> Richard Adhikari has written about high-tech for leading industry publications since the 1990s </p><p>03/26/14 Bioprinting, Part 1: The Promise and the Pitfalls <u>http://www.technewsworld.com/story/80198.html</p><p></u>[<u><mark>According t</mark>o <mark>Jordan Miller</u>,</mark> assistant professor of bioengineering <u><mark>at Rice</u></mark> University]. <u>"<mark>Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away </mark>from reaching human patients," </u>Miller said<u>. "<mark>We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs</mark>." A 3D structure will require nearly 1 billion functioning cells to approximate the function of a liver or kidney, and "<mark>there are dozens of cell types in these organs</mark>," </u>Miller pointed out<u>. "<mark>We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure</mark>."</p><p></u>NOTE SOURCE WITH QUALS EDITED INTO BEGINNING OF CARD</p>

Contention 1 – Shortage

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Artificial are too expensive

Gopar 14

Gopar 14 Jennifer Julisa Gopar ans Dr. Rance LeFebvre 28 July 2014 COSMOS Cluster 7: Biomedical Sciences The Moral and Ethical Debate Regarding Artificial Organ Growth http://cosmos.ucdavis.edu/archives/2014/Cluster7/Gopar_Jennifer_EthicsofGrowingOrgans.pdf

The Scientist elaborated on this possible problem, stating Platt thinks that organ engineering is too costly to meet the needs of everyone waiting for a transplant. ‘You’d have to turn over the entire GDP of a country to accomplish that,’ he says. So it is still unclear whether the cost of these artificial organs will allow them to be within the reach of patients in need of an organ transplant.

organ engineering is too costly to meet the needs of everyone waiting for a transplant. ‘You’d have to turn over the entire GDP of a country to accomplish that,’ it is unclear whether the cost of these artificial organs will allow them to be within the reach of patients in need of an organ transplant.

With these possible outcomes taken consideration, it is now becoming clear that money will play an important role in artificial organ growth. If we begin producing artificial organs, will these be available to everyone? Or will these be only available to the wealthy? The whole purpose of artificial organ growth is to give hope to those waiting for an organ transplant. How would this fulfill that purpose if only the wealthy will be able to afford it? The Scientist elaborated on this possible problem, stating, “[Jeffrey] Platt thinks that organ engineering is too costly to meet the needs of everyone waiting for a transplant. ‘You’d have to turn over the entire GDP of a country to accomplish that,’ he says. On the other hand, ‘I could get a pig for a couple of hundred dollars.’ But [Paolo] Macchiarini argues that organ engineering is in its infancy, and every advance improves efficiency and lowers cost. ‘What we did in 2008 in 6 months, we can now do in a few weeks,’ he says. ‘We do care about getting this to every patient.’ [Joseph] Vacanti adds that mass-producing artificial scaffolds will make organ engineering even more cost-effective. ‘When you scale them up, the bulk materials and manufacturing tech are extremely cheap,’ he says. ‘I think it’s going to be cheaper than growing lots of pigs.’” So it is still unclear whether the cost of these artificial organs will allow them to be within the reach of patients in need of an organ transplant.

<h4>Artificial are too expensive</h4><p><strong>Gopar 14</strong> Jennifer Julisa Gopar ans Dr. Rance LeFebvre 28 July 2014 COSMOS Cluster 7: Biomedical Sciences The Moral and Ethical Debate Regarding Artificial Organ Growth</p><p><u>http://cosmos.ucdavis.edu/archives/2014/Cluster7/Gopar_Jennifer_EthicsofGrowingOrgans.pdf</p><p></u>With these possible outcomes taken consideration, it is now becoming clear that money will play an important role in artificial organ growth. If we begin producing artificial organs, will these be available to everyone? Or will these be only available to the wealthy? The whole purpose of artificial organ growth is to give hope to those waiting for an organ transplant. How would this fulfill that purpose if only the wealthy will be able to afford it? <u>The Scientist elaborated on this possible problem, stating</u>, “[Jeffrey] <u>Platt thinks that <mark>organ engineering is too</u> <u>costly to meet the needs of everyone waiting for a transplant. ‘You’d have to turn over <strong>the entire GDP of a country</strong> to accomplish that,’</mark> he says.</u> On the other hand, ‘I could get a pig for a couple of hundred dollars.’ But [Paolo] Macchiarini argues that organ engineering is in its infancy, and every advance improves efficiency and lowers cost. ‘What we did in 2008 in 6 months, we can now do in a few weeks,’ he says. ‘We do care about getting this to every patient.’ [Joseph] Vacanti adds that mass-producing artificial scaffolds will make organ engineering even more cost-effective. ‘When you scale them up, the bulk materials and manufacturing tech are extremely cheap,’ he says. ‘I think it’s going to be cheaper than growing lots of pigs.’” <u>So <mark>it is</mark> still <mark>unclear whether the cost of these artificial <strong>organs will allow them to be within the reach of patients in need of an organ transplant.</p></u></strong></mark>

Contention 1 – Shortage

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Binghamton

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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sales solve – default to studies

Kaserman, 7

Kaserman, 7 Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.

Proposals to resolve the organ shortage through the use of financial incentives have surfaced repeatedly over the years Importantly, every economist that has written on this subject has reached the same conclusion - i.e., that the shortage is caused by the zero price policy and that the straightforward cure, therefore, is the elimination of that policy.

over the years every economist that has written on this subject has reached the same conclusion - i.e., that the shortage is caused by the zero price policy and that the straightforward cure, therefore, is the elimination of that polic

Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis Financial Incentives Proposals to resolve the organ shortage through the use of financial incentives (or, similarly, through the formation of cadaveric organ procurement markets) have surfaced repeatedly over the years. n56 Importantly, every economist that has written on this subject has reached the same conclusion - i.e., that the shortage is caused by the zero price policy and that the straightforward cure, therefore, is the elimination of that policy. Other, non-economist commentators have reached that same conclusion as well.

<h4>sales solve – default to studies</h4><p><strong>Kaserman, 7</strong> Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University. </p><p>Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis</p><p>Financial Incentives <u>Proposals to resolve the organ shortage through the use of financial incentives</u> (or, similarly, through the formation of cadaveric organ procurement markets) <u>have surfaced repeatedly <mark>over the years</u></mark>. n56 <u>Importantly, <mark>every economist that has written on this subject has reached the same conclusion - i.e., that the shortage is caused by the zero price policy and that the straightforward cure, therefore, is the elimination of that polic</mark>y. </u>Other, non-economist commentators have reached that same conclusion as well.</p>

Contention 1 – Shortage

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Binghamton

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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no crowd out – only real neg study is wrong

Economist 11

Economist 11 The Economist Feb 16th 2011 Blood, not money http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2011/02/volunteering_and_profiteering

In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy" Titmuss compared the voluntary British system with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses, he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited

In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift Titmuss compared the voluntary British system with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses, he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited

Blood donors are also unpaid, in Britain and elsewhere. A debate over whether or not they should be compensated for their efforts has raged for at least four decades. In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy" Richard Titmuss compared the voluntary British system favourably with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses, and led eventually to a contaminated product. Although he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited, Americans mostly no longer receive payment for giving blood. Too many people in poor health lied about their medical histories in order to make a few bucks, endangering those who were to receive the blood. As the World Health Organisation notes, people who give blood voluntarily and for altruistic reasons have a lower prevalence of HIV, hepatitis viruses and other blood-borne infections than do those who seek monetary reward. Presumably that is because being rich is a great protection against disease.

<h4>no crowd out – only real neg study is wrong</h4><p><strong>Economist 11</strong> The Economist Feb 16th 2011 Blood, not money</p><p>http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2011/02/volunteering_and_profiteering</p><p>Blood donors are also unpaid, in Britain and elsewhere. A debate over whether or not they should be compensated for their efforts has raged for at least four decades. <u><mark>In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift</mark> Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy"</u> Richard <u><mark>Titmuss compared the voluntary British</u> <u>system</u></mark> favourably <u><mark>with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses,</u></mark> and led eventually to a contaminated product. Although <u><mark>he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited</u></mark>, Americans mostly no longer receive payment for giving blood. Too many people in poor health lied about their medical histories in order to make a few bucks, endangering those who were to receive the blood. As the World Health Organisation notes, people who give blood voluntarily and for altruistic reasons have a lower prevalence of HIV, hepatitis viruses and other blood-borne infections than do those who seek monetary reward. Presumably that is because being rich is a great protection against disease.</p>

Contention 1 – Shortage

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Binghamton

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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no crowd out - friends and family will still donate

Gill 2

Gill 2 Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45

In the early 1970s, Titmuss and Singer argued that the existence of financial incentives for blood products would decrease the amount of blood products overall, and some people might believe that the same argument can be extended to financial incentives for kidneys, first the available evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood products has reduced blood supply in the U S secondly, because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate.

first o the available evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood products has reduced blood supply in the U St secondly, because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate.

Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html 3. In the early 1970s, Titmuss (1971) and Singer (1973) argued that the existence of financial incentives for blood products would decrease the amount of blood products overall, and some people might believe that the same argument can be extended to financial incentives for kidneys, leading to the conclusion that payment for kidneys will decrease the overall number of kidneys available for transplant. Singer and Titmuss's criticisms of payment for blood products are consequentialist—they argue that such payment is wrong because it would reduce the amount of blood for people who needed it. We believe, first of all, that their consequentialist arguments against payment for blood products have turned out to be inconclusive at best—that the available evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood products has reduced blood supply in the United States. And we believe, secondly, that because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate. We do, however, remain open to the possibility that future evidence may vitiate our belief that payment for kidneys will increase supplies. For discussion of Titmuss and Singer in relation to kidney sales, see Campbell (1992, pp. 41-42); Cherry (2000, pp. 340-41); and Harvey (1999, p. 119).

<h4>no crowd out - friends and family will still donate</h4><p><strong>Gill 2</strong> Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45</p><p>Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html</p><p>3. <u>In the early 1970s, Titmuss</u> (1971) <u>and Singer</u> (1973) <u>argued that the existence of financial incentives for blood products would decrease the amount of blood products overall, and some people might believe that the same argument can be extended to financial incentives for kidneys,</u> leading to the conclusion that payment for kidneys will decrease the overall number of kidneys available for transplant. Singer and Titmuss's criticisms of payment for blood products are consequentialist—they argue that such payment is wrong because it would reduce the amount of blood for people who needed it. We believe, <u><mark>first </u>o</mark>f all, that their consequentialist arguments against payment for blood products have turned out to be inconclusive at best—that <u><mark>the available evidence does not support the conclusion that payment for blood products has reduced blood supply in the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u>t</mark>ates. And we believe, <u><mark>secondly,</mark> </u>that<u> <mark>because live kidney donations are usually between family members, there is a significant difference between blood and kidneys that makes it illegitimate to transfer Titmuss and Singer's conclusions to the kidney debate.</u></mark> We do, however, remain open to the possibility that future evidence may vitiate our belief that payment for kidneys will increase supplies. For discussion of Titmuss and Singer in relation to kidney sales, see Campbell (1992, pp. 41-42); Cherry (2000, pp. 340-41); and Harvey (1999, p. 119). </p>

Contention 1 – Shortage

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvAh/Dartmouth-Avendano-Ahmad-Aff-Binghamton-Round2.docx

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Binghamton

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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even with crowd out - Sales would solve the shortage. Study by Becker and Elias 14

Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina. Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.

Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths The most effective change would be to provide compensation we recommend a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment would increase the supply by a large percentage, without increasing the total cost very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney Iran permits the sale by living donors waiting times have been eliminated Since the number uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o there would no longer be any significant waiting time deaths due to long waits for a transplant would disappear the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag isn't consistent with supply of other parts of the body for medical use.

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change, we believe, would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap. In particular, sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. Paying for organs would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.

<h4>even with crowd out - Sales would solve the shortage<strong>. Study by Becker and Elias 14 </h4><p></strong> Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina. Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs</p><p><u>http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth</p><p><mark>Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths</mark>, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. <mark>The most effective change</u></mark>, we believe, <u><mark>would be to provide</mark> <mark>compensation</mark> to people who give their organs—that is, <mark>we recommend</mark> establishing <mark>a market for organs.</mark> </u>Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. <u><mark>Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap</u></mark>. In particular, <u><mark>sufficient</mark> <mark>payment</mark> to kidney donors <mark>would increase the supply</mark> of kidneys <mark>by a large percentage,</mark> <mark>without</mark> greatly <mark>increasing the total cost</mark> of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. </u>These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. <u>Our conclusion is that a <mark>very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney</mark>.</u> That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but <u><mark>Iran permits the sale</mark> of kidneys <mark>by living donors</mark>.</u> Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that <u><mark>waiting times</mark> to get kidneys <mark>have</mark> <mark>been</mark> largely <mark>eliminated</u></mark>. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. <u><mark>Since the number</mark> of kidneys available at a reasonable price wo<mark>uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o</mark>f kidneys, <mark>there would no longer be any significant waiting time </mark>to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and <mark>deaths due to long waits for a transplant</mark> <mark>would</mark> essentially <mark>disappear</mark>. </u>Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But <u><mark>the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag</mark>e of organs <mark>isn't consistent with</mark> what we know about the <mark>supply of other parts of the body for medical use.</u></mark> For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. <u>Paying for organs </u>would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it <u>would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.</p></u>

Contention 1 – Shortage

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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Market-clearing price specifically solves the shortage

Watkins 5

Watkins 5 Christy M. Watkins, University of Tulsa Journal of International and Comparative Law Spring, 2005 5 JICL 1 ARTICLE: A Deadly Dilemma: The Failure of Nations' Organ Procurement Systems and Potential Reform Alternatives n1 lexis

the organ supplier (potential donor or his or her surviving relatives) would be offered a market-determined price, which would fluctuate depending on supply and demand. Price flexibility would eliminate surpluses or shortages automatically.

the organ supplier (potential donor or his or her surviving relatives) would be offered a market-determined price, which would fluctuate depending on supply and demand Price flexibility would eliminate shortages automatically. n

2. The Market Process A minimum of five groups would be seriously affected by an organ market: (1) current and potential transplant candidates; (2) actual and potential organ donors and their families; (3) hospitals, physicians, and other transplant caregivers; (4) The United Network for Organ Sharing, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, and other organ procurement [*27] organizations; and (5) taxpayers and those who finance patient care. n214 First, the organ supplier (potential donor or his or her surviving relatives) would be offered a market-determined price, which would fluctuate depending on supply and demand. n215 Price flexibility would eliminate surpluses or shortages automatically. n216 Organ procurement firms would then remove the organs at death and sell them to transplant centers that have put in an organ order. n217 In turn, the centers would include the price paid to the firm in the operation bill, with the resale price being the price paid to the donor plus the firm's collection and distribution cost. n218 From here, the center could allocate the organs in "precisely the same fashion they are allocated today" under the guidelines of the UNOS. n219 The firms acquiring the organs for sale would presumably operate competitively on a for-profit basis, resulting in powerful market incentives to create and use the best strategies in finding potential donors and encouraging them to donate. n220 Procurement agencies currently operate on a nonprofit basis, and while they may work diligently, it is doubtful they could match the performance of the competitive for-profit firms. n221

<h4>Market-clearing price specifically solves the shortage</h4><p><strong>Watkins 5</strong> Christy M. Watkins, University of Tulsa Journal of International and Comparative Law Spring, 2005 5 JICL 1 ARTICLE: A Deadly Dilemma: The Failure of Nations' Organ Procurement Systems and Potential Reform Alternatives n1 lexis</p><p>2. The Market Process</p><p>A minimum of five groups would be seriously affected by an organ market: (1) current and potential transplant candidates; (2) actual and potential organ donors and their families; (3) hospitals, physicians, and other transplant caregivers; (4) The United Network for Organ Sharing, the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, and other organ procurement [*27] organizations; and (5) taxpayers and those who finance patient care. n214 First, <u><mark>the organ supplier (potential donor or his or her surviving relatives) would be offered a market-determined price, which would fluctuate depending on supply and demand</mark>. </u> n215 <u><mark>Price flexibility would eliminate</mark> surpluses or <mark>shortages automatically. </u> n</mark>216 Organ procurement firms would then remove the organs at death and sell them to transplant centers that have put in an organ order. n217 In turn, the centers would include the price paid to the firm in the operation bill, with the resale price being the price paid to the donor plus the firm's collection and distribution cost. n218 From here, the center could allocate the organs in "precisely the same fashion they are allocated today" under the guidelines of the UNOS. n219 The firms acquiring the organs for sale would presumably operate competitively on a for-profit basis, resulting in powerful market incentives to create and use the best strategies in finding potential donors and encouraging them to donate. n220 Procurement agencies currently operate on a nonprofit basis, and while they may work diligently, it is doubtful they could match the performance of the competitive for-profit firms. n221</p>

Contention 1 – Shortage

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Binghamton

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market

Hughes 9

Hughes 9 J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.

U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid

A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. banning organ sales. illegality of the trade is insufficient to discourage many faced with the possibility of dying on an waiting list transplant tourism" has become its own industry S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, under don't ask, don't tell" policy The lack of regulated organ marketplace in the U.S resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world .S. policy have produced immoral and unethical consequences

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351 Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global black market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales. n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid. n92

<h4>The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market</h4><p><strong>Hughes 9</strong> J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.</p><p>Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351</p><p>Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models</p><p><u>U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. <mark>A</mark> <mark>thriving global</u></mark> black <u><mark>market in human organs has resulted from U.S.</mark> policy <mark>banning organ sales</u>.</mark> n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 <u>The <mark>illegality of the</mark> organ <mark>trade is insufficient to</mark> <mark>discourage many </mark>of those <mark>faced with the possibility of dying on an</mark> organ <mark>waiting list</mark>, and "<mark>transplant tourism" has become its own industry</mark>.</u> n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 <u>U.<mark>S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too,</mark> often <mark>under</mark> hospitals' "<mark>don't ask, don't tell" policy</mark> regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related</u>. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 <u><mark>The lack of</mark> a <mark>regulated organ marketplace in the U.S</mark>. has <mark>resulted in</mark> <mark>exploitation of the poor throughout the world</mark>.</u> n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 <u>In short, U<mark>.S. policy</mark> and its ban on organ sales <mark>have produced</mark> some of the same <mark>immoral and unethical consequences</mark> the ban was designed to avoid</u>. n92</p>

Contention 2 Worldwide transplants will be better

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvAh/Dartmouth-Avendano-Ahmad-Aff-Binghamton-Round2.docx

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Binghamton

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.

Jaycox 12

Jaycox 12 Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College, Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION

Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:

Moazam found almost all organ vendors were in significant debt at the time they sold their kidneys Although vendors were promised by brokers 160,000 rupees the amount received was 103,000 rupees a majority were either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady majority expressed regret because they were not freed from their debts sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority (17) of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them: In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.

<h4>Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.</h4><p><strong>Jaycox 12</strong> Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,</p><p>Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION</p><p>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf</p><p><u>Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat <mark>Moazam</mark> offers the results of a recent study </u>in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 <u>He <mark>found</mark> that <mark>almost all </mark>of these <mark>organ vendors were in significant debt</mark> to wealthy landlords <mark>at the time they sold their kidneys</mark>;</u> the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. <u><mark>Although</mark> the <mark>vendors were promised by</mark> third-party <mark>brokers </mark>an average price of <mark>160,000 rupees</mark> per kidney, <mark>the amount</mark> actually <mark>received</mark> by the vendors <mark>was</mark> an average of <mark>103,000 rupees</mark>. As a result, <mark>a majority</mark> </u>(17) <u>of them <mark>were</mark> ‘<mark>either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’</mark> </u>at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, <u>a majority of the <mark>vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady</mark> as a result of their nephrectomies, and a <mark>majority</mark> also <mark>expressed regret</mark> or shame for their decision <mark>because they were not freed from their debts</mark> and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act.</u> When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and<u> </u>ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,<u><strong>Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the <mark>sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:</strong></mark> </u>In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.</p>

Contention 2 Worldwide transplants will be better

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Binghamton

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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For many, the coercion is more violent

Bowden 13

Bowden 13 Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis

Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades Imagine living in a poor country As you walk peacefully you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live , there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem.

Organ trafficking depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given Your body is then dumped you are extremely lucky if you live. on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking

[*452] Introduction [*452] Introduction Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades. n1 Imagine living in a poor country, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. As you walk peacefully to your home at the end of the day, you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live. Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However, there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10

<h4>For many, the coercion is more violent</h4><p><strong>Bowden 13</strong> Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis</p><p> [*452] Introduction</p><p>[*452] Introduction <u><mark>Organ trafficking</mark> has been <mark>depriving innocent people of their</mark> <mark>fundamental right to life</mark> for decades</u>. n1 <u>Imagine living in a poor country</u>, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. <u>As you walk peacefully</u> to your home at the end of the day, <u><mark>you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck</mark>. </u>n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as <u><mark>a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney</u></mark>. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, <u><mark>no anesthesia is administered and no medication</mark> <mark>is given</mark> to prevent infection</u>. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. <u><mark>Your body is then dumped</mark> on a side street, and <mark>you are extremely lucky if you live</u>.</mark> Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However<u>, there are reported accounts suggesting that abducti<mark>on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking</mark>.</u> n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 <u>Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. </u>n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10</p><p> </p>

Contention 2 Worldwide transplants will be better

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvAh/Dartmouth-Avendano-Ahmad-Aff-Binghamton-Round2.docx

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Binghamton

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JMU CH

Poapst

organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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And that market is widespread and expanding—desperation and profit ensures expansion and exploitation

Samadi 2012

Samadi 2012 – Vice Chairman of the Department of Urology and Chief of Robotics and Minimally Invasive Surgery at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (David, May 30, 2012, “Consequences of the rise in illegal organ trafficking,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/05/30/consequences-rise-in-illegal-organ-trafficking/,)

the WHO released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. Unfortunately the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives with patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs In the majority of situations, those selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations In countries like Pakistan, China or India a person can sell a kidney for $5,000 while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit Prior reports demonstrated that the recipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower statistics might underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable

WHO) released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market , in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives, hose selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations. ipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally. the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower

Earlier this week, the World Health Organization (WHO) released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market. According to the paper, in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. Organ transplantation is a necessary treatment for many individuals whose organs have failed and has been in practice in the United States since the 1950s. In the U.S. organ donations are regulated by an independent non-for-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Organs are given to those whose need is the greatest, regardless of wealth or position. Unfortunately, the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply. As of March 2012 over 113,115 patients are currently waiting for an organ to become available. An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation, and the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives, with patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney. According to the WHO report, 76 percent of organs sold were kidneys, reflecting the growing demand secondary to complications of high blood pressure and diabetes. There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs. In the majority of situations, those selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations. In countries like Pakistan, China or India, a person can sell a kidney for $5,000, while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit. Prior reports have also demonstrated that the recipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally. A recent meta-analysis involving 39 original publications revealed that those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV. Furthermore the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower. These statistics might even underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias; those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies. Additionally, given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams. In 2010, a former psychiatrist was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison for offering false promises of organ transplants in the Philippines, while taking over $400,000 dollars from patients. Over five patients actually travelled to the Philippines only to find out that there was no organ awaiting them. One of these patients died in the Philippines. Regretfully, the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable

<h4>And that market is <u>widespread and expanding</u>—desperation and profit ensures expansion and exploitation</h4><p><strong>Samadi 2012</strong> – Vice Chairman of the Department of Urology and Chief of Robotics and Minimally Invasive Surgery at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (David, May 30, 2012, “Consequences of the rise in illegal organ trafficking,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/05/30/consequences-rise-in-illegal-organ-trafficking/,)</p><p>Earlier this week, <u>the</u> World Health Organization (<u><mark>WHO</u>) <u>released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market</u></mark>. According to the paper<mark>, <u>in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour.</mark> </u>Organ transplantation is a necessary treatment for many individuals whose organs have failed and has been in practice in the United States since the 1950s. In the U.S. organ donations are regulated by an independent non-for-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Organs are given to those whose need is the greatest, regardless of wealth or position. <u>Unfortunately</u>, <u>the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply</u>. As of March 2012 over 113,115 patients are currently waiting for an organ to become available. <u><mark>An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation</u></mark>, and <u><mark>the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives</u>,</mark> <u>with</u> <u>patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney</u>. According to the WHO report, 76 percent of organs sold were kidneys, reflecting the growing demand secondary to complications of high blood pressure and diabetes. <u>There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs</u>. <u>In the majority of situations, t<mark>hose selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations</u>.</mark> <u>In countries like Pakistan, China or India</u>, <u>a person can sell a kidney for $5,000</u>, <u>while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit</u>. <u>Prior reports</u> have also <u>demonstrated that the rec<mark>ipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally</u>.</mark> A recent meta-analysis involving 39 original publications revealed that <u>those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV</u>. Furthermore <u><mark>the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower</u></mark>. These <u>statistics</u> <u>might</u> even <u>underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias</u>; <u>those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies</u>. Additionally, <u>given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams</u>. In 2010, a former psychiatrist was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison for offering false promises of organ transplants in the Philippines, while taking over $400,000 dollars from patients. Over five patients actually travelled to the Philippines only to find out that there was no organ awaiting them. One of these patients died in the Philippines. Regretfully, <u>the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable</u><strong> </p></strong>

Contention 2 Worldwide transplants will be better

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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The illicit market exploits in a way like slavery

Delmonico 3

Delmonico 3 Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts

the exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery The pressures put by organ brokers upon the desperation of the world’s dislocated, refugee, and poorest populations to provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy. the pressure of organ brokers upon the poor makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice. The most disturbing issue of organ sales is the formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy. they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce, such as the documented evidence of postsurgery medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers in many parts of the world

exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery pressures put by organ brokers provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy. makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers

General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003) WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco Although class distinctions are an almost naturalized part of social life in all complex societies, in this particular instance the exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery, as argued by Giovanni Berlinguer (Berlinguer and Garrafa 1996). The pressures put by organ brokers upon the desperation of the world’s dislocated, refugee, and poorest populations to provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy. Yes, even the poorest people of the world “make choices,” but they do not make these freely or under social or economic conditions of their own making. Further, the pressure of organ brokers upon the poor makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice. These secular arguments reach a conclusion similar to one derived from Christian morality—that the sale of human organs is unethical. The most disturbing issue of organ sales to both Christian and secular ethicists is the formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy. This is not to suggest that proponents of organ sales are in favor of exploiting the poor but, rather, that they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce, such as the documented evidence of postsurgery medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers in many parts of the world (see Zargooshi 2002; Jimenez and Scheper-Hughes 2002a; Ram 2002).

<h4><strong>The illicit market exploits in a way like slavery</h4><p>Delmonico 3 </strong>Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts</p><p>General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of</p><p>Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003)</p><p>WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco </p><p>Although class distinctions are an almost naturalized part of social life in all complex societies, in this particular instance <u>the <mark>exploitation of organ sellers veers dangerously close to human slavery</u></mark>, as argued by Giovanni Berlinguer (Berlinguer and Garrafa 1996). <u>The <mark>pressures put by organ brokers</mark> upon the desperation of the world’s dislocated, refugee, and poorest populations to <mark>provide the scarce commodities reveals the limits of argu- ments based solely on individual autonomy.</mark> </u>Yes, even the poorest people of the world “make choices,” but they do not make these freely or under social or economic conditions of their own making. Further, <u>the pressure of organ brokers upon the poor <mark>makes their decision to sell an organ anything but a free and autonomous choice</mark>. </u>These secular arguments reach a conclusion similar to one derived from Christian morality—that the sale of human organs is unethical. <u>The most disturbing issue of organ sales </u>to both Christian and secular ethicists <u>is the <mark>formation of an economic underclass of organ donors throughout the world to serve the wealthy</mark>.</u> This is not to suggest that proponents of organ sales are in favor of exploiting the poor but, rather, that <u><mark>they are indifferent to the social and individual pathologies that markets in kidneys and other body parts produce</mark>, such as the documented evidence of postsurgery <mark>medical complications, chronic pain, psychological problems, unemployment, decreased earning power, social ostracism, and social stigma faced by kidney sellers</mark> in many parts of the world</u> (see Zargooshi 2002; Jimenez and Scheper-Hughes 2002a; Ram 2002). </p>

Contention 2 Worldwide transplants will be better

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvAh/Dartmouth-Avendano-Ahmad-Aff-Binghamton-Round2.docx

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Binghamton

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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The illicit organ market is colonial in nature

Delmonico 3

Delmonico 3 Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts

The pattern of organ distribu- tion follows established routes of capital: from South to North, from Third to First World, from poor to rich, from black and brown to white, and from female to male recipients.

The pattern of organ distribu- tion follows established routes of capital: from South to North, from Third to First World, from poor to rich, from black and brown to white, and from female to male recipients

General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003) WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco For several years, one of us (Nancy Scheper-Hughes [2003]) has been actively involved in multi-sited, ethnographic field research in nine countries on the global traffic in human organs. The pattern of organ distribu- tion follows established routes of capital: from South to North, from Third to First World, from poor to rich, from black and brown to white, and from female to male recipients. Residents of Japan, the Gulf States in the Middle East (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman), Israel, Western Europe, and North America now travel in individually tailored or in organized group packages to medical centers in India, China, the Philippines, South America, Turkey, and Eastern Europe to purchase kidneys that are not available locally or legally. They are aided in their quest by a new class of organ brokers, some of whom operate on the Internet.

<h4><strong>The illicit organ market is colonial in nature</h4><p>Delmonico 3 </strong>Francis L. Delmonico, Director of the Renal Transplantation Unit at Massachusetts</p><p>General Hospital, the medical director at the New England Organ Bank, and Professor of</p><p>Surgery at Harvard Medical School; and Nancy Scheper-Hughes.Director of Organs Watch and Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley Zygon, vol. 38, no. 3 (September 2003)</p><p>WHY WE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR HUMAN ORGANS Ebsco </p><p>For several years, one of us (Nancy Scheper-Hughes [2003]) has been actively involved in multi-sited, ethnographic field research in nine countries on the global traffic in human organs. <u><mark>The pattern of organ distribu- tion follows established routes of capital: from South to North, from Third to First World, from poor to rich, from black and brown to white, and from female to male recipients</mark>. </u>Residents of Japan, the Gulf States in the Middle East (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman), Israel, Western Europe, and North America now travel in individually tailored or in organized group packages to medical centers in India, China, the Philippines, South America, Turkey, and Eastern Europe to purchase kidneys that are not available locally or legally. They are aided in their quest by a new class of organ brokers, some of whom operate on the Internet.</p>

Contention 2 Worldwide transplants will be better

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvAh/Dartmouth-Avendano-Ahmad-Aff-Binghamton-Round2.docx

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Binghamton

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JMU CH

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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The illicit market is apartheid medicine

SCHEPER-HUGHES 3

SCHEPER-HUGHES 3 Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley, where she directs the doctoral program in Critical Studies in Medicine, Science, and the Body. JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, VOL . 2, NO. 2 (JUNE2003), 197–226 Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/ pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid =97cebe61-9315-4e5e-b8db-f7372c8a971e%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=117

We have found almost everywhere a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients, over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’, about whom almost nothing is known

We have found almost everywhere a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients, over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’, about whom almost nothing is known

This paper continues my discussion (Scheper-Hughes 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) of the darker side of transplant practice. In all, three crucial points about the organs trade have emerged. The first is about invented scarcities and artificial needs within a new context of highly fetishized ‘fresh’ organs. The scarcity of cadaver organs has evolved into an active trade in ‘surplus’ organs from living ‘ suppliers’ as well as in new forms of ‘biopiracy’. The second point concerns the transplant rhetoric of altruism masking real demands for human sacrifice. The third point concerns surplus empathy and the relative visibility of two distinct populations – excluded and invisible organ givers and included and highly visible organ receivers. We have found almost everywhere a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients, over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’, about whom almost nothing is known – an excellent place for a critical medical anthropologist (Scheper-Hughes 1990) to begin.

<h4>The illicit market is apartheid medicine</h4><p><strong>SCHEPER-HUGHES 3</strong> Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Professor of Medical Anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley, where she directs the doctoral program in Critical Studies in Medicine, Science, and the Body. JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, VOL . 2, NO. 2 (JUNE2003), 197–226 Rotten trade: millennial capitalism, human values and global justice in organs trafficking http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/ pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid =97cebe61-9315-4e5e-b8db-f7372c8a971e%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=117</p><p>This paper continues my discussion (Scheper-Hughes 2000b, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) of the darker side of transplant practice. In all, three crucial points about the organs trade have emerged. The first is about invented scarcities and artificial needs within a new context of highly fetishized ‘fresh’ organs. The scarcity of cadaver organs has evolved into an active trade in ‘surplus’ organs from living ‘ suppliers’ as well as in new forms of ‘biopiracy’. The second point concerns the transplant rhetoric of altruism masking real demands for human sacrifice. The third point concerns surplus empathy and the relative visibility of two distinct populations – excluded and invisible organ givers and included and highly visible organ receivers. <u><mark>We have found almost everywhere a new form of globalized ‘apartheid medicine’ that privileges one class of patients, organ recipients, over another class of invisible and unrecognized ‘non-patients’, about whom almost nothing is known</u></mark> – an excellent place for a critical medical anthropologist (Scheper-Hughes 1990) to begin.</p>

Contention 2 Worldwide transplants will be better

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvAh/Dartmouth-Avendano-Ahmad-Aff-Binghamton-Round2.docx

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Binghamton

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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Plan solves 2 internal links--

<h4>Plan solves 2 internal links--</h4>

Contention 2 Worldwide transplants will be better

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvAh/Dartmouth-Avendano-Ahmad-Aff-Binghamton-Round2.docx

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Binghamton

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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First, It dries up the demand for illegal organs

Upchurch 12

Upchurch 12 Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18

By increasing the supply of available organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.

By increasing the supply of organs in the U S through compensation, citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ If demand dried up transplant tourism would take a major hit merican citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients Most organs ended up transplanted into American citizens If those American citizens were not forced abroad to find an organ, this would become much less commonplace.

By increasing the supply of available organs in the United States through compensation, American citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 If demand dried up from foreign citizens, transplant tourism in these countries would take a major hit because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but presumably American citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs succinctly stated, “Most of those organs ended up transplanted into American citizens.”119 The black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 If those American citizens with the means to purchase were not forced abroad to find an organ, it is very possible that stories like this would become much less commonplace.

<h4>First, It dries up the<u> demand</u> for illegal organs </h4><p><strong>Upchurch 12</strong> Ryan Upchurch, Seton Hall Law 1-1-12 Seton Hall Law eRepository "The Man who Removes<u> a Mountain Begins by Carrying Away Small Stones: Flynn v. Holder and a Re-Examination of The National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984" (2012). http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/18</p><p><mark>By increasing the supply of</mark> available <mark>organs in the U</u></mark>nited<u> <mark>S</u></mark>tates<u> <mark>through compensation,</mark> </u>American<u> <mark>citizens would have less reason to travel elsewhere to pay for an organ</u></mark>. For example, Aadil Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan advertises two transplant packages catered towards foreign patients: $14,000 for the first transplant and $16,000 for the second if the first organ fails.118 <u><mark>If demand dried up</u></mark> from foreign citizens, <u><mark>transplant tourism</mark> in these countries <mark>would take a major hit</u></mark> because brokers would fetch lower sums for organs they procure. Statistical information is difficult to come by for obvious reasons, but <u>presumably A<mark>merican citizens make up a substantial percentage of the tourist patients</mark> seeking a new organ they cannot attain domestically. As one report </u>about impoverished Bangladeshi villagers taken advantage of for their organs<u> </u>succinctly <u>stated, “<mark>Most </mark>of those <mark>organs ended up transplanted into American citizens</u></mark>.”119 The<u> </u>black market for organs in other countries is not fueled by local patients. Rather, it is driven<u> </u>upwards and out of control by those American as well as European citizens who cannot acquire<u> </u>what they need domestically.120 One estimate is that the black market accounts for as high as twenty percent of all kidney transplants worldwide.121 Nadley Hakim, transplant surgeon for St. Mary’s Hospital in London, offered an interesting take on this problem of the black market when he said, “this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer.”122 Within the past month, an indigent Chinese teenager sold his kidney so that he could purchase an iPad and iPhone.123 The unnamed teenager now suffers from renal deficiency.124 Sadly, the boy received roughly ten percent of what the buyer paid, with the rest going to the surgeon and others involved in coordinating the operation.125 <u><mark>If those American citizens </mark>with the means to purchase <mark>were not forced abroad to find an organ,</mark> it is very possible that stories like <mark>this would become much less commonplace.</p></u></mark>

Contention 2 Worldwide transplants will be better

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvAh/Dartmouth-Avendano-Ahmad-Aff-Binghamton-Round2.docx

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Binghamton

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JMU CH

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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Second, Legalizing organ sales in the US spills over globally

Calandrillo 4

Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis

if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad.

if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs America might be the best response a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product a legalized market U.S. may lead to similar structures abroad

Moreover, if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S. may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market would significantly reduce the demand for black market organs, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure the quality of its product. Furthermore, a legalized market in the U.S. (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) may lead to similar structures abroad. On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share.

<h4>Second, Legalizing organ sales in the US spills over globally </h4><p><strong>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p> Moreover, <u><mark>if we cannot prevent the black markets in human organs</mark> that continue to thrive worldwide today, a thoughtful and responsible regulatory solution in <mark>America might be the best response</u></mark>. Many scholars have chronicled the reality that today's black markets lead to a host of abuses, provide for no follow-up health care, and generally exploit the poor to the wealthy's advantage. n180 Stephen Spurr details the potential for misrepresentation and fraud against both buyers and sellers today, as prices spiral out of control for organs that are of dubious quality. n181 Gloria Banks decries the exploitation of society's most vulnerable individuals in the organ sale trade, and urges legal and ethical safeguards for their protection. n182 Susan Hankin Denise adds that a properly regulated organ market may therefore be a better solution to the problem of scarcity than the outright ban we witness today. n183 FOOTNOTE ATTACHED n183 See Denise, supra note 72, at 1035-36 (arguing that regulated markets are superior to the existing ban on organ sales in the U.S.). Of course, even <u><mark>a well-regulated legalized market in the U.S.</mark> </u>may not completely eliminate black markets worldwide<u> </u>if patients can still find organs more cheaply abroad. <u>However, it is reasonable to suspect that an American market <mark>would <strong>significantly reduce the demand for black market organs</strong>, especially given the ability of a regulated market to better ensure <strong>the quality of its product</strong></mark>. Furthermore, <mark>a legalized market</mark> in the <mark>U.S.</mark> (with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse of sellers) <strong><mark>may lead to similar structures abroad</strong></mark>.</u> On the other hand, one might argue that competing markets might lead to a "race to the bottom" in terms of regulatory standards, as each country tries to gain more market share. </p>

Contention 2 Worldwide transplants will be better

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Binghamton

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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Illegal market abuses are not an indication of what legal sales would be like – just the opposite

Kaserman, 7

Kaserman, 7 Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.

In a truly ironic twist of logic, some opponents of the use of financial incentives have cited abuses and high prices associated with such black market activities as har-bingers of the sorts of outcomes likely to accompany legalized organ markets This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion. This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized Eliminating the shortage of cadaveric organs through legalization of financial incentives would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the demand for living donor kidneys obtained through black markets

some opponents of the use of financial incentives ited buses to accompany legalized organ markets This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized.

Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis In a truly ironic twist of logic, some opponents of the use of financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors have cited various human rights abuses and extraordinarily high prices associated with such black market activities as har-bingers of the sorts of outcomes likely to accompany legalized organ markets. n32 This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion. This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized. Legalized trade allows the market price to fall as legitimate businesses enter the market and increase supply. Moreover, costs decrease as the risks of both prosecution and violent actions by rival producers are eliminated. The outcome is lower prices, an increase in the volume of trade, and a cessation of criminal activities. Thus, the types of conduct associated with illegal suppliers involved in black market trade and the prices at which such trade takes place do not accurately reflect the behavior and prices likely to result from legalized sales. In fact, it has long been recognized that the most effective remedy for undesirable black market activity is to eliminate restrictions on trade. Stated succinctly, the cure for black market abuses is legalized trade. That conclusion holds a fortiori, in the case at hand. Eliminating the shortage of cadaveric organs through legalization of financial incentives would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the demand for living donor kidneys obtained through black markets. Therefore, if one is opposed to current black market activities, then one should favor financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors.

<h4>Illegal market abuses are not an indication of what legal sales would be like – just the opposite</h4><p><strong>Kaserman, 7</strong> Dr. David Kaserman is currently Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University. </p><p>Issues in Law & Medicine Summer, 2007 23 Issues L. & Med. 45 ARTICLE: Fifty Years of Organ Transplants: The Successes and The Failures lexis</p><p><u>In a truly ironic twist of logic, <mark>some opponents of the use of financial incentives</u></mark> for cadaveric organ donors <u>have c<mark>ited</mark> </u>various human rights <u>a<mark>buses</mark> and </u>extraordinarily <u>high prices associated with such black market activities as har-bingers of the sorts of outcomes likely <mark>to accompany legalized organ markets</u></mark>. n32 <u><mark>This line of "reasoning" is equivalent to arguing that legalization of liquor sales would lead to the sorts of mafia-related activities that arose during prohibi-tion</mark>. <mark>This argument stands accepted economic theory on its head. The truth is that the types of behavior and price levels that frequently accompany black market sales tend to disappear when trade is legalized</u>.</mark> Legalized trade allows the market price to fall as legitimate businesses enter the market and increase supply. Moreover, costs decrease as the risks of both prosecution and violent actions by rival producers are eliminated. The outcome is lower prices, an increase in the volume of trade, and a cessation of criminal activities. Thus, the types of conduct associated with illegal suppliers involved in black market trade and the prices at which such trade takes place do not accurately reflect the behavior and prices likely to result from legalized sales. In fact, it has long been recognized that the most effective remedy for undesirable black market activity is to eliminate restrictions on trade. Stated succinctly, the cure for black market abuses is legalized trade. That conclusion holds a fortiori, in the case at hand. <u>Eliminating the shortage of cadaveric organs through legalization of financial incentives would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the demand for living donor kidneys obtained through black markets</u><strong>. Therefore, if one is opposed to current black market activities, then one should favor financial incentives for cadaveric organ donors. </p></strong>

Contention 2 Worldwide transplants will be better

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Binghamton

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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Specifically, debate over organ sales is necessary given shortages

Smith 11

Smith 11 Lewis Smith 05 January 2011 The Independent Sale of human organs should be legalised, say surgeons http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/sale-of-human-organs-should-be-legalised-say-surgeons-2176110.html

Professor John Harris, an ethicist at the University of Manchester, believes a debate of an organ market long overdue. Professor Bell, former vice-president of the Royal College of Surgeons wants a public debate because there is such a shortage of organs for transplantation: "It is time to debate it again Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs. "The British Transplantation Society opposes this view, however it is prepared to debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolves," said a spokesman. Keith Rigg, the transplant surgeon and BTS president, said: "I'm happy to debate it. There are pros and cons

an ethicist at the University of Manchester, believes a debate of an organ market long overdue former vice-president of the Royal College of Surgeons wants a public debate because there is such a shortage of organs for transplantation: "It is time to debate it again Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs

Professor John Harris, an ethicist at the University of Manchester, believes a debate and the introduction of an organ market are long overdue. "Morality demands it," he said. "It's time to consider it because this country, to its eternal shame, has allowed a completely unnecessary shortage for 30 years. Thousands of people die each year [internationally] for want of organs. That's the measure of the urgency of the problem. "Being paid doesn't nullify altruism – doctors aren't less caring because they are paid. With the current system, everyone gets paid except for the donor." Professor Harris has developed proposals for an ethical market in organs in which donors would be paid as part of a regulated system. Such a system, he said, would have to be controlled within a strictly defined community, probably the UK but possibly extended to the EU, so every organ could be accounted for. No imports would be allowed. The NHS would be the sole supplier and would distribute organs as it does other treatments – ability to pay would not be a factor. Consent would be required for every donation and would have to be rigorously carried out to ensure no donor was subjected to untoward pressure. Professor Sir Peter Bell, former vice-president of the Royal College of Surgeons but now retired from practice, wants a public debate because there is such a shortage of organs for transplantation: "It is time to debate it again.[…] There is a great shortage of organs." There remains stiff opposition to liberalising the market, not least from the British Transplantation Society (BTS). Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs. "The British Transplantation Society opposes this view, however it is prepared to debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolves," said a spokesman. Keith Rigg, the transplant surgeon and BTS president, said: "I'm happy to debate it. There are pros and cons. I think the trouble is it would require a huge change in public opinion and legislation. One argument against a regulated market is if you are paying some people, what would be the impact on the existing deceased donor programme and living donor programme?"

<h4><strong>Specifically, debate over organ sales is necessary given shortages</h4><p>Smith 11</strong> Lewis Smith 05 January 2011 The Independent Sale of human organs should be legalised, say surgeons http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/sale-of-human-organs-should-be-legalised-say-surgeons-2176110.html</p><p><u>Professor John Harris, <mark>an ethicist at the University of Manchester, believes a debate</mark> </u>and the introduction <u><mark>of an organ market</mark> </u>are <u><mark>long overdue</mark>.</u> "Morality demands it," he said. "It's time to consider it because this country, to its eternal shame, has allowed a completely unnecessary shortage for 30 years. Thousands of people die each year [internationally] for want of organs. That's the measure of the urgency of the problem. "Being paid doesn't nullify altruism – doctors aren't less caring because they are paid. With the current system, everyone gets paid except for the donor." Professor Harris has developed proposals for an ethical market in organs in which donors would be paid as part of a regulated system. Such a system, he said, would have to be controlled within a strictly defined community, probably the UK but possibly extended to the EU, so every organ could be accounted for. No imports would be allowed. The NHS would be the sole supplier and would distribute organs as it does other treatments – ability to pay would not be a factor. Consent would be required for every donation and would have to be rigorously carried out to ensure no donor was subjected to untoward pressure. <u>Professor</u> Sir Peter <u>Bell, <mark>former vice-president of the Royal College of Surgeons</u></mark> but now retired from practice, <u><mark>wants a public debate because there is such a shortage of organs for transplantation: "It is time to debate it again</u></mark>.[…] There is a great shortage of organs." There remains stiff opposition to liberalising the market, not least from the British Transplantation Society (BTS). <u><mark>Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs</mark>. "The British Transplantation Society opposes this view, however it is prepared to debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolves," said a spokesman. Keith Rigg, the transplant surgeon and BTS president, said: "I'm happy to debate it. There are pros and cons</u>. I think the trouble is it would require a huge change in public opinion and legislation. One argument against a regulated market is if you are paying some people, what would be the impact on the existing deceased donor programme and living donor programme?"</p>

Contention 2 Worldwide transplants will be better

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvAh/Dartmouth-Avendano-Ahmad-Aff-Binghamton-Round2.docx

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Binghamton

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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Debate on effective implementation is a moral responsibility

Taub et al 3

Taub et al 3 Sara Taub, Andrew H. Maixner, Karine Morin, Robert M. Sade, For The Council On Ethical And Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. "Cadaveric Organ Donation: Encouraging The Study Of Motivation." Transplantation Forum. Vol. 76, 748–751, No. 4, August 27, 2003. https://www.musc.edu/humanvalues/pdf/Cadaveric-organ-donation.pdf

If policymakers, ethicists, or legislators prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and reduce the number of deaths, then they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transplant. Therefore, a better informed debate is necessary, one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured.

A thorough discussion of this matter also must include an examination of the costs of foregoing such studies. Currently, about 16 patients die each day waiting for an available organ (15). If policymakers, ethicists, or legislators prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and reduce the number of deaths, then they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transplant. Therefore, a better informed debate is necessary, one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured.

<h4>Debate on effective implementation is a moral responsibility</h4><p><strong>Taub et al 3</strong> Sara Taub, Andrew H. Maixner, Karine Morin, Robert M. Sade, For The Council On Ethical And Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. "Cadaveric Organ Donation: Encouraging The Study Of Motivation." Transplantation Forum. Vol. 76, 748–751, No. 4, August 27, 2003. <u>https://www.musc.edu/humanvalues/pdf/Cadaveric-organ-donation.pdf</p><p></u>A thorough discussion of this matter also must include an examination of the costs of foregoing such studies. Currently, about 16 patients die each day waiting for an available organ (15). <u>If policymakers, ethicists, or legislators prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and reduce the number of deaths, then they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transplant. Therefore, a better informed debate is necessary, one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured.</p></u>

Contention 2 Worldwide transplants will be better

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Binghamton

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organs A1 - shortage A2 - illicit market

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The plan is an example of the broader principle of using prices as a mechanism to allocate resources. Market mechanism are an effective means; non-market economies have no other means of allocating resources than bureaucratic choice and this usually fails

Gongol 9

Gongol 9—owner Gongol.com[Brian, “Is Socialism Good for the Environment?” ,http://www.gongol.com/research/economics/socialismandtheenvironment/]RMT

Socialism assumes someone or some group has the ability to predict and plan for the needs of the many. This kind of omniscience is plainly impossible. there will inevitably be some difference between what the planner expects supply and demand for Stuff to be and what actually emerges. when too little Stuff is produced to meet demand, people needlessly suffer. this planning function is routinely achieved with great efficiency by the feedback systems of a market economy, in which freely-moving prices effectively tell everyone in the market whether too much or too little of anything is being produced

Socialism ability to predict needs of the many omniscience is plainly impossible. inevitably be some difference between expects supply and demand when too little Stuff is produced to meet demand, people needlessly suffe the feedback systems of a market economy effectively tell everyone in the market whether too much or too little of anything is being produced

Socialism assumes that someone or some group of people has the ability to predict and plan for the needs of the many. This kind of omniscience is plainly impossible. Pretend, for instance, that everything that people might need or want can be lumped together in a single category, called "Stuff." In any given planning period, the planner must determine how much Stuff people will want and how much Stuff must be produced. But there will inevitably be some difference between what the planner expects supply and demand for Stuff to be and what actually emerges. Even if the planner is occasionally correct, every deviation from the actual demand for Stuff causes waste -- when too little Stuff is produced to meet demand, people needlessly suffer. When too much Stuff is produced to meet demand, all that extra Stuff represents waste. Even a really, really good planner will be unable to accurately predict the vast fluctuations in day-to-day demand for Stuff, leading to huge amounts of either waste or suffering. Yet this planning function is routinely achieved with great efficiency by the feedback systems of a market economy, in which freely-moving prices effectively tell everyone in the market whether too much or too little of anything is being produced.

<h4><strong>The plan is an example of the broader principle of using prices as a mechanism to allocate resources. Market mechanism are an effective means; non-market economies have no other means of allocating resources than bureaucratic choice and this usually fails</h4><p>Gongol 9</strong>—owner Gongol.com[Brian, “Is Socialism Good for the Environment?” ,http://www.gongol.com/research/economics/socialismandtheenvironment/]RMT </p><p><u><mark>Socialism</mark> assumes </u>that<u> someone or some group </u>of people <u>has the <mark>ability to predict</mark> and plan for the <mark>needs of the many</mark>. This kind of <mark>omniscience is plainly impossible.</u></mark> Pretend, for instance, that everything that people might need or want can be lumped together in a single category, called "Stuff." In any given planning period, the planner must determine how much Stuff people will want and how much Stuff must be produced. But <u>there will <mark>inevitably be some difference between </mark>what the planner <mark>expects supply and demand</mark> for Stuff to be and what actually emerges. </u>Even if the planner is occasionally correct, every deviation from the actual demand for Stuff causes waste -- <u><mark>when too little Stuff is produced to meet demand, people needlessly suffe</mark>r.</u> When too much Stuff is produced to meet demand, all that extra Stuff represents waste. Even a really, really good planner will be unable to accurately predict the vast fluctuations in day-to-day demand for Stuff, leading to huge amounts of either waste or suffering. Yet <u>this planning function is routinely achieved with great efficiency by <mark>the feedback systems of a market economy</mark>, in which freely-moving prices <mark>effectively tell everyone in the market whether too much or too little of anything is being produced</u><strong></mark>. </p></strong>

Contention 3 is method

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Without prices to allocate resources, planners make the decisions on resource allocation, and they are too often subject to cronies and corruptions

Tanner 93

Mack Tanner Oct 93 The Common Good and the Free Rider, Freeman

http://www.thefreemanonline.org/columns/the-common-good-and-the-free-rider/ The central planners never serve the common good; they always serve the good of those who are clever enough to work the system to their own advantage. The winners are always the politicians, the bureaucrats, and those who learn to manipulate the system by spending money in the right places.