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741,705 | The United States splits sovereignty among federal and state governments | Power 13 | Power 13 Andrew Power et al, Active Citizenship and Disability: Implementing the Personalisation of Support, Cambridge University Press, Jan 14, 2013, Page 88 | The United States has a unique political and geographical landscape It has an intricate federal-state level relationship the United States is a constitutional republic in which the president, Congressional and judiciary share powers reserved for the national government, and the federal government shares sovereignty with the state governments. | the United States is a constitutional republic in which the president, Congressional and judiciary share powers and the federal government shares sovereignty with the state governments | The United States has a unique political and geographical landscape which provides a complex territorial system of administration of disability support policy. It has an intricate federal-state level relationship, with different institutions and actors who can shape disability support policy in many different ways and at various different scales. At the federal level the United States is a constitutional republic in which the president, Congressional and judiciary share powers reserved for the national government, and the federal government shares sovereignty with the state governments. | 595 | <h4>The United States splits sovereignty among federal and state governments</h4><p><strong>Power 13</strong> Andrew Power et al, Active Citizenship and Disability: Implementing the Personalisation<u> of Support, Cambridge University Press, Jan 14, 2013, Page 88</p><p>The United States has a unique political and geographical landscape</u> which provides a complex territorial system of administration of disability support policy. <u>It has an intricate federal-state level relationship</u>, with different institutions and actors who can shape disability support policy in many different ways and at various different scales. At the federal level <u><mark>the United States is a constitutional republic in which the president, Congressional and judiciary share powers</mark> reserved for the national government, <mark>and the federal government shares sovereignty with the state governments</mark>. </p></u> | null | 2NC | Case | 317,205 | 69 | 17,059 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx | 565,293 | N | Cedanats | 3 | Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos | Stone | 1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,706 | Every life is an end—the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved. | Cummisky 96 | Cummisky 96 | even if saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh killing one this still does not justify deontological constraints why would not killing one be a stronger obligation than saving two If I am concerned with priceless dignity I may still save two it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed each is priceless I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better. | even if saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh killing one this does not justify deontological constraints why would not killing one be a stronger obligation than saving two If I am concerned with priceless dignity I may still save two; it is just that loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed each is priceless I have good reason to save as many as I can | (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 130-131)
Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one-because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way-this point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hill’s example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statues only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of the one, each is priceless; this, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better. | 1,415 | <h4><strong>Every life is an end—the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved.</h4><p>Cummisky 96 </p><p></strong>(David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 130-131)</p><p>Finally, <u><strong><mark>even if</u></strong></mark> one grants that <u><strong><mark>saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh</u></strong></mark> and compensate for<u><strong> <mark>killing one</u></strong></mark>-because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way-<u><strong><mark>this</u></strong></mark> point <u><strong>still <mark>does not justify deontological constraints</u></strong></mark>. On the extreme interpretation, <u><strong><mark>why would not killing one</u></strong></mark> person <u><strong><mark>be a stronger obligation than saving two</u></strong></mark> persons? <u><strong><mark>If I am concerned with</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>priceless dignity</u></strong></mark> of each, it would seem that <u><strong><mark>I may still save two</u></strong>; <u><strong>it is just that </mark>my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one</u></strong>. Consider Hill’s example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statues only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, <u><strong>the <mark>loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of the one, <u><strong><mark>each is priceless</u></strong></mark>; this, <u><strong><mark>I have good reason to save as many as I can</strong></mark>. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.</p></u> | null | 2AC | FW | 84,751 | 179 | 17,058 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,290 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | West Georgia Kelly-Zapata | Rumbaugh | 1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,707 | Nearly all is over 90% | Cooke 6 | Cooke 6 Janel Cooke & John Woollard 2006 Visual literacy and how children use icons | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/55253/1/chapter9-1.pdf
: nearly all means over 90%, http://www.cblt.soton.ac.uk/chapter | null | http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/55253/1/chapter9-1.pdf
The following words are used to describe the results: nearly all means over 90%, most means over 75%, over half means between 60 and 75%, half means between 40 and 60%, less than half means between 30% and 40%, some means between 10% and 30%, and few means less than 10%. The full data set and its analysis is available on http://www.cblt.soton.ac.uk/chapter | 409 | <h4>Nearly all is over 90%</h4><p><strong>Cooke 6</strong> Janel Cooke & John Woollard 2006 Visual literacy and how children use icons</p><p><u>http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/55253/1/chapter9-1.pdf</p><p></u>The following words are used to describe the results<u>: nearly all means over 90%,</u> most means over 75%, over half means between 60 and 75%, half means between 40 and 60%, less than half means between 30% and 40%, some means between 10% and 30%, and few means less than 10%. The full data set and its analysis is available on <u>http://www.cblt.soton.ac.uk/chapter</p></u> | null | 2NC | Case | 430,375 | 1 | 17,060 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | 565,294 | N | Cedanats | 7 | Fresno State Levin-Sicairos | Munday | 1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,708 | The plan forecloses cross-retaliation---it’s legally linked to noncompliance on the federal horse-racing law | Rosenzweig 14 | Adam H. Rosenzweig 14, Professor of Law, Washington University in Saint Louis, 2014, “Conceptualizing a New Institutional Framework for International Taxation: An Antigua Gambling Model for the International Tax Regime,” Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, 44 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 79 | In July 2013 Antigua announced the formation of a committee to direct "the government's plan to build the framework necessary to suspend selected US intellectual property rights Antigua declared its intent to begin selling copyrighted songs, movies, and other material directly to U.S. consumers without paying royalties
the WTO permitted Antigua to retaliate under TRIPS). This is referred to as "cross-retaliation as the aggrieved member state is permitted to retaliate under one agreement for a violation of a different agreement under the purview of the WTO Antigua could perfectly legally, sell U.S. copyrighted material in the U S
In response the U S was provided the opportunity to repeal the ban and comply with the WTO ruling The U S declined
Antigua sought permission to retaliate against the U S for failing to comply the D S B took into account the holding of the Appellate Body by limiting the right of Antigua to retaliate only to those lost profits attributable to horse racing, and not to all online gambling although Antigua requested the ability to cross-retaliate in an amount up to $ 3 billion per year the WTO limited the Antigua retaliation to approximately $ 21 million per year
Antigua Gambling represented the first time the WTO ruled in favor of a specific form of cross-retaliation Despite continued attempts at bilateral negotiations it appears as if Antigua will pursue its options to begin suspending obligations to protect U.S. intellectual property rights under TRIPS | Antigua announced the government's plan to suspend US i p r Antigua declared intent to sell copyrighted material
the WTO permitted Antigua to retaliate under TRIPS "cross-retaliation Antigua could, perfectly legally, sell U.S. copyrighted material
In response, the U S was provided the opportunity to repeal the ban and comply with the WTO The declined
the D S B limit the right of Antigua to retaliate only to lost profits attributable to horse racing not to all online gambling the WTO limited retaliation to $ 21 million per year
it appears Antigua will pursue its options to begin suspending U.S. i p r under TRIPS | In July of 2013, the government of Antigua and Barbuda announced the formation of a committee to direct "the government's plan to build the framework necessary to suspend selected US intellectual property rights ... ." n4 In other words, Antigua and Barbuda declared its intent to begin selling copyrighted songs, movies, and other material directly to U.S. consumers without paying royalties. n5 What made this different from any college student ripping their favorite songs off of BitTorrent or Pirate Bay was that these sales were to be completely legal. How could that be?
Antigua and Barbuda is the smallest member country of the WTO and for years hosted popular online gambling sites directed primarily at U.S. gamblers. In 2006, the United States enacted the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA), n6 making it illegal to offer online gambling in the United States. In response, Antigua and Barbuda brought a claim in the WTO that the United States was impermissibly restraining international trade in services in violation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). After several rounds of hearings and appeals, Antigua and Barbuda won the case. The typical remedy for a violation of GATS is permission for the aggrieved country to retaliate by enacting restraints or tariffs on services from the other country.
Unfortunately, this remedy would not be very effective between the United States and Antigua and Barbuda. Why? For the simple reason that there is virtually no trade in services between the United States and Antigua and Barbuda. So even if Antigua and Barbuda could impose retaliatory tariffs of 1000 percent on services provided by the United States in Antigua and Barbuda, it would prove near meaningless. In response, the WTO permitted Antigua and Barbuda [*82] to retaliate not under GATS but under the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This is referred to as "cross-retaliation," as the aggrieved member state is permitted to retaliate under one agreement for a violation of a different agreement under the purview of the WTO. n7 In other words, Antigua and Barbuda could, perfectly legally, sell U.S. copyrighted material in the United States.
In response, the United States was provided the opportunity to repeal the ban and comply with the WTO ruling. The United States declined, citing the ability under the WTO for member states to enact legislation for public morality. Instead, it appealed the decision to the Appellate Body of the WTO.
The Appellate Body agreed in part with the United States that it did have a legitimate interest under GATS in furthering public morals. The problem was that the United States permitted inter-state gambling on horse racing through so-called "off-track betting" locations. n8 Thus, at a minimum, the United States was discriminating against offshore gambling websites with respect to horse racing. Accordingly, the Appellate Body held that the public morals exception did not justify discrimination against offshore gambling with respect to horse racing. n9
The United States requested reasonable time to comply with this decision, but eventually Antigua sought permission to retaliate against the United States for failing to comply. At this remedy stage, the Dispute Settlement Body took into account the holding of the Appellate Body by limiting the right of Antigua to retaliate only to those lost profits attributable to horse racing, and not to all online gambling, such as poker and other card games. n10 Thus, although [*83] Antigua requested the ability to cross-retaliate in an amount up to $ 3 billion per year, the WTO limited the Antigua retaliation to approximately $ 21 million per year. n11
Even at this relatively small annual amount, Antigua Gambling represented the first time the WTO ruled in favor of a specific form of cross-retaliation. Prior to Antigua Gambling, the mere threat of cross-retaliation had proven sufficient to result in a negotiated compromise between the countries. n12 But in Antigua Gambling, the United States decided that the offending law was sufficiently important to its public policy as to be worth incurring the cost from cross-retaliation. Despite continued attempts at bilateral negotiations to avoid the implementation of the cross-retaliation, it appears as if Antigua and Barbuda will pursue its options to begin suspending obligations to protect U.S. intellectual property rights under TRIPS. n13 | 4,488 | <h4>The plan <u>forecloses</u> cross-retaliation---it’s legally linked to noncompliance on the <u>federal horse-racing</u> law</h4><p>Adam H. <strong>Rosenzweig 14</strong>, Professor of Law, Washington University in Saint Louis, 2014, “Conceptualizing a New Institutional Framework for International Taxation: An Antigua Gambling Model for the International Tax Regime,” Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, 44 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 79</p><p><u><strong>In July</u></strong> of <u><strong>2013</u></strong>, the government of <u><strong><mark>Antigua</u></strong></mark> and Barbuda <u><strong><mark>announced</mark> the formation of a committee to direct "<mark>the government's plan to</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>build the framework necessary to <mark>suspend</mark> selected <mark>US i</mark>ntellectual <mark>p</mark>roperty <mark>r</mark>ights</u></strong> ... ." n4 In other words, <u><strong><mark>Antigua</u></strong></mark> and Barbuda <u><strong><mark>declared</mark> its <mark>intent to</mark> begin <mark>sell</mark>ing <mark>copyrighted</mark> songs, movies, and other <mark>material</mark> directly to U.S. consumers without paying royalties</u></strong>. n5 What made this different from any college student ripping their favorite songs off of BitTorrent or Pirate Bay was that these sales were to be completely legal. How could that be?</p><p>Antigua and Barbuda is the smallest member country of the WTO and for years hosted popular online gambling sites directed primarily at U.S. gamblers. In 2006, the United States enacted the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA), n6 making it illegal to offer online gambling in the United States. In response, Antigua and Barbuda brought a claim in the WTO that the United States was impermissibly restraining international trade in services in violation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). After several rounds of hearings and appeals, Antigua and Barbuda won the case. The typical remedy for a violation of GATS is permission for the aggrieved country to retaliate by enacting restraints or tariffs on services from the other country.</p><p>Unfortunately, this remedy would not be very effective between the United States and Antigua and Barbuda. Why? For the simple reason that there is virtually no trade in services between the United States and Antigua and Barbuda. So even if Antigua and Barbuda could impose retaliatory tariffs of 1000 percent on services provided by the United States in Antigua and Barbuda, it would prove near meaningless. In response, <u><strong><mark>the WTO permitted Antigua</u></strong></mark> and Barbuda [*82] <u><strong><mark>to retaliate</u></strong></mark> not under GATS but <u><strong><mark>under</u></strong></mark> the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (<u><strong><mark>TRIPS</mark>). This is referred to as <mark>"cross-retaliation</u></strong></mark>," <u><strong>as the aggrieved member state is permitted to retaliate under one agreement for a violation of a different agreement under the purview of the WTO</u></strong>. n7 In other words, <u><strong><mark>Antigua</u></strong></mark> and Barbuda <u><strong><mark>could</u></strong>, <u><strong>perfectly legally, sell U.S. copyrighted material</mark> in the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates.</p><p><u><strong><mark>In response</u></strong>,</mark> <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>was provided the opportunity to repeal the ban and comply with the WTO</mark> ruling</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong><mark>declined</u></strong></mark>, citing the ability under the WTO for member states to enact legislation for public morality. Instead, it appealed the decision to the Appellate Body of the WTO.</p><p>The Appellate Body agreed in part with the United States that it did have a legitimate interest under GATS in furthering public morals. The problem was that the United States permitted inter-state gambling on horse racing through so-called "off-track betting" locations. n8 Thus, at a minimum, the United States was discriminating against offshore gambling websites with respect to horse racing. Accordingly, the Appellate Body held that the public morals exception did not justify discrimination against offshore gambling with respect to horse racing. n9</p><p>The United States requested reasonable time to comply with this decision, but eventually <u><strong>Antigua sought permission to retaliate against the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>for failing to comply</u></strong>. At this remedy stage, <u><strong><mark>the D</u></strong></mark>ispute <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>ettlement <u><strong><mark>B</u></strong></mark>ody <u><strong>took into account the holding of the Appellate Body by <mark>limit</mark>ing <mark>the right of Antigua to retaliate only to</mark> those <mark>lost profits</u></strong> <u><strong>attributable to horse racing</mark>, and <mark>not to all online gambling</u></strong></mark>, such as poker and other card games. n10 Thus, <u><strong>although</u></strong> [*83] <u><strong>Antigua requested the ability to cross-retaliate in an amount up to $ 3 billion per year</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>the WTO limited</mark> the Antigua <mark>retaliation to</mark> approximately <mark>$ 21 million per year</u></strong></mark>. n11</p><p>Even at this relatively small annual amount, <u><strong>Antigua Gambling represented the first time the WTO ruled in favor of a specific form of cross-retaliation</u></strong>. Prior to Antigua Gambling, the mere threat of cross-retaliation had proven sufficient to result in a negotiated compromise between the countries. n12 But in Antigua Gambling, the United States decided that the offending law was sufficiently important to its public policy as to be worth incurring the cost from cross-retaliation. <u><strong>Despite continued attempts at bilateral negotiations</u></strong> to avoid the implementation of the cross-retaliation, <u><strong><mark>it appears</mark> as if <mark>Antigua</u></strong></mark> and Barbuda <u><strong><mark>will pursue its options to begin suspending</mark> obligations to protect <mark>U.S.</mark> <mark>i</mark>ntellectual <mark>p</mark>roperty <mark>r</mark>ights <mark>under TRIPS</u></strong></mark>. n13</p> | null | 1NC | 1NC | 430,376 | 8 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,709 | Impact only goes one way – there are problems with the debate community but eliminating restrictions on argumentation doesn’t resolve them – BUT they throw out the baby with the bathwater by splitting democratic engagement along lines of subjective knowledge and personal experience | Tonn ‘5 | Mari Boor Tonn, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland, ‘5 (“Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public” Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 8, No. 3) | a dialogic approach may help if highly procedural A fixed set of ground rules for managing participation, including apportioned speaking rights, guided discussions access to deliberative processes t is a baseline of any genuine democracy the conversational model's emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded nonwhites and gave rise to demands for inclusion absence of formal rules leaves relational power capricious privileging personal experiences, and individual perspectives mirrors justifications used or hegemonic social premises to oppress people of color Consider comments of an aide to Bush made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction Investigative reporters he claimed, operate "in he reality-based community Such people "believe that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality." Then he added: "That's not the way the world really works anymore . . . now when we act, we create our own reality The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts public argument are the "heart" of true democracy | a dialogic approach may help if highly procedural the conversational model's emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded nonwhites and gave rise to demands for inclusion absence of formal rules leaves relational power capricious privileging personal experiences, and individual perspectives mirrors justifications used for hegemonic social premises to oppress people Consider comments an aide to Bush made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no w m d when we act, we create our own reality The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts | So, too, certain aspects of a dialogic approach to public conflicts may help bridge entrenched differences, particularly if facilitated by experts skilled in [End Page 422] mediation techniques. As illustration, Senator George Mitchell himself characterized his brokering of the 1998 historic peace accord in Northern Ireland as a "democratic dialogue," given the unprecedented inclusion of representatives from all warring sides.99 Yet in crucial respects, the process Mitchell oversaw enacted the type of deliberative model Hauser and Benoit-Barne would replace with civic "conversation." The conventional "procedural view" of democracy, they argue, "is prone to reducing deliberation to exchanges among an epistemic elite credentialed to engage in critical rational deliberation. Moreover, it rules out the impact of attachments, which motivate citizens to become involved in political issues."100 Yet, from the outset, the 22-month-long negotiation leading to the treaty was highly procedural. A fixed set of ground rules for managing participation, including apportioned speaking rights, guided the difficult discussions as did six basic principles demanding that parties eschew what Hauser and Benoit-Barne might term their "attachments" to violence. A firm deadline for resolution was implemented and observed. And, most significantly, the final 69-page document required ratification through referendum by Irish citizens.101¶ This widespread recognition that access to public deliberative processes and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan "The Personal Is Political" to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet the conversational model's emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan's landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102 [End Page 423]¶ The price exacted by promoting approaches to complex public issues—models that cast conventional deliberative processes, including the marshaling of evidence beyond individual subjectivity, as "elitist" or "monologic"—can be steep. Consider comments of an aide to President George W. Bush made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction, the primary justification for a U.S.-led war costing thousands of lives. Investigative reporters and other persons sleuthing for hard facts, he claimed, operate "in what we call the reality-based community." Such people "believe that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality." Then baldly flexing the muscle afforded by increasingly popular social-constructionist and poststructuralist models for conflict resolution, he added: "That's not the way the world really works anymore . . . We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we'll act again, creating other new realities."103¶ The recent fascination with public conversation and dialogue most likely is a product of frustration with the tone of much public, political discourse. Such concerns are neither new nor completely without merit. Yet, as Burke insightfully pointed out nearly six decades ago, "A perennial embarrassment in liberal apologetics has arisen from its 'surgical' proclivity: its attempt to outlaw a malfunction by outlawing the function." The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process, he writes, "is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts."104 Because public argument and deliberative processes are the "heart" of true democracy, supplanting those models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself. | 5,203 | <h4>Impact only goes one way – there are problems with the debate community but eliminating restrictions on argumentation doesn’t resolve them – BUT they throw out the baby with the bathwater by splitting democratic engagement along lines of subjective knowledge and personal experience</h4><p>Mari Boor <u><strong>Tonn</u></strong>, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland, <u><strong>‘5</u></strong> (“Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public” Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 8, No. 3)</p><p>So, too, certain aspects of <u><strong><mark>a dialogic approach</u></strong></mark> to public conflicts <u><strong><mark>may help</u></strong></mark> bridge entrenched differences, particularly <u><mark>if</u></mark> facilitated by experts skilled in [End Page 422] mediation techniques. As illustration, Senator George Mitchell himself characterized his brokering of the 1998 historic peace accord in Northern Ireland as a "democratic dialogue," given the unprecedented inclusion of representatives from all warring sides.99 Yet in crucial respects, the process Mitchell oversaw enacted the type of deliberative model Hauser and Benoit-Barne would replace with civic "conversation." The conventional "procedural view" of democracy, they argue, "is prone to reducing deliberation to exchanges among an epistemic elite credentialed to engage in critical rational deliberation. Moreover, it rules out the impact of attachments, which motivate citizens to become involved in political issues."100 Yet, from the outset, the 22-month-long negotiation leading to the treaty was <u><mark>highly procedural</u></mark>. <u><strong>A fixed set of ground rules for managing participation, including apportioned speaking rights, guided</u></strong> the difficult <u><strong>discussions</u></strong> as did six basic principles demanding that parties eschew what Hauser and Benoit-Barne might term their "attachments" to violence. A firm deadline for resolution was implemented and observed. And, most significantly, the final 69-page document required ratification through referendum by Irish citizens.101¶ This widespread recognition that <u><strong>access to</u></strong> public <u><strong>deliberative processes</u></strong> and the ballo<u><strong>t is a baseline of any genuine democracy</u></strong> points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan "The Personal Is Political" to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet <u><strong><mark>the conversational model's emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can </strong>duplicate<strong> the power networks that traditionally </strong>excluded</u></mark> females and <u><mark>nonwhites<strong> and gave rise</u></strong> <u><strong>to</u></strong></mark> numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, <u><strong><mark>demands for</u></strong></mark> democratic <u><strong><mark>inclusion</u></strong></mark>. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the <u><strong><mark>absence of formal rules leaves relational power</mark> </u></strong>unchecked and potentially <u><mark>capricious</u></mark>. Moreover, the <u><strong><mark>privileging</u></strong></mark> of the self, <u><strong><mark>personal experiences, and individual perspectives</u></strong></mark> of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm <u><mark>mirrors<strong> justifications</u></strong></mark> once <u><strong><mark>used</u></strong></mark> by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates <mark>f<u><strong>or hegemonic social premises to</u></strong> <u><strong>oppress</u></strong></mark> women, the lower class, and <u><strong><mark>people</mark> of color</u></strong>. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan's landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102 [End Page 423]¶ The price exacted by promoting approaches to complex public issues—models that cast conventional deliberative processes, including the marshaling of evidence beyond individual subjectivity, as "elitist" or "monologic"—can be steep. <u><strong><mark>Consider comments</mark> of <mark>an aide to</u></strong></mark> President George W. <u><strong><mark>Bush</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no w</mark>eapons of <mark>m</mark>ass <mark>d</mark>estruction</u></strong>, the primary justification for a U.S.-led war costing thousands of lives. <u><strong>Investigative reporters</u></strong> and other persons sleuthing for hard facts, <u><strong>he claimed, operate "in</u></strong> what we call t<u><strong>he reality-based community</u></strong>." <u><strong>Such people "believe that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality." Then</u></strong> baldly flexing the muscle afforded by increasingly popular social-constructionist and poststructuralist models for conflict resolution, <u><strong>he added: "That's not the way the world really works anymore . . . </u></strong>We're an empire <u><strong>now</u></strong>, and <u><strong><mark>when we act, we create our own reality</u></strong></mark>. And while you're studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we'll act again, creating other new realities."103¶ The recent fascination with public conversation and dialogue most likely is a product of frustration with the tone of much public, political discourse. Such concerns are neither new nor completely without merit. Yet, as Burke insightfully pointed out nearly six decades ago, "A perennial embarrassment in liberal apologetics has arisen from its 'surgical' proclivity: its attempt to outlaw a malfunction by outlawing the function." <u><strong><mark>The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process</u></strong></mark>, he writes, "<u><strong><mark>is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts</u></strong></mark>."104 Because <u><strong>public argument</u></strong> and deliberative processes <u><strong>are the "heart" of true democracy</u></strong>, supplanting those models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself.</p> | null | 2NC | Case | 113,483 | 114 | 17,059 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx | 565,293 | N | Cedanats | 3 | Pittsburgh Chebrolu-Piekos | Stone | 1AC - Workless PAS
1NC - T Romanticization K Physician PIC Ableism turns on Case
2NC - T K
1NR - PIC
2NR - T | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round3.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,710 | Public Debate of organs is key and good—shifts attitudes | Smith 11 http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/sale-of-human-organs-should-be-legalised-say-surgeons-2176110.html | Smith 11 Lewis Smith 05 January 2011 The Independent Sale of human organs should be legalised, say surgeons http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/sale-of-human-organs-should-be-legalised-say-surgeons-2176110.html | Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs. "The British Transplantation Society opposes this view, however it is prepared to debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolve
Keith Rigg, the transplant surgeon and BTS president, said: "I'm happy to debate it. There are pros and cons | Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolve | There remains stiff opposition to liberalising the market, not least from the British Transplantation Society (BTS). Opponents agree there should be a public debate about the merits and flaws of a market in organs. "The British Transplantation Society opposes this view, however it is prepared to debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolves," said a spokesman.
Keith Rigg, the transplant surgeon and BTS president, said: "I'm happy to debate it. There are pros and cons. I think the trouble is it would require a huge change in public opinion and legislation. One argument against a regulated market is if you are paying some people, what would be the impact on the existing deceased donor programme and living donor programme?" | 754 | <h4>Public Debate of organs is key and good—shifts <u>attitudes</u> </h4><p><strong>Smith 11</strong> Lewis Smith 05 January 2011 The Independent Sale of human organs should be legalised, say surgeons <u><strong>http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/health-and-families/health-news/sale-of-human-organs-should-be-legalised-say-surgeons-2176110.html</p><p></u></strong>There remains stiff opposition to liberalising the market, not least from the British Transplantation Society (BTS). <u><strong><mark>Opponents agree there should be a public debate</mark> <mark>about the merits and flaws of a market in organs</mark>. "The British Transplantation Society opposes this view, however it is prepared to <mark>debate this issue as the theoretical and empirical literature evolve</u></mark>s," said a spokesman.</p><p><u>Keith Rigg, the transplant surgeon and BTS president, said: "I'm happy to debate it. There are pros and cons</u></strong>. I think the trouble is it would require a huge change in public opinion and legislation. One argument against a regulated market is if you are paying some people, what would be the impact on the existing deceased donor programme and living donor programme?"</p> | null | 2AC | FW | 430,368 | 2 | 17,058 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,290 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | West Georgia Kelly-Zapata | Rumbaugh | 1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,711 | Nearly all is 90 percent or more. | Gray 91 | Gray 91 (James U. Gray and Ronald N. MacGregor, University of British Columbia, "A Cross-Canada Study of High School Art Teachers", Canadian Journal of Education, 16(1), 1991, p. 51) | nearly all means 90% or more | null | http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE16-1/CJE16-1-4Gray.pdf
Rather than present numerical data as tables, general descriptors are used, sometimes along with numbers. Thus, nearly all means 90% or more of teachers interviewed; many means 70%–89%; half means 50%; some means 20%–49%; and a few means fewer than 20%. | 325 | <h4>Nearly all is 90 percent or more.</h4><p><strong>Gray 91</strong> (James U. Gray and Ronald N. MacGregor, University of British Columbia, "A Cross-Canada Study of High School Art Teachers", Canadian Journal of Education, 16(1), 1991, p. 51)</p><p>http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE16-1/CJE16-1-4Gray.pdf</p><p>Rather than present numerical data as tables, general descriptors are used, sometimes along with numbers. Thus, <u>nearly all means 90% or more</u> of teachers interviewed; many means 70%–89%; half means 50%; some means 20%–49%; and a few means fewer than 20%.</p> | null | 2NC | Case | 430,374 | 6 | 17,060 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | 565,294 | N | Cedanats | 7 | Fresno State Levin-Sicairos | Munday | 1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,712 | State legalization solves the case---DOJ guidance legitimizes it | Rose 12 | I. Nelson Rose 12, Professor of Law, Whittier Law School; Visiting Professor, University of Macau; and Rebecca Bolin, Resident Fellow, Yale Law School, December 2012, “Article: Game On for Internet Gambling: With Federal Approval, States Line Up to Place Their Bets,” Connecticut Law Review, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 653 | With a legal memorandum the Obama Administration reversed an aggressive, decades-old DOJ") position and opened the door for states to legalize almost every form of Internet gambling without interference from federal laws OLC announced the major federal anti-gambling statute, the Wire Act applies only to bets on sports events and races By issuing a clear interpretation of previously vague and inconsistent federal gambling laws, the Executive Branch turned oversight of Internet gambling operations over to states
Internet gambling, is soon to be legalized by the states The debate about Internet gambling has now been pushed to cash-strapped state authorities, allowing them to make their own decisions. This major change in federal law will advance the current wave of legalized gambling which already encompasses all but two states Internet gambling has the potential to spread pervasively with state cooperation. State legislators are desperate to raise revenue without raising taxes Gambling is seen as a painless tax, so states are seriously and quickly expanding to online gambling. They can now do so with the DOJ's blessing for every form of gambling except sports betting | Obama reversed an aggressive DOJ") position and opened the door for states to legalize almost every form of Internet gambling without interference OLC announced the Wire Act applies only to sports By issuing clear interpretation of inconsistent gambling laws, the Executive turned oversight of Internet gambling over to states
This major change will advance the wave of legalized gambling Internet gambling has the potential to spread pervasively with state cooperation states are seriously and quickly expanding | Two days before Christmas in 2011, President Obama gave an unexpected gift to the states. n1 With a thirteen-page legal memorandum ("Memorandum"), the Obama Administration reversed an aggressive, decades-old Department of Justice ("DOJ") position and opened the door for states to legalize almost every form of Internet gambling without interference from federal laws. n2 Through the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC"), the Obama Administration announced that the major federal anti-gambling statute, the Wire Act, n3 now applies only to bets on sports events and races. By issuing a clear interpretation of previously vague and inconsistent federal gambling laws, the Executive Branch maneuvered what Congress could not: it turned oversight of Internet gambling operations over to states.
The impacts of land-based casino gambling are long debated, n4 but Internet gaming is a recently developed industry. Opponents have compared online gambling to crack cocaine, n5 but it has also been described [*656] as inevitable and unstoppable. n6 Americans have made Internet bets in the hundreds of millions of dollars to the benefit of offshore illegal and gray market operations. n7 President Obama's Christmas Memorandum was a gift to states worth billions of dollars in new tax revenue and thousands of new jobs. After this thirteen-page reversal, expect a quick departure to uncharted territory for the United States: legal Internet gambling.
Part II of this Article explains the complicated, interlocked set of federal gaming laws at issue. These laws are critical to federal enforcement of state gambling laws and to federal involvement in states' decisions about what forms of gambling they might want to regulate. The law addressed in the Memorandum, the Wire Act, was the most important weapon the DOJ used to prevent states from authorizing Internet gambling, but it is not the only federal barrier to state-authorized gambling.
Part III discusses the tension among these federal laws, which at times undermine and contradict one another. With no legislative solution in sight, the Memorandum offers a clean solution and interprets the law to eliminate most, though not all, of the problems.
Part IV explores the explosion of Internet gambling, which is soon to be legalized by the states. The debate about Internet gambling has now been pushed to cash-strapped state authorities, allowing them to make their own decisions. This major change in federal law will advance the current wave of legalized gambling, which already encompasses all but two states. Internet gambling has the potential to spread pervasively with state cooperation. State legislators and governors are desperate to find ways to raise revenue without raising taxes. Gambling is seen as a painless tax, so states are seriously and quickly expanding to online gambling. They can [*657] now do so with the DOJ's blessing for every form of gambling except sports betting. | 2,948 | <h4><u>State legalization</u> solves the case---DOJ guidance legitimizes it </h4><p>I. Nelson <strong>Rose 12</strong>, Professor of Law, Whittier Law School; Visiting Professor, University of Macau; and Rebecca Bolin, Resident Fellow, Yale Law School, December 2012, “Article: Game On for Internet Gambling: With Federal Approval, States Line Up to Place Their Bets,” Connecticut Law Review, 45 Conn. L. Rev. 653</p><p>Two days before Christmas in 2011, President Obama gave an unexpected gift to the states. n1 <u><strong>With a</u></strong> thirteen-page <u><strong>legal memorandum</u></strong> ("Memorandum"), <u><strong>the <mark>Obama</mark> Administration</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>reversed</u></strong> <u><strong>an aggressive</mark>, decades-old</u></strong> Department of Justice ("<u><strong><mark>DOJ") position and</u></strong> <u><strong>opened the door for states to legalize almost every form of Internet gambling</u></strong> <u><strong>without interference</mark> from federal laws</u></strong>. n2 Through the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel ("<u><strong><mark>OLC</u></strong></mark>"), the Obama Administration <u><strong><mark>announced</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong>the major federal anti-gambling statute, <mark>the Wire Act</u></strong></mark>, n3 now <u><strong><mark>applies only to</mark> bets on <mark>sports</mark> events and races</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>By issuing</mark> a <mark>clear interpretation of</mark> previously vague and <mark>inconsistent</mark> federal <mark>gambling laws, the Executive</mark> Branch</u></strong> maneuvered what Congress could not: it <u><strong><mark>turned oversight of Internet gambling</mark> operations <mark>over to states</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>The impacts of land-based casino gambling are long debated, n4 but Internet gaming is a recently developed industry. Opponents have compared online gambling to crack cocaine, n5 but it has also been described [*656] as inevitable and unstoppable. n6 Americans have made Internet bets in the hundreds of millions of dollars to the benefit of offshore illegal and gray market operations. n7 President Obama's Christmas Memorandum was a gift to states worth billions of dollars in new tax revenue and thousands of new jobs. After this thirteen-page reversal, expect a quick departure to uncharted territory for the United States: legal Internet gambling.</p><p>Part II of this Article explains the complicated, interlocked set of federal gaming laws at issue. These laws are critical to federal enforcement of state gambling laws and to federal involvement in states' decisions about what forms of gambling they might want to regulate. The law addressed in the Memorandum, the Wire Act, was the most important weapon the DOJ used to prevent states from authorizing Internet gambling, but it is not the only federal barrier to state-authorized gambling.</p><p>Part III discusses the tension among these federal laws, which at times undermine and contradict one another. With no legislative solution in sight, the Memorandum offers a clean solution and interprets the law to eliminate most, though not all, of the problems.</p><p>Part IV explores the explosion of <u><strong>Internet gambling,</u></strong> which <u><strong>is soon to be legalized by the states</u></strong>. <u><strong>The debate about Internet gambling has now been pushed to cash-strapped state authorities, allowing them to make their own decisions. <mark>This</u></strong> <u><strong>major change</mark> in federal law</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>will advance the</mark> current <mark>wave of legalized gambling</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>which already encompasses all but two states</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Internet gambling has the potential to</u></strong> <u><strong>spread pervasively</u></strong> <u><strong>with state cooperation</mark>. State legislators</u></strong> and governors <u><strong>are</u></strong> <u><strong>desperate</u></strong> <u><strong>to</u></strong> find ways to <u><strong>raise revenue without raising taxes</u></strong>. <u><strong>Gambling is seen as a painless tax, so <mark>states are</u></strong> <u><strong>seriously and quickly expanding</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to online gambling. They can</u></strong> [*657] <u><strong>now do so with the DOJ's blessing for every form of gambling except sports betting</u></strong>.</p> | null | 1NC | 1NC | 430,377 | 7 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,713 | Debate on effective implementation of organ policies is a moral responsibility | Taub et al 3 | Taub et al 3 Sara Taub, Andrew H. Maixner, Karine Morin, Robert M. Sade, For The Council On Ethical And Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. "Cadaveric Organ Donation: Encouraging The Study Of Motivation." Transplantation Forum. Vol. 76, 748–751, No. 4, August 27, 2003. https://www.musc.edu/humanvalues/pdf/Cadaveric-organ-donation.pdf | If policymakers, ethicists, or legislators prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and reduce the number of deaths, then they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transplant. Therefore, a better informed debate is necessary, one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured | If policymakers prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and reduce the number of deaths they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transpla better informed debate is necessar one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured | A thorough discussion of this matter also must include an examination of the costs of foregoing such studies. Currently, about 16 patients die each day waiting for an available organ (15). If policymakers, ethicists, or legislators prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and reduce the number of deaths, then they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transplant. Therefore, a better informed debate is necessary, one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured | 616 | <h4>Debate on effective implementation of organ policies is a moral responsibility</h4><p><strong>Taub et al 3</strong> Sara Taub, Andrew H. Maixner, Karine Morin, Robert M. Sade, For The Council On Ethical And Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. "Cadaveric Organ Donation: Encouraging The Study Of Motivation." Transplantation Forum. Vol. 76, 748–751, No. 4, August 27, 2003. https://www.musc.edu/humanvalues/pdf/Cadaveric-organ-donation.pdf</p><p>A thorough discussion of this matter also must include an examination of the costs of foregoing such studies. Currently, about 16 patients die each day waiting for an available organ (15). <u><strong><mark>If policymakers</mark>, ethicists, or legislators <mark>prohibit the implementation of programs that could be shown to increase the number of available organs and</mark> <mark>reduce the number of deaths</mark>, then <mark>they must bear some moral responsibility for the patients who die from lack of an organ transpla</mark>nt. Therefore, a <mark>better informed debate is necessar</mark>y, <mark>one that can occur only after the effectiveness of various incentive models has been measured</p></u></strong></mark> | null | 2AC | FW | 430,266 | 7 | 17,058 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,290 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | West Georgia Kelly-Zapata | Rumbaugh | 1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,714 | Nearly all is over 90% | Holland 8 | Holland 8 Danielle Holland, AARP : Press Center, August 14, 2008 AARP: Statement Recognizing Social Security's 73rd Anniversary http://www.aarp.org/about-aarp/press-center/info-08-2008/aarp_statement _recognizing_ social_securitys_73rd_a.html | nearly all (90 percent or more | null | According to the Social Security Administration’s most recent data, one out of three 65+ households rely on Social Security for nearly all (90 percent or more) of their income. For two out of three retirees, Social Security is their largest source of income. | 258 | <h4>Nearly all is over 90%</h4><p><strong>Holland 8</strong> Danielle Holland, AARP : Press Center, August 14, 2008 AARP: Statement Recognizing Social Security's 73rd Anniversary http://www.aarp.org/about-aarp/press-center/info-08-2008/aarp_statement _recognizing_ social_securitys_73rd_a.html</p><p>According to the Social Security Administration’s most recent data, one out of three 65+ households rely on Social Security for <u>nearly all (90 percent or more</u>) of their income. For two out of three retirees, Social Security is their largest source of income.</p> | null | 2NC | Case | 430,378 | 1 | 17,060 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | 565,294 | N | Cedanats | 7 | Fresno State Levin-Sicairos | Munday | 1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,715 | Antiguan cross-retaliation triggers monitoring systems for TRIPS compliance---that massively boosts overall enforcement of all IP laws---it’s unique because there’s no political will for LDCs to cooperate in enforcement now | Hamann 9 | Georgia Hamann 9, J.D. 2009, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009, “NOTE: REPLACING SLINGSHOTS WITH SWORDS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANTIGUA-GAMBLING 22.6 PANEL REPORT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 993 | Monitoring and enforcement systems are untested territory because Ecuador settled instead of suspending TRIPS Ecuador's proposed mechanism is an indication that viable options exist
reference to the EC-Bananas III arbitration by the Anitigua-Gambling arbitrators hints that the WTO would require a similar system for developing countries in subsequent arbitration that actually implements the TRIPS suspension remedy
Forcing developing countries seeking retaliation under TRIPS to demonstrate effective monitoring and enforcement of the authorized IP suspensions could lead to more effective monitoring and enforcement of regular TRIPS protections
Whereas the incentives to develop systems to enforce TRIPS protections are currently relatively low authorization of the TRIPS suspension remedy increases those incentives The U.S., would watch for signs that the retaliating country lost control of the remedy The developing country would have an incentive to avoid expensive and exhausting disputes over the scope of retaliation the developing country would develop "the political will to curb "piracy the developing country would also correct "institutional weaknesses by developing effective means of monitoring pirates and protecting information
Other developed countries would have an interest in ensuring that the suspensions did not affect their protected material Increased interest in maintaining protection would increase the pressure on the developing state to increase TRIPS enforcement across the board and would lead to assistance in creating enforcement regimes Such assistance would go far to increase TRIPS compliance | Monitoring and enforcement are untested because Ecuador settled instead of suspending TRIPS Ecuador's mechanism is an indication viable options exist
the WTO would require a similar system for developing countries in subsequent arbitration that implements TRIPS suspension
Forcing developing countries to demonstrate effective monitoring and enforcement of the authorized suspensions could lead to more effective monitoring and enforcement of regular TRIPS protections
Whereas incentives to develop systems to enforce TRIPS are currently low authorization of TRIPS suspension remedy increases those incentives. The U.S., would watch for signs the retaliating country lost control of the remedy The developing country would have an incentive to avoid disputes over the scope of retaliation the developing country would develop political will to curb "piracy correct "institutional weaknesses by developing effective means of monitoring and protecting information
developed countries would have an interest in ensuring suspensions did not affect their material Increased interest would increase pressure on the developing state to increase TRIPS enforcement across the board and would lead to assistance creating enforcement regimes. assistance would go far to increase TRIPS compliance | Monitoring and enforcement systems are, unfortunately, untested territory because Ecuador settled instead of suspending TRIPS. n232 However, Ecuador's proposed mechanism is an indication that viable options exist. n233 In EC-Bananas III, the decision noted "with approval" n234 that Ecuador had proposed to implement a coherent and likely effective structure for monitoring and calculating the value of continued violations, in addition to the "actual impact" of initial violations. n235 If it were to suspend TRIPS, Ecuador intended to establish a licensing system whereby companies or individuals who wanted to produce materials with an EC copyright would instead apply for a license from the Ecuadorian government. n236 The licensing system would "[limit] the suspension of concessions in terms of quantity, value, and time." n237 The government would use a specified ""related right value' of a new ... sound recording," with the value [*1026] calculated by an international institution. n238 The EC-Bananas III decision further explained,
The Ecuadorian government would reserve its right to revoke these licenses at any time... . A certain proportion of this value would represent the performer's share and another, larger part would represent the producer's share. If the level of suspension thus calculated were to risk reaching (together with authorized suspension in other sectors and/or under other agreements, if any) the level of nullification and impairment suffered by Ecuador, the authorization scheme would be stopped. Ecuador believes that the chances that this would happen are very close to nil. n239
Although Antigua proposed no such structure and merely sought the right to suspend TRIPS, n240 the specific reference n241 to the EC-Bananas III arbitration by the Anitigua-Gambling arbitrators n242 hints that the WTO would require a similar system for developing countries in subsequent arbitration that actually implements the TRIPS suspension remedy.
Forcing developing countries seeking retaliation under TRIPS to demonstrate effective monitoring and enforcement of the authorized IP suspensions could also lead to more effective monitoring and enforcement of regular TRIPS protections. Weak TRIPS enforcement in developing countries is primarily attributed to "institutional weaknesses and the lack of resources," as well as a lack of "the political will to curb "piracy.'" n243
Whereas the incentives to develop systems to enforce TRIPS protections are currently relatively low, n244 authorization of the TRIPS suspension remedy increases those incentives. The U.S., or any similarly situated developed country, would watch for signs that the retaliating country lost control of the remedy. The developing country would have an incentive to avoid expensive and exhausting disputes over the scope of retaliation and attempts by the developing economy to maximize the value of suspensions - that is, the [*1027] developing country would develop "the political will to curb "piracy.'" n245 In addition to this newfound will, the developing country would also correct "institutional weaknesses" by developing effective means of monitoring pirates and protecting information. n246
Other developed countries, though not directly entangled in the dispute, would nevertheless have an interest in ensuring that the suspensions did not affect their protected material. n247 Increased interest in maintaining protection would increase the pressure on the developing state to increase TRIPS enforcement across the board and perhaps would lead to assistance in creating enforcement regimes. Such assistance would go far to increase TRIPS compliance. n248 | 3,672 | <h4>Antiguan cross-retaliation triggers <u>monitoring systems</u> for TRIPS compliance---that <u>massively boosts</u> overall <u>enforcement</u> of <u>all</u> IP laws---it’s unique because there’s <u>no political will</u> for LDCs to cooperate in enforcement now </h4><p>Georgia <strong>Hamann 9</strong>, J.D. 2009, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009, “NOTE: REPLACING SLINGSHOTS WITH SWORDS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANTIGUA-GAMBLING 22.6 PANEL REPORT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 993 </p><p><u><strong><mark>Monitoring and enforcement</mark> systems <mark>are</u></strong></mark>, unfortunately, <u><strong><mark>untested</mark> territory <mark>because Ecuador settled instead of suspending TRIPS</u></strong></mark>. n232 However, <u><strong><mark>Ecuador's</mark> proposed <mark>mechanism is an indication</mark> that</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>viable options exist</u></strong></mark>. n233 In EC-Bananas III, the decision noted "with approval" n234 that Ecuador had proposed to implement a coherent and likely effective structure for monitoring and calculating the value of continued violations, in addition to the "actual impact" of initial violations. n235 If it were to suspend TRIPS, Ecuador intended to establish a licensing system whereby companies or individuals who wanted to produce materials with an EC copyright would instead apply for a license from the Ecuadorian government. n236 The licensing system would "[limit] the suspension of concessions in terms of quantity, value, and time." n237 The government would use a specified ""related right value' of a new ... sound recording," with the value [*1026] calculated by an international institution. n238 The EC-Bananas III decision further explained, </p><p>The Ecuadorian government would reserve its right to revoke these licenses at any time... . A certain proportion of this value would represent the performer's share and another, larger part would represent the producer's share. If the level of suspension thus calculated were to risk reaching (together with authorized suspension in other sectors and/or under other agreements, if any) the level of nullification and impairment suffered by Ecuador, the authorization scheme would be stopped. Ecuador believes that the chances that this would happen are very close to nil. n239</p><p>Although Antigua proposed no such structure and merely sought the right to suspend TRIPS, n240 the specific <u><strong>reference</u></strong> n241 <u><strong>to the EC-Bananas III arbitration by the Anitigua-Gambling arbitrators</u></strong> n242 <u><strong>hints that <mark>the WTO would</u></strong> <u><strong>require a similar system for developing countries in subsequent arbitration that</mark> actually <mark>implements</mark> the <mark>TRIPS suspension</mark> remedy</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Forcing developing countries</mark> seeking retaliation under TRIPS <mark>to demonstrate effective monitoring and enforcement of the authorized</mark> IP <mark>suspensions could</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>lead to more effective monitoring and enforcement of regular TRIPS protections</u></strong></mark>. Weak TRIPS enforcement in developing countries is primarily attributed to "institutional weaknesses and the lack of resources," as well as a lack of "the political will to curb "piracy.'" n243</p><p><u><strong><mark>Whereas</mark> the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>incentives to develop systems to enforce TRIPS</mark> protections <mark>are currently</mark> relatively <mark>low</u></strong></mark>, n244 <u><strong><mark>authorization of</mark> the <mark>TRIPS suspension remedy</u></strong> <u><strong>increases those incentives</u></strong>. <u><strong>The U.S.,</u></strong></mark> or any similarly situated developed country, <u><strong><mark>would watch for signs</mark> that <mark>the retaliating country lost control of the remedy</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>The developing country would have an incentive to avoid</mark> expensive and exhausting <mark>disputes over the scope of retaliation</u></strong></mark> and attempts by the developing economy to maximize the value of suspensions - that is, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> [*1027] <u><strong><mark>developing country would</u></strong> <u><strong>develop</mark> "the <mark>political will to curb "piracy</u></strong></mark>.'" n245 In addition to this newfound will, <u><strong>the developing country would also</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>correct "institutional weaknesses</u></strong></mark>" <u><strong><mark>by developing effective means of monitoring</mark> pirates <mark>and protecting information</u></strong></mark>. n246</p><p><u><strong>Other <mark>developed countries</u></strong></mark>, though not directly entangled in the dispute, <u><strong><mark>would</u></strong></mark> nevertheless <u><strong><mark>have an interest in ensuring</mark> that the <mark>suspensions did not affect their</mark> protected <mark>material</u></strong></mark>. n247 <u><strong><mark>Increased interest</mark> in maintaining protection <mark>would</u></strong> <u><strong>increase</mark> the <mark>pressure on the developing state to</u></strong> <u><strong>increase TRIPS enforcement across the board</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong></mark> perhaps <u><strong><mark>would lead to</u></strong> <u><strong>assistance</mark> in <mark>creating enforcement regimes</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>Such <mark>assistance would</u></strong> <u><strong>go far to increase TRIPS compliance</u></strong></mark>. n248</p> | null | 1NC | 1NC | 430,379 | 9 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,716 | 2. It papers over other views in African American culture. When you assume a language only expresses resistance, it prevents dialectic to change those ideas. | McCLendon 4 | McCLendon 4 John h. Mcclendon III, Bates College Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2004. P.308-9 | Yancy argues that resistance to white supremacy is the defining characteristic of African American culture and hence language
African American culture is not in any way a monolithically formed culture where there are only manifestations of resistance There is more to African American history and culture than a continuous line of resistance to oppression not all African Americans sang the spirituals with an eye to joining the Underground Railroad
those who ratted out the slave revolts shared in the same language The idea that identity among African Americans, are preeminently the same for all is the sort of reductionism that flattens out the cultural, social, political, and ideological landscape called African American culture.
African American culture in its full substance and scope is more complex than a singular thrust in the monodirection of resistance African American culture historically constitutes an ensemble of traditions in which we are able to locate what are two primary and yet contradictory forms, viz. one of resistance and another of accommodation This internal dialectic is undermined when a scenario of resistance sans accommodation gains support | Yancy argues that resistance to white supremacy is the defining characteristic of African American language
African American culture is not monolithically formed where there are only manifestations of resistance
those who ratted out the slave revolts shared in the same language
African American culture is more complex than a singular thrust in the monodirection of resistance This internal dialectic is undermined when a scenario of resistance sans accommodation gains support | Additionally, the function of various forms of social stratification—especially the impact of class contradictions—harbors the real possibility for different ideological responses to commonly experienced conditions of life. In the manner of the Marxist conception of ideology, as found in The German Ideology, I presume that philosophy (ontology) is a form of ideology (Marx and Engels 1976). Hence, only on the presupposition that the African American community is socially homogeneous can it plausibly be argued that African Americans all share the same ontology. Given it is not the case that the African American community is homogeneous, then there is no plausible warranting for the belief that all African Americans share a common ontology. This leads directly to point three and my charge of Yancy’s (and Smitherman’s) vindicationism, where he argues that resistance to white supremacy is the defining characteristic of African American culture and hence language.
When African American vindicationism is bereft of dialectical theory and method, as a determinate philosophical approach to African American culture, it neglects a very important aspect of the historical dialectic of African Ameri can culture, viz. that African American culture is not in any way a monolithically formed culture where there are only manifestations of resistance. There is more to African American history and culture than a continuous line of resistance to oppression, for, by way of example, not all African Americans sang the spirituals with an eye to joining the Underground Railroad (Fisher 1990). Some believed that freedom was wearing a robe in “heaben” and that washing in the blood of Jesus would make one “as white as the snow.” Or that loyalty to Massa was the highest virtue and resistance and revolt were of the greatest folly. The modern day connotation for “Uncle Tom” did not enter the lexicon of African American language without the historical presence of real, existing “Toms.” It is no accident that there is the current exercise in African American locution of playing on this word (Tom) whenever Supreme Court Justice, Clarence “Tomto- us” is mentioned among African American political speakers.
After all, the historical record indicates that the failure of Gabriel Prosser’s, Denmark Vesey’s, and Nat Turner’s slave insurrections were due in part to other slaves that were more loyal to Massa than their own liberation. Mind you that those who ratted out the slave revolts shared in the same language, ate the same food, lived the same experiences, but also had a different worldview (conception of reality) and set of values. The idea that social ontology and identity among African Americans, past and present, are preeminently the same for all is the sort of reductionism that flattens out the cultural, social, political, and ideological landscape called African American culture.
Albeit, resistance is cardinal and crucial to any description, definition, and interpretation of African American culture, nonetheless, it is not exhaustive of its actualities and even of its future possibilities. African American culture in its full substance and scope is more complex than a singular thrust in the monodirection of resistance. Rather, African American culture historically constitutes an ensemble of traditions in which we are able, for analytical purposes, to locate what are two primary and yet contradictory forms, viz. one of resistance and another of accommodation. This internal dialectic is undermined when a scenario of resistance sans accommodation gains support via vindicationism. | 3,608 | <h4>2. It papers over other views in African American culture. When you assume a language only expresses resistance, it prevents dialectic to change those ideas. </h4><p><strong>McCLendon 4</strong> John h. Mcclendon III, Bates College Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2004. P.308-9</p><p>Additionally, the function of various forms of social stratification—especially the impact of class contradictions—harbors the real possibility for different ideological responses to commonly experienced conditions of life. In the manner of the Marxist conception of ideology, as found in The German Ideology, I presume that philosophy (ontology) is a form of ideology (Marx and Engels 1976). Hence, only on the presupposition that the African American community is socially homogeneous can it plausibly be argued that African Americans all share the same ontology. Given it is not the case that the African American community is homogeneous, then there is no plausible warranting for the belief that all African Americans share a common ontology. This leads directly to point three and my charge of <u><mark>Yancy</u></mark>’s (and Smitherman’s) vindicationism, where he <u><mark>argues that resistance to white supremacy is the defining characteristic of African American</u> <u></mark>culture and hence <mark>language</u></mark>.</p><p>When African American vindicationism is bereft of dialectical theory and method, as a determinate philosophical approach to African American culture, it neglects a very important aspect of the historical dialectic of African Ameri can culture, viz. that <u><mark>African American culture is not</mark> in any way a <mark>monolithically formed</mark> culture <mark>where there are only manifestations of resistance</u></mark>. <u>There is more to African American history and culture than a continuous line of resistance to oppression</u>, for, by way of example, <u>not all African Americans sang the spirituals with an eye to joining the Underground Railroad</u> (Fisher 1990). Some believed that freedom was wearing a robe in “heaben” and that washing in the blood of Jesus would make one “as white as the snow.” Or that loyalty to Massa was the highest virtue and resistance and revolt were of the greatest folly. The modern day connotation for “Uncle Tom” did not enter the lexicon of African American language without the historical presence of real, existing “Toms.” It is no accident that there is the current exercise in African American locution of playing on this word (Tom) whenever Supreme Court Justice, Clarence “Tomto- us” is mentioned among African American political speakers.</p><p>After all, the historical record indicates that the failure of Gabriel Prosser’s, Denmark Vesey’s, and Nat Turner’s slave insurrections were due in part to other slaves that were more loyal to Massa than their own liberation. Mind you that <u><mark>those who ratted out the slave revolts shared in the same language</u></mark>, ate the same food, lived the same experiences, but also had a different worldview (conception of reality) and set of values. <u>The idea that</u> social ontology and<u> identity among African Americans,</u> past and present, <u>are preeminently the same for all is the sort of reductionism that flattens out the cultural, social, political, and ideological landscape called African American culture.</p><p></u>Albeit, resistance is cardinal and crucial to any description, definition, and interpretation of African American culture, nonetheless, it is not exhaustive of its actualities and even of its future possibilities. <u><mark>African American culture</mark> in its full substance and scope <mark>is more complex than a singular thrust in the monodirection of resistance</u></mark>. Rather, <u>African American culture historically constitutes an ensemble of traditions in which we are able</u>, for analytical purposes, <u>to locate what are two primary and yet contradictory forms, viz. one of resistance and another of accommodation</u>. <u><mark>This internal dialectic is undermined when a scenario of resistance sans accommodation gains support</u></mark> via vindicationism. </p> | null | A2 George Yancy/Nommo | A2 Yancy or Nommo – McClendon 4 Clarke 4 – Top Level Turns | 430,380 | 12 | 17,058 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,290 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | West Georgia Kelly-Zapata | Rumbaugh | 1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,717 | Strengthening global IP protection is key to U.S. growth and competitiveness | Pham 10 | Nam D. Pham 10, Managing Partner of NDP Consulting Group, formerly Vice President at Scudder Kemper Investments in Boston, where he was responsible for research, asset allocations, and currency hedging for Scudder’s global and international bond funds; formerly Chief Economist of the Asia Region for Standard & Poor’s DRI in Boston; an economist at the World Bank in Washington D.C.; and a consultant to both the Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission, April 2010, “The Impact of Innovation and the Role of Intellectual Property Rights on U.S. Productivity, Competitiveness, Jobs, Wages, and Exports,” http://infojustice.org/download/gcongress/dii/pham%20article.pdf | the creation of i p is the key factor in sustaining economic growth i p enhances U.S. productivity and strengthens global competitiveness
IP-intensive industries enjoy higher productivity and greater competitiveness While the U.S. job market remains weak IP-intensive industries are creating jobs
To strengthen the U.S. economic position in global markets U.S. policymakers will need to support policies to encourage innovation
With the growing importance of knowledge as a driving force for economic expansion worldwide protection of i p rights has attracted greater attention and concern piracy of products are rising exponentially and are costing the global economy hundreds of billions The challenge is developing the policy instruments and frameworks to better protect intellectual property rights Policies that enhance law enforcement’s ability to prosecute IP theft are essential for promoting further innovation protection of i p rights will require the effective strengthening of national policies as well as the international coordination of effective policies
U.S. policy action to further encourage IP creation while protecting IP rights will be critical in helping the U S retain its global competitive edge in innovation This is essential for ensuring sustained U.S. economic growth | creation of i p is the key factor in sustaining growth and strengthens global competitiveness
To strengthen the U.S. position in global markets policymakers need to encourage innovation
protection of i p has attracted greater concern piracy are rising exponentially Policies that enhance ability to prosecute IP theft are essential for promoting innovation protection will require effective national policies, as well as international coordination
U.S. policy protecting IP will be critical in helping the U S retain its global competitive edge | We conclude that the creation of intellectual property is the key factor in sustaining economic growth and achieving high living standards, a finding that is consistent with the current literature. Evidence from the United States for the 2000s confirms that intellectual property enhances U.S. productivity, in terms of revenue and value added, and strengthens global competitiveness, as reflected in higher exports.
IP-intensive industries, measured by R&D expenditure as such expenditures are direct inputs for innovation and are the most widely used measures for intellectual property, enjoy higher productivity and greater competitiveness than non-IP intensive industries. While the U.S. job market remains weak, with the unemployment rate stuck at historical highs, IP-intensive industries are creating jobs for scientists and engineers, as well as for low-skilled production workers. In addition to R&D expenditure, IP-intensive industries show more capital expenditure per employee. In this way, IP-intensive industries exert positive effects on other tradable industries (machinery and equipment), as well as on non-tradable industries (buildings and other structures). From a global perspective, innovations in developed countries also have positive effects on factor productivity in developing countries.
To strengthen the U.S. economic position in global markets, U.S. policymakers will need to support policies to encourage innovation. While R&D expenditures by the United States account for 33 percent of global R&D spending--far exceeding the spending of all other countries--seven other countries report R&D-intensity levels (R&D as a percent of GDP) above the U.S. level.77 This suggests the need for the United States to further increase its R&D spending to maintain its advantage in the coming years.
Since industry is the largest source of R&D funding (67 percent) as well as the largest R&D spender (72 percent), such valuable policy incentives as R&D tax credits will continue to encourage applied research and development. U.S. policymakers would also do well in supporting the recent proposals to the Congress of the National Science Board; the Board recommended additional federal funding for basic research, more intellectual interchanges between industry and academia, and new databases to track the impact of the globalization of manufacturing and services on the U.S. economy.78
With the growing importance of knowledge as a driving force for innovation and economic expansion worldwide, the protection of intellectual property rights has attracted greater attention and concern. The counterfeiting and piracy of products are rising exponentially and are costing the global economy hundreds of billions of dollars a year in lost revenues and thousands of jobs. The challenge for policymakers is therefore to continue encouraging investment in R&D and human capital in order to promote innovation while at the same time developing the policy instruments and frameworks to better protect intellectual property rights. Policies that enhance law enforcement’s ability to detect, investigate, and prosecute IP theft are essential for better protecting intellectual property rights and thereby promoting further innovation. The protection of intellectual property rights will require the effective strengthening of national policies, as well as the international coordination of effective policies and frameworks in such forums as the World Trade Organization.
The United States has demonstrated a commitment to protecting intellectual property rights. The Congress in 2008 passed, and President Bush signed into law, the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act (ProIP Act) that increased both civil and criminal penalties for trademark and copyright infringement. Consequently, the Senate in December 2009 confirmed Victoria Espinel as the first IP enforcement coordinator to oversee the nation’s enforcement of intellectual property laws and to protect U.S. intellectual property abroad. And the U.S. House of Representatives recently passed the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2009 to protect intellectual property online.79 As for cross-border IP theft, this can be addressed by re-authorizing the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Reauthorization Act to enhance the IP enforcement capabilities of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and to press for internationally coordinated rules in relevant global forums.
U.S. policy action to further encourage IP creation while protecting IP rights will be critical in helping the United States retain its global competitive edge in innovation. This, in turn, is essential for ensuring sustained U.S. economic growth and job creation in the coming years. | 4,759 | <h4><u>Strengthening global IP protection</u> is key to U.S. growth and competitiveness </h4><p>Nam D. <strong>Pham 10</strong>, Managing Partner of NDP Consulting Group, formerly Vice President at Scudder Kemper Investments in Boston, where he was responsible for research, asset allocations, and currency hedging for Scudder’s global and international bond funds; formerly Chief Economist of the Asia Region for Standard & Poor’s DRI in Boston; an economist at the World Bank in Washington D.C.; and a consultant to both the Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission, April 2010, “The Impact of Innovation and the Role of Intellectual Property Rights on U.S. Productivity, Competitiveness, Jobs, Wages, and Exports,” http://infojustice.org/download/gcongress/dii/pham%20article.pdf</p><p>We conclude that <u><strong>the <mark>creation of</u></strong> <u><strong>i</u></strong></mark>ntellectual <u><strong><mark>p</u></strong></mark>roperty <u><strong><mark>is the</u></strong> <u><strong>key factor in sustaining</mark> economic <mark>growth</u></strong></mark> and achieving high living standards, a finding that is consistent with the current literature. Evidence from the United States for the 2000s confirms that <u><strong>i</u></strong>ntellectual <u><strong>p</u></strong>roperty <u><strong>enhances U.S. productivity</u></strong>, in terms of revenue and value added, <u><strong><mark>and</u></strong> <u><strong>strengthens global competitiveness</u></strong></mark>, as reflected in higher exports. </p><p><u><strong>IP-intensive industries</u></strong>, measured by R&D expenditure as such expenditures are direct inputs for innovation and are the most widely used measures for intellectual property, <u><strong>enjoy higher productivity and greater competitiveness</u></strong> than non-IP intensive industries. <u><strong>While the U.S. job market remains weak</u></strong>, with the unemployment rate stuck at historical highs, <u><strong>IP-intensive industries are creating jobs</u></strong> for scientists and engineers, as well as for low-skilled production workers. In addition to R&D expenditure, IP-intensive industries show more capital expenditure per employee. In this way, IP-intensive industries exert positive effects on other tradable industries (machinery and equipment), as well as on non-tradable industries (buildings and other structures). From a global perspective, innovations in developed countries also have positive effects on factor productivity in developing countries. </p><p><u><strong><mark>To strengthen the U.S.</mark> economic <mark>position in global markets</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>U.S. <mark>policymakers</mark> will <mark>need to</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>support policies to <mark>encourage innovation</u></strong></mark>. While R&D expenditures by the United States account for 33 percent of global R&D spending--far exceeding the spending of all other countries--seven other countries report R&D-intensity levels (R&D as a percent of GDP) above the U.S. level.77 This suggests the need for the United States to further increase its R&D spending to maintain its advantage in the coming years.</p><p>Since industry is the largest source of R&D funding (67 percent) as well as the largest R&D spender (72 percent), such valuable policy incentives as R&D tax credits will continue to encourage applied research and development. U.S. policymakers would also do well in supporting the recent proposals to the Congress of the National Science Board; the Board recommended additional federal funding for basic research, more intellectual interchanges between industry and academia, and new databases to track the impact of the globalization of manufacturing and services on the U.S. economy.78</p><p><u><strong>With the growing importance of knowledge as a driving force for</u></strong> innovation and <u><strong>economic expansion worldwide</u></strong>, the <u><strong><mark>protection of i</u></strong></mark>ntellectual <u><strong><mark>p</u></strong></mark>roperty <u><strong>rights</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>has attracted greater</mark> attention and <mark>concern</u></strong></mark>. The counterfeiting and <u><strong><mark>piracy</mark> of products <mark>are rising exponentially</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and are costing the global economy hundreds of billions</u></strong> of dollars a year in lost revenues and thousands of jobs. <u><strong>The challenge</u></strong> for policymakers <u><strong>is</u></strong> therefore to continue encouraging investment in R&D and human capital in order to promote innovation while at the same time <u><strong>developing the policy instruments and frameworks to</u></strong> <u><strong>better protect intellectual property rights</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Policies that enhance</mark> law enforcement’s <mark>ability to</u></strong></mark> detect, investigate, and <u><strong><mark>prosecute IP theft are essential for</u></strong></mark> better protecting intellectual property rights and thereby <u><strong><mark>promoting</mark> further <mark>innovation</u></strong></mark>. The <u><strong><mark>protection</mark> of i</u></strong>ntellectual <u><strong>p</u></strong>roperty <u><strong>rights <mark>will</u></strong> <u><strong>require</mark> the <mark>effective</mark> strengthening of <mark>national policies</u></strong>, <u><strong>as well as</mark> the <mark>international coordination</mark> of effective policies</u></strong> and frameworks in such forums as the World Trade Organization.</p><p>The United States has demonstrated a commitment to protecting intellectual property rights. The Congress in 2008 passed, and President Bush signed into law, the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act (ProIP Act) that increased both civil and criminal penalties for trademark and copyright infringement. Consequently, the Senate in December 2009 confirmed Victoria Espinel as the first IP enforcement coordinator to oversee the nation’s enforcement of intellectual property laws and to protect U.S. intellectual property abroad. And the U.S. House of Representatives recently passed the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2009 to protect intellectual property online.79 As for cross-border IP theft, this can be addressed by re-authorizing the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Reauthorization Act to enhance the IP enforcement capabilities of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and to press for internationally coordinated rules in relevant global forums. </p><p><u><strong><mark>U.S. policy</mark> action to further encourage IP creation while <mark>protecting IP</mark> rights <mark>will be</u></strong> <u><strong>critical in helping the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>retain its global competitive edge</mark> in innovation</u></strong>. <u><strong>This</u></strong>, in turn, <u><strong>is essential for ensuring sustained U.S. economic growth</u></strong> and job creation in the coming years.</p> | null | 1NC | 1NC | 430,381 | 10 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,718 | Debate inevitably involves exclusions---making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary to foster democratic habits and critical thinking---this process outweighs the content of the aff | Anderson 6—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 25-8) | Anderson 6—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 25-8) | substantive normative guidance through appeal to the principles of respect and reciprocity Attempt to redress the overwhelmingly negative forms of critique characteristic of poststructuralist traditions, he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute “a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life The potential is the potential for mutual understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language Habermas acknowledges the dominance of instrumental reason his project is largely devoted to a systematic analysis of the conditions of that dominance yet he wishes to retrieve an emancipatory model of communicative reason derived from a linguistic understanding of intersubjective relations he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of such norms is possible he insists instead that we view the normative constraints of speech community as “universal pragmatic presuppositions” Benhabib promot a self-conscious universalism that locates the ethical principles of respect and reciprocity as “constituents of the moral point of view Benhabib constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of modernity differs in two key respects Habermas’s emphasis on consensus distorts his account of communicative ethics Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus Benhabib champions a discourse model of ethics that is geared toward keeping the conversation going: When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethics from consensus to the idea of an ongoing conversation, we begin to ask not what all would agree to as a result of practical discourses to be morally permissible or impermissible but what would be allowed from the standpoint of continuing and sustaining the practice of the conversation The emphasis now is less on rational agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish Benhabib opposes any politics that privileges the detached self over the concrete, embodied, self she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”: Interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and differences among humans without endorsing all these pluralities as valid While agreeing that normative disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are necessary conditions interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection In this sense, “universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied identity but aims at developing moral attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a point of view acceptable to all Universality is not consensus but the concrete process in politics Benhabib’s position attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm enabling crucial distinctions between notions of the good life that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.” It understands identity as “embodied and promotes encounters with otherness to nurture a moral attitude that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.” Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “all” here cannot coherently include those who have forfeited their place as equal participants in the ethicopolitical community redefinition of universalism insists on inevitable exclusion but not in the sense that poststructuralist critics do as the hardwired effect of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness, and as victimizing those disempowered by race, class, gender, or sexuality Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness which prove self-undermining in their toleration of practices that exclude others arbitrarily, interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are not only justified, but indeed required by the principles of recognition and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices
Lethal Injection Can Be Performed By Non-Medical PersonnelCatheter insertion and barbiturate administration are easily performed with minimal training, and physicians need not be involved
Participation of medical professionals in American executions is a controversial topic, due to its moral and legal implications. The practice is proscribed by the American Medical Association, as defined in its Code of Medical Ethics. The American Society of Anesthesiologists endorses this position, stating "[lethal injections] can never conform to the science, art and practice of anesthesiology".[ | substantive normative guidance through appeal to reciprocity wishes to retrieve emancipatory communicative reason derived from intersubjective relations he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of norms is possible instead we view the normative constraints of speech community as “ pragmatic presuppositions Benhabib promot a self-conscious universalism that locates reciprocity as “constituents of the moral view Benhabib champions a model geared toward keeping the conversation going: When we shift the burden of the moral test to the idea of an ongoing conversation we begin to ask not what all would agree to be morally impermissible but what would be allowed from the standpoint of sustaining the practice of conversation The emphasis now is on sustaining normative practices within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish Interactive universalism acknowledges differences agreeing that disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are necessary universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied identity but aims at developing attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a view acceptable to all Universality is not consensus but the process in politics all cannot include those who have forfeited their place as participants in the community redefinition of universalism insists on exclusion but not in the sense of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness victimizing those disempowered by race Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness which prove self-undermining in their toleration of practices that exclude others arbitrarily interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are required by the principles of recognition that underpin democratic practices | 25¶ Whether such a procedural approach actually helps to yield any substantive normative guidance is an issue of debate. Habermas has sought to justify communicative ethics through appeal to the principles of respect and reciprocity that he claims are inherent in linguistic practices geared toward reaching understanding. Attempting to redress the overwhelmingly negative forms of critique characteristic of both the Frankfurt School and poststructuralist traditions, he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the powerful instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute “a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life.” The potential he refers to is the potential for mutual understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language.” 7 Habermas acknowledges the dominance and reach of instrumental reason—his project is largely devoted to a systematic analysis of the historical conditions and social effects of that dominance—yet at the same time he wishes to retrieve an emancipatory model of communicative¶ ¶ 26¶ reason derived from a linguistic understanding of intersubjective relations. As Benhabib argues, this form of communicative action, embodied in the highly controversial and pervasively misunderstood concept of the “ideal speech situation,” entails strong ethical assumptions, namely the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (SS, 29).¶ Habermas has famously argued that he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of such norms is possible; he insists instead that we view the normative constraints of the ideal speech community as “universal pragmatic presuppositions” of competent moral actors who have reached the postconventional stage of moral reasoning. Habermas’s theory combines a “weak transcendental argument” concerning the four types of validity claims operative in speech acts with an empirical reconstruction of psychosocial development derived from Lawrence Kohlberg. Benhabib, though she, too, appeals to socialization processes, distinguishes her position from Habermas’s “weak transcendental argument” by promoting a “historically self-conscious universalism” that locates the ethical principles of respect and reciprocity as “constituents of the moral point of view from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (SS, 30). Benhabib’s work thus constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of specific potentialities of modernity. She differs from him in two key respects, besides the emphasis already outlined. First, she believes that Habermas’s emphasis on consensus seriously distorts his account of communicative ethics. Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus, Benhabib champions instead a discourse model of ethics that is geared toward keeping the conversation going:¶ When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethics from consensus to the idea of an ongoing moral conversation, we begin to ask not what all would or could agree to as a result of practical discourses to be morally permissible or impermissible, but what would be allowed and perhaps even necessary from the standpoint of continuing and sustaining the practice of the moral conversation among us. The emphasis now is less on rational agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue. (SS, 38)8¶ ¶ 27¶ The second significant difference between Habermas and Benhabib is that Benhabib rejects Habermas’s rigid opposition between justice and the good life, an opposition that effectively relegates identity-based politics to a lower plane of moral practice, and that for Benhabib undercuts our ability to apprehend the radical particularity of the other. While she believes in the importance of self-reflexive interrogations of conventional identities and roles, she strongly opposes any ethics or politics that privileges the unencumbered or detached self over the concrete, embodied, situated self. She argues in particular against those liberal models that imagine that conversations of moral justification should take place between individuals who have bracketed their strongest cultural or social identifications and attachments. Instead she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”:¶ Interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and differences among humans, without endorsing all these pluralities and differences as morally and politically valid. While agreeing that normative disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are constituents, that is, necessary conditions of the moral standpoint, interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection and action. In this sense, “universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied and embedded identity, but aims at developing moral attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a point of view acceptable to all. Universality is not the ideal consensus of fictitiously defined selves, but the concrete process in politics and morals of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy. (SS, 153) ¶ This passage encapsulates the core of Benhabib’s position, which attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism as traditionally understood. On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm, enabling crucial distinctions between those notions of the good life that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles. It insists, in other words, that there is a specifiable moral standpoint from which—to take a few prominent examples—Serbian aggression, neo-Nazism, and gay bashing can be definitively condemned. On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.” It understands identity as “embodied and embedded” and promotes encounters with otherness so as to nurture the development of a moral attitude that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”¶ Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “all” here cannot coherently include those who have, according to universalism’s own principles, forfeited their place as equal participants in the ethicopolitical¶ ¶ 28¶ community. Ironically, then, Benhabib’s redefinition of universalism insists on inevitable exclusion, but not in the sense that many poststructuralist and postmodernist cultural critics do, as the hardwired effect of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness, and as victimizing those disempowered by race, class, gender, or sexuality. Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness and plurality, which ultimately prove self-undermining in their toleration of communities, individuals, and practices that exclude others arbitrarily, interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are not only justified, but indeed required by the principles of recognition and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices.
Counterplan can solve
Physicians Committee 14 The Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine 2014
Section Four: Physician-Assisted Suicide And Capital Punishment: What Role Should Physicians Play?
http://www.pcrm.org/research/healthcare-professionals/medicine-curriculum/physician-assisted-suicide
3. Lethal Injection Can Be Performed By Non-Medical PersonnelCatheter insertion and barbiturate administration are easily performed with minimal training, and physicians need not be involved.
Medical ethics codes prevent doctor executions
Wikipedia 2015 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Participation_of_medical_professionals_in_American_executions
Participation of medical professionals in American executions is a controversial topic, due to its moral and legal implications. The practice is proscribed by the American Medical Association, as defined in its Code of Medical Ethics. The American Society of Anesthesiologists endorses this position, stating "[lethal injections] can never conform to the science, art and practice of anesthesiology".[1] | 8,341 | <h4>Debate inevitably involves exclusions---making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary to foster democratic habits and critical thinking---this process outweighs the content of the aff </h4><p><strong>Anderson 6<u>—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 25-8)</p><p></u></strong>25¶ Whether such a procedural approach actually helps to yield any <u><mark>substantive normative guidance</u></mark> is an issue of debate. Habermas has sought to justify communicative ethics <u><mark>through appeal to </mark>the principles of respect and <strong><mark>reciprocity</u></strong></mark> that he claims are inherent in linguistic practices geared toward reaching understanding. <u>Attempt</u>ing <u>to redress the</u> <u><strong>overwhelmingly negative forms of critique</u></strong> <u>characteristic of </u>both the Frankfurt School and <u>poststructuralist traditions,</u> <u>he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the</u> powerful <u>instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute</u> <u>“a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life</u>.” <u>The potential</u> he refers to <u>is the potential for mutual</u> <u>understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language</u>.” 7 <u>Habermas acknowledges the dominance</u> and reach <u>of instrumental reason</u>—<u>his project is largely devoted to a</u> <u>systematic analysis of the</u> historical <u>conditions</u> and social effects <u>of that</u> <u>dominance</u>—<u>yet</u> at the same time <u>he <mark>wishes to retrieve </mark>an <strong><mark>emancipatory</mark> model of <mark>communicative</u></strong></mark>¶ ¶ 26¶ <u><strong><mark>reason derived from</mark> a linguistic understanding of <mark>intersubjective relations</u></strong></mark>. As Benhabib argues, this form of communicative action, embodied in the highly controversial and pervasively misunderstood concept of the “ideal speech situation,” entails strong ethical assumptions, namely the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (SS, 29).¶ Habermas has famously argued that <u><mark>he does not believe any metaphysical grounding</mark> <mark>of</mark> such <mark>norms is possible</u></mark>; <u>he insists <mark>instead </mark>that</u> <u><mark>we view the <strong>normative constraints of</u></strong> </mark>the ideal <u><strong><mark>speech community</u></strong> <u>as “<strong></mark>universal</strong> <strong><mark>pragmatic</strong></mark> <strong><mark>presuppositions</strong></mark>” </u>of competent moral actors who have reached the postconventional stage of moral reasoning. Habermas’s theory combines a “weak transcendental argument” concerning the four types of validity claims operative in speech acts with an empirical reconstruction of psychosocial development derived from Lawrence Kohlberg. <u><mark>Benhabib</u></mark>, though she, too, appeals to socialization processes, distinguishes her position from Habermas’s “weak transcendental argument” by <u><mark>promot</u></mark>ing <u><mark>a</mark> </u>“historically <u><strong><mark>self-conscious universalism</u></strong></mark>” <u><mark>that locates</mark> the ethical</u> <u>principles of <strong>respect and <mark>reciprocity</strong> as “constituents of the moral </mark>point of <mark>view</mark> </u>from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (SS, 30). <u>Benhabib</u>’s work thus <u>constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of</u> specific potentialities of <u>modernity</u>. She <u>differs</u> from him <u>in two key respects</u>, besides the emphasis already outlined. First, she believes that <u>Habermas’s emphasis</u> <u>on</u> <u>consensus</u> seriously <u>distorts his account of communicative ethics</u>. <u>Like others who have <strong>argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus</u></strong>,<mark> <u>Benhabib champions</u></mark> instead <u><mark>a</mark> discourse <mark>model</mark> of ethics that is <mark>geared toward <strong>keeping the conversation going</strong>:</u></mark>¶<u> <strong><mark>When we shift the burden of the moral test</strong></mark> in communicative ethics from consensus <mark>to the idea of an <strong>ongoing</strong></mark> </u>moral<u> <strong><mark>conversation</strong></mark>,</u> <u><strong><mark>we begin to ask not what all would</u></strong></mark> or could <u><strong><mark>agree</strong></mark> to as a result of practical discourses <strong><mark>to be morally </mark>permissible </strong>or <strong><mark>impermissible</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>but what would be allowed</mark> </u></strong>and perhaps even necessary<u><strong> <mark>from the standpoint of </mark>continuing and <mark>sustaining the practice of </mark>the</u></strong> moral <u><strong><mark>conversation</u></strong></mark> among us. <u><mark>The emphasis now is</mark> less on rational agreement, but more <mark>on <strong>sustaining</mark> those <mark>normative</u></strong> <u><strong>practices</u></strong></mark> and moral relationships <u><strong><mark>within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish</u></strong></mark> and continue. (SS, 38)8¶ ¶ 27¶ The second significant difference between Habermas and Benhabib is that Benhabib rejects Habermas’s rigid opposition between justice and the good life, an opposition that effectively relegates identity-based politics to a lower plane of moral practice, and that for <u>Benhabib</u> undercuts our ability to apprehend the radical particularity of the other. While she believes in the importance of self-reflexive interrogations of conventional identities and roles, she strongly <u>opposes any </u>ethics or <u>politics that privileges the</u> unencumbered or <u>detached self over the concrete, embodied,</u> situated <u>self</u>. She argues in particular against those liberal models that imagine that conversations of moral justification should take place between individuals who have bracketed their strongest cultural or social identifications and attachments. Instead <u>she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”:</u>¶ <u><mark>Interactive universalism acknowledges</mark> the plurality of modes of being human, and <mark>differences</mark> among humans</u>, <u>without endorsing all</u> <u>these pluralities</u> and differences <u>as</u> morally and politically <u>valid</u>. <u>While <mark>agreeing that</mark> normative <mark>disputes can be settled rationally, <strong>and </strong>that<strong> fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are</mark> </u></strong>constituents, that is, <u><strong><mark>necessary </mark>conditions </u></strong>of the moral standpoint, <u>interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection</u> and action. <u>In this sense, <strong>“<mark>universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied</mark> </u></strong>and embedded<u><strong> <mark>identity</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>but aims at developing</u></mark> <u>moral <mark>attitudes and <strong>encouraging political transformations that can yield a </mark>point of <mark>view acceptable to all</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Universality is not</mark> </u>the ideal<u> <mark>consensus</mark> </u>of fictitiously defined selves, <u><mark>but the </mark>concrete <strong><mark>process in politics</u></strong></mark> and morals of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy. (SS, 153) ¶ This passage encapsulates the core of <u>Benhabib’s position</u>, which <u>attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism</u> as traditionally understood. <u>On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm</u>, <u>enabling crucial distinctions between </u>those<u> notions of the good life</u> <u>that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles</u>. It insists, in other words, that there is a specifiable moral standpoint from which—to take a few prominent examples—Serbian aggression, neo-Nazism, and gay bashing can be definitively condemned. <u>On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.”</u> <u>It understands identity as “embodied</u> and embedded” <u>and promotes encounters with otherness</u> so as <u>to nurture</u> the development of <u>a moral attitude</u> <u>that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”</u>¶<u> <strong>Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “<mark>all</mark>” here <mark>cannot</mark> coherently <mark>include those who have</u></strong></mark>, according to universalism’s own principles,<u><strong> <mark>forfeited their place as </mark>equal <mark>participants in the </mark>ethicopolitical</u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>¶ 28¶ <u><strong><mark>community</u></strong></mark>. Ironically, then, Benhabib’s <u><mark>redefinition of universalism insists on </mark>inevitable <mark>exclusion</u></mark>, <u><strong><mark>but not in the sense </mark>that </u></strong>many <u><strong>poststructuralist</u></strong> and postmodernist cultural <u><strong>critics</u></strong> <u><strong>do</u></strong>, <u>as the hardwired effect <mark>of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness</mark>, and</u> <u>as <mark>victimizing those</mark> <mark>disempowered by race</mark>, class, gender, or sexuality</u>. <u><strong><mark>Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness</strong></mark> </u>and plurality, <u><mark>which</u></mark> ultimately <u><strong><mark>prove self-undermining in their toleration of</mark> </u></strong>communities, individuals, and <u><strong><mark>practices that exclude others arbitrarily</mark>,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>interactive universalism</mark> <mark>claims that certain</mark> <mark>exclusions are</mark> not only justified, but indeed <mark>required by the</mark> <mark>principles of recognition</mark> and respect <mark>that underpin democratic </mark>institutions and <mark>practices</u></mark>.</p><p>Counterplan can solve</p><p>Physicians Committee 14</strong> The Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine 2014</p><p>Section Four: Physician-Assisted Suicide And Capital Punishment: What Role Should Physicians Play?</p><p>http://www.pcrm.org/research/healthcare-professionals/medicine-curriculum/physician-assisted-suicide</p><p>3. <u>Lethal Injection Can Be Performed By Non-Medical PersonnelCatheter insertion and barbiturate administration are easily performed with minimal training, and physicians need not be involved</u><strong>.</p><p>Medical ethics codes prevent doctor executions</p><p>Wikipedia 2015</strong> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Participation_of_medical_professionals_in_American_executions</p><p><u>Participation of medical professionals in American executions is a controversial topic, due to its moral and legal implications. The practice is proscribed by the American Medical Association, as defined in its Code of Medical Ethics. The American Society of Anesthesiologists endorses this position, stating "[lethal injections] can never conform to the science, art and practice of anesthesiology".[</u>1]</p> | null | 2NC | Case | 74,354 | 284 | 17,060 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | 565,294 | N | Cedanats | 7 | Fresno State Levin-Sicairos | Munday | 1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,719 | 3. Methods have to be compared against each other --- They don’t win for using their method, but the argument that they should shuts down deliberation. | Clarke 4 | Clarke 4 Lynn Clarke, Department of Communication Studies and Theatre, Vanderbilt University, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2004., p. 319-21 | there is no account of whether Nommo is oriented toward coerced or communicatively reasoned terms of communal harmony Should AAL be understood as linguistic resistance without intent to relate to self-defined black individuals who disagree with black majoritarian terms? do the terms of Yancy’s AAL community open a space of interaction within “Black America” for the sort of opposition that Yancy’s linguistic framework defends? do these terms direct attention to speech practices that have the potential to render the dissent productive of black people’s deliberation on the legitimacy of their community’s self-understanding? what compass of creative power should a philosophy of language attribute to (the speech of) AAL, and how might this power be held accountable to the very members of the community in whose name(s) AAL is said to create? neither a sheerly instrumental Nommo nor a sheerly oppositional theory of AAL may do
the problem of holding power accountable to those in whose name it speaks is apparent in certain deployments of Nommo as instrumental force. The speech practice of “call and response” is a striking example ,” a speaker makes “a verbal point” to an audience charged with responding The conceived, expected response is one of “approval.” If not received, the audience will likely be deemed “‘dead. in discussions of call and response, an account of disagreement and its potential to hold power accountable does not appear At most, disagreement is figured as privatized rejection The grounds of this response remain unknown to the speaker and audience members, among whom reasons for dissent may vary The dead audience plays no transparent cognitive- practice role. The caller is free to cast his word-spell.
talk of reason appears relatively unimportant in Asante’s “traditional” understanding of African public discourse Creativity’s “highlight” shines in the absence of an explicit role for communicative reason in public speech. Accountability appears as a non-issue, lurking uncomfortably in the shadow of creative power.
the word’s generative function funds “an oppositional way of speaking” the speech acts of resistance manifest themselves in a black identity and reality based on a presumption of shared interests among African American selves Nommo’s creative force is conceptually detached from the word’s power to constitute intersubjective relations between selves and others within the African American community. Thus, Yancy’s concept of Nommo only admits a generative power to create identification among blacks who already agree to the presence and terms of shared interest. The power of this Nommo fails to reach those African Americans who disagree with black majoritarian terms. potential to forge relations between African Americans who are divided on the terms of their present and future. | neither a sheerly instrumental Nommo nor a sheerly oppositional theory of AAL may do
the problem of holding power accountable to those in whose name it speaks is apparent in certain deployments of Nommo as instrumental force. The speech practice of “call and response” is a striking example The expected response is one of “approval.” If not received, the audience will likely be deemed “‘dead. in discussions an account of disagreement and its potential to hold power accountable does not appear disagreement is figured as privatized rejection The dead audience plays no transparent cognitive- practice role. The caller is free to cast his word-spell.
Accountability appears as a non-issue, lurking uncomfortably in the shadow of creative power.
the speech acts of resistance manifest themselves in a black identity and reality based on a presumption of shared interests among African American selves Yancy’s concept of Nommo only admits a generative power to create identification among blacks who already agree to the presence and terms of shared interest. The power of this Nommo fails to reach those African Americans who disagree with black majoritarian terms | Notwithstanding the importance of creative speech to philosophy of language and to a community’s self-formation, it remains unclear whether the collective resistance embodied in AAL meets certain interests expressed by those in whose name it is theorized. To be sure, and as Yancy argues, oppositional speech matters to the lives of the oppressed. Yet, questions remain about the terms and relations of Nommo’s creativity and its significance for AAL. Conceptually, there is no account of whether Nommo is oriented toward coerced or communicatively reasoned terms of communal harmony. This absence raises a question of relation: Should AAL be understood as linguistic resistance without intent to relate to self-defined black individuals who disagree with black majoritarian terms? Put another way, do the terms of Yancy’s AAL community open a space of interaction within “Black America” for the sort of opposition that Yancy’s linguistic framework defends? Equally important, do these terms direct attention to speech practices that have the potential to render the dissent productive of black people’s deliberation on the legitimacy of their community’s self-understanding? Extending the boundaries of humane community a bit further, might the power of Nommo move beyond the constitution of African American identity, experience, and community, to promote the intersubjective transformation of oppressive social norms as Fanon both worked for and hoped (Fanon 1967, 100, 222)? Asked in brief, these questions may be folded into two queries: what compass of creative power should a philosophy of language attribute to (the speech of) AAL, and how might this power be held accountable to the very members of the community in whose name(s) AAL is said to create? If there is good reason to commend the presupposition of shared nonidentity that informs these two questions, neither a sheerly instrumental Nommo nor a sheerly oppositional theory of AAL may do.2
Addressing the second question first, the problem of holding power accountable to those in whose name it speaks is apparent in certain deployments of Nommo as instrumental force. The speech practice of “call and response” is a striking example. In Yancy’s invocation of Nommo to account for this dynamic “co-signing and co-narrating of a shared communicative reality,” a speaker makes “a verbal point” to an audience charged with responding (293). The conceived, expected response is one of “approval.” If not received, the audience will likely be deemed “‘dead.’” Knowles-Borishade, who comes closest to thinking the question of Nommo and dissent, offers a somewhat different account. In it, responders co-create the caller’s “message—the Word” by either sanctioning or rejecting it “spontaneously during the speech,” based on “the perceived morality and vision of the Caller” and “the relevance of the message” (Knowles- Borishade 1991, 497–98). According to Knowles-Borishade, call and response aims at “consensus” determined by “the people themselves” (493–94). Through the process of “checks and balances” that constitutes call and response, “levels of perfected social interaction” are promoted. Yet, in Yancy’s and Knowles- Borishade’s discussions of call and response, an account of disagreement and its potential to hold power accountable does not appear. At most, disagreement is figured as privatized rejection. The grounds of this response remain unknown to the speaker and audience members, among whom reasons for dissent may vary. In the face of silent rejection, the accounts of AAL’s call and response are mum on what ought happen next. The dead audience plays no transparent cognitive- practice role. The caller is free to cast his word-spell.
The absense of accountability in a sheerly productive word appears more readily in Asante’s conception of African communication. In it, the group is thought to take precedence over the individual (Asante 1998, 74). To Asante, this “strong collective mentality” warrants a focus on the aesthetic dimension of speech in “traditional African public discourse.” The focus is relatively narrow, prompting a declaration that, “The African speaker means to be a poet; not a lecturer,” inducing “compulsive relationships” and invoking the audience’s “inner needs” through “the inherent power” of “concrete images” (91). Though reason may matter on this account of Nommo, it is tough to see how and why. Indeed, talk of reason appears relatively unimportant in Asante’s “traditional” understanding of African public discourse (75, 90–91). Creativity’s “highlight” shines in the absence of an explicit role for communicative reason in public speech.3 Accountability appears as a non-issue, lurking uncomfortably in the shadow of creative power.
Returning to the question of creative power’s compass—Yancy’s account of Nommo raises problems here as well. In the account, recall, the word’s generative function funds “an oppositional way of speaking” (Yancy 2004, 289). Among other products, the speech acts of resistance manifest themselves in a black identity and reality based on a presumption of shared interests among African American selves.4 At the same time, however, Nommo’s creative force is conceptually detached from the word’s power to constitute intersubjective relations between selves and others within the African American community. Thus, Yancy’s concept of Nommo only admits a generative power to create identification among blacks who already agree to the presence and terms of shared interest. The power of this Nommo fails to reach those African Americans who disagree with black majoritarian terms. This relatively minimal compass of power suggests that Nommo’s potential to define black community and reality may need to be reconceptualized beyond the presumptions of shared experience and common values to consider Nommo’s potential to forge relations between African Americans who are divided on the terms of their present and future. | 5,969 | <h4>3. Methods have to be compared against each other --- They don’t win for using their method, but the argument that they should <u>shuts down deliberation</u>.</h4><p><strong>Clarke 4</strong> Lynn Clarke, Department of Communication Studies and Theatre, Vanderbilt University, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2004., p. 319-21</p><p>Notwithstanding the importance of creative speech to philosophy of language and to a community’s self-formation, it remains unclear whether the collective resistance embodied in AAL meets certain interests expressed by those in whose name it is theorized. To be sure, and as Yancy argues, oppositional speech matters to the lives of the oppressed. Yet, questions remain about the terms and relations of Nommo’s creativity and its significance for AAL. Conceptually, <u><strong>there is no account of whether Nommo is oriented toward coerced or communicatively reasoned terms of communal harmony</u></strong>. This absence raises a question of relation: <u><strong>Should AAL be understood as linguistic resistance without intent to relate to self-defined black individuals who disagree with black majoritarian terms? </u></strong>Put another way, <u><strong>do the terms of Yancy’s AAL community open a space of interaction within “Black America” for the sort of opposition that Yancy’s linguistic framework defends?</u></strong> Equally important, <u><strong>do these terms direct attention to speech practices that have the potential to render the dissent productive of black people’s deliberation on the legitimacy of their community’s self-understanding? </u></strong>Extending the boundaries of humane community a bit further, might the power of Nommo move beyond the constitution of African American identity, experience, and community, to promote the intersubjective transformation of oppressive social norms as Fanon both worked for and hoped (Fanon 1967, 100, 222)? Asked in brief, these questions may be folded into two queries: <u><strong>what compass of creative power should a philosophy of language attribute to (the speech of) AAL, and how might this power be held accountable to the very members of the community in whose name(s) AAL is said to create?</u></strong> If there is good reason to commend the presupposition of shared nonidentity that informs these two questions, <u><strong><mark>neither a sheerly instrumental Nommo nor a sheerly oppositional theory of AAL may do</u></strong></mark>.2 </p><p>Addressing the second question first, <u><strong><mark>the problem of holding power accountable to those in whose name it speaks is apparent in certain deployments of Nommo as instrumental force. The speech practice of “call and response” is a striking example</u></strong></mark>. In Yancy’s invocation of Nommo to account for this dynamic “co-signing and co-narrating of a shared communicative reality<u><strong>,” a speaker makes “a verbal point” to an audience charged with responding</u></strong> (293). <u><strong><mark>The</mark> conceived, <mark>expected response is one of “approval.” If not received, the audience will likely be deemed “‘dead.</u></strong></mark>’” Knowles-Borishade, who comes closest to thinking the question of Nommo and dissent, offers a somewhat different account. In it, responders co-create the caller’s “message—the Word” by either sanctioning or rejecting it “spontaneously during the speech,” based on “the perceived morality and vision of the Caller” and “the relevance of the message” (Knowles- Borishade 1991, 497–98). According to Knowles-Borishade, call and response aims at “consensus” determined by “the people themselves” (493–94). Through the process of “checks and balances” that constitutes call and response, “levels of perfected social interaction” are promoted. Yet, <u><strong><mark>in</u></strong></mark> Yancy’s and Knowles- Borishade’s <u><strong><mark>discussions</mark> of call and response, <mark>an account of disagreement and its potential to hold power accountable does not appear</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>At most, <mark>disagreement is </strong>figured as privatized rejection</u></mark>. <u><strong>The grounds of this response remain unknown to the speaker and audience members, among whom reasons for dissent may vary</u></strong>. In the face of silent rejection, the accounts of AAL’s call and response are mum on what ought happen next. <u><strong><mark>The dead audience plays no transparent cognitive- practice role. The caller is free to cast his word-spell.</p><p></u></strong></mark>The absense of accountability in a sheerly productive word appears more readily in Asante’s conception of African communication. In it, the group is thought to take precedence over the individual (Asante 1998, 74). To Asante, this “strong collective mentality” warrants a focus on the aesthetic dimension of speech in “traditional African public discourse.” The focus is relatively narrow, prompting a declaration that, “The African speaker means to be a poet; not a lecturer,” inducing “compulsive relationships” and invoking the audience’s “inner needs” through “the inherent power” of “concrete images” (91). Though reason may matter on this account of Nommo, it is tough to see how and why. Indeed, <u><strong>talk of reason appears relatively unimportant in Asante’s “traditional” understanding of African public discourse</u></strong> (75, 90–91). <u><strong>Creativity’s “highlight” shines in the absence of an explicit role for communicative reason in public speech.</u></strong>3 <u><strong><mark>Accountability appears as a non-issue, lurking uncomfortably in the shadow of creative power.</u></strong></mark> </p><p>Returning to the question of creative power’s compass—Yancy’s account of Nommo raises problems here as well. In the account, recall, <u>the word’s generative function funds “an oppositional way of speaking”</u> (Yancy 2004, 289). Among other products, <u><mark>the speech acts of resistance manifest themselves in a black identity and reality based on a presumption of shared interests among African American selves</u></mark>.4 At the same time, however, <u>Nommo’s creative force is conceptually detached from the word’s power to constitute intersubjective relations between selves and others within the African American community. Thus, <mark>Yancy’s concept of Nommo only admits a generative power to create identification among blacks who already agree to the presence and terms of shared interest.</u> <u>The power of this Nommo fails to reach those African Americans who disagree with black majoritarian terms</mark>.</u> This relatively minimal compass of power suggests that Nommo’s potential to define black community and reality may need to be reconceptualized beyond the presumptions of shared experience and common values to consider Nommo’s<u> potential to forge relations between African Americans who are divided on the terms of their present and future. </p></u> | null | A2 George Yancy/Nommo | A2 Yancy or Nommo – McClendon 4 Clarke 4 – Top Level Turns | 94,405 | 36 | 17,058 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,290 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | West Georgia Kelly-Zapata | Rumbaugh | 1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,720 | Competitiveness key to heg and preventing great power war---also turns trade | Colby 14 | Elbridge Colby 14, the Robert M. Gates fellow at the Center for a New American Security; and Paul Lettow, was senior director for strategic planning on the U.S. National Security Council staff from 2007 to 2009, 7/3/14, “Have We Hit Peak America?,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/03/have_we_hit_peak_america | foreign-policy experts believe retaining American primacy is a matter of will -- of how America chooses to exert its power
But will is unavailing without strength. If the U S wants the international system to continue to reflect its interests and values a system in which the global commons are protected, trade is broad-based and extensive, and armed conflicts among great nations are curtailed it needs to sustain not just resolve, but relative power. That will require acknowledging that global power and wealth are shifting at an unprecedented pace
Preserving America's international position will require it to restore its economic vitality the U S still enjoys greater freedom to determine its future than any other major power because many of its problems are within its ability to address. But renewal must begin with analyzing America's competitive position and understanding the gravity of the situation Americans face. | will is unavailing without strength. If the U S wants the system to reflect its interests in which trade is broad-based armed conflicts among great nations are curtailed it needs to sustain relative power global power and wealth are shifting
Preserving America's position will require economic vitality its problems are within its ability to address renewal must begin with America's competitive position | Many foreign-policy experts seem to believe that retaining American primacy is largely a matter of will -- of how America chooses to exert its power abroad. Even President Obama, more often accused of being a prophet of decline than a booster of America's future, recently asserted that the United States "has rarely been stronger relative to the rest of the world." The question, he continued, is "not whether America will lead, but how we will lead."
But will is unavailing without strength. If the United States wants the international system to continue to reflect its interests and values -- a system, for example, in which the global commons are protected, trade is broad-based and extensive, and armed conflicts among great nations are curtailed -- it needs to sustain not just resolve, but relative power. That, in turn, will require acknowledging the uncomfortable truth that global power and wealth are shifting at an unprecedented pace, with profound implications. Moreover, many of the challenges America faces are exacerbated by vulnerabilities that are largely self-created, chief among them fiscal policy. Much more quickly and comprehensively than is understood, those vulnerabilities are reducing America's freedom of action and its ability to influence others.
Preserving America's international position will require it to restore its economic vitality and make policy choices now that pay dividends for decades to come. America has to prioritize and to act. Fortunately, the United States still enjoys greater freedom to determine its future than any other major power, in part because many of its problems are within its ability to address. But this process of renewal must begin with analyzing America's competitive position and understanding the gravity of the situation Americans face. | 1,809 | <h4>Competitiveness key to heg and preventing great power war---also turns trade </h4><p>Elbridge <strong>Colby 14</strong>, the Robert M. Gates fellow at the Center for a New American Security; and Paul Lettow, was senior director for strategic planning on the U.S. National Security Council staff from 2007 to 2009, 7/3/14, “Have We Hit Peak America?,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/03/have_we_hit_peak_america</p><p>Many <u><strong>foreign-policy experts</u></strong> seem to <u><strong>believe</u></strong> that <u><strong>retaining American primacy is</u></strong> largely <u><strong>a matter of will -- of how America chooses to exert its power</u></strong> abroad. Even President Obama, more often accused of being a prophet of decline than a booster of America's future, recently asserted that the United States "has rarely been stronger relative to the rest of the world." The question, he continued, is "not whether America will lead, but how we will lead."</p><p><u><strong>But <mark>will is unavailing without strength. If the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>wants the</mark> international <mark>system to</mark> continue to <mark>reflect its interests</mark> and values</u></strong> -- <u><strong>a system</u></strong>, for example, <u><strong><mark>in which</mark> the global commons are protected, <mark>trade is broad-based</mark> and extensive, and</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>armed conflicts among great nations are curtailed</u></strong></mark> -- <u><strong><mark>it needs to sustain</mark> not just resolve, but <mark>relative power</mark>. That</u></strong>, in turn, <u><strong>will require acknowledging</u></strong> the uncomfortable truth <u><strong>that</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>global power and wealth are shifting</mark> at an unprecedented pace</u></strong>, with profound implications. Moreover, many of the challenges America faces are exacerbated by vulnerabilities that are largely self-created, chief among them fiscal policy. Much more quickly and comprehensively than is understood, those vulnerabilities are reducing America's freedom of action and its ability to influence others.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Preserving America's</mark> international <mark>position will</u></strong> <u><strong>require</mark> it to restore its <mark>economic vitality</u></strong></mark> and make policy choices now that pay dividends for decades to come. America has to prioritize and to act. Fortunately, <u><strong>the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>still enjoys greater freedom to determine its future than any other major power</u></strong>, in part <u><strong>because many of <mark>its problems are within its ability to address</mark>. But</u></strong> this process of <u><strong><mark>renewal must begin with</mark> analyzing</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>America's competitive position</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and understanding the gravity of the situation</strong> Americans face.</p></u> | null | 1NC | 1NC | 32,227 | 195 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,721 | Prison PAS would medicalize taking life, contrary to medical training | Boehnlein 13 | Boehnlein 13 James K. Boehnlein, MD Virtual Mentor. March 2013, Volume 15, Number 3: 240-243.\ | Those who are opposed to physician participation in lethal injection argue that it is unethical on several counts: physician skills and procedures that contradict established medical practice are being used to carry out government mandates; a previously nonmedical social and judicial act is being medicalized and the doctor is using knowledge and skills attained during medical education and is recognized by society as possessing and using those specific skills that are normally used to sustain and enhance life | Those who are opposed to physician participation in lethal injection argue that it is unethical on several counts physician procedures that contradict established medical practice are being used to carry out government mandates; a previously nonmedical judicial act is being medicalized and the doctor is using knowledge and skills attained during medical education and is recognized by society as possessing and using those specific skills that are normally used to sustain life | Should Physicians Participate in State-Ordered Executions? http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2013/03/pfor3-1303.html
Those who are opposed to physician participation in lethal injection argue that it is unethical on several counts: physician skills and procedures that contradict established medical practice are being used to carry out government mandates; a previously nonmedical social and judicial act is being medicalized; executions by lethal injection are carried out in a quasimedical setting and give the impression that a medical procedure is being administered [5]; and the doctor is using knowledge and skills attained during medical education and is recognized by society as possessing and using those specific skills that are normally used to sustain and enhance life [6]. | 789 | <h4>Prison PAS would medicalize taking life, contrary to medical training</h4><p><strong>Boehnlein 13</strong> James K. Boehnlein, MD Virtual Mentor. March 2013, Volume 15, Number 3: 240-243.\</p><p>Should Physicians Participate in State-Ordered Executions? http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2013/03/pfor3-1303.html</p><p><u><mark>Those who are opposed to physician participation in lethal injection argue that it is unethical</mark> <mark>on several counts</mark>: <mark>physician</mark> skills and <mark>procedures that contradict established medical practice are being used to carry out government mandates;</mark> <mark>a previously nonmedical</mark> social and <mark>judicial act is being medicalized</u></mark>; executions by lethal injection are carried out in a quasimedical setting and give the impression that a medical procedure is being administered [5]; <u><mark>and the doctor is using knowledge and skills attained during medical education and is recognized by society as possessing and using those specific skills that are normally used to sustain</mark> and enhance <mark>life</u></mark> [6]. </p> | null | 2NC | Case | 430,383 | 1 | 17,060 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | 565,294 | N | Cedanats | 7 | Fresno State Levin-Sicairos | Munday | 1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,722 | AND PERM – DO BOTH | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>AND PERM – DO BOTH </h4> | null | A2 George Yancy/Nommo | Perms | 430,382 | 1 | 17,058 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,290 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | West Georgia Kelly-Zapata | Rumbaugh | 1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,723 | Absence of doctor – patient relationship with prisoners is irrelevant | Boehnlein 13 | Boehnlein 13 James K. Boehnlein, MD Virtual Mentor. March 2013, Volume 15, Number 3: 240-243.\ | An argument is sometimes raised that these professional standards may not apply to lethal injection because there is no established doctor-patient relationship. But the lack of such a relationship does not lessen the doctor’s responsibility; , the physician is still using medical knowledge and skills and still viewed by the corrections system, the state, and as society as functioning in a medical role. | null | Should Physicians Participate in State-Ordered Executions? http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2013/03/pfor3-1303.html
An argument is sometimes raised that these professional standards may not apply to lethal injection because there is no established doctor-patient relationship. But the lack of such a relationship does not lessen the doctor’s responsibility; even though a therapeutic relationship does not exist, the physician is still using medical knowledge and skills and still viewed by the corrections system, the state, and as society as functioning in a medical role. In addition, the condemned prisoner is not in a position to consent to or refuse what would normally be a medical procedure conducted by a physician (insertion of an IV and injection of drugs). | 772 | <h4>Absence of doctor – patient relationship with prisoners is irrelevant</h4><p><strong>Boehnlein 13</strong> James K. Boehnlein, MD Virtual Mentor. March 2013, Volume 15, Number 3: 240-243.\</p><p>Should Physicians Participate in State-Ordered Executions? http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2013/03/pfor3-1303.html</p><p><u>An argument is sometimes raised that these professional standards may not apply to lethal injection because there is no established doctor-patient relationship. But the lack of such a relationship does not lessen the doctor’s responsibility;</u> even though a therapeutic relationship does not exist<u>, the physician is still using medical knowledge and skills and still viewed by the corrections system, the state, and as society as functioning in a medical role.</u> In addition, the condemned prisoner is not in a position to consent to or refuse what would normally be a medical procedure conducted by a physician (insertion of an IV and injection of drugs).</p> | null | 2NC | Case | 430,384 | 1 | 17,060 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | 565,294 | N | Cedanats | 7 | Fresno State Levin-Sicairos | Munday | 1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,724 | Successful Antiguan cross-retaliation sets a precedent that spills over to make the global tax collection regime successful---causes buy-in from LDCs | Rosenzweig 14 | Adam H. Rosenzweig 14, Professor of Law, Washington University in Saint Louis, 2014, “Conceptualizing a New Institutional Framework for International Taxation: An Antigua Gambling Model for the International Tax Regime,” Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, 44 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 79 | An Antigua Gambling Model for International Tax
What lessons can be drawn from these two stories? In the tax context disparate incentives between some developed and developing countries have led to a breakdown in the international order In trade we observe a dispute between the wealthiest and poorest member nations being resolved pursuant to the terms of the WTO treaties and within the institutional framework of the WTO Could the lessons from the WTO be incorporated into the BEPS project to solve this problem?
in building a new institutional framework, the international tax regime can learn from the recent experiences of the WTO in overcoming this impasse by balancing the interests of both developed and developing nations
what would an international tax regime look like that would incorporate the lessons of Antigua Gambling? the current BEPS project focuses on a set of consistent international norms Without some mechanism to incorporate smaller countries that might have disparate incentives, this may not prove effective
to the WTO cross-retaliation mechanism the dispute settlement understanding of the WTO provides
any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements
There are two crucial aspects to cross-retaliation that would need to be amended to fit within the international tax context the WTO is a dispute resolution body. there would need to be established some permanent dispute resolution body for international tax it is not difficult in theory and has been covered in other places so this Essay will assume that away Second, the retaliation in the WTO is intended to increase sales or profits for private actors in the complaining party country at the expense of competitors in the offending country In the tax context the remedy would have to result in revenue for the government of the complaining country
In the specific context of BEPS it might be possible to establish commonly accepted worldwide norms the primary hurdle to applying a WTO model to international tax - the lack of common norms - would be overcome A WTO-type regime would remain difficult to translate into international tax because as between asymmetric countries with little or no trade there is no direct retaliation possible This is where an Antigua Gambling type model comes into play | An Antigua Gambling Model for International Tax
In tax disparate incentives between developed and developing countries led to a breakdown in the international order In trade we observe a dispute being resolved pursuant to WTO treaties
the international tax regime can learn from experiences of the WTO
the current project focuses on norms Without some mechanism to incorporate smaller countries this may not prove effective
WTO cross-retaliation provides
any party may request authorization to suspend obligations under covered agreements
two crucial aspects to cross-retaliation would need to be amended within the international tax context there would need to be some dispute resolution body it is not difficult retaliation in the WTO is intended to increase profits for private actors In tax the remedy would have to result in revenue for the government
In the context of BEPS it might be possible to establish accepted worldwide norms the primary hurdle to applying a WTO model the lack of common norms - would be overcome. A WTO-type regime would remain difficult to translate into international tax because there is no direct retaliation possible This is where an Antigua Gambling model comes into play | III. An Antigua Gambling Model for International Tax
What lessons can be drawn from these two stories? In the tax context, it appears disparate incentives between some developed and developing countries have led to a breakdown in the international order. In the trade context, we observe a dispute between arguably the wealthiest and poorest member nations being resolved pursuant to the terms of the WTO treaties and within the institutional framework of the WTO. Why has the WTO framework been so successful when the international tax framework seems not to have been? Could the lessons from the WTO be incorporated into the BEPS project to solve this problem?
The primary reason this disconnect arises is that the WTO institutional framework takes into account the disparate incentives of the developed and developing member nations in a manner that the international tax regime does not. Instead, the international tax regime continues to try to adopt a harmonized worldwide regime, which could be thought of as a one-size-fits-all approach. But if certain developing and developed countries cannot even agree on the normative starting point for the international tax regime, how can they agree on policing transfer pricing? Even worse, as noted above, only one country needs to defect from the regime for the entire system to unravel. Thus, the international tax system seems at an impasse. The primary thesis of this Essay is that, in building a new institutional framework, the international tax regime can learn from the recent experiences of the WTO in overcoming this impasse by balancing the interests of both developed and developing nations.
So what would an international tax regime look like that would incorporate the lessons of Antigua Gambling? The clearest answer would be to build a dispute settlement mechanism into the BEPS project that permits a form of cross-retaliation such as that used in the WTO. In other words, the current BEPS project focuses on building a set of consistent international norms on transfer pricing and dividing the tax base of multinational corporations among countries. Without [*91] some mechanism to incorporate smaller countries that might have disparate incentives, however, this may not prove effective. The WTO cross-retaliation model could provide one such mechanism.
Turning to the WTO cross-retaliation mechanism in particular, in relevant part, Article 22 of the dispute settlement understanding of the WTO provides:
2. If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance ... such Member shall ... enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation. If no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.
3. In considering what concessions or other obligations to suspend, the complaining party shall apply the following principles and procedures:
(a) the general principle is that the complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment;
(b) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations in other sectors under the same agreement;
(c) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the circumstances are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations under another covered agreement;
[*92] (d) in applying the above principles, that party shall take into account:
(i) the trade in the sector or under the agreement under which the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment, and the importance of such trade to that party;
(ii) the broader economic elements related to the nullification or impairment and the broader economic consequences of the suspension of concessions or other obligations; n29
There are two crucial aspects to cross-retaliation in the WTO context that would need to be amended to fit within the international tax context. First, the WTO is a dispute resolution body. Thus, there would need to be established some permanent dispute resolution body for international tax. While this may be difficult in practice, it is not difficult in theory and has been covered in other places, so this Essay will assume that away. Second, the retaliation in the WTO is intended to increase sales or profits for private actors in the complaining party country at the expense of competitors in the offending country, potentially leading to political pressure to repeal the offending law. n30 In the tax context, however, the remedy would have to result in revenue for the government of the complaining country.
It is for these two reasons that the WTO mechanism has typically been deemed insufficient for international tax. n31 First, and primarily, as between countries that have not entered into tax treaties, there are no common norms to be violated. Thus, unlike in the WTO, there cannot be dispute resolution as to an underlying norm that does not [*93] exist, making the WTO model inapplicable to most international tax disputes. n32
In the specific context of BEPS, however, it might be possible to establish commonly accepted worldwide norms. In such a case, the primary hurdle to applying a WTO model to international tax - the lack of common norms - would be overcome. A WTO-type regime would remain difficult to translate into international tax, however, because as between asymmetric countries with little or no trade, there is no direct retaliation possible in the tax context. This is where an Antigua Gambling type model comes into play. | 6,277 | <h4>Successful Antiguan cross-retaliation sets a precedent that spills over to make the <u>global tax collection regime</u> successful---causes <u>buy-in from LDCs </h4><p></u>Adam H. <strong>Rosenzweig 14</strong>, Professor of Law, Washington University in Saint Louis, 2014, “Conceptualizing a New Institutional Framework for International Taxation: An Antigua Gambling Model for the International Tax Regime,” Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, 44 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 79</p><p>III. <u><strong><mark>An Antigua Gambling Model for International Tax</u></strong></mark> </p><p><u><strong>What lessons can be drawn from these two stories?</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>In</mark> the <mark>tax</mark> context</u></strong>, it appears <u><strong><mark>disparate incentives between</mark> some <mark>developed and developing countries</mark> have <mark>led to a</mark> <mark>breakdown in the international order</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>In</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>trade</u></strong></mark> context, <u><strong><mark>we observe a dispute</mark> between</u></strong> arguably <u><strong>the wealthiest and poorest member nations <mark>being</u></strong> <u><strong>resolved pursuant to</mark> the terms of the <mark>WTO treaties</mark> and within the institutional framework of the WTO</u></strong>. Why has the WTO framework been so successful when the international tax framework seems not to have been? <u><strong>Could the</u></strong> <u><strong>lessons from the WTO be incorporated into the BEPS project to solve this problem?</p><p></u></strong>The primary reason this disconnect arises is that the WTO institutional framework takes into account the disparate incentives of the developed and developing member nations in a manner that the international tax regime does not. Instead, the international tax regime continues to try to adopt a harmonized worldwide regime, which could be thought of as a one-size-fits-all approach. But if certain developing and developed countries cannot even agree on the normative starting point for the international tax regime, how can they agree on policing transfer pricing? Even worse, as noted above, only one country needs to defect from the regime for the entire system to unravel. Thus, the international tax system seems at an impasse. The primary thesis of this Essay is that, <u><strong>in building a new institutional framework, <mark>the international tax regime can</u></strong> <u><strong>learn from</mark> the recent <mark>experiences of the WTO</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>in overcoming this impasse by balancing the interests of both developed and developing nations</u></strong>.</p><p>So <u><strong>what would an international tax regime look like that would incorporate the lessons of Antigua Gambling?</u></strong> The clearest answer would be to build a dispute settlement mechanism into the BEPS project that permits a form of cross-retaliation such as that used in the WTO. In other words, <u><strong><mark>the current </mark>BEPS <mark>project focuses on</u></strong></mark> building <u><strong>a set of consistent international <mark>norms</u></strong></mark> on transfer pricing and dividing the tax base of multinational corporations among countries. <u><strong><mark>Without</u></strong></mark> [*91] <u><strong><mark>some mechanism to incorporate smaller countries</mark> that might have disparate incentives,</u></strong> however, <u><strong><mark>this may not prove effective</u></strong></mark>. The WTO cross-retaliation model could provide one such mechanism.</p><p>Turning <u><strong>to the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>WTO cross-retaliation </mark>mechanism</u></strong> in particular, in relevant part, Article 22 of <u><strong>the dispute settlement understanding of the WTO <mark>provides</u></strong></mark>: </p><p>2. If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance ... such Member shall ... enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation. If no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, <u><strong><mark>any party</mark> having invoked the dispute settlement procedures <mark>may request authorization</mark> from the DSB <mark>to suspend</mark> the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other <mark>obligations under</mark> the <mark>covered agreements</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>3. In considering what concessions or other obligations to suspend, the complaining party shall apply the following principles and procedures:</p><p>(a) the general principle is that the complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment;</p><p>(b) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations in other sectors under the same agreement;</p><p>(c) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the circumstances are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations under another covered agreement;</p><p> [*92] (d) in applying the above principles, that party shall take into account:</p><p>(i) the trade in the sector or under the agreement under which the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment, and the importance of such trade to that party;</p><p>(ii) the broader economic elements related to the nullification or impairment and the broader economic consequences of the suspension of concessions or other obligations; n29 </p><p><u><strong>There are</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>two crucial aspects to cross-retaliation</u></strong></mark> in the WTO context <u><strong>that <mark>would need to be amended</mark> to fit <mark>within the international tax context</u></strong></mark>. First, <u><strong>the WTO is a dispute resolution body.</u></strong> Thus, <u><strong><mark>there would need to be</mark> established <mark>some</mark> permanent <mark>dispute resolution body</mark> for international tax</u></strong>. While this may be difficult in practice, <u><strong><mark>it is not difficult</mark> in theory and has been covered in other places</u></strong>, <u><strong>so this Essay will assume that away</u></strong>. <u><strong>Second, the <mark>retaliation in the WTO is intended to increase</mark> sales or <mark>profits for private actors</mark> in the complaining party country at the expense of competitors in the offending country</u></strong>, potentially leading to political pressure to repeal the offending law. n30 <u><strong><mark>In</mark> the <mark>tax</mark> context</u></strong>, however, <u><strong><mark>the remedy would have to result in revenue for the government</mark> of the complaining country</u></strong>.</p><p>It is for these two reasons that the WTO mechanism has typically been deemed insufficient for international tax. n31 First, and primarily, as between countries that have not entered into tax treaties, there are no common norms to be violated. Thus, unlike in the WTO, there cannot be dispute resolution as to an underlying norm that does not [*93] exist, making the WTO model inapplicable to most international tax disputes. n32</p><p><u><strong><mark>In the</mark> specific <mark>context of BEPS</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>it might be possible to</u></strong> <u><strong>establish</mark> commonly <mark>accepted worldwide norms</u></strong></mark>. In such a case, <u><strong><mark>the primary hurdle to applying a WTO model</mark> to international tax - <mark>the lack of common norms - would be overcome</u></strong>. <u><strong>A WTO-type regime would remain difficult to translate into international tax</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>because</mark> as between asymmetric countries with little or no trade</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>there is no direct retaliation possible</u></strong></mark> in the tax context. <u><strong><mark>This is where an Antigua Gambling</mark> type <mark>model comes into play</u></strong></mark>.</p> | null | 1NC | 1NC | 430,385 | 6 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,725 | FIRST – PERM SOLVES RACE ARGUMENTS - Totally abandoning liberalism is too simplifying – we should incorporate what we learn from the alt into the aff – | Ward ’99 | Ward ’99 Cynthia V. Ward – Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW Vol. 40:719 – http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1554andcontext=wmlr | provocative literature affirmatively defends liberal values and celebrates liberal legal institutions as the best-perhaps the only-way of respecting and encouraging human "difference the work of radical critics of liberalism has begun to reflect the idea that liberal values are worth examining in a reconstructive light something irreplaceable, would be lost were liberal rights and institutions to be rejected wholesale along with the scourges of racism and sexism that have always shadowed them It is tempting to oversimplify One should take seriously the declared motivations of one's opponents, and be careful not to discover casually that they have been on one's side all along, there are important and irreconcilable differences between liberal visions of the person, of politics, and of the law, and the visions articulated by liberalism's communitarian, critical race, feminist, and postmodern critics. amid such basic differences there is also a growing area of common ground. the reconstruction of liberal legalism, in some recognizable form, will become the single most dramatic result of radical legal theory | literature defends liberal values and c legal institutions as the only-way of respecting "difference" critics of liberalism has begun to reflect the idea that liberal values- are worth examining omething irreplaceable, would be lost to It is tempting to oversimplify that amid such basic differences there is also a growing area of common ground the reconstruction of liberal legalism, in some recognizable form, will become the single most dramatic result of radical legal theory. | However bruised by the continuous attacks of its radical critics, "liberal legalism" has so far survived the critical onslaught. But like all battles between powerful opponents the fight has produced casualties on both sides. Liberal theorists have responded to radical attacks by re-examining certain facile assumptions about the priority of individual autonomy, the nature of rationality, and the possibility of state neutrality, and replacing them with a rich and provocative literature that affirmatively defends liberal values and celebrates liberal legal institutions as the best-perhaps the only-way of respecting and encouraging human "difference" while also maximizing freedom and equality. On the other side, the work of radical critics of liberalism has begun to reflect the idea that liberal values-appropriately modified-are worth examining in a reconstructive light. Without losing sight of the injustices that have been inflicted on vulnerable groups under the liberal American Constitution, at least some radical theorists seem willing to concede that something precious, perhaps even irreplaceable, would be lost were liberal rights and institutions, with their vision of respect for individual dignity and their desire to maximize individual freedom, to be rejected wholesale along with the scourges of racism and sexism that have always shadowed them. It is tempting to oversimplify. One should take seriously the declared motivations and concerns of one's opponents, and be careful not to discover casually that they have been on one's side all along, although somehow without realizing it. Let me therefore emphasize that I think there are important and irreconcilable differences, at many levels, between liberal visions of the person, of politics, and of the law, and the visions articulated by liberalism's communitarian, critical race, feminist, and postmodern critics. What I find most fascinating in recent legal theory, though, is the increasingly apparent intuition that amid such basic differences there is also a growing area of common ground. Ironically, it may be that the reconstruction of liberal legalism, in some recognizable form, will become the single most dramatic result of radical legal theory.
Ocular | 2,250 | <h4>FIRST – PERM SOLVES RACE ARGUMENTS - Totally abandoning liberalism is too simplifying – we should incorporate what we learn from the alt into the aff<strong> – </h4><p>Ward ’99 </strong>Cynthia V. Ward – Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW Vol. 40:719 – http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1554andcontext=wmlr</p><p>However bruised by the continuous attacks of its radical critics, "liberal legalism" has so far survived the critical onslaught. But like all battles between powerful opponents the fight has produced casualties on both sides. Liberal theorists have responded to radical attacks by re-examining certain facile assumptions about the priority of individual autonomy, the nature of rationality, and the possibility of state neutrality, and replacing them with a rich and <u><strong>provocative <mark>literature</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong>affirmatively <mark>defends liberal values and c</mark>elebrates liberal <mark>legal institutions as</mark> the best-perhaps <mark>the only-way of respecting</mark> and encouraging human <mark>"difference</u></strong>"</mark> while also maximizing freedom and equality. On the other side, <u><strong>the work of radical <mark>critics of liberalism has begun to</mark> <mark>reflect the idea that liberal values</u></strong>-</mark>appropriately modified-<u><strong><mark>are worth examining</mark> in a reconstructive light</u></strong>. Without losing sight of the injustices that have been inflicted on vulnerable groups under the liberal American Constitution, at least some radical theorists seem willing to concede that <u><strong>s<mark>omething</u></strong></mark> precious, perhaps even <u><strong><mark>irreplaceable, would be lost</mark> were liberal rights and institutions</u></strong>, with their vision of respect for individual dignity and their desire to maximize individual freedom, <u><strong><mark>to</mark> be rejected wholesale along with the scourges of racism and sexism that have always shadowed them</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>It is tempting to oversimplify</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>One should take seriously the declared motivations </u></strong>and concerns <u><strong>of one's opponents,</u></strong> <u><strong>and be careful not to discover casually that they have been on one's side all along,</u></strong> although somehow without realizing it. Let me therefore emphasize that I think <u><strong>there are important and irreconcilable differences</u></strong>, at many levels, <u><strong>between liberal visions of the person, of politics, and of the law, and the visions articulated by liberalism's communitarian, critical race, feminist, and postmodern critics.</u></strong> What I find most fascinating in recent legal theory, though, is the increasingly apparent intuition <mark>that <u><strong>amid such basic differences there is also a growing area of common ground</mark>.</u></strong> Ironically, it may be that <u><strong><mark>the reconstruction of liberal legalism, in some recognizable form, will become the single most dramatic result of radical legal theory</u></strong>.</p><p></mark>Ocular</p> | null | A2 George Yancy/Nommo | Perms | 188,321 | 6 | 17,058 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,290 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | West Georgia Kelly-Zapata | Rumbaugh | 1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,726 | Harmonized tax regime’s key to prevent global tax avoidance by MNCs---unchecked avoidance crushes developing world tax revenue | Biron 14 | Carey L. Biron 14, Inter Press Service, 6/26/14, “IMF Issues “Revolutionary” Warning on Corporate Tax Avoidance,” http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/06/imf-issues-revolutionary-warning-on-corporate-tax-avoidance/ | the IMF issued an unusually stark warning over the lack of harmonised global tax policies these gaps are allowing for widespread tax gaming by corporations with particularly negative impacts for developing countries
The paper is the result of a new focus on tax-dodging among the G20
The sums involved can be large, not just relative to corporate tax but relative to all tax revenue these effects are systematically more important for developing countries
Corporate tax rates have plummeted
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, rich and middle-income countries have begun actively discussing how to maximise their tax revenues, with a focus on ending corporate accounting gimmickry
Rich companies could be stashing away as much as 20 trillion dollars overseas in order to escape national taxation
Developed countries need more income and are mad because not everyone is paying their taxes
that anger is also translating into public pressure People who pay their taxes even during a difficult recession are even madder than the governments
tax competition between countries
has been significantly exacerbated as multinational companies have increasingly learned how to legally “move” their operations for tax benefit
a key issue in assessing any international tax arrangement is how it divides the rights to tax between source and residence countries The allocation of rights is especially important for low-income countries
the impact of these spillover effects on corporate tax bases are “significant and sizable especially for low-income countries
The IMF analysis raises worrying concerns about the impact of tax rules and practices in rich countries on the ability of poor countries to raise their own revenues
We see a clear message to … major capital-exporting countries to review their tax rules and make sure they are not harming the ability of poor countries to raise the revenues they need for their development | IMF issued a warning over lack of harmonised global tax policies gaps are allowing widespread tax gaming by corporations with negative impacts for developing countries
sums involved can be large relative to revenue
companies could be stashing 20 trillion to escape taxation
key in any international tax arrangement is how it divides the rights to tax between source and residence countries allocation of rights is especially important for low-income countries
We see a message to major capital-exporting countries to review their tax rules and make sure they are not harming the ability of poor countries to raise revenues for development | The staff at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has issued an unusually stark warning over the lack of harmonised global tax policies, pointing out that these gaps are allowing for widespread tax gaming by corporations with particularly negative impacts for developing countries.
Anti-poverty advocates are lauding a new staff paper from the fund released Wednesday. Its findings not only coincide with civil society calls for major taxation reforms at the national and international levels, but also repeatedly push back against longstanding tax-related dogma, including that offered by the Washington-based IMF itself.
“This is, frankly, a revolutionary paper,” Jo Marie Griesgraber, the executive director of the New Rules for Global Finance Coalition, a Washington-based international network, told IPS.
“It looks very carefully at many aspects of tax planning, and each time says that this has very negative impact on developing countries … Ultimately, it says that traditional tax theory is essentially uninformed by empirical knowledge.”
The paper is the result of a new focus on tax-dodging among the Group of 20 (G20) industrialised countries, which directed the fund to undertake related research. The findings are particularly notable in their sustained focus on the impacts on developing countries.
“Our technical assistance work in developing countries frequently encounters large revenue losses through gaps and weaknesses in the international tax regime,” Michael Keen, deputy director of the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, said in a statement.
“The sums involved for them can be large, not just relative to corporate tax but relative to all tax revenue: 10-15 percent in some cases. The paper reports new evidence that these effects are in fact systematically more important for developing countries.”
Corporate tax rates in all countries have plummeted in recent decades, the paper notes.
Low-income countries have seen these rates degrade from near 50 percent in 1980 to under 30 percent last year. Others have seen similar plunges, with high-income countries seeing corporate taxation fall from around 40 percent three decades ago to little more than 20 percent today.
Such trends have been tracked for years. Yet in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, rich and middle-income countries have begun actively discussing how to maximise their tax revenues, with a focus on ending corporate accounting gimmickry.
Rich companies and individuals could be stashing away as much as 20 trillion dollars overseas in order to escape national taxation, according to some estimates.
“Developed countries today need more income and are mad because not everyone is paying their taxes,” Griesgraber says.
“And that anger is also translating into public pressure. People who pay their taxes even during a difficult recession are even madder than the governments.”
“Meaningless” designations
According to the IMF data, developing countries should perhaps be the most incensed by the impacts of today’s global taxation hodgepodge. The paper offers new findings on the ramifications of what the fund terms “spillover effects” – the ways in which one country’s tax rules impact on another country, which can also be thought of in terms of tax competition between countries.
This phenomenon has been significantly exacerbated as multinational companies have increasingly learned how to legally “move” their operations – largely on paper – for tax benefit. Such companies appear to be based in countries with low taxes, despite doing most of their work in another country that, in turn, is unable to place levies on the company’s full earnings.
“Current international tax arrangements rest on concepts of companies’ ‘residence’ and the ‘source’ of their income, both of which globalization has made increasingly fragile (some would say meaningless),” the paper states.
“At its core, a key issue in assessing any international tax arrangement is how it divides the rights to tax between source and residence countries … The allocation of rights is especially important for low-income countries, however, as flows are for them commonly very asymmetric – they are essentially ‘source’ countries.”
The fund staff found that the impact of these spillover effects on corporate tax bases are “significant and sizable” but are “especially pronounced for low-income countries”. Compared to rich countries, the paper notes, “the base spillovers from others’ tax rates are two to three times larger” in developing countries, and “statistically more significant”.
Particularly problematic has been the extractives industry, though the fund also calls out telecommunications companies. The paper recounts IMF experiences in multiple countries where corporate tax trickery has eaten up much of a project’s revenue, such as a “gold mining sector in which USD 100 billion has been invested over the last decade, but which is almost entirely debt financed”.
The fund ultimately goes so far as to suggest that countries should be extremely careful about signing any bilateral tax treaty, urging developing country governments instead to signal openness to investment by other means. Through such agreements, countries can sign away their right to levy full tax rates and give an upper hand to foreign corporations.
“The IMF analysis raises some very worrying concerns about the impact of tax rules and practices in rich countries on the ability of poor countries to raise their own revenues,” Diarmid O’Sullivan, a tax justice policy advisor with ActionAid, a watchdog group, said Wednesday.
“We see a clear message to … major capital-exporting countries to review their tax rules and make sure they are not harming the ability of poor countries to raise the revenues they need for their development.” | 5,793 | <h4>Harmonized tax regime’s key to prevent global tax avoidance by MNCs---unchecked avoidance crushes developing world tax revenue </h4><p>Carey L. <strong>Biron 14</strong>, Inter Press Service, 6/26/14, “IMF Issues “Revolutionary” Warning on Corporate Tax Avoidance,” http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/06/imf-issues-revolutionary-warning-on-corporate-tax-avoidance/</p><p>The staff at <u><strong>the</u></strong> International Monetary Fund (<u><strong><mark>IMF</u></strong></mark>) has <u><strong><mark>issued a</mark>n</u></strong> <u><strong>unusually stark <mark>warning over</mark> the</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>lack of harmonised global tax policies</u></strong></mark>, pointing out that <u><strong>these <mark>gaps are allowing</mark> for <mark>widespread tax gaming by corporations with</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>particularly <mark>negative impacts for developing countries</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Anti-poverty advocates are lauding a new staff paper from the fund released Wednesday. Its findings not only coincide with civil society calls for major taxation reforms at the national and international levels, but also repeatedly push back against longstanding tax-related dogma, including that offered by the Washington-based IMF itself.</p><p>“This is, frankly, a revolutionary paper,” Jo Marie Griesgraber, the executive director of the New Rules for Global Finance Coalition, a Washington-based international network, told IPS. </p><p>“It looks very carefully at many aspects of tax planning, and each time says that this has very negative impact on developing countries … Ultimately, it says that traditional tax theory is essentially uninformed by empirical knowledge.” </p><p><u><strong>The paper is the result of a</u></strong> <u><strong>new focus on tax-dodging</u></strong> <u><strong>among the</u></strong> Group of 20 (<u><strong>G20</u></strong>) industrialised countries, which directed the fund to undertake related research. The findings are particularly notable in their sustained focus on the impacts on developing countries. </p><p>“Our technical assistance work in developing countries frequently encounters large revenue losses through gaps and weaknesses in the international tax regime,” Michael Keen, deputy director of the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, said in a statement. </p><p>“<u><strong>The <mark>sums involved</u></strong></mark> for them <u><strong><mark>can be large</mark>, not just relative to corporate tax but <mark>relative to </mark>all tax <mark>revenue</u></strong></mark>: 10-15 percent in some cases. The paper reports new evidence that <u><strong>these effects are</u></strong> in fact <u><strong>systematically more important for developing countries</u></strong>.” </p><p><u><strong>Corporate tax rates</u></strong> in all countries <u><strong>have</u></strong> <u><strong>plummeted</u></strong> in recent decades, the paper notes. </p><p>Low-income countries have seen these rates degrade from near 50 percent in 1980 to under 30 percent last year. Others have seen similar plunges, with high-income countries seeing corporate taxation fall from around 40 percent three decades ago to little more than 20 percent today. </p><p>Such trends have been tracked for years. Yet <u><strong>in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, rich and middle-income countries have begun actively discussing how to maximise their tax revenues, with a focus on ending corporate accounting gimmickry</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>Rich <mark>companies</u></strong></mark> and individuals <u><strong><mark>could be stashing</mark> away</u></strong> <u><strong>as much as <mark>20 trillion</mark> dollars overseas</u></strong> <u><strong>in order <mark>to escape</mark> national <mark>taxation</u></strong></mark>, according to some estimates. </p><p>“<u><strong>Developed countries</u></strong> today <u><strong>need more income and are mad because not everyone is paying their taxes</u></strong>,” Griesgraber says. </p><p>“And <u><strong>that anger is also translating into public pressure</u></strong>. <u><strong>People who pay their taxes even during a difficult recession are</u></strong> <u><strong>even madder than the governments</u></strong>.” </p><p>“Meaningless” designations</p><p>According to the IMF data, developing countries should perhaps be the most incensed by the impacts of today’s global taxation hodgepodge. The paper offers new findings on the ramifications of what the fund terms “spillover effects” – the ways in which one country’s tax rules impact on another country, which can also be thought of in terms of <u><strong>tax competition between countries</u></strong>. </p><p>This phenomenon <u><strong>has been significantly exacerbated as multinational companies have increasingly learned how to legally “move” their operations</u></strong> – largely on paper – <u><strong>for tax benefit</u></strong>. Such companies appear to be based in countries with low taxes, despite doing most of their work in another country that, in turn, is unable to place levies on the company’s full earnings. </p><p>“Current international tax arrangements rest on concepts of companies’ ‘residence’ and the ‘source’ of their income, both of which globalization has made increasingly fragile (some would say meaningless),” the paper states. </p><p>“At its core, <u><strong>a <mark>key</mark> issue <mark>in</mark> assessing <mark>any international tax arrangement is how it divides the rights to tax between source and residence countries</u></strong></mark> … <u><strong>The <mark>allocation of rights is especially important for low-income countries</u></strong></mark>, however, as flows are for them commonly very asymmetric – they are essentially ‘source’ countries.” </p><p>The fund staff found that <u><strong>the impact of these spillover effects on corporate tax bases are</u></strong> <u><strong>“significant and sizable</u></strong>” but are “<u><strong>especially</u></strong> pronounced <u><strong>for low-income countries</u></strong>”. Compared to rich countries, the paper notes, “the base spillovers from others’ tax rates are two to three times larger” in developing countries, and “statistically more significant”.</p><p>Particularly problematic has been the extractives industry, though the fund also calls out telecommunications companies. The paper recounts IMF experiences in multiple countries where corporate tax trickery has eaten up much of a project’s revenue, such as a “gold mining sector in which USD 100 billion has been invested over the last decade, but which is almost entirely debt financed”. </p><p>The fund ultimately goes so far as to suggest that countries should be extremely careful about signing any bilateral tax treaty, urging developing country governments instead to signal openness to investment by other means. Through such agreements, countries can sign away their right to levy full tax rates and give an upper hand to foreign corporations. </p><p>“<u><strong>The IMF analysis raises</u></strong> some very <u><strong>worrying concerns about the</u></strong> <u><strong>impact of tax rules and practices in rich countries on the</u></strong> <u><strong>ability of poor countries to raise their own revenues</u></strong>,” Diarmid O’Sullivan, a tax justice policy advisor with ActionAid, a watchdog group, said Wednesday.</p><p>“<u><strong><mark>We see a</mark> clear <mark>message to</mark> … <mark>major capital-exporting countries to review their tax rules and make sure they are not</u></strong> <u><strong>harming the ability of poor countries to raise</mark> the <mark>revenues</mark> they need <mark>for</mark> their <mark>development</u></strong></mark>.”</p> | null | 1NC | 1NC | 430,387 | 6 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,727 | Language K | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Language K</h4> | null | A2 George Yancy/Nommo | Perms | 430,386 | 1 | 17,058 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,290 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | West Georgia Kelly-Zapata | Rumbaugh | 1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,728 | Warming exacerbates various forms of structural violence | Hoerner 8 | Hoerner 8 (J. Andrew, Former director of Research at the Center for a Sustainable Economy, Director of Tax Policy at the Center for Global Change at the University of Maryland College Park, and editor of Natural Resources Tax Review. He has done research on environmental economics and policy on behalf of the governments of Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States. Andrew received his B.A. in Economics from Cornell University and a J.D. from Case Western Reserve School of Law—AND—Nia Robins—former inaugural Climate Justice Corps Fellow in 2003, director of Environmental Justice and Climate Change Initiative “A Climate of Change African Americans, Global Warming, and a Just Climate Policy for the U.S.” July 2008, http://www.ejcc.org/climateofchange.pdf) | Everywhere we turn, the issues and impacts of climate change confront us there is a human face to this story Climate change is an issue of justice and human rights, one that dangerously intersects race and class people of color, Indigenous Peoples and low-income communities bear disproportionate burdens from climate change Though less responsible for climate change, African Americans are significantly more vulnerable to its effects Health, housing, economic well-being, culture, and social stability are harmed from storms, floods, and climate variability. African Americans are also more vulnerable to higher energy bills, unemployment, recessions caused by energy shocks warming amplifies nearly all existing inequalities Under warming, injustices that are already unsustainable become catastrophic Sound global warming policy is also racial justice policy sound global warming policy will strengthen the economies of low-income communities and communities of color Climate policies that best serve disproportionately affected communities also best serve global economic and environmental justice. Domestic reductions provide the greatest benefit to African Americans the peoples of Africa, and people across the Global South Special interests are represented by powerful lobbies he political playing field has been defined and limited to conventional environmental goals • The six states with the highest African American population are expected to experience more intense storms resembling Katrina | Everywhere we turn, the issues and impacts of climate change confront us there is a human face to this story Climate change is an issue of justice and human rights, one that dangerously intersects race and class people of color, Indigenous Peoples and low-income communities bear disproportionate burdens from climate change Though less responsible African Americans are significantly more vulnerable to its effects Health, housing, economic well-being, culture, and social stability are harmed from storms, floods, and climate variability. African Americans are also more vulnerable to higher energy bills, unemployment, recessions caused by energy shocks warming amplifies nearly all existing inequalities Under warming, injustices that are already unsustainable become catastrophic Sound global warming policy is also racial justice policy sound global warming policy will strengthen the economies of low-income communities and communities of color Climate policies that best serve disproportionately affected communities also best serve global economic and environmental justice. Domestic reductions provide the greatest benefit to the South Special interests are represented by powerful lobbies he political playing field has been defined and limited to conventional environmental goals The six states with the highest African American population are expected to experience more intense storms resembling Katrina | Everywhere we turn, the issues and impacts of climate change confront us. One of the most serious environmental threats facing the world today, climate change has moved from the minds of scientists and offices of environmentalists to the mainstream. Though the media is dominated by images of polar bears, melting glaciers, flooded lands, and arid desserts, there is a human face to this story as well. Climate change is not only an issue of the environment; it is also an issue of justice and human rights, one that dangerously intersects race and class. All over the world people of color, Indigenous Peoples and low-income communities bear disproportionate burdens from climate change itself, from ill-designed policies to prevent it, and from side effects of the energy systems that cause it. A Climate of Change explores the impacts of climate change on African Americans, from health to economics to community, and considers what policies would most harm or benefit African Americans—and the nation as a whole. African Americans are thirteen percent of the U.S. population and on average emit nearly twenty percent less greenhouse gases than non-Hispanic whites per capita. Though far less responsible for climate change, African Americans are significantly more vulnerable to its effects than non- Hispanic whites. Health, housing, economic well-being, culture, and social stability are harmed from such manifestations of climate change as storms, floods, and climate variability. African Americans are also more vulnerable to higher energy bills, unemployment, recessions caused by global energy price shocks, and a greater economic burden from military operations designed to protect the flow of oil to the U.S. Climate Justice: The Time Is Now Ultimately, accomplishing climate justice will require that new alliances are forged and traditional movements are transformed. An effective policy to address the challenges of global warming cannot be crafted until race and equity are part of the discussion from the outset and an integral part of the solution. This report finds that: Global warming amplifies nearly all existing inequalities. Under global warming, injustices that are already unsustainable become catastrophic. Thus it is essential to recognize that all justice is climate justice and that the struggle for racial and economic justice is an unavoidable part of the fight to halt global warming. Sound global warming policy is also economic and racial justice policy. Successfully adopting a sound global warming policy will do as much to strengthen the economies of low-income communities and communities of color as any other currently plausible stride toward economic justice. Climate policies that best serve African Americans also best serve a just and strong United States. This paper shows that policies well-designed to benefit African Americans also provide the most benefit to all people in the U.S. Climate policies that best serve African Americans and other disproportionately affected communities also best serve global economic and environmental justice. Domestic reductions in global warming pollution and support for such reductions in developing nations financed by polluter-pays principles provide the greatest benefit to African Americans, the peoples of Africa, and people across the Global South. A distinctive African American voice is critical for climate justice. Currently, legislation is being drafted, proposed, and considered without any significant input from the communities most affected. Special interests are represented by powerful lobbies, while traditional environmentalists often fail to engage people of color, Indigenous Peoples, and low-income communities until after the political playing field has been defined and limited to conventional environmental goals. A strong focus on equity is essential to the success of the environmental cause, but equity issues cannot be adequately addressed by isolating the voices of communities that are disproportionately impacted. Engagement in climate change policy must be moved from the White House and the halls of Congress to social circles, classrooms, kitchens, and congregations. The time is now for those disproportionately affected to assume leadership in the climate change debate, to speak truth to power, and to assert rights to social, environmental and economic justice. Taken together, these actions affirm a vital truth that will bring communities together: Climate Justice is Common Justice. African Americans and Vulnerability In this report, it is shown that African Americans are disproportionately affected by climate change. African Americans Are at Greater Risk from Climate Change and Global Warming Co-Pollutants ¶ • The six states with the highest African American population are all in the Atlantic hurricane zone, and are expected to experience more intense storms resembling Katrina and Rita in the future. | 4,938 | <h4>Warming exacerbates various forms of structural violence</h4><p><strong>Hoerner 8</strong> (J. Andrew, Former director of Research at the Center for a Sustainable Economy, Director of Tax Policy at the Center for Global Change at the University of Maryland College Park, and editor of Natural Resources Tax Review. He has done research on environmental economics and policy on behalf of the governments of Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States. Andrew received his B.A. in Economics from Cornell University and a J.D. from Case Western Reserve School of Law—AND—Nia Robins—former inaugural Climate Justice Corps Fellow in 2003, director of Environmental Justice and Climate Change Initiative “A Climate of Change African Americans, Global Warming, and a Just Climate Policy for the U.S.” July 2008, http://www.ejcc.org/climateofchange.pdf)</p><p><u><mark>Everywhere we turn, the issues and impacts of climate change confront us</u></mark>. One of the most serious environmental threats facing the world today, climate change has moved from the minds of scientists and offices of environmentalists to the mainstream. Though the media is dominated by images of polar bears, melting glaciers, flooded lands, and arid desserts, <u><mark>there is a human face to this story</u></mark> as well. <u><mark>Climate change</u></mark> is not only an issue of the environment; it <u><mark>is</u></mark> also <u><mark>an issue of justice and human rights, one</mark> <mark>that dangerously intersects <strong>race and class</u></strong></mark>. All over the world <u><mark>people of color, Indigenous Peoples and low-income communities bear <strong>disproportionate burdens</strong> from climate change</u></mark> itself, from ill-designed policies to prevent it, and from side effects of the energy systems that cause it. A Climate of Change explores the impacts of climate change on African Americans, from health to economics to community, and considers what policies would most harm or benefit African Americans—and the nation as a whole. African Americans are thirteen percent of the U.S. population and on average emit nearly twenty percent less greenhouse gases than non-Hispanic whites per capita. <u><mark>Though</u></mark> far <u><mark>less responsible</mark> for climate change, <mark>African Americans are significantly more vulnerable to its effects</u></mark> than non- Hispanic whites. <u><mark>Health, housing, economic well-being, culture, and social stability are harmed from</u></mark> such manifestations of climate change as <u><mark>storms, floods, and climate variability. African Americans are also more vulnerable to higher energy bills, unemployment, recessions caused by</u></mark> global <u><mark>energy</u></mark> price <u><mark>shocks</u></mark>, and a greater economic burden from military operations designed to protect the flow of oil to the U.S. Climate Justice: The Time Is Now Ultimately, accomplishing climate justice will require that new alliances are forged and traditional movements are transformed. An effective policy to address the challenges of global warming cannot be crafted until race and equity are part of the discussion from the outset and an integral part of the solution. This report finds that: Global <u><strong><mark>warming amplifies nearly all existing inequalities</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Under</u></mark> global <u><mark>warming, injustices that are already unsustainable become catastrophic</u></mark>. Thus it is essential to recognize that all justice is climate justice and that the struggle for racial and economic justice is an unavoidable part of the fight to halt global warming. <u><mark>Sound global warming policy is also</mark> </u>economic and<u> <mark>racial justice policy</u></mark>.<u> </u>Successfully adopting a <u><mark>sound global warming policy will</u></mark> do as much to <u><mark>strengthen the economies of low-income communities and communities of color</u></mark> as any other currently plausible stride toward economic justice. Climate policies that best serve African Americans also best serve a just and strong United States. This paper shows that policies well-designed to benefit African Americans also provide the most benefit to all people in the U.S. <u><mark>Climate policies that best serve</u></mark> African Americans and other <u><mark>disproportionately affected communities also best serve global economic and environmental justice. Domestic reductions</u></mark> in global warming pollution and support for such reductions in developing nations financed by polluter-pays principles <u><mark>provide the greatest benefit to</mark> African Americans</u>, <u>the peoples of Africa, and people across <mark>the</mark> Global <mark>South</u></mark>. A distinctive African American voice is critical for climate justice. Currently, legislation is being drafted, proposed, and considered without any significant input from the communities most affected. <u><mark>Special interests are represented by powerful lobbies</u></mark>, while traditional environmentalists often fail to engage people of color, Indigenous Peoples, and low-income communities until after t<u><mark>he political playing field has been defined and limited to conventional environmental goals</u></mark>. A strong focus on equity is essential to the success of the environmental cause, but equity issues cannot be adequately addressed by isolating the voices of communities that are disproportionately impacted. Engagement in climate change policy must be moved from the White House and the halls of Congress to social circles, classrooms, kitchens, and congregations. The time is now for those disproportionately affected to assume leadership in the climate change debate, to speak truth to power, and to assert rights to social, environmental and economic justice. Taken together, these actions affirm a vital truth that will bring communities together: Climate Justice is Common Justice. African Americans and Vulnerability In this report, it is shown that African Americans are disproportionately affected by climate change. African Americans Are at Greater Risk from Climate Change and Global Warming Co-Pollutants ¶ <u>• <mark>The six states with the highest African American population are</mark> </u>all in the Atlantic hurricane zone, and are <u><mark>expected to experience more intense storms resembling Katrina</u></mark> and Rita in the future. </p> | null | 1NR | Case | 10,401 | 113 | 17,060 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | 565,294 | N | Cedanats | 7 | Fresno State Levin-Sicairos | Munday | 1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,729 | Developing world public revenue’s key to reduce North-South disparity | McHale 5 | John McHale 5, Professor of Economics and a faculty research fellow at the Queen's School of Business, Queen's University, Canada, February 2005, “Taxation and Skilled Indian Migration to the United States: Revisiting the Bhagwati Tax,” http://web.business.queensu.ca/faculty/jmchale/research3/Taxation%20and%20Skilled%20Migration%20to%20the%20Uniited%20States%20%20Revisiting%20the%20Bhagwati%20Tax.pdf | poor countries face large investment gaps that trap them in poverty and a significant part of the needed investment must come through the public sector Fiscal resources are needed to fund badly needed investments in education, health care, environmental protection and infrastructure Although increased aid and debt relief are an important parts of the solution, there is increasing interest in fiscal transfers to poor countries | poor countries face large investment gaps that trap them in poverty a significant part of needed investment must come through the public sector Fiscal resources are needed to fund investments in education, health care, environmental protection and infrastructure Although aid are important there is increasing interest in fiscal transfers to poor countries | Second, there is a renewed appreciation that poor countries face large investment gaps that trap them in poverty, and that a significant part of the needed investment must come through the public sector (United Nations Millennium Project, 2005). Fiscal resources are needed to fund badly needed investments in education, health care, environmental protection and infrastructure. Although increased aid and debt relief are an important parts of the solution, there is increasing interest in “innovative” mechanisms for making fiscal transfers to poor countries to help make up inevitable shortfalls (see, for example, the papers collected in Atkinson, 2004). This could be a sign that innovative, emigration-related fiscal instruments would get a more sympathetic hearing now than they did three decades ago. | 807 | <h4>Developing world public revenue’s key to reduce North-South disparity </h4><p>John <strong>McHale 5</strong>, Professor of Economics and a faculty research fellow at the Queen's School of Business, Queen's University, Canada, February 2005, “Taxation and Skilled Indian Migration to the United States: Revisiting the Bhagwati Tax,” http://web.business.queensu.ca/faculty/jmchale/research3/Taxation%20and%20Skilled%20Migration%20to%20the%20Uniited%20States%20%20Revisiting%20the%20Bhagwati%20Tax.pdf</p><p>Second, there is a renewed appreciation that <u><strong><mark>poor countries face</u></strong> <u><strong>large investment gaps that trap them in poverty</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>and</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>a significant part of</mark> the <mark>needed investment</u></strong> <u><strong>must come through the public sector</u></strong></mark> (United Nations Millennium Project, 2005). <u><strong><mark>Fiscal resources are needed to fund</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>badly needed <mark>investments</u></strong> <u><strong>in education, health care, environmental protection and infrastructure</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Although</mark> increased <mark>aid</mark> and debt relief <mark>are</mark> an <mark>important</mark> parts of the solution, <mark>there is increasing interest in</u></strong></mark> “innovative” mechanisms for making <u><strong><mark>fiscal transfers to poor countries</u></strong></mark> to help make up inevitable shortfalls (see, for example, the papers collected in Atkinson, 2004). This could be a sign that innovative, emigration-related fiscal instruments would get a more sympathetic hearing now than they did three decades ago.</p> | null | 1NC | 1NC | 430,388 | 6 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,730 | Unites States includes federal and state | Black Law 90 | Black Law 90 Black's Law Dictionary 1990 p 695 | In the United States, government includes the federal government and all its agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments. | null | In the United States, government consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in addition to administrative agencies. In a broader sense, includes the federal government and all its agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments. | 286 | <h4>Unites States includes federal and state</h4><p><strong>Black Law 90</strong> <u>Black's Law Dictionary 1990 p 695</p><p>In the United States, government </u>consists of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches in addition to administrative agencies. In a broader sense, <u><strong>includes the federal government and all its agencies and bureaus, state and county governments, and city and township governments.</p></u></strong> | null | 1NR | Case | 68,862 | 75 | 17,060 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | 565,294 | N | Cedanats | 7 | Fresno State Levin-Sicairos | Munday | 1AC - PAS for death row inmates
1NC - Doctors PIC Trust DA T-Nearly All Zizek K California Politics DA
2NC - PICDA T
1NR - Politics
2NR - TCP | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,731 | Their demand for rejection shuts down the public sphere and perpetrates a violent vision of individuals as inherently fragile and in need of protecting from words and ideas – this links both to the form of counterplan that attempts to avoid debate over the plan itself | O’Neill 10 | O’Neill 10 | you’re creating shrinking violets rather than thinking individuals, a generation of young adults going out into the world with their offensiveness antennae permanently switched on – more likely to say ‘You can’t say that’ than Let’s have a debate We have to have deadly serious discussions about deadly serious things – and we can’t do that if everyone is listening out for potentially offensive words rather than thinking about and responding to the ideas being expressed It shows that it is not only the state or even sections of the authorities that demand censorship today – all sorts of advocacy groups, educators and youthful organisations now crusade like modern-day Torquemadas for the silencing of their opponents. it demonstrates the extent to which censorship today both springs from and reinforces a new degraded view of human subjectivity, a view of individuals as fundamentally psychologically fragile and thus in need of protection from allegedly dangerous ideas. censorship can even be re-presented as a public good, designed not necessarily to police morality in any old-fashioned way but rather to manage relations between the various fragile sections of society censorship is repackaged as a way of protecting the powerless. That idea, more than any other, needs to be challenged, and the authoritarian, patronising, divisive, knowledge-hampering consequences of modern-day censorship exposed
McCoy, 1997
Spivak speaks of the "necessary lack of fit between discourse and example, the necessary crisis between theory and practice, that marks deconstruction." She would have us read this split between method and message not as a failure but as "the new making-visible of a `success' that does not conceal or bracket problems."( a suspicion of the wish for the fit of theory and practice, in which such a fit would hide problems that are exposed in the disjunction made plain when our theory negates our rhetorical habits Re-reading practices and rhetorical habits as a kind of mother-tongue, an academese, an institutionalized ritual, a way of meaning-making that is easily taken as "given," a disciplinary practice. It seems a grievous and obvious contradiction to me, one that makes me want to dismiss him, discipline him, master him, mistress him. But, I can read with Spivak, more sympathetically and more deconstructively, I can experience an "affirmative duplicity" that may allow me to "think about the danger of what is useful," the "dangerousness of something one cannot not use."( "The most serious critique in deconstruction is the critique of things that are extremely useful, things without which we cannot live on, take chances; like our running self-identikit." Can our rhetorical habits reinscribe the circle we inhabit, while at the same time allowing us to take chances, chances we may be otherwise too paralyzed to take? To be able to do something like this would be to take seriously Butler's idea of "subversive repetition." The critical task is...to locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by [a cultural] construction, to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through participating in precisely those practices of repetition that constitute [conventional critical endeavor] and, therefore, present the immanent possibility of contesting them. | you’re creating shrinking violets rather than thinking individuals, a generation of young adults going out into the world more likely to say ‘You can’t say that’ than Let’s have a debate We have to have deadly serious discussions about deadly serious things – and we can’t do that if everyone is listening out for potentially offensive words rather than thinking about and responding to the ideas being expressed it demonstrates the extent to which censorship today both springs from and reinforces a new degraded view of human subjectivity, a view of individuals as fundamentally psychologically fragile and thus in need of protection from allegedly dangerous ideas censorship is repackaged as a way of protecting the powerless. That idea, more than any other, needs to be challenged
Spivak speaks of the "necessary lack of fit between discourse and example I can experience an "affirmative duplicity" that may allow me to "think about the danger of what is useful," the "dangerousness of something one cannot not use Can our rhetorical habits reinscribe the circle we inhabit, while at the same time allowing us to take chances To be able to do something like this would be to take seriously Butler's idea of "subversive repetition The critical task is...to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through participating in precisely those practices of repetition that constitute the possibility of contesting them | (Brendan, Students are supposed to read books, not burn them, November 18, http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/article/9905/)
In short, you’re creating shrinking violets rather than thinking individuals, a generation of young adults going out into the world with their offensiveness antennae permanently switched on – more likely to say ‘You can’t say that’ than ‘Why do you say that? Let’s have a debate…’. Lukianoff says we have to move away from the idea that ‘words are like bullets’, that speech is a form of physical assault, and recognise that being argued with, even vociferously, is not the same as being beaten up. However, he says, ‘maybe words should wound. What’s so bad about that? The fact that words can hurt feelings, the fact that they carry emotional charges, is all the more reason for protecting them from censorship. Because the whole point of free speech is to have deep, meaningful, robust debates. We have to have deadly serious discussions about deadly serious things – and we can’t do that if everyone is listening out for potentially offensive words rather than thinking about and responding to the ideas being expressed.’ The new censoriousness on campus – which, for the record, is as profound a problem in Britain as it is in the US – highlights some worrying new trends in today’s war on freedom of thought and speech. It shows that it is not only the state or even sections of the authorities that demand censorship today – all sorts of advocacy groups, educators and youthful organisations now crusade like modern-day Torquemadas for the silencing of their opponents. And it demonstrates the extent to which censorship today both springs from and reinforces a new degraded view of human subjectivity, a view of individuals as fundamentally psychologically fragile and thus in need of protection from allegedly dangerous ideas. In such circumstances, censorship can even be re-presented as a public good, designed not necessarily to police morality in any old-fashioned way but rather to manage relations between the various fragile sections of society. Perversely, censorship is repackaged as a way of protecting the powerless. That idea, more than any other, needs to be challenged, and the authoritarian, patronising, divisive, knowledge-hampering consequences of modern-day censorship exposed. We could really do with starting a FIRE in British universities, too.
Perm do both: Juxtaposing the terms in the perm text is central to mounting and critique and keeping the targeted language available for political reimagination.
McCoy, 1997
(Kate, Research Associate in the Department of Anthropology at John Jay College of Criminal Justice and Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Queens College, Educational Theory, Fall 1997, Vol. 47, No. 4, “Killing the Father/Becoming Uncomfortable with the Mother Tongue: Rethinking the Performative Contradiction”)
Spivak speaks of the "necessary lack of fit between discourse and example, the necessary crisis between theory and practice, that marks deconstruction." She would have us read this split between method and message not as a failure but as "the new making-visible of a `success' that does not conceal or bracket problems."(n30) I see this as a suspicion of the wish for the fit of theory and practice, in which such a fit would hide problems that are exposed in the disjunction made plain when our theory negates our rhetorical habits, our mother-tongue. Spivak describes mother-tongue as: a language with a history--in that sense it is "instituted"--before our birth and after our death ...We learn it in a "natural" way and fill it once and for all with our own "intentions" and thus make it "or own" for the span of our life and then leave it, without intent.(n31) Re-reading my first reading of Spanos, I situate his reading practices and rhetorical habits as a kind of mother-tongue, an academese, an institutionalized ritual, a way of meaning-making that is easily taken as "given," a disciplinary (in the Foucauldian panoptic sense) practice. The irony in this reading is that Spanos is concerned with these same dynamics that he reads in the humanist panopticism of the Harvard Core Curriculum movement. It seems a grievous and obvious contradiction to me, one that makes me want to dismiss him, discipline him, master him, mistress him. But, perhaps, if I can read Spanos with Spivak, more sympathetically and more deconstructively, I can experience an "affirmative duplicity" that may allow me to "think about the danger of what is useful," the "dangerousness of something one cannot not use."(n32) How can Spanos not want to persuade us? How can he not want to establish his place in the discursive fields of cultural critique? Spivak says: "The most serious critique in deconstruction is the critique of things that are extremely useful, things without which we cannot live on, take chances; like our running self-identikit."(n33) Can our rhetorical habits reinscribe the circle we inhabit, while at the same time allowing us to take chances, chances we may be otherwise too paralyzed to take? To be able to do something like this would be to take seriously Butler's idea of "subversive repetition." She claims that The critical task is...to locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by [a cultural] construction, to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through participating in precisely those practices of repetition that constitute [conventional critical endeavor] and, therefore, present the immanent possibility of contesting them.(n34) | 5,594 | <h4><strong>Their demand for rejection shuts down the public sphere and perpetrates a violent vision of individuals as inherently fragile and in need of protecting from words and ideas – this links both to the form of counterplan that attempts to avoid debate over the plan itself </h4><p>O’Neill 10</p><p></strong>(Brendan, Students are supposed to read books, not burn them, November 18, http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php/site/article/9905/)</p><p>In short, <u><mark>you’re creating shrinking violets rather than thinking individuals, a generation of young adults going out into the world</mark> with their offensiveness antennae permanently switched on – <mark>more likely to say ‘You can’t say that’ than</u></mark> ‘Why do you say that? <u><mark>Let’s have a debate</u></mark>…’. Lukianoff says we have to move away from the idea that ‘words are like bullets’, that speech is a form of physical assault, and recognise that being argued with, even vociferously, is not the same as being beaten up. However, he says, ‘maybe words should wound. What’s so bad about that? The fact that words can hurt feelings, the fact that they carry emotional charges, is all the more reason for protecting them from censorship. Because the whole point of free speech is to have deep, meaningful, robust debates. <u><mark>We have to have deadly serious discussions about deadly serious things – and we can’t do that if everyone is listening out for potentially offensive words rather than thinking about and responding to the ideas being expressed</u></mark>.’ The new censoriousness on campus – which, for the record, is as profound a problem in Britain as it is in the US – highlights some worrying new trends in today’s war on freedom of thought and speech. <u>It shows that it is not only the state or even sections of the authorities that demand censorship today – all sorts of advocacy groups, educators and youthful organisations now crusade like modern-day Torquemadas for the silencing of their opponents.</u> And <u><mark>it demonstrates the extent to which censorship today both springs from and reinforces a new degraded view of human subjectivity, a view of individuals as fundamentally psychologically fragile and thus in need of protection from allegedly dangerous ideas</mark>.</u> In such circumstances, <u>censorship can even be re-presented as a public good, designed not necessarily to police morality in any old-fashioned way but rather to manage relations between the various fragile sections of society</u>. Perversely, <u><mark>censorship is repackaged as a way of protecting the powerless. That idea, more than any other, needs to be challenged</mark>, and the authoritarian, patronising, divisive, knowledge-hampering consequences of modern-day censorship exposed</u>. We could really do with starting a FIRE in British universities, too.</p><p>Perm do both: Juxtaposing the terms in the perm text is central to mounting and critique and keeping the targeted language available for political reimagination. </p><p><u>McCoy, 1997</p><p></u>(Kate, Research Associate in the Department of Anthropology at John Jay College of Criminal Justice and Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Queens College, Educational Theory, Fall 1997, Vol. 47, No. 4, “Killing the Father/Becoming Uncomfortable with the Mother Tongue: Rethinking the Performative<strong> Contradiction”)</p><p><u></strong><mark>Spivak speaks of the "necessary lack of fit between discourse and example</mark>, the necessary crisis between theory and practice, that marks deconstruction." She would have us read this split between method and message not as a failure but as "the new making-visible of a `success' that does not conceal or bracket problems."(</u>n30) I see this as <u>a suspicion of the wish for the fit of theory and practice, in which such a fit would hide problems that are exposed in the disjunction made plain when our theory negates our rhetorical habits</u>, our mother-tongue. Spivak describes mother-tongue as: a language with a history--in that sense it is "instituted"--before our birth and after our death ...We learn it in a "natural" way and fill it once and for all with our own "intentions" and thus make it "or own" for the span of our life and then leave it, without intent.(n31) <u>Re-reading</u> my first reading of Spanos, I situate his<u> </u>reading<u> practices and rhetorical habits as a kind of mother-tongue, an academese, an institutionalized ritual, a way of meaning-making that is easily taken as "given," a disciplinary</u> (in the Foucauldian panoptic sense) <u>practice. </u>The irony in this reading is that Spanos is concerned with these same dynamics that he reads in the humanist panopticism of the Harvard Core Curriculum movement. <u>It seems a grievous and obvious contradiction to me, one that makes me want to dismiss him, discipline him, master him, mistress him. But,</u> perhaps, if <u>I can read </u>Spanos <u>with Spivak, more sympathetically and more deconstructively, <mark>I can experience an "affirmative duplicity" that may allow me to "think about the danger of what is useful," the "dangerousness of something one cannot not use</mark>."(</u>n32) How can Spanos not want to persuade us? How can he not want to establish his place in the discursive fields of cultural critique? Spivak says: <u>"The most serious critique in deconstruction is the critique of things that are extremely useful, things without which we cannot live on, take chances; like our running self-identikit."</u>(n33) <u><mark>Can our rhetorical habits reinscribe the circle we inhabit, while at the same time allowing us to take chances</mark>, chances we may be otherwise too paralyzed to take? <mark>To be able to do something like this would be to take seriously Butler's idea of "subversive repetition</mark>."</u> She claims that <u><mark>The critical task is...to</mark> locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by [a cultural] construction, to <mark>affirm the local possibilities of intervention through participating in precisely those practices of repetition that constitute</mark> [conventional critical endeavor] and, therefore, present <mark>the</mark> immanent <mark>possibility of contesting them</mark>.</u>(n34)</p> | null | A2 George Yancy/Nommo | Perms | 430,389 | 1 | 17,058 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,290 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | West Georgia Kelly-Zapata | Rumbaugh | 1AC - Organs
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2NR - "Black Market" Word K | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,732 | Nuclear war | Goldstein 10 | Joshua S. Goldstein 10, Professor Emeritus, School of International Service, American University , 2010, “Changing World Order - Engaging the South,” online: http://wps.ablongman.com/long_goldstein_ir_7/35/8977/2298242.cw/index.html | global rebound operates from North to South Actions the North takes in the South come back to haunt the North later The problem of unintended consequences has been called “blowback
extreme disparities of wealth and power between North and South create conflicts and resentments that can reach out of the South to punish the North
To let a continent descend into despair may no longer be practical in the era of terrorism. Their fate may be the fate of the North that ignores them desperate states will be able to press their demands with w m d fanatics may destroy cities with nuclear weapons these issues may be less amenable to unilateral U.S. actions than are military responses to terrorism
closer engagement of the global North with the South toward seriously addressing the South’s problems, would mark a shift | global rebound operates from North to South The problem of unintended consequences has been called “blowback
disparities of wealth and power between North and South create conflicts and resentments that punish the North
To let a continent despair may no longer be practical in the era of terrorism. Their fate may be the fate of the North states will press their demands with w m d fanatics destroy cities with nuclear weapons these issues may be less amenable to unilateral U.S. actions
closer engagement of the North with the South toward seriously addressing problems would mark a shift | In the last chapter’s “Changing World Order” section, there was mention of how a smallpox epidemic launched from the global South and aimed at the global North would most likely return to do most damage in the South. This quality of global rebound operates from North to South as well. Actions the North takes in the South, such as arming Islamic extremists to fight Soviet occupiers in Afghanistan in the 1980s, come back to haunt the North later—as when Afghan-based Islamic extremists attacked the United States. The problem of unintended consequences of distant actions has been called “blowback.”*
September 2001 demonstrated the increased interdependence of the global North and South. The extreme disparities of wealth and power between North and South create conflicts and resentments that can reach out of the South to punish the privileged citizens of the North who had been oblivious to the problems of poor countries. In the world order of the 1990s, disparities sharpened and prosperity cut unevenly with both winners and losers. The continent of Africa, along with zones of festering war and poverty in countries like Afghanistan, were losers in the 1990s.
To let a continent or even a country descend into despair may no longer be practical in the era of terrorism. Their fate ultimately may be the fate of the North that ignores them. This is the century in which desperate African states will be able to press their demands with weapons of mass destruction, and in which fanatics may destroy cities with nuclear weapons. To combat terrorism may—though this is disputed—require addressing poverty, repression, and war throughout the poorest world regions. Furthermore, these issues may be less amenable to unilateral U.S. actions than are military responses to terrorism. Thus, the need to address “root causes” of terrorism may draw the United States into closer cooperation with the UN and other international institutions in the years to come.
It is unclear how these relationships will play out in practice. But if in fact the new world order is moving toward closer engagement of the global North with the South, and toward seriously addressing the South’s problems, this move would mark a shift from the world order that was developing in the 1990s, with its sharpened disparities. Do you think that investing in development, democracy, and peace in the world’s poorest countries is an important principle that should govern world order in the era of terrorist attacks? If you think this is a good idea, should it extend globally or just to countries currently “breeding” terrorists? Can Argentina or Democratic Congo fall apart without upsetting the rest of the world? Could all of Latin America or all of Africa? Will the emerging world order bring together the North and South in new ways? | 2,814 | <h4>Nuclear war </h4><p>Joshua S. <strong>Goldstein 10</strong>, Professor Emeritus, School of International Service, American University , 2010, “Changing World Order - Engaging the South,” online: http://wps.ablongman.com/long_goldstein_ir_7/35/8977/2298242.cw/index.html</p><p>In the last chapter’s “Changing World Order” section, there was mention of how a smallpox epidemic launched from the global South and aimed at the global North would most likely return to do most damage in the South. This quality of <u><strong><mark>global rebound operates from North to South</u></strong></mark> as well. <u><strong>Actions the North takes in the South</u></strong>, such as arming Islamic extremists to fight Soviet occupiers in Afghanistan in the 1980s, <u><strong>come back to haunt the North later</u></strong>—as when Afghan-based Islamic extremists attacked the United States. <u><strong><mark>The problem of unintended consequences</u></strong></mark> of distant actions <u><strong><mark>has been called “blowback</u></strong></mark>.”*</p><p>September 2001 demonstrated the increased interdependence of the global North and South. The <u><strong>extreme <mark>disparities of wealth and power</u></strong> <u><strong>between North and South</u></strong> <u><strong>create conflicts and resentments</u></strong> <u><strong>that</mark> can reach out of the South to <mark>punish the</u></strong></mark> privileged citizens of the <u><strong><mark>North</u></strong></mark> who had been oblivious to the problems of poor countries. In the world order of the 1990s, disparities sharpened and prosperity cut unevenly with both winners and losers. The continent of Africa, along with zones of festering war and poverty in countries like Afghanistan, were losers in the 1990s.</p><p><u><strong><mark>To let a continent</u></strong></mark> or even a country <u><strong>descend into <mark>despair may no longer be practical in the era of terrorism.</u></strong> <u><strong>Their fate</u></strong></mark> ultimately <u><strong><mark>may be the fate of the North</mark> that ignores them</u></strong>. This is the century in which <u><strong>desperate</u></strong> African <u><strong><mark>states will</mark> be able to</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>press their demands with</u></strong> <u><strong>w</u></strong></mark>eapons of <u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>ass <u><strong><mark>d</u></strong></mark>estruction, and in which <u><strong><mark>fanatics</mark> may</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>destroy cities with nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>. To combat terrorism may—though this is disputed—require addressing poverty, repression, and war throughout the poorest world regions. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>these issues may be</u></strong> <u><strong>less amenable to unilateral U.S. actions</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>than are military responses to terrorism</u></strong>. Thus, the need to address “root causes” of terrorism may draw the United States into closer cooperation with the UN and other international institutions in the years to come.</p><p>It is unclear how these relationships will play out in practice. But if in fact the new world order is moving toward <u><strong><mark>closer engagement of the</mark> global <mark>North with the South</u></strong></mark>, and <u><strong><mark>toward seriously addressing</mark> the South’s <mark>problems</mark>,</u></strong> this move <u><strong><mark>would mark a shift</u></strong></mark> from the world order that was developing in the 1990s, with its sharpened disparities. Do you think that investing in development, democracy, and peace in the world’s poorest countries is an important principle that should govern world order in the era of terrorist attacks? If you think this is a good idea, should it extend globally or just to countries currently “breeding” terrorists? Can Argentina or Democratic Congo fall apart without upsetting the rest of the world? Could all of Latin America or all of Africa? Will the emerging world order bring together the North and South in new ways?</p> | null | 1NC | 1NC | 434,549 | 25 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
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741,733 | And warming not inevitable – emissions reductions now mean IMMEDIATE climate benefits | Desjardins 13 | Desjardins 13 (Clea, Senior Advisor in Media Relations @ Concordia Univ. - Canada, “Global Warming: Irreversible but Not Inevitable, “http://www.concordia.ca/cunews/main/stories/2013/04/02/global-warming-irreversible-but-not-inevitable.html) | There is a persistent misconception that there is a delay between emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and the climate’s response to those emissions. This erroneous line of argument makes the climate problem seem more intractable than it actually is, say Concordia University’s Damon Matthews and MIT’s Susan Solomon If we can successfully decrease CO2 emissions in the near future, this change will be felt by the climate system when the emissions reductions are implemented the climate benefits of emissions reductions would occur on the same timescale as political decisions the onus for slowing the rate of global warming falls squarely on current efforts at reducing CO2 emissions Emission cuts made now will have an immediate effect on the rate of global warming,” he asserts. | There is a persistent misconception that there is a delay between emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and the climate’s response to those emissions This argument makes the climate seem more intractable than it actually is, say Concordia Matthews and MIT’s Solomon If we can successfully decrease CO2 emissions in the near future, this change will be felt by the climate system when the emissions reductions are implemented the climate benefits of emissions reductions would occur on the same timescale as political decisions the onus for slowing the rate of global warming falls squarely on current efforts at reducing CO2 emissions Emission cuts made now will have an immediate effect on the rate of global warming,” | There is a persistent misconception among both scientists and the public that there is a delay between emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and the climate’s response to those emissions. This misconception has led policy makers to argue that CO2 emission cuts implemented now will not affect the climate system for many decades. This erroneous line of argument makes the climate problem seem more intractable than it actually is, say Concordia University’s Damon Matthews and MIT’s Susan Solomon in a recent Science article. The researchers show that immediate decreases in CO2 emissions would in fact result in an immediate decrease in the rate of climate warming. Explains Matthews, professor in the Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, “If we can successfully decrease CO2 emissions in the near future, this change will be felt by the climate system when the emissions reductions are implemented – not in several decades." “The potential for a quick climate response to prompt cuts in CO2 emissions opens up the possibility that the climate benefits of emissions reductions would occur on the same timescale as the political decisions themselves.” In their paper, Matthews and Solomon, Ellen Swallow Richards professor of Atmospheric Chemistry and Climate Science, show that the onus for slowing the rate of global warming falls squarely on current efforts at reducing CO2 emissions, and the resulting future emissions that we produce. This means that there are critical implications for the equity of carbon emission choices currently being discussed internationally. Total emissions from developing countries may soon exceed those from developed nations. But developed countries are expected to maintain a far higher per-capita contribution to present and possible future warming. “This disparity clarifies the urgency for low-carbon technology investment and diffusion to enable developing countries to continue to develop,” says Matthews. “Emission cuts made now will have an immediate effect on the rate of global warming,” he asserts. “I see more hope for averting difficult-to-avoid negative impacts by accelerating advances in technology development and diffusion, than for averting climate system changes that are already inevitable. Given the enormous scope and complexity of the climate mitigation challenge, clarifying these points of hope is critical to motivate change.” | 2,398 | <h4><strong>And warming not inevitable – emissions reductions now mean IMMEDIATE climate benefits</h4><p>Desjardins 13</strong> (Clea, Senior Advisor in Media Relations @ Concordia Univ. - Canada, “Global Warming: Irreversible but Not Inevitable, “http://www.concordia.ca/cunews/main/stories/2013/04/02/global-warming-irreversible-but-not-inevitable.html)</p><p><u><mark>There is a persistent misconception</u></mark> among both scientists and the public <u><mark>that there is a delay between emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and the climate’s response to those emissions</mark>.</u> This misconception has led policy makers to argue that CO2 emission cuts implemented now will not affect the climate system for many decades. <u><mark>This </mark>erroneous line of <mark>argument makes the climate </mark>problem <mark>seem more intractable than it actually is,</u> <u>say Concordia </mark>University’s Damon <mark>Matthews and MIT’s </mark>Susan <mark>Solomon</u></mark> in a recent Science article. The researchers show that immediate decreases in CO2 emissions would in fact result in an immediate decrease in the rate of climate warming. Explains Matthews, professor in the Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, “<u><mark>If we can successfully decrease CO2 emissions in the near future, this change will be felt by the climate system when the emissions reductions are implemented</u></mark> – not in several decades." “The potential for a quick climate response to prompt cuts in CO2 emissions opens up the possibility that <u><mark>the climate benefits of emissions reductions would occur on the same timescale as </u></mark>the<u><mark> political decisions </u></mark>themselves.” In their paper, Matthews and Solomon, Ellen Swallow Richards professor of Atmospheric Chemistry and Climate Science, show that <u><mark>the onus for slowing the rate of global warming falls squarely on current efforts at reducing CO2 emissions</u></mark>, and the resulting future emissions that we produce. This means that there are critical implications for the equity of carbon emission choices currently being discussed internationally. Total emissions from developing countries may soon exceed those from developed nations. But developed countries are expected to maintain a far higher per-capita contribution to present and possible future warming. “This disparity clarifies the urgency for low-carbon technology investment and diffusion to enable developing countries to continue to develop,” says Matthews. “<u><mark>Emission cuts made now <strong>will have an immediate effect</strong> on the rate of global warming,”</mark> he asserts.</u> “I see more hope for averting difficult-to-avoid negative impacts by accelerating advances in technology development and diffusion, than for averting climate system changes that are already inevitable. Given the enormous scope and complexity of the climate mitigation challenge, clarifying these points of hope is critical to motivate change.”</p> | null | 1NR | Case | 18,266 | 136 | 17,060 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Cedanats-Round7.docx | 565,294 | N | Cedanats | 7 | Fresno State Levin-Sicairos | Munday | 1AC - PAS for death row inmates
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741,734 | It is impossible to attribute symbolic racist motives to policy and individuals in policy debates | Sniderman and Tetlock ’86 | Sniderman and Tetlock ’86 [Paul M. Sniderman, Stanford University and UC Berkeley Survey Research Center, and Philip E. Tetlock, UC Berkeley, 1986, “Symbolic Racism: Problems of Motive Attribution in Political Analysis,” accessed 3/31/14] | At what point is one justified in concluding that racist motives determine a policy preference different groups set different thresholds of proof. Some civil rights activists View opposition to affirmative action quotas as inspired in large part by racism. Some conservatives see the same programs as threats to fundamental (nonracial) values One person’s reason is frequently another‘s rationalization , 1985).
Symbolic racism theory is an attempt to apply the methods of social science. to the problem of political motive attribution to what extent are political debates over the “true motives" underlying racial policy preferences resolvable through the techniques of causal analysis available to the social sciences?
To what extent does the relationship hold when one controls for alternative explanations such as traditional values or attitudes toward the federal government?) a hard case, such as symbolic racism, repre- sents a quite different order of difficulty There is no nomological net in the case of symbolic racism. motive attributions are contestable, not merely by the person to whom they are attributed, but also by other analysts generally. they are inherently contestable because the sym- bolic racism approach begs the question—how, after all, is one to tell whether opposition to affirmative action is racist or not when, in the case of symbolic racism, racism is not related to an agreed-on sign of racism, for example, crude stereotyping?
one might turn to negative evidence
Negative arguments, however, are inherently weak ways to resolve prob- lems of motive attribution The variety of alternative motives for taking a particular policy stand is practically endless. How exactly should one go about operationalizing "self-interest"-objective life circumstances perceived life circumstances societal resources or the perceived life circumstances
Symbolic racism researchers have only skimmed the surface of such poten- tial motivational counter-hypotheses supposing they went deeper: Is the attribution of symbolic racism falsifiable? We believe not. The list of counter- hypotheses is, infinite the flow of causality, even when studied by the most sophisticated statistical modeling procedures, will remain highly ambiguous as long as symbolic racism researchers reserve the right to label a wide range of (nonracial) values and policy preferences as racist Suppose, for example, that one were to find that all the variance in white opposition to government assistance for blacks could be statistically explained as a function of commitment to economic individualism Assume, moreover, that affect toward blacks did not even emerge as a significant predictor of opposition to government assistance to blacks Would this evidence count against the symbolic racism thesis? researchers could respond that such data only buttress their case. the data reveal a connection between traditional values and opposition to assistance for blacks symbolic racism theory fails the fundamental test expected of any scientific theory – falsifiability | At what point is one justified in concluding racist motives determine policy preference different groups set different thresholds of proof. One person’s reason is frequently another‘s rationalization
Symbolic racism theory an attempt to apply the methods of social science. to political motive attribution
There is no nomological net in the case of symbolic racism. motive attributions are contestable, not merely by the person to whom they are attributed, but also by other analysts generally they are inherently contestable because the racism approach begs the question symbolic racism is not related to an agreed-on sign of racism
Negative arguments are inherently weak The variety of motives is practically endless
Is the attribution of symbolic racism falsifiable? We believe not. The list of counter- hypotheses is infinite the flow of causality, even when studied by the most sophisticated statistical modeling procedures, will remain highly ambiguous as long as researchers reserve the right to label a wide range of values as racist symbolic racism theory fails the fundamental test expected of any scientific theory – falsifiability | At what point is one justified in concluding that racist motives determine a policy preference? Not surprisingly, different groups set different thresholds of proof. Some civil rights activists View opposition to affirmative action quotas as inspired in large part by racism. Some conservatives see the same programs as threats to fundamental (nonracial) values such as equality of opportunity. Dis- agreements of this sort, of course, are the stuff of politics. One person’s reason is frequently another‘s rationalization (cf. Mills, 1940; Tetlock, 1985).
Symbolic racism theory, in its fundamental sense, is an attempt to apply the methods of social science. to the problem of political motive attribution. It is therefore important to consider an especially basic question: to what extent are political debates over the “true motives" underlying racial policy preferences resolvable through the techniques of causal analysis available to the social sciences?
The answer to this question is by no means obvious. Problems of political motive attribution may roughly be divided into “easy” and “hard” cases. An example of the former is old-fashioned racism; of the latter, symbolic racism. Consider old-fashioned racism: what analytical tools might the investigator draw upon to determine whether traditional racism underlies opposition to quotas? The classical strategy is to locate attitudes toward quotas in a nomological network of relevant constructs-—constructs that should theoretically relate to attitudes toward quotas (cf. Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Thus, one would explore the relations among affect toward blacks, crude stereotyping of blacks, policy stands that contemporary American political culture would label as unambiguously racist (erg., support for segregation), and policy stands whose mean- ing is politically controversial (e.g., minority job quotas).
Now a case such as this, though easy in principle, may in practice be quite hard. (What “third variables" moderate the relation between traditional racism and opposition to quotas? To what extent does the relationship hold when one controls for alternative explanations such as traditional values or attitudes toward the federal government?) Even so, a hard case, such as symbolic racism, repre- sents a quite different order of difficulty. The difficulty is as follows: There is no nomological net in the case of symbolic racism. Many of the motive attributions are contestable, not merely by the person to whom they are attributed, but also by other analysts generally. And they are inherently contestable because the sym- bolic racism approach begs the question—how, after all, is one to tell whether opposition to affirmative action is racist or not when, in the case of symbolic racism, racism is not related to an agreed-on sign of racism, for example, crude stereotyping?
Lacking positive evidence of racist motivation, one might turn to negative evidence. Perhaps one could infer racist motivation by a process of elimina- tion—by ruling out other plausible motives for, say, opposing affirmative action. Thus, an investigator might propose that because the well-being of the individual respondent is not directly threatened by quotas, the individual is not driven by concern for his or her self—interest.
Negative arguments, however, are inherently weak ways to resolve prob- lems of motive attribution (cf. Tetlock & Manstead, i985). The variety of alternative motives for taking a particular policy stand is practically endless. How exactly should one go about operationalizing "self-interest"-objective life circumstances (the presence or absence of a quota system in one‘s place of work), perceived life circumstances (do the respondents believe, in competing for scarce societal resources, they are at a comparative disadvantage by virtue of being white?), or the perceived life circumstances of individuals or groups with whom the respondent identifies (e.g., friends, family, neighbors)? Moreover, self-interest is only one class of motivational counterhypothesis. Perhaps the respondent objects out of belief that color-blind decision-making procedures provide the fairest method of guaranteeing equality of opportunity (or social harmony) in the long run. Or perhaps the respondent perceives quota systems as one more manifestation of an increasingly intrusive and legalistic federal bureau- cracy that restricts individual freedom and market efficiency.
Symbolic racism researchers have only skimmed the surface of such poten- tial motivational counter-hypotheses. But, supposing they went deeper: Is the attribution of symbolic racism falsifiable? We believe not. The list of counter- hypotheses is, in principle, infinite. Furthermore, the flow of causality, even when studied by the most sophisticated statistical modeling procedures, will remain highly ambiguous as long as symbolic racism researchers reserve the right to label a wide range of (nonracial) values and policy preferences as racist. Suppose, for example, that one were to find that all the variance in white opposition to government assistance for blacks could be statistically explained as a function of commitment to economic individualism, antipathy toward the federal government, and the belief that market mechanisms are the most efficient method of alleviating the plight of the poor. Assume, moreover, that affect toward blacks did not even emerge as a significant predictor of opposition to government assistance to blacks. Would this – at first glance, quite devastating – evidence count against the symbolic racism thesis? Not necessarily. Symbolic racism researchers could respond that such data only buttress their case. After all, the data reveal a connection between traditional values (support for economic individualism and capitalism) and opposition to assistance for blacks, and these traditional values are the very essence of symbolic racism. In short, as currently formulated, symbolic racism theory fails the fundamental test expected of any scientific theory – falsifiability. It is unclear what evidence it would take to convince symbolic racism researchers they are wrong. | 6,157 | <h4>It is impossible to attribute symbolic racist motives to policy and individuals in policy debates</h4><p><strong>Sniderman and Tetlock ’86</strong> [Paul M. Sniderman, Stanford University and UC Berkeley Survey Research Center, and Philip E. Tetlock, UC Berkeley, 1986, “Symbolic Racism: Problems of Motive Attribution in Political Analysis,” accessed 3/31/14]</p><p><u><strong><mark>At what point is one justified in concluding</mark> that <mark>racist motives determine</mark> a <mark>policy preference</u></strong></mark>? Not surprisingly, <u><strong><mark>different groups set different thresholds of proof.</mark> Some civil rights activists View opposition to affirmative action quotas as inspired in large part by racism. Some conservatives see the same programs as threats to fundamental (nonracial) values</u></strong> such as equality of opportunity. Dis- agreements of this sort, of course, are the stuff of politics. <u><strong><mark>One person’s reason is frequently another‘s rationalization</mark> </u></strong>(cf. Mills, 1940; Tetlock<u><strong>, 1985). </p><p><mark>Symbolic racism theory</u></strong></mark>, in its fundamental sense, <u><strong>is <mark>an attempt to apply the methods of social science. to</mark> the problem of <mark>political motive attribution</u></strong></mark>. It is therefore important to consider an especially basic question: <u><strong>to what extent are political debates over the “true motives" underlying racial policy preferences resolvable through the techniques of causal analysis available to the social sciences? </p><p></u></strong>The answer to this question is by no means obvious. Problems of political motive attribution may roughly be divided into “easy” and “hard” cases. An example of the former is old-fashioned racism; of the latter, symbolic racism. Consider old-fashioned racism: what analytical tools might the investigator draw upon to determine whether traditional racism underlies opposition to quotas? The classical strategy is to locate attitudes toward quotas in a nomological network of relevant constructs-—constructs that should theoretically relate to attitudes toward quotas (cf. Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Thus, one would explore the relations among affect toward blacks, crude stereotyping of blacks, policy stands that contemporary American political culture would label as unambiguously racist (erg., support for segregation), and policy stands whose mean- ing is politically controversial (e.g., minority job quotas). </p><p>Now a case such as this, though easy in principle, may in practice be quite hard. (What “third variables" moderate the relation between traditional racism and opposition to quotas? <u><strong>To what extent does the relationship hold when one controls for alternative explanations such as traditional values or attitudes toward the federal government?)</u></strong> Even so, <u><strong>a hard case, such as symbolic racism, repre- sents a quite different order of difficulty</u></strong>. The difficulty is as follows: <u><strong><mark>There is no nomological net in the case of symbolic racism.</u></strong></mark> Many of the <u><strong><mark>motive attributions are contestable, not merely by the person to whom they are attributed, but also by other analysts generally</mark>.</u></strong> And <u><strong><mark>they are inherently contestable because the</mark> sym- bolic <mark>racism approach begs the question</mark>—how, after all, is one to tell whether opposition to affirmative action is racist or not when, in the case of <mark>symbolic racism</mark>, racism <mark>is not related to an agreed-on sign of racism</mark>, for example, crude stereotyping?</p><p></u></strong>Lacking positive evidence of racist motivation, <u><strong>one might turn to negative evidence</u></strong>. Perhaps one could infer racist motivation by a process of elimina- tion—by ruling out other plausible motives for, say, opposing affirmative action. Thus, an investigator might propose that because the well-being of the individual respondent is not directly threatened by quotas, the individual is not driven by concern for his or her self—interest. </p><p><u><strong><mark>Negative arguments</mark>, however, <mark>are inherently weak</mark> ways to resolve prob- lems of motive attribution</u></strong> (cf. Tetlock & Manstead, i985). <u><strong><mark>The variety of</mark> alternative <mark>motives</mark> for taking a particular policy stand <mark>is practically endless</mark>. How exactly should one go about operationalizing "self-interest"-objective life circumstances</u></strong> (the presence or absence of a quota system in one‘s place of work), <u><strong>perceived life circumstances</u></strong> (do the respondents believe, in competing for scarce <u><strong>societal resources</u></strong>, they are at a comparative disadvantage by virtue of being white?), <u><strong>or the perceived life circumstances</u></strong> of individuals or groups with whom the respondent identifies (e.g., friends, family, neighbors)? Moreover, self-interest is only one class of motivational counterhypothesis. Perhaps the respondent objects out of belief that color-blind decision-making procedures provide the fairest method of guaranteeing equality of opportunity (or social harmony) in the long run. Or perhaps the respondent perceives quota systems as one more manifestation of an increasingly intrusive and legalistic federal bureau- cracy that restricts individual freedom and market efficiency. </p><p><u><strong>Symbolic racism researchers have only skimmed the surface of such poten- tial motivational counter-hypotheses</u></strong>. But, <u><strong>supposing they went deeper: <mark>Is the attribution of symbolic racism falsifiable? We believe not. The list of counter- hypotheses is</mark>,</u></strong> in principle, <u><strong><mark>infinite</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>the flow of causality, even when studied by the most sophisticated statistical modeling procedures, will remain highly ambiguous as long as</mark> symbolic racism <mark>researchers reserve the right to label a wide range of</mark> (nonracial) <mark>values</mark> and policy preferences <mark>as racist</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Suppose, for example, that one were to find that all the variance in white opposition to government assistance for blacks could be statistically explained as a function of commitment to economic individualism</u></strong>, antipathy toward the federal government, and the belief that market mechanisms are the most efficient method of alleviating the plight of the poor. <u><strong>Assume, moreover, that affect toward blacks did not even emerge as a significant predictor of opposition to government assistance to blacks</u></strong>. <u><strong>Would this</u></strong> – at first glance, quite devastating – <u><strong>evidence count against the symbolic racism thesis?</u></strong> Not necessarily. Symbolic racism <u><strong>researchers could respond that such data only buttress their case.</u></strong> After all, <u><strong>the data reveal a connection between traditional values</u></strong> (support for economic individualism and capitalism) <u><strong>and opposition to assistance for blacks</u></strong>, and these traditional values are the very essence of symbolic racism. In short, as currently formulated, <u><strong><mark>symbolic racism theory fails the fundamental test expected of any scientific theory – falsifiability</u></strong></mark>. It is unclear what evidence it would take to convince symbolic racism researchers they are wrong.</p> | null | 1AR | Perms | 241,146 | 2 | 17,058 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,290 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | West Georgia Kelly-Zapata | Rumbaugh | 1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,735 | Miniorities disproportionately suffer kidney disease | Pollack 14 | Pollack 14 MARTIN POLLAK and MARK ZEIDEL, respectively, chief of the Division of Nephrology and chairman of the department of medicine at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. Sept. 2, 2014 | End-stage kidney failure is the cause of tremendous mortality as well as great cost: The growing obesity epidemic and the consequent increase in Type 2 diabetes are major contributors to the rates and costs of kidney failure.
Kidney disease also disproportionately affects minority populations. Blacks develop kidney failure at three to five times the rate of nonblacks, largely the effect of recently identified genetic factors. | null | New York Times The Opinion Pages | Letters Ideas to Relieve a Kidney Shortage http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/opinion/ideas-to-relieve-a-kidney-shortage.html?_r=0
End-stage kidney failure is the cause of tremendous mortality as well as great cost: About 6 percent of the Medicare budget — more than $30 billion — is spent yearly on end-stage kidney disease care. The growing obesity epidemic and the consequent increase in Type 2 diabetes are major contributors to the rates and costs of kidney failure.
Kidney disease also disproportionately affects minority populations. Blacks develop kidney failure at three to five times the rate of nonblacks, largely the effect of recently identified genetic factors. | 715 | <h4>Miniorities disproportionately suffer kidney disease</h4><p><strong>Pollack 14</strong> MARTIN POLLAK and MARK ZEIDEL, respectively, chief of the Division of Nephrology and chairman of the department of medicine at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. Sept. 2, 2014 </p><p>New York Times The Opinion Pages | Letters Ideas to Relieve a Kidney Shortage http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/opinion/ideas-to-relieve-a-kidney-shortage.html?_r=0</p><p><u><strong>End-stage kidney failure is the cause of tremendous mortality as well as great cost:</u></strong> About 6 percent of the Medicare budget — more than $30 billion — is spent yearly on end-stage kidney disease care. <u><strong>The growing obesity epidemic and the consequent increase in Type 2 diabetes are major contributors to the rates and costs of kidney failure.</p><p>Kidney disease also disproportionately affects minority populations. Blacks develop kidney failure at three to five times the rate of nonblacks, largely the effect of recently identified genetic factors.</p></u></strong> | null | 1AR | Perms | 430,390 | 3 | 17,058 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,290 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | West Georgia Kelly-Zapata | Rumbaugh | 1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,736 | State sponsorship of online gambling allows it to grow into a global industry that preys on the most disadvantaged and drastically accelerates inequality. You should be skeptical of all their scholarship because gambling research systematically ignores the social externalities of online gambling. | Young and Markham 14 | Young and Markham 14 (Francis Young, The Fenner School of Environment and Society, and Martin Markham, School of Tourism and Hospitality Management @ Southern Cross University, “”Big Gambling”: The rise of the global industry-state gambling complex” Addict Research & Theory, pp. 1-3) | global gambling losses have risen from S250 billion to S450 billion Big Gambling is driven by political processes and economic imperatives It has inserted dangerous commodities en masse into vulnerable communities
Australia provides the example par excellence of Big Gambling ascendant
Over the last three decades, EGMs have proliferated machines encourage gamblers to stake higher amounts and give the misleading impression of frequent wins and near-misses Despite rhetoric about targeting "'high-rollers", Australian casinos continue to earn over 80% of their income from the non-VIP ''grind" market Odds are available on more sports than ever before and "exotic" bets have transformed even the most banal moment into a money-making bonanza the final frontier of gambling liberalisation, online casino-style gambling, was recommended for staged liberalisation by a government-commissioned review
It is difficult to imagine this industry without rampant exploitation of the working classes EGMs and the gambling losses are overwhelming located in poorer suburbs problem gambling - and thus gambling loss - is concentrated among the poor
Commercial gambling has also minted a new class of super-rich individuals through accumulation by dispossession Gambling moguls are over-represented among Australia's wealthiest 0.01%.
This level of class-based exploitation is only possible because the gambling super-rich are willing to use their money and influence to reinforce their class position. Political power is used to block reform there was a concerted and ultimately successful effort to sabotage reforms that would have made EGMs less addictive, despite overwhelming popular opinion a spate of political donations by the gambling lobby peaked at the same time,
Political power is also used proactively to further gambling liberalisation
It is no coincidence that gambling liberalisation occurred concurrently with the ascendance of the neoliberal economic project, with its emphasis on deregulation and free markets As state and territory governments found themselves subject to shrinking taxation revenue, commercial gambling has paradoxically offered certainty and an independent source of income to cash-strapped jurisdictions
the state-sponsored gambling industry has resulted in the unabated economic exploitation of Australia's most socioeconomically disadvantaged citizens . It has been an exercise in class warfare from above, based on the calculated, industrial-scale exploitation of the working classes by a super-rich elite liberalisation" of gambling has enabled the dramatic redistribution of resources, transferring, with industrial efficiency, billions of dollars from the pay packets of the working classes to the bank accounts of the richest Big Gambling uses its enormous political power to accelerate deregulation, expand its remit, and resist public health reforms
the class-project of gambling liberalisation and exploitation of the working glasses is increasingly global Governments across the globe are feeling the pressure to support gambling liberalisation a study found that casino legalisation by national governments was associated with the pressure for economic growth
the field of gambling studies appears almost oblivious to the astonishing transformation of gambling into a socially-damaging, economically-exploitative global industry content area has focussed without meaningful analysis of the social and economic systems that produce industrial gambling research has focussed heavily on identifying, enumerating and profiling pathological gamblers problem gambling has emerged as the primary issue raised by gambling liberalisation In this way, the pathological gambler, rather than the process of gambling liberalisation, has been constructed and mobilised as the object of policy and intervention The pressing problem for gambling studies is to understand the political economy of gambling and its societal consequences, an agenda beyond the routine psychological approaches that dominate the field | gambling losses have risen from S250 billion to S450 billion Gambling inserted dangerous commodities en masse into vulnerable communities
Australia provides the example par excellence
machines encourage gamblers to stake higher amounts and give the misleading impression of wins casinos earn over 80% of their income from the ''grind" market bets have transformed even the most banal moment into a money-making bonanza the final frontier online gambling was recommended for staged liberalisation
It is difficult to imagine this industry without rampant exploitation of the working classes gambling losses are overwhelming located in poor suburbs
Commercial gambling has also minted a new class of super-rich individuals Gambling moguls are over-represented among Australia's wealthiest 0.01%
gambling super-rich use Political power to block reform there was a successful effort to sabotage reforms that would have made EGMs less addictive donations by the gambling lobby peaked at the same time
It is no coincidence that gambling liberalisation occurred concurrently with the ascendance of the neoliberal economic project, with its emphasis on deregulation
state-sponsored gambling has resulted in the unabated economic exploitation of disadvantaged citizens It has been an exercise in class warfare from above
gambling studies appears almost oblivious to the transformation into a damaging exploitative global industry research has focussed heavily on profiling pathological gamblers The pressing problem is to understand the political economy of gambling and its societal consequences beyond routine psychological approaches that dominate the field | Global commercial gambling has grown to be an industry of remarkable size and power. Over the past decade, global gambling losses have risen from approximately S250 billion USD in 2003 to S450 billion in 2013 (The Economist. 2014). No longer gambling is low-key and small-scale, the differentiated expression of local cultures (Binde. 2005). It is a global economic project, one central to the liberalisation of markets associated with the emergence of the international consumer society (Reith. 2013). We argue that that the emergence of "Big Gambling", the industry-state gambling complex, is both exemplary and symptomatic of the concentration of capital and political power among an economic elite in the Western World since the 1980s. Rather than reflecting changing patterns in consumer demand, Big Gambling is driven by political processes and economic imperatives. It has inserted dangerous commodities en masse into vulnerable communities in ways that parallels the actions of both Big Alcohol and Big Tobacco, with similarly damaging consequences. To make this case, we outline of the growth and consequences of the gambling industry in Australia. We choose Australia as our case study, not only because it has formed the context for our own research efforts, but also because of its unprecedented rate and degree of gambling liberalisation, particularly through electronic gambling machines (EGMs). the Australian-variant of the slot machine.
Australia provides the example par excellence of Big Gambling ascendant. Electronic gambling machines (EGMs) have become ubiquitous in public hotels (pubs) and "not-for-profit" community clubs in every state and territory except for Western Australia, with a national ratio of 89 adults per EGM in 2011-12 (Office of Economic and Statistical Research. 2014). According to industry analysts, Australians lose more money gambling per person than any other nation, 23% more than the second-ranked Singapore and 60% more than the fifth-ranked United States (The Economist. 2014). In 2011—12, this amounted to over AUD20 billion lost on gambling nationally, a figure that excludes losses on overseas websites (Office of Economic and Statistical Research. 2014).
Gambling industries in Australia have not always been so profitable. In the 1970s, gambling opportunities were limited. The most popular form of gambling was betting on races and, except at the racetrack, bets could only be made with government-owned monopoly operators. Lotteries were similarly government-run in all states but one. Sports betting was illegal. EGMs were clunky, mechanical, single-line affairs. The machines accepted only smaller-denomination coins and were restricted to clubs in two jurisdictions. EGMs were even prohibited in the four small British-styled casinos, which themselves were located in remote tourist destinations, far from the great mass of the Australian population (Australian Institute for Gambling Research, 1999).
Over the last three decades, EGMs have proliferated in pubs, clubs and casinos across the country (excluding Western Australia) and EGM technology has advanced considerably. Australian company Aristocrat Leisure pioneered the development of linked jackpots and multiline games, a move that was only possible due to the transition from mechanical to electronic machines (Schiill, 2012). These machines encourage gamblers to stake higher amounts (Rockloff et al., 2014) and give the misleading impression of frequent wins and near-misses, encouraging gamblers to continue playing for longer periods (Dixon, Harrigan, Sandhu, Collins. & Fugclsang. 2010; Haw, 2009). Compared to their mechanical predecessors, EGMs are both more profitable for the gambling industry and more dangerous to gamblers. In addition, casinos have been legalised in every state and territory. Despite rhetoric about targeting "'high-rollers", Australian casinos continue to earn over 80% of their income from the non-VIP ''grind" market (Productivity Commission, 2010). Indeed, casino development continues apace, with four new Vegas-styled casinos planned for NSW and Queensland in the coming years (Markham & Young, 2013). Lotteries have been privatised in every state and territory. Betting, once confined to the trackside and government-owned pari-mutuels, has been privatised and deregulated. Odds are available on more sports than ever before and "exotic" bets have transformed even the most banal moment in a sporting match into a money-making bonanza for corporate bookmakers. The legalisation of internet wagering has made gambling accessible 24 h a day, wherever a smartphone can be connected. And the final frontier of gambling liberalisation, online casino-style gambling, was recommended for staged liberalisation by an authoritative, government-commissioned review (Productivity Commission, 2010).
It is difficult to imagine this industry without rampant exploitation of the working classes. The distribution of EGM gambling expenditure and class are highly correlated. EGMs and the gambling losses are overwhelming located in poorer suburbs in Australia (Marshall & Baker, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Rintoul, Livingstone, Mellor, & Jolley, 2012). Prevalence studies have confirmed this spatial correlation at the individual level: problem gambling - and thus gambling loss - is concentrated among the poor and poorly educated (e.g. Young et al., 2006).
The money lost on gambling by Australia's working classes flows directly to state and territory treasuries and the gambling industry's pockets. While around a quarter of gambling losses ends up in state coffers (Office of Economic and Statistical Research, 2014), the remaining S15 billion a year is appropriated by the "not-for-profit" clubs and private sector companies. Only a small fraction of club sector EGM profits, often justified on the basis of community benefit, are returned by clubs to the community. For example, in 2010-11, clubs in NSW, Victoria, Queensland and the ACT spent, respectively, 1.3%, 2.4%, 2.3% and 6.6% of EGM losses on community benefits (Livingstone, Kipsaina, & Rintoul, 2012). The remaining EGM profits are, according to data from Clubs Australia (2009), mostly spent subsidising "other" activities such as "donations, cash grants, abnormal and extraordinary and other expenses". In Canberra, for example, gamblers lost over $16 million in 2012-13 playing the 271 EGMs at the Canberra Labor Group's network of clubs (ACT Gambling and Racing Commission, 2013). Of these takings, $4.2 million were promptly transferred to the affiliated branch of the Australian Labor Party (ABC News, 2012).
Commercial gambling has also minted a new class of super-rich individuals, enriched not through the production of surplus value but through accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003). Gambling moguls are over-represented among Australia's wealthiest 0.01%. For example, Australia's second-richest person, James Packer, has poured his considerable inheritance into casinos and profited massively. His majority-owned Crown Limited made a $490 million profit last (Crown Resorts, 2013), bringing his personal wealth to $7.7 billion (Heathcote, 2013b). Hotel owners have likewise shared the spoils, especially the corporate retailer Woolworths Limited and its joint-venture partners. Bruce Mathieson, partner with Woolworths in Australian Leisure and Hospitality Group, has amassed $1.2 billion, while Arthur Laundy, another Woolworths partner, owns pub assets worth $310 million. The Ferrell Family, owners of Australia's first casino and beneficiaries of legislated monopoly ownership of all EGMs in the state of Tasmania, have reputedly accumulated assets worth $275 million. Other members of the capitalist elite to profit from gambling liberalisation include Cyril Maloney ($360 million, pubs), John Singleton ($355 million, also pubs), the Kafataris family ($110 million, online wagering) and Matthew Tripp ($115 million, online wagering) (Bennet, 2011; Heathcote, 2012, 2013a).
This level of class-based exploitation is only possible because the gambling super-rich are willing to use their money and influence to reinforce their class position. Political power is used to block reform. In the Australian context, for example, there was a concerted and ultimately successful effort to sabotage reforms that would have made EGMs less addictive, despite overwhelming popular opinion (Mond, Davidson, & McAllister, 2011; Panichi, 2013). Not coin-cidentally, a spate of political donations by the gambling lobby peaked at the same time, doubtless reminding politicians of the benefits of having Big Gambling on side (Safi, 2013).
Political power is also used proactively to further gambling liberalisation. Clubs in NSW recently leveraged their relationship with the state government to gain further tax concessions and the entitlement to offer new "electronic table games". More outrageously, the so-called "unsolicited proposal" for a new Sydney casino by James Packer avoided a competitive tender process and designed its own tax rate (Hewson, 2012; Saulwick, 2013). This is after Packer's late father, Kerry, lost a competitive tender process for the first Sydney casino in the 1990s, despite allegedly threatening a former NSW government with political death should the bid be unsuccessful (Barry, 2010).
Indeed, the growth of Big Gambling has only been possible with state collusion (Livingstone & Adams, 2011). It is no coincidence that gambling liberalisation occurred concurrently with the ascendance of the neoliberal economic project, with its emphasis on deregulation and free markets (Harvey, 2005). Since the 1980s, Australia has deregulated and largely deindustrialised its economy. As state and territory governments found themselves subject to shrinking taxation revenue, commercial gambling has paradoxically offered certainty and an independent source of income to cash-strapped jurisdictions reliant in large part on federal largess (Livingstone, 2001; Livingstone & Woolley, 2007; Young, 2010). As such, by 2008-09, gambling accounted for 10% of total own-state tax revenue (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 2.11).
In terms of society, the state-sponsored gambling industry has resulted in the unabated economic exploitation of Australia's most socioeconomically disadvantaged citizens (Doran & Young, 2010; Marshall & Baker, 2001a; Rintoul et al., 2012; Young, Doran, & Markham, 2013; Young, Lamb, & Doran, 2011). These changes have not occurred because liberated Australian consumers have chosen, and demanded, that 200,000 EGMs be installed across the country. It has been an exercise in class warfare from above, based on the calculated, industrial-scale exploitation of the working classes by a super-rich elite. It has not been brought about by the sudden rise of rational, sovereign consumers demand gambling opportunities, but by the imposition of mass-produced gambling onto often unwilling neighbourhoods. The so-called "liberalisation" of gambling has enabled the dramatic redistribution of resources, transferring, with industrial efficiency, billions of dollars from the pay packets of the working classes to the bank accounts of the richest 0.01%. Big Gambling uses its enormous political power to accelerate deregulation, expand its remit, and resist public health reforms.
The growth of "Big Gambling" and its class dynamics in Australia have been mirrored across the Western world. Extrapolating from the political economy of the Australia experience (Young, 2011), we argue that the class-project of gambling liberalisation and exploitation of the working glasses is increasingly global. In many countries beyond Australia, gambling opportunities are concentrated poorer suburbs (e.g. Robitaille & Herjean, 2008; Wardle, Keily, Astbury, & Reith, 2014; Wheeler, Rigby, & Huriwai, 2006). Big Gambling's political influence is similarly global. Witness, for example, the so-called "Sheldon Primary" in which an American casino multi-billionaire and worlds 10th richest man offered his considerable financial backing to a political candidate who would protect his business interests (Confesore & Lipton, 2014). And the global reach of Big Gambling is expanding. Governments across the globe are feeling the pressure to support gambling liberalisation. In a study of 13 countries, Richard (2010) found that casino legalisation by national governments was associated with the pressure for economic growth. The Australian experience shows that this economic growth entails a direct appropriation of wealth by Big Gambling from those communities who can least afford it.
Bizarrely, the field of gambling studies appears almost oblivious to the astonishing transformation of gambling from a mostly private affair into a socially-damaging, economically-exploitative, multi-billion dollar global industry. The ad-hoc content area of gambling studies has focussed heavily on the psychological behaviour of individual gamblers, without meaningful analysis of the social and economic systems that produce industrial gambling (e.g. Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Raylu & Oei, 2002; Rogers, 1998). A prodigious, international research effort has been directed towards the measurement of pathological gambling prevalence and its social correlates. National problem gambling prevalence studies have been undertaken wherever commercial gambling has been liberalised, at last count over 25 countries on six continents (Shaffer, Hall, & Bilt, 1999; Storer, Abbott, & Stubbs, 2009; Volberg, 2004; Williams, Volberg, & Stevens, 2012). This research has focussed heavily on identifying, enumerating and profiling pathological gamblers. Indeed, in all these countries, problem gambling has emerged as the primary issue raised by gambling liberalisation. In this way, the pathological gambler, rather than the process of gambling liberalisation, has been constructed and mobilised as the object of policy and intervention (Collins, 2006; Livingstone & Woolley, 2007; Reith, 2007; Young, 2013a, 2013b). The stigmatised figure of the pathological gambler has arguably distracted the academic research community from the true social damage resulting from gambling liberalisation. The pressing problem for gambling studies is to understand the political economy of gambling and its societal consequences, an agenda beyond the routine psychological approaches that dominate the field (Young, 2013a, 2013b). | 14,444 | <h4>State sponsorship of online gambling allows it to grow into a global industry that preys on the most disadvantaged and drastically accelerates inequality. You should be skeptical of all their scholarship because gambling research systematically ignores the social externalities of online gambling.</h4><p><strong>Young and Markham 14</strong> (Francis Young, The Fenner School of Environment and Society, and Martin Markham, School of Tourism and Hospitality Management @ Southern Cross University, “”Big Gambling”: The rise of the global industry-state gambling complex” Addict Research & Theory, pp. 1-3)</p><p>Global commercial gambling has grown to be an industry of remarkable size and power. Over the past decade, <u><strong>global <mark>gambling losses have risen from</u></strong></mark> approximately <u><strong><mark>S250 billion</u></strong></mark> USD in 2003 <u><strong><mark>to</mark> <mark>S450 billion</u></strong></mark> in 2013 (The Economist. 2014). No longer gambling is low-key and small-scale, the differentiated expression of local cultures (Binde. 2005). It is a global economic project, one central to the liberalisation of markets associated with the emergence of the international consumer society (Reith. 2013). We argue that that the emergence of "Big Gambling", the industry-state gambling complex, is both exemplary and symptomatic of the concentration of capital and political power among an economic elite in the Western World since the 1980s. Rather than reflecting changing patterns in consumer demand, <u><strong>Big <mark>Gambling</mark> is driven by political processes and economic imperatives</u></strong>. <u><strong>It has <mark>inserted dangerous commodities en masse into vulnerable communities</u></strong></mark> in ways that parallels the actions of both Big Alcohol and Big Tobacco, with similarly damaging consequences. To make this case, we outline of the growth and consequences of the gambling industry in Australia. We choose Australia as our case study, not only because it has formed the context for our own research efforts, but also because of its unprecedented rate and degree of gambling liberalisation, particularly through electronic gambling machines (EGMs). the Australian-variant of the slot machine.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Australia provides the example par excellence</mark> of Big Gambling ascendant</u></strong>. Electronic gambling machines (EGMs) have become ubiquitous in public hotels (pubs) and "not-for-profit" community clubs in every state and territory except for Western Australia, with a national ratio of 89 adults per EGM in 2011-12 (Office of Economic and Statistical Research. 2014). According to industry analysts, Australians lose more money gambling per person than any other nation, 23% more than the second-ranked Singapore and 60% more than the fifth-ranked United States (The Economist. 2014). In 2011—12, this amounted to over AUD20 billion lost on gambling nationally, a figure that excludes losses on overseas websites (Office of Economic and Statistical Research. 2014).</p><p>Gambling industries in Australia have not always been so profitable. In the 1970s, gambling opportunities were limited. The most popular form of gambling was betting on races and, except at the racetrack, bets could only be made with government-owned monopoly operators. Lotteries were similarly government-run in all states but one. Sports betting was illegal. EGMs were clunky, mechanical, single-line affairs. The machines accepted only smaller-denomination coins and were restricted to clubs in two jurisdictions. EGMs were even prohibited in the four small British-styled casinos, which themselves were located in remote tourist destinations, far from the great mass of the Australian population (Australian Institute for Gambling Research, 1999).</p><p><u><strong>Over the last three decades, EGMs have proliferated</u></strong> in pubs, clubs and casinos across the country (excluding Western Australia) and EGM technology has advanced considerably. Australian company Aristocrat Leisure pioneered the development of linked jackpots and multiline games, a move that was only possible due to the transition from mechanical to electronic machines (Schiill, 2012). These <u><strong><mark>machines encourage gamblers to stake higher amounts</u></strong></mark> (Rockloff et al., 2014) <u><strong><mark>and give the misleading impression of</mark> frequent <mark>wins</mark> and near-misses</u></strong>, encouraging gamblers to continue playing for longer periods (Dixon, Harrigan, Sandhu, Collins. & Fugclsang. 2010; Haw, 2009). Compared to their mechanical predecessors, EGMs are both more profitable for the gambling industry and more dangerous to gamblers. In addition, casinos have been legalised in every state and territory. <u><strong>Despite rhetoric about targeting "'high-rollers", Australian <mark>casinos</mark> continue to <mark>earn over 80% of their income from the</mark> non-VIP <mark>''grind" market</u></strong></mark> (Productivity Commission, 2010). Indeed, casino development continues apace, with four new Vegas-styled casinos planned for NSW and Queensland in the coming years (Markham & Young, 2013). Lotteries have been privatised in every state and territory. Betting, once confined to the trackside and government-owned pari-mutuels, has been privatised and deregulated. <u><strong>Odds are available on more sports than ever before and "exotic" <mark>bets have transformed even the most banal moment</u></strong></mark> in a sporting match <u><strong><mark>into a money-making bonanza</u></strong></mark> for corporate bookmakers. The legalisation of internet wagering has made gambling accessible 24 h a day, wherever a smartphone can be connected. And <u><strong><mark>the final frontier</mark> of gambling liberalisation, <mark>online</mark> casino-style <mark>gambling</mark>, <mark>was recommended for staged liberalisation</mark> by a</u></strong>n authoritative, <u><strong>government-commissioned review</u></strong> (Productivity Commission, 2010).</p><p><u><strong><mark>It is difficult to imagine this industry without rampant exploitation of the working classes</u></strong></mark>. The distribution of EGM gambling expenditure and class are highly correlated. <u><strong>EGMs and the <mark>gambling</mark> <mark>losses are overwhelming located in poor</mark>er <mark>suburbs</u></strong></mark> in Australia (Marshall & Baker, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Rintoul, Livingstone, Mellor, & Jolley, 2012). Prevalence studies have confirmed this spatial correlation at the individual level: <u><strong>problem gambling - and thus gambling loss - is concentrated among the poor</u></strong> and poorly educated (e.g. Young et al., 2006).</p><p>The money lost on gambling by Australia's working classes flows directly to state and territory treasuries and the gambling industry's pockets. While around a quarter of gambling losses ends up in state coffers (Office of Economic and Statistical Research, 2014), the remaining S15 billion a year is appropriated by the "not-for-profit" clubs and private sector companies. Only a small fraction of club sector EGM profits, often justified on the basis of community benefit, are returned by clubs to the community. For example, in 2010-11, clubs in NSW, Victoria, Queensland and the ACT spent, respectively, 1.3%, 2.4%, 2.3% and 6.6% of EGM losses on community benefits (Livingstone, Kipsaina, & Rintoul, 2012). The remaining EGM profits are, according to data from Clubs Australia (2009), mostly spent subsidising "other" activities such as "donations, cash grants, abnormal and extraordinary and other expenses". In Canberra, for example, gamblers lost over $16 million in 2012-13 playing the 271 EGMs at the Canberra Labor Group's network of clubs (ACT Gambling and Racing Commission, 2013). Of these takings, $4.2 million were promptly transferred to the affiliated branch of the Australian Labor Party (ABC News, 2012).</p><p><u><strong><mark>Commercial gambling has also minted a new class of super-rich individuals</u></strong></mark>, enriched not through the production of surplus value but <u><strong>through accumulation by dispossession</u></strong> (Harvey, 2003). <u><strong><mark>Gambling moguls are over-represented among Australia's wealthiest 0.01%</mark>.</u></strong> For example, Australia's second-richest person, James Packer, has poured his considerable inheritance into casinos and profited massively. His majority-owned Crown Limited made a $490 million profit last (Crown Resorts, 2013), bringing his personal wealth to $7.7 billion (Heathcote, 2013b). Hotel owners have likewise shared the spoils, especially the corporate retailer Woolworths Limited and its joint-venture partners. Bruce Mathieson, partner with Woolworths in Australian Leisure and Hospitality Group, has amassed $1.2 billion, while Arthur Laundy, another Woolworths partner, owns pub assets worth $310 million. The Ferrell Family, owners of Australia's first casino and beneficiaries of legislated monopoly ownership of all EGMs in the state of Tasmania, have reputedly accumulated assets worth $275 million. Other members of the capitalist elite to profit from gambling liberalisation include Cyril Maloney ($360 million, pubs), John Singleton ($355 million, also pubs), the Kafataris family ($110 million, online wagering) and Matthew Tripp ($115 million, online wagering) (Bennet, 2011; Heathcote, 2012, 2013a).</p><p><u><strong>This level of class-based exploitation is only possible because the <mark>gambling super-rich</mark> are willing to <mark>use</mark> their money and influence to reinforce their class position. <mark>Political power </mark>is used <mark>to block reform</u></strong></mark>. In the Australian context, for example, <u><strong><mark>there was</mark> <mark>a</mark> concerted and ultimately <mark>successful effort to sabotage reforms that would have made EGMs less addictive</mark>, despite overwhelming popular opinion</u></strong> (Mond, Davidson, & McAllister, 2011; Panichi, 2013). Not coin-cidentally, <u><strong>a spate of political <mark>donations</mark> <mark>by the gambling lobby</mark> <mark>peaked at the same time</mark>,</u></strong> doubtless reminding politicians of the benefits of having Big Gambling on side (Safi, 2013).</p><p><u><strong>Political power is also used proactively to further gambling liberalisation</u></strong>. Clubs in NSW recently leveraged their relationship with the state government to gain further tax concessions and the entitlement to offer new "electronic table games". More outrageously, the so-called "unsolicited proposal" for a new Sydney casino by James Packer avoided a competitive tender process and designed its own tax rate (Hewson, 2012; Saulwick, 2013). This is after Packer's late father, Kerry, lost a competitive tender process for the first Sydney casino in the 1990s, despite allegedly threatening a former NSW government with political death should the bid be unsuccessful (Barry, 2010).</p><p>Indeed, the growth of Big Gambling has only been possible with state collusion (Livingstone & Adams, 2011). <u><strong><mark>It is no coincidence that gambling liberalisation occurred concurrently with the ascendance of the neoliberal economic project, with its emphasis on deregulation</mark> and free markets</u></strong> (Harvey, 2005). Since the 1980s, Australia has deregulated and largely deindustrialised its economy. <u><strong>As state and territory governments found themselves subject to shrinking taxation revenue, commercial gambling has paradoxically offered certainty and an independent source of income to cash-strapped jurisdictions</u></strong> reliant in large part on federal largess (Livingstone, 2001; Livingstone & Woolley, 2007; Young, 2010). As such, by 2008-09, gambling accounted for 10% of total own-state tax revenue (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 2.11).</p><p>In terms of society, <u><strong>the <mark>state-sponsored gambling</mark> industry <mark>has resulted in the unabated economic exploitation of</mark> Australia's most socioeconomically <mark>disadvantaged citizens</u></strong></mark> (Doran & Young, 2010; Marshall & Baker, 2001a; Rintoul et al., 2012; Young, Doran, & Markham, 2013; Young, Lamb, & Doran, 2011). These changes have not occurred because liberated Australian consumers have chosen, and demanded, that 200,000 EGMs be installed across the country<u><strong>. <mark>It has been an exercise in class warfare from above</mark>, based on the calculated, industrial-scale exploitation of the working classes by a super-rich elite</u></strong>. It has not been brought about by the sudden rise of rational, sovereign consumers demand gambling opportunities, but by the imposition of mass-produced gambling onto often unwilling neighbourhoods. The so-called "<u><strong>liberalisation" of gambling has enabled the dramatic redistribution of resources, transferring, with industrial efficiency, billions of dollars from the pay packets of the working classes to the bank accounts of the richest</u></strong> 0.01%. <u><strong>Big Gambling uses its enormous political power to accelerate deregulation, expand its remit, and resist public health reforms</u></strong>.</p><p>The growth of "Big Gambling" and its class dynamics in Australia have been mirrored across the Western world. Extrapolating from the political economy of the Australia experience (Young, 2011), we argue that <u><strong>the class-project of gambling liberalisation and exploitation of the working glasses is increasingly global</u></strong>. In many countries beyond Australia, gambling opportunities are concentrated poorer suburbs (e.g. Robitaille & Herjean, 2008; Wardle, Keily, Astbury, & Reith, 2014; Wheeler, Rigby, & Huriwai, 2006). Big Gambling's political influence is similarly global. Witness, for example, the so-called "Sheldon Primary" in which an American casino multi-billionaire and worlds 10th richest man offered his considerable financial backing to a political candidate who would protect his business interests (Confesore & Lipton, 2014). And the global reach of Big Gambling is expanding. <u><strong>Governments across the globe are feeling the pressure to support gambling liberalisation</u></strong>. In <u><strong>a study</u></strong> of 13 countries, Richard (2010) <u><strong>found that casino legalisation by national governments was associated with the pressure for economic growth</u></strong>. The Australian experience shows that this economic growth entails a direct appropriation of wealth by Big Gambling from those communities who can least afford it.</p><p>Bizarrely, <u><strong>the field of <mark>gambling studies appears almost oblivious</mark> <mark>to the</mark> astonishing <mark>transformation</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>of gambling</u></strong> from a mostly private affair <u><strong><mark>into a</mark> socially-<mark>damaging</mark>, economically-<mark>exploitative</u></strong></mark>, multi-billion dollar <u><strong><mark>global industry</u></strong></mark>. The ad-hoc <u><strong>content area</u></strong> of gambling studies <u><strong>has focussed</u></strong> heavily on the psychological behaviour of individual gamblers, <u><strong>without meaningful analysis of the social and economic systems that produce industrial gambling</u></strong> (e.g. Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; Raylu & Oei, 2002; Rogers, 1998). A prodigious, international research effort has been directed towards the measurement of pathological gambling prevalence and its social correlates. National problem gambling prevalence studies have been undertaken wherever commercial gambling has been liberalised, at last count over 25 countries on six continents (Shaffer, Hall, & Bilt, 1999; Storer, Abbott, & Stubbs, 2009; Volberg, 2004; Williams, Volberg, & Stevens, 2012). This <u><strong><mark>research has focussed heavily on</mark> identifying, enumerating and <mark>profiling pathological gamblers</u></strong></mark>. Indeed, in all these countries, <u><strong>problem gambling has emerged as the primary issue raised by gambling liberalisation</u></strong>. <u><strong>In this way, the pathological gambler, rather than the process of gambling liberalisation, has been constructed and mobilised as the object of policy and intervention</u></strong> (Collins, 2006; Livingstone & Woolley, 2007; Reith, 2007; Young, 2013a, 2013b). The stigmatised figure of the pathological gambler has arguably distracted the academic research community from the true social damage resulting from gambling liberalisation. <u><strong><mark>The pressing problem</mark> for gambling studies <mark>is to understand the political economy of gambling and its societal consequences</mark>, an agenda <mark>beyond</mark> the <mark>routine psychological approaches that dominate the field</u></strong></mark> (Young, 2013a, 2013b).</p> | null | 1NC | 1NC | 430,391 | 1 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,737 | The call to discuss our privilege locks in structures of domination, produces complacency, and re-produces the privilege it is intended to combat. | Smith 2013 ( ) | Smith 2013 (The Problem of Privilege, Co founder of INCITE, Professor at North American Institute for Indigenous Theological Studies http://andrea366.wordpress.com/2013/08/14/the-problem-with-privilege-by-andrea-smith/) | “I am so and so, and I have x privilege.” It was never quite clear what the point of these confessions were. It was not as if other participants did not know the confessor in question had her/his proclaimed privilege. It did not appear that these individual confessions actually led to any political projects to dismantle the structures of domination that enabled their privilege. Rather, the confessions became the political project themselves For the instant the confession took place, those who do not have that privilege in daily life would have a temporary position of power as the hearer of the confession who could grant absolution and forgiveness. The sayer of the confession could then be granted temporary forgiveness for her/his abuses of power and relief from white/male/heterosexual/etc guilt. it primarily served to reinstantiate the structures of domination it was supposed to resist. .” Those who had little privilege did not have to confess and were in the position to be the judge of those who did have privilege. Consequently, people aspired to be oppressed these rituals ultimately reinstantiated the white majority subject as the subject capable of self-reflexivity and the colonized/racialized subject as the occasion for self-reflexivity. | It was never quite clear what the point of these confessions were It was not as if other participants did not know the confessor in question had privilege It did not appear that these individual confessions actually led to any political projects the confessions became the political project themselves The sayer of the confession could then be granted temporary forgiveness it primarily served to reinstantiate the structures of domination it was supposed to resist Those who had little privilege did not have to confess and were in the position to be the judge Consequently people aspired to be oppressed | In my experience working with a multitude of anti-racist organizing projects over the years, I frequently found myself participating in various workshops in which participants were asked to reflect on their gender/race/sexuality/class/etc. privilege. These workshops had a bit of a self-help orientation to them: “I am so and so, and I have x privilege.” It was never quite clear what the point of these confessions were. It was not as if other participants did not know the confessor in question had her/his proclaimed privilege. It did not appear that these individual confessions actually led to any political projects to dismantle the structures of domination that enabled their privilege. Rather, the confessions became the political project themselves. The benefits of these confessions seemed to be ephemeral. For the instant the confession took place, those who do not have that privilege in daily life would have a temporary position of power as the hearer of the confession who could grant absolution and forgiveness. The sayer of the confession could then be granted temporary forgiveness for her/his abuses of power and relief from white/male/heterosexual/etc guilt. Because of the perceived benefits of this ritual, there was generally little critique of the fact that in the end, it primarily served to reinstantiate the structures of domination it was supposed to resist. One of the reasons there was little critique of this practice is that it bestowed cultural capital to those who seemed to be the “most oppressed.” Those who had little privilege did not have to confess and were in the position to be the judge of those who did have privilege. Consequently, people aspired to be oppressed. Inevitably, those with more privilege would develop new heretofore unknown forms of oppression from which they suffered. “I may be white, but my best friend was a person of color, which caused me to be oppressed when we played together.” Consequently, the goal became not to actually end oppression but to be as oppressed as possible. These rituals often substituted confession for political movement-building. And despite the cultural capital that was, at least temporarily, bestowed to those who seemed to be the most oppressed, these rituals ultimately reinstantiated the white majority subject as the subject capable of self-reflexivity and the colonized/racialized subject as the occasion for self-reflexivity. | 2,445 | <h4>The call to discuss our privilege locks in structures of domination, produces complacency, and re-produces the privilege it is intended to combat.</h4><p><strong>Smith 2013 (</strong>The Problem of Privilege, Co founder of INCITE, Professor at North American Institute for Indigenous Theological Studies http://andrea366.wordpress.com/2013/08/14/the-problem-with-privilege-by-andrea-smith/<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>In my experience working with a multitude of anti-racist organizing projects over the years, I frequently found myself participating in various workshops in which participants were asked to reflect on their gender/race/sexuality/class/etc. privilege. These workshops had a bit of a self-help orientation to them: <u><strong>“I am so and so, and I have x privilege.” <mark>It was never quite clear what the point of these confessions were</mark>. <mark>It was not as if other participants did not know the confessor in question had</mark> her/his proclaimed <mark>privilege</mark>. <mark>It did not appear that these individual confessions actually led to any political projects</mark> to dismantle the structures of domination that enabled their privilege. Rather, <mark>the confessions became the political project themselves</u></strong></mark>. The benefits of these confessions seemed to be ephemeral. <u><strong>For the instant the confession took place, those who do not have that privilege in daily life would have a temporary position of power as the hearer of the confession who could grant absolution and forgiveness. <mark>The sayer of the confession could then be granted temporary forgiveness</mark> for her/his abuses of power and relief from white/male/heterosexual/etc guilt.</u></strong> Because of the perceived benefits of this ritual, there was generally little critique of the fact that in the end, <u><strong><mark>it primarily served to reinstantiate the structures of domination it was supposed to resist</mark>. </u></strong> One of the reasons there was little critique of this practice is that it bestowed cultural capital to those who seemed to be the “most oppressed<u><strong>.” <mark>Those who had little privilege did not have to confess</mark> <mark>and were in the position to be the judge</mark> of those who did have privilege. <mark>Consequently</mark>, <mark>people aspired to be oppressed</u></strong></mark>. Inevitably, those with more privilege would develop new heretofore unknown forms of oppression from which they suffered. “I may be white, but my best friend was a person of color, which caused me to be oppressed when we played together.” Consequently, the goal became not to actually end oppression but to be as oppressed as possible. These rituals often substituted confession for political movement-building. And despite the cultural capital that was, at least temporarily, bestowed to those who seemed to be the most oppressed, <u><strong>these rituals ultimately reinstantiated the white majority subject as the subject capable of self-reflexivity and the colonized/racialized subject as the occasion for self-reflexivity.</p></u></strong> | null | 1AR | Perms | 429,440 | 29 | 17,058 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,290 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | West Georgia Kelly-Zapata | Rumbaugh | 1AC - Organs
1NC - T-USFG Framework Yancy K Ablism K
2NR - "Black Market" Word K | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,738 | GATS is elitism – it was made by and for large corporate interests | Fukuda 10 | Fukuda 10 Yasuo Fukuda, Professor of Graduate School of Economics at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, “WTO Regime as a New Stage of Imperialism: Decaying Capitalism and its Alternative,” World Review of Political Economy, 1(3): 485-499 http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/22161/1/0101106701.pdf | four of the five pillars are still applicable to capitalism under the WTO regime , a small number of multinational corporations typically control more than half the market-share of major industries the world’s top 45 banks account for 45 percent of the total assets these companies enhance their power considerably through close relationships with governments, and through political contributions, lobbying, and the like. negotiation of GATS) represents a typical example of this sort of collusion between major companies of both the industrial and financial spheres large multinational corporations often collude to form price cartels Monopoly capital has gained new methods of obtaining the governing power over developing countries in place of colonization major multinational corporations subcontract to firms in developing countries big food retailers such as Wal-Mart and Tesco have established global supply chain management networks which subcontract to farmers in developing countries, thereby bringing these farmers under centralized managerial control monopoly capital now dictates the rules of trade Big business coalitions took part in drafting the WTO Agreements In the case of GATS, multinational corporations drafted the proposal then used lobbying to push the agreement through large multinationals control the rules of trade, specifically through cozy relationships with the US government Thus, the WTO regime is nothing short of a regime of imperialism, whereby monopoly capital exercises governing power over both national markets and the world economy In losing the policy space to protect and develop local firms, developing countries are obliged to become incorporated into a global network managed by monopoly capital income is steadily transferred from the lower rungs of the global economy to monopoly capital at the top | under the WTO regime a small number of multinational corporations control more than half the market-share of major industries companies enhance their power considerably through close relationships with governments negotiation of GATS) represents a typical example of this sort of collusion multinational corporations often collude to form price cartels big food retailers such as Wal-Mart have established global supply chain management networks which subcontract to farmers in developing countries, bringing these farmers under centralized control monopoly capital now dictates the rules of trade Big business coalitions took part in drafting the WTO Agreements. In GATS, multinational corporations drafted the proposal then used lobbying to push the agreement through the WTO regime is nothing short of a regime of imperialism developing countries are obliged to become incorporated into a global network managed by monopoly capital income is steadily transferred from the lower rungs of the global economy to the top | Looking at contemporary capitalism from the viewpoint of Lenin’s “Imperialism,” it is clear that four of the five pillars (excepting the fifth) are still applicable to capitalism under the WTO regime. First, a small number of multinational corporations typically control more than half the market-share of major industries. For example, in the commercial seed market, the world’s top three corporations (Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta of Switzerland) control almost half of the world market. Cargill, along with its top four competitors, handle 85 percent of world grain trade. In the pharmaceutical industry, the top ten corporations hold a combined 54.8 percent share of the world market (ETC Group 2008). In banking, the world’s top 45 banks account for nearly 40 percent of the gross tier 1 capital of the top 1,000, and about 45 percent of the total assets (The Banker, June 24, 2009). It hardly needs saying that these companies enhance their power considerably through close relationships with governments, and through political contributions, lobbying, revolving doors, and the like. Second, industrial and financial monopoly capital establish political action groups as a means to advance common political goals. The negotiation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) represents a typical example of this sort of collusion between major companies of both the industrial and financial spheres. Third, no monopoly capital can survive without strategic foreign investment, including direct as well as portfolio investment. For instance, automobile companies will not survive without gaining access to Chinese and Indian markets. Fourth, in the course of intense competition over dominant market shares, large multinational corporations often collude to form price cartels (Connor 2001; Levenstein and Suslow 2001). The cartel-based character of monopoly capital culminated during GATT Uruguay Round negotiations, as large businesses cooperated to set market-rules specifically tailored to their own ends. There is no colonization occurring under the WTO regime. Modern capitalism lacks the fifth pillar of early 20th century imperialism. However, this does not mean that modern capitalism is without imperialism. Monopoly capital has gained new methods of obtaining the governing power over developing countries in place of colonization. First, major multinational corporations subcontract to firms in developing countries, thereby assimilating these firms into global business networks. For example, big food retailers such as Wal-Mart and Tesco have established global supply chain management networks which subcontract to farmers in developing countries, thereby bringing these farmers under centralized managerial control (South Centre and Traidcraft 2008). Here, prices fetched at farm gates are determined by monopolists at the top of the supply chain. Second, monopoly capital now dictates the rules of trade by directly involving itself in the crafting of trade policy. Big business coalitions took part in drafting the WTO Agreements. In the case of GATS, multinational corporations, including Citigroup, J. P. Morgan Chase, and Barclays Bank, drafted the proposal under the authorization of US and EU governments, and then used lobbying to push the agreement through at the time of negotiations (Balanya ct al. 2003). In the case of the negotiations for the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), it was the US Intellectual Property Committee (USIPC), a US business group, which wrote the initial draft, at the request of the US Trade Representative (Weissman 1996). Those party to the USIPC include Monsanto, Pfizer, DuPont, and IBM. Market and trade rules amount to a form of infrastructure vis-a-vis the markets. The body which decides the rules of trade has a considerable advantage over other stakeholders. Under the current setting, it is large multinationals, especially the agents of US monopoly capital, which control the rules of trade, specifically through cozy relationships with the US government. Therefore, it is the governance of trade rules which most distinguishes modem capitalism from the imperialist systems of the early 20th century. The IMF and the World Bank are monopoly capital's third source of governing power over developing countries. The IMF and the World Bank are under the control of the G7 (the US, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, Canada, and Italy), which hold nearly 42 percent of the votes in these two organizations. Within the G7 itself, only the US (specifically the US Treasury Department) has the power of veto. Furthermore, US and EU companies routinely establish relationships with the IMF and the World Bank directly. Stanley Fisher, former deputy managing director of the IMF, became vice-chairman of Citibank shortly after finishing his IMF tenure. James Wolfensohn, a former World Bank president, came from a senior executive role at Salomon Brothers and, following his stint at the World Bank, returned to Wall Street as chairman of the International Advisory Board of Citigroup. In 1995, while president of the World Bank, Wolfensohn started a Staff Exchange Program in order to facilitate employee sharing between multinational corporations and the Bank (Cray 2006). It was against this backdrop that the IMF and World Bank, through loan conditionality, forced developing countries to adopt open door policies, resulting in a flood of imports from the developed world (Marsden 2003; Weissman 2000; Weisbrot ct al. 2009). Thus, the WTO regime is nothing short of a regime of imperialism, whereby monopoly capital exercises governing power over both national markets and the world economy. Whereas the first four of the five pillars by which Lenin defined imperialism still apply under the WTO regime, in place of the fifth (colonization), monopoly capital has gained new tools of dominance, most specifically the ability to design market rules. In losing the policy space to protect and develop local firms, developing countries are obliged to become incorporated into a global network managed by monopoly capital. In this way, income is steadily transferred from the lower rungs of the global economy to monopoly capital at the top. In short, the WTO regime constitutes a new stage of imperialism, in which monopoly capital holds hegemony over market rules in place of colonization. | 6,400 | <h4>GATS is elitism – it was made by and for large corporate interests</h4><p><strong>Fukuda 10</strong> Yasuo Fukuda, Professor of Graduate School of Economics at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, “WTO Regime as a New Stage of Imperialism: Decaying Capitalism and its Alternative,” World Review of Political Economy, 1(3): 485-499 http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/22161/1/0101106701.pdf</p><p>Looking at contemporary capitalism from the viewpoint of Lenin’s “Imperialism,” it is clear that <u><strong>four of the five pillars</u></strong> (excepting the fifth) <u><strong>are still applicable to capitalism <mark>under the WTO regime</u></strong></mark>. First<u><strong>, <mark>a small number of multinational corporations</mark> typically <mark>control more than half the market-share of major industries</u></strong></mark>. For example, in the commercial seed market, the world’s top three corporations (Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta of Switzerland) control almost half of the world market. Cargill, along with its top four competitors, handle 85 percent of world grain trade. In the pharmaceutical industry, the top ten corporations hold a combined 54.8 percent share of the world market (ETC Group 2008). In banking, <u><strong>the world’s top 45 banks account for</u></strong> nearly 40 percent of the gross tier 1 capital of the top 1,000, and about <u><strong>45 percent of the total assets</u></strong> (The Banker, June 24, 2009). It hardly needs saying that <u><strong>these <mark>companies enhance their power considerably through close relationships with governments</mark>, and through political contributions, lobbying, </u></strong>revolving doors,<u><strong> and the like. </u></strong>Second, industrial and financial monopoly capital establish political action groups as a means to advance common political goals. The <u><strong><mark>negotiation of</u></strong></mark> the General Agreement on Trade in Services (<u><strong><mark>GATS) represents a typical example of this sort of collusion</mark> between major companies of both the industrial and financial spheres</u></strong>. Third, no monopoly capital can survive without strategic foreign investment, including direct as well as portfolio investment. For instance, automobile companies will not survive without gaining access to Chinese and Indian markets. Fourth, in the course of intense competition over dominant market shares, <u><strong>large <mark>multinational corporations often collude to form price cartels</u></strong></mark> (Connor 2001; Levenstein and Suslow 2001). The cartel-based character of monopoly capital culminated during GATT Uruguay Round negotiations, as large businesses cooperated to set market-rules specifically tailored to their own ends. There is no colonization occurring under the WTO regime. Modern capitalism lacks the fifth pillar of early 20th century imperialism. However, this does not mean that modern capitalism is without imperialism. <u><strong>Monopoly capital has gained new methods of obtaining the governing power over developing countries in place of colonization</u></strong>. First, <u><strong>major multinational corporations subcontract to firms in developing countries</u></strong>, thereby assimilating these firms into global business networks. For example, <u><strong><mark>big food retailers such as Wal-Mart</mark> and Tesco <mark>have established global supply chain management networks which subcontract to farmers in developing countries, </mark>thereby <mark>bringing these farmers under centralized </mark>managerial <mark>control</u></strong></mark> (South Centre and Traidcraft 2008). Here, prices fetched at farm gates are determined by monopolists at the top of the supply chain. Second, <u><strong><mark>monopoly capital now dictates the rules of trade</u></strong></mark> by directly involving itself in the crafting of trade policy. <u><strong><mark>Big business coalitions took part in drafting the WTO Agreements</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>In</mark> the case of <mark>GATS,</u></strong> <u><strong>multinational corporations</u></strong></mark>, including Citigroup, J. P. Morgan Chase, and Barclays Bank, <u><strong><mark>drafted the proposal</u></strong></mark> under the authorization of US and EU governments, and <u><strong><mark>then used lobbying to push the agreement through</u></strong></mark> at the time of negotiations (Balanya ct al. 2003). In the case of the negotiations for the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), it was the US Intellectual Property Committee (USIPC), a US business group, which wrote the initial draft, at the request of the US Trade Representative (Weissman 1996). Those party to the USIPC include Monsanto, Pfizer, DuPont, and IBM. Market and trade rules amount to a form of infrastructure vis-a-vis the markets. The body which decides the rules of trade has a considerable advantage over other stakeholders. Under the current setting, it is <u><strong>large multinationals</u></strong>, especially the agents of US monopoly capital, which <u><strong>control the rules of trade, specifically through cozy relationships with the US government</u></strong>. Therefore, it is the governance of trade rules which most distinguishes modem capitalism from the imperialist systems of the early 20th century. The IMF and the World Bank are monopoly capital's third source of governing power over developing countries. The IMF and the World Bank are under the control of the G7 (the US, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, Canada, and Italy), which hold nearly 42 percent of the votes in these two organizations. Within the G7 itself, only the US (specifically the US Treasury Department) has the power of veto. Furthermore, US and EU companies routinely establish relationships with the IMF and the World Bank directly. Stanley Fisher, former deputy managing director of the IMF, became vice-chairman of Citibank shortly after finishing his IMF tenure. James Wolfensohn, a former World Bank president, came from a senior executive role at Salomon Brothers and, following his stint at the World Bank, returned to Wall Street as chairman of the International Advisory Board of Citigroup. In 1995, while president of the World Bank, Wolfensohn started a Staff Exchange Program in order to facilitate employee sharing between multinational corporations and the Bank (Cray 2006). It was against this backdrop that the IMF and World Bank, through loan conditionality, forced developing countries to adopt open door policies, resulting in a flood of imports from the developed world (Marsden 2003; Weissman 2000; Weisbrot ct al. 2009). <u><strong>Thus, <mark>the WTO regime is nothing short of a regime of imperialism</mark>, whereby monopoly capital exercises governing power over both national markets and the world economy</u></strong>. Whereas the first four of the five pillars by which Lenin defined imperialism still apply under the WTO regime, in place of the fifth (colonization), monopoly capital has gained new tools of dominance, most specifically the ability to design market rules. <u><strong>In losing the policy space to protect and develop local firms, <mark>developing countries are obliged to become incorporated into a global network managed by monopoly capital</u></strong></mark>. In this way, <u><strong><mark>income is steadily transferred from the lower rungs of the global economy</mark> <mark>to</mark> monopoly capital at <mark>the top</u></strong></mark>. In short, the WTO regime constitutes a new stage of imperialism, in which monopoly capital holds hegemony over market rules in place of colonization.</p> | null | 1NC | 1NC | 754,775 | 30 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,739 | Inequality creates multiple structural trends towards extinction | Szentes ‘8 | Szentes ‘8
Tamás Szentes, a Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf | arms race and militarisation have not ended but escalated and continued many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor , manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation , exploitation and oppression, and in the degradation of human environment, ”, Behind “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars peace cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe Nevertheless, . Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. The real choice for the world society is between continuation of visible and “invisible wars” and transformation of the world order | arms race and militarisation have not ended but escalated and continued invisible wars are suffered by the poor Behind invisible wars” we find striking international inequities which tend to generate tensions paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars peace cannot be safeguarded in one part when some others suffer no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap are substantially reduced selfish behaviour paves the way for the final catastrophe human society cannot survive unless profound international inequalities are eliminated | It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment. | 7,499 | <h4>Inequality creates <u><strong>multiple structural trends towards extinction</h4><p>Szentes ‘8</p><p></u></strong>Tamás Szentes, a Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf</p><p>It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --<u><mark>arms race and militarisation have not ended</u></mark> with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, <u><mark>but escalated and continued</u></mark>, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --<u>many “<mark>invisible wars</mark>” <mark>are suffered by the poor</mark> </u>and oppressed people<u>, manifested in<strong> mass misery, </strong>poverty,<strong> unemployment, homelessness, starvation</strong> </u>and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions<u>, exploitation and oppression, </u>racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc.,<u> <strong>and</strong> </u>last but not least,<u> <strong>in the degradation of human environment</strong>, </u>which means that --the “war against Nature<u>”,</u> i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. <u><mark>Behind<strong></mark> </u></strong>global terrorism and<u> “<mark>invisible wars” we find striking international </mark>and intrasociety <mark>inequities</mark> and distorted development patterns , <mark>which tend to generate</mark> social as well as international <mark>tensions</u></mark>, thus <u><mark>paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars</u></mark>. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, <u><mark>peace<strong></mark> </u></strong>is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and<u> <mark>cannot be safeguarded in one part</mark> of the world <mark>when some others suffer</mark> visible or invisible wars</u>. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However,<u> <mark>no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap</mark> and intra-society inequalities <mark>are substantially reduced</u></mark>. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. <u>The narrow-minded, election-oriented, <mark>selfish behaviour</mark> motivated by thirst for power and wealth,</u> which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, <u><mark>paves the way for</mark> <strong><mark>the final</mark>, last <mark>catastrophe</u></strong></mark>. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. <u>Nevertheless, </u>the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution<u>. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, <mark>human society cannot survive unless</mark> such <mark>profound</mark> intra-society and <mark>international inequalities</mark> prevailing today <mark>are</mark> soon <mark>eliminated</mark>.</u> Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. <u>The real choice for the world society is between</u> negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, <u>continuation of visible and “invisible wars”</u>, as long as this is possible at all, <u>and</u>, on the other, <u><strong>transformation of the world order</u></strong> by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.</p> | null | 1NC | 1NC | 912 | 269 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,740 | The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of an ethic of sustainability and localism – free trade alone cannot reduce stratification | Fukuda 10 | Fukuda 10 Yasuo Fukuda, Professor of Graduate School of Economics at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, “WTO Regime as a New Stage of Imperialism: Decaying Capitalism and its Alternative,” World Review of Political Economy, 1(3): 485-499 http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/22161/1/0101106701.pdf | free trade is not a panacea for citizen welfare The task of this section is to outline an alternative system Shiva advocates "earth democracy composed of four basic principles ecological sustainability community control of the commons security of livelihoods local sovereignty Localization does not mean a closed economy rather local production should have priority over trade the power structure of corporate globalization must be broken up market rules such as WTO agreements, should be rewritten the aim of these rules has been nothing other than to allow large companies to use monopolistic power to control the global marketplace. Local governments must take back the right to formulate policy on matters affecting their own communities corporations should be deprived of the entitlement to express their political opinions through media, think tanks, etc it is also necessary that communities regain their independence on matters of economic policy. the strengthening of local actors leads to the independence of the local economy large firms need to be regulated so as to prevent them from damaging the interests of local economic actors Localization is a way for people to realize democracy on a higher level. Upon this new dimension of democracy, local citizens can make strides toward more healthy and sustainable lives | free trade is not a panacea this section is an alternative Shiva advocates "earth democracy composed of four basic principles ecological sustainability community control of the commons security of livelihoods. local sovereignty Localization does not mean a closed economy local production should have priority over trade corporate globalization must be broken up market rules such as WTO agreements, should be rewritten the aim of these rules has been to allow large companies to use monopolistic power it is necessary that communities regain their independence on economic policy Localization is a way for people to realize democracy on a higher level. Upon this new dimension local citizens can make strides toward more healthy and sustainable lives | There is considerable ongoing debate between "globaphobes" and "globaphiles." The decaying nature of modern capitalism shows that free trade is not a panacea for citizen welfare. The task of this section is not however to recount the arguments between globaphobes and globaphiles. Rather, the aim is to outline an alternative system. The matter at hand is how to restore viability, independence, and sustain-ability to local communities. But before arguing how this may be achieved, it is worthwhile to clarify the social conditions necessary for realizing such an outcome. V. Shiva (2005: Ch. 2) advocates "earth democracy" as an alternative to corporate globalization. Earth democracy is composed of four basic principles of sustainable society. The first is "ecological sustainability." That is, the recognition that all species have intrinsic worth and that their life-cycles are interdependent of one another. The second is "community control of the commons." Resources vital to sustenance, including public services and infrastructure, should not be privately owned; public resources must remain in the commons. The third is "security of livelihoods." That is, the idea that all people have the right to basic needs, such as food, water, housing, and jobs. The fourth is "local sovereignty," which amounts to community self-governance in regards to local economic affairs. Localization of the economy does not mean a closed economy; rather, it is the idea that local production should have priority over trade. These four principles are necessary conditions for sound and sustainable community life. The second principle, community control of the commons, and the fourth, local sovereignty, are necessary conditions for the third, security of livelihoods. The first principle, ecological sustainability, guarantees preservation of the environment, thereby protecting sustainability of livelihoods as well. These principles are not just the necessary conditions for sustainable society (Cavanach and Mandcr 2004), they are also the policy guidelines for realizing it (Kortcn 2001). It is a requirement of earth democracy that corporate globalization be dismantled. This is because corporate globalization denies all of the principles of earth democracy. Therefore, the power structure of corporate globalization must be broken up. First, the Anti-Trust Act must be reformed so that governments can mitigate the power of large firms in the global marketplace. Large companies that have no technical reason for maintaining such large organizations should be broken up into more governable segments. Second, market rules such as WTO agreements, should be rewritten. Introduced in the name of deregulation and trade liberalization, the aim of these rules has been nothing other than to allow large companies to use monopolistic power to control the global marketplace. Local governments must take back the right to formulate policy on matters affecting their own communities, reclaiming the policy space which has been hijacked by the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank. Third, the ability of corporate power to design market systems must be checked. The political power of big business is principally based on cozy relationships with government. Therefore, political contributions from corporations must be prohibited, lobbying tied to political money should not be allowed, and revolving doors between big business and government must be closed (Marx et al. 2007). Finally, corporations should be deprived of the entitlement to express their political opinions through media, think tanks, etc. Simultaneous to the dismantling of the excesses of corporate power, it is also necessary that communities regain their independence on matters of economic policy. The arguments presented below are intended to itemize the policy tasks needed for the rebuilding of community-based society. The first task is to strengthen the foundations of the local economy. Here, the policy matter is how to secure productive investment in local communities. Local governments need to protect and support their home firms by adopting policies such as local contents regulations, and reinvestment rules in regards to profits gained locally. The second task is to support and nurture local businesses, such as small to medium-sized firms, the self-employed, family farming, and so forth, as these represent core elements of the local economy. The priority of industrial policies must be to shift power from big business to these local actors. The objective of such a policy shift should be to strengthen reproductive circulation within the local economy. Local actors are interdependent on one another through the internal circulations which occur at the local level. Therefore, the strengthening of local actors leads to the independence of the local economy. But this policy does not amount to locally closed economics (autarchy). To the contrary, it is essential that local industries establish linkages with external markets to ensure viability of the local economy. What is important here is for local actors to take the initiative in establishing these linkages. Therefore, large firms need to be regulated so as to prevent them from damaging the interests of local economic actors. Large companies should be made to support local actors rather than inhibit them. The third task is for local communities to regain control of the commons. The commons, including natural resources (water, soil, seeds, gene information), public services and utilities (municipal water supplies, electric power sources, educational services, medical care), arc indispensable to peoples' lives. It is thus a prerequisite to the establishment of economic independence that local communities retain their policy space on issues which concern the commons. Even in cases of private ownership, local communities should have the final say with respect to governance of the commons. In addition, it should be strongly encouraged for citizens to develop a stake in the local economy through, for example, promotion of the co-ownership of cooperatives and the establishment of municipal holding companies. Localization is a way for people to realize democracy on a higher level. Upon this new dimension of democracy, local citizens can make strides toward more healthy and sustainable lives. | 6,344 | <h4>The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of an ethic of sustainability and localism – free trade alone cannot reduce stratification</h4><p><strong>Fukuda 10</strong> Yasuo Fukuda, Professor of Graduate School of Economics at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, “WTO Regime as a New Stage of Imperialism: Decaying Capitalism and its Alternative,” World Review of Political Economy, 1(3): 485-499 http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/22161/1/0101106701.pdf</p><p>There is considerable ongoing debate between "globaphobes" and "globaphiles." The decaying nature of modern capitalism shows that <u><strong><mark>free trade is not a panacea</mark> for citizen welfare</u></strong>. <u><strong>The task of <mark>this section is</u></strong></mark> not however to recount the arguments between globaphobes and globaphiles. Rather, the aim is <u><strong>to outline <mark>an alternative</mark> system</u></strong>. The matter at hand is how to restore viability, independence, and sustain-ability to local communities. But before arguing how this may be achieved, it is worthwhile to clarify the social conditions necessary for realizing such an outcome. V. <u><strong><mark>Shiva</u></strong></mark> (2005: Ch. 2) <u><strong><mark>advocates "earth democracy</u></strong></mark>" as an alternative to corporate globalization. Earth democracy is <u><strong><mark>composed of four basic principles</u></strong></mark> of sustainable society. The first is "<u><strong><mark>ecological sustainability</u></strong></mark>." That is, the recognition that all species have intrinsic worth and that their life-cycles are interdependent of one another. The second is "<u><strong><mark>community control of the commons</u></strong></mark>." Resources vital to sustenance, including public services and infrastructure, should not be privately owned; public resources must remain in the commons. The third is "<u><strong><mark>security of livelihoods</u></strong>.</mark>" That is, the idea that all people have the right to basic needs, such as food, water, housing, and jobs. The fourth is "<u><strong><mark>local sovereignty</u></strong></mark>," which amounts to community self-governance in regards to local economic affairs. <u><strong><mark>Localization</u></strong></mark> of the economy <u><strong><mark>does not mean a closed economy</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong>rather</u></strong>, it is the idea that <u><strong><mark>local production should have priority over trade</u></strong></mark>. These four principles are necessary conditions for sound and sustainable community life. The second principle, community control of the commons, and the fourth, local sovereignty, are necessary conditions for the third, security of livelihoods. The first principle, ecological sustainability, guarantees preservation of the environment, thereby protecting sustainability of livelihoods as well. These principles are not just the necessary conditions for sustainable society (Cavanach and Mandcr 2004), they are also the policy guidelines for realizing it (Kortcn 2001). It is a requirement of earth democracy that corporate globalization be dismantled. This is because corporate globalization denies all of the principles of earth democracy. Therefore, <u><strong>the power structure of <mark>corporate globalization must be broken up</u></strong></mark>. First, the Anti-Trust Act must be reformed so that governments can mitigate the power of large firms in the global marketplace. Large companies that have no technical reason for maintaining such large organizations should be broken up into more governable segments. Second, <u><strong><mark>market rules such as WTO agreements, should be rewritten</u></strong></mark>. Introduced in the name of deregulation and trade liberalization, <u><strong><mark>the aim of these rules has been</mark> nothing other than <mark>to allow large companies to use monopolistic power</mark> to control the global marketplace. Local governments must take back the right to formulate policy on matters affecting their own communities</u></strong>, reclaiming the policy space which has been hijacked by the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank. Third, the ability of corporate power to design market systems must be checked. The political power of big business is principally based on cozy relationships with government. Therefore, political contributions from corporations must be prohibited, lobbying tied to political money should not be allowed, and revolving doors between big business and government must be closed (Marx et al. 2007). Finally, <u><strong>corporations should be deprived of the entitlement to express their political opinions through media, think tanks, etc</u></strong>. Simultaneous to the dismantling of the excesses of corporate power, <u><strong><mark>it is</mark> also <mark>necessary that communities regain their independence on</mark> matters of <mark>economic policy</mark>.</u></strong> The arguments presented below are intended to itemize the policy tasks needed for the rebuilding of community-based society. The first task is to strengthen the foundations of the local economy. Here, the policy matter is how to secure productive investment in local communities. Local governments need to protect and support their home firms by adopting policies such as local contents regulations, and reinvestment rules in regards to profits gained locally. The second task is to support and nurture local businesses, such as small to medium-sized firms, the self-employed, family farming, and so forth, as these represent core elements of the local economy. The priority of industrial policies must be to shift power from big business to these local actors. The objective of such a policy shift should be to strengthen reproductive circulation within the local economy. Local actors are interdependent on one another through the internal circulations which occur at the local level. Therefore, <u><strong>the strengthening of local actors leads to the independence of the local economy</u></strong>. But this policy does not amount to locally closed economics (autarchy). To the contrary, it is essential that local industries establish linkages with external markets to ensure viability of the local economy. What is important here is for local actors to take the initiative in establishing these linkages. Therefore, <u><strong>large firms need to be regulated so as to prevent them from damaging the interests of local economic actors</u></strong>. Large companies should be made to support local actors rather than inhibit them. The third task is for local communities to regain control of the commons. The commons, including natural resources (water, soil, seeds, gene information), public services and utilities (municipal water supplies, electric power sources, educational services, medical care), arc indispensable to peoples' lives. It is thus a prerequisite to the establishment of economic independence that local communities retain their policy space on issues which concern the commons. Even in cases of private ownership, local communities should have the final say with respect to governance of the commons. In addition, it should be strongly encouraged for citizens to develop a stake in the local economy through, for example, promotion of the co-ownership of cooperatives and the establishment of municipal holding companies. <u><strong><mark>Localization is a way for people to realize democracy on a higher level. Upon this new dimension</mark> of democracy, <mark>local citizens can make strides toward more healthy and sustainable lives</u></strong></mark>.</p> | null | 1NC | 1NC | 365,454 | 10 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,741 | Internet won’t collapse – ignore their empirically denied doomsaying | -only threat is viruses, which you don’t affect | -only threat is viruses, which you don’t affect | When is the Internet going to collapse? NEVER The Internet is amazing for no other reason than that it hasn't simply collapsed It's actually the astonishing overall growth of the Internet that is amazing. So when does this thing just grind to a halt or blow up? we have to admit that the structure of the Net is robust, to say the least. This is impressive, considering the fact that experts were predicting a collapse in the 1990s Many believe that the Net has never collapsed because it does tend to fix itself. A decade ago we were going to run out of IP addresses It righted itself, with rotating addresses and subnets. Many of the Net's improvements are self-improvements. Only spam, viruses, and spyware represent incurable diseases the worst-case scenario Net is an outage here or there, if anywhere After all, the phone system, never really imploded While it has outages, it's actually more reliable than the power grid it sits on Why should the Internet be any different now that it is essentially run by phone companies And let's be real here. The Net is being improved daily, with newer routers and better gear being constantly hot-swapped all over the world. This is not the same Internet we had in 1990, nor 2000 | When is the Internet going to collapse NEVER it hasn't the structure is robust This is impressive, considering experts were predicting collapse in 90s it does tend to fix itself. A decade ago we were going to run out of addresses It righted itself Only spam represent incurable diseases worst-case is outage the phone system never imploded it's more reliable than the grid Why should the Internet be different run by phone companies | Dvorak 7 {John C., syndicated technology and computing analyst, Bachelors in History (California-Berkley), “Will the Internet Collapse?” PC Mag, 5/1, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0%2c2817%2c2124376%2c00.asp}
When is the Internet going to collapse? The answer is NEVER. The Internet is amazing for no other reason than that it hasn't simply collapsed, never to be rebooted. Over a decade ago, many pundits were predicting an all-out catastrophic failure, and back then the load was nothing compared with what it is today. So how much more can this network take? Let's look at the basic changes that have occurred since the Net became chat-worthy around 1990. First of all, only a few people were on the Net back in 1990, since it was essentially a carrier for e-mail (spam free!), newsgroups, gopher, and FTP. These capabilities remain. But the e-mail load has grown to phenomenal proportions and become burdened with megatons of spam. In one year, the amount of spam can exceed a decade's worth, say 1990 to 2000, of all Internet traffic. It's actually the astonishing overall growth of the Internet that is amazing. In 1990, the total U.S. backbone throughput of the Internet was 1 terabyte, and in 1991 it doubled to 2TB. Throughput continued to double until 1996, when it jumped to 1,500TB. After that huge jump, it returned to doubling, reaching 80,000 to 140,000TB in 2002. This ridiculous growth rate has continued as more and more services are added to the burden. The jump in 1996 is attributable to the one-two punch of the universal popularization of the Web and the introduction of the MP3 standard and subsequent music file sharing. More recently, the emergence of inane video clips (YouTube and the rest) as universal entertainment has continued to slam the Net with overhead, as has large video file sharing via BitTorrent and other systems. Then VoIP came along, and IPTV is next. All the while, e-mail numbers are in the trillions of messages, and spam has never been more plentiful and bloated. Add blogging, vlogging, and twittering and it just gets worse. According to some expensive studies, the growth rate has begun to slow down to something like 50 percent per year. But that's growth on top of huge numbers. Petabytes. So when does this thing just grind to a halt or blow up? To date, we have to admit that the structure of the Net is robust, to say the least. This is impressive, considering the fact that experts were predicting a collapse in the 1990s. Robust or not, this Internet is a transportation system. It transports data. All transportation systems eventually need upgrading, repair, basic changes, or reinvention. But what needs to be done here? This, to me, has come to be the big question. Does anything at all need to be done, or do we run it into the ground and then fix it later? Is this like a jalopy leaking oil and water about to blow, or an organic perpetual-motion machine that fixes itself somehow? Many believe that the Net has never collapsed because it does tend to fix itself. A decade ago we were going to run out of IP addresses—remember? It righted itself, with rotating addresses and subnets. Many of the Net's improvements are self-improvements. Only spam, viruses, and spyware represent incurable diseases that could kill the organism. I have to conclude that the worst-case scenario for the Net is an outage here or there, if anywhere. After all, the phone system, a more machine-intensive system, never really imploded after years and years of growth, did it? While it has outages, it's actually more reliable than the power grid it sits on. Why should the Internet be any different now that it is essentially run by phone companies who know how to keep networks up? And let's be real here. The Net is being improved daily, with newer routers and better gear being constantly hot-swapped all over the world. This is not the same Internet we had in 1990, nor is it what we had in 2000. | 3,944 | <h4>Internet won’t collapse – ignore their empirically denied doomsaying </h4><p><strong>-only threat is viruses, which you don’t affect</p><p>Dvorak 7 </strong>{John C., syndicated technology and computing analyst, Bachelors in History (California-Berkley), “Will the Internet Collapse?” PC Mag, 5/1, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0%2c2817%2c2124376%2c00.asp}</p><p><u><strong><mark>When is the Internet going to collapse</mark>?</u></strong> The answer is <u><strong><mark>NEVER</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The Internet is amazing for no other reason than that <mark>it hasn't</mark> simply collapsed</u></strong>, never to be rebooted. Over a decade ago, many pundits were predicting an all-out catastrophic failure, and back then the load was nothing compared with what it is today. So how much more can this network take? Let's look at the basic changes that have occurred since the Net became chat-worthy around 1990. First of all, only a few people were on the Net back in 1990, since it was essentially a carrier for e-mail (spam free!), newsgroups, gopher, and FTP. These capabilities remain. But the e-mail load has grown to phenomenal proportions and become burdened with megatons of spam. In one year, the amount of spam can exceed a decade's worth, say 1990 to 2000, of all Internet traffic. <u><strong>It's actually the astonishing overall growth of the Internet that is amazing.</u></strong> In 1990, the total U.S. backbone throughput of the Internet was 1 terabyte, and in 1991 it doubled to 2TB. Throughput continued to double until 1996, when it jumped to 1,500TB. After that huge jump, it returned to doubling, reaching 80,000 to 140,000TB in 2002. This ridiculous growth rate has continued as more and more services are added to the burden. The jump in 1996 is attributable to the one-two punch of the universal popularization of the Web and the introduction of the MP3 standard and subsequent music file sharing. More recently, the emergence of inane video clips (YouTube and the rest) as universal entertainment has continued to slam the Net with overhead, as has large video file sharing via BitTorrent and other systems. Then VoIP came along, and IPTV is next. All the while, e-mail numbers are in the trillions of messages, and spam has never been more plentiful and bloated. Add blogging, vlogging, and twittering and it just gets worse. According to some expensive studies, the growth rate has begun to slow down to something like 50 percent per year. But that's growth on top of huge numbers. Petabytes. <u><strong>So when does this thing just grind to a halt or blow up? </u></strong>To date, <u><strong>we have to admit that <mark>the structure</mark> of the Net <mark>is robust</mark>, to say the least. <mark>This is impressive, considering</mark> the fact that <mark>experts were predicting</mark> a <mark>collapse in</mark> the 19<mark>90s</u></strong></mark>. Robust or not, this Internet is a transportation system. It transports data. All transportation systems eventually need upgrading, repair, basic changes, or reinvention. But what needs to be done here? This, to me, has come to be the big question. Does anything at all need to be done, or do we run it into the ground and then fix it later? Is this like a jalopy leaking oil and water about to blow, or an organic perpetual-motion machine that fixes itself somehow? <u><strong>Many believe that the Net has never collapsed because <mark>it does tend to fix itself. A decade ago we were going to run out of </mark>IP <mark>addresses</u></strong></mark>—remember? <u><strong><mark>It righted itself</mark>, with rotating addresses and subnets. Many of the Net's improvements are self-improvements. <mark>Only spam</mark>, viruses, and spyware <mark>represent incurable diseases</u></strong></mark> that could kill the organism. I have to conclude that <u><strong>the <mark>worst-case</mark> scenario </u></strong>for the <u><strong>Net <mark>is</mark> an <mark>outage</mark> here or there, if anywhere</u></strong>. <u><strong>After all, <mark>the phone system</mark>,</u></strong> a more machine-intensive system, <u><strong><mark>never</mark> really <mark>imploded</u></strong></mark> after years and years of growth, did it? <u><strong>While it has outages, <mark>it's</mark> actually <mark>more reliable</mark> <mark>than the</mark> power <mark>grid</mark> it sits on</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Why should the Internet be</mark> any <mark>different</mark> now that it is essentially <mark>run by phone companies</u></strong></mark> who know how to keep networks up? <u><strong>And let's be real here. The Net is being improved daily, with newer routers and better gear being constantly hot-swapped all over the world. This is not the same Internet we had in 1990, nor</u></strong> is it what we had in <u><strong>2000</u></strong>.</p> | null | 1NC | Internet | 9,492 | 43 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,742 | No motive to protect “open internet” | Aaronson 12 } | Aaronson 12 {Susan Ariel, Research Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, former Minerva Chair at the National War College, “Can Trade Policy Set Information Free?” Vox EU, 12/22, http://www.voxeu.org/article/trade-agreements-global-internet-governance} | In theory, the WTO should be an appropriate venue for such discussions However member states have not found common ground on how to reduce barriers to information In 2011, several nations stopped a US and EU proposal that members agree not to block internet service providers or impede the free flow of information online4 Moreover members have made little progress on new regulatory issues such as privacy and cyber security However, many new online activities will require cooperative global regulation that transcend market access – the traditional turf of the WTO Alas, policymakers are not consistently collaborating to achieve interoperability. | WTO should be appropriate However states have not found common ground on barriers to info several stopped a US proposal that members agree not block free information members have made little progress on privacy activities require cooperative global regulation that transcend traditional turf of the WTO policymakers are not collaborating | The WTO In theory, the WTO should be an appropriate venue for such discussions. WTO members agreed not to place tariffs on data flows. In addition, the WTO’s dispute settlement body has settled two trade disputes related to internet issues: internet gambling and China’s state trading rights on audiovisual products and services (WTO 2007, WTO 2012). However, the member states have not found common ground on how to reduce new trade barriers to information flows3. In 2011, several nations stopped a US and EU proposal that members agree not to block internet service providers or impede the free flow of information online4. Moreover, the members of the WTO have made little progress on adding new regulatory issues such as privacy and cyber security that challenge internet policymakers5. However, many new online activities will require cooperative global regulation on issues that transcend market access – the traditional turf of the WTO. These issues will require policymakers to think less about ensuring that their model of regulation is adopted globally but more about achieving interoperability among different governance approaches (see Burri and Cottier 2012). Alas, policymakers are not consistently collaborating to achieve interoperability. | 1,256 | <h4>No motive to protect “open internet”</h4><p><strong>Aaronson 12 </strong>{Susan Ariel, Research Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, former Minerva Chair at the National War College, “Can Trade Policy Set Information Free?” Vox EU, 12/22, http://www.voxeu.org/article/trade-agreements-global-internet-governance<u><strong>}</p><p></u></strong>The WTO <u><strong>In theory, the <mark>WTO should be</mark> an <mark>appropriate</mark> venue for such discussions</u></strong>. WTO members agreed not to place tariffs on data flows. In addition, the WTO’s dispute settlement body has settled two trade disputes related to internet issues: internet gambling and China’s state trading rights on audiovisual products and services (WTO 2007, WTO 2012). <u><strong><mark>However</u></strong></mark>, the <u><strong>member <mark>states have not found common ground on</mark> how to reduce</u></strong> new trade <u><strong><mark>barriers to info</mark>rmation </u></strong>flows3. <u><strong>In 2011, <mark>several</mark> nations <mark>stopped a US</mark> and EU <mark>proposal that members agree not</mark> to <mark>block</mark> internet service providers or impede the <mark>free</mark> flow of <mark>information</mark> online4</u></strong>. <u><strong>Moreover</u></strong>, the <u><strong><mark>members</u></strong></mark> of the WTO <u><strong><mark>have made little progress on</u></strong></mark> adding <u><strong>new regulatory issues such as <mark>privacy</mark> and cyber security</u></strong> that challenge internet policymakers5. <u><strong>However, many new online <mark>activities</mark> will <mark>require cooperative global regulation</u></strong></mark> on issues <u><strong><mark>that transcend</mark> market access – the <mark>traditional turf of the WTO</u></strong></mark>. These issues will require policymakers to think less about ensuring that their model of regulation is adopted globally but more about achieving interoperability among different governance approaches (see Burri and Cottier 2012). <u><strong>Alas, <mark>policymakers are not</mark> consistently <mark>collaborating</mark> to achieve interoperability.</p></u></strong> | null | 1NC | Internet | 216,731 | 14 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,743 | non-compliance inev | Ikenson 13 | Daniel J. Ikenson 13, director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, MA in economics from George Washington University, “Protectionist Antidumping Regime Is a Pox on America’s Glass House,” www.cato.org/publications/commentary/protectionist-antidumping-regime-pox-americas-glass-house | U.S. policies have been the subject of more W T O disputes 119 and have been found to violate WTO rules more frequently than any other government’s policies No government is more likely to be out of compliance with a final DSB ruling the U S remains out of compliance in cases involving U.S. subsidies to cotton farmers restrictions on Antigua’s gambling services, country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the so-called Byrd Amendment, a variety of antidumping measures, and several other issues some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. , U.S. trade partners have either retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate yet non-compliance continues | U.S. policies have been the subject of more W T O disputes 119 and violate WTO rules more than any other government the U S remains out of compliance in subsidies to cotton farmers country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the Byrd Amendment antidumping measures, and several other issues U.S. trade partners have retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate yet non-compliance continues | Other candidates come to mind when contemplating the world’s worst international trade scofflaw, but the United States makes a strong case for itself. A recent Commerce Department determination that foreign companies like Samsung, LG, and Electrolux engaged in “targeted dumping” by reducing prices on their washing machines for Black Friday sales confirms that the United States is actively seeking that ignominious distinction.
U.S. policies have been the subject of more World Trade Organization disputes (119, followed by the EU with 73, then China with 30) and have been found to violate WTO rules more frequently than any other government’s policies. No government is more likely to be out of compliance with a final WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) ruling — or for a longer period — than the U.S. government. To this day, the United States remains out of compliance in cases involving U.S. subsidies to cotton farmers, restrictions on Antigua’s provision of gambling services, country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the so-called Byrd Amendment, a variety of antidumping measures, and several other issues, some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. In some of these cases, U.S. trade partners have either retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate, against U.S. exporters or asset holders, yet the non-compliance continues as though the United States considers itself above the rules. | 1,425 | <h4>non-compliance inev </h4><p>Daniel J. <strong>Ikenson 13</strong>, director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, MA in economics from George Washington University, “Protectionist Antidumping Regime Is a Pox on America’s Glass House,” www.cato.org/publications/commentary/protectionist-antidumping-regime-pox-americas-glass-house</p><p>Other candidates come to mind when contemplating the world’s worst international trade scofflaw, but the United States makes a strong case for itself. A recent Commerce Department determination that foreign companies like Samsung, LG, and Electrolux engaged in “targeted dumping” by reducing prices on their washing machines for Black Friday sales confirms that the United States is actively seeking that ignominious distinction.</p><p><u><strong><mark>U.S. policies have been the subject of more</u></strong> <u><strong>W</u></strong></mark>orld <u><strong><mark>T</u></strong></mark>rade <u><strong><mark>O</u></strong></mark>rganization <u><strong><mark>disputes</u></strong></mark> (<u><strong><mark>119</u></strong></mark>, followed by the EU with 73, then China with 30) <u><strong><mark>and</mark> have been found to <mark>violate WTO rules more</mark> frequently <mark>than any other government</mark>’s policies</u></strong>. <u><strong>No government is more likely to be out of compliance with a final</u></strong> WTO Dispute Settlement Body (<u><strong>DSB</u></strong>) <u><strong>ruling</u></strong> — or for a longer period — than the U.S. government. To this day, <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>remains out of compliance in</mark> cases involving U.S. <mark>subsidies to cotton farmers</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>restrictions on Antigua’s </u></strong>provision of<u><strong> gambling services, <mark>country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the </mark>so-called <mark>Byrd Amendment</mark>, a variety of <mark>antidumping measures, and several other issues</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. </u></strong>In some of these cases<u><strong>, <mark>U.S. trade partners have</mark> either <mark>retaliated, or been authorized to</mark> <mark>retaliate</u></strong></mark>, against U.S. exporters or asset holders, <u><strong><mark>yet</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>non-compliance continues</u></mark> as though the United States considers itself above the rules.</p></strong> | null | 1NC | Ecommerce | 97,365 | 55 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,744 | The WTO is dead already – aff can’t solve | Donnan 8/1 | Donnan 8/1, Shawn, Financial Times' World Trade Editor, “WTO plunged into crisis as doubts grow over its future,” August 1st, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bac249d0-198c-11e4-9745-00144feabdc0.html | Azevêdo the new head of the W T O announced The WTO is back Azevêdo was speaking too soon. the WTO has been plunged into an existential crisis, after India blocked the centrepiece of the Bali deal Azevêdo is now facing doubts about the future of his organisation There are bound to be efforts to revive negotiations However, the Bali agreement already amounted to a rescue operation and its failure bodes badly for the system. There is significant dysfunction India carried out a threat this week to block a procedural measure to the trade facilitation agreement The Doha round was launched in 2001 and has since repeatedly broken down Putting it back on track would mean tackling much knottier issues such as agricultural subsidies in a new climate of distrust Several members have threatened to enact the trade facilitation agreement as a “plurilateral” deal outside the WTO, a move that would further marginalise the Geneva-based organisation its future looks bleak if the Doha negotiations go back into the coma that has been their dominant state in recent years there are going to be more and more disputes that cannot be resolved [at the WTO | the WTO has been plunged into an existential crisis after India blocked the Bali deal the Bali amounted to a rescue operation its failure bodes badly for the system There is significant dysfunction Doha has repeatedly broken down Putting it back would mean tackling knottier issues such as ag subsidies in a climate of distrust its future looks bleak more and more disputes cannot be resolved [at the WTO | Roberto Azevêdo, the new head of the World Trade Organisation, struck a triumphal tone in Bali last December when he announced that the body’s 159 members had reached the first global agreement in its 18-year history. “The WTO is back!” the visibly sleep-deprived Brazilian told delegates, drawing cheers from all around. Mr Azevêdo, it turns out, was speaking too soon. Seven months later, the WTO has been plunged into an existential crisis, after India’s new government this week blocked the centrepiece of the Bali deal: a seemingly benign arrangement to reduce customs red tape around the world. As a result, Mr Azevêdo is now facing doubts about both the future of his organisation and, more broadly, the liberal vision of a multilateral trading system that has guided the postwar era in the global economy. The WTO, which took over in 1995 from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, has grown out of the agreements struck at Bretton Woods in the US in 1944, which sought to keep world leaders from repeating the protectionist mistakes of the 1930s. There are bound to be efforts to revive negotiations. The government in New Delhi has already sought to play down the implications of its stand. Announcing the failure to reach a compromise to members on Thursday, Mr Azevedo urged them to use the August break to ponder the future and return in September with ideas. However, the Bali agreement already amounted to a rescue operation and its failure bodes badly for the system. “There is an element of significant dysfunction that you can’t hide,” said one senior official on Friday. India had originally given its blessing to the deal. But that was before a new government, led by Narendra Modi, came to power two months ago. New Delhi has in recent weeks insisted it wants to renegotiate deadlines set in Bali in order to bring forward negotiations to update the WTO rules that apply to subsidies it gives to farmers as part of a massive government programme to provide cheap food to poor people. In an effort to get what it wanted, India carried out a threat this week to block a procedural measure to the trade facilitation agreement from making the July 31 deadline set in Bali for its implementation. The failure to meet the deadline means the WTO’s members are even less likely to meet another in December to come up with a plan to deliver the rest of the Doha round of negotiations for a global trade deal. The Doha round was launched in 2001 and has since repeatedly broken down as a result of the failure of rich countries, such as the US, and emerging economies, like China and India, to narrow their differences. Putting it back on track would mean tackling much knottier issues such as agricultural subsidies in a new climate of distrust, say diplomats. The irony is that India and other developing countries are likely to suffer most from any collapse of the Doha round, say trade analysts. The US, EU and other key players such as Japan all have big regional trade initiatives under way, and are likely to find moving on much easier than India or smaller and more vulnerable states. Several members have threatened to enact the trade facilitation agreement as a “plurilateral” deal outside the WTO, a move that would further marginalise the Geneva-based organisation. The text to do so has already been drafted and translated into three languages. Up to 60 countries have indicated they are keen to see it implemented. But that is a narrower issue than what happens next at the WTO. Negotiations such as those now under way between the EU and US or between the US and 11 other countries to create a Trans-Pacific Partnership are increasingly focused on more complex, non-tariff barriers to trade. In Brussels and Washington, negotiators are also starting to tackle how to guarantee the free flow of data across borders or ease the way for the global supply chains so vital to modern business. These are discussions that are years beyond what is on the agenda at the WTO. The WTO will not come crashing down tomorrow, says Kimberly Elliott, a trade analyst at the Center for Global Development think-tank in Washington. But its future looks bleak if the Doha negotiations go back into the coma that has been their dominant state in recent years. While many celebrate the WTO’s place as a venue for settling disputes, that function will be eroded if it is not updating its rules to reflect new issues. Without any progress in negotiations, “there are going to be more and more disputes that cannot be resolved [at the WTO],” said Ms Elliott. | 4,566 | <h4>The WTO is dead already – aff can’t solve</h4><p><strong>Donnan 8/1</strong>, Shawn, Financial Times' World Trade Editor, “WTO plunged into crisis as doubts grow over its future,” August 1st, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bac249d0-198c-11e4-9745-00144feabdc0.html</p><p>Roberto <u><strong>Azevêdo</u></strong>, <u><strong>the new head of the W</u></strong>orld <u><strong>T</u></strong>rade <u><strong>O</u></strong>rganisation, struck a triumphal tone in Bali last December when he <u><strong>announced</u></strong> that the body’s 159 members had reached the first global agreement in its 18-year history. “<u><strong>The WTO is back</u></strong>!” the visibly sleep-deprived Brazilian told delegates, drawing cheers from all around. Mr <u><strong>Azevêdo</u></strong>, it turns out, <u><strong>was speaking too soon.</u></strong> Seven months later, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> <mark>WTO has been plunged into an existential crisis</mark>, <mark>after India</u></strong></mark>’s new government this week <u><strong><mark>blocked the</mark> centrepiece of the <mark>Bali deal</u></strong></mark>: a seemingly benign arrangement to reduce customs red tape around the world. As a result, Mr <u><strong>Azevêdo is now facing doubts about</u></strong> both <u><strong>the future of his organisation</u></strong> and, more broadly, the liberal vision of a multilateral trading system that has guided the postwar era in the global economy. The WTO, which took over in 1995 from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, has grown out of the agreements struck at Bretton Woods in the US in 1944, which sought to keep world leaders from repeating the protectionist mistakes of the 1930s. <u><strong>There are bound to be efforts to revive negotiations</u></strong>. The government in New Delhi has already sought to play down the implications of its stand. Announcing the failure to reach a compromise to members on Thursday, Mr Azevedo urged them to use the August break to ponder the future and return in September with ideas. <u><strong>However, <mark>the Bali</mark> agreement already <mark>amounted to a rescue operation</mark> and <mark>its</mark> <mark>failure bodes badly for the system</mark>. </u>“<u><mark>There is</u></strong></mark> an element of <u><strong><mark>significant dysfunction</u></strong></mark> that you can’t hide,” said one senior official on Friday. India had originally given its blessing to the deal. But that was before a new government, led by Narendra Modi, came to power two months ago. New Delhi has in recent weeks insisted it wants to renegotiate deadlines set in Bali in order to bring forward negotiations to update the WTO rules that apply to subsidies it gives to farmers as part of a massive government programme to provide cheap food to poor people. In an effort to get what it wanted, <u><strong>India carried out a threat this week to block a procedural measure to the trade facilitation agreement</u></strong> from making the July 31 deadline set in Bali for its implementation. The failure to meet the deadline means the WTO’s members are even less likely to meet another in December to come up with a plan to deliver the rest of the Doha round of negotiations for a global trade deal. <u><strong>The <mark>Doha</mark> round was launched in 2001 and <mark>has</mark> since <mark>repeatedly broken down</u></strong></mark> as a result of the failure of rich countries, such as the US, and emerging economies, like China and India, to narrow their differences. <u><strong><mark>Putting it back</mark> on track <mark>would mean tackling</mark> much <mark>knottier issues such as ag</mark>ricultural <mark>subsidies</mark> <mark>in a</mark> new <mark>climate of distrust</u></mark>,</strong> say diplomats. The irony is that India and other developing countries are likely to suffer most from any collapse of the Doha round, say trade analysts. The US, EU and other key players such as Japan all have big regional trade initiatives under way, and are likely to find moving on much easier than India or smaller and more vulnerable states. <u><strong>Several members have threatened to enact the trade facilitation agreement as a “plurilateral” deal outside the WTO, a move that would further marginalise the Geneva-based organisation</u></strong>. The text to do so has already been drafted and translated into three languages. Up to 60 countries have indicated they are keen to see it implemented. But that is a narrower issue than what happens next at the WTO. Negotiations such as those now under way between the EU and US or between the US and 11 other countries to create a Trans-Pacific Partnership are increasingly focused on more complex, non-tariff barriers to trade. In Brussels and Washington, negotiators are also starting to tackle how to guarantee the free flow of data across borders or ease the way for the global supply chains so vital to modern business. These are discussions that are years beyond what is on the agenda at the WTO. The WTO will not come crashing down tomorrow, says Kimberly Elliott, a trade analyst at the Center for Global Development think-tank in Washington. But <u><strong><mark>its future looks bleak</mark> if the Doha negotiations go back into the coma that has been their dominant state in recent years</u></strong>. While many celebrate the WTO’s place as a venue for settling disputes, that function will be eroded if it is not updating its rules to reflect new issues. Without any progress in negotiations, “<u><strong>there are going to be <mark>more and more disputes</mark> that <mark>cannot</mark> <mark>be resolved [at the WTO</u></strong></mark>],” said Ms Elliott.</p> | null | 1NC | Ecommerce | 430,392 | 9 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,745 | The plan complies instantly---that makes cross-retaliation illegal before it can even begin | TRIPS: A Proposal for Retaliating Against Technology-Exporting Countries in the World Trade Organization,” The Georgetown Law Journal, 97 Geo. L.J. 1365 | Gabriel L. Slater 9, J.D., Georgetown University School of Law, 2008-2009, “The Suspension of Intellectual Property Obligations Under TRIPS: A Proposal for Retaliating Against Technology-Exporting Countries in the World Trade Organization,” The Georgetown Law Journal, 97 Geo. L.J. 1365
Article 22.8 of the DSU provides that: | suspension shall only be applied until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or the Member that must implement rulings provides a solution or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached
Any regime of suspended IP rights must therefore cease if the violating state comes into compliance | suspension shall only be applied until the Member that must implement rulings provides a solution or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached
Any regime of suspended IP rights must therefore cease if the violating state comes into compliance | The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and shall only be applied until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or the Member that must implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached.
Any regime of suspended IP rights must therefore cease if and when: (1) the violating state comes into compliance; (2) the violating state remedies the nullification or impairment of benefits; or (3) the parties reach a mutually satisfactory solution. 60 Uncertainty about when or even if any of these three events will occur creates risks for any business that seeks to take advantage of suspended IP obligations. | 786 | <h4>The plan complies <u>instantly</u>---that makes cross-retaliation illegal <u>before it can even begin</u> </h4><p>Gabriel L. Slater 9, J.D., Georgetown University School of Law, 2008-2009, “The Suspension of Intellectual Property Obligations Under<u><strong> TRIPS: A Proposal for Retaliating Against Technology-Exporting Countries in the World Trade Organization,” The Georgetown Law Journal, 97 Geo. L.J. 1365 </p><p></u></strong>Article 22.8 of the <u><strong><mark>DSU provides that:</p><p></u></strong></mark>The <u><strong><mark>suspension</u></strong></mark> of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and <u><strong><mark>shall only be applied until </mark>such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or <mark>the Member that must implement</u></strong></mark> recommendations or <u><strong><mark>rulings provides a solution</u></strong></mark> to the nullification or impairment of benefits, <u><strong><mark>or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Any regime of suspended IP rights must therefore cease if</u></strong></mark> and when: (1) <u><strong><mark>the violating state comes into compliance</u></strong></mark>; (2) the violating state remedies the nullification or impairment of benefits; or (3) the parties reach a mutually satisfactory solution. 60 Uncertainty about when or even if any of these three events will occur creates risks for any business that seeks to take advantage of suspended IP obligations. </p> | null | 2NC | Do Both---2NC | 430,394 | 4 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,746 | Cross-retaliation is only authorized so long as the U.S. fails to change its gambling laws---plan and perm both remove Antigua’s legal claim in its entirety | Hamann 9 | Georgia Hamann 9, J.D. Candidate 2009, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009, “NOTE: REPLACING SLINGSHOTS WITH SWORDS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANTIGUA-GAMBLING 22.6 PANEL REPORT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 993 | the U.S. announced that it was withdrawing from its commitment to provide offshore gambling and, as a result, continued to negotiate the scope of possible concessions with the affected WTO members
the U.S. claimed inaction constituted "conformity The Panel rejected this argument, declaring that a demonstrable change in the laws - either a change originating in the U.S. or a change in the legal situation - was necessary to support a finding of compliance Thus, the Panel found that the U.S. had not complied within the requisite timeframe
Following this finding, Antigua requested authorization to suspend certain GATS privileges and TRIPS concessions subsequent arbitration sought to determine the propriety of the remedy requested and the proper amount for suspension the decision addressed only the legality of the requested TRIPS suspensions | the U.S. announced it was withdrawing from its commitment to provide offshore gambling and as a result, continued to negotiate concessions with affected members
the U.S. claimed inaction constituted "conformity The Panel rejected this declaring a demonstrable change in the laws was necessary to support compliance the Panel found the U.S. had not complied
Following this finding, Antigua requested authorization to suspend TRIPS concessions arbitration sought to determine the proper amount for suspension | Following the decision of the Appellate Body, the U.S. announced that it was withdrawing from its commitment to provide offshore gambling, n80 and, as a result, continued to negotiate the scope of possible concessions with the affected WTO members. n81 Although news releases suggested that the U.S. would consider itself in [*1005] compliance after the withdrawal was affected, n82 the U.S. did not raise any arguments related to this announcement in the arbitration related to compliance issues. n83
Although the Award of the Arbitrator, under Article 21.3, gave the U.S. until April 2006 to conform its laws and regulations to its GATS obligations, n84 the U.S. took no action. n85 Antigua subsequently took steps to establish non-compliance by requesting establishment of a Compliance Panel under Article 21.5. n86
The Panel scornfully dismissed the U.S. argument as simply an attempt to reassert its original argument. n87 According to the Panel, the U.S. claimed that its inaction constituted "conformity" n88 on the grounds that its laws had been in compliance from the beginning of the dispute. Thus, the U.S. sought to challenge the Appellate Body findings and demonstrate to the Panel its laws conformed to its GATS obligations all along. n89 The Panel rejected this argument, declaring that a demonstrable change in the laws - either a change originating in the U.S. or a change in the legal situation - was necessary to support a finding of compliance. n90 The U.S. was, in effect, attempting to re-argue the same issues, n91 which conflicted with its commitment to "unconditionally accept" the findings of the Appellate Body. n92 Thus, the Panel found that the U.S. had not complied within the requisite timeframe. n93
Following this finding, Antigua requested authorization to suspend certain GATS privileges and TRIPS concessions. n94 The subsequent arbitration, convened pursuant to Article 22.6, sought to determine the propriety of the remedy requested and the proper amount for suspension. n95 The Arbitrator's decision devoted [*1006] considerable attention to the development of an appropriate counterfactual that would determine the degree to which Antigua's economy had been affected by the U.S. action. n96 However, as Antigua had abandoned its arguments regarding the proper remedy under GATS, n97 the decision addressed only the legality of the requested TRIPS suspensions. n98 | 2,407 | <h4>Cross-retaliation is <u>only authorized</u> so long as the U.S. <u>fails to change its gambling laws</u>---plan and perm <u>both remove Antigua’s legal claim</u> in its entirety </h4><p>Georgia <strong>Hamann 9</strong>, J.D. Candidate 2009, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009, “NOTE: REPLACING SLINGSHOTS WITH SWORDS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANTIGUA-GAMBLING 22.6 PANEL REPORT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 993 </p><p>Following the decision of the Appellate Body, <u><strong><mark>the U.S. announced</mark> that <mark>it was</u></strong> <u><strong>withdrawing from its commitment to provide offshore gambling</u></strong></mark>, n80 <u><strong><mark>and</mark>, <mark>as a result, continued to negotiate</mark> the scope of possible <mark>concessions with</mark> the <mark>affected </mark>WTO <mark>members</u></strong></mark>. n81 Although news releases suggested that the U.S. would consider itself in [*1005] compliance after the withdrawal was affected, n82 the U.S. did not raise any arguments related to this announcement in the arbitration related to compliance issues. n83</p><p>Although the Award of the Arbitrator, under Article 21.3, gave the U.S. until April 2006 to conform its laws and regulations to its GATS obligations, n84 the U.S. took no action. n85 Antigua subsequently took steps to establish non-compliance by requesting establishment of a Compliance Panel under Article 21.5. n86</p><p>The Panel scornfully dismissed the U.S. argument as simply an attempt to reassert its original argument. n87 According to the Panel, <u><strong><mark>the U.S. claimed</u></strong></mark> that its <u><strong><mark>inaction constituted "conformity</u></strong></mark>" n88 on the grounds that its laws had been in compliance from the beginning of the dispute. Thus, the U.S. sought to challenge the Appellate Body findings and demonstrate to the Panel its laws conformed to its GATS obligations all along. n89 <u><strong><mark>The Panel rejected this</mark> argument, <mark>declaring</mark> that <mark>a demonstrable change in the laws</mark> - either a change originating in the U.S. or a change in the legal situation - <mark>was necessary to support</mark> a finding of <mark>compliance</u></strong></mark>. n90 The U.S. was, in effect, attempting to re-argue the same issues, n91 which conflicted with its commitment to "unconditionally accept" the findings of the Appellate Body. n92 <u><strong>Thus, <mark>the Panel found</mark> that <mark>the U.S. had not complied</mark> within the requisite timeframe</u></strong>. n93</p><p><u><strong><mark>Following this finding, Antigua requested authorization to suspend</mark> certain GATS privileges and <mark>TRIPS concessions</u></strong></mark>. n94 The <u><strong>subsequent <mark>arbitration</u></strong></mark>, convened pursuant to Article 22.6, <u><strong><mark>sought to determine</mark> the propriety of the remedy requested and <mark>the proper amount for suspension</u></strong></mark>. n95 The Arbitrator's decision devoted [*1006] considerable attention to the development of an appropriate counterfactual that would determine the degree to which Antigua's economy had been affected by the U.S. action. n96 However, as Antigua had abandoned its arguments regarding the proper remedy under GATS, n97 <u><strong>the decision addressed only the legality of the requested TRIPS suspensions</u></strong>. n98</p> | null | 2NC | Do Both---2NC | 430,393 | 3 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,747 | Compliance precludes TRIPS suspension | Bloom 8 | Heather A. Bloom 8, J.D., 2008, The George Washington University Law School, Fall 2008, “ARTICLE: UPPING THE ANTE: THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT'S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION LAW,” South Carolina Journal of International Law & Business, 5 S.C. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 75 | complying is important to avoid patent retaliation from member countries if the U.S. ignores a WTO finding member countries will have the option to disregard treaties requiring them to comply with U.S. patent laws because the U.S. refused to follow the Compliance Panel's findings in the Antigua case WTO arbitration panel gave Antigua the right to disregard U.S. copyrights | complying is important to avoid patent retaliation if the U.S. ignores a finding member countries will have the option to disregard U.S. patent laws because the U.S. refused to follow the Compliance Panel's findings in Antigua WTO arbitration gave Antigua the right to disregard copyrights | Second, complying with GATS is important to avoid patent retaliation from member countries. Under WTO law, if the U.S. ignores a WTO finding or decision, member countries will have the option to disregard treaties requiring them to comply with U.S. patent laws. 73 For example, because the U.S. refused to follow the Compliance Panel's findings in the Antigua case, WTO arbitration panel gave Antigua the right to disregard U.S. copyrights on (e.g.,) videos, music, electronics, or software. 174 This type of retaliation will pose serious ramifications for the U.S. if larger WTO member countries bring internet gambling complaints. Moreover, member countries might also retaliate by refusing to allow U.S. companies to use certain geographical indications. 175 | 761 | <h4>Compliance precludes TRIPS suspension </h4><p>Heather A. <strong>Bloom 8</strong>, J.D., 2008, The George Washington University Law School, Fall 2008, “ARTICLE: UPPING THE ANTE: THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT'S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION LAW,” South Carolina Journal of International Law & Business, 5 S.C. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 75</p><p>Second, <u><strong><mark>complying</u></strong></mark> with GATS <u><strong><mark>is important to</u></strong> <u><strong>avoid patent retaliation</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>from member countries</u></strong>. Under WTO law, <u><strong><mark>if the U.S. ignores a</mark> WTO <mark>finding</u></strong></mark> or decision, <u><strong><mark>member countries will have the option to disregard</mark> treaties requiring them to comply with <mark>U.S. patent laws</u></strong></mark>. 73 For example, <u><strong><mark>because the U.S. refused to follow the Compliance Panel's findings</mark> <mark>in</mark> the <mark>Antigua</mark> case</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>WTO arbitration</mark> panel <mark>gave Antigua the right to disregard</mark> U.S. <mark>copyrights</u></strong></mark> on (e.g.,) videos, music, electronics, or software. 174 This type of retaliation will pose serious ramifications for the U.S. if larger WTO member countries bring internet gambling complaints. Moreover, member countries might also retaliate by refusing to allow U.S. companies to use certain geographical indications. 175</p> | null | 2NC | Do Both---2NC | 430,395 | 3 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,748 | Cross-retaliation only sets an effective precedent if it’s actually implemented---otherwise uncertainty destroys the signal | Phoon 13 | Mark Phoon 13, graduate student, London School of Economics and Political Science, 8/28/13, “Developing Countries and “Cross-Retaliation” in the WTO,” http://www.e-ir.info/2013/08/28/developing-countries-and-cross-retaliation-in-the-wto/ | the Antiguan authorities managed to secure an arbitral ruling allowing the use of cross-retaliation against the U S Antigua requested and was granted authorisation to suspend its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement Despite the right to cross-retaliate however, it is still uncertain if Antigua will indeed implement a suspension of intellectual property rights against the US. models of uncertainty puts into question the effectiveness and efficiency of actually implementing cross-retaliation Given the above, we conjecture cross-retaliation, on its own, is not an effective instrument | Antigua was granted authorisation to suspend TRIPS Despite the right to cross-retaliate it is uncertain if Antigua will implement a suspension models of uncertainty puts into question the effectiveness and efficiency of actually implementing cross-retaliation. Given the above, we conjecture cross-retaliation, on its own, is not effective | In the case of Antigua, the Antiguan authorities managed to secure an arbitral ruling allowing the use of cross-retaliation against the United States. Antigua requested and was granted authorisation to suspend its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. Despite the right to cross-retaliate however, it is still uncertain if Antigua will indeed implement a suspension of intellectual property rights against the US. Such models of uncertainty puts into question the effectiveness and efficiency of actually implementing cross-retaliation. Given the evidence above, we conjecture that cross-retaliation, on its own, is not an effective instrument. | 645 | <h4>Cross-retaliation only sets an effective precedent <u>if it’s actually implemented</u>---otherwise uncertainty destroys the signal </h4><p>Mark <strong>Phoon 13</strong>, graduate student, London School of Economics and Political Science, 8/28/13, “Developing Countries and “Cross-Retaliation” in the WTO,” http://www.e-ir.info/2013/08/28/developing-countries-and-cross-retaliation-in-the-wto/</p><p>In the case of Antigua, <u><strong>the Antiguan authorities managed to secure an arbitral ruling allowing the use of cross-retaliation against the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates. <u><strong><mark>Antigua</mark> requested and <mark>was granted authorisation to suspend</mark> its obligations under the <mark>TRIPS</mark> Agreement</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Despite the right to cross-retaliate</mark> however,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>it is</mark> still <mark>uncertain if Antigua will</mark> indeed</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>implement a suspension</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>of intellectual property rights against the US.</u></strong> Such <u><strong><mark>models of uncertainty</u></strong> <u><strong>puts into question the effectiveness and efficiency of actually implementing cross-retaliation</u></strong>. <u><strong>Given the</u></strong></mark> evidence <u><strong><mark>above, we conjecture</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>cross-retaliation, on its own,</u></strong> <u><strong>is not</mark> an <mark>effective</mark> instrument</u></strong>.</p> | null | 2NC | Do Both---2NC | 430,396 | 2 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,749 | FDI isn’t key and countries already are dealing with reductions because it’s being spread more evenly | Beattie 14 | Beattie 14 Alan Beattie, Blogger for Financial Times, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/10/23/foreign-direct-investment-its-not-all-good/ | particularly concerning for deficit countries that have been relying on FDI to finance their current accounts though existing FDI is less likely to flee during a crisis, the flow of new investments is likely to dry up As emerging markets become a larger share of the world economy, it is unsurprising that they are taking a bigger spoonful of the FDI pudding as well policymakers would do well to remember that FDI is a liability that, one way or another, has to be repaid. FDI can be a helpful tool, but it is not a foundation on which an economy can unquestioningly rely | null | This should be particularly concerning for deficit countries like Brazil and Turkey that have been relying on FDI to finance their current accounts. In Latin America, the income generated and repatriated from the existing stock of FDI has become almost as large as new FDI inflows, meaning that multinational corporations will no longer balance a current account deficit. Indeed, though existing FDI is less likely to flee during a crisis, the flow of new investments is likely to dry up. In Turkey, for example, policymakers have always stressed that inward investment is a sign of confidence in the Turkish economy, with foreign companies wanting to use the crossroads between Europe and Asia as a production base for exports to the EU. Yet FDI to Turkey has dropped sharply since the financial crisis: UN data show it at $10.4bn as opposed to $28.9bn in 2007. And while the share of greenfield in the total last year was a healthy 92 per cent, it was much lower during the boom years of the 2000s when the current account deficit began to widen. In 2007 just 49 per cent of Turkey’s FDI was greenfield. As emerging markets become a larger share of the world economy, it is unsurprising that they are taking a bigger spoonful of the FDI pudding as well. Yet as part of their preparations for the potential capital outflow as the US Federal Reserve continues to withdraw stimulus, policymakers would do well to remember that FDI is a liability that, one way or another, has to be repaid. FDI can be a helpful tool, but it is not a foundation on which an economy can unquestioningly rely. | 1,588 | <h4>FDI isn’t key and countries already are dealing with reductions because it’s being spread more evenly</h4><p><strong>Beattie 14</strong> Alan Beattie, Blogger for Financial Times, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/10/23/foreign-direct-investment-its-not-all-good/</p><p>This should be <u><strong>particularly concerning for deficit countries</u></strong> like Brazil and Turkey<u><strong> that have been relying on FDI to finance their current accounts</u></strong>. In Latin America, the income generated and repatriated from the existing stock of FDI has become almost as large as new FDI inflows, meaning that multinational corporations will no longer balance a current account deficit. Indeed, <u><strong>though existing FDI is less likely to flee during a crisis, the flow of new investments is likely to dry up</u></strong>. In Turkey, for example, policymakers have always stressed that inward investment is a sign of confidence in the Turkish economy, with foreign companies wanting to use the crossroads between Europe and Asia as a production base for exports to the EU. Yet FDI to Turkey has dropped sharply since the financial crisis: UN data show it at $10.4bn as opposed to $28.9bn in 2007. And while the share of greenfield in the total last year was a healthy 92 per cent, it was much lower during the boom years of the 2000s when the current account deficit began to widen. In 2007 just 49 per cent of Turkey’s FDI was greenfield. <u><strong>As emerging markets become a larger share of the world economy, it is unsurprising that they are taking a bigger spoonful of the FDI pudding as well</u></strong>. Yet as part of their preparations for the potential capital outflow as the US Federal Reserve continues to withdraw stimulus, <u><strong>policymakers would do well to remember that FDI is a liability that, one way or another, has to be repaid. FDI can be a helpful tool, but it is not a foundation on which an economy can unquestioningly rely</u></strong>.</p> | null | 2NC | AT: FDI DA | 430,397 | 1 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,750 | IP lobbies are incredibly strong---causes compliance | Basheer 10 | Shamnad Basheer 10, Ministry of HRD Professor in Intellectual Property Law, NUJS, Kolkata, India, 2010, “Turning TRIPS on It's Head: An IP 'Cross Retaliation' Model For Developing Countries,” The Law & Development Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 | the aim of this paper is to evolve a model that will help in securing compliance or a settlement Given that the IP lobbies in countries such as the US are powerful the likelihood of a settlement or compliance is very strong
a credible cross-retaliatory model will place the right kind of pressures on developed countries to comply as the IP lobbies in these countries are quite powerful | the aim is to evolve a model that will help in securing compliance Given that the IP lobbies in countries such as the US are powerful, the likelihood of a settlement or compliance is very strong
a credible cross-retaliatory model will place the right kind of pressures on developed countries to comply IP lobbies in these countries are quite powerful | This paper seeks to fill this lacuna by proposing a tiered suspension mechanism as a viable option. That the model lacks technical precision in terms of computing losses to IP owners accurately is not fatal since the current WTO framework only requires a broadly objective model that does not reek of arbitrariness. Further, the aim of this paper is to evolve a model that will help in securing compliance or a settlement. Given that the IP lobbies in countries such as the US and the EU are powerful, the likelihood of a settlement or compliance is very strong. Particularly, since the model advocates an automatic compulsory license after the offending measures have been removed. In other words, the likelihood of a country having to operationalize the IP suspension model is very remote. Any infirmities in the model ought to be evaluated, bearing this overarching assumption in the model. Further, the current WTO framework only requires that broad equivalence be achieved and not that the retaliating state compute the losses to suspended IP owners in a technically accurate manner.
Lastly, this paper highlights a paradox, albeit an obvious one. Crossretaliation is often positioned as an exception to traditional retaliation, which often involves a simple imposition of tariffs on imports. In most cases concerning developing countries, cross-retaliation is a more effective remedy than traditional retaliation. Not least because a credible cross-retaliatory model will place the right kind of pressures on developed countries to comply, as the IP lobbies in these countries are quite powerful. Also, at a conceptual level, prominent free trade scholars remain skeptical of the imposition of minimum standards through TRIPS and the linkage between TRIPS and the WTO. To these free trade scholars who view traditional retaliatory techniques are somewhat antithetical to the very purpose of the free trade agreements, cross-retaliation by suspending TRIPS obligations sits much better—and in fact, may be desirable to offset the negative impact of TRIPS. As noted earlier, the bargain between the developed and the developing countries could be viewed as a give and take-where the developed countries offered to open their markets to developing country goods such as textiles and agriculture and the developing countries promised to implement minimum standards in IP so that developed country entities could extract rents from these countries.194 Given the framework of this bargain, it is only fair that TRIPS obligations be suspended by developing countries, when developed countries fail to live up to their commitment to open up their markets.195 | 2,656 | <h4>IP lobbies are <u>incredibly</u> strong---causes compliance </h4><p>Shamnad <strong>Basheer 10</strong>, Ministry of HRD Professor in Intellectual Property Law, NUJS, Kolkata, India, 2010, “Turning TRIPS on It's Head: An IP 'Cross Retaliation' Model For Developing Countries,” The Law & Development Review, Vol. 3, No. 2</p><p>This paper seeks to fill this lacuna by proposing a tiered suspension mechanism as a viable option. That the model lacks technical precision in terms of computing losses to IP owners accurately is not fatal since the current WTO framework only requires a broadly objective model that does not reek of arbitrariness. Further, <u><strong><mark>the aim</mark> of this paper <mark>is to evolve a model that will help in</u></strong> <u><strong>securing compliance</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>or a settlement</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Given that the</u></strong> <u><strong>IP lobbies in countries such as the US</u></strong></mark> and the EU <u><strong><mark>are powerful</u></strong>, <u><strong>the likelihood of a settlement or compliance is very strong</u></strong></mark>. Particularly, since the model advocates an automatic compulsory license after the offending measures have been removed. In other words, the likelihood of a country having to operationalize the IP suspension model is very remote. Any infirmities in the model ought to be evaluated, bearing this overarching assumption in the model. Further, the current WTO framework only requires that broad equivalence be achieved and not that the retaliating state compute the losses to suspended IP owners in a technically accurate manner.</p><p>Lastly, this paper highlights a paradox, albeit an obvious one. Crossretaliation is often positioned as an exception to traditional retaliation, which often involves a simple imposition of tariffs on imports. In most cases concerning developing countries, cross-retaliation is a more effective remedy than traditional retaliation. Not least because <u><strong><mark>a credible cross-retaliatory model will</u></strong> <u><strong>place the right kind of pressures on developed countries to comply</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>as the <mark>IP lobbies in these countries are</u></strong> <u><strong>quite powerful</u></strong></mark>. Also, at a conceptual level, prominent free trade scholars remain skeptical of the imposition of minimum standards through TRIPS and the linkage between TRIPS and the WTO. To these free trade scholars who view traditional retaliatory techniques are somewhat antithetical to the very purpose of the free trade agreements, cross-retaliation by suspending TRIPS obligations sits much better—and in fact, may be desirable to offset the negative impact of TRIPS. As noted earlier, the bargain between the developed and the developing countries could be viewed as a give and take-where the developed countries offered to open their markets to developing country goods such as textiles and agriculture and the developing countries promised to implement minimum standards in IP so that developed country entities could extract rents from these countries.194 Given the framework of this bargain, it is only fair that TRIPS obligations be suspended by developing countries, when developed countries fail to live up to their commitment to open up their markets.195</p> | null | 2NC | Causes Compliance---2NC | 430,400 | 8 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,751 | Even if it doesn’t cause outright compliance, cross-retaliation creates effective pressure for settlement, which solves the impact to the case | Hamann 9 | Georgia Hamann 9, J.D. Candidate 2009, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009, “NOTE: REPLACING SLINGSHOTS WITH SWORDS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANTIGUA-GAMBLING 22.6 PANEL REPORT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 993 | A foreseeable effect of TRIPS suspension as a remedy will inevitably be a marked increase in developed countries' incentives to enter settlement negotiations with developing countries
The pressure to settle must fulfill the underlying goals of the WTO increased pressure to settle does fulfill those goals the actual number of TRIPS violations could be relatively small balancing some of the arguments against permitting TRIPS to be suspended. the number of actual TRIPS suspensions could be minute
international economic law faces the serious challenge of securing compliance from economies too large to feel much pain from noncompliance If the WTO credibly endorses a damaging, asymmetrical remedy for small countries the mere presence of that remedy could have a balancing effect as the conduct and policies of large nations transform to avoid confrontation with smaller economies | A effect of TRIPS suspension will inevitably be a increase in developed countries' incentives to enter settlement negotiations with developing countries
pressure to settle must fulfill the goals of the WTO increased pressure to settle does fulfill those goals the actual number of violations could be small the number of actual suspensions could be minute
international law faces the challenge of compliance from economies too large to feel pain If the WTO credibly endorses a damaging, asymmetrical remedy for small countries the presence of that remedy could have a balancing effect as policies of large nations transform to avoid confrontation | Discussion of TRIPS suspension must also include consideration of pressure to settle through private negotiation. A foreseeable effect of TRIPS suspension as a remedy will inevitably be a marked increase in developed countries' incentives to enter settlement negotiations with developing countries. n198
The pressure to settle necessarily implicates the legitimacy of the remedy. While settlement may reduce some of the practical difficulties of TRIPS retaliation to hypotheticals, pressure to settle also means that blackmail and coercion could potentially undermine the legitimacy of the remedy. While TRIPS suspension is intentionally asymmetrical because it empowers weaker economies through direct means, the trading system cannot overcompensate for developing countries by granting a license to steal.
The pressure to settle must fulfill the underlying goals of the WTO in order to be a legitimate goal of WTO dispute resolution. In many ways, increased pressure to settle does fulfill those goals. As a result, the actual number of TRIPS violations could be relatively [*1021] small, potentially balancing some of the arguments against permitting TRIPS to be suspended. Just as the actual number of trade retaliations has been small relative to the number of cases brought to the WTO, n199 the number of actual TRIPS suspensions could be minute.
As with any trade system, the WTO prefers that countries avoid the violation of rights in the first place. However, international economic law faces the serious challenge of securing compliance from economies too large to feel much pain from noncompliance. n200 If the WTO credibly endorses a damaging, asymmetrical remedy for small countries, the mere presence of that remedy could have a balancing effect as the conduct and policies of large nations transform to avoid confrontation with smaller economies. | 1,863 | <h4>Even if it doesn’t cause <u>outright compliance</u>, cross-retaliation creates <u>effective pressure for settlement</u>, which solves the <u>impact</u> to the case </h4><p>Georgia <strong>Hamann 9</strong>, J.D. Candidate 2009, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009, “NOTE: REPLACING SLINGSHOTS WITH SWORDS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANTIGUA-GAMBLING 22.6 PANEL REPORT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 993 </p><p>Discussion of TRIPS suspension must also include consideration of pressure to settle through private negotiation. <u><strong><mark>A</mark> foreseeable <mark>effect of TRIPS suspension</mark> as a remedy <mark>will</u></strong> <u><strong>inevitably be a</mark> marked <mark>increase in developed countries' incentives to enter settlement negotiations</u></strong> <u><strong>with developing countries</u></strong></mark>. n198</p><p>The pressure to settle necessarily implicates the legitimacy of the remedy. While settlement may reduce some of the practical difficulties of TRIPS retaliation to hypotheticals, pressure to settle also means that blackmail and coercion could potentially undermine the legitimacy of the remedy. While TRIPS suspension is intentionally asymmetrical because it empowers weaker economies through direct means, the trading system cannot overcompensate for developing countries by granting a license to steal.</p><p><u><strong>The <mark>pressure to settle must fulfill the</mark> underlying <mark>goals of the WTO</u></strong></mark> in order to be a legitimate goal of WTO dispute resolution. In many ways, <u><strong><mark>increased pressure to settle does fulfill those goals</u></strong></mark>. As a result, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong> <u><strong>actual</u></strong> <u><strong>number of</mark> TRIPS <mark>violations could be</mark> relatively</u></strong> [*1021] <u><strong><mark>small</u></strong></mark>, potentially <u><strong>balancing some of the arguments against permitting TRIPS to be suspended.</u></strong> Just as the actual number of trade retaliations has been small relative to the number of cases brought to the WTO, n199 <u><strong><mark>the number of actual</mark> TRIPS <mark>suspensions could be minute</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>As with any trade system, the WTO prefers that countries avoid the violation of rights in the first place. However, <u><strong><mark>international</mark> economic <mark>law faces the</mark> serious <mark>challenge of</mark> securing <mark>compliance from economies too large to feel</mark> much <mark>pain</mark> from noncompliance</u></strong>. n200 <u><strong><mark>If the WTO credibly endorses a damaging, asymmetrical remedy for small countries</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>mere <mark>presence of that remedy</u></strong> <u><strong>could have a balancing effect as</mark> the conduct and <mark>policies of large nations transform to avoid confrontation</mark> with smaller economies</u></strong>.</p> | null | 2NC | Causes Compliance---2NC | 430,401 | 2 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,752 | Establishing a successful cross-retaliation model is key to overall trade---several warrants: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Establishing a <u>successful</u> cross-retaliation model is <u>key to overall trade</u>---several warrants: </h4> | null | 2NC | Turns Trade---2NC | 430,398 | 1 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,753 | 1) Benefits for LDCs: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u>1) Benefits for LDCs</u>: </h4> | null | 2NC | Turns Trade---2NC | 430,399 | 1 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,754 | a) It’s the only thing that sets a precedent and gives large economies an incentive to comply with rulings against them---otherwise powerful states will always give the WTO the finger which crushes cred---try or die neg | Danish 13 | Danish 13, Fourth Year, B.A. LL.B.(H) National University of Advanced Legal Studies, India, October 2013, “WTO Dispute Resolution and Cross Retaliation under Trips: Is it Sanctioned Piracy of Intellectual Property? A Case Study of the US - Gambling (Antigua) Case,” Westminster Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, http://www.westminsterlawreview.org/wlr16.php | One of the major drawbacks of the entire WTO Dispute Settlement is the lack of authority to impose punitive sanctions Without the threat of sanctions being imposed most errant countries tend to simply ignore its recommendations or make facile changes The question of effective enforcement of DSB rulings is a definite lacuna in the otherwise well functioning dispute settlement mechanism It is therefore suggested the WTO should create a system which would allow the imposition of sanctions on behalf of the complainant
The Cross-Retaliation Model has induced a greater degree of compliance
As of today, cross retaliation under TRIPs is the best remedy available to small economies against developed nations, especially given that many such countries are highly dependent on the upholding of their intellectual property rights The rights of the lesser developed nations have to be respected if the WTO intends to remain relevant as a “forum for negotiating agreements aimed at reducing obstacles to international trade and ensuring a level playing field for all This will only be achieved if the WTO disproves the conventional wisdom that the dispute settlement mechanism is “a waste of time and money for developing countries to invoke the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures against industrialised countries | the major drawback of WTO Dispute Settlement is the lack of authority to impose sanctions Without sanctions errant countries ignore its recommendations enforcement is a lacuna in the otherwise well functioning mechanism the WTO should allow imposition of sanctions
Cross-Retaliation has induced greater compliance
cross retaliation is the best remedy available to small economies such countries are highly dependent on their i p r rights of lesser developed nations have to be respected if the WTO intends to remain relevant This will only be achieved if the WTO disproves conventional wisdom that the dispute mechanism is “a waste for developing countries | One of the major drawbacks of the entire WTO Dispute Settlement is the lack of authority to impose punitive sanctions such as those possessed by the UN Security Council. In this regard, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding is more diplomatic in its approach than judicial. While mutually acceptable solutions are always preferable to adjudicatory procedures, the lack of punitive options in the latter renders the point moot. Without the threat of sanctions being imposed on a global scale, most errant countries tend to simply ignore its recommendations or make facile changes, especially when they are developed economies. Most cases that come to the WTO take a long time to be resolved through its arbitrative approach and by the time the resolution comes about, severe harm might have already been committed to the economy of the complaining nations, especially if it is a developing or a least – developed nation. The question of effective enforcement of DSB rulings is a definite lacuna in the otherwise well functioning dispute settlement mechanism. It is therefore suggested that in cases where the defendant does not comply with the recommendations of the DSB, and the complainant does not have the economic muscle to impose traditional trade sanctions without harming its own interests, then the WTO should create a system which would allow the imposition of sanctions on behalf of the complainant at a global or near – global level.
The Cross-Retaliation Model under Article 22 has induced a greater degree of compliance, especially when the retaliation is sought under the TRIPs Agreement. However, this remedy is not foolproof and has its own peculiar predicaments. The length of the dispute and its resolution are formidable obstacles that a complaining country must contend with. While the extended delay might assure a large payout at the time of resolution, the economic harm being caused in the meanwhile still has to be suffered by the complainant. The DSU procedures do not have any provisional measures (interim relief) for successful complainants. This is a serious drawback that can be best addressed by the creation of a consolidated fund where the non compliant nation must deposit the amount due. Considering past precedent, it is highly probable that many countries would settle with the complainants than have to pay the amount and go through more legal costs.
Secondly, the non tangible costs that a complainant has to bear for fighting such disputes should be added to the compensation due to them. Especially in cases such as US – Gambling, where Antigua has to put up with the slander of being called pirates, there should be some kind of relief provided to them by the WTO. This would ensure better standards of decorum from the disputing parties and prevent a media circus of unsubstantiated allegations. While it seems that the view of infringement as theft is largely concentrated in the US, the application of labels such as pirates is a vicious offensive by any defaulting nation. It is therefore, in the interest of all WTO Members that such acts have the harshest penalties and sanctions imposed upon the nation falsely insinuating such charges.
As of today, cross retaliation under TRIPs is the best remedy available to small economies against developed nations, especially given that many such countries are highly dependent on the upholding of their intellectual property rights for revenue purposes. The denigration of this remedy as piracy of intellectual property is an affront to the entire system of DSU and should be punished with international trade sanctions. However, suspension of obligations under TRIPs is a last resort solution, with wide ramifications, and care should be taken to use it as sparingly as possible. The rights of the lesser developed nations have to be respected if the WTO intends to remain relevant as a “forum for negotiating agreements aimed at reducing obstacles to international trade and ensuring a level playing field for all, thus contributing to economic growth and development.”79 This will only be achieved if the WTO disproves the conventional wisdom that the dispute settlement mechanism is “a waste of time and money for developing countries to invoke the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures against industrialised countries.”80 | 4,319 | <h4>a) It’s the only thing that <u>sets a precedent</u> and gives <u>large economies</u> an <u>incentive</u> to comply with rulings against them---otherwise powerful states will <u>always</u> give the WTO the finger which crushes cred---<u>try or die</u> neg </h4><p><strong>Danish 13</strong>, Fourth Year, B.A. LL.B.(H) National University of Advanced Legal Studies, India, October 2013, “WTO Dispute Resolution and Cross Retaliation under Trips: Is it Sanctioned Piracy of Intellectual Property? A Case Study of the US - Gambling (Antigua) Case,” Westminster Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, http://www.westminsterlawreview.org/wlr16.php</p><p><u><strong>One of <mark>the</u></strong> <u><strong>major drawback</mark>s <mark>of</mark> the entire <mark>WTO Dispute Settlement</u></strong> <u><strong>is the lack of authority to impose</mark> punitive <mark>sanctions</u></strong></mark> such as those possessed by the UN Security Council. In this regard, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding is more diplomatic in its approach than judicial. While mutually acceptable solutions are always preferable to adjudicatory procedures, the lack of punitive options in the latter renders the point moot. <u><strong><mark>Without</mark> the threat of <mark>sanctions</mark> being imposed</u></strong> on a global scale, <u><strong>most <mark>errant countries</mark> tend to simply <mark>ignore its recommendations</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>or make facile changes</u></strong>, especially when they are developed economies. Most cases that come to the WTO take a long time to be resolved through its arbitrative approach and by the time the resolution comes about, severe harm might have already been committed to the economy of the complaining nations, especially if it is a developing or a least – developed nation. <u><strong>The question of effective <mark>enforcement </mark>of DSB rulings <mark>is a</mark> definite <mark>lacuna in the otherwise well functioning</mark> dispute settlement <mark>mechanism</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>It is therefore suggested</u></strong> that in cases where the defendant does not comply with the recommendations of the DSB, and the complainant does not have the economic muscle to impose traditional trade sanctions without harming its own interests, then <u><strong><mark>the WTO should</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>create a system which would <mark>allow</mark> the <mark>imposition of sanctions</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>on behalf of the complainant</u></strong> at a global or near – global level. </p><p><u><strong>The <mark>Cross-Retaliation</mark> Model</u></strong> under Article 22 <u><strong><mark>has induced</mark> a <mark>greater</mark> degree of <mark>compliance</u></strong></mark>, especially when the retaliation is sought under the TRIPs Agreement. However, this remedy is not foolproof and has its own peculiar predicaments. The length of the dispute and its resolution are formidable obstacles that a complaining country must contend with. While the extended delay might assure a large payout at the time of resolution, the economic harm being caused in the meanwhile still has to be suffered by the complainant. The DSU procedures do not have any provisional measures (interim relief) for successful complainants. This is a serious drawback that can be best addressed by the creation of a consolidated fund where the non compliant nation must deposit the amount due. Considering past precedent, it is highly probable that many countries would settle with the complainants than have to pay the amount and go through more legal costs. </p><p>Secondly, the non tangible costs that a complainant has to bear for fighting such disputes should be added to the compensation due to them. Especially in cases such as US – Gambling, where Antigua has to put up with the slander of being called pirates, there should be some kind of relief provided to them by the WTO. This would ensure better standards of decorum from the disputing parties and prevent a media circus of unsubstantiated allegations. While it seems that the view of infringement as theft is largely concentrated in the US, the application of labels such as pirates is a vicious offensive by any defaulting nation. It is therefore, in the interest of all WTO Members that such acts have the harshest penalties and sanctions imposed upon the nation falsely insinuating such charges. </p><p><u><strong>As of today, <mark>cross retaliation</mark> under TRIPs <mark>is the</u></strong> <u><strong>best remedy available to small economies</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>against developed nations, especially given that many <mark>such countries are highly dependent on</mark> the upholding of <mark>their i</mark>ntellectual <mark>p</mark>roperty <mark>r</mark>ights</u></strong> for revenue purposes. The denigration of this remedy as piracy of intellectual property is an affront to the entire system of DSU and should be punished with international trade sanctions. However, suspension of obligations under TRIPs is a last resort solution, with wide ramifications, and care should be taken to use it as sparingly as possible. <u><strong>The <mark>rights of</mark> the <mark>lesser developed nations have to be respected</u></strong> <u><strong>if the WTO intends to remain relevant</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>as a “forum for negotiating agreements aimed at reducing obstacles to international trade and ensuring a level playing field for all</u></strong>, thus contributing to economic growth and development.”79 <u><strong><mark>This will</u></strong> <u><strong>only be achieved</u></strong> <u><strong>if the WTO disproves</mark> the <mark>conventional wisdom that the dispute</mark> settlement <mark>mechanism is “a waste</mark> of time and money <mark>for developing countries</mark> to invoke the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures against industrialised countries</u></strong>.”80</p> | null | 2NC | Turns Trade---2NC | 430,403 | 5 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,755 | c) Antigua’s perception of fairness is determined by success or failure in actually implementing cross-retaliation | Basheer 10 | Shamnad Basheer 10, Ministry of HRD Professor in Intellectual Property Law, NUJS, Kolkata, India, 2010, “Turning TRIPS on It's Head: An IP 'Cross Retaliation' Model For Developing Countries,” The Law & Development Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 | The US-Antigua Gambling case is seen as a test of whether the global trade body's dispute settlement system is equitable and fair Such “fairness” will depend on how successful Antigua is with its threat to implement the cross retaliation authorization
there is considerable uncertainty regarding how this concept will be operationalized and implemented Developing countries urgently need to work out an optimal model that helps assess losses to the foreign IP owner in a reasonably objective way | The Gambling case is a test of whether the global trade system is equitable and fair. Such “fairness” will depend on how successful Antigua is to implement the cross retaliation authorization
there is uncertainty regarding how this concept will be implemented Developing countries urgently need an optimal model | The US-Antigua Gambling case, which has pitted one of the WTO’s tiniest economies against its biggest, is seen as a test of whether the global trade body's dispute settlement system is equitable and fair. Such “fairness” will depend in some part, on how successful Antigua is with its threat to implement the cross retaliation authorization.
Whilst the notion of IP “cross-retaliation” has been doing the rounds for a while, there is considerable uncertainty regarding how this concept will be operationalized and implemented. Developing countries urgently need to work out an optimal model that helps assess losses to the foreign IP owner in a reasonably objective way—this way there is no time lost between the procuring of a favorable order from the WTO sanctioning cross-retaliation and the actual crossretaliation itself. The lack of a credible domestic model has no doubt caused Antigua’s threat of cross retaliation to be taken less seriously by the US. | 960 | <h4>c) <u>Antigua’s</u> perception of fairness is <u>determined</u> by success or failure in <u>actually implementing</u> cross-retaliation </h4><p>Shamnad <strong>Basheer 10</strong>, Ministry of HRD Professor in Intellectual Property Law, NUJS, Kolkata, India, 2010, “Turning TRIPS on It's Head: An IP 'Cross Retaliation' Model For Developing Countries,” The Law & Development Review, Vol. 3, No. 2</p><p><u><strong><mark>The</mark> US-Antigua <mark>Gambling case</u></strong></mark>, which has pitted one of the WTO’s tiniest economies against its biggest, <u><strong><mark>is</mark> seen as <mark>a</u></strong> <u><strong>test</u></strong> <u><strong>of whether the global trade</mark> body's dispute settlement <mark>system is</u></strong> <u><strong>equitable and fair</u></strong>. <u><strong>Such “fairness” will depend</u></strong></mark> in some part, <u><strong><mark>on</u></strong> <u><strong>how successful Antigua is</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>with its threat <mark>to implement the cross retaliation authorization</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Whilst the notion of IP “cross-retaliation” has been doing the rounds for a while, <u><strong><mark>there is</mark> considerable <mark>uncertainty regarding how this concept will be</mark> operationalized and <mark>implemented</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Developing countries urgently need</mark> to work out <mark>an optimal model</mark> that helps assess losses to the foreign IP owner in a reasonably objective way</u></strong>—this way there is no time lost between the procuring of a favorable order from the WTO sanctioning cross-retaliation and the actual crossretaliation itself. The lack of a credible domestic model has no doubt caused Antigua’s threat of cross retaliation to be taken less seriously by the US.</p> | null | 2NC | Turns Trade---2NC | 430,400 | 8 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,756 | 2) Benefits for large economies: | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u>2) Benefits for large economies</u>: </h4> | null | 2NC | Turns Trade---2NC | 430,402 | 1 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,757 | Only cross-retaliation enables powerful WTO members to choose to pay the costs of noncompliance in vital policy areas---removing that flexibility causes WTO collapse | Hamann 9 | Georgia Hamann 9, J.D. Candidate 2009, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009, “NOTE: REPLACING SLINGSHOTS WITH SWORDS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANTIGUA-GAMBLING 22.6 PANEL REPORT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 993 | the offending country should be empowered to accept the cost of non-compliance and continue to the violation Invoking the rationale of "induced compliance" could increase demands for ever-expanding penalties and upset the balance that exists between WTO institutional legitimacy and the national sovereignty of its members A country's ability to "efficiently breach" WTO obligations when domestic economic considerations demand such action is a key aspect of sovereignty If the WTO begins to place its own institutional demands above the interests of its member nations it risks a severe backlash and eventually its own destruction | the offending country should be empowered to accept cost of non-compliance and continue the violation induced compliance" could increase demands for ever-expanding penalties and upset the balance between WTO legitimacy and sovereignty of its members A country's ability to "efficiently breach WTO obligations when domestic considerations demand is a key aspect of sovereignty If the WTO begins to place its own demands above interests of its member s, it risks a severe backlash and its own destruction | Authorizing a remedy that guarantees, rather than encourages, settlement is a troubling example of severing proportionality considerations from discussions of remedy. n203 The WTO documents do not contemplate that remedies be structured with the goal of inducing compliance; instead, the language addressing suspensions of concessions is focused on proportionality and equality of the [*1022] remedy. n204 In theory, the offending country should be empowered to accept the cost of non-compliance and continue to the violation (analogous to the rationale underlying "efficient breach" in contract theory). n205 Invoking the rationale of "induced compliance" could potentially increase demands for ever-expanding penalties and upset the balance that exists between WTO institutional legitimacy and the national sovereignty of its members. n206 A country's ability to "efficiently breach" WTO obligations when domestic economic considerations demand such action is a key aspect of sovereignty. n207 If the WTO begins to place its own institutional demands above the interests of its member nations, it risks a severe backlash and eventually its own destruction. n208 | 1,165 | <h4><u>Only</u> cross-retaliation enables powerful WTO members to <u>choose to pay the costs of noncompliance</u> in vital policy areas---removing that flexibility <u>causes WTO collapse</h4><p></u>Georgia <strong>Hamann 9</strong>, J.D. Candidate 2009, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009, “NOTE: REPLACING SLINGSHOTS WITH SWORDS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANTIGUA-GAMBLING 22.6 PANEL REPORT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 993 </p><p>Authorizing a remedy that guarantees, rather than encourages, settlement is a troubling example of severing proportionality considerations from discussions of remedy. n203 The WTO documents do not contemplate that remedies be structured with the goal of inducing compliance; instead, the language addressing suspensions of concessions is focused on proportionality and equality of the [*1022] remedy. n204 In theory, <u><strong><mark>the offending country should be</u></strong> <u><strong>empowered to accept</mark> the <mark>cost of non-compliance and continue</mark> to <mark>the violation</u></strong></mark> (analogous to the rationale underlying "efficient breach" in contract theory). n205 <u><strong>Invoking the rationale of "<mark>induced compliance" could</u></strong></mark> potentially <u><strong><mark>increase demands for ever-expanding penalties</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>upset the balance</mark> that exists <mark>between WTO</mark> institutional <mark>legitimacy and</mark> the national <mark>sovereignty of its members</u></strong></mark>. n206 <u><strong><mark>A country's ability to "efficiently breach</mark>" <mark>WTO obligations when domestic</mark> economic <mark>considerations demand</mark> such action <mark>is a</u></strong> <u><strong>key aspect of sovereignty</u></strong></mark>. n207 <u><strong><mark>If the WTO begins to place its own</mark> institutional <mark>demands above</mark> the <mark>interests of its member</mark> nation<mark>s</u></strong>, <u><strong>it risks a severe backlash and</mark> eventually <mark>its own destruction</u></strong></mark>. n208</p> | null | 2NC | Turns Trade---2NC | 430,405 | 2 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,758 | a) Making cross-retaliation the first resort is vital to overall WTO legitimacy | Basheer 10 | Shamnad Basheer 10, Ministry of HRD Professor in Intellectual Property Law, NUJS, Kolkata, India, 2010, “Turning TRIPS on It's Head: An IP 'Cross Retaliation' Model For Developing Countries,” The Law & Development Review, Vol. 3, No. 2 | IP suspension could help countries such as Antigua
Such a model could be useful for a large number of developing countries such as India and Brazil, that find that despite WTO victories, economically powerful developed countries such as the US and EU fail to comply
cross-retaliation fits conceptually better within the world trading system and what it stands for To this extent it needs to be positioned as the primary retaliatory mechanism for developing countries and not just a secondary resort Since developing countries constitute the majority at the WTO, such a paradigmatic shift will go a long way towards preserving the “fairness” and legitimacy of the WTO | IP suspension could help Antigua
a model could be useful for developing countries that find despite WTO victories, economically powerful countries fail to comply
cross-retaliation fits better within the world trading system it needs to be positioned as the primary retaliatory mechanism for developing countries not just a secondary resort such a shift will go a long way towards preserving the “fairness” and legitimacy of the WTO | This paper therefore seeks to work out a detailed IP suspension model that could help countries such as Antigua. It proposes a “Tiered IP suspension model”, where certain kinds of IP are targeted first for suspension before others, depending on the ease of objectively ascertaining the value of IP and thereby the harm caused by the unauthorized use of such IP and/or the potential to induce compliance by the defaulting state. Illustratively, copyrights over sound recordings that have established rates for public performance are targeted first. If working with this tier of IP subject matter does not yield desired results, then the complaining state moves on to other IP where it is relatively more difficult to compute the loss caused to the IP owner (such as pharmaceutical patents) but which may prove a more powerful tool to induce compliance.
Such a model could be useful for a large number of developing countries such as India and Brazil, that often find that, despite WTO victories, economically powerful developed countries such as the US and EU fail to comply.7 Towards this end, this paper offers a very concrete “development” oriented international trade law remedy.
This paper will also demonstrate that cross-retaliation fits conceptually better within the world trading system and what it stands for. To this extent, it needs to be positioned as the primary retaliatory mechanism for developing countries and not just a secondary resort. Since developing countries constitute the majority at the WTO, such a paradigmatic shift will go a long way towards preserving the “fairness” and legitimacy of the WTO. | 1,625 | <h4>a) Making cross-retaliation <u>the first resort</u> is <u>vital</u> to <u>overall</u> WTO legitimacy </h4><p>Shamnad <strong>Basheer 10</strong>, Ministry of HRD Professor in Intellectual Property Law, NUJS, Kolkata, India, 2010, “Turning TRIPS on It's Head: An IP 'Cross Retaliation' Model For Developing Countries,” The Law & Development Review, Vol. 3, No. 2</p><p>This paper therefore seeks to work out a detailed <u><strong><mark>IP suspension</u></strong></mark> model that <u><strong><mark>could help</mark> countries such as <mark>Antigua</u></strong></mark>. It proposes a “Tiered IP suspension model”, where certain kinds of IP are targeted first for suspension before others, depending on the ease of objectively ascertaining the value of IP and thereby the harm caused by the unauthorized use of such IP and/or the potential to induce compliance by the defaulting state. Illustratively, copyrights over sound recordings that have established rates for public performance are targeted first. If working with this tier of IP subject matter does not yield desired results, then the complaining state moves on to other IP where it is relatively more difficult to compute the loss caused to the IP owner (such as pharmaceutical patents) but which may prove a more powerful tool to induce compliance.</p><p><u><strong>Such <mark>a model could be</u></strong> <u><strong>useful for</mark> a large number of <mark>developing countries</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>such as India and Brazil, <mark>that</u></strong></mark> often <u><strong><mark>find</mark> that</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>despite WTO victories,</u></strong> <u><strong>economically powerful</mark> developed <mark>countries</mark> such as the US and EU <mark>fail to comply</u></strong></mark>.7 Towards this end, this paper offers a very concrete “development” oriented international trade law remedy. </p><p>This paper will also demonstrate that <u><strong><mark>cross-retaliation fits</mark> conceptually <mark>better within the world trading system</mark> and what it stands for</u></strong>. <u><strong>To this extent</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>it needs to be positioned as the primary retaliatory mechanism for developing countries</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>not just a secondary resort</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Since developing countries constitute the majority at the WTO, <mark>such a</mark> paradigmatic <mark>shift will</u></strong> <u><strong>go a long way towards preserving the “fairness” and legitimacy of the WTO</u></strong></mark>.</p> | null | 2NC | Turns Trade---2NC | 430,406 | 4 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,759 | State legalization obviates federal legalization---the CP authorizes international access to every state’s market which means Antigua can legally enter the U.S. market in every type of gambling except sports betting, which the CP also prohibits domestically, rendering the ban non-discriminatory | Rose 13 | I. Nelson Rose 13, J.D. Harvard Law School, is a Full Professor with Tenure at Whittier Law School, Spring 2013, “ARTICLE: The DOJ Gives States a Gift,” UNLV Gaming Law Journal, 4 UNLV Gaming L.J. 1 | Since states are now free to legalize intrastate online poker, and even interstate and international there is not much reason to bother with a federal law the success of the gambling currently licensed or operated solely by states and tribes demonstrates that consistency is not essential.
control of gambling has always been left up to the states A federal law would not significantly change things
The reaction to the DOJ's announcement shows there never was much chance that Congress would carve out poker from the UIGEA
developments happen so fast, that it won't take four decades before Internet gambling is legal in almost every state. While Congress continues to do nothing Internet gambling is about to explode across the nation, made legal under state laws | Since states are now free to legalize interstate and international, there is not much reason to bother with federal law consistency is not essential
control of gambling has always been left up to the states
it won't take decades before Internet gambling is legal in every state While Congress continues to do nothing Internet gambling is about to explode made legal under state laws | But the reality is that Congressional advocates, like Barney Frank (D.-Mass.) and Joe Barton (R.-Tx.), have had some of the wind knocked out of their sails. Since states are now free to legalize intrastate online poker, and even interstate and international, there is not much reason to bother with a federal law. It might be a good idea to have one unified law. On the other hand, the success of the gambling currently licensed or operated solely by states and tribes demonstrates that consistency is not essential. Only the major operators, like Caesars Entertainment, need an overriding federal law, because they do not want to be competing with politically connected local gaming companies for limited numbers of licenses in 50 states.
The control of gambling has always been left up to the states. A federal law would not significantly change things. Every proposed federal restriction on Internet gambling allows states to opt in or out. Even the UIGEA is only an enforcement act, requiring that the gambling be illegal under some other federal or state statute.
The reaction to the DOJ's announcement shows that there never was much chance that Congress would carve out poker from the UIGEA. News media and online gaming opponents, both anti-gambling activists and potential competitors, attacked the decision as creating great danger to compulsive gamblers. n60 The North American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries announced that there was now no need for federal legislation. n61 And, as I have pointed out - to the ire of some who have contributed money to politicians and lobbyists, hoping for a federal Internet gambling law - Congress has passed no new substantive [*10] laws, other than a change in patent laws, since the Republicans took over the House of Representatives in January 2011.
Opponents, like Jon Kyl and Frank Wolf (R.-VA), might get some leverage for their attempts to expand the Wire Act to cover all forms of gambling. However, there is as little chance of this, or any, Congress passing a new prohibition as there is of it passing a repeal of the UIGEA.
Internet years are like "dog years." In 1962, there were no legal state lotteries in the U.S. It took more than 45 years before almost all states made lotteries legal. Now, developments happen so fast, that it won't take four decades before Internet gambling is legal in almost every state. While Congress continues to do nothing, Internet gambling is about to explode across the nation, made legal under state laws. | 2,516 | <h4>State legalization <u>obviates</u> federal legalization---the CP authorizes <u>international access to every state’s market</u> which means <u>Antigua can legally enter the U.S. market</u> in every type of gambling except sports betting, which the CP <u>also</u> prohibits <u>domestically</u>, rendering the ban <u>non-discriminatory</u> </h4><p>I. Nelson <strong>Rose 13</strong>, J.D. Harvard Law School, is a Full Professor with Tenure at Whittier Law School, Spring 2013, “ARTICLE: The DOJ Gives States a Gift,” UNLV Gaming Law Journal, 4 UNLV Gaming L.J. 1</p><p>But the reality is that Congressional advocates, like Barney Frank (D.-Mass.) and Joe Barton (R.-Tx.), have had some of the wind knocked out of their sails. <u><strong><mark>Since states are now free to legalize</mark> intrastate online poker,</u></strong> <u><strong>and even <mark>interstate and international</u></strong>,</mark> <u><strong><mark>there is not much reason to bother with</mark> a <mark>federal law</u></strong></mark>. It might be a good idea to have one unified law. On the other hand, <u><strong>the success of the gambling currently licensed or operated solely by states and tribes demonstrates that</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>consistency is not essential</mark>.</u></strong> Only the major operators, like Caesars Entertainment, need an overriding federal law, because they do not want to be competing with politically connected local gaming companies for limited numbers of licenses in 50 states.</p><p>The <u><strong><mark>control of gambling has always been left up to the states</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>A federal law would not significantly change things</u></strong>. Every proposed federal restriction on Internet gambling allows states to opt in or out. Even the UIGEA is only an enforcement act, requiring that the gambling be illegal under some other federal or state statute.</p><p><u><strong>The reaction to the DOJ's announcement shows</u></strong> that <u><strong>there never was much chance that Congress would carve out poker from the UIGEA</u></strong>. News media and online gaming opponents, both anti-gambling activists and potential competitors, attacked the decision as creating great danger to compulsive gamblers. n60 The North American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries announced that there was now no need for federal legislation. n61 And, as I have pointed out - to the ire of some who have contributed money to politicians and lobbyists, hoping for a federal Internet gambling law - Congress has passed no new substantive [*10] laws, other than a change in patent laws, since the Republicans took over the House of Representatives in January 2011.</p><p>Opponents, like Jon Kyl and Frank Wolf (R.-VA), might get some leverage for their attempts to expand the Wire Act to cover all forms of gambling. However, there is as little chance of this, or any, Congress passing a new prohibition as there is of it passing a repeal of the UIGEA.</p><p>Internet years are like "dog years." In 1962, there were no legal state lotteries in the U.S. It took more than 45 years before almost all states made lotteries legal. Now, <u><strong>developments happen so fast, that <mark>it won't take</mark> four <mark>decades before Internet gambling is legal in</mark> almost <mark>every state</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>While Congress continues to do nothing</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>Internet gambling is about to explode</mark> across the nation, <mark>made legal under state laws</u></strong></mark>.</p> | null | 2NC | States Solvency---2NC | 430,407 | 55 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,760 | US internet freedom push is self-defeating | Morozov 11 | Morozov 11
Evgeny Morozov, visiting scholar in the Liberation Technology Program at Stanford University and a Scwhartz fellow at the New America Foundation, former Yahoo fellow at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University and a former fellow at the Open Society Institute, where he remains on the board of the Information Program, Contributing editor at Foreign Policy and the New Republic, Foreign Policy, January/February 2011, "Freedom.gov", http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/freedomgov?page=full | Clinton took the stage to tout
the Internet Freedom Agenda
A year later the Internet Freedom Agenda can boast of precious few real accomplishments it looks more and more like Bush's lower-tech "Freedom Agenda," his unrealized second-term push for democratization across the broader Middle East. Clinton's effort generated plenty of positive headlines But it's hard to say what they succeeded in doing
the State Department's enthusiasm for technology has surpassed its understanding of it
the Internet Freedom Agenda's woes extend far beyond a few botched projects The State Department's online democratizing efforts have fallen prey to the same problems that plagued Bush's Freedom Agenda By aligning themselves with Internet companies and organizations, Clinton's digital diplomats convinced enemies abroad Internet freedom is another Trojan horse for American imperialism
Clinton went wrong from the outset by violating the first rule of promoting Internet freedom Don't talk about promoting Internet freedom Her speech was full of analogies to the Berlin Wall and praise for Twitter revolutions vocabulary straight out of the Bush handbook To governments already nervous about a wired citizenry, this sounded less like freedom of the Internet than freedom via the Internet: not just a call for free speech but a bid to overthrow them by way of cyberspace
lessons of the first Freedom Agenda should have been instructive. After "color revolutions" swept Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan Bush openly bragged about his support for such groups Countries like Russia, which had previously been relatively blasé about such activism panicked blocking foreign funding to civil society groups The end result in many countries was a net loss for democracy and freedom
The Internet Freedom Agenda has similarly backfired The state of web freedom was far from perfect before Clinton's initiative Google, Facebook, and Twitter were hardly unabashed defenders of free speech, but they were nevertheless emissaries of a more open Internet. Authoritarian governments didn't treat them as a threat
But as the State Department forged closer ties with Silicon Valley, it vastly complicated the tech companies' inadvertent democracy promotion
Today, foreign governments see the writing on the virtual wall Democratic and authoritarian states alike are now seeking "information sovereignty" from American companies Internet search, social networking, and even email are increasingly seen as strategic industries to be protected from foreign control Even Turkey, a U.S. ally, has plans to provide a government-run email address to every Turkish citizen to lessen the population's dependence on U.S. providers
Where the bureaucrats and diplomats who touted the Internet Freedom Agenda went wrong was in thinking Washington could work with Silicon Valley without people thinking Silicon Valley was a tool of Washington
The idea the U.S. can advance the cause of Internet freedom by loudly affirming its commitment to it especially when it hypocritically attempts to shut down projects like WikiLeaks is delusional The best way to promote the goals behind the Internet Freedom Agenda may be not to have an agenda at all. | Clinton took the stage to tout
Internet Freedom
A year later the Agenda can boast of few accomplishments it looks like Bush's Freedom Agenda
the State Department's enthusiasm has surpassed its understanding
By aligning themselves with Internet companies Clinton's diplomats convinced enemies Internet freedom is another Trojan horse for imperialism.
Clinton went wrong violating the first rule of promoting Internet freedom: Don't talk about Internet freedom Her speech was full of analogies straight out of the Bush handbook. To governments this sounded like a bid to overthrow them
After color revolutions Bush bragged about his support Russia panicked blocking civil society groups The result was a net loss for freedom.
Internet Freedom has similarly backfired
as State forged closer ties with Silicon Valley, it complicated companies' democracy promotion
Democratic and authoritarian states are seeking "information sovereignty" from American companies
The idea the U.S. can advance Internet freedom by affirming its commitment especially when it hypocritically attempts to shut down WikiLeaks -- is delusional. | A year ago this January, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton took the stage at Washington's Newseum to tout an idea that her State Department had become very taken with: the Internet's ability to spread freedom and democracy. "We want to put these tools in the hands of people who will use them to advance democracy and human rights," she told the crowd, drawn from both the buttoned-up Beltway and chronically underdressed Silicon Valley.
Call it the Internet Freedom Agenda: the notion that technology can succeed in opening up the world where offline efforts have failed. That Barack Obama's administration would embrace such an idea was not surprising; the U.S. president was elected in part on the strength of his online organizing and fundraising juggernaut. The 2009 anti-government protests in Iran, Moldova, and China's Xinjiang region -- all abetted to varying degrees by communications technology -- further supported the notion that the Internet was, as Clinton said in her speech, "a critical tool for advancing democracy."
A year later, however, the Internet Freedom Agenda can boast of precious few real accomplishments; if anything, it looks more and more like George W. Bush's lower-tech "Freedom Agenda," his unrealized second-term push for democratization across the broader Middle East. Clinton's effort has certainly generated plenty of positive headlines and gimmicky online competitions, but not much else. In July, the New York Times Magazine lavished almost 5,000 words on a profile of Jared Cohen and Alec Ross, the State Department's digital-diplomacy wunderkinds. But it's hard to say what exactly they succeeded in doing, beyond getting in trouble for tweeting from Syria about how delicious the frappuccinos were. The only big move that the State Department did make was granting $1.5 million to Falun Gong-affiliated technologists based in the United States to help circumvent censorship -- a step that instead angered Falun Gong's numerous supporters in Washington, who had originally asked for $4 million.
Elsewhere, the State Department's enthusiasm for technology has surpassed its understanding of it. Early last year, in an effort to help Iranian dissidents, the U.S. government granted an export license to the company behind Haystack, a privacy-protecting and censorship-circumventing technology then being touted in the media as a revolutionary tool for Internet freedom. But Haystack proved to be poorly designed and massively insecure in its early tests in Iran, putting its users -- the democracy advocates it was supposed to protect -- in even greater danger. It was summarily shut down in September. Since October 2009, the State Department has been working to launch an anonymous SMS tip line to help law-abiding Mexicans share information about drug cartels. Like Haystack, it attracted plenty of laudatory coverage, but it succumbed to (still ongoing) delays when it ran into a predictable problem: Ensuring the anonymity of text messages is not easy anywhere, let alone when dealing with Ciudad Juárez's corrupt police force.
But the Internet Freedom Agenda's woes extend far beyond a few botched projects. The State Department's online democratizing efforts have fallen prey to the same problems that plagued Bush's Freedom Agenda. By aligning themselves with Internet companies and organizations, Clinton's digital diplomats have convinced their enemies abroad that Internet freedom is another Trojan horse for American imperialism.
Clinton went wrong from the outset by violating the first rule of promoting Internet freedom: Don't talk about promoting Internet freedom. Her Newseum speech was full of analogies to the Berlin Wall and praise for Twitter revolutions -- vocabulary straight out of the Bush handbook. To governments already nervous about a wired citizenry, this sounded less like freedom of the Internet than freedom via the Internet: not just a call for free speech online, but a bid to overthrow them by way of cyberspace.
The lessons of the first Freedom Agenda should have been instructive. After youth-movement-driven "color revolutions" swept Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan from 2003 to 2005, Bush openly bragged about his support for such groups and vowed to help the new pro-democracy wave go global. The backlash was immediate. Countries like Russia, which had previously been relatively blasé about such activism, panicked, blocking foreign funding to civil society groups and NGOs and creating their own pro-government youth movements and civil society organizations. The end result in many countries was a net loss for democracy and freedom.
The Internet Freedom Agenda has similarly backfired. The state of web freedom in countries like China, Iran, and Russia was far from perfect before Clinton's initiative, but at least it was an issue independent of those countries' fraught relations with the United States. Google, Facebook, and Twitter were hardly unabashed defenders of free speech, but they were nevertheless emissaries, however accidentally, of a more open and democratic vision of the Internet. Authoritarian governments didn't treat them as a threat, viewing them largely as places where their citizens chose to check their email, post status updates, and share pasta recipes. Most governments, China being the obvious exception, did not bother to build any barriers to them.
But as the State Department forged closer ties with Silicon Valley, it vastly complicated the tech companies' inadvertent democracy promotion. The department organized private dinners for Internet CEOs and shuttled them around the world as part of "technology delegations." Cohen, who recently left Foggy Bottom to work for Google, called Facebook "one of the most organic tools for democracy promotion the world has ever seen" and famously asked Twitter to delay planned maintenance work to keep the service up and running during Iran's 2009 Green Revolution.
Today, foreign governments see the writing on the virtual wall. Democratic and authoritarian states alike are now seeking "information sovereignty" from American companies, especially those perceived as being in bed with the U.S. government. Internet search, social networking, and even email are increasingly seen as strategic industries that need to be protected from foreign control. Russia is toying with spending $100 million to build a domestic alternative to Google. Iranian authorities are considering a similar idea after banning Gmail last February, and last summer launched their own Facebook clone called Velayatmadaran, named after followers of the velayaat, or supreme leader. Even Turkey, a U.S. ally, has plans to provide a government-run email address to every Turkish citizen to lessen the population's dependence on U.S. providers.
Where the bureaucrats and diplomats who touted the Internet Freedom Agenda went wrong was in thinking that Washington could work with Silicon Valley without people thinking that Silicon Valley was a tool of Washington. They bought into the technologists' view of the Internet as an unbridled, limitless space that connects people without regard to borders or physical constraints. At its best, that remains true, but not when governments get involved.
The Internet is far too valuable to become an agent of Washington's digital diplomats. The idea that the U.S. government can advance the cause of Internet freedom by loudly affirming its commitment to it -- especially when it hypocritically attempts to shut down projects like WikiLeaks -- is delusional. The best way to promote the goals behind the Internet Freedom Agenda may be not to have an agenda at all. | 7,648 | <h4><strong>US internet freedom push is self-defeating</h4><p>Morozov 11</p><p></strong>Evgeny Morozov, visiting scholar in the Liberation Technology Program at Stanford University and a Scwhartz fellow at the New America Foundation, former Yahoo fellow at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University and a former fellow at the Open Society Institute, where he remains on the board of the Information Program, Contributing editor at Foreign Policy and the New Republic, Foreign Policy, January/February 2011, "Freedom.gov", http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/freedomgov?page=full</p><p>A year ago this January, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary <u><mark>Clinton took the stage</u></mark> at Washington's Newseum <u><mark>to tout</u></mark> an idea that her State Department had become very taken with: the Internet's ability to spread freedom and democracy. "We want to put these tools in the hands of people who will use them to advance democracy and human rights," she told the crowd, drawn from both the buttoned-up Beltway and chronically underdressed Silicon Valley.</p><p>Call it <u>the <mark>Internet Freedom</mark> Agenda</u>: the notion that technology can succeed in opening up the world where offline efforts have failed. That Barack Obama's administration would embrace such an idea was not surprising; the U.S. president was elected in part on the strength of his online organizing and fundraising juggernaut. The 2009 anti-government protests in Iran, Moldova, and China's Xinjiang region -- all abetted to varying degrees by communications technology -- further supported the notion that the Internet was, as Clinton said in her speech, "a critical tool for advancing democracy."</p><p><u><mark>A year later</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>the</mark> Internet Freedom <mark>Agenda can</u> <u><strong>boast of</mark> precious <mark>few</mark> real <mark>accomplishments</u></strong></mark>; if anything, <u><mark>it looks</mark> more and more <mark>like</u></mark> George W. <u><mark>Bush's</mark> lower-tech "<mark>Freedom Agenda</mark>," his unrealized second-term push for democratization across the broader Middle East. Clinton's effort</u> has certainly <u>generated plenty of positive headlines</u> and gimmicky online competitions, but not much else. In July, the New York Times Magazine lavished almost 5,000 words on a profile of Jared Cohen and Alec Ross, the State Department's digital-diplomacy wunderkinds. <u><strong>But it's hard to say what</u></strong> exactly <u><strong>they succeeded in doing</u></strong>, beyond getting in trouble for tweeting from Syria about how delicious the frappuccinos were. The only big move that the State Department did make was granting $1.5 million to Falun Gong-affiliated technologists based in the United States to help circumvent censorship -- a step that instead angered Falun Gong's numerous supporters in Washington, who had originally asked for $4 million.</p><p>Elsewhere, <u><mark>the State Department's enthusiasm</mark> for technology</u> <u><strong><mark>has surpassed its understanding</mark> of it</u></strong>. Early last year, in an effort to help Iranian dissidents, the U.S. government granted an export license to the company behind Haystack, a privacy-protecting and censorship-circumventing technology then being touted in the media as a revolutionary tool for Internet freedom. But Haystack proved to be poorly designed and massively insecure in its early tests in Iran, putting its users -- the democracy advocates it was supposed to protect -- in even greater danger. It was summarily shut down in September. Since October 2009, the State Department has been working to launch an anonymous SMS tip line to help law-abiding Mexicans share information about drug cartels. Like Haystack, it attracted plenty of laudatory coverage, but it succumbed to (still ongoing) delays when it ran into a predictable problem: Ensuring the anonymity of text messages is not easy anywhere, let alone when dealing with Ciudad Juárez's corrupt police force.</p><p>But <u>the Internet Freedom Agenda's</u> <u><strong>woes extend far beyond a few botched projects</u></strong>. <u>The State Department's online democratizing efforts have fallen prey to the same problems that plagued Bush's Freedom Agenda</u>. <u><strong><mark>By aligning themselves with Internet companies</mark> and organizations, <mark>Clinton's</mark> digital <mark>diplomats</u></strong></mark> have <u><strong><mark>convinced</u></strong></mark> their <u><strong><mark>enemies</mark> abroad</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>Internet freedom is another Trojan horse for</mark> American <mark>imperialism</u></strong>.</p><p><u>Clinton</u> <u><strong>went wrong</mark> from the outset</u></strong> <u>by <mark>violating the first rule of promoting Internet freedom</u>: <u><strong>Don't talk</mark> <mark>about</mark> promoting <mark>Internet freedom</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Her</u></mark> Newseum <u><mark>speech was full of analogies</mark> to the Berlin Wall and praise for Twitter revolutions</u> -- <u><strong>vocabulary <mark>straight out of the Bush handbook</u></strong>. <u>To governments</mark> already nervous about a wired citizenry, <mark>this sounded</mark> less <mark>like</mark> freedom of the Internet than freedom via the Internet: not just a call for free speech</u> online, <u><strong>but <mark>a bid to overthrow them</mark> by way of cyberspace</u></strong>.</p><p>The <u>lessons of the first Freedom Agenda should have been instructive. <mark>After</u></mark> youth-movement-driven <u>"<mark>color revolutions</mark>" swept Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan</u> from 2003 to 2005, <u><mark>Bush</mark> openly <mark>bragged</mark> <mark>about his support</mark> for such groups</u> and vowed to help the new pro-democracy wave go global. The backlash was immediate. <u>Countries like <mark>Russia</mark>, which had previously been relatively blasé about such activism</u>, <u><strong><mark>panicked</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>blocking</mark> foreign funding to <mark>civil society groups</u></mark> and NGOs and creating their own pro-government youth movements and civil society organizations. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> end <mark>result</mark> in many countries <mark>was a net loss for</mark> democracy and <mark>freedom</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong></mark>The <mark>Internet Freedom</mark> Agenda <mark>has similarly backfired</u></strong></mark>. <u>The state of web freedom</u> in countries like China, Iran, and Russia <u>was far from perfect before Clinton's initiative</u>, but at least it was an issue independent of those countries' fraught relations with the United States. <u>Google, Facebook, and Twitter were hardly unabashed defenders of free speech, but they were nevertheless emissaries</u>, however accidentally, <u>of a more open</u> and democratic vision of the <u>Internet. Authoritarian governments didn't treat them as a threat</u>, viewing them largely as places where their citizens chose to check their email, post status updates, and share pasta recipes. Most governments, China being the obvious exception, did not bother to build any barriers to them.</p><p><u><strong>But <mark>as</mark> the <mark>State</mark> Department <mark>forged closer ties with Silicon Valley, it</mark> vastly <mark>complicated</mark> the tech <mark>companies'</mark> inadvertent <mark>democracy promotion</u></strong></mark>. The department organized private dinners for Internet CEOs and shuttled them around the world as part of "technology delegations." Cohen, who recently left Foggy Bottom to work for Google, called Facebook "one of the most organic tools for democracy promotion the world has ever seen" and famously asked Twitter to delay planned maintenance work to keep the service up and running during Iran's 2009 Green Revolution.</p><p><u><strong>Today, foreign governments see the writing on the virtual wall</u></strong>. <u><mark>Democratic and authoritarian states</mark> alike <mark>are</mark> now <mark>seeking "information sovereignty" from American companies</u></mark>, especially those perceived as being in bed with the U.S. government. <u>Internet search, social networking, and even email are increasingly seen as strategic industries</u> that need <u>to be protected from foreign control</u>. Russia is toying with spending $100 million to build a domestic alternative to Google. Iranian authorities are considering a similar idea after banning Gmail last February, and last summer launched their own Facebook clone called Velayatmadaran, named after followers of the velayaat, or supreme leader. <u>Even Turkey, a U.S. ally, has plans to provide a government-run email address to every Turkish citizen to lessen the population's dependence on U.S. providers</u>.</p><p><u>Where the bureaucrats and diplomats who touted the Internet Freedom Agenda went wrong was in thinking</u> that <u>Washington could work with Silicon Valley without people thinking</u> that <u>Silicon Valley was a tool of Washington</u>. They bought into the technologists' view of the Internet as an unbridled, limitless space that connects people without regard to borders or physical constraints. At its best, that remains true, but not when governments get involved.</p><p>The Internet is far too valuable to become an agent of Washington's digital diplomats. <u><mark>The idea</u></mark> that <u><mark>the U.S.</u></mark> government <u><mark>can advance</mark> the cause of <mark>Internet freedom by</mark> loudly <mark>affirming its commitment</mark> to it</u> -- <u><mark>especially when it hypocritically attempts to shut down</mark> projects like <mark>WikiLeaks</u> -- <u><strong>is delusional</u></strong>.</mark> <u>The best way to promote the goals behind the Internet Freedom Agenda</u> <u><strong>may be not to have an agenda at all.</p></u></strong> | null | 1NR | Internet | 201,571 | 3 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,761 | Compliance won’t change the WTO’s credibility | Meltzer 2011 | Meltzer, Fellow Global Economy and Development at Brookings, 2011 Joshua, “The Challenges to the World Trade Organization: It’s All About Legitimacy” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/4/19%20world%20trade%20organization%20meltzer/0419_world_trade_organization_meltzer.pdf | For the WTO to address challenges international policymakers must enhance the WTO's role in global economic governance However in order to do this, the WTO needs to be seen as legitimate. It is often argued that the WTO derives a sufficient level of legitimacy from the consent of its members there is a problem with relying on members' consent for legitimacy governments provided inadequate levels of consultation and transparency when formulating their negotiating positions during the Uruguay Round. Before countries consented there was limited opportunity for public comment and debate about the outcomes and implications Instead, public access to trade officials was restricted and the opportunity to follow the developments in the negotiations was made difficult by the secrecy of the process Pointing to members' consent as being sufficient to legitimate the WTO ignores the agency costs that arise between trade officials and the broader government Agency costs arise when national officials adopt a position in a trade round that might not meet the wishes of the country the negotiations may be so complex that officials do not fully understand the implications of the deal Specifically, the negotiations for the WTO's rules on i p were so complex that developing country negotiators often did not have the resources The complexity made it practically impossible for countries to assess whether the deal was ultimately the best for them The fact that the WTO cannot gain sufficient legitimacy from members' consent highlights whether the WTO's exercise of power is in fact legitimate | It is often argued that the WTO derives legitimacy from consent there is a problem governments provided inadequate levels of consultation and transparency when formulating positions Before countries consented there was limited opportunity for public comment and debate consent ignores the agency costs that arise between trade officials and the broader government when national officials adopt a position in a trade round that might not meet the wishes of the country the negotiations may be so complex that officials do not fully understand the implications complexity made it impossible for countries to assess whether the deal was ultimately best for them | The challenges in completing the Doha Round, the proliferation of FTAs, the growth of large developing coun- tries and the globalization of the world economy require creative thinking about how the international commu- nity can strengthen the WTO as the key international institution for managing global trade. In contrast to other forums and institutions like the G-20 and the IMF, the WTO is the only international organization focused on international trade with legally binding rules and the power to enforce them. For the WTO to address the challenges identified above, international policymakers must enhance the WTO's role in global economic governance. However in order to do this, the WTO needs to be seen as legitimate.9 It is often argued that the WTO derives a sufficient level of legitimacy from the consent of its members. However, there is a problem with relying on members' consent for legitimacy. For instance, governments provided inadequate levels of consultation and transparency when formulating their negotiating positions during the Uruguay Round. Before countries consented to the final agreements of the Uruguay Round, there was limited opportunity for public comment and debate about the outcomes and implications of the round. Instead, public access to trade officials was restricted and the opportunity to follow the developments in the negotiations was made difficult by the secrecy of the process.10 Pointing to members' consent as being sufficient to legitimate the WTO also ignores the agency costs that arise between trade officials and the broader government and legislative body. Agency costs arise when national officials adopt a position or accept an outcome in a trade round that might not meet the wishes of the country." This might happen in cases where career advancement of officials is tied to completing the trade round. In other cases, the negotiations may be so complex that officials do not fully understand the implications of the deal, as was the case in the Uruguay Round. Specifically, the negotiations for the WTO's rules on intellectual property were so complex that developing country negotiators often did not have the resources to assess what these rules would mean for their respective countries.11 The complexity of the deal and the difficulty of identifying the final trade-offs required to complete the Uruguay Round made it practically impossible for countries to assess whether the deal was ultimately the best for them.14 In many countries, national legislation had to be passed in order to implement the Uruguay Round, which provided a further opportunity for scrutiny. However, the complexity of the Uruguay Round texts made it par- ticularly difficult and time consuming for legislators to understand the implications. In the U.S., Congress was limited to an up or down vote on the issue. Therefore, unless a Congressional member was prepared to veto the Uruguay Round entirely, there was little incentive to spend resources scrutinizing the implications of the deal. The fact that the WTO cannot gain sufficient legitimacy from members' consent highlights whether the WTO's exercise of power is in fact legitimate. Indeed, legitimating such power could help address some of the defects in member consent. | 3,271 | <h4>Compliance won’t change the WTO’s credibility</h4><p><strong>Meltzer</strong>, Fellow Global Economy and Development at Brookings, <strong>2011</strong> Joshua, “The Challenges to the World Trade Organization: It’s All About Legitimacy” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/4/19%20world%20trade%20organization%20meltzer/0419_world_trade_organization_meltzer.pdf</p><p>The challenges in completing the Doha Round, the proliferation of FTAs, the growth of large developing coun- tries and the globalization of the world economy require creative thinking about how the international commu- nity can strengthen the WTO as the key international institution for managing global trade. In contrast to other forums and institutions like the G-20 and the IMF, the WTO is the only international organization focused on international trade with legally binding rules and the power to enforce them. <u>For the WTO to address</u> the <u>challenges</u> identified above, <u>international policymakers must enhance the WTO's role in global economic governance</u>. <u>However in order to do this, the WTO needs to be seen as legitimate.</u>9 <u><mark>It is often argued that the WTO derives</mark> a sufficient level of <mark>legitimacy from</mark> the <mark>consent</mark> of its members</u>. However, <u><strong><mark>there is a problem</mark> with relying on members' consent for legitimacy</u></strong>. For instance, <u><mark>governments provided <strong>inadequate levels of consultation and transparency</strong> when formulating</mark> their negotiating <mark>positions</mark> during the Uruguay Round. <mark>Before countries consented</u></mark> to the final agreements of the Uruguay Round, <u><mark>there was limited opportunity for public comment and debate</mark> about the outcomes and implications</u> of the round. <u>Instead, public access to trade officials was restricted</u> <u>and the opportunity to follow the developments in the negotiations was made difficult by the secrecy of the process</u>.10 <u>Pointing to members' <mark>consent</mark> as being sufficient to legitimate the WTO</u> also <u><strong><mark>ignores the agency costs that arise between trade officials and the broader government</u></strong></mark> and legislative body. <u>Agency costs arise <mark>when national officials adopt a position</u></mark> or accept an outcome <u><mark>in a trade round that might not meet the wishes of the country</u></mark>." This might happen in cases where career advancement of officials is tied to completing the trade round. In other cases, <u><mark>the negotiations may be so complex that officials do not fully understand the</mark> <mark>implications</mark> of the deal</u>, as was the case in the Uruguay Round. <u>Specifically, the negotiations for the WTO's rules on</u> <u><strong>i</u></strong>ntellectual <u><strong>p</u></strong>roperty <u>were so complex that developing country negotiators often did not have the resources</u> to assess what these rules would mean for their respective countries.11 <u>The <mark>complexity</u></mark> of the deal and the difficulty of identifying the final trade-offs required to complete the Uruguay Round <u><mark>made it</mark> practically <mark>impossible for countries to assess whether the deal was ultimately</mark> the <mark>best for them</u></mark>.14 In many countries, national legislation had to be passed in order to implement the Uruguay Round, which provided a further opportunity for scrutiny. However, the complexity of the Uruguay Round texts made it par- ticularly difficult and time consuming for legislators to understand the implications. In the U.S., Congress was limited to an up or down vote on the issue. Therefore, unless a Congressional member was prepared to veto the Uruguay Round entirely, there was little incentive to spend resources scrutinizing the implications of the deal. <u>The fact that the WTO cannot gain sufficient legitimacy from members' consent</u> <u><strong>highlights whether the WTO's exercise of power is in fact legitimate</u></strong>. Indeed, legitimating such power could help address some of the defects in member consent.</p> | null | 1NR | E-commerce | 430,408 | 18 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,762 | WTO collapse won’t cause protectionism – trade is self-enforcing | Ikenson, Associate Director at the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, 2009 | Ikenson, Associate Director at the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, 2009 (Daniel, March 12, “A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived” Center for Trade Policy Studies Free Trade Bulletin, No 37, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-037.html) | The WTO was created to deter a protectionist pandemic triggered by global economic contraction But in today's integrated global economy, those rules are not the only incentives to keep trade barriers in check. With the advent and proliferation of transnational supply chains, cross-border direct investment, multinational joint ventures, and equity tie-ups, the "Us versus Them" characterization of world commerce no longer applies Most WTO members are happy to lower tariffs because imports provide consumers with lower prices and greater variety, which incentivizes local business to improve quality and productivity, which is crucial to increasing living standards countries must maintain policies that create a stable business climate with limited administrative, logistical, and physical obstacles despite the occasional anti-trade rhetoric of the Democratic Congress and the protectionist-sounding campaign pledges of Obama, the United States is unlikely to alter its strong commitment to the global trading system. There is simply too much at stake the President has made it a priority to restore squandered U.S. credibility with the international community. That objective cannot be fulfilled by acting in a multilateral, internationalist manner on foreign policy, while acting in a provocative or unilateralist manner on trade policy because U.S. trade openness and engagement is the form of diplomacy that matters most the president will have to thwart the Congress's sometimes combative, unilateralist tendencies on trade policy if he hopes to restore U.S. foreign policy credibility retrogressive policies will be marginal, short-lived, and ultimately rejected we have the benefit of understanding the consequences of the actions taken in the 1930s we also have solid institutions and incentives to help steer policymakers away from the abyss. The rules governing more than 60 years of trade liberalization have fostered greater certainty and stability, and thus more investment, trade, and economic growth the commercial and political appeal of protectionism is considerably diminished because most countries have established domestic constituencies that depend on a trade and investment environment that is open in both directions | The WTO was created to deter protectionist contraction With the proliferation of supply chain the "Us versus Them" characterization no longer applies Most members lower tariffs because imports provide consumers with lower prices countries must maintain policies that create a stable business climate despite anti-trade rhetoric of the Democratic Congress the U S is unlikely to alter its strong commitment to the global trading system. There is much at stake we have the benefit of understanding the consequences of the actions taken in the 1930s we also have solid institutions to steer policymakers away from the abyss. The rules governing trade liberalization fostered greater certainty and stability the appeal of protectionism is diminished because most countries have established domestic constituencies that depend on a trade | A Growing Constituency for Freer Trade The WTO/GATT system was created in the first place to deter a protectionist pandemic triggered by global economic contraction. It was created to deal with the very situation that is at hand. But in today's integrated global economy, those rules are not the only incentives to keep trade barriers in check. With the advent and proliferation of transnational supply chains, cross-border direct investment, multinational joint ventures, and equity tie-ups, the "Us versus Them" characterization of world commerce no longer applies. Most WTO members are happy to lower tariffs because imports provide consumers with lower prices and greater variety, which incentivizes local business to improve quality and productivity, which is crucial to increasing living standards. Moreover, many local economies now rely upon access to imported raw materials, components, and capital equipment for their own value-added activities. To improve chances to attract investment and talent in a world where capital (physical, financial, and human) is increasingly mobile, countries must maintain policies that create a stable business climate with limited administrative, logistical, and physical obstacles. The experience of India is instructive. Prior to reforms beginning in the 1990s, India's economy was virtually closed. The average tariff rate on intermediate goods in 1985 was nearly 150 percent. By 1997 the rate had been reduced to 30 percent. As trade barriers were reduced, imports of intermediate goods more than doubled. The tariff reductions caused prices to fall and Indian industry suddenly had access to components and materials it could not import previously. That access enabled Indian manufacturers to cut costs and use the savings to invest in new product lines, which was a process that played a crucial role in the overall growth of the Indian economy.16 India's approach has been common in the developing world, where most comprehensive trade reforms during the past quarter century have been undertaken unilaterally, without any external pressure, because governments recognized that structural reforms were in their country's interest. According to the World Bank, between 1983 and 2003, developing countries reduced their weighted average tariffs by almost 21 percentage points (from 29.9 percent to 9.3 percent) and unilateral reforms accounted for 66 percent of those cuts.17 The Indispensible Nation The United States accounts for the highest percentage of world trade and has the world's largest economy. The WTO/GATT system is a U.S.-inspired and U.S.-shaped institution. Recession in the United States has triggered a cascade of economic contractions around the world, particularly in export-dependent economies. Needless to say, U.S. trade policy is closely and nervously observed in other countries. But despite the occasional anti-trade rhetoric of the Democratic Congress and the protectionist-sounding campaign pledges of President Obama, the United States is unlikely to alter its strong commitment to the global trading system. There is simply too much at stake. Like businesses in other countries, U.S. businesses have become increasingly reliant on transnational supply chains. Over 55 percent of U.S. import value in 2007 was of intermediate goods, which indicates that U.S. producers depend highly on imported materials, components, and capital equipment. And there is also the fact that 95 percent of the world's population lives outside of the United States, so an open trade policy is an example to uphold. Finally, the President has made it a priority to restore squandered U.S. credibility with the international community. That objective cannot be fulfilled by acting in a multilateral, internationalist manner on foreign policy, while acting in a provocative or unilateralist manner on trade policy because, for most countries, U.S. trade openness and engagement is the form of diplomacy that matters most. Accordingly, the president will have to thwart the Congress's sometimes combative, unilateralist tendencies on trade policy if he hopes to restore U.S. foreign policy credibility. Conclusion Despite the global economic contraction and the occasional protectionist indulgence, there is reason to be hopefulthat retrogressive policies will be marginal, short-lived, and ultimately rejected. The absence of trade rules in the 1930s meant that there were no proffered courses of action, no sources of adjudication or remediation, and no generally accepted limits to the actions governments could take in response to external economic policies. And there were far fewer domestic constituencies of any political consequence advocating against protectionism in the ‘30s. Consequently, there were no proven stopgaps to prevent the pandemic of spiraling protectionism that erupted and exacerbated the global recession. Today we have the benefit of understanding the consequences of the actions taken in the 1930s. Although that understanding does not guarantee avoidance of past mistakes, we also have solid institutions and incentives to help steer policymakers away from the abyss. The rules governing more than 60 years of trade liberalization have fostered greater certainty and stability, and thus more investment, trade, and economic growth. And today, the commercial and political appeal of protectionism is considerably diminished because most countries have established domestic constituencies that depend on a trade and investment environment that is open in both directions. | 5,564 | <h4>WTO collapse won’t cause protectionism – trade is self-enforcing</h4><p><strong>Ikenson, Associate Director at the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, 2009</strong> (Daniel, March 12, “A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived” Center for Trade Policy Studies Free Trade Bulletin, No 37, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/FTBs/FTB-037.html)</p><p>A Growing Constituency for Freer Trade <u><mark>The WTO</u></mark>/GATT system <u><mark>was created</u></mark> in the first place <u><mark>to deter</mark> a <mark>protectionist</mark> pandemic triggered by global economic <mark>contraction</u></mark>. It was created to deal with the very situation that is at hand. <u>But in today's integrated global economy, those rules are not the only incentives to keep trade barriers in check. <mark>With the</mark> advent and <mark>proliferation of</mark> transnational <mark>supply chain</mark>s, cross-border direct investment, multinational joint ventures, and equity tie-ups, <mark>the "Us versus Them" characterization</mark> of world commerce <mark>no longer applies</u></mark>. <u><mark>Most</mark> WTO <mark>members </mark>are happy to <mark>lower tariffs because imports provide consumers with lower prices</mark> and greater variety, which incentivizes local business to improve quality and productivity, which is crucial to increasing living standards</u>. Moreover, many local economies now rely upon access to imported raw materials, components, and capital equipment for their own value-added activities. To improve chances to attract investment and talent in a world where capital (physical, financial, and human) is increasingly mobile, <u><mark>countries must maintain policies that create a stable business climate</mark> with limited administrative, logistical, and physical obstacles</u>. The experience of India is instructive. Prior to reforms beginning in the 1990s, India's economy was virtually closed. The average tariff rate on intermediate goods in 1985 was nearly 150 percent. By 1997 the rate had been reduced to 30 percent. As trade barriers were reduced, imports of intermediate goods more than doubled. The tariff reductions caused prices to fall and Indian industry suddenly had access to components and materials it could not import previously. That access enabled Indian manufacturers to cut costs and use the savings to invest in new product lines, which was a process that played a crucial role in the overall growth of the Indian economy.16 India's approach has been common in the developing world, where most comprehensive trade reforms during the past quarter century have been undertaken unilaterally, without any external pressure, because governments recognized that structural reforms were in their country's interest. According to the World Bank, between 1983 and 2003, developing countries reduced their weighted average tariffs by almost 21 percentage points (from 29.9 percent to 9.3 percent) and unilateral reforms accounted for 66 percent of those cuts.17 The Indispensible Nation The United States accounts for the highest percentage of world trade and has the world's largest economy. The WTO/GATT system is a U.S.-inspired and U.S.-shaped institution. Recession in the United States has triggered a cascade of economic contractions around the world, particularly in export-dependent economies. Needless to say, U.S. trade policy is closely and nervously observed in other countries. But <u><mark>despite</mark> the occasional <mark>anti-trade rhetoric of the Democratic Congress</mark> and the protectionist-sounding campaign pledges of</u> President <u>Obama, <mark>the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>is unlikely to alter its strong commitment to the global trading system. There is</mark> simply too <mark>much at stake</u></mark>. Like businesses in other countries, U.S. businesses have become increasingly reliant on transnational supply chains. Over 55 percent of U.S. import value in 2007 was of intermediate goods, which indicates that U.S. producers depend highly on imported materials, components, and capital equipment. And there is also the fact that 95 percent of the world's population lives outside of the United States, so an open trade policy is an example to uphold. Finally, <u>the President has made it a priority to restore squandered U.S. credibility with the international community. That objective cannot be fulfilled by acting in a multilateral, internationalist manner on foreign policy, while acting in a provocative or unilateralist manner on trade policy because</u>, for most countries, <u>U.S. trade openness and engagement is the form of diplomacy that matters most</u>. Accordingly, <u>the president will have to thwart the Congress's sometimes combative, unilateralist tendencies on trade policy if he hopes to restore U.S. foreign policy credibility</u>. Conclusion Despite the global economic contraction and the occasional protectionist indulgence, there is reason to be hopefulthat <u>retrogressive policies will be marginal, short-lived, and ultimately rejected</u>. The absence of trade rules in the 1930s meant that there were no proffered courses of action, no sources of adjudication or remediation, and no generally accepted limits to the actions governments could take in response to external economic policies. And there were far fewer domestic constituencies of any political consequence advocating against protectionism in the ‘30s. Consequently, there were no proven stopgaps to prevent the pandemic of spiraling protectionism that erupted and exacerbated the global recession. Today <u><mark>we have the benefit of understanding the consequences of the actions taken in the 1930s</u></mark>. Although that understanding does not guarantee avoidance of past mistakes, <u><mark>we also have solid institutions</mark> and incentives <mark>to</mark> help <mark>steer policymakers away from the abyss. The rules governing</mark> more than 60 years of <mark>trade liberalization</mark> have <mark>fostered</mark> <mark>greater certainty and stability</mark>, and thus more investment, trade, and economic growth</u>. And today, <u><mark>the</mark> commercial and political <mark>appeal of protectionism is</mark> considerably <mark>diminished because most countries have established domestic constituencies that depend on a trade</mark> and investment environment that is open in both directions</u>. </p> | null | 1NR | E-commerce | 162,316 | 31 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,763 | China has no incentive to rise violently | White 13 | White 13 (Hugh, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 6/24/13, “The new security order,” http://epress.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/EAFQ-5.2-WEB-FINAL.pdf) | any rising power must inevitably aim to overturn the preexisting order many people fear that China too has these ambitions but this fear underestimates China’s immense stake in many aspects of the current order of which it has been by far the biggest beneficiary. it is very unlike the disruptive rising powers of the 20th century there is no evidence that China has territorial ambitions It has no political or ideological agendas, and no reason to change the economic order. China seems to want to change very little about the global or regional order and its ambitions seem limited to Asia | any rising power must overturn the preexisting order people fear China has these ambitions. but this underestimates China’s stake in the current order it is unlike rising powers of the 20th century there is no evidence China has territorial ambitions It has no political or ideological agendas, and no reason to change the economic order China ambitions seem limited to Asia. | The second view of China’s ambitions is that they are far-reaching. The examples of nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and stalinist Russia lead some to assume that any rising power must inevitably aim to overturn every aspect of the preexisting order—territorial, economic, political, ideological, even moral. many people fear that China too has these ambitions. but this fear underestimates China’s immense stake in many aspects of the current order of which it has been by far the biggest beneficiary. In this way, it is very unlike the disruptive rising powers of the 20th century—there is no evidence that China has territorial ambitions, notwithstanding its assertiveness in the south China sea. It has no political or ideological agendas, and no reason to change the economic order. In fact, China seems to want to change very little about the global or regional order except its own role in it, and even there its leadership ambitions seem primarily limited to Asia. | 968 | <h4>China has no incentive to rise violently </h4><p><strong>White 13</strong> (Hugh, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 6/24/13, “The new security order,” http://epress.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/EAFQ-5.2-WEB-FINAL.pdf)</p><p>The second view of China’s ambitions is that they are far-reaching. The examples of nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and stalinist Russia lead some to assume that <u><strong><mark>any rising power must</mark> inevitably aim to <mark>overturn</u></strong></mark> every aspect of <u><strong><mark>the preexisting order</u></strong></mark>—territorial, economic, political, ideological, even moral. <u><strong>many <mark>people fear</mark> that <mark>China</mark> too <mark>has these ambitions</u></strong>. <u><strong>but this</mark> fear <mark>underestimates China’s</mark> immense <mark>stake in</mark> many aspects of <mark>the current order</mark> of which it has been by far the biggest beneficiary.</u></strong> In this way, <u><strong><mark>it is</mark> very <mark>unlike</mark> the disruptive <mark>rising powers of the 20th century</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong><mark>there is no evidence</mark> that <mark>China has territorial ambitions</u></strong></mark>, notwithstanding its assertiveness in the south China sea. <u><strong><mark>It has no political</mark> <mark>or ideological agendas, and no reason to change the economic order</mark>.</u></strong> In fact, <u><strong><mark>China</mark> seems to want to change very little about the global or regional order</u></strong> except its own role in it, <u><strong>and</u></strong> even there <u><strong>its</u></strong> leadership <u><strong><mark>ambitions seem</u></strong></mark> primarily <u><strong><mark>limited to Asia</u></strong>.</p></mark> | null | 1NR | China | 430,409 | 12 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,764 | protectionism is inev but won’t escalate | Sally 11 | Rzeen Sally 11, Director of the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) in Brussels and on the faculty of the London School of Economics, THE CRISIS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, www.ecipe.org/media/publication_pdfs/the-crisis-and-the-global-economy-a-shifting-world-order.pdf | the WTO have been quick to claim credit for restraining traditional protectionism That does not ring altogether true. G20 pledges not to increase protectionism have been violated “every other day” by its members WTO disciplines have certainly not restrained most developing countries’ protectionism
The credit for restraining traditional protectionism should go in the first instance to markets and globalisation, and only in the second instance to multilateral trade rules Global market integration has imposed spontaneous disciplines on governments and businesses They realise that up-front protectionism raises business costs, invites retaliation, excludes them from the benefits of globalisation, and damages wealth and welfare at home. That applies particularly to global supply chains.
More worrisome is the non-traditional regulatory protectionism in the pipeline, especially on subsidies and standards, on which WTO disciplines are weak-to-non-existent Given the parlous state of WTO negotiations, it will be a long time before the WTO strengthens rules on subsidies, FDI, government procurement, cross-border movement of labour and standards – if it ever happens These measures are more opaque than border-based protection; governments and organised interests may well resort to them more frequently, not least to evade existing WTO disciplines | pledges not to increase protectionism have been violated “every other day” by members WTO disciplines have not restrained protectionism
credit for restraining protectionism should go first to markets and only second to multilateral trade market integration has imposed disciplines on governments and businesses They realise that protectionism raises business costs, invites retaliation, excludes them from globalisation, and damages welfare at home
More worrisome is non-traditional protectionism on subsidies on which WTO disciplines are non-existent FDI, government procurement labour These are more opaque governments may resort to them to WTO disciplines | Predictably, the WTO and G20 have been quick to claim credit for restraining traditional protectionism. That does not ring altogether true. G20 pledges not to increase protectionism have been violated “every other day” by its members.25 WTO disciplines may, at the margin, have restrained border protectionism by OECD members and newly-acceded members like China and Vietnam, given strong GATT disciplines on tariffs and other border barriers. But they have certainly not restrained most developing countries’ protectionism, even on tariffs. Most developing countries have high bound tariffs in the WTO, and they could quite legally raise applied tariffs much higher than they have done.
There is something else at work. The credit for restraining traditional protectionism should go in the first instance to markets and globalisation, and only in the second instance to multilateral trade rules, international policy coordination and assorted summitry in the G20 and other international fora. Global market integration has imposed spontaneous disciplines on governments and businesses. They realise that up-front protectionism raises business costs, invites retaliation, excludes them from the benefits of globalisation, and damages wealth and welfare at home. That applies particularly to global supply chains. Take manufacturing supply chains with production centred in east Asia. They suffered disproportionately from trade contraction in the first six months of the crisis. But protectionism did not increase in these sectors; and supply chains remained intact, ready for the upturn that followed.
More worrisome is the non-traditional regulatory protectionism in the pipeline, especially on subsidies and standards, on which WTO disciplines are weak-to-non-existent. These measures are not covered by the Doha agenda. Given the parlous state of WTO negotiations, it will be a long time before the WTO strengthens rules on subsidies, FDI, government procurement, cross-border movement of labour and standards – if it ever happens, that is. These measures are more opaque than border-based protection; governments and organised interests may well resort to them more frequently, not least to evade existing WTO disciplines. The danger is that, if not contained, they will spread gradually to cover bigger swathes of international trade. That is the 1970s scenario to worry about. | 2,383 | <h4>protectionism is inev but won’t escalate</h4><p>Rzeen <strong>Sally 11</strong>, Director of the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) in Brussels and on the faculty of the London School of Economics, THE CRISIS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, www.ecipe.org/media/publication_pdfs/the-crisis-and-the-global-economy-a-shifting-world-order.pdf</p><p>Predictably, <u><strong>the WTO</u></strong> and G20 <u><strong>have been quick to claim credit for restraining traditional protectionism</u></strong>. <u><strong>That does not ring altogether true.</u></strong> <u><strong>G20 <mark>pledges not to increase protectionism have been violated “every other day” by</mark> its <mark>members</u></strong></mark>.25 <u><strong><mark>WTO</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>disciplines</u></strong></mark> may, at the margin, have restrained border protectionism by OECD members and newly-acceded members like China and Vietnam, given strong GATT disciplines on tariffs and other border barriers. But they <u><strong><mark>have</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>certainly <mark>not restrained</mark> most developing countries’ <mark>protectionism</u></strong></mark>, even on tariffs. Most developing countries have high bound tariffs in the WTO, and they could quite legally raise applied tariffs much higher than they have done.</p><p>There is something else at work. <u><strong>The <mark>credit for restraining</mark> traditional <mark>protectionism</mark> <mark>should go</mark> in the <mark>first</mark> instance <mark>to markets</mark> and globalisation, <mark>and</mark> <mark>only</mark> in the <mark>second</mark> instance <mark>to multilateral trade</mark> rules</u></strong>, international policy coordination and assorted summitry in the G20 and other international fora. <u><strong>Global <mark>market integration</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>has imposed </mark>spontaneous <mark>disciplines on governments and businesses</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>They realise that</mark> up-front <mark>protectionism raises</mark> <mark>business costs, invites retaliation, excludes them from</mark> the benefits of <mark>globalisation, and damages</mark> wealth and <mark>welfare at home</mark>. That applies particularly to global supply chains. </u></strong>Take manufacturing supply chains with production centred in east Asia. They suffered disproportionately from trade contraction in the first six months of the crisis. But protectionism did not increase in these sectors; and supply chains remained intact, ready for the upturn that followed.</p><p><u><strong><mark>More worrisome is</mark> the <mark>non-traditional</mark> regulatory <mark>protectionism</mark> in the pipeline, especially <mark>on subsidies</mark> and standards, <mark>on which WTO</mark> <mark>disciplines are</mark> weak-to-<mark>non-existent</u></strong></mark>. These measures are not covered by the Doha agenda. <u><strong>Given the parlous state of WTO negotiations, it will be a long time before the WTO strengthens rules on subsidies, <mark>FDI, government procurement</mark>, cross-border movement of <mark>labour</mark> and standards – if it ever happens</u></strong>, that is. <u><strong><mark>These</mark> measures <mark>are more opaque</mark> than border-based protection; <mark>governments</mark> and organised interests <mark>may</mark> well <mark>resort</mark> <mark>to them</mark> more frequently, not least <mark>to</mark> evade existing <mark>WTO disciplines</u></strong></mark>. The danger is that, if not contained, they will spread gradually to cover bigger swathes of international trade. That is the 1970s scenario to worry about.</p> | null | 1NR | China | 430,410 | 5 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,765 | No impact to trade | Miller 14 | Miller 14 (Charles Miller, lecturer at ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, “Globalisation and war,” April 2014) http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/globalisation-and-war/ | Analysing trade and conflict data they found that trade flows do have a significant impact in reducing the chances of conflict, even when taking a variety of other factors into account their model failed to take three things into account it’s quite possible that peace causes trade rather than the other way around—no company wants to start an export business to another country if it anticipates that business linkages will be cut off by war further down the line. Second, conflict behaviour exhibits what’s called ‘network effects’— if France and Germany are at peace, chances are Belgium and Germany will be too. And third, both the likelihood of conflict and the level of trade are influenced by the number of years a pair of countries has already been at peace Take any of these factors into account, and studies have shown that the apparent relationship between trade flows and peace disappears. The statistical evidence certainly doesn’t tell us that globalisation has made war in impossible. | Analysing trade they found that trade flows reduc conflict their model failed to take three things into account it’s possible peace causes trade rather than the other way around no company wants to export if it anticipates war Second, conflict behaviour exhibits network effects’ if France and Germany are at peace, chances are Belgium and Germany will be too. And third both the likelihood of conflict and the level of trade are influenced by the number of years a pair of countries has been at peace Take any of these into account, and studies have shown the relationship between trade flows and peace disappears The statistical evidence certainly doesn’t tell us that globalisation has made war in impossible | John O’Neal and Bruce Russett’s work is perhaps the best known in this regard—and Steven Pinker cites them approvingly in his book The Better Angels of Our Nature. Analysing trade and conflict data from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries, they found that trade flows do have a significant impact in reducing the chances of conflict, even when taking a variety of other factors into account. But their conclusions have in turn been questioned by other scholars. For one thing, their model failed to take three things into account. First, it’s quite possible that peace causes trade rather than the other way around—no company wants to start an export business to another country if it anticipates that business linkages will be cut off by war further down the line. Second, conflict behaviour exhibits what’s called ‘network effects’— if France and Germany are at peace, chances are Belgium and Germany will be too. And third, both the likelihood of conflict and the level of trade are influenced by the number of years a pair of countries has already been at peace—because prolonged periods of peace increase mutual trust. Take any of these factors into account, and studies have shown (here and here) that the apparent relationship between trade flows and peace disappears. Perhaps, though, conceiving of globalisation solely in terms of trade flows is mistaken. Alternative indicators of globalisation include foreign direct investment, financial openness and the levels of government intervention in economic relations with the rest of the world. Data on those variables is less extensive than on trade flows, usually dating back only to the post World War II period. But some analysts, such as Patrick McDonald and Erik Gartzke, have argued that a significant correlation can be found between them and a reduction in the probability of conflict. Those findings, newer than O’Neal and Russett’s, haven’t yet been subjected to the same intense scrutiny, so may in turn be qualified by future research. What does all that mean for the policy-maker? The statistical evidence certainly doesn’t tell us that globalisation has made war in East Asia impossible. ‘Cromwell’s law’ counsels us that a logically conceivable event should never be assigned a probability of zero. The most we could conclude is that globalisation has made such an occurrence much less likely. There’s some hopeful numerical evidence that globalisation does indeed have that effect, but the evidence isn’t so compelling that we can substitute an economic engagement policy for a security policy. By all means, let’s continue to promote trade in the Asia-Pacific. But we should also continue to be prepared for scenarios which are unlikely but would be hugely damaging if they were to occur. | 2,771 | <h4>No impact to trade</h4><p><strong>Miller 14</strong> (Charles Miller, lecturer at ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, “Globalisation and war,” April 2014) http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/globalisation-and-war/</p><p>John O’Neal and Bruce Russett’s work is perhaps the best known in this regard—and Steven Pinker cites them approvingly in his book The Better Angels of Our Nature. <u><mark>Analysing trade </mark>and conflict data</u> from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries, <u><mark>they found that trade flows </mark>do have a significant impact in <mark>reduc</mark>ing the chances of <mark>conflict</mark>, even when taking a variety of other factors into account</u>. But their conclusions have in turn been questioned by other scholars. For one thing, <u><mark>their model failed to take three things into account</u></mark>. First, <u><mark>it’s </mark>quite <mark>possible </mark>that <strong><mark>peace causes trade rather than the other way around</strong></mark>—<mark>no company wants to </mark>start an <mark>export </mark>business to another country <mark>if it anticipates </mark>that business linkages will be cut off by <mark>war </mark>further down the line. <mark>Second, conflict behaviour exhibits </mark>what’s called ‘<mark>network effects’</mark>—<mark> if France and Germany are at peace, chances are Belgium and Germany will be too. And third</mark>, <mark>both the likelihood of conflict and the level of trade are influenced by the number of years a pair of countries has </mark>already <mark>been at peace</u></mark>—because prolonged periods of peace increase mutual trust. <u><mark>Take <strong>any of these </mark>factors</strong> <mark>into account, and studies have shown</u> </mark>(here and here) <u>that <mark>the </mark>apparent <strong><mark>relationship between trade flows and peace disappears</strong></mark>. </u>Perhaps, though, conceiving of globalisation solely in terms of trade flows is mistaken. Alternative indicators of globalisation include foreign direct investment, financial openness and the levels of government intervention in economic relations with the rest of the world. Data on those variables is less extensive than on trade flows, usually dating back only to the post World War II period. But some analysts, such as Patrick McDonald and Erik Gartzke, have argued that a significant correlation can be found between them and a reduction in the probability of conflict. Those findings, newer than O’Neal and Russett’s, haven’t yet been subjected to the same intense scrutiny, so may in turn be qualified by future research. What does all that mean for the policy-maker? <u><mark>The statistical evidence certainly doesn’t tell us that globalisation has made war in </u></mark>East Asia <u><mark>impossible</mark>. </u>‘Cromwell’s law’ counsels us that a logically conceivable event should never be assigned a probability of zero. The most we could conclude is that globalisation has made such an occurrence much less likely. There’s some hopeful numerical evidence that globalisation does indeed have that effect, but the evidence isn’t so compelling that we can substitute an economic engagement policy for a security policy. By all means, let’s continue to promote trade in the Asia-Pacific. But we should also continue to be prepared for scenarios which are unlikely but would be hugely damaging if they were to occur.</p> | null | 1NR | China | 49,700 | 154 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,766 | Disease can’t cause extinction – it’s genetically impossible | Posner 2005 | Richard Posner, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Chicago, judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, January 1, 2005, Skeptic, “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them,” http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html#abstract | the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease in the 200,000 years of existence is a source of genuine comfort There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past The reason is improvements in medical science. | the fact that Homo sapien has managed to survive every disease in 200,000 years is a source of genuine comfort There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as Black Death, smallpox, and AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the race Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality genes are more likely to be spread if germs do not kill their hosts too quickly | Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time. | 1,366 | <h4>Disease can’t cause extinction – it’s genetically impossible</h4><p>Richard <u><strong>Posner</strong>,</u> Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Chicago, judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, January 1, <u><strong>2005</u></strong>, Skeptic, “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them,” http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html#abstract</p><p>Yet <u><mark>the fact that Homo sapien</mark>s <mark>has managed to survive every disease</u></mark> to assail it <u><mark>in</mark> the <mark>200,000 years</u></mark> or so <u>of</u> its <u>existence <mark>is a source of genuine comfort</u></mark>, at least if the focus is on extinction events. <u><mark>There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as</mark> the <mark>Black Death, smallpox, and</u></mark> now <u><mark>AIDS, but none</mark> <mark>has come close to destroying the</mark> entire human <mark>race</mark>. There is a biological reason. <mark>Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality</u></mark>; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because <u>their <mark>genes are more likely to be spread if</mark> the <mark>germs do not kill their hosts too quickly</mark>.</u> The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet <u>there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race.</u> <u>The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past</u> (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. <u>The reason is improvements in medical science.</u> But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.</p> | null | 1NR | Addon Answers | 64,791 | 356 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,767 | Trade war articles are hype – zero risk – China doesn’t retaliate | Alden 12 | Edward Alden, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/31/12, A U.S.-China “Trade War”: Time to Abolish a Silly Notion, thediplomat.com/pacific-money/2012/10/31/a-u-s-china-trade-war-time-to-abolish-a-silly-notion/ | it is time to bury the concept of a “trade war The phrase is so ubiquitous it is almost a reflex that every time the U S takes any action that restricts imports in any fashion, reporters jump to their keyboards to warn that a trade war is looming. it is a canard The closest historical example is Smoot-Hawley what are the chances of a “trade war zero for two big reasons in 1930, there was no W T O no N A F T A no E U – in short, no rules Today unilateral action is largely forbidden tit-for-tat measures we have seen have all been taken within the framework of WTO rules When Obama curbed purchases of Chinese steel China responded with an “anti-dumping” case the U S challenged that action in the WTO No trade war instead see you in court every nation in the world seems fully aware of the dangers of aggressive protectionism trade plunging by 12 percent in 2009 the biggest drop since World War II is how little protectionism that is permitted under WTO rules actually occurred no trade war – just an unfavorable WTO decision a administration would quickly comply. The “trade war” threat stifles reasonable debate, because every trade action – however modest — is assumed to cause a self-destructive over-reaction | it is time to bury the concept of a “trade war what are the chances of a “trade war” zero in 1930, there was no W T O N A F T A E U no rules Today tit-for-tat measures have all been within WTO rules China responded with anti-dumping the U S challenged that action No war – instead court every nation seems aware of the dangers of aggressive protectionism every trade action is assumed to cause self-destructive over-reaction | I have a suggestion for everyone who writes about international trade: it is time to bury, once and for all, the concept of a “trade war.” The phrase is so ubiquitous that it will be awfully hard to abolish; I have probably been guilty of this myself from time to time. Indeed, it is almost a reflex that every time the United States or some other nation takes any action that restricts imports in any fashion, reporters and editorial writers jump to their keyboards to warn that a trade war is looming. But it is a canard that makes it far harder to have a sensible discussion about U.S. trade policy. No sooner had President Obama and Mitt Romney finished their latest round of “who’s tougher on trade with China?” in their final debate than the New York Times – to take one of many possible examples – warned that “formally citing Beijing as a currency manipulator may backfire, economic and foreign-policy experts have said. In the worst case, it could set off a trade war, leading to falling American exports to China and more expensive Chinese imports.” But what exactly is a “trade war”? To take the U.S.-China example, the notion seems to be that, if the United States restricts Chinese imports, China will respond by restricting imports of U.S. goods, in turn leading to further U.S. restrictions and so on and so on until trade between the two countries plummets. The closest historical example is the reaction to the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff act of 1930, which raised the average U.S. tariff on imports to historically high levels. As trade historian Douglas Irwin of Dartmouth has shown persuasively, Smoot-Hawley did not cause the Great Depression, and probably did not even exacerbate it very much since trade was a tiny part of the U.S. economy. But Smoot-Hawley did result in Great Britain, Canada and other U.S. trading partners raising their own tariffs in response. Irwin suggests that the higher tariffs were probably responsible for about a third of the 40 percent drop in imports between 1929 and 1932, and perhaps a slightly higher percentage of export losses. And the new trade barriers put in place took many decades to dismantle. With imports and exports today comprising roughly a third of the U.S. economy, and the few remaining tariffs mostly in the single digits, the consequences of similar tit-for-tat tariff increases today would be far more severe. But what are the chances of such a “trade war” actually occurring? Pretty close to zero, for two big reasons. First, in 1930, there was no World Trade Organization, no North American Free Trade Agreement, no European Community/Union – in short, no rules to prevent countries from jacking up tariffs or imposing quotas whenever governments felt domestic political pressure to do so. Today, such unilateral action is largely forbidden. Indeed, the tit-for-tat measures we have seen in the U.S.-China trade relationship have all been taken within the framework of WTO rules. When the Obama administration curbed purchases of Chinese steel in 2009 under the “Buy America” provisions of the stimulus, for example, China responded with an “anti-dumping” case which led to tariffs on imports of U.S. steel. But the United States challenged that action in the WTO, and earlier this month the WTO ordered China to lift the duties. No trade war – instead the phrase “see you in court” comes to mind. Secondly, almost every nation in the world seems fully aware of the dangers of aggressive protectionism. One of the striking things about the Great Recession– which resulted in global trade volumes plunging by more than 12 percent in 2009, the biggest drop since World War II – is how little of the protectionism that is permitted under WTO rules actually occurred. Chad Bown of the World Bank has documented the surprising low level of new trade barriers imposed during the recession and its aftermath. The danger of competitive currency devaluations – which are not clearly covered under WTO rules – is a greater threat than tariffs. This is one of the reasons that Romney’s pledge to label China a currency manipulator could be playing with fire, particularly after more than seven years in which the value of the renminbi has been creeping up steadily against the dollar. And his suggestion that the United States would impose tariffs in response is just silly – it would be a blatant violation of WTO rules and would quickly be slapped down as such. Again, however, no trade war – just an unfavorable WTO decision with which a Romney administration would quickly comply. The real questions about trade restrictions should be practical ones – are the gains to the economy worth the costs? Generally, the answer is no, because free competition is a good thing for consumers and competitive businesses. But sometimes protecting a viable domestic industry temporarily against a flood of low-priced imports makes sense, which is why the WTO has rules permitting temporary safeguards. Sometimes foreign subsidies make fair competition impossible, which is why the WTO permits tariffs against dumped or subsidized imports. Such actions raise prices for U.S. consumers, but may still on balance bring benefits to the U.S. economy. The “trade war” threat stifles reasonable debate, because every trade action – however modest — is assumed to cause a self-destructive over-reaction by trading partners. So I hereby pledge to abolish the phrase from all my future writings on the subject. I hope others will do the same. | 5,491 | <h4>Trade war articles are hype – zero risk – China doesn’t retaliate</h4><p>Edward <strong>Alden</strong>, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/31/<strong>12</strong>, A U.S.-China “Trade War”: Time to Abolish a Silly Notion, thediplomat.com/pacific-money/2012/10/31/a-u-s-china-trade-war-time-to-abolish-a-silly-notion/</p><p>I have a suggestion for everyone who writes about international trade: <u><mark>it is time to bury</u></mark>, once and for all, <u><mark>the concept of a “trade war</u></mark>.” <u><strong>The phrase is so ubiquitous </u></strong>that it will be awfully hard to abolish; I have probably been guilty of this myself from time to time. Indeed, <u><strong>it is</u></strong> <u><strong>almost a reflex that every time the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates or some other nation <u><strong>takes any action that restricts imports in any fashion, reporters</u></strong> and editorial writers <u><strong>jump to their keyboards to warn that a trade war is looming.</u></strong> But <u>it is a canard</u> that makes it far harder to have a sensible discussion about U.S. trade policy. No sooner had President Obama and Mitt Romney finished their latest round of “who’s tougher on trade with China?” in their final debate than the New York Times – to take one of many possible examples – warned that “formally citing Beijing as a currency manipulator may backfire, economic and foreign-policy experts have said. In the worst case, it could set off a trade war, leading to falling American exports to China and more expensive Chinese imports.” But what exactly is a “trade war”? To take the U.S.-China example, the notion seems to be that, if the United States restricts Chinese imports, China will respond by restricting imports of U.S. goods, in turn leading to further U.S. restrictions and so on and so on until trade between the two countries plummets. <u><strong>The closest historical example is</u></strong> the reaction to the infamous <u><strong>Smoot-Hawley</u></strong> tariff act of 1930, which raised the average U.S. tariff on imports to historically high levels. As trade historian Douglas Irwin of Dartmouth has shown persuasively, Smoot-Hawley did not cause the Great Depression, and probably did not even exacerbate it very much since trade was a tiny part of the U.S. economy. But Smoot-Hawley did result in Great Britain, Canada and other U.S. trading partners raising their own tariffs in response. Irwin suggests that the higher tariffs were probably responsible for about a third of the 40 percent drop in imports between 1929 and 1932, and perhaps a slightly higher percentage of export losses. And the new trade barriers put in place took many decades to dismantle. With imports and exports today comprising roughly a third of the U.S. economy, and the few remaining tariffs mostly in the single digits, the consequences of similar tit-for-tat tariff increases today would be far more severe. But <u><mark>what are the chances of</u></mark> such <u><mark>a “trade war</u>”</mark> actually occurring? Pretty close to <u><strong><mark>zero</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>for two big reasons</u></strong>. First, <u><strong><mark>in 1930, there was no W</u></strong></mark>orld <u><strong><mark>T</u></strong></mark>rade <u><strong><mark>O</u></strong></mark>rganization, <u><strong>no <mark>N</u></strong></mark>orth <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>merican <u><strong><mark>F</u></strong></mark>ree <u><strong><mark>T</u></strong></mark>rade <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>greement, <u><strong>no <mark>E</u></strong></mark>uropean Community/<u><strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nion <u><strong>– in short, <mark>no rules</u></strong></mark> to prevent countries from jacking up tariffs or imposing quotas whenever governments felt domestic political pressure to do so. <u><strong><mark>Today</u></strong></mark>, such <u><strong>unilateral action is largely forbidden</u></strong>. Indeed, the <u><strong><mark>tit-for-tat measures</mark> we have seen</u></strong> in the U.S.-China trade relationship <u><strong><mark>have all been</mark> taken <mark>within</mark> the framework of <mark>WTO rules</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>When</u></strong> the <u><strong>Obama</u></strong> administration <u><strong>curbed purchases of Chinese steel</u></strong> in 2009 under the “Buy America” provisions of the stimulus, for example, <u><strong><mark>China responded with</mark> an “<mark>anti-dumping</mark>” case</u></strong> which led to tariffs on imports of U.S. steel. But <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>challenged that action</mark> in the WTO</u></strong>, and earlier this month the WTO ordered China to lift the duties. <u><mark>No</mark> trade <mark>war</u> – <u>instead</u></mark> the phrase “<u>see you in <mark>court</u></mark>” comes to mind. Secondly, almost <u><mark>every nation</mark> in the world <mark>seems</mark> fully <mark>aware of the dangers of aggressive protectionism</u></mark>. One of the striking things about the Great Recession– which resulted in global <u><strong>trade</u></strong> volumes <u><strong>plunging by</u></strong> more than <u><strong>12 percent in 2009</u></strong>, <u><strong>the biggest drop since World War II</u></strong> – <u><strong>is how little</u></strong> of the <u><strong>protectionism that is permitted under WTO rules actually occurred</u></strong>. Chad Bown of the World Bank has documented the surprising low level of new trade barriers imposed during the recession and its aftermath. The danger of competitive currency devaluations – which are not clearly covered under WTO rules – is a greater threat than tariffs. This is one of the reasons that Romney’s pledge to label China a currency manipulator could be playing with fire, particularly after more than seven years in which the value of the renminbi has been creeping up steadily against the dollar. And his suggestion that the United States would impose tariffs in response is just silly – it would be a blatant violation of WTO rules and would quickly be slapped down as such. Again, however, <u><strong>no trade war – just an unfavorable WTO decision</u></strong> with which <u><strong>a</u></strong> Romney <u><strong>administration would quickly comply. </u></strong>The real questions about trade restrictions should be practical ones – are the gains to the economy worth the costs? Generally, the answer is no, because free competition is a good thing for consumers and competitive businesses. But sometimes protecting a viable domestic industry temporarily against a flood of low-priced imports makes sense, which is why the WTO has rules permitting temporary safeguards. Sometimes foreign subsidies make fair competition impossible, which is why the WTO permits tariffs against dumped or subsidized imports. Such actions raise prices for U.S. consumers, but may still on balance bring benefits to the U.S. economy. <u><strong>The “trade war” threat stifles reasonable debate, because <mark>every trade action</mark> – however modest — <mark>is assumed to cause</mark> a <mark>self-destructive over-reaction</u></strong></mark> by trading partners. So I hereby pledge to abolish the phrase from all my future writings on the subject. I hope others will do the same.</p> | null | 2NR | Addon Answers | 39,143 | 61 | 17,061 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | 565,291 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 2 | Georgetown Louvis-McCoy | Hester | 1AC - Gambling (Internet Ecommerce)
1NC - Inequality K Cross-Retaliation CP
2NC - CP
1NR - Case
2NR - CPCase | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/AvMa/Dartmouth-Avendano-Martin-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round2.docx | null | 48,458 | AvMa | Dartmouth AvMa | null | Im..... | Av..... | Jo..... | Ma..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,768 | Obama can sustain a veto of Iran sanctions now- but it’s close- PC’s key | Politico 12/29 | Politico 12/29/2014 (GOP to move on Iran sanctions legislation, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/gop-senate-iran-sanctions-bill-113852.html) | Republicans are setting up early challenges to Obama preparing to move forward quickly on Iran The Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next year taking a confrontational stance toward Iran appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority. You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the Kirk-Menendez legislation in 2014, though Obama convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off legislation could upset ongoing negotiations While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress aides declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. the largest challenge is building veto-proof support that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House. Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP Kirk expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate | Republicans are setting up early challenges o bama Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next yea taking a confrontational stance toward Iran appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority Kirk-Menendez Obama’s convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off legislation could upset ongoing negotiations. the largest challenge is building veto-proof support Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task, given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP | Congressional Republicans are setting up early challenges to President Barack Obama in January, preparing to move forward quickly on new Iran sanctions legislation following on the heels of a vote on a bill approving the Keystone XL Pipeline. The Republican-controlled Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next year, according to Republican senators and aides. The starting point would be a bill written a year ago by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that managed to accrue the support of 60 senators in both parties despite opposition from the White House. Kirk and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said over the weekend that an Iran vote could occur in January after a vote on Keystone, which is the first bill the Republican Senate will take up and is also opposed by President Barack Obama. Republican leaders have not yet finalized their legislative schedule, but the bipartisan Iran proposal is supported by incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and all of his leadership team. And taking a confrontational stance toward Iran as diplomatic negotiations continue with a group of Western nations appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority. “It’s an important issue, a priority, and has wide bipartisan support in the Senate,” said McConnell spokesman Don Stewart on Monday. The Republican House overwhelmingly passed a sanctions bill targeting Iran’s energy industry in 2013, though that legislation was never taken up by the Senate. The Kirk-Menendez legislation would tighten economic sanctions on Iran if the country walks away from ongoing negotiations over nuclear enrichment or reneges on an interim agreement that has frozen some of Iran’s nuclear activities in return for unwinding some sanctions. In November, Western and Iranians negotiators extended that interim deal until July as they attempt to hammer out a permanent deal that would curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and relax sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and isolated the country globally. A separate bill written by Graham and incoming Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) would require Congress to approve of any final deal and could figure into the GOP’s plans next year. “You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran. You will see a Congress making sure that sanctions are real and will be reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see a Congress wanting to have any say about a final deal,” Graham said at a weekend press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the Kirk-Menendez legislation in 2014, though President Barack Obama’s administration convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off public support after warning that voting on that legislation could upset ongoing negotiations. While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress, Democratic aides on Monday declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. Indeed, the largest challenge for both supporters of Iran sanctions and the Keystone pipeline is building veto-proof levels of support in Congress that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House. White House press secretary Josh Earnest said in November that new penalties during negotiations would be “counterproductive.” Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task, given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP. But Kirk said on Sunday in an interview with Fox news that he expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate.” | 3,916 | <h4>Obama can sustain a veto of Iran sanctions now- but it’s close- PC’s key</h4><p><strong>Politico 12/29</strong>/2014 (GOP to move on Iran sanctions legislation, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/gop-senate-iran-sanctions-bill-113852.html)</p><p>Congressional <u><mark>Republicans are setting up early challenges</mark> t<mark>o</u></mark> President Barack <u>O<mark>bama</u></mark> in January, <u>preparing to move forward quickly on</u> new <u>Iran</u> sanctions legislation following on the heels of a vote on a bill approving the Keystone XL Pipeline. <u>The</u> Republican-controlled <u><mark>Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next yea</mark>r</u>, according to Republican senators and aides. The starting point would be a bill written a year ago by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that managed to accrue the support of 60 senators in both parties despite opposition from the White House. Kirk and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said over the weekend that an Iran vote could occur in January after a vote on Keystone, which is the first bill the Republican Senate will take up and is also opposed by President Barack Obama. Republican leaders have not yet finalized their legislative schedule, but the bipartisan Iran proposal is supported by incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and all of his leadership team. And <u><mark>taking a confrontational stance toward Iran</u></mark> as diplomatic negotiations continue with a group of Western nations <u><mark>appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority</mark>. </u>“It’s an important issue, a priority, and has wide bipartisan support in the Senate,” said McConnell spokesman Don Stewart on Monday. The Republican House overwhelmingly passed a sanctions bill targeting Iran’s energy industry in 2013, though that legislation was never taken up by the Senate. The Kirk-Menendez legislation would tighten economic sanctions on Iran if the country walks away from ongoing negotiations over nuclear enrichment or reneges on an interim agreement that has frozen some of Iran’s nuclear activities in return for unwinding some sanctions. In November, Western and Iranians negotiators extended that interim deal until July as they attempt to hammer out a permanent deal that would curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and relax sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and isolated the country globally. A separate bill written by Graham and incoming Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) would require Congress to approve of any final deal and could figure into the GOP’s plans next year. “<u>You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran</u>. You will see a Congress making sure that sanctions are real and will be reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see a Congress wanting to have any say about a final deal,” Graham said at a weekend press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. <u>A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the <mark>Kirk-Menendez</mark> legislation in 2014, though </u>President Barack <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong>’s</mark> administration <u><strong><mark>convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off</u></strong></mark> public support after warning that voting on that <u><strong><mark>legislation could upset ongoing negotiations</u></strong>.</mark> <u>While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress</u>, Democratic <u>aides</u> on Monday <u>declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. </u>Indeed, <u><strong><mark>the largest challenge</u></strong></mark> for both supporters of Iran sanctions and the Keystone pipeline <u><strong><mark>is building veto-proof</u></strong></mark> levels of <u><strong><mark>support</u></strong></mark> in Congress <u>that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House.</u> White House press secretary Josh Earnest said in November that new penalties during negotiations would be “counterproductive.” <u><mark>Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a <strong>steep task</u></strong>,</mark> <u><mark>given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP</u></mark>. But <u>Kirk</u> said on Sunday in an interview with Fox news that he <u>expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate</u>.”</p> | null | 1nc | 1 | 430,411 | 46 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,769 | Plan costs an extraordinary amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities | Downs 12 | Downs 12 David, freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/ | As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities. | As much as he may want to reform drug laws , Obama is hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those laws the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any easing of federal law and other issues, rank higher on his list of legislative priorities | Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. As much as he may want to reform drug laws on a personal level, Obama is nonetheless hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those same laws since their inception (see discussion above). Given this history, the president would risk an extraordinary level of political capital on any proposed easing of federal law through legislative channels; and other issues, such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to rank higher on his list of legislative priorities. | 563 | <h4>Plan costs an <u>extraordinary</u> amount of political capital, trades off with other legislative priorities</h4><p><strong>Downs 12 </strong>David, <u>freelance journalist who has written for the new york times, rollingstone, and SF chronicle and specializes in cannabis policy; “What Obama and the Feds Will Do About Washington and Colorado Legalization – Expert Analysis” San Francisco Chronicle; November 13, 2012 http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2012/11/13/what-obama-and-the-feds-will-do-about-washington-and-colorado-legalization-expert-analysis/</p><p></u>Perhaps. But there are plenty of other caveats to consider. <u><mark>As much as he may want to reform drug laws </mark>on a personal level<mark>, Obama is</mark> nonetheless <mark>hampered by the heritage of an ugly racial history entwined with those</mark> same <mark>laws</u></mark> since their inception (see discussion above). <u>Given this history, <mark>the president would <strong>risk an extraordinary level of political capital</u></strong> <u>on any</mark> proposed <mark>easing of federal law</u></mark> through legislative channels; <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><mark>other issues,</u></mark> such as healthcare, the environment, and above all jobs appear to <u><mark>rank higher on his list of</u></mark> <u><mark>legislative</mark> <mark>priorities</mark>.</p></u> | null | 1nc | 1 | 305,170 | 62 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,770 | New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- escalates and causes nuclear extinction | Borger 12/31 | Borger 12/31/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation) | There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba This deal will be about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. the parties to the talks have given themselves more time They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions That would provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment. | no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. is deal will b about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets anctions would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment | There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. This deal will not be about cash machines in the Caribbean, but about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away from the table. A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. So the parties to the talks have given themselves more time – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor. The legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. That would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, and a very volatile environment. It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year. | 3,580 | <h4>New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- escalates and causes nuclear extinction</h4><p><strong>Borger 12/31</strong>/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)</p><p><u>There will be <mark>no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.</mark> In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba</u>, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. <u>Th<mark>is deal will</u></mark> not <u><mark>b</mark>e</u> about cash machines in the Caribbean, but <u><mark>about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth</u></mark>. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These <u>gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away</u> from the table. <u><strong><mark>A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel</u></strong>; <u>the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a <strong>wave of proliferation across the region and beyond</strong> as other countries hedge their bets</mark>. </u>So <u>the parties to the talks have given themselves more time</u> – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. <u>They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran</u>. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, <u>the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor</u>. The <u>legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered s<mark>anctions</u></mark>, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. <u>That</u> would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it <u><mark>would</u> also <u>provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament</u></mark>, the Majlis, <u><mark>and a very volatile environment</mark>. </u>It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.</p> | null | 1nc | 1 | 171,429 | 23 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,771 | The fifty United States and relevant territories should make legal nearly all marihuana in the United States. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The fifty United States and relevant territories should make legal nearly all marihuana in the United States. </h4> | null | 1nc | 2 | 430,412 | 1 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,772 | The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The United States Supreme Court should apply a clear statement rule to enforcement of provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to marihuana, finding that it does not contain a clear statement intended to preempt state marihuana laws nor a clear statement authorizing commandeering of state resources for enforcement of federal marihuana laws.</h4> | null | 1nc | 2 | 430,413 | 1 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,773 | The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The United States Attorney General should offer each state government a contract stipulating that the Justice Department will exercise prosecutorial discretion in its enforcement of federal marihuana laws, specifically taking no enforcement action against entities clearly following the marihuana laws of that state. </h4> | null | 1nc | 2 | 430,414 | 1 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,774 | The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The United States federal government should prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed marihuana businesses.</h4> | null | 1nc | 2 | 430,415 | 1 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,775 | CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement | Schwartz 2013 | Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis) | forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. marijuana legalization provides a salient example the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly | only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the political obstacles that would prevent Congress from taking such a step directly | Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. [*633] The marijuana legalization issue provides a salient example. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous. As of 2008, there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities." n240 Thus, commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states. The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism. Such a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the significant political obstacles that would likely prevent Congress from taking such a step directly. | 2,875 | <h4>CP solves- only 1% of marijuana cases are federal- we end virtually all enforcement</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>Still, to convince proponents of the political safeguards of federalism to overcome their resistance to a categorical anti-commandeering rule may take some work. Young and others have explained the rule as serving state autonomy interests by forcing Congress to internalize the costs - political and fiscal - of federal legislation. n236 The New York and Printz Courts both made much of the "democratic accountability" problem created by commandeering, which could be used by Congress to make an unpopular policy look like it emanated from the state. n237 This problem can be overblown, of course. Externalizing political costs - making the state the bad guy through commandeering - might be an issue in the case of an obscure, complex regulatory scheme like that involved in New York; but it would hardly have been an issue in Printz, where it would have been a simple matter for local police chiefs to inform the public that they were reluctantly enforcing a federal law that they strongly opposed, where the law had been well publicized, and where it would be easy for the public to understand the point. A much stronger rationale for anti-commandeering is its tendency to prevent Congress from externalizing the financial costs of the law: By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. n238 Given the culture of resistance to taxes and government spending, <u>forcing Congress to internalize the fiscal costs of federal regulation is a significant check, and allowing it to externalize costs is a significant incentive to commandeer. </u>[*633] The <u>marijuana legalization</u> issue <u>provides a salient example</u>. The accountability issue is minimal: Any reasonably well-informed person in a marijuana legalization state knows that it is federal law that imposes the strict prohibition. But <u>the shifting of fiscal costs onto the states through commandeering is potentially enormous</u>. As of 2008, <u>there were approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level</u>. n239 Professor Mikos reports that "<u><strong><mark>only 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are handled by federal authorities</u></strong></mark>." n240 Thus, <u><mark>commandeering state officials to enforce the CSA could create a massive shift in law enforcement costs onto the states</u>. <u></mark>The idea that the courts might have the power to accomplish this large-scale commandeering through an aggressive CSA-preemption ruling should alarm anyone who believes in political safeguards of federalism</u>. <u>Such <mark>a judicial application of preemption doctrine would bypass the</mark> significant <mark>political obstacles that would </mark>likely<mark> prevent Congress from taking such a step directly</u></mark>.</p> | null | 1nc | 2 | 430,416 | 19 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,776 | The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism | Schwartz 2013 | Schwartz 2013 (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis) | The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is | The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong to overcome a strong belief held by key justices that constitutional law must accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states the anti-commandeering doctrine is not y entrenched; the vote of just one conservative justices could limit the anti-commandeering doctrine, to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA a loophole would make it even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment designed to regulate would-be consumers , if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is. | B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong enough and clear enough to overcome a strong belief possibly held by key justices that constitutional law must somehow accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states. Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, the anti-commandeering doctrine is not exactly entrenched; the vote of just one of the five conservative justices could produce a decision qualifying or limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine, if not entirely scrapping it, in order to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, such a loophole would make it easier to characterize the CSA - even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering" under Reno. Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custody, would constitute a regulatory adjustment ultimately designed to regulate would-be consumers of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data. Put another way, while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions. Rather the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way, if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is. I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule. | 8,598 | <h4>The CP is key to judicial protection against commandeering- that’s the single biggest issue of federalism</h4><p><strong>Schwartz 2013</strong> (David, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 Cardozo L. Rev. 567, December, lexis)</p><p>B. The Anti-Commandeering Rule After Reno: Limits and Loopholes <u><mark>The anti-commandeering rule after Reno provides less guidance than one might hope for courts to apply the CSA to state marijuana legalization</u></mark>. We can start by asking whether Reno's doctrinal formulas supply an answer. To be sure, a federal law requiring a state police officer to arrest a suspect under the CSA appears to be a "federal [*617] regulation of the state's regulation of private parties." If this is the current definition of what is forbidden by the anti-commandeering doctrine, or even the hard core of a broader concept that is fuzzy around the edges, perhaps the anti-commandeering doctrine does indeed resolve the arrest-seizure hypothetical and other aspects of the marijuana federalism crisis besides. But the question becomes more complicated when posed in a more pragmatic form. <u>Doctrines come and go, their contours, strength, and existence tested by hard cases</u>. Cases are hard when case-specific considerations of justice or public policy go against the pre-existing doctrine. <u><strong><mark>We need to ask whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong </u></mark>enough and clear enough<u></strong><mark> <strong>to overcome a strong belief</strong></mark> possibly <mark>held <strong>by key justices that constitutional law must </mark>somehow <mark>accommodate the imposition of a federal anti-drug policy on the states</mark>.</u></strong> Given the 5-4 margin in Printz and continuing scholarly criticism, <u><mark>the <strong>anti-commandeering doctrine is not</strong> </mark>exactl<mark>y <strong>entrenched</strong>; the vote of just one </mark>of the five <mark>conservative justices could </mark>produce a decision qualifying or <mark>limit</mark>ing<mark> the anti-commandeering doctrine,</mark> if not entirely scrapping it</u>, <u>in order <mark>to make room for de facto commandeering of state officials under the CSA</u></mark>. n193 [*618] So just how strong and clear is the anti-commandeering doctrine? <u>Possible qualifications and loopholes can be found in Printz and Reno</u>. To begin with, Printz characterized its holding as one invalidating a law whose "whole object" was "to direct the functioning of the state executive." n194 Plainly, that is not the "whole object" of the CSA, most of which is aimed at direct federal regulation of drug users, manufacturers, and distributors. If "whole object" is the test of impermissible commandeering laws, then the CSA - indeed most federal laws - could escape that net. Control over state officials is rarely, if ever, a federal regulatory end in itself. The description is not particularly applicable even to the law at issue in Printz: If the Brady Act had any identifiable "whole object," it was to require background checks of gun purchasers, not to regulate state police. Reno's definition of prohibited commandeering - laws that regulate the states' regulation of private parties - is undoubtedly more robust than the "whole object" formula, yet even that seems less than ironclad on close scrutiny. On the one hand, it makes sense to distinguish Reno from Printz by saying that the Brady Act conscripted state officials in the regulation of private gun purchasers (by requiring the state CLEOs to participate in background checks), whereas the DPPA in Reno regulated the state's primary conduct in selling drivers' data. While the DPPA aimed at protecting the privacy rights of private drivers' licensees, that is not the same thing as regulating them, if "regulation of private parties" in the Reno anti-commandeering formula means subjecting private behavior to restrictions - a reasonable definition - rather than providing private parties with protections or benefits. n195 On the other hand, such a view of Reno requires that we ignore the would-be purchasers of the drivers' data, who certainly experience their behavior as significantly restricted by rules, since their efforts to purchase data will be limited or denied. Does it make sense to say that the would-be purchasers are "unregulated" or "merely incidentally regulated" by the law? Perhaps. But, at the same time, it would be far from absurd to say that they are regulated by the law. The DPPA's regulation of the state is merely a means to regulate the sale of drivers' [*619] information to the private data-miners; indeed, the purpose of the DPPA was to crack down on lax state regulation of the sale of private data to private parties - by the state and by private data sellers. It is thus quite easy to characterize the DPPA as a regulation of the state's regulation of private parties. n196 By focusing on the case's facts rather than the Court's effort to doctrinalize them, Reno can be read to permit some significant federal regulation of states that Printz seemed to have taken off the table. "Regulating the states' regulation of private parties" is a pithy and seemingly clear definition of prohibited commandeering, but it blurs considerably when we try to apply it carefully to the facts of Reno. We can next try to excavate an anti-commandeering rule from the facts of Reno by making further qualifications - perhaps by saying that laws like the DPPA are not commandeering if they primarily regulate state official behavior and at most incidentally regulate private conduct. We might thereby succeed in harmonizing Reno as a correctly decided anti-commandeering case, but only at the cost of widening the loophole in the previously clear and straightforward anti-commandeering doctrine. Significantly for present purposes, however, <u>such <mark>a loophole would make it </mark>easier to characterize the CSA - <mark>even the arrest/seizure hypothetical - as "not commandeering"</u></mark> under Reno. <u><mark>Requiring state police officers to make the arrest and seizure, </mark>and perhaps to transfer the suspect or the marijuana or both to federal custod<mark>y, would constitute a regulatory adjustment </mark>ultimately<mark> designed to regulate would-be consumers</mark> of marijuana, just as Reno required state compliance with federal regulations controlling would-be consumers of drivers' data</u>. Put another way, <u>while it is easy to distinguish the CSA from the DPPA, it is also possible to emphasize important similarities</u>. Perhaps even the result deemed impermissible in Printz - requiring local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on gun purchasers - could itself be upheld post-Reno if the law were patterned more closely on the DPPA. n197 [*620] Reno's treatment of the "general applicability" doctrine further complicates the anti-commandeering rule. A future Court might well decide that Reno will jettison the "general applicability" doctrine as the touchstone of permissible federal regulation of states, expanding permissible regulation to extend to anything that does not "regulate the states' regulation of private parties." But the Reno Court did not make this move; it assumed arguendo that general applicability was a bottom line constitutional requirement and found the DPPA to be generally applicable. That aspect of the ruling is itself noteworthy. In prior general applicability cases, the law in question regulated the state's relationships with its own employees or instrumentalities in a manner analogous to the federal regulation of private relationships - such as employing workers or running a transit company. In Reno, however, the DPPA was deemed generally applicable even though it governed the state's interactions with private parties. <u>The point here is not that the anti-commandeering doctrine is incoherent and theoretically incapable of answering the arrest/seizure problem or other marijuana federalism questions</u>. Rather <u>the question is whether the anti-commandeering doctrine is strong and clear enough to constrain justices from indulging in an anti-marijuana-legalization policy preference by fitting the CSA into easily conceived loopholes in the anti-commandeering doctrine</u>. If there is a coherent core to an anti-commandeering doctrine, then the arrest/seizure hypothetical lies squarely within it. Put another way<mark>, <u><strong>if a federal command to state police to make arrests and seizures for CSA violations is not impermissible commandeering, nothing is</u></strong>.</mark> I take it as a given that a state's control over the arrest authority of its police is so fundamental that any anti-commandeering rule that allows the federal commandeering of state police to enforce federal criminal law is not worth the trouble. The Court showed a continued commitment to the anti-commandeering rule in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, n198 where seven justices relied on it as a premise for the conclusion that states cannot be coerced under the conditional spending power. n199 But Reno muddies the waters by suggesting the existence of significant qualifications or loopholes in the anti-commandeering rule.</p> | null | 1nc | 2 | 430,417 | 18 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,777 | Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations | Taylor 2013 | Taylor 2013 (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf) | without congressional action and given Obama’s opposition to legalizing marijuana the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with states The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives broad discretion to do so including legally binding contractual agreements. Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do should not require much boldness Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise prosecutorial discretion to ensure that Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong deterrent to unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently in contrast to the uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to marijuana with the invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen too much chaos | Written contractual agreements should provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, | The good news is that even without a congressional action, and even given President Obama’s opposition to legalizing recreational or medical marijuana, the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana states and the District of Columbia. The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives him broad discretion to do so, through means including legally binding contractual agreements. This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do (cooperate with the states) should not require much boldness. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. Written contractual agreements should, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate in targeting those who grow and distribute marijuana without state licenses. This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to control trafficking, abuse, and diversion than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes. Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General to exercise his prosecutorial discretion to ensure that his Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General (or a high-level designee) personally finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong political deterrent to such an unwarranted enforcement action. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together, by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently—again, in marked contrast to the chaos and uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to medical marijuana. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, with the above-mentioned invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse. At the very last, they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen, of late, all too much chaos. | 5,417 | <h4>Contracts solve any uncertainty over enforcement and strengthens state regulations</h4><p><strong>Taylor 2013</strong> (Stuart, Brookings nonresident senior fellow, Marijuana Policy and Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf)</p><p>The good news is that even <u>without</u> a <u>congressional action</u>, <u>and</u> even <u>given</u> President <u>Obama’s</u> <u>opposition to legalizing</u> recreational or medical <u>marijuana</u>, <u>the CSA provides a standing invitation for his Administration to work out contractual cooperation agreements with</u> Colorado, Washington, and some or all of the sixteen other medical marijuana <u>states</u> and the District of Columbia. <u>The CSA not only directs that the Attorney General “shall cooperate” with the state and local governments on drugs but also gives</u> him <u>broad discretion to do so</u>, through means <u>including legally binding contractual agreements.</u> This is a president who has taken bold unilateral action amid congressional paralysis on issues including immigration (ordering amnesty for a generation of Dream Act immigrants), gay marriage (an extraordinary refusal to defend in federal court the duly enacted Defense of Marriage Act), and military force abroad (bombing Libya without consulting Congress, using drones to kill people in multiple countries, and much more). <u>Doing with marijuana what the congressionally adopted CSA tells the Attorney General he should do</u> (cooperate with the states) <u>should not require much boldness</u>. Indeed, with this option sitting in plain view, it would be intolerable for the Obama Administration to put officials in eighteen states and D.C. to the choice of either ignoring the will of their own voters or gambling on limited enforcement of a federal marijuana law that is widely seen as outmoded. The Obama Administration should instead work with Colorado and Washington (and later with other medical marijuana states) to implement their partial legalization initiatives in ways that serve both federal and state interests in protecting the public health and safety. <u><mark>Written contractual agreements should</u></mark>, suggests Tamar Todd of the Drug Policy Alliance, <u><mark>provide for Colorado and Washington to tightly control and regulate</u></mark> licensing, production and distribution within their borders and do everything feasible to prevent diversion to other states; for federal resources to focus primarily on preventing such diversion; <u><mark>and for federal and state law enforcement agencies to cooperate </mark>in targeting those who grow and distribute <mark>marijuana without state licenses</u>. <u>This would be more consonant with the CSA’s intent to </mark>control trafficking, abuse, and diversion <mark>than for federal and state governments to be at cross-purposes</u>. <u>Federal-state agreements should also include clear, unambiguous commitments by the Attorney General </mark>to exercise</u> his <u>prosecutorial discretion to ensure that</u> his <u>Justice Department subordinates take no enforcement action against any state-licensed marijuana supplier unless the Attorney General</u> (or a high-level designee) personally <u>finds, in writing, that the supplier has violated state as well as federal law</u> and that state and local authorities are unable or unwilling to correct the problem. Any such agreement could be voidable at the option of the Attorney General if he believes that the state has failed to carry out responsibly its commitment to regulate. This is not to suggest that such a contractual agreement could provide a state-licensed marijuana supplier with a legal defense recognized by the courts in the event of a federal prosecution or other enforcement action that violates the agreement. But <u><strong><mark>the formality and specificity of a contractual agreement would provide a strong</u></strong> political <u><strong>deterrent to</u></strong> such an <u><strong>unwarranted enforcement action</u></strong></mark>. It would also protect federal interests far more effectively than would a federal effort to abort states’ experiments with partial legalization. The commitments that states would make in negotiating contractual agreements, and the subsequent federal scrutiny of their compliance, would help keep states honest, giving them a powerful incentive to take seriously their obligations to control marijuana distribution and accommodate federal priorities—as, for example, California has not done with medical marijuana. By the same token, <u><mark>the process of sitting down with the states and drawing up agreements would force the federal government to get its act together,</mark> by setting enforcement priorities and then applying them consistently</u>—again, <u>in</u> marked <u>contrast to the</u> chaos and <u>uncertainty that have so far marked the federal government’s approach to</u> medical <u>marijuana</u>. The moral is that we will need enlightened, determined leadership on both the federal and state level for the partial legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington to avoid the federal-state conflicts and confusion that have so far been emblematic of the Obama-Holder medical marijuana regime. Fortunately, the leaders of Colorado and Washington State appear so far to be doing a better job of setting clear rules and protecting federal interests than have the states whose medical marijuana regimes have been on the receiving end of most federal crackdowns. With the state-legalized recreational marijuana ball now in the Obama Administration’s court, <u>with the</u> above-mentioned <u>invitation from the CSA to enter into cooperation agreements with states</u>, and with leaders in Colorado and Washington who seem willing and able to do their part, <u>the President and Attorney General are poised to make history, for better or worse</u>. At the very last, <u>they should be able to bring some order to a marijuana-policy regime that has seen</u>, of late, all <u>too much chaos</u>.</p> | null | 1nc | 2 | 56,721 | 34 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,778 | The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage | Williams 14 | Williams 14 Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver | Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the U S Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number requiring organs is likely higher This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains | many die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs more than 122,000 are waitlisted Due to other barriers actual number of requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap continues to widen. NOTA) prohibits valuable consideration in exchange for organs for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite these , a severe organ shortage remains | Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514
Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs.1 Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the United States.2 Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number of Americans requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen.4 The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains. | 1,611 | <h4><strong>The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage</h4><p>Williams 14</strong> Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver </p><p>Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514</p><p><u>Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, <mark>many</mark> individuals <mark>die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs</u></mark>.1 <u>Currently, <mark>more than</mark> <mark>122,000 </mark>individuals <mark>are waitlisted</mark> for organs in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.2 <u><mark>Due to</mark> financial and <mark>other barriers</mark> to becoming waitlisted, the <mark>actual number </u>of</mark> Americans <u><mark>requiring organs is</mark> <mark>likely higher</u>.3</mark> <u><mark>This gap</mark> between available organs and the need for organs <mark>continues to widen</u>.</mark>4 <u>The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, </u>and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 <u>The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The</u> National Organ Transplantation Act <u>(<mark>NOTA) prohibits</mark> the receipt of any form of <mark>valuable consideration in exchange for organs</mark> to be used <mark>for transplantation</u></mark>.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, <u><mark>other methods have been</mark> <mark>employed in attempts to increase donations</u>.9 <u>Despite</mark> the implementation of <mark>these</mark> strategies<mark>, a severe organ shortage remains</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong> | null | null | Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives | 430,245 | 16 | 17,064 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | 565,284 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 4 | Georgetown Kazteridis-Knez | Mathis | null | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,779 | Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics | American Banker 2014 | American Banker 7/18/2014 (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis) | The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry The legislation has yet to pass in the Senate Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system | The House gave a thumbs-up to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry," | The House of Representatives gave a thumbs-up Wednesday to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system. The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses. It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, the House vote marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. The House measure passed with the support of 186 Democrats and 45 Republicans, and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark. "This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry," Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. The legislation, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, has yet to pass in the Senate. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering. | 1,984 | <h4>Solves banking access for marijuana businesses and avoids politics</h4><p><strong>American Banker</strong> 7/18/<strong>2014</strong> (House Gives Thumbs-Up to Marijuana Banking, lexis)</p><p><u><mark>The House</u></mark> of Representatives <u><mark>gave a thumbs-up</u></mark> Wednesday <u><mark>to allowing the marijuana industry into the banking system</u></mark>. <u><mark>The legislation, which passed by a 231-192 margin, would prohibit the use of federal funds to penalize banks and credit unions for providing financial services to state-licensed pot businesses.</mark> </u>It is unclear if the measure will make a difference for banks and credit unions that are weighing the risks involved with serving the pot business. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law, but numerous states have legalized its medicinal or recreational use, and that conflict puts banks in a difficult position. Still, <u>the House vote <mark>marks another step in the direction of bringing marijuana enterprises into the financial mainstream</u></mark>. In February, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released guidance for banks interested in serving the pot industry. <u><strong><mark>The House measure passed</strong> with the support of <strong>186 Democrats and 45 Republicans</u></strong>, <u>and was hailed by the marijuana industry as a landmark</u>. "<u><strong>This is a huge step forward for the legal cannabis industry</u></strong>,"</mark> Aaron Smith, executive director of the National Cannabis Industry Association, said in a news release. <u>The legislation</u>, which was introduced as an amendment to a financial services appropriations bill, <u>has yet to pass in the Senate</u>. The House version was sponsored by Democratic Reps. Denny Heck, Ed Perlmutter and Barbara Lee and GOP Rep. Dana Rohrabacher. A competing amendment, which would have blocked the implementation of the Fincen guidance on marijuana, was defeated by a 236-186 margin. <u>Since recreational marijuana was legalized in Colorado and Washington state, a coalition that includes the pot industry, elected officials, and law enforcement agencies in those states have been calling for marijuana businesses to be brought into the banking system</u>. They argue that as long as pot enterprises operate as cash-only businesses, they are susceptible to threats such as armed robbery and money laundering.</p> | null | 1nc | 2 | 430,418 | 16 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,780 | Obama can sustain a veto of Iran sanctions now- but it’s close- PC’s key | Politico 12/29 | Politico 12/29/2014 (GOP to move on Iran sanctions legislation, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/gop-senate-iran-sanctions-bill-113852.html) | Republicans are setting up early challenges to Obama preparing to move forward quickly on Iran The Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next year taking a confrontational stance toward Iran appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority. You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the Kirk-Menendez legislation in 2014, though Obama convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off legislation could upset ongoing negotiations While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress aides declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. the largest challenge is building veto-proof support that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House. Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP Kirk expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate | Republicans are setting up early challenges o bama Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next yea taking a confrontational stance toward Iran appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority Kirk-Menendez Obama’s convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off legislation could upset ongoing negotiations. the largest challenge is building veto-proof support Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task, given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP | Congressional Republicans are setting up early challenges to President Barack Obama in January, preparing to move forward quickly on new Iran sanctions legislation following on the heels of a vote on a bill approving the Keystone XL Pipeline. The Republican-controlled Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next year, according to Republican senators and aides. The starting point would be a bill written a year ago by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that managed to accrue the support of 60 senators in both parties despite opposition from the White House. Kirk and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said over the weekend that an Iran vote could occur in January after a vote on Keystone, which is the first bill the Republican Senate will take up and is also opposed by President Barack Obama. Republican leaders have not yet finalized their legislative schedule, but the bipartisan Iran proposal is supported by incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and all of his leadership team. And taking a confrontational stance toward Iran as diplomatic negotiations continue with a group of Western nations appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority. “It’s an important issue, a priority, and has wide bipartisan support in the Senate,” said McConnell spokesman Don Stewart on Monday. The Republican House overwhelmingly passed a sanctions bill targeting Iran’s energy industry in 2013, though that legislation was never taken up by the Senate. The Kirk-Menendez legislation would tighten economic sanctions on Iran if the country walks away from ongoing negotiations over nuclear enrichment or reneges on an interim agreement that has frozen some of Iran’s nuclear activities in return for unwinding some sanctions. In November, Western and Iranians negotiators extended that interim deal until July as they attempt to hammer out a permanent deal that would curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and relax sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and isolated the country globally. A separate bill written by Graham and incoming Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) would require Congress to approve of any final deal and could figure into the GOP’s plans next year. “You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran. You will see a Congress making sure that sanctions are real and will be reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see a Congress wanting to have any say about a final deal,” Graham said at a weekend press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the Kirk-Menendez legislation in 2014, though President Barack Obama’s administration convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off public support after warning that voting on that legislation could upset ongoing negotiations. While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress, Democratic aides on Monday declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. Indeed, the largest challenge for both supporters of Iran sanctions and the Keystone pipeline is building veto-proof levels of support in Congress that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House. White House press secretary Josh Earnest said in November that new penalties during negotiations would be “counterproductive.” Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task, given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP. But Kirk said on Sunday in an interview with Fox news that he expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate.” | 3,916 | <h4><strong>Obama can sustain a veto of Iran sanctions now- but it’s close- PC’s key</h4><p>Politico 12/29</strong>/2014 (GOP to move on Iran sanctions legislation, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/gop-senate-iran-sanctions-bill-113852.html)</p><p>Congressional <u><mark>Republicans are setting up early challenges</mark> t<mark>o</u></mark> President Barack <u>O<mark>bama</u></mark> in January, <u>preparing to move forward quickly on</u> new <u>Iran</u> sanctions legislation following on the heels of a vote on a bill approving the Keystone XL Pipeline. <u>The</u> Republican-controlled <u><mark>Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next yea</mark>r</u>, according to Republican senators and aides. The starting point would be a bill written a year ago by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that managed to accrue the support of 60 senators in both parties despite opposition from the White House. Kirk and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said over the weekend that an Iran vote could occur in January after a vote on Keystone, which is the first bill the Republican Senate will take up and is also opposed by President Barack Obama. Republican leaders have not yet finalized their legislative schedule, but the bipartisan Iran proposal is supported by incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and all of his leadership team. And <u><mark>taking a confrontational stance toward Iran</u></mark> as diplomatic negotiations continue with a group of Western nations <u><mark>appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority</mark>. </u>“It’s an important issue, a priority, and has wide bipartisan support in the Senate,” said McConnell spokesman Don Stewart on Monday. The Republican House overwhelmingly passed a sanctions bill targeting Iran’s energy industry in 2013, though that legislation was never taken up by the Senate. The Kirk-Menendez legislation would tighten economic sanctions on Iran if the country walks away from ongoing negotiations over nuclear enrichment or reneges on an interim agreement that has frozen some of Iran’s nuclear activities in return for unwinding some sanctions. In November, Western and Iranians negotiators extended that interim deal until July as they attempt to hammer out a permanent deal that would curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and relax sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and isolated the country globally. A separate bill written by Graham and incoming Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) would require Congress to approve of any final deal and could figure into the GOP’s plans next year. “<u>You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran</u>. You will see a Congress making sure that sanctions are real and will be reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see a Congress wanting to have any say about a final deal,” Graham said at a weekend press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. <u>A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the <mark>Kirk-Menendez</mark> legislation in 2014, though </u>President Barack <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong>’s</mark> administration <u><strong><mark>convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off</u></strong></mark> public support after warning that voting on that <u><strong><mark>legislation could upset ongoing negotiations</u></strong>.</mark> <u>While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress</u>, Democratic <u>aides</u> on Monday <u>declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. </u>Indeed, <u><strong><mark>the largest challenge</u></strong></mark> for both supporters of Iran sanctions and the Keystone pipeline <u><strong><mark>is building veto-proof</u></strong></mark> levels of <u><strong><mark>support</u></strong></mark> in Congress <u>that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House.</u> White House press secretary Josh Earnest said in November that new penalties during negotiations would be “counterproductive.” <u><mark>Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a <strong>steep task</u></strong>,</mark> <u><mark>given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP</u></mark>. But <u>Kirk</u> said on Sunday in an interview with Fox news that he <u>expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate</u><strong>.”</p></strong> | null | 1nc | 1 | 430,411 | 46 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,781 | Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination | Beard 8 | Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy | the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote At least seven such actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. federal legislation requiring all hospitals to request organ donation additional legislation to refer potential organ donors the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Finally, i legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct costs incurred by onors We must conclude that none of the policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. . Rather, every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage | transplant industry adopted policy options designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, maintain the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remo seven actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses legislation requiring all hospitals to request organ donation additional legislation to refer potential organ donors Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative KIDNEY EXCHANGES none of the policies resolve the transplant shortage it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage. | http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote. At least seven such actions have been implemented over the last two decades or so: ■ INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards. ■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, federal legislation was passed in 1987 requiring all hospitals receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) to request organ donation in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, additional legislation was passed that requires hospitals to refer potential organ donors to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been the so-called “Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS Finally, in another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct (explicit) costs incurred by such donors (e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. We must conclude that none of the above-listed policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount. Rather, our concern is that every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage. | 9,339 | <h4><strong>Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination </h4><p>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p> Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, <u>the <mark>transplant industry</mark> has examined and <mark>adopted</mark> a series of <mark>policy options</mark> ostensibly <mark>designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these,</mark> however, continue to <mark>maintain the</mark> basic zero-price property of the <mark>altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remo</mark>te</u>. <u>At least <mark>seven</mark> such <mark>actions have been</mark> <mark>implemented</u></mark> over the last two decades or so: ■ <u><mark>INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES</u></mark> In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of <u><mark>incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses</mark>.</u> The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards.<u> </u>■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, <u>federal <mark>legislation</u></mark> was passed in 1987 <u><mark>requiring all hospitals</u></mark> receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) <u><mark>to request organ donation</u></mark> in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, <u><mark>additional</mark> <mark>legislation</u></mark> was passed that requires hospitals<u> <mark>to refer potential organ donors</mark> </u>to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been <u>the </u>so-called “<u><mark>Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative</mark>,” </u>which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. <u>■ <mark>KIDNEY</mark> <mark>EXCHANGES</u></mark> Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS <u>Finally, i</u>n another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed <u>legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct </u>(explicit) <u>costs incurred by</u> such d<u>onors </u>(e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. <u>We must conclude that <mark>none of the</u></mark> above-listed <u><mark>policies</mark> should be expected to <mark>resolve the transplant</mark> organ <mark>shortage</mark>.</u> We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount<u>. Rather,</u> our concern is that <u>every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, <mark>it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage</u><strong>.</p></strong></mark> | null | null | Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives | 430,246 | 21 | 17,064 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | 565,284 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 4 | Georgetown Kazteridis-Knez | Mathis | null | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,782 | Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change | Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 | Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf) | All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection | The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option reputational costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond soft defection | All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. The strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option to consider in various parts of the world, the reputational (and possibly economic) costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond some form of soft defection. | 1,067 | <h4>Countries will stay within the treaty regime now despite push for change</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_intro.pdf)</p><p><u><strong>All these policy practices were interpreted by the implementing countries as respecting the confines of treaty latitude. Most have a solid legal basis, others employ a certain legal creativity</u></strong>, not always acknowledged by the INCB. And sometimes schemes perfectly justifiable in principle have been applied with a “pragmatic” dose of hypocrisy. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> <mark>strictures of the conventions and the near impossibility to amend them have impelled some countries to stretching their inbuilt flexibility and escape clauses</u></strong></mark> to questionable limits. Examples are the legal contradictions around the backdoor of the Dutch coffeeshops; the expansion of medical marijuana schemes in some U.S. states into recreational use; and the establishment of large-scale commercial cannabis social clubs in Spain. Indeed, <u><strong><mark>while a fundamental change in cannabis policy is increasingly viewed as a legitimate option</mark> to consider in various parts of the world</u></strong>, the <u><strong><mark>reputational</u></strong></mark> (and possibly economic) <u><strong><mark>costs of treaty breach are likely to deter most states from moving beyond</u></strong></mark> some form of <u><strong><mark>soft defection</u></mark>.</p></strong> | null | 1nc | 3 | 430,419 | 39 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,783 | Organ sales would become a wedge issue – partisan. | Gregory, ’11 | Gregory, ’11 Anthony, “Why Legalizing Organ Sales Would Help to Save Lives, End Violence”, The Atlantic, 10-9-11, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/11/why-legalizing-organ-sales-would-help-to-save-lives-end-violence/248114/, RSR | The very idea of legalization sound gruesome to most Many protest an organ market will lead to unfair advantages for the rich Many will protest that an organ market will lead to exploitation and unfair advantages for the rich and powerful. In Japan, you can buy livers and kidneys harvested from executed Chinese prisoners Witnessing the horror stories, many are calling on governments to crack down even more severely. The most fundamental case for legalizing organ sales -- an appeal to civil liberty -- has proven highly controversial. Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice," and conservatives claim to favor free markets, this has become a matter of life and death. | legalization sound gruesome to most Many protes an organ market will lead to unfair advantages In Japan you can buy livers from executed prisoners itnessing the horror stories, many are calling on governments to crack down The case for legalizing organ sales has proven highly controversial. this has become a matter of life and death. | The very idea of legalization might sound gruesome to most people, but it shouldn't, especially since research shows it would save lives. In the United States, where the 1984 National Organ Transplantation Act prohibits compensation for organ donating, there are only about 20,000 kidneys every year for the approximately 80,000 patients on the waiting list. In 2008, nearly 5,000 died waiting. Many protest that an organ market will lead to unfair advantages for the rich, but this is a characteristic of the current trade. A global perspective shows how big the problem is. "Millions of people suffer from kidney disease, but in 2007 there were just 64,606 kidney-transplant operations in the entire world," according to George Mason University professor and Independent Institute research director Alexander Tabarrok, writing in the Wall Street Journal. Almost every other country has prohibitions like America's. In Iran, however, selling one's kidney for profit is legal. There are no patients anguishing on the waiting list. The Iranians have solved their kidney shortage by legalizing sales. Many will protest that an organ market will lead to exploitation and unfair advantages for the rich and powerful. But these are the characteristics of the current illicit organ trade. Moreover, as with drug prohibition today and alcohol prohibition in the 1920s, pushing a market underground is the way to make it rife with violence and criminality. In Japan, for the right price, you can buy livers and kidneys harvested from executed Chinese prisoners. Three years ago in India, police broke up an organ ring that had taken as many as 500 kidneys from poor laborers. The World Health Organization estimates that the black market accounts for 20 percent of kidney transplants worldwide. Everywhere from Latin America to the former Soviet Republics, from the Philippines to South Africa, a huge network has emerged typified by threats, coercion, intimidation, extortion, and shoddy surgeries. Although not every black market transaction is exploitative -- demonstrating that organ sales, in and of themselves, are not the problem -- the most unsavory parts of the trade can be attributed to the fact that it is illegal. Witnessing the horror stories, many are calling on governments to crack down even more severely. Unfortunately, prohibition drives up black-market profits, turns the market over to organized crime, and isolates those harmed in the trade from the normal routes of recourse. Several years ago, transplant surgeon Nadley Hakim at St. Mary's Hospital in London pointed out that "this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer." Bringing the market into the open is the best way to ensure the trade's appropriate activity. Since the stakes would be very high, market forces and social pressure would ensure that people are not intimidated or defrauded. In the United States, attitudes are not so casual as to allow gross degeneracy. Enabling a process by which consenting people engage in open transactions would mitigate the exploitation of innocent citizens and underhanded dealing by those seeking to skirt the law. The most fundamental case for legalizing organ sales -- an appeal to civil liberty -- has proven highly controversial. Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice," and conservatives claim to favor free markets, but true self-ownership would include the right to sell one's body parts, and genuine free enterprise would imply a market in human organs. In any event, studies show that this has become a matter of life and death. | 3,714 | <h4><strong>Organ sales would become a wedge issue – partisan.</h4><p>Gregory, ’11<u></strong> Anthony, “Why Legalizing Organ Sales Would Help to Save Lives, End Violence”, The Atlantic, 10-9-11, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/11/why-legalizing-organ-sales-would-help-to-save-lives-end-violence/248114/, RSR</p><p>The very idea of <mark>legalization</mark> </u>might<u> <mark>sound gruesome to most</mark> </u>people, but it shouldn't, especially since research shows it would save lives. In the United States, where the 1984 National Organ Transplantation Act prohibits compensation for organ donating, there are only about 20,000 kidneys every year for the approximately 80,000 patients on the waiting list. In 2008, nearly 5,000 died waiting. <u><mark>Many</mark> <mark>protes</mark>t</u> that <u><mark>an organ market will lead to unfair advantages</mark> for the rich</u>, but this is a characteristic of the current trade. A global perspective shows how big the problem is. "Millions of people suffer from kidney disease, but in 2007 there were just 64,606 kidney-transplant operations in the entire world," according to George Mason University professor and Independent Institute research director Alexander Tabarrok, writing in the Wall Street Journal. Almost every other country has prohibitions like America's. In Iran, however, selling one's kidney for profit is legal. There are no patients anguishing on the waiting list. The Iranians have solved their kidney shortage by legalizing sales. <u>Many will protest that an organ market will lead to exploitation and unfair advantages for the rich and powerful.</u> But these are the characteristics of the current illicit organ trade. Moreover, as with drug prohibition today and alcohol prohibition in the 1920s, pushing a market underground is the way to make it rife with violence and criminality. <u><mark>In</mark> <mark>Japan</mark>,</u> for the right price, <u><mark>you can buy livers</mark> and kidneys harvested <mark>from executed</mark> Chinese <mark>prisoners</u></mark>. Three years ago in India, police broke up an organ ring that had taken as many as 500 kidneys from poor laborers. The World Health Organization estimates that the black market accounts for 20 percent of kidney transplants worldwide. Everywhere from Latin America to the former Soviet Republics, from the Philippines to South Africa, a huge network has emerged typified by threats, coercion, intimidation, extortion, and shoddy surgeries. Although not every black market transaction is exploitative -- demonstrating that organ sales, in and of themselves, are not the problem -- the most unsavory parts of the trade can be attributed to the fact that it is illegal. <u>W<mark>itnessing the horror stories,</u> <u>many are calling on governments to crack down</mark> even more severely.</u> Unfortunately, prohibition drives up black-market profits, turns the market over to organized crime, and isolates those harmed in the trade from the normal routes of recourse. Several years ago, transplant surgeon Nadley Hakim at St. Mary's Hospital in London pointed out that "this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer." Bringing the market into the open is the best way to ensure the trade's appropriate activity. Since the stakes would be very high, market forces and social pressure would ensure that people are not intimidated or defrauded. In the United States, attitudes are not so casual as to allow gross degeneracy. Enabling a process by which consenting people engage in open transactions would mitigate the exploitation of innocent citizens and underhanded dealing by those seeking to skirt the law. <u><mark>The</mark> most fundamental <mark>case for legalizing organ sales</mark> -- an appeal to civil liberty -- <mark>has proven <strong>highly controversial</strong>.</u></mark> <u>Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice," and conservatives claim to favor free markets,</u> but true self-ownership would include the right to sell one's body parts, and genuine free enterprise would imply a market in human organs. In any event, studies show that <u><strong><mark>this has become a matter of life and death.</p></u></strong></mark> | null | 1nc | 1 | 109,344 | 24 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,784 | Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention | Rico 2014 Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest) | Rico 2014 (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?, Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest) | marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. | marijuana legalization violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs | It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, marijuana legalization still violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. | 936 | <h4>Federal legalization violates the 1961 Single Convention</h4><p><strong>Rico 2014</strong> (Bernardo, international banker and Central America development specialist, INROADS OR DETOURS in the Drug Debate?,<u><strong> Americas Quarterly8.1 (Winter 2014): 40-45, proquest)</p><p></u></strong>It's important, first of all, to understand that neither of these options has anything to do with "legalization." Legalizing a drug removes the prohibition on its production, sale or consumption, albeit with government regulation. Uruguay is the only nation to have recently approved legislation to legalize marijuana, which will allow the government to control most of the stages from production to consumption. Colorado and Washington are the only U.S. states to have legalized the recreational use of marijuana; possession and sale for medical purposes is permitted in 20 other states. However, <u><strong>marijuana remains on the U.S. federal government's list of "controlled substances" as an illegal narcotic</u></strong>. Even though the U.S. Department of Justice has indicated it is reconsidering whether it will enforce federal penalties, <u><strong><mark>marijuana legalization</u></strong></mark> still <u><strong><mark>violates UN drug treaties, primarily the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs</mark>.</p></u></strong> | null | 1nc | 3 | 430,420 | 24 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,785 | The shortage means many die | Beard 8 | Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy | our failure to adapt our organ procurement policy suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists We run the forecasts out 10 years a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage. | failure to adapt organ procurement suggests more than 80,000 lives have been sacrificed of our so-called “altruistic” system the pain and suffering of those forced to wait unemployment, and declining health must be reckoned Nonetheless, the death imposed pales in comparison to what lies ahead if change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage. | http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of our failure to adapt our cadaveric organ procurement policy to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists for each of our sample periods. We run the forecasts out 10 years from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage. Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not. | 5,967 | <h4><strong>The shortage means many die</h4><p>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of <u>our <mark>failure to adapt</mark> our</u> cadaveric <u><mark>organ</mark> <mark>procurement</mark> policy</u> to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, <u><mark>suggests</mark> that <mark>more than 80,000 lives have</mark> now <mark>been sacrificed</mark> on the altar <mark>of our so-called “altruistic” system</mark>. In addition, <mark>the</mark> unnecessary <mark>pain and</mark> <mark>suffering of those</mark> who have been <mark>forced to wait</mark> while undergoing dialysis, <mark>unemployment, and declining health must</mark> also <mark>be reckoned</mark> along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. <mark>Nonetheless, the</mark> pain, suffering, and <mark>death imposed</mark> on the innocents thus far <mark>pales in comparison to what lies ahead if</mark> more fundamental <mark>change is not forthcoming</u></mark>. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, <u><mark>we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists</u></mark> for each of our sample periods. <u>We run the forecasts out 10 years</u> from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, <u>a cumulative total of <mark>196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015</mark> <mark>as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.</u><strong></mark> Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.</p></strong> | null | null | Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives | 430,247 | 16 | 17,064 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | 565,284 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 4 | Georgetown Kazteridis-Knez | Mathis | null | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,786 | New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction | Borger 12/31 | Borger 12/31/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation) | There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba This deal will be about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. the parties to the talks have given themselves more time They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions That would provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment. It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year. | no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. is deal will b about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets anctions would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment | There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. This deal will not be about cash machines in the Caribbean, but about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away from the table. A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. So the parties to the talks have given themselves more time – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor. The legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. That would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, and a very volatile environment. It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year. | 3,580 | <h4><strong>New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction</h4><p>Borger 12/31</strong>/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)</p><p><u>There will be <mark>no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.</mark> In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba</u>, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. <u>Th<mark>is deal will</u></mark> not <u><mark>b</mark>e</u> about cash machines in the Caribbean, but <u><mark>about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth</u></mark>. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These <u>gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away</u> from the table. <u><strong><mark>A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel</u></strong>; <u>the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a <strong>wave of proliferation across the region and beyond</strong> as other countries hedge their bets</mark>. </u>So <u>the parties to the talks have given themselves more time</u> – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. <u>They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran</u>. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, <u>the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor</u>. The <u>legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered s<mark>anctions</u></mark>, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. <u>That</u> would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it <u><mark>would</u> also <u>provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament</u></mark>, the Majlis, <u><mark>and a very volatile environment</mark>. <strong>It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.</p></u></strong> | null | 1nc | 1 | 171,429 | 23 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,787 | Organ sales would be the most effective way to solve the transplant shortage | Study by Becker and Elias 14 | Study by Becker and Elias 14 Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina. Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth | Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. Paying for organs would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need. | Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths The most effective change would be to provide compensation we recommend a market for organs. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap sufficient payment would increase the supply by a large percentage, without increasing the total cost very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney Iran permits the sale by living donors waiting times have been eliminated Since the number uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o there would no longer be any significant waiting time deaths due to long waits for a transplant would disappear the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag isn't consistent with supply of other parts of the body for medical use. | Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. The most effective change, we believe, would be to provide compensation to people who give their organs—that is, we recommend establishing a market for organs. Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap. In particular, sufficient payment to kidney donors would increase the supply of kidneys by a large percentage, without greatly increasing the total cost of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. Our conclusion is that a very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney. That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but Iran permits the sale of kidneys by living donors. Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that waiting times to get kidneys have been largely eliminated. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. Since the number of kidneys available at a reasonable price would be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply of kidneys, there would no longer be any significant waiting time to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and deaths due to long waits for a transplant would essentially disappear. Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortage of organs isn't consistent with what we know about the supply of other parts of the body for medical use. For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. Paying for organs would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need. | 10,692 | <h4><strong>Organ sales would be the most effective way to solve the transplant shortage</h4><p>Study by Becker and Elias 14 </strong>Gary S. Becker, Nobel Prize-winning professor of economics at the University of Chicago and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution; and Julio J. Elias, economics professor at the Universidad del CEMA in Argentina.<strong> </strong>Updated Jan. 18, 2014 Wall Street Journal Cash for Kidneys: The Case for a Market for Organs</p><p><u>http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304149404579322560004817176?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsFifth</p><p><mark>Finding a way to increase the supply of organs would reduce wait times and deaths</mark>, and it would greatly ease the suffering that many sick individuals now endure while they hope for a transplant. <mark>The most effective change</u></mark>, we believe, <u><mark>would be to provide</mark> <mark>compensation</mark> to people who give their organs—that is, <mark>we recommend</mark> establishing <mark>a market for organs.</mark> </u>Organ transplants are one of the extraordinary developments of modern science. They began in 1954 with a kidney transplant performed at Brigham & Women's hospital in Boston. But the practice only took off in the 1970s with the development of immunosuppressive drugs that could prevent the rejection of transplanted organs. Since then, the number of kidney and other organ transplants has grown rapidly, but not nearly as rapidly as the growth in the number of people with defective organs who need transplants. The result has been longer and longer delays to receive organs. Many of those waiting for kidneys are on dialysis, and life expectancy while on dialysis isn't long. For example, people age 45 to 49 live, on average, eight additional years if they remain on dialysis, but they live an additional 23 years if they get a kidney transplant. That is why in 2012, almost 4,500 persons died while waiting for kidney transplants. Although some of those waiting would have died anyway, the great majority died because they were unable to replace their defective kidneys quickly enough. Enlarge Image The toll on those waiting for kidneys and on their families is enormous, from both greatly reduced life expectancy and the many hardships of being on dialysis. Most of those on dialysis cannot work, and the annual cost of dialysis averages about $80,000. The total cost over the average 4.5-year waiting period before receiving a kidney transplant is $350,000, which is much larger than the $150,000 cost of the transplant itself. Individuals can live a normal life with only one kidney, so about 34% of all kidneys used in transplants come from live donors. The majority of transplant kidneys come from parents, children, siblings and other relatives of those who need transplants. The rest come from individuals who want to help those in need of transplants. In recent years, kidney exchanges—in which pairs of living would-be donors and recipients who prove incompatible look for another pair or pairs of donors and recipients who would be compatible for transplants, cutting their wait time—have become more widespread. Although these exchanges have grown rapidly in the U.S. since 2005, they still account for only 9% of live donations and just 3% of all kidney donations, including after-death donations. The relatively minor role of exchanges in total donations isn't an accident, because exchanges are really a form of barter, and barter is always an inefficient way to arrange transactions. Exhortations and other efforts to encourage more organ donations have failed to significantly close the large gap between supply and demand. For example, some countries use an implied consent approach, in which organs from cadavers are assumed to be available for transplant unless, before death, individuals indicate that they don't want their organs to be used. (The U.S. continues to use informed consent, requiring people to make an active declaration of their wish to donate.) In our own highly preliminary study of a few countries—Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile and Denmark—that have made the shift to implied consent from informed consent or vice versa, we found that the switch didn't lead to consistent changes in the number of transplant surgeries. Other studies have found more positive effects from switching to implied consent, but none of the effects would be large enough to eliminate the sizable shortfall in the supply of organs in the U.S. That shortfall isn't just an American problem. It exists in most other countries as well, even when they use different methods to procure organs and have different cultures and traditions. <u><mark>Paying donors for their organs would finally eliminate the supply-demand gap</u></mark>. In particular, <u><mark>sufficient</mark> <mark>payment</mark> to kidney donors <mark>would increase the supply</mark> of kidneys <mark>by a large percentage,</mark> <mark>without</mark> greatly <mark>increasing the total cost</mark> of a kidney transplant. We have estimated how much individuals would need to be paid for kidneys to be willing to sell them for transplants. </u>These estimates take account of the slight risk to donors from transplant surgery, the number of weeks of work lost during the surgery and recovery periods, and the small risk of reduction in the quality of life. <u>Our conclusion is that a <mark>very large number of both live and cadaveric kidney donations would be available by paying about $15,000 for each kidney</mark>.</u> That estimate isn't exact, and the true cost could be as high as $25,000 or as low as $5,000—but even the high estimate wouldn't increase the total cost of kidney transplants by a large percentage. Few countries have ever allowed the open purchase and sale of organs, but <u><mark>Iran permits the sale</mark> of kidneys <mark>by living donors</mark>.</u> Scattered and incomplete evidence from Iran indicates that the price of kidneys there is about $4,000 and that <u><mark>waiting times</mark> to get kidneys <mark>have</mark> <mark>been</mark> largely <mark>eliminated</u></mark>. Since Iran's per capita income is one-quarter of that of the U.S., this evidence supports our $15,000 estimate. Other countries are also starting to think along these lines: Singapore and Australia have recently introduced limited payments to live donors that compensate mainly for time lost from work. <u><mark>Since the number</mark> of kidneys available at a reasonable price wo<mark>uld be far more than needed to close the gap between the demand and supply o</mark>f kidneys, <mark>there would no longer be any significant waiting time </mark>to get a kidney transplant. The number of people on dialysis would decline dramatically, and <mark>deaths due to long waits for a transplant</mark> <mark>would</mark> essentially <mark>disappear</mark>. </u>Today, finding a compatible kidney isn't easy. There are four basic blood types, and tissue matching is complex and involves the combination of six proteins. Blood and tissue type determine the chance that a kidney will help a recipient in the long run. But the sale of organs would result in a large supply of most kidney types, and with large numbers of kidneys available, transplant surgeries could be arranged to suit the health of recipients (and donors) because surgeons would be confident that compatible kidneys would be available. The system that we're proposing would include payment to individuals who agree that their organs can be used after they die. This is important because transplants for heart and lungs and most liver transplants only use organs from the deceased. Under a new system, individuals would sell their organs "forward" (that is, for future use), with payment going to their heirs after their organs are harvested. Relatives sometimes refuse to have organs used even when a deceased family member has explicitly requested it, and they would be more inclined to honor such wishes if they received substantial compensation for their assent. The idea of paying organ donors has met with strong opposition from some (but not all) transplant surgeons and other doctors, as well as various academics, political leaders and others. Critics have claimed that paying for organs would be ineffective, that payment would be immoral because it involves the sale of body parts and that the main donors would be the desperate poor, who could come to regret their decision. In short, critics believe that monetary payments for organs would be repugnant. But <u><mark>the claim that payments would be ineffective in eliminating the shortag</mark>e of organs <mark>isn't consistent with</mark> what we know about the <mark>supply of other parts of the body for medical use.</u></mark> For example, the U.S. allows market-determined payments to surrogate mothers—and surrogacy takes time, involves great discomfort and is somewhat risky. Yet in the U.S., the average payment to a surrogate mother is only about $20,000. Another illuminating example is the all-volunteer U.S. military. Critics once asserted that it wouldn't be possible to get enough capable volunteers by offering them only reasonable pay, especially in wartime. But the all-volunteer force has worked well in the U.S., even during wars, and the cost of these recruits hasn't been excessive. Whether paying donors is immoral because it involves the sale of organs is a much more subjective matter, but we question this assertion, given the very serious problems with the present system. Any claim about the supposed immorality of organ sales should be weighed against the morality of preventing thousands of deaths each year and improving the quality of life of those waiting for organs. How can paying for organs to increase their supply be more immoral than the injustice of the present system? Under the type of system we propose, safeguards could be created against impulsive behavior or exploitation. For example, to reduce the likelihood of rash donations, a period of three months or longer could be required before someone would be allowed to donate their kidneys or other organs. This would give donors a chance to re-evaluate their decisions, and they could change their minds at any time before the surgery. They could also receive guidance from counselors on the wisdom of these decisions. Though the poor would be more likely to sell their kidneys and other organs, they also suffer more than others from the current scarcity. Today, the rich often don't wait as long as others for organs since some of them go to countries such as India, where they can arrange for transplants in the underground medical sector, and others (such as the late Steve Jobs ) manage to jump the queue by having residence in several states or other means. The sale of organs would make them more available to the poor, and Medicaid could help pay for the added cost of transplant surgery. The altruistic giving of organs might decline with an open market, since the incentive to give organs to a relative, friend or anyone else would be weaker when organs are readily available to buy. On the other hand, the altruistic giving of money to those in need of organs could increase to help them pay for the cost of organ transplants. <u>Paying for organs </u>would lead to more transplants—and thereby, perhaps, to a large increase in the overall medical costs of transplantation. But it <u>would save the cost of dialysis for people waiting for kidney transplants and other costs to individuals waiting for other organs. More important, it would prevent thousands of deaths and improve the quality of life among those who now must wait years before getting the organs they need.</p><p><strong> </p></u></strong> | null | null | Contention 1 – organ sales will save lives | 430,254 | 24 | 17,064 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | 565,284 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 4 | Georgetown Kazteridis-Knez | Mathis | null | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,788 | Plan destroys the treaty regime- the CP is key to a model of re-interpretation that keeps it intact | Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 | Bewley-Taylor et al 2014 (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf) | The United States invested more effort than any other nation to influence the design of the global control regime If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession are still criminal offences under federal drug law and because the treaty provisions allow flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. if, the U.S. interpretation attracted political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include coffeeshops | If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument regarding enforcement priorities still criminal offences under federal drug law because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system f, the U.S. interpretation attracted of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation | The United States has invested probably more effort than any other nation over the past century to influence the design of the global control regime and enforce its almost universal adherence. If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department regarding enforcement priorities, claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession of cannabis are still criminal offences under federal drug law; and because the treaty provisions allow for considerable flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system. Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, if, the U.S. interpretation attracted a certain level of political acceptance and became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation, significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up. Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a de facto amendment by means of broad interpretation that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the coffeeshops by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines. | 4,540 | <h4>Plan destroys the treaty regime- the CP is key to a model of re-interpretation that keeps it intact</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor et al 2014</strong> (Dave Bewley-Taylor, Tom Blickman and Martin Jelsma, Professor of International Relations and Public Policy at Swansea University and founding Director of the Global Drug Policy Observatory, The Rise and Decline of Cannabis Prohibition, http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/rise_and_decline_web.pdf)</p><p><u>The United States</u> has <u>invested</u> probably <u>more effort than any other nation</u> over the past century <u>to</u> <u>influence the design of the global control regime</u> and enforce its almost universal adherence. <u><strong><mark>If the U.S. now proclaims it can no longer live by the regime’s rules, it risks undermining the legal instrument</u></strong></mark> it has used so often in the past to coerce other countries to operate in accordance with U.S. drug control policies and principles. <u><mark>Officials in Washington have been trying to develop a legal argument</u></mark>, based on the August 2013 memorandum from the Justice Department <u><mark>regarding</u> <u><strong>enforcement priorities</u></strong></mark>, <u>claiming that the U.S. is not violating the treaties because cultivation, trade and possession</u> of cannabis <u>are <strong><mark>still criminal offences under federal drug law</u></strong></mark>; <u>and <mark>because the treaty provisions allow</u> for considerable <u>flexibility regarding law enforcement practices, especially when there are conflicts with a party’s constitution and domestic legal system</mark>.</u> Using the expediency principle, the argument continues, federal law enforcement intervention in state-level cannabis regulation is simply not high priority; but by allowing states de facto to regulate the cannabis market, the federal government would not be violating its international treaty obligations because the approaches pursued in Washington and Colorado are still prohibited under federal law. In legal terms, such a line of argumentation is easily contestable. The INCB has pointed out in recent annual reports in reference to cannabis developments at state level in the U.S., a party is obliged “to ensure the full implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire territory”. Hence law enforcement priority isn’t a valid consideration; rather the law needs to be in conformity with the treaties at all levels of jurisdiction. Any reference regarding treaty flexibility based on the premise that the manner in which a party implements the provisions is “subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system” is also very problematic. While that principle applied to the 1961 Convention as a whole, the escape clause was deliberately deleted from the 1988 Convention with regard to the obligation to establish cultivation, trade and possession as a criminal offence, except in relation to personal consumption mainly due to U.S. pressure during the negotiations. Washington’s rationale was that it wanted to limit the flexibility the preceding conventions had left to nation states. And finally (as mentioned in the section on Dutch coffeeshops in the previous chapter), the 1988 Convention restricted the use of discretionary legal powers regarding cultivation and trafficking offences (article 3, paragraph 6). All that notwithstanding, <u>i<mark>f, the U.S. interpretation attracted</mark> </u>a certain level <mark>of <u>political acceptance</u> <u>and</u> <u>became part of an extended practice of flexible treaty interpretation</u>, <u><strong>significantly more room for manoeuvre would open up</u></strong></mark>. <u>Other countries would be able to apply similar arguments</u>, not only to legally justify cannabis regulation, but for other currently contested policies as well, such as drug consumption rooms or legally regulated markets for coca leaf. <u><mark>Accepting such an argumentation would come close to a <strong>de facto amendment</strong> by means of broad interpretation</u></mark> that would restore the escape clause for the entire 1988 Convention (including for article 3, paragraph 1 (a) and (b) offences), and simultaneously annul the restrictions placed on the exercise of discretionary powers under domestic law. The Netherlands, for example, made a special reservation upon ratification of the 1988 Convention, exempting the country from the limitations on prosecutorial discretion the treaty intended to impose. Even with such a reservation in hand, however, the Dutch government has maintained thus far that the expediency principle under which the coffeeshops are operating, could not be used to justify non-enforcement guidelines with regard to cannabis cultivation. That position has often been challenged in the domestic policy debate as an excessively restrictive legal interpretation of existing treaty flexibility. <u><mark>If the U.S. now asserts that the treaties are sufficiently flexible to allow state control and taxed regulation</u></mark> of cultivation and trade for non-medical purposes on its territory, accordingly <u>the Netherlands could comfortably extend the expediency principle to include</u> the cultivation of cannabis destined to supply the <u>coffeeshops</u><strong> by issuing additional nonprosecution guidelines.</p></strong> | null | 1nc | 3 | 430,422 | 43 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,789 | Text: The United States Federal Government should | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>Text: The United States Federal Government should</h4></strong> | null | 1nc | 2 | 430,421 | 1 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,790 | The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market | Hughes 9 | Hughes 9 J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009. | U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid | A thriving global market in human organs has resulted from U.S. banning organ sales. illegality of the trade is insufficient to discourage many faced with the possibility of dying on an waiting list transplant tourism" has become its own industry S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, under don't ask, don't tell" policy The lack of regulated organ marketplace in the U.S resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world .S. policy have produced immoral and unethical consequences | Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351
Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models
U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. A thriving global black market in human organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales. n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and "transplant tourism" has become its own industry. n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world. n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 In short, U.S. policy and its ban on organ sales have produced some of the same immoral and unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid. n92 | 2,620 | <h4><strong>The US ban on sales has created an international illegal market</h4><p>Hughes 9</strong> J. Andrew Hughes, J.D. candidate, Vanderbilt University Law School, May 2009.</p><p>Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law January, 2009 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 351</p><p>Note: You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models</p><p><u>U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a domestic organ shortage. <mark>A</mark> <mark>thriving global</u></mark> black <u><mark>market in human organs has resulted from U.S.</mark> policy <mark>banning organ sales</u>.</mark> n78 While nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws. n79 <u>The <mark>illegality of the</mark> organ <mark>trade is insufficient to</mark> <mark>discourage many </mark>of those <mark>faced with the possibility of dying on an</mark> organ <mark>waiting list</mark>, and "<mark>transplant tourism" has become its own industry</mark>.</u> n80 In Bombay in 2001, nearly US$ 10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. n81 Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not being paid. n82 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human organs." n83 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases in Estonia and Germany suggest. n84 <u>U.<mark>S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too,</mark> often <mark>under</mark> hospitals' "<mark>don't ask, don't tell" policy</mark> regarding transplants involving foreigners who claim to be related</u>. n85 U.S. hospitals set their own rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship between "donors" and "donees." n86 <u><mark>The lack of</mark> a <mark>regulated organ marketplace in the U.S</mark>. has <mark>resulted in</mark> <mark>exploitation of the poor throughout the world</mark>.</u> n87 Organ sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems; as such, they are easy targets for abuse. n88 Prisoners and the homeless are among those exploited. n89 Sellers of organs on the black market are often paid less than what they were initially promised, while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the transplants. n90 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys [*363] support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ sales, and "four out of five sellers would not recommend that others follow their lead in selling organs." n91 <u>In short, U<mark>.S. policy</mark> and its ban on organ sales <mark>have produced</mark> some of the same <mark>immoral and unethical consequences</mark> the ban was designed to avoid</u><strong>. n92</p></strong> | null | null | Contention 2 is illegal markets | 430,256 | 14 | 17,064 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | 565,284 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 4 | Georgetown Kazteridis-Knez | Mathis | null | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,791 | Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law | Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf) | Bewley-Taylor 2003 (David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf) | Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary including legalisation of cannabis Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions. | Disregarding the treaties raises serious issues nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system selective application would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions. | Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties or certain parts of them. In this way they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary at the national level, including for example the legalisation of cannabis and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. Disregarding all or selected components of the treaties, however, raises serious issues beyond the realm of drug control. The possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the selective application of such a principle would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions. | 1,236 | <h4>Disregarding drug control treaties spills over- destroys international law</h4><p><strong>Bewley-Taylor 2003</strong> <u><strong>(David, Department of American Studies, Vnireraty of Wales Swansea Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and Possibilities International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (2003) 171/179, http://www.unawestminster.org.uk/pdf/drugs/UNdrugsBewley_Taylor_IJDP14.pdf)</p><p>Another strategy would be for Parties to simply ignore the treaties</u></strong> or certain parts of them. In this way <u><strong>they could institute any policies deemed to be necessary</u></strong> at the national level, <u><strong>including</u></strong> for example the <u><strong>legalisation of cannabis</u></strong> and the introduction of a licensing system for domestic producers. This option has been gaining support amongst many opponents of the prohibition based international system for some time. <u><strong><mark>Disregarding</u></strong></mark> all or selected components of <u><strong><mark>the treaties</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>raises serious issues</mark> beyond the realm of drug control</u></strong>. <u><strong>The possibility of <mark>nations unilaterally ignoring drug control treaty commitments could threaten the stability of the entire treaty system</u></strong></mark>. As a consequence states may be wary of opting out. Some international lawyers argue that all treaties can naturally cease to be binding when a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred since the time of signing (Starke, 1989, pp. 473/474). Bearing in mind the dramatic changes in the nature and extent of the drug problem since the 1960s, this doctrine of rebus sic stantibus could probably be applied to the drug treaties. Yet the <u><strong><mark>selective application</u></strong></mark> of such a principle <u><strong><mark>would call into question the validity of many and varied conventions.</p></u></strong></mark> | null | 1nc | 3 | 193,806 | 47 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,792 | permit and facilitate “paired-organ exchanges” with an indirect exchange if no direct exchange matches are available. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong> permit and facilitate “paired-organ exchanges” with an indirect exchange if no direct exchange matches are available. </h4></strong> | null | 1nc | 2 | 430,423 | 1 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,793 | And that market is expanding—desperation and profit ensures expansion and exploitation | Samadi 2012 | Samadi 2012 – Vice Chairman of the Department of Urology and Chief of Robotics and Minimally Invasive Surgery at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (David, May 30, 2012, “Consequences of the rise in illegal organ trafficking,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/05/30/consequences-rise-in-illegal-organ-trafficking/,) | the WHO released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. Unfortunately the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives with patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs In the majority of situations, those selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations In countries like Pakistan, China or India a person can sell a kidney for $5,000 while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit Prior reports demonstrated that the recipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower statistics might underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable | WHO) released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market , in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives, hose selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations. ipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally. the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower | Earlier this week, the World Health Organization (WHO) released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market. According to the paper, in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour. Organ transplantation is a necessary treatment for many individuals whose organs have failed and has been in practice in the United States since the 1950s. In the U.S. organ donations are regulated by an independent non-for-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Organs are given to those whose need is the greatest, regardless of wealth or position. Unfortunately, the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply. As of March 2012 over 113,115 patients are currently waiting for an organ to become available. An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation, and the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives, with patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney. According to the WHO report, 76 percent of organs sold were kidneys, reflecting the growing demand secondary to complications of high blood pressure and diabetes. There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs. In the majority of situations, those selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations. In countries like Pakistan, China or India, a person can sell a kidney for $5,000, while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit. Prior reports have also demonstrated that the recipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally. A recent meta-analysis involving 39 original publications revealed that those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV. Furthermore the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower. These statistics might even underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias; those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies. Additionally, given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams. In 2010, a former psychiatrist was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison for offering false promises of organ transplants in the Philippines, while taking over $400,000 dollars from patients. Over five patients actually travelled to the Philippines only to find out that there was no organ awaiting them. One of these patients died in the Philippines. Regretfully, the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable | 2,662 | <h4><strong>And that market is <u>expanding</u>—desperation and profit ensures expansion and exploitation</h4><p>Samadi 2012</strong> – Vice Chairman of the Department of Urology and Chief of Robotics and Minimally Invasive Surgery at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine (David, May 30, 2012, “Consequences of the rise in illegal organ trafficking,” Fox News, http://www.foxnews.com/health/2012/05/30/consequences-rise-in-illegal-organ-trafficking/,)</p><p>Earlier this week, <u>the</u> World Health Organization (<u><mark>WHO</u>) <u>released a report demonstrating a rise in the number of human organs being sold on the black market</u></mark>. According to the paper<mark>, <u>in 2010 over 10,000 organs were sold, translating to more than one organ sold every hour.</mark> </u>Organ transplantation is a necessary treatment for many individuals whose organs have failed and has been in practice in the United States since the 1950s. In the U.S. organ donations are regulated by an independent non-for-profit organization, United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Organs are given to those whose need is the greatest, regardless of wealth or position. <u>Unfortunately</u>, <u>the need for organs greatly outweighs the current supply</u>. As of March 2012 over 113,115 patients are currently waiting for an organ to become available. <u><mark>An illegal market has capitalized on these individuals’ desperation</u></mark>, and <u><mark>the prospects of large profits are creating unfortunate incentives</u>,</mark> <u>with</u> <u>patients willing to pay up to $200,000 for a kidney</u>. According to the WHO report, 76 percent of organs sold were kidneys, reflecting the growing demand secondary to complications of high blood pressure and diabetes. <u>There are many ethical and health concerns surrounding the trafficking of human organs</u>. <u>In the majority of situations, t<mark>hose selling their organs represent members of vulnerable populations</u>.</mark> <u>In countries like Pakistan, China or India</u>, <u>a person can sell a kidney for $5,000</u>, <u>while those handling the transaction make a substantial profit</u>. <u>Prior reports</u> have also <u>demonstrated that the rec<mark>ipients of illegal organs tend to fair worse than those who have received one legally</u>.</mark> A recent meta-analysis involving 39 original publications revealed that <u>those obtaining organs abroad are at a higher risk of contracting transmissible diseases, such as hepatitis B or HIV</u>. Furthermore <u><mark>the patient and organ survival rates abroad are significantly lower</u></mark>. These <u>statistics</u> <u>might</u> even <u>underestimate the risk as the data is vulnerable to survivor bias</u>; <u>those who do not survive the procedure and return home are often not included in studies</u>. Additionally, <u>given the duplicitous nature of illegal organ trade, there are many scams</u>. In 2010, a former psychiatrist was sentenced to more than 15 years in prison for offering false promises of organ transplants in the Philippines, while taking over $400,000 dollars from patients. Over five patients actually travelled to the Philippines only to find out that there was no organ awaiting them. One of these patients died in the Philippines. Regretfully, <u>the number of individuals needing organs continues to grow while the number of donors remains stable</u><strong> </p></strong> | null | null | Contention 2 is illegal markets | 267,351 | 8 | 17,064 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | 565,284 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 4 | Georgetown Kazteridis-Knez | Mathis | null | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,794 | International treaty system solves great power war | Muller 2000 | Muller 2000 (Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf) | As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age arms races are likely stabilization remains a key a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. arms limitation agreement are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth Global agreements also reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement. | as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists constructing barriers against major violence remains a pivotal task arms races are likely interlocking agreements create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome confrontations and enable transitions towards cooperative relationships arms limitation agreements are needed to ban existential dangers ecological safety, and the survival of human life Global agreements reduce the chances that conflicts will escalate. , it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if means are available to ensure compliance | In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • As long as the risk of great power rivalry and competition exists—and it exists today—constructing barriers against a degeneration of this competition into major violence remains a pivotal task of global security policy. Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, arms races are likely to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or stabilization remains a key goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, a web of interlocking agreements may even create enough of a sense of security and confidence to overcome past confrontations and enable transitions towards more cooperative relationships. At the global level, arms limitation or prohibition agreements, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, are needed to ban existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety, and maybe the very survival of human life on earth. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. Global agreements also affect regional balances and help, if successful, to reduce the chances that regional conflicts will escalate. Under opportune circumstances, the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement, it will serve these worthwhile purposes only if it is implemented appropriately and, if not, means are available to ensure compliance. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement. | 3,802 | <h4><strong>International treaty system solves great power war</h4><p>Muller 2000 </strong>(Dr. Harold Muller is the Director of the Peace Research Institute-Frankfurt and Professor of International Relations at Goethe University Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multilateral Arms Control Treaty Enforcement http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72muell.pdf)</p><p>In this author's view,3 at least four distinct missions continue to make arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements useful, even indispensable parts of a stable and reliable world security structure: • <u>As long <mark>as the risk of <strong>great power rivalry</strong> and <strong>competition</strong> exists</u></mark>—and it exists today—<u><mark>constructing barriers</mark> <mark>against</mark> a degeneration of this competition into <strong><mark>major violence</strong> remains a pivotal task</u></mark> of global security policy. <u>Things may be more complicated than during the bipolar age</u> since asymmetries loom larger and more than one pair of competing major powers may exist. With overlapping rivalries among these powers, <u><mark>arms races are <strong>likely</u></strong></mark> to be interconnected, and the stability of any one pair of rivals might be affected negatively by developments in other dyads. Because of this greater risk of instability, the increased political complexity of the post-bipolar world calls for more rather than less arms control. For these competitive relationships, stability or <u>stabilization remains a key</u> goal, and effectively verified agreements can contribute much to establish such stability. • Arms control also has a role to play in securing regional stability. At the regional level, arms control agreements can create balances of forces that reassure regional powers that their basic security is certain, and help build confidence in the basically non-aggressive policies of neighbors. Over time, <u>a web of <strong><mark>interlocking agreements</strong></mark> may even <mark>create enough of a sense of <strong>security</strong> and <strong>confidence</strong> to overcome</mark> past <mark>confrontations and enable transitions towards</mark> more <mark>cooperative relationships</mark>.</u> At the global level, <u><mark>arms limitation</u></mark> or prohibition <u><mark>agreement</u>s</mark>, notably in the field of weapons of mass destruction, <u><mark>are needed to ban <strong>existential dangers</strong></mark> for global stability, <strong><mark>ecological</strong> safety, and</mark> maybe <strong><mark>the</mark> very <mark>survival of human life</mark> on earth</u></strong>. In an age of increasing interdependence and ensuing complex networks that support the satisfaction of basic needs, international cooperation is needed to secure the smooth working of these networks. Arms control can create underlying conditions of security and stability that reduce distrust and enable countries to commit them-selves to far-reaching cooperation in other sectors without perceiving undesirable risks to their national security. <u><mark>Global agreements</mark> also</u> affect regional balances and help, if successful, to <u><strong><mark>reduce the chances</strong> that</mark> regional <mark>conflicts will escalate</u>.</mark> Under opportune circumstances, <u>the normative frameworks that they enshrine may engender a feeling of community and shared security interests that help reduce the general level of conflict and assist in ushering in new relations of global cooperation</u>. • Finally, one aspect that is rarely discussed in the arms control context is arms control among friends and partners. It takes the innocent form of military cooperation; joint staffs, commands, and units; common procurement planning; and broad and far-reaching transparency. While these relations serve at the surface to enhance a country's military capability by linking it with others, they are conducive as well to creating a sense of irreversibility in current friendly relations, by making unthinkable a return to previous, possibly more conflictual times. European defense cooperation is a case in point.1 Whatever the particular mission of a specific agreement<mark>, <u>it will serve these worthwhile purposes <strong>only if</u></strong></mark> it is implemented appropriately and, if not, <u><mark>means are available to ensure <strong>compliance</strong></mark>. In other words, the enduring value of arms control rests very much on the ability to assure compliance.5 Despite the reasons given above for the continuing utility of arms control, the skeptics may still have the last word if agreements are made empty shells by repeated breaches and a lack of effective enforcement.</p></u> | null | 1nc | 3 | 65,123 | 59 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,795 | Set up an opt-out system for cadaveric donations | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>Set up an opt-out system for cadaveric donations</h4></strong> | null | 1nc | 2 | 430,424 | 1 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,796 | Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off. | Jaycox 12 | Jaycox 12 Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,
Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION | Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them: | Moazam found almost all organ vendors were in significant debt at the time they sold their kidneys Although vendors were promised by brokers 160,000 rupees the amount received was 103,000 rupees a majority were either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady majority expressed regret because they were not freed from their debts sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them: | http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf
Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat Moazam offers the results of a recent study in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 He found that almost all of these organ vendors were in significant debt to wealthy landlords at the time they sold their kidneys; the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. Although the vendors were promised by third-party brokers an average price of 160,000 rupees per kidney, the amount actually received by the vendors was an average of 103,000 rupees. As a result, a majority (17) of them were ‘either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’ at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, a majority of the vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady as a result of their nephrectomies, and a majority also expressed regret or shame for their decision because they were not freed from their debts and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act. When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them: In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254. | 2,479 | <h4><strong>Economically desperate people are coerced into selling their organs in the hope of bettering their situation. As a result of the actions of unscrupulous organ brokers and inadequate medical care, they are actually made worse off.</h4><p>Jaycox 12</strong> Michael P. Jaycox, teaching fellow and Ph.D. candidate in theological ethics at Boston College,</p><p>Developing World Bioethics Volume 12 Number 3 2012 pp 135–147 COERCION, AUTONOMY, AND THE PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR IN THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION</p><p>http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1471-8847.2012.00327.x/pdf</p><p><u>Pakistani surgeon and bioethicist Farhat <mark>Moazam</mark> offers the results of a recent study </u>in which he interviewed thirty-two farm laborers in Pakistan, each of whom had sold a kidney within the past three years. 14 <u>He <mark>found</mark> that <mark>almost all </mark>of these <mark>organ vendors were in significant debt</mark> to wealthy landlords <mark>at the time they sold their kidneys</mark>;</u> the average debt of each was 130,000 rupees at the time of sale. <u><mark>Although</mark> the <mark>vendors were promised by</mark> third-party <mark>brokers </mark>an average price of <mark>160,000 rupees</mark> per kidney, <mark>the amount</mark> actually <mark>received</mark> by the vendors <mark>was</mark> an average of <mark>103,000 rupees</mark>. As a result, <mark>a majority</mark> </u>(17) <u>of them <mark>were</mark> ‘<mark>either still in debt or had accumulated new debts’</mark> </u>at the time of their interviews. 15 Moreover, <u>a majority of the <mark>vendors experienced long-term physical and psychological malady</mark> as a result of their nephrectomies, and a <mark>majority</mark> also <mark>expressed regret</mark> or shame for their decision <mark>because they were not freed from their debts</mark> and/or felt they had committed a morally wrong act.</u> When asked why they had made the decision, ‘the most common [Urdu] words they used were majboori (a word that arises from the root jabr, which means a state that is beyond one’s control) and<u> </u>ghurbat (extreme poverty).’16,<u><strong>Moazam summarizes his findings with the conclusion that the <mark>sale of kidneys functions to reinforce the poverty of those who sell them:</strong></mark> </u><strong>In the words of the vendors, they sell a kidney...in order to fulfill what they see as obligations toward immediate and extended families in which they are inextricably embedded, and within systems of social and economic inequalities which they can neither control nor escape. They sell kidneys in hopes of paying off loans taken to cover their families’ medical expenses or to meet the responsibilities for arranging marriages and burying their dead. These are recurring expenses, and for most the debts rapidly accumulate again, even if they have been partially or completely paid back with the money from selling a kidney. 17 4 F. Moazam, R.M. Zaman & A.M. Jafarey. Conversations with Kidney Vendors in Pakistan: An Ethnographic Study.Hastings Cent Rep 2009; 39: 29–44. Due to recent legislation (18 March 2010), the sale of human organs is now illegal in Pakistan, although the social effects of this new legislation remain to be studied; see T.M. Pope. Legal Briefing: Organ Donation and Allocation. J Clin Ethics 2010; 21: 243–263: 254.</p></strong> | null | null | Contention 2 is illegal markets | 430,255 | 14 | 17,064 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | 565,284 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 4 | Georgetown Kazteridis-Knez | Mathis | null | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,797 | Hegemony is unsustainable | Layne, 12 | Layne, 12 - Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley (Christopher, 2012, "The Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, Ebsco, p. 2, KONTOPOULOS) | it now is evident that the declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. The Great Recession has underscored the reality of decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise. the Great Recession has accelerated forces driving trends and magnified their impact. There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The external is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia. the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domestically, the driver of change is the decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis confronting the U S and increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status. | The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. the Great Recession has accelerated forces driving trends and magnified their impact drivers of American decline is the emergence of new great powers and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia the rise of China—is the most tangible evidence of the erosion of power Domestically, the driver of change is the decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the dollar’s hold on reserve currency status | Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, it now is evident that both the 1980s declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right after all. The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. The Great Recession has underscored the reality of US decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise. To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of history. However, it is fair to say the Great Recession has both accelerated the causal forces driving these trends and magnified their impact. There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The external driver of US decline is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia. In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domestically, the driver of change is the relative—and in some ways absolute—decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis confronting the United States, and increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status. | 1,507 | <h4>Hegemony is unsustainable</h4><p><strong>Layne, 12</strong> - Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley (Christopher, 2012, "The Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, Ebsco, p. 2, KONTOPOULOS)</p><p>Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, <u><strong>it now is evident that</u></strong> both <u><strong>the</u></strong> 1980s <u><strong>declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right</u></strong> after all. <u><strong><mark>The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun.</mark> The Great Recession has underscored the reality of</u></strong> US <u><strong>decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise.</u></strong> To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of history. However, it is fair to say <u><strong><mark>the Great Recession has</u></strong></mark> both <u><strong><mark>accelerated</u></strong></mark> the causal <u><strong><mark>forces driving</u></strong></mark> these <u><strong><mark>trends and magnified their impact</mark>. There are two <mark>drivers of American decline</mark>, one external and one domestic. The external</u></strong> driver of US decline <u><strong><mark>is the emergence of new great powers</mark> in world politics <mark>and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia</mark>.</u></strong> In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: <u><strong><mark>the rise of</mark> new great powers—especially <mark>China—is</mark> in itself <mark>the most tangible evidence of the erosion of</mark> the United States’ <mark>power</mark>. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. <mark>Domestically, the driver of change is the</u></strong></mark> relative—and in some ways absolute—<u><strong><mark>decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis</mark> confronting the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> increasing <mark>doubts about the dollar’s</mark> long-term <mark>hold on reserve currency status</mark>.</p></u></strong> | null | 1nc | a1 | 127,282 | 17 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,798 | Training health professionals to educate the public about organ donation | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>Training health professionals to educate the public about organ donation</h4></strong> | null | 1nc | 2 | 430,425 | 1 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,799 | They only defer decline, don’t contribute positively to US heg | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>They only defer decline, don’t contribute positively to US heg</h4> | null | 1nc | a1 | 430,426 | 1 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,800 | For many, the coercion is more violent | Bowden 13 | Bowden 13 Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis | Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades Imagine living in a poor country As you walk peacefully you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live , there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. | Organ trafficking depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given Your body is then dumped you are extremely lucky if you live. on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking | [*452] Introduction Organ trafficking has been depriving innocent people of their fundamental right to life for decades. n1 Imagine living in a poor country, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. As you walk peacefully to your home at the end of the day, you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck. n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, no anesthesia is administered and no medication is given to prevent infection. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. Your body is then dumped on a side street, and you are extremely lucky if you live. Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However, there are reported accounts suggesting that abduction of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking. n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10 | 1,529 | <h4><strong>For many, the coercion is more violent</h4><p>Bowden 13</strong> Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis</p><p> [*452] Introduction <u><mark>Organ trafficking</mark> has been <mark>depriving innocent people of their</mark> <mark>fundamental right to life</mark> for decades</u>. n1 <u>Imagine living in a poor country</u>, where you wake up in the morning and set out to find work and food for the day. <u>As you walk peacefully</u> to your home at the end of the day, <u><mark>you are grabbed and thrown into the back of an unmarked truck</mark>. </u>n2 You wake up, screaming from excruciating pain, as <u><mark>a surgeon slices through your flesh to remove your kidney</u></mark>. Due to the costs associated with such a procedure, <u><mark>no anesthesia is administered and no medication</mark> <mark>is given</mark> to prevent infection</u>. n3 In the event that the surgery does not go as planned, no forms of emergency assistance are available. <u><mark>Your body is then dumped</mark> on a side street, and <mark>you are extremely lucky if you live</u>.</mark> Should you report the incident to government officials? What if the government is actually involved in this inhumane activity? n4 [*453] There are conflicting views on whether people are actually kidnapped for their organs. n5 In fact, many believe these stories are just myths. n6 However<u>, there are reported accounts suggesting that abducti<mark>on of organs is a harsh reality of organ trafficking</mark>.</u> n7 Reports indicate organ trafficking is so prevalent that there is a surplus of organs available for transplantation. n8 <u>Furthermore, there is evidence of governmental involvement, which contributes to and exacerbates the problem. </u>n9 Fortunately, most countries have enacted laws to prevent and prohibit organ trafficking from occurring. n10</p><p><strong> </p></strong> | null | null | Contention 2 is illegal markets | 430,258 | 14 | 17,064 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | 565,284 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 4 | Georgetown Kazteridis-Knez | Mathis | null | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,801 | Families and friends of two distinct patients can be matched up for two successful transplants under our advocacy-it solves | Morley 3’ | Morley 3’ Michael T. “Increasing the Supply of Organs for Transplantation through Paired Organ Exchanges” Yale Law & Policy Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter, 2003), pp. 221-262 http://www.jstor.org/stable/40232670 PA | federal law should be amended so as to allow the already-existing registry of patients in need of organ transplants to bring together different patients on the waiting list in order to save lives A system of paired organ exchanges would facilitate transplantation in situations where a friend or family member of Patient A is incompatible with him, but would be compatible with some other person on the waiting list (Patient B), and a close friend or family member of Patient B is incompatible with her, but compatible with Patient A. The family member of patient A would donate a compatible nonvital organ to patient B, on the condition that the family member of patient B donates a compatible nonvital organ to patient A; hence the phrase "paired organ exchange paired organ exchanges should not only be permitted under federal law, but also facilitated, by expanding the existing national database of patients in need of organs to include information about individuals potentially willing to donate on behalf of each patient , the government could bring together compatible donors and recipients who would otherwise never meet, and in each successful case allow two transplants to occur that might otherwise be impossible | federal law should be amended so as to allow the already-existing registry of patients in need of organ transplants to bring together different patients on the waiting list in order to save live paired organ exchanges would facilitate in situations where a friend or family member of Patient A is incompatible with him, but would be compatible with some other person on the waiting list and a close friend or family member of Patient B is incompatible with her, but compatible with Patient A paired organ exchanges should not only be permitted under federal law, but also facilitated, by expanding the existing national database of patients | This Note argues that federal law should be amended so as to allow the already-existing registry of patients in need of organ transplants to bring together the families and friends of different patients on the waiting list in order to save lives. There are many people who, although willing to donate a nonvital organ to save the life of a loved one in need of a transplant, are unable to do so due to biological incompatibility.18 A system of paired organ exchanges would facilitate transplantation in situations where a friend or family member of Patient A is incompatible with him, but would be compatible with some other person on the waiting list (Patient B), and a close friend or family member of Patient B is incompatible with her, but compatible with Patient A. The family member of patient A would donate a compatible nonvital organ to patient B, on the condition that the family member of patient B donates a compatible nonvital organ to patient A; hence the phrase "paired organ exchange." While potential enforcement issues can be avoided by conducting the transplants at the same time and, if possible, in the same hospital, this is not essential to my proposal. I contend that paired organ exchanges should not only be permitted under federal law, but also facilitated, by expanding the existing national database of patients in need of organs to include information about individuals potentially willing to donate on behalf of each patient, and using this data to identify cross-matches. By permitting and facilitating paired organ exchanges, the government could bring together compatible donors and recipients who would otherwise never meet, and in each successful case allow two transplants to occur that might otherwise be impossible. This system would, of course, be limited to the exchange of nonvital or regenerable organs (kidneys and livers), where donation would not endanger the donor or adversely impact the donor's major life activities. | 1,966 | <h4><strong>Families and friends of two distinct patients can be matched up for two successful transplants under our advocacy-it solves</h4><p>Morley 3’ </strong>Michael T. “Increasing the Supply of Organs for Transplantation through Paired Organ Exchanges” Yale Law & Policy Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Winter, 2003), pp. 221-262 http://www.jstor.org/stable/40232670 PA</p><p>This Note argues that <u><mark>federal law should be amended so as to allow the already-existing registry of patients in need of organ transplants to bring together</u></mark> the families and friends of <u><mark>different patients on the waiting list in order to save live</mark>s</u>. There are many people who, although willing to donate a nonvital organ to save the life of a loved one in need of a transplant, are unable to do so due to biological incompatibility.18 <u>A system of <mark>paired organ exchanges would facilitate</mark> transplantation <mark>in situations where a friend or family member of Patient A is incompatible with him, but would be compatible with some other person on the waiting list</mark> (Patient B), <mark>and a close friend or family member of Patient B is incompatible with her, but compatible with Patient A</mark>. The family member of patient A would donate a compatible nonvital organ to patient B, on the condition that the family member of patient B donates a compatible nonvital organ to patient A; hence the phrase "paired organ exchange</u>." While potential enforcement issues can be avoided by conducting the transplants at the same time and, if possible, in the same hospital, this is not essential to my proposal. I contend that <u><mark>paired organ exchanges should not only be permitted under federal law, but also facilitated, by expanding the existing national database of patients</mark> in need of organs to include information about individuals potentially willing to donate on behalf of each patient</u>, and using this data to identify cross-matches. By permitting and facilitating paired organ exchanges<u>, the government could bring together compatible donors and recipients who would otherwise never meet, and in each successful case allow two transplants to occur that might otherwise be impossible</u><strong>. This system would, of course, be limited to the exchange of nonvital or regenerable organs (kidneys and livers), where donation would not endanger the donor or adversely impact the donor's major life activities.</p></strong> | null | 1nc | 2 | 430,427 | 2 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,802 | Victims of trafficking experience horrific forms of dehumanization- we must reject this violence | Crouse ’07 | Crouse ’07 (Janice, PhD, Senior Fellow at the Beverly LaHaye Institute, the think tank for Concerned Women for America, “Sex Trafficking Victims: Disposable or Human”, July 12, 2007, http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=13418, [SG]) | What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places. It is a stain on humanity. Every time a woman, a girl, a foreign migrant is treated as less than human, the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all." "It's high time we treat pimps as exploiters rather than hip urban rebels. When a pimp insists his name or symbol be tattooed on his 'girls' he is branding them like cattle — dehumanizing them, treating them like property." "There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. Corruption is typically poverty's handmaiden in cases of human trafficking." We agree with Ambassador Lagon that trafficking in persons "shouldn't be regulated or merely mitigated; it must be abolished." The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world." "Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence." Those who treat people as commercial commodities — pimps, madams and johns — are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods for their brothels, factories or fields. Otherwise, such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom; only corruption—free democratic processes create a society where peace and prosperity are possible for all citizens. | What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places. the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. C trafficking must be abolished The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world Those who treat people as commercial commodities are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom; | We have all heard the catchy song lyrics about "what happens in Mexico" staying in Mexico or the advertisements about "what happens in Vegas" staying in Vegas. Ambassador Lagon addressed that fallacy. "What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places. It is a stain on humanity. Every time a woman, a girl, a foreign migrant is treated as less than human, the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all." It was gratifying to hear the ambassador directly address the problems of American popular culture in glamorizing the "ho" and "pimp." He said, "It's high time we treat pimps as exploiters rather than hip urban rebels. When a pimp insists his name or symbol be tattooed on his 'girls' he is branding them like cattle — dehumanizing them, treating them like property." There are those who would argue that human trafficking is the inevitable outcome of poverty and that some poverty—stricken people choose willingly to be involved. But, as Ambassador Lagon pointed out, "There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. Corruption is typically poverty's handmaiden in cases of human trafficking." CWA is pleased to be among those that Ambassador Lagon called an "indomitable force." We and other evangelical Christians are at the forefront of this battle as modern—day abolitionists who work for the human rights of women and for the dignity of all of God's people. We agree with Ambassador Lagon that trafficking in persons "shouldn't be regulated or merely mitigated; it must be abolished." The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world." We join the ambassador in declaring, "Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence." Those who treat people as commercial commodities — pimps, madams and johns — are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods for their brothels, factories or fields. We must work for good laws and good law enforcement that will treat human trafficking as a criminal offense that will be investigated and the perpetrators prosecuted, convicted and punished to the fullest extent of the law. Otherwise, such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom; only corruption—free democratic processes create a society where peace and prosperity are possible for all citizens. | 2,396 | <h4><strong>Victims of trafficking experience horrific forms of dehumanization- we must reject this violence </h4><p>Crouse ’07</strong> (Janice, PhD, Senior Fellow at the Beverly LaHaye Institute, the think tank for Concerned Women for America, “Sex Trafficking Victims: Disposable or Human”, July 12, 2007, http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=13418<u>, [SG]) </p><p></u>We have all heard the catchy song lyrics about "what happens in Mexico" staying in Mexico or the advertisements about "what happens in Vegas" staying in Vegas. Ambassador Lagon addressed that fallacy. "<u><mark>What 'happens' in these places does not 'stay' in these places.</mark> It is a stain on humanity. Every time a woman, a girl, a foreign migrant is treated as less than human, <strong><mark>the loss of dignity for one is a loss of dignity for us all</mark>."</u></strong> It was gratifying to hear the ambassador directly address the problems of American popular culture in glamorizing the "ho" and "pimp." He said, <u>"It's high time we treat pimps as exploiters rather than hip urban rebels. When a pimp insists his name or symbol be tattooed on his 'girls' he is branding them like cattle — dehumanizing them, treating them like property."</u> There are those who would argue that human trafficking is the inevitable outcome of poverty and that some poverty—stricken people choose willingly to be involved. But, as Ambassador Lagon pointed out, <u>"<mark>There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. C</mark>orruption is typically poverty's handmaiden in cases of human trafficking."</u> CWA is pleased to be among those that Ambassador Lagon called an "indomitable force." We and other evangelical Christians are at the forefront of this battle as modern—day abolitionists who work for the human rights of women and for the dignity of all of God's people. <u>We agree with Ambassador Lagon that <mark>trafficking</mark> in persons "shouldn't be regulated or merely mitigated; it <mark>must be abolished</mark>." <strong><mark>The victims of this crime are among the "most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world</mark>."</u></strong> We join the ambassador in declaring, <u>"Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence." <mark>Those who treat people as commercial</mark> <mark>commodities</mark> — pimps, madams and johns — <mark>are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods</mark> for their brothels, factories or fields.</u> We must work for good laws and good law enforcement that will treat human trafficking as a criminal offense that will be investigated and the perpetrators prosecuted, convicted and punished to the fullest extent of the law. <u>Otherwise, <mark>such crimes undermine everyone's liberty and freedom;<strong></mark> only corruption—free democratic processes create a society where peace and prosperity are possible for all citizens.</p></u></strong> | null | null | Contention 2 is illegal markets | 97,673 | 23 | 17,064 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | 565,284 | A | Hurricanedebates2015 | 4 | Georgetown Kazteridis-Knez | Mathis | null | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Aff-Hurricanedebates2015-Round4.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,803 | Decline causes peaceful retrenchment—prolonging hegemony makes a stable transition less likely | MacDonald, 11 | MacDonald, 11 - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Paul K, Spring 2011, "Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment", International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS) | Our findings are directly relevant to an impending great power transition between China and the U S Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record the U S should be able to retrench In the next few years, the U S is ripe to overhaul its military shift burdens to its allies, and decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this fearing the erosion of U.S. credibility Yet our analysis suggests retrenchment need not signal weakness Holding on to expensive commitments for the sake of reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble Some observers dispute argu that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this hegemonic powers should find it easier to manage acute relative decline Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions and they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation hegemonic powers should be able to identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations the empirical record supports these conclusions periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone similar factors may cushion the impending Sino-American transition Both are large secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition the U S will experience a "moderate" decline Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The U S would still possess of a third of the share of great power GDP and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy it is unclear how Beijing could consolidate or expand its advantageous position through confrontation. | Our findings are relevant to power transition between China and the U S Many scholars foresee conflict analysis suggests grounds for optimism the U S is ripe to overhaul its military and decrease international commitments It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes and settle these more amicably retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to commitments for reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble Some argu hegemonic transitions are conflict prone there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens any state that tries them hegemonic powers eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities the empirical record supports these conclusions hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone The U S would have little to gain from provoking a crisis China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness | Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two.91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America's superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, "[N]o amount [End Page 40] of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia."92 Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one's reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United [End Page 41] States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a "moderate" decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. | 4,515 | <h4>Decline causes <u>peaceful retrenchment</u>—<u>prolonging</u> hegemony makes a <u>stable transition</u> less likely </h4><p><strong>MacDonald, 11</strong> - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Paul K, Spring 2011, "Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment", International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)</p><p><u><mark>Our findings are</mark> directly <mark>relevant to</u></mark> what appears to be <u><strong>an impending great <mark>power transition</u></strong> <u>between China and the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two.91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. <u><mark>Many scholars foresee</mark> major <mark>conflict</mark> during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition</u>. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America's superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, "[N]o amount [End Page 40] of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia."92 <u>Contrary to these predictions, our <mark>analysis suggests</u></mark> some <u><strong><mark>grounds for optimism</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Based on the historical track record</u> of great powers facing acute relative decline, <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>should be able to</u> <u>retrench</u> in the coming decades. <u><strong>In the next few years,</u></strong> <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>is ripe to overhaul its military</u></mark>, <u>shift burdens to its allies, <mark>and</u></mark> work to <u><mark>decrease</mark> costly <mark>international commitments</mark>.</u> <u><mark>It is</u> <u><strong>likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes</u></strong></mark> <u>than the average great power <mark>and</u></mark> to <u><strong><mark>settle these</mark> disputes <mark>more amicably</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Some might view this</u> prospect with apprehension, <u>fearing the</u> steady <u><strong>erosion of U.S. credibility</u></strong>. <u>Yet our analysis suggests</u> that <u><strong><mark>retrenchment need not signal weakness</u></strong>. <u><strong>Holding on to</u></strong></mark> exposed and <u>expensive <strong><mark>commitments</mark> </u></strong>simply <u><mark>for</mark> the sake of</u> one's <u><mark>reputation is a</u> <u><strong>greater geopolitical gamble</u></strong></mark> than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. <u><mark>Some</mark> observers</u> might <u>dispute</u> our conclusions, <u><mark>argu</u></mark>ing <u>that</u> <u><mark>hegemonic transitions are</mark> more <mark>conflict prone</u></mark> than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that <u><mark>there are</u> <u><strong>deductive and empirical reasons</u></strong> <u>to doubt this</u></mark> argument. Theoretically, <u>hegemonic powers should</u> actually <u>find it easier to</u> <u>manage acute relative decline</u>. <u><mark>Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability</u>, <u>which</u> <u><strong>threatens</mark> grave harm</u></strong> <u>to <mark>any state that tries</mark> to cross <mark>them</u></mark>. Further, <u>they are</u> <u>no longer the top target for balancing coalitions</u>, <u>and</u> recovering hegemons may be influential because <u>they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation</u>. In addition, <u><mark>hegemonic powers</u></mark>, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they <u>should be able to</u> more readily <u>identify and <mark>eliminate extraneous burdens</u> <u><strong>without exposing vulnerabilities</u></strong></mark> <u>or exciting domestic populations</u>. We believe <u><mark>the empirical record supports these conclusions</u></mark>. In particular, <u>periods of <mark>hegemonic transition</u> <u><strong>do not appear more conflict prone</u></strong></mark> than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United [End Page 41] States differ in regime type, <u>similar factors may</u> work to <u>cushion the impending Sino-American transition</u>. <u>Both are large</u>, relatively <u>secure continental great powers, a fact that</u> <u>mitigates potential geopolitical competition</u>.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>will</u> <u><strong>experience a "moderate" decline</u></strong>, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 <u>Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline</u> relative to China, the <u><strong>incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal.</u></strong> <u><mark>The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>would still possess</u> upwards <u>of a third of the share of great power GDP</u>, <u>and <mark>would have</u> <u><strong>little to gain from provoking a crisis</u></strong></mark> <u>over a peripheral issue</u>. Conversely, <u><mark>China has</u> <u><strong>few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness</u></strong></mark>.96 <u>Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy</u>, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, <u>it is unclear how Beijing could</u> hope to <u>consolidate or expand its</u> increasingly <u>advantageous position through</u> direct <u>confrontation.</p></u> | null | 1nc | a1 | 97,153 | 117 | 17,062 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | 565,288 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 6 | Michigan Chappell-Peilen | Taylor | Treaties DA (2NR)
Fed CP (2NR)
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round6.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,804 | Indirect Exchange backup guarantees minimal deficit | Zenios 2’ | Zenios 2’ (Stefanos Zenios, “Optimal Control of a Paired-Kidney Exchange Program”, Management Science, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Mar., 2002), pp. 328-342, Stanford Graduate School of Business, http://www.jstor.org/stable/822569 ) PA | results in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that indirect exchanges serve a dual purpose some pairs are "forced" to participate in indirect exchanges to expedite access to direct exchanges for the vast majority of pairs who join the exchange system. As the arrival rates become increasingly imbalanced, the fraction of indirect exchanges converges the fraction of the total demand for organs in the exchange system that the system's donors cannot satisfy. these results demonstrate that tight control of the exchange system through the judicial use of indirect exchanges will guarantee quick access to living-donor organs to the largest possible number of donor-candidate pairs | results in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that indirect exchanges serve a dual purpos some pairs are "forced" to participate in indirect exchanges to expedite access to direct exchanges for the vast majority of pairs who join the exchange system. As the arrival rates become increasingly imbalanced, the fraction of indirect exchanges converges these results demonstrate that tight control of the exchange system through the judicial use of indirect exchanges will guarantee quick access to living-donor organs to the largest possible number of donor-candidate pairs. | *indirect exchange is between a donor-candidate pair and a priority member on the cadaveric list, the candidate on the cadaveric list would receive an organ and the original candidate would receive high priority on the cadaveric list
The results in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that indirect exchanges serve a dual purpose. When the arrival rates of the two pair types are approximately balanced, some pairs are "forced" to participate in indirect exchanges to expedite access to direct exchanges for the vast majority of pairs who join the exchange system. As the arrival rates become increasingly imbalanced, the fraction of indirect exchanges converges to IA1 - A2 /(Al + A2), the fraction of the total demand for organs in the exchange system that the system's donors cannot satisfy. Furthermore, the optimal barriers induce the required fraction of exchanges and optimize candidate wait. Note that in scenario A1 = 4, A2 = 6, all three policies achieve the same fraction of indirect exchanges, but only the heavy-traffic policy and heuristic policy effectively control the overall wait. (4) The results for the incentive compatible policy in Tables 3 and 4 reveal a major dilemma underlying the organ exchange system. […] In summary, these results demonstrate that tight control of the exchange system through the judicial use of indirect exchanges will guarantee quick access to living-donor organs to the largest possible number of donor-candidate pairs. | 1,459 | <h4><strong>Indirect Exchange backup guarantees minimal deficit</h4><p>Zenios 2’</strong> (Stefanos Zenios, “Optimal Control of a Paired-Kidney Exchange Program”, Management Science, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Mar., 2002), pp. 328-342, Stanford Graduate School of Business, http://www.jstor.org/stable/822569 ) PA</p><p>*indirect exchange is between a donor-candidate pair and a priority member on the cadaveric list, the candidate on the cadaveric list would receive an organ and the original candidate would receive high priority on the cadaveric list</p><p>The <u><mark>results in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that indirect exchanges serve a dual purpos</mark>e</u>. When the arrival rates of the two pair types are approximately balanced, <u><mark>some pairs are "forced" to participate in indirect exchanges to expedite access to direct exchanges for the vast majority of pairs who join the exchange system.</u></mark> <u><mark>As the arrival rates become increasingly imbalanced, the fraction of indirect exchanges converges</u></mark> to IA1 - A2 /(Al + A2), <u>the fraction of the total demand for organs in the exchange system that the system's donors cannot satisfy.</u> Furthermore, the optimal barriers induce the required fraction of exchanges and optimize candidate wait. Note that in scenario A1 = 4, A2 = 6, all three policies achieve the same fraction of indirect exchanges, but only the heavy-traffic policy and heuristic policy effectively control the overall wait. (4) The results for the incentive compatible policy in Tables 3 and 4 reveal a major dilemma underlying the organ exchange system. […] In summary, <u><mark>these results demonstrate that tight control of the exchange system through the judicial use of indirect exchanges will guarantee quick access to living-donor organs to the largest possible number of donor-candidate pairs</u><strong>.</p></strong></mark> | null | 1nc | 2 | 430,428 | 2 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |