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741,905 | Preparation and clash—including all suicide undermines limits on topic action and makes substantive debate impossible. Changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Preparation and clash—including all suicide undermines limits on topic action and makes substantive debate impossible. Changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which <u>structurally favors the aff</u> because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent. </h4> | null | 1nc | FW 1NC | 430,485 | 1 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,906 | Both pieces of evidence cite the same interview with Marco Rubio—he has an incentive to engage in political grandstanding and bluster. Prefer our evidence b/c it’s predictive. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>Both pieces of evidence cite the <u>same interview with Marco Rubio—he has an incentive to engage in political grandstanding and bluster. Prefer our evidence b/c it’s predictive.</h4></u></strong> | null | 1nr | U/Q | 430,486 | 1 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,907 | Organ sales are highly controversial—it’s a wedge issue that forces Obama to fight—opposed strongly by everyone who’s not really liberal. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>Organ sales are highly controversial—it’s a wedge issue that forces Obama to fight—opposed strongly by everyone who’s not really liberal.</h4></strong> | null | 1nr | Link | 430,487 | 1 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,908 | Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role | Galloway 7 | Galloway 7—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007) | Debate as a dialogue The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative When competitive equity suffers However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue Far from a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation a case might defend neither state nor action yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy | Debate as a dialogue is set by topic requirements When competitive equity suffers it denies the personhood of the other participant this is a fundamental condition of dialogue Far from a banal request for links fairness is a demand for respect that months of preparation not be silenced. cases that suspend fairness exclude strategies one side comes unable to participate Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation a case might defend neither state nor action yet claim to be germane to the topic the aff subverts any meaningful role to the neg undermining the value of exchange Germaneness and substitutes for topical action do not accrue dialogical benefits | Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy. | 3,503 | <h4>Topical fairness requirements are key to <u>effective</u> dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and <u>subverts any meaningful neg role</h4><p></u><strong>Galloway 7</strong>—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)</p><p><u><mark>Debate as a dialogue </u></mark>sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. <u>The affirmative side <mark>is set by </mark>the <mark>topic </mark>and fairness <mark>requirements</u></mark>. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ <u>Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative</u>. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ <u><mark>When </u></mark>one side takes more than its share,<u> <mark>competitive equity suffers</u></mark>. <u>However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, <mark>it </mark>fundamentally <strong><mark>denies the personhood of the other participant</u></strong></mark> (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). <u>A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes <mark>this</mark> respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair<mark> is a fundamental condition of </mark>a <mark>dialogue</mark> </u>that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. <u><strong><mark>Far from</strong> </u></mark>being<u> <strong><mark>a banal request for links</strong> </mark>to a disadvantage, <mark>fairness is a demand for respect</mark>, a demand to be heard, a demand <mark>that</mark> a voice backed by literally months upon <strong><mark>months of preparation</strong></mark>, research, and critical thinking<mark> not be silenced</u>.</mark>¶ <u>Affirmative <mark>cases that suspend </mark>basic <mark>fairness</mark> norms <strong>operate to <mark>exclude</strong> </mark>particular negative <mark>strategies</mark>. Unprepared, <mark>one side comes</mark> to the argumentative table <mark>unable to </mark>meaningfully <mark>participate </mark>in a dialogue.</u> <u>They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power</u> (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ <u>Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions</u>. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because <u>it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions</u> (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ <u><strong><mark>Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation</strong></mark> </u>(Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, <u><mark>a</u></mark>n affirmative<u> <mark>case</u></mark> on the 2007-2008 college topic <u><mark>might defend neither state nor</mark> </u>international <u><mark>action </u></mark>in the Middle East, and<u><mark> <strong>yet claim to be germane to the topic</strong></mark> in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions </u>in the international arena <u>are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response,<mark> the aff</mark>irmative <strong><mark>subverts any meaningful role to the neg</strong></mark>ative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and <mark>undermining the value of </mark>a meaningful <mark>exchange</mark> of speech acts. <strong><mark>Germaneness and</mark> other <mark>substitutes for topical action do not accrue </mark>the <mark>dialogical benefits</strong></mark> of topical advocacy</u>.</p> | null | 1nc | FW 1NC | 90,248 | 398 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,909 | Supporting sales would be political suicide | Calandrillo 4 | Calandrillo 4 Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis | any form of legalized human organ market would be political suicide to propose and monitor, and remain morally distasteful to many Americans. | null | IV. Real Reforms: Utilizing Incentives to End the Nation's Organ Shortage
Despite the above analysis, any form of legalized human organ market would be far from a utopian solution: it would be political suicide to propose, entail significant administrative costs to establish and monitor, and remain morally distasteful to many Americans. While such markets have been debated without much progress in the past, far less attention has been paid to dozens of other monetary and nonmonetary incentives that could be employed. Taking an incentive-based approach would avoid imposing risk [*108] on living donors, dramatically expand the pool of avail-able organs, and shock the conscience far less than allowing living-seller markets. n190 | 737 | <h4><strong>Supporting sales would be political suicide</h4><p>Calandrillo 4</strong> Steve P. Calandrillo, Associate Professor, Univ. of Washington School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School. B.A. in Economics, Univ. of California at Berkeley. George Mason Law Review Fall, 2004 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 69 ARTICLE: Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage lexis</p><p> IV. Real Reforms: Utilizing Incentives to End the Nation's Organ Shortage</p><p> Despite the above analysis, <u>any form of legalized human organ market</u> would be far from a utopian solution: it <u>would be</u> <u>political suicide to propose</u>, entail significant administrative costs to establish <u>and monitor, and remain morally distasteful to many Americans. </u><strong>While such markets have been debated without much progress in the past, far less attention has been paid to dozens of other monetary and nonmonetary incentives that could be employed. Taking an incentive-based approach would avoid imposing risk [*108] on living donors, dramatically expand the pool of avail-able organs, and shock the conscience far less than allowing living-seller markets. n190</p></strong> | null | 1nr | Link | 430,489 | 16 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,910 | Switch side debate solves their offense—can K physician assisted suicide on the negative | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u><strong>Switch side debate solves their offense—can K physician assisted suicide on the negative</h4></u></strong> | null | 1nc | FW 1NC | 430,488 | 1 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,911 | Organ sales are unpopular – viewed as exploitative—specifically unpopular with the health care industry | Enright 7 | Enright 7 reporter for The Minnesota Daily (Mike, "Doctor backs kidney sales," 4/11/07, http://www.mndaily.com/2007/04/11/doctor-backs-kidney-sales)//AM | null | The sale of organs is still unpopular The American Society of Transplant Surgeons doesn't support the concept sales of organs present dilemmas, namely ploiting people of lower income. " promoting paid donations could take a financial toll on the country's health care system | But after being involved in the debate for this long, Matas said he has no illusions about the difficulty in convincing others of his point of view. The sale of organs is still unpopular and illegal - Congress outlawed it in 1984. The American Society of Transplant Surgeons, which Matas is president of, also doesn't support the concept. One critic yet to be convinced is Dr. Steven Miles, University professor of internal medicine. Miles, a faculty member of the Center for Bioethics, said sales of organs, even regulated, present several dilemmas, namely the potential problem of exploiting people of lower income. "You still wind up with the problem where the people most susceptible to giving would be people from a lower socio-economic group," he said. And in the long run, promoting paid donations from poorer individuals could take a financial toll on the country's health care system with the public picking up the extra costs, Miles said.¶ | 949 | <h4><strong>Organ sales are unpopular – viewed as exploitative—specifically unpopular with the health care industry </h4><p>Enright 7</strong> reporter for The Minnesota Daily (Mike, "Doctor backs kidney sales," 4/11/07, http://www.mndaily.com/2007/04/11/doctor-backs-kidney-sales)//AM</p><p>But after being involved in the debate for this long, Matas said he has no illusions about the difficulty in convincing others of his point of view. <strong><mark>The sale of organs is still unpopular</strong></mark> and illegal - Congress outlawed it in 1984. <mark>The American Society of Transplant Surgeons</mark>, which Matas is president of, also <mark>doesn't support the concept</mark>. One critic yet to be convinced is Dr. Steven Miles, University professor of internal medicine. Miles, a faculty member of the Center for Bioethics, said <mark>sales of organs</mark>, even regulated, <mark>present</mark> several <mark>dilemmas, namely</mark> the potential problem of ex<mark>ploiting people of lower income. "</mark>You still wind up with the problem where the people most susceptible to giving would be people from a lower socio-economic group," he said. And in the long run, <mark>promoting paid donations</mark> from poorer individuals <mark>could take a financial toll on the country's health care system</mark> with the public picking up the extra costs, Miles said.¶<strong> </p></strong> | null | 1nr | Link | 430,490 | 1 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,912 | Pirzada and I advocate banning physician assisted suicide – that solves the medicalization of death | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Pirzada and I advocate banning physician assisted suicide – that solves the medicalization of death</h4> | null | 1nc | 1NC | 430,491 | 1 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,913 | Religious opposition | Bowden 13 | Bowden 13 Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis | null | Some perspectives in favor of prohibiting sale of organs derive from religious beliefs Pope presented religious beliefs regarding selling organs by "reinforc ing] the transplant ethic of altruism are and condemned an emerging commerce in human organs from live donors
Judaism teaches donations are "expected to be an altruistic action people should not accept payment Islam allows for organ donations in the event there is no other means for obtaining the organ, | D. Religious Perspectives
Some of the perspectives in favor of prohibiting human trafficking and the sale of organs derive from religious beliefs and the harmful effects resulting from such acts. In 2000, Pope John Paul II in his "[a]ddress to the XVIII Interna-tional Congress of the Transplantation Society," presented the Catholic community's religious beliefs regarding the selling or trading of organs by "reinforc[ing] the transplant ethic of altruism and empathy for strangers that are the pre-requisites for cadaveric organ sharing, and condemned an emerging commerce in human organs from live donors 'be-cause to use the body as an object is to violate the dignity of the human person.'" n166
Judaism allows for organ donations from cadavers, but only to save the life of a person. n167 Judaism teaches that organ donations [*480] are "expected to be an altruistic action," and, therefore, people should not accept payment for donating organs. n168 However, Judaism finds it acceptable for a person to pay living donors if it is the only means to receive an organ and save his or her own life. n169 Similarly, Islam allows for paid organ donations in the event there is no other means for obtaining the organ, as long as the paid donor is unharmed, and the donor is not pressured to donate the organ. n170 Both Judaism and Islam share the belief of prohibiting organ sales if the sales will create competition or criminal environments. n171 | 1,457 | <h4><strong>Religious opposition</h4><p>Bowden 13</strong> Jackie Bowden, 2013 J.D. graduate from St. Thomas University School of Law. Intercultural Human Rights Law Review 2013 8 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 451 ARTICLE: FEELING EMPTY? ORGAN TRAFFICKING & TRADE: THE BLACK MARKET FOR HUMAN ORGANS lexis</p><p>D. Religious Perspectives</p><p><mark>Some</mark> of the <mark>perspectives in favor of prohibiting</mark> human trafficking and the <mark>sale of organs derive from religious beliefs</mark> and the harmful effects resulting from such acts. In 2000, <mark>Pope</mark> John Paul II in his "[a]ddress to the XVIII Interna-tional Congress of the Transplantation Society," <mark>presented</mark> the Catholic community's <mark>religious beliefs regarding</mark> the <mark>selling</mark> or trading of <mark>organs by "reinforc</mark>[<mark>ing] the transplant ethic of altruism</mark> and empathy for strangers that <mark>are</mark> the pre-requisites for cadaveric organ sharing, <mark>and</mark> <mark>condemned an emerging commerce in human organs from live donors</mark> 'be-cause to use the body as an object is to violate the dignity of the human person.'" n166</p><p>Judaism allows for organ donations from cadavers, but only to save the life of a person. n167 <mark>Judaism teaches</mark> that organ <mark>donations</mark> [*480] <mark>are "expected to be an altruistic</mark> <mark>action</mark>," and, therefore, <mark>people should not accept payment</mark> for donating organs. n168 However, Judaism finds it acceptable for a person to pay living donors if it is the only means to receive an organ and save his or her own life. n169 Similarly, <mark>Islam allows for</mark> paid <mark>organ donations in the event there is no other means for obtaining the organ,<strong></mark> as long as the paid donor is unharmed, and the donor is not pressured to donate the organ. n170 Both Judaism and Islam share the belief of prohibiting organ sales if the sales will create competition or criminal environments. n171</p></strong> | null | 1nr | Link | 430,492 | 1 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,914 | Obama can sustain a veto of Iran sanctions now- but it’s close- PC’s key | Politico 12/29 | Politico 12/29/2014 (GOP to move on Iran sanctions legislation, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/gop-senate-iran-sanctions-bill-113852.html) | Republicans are setting up early challenges to Obama preparing to move forward quickly on Iran The Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next year taking a confrontational stance toward Iran appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority. You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the Kirk-Menendez legislation in 2014, though Obama convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off legislation could upset ongoing negotiations While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress aides declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. the largest challenge is building veto-proof support that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House. Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP Kirk expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate | Republicans are setting up early challenges o bama Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next yea taking a confrontational stance toward Iran appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority Kirk-Menendez Obama’s convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off legislation could upset ongoing negotiations. the largest challenge is building veto-proof support Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task, given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP | Congressional Republicans are setting up early challenges to President Barack Obama in January, preparing to move forward quickly on new Iran sanctions legislation following on the heels of a vote on a bill approving the Keystone XL Pipeline. The Republican-controlled Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next year, according to Republican senators and aides. The starting point would be a bill written a year ago by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that managed to accrue the support of 60 senators in both parties despite opposition from the White House. Kirk and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said over the weekend that an Iran vote could occur in January after a vote on Keystone, which is the first bill the Republican Senate will take up and is also opposed by President Barack Obama. Republican leaders have not yet finalized their legislative schedule, but the bipartisan Iran proposal is supported by incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and all of his leadership team. And taking a confrontational stance toward Iran as diplomatic negotiations continue with a group of Western nations appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority. “It’s an important issue, a priority, and has wide bipartisan support in the Senate,” said McConnell spokesman Don Stewart on Monday. The Republican House overwhelmingly passed a sanctions bill targeting Iran’s energy industry in 2013, though that legislation was never taken up by the Senate. The Kirk-Menendez legislation would tighten economic sanctions on Iran if the country walks away from ongoing negotiations over nuclear enrichment or reneges on an interim agreement that has frozen some of Iran’s nuclear activities in return for unwinding some sanctions. In November, Western and Iranians negotiators extended that interim deal until July as they attempt to hammer out a permanent deal that would curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and relax sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and isolated the country globally. A separate bill written by Graham and incoming Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) would require Congress to approve of any final deal and could figure into the GOP’s plans next year. “You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran. You will see a Congress making sure that sanctions are real and will be reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see a Congress wanting to have any say about a final deal,” Graham said at a weekend press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the Kirk-Menendez legislation in 2014, though President Barack Obama’s administration convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off public support after warning that voting on that legislation could upset ongoing negotiations. While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress, Democratic aides on Monday declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. Indeed, the largest challenge for both supporters of Iran sanctions and the Keystone pipeline is building veto-proof levels of support in Congress that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House. White House press secretary Josh Earnest said in November that new penalties during negotiations would be “counterproductive.” Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task, given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP. But Kirk said on Sunday in an interview with Fox news that he expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate.” | 3,916 | <h4>Obama can sustain a veto of Iran sanctions now- but it’s close- PC’s key</h4><p><strong>Politico 12/29</strong>/2014 (GOP to move on Iran sanctions legislation, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/gop-senate-iran-sanctions-bill-113852.html)</p><p>Congressional <u><mark>Republicans are setting up early challenges</mark> t<mark>o</u></mark> President Barack <u>O<mark>bama</u></mark> in January, <u>preparing to move forward quickly on</u> new <u>Iran</u> sanctions legislation following on the heels of a vote on a bill approving the Keystone XL Pipeline. <u>The</u> Republican-controlled <u><mark>Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next yea</mark>r</u>, according to Republican senators and aides. The starting point would be a bill written a year ago by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that managed to accrue the support of 60 senators in both parties despite opposition from the White House. Kirk and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said over the weekend that an Iran vote could occur in January after a vote on Keystone, which is the first bill the Republican Senate will take up and is also opposed by President Barack Obama. Republican leaders have not yet finalized their legislative schedule, but the bipartisan Iran proposal is supported by incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and all of his leadership team. And <u><mark>taking a confrontational stance toward Iran</u></mark> as diplomatic negotiations continue with a group of Western nations <u><mark>appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority</mark>. </u>“It’s an important issue, a priority, and has wide bipartisan support in the Senate,” said McConnell spokesman Don Stewart on Monday. The Republican House overwhelmingly passed a sanctions bill targeting Iran’s energy industry in 2013, though that legislation was never taken up by the Senate. The Kirk-Menendez legislation would tighten economic sanctions on Iran if the country walks away from ongoing negotiations over nuclear enrichment or reneges on an interim agreement that has frozen some of Iran’s nuclear activities in return for unwinding some sanctions. In November, Western and Iranians negotiators extended that interim deal until July as they attempt to hammer out a permanent deal that would curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and relax sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and isolated the country globally. A separate bill written by Graham and incoming Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) would require Congress to approve of any final deal and could figure into the GOP’s plans next year. “<u>You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran</u>. You will see a Congress making sure that sanctions are real and will be reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see a Congress wanting to have any say about a final deal,” Graham said at a weekend press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. <u>A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the <mark>Kirk-Menendez</mark> legislation in 2014, though </u>President Barack <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong>’s</mark> administration <u><strong><mark>convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off</u></strong></mark> public support after warning that voting on that <u><strong><mark>legislation could upset ongoing negotiations</u></strong>.</mark> <u>While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress</u>, Democratic <u>aides</u> on Monday <u>declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. </u>Indeed, <u><strong><mark>the largest challenge</u></strong></mark> for both supporters of Iran sanctions and the Keystone pipeline <u><strong><mark>is building veto-proof</u></strong></mark> levels of <u><strong><mark>support</u></strong></mark> in Congress <u>that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House.</u> White House press secretary Josh Earnest said in November that new penalties during negotiations would be “counterproductive.” <u><mark>Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a <strong>steep task</u></strong>,</mark> <u><mark>given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP</u></mark>. But <u>Kirk</u> said on Sunday in an interview with Fox news that he <u>expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate</u><strong>.”</p></strong> | null | 1nc | 1NC | 430,411 | 46 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,915 | Those opposed to sales are politically much stronger | Beard 8 | Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy | parties more or less consistently pursue public policies that are in their own self interest, broadly defined. Consequently, we are seriously tempted to draw this somewhat disturbing conclusion there are parties directly involved in this policy debate that benefit economically from a continuation of the organ shortage dialysis clinics agencies that manage organ procurement and allocation and even the transplant centers themselves all may experience significant financial gains from shortage conditions Moreover, the above groups tend to be highly organized and politically influential, particularly in debates relating to organ procurement issues.
After all, they are the “experts.” It is
more likely that the underlying economics tends to predispose at least some of these parties to accept arguments (however weak) that yield outcomes that are consistent with their financial well-being.
juxtaposed against the politically influential interest groups who benefit economically from the organ shortage are the patients who occupy the transplant waiting lists. Unfortunately, this latter group exhibits several characteristics that tend to render it completely politically impotent.
It is difficult to imagine a group less likely to wield significant political influence. Thus, interest group politics appears to go a long way toward explaining the longevity of this tragic and inane public policy. | parties more or less consistently pursue public policies that are in their own self interest, broadly defined. there are parties directly involved in this policy debate that benefit economically from a continuation of the organ shortage Moreover, the above groups tend to be highly organized and politically influential, particularly in debates relating to organ procurement issues.
It is
more likely that the underlying economics tends to predispose at least some of these parties to accept arguments (however weak) that yield outcomes that are consistent with their financial well-being
juxtaposed against the politically influential interest groups who benefit economically from the organ shortage are the patients who occupy the transplant waiting lists this latter group exhibits several characteristics that tend to render it completely politically impoten
It is difficult to imagine a group less likely to wield significant political influence | http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf
A cynical observer might easily conclude that the above string of largely ineffectual actions represents an intentional strategy of what might be termed “illusory responsiveness.” That is, the policies were never really intended or expected to resolve or even substantially ameliorate the organ shortage. Rather, they have been undertaken strategically to create the illusion that serious efforts were being made to address the issue while postponing more effective reforms.
As economists, we generally believe that parties more or less consistently pursue public policies that are in their own self interest, broadly defined. Consequently, we are seriously tempted to draw this somewhat disturbing conclusion from the evidence at hand. Certainly, there are parties directly involved in this policy debate that benefit economically from a continuation of the organ shortage. For example, owners of dialysis clinics, investigators who receive funding for xenograph research, the agencies that manage organ procurement and allocation activities, and even the transplant centers themselves all may experience significant financial gains from shortage conditions. As with any cartel-type arrangement, producers receive increased profits when they are able to restrict supply. And constraining the supply of an essential input (transplantable organs) by imposing a zero-price restraint is guaranteed to restrict the supply of the associated output (transplant operations). In addition, paying a below equilibrium price for an input creates rents that can be captured by downstream producers. Moreover, the above groups tend to be highly organized and politically influential, particularly in debates relating to organ procurement issues.
After all, they are the “experts.” It is not necessary, of course, that the opponents of financial incentives consciously pursue policies that promote their own economic interest at the expense of patients’ lives. It is
more likely that the underlying economics tends to predispose at least some of these parties to accept arguments (however weak) that yield outcomes that are consistent with their financial well-being. That is, their underlying economic interests mold their receptiveness to otherwise unconvincing arguments against the use of financial incentives in cadaveric organ procurement. But the outcome is the same — the organ shortage continues and thousands of patients continue to die unnecessarily each year.
Finally, juxtaposed against the politically influential interest groups who benefit economically from the organ shortage are the patients who occupy the transplant waiting lists. Unfortunately, this latter group exhibits several characteristics that tend to render it completely politically impotent. Specifically, there are “only” 100,000 or so of these individuals spread out across the entire country. They are disproportionately minority
and low-income individuals. They are also completely unorganized, generally uninformed of the underlying economic cause of their plight (the zero-price organ procurement policy), and they are sick. It is difficult to imagine a group less likely to wield significant political influence. Thus, interest group politics appears to go a long way toward explaining the longevity of this tragic and inane public policy. | 3,402 | <h4><strong>Those opposed to sales are politically much stronger </h4><p>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>A cynical observer might easily conclude that the above string of largely ineffectual actions represents an intentional strategy of what might be termed “illusory responsiveness.” That is, the policies were never really intended or expected to resolve or even substantially ameliorate the organ shortage. Rather, they have been undertaken strategically to create the illusion that serious efforts were being made to address the issue while postponing more effective reforms.</p><p>As economists, we generally believe that <u><mark>parties more or less consistently pursue public policies that are in their own self interest, broadly defined.</mark> Consequently, we are seriously tempted to draw this somewhat disturbing conclusion </u>from the evidence at hand. Certainly, <u><mark>there are parties directly involved in this policy debate that benefit economically from a continuation of the organ shortage</u></mark>. For example, owners of <u>dialysis clinics</u>, investigators who receive funding for xenograph research, the <u>agencies that manage organ procurement and allocation</u> activities, <u>and even the transplant centers themselves all may experience significant financial gains from shortage conditions</u>. As with any cartel-type arrangement, producers receive increased profits when they are able to restrict supply. And constraining the supply of an essential input (transplantable organs) by imposing a zero-price restraint is guaranteed to restrict the supply of the associated output (transplant operations). In addition, paying a below equilibrium price for an input creates rents that can be captured by downstream producers. <u><mark>Moreover, the above groups tend to be highly organized and politically influential, particularly in debates relating to organ procurement issues.</p><p></mark>After all, they are the “experts.”</u> It is not necessary, of course, that the opponents of financial incentives consciously pursue policies that promote their own economic interest at the expense of patients’ lives. <u><mark>It is</p><p>more likely that the underlying economics tends to predispose at least some of these parties to accept arguments (however weak) that yield outcomes that are consistent with their financial well-being</mark>.</u> That is, their underlying economic interests mold their receptiveness to otherwise unconvincing arguments against the use of financial incentives in cadaveric organ procurement. But the outcome is the same — the organ shortage continues and thousands of patients continue to die unnecessarily each year.</p><p>Finally, <u><mark>juxtaposed against the politically influential interest groups who benefit economically from the organ shortage are the patients who occupy the transplant waiting lists</mark>. Unfortunately, <mark>this latter group exhibits several characteristics that tend to render it completely politically impoten</mark>t.</u> Specifically, there are “only” 100,000 or so of these individuals spread out across the entire country. They are disproportionately minority</p><p>and low-income individuals. They are also completely unorganized, generally uninformed of the underlying economic cause of their plight (the zero-price organ procurement policy), and they are sick. <u><mark>It is difficult to imagine a group less likely to wield significant political influence</mark>.<strong> Thus, interest group politics appears to go a long way toward explaining the longevity of this tragic and inane public policy.</p></u></strong> | null | 1nr | Link | 637,287 | 5 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,916 | Physician assisted suicide is a wedge issue – strong partisan gap. | Saad ’11 | Saad, ’11 [Lydia, “Doctor-Assisted Suicide Is Moral Issue Dividing Americans Most”, 5-31-11, Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/147842/doctor-assisted-suicide-moral-issue-dividing-americans.aspx, RSR] | Doctor-assisted suicide emerges as the most controversial cultural issue in Gallup's 2011 Values and Beliefs poll, with Americans divided 45% vs. 48% over whether it is morally acceptable or morally wrong The three most controversial issues -- doctor-assisted suicide, abortion, and out-of-wedlock births -- are the ones on which fewer than 15 points separate the percentage considering the issue morally acceptable from the percentage considering it morally wrong Partisans disagree widely on these issues with majorities of Democrats accepting of all three issues, compared with, at most, barely a third of Republicans | null | PRINCETON, NJ -- Doctor-assisted suicide emerges as the most controversial cultural issue in Gallup's 2011 Values and Beliefs poll, with Americans divided 45% vs. 48% over whether it is morally acceptable or morally wrong. Having a baby out of wedlock and abortion also closely divide Americans. However, stronger public consensus exists on 14 other issues tested. Americans are in broadest agreement about what behaviors are morally wrong. At least 8 in 10 U.S. adults interviewed in the May 5-8 survey say this about extramarital affairs, polygamy, cloning humans, and suicide. At least 6 in 10 say pornography and cloning animals are each morally wrong. Widest agreement about what is morally acceptable, ranging from 60% to 69%, is found for divorce, the death penalty, gambling, embryonic stem cell research, and premarital sex. Also, 55% or better say medical testing on animals, gay/lesbian relations, and the use of animal fur for clothing are each acceptable. The three most controversial issues -- doctor-assisted suicide, abortion, and out-of-wedlock births -- are the ones on which fewer than 15 points separate the percentage considering the issue morally acceptable from the percentage considering it morally wrong. Attitudes on each have been fairly stable in recent years. Partisans disagree widely on these issues, with majorities of Democrats accepting of all three issues, compared with, at most, barely a third of Republicans. Abortion is the most divisive of the three, with a 37-point Republican-Democratic gap. | 1,533 | <h4><strong>Physician assisted suicide is a wedge issue – strong partisan gap.</h4><p>Saad</strong>, <strong>’11</strong> [Lydia, “Doctor-Assisted Suicide Is Moral Issue Dividing Americans Most”, 5-31-11, Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/147842/doctor-assisted-suicide-moral-issue-dividing-americans.aspx, RSR]</p><p>PRINCETON, NJ -- <u>Doctor-assisted suicide emerges as the <strong>most controversial cultural issue</strong> in Gallup's 2011 Values and Beliefs poll, with Americans divided 45% vs. 48% over whether it is morally acceptable or morally wrong</u>. Having a baby out of wedlock and abortion also closely divide Americans. However, stronger public consensus exists on 14 other issues tested. Americans are in broadest agreement about what behaviors are morally wrong. At least 8 in 10 U.S. adults interviewed in the May 5-8 survey say this about extramarital affairs, polygamy, cloning humans, and suicide. At least 6 in 10 say pornography and cloning animals are each morally wrong. Widest agreement about what is morally acceptable, ranging from 60% to 69%, is found for divorce, the death penalty, gambling, embryonic stem cell research, and premarital sex. Also, 55% or better say medical testing on animals, gay/lesbian relations, and the use of animal fur for clothing are each acceptable. <u>The three most controversial issues -- doctor-assisted suicide, abortion, and out-of-wedlock births -- are the ones on which fewer than 15 points separate the percentage considering the issue morally acceptable from the percentage considering it morally wrong</u>. Attitudes on each have been fairly stable in recent years. <u><strong>Partisans disagree widely on these issues</u></strong>, <u>with majorities of Democrats accepting of all three issues, compared with, at most, <strong>barely a third of Republicans</u></strong>. Abortion is the most divisive of the three, with a 37-point Republican-Democratic gap.</p> | null | 1nc | 1NC | 429,684 | 5 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,917 | Above on overview | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>Above on overview</h4></strong> | null | 1nr | No Strike | 430,493 | 1 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,918 | Yes strikes- and they escalate- prefer recent ev | Guardian 1/1 | Guardian 1/1/2015 (Middle East, 2015: further standoffs, tripwires and catastrophes; The jihadist threat of Isis and ongoing Syria disaster will pile pressure on western leaders. Then there's Iran, Turkey, Israel-Palestine and north Africa, lexis) | The Middle East in 2015 features several dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos The most obvious is the standoff over Iran's suspect nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat. Opinions differ whether a deal can be reached. If it is, Iran could come in from the cold If not the possibility that Israel, led by Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is very real indeed. | The Middle East in 2015 features several dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos. The most obvious is the standoff over Iran's suspect nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat Opinions differ whether a deal can be reached. If it is, Iran could come in from the cold If not, the possibility that Israel, led by Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is very real | The Middle East in 2015 features several other dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos. The most obvious is the standoff over Iran's suspect nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat. Long-running talks again ended without agreement in November. A new deadline of July, 2015 has been set. Opinions differ whether a deal can be reached. If it is, Iran could come in from the cold for the first time since 1979. If not, the possibility that Israel, led by prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is very real indeed. | 656 | <h4><strong>Yes strikes- and they escalate- prefer recent ev</h4><p>Guardian 1/1</strong>/2015 (Middle East, 2015: further standoffs, tripwires and catastrophes; The jihadist threat of Isis and ongoing Syria disaster will pile pressure on western leaders. Then there's Iran, Turkey, Israel-Palestine and north Africa, lexis)</p><p><u><mark>The Middle East in 2015 features several</u></mark> other <u><mark>dangerous tripwires that could tip the region into sudden chaos</u>. <u>The most obvious is the standoff over Iran's suspect nuclear programme, which Israel regards as an existential threat</mark>.</u> Long-running talks again ended without agreement in November. A new deadline of July, 2015 has been set. <u><mark>Opinions differ whether a deal can be reached. If it is, Iran could come in from the cold</mark> </u>for the first time since 1979. <u><mark>If not</u>, <u>the possibility that Israel, led by</u></mark> prime minister Binyamin <u><mark>Netanyahu, will take matters into its own hands and launch military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities is <strong>very real</mark> indeed.</p></u></strong> | null | 1nr | No Strike | 430,495 | 6 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,919 | New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction | Borger 12/31 | Borger 12/31/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation) | There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba This deal will be about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. the parties to the talks have given themselves more time They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions That would provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment. | no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. is deal will b about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets anctions would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment | There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. This deal will not be about cash machines in the Caribbean, but about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away from the table. A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. So the parties to the talks have given themselves more time – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor. The legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. That would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, and a very volatile environment. It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year. | 3,580 | <h4>New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction</h4><p><strong>Borger 12/31</strong>/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)</p><p><u>There will be <mark>no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.</mark> In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba</u>, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. <u>Th<mark>is deal will</u></mark> not <u><mark>b</mark>e</u> about cash machines in the Caribbean, but <u><mark>about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth</u></mark>. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These <u>gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away</u> from the table. <u><strong><mark>A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel</u></strong>; <u>the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a <strong>wave of proliferation across the region and beyond</strong> as other countries hedge their bets</mark>. </u>So <u>the parties to the talks have given themselves more time</u> – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. <u>They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran</u>. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, <u>the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor</u>. The <u>legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered s<mark>anctions</u></mark>, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. <u>That</u> would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it <u><mark>would</u> also <u>provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament</u></mark>, the Majlis, <u><mark>and a very volatile environment</mark>. </u>It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.</p> | null | 1nc | 1NC | 171,429 | 23 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,920 | And yes escalation and nuclear war | Kahl, Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, 12 | Kahl, Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, 12 (Colin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East and Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, Iran and the Bomb, Foreign Affairs; Sep/Oct2012, Vol. 91 Issue 5, p157-162) | historical record suggests that competition between a nuclear-armed Iran and its principal adversaries would likely follow the pattern known as "the stability-instability paradox," A recent statistical analysis by Horowitz demonstrated that inexperienced nuclear powers tend to be more crisis-prone than other types of states, history suggests that Tehran's development of nuclear weapons would encourage Iranian adventurism, leading to more frequent and intense crises in the Middle East. Such crises would entail some inherent risk of a nuclear exchange resulting from a miscalculation, an accident, or an unauthorized use a risk that currently does not exist at all. The threat would be particularly high in the initial period after Iran joined the nuclear club. , the residual risk of inadvertent escalation stemming from decades of distrust and hostility, the absence of direct lines of communication, and organizational mistakes would be nontrivial and the consequences of even a low-probability outcome could be devastating. | inexperienced nuclear powers tend to be crisis-prone Tehran's development of nuclear weapons would encourage adventurism leading to frequent and intense Such crises would entail risk of a nuclear exchange from miscalculation accident the risk of inadvertent escalation would be nontrivial | Waltz writes that "policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability." In fact, the historical record suggests that competition between a nuclear-armed Iran and its principal adversaries would likely follow the pattern known as "the stability-instability paradox," in which the supposed stability created by mutually assured destruction generates greater instability by making provocations, disputes, and conflict below the nuclear threshold seem safe. During the Cold War, for example, nuclear deterrence prevented large-scale conventional or nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, the superpowers experienced several direct crises and faced off in a series of bloody proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and elsewhere. A recent statistical analysis by the political scientist Michael Horowitz demonstrated that inexperienced nuclear powers tend to be more crisis-prone than other types of states, and research by another political scientist, Robert Rauchhaus, has found that nuclear states are more likely to engage in low-level militarized disputes with one another, even if they are less likely to engage in full-scale war. If deterrence operates the way Waltz expects it to, a nuclear-armed Iran might reduce the risk of a major conventional war among Middle Eastern states. But history suggests that Tehran's development of nuclear weapons would encourage Iranian adventurism, leading to more frequent and intense crises in the Middle East. Such crises would entail some inherent risk of a nuclear exchange resulting from a miscalculation, an accident, or an unauthorized use -- a risk that currently does not exist at all. The threat would be particularly high in the initial period after Iran joined the nuclear club. Once the superpowers reached rough nuclear parity during the Cold War, for example, the number of direct crises decreased, and the associated risks of nuclear escalation abated. But during the early years of the Cold War, the superpowers were involved in several crises, and on at least one occasion -- the 1962 Cuban missile crisis -- they came perilously close to nuclear war. Similarly, a stable deterrent relationship between Iran, on the one hand, and the United States and Israel, on the other, would likely emerge over time, but the initial crisis-prone years would be hair-raising. Although all sides would have a profound interest in not allowing events to spiral out of control, the residual risk of inadvertent escalation stemming from decades of distrust and hostility, the absence of direct lines of communication, and organizational mistakes would be nontrivial -- and the consequences of even a low-probability outcome could be devastating. | 2,921 | <h4><strong>And yes escalation and nuclear war </h4><p>Kahl, Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, 12<u></strong> (Colin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East and Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, Iran and the Bomb, Foreign Affairs; Sep/Oct2012, Vol. 91 Issue 5, p157-162)</p><p></u>Waltz writes that "policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability." In fact, the <u>historical record suggests that competition between a nuclear-armed Iran and its principal adversaries would likely follow the pattern known as "the stability-instability paradox,"</u> in which the supposed stability created by mutually assured destruction generates greater instability by making provocations, disputes, and conflict below the nuclear threshold seem safe. During the Cold War, for example, nuclear deterrence prevented large-scale conventional or nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, the superpowers experienced several direct crises and faced off in a series of bloody proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and elsewhere. <u>A recent statistical analysis by</u> the political scientist Michael <u>Horowitz demonstrated that <mark>inexperienced nuclear powers tend to</mark> <mark>be</mark> more <mark>crisis-prone</mark> than other types of states, </u>and research by another political scientist, Robert Rauchhaus, has found that nuclear states are more likely to engage in low-level militarized disputes with one another, even if they are less likely to engage in full-scale war. If deterrence operates the way Waltz expects it to, a nuclear-armed Iran might reduce the risk of a major conventional war among Middle Eastern states. But <u>history suggests that <mark>Tehran's development of nuclear weapons would</mark> <mark>encourage</mark> Iranian <mark>adventurism</mark>, <mark>leading to</mark> <strong>more <mark>frequent and intense</mark> crises</strong> in the Middle East. <mark>Such crises would entail</mark> some <strong>inherent <mark>risk of a nuclear exchange</strong></mark> resulting <mark>from</mark> a <mark>miscalculation</mark>,</u> <u>an <mark>accident</mark>, or an unauthorized use</u> -- <u>a risk that currently does not exist at all. The threat would be particularly high in the initial period after Iran joined the nuclear club. </u>Once the superpowers reached rough nuclear parity during the Cold War, for example, the number of direct crises decreased, and the associated risks of nuclear escalation abated. But during the early years of the Cold War, the superpowers were involved in several crises, and on at least one occasion -- the 1962 Cuban missile crisis -- they came perilously close to nuclear war. Similarly, a stable deterrent relationship between Iran, on the one hand, and the United States and Israel, on the other, would likely emerge over time, but the initial crisis-prone years would be hair-raising. Although all sides would have a profound interest in not allowing events to spiral out of control<u>, <mark>the</mark> residual <mark>risk of inadvertent</mark> <mark>escalation</mark> stemming from decades of distrust and hostility, the absence of direct lines of communication, and organizational mistakes <mark>would be nontrivial</u></mark> -- <u><strong>and the consequences of even a low-probability outcome could be devastating.</p></u></strong> | null | 1nr | No ME Arms Race | 47,404 | 18 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,921 | People are terrible at suicide | Moore 2013 ) | Moore 2013 (Feb 16 2013 Dr. Mana Moore http://www.vice.com/read/people-are-crap-at-suicide) | People are awful at killing themselves. You would think that once you set your mind to self-destruction, it would be fairly straightforward—but the majority of people fail. In fact, ten to 20 million people fail to kill themselves worldwide every year Eighty percent of people opt for an overdose in some misconceived notion of a tragic rock star ending facedown in a pile of vomit and scattered pills. But all they get is the liver of Keith Richards without the years of fun and excess to justify it. The mid-life crisis cases use antidepressants and the old depressives take sedatives lulling themselves into that very long sleep. they all make the same mistake, they just don't take enough. to actually succeed in shuffling off this mortal coil you've really got to go for it. . Your liver fails and you turn yellow, start bleeding from all over and have a lifetime as a transplant patient to look forward to, and that is going to be shitty. Even if you do cut deep enough and directly on the artery, still it takes so long that you'll normally chicken out before you snuff it. In general, failing at death is worse than failing at life. Jump from one floor too low and you're paralyzed for life. One mouthful short of bleach and you’ll have to wait for your stomach to slowly melt. | People are awful at killing themselves. You would think that once you set your mind to self-destruction, it would be fairly straightforward—but the majority of people fail. In fact, ten to 20 million people fail to kill themselves worldwide every year Eighty percent of people opt for an overdose in some misconceived notion of a tragic rock star ending facedown in a pile of vomit and scattered pills. But all they get is the liver of Keith Richards without the years of fun and excess to justify it to actually succeed in shuffling off this mortal coil you've really got to go for it. In general, failing at death is worse than failing at life Jump from one floor too low and you're paralyzed for life. One mouthful short of bleach and you’ll have to wait for your stomach to slowly melt. | People are awful at killing themselves. You would think that once you set your mind to self-destruction, it would be fairly straightforward—but the majority of people fail. In fact, ten to 20 million people fail to kill themselves worldwide every year. That's a lot of wasted hospital time. For that reason, you won't get much sympathy from the medical profession if you come in having munched your way through a box of Feminax and a bottle of Peach Schnapps after your boyfriend's dumped you. They start rolling in about midnight—the suicides and the drunks. Eighty percent of people opt for an overdose in some misconceived notion of a tragic rock star ending facedown in a pile of vomit and scattered pills. But all they get is the liver of Keith Richards without the years of fun and excess to justify it. The kids prefer paracetamol. The mid-life crisis cases use antidepressants and the old depressives take sedatives lulling themselves into that very long sleep. But they all make the same mistake, they just don't take enough. Think about it, there must have been a weekend you've done pretty much endless ketamine, yet (generally) you and your friends haven't died, so, to actually succeed in shuffling off this mortal coil you've really got to go for it. Thing is it's almost worse if you only take nearly enough. Your liver fails and you turn yellow, start bleeding from all over and have a lifetime as a transplant patient to look forward to, and that is going to be shitty. Teen movies are to blame for the myth that slitting your wrists is effective. Even if you do cut deep enough and directly on the artery, still it takes so long that you'll normally chicken out before you snuff it. Though aesthetically it is dramatic. In general, failing at death is worse than failing at life. If you shoot yourself through the head at the wrong angle you end up retarded. Jump from one floor too low and you're paralyzed for life. One mouthful short of bleach and you’ll have to wait for your stomach to slowly melt. | 2,021 | <h4><strong>People are terrible at suicide</h4><p> Moore 2013</strong> (Feb 16 2013<strong> </strong>Dr. Mana Moore http://www.vice.com/read/people-are-crap-at-suicide<u><strong>)</p><p><mark>People are awful at killing themselves.</u></strong> <u><strong>You would think that once you set your mind to self-destruction, it would be fairly straightforward—but the majority of people fail. In fact, ten to 20 million people fail to kill themselves worldwide every year</u></strong></mark>. That's a lot of wasted hospital time. For that reason, you won't get much sympathy from the medical profession if you come in having munched your way through a box of Feminax and a bottle of Peach Schnapps after your boyfriend's dumped you. They start rolling in about midnight—the suicides and the drunks. <u><strong><mark>Eighty percent of people opt for an overdose in some misconceived notion of a tragic rock star ending facedown in a pile of vomit and scattered pills. But all they get is the liver of Keith Richards without the years of fun and excess to justify it</mark>.</u></strong> The kids prefer paracetamol. <u><strong>The mid-life crisis cases use antidepressants and the old depressives take sedatives lulling themselves into that very long sleep.</u></strong> But <u><strong>they all make the same mistake, they just don't take enough.</u></strong> Think about it, there must have been a weekend you've done pretty much endless ketamine, yet (generally) you and your friends haven't died, so, <u><strong><mark>to actually succeed in shuffling off this mortal coil you've really got to go for it.</u></strong></mark> Thing is it's almost worse if you only take nearly enough<u><strong>. Your liver fails and you turn yellow, start bleeding from all over and have a lifetime as a transplant patient to look forward to, and that is going to be shitty.</u></strong> Teen movies are to blame for the myth that slitting your wrists is effective. <u><strong>Even if you do cut deep enough and directly on the artery, still it takes so long that you'll normally chicken out before you snuff it.</u></strong> Though aesthetically it is dramatic. <u><strong><mark>In general, failing at death is worse than failing at life</mark>.</u></strong> If you shoot yourself through the head at the wrong angle you end up retarded. <u><strong><mark>Jump from one floor too low and you're paralyzed for life. One mouthful short of bleach and you’ll have to wait for your stomach to slowly melt.</p></u></strong></mark> | null | 1nc | Case | 430,497 | 1 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,922 | here’s a key point about the 1AC – they are assisted death | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>here’s a key point about the 1AC – they are assisted death </h4> | null | 1nc | Case | 430,496 | 1 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,923 | And high risk of miscalculation and strikes | Wall Street Journal 2011 | Wall Street Journal 2011 | red lines would be hard to credit once the U.S. squandered its credibility by allowing Iran to go nuclear after spending a decade warning that such an outcome was "unacceptable." One certain result would thus be a nuclear proliferation spiral in the Middle East, in which Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt would acquire arsenals That would be an odd outcome for an Administration that has made nuclear arms control a cornerstone of its foreign policy the power of nuclear weapons lies in the fact of their possession even if they are never used Iran could use ambiguous threats or work through proxies to both provoke and deter its adversaries in the region, Iran's prestige would be bolstered at home and abroad It is perilous to assume that Iran is a "normal" regime that wouldn't dare use nuclear weapons. Iran's regime routinely vows to annihilate Israel and the U.S. Iran is also a regime shaped by martyrdom, one that sent thousands of children to clear mine fields during the Iran-Iraq war tyrannical regimes with a fanatical will to power have a way of holding on against the odds: Look at North Korea All of this adds up to far more dangerous world—in which Iran becomes a regional hegemon, Israel faces a threat to its very existence, the Middle East embarks on a nuclear arms race, America's freedom of action is curtailed, and the dangers of a nuclear exchange rise to levels above what they were even during the early Cold War. *** The question for the world, and especially for the Obama Administration, is whether those dire consequences are worse than the risks of a pre-emptive strike. We think we know what the Israelis will decide, especially if they conclude that President Obama stays on his current course. Opponents of a pre-emptive strike say it would do no more than delay Iran's programs by a few years. But something similar was said after Israel's strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, without which the U.S. could never have stood up to Saddam after his invasion of Kuwait. In life as in politics, nothing is forever. But a strike that sets Iran's nuclear programs back by several years at least offers the opportunity for Iran's democratic forces to topple the regime without risking a wider conflagration. No U.S. President could undertake a strike on Iran except as a last resort, and Mr. Obama can fairly say that he has given every resort short of war an honest try. At the same time, no U.S. President should leave his successor with the catastrophe that would be a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran on Mr. Obama's watch would be fatal to more than his legacy. | red lines would be hard to credit once the U.S. squandered its credibility by allowing Iran to go nuclear One certain result would be nuclear proliferation in Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt the power of nuclear weapons lies in their possession even if they are never used Iran could use ambiguous threats or work through proxies to provoke and deter its adversaries Iran's regime vows to annihilate Israel and the U.S. Iran is a regime shaped by martyrdom, one that sent thousands of children to clear mine fields during the Iran-Iraq war All of this adds up to far more dangerous world—in which the dangers of a nuclear exchange rise to levels above during the Cold War | If Iran Gets the Bomb, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204224604577027842025797760.html
Advocates of a "containment" strategy toward a nuclear Iran argue that its behavior would differ little from what it is today. By this logic, the U.S. and its allies would warn Iran that it would face nuclear annihilation if it crossed certain red lines, such as passing a bomb to terrorists, and Iran wouldn't dare breach them. But those red lines would be hard to credit once the U.S. squandered its credibility by allowing Iran to go nuclear after spending a decade warning that such an outcome was "unacceptable." Would the U.S. really risk nuclear war with a fanatical regime for the sake of, say, Bahrain, or even Israel? We doubt it, and so would every power in the region. One certain result would thus be a nuclear proliferation spiral in the Middle East, in which Saudi Arabia, Turkey and probably Egypt would acquire nuclear arsenals of their own. That would be an odd outcome for an Administration that has made nuclear arms control a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Then again, not every country in the region would have the will or wherewithal to stand up to Iran. Some could no doubt be bullied or induced to cooperate with it, especially as the U.S. presence in the region diminishes after withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan. Those Iranian neighbors could fall into its orbit, thereby extending Tehran's strategic reach from Kabul to Beirut. Containment advocates also assert that Iran would never use its nuclear weapons, since it would invite devastating reprisals. But the power of nuclear weapons lies in the fact of their possession even if they are never used. Iran could use ambiguous threats or work through proxies to both provoke and deter its adversaries in the region, including the U.S. Iran's prestige would also be immensely bolstered, both at home and abroad, by developing nuclear weapons in the teeth of international opposition. It is perilous, in any case, to assume that Iran is a "normal" regime that wouldn't dare use nuclear weapons. Iran's regime was born in revolutionary religious fervor and routinely vows to annihilate Israel and its "Great Satan" protector, the U.S. Iran is also a regime shaped by a messianic cult of martyrdom, one that sent thousands of children to clear mine fields during the Iran-Iraq war. Sometimes such governments mean what they say even if the rest of the world won't believe it. The Nazis did. In the case of the assassination plot against the Saudi ambassador, one plausible explanation is that the strike was ordered by a faction within the regime trying to undermine its internal rivals. What does that say about the unity of command needed to secure a nuclear arsenal? Another argument for containment is that the Iranian regime is destined to collapse and so we can afford to wait it out. But tyrannical regimes with a fanatical will to power have a way of holding on against the odds: Look at the Kim dynasty in North Korea. Nuclear weapons would not save the mullahs from an internal uprising in the Libyan mold, though it's worth noting that Gadhafi would still be in power had he not abandoned his nuclear programs. It's also worth wondering what a regime faced with such an uprising would do with its nuclear weapons if it believed it was on the verge of collapse. All of this adds up to far more dangerous world—in which Iran becomes a regional hegemon, Israel faces a threat to its very existence, the Middle East embarks on a nuclear arms race, America's freedom of action is curtailed, and the dangers of a nuclear exchange rise to levels above what they were even during the early Cold War. *** The question for the world, and especially for the Obama Administration, is whether those dire consequences are worse than the risks of a pre-emptive strike. We think we know what the Israelis will decide, especially if they conclude that President Obama stays on his current course. Opponents of a pre-emptive strike say it would do no more than delay Iran's programs by a few years. But something similar was said after Israel's strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, without which the U.S. could never have stood up to Saddam after his invasion of Kuwait. In life as in politics, nothing is forever. But a strike that sets Iran's nuclear programs back by several years at least offers the opportunity for Iran's democratic forces to topple the regime without risking a wider conflagration. No U.S. President could undertake a strike on Iran except as a last resort, and Mr. Obama can fairly say that he has given every resort short of war an honest try. At the same time, no U.S. President should leave his successor with the catastrophe that would be a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran on Mr. Obama's watch would be fatal to more than his legacy. | 4,850 | <h4><strong>And high risk of miscalculation and strikes </h4><p>Wall Street Journal 2011</p><p></strong>If Iran Gets the Bomb, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204224604577027842025797760.html</p><p>Advocates of a "containment" strategy toward a nuclear Iran argue that its behavior would differ little from what it is today. By this logic, the U.S. and its allies would warn Iran that it would face nuclear annihilation if it crossed certain red lines, such as passing a bomb to terrorists, and Iran wouldn't dare breach them. But those <u><mark>red lines would be hard to credit once the U.S. squandered its credibility by allowing Iran to go nuclear</mark> after spending a decade warning that such an outcome was "unacceptable."</u> Would the U.S. really risk nuclear war with a fanatical regime for the sake of, say, Bahrain, or even Israel? We doubt it, and so would every power in the region. <u><mark>One certain result would</mark> thus <mark>be</mark> a <mark>nuclear proliferation</mark> spiral in the Middle East, <mark>in</mark> which <mark>Saudi Arabia, Turkey and</u></mark> probably <u><mark>Egypt</mark> would acquire</u> nuclear <u>arsenals</u> of their own. <u>That would be an odd outcome for an Administration that has made nuclear arms control a cornerstone of its foreign policy</u>. Then again, not every country in the region would have the will or wherewithal to stand up to Iran. Some could no doubt be bullied or induced to cooperate with it, especially as the U.S. presence in the region diminishes after withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan. Those Iranian neighbors could fall into its orbit, thereby extending Tehran's strategic reach from Kabul to Beirut. Containment advocates also assert that Iran would never use its nuclear weapons, since it would invite devastating reprisals. But <u><mark>the power of nuclear weapons lies in</mark> the fact of <mark>their possession <strong>even if they are never used</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Iran could use ambiguous threats or work through proxies to</mark> both <mark>provoke and deter its adversaries</mark> in the region, </u>including the U.S.<u> Iran's prestige would</u> also <u>be</u> immensely <u>bolstered</u>, both <u>at home and abroad</u>, by developing nuclear weapons in the teeth of international opposition. <u>It is perilous</u>, in any case, <u>to assume that Iran is a "normal" regime that wouldn't dare use nuclear weapons. <mark>Iran's regime</u></mark> was born in revolutionary religious fervor and <u>routinely <mark>vows to annihilate Israel and</u></mark> its "Great Satan" protector, <u><mark>the U.S.</mark> <mark>Iran is</mark> also <mark>a regime shaped by</u></mark> a messianic cult of <u><mark>martyrdom, one that sent thousands of children to clear mine fields during the Iran-Iraq war</u></mark>. Sometimes such governments mean what they say even if the rest of the world won't believe it. The Nazis did. In the case of the assassination plot against the Saudi ambassador, one plausible explanation is that the strike was ordered by a faction within the regime trying to undermine its internal rivals. What does that say about the unity of command needed to secure a nuclear arsenal? Another argument for containment is that the Iranian regime is destined to collapse and so we can afford to wait it out. But <u>tyrannical regimes with a fanatical will to power have a way of holding on against the odds: Look at</u> the Kim dynasty in <u>North Korea</u>. Nuclear weapons would not save the mullahs from an internal uprising in the Libyan mold, though it's worth noting that Gadhafi would still be in power had he not abandoned his nuclear programs. It's also worth wondering what a regime faced with such an uprising would do with its nuclear weapons if it believed it was on the verge of collapse. <u><mark>All of this adds up to far more dangerous world—in which</mark> Iran becomes a regional hegemon, Israel faces a threat to its very existence, the Middle East embarks on a nuclear arms race, America's freedom of action is curtailed, and <mark>the dangers of a nuclear exchange <strong>rise to levels above</mark> what they were even <mark>during the</mark> early <mark>Cold War</mark>. *** The question for the world, and especially for the Obama Administration, is whether those dire consequences are worse than the risks of a pre-emptive strike. We think we know what the Israelis will decide, especially if they conclude that President Obama stays on his current course. Opponents of a pre-emptive strike say it would do no more than delay Iran's programs by a few years. But something similar was said after Israel's strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, without which the U.S. could never have stood up to Saddam after his invasion of Kuwait. In life as in politics, nothing is forever. But a strike that sets Iran's nuclear programs back by several years at least offers the opportunity for Iran's democratic forces to topple the regime without risking a wider conflagration. No U.S. President could undertake a strike on Iran except as a last resort, and Mr. Obama can fairly say that he has given every resort short of war an honest try. At the same time, no U.S. President should leave his successor with the catastrophe that would be a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran on Mr. Obama's watch would be fatal to more than his legacy. </p></u></strong> | null | 1nr | No ME Arms Race | 430,500 | 1 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,924 | Either a)they use pa’s, just use a different word, OR | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Either a)they use pa’s, just use a different word, OR</h4> | null | 1nc | Case | 430,498 | 1 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,925 | No uniqueness—winning now ______insert legislation that Obama recently pushed through___ | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u><strong>No uniqueness—winning now ______insert legislation that Obama recently pushed through___</h4></u></strong> | null | 1nr | Winners Win | 430,499 | 1 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,926 | couple of disads- | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>couple of disads-</h4> | null | 1nc | Case | 430,501 | 1 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,927 | Even if a confrontational strategy is key, that doesn’t mean the plan’s singular win spills-over—it’s more likely to undermine Obama’s careful strategy | Lizza 13 | Ryan Lizza, 1/7/13, Will Hagel Spike the G.O.P.’s Fever?, www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/how-much-will-the-nomination-of-chuck-hagel-hurt-obamas-second-term-agenda.html | Obama’s victory has made almost no difference in changing the psychology or incentives of the members of the G.O.P. who matter most breaking the fever” was the wrong metaphor There is no one event that can change a political party overnight A better metaphor for the coming battles with Congress may be three yards and a cloud of dust”: a series of grinding plays where small victories are earned only after lots of intense combat While the fiscal-cliff showdown demonstrated that there’s potential for bipartisan deal-making in the Senate, passing any Obama priority through the House of Representatives is nearly impossible unless the political pressure is extremely intense The fiscal-cliff bill offers the White House a general template for the coming fights over spending issues where there is very little consensus between Obama and most House Republicans. Deals will have to be negotiated in the Senate and gain the imprimatur of some high-profile Republicans. Then a pressure campaign will have to be mounted to convince Boehner to move the legislation to the floor of the House under rules that allow it to pass with mostly Democratic votes. It’s easier to see how this could happen with the coming budgetary issues, which have deadlines that force action, than for the rest of Obama’s agenda, which is more likely than not to simply die in the House. | Obama’s victory made no difference in changing the psychology or incentives of members of the G.O.P. who matter that “breaking the fever” was the wrong metaphor There is no one event that can change a political party overnight A better metaphor for coming battles three yards and a cloud of dust a series of grinding plays where victories are earned only after intense combat fiscal-cliff demonstrated there’s potential for bipartisan deal-making passing the House is impossible unless pressure is extremely intense Deals will have to be negotiated and gain imprimatur of Republicans | But Obama’s victory has made almost no difference in changing the psychology or incentives of the members of the G.O.P. who matter most: the House Republicans. The idea that a bloc of conservative, mostly Southern, Republicans would start to coöperate with the President on issues like tax policy and immigration may have rested on a faulty assumption. The past few weeks of fiscal-cliff drama have taught us that “breaking the fever” was the wrong metaphor. There is no one event—even the election of a President—that can change a political party overnight. Congress is a co-equal branch of government, and House Republicans feel that they have as much of a mandate for their policies as Obama does for his. Shouldn’t House Republicans care that their views on Obama’s priorities, like tax cuts for the rich and immigration, helped cost Romney the White House and will make it difficult for their party’s nominee to win in 2016? In the abstract, many do, but that’s not enough to change the voting behavior of the average House Republican, who represents a gerrymandered and very conservative district. A better metaphor for the coming battles with Congress may be what Woody Hayes, the college-football coach, famously called “three yards and a cloud of dust”: a series of grinding plays where small victories are earned only after lots of intense combat. While the fiscal-cliff showdown demonstrated that there’s potential for bipartisan deal-making in the Senate, passing any Obama priority through the House of Representatives is nearly impossible unless the political pressure is extremely intense. The fiscal-cliff bill passed the House only when Speaker John Boehner’s members realized that their only alternative was blowing up the settlement negotiated by Joe Biden and Mitch McConnell—and accepting all the blame and consequences. That episode offers the White House a general template for the coming fights over spending, immigration, and gun control—three issues where there is very little consensus between Obama and most House Republicans. Deals will have to be negotiated in the Senate and gain the imprimatur of some high-profile Republicans. Then a pressure campaign will have to be mounted to convince Boehner to move the legislation to the floor of the House under rules that allow it to pass with mostly Democratic votes. It’s easier to see how this could happen with the coming budgetary issues, which have deadlines that force action, than for the rest of Obama’s agenda, which is more likely than not to simply die in the House. | 2,552 | <h4><strong>Even if a confrontational strategy is key, that doesn’t mean the plan’s singular win spills-over—it’s more likely to undermine Obama’s careful strategy </h4><p></strong>Ryan <strong>Lizza</strong>, 1/7/<strong>13</strong>, Will Hagel Spike the G.O.P.’s Fever?, www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/01/how-much-will-the-nomination-of-chuck-hagel-hurt-obamas-second-term-agenda.html</p><p>But <u><strong><mark>Obama’s victory</mark> has <mark>made </mark>almost <mark>no difference in changing the psychology or incentives of </mark>the <mark>members of the G.O.P. who matter</mark> most</u></strong>: the House Republicans. The idea that a bloc of conservative, mostly Southern, Republicans would start to coöperate with the President on issues like tax policy and immigration may have rested on a faulty assumption. The past few weeks of fiscal-cliff drama have taught us <mark>that “<u><strong>breaking the fever” was the wrong metaphor</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>There is no one event</u></strong></mark>—even the election of a President—<u><strong><mark>that can change a political party overnight</u></strong></mark>. Congress is a co-equal branch of government, and House Republicans feel that they have as much of a mandate for their policies as Obama does for his. Shouldn’t House Republicans care that their views on Obama’s priorities, like tax cuts for the rich and immigration, helped cost Romney the White House and will make it difficult for their party’s nominee to win in 2016? In the abstract, many do, but that’s not enough to change the voting behavior of the average House Republican, who represents a gerrymandered and very conservative district. <u><strong><mark>A better metaphor for </mark>the <mark>coming battles </mark>with Congress may be</u></strong> what Woody Hayes, the college-football coach, famously called “<u><strong><mark>three yards and a cloud of dust</mark>”: <mark>a series of grinding plays where </mark>small <mark>victories are earned only after </mark>lots of <mark>intense combat</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>While the <mark>fiscal-cliff</mark> showdown <mark>demonstrated </mark>that <mark>there’s potential for bipartisan deal-making </mark>in the Senate, <mark>passing </mark>any Obama priority through <mark>the House </mark>of Representatives <mark>is </mark>nearly <mark>impossible unless </mark>the political <mark>pressure is extremely intense</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The fiscal-cliff bill</u></strong> passed the House only when Speaker John Boehner’s members realized that their only alternative was blowing up the settlement negotiated by Joe Biden and Mitch McConnell—and accepting all the blame and consequences. That episode <u><strong>offers the White House a general template for the coming fights over spending</u></strong>, immigration, and gun control—three <u><strong>issues where there is very little consensus between Obama and most House Republicans. <mark>Deals will have to be negotiated</mark> in the Senate <mark>and gain </mark>the <mark>imprimatur of</mark> some high-profile <mark>Republicans</mark>. Then a pressure campaign will have to be mounted to convince Boehner to move the legislation to the floor of the House under rules that allow it to pass with mostly Democratic votes. It’s easier to see how this could happen with the coming budgetary issues, which have deadlines that force action, than for the rest of Obama’s agenda, which is more likely than not to simply die in the House.</p></u></strong> | null | 1nr | Winners Win | 249,834 | 6 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,928 | coercion – others can force people to write suicide notes and include them in their will | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>coercion – others can force people to write suicide notes and include them in their will</h4> | null | 1nc | Case | 430,502 | 1 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,929 | Winners lose | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>Winners lose</h4></strong> | null | 1nr | Winners Win | 430,503 | 1 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,930 | murder – they’ve said murder is okay and have given people a lot of leeway to get away with it | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>murder – they’ve said murder is okay and have given people a lot of leeway to get away with it </h4> | null | 1nc | Case | 430,504 | 1 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,931 | Winners lose – prefer contextual evidence for election year | Atkinson 2/6 President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation) | Atkinson 2/6 (Selling the President's Ambitious Trade Agenda 2/6/14 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-d-atkinson-phd/selling-the-presidents-am_b_4733087.html Robert D. Atkinson, Ph.D. ¶ President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation) | Judging by congressional reaction President Obama still has his work cut out for him Republicans may not want to give him a big "win" in an election year). | President Obama still has his work cut out for him Republicans may not want to give him a big "win" in an election year). | Judging by congressional reaction to the trade elements in the State of the Union, President Obama still has his work cut out for him ift he's going to sell his plan to reticent Democrats (who remain unconvinced of the benefits of trade) and Republicans (who may not want to give him a big "win" in an election year). | 317 | <h4><strong>Winners lose – prefer contextual evidence for election year</h4><p>Atkinson 2/6 </strong>(Selling the President's Ambitious Trade Agenda 2/6/14 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-d-atkinson-phd/selling-the-presidents-am_b_4733087.html Robert D. Atkinson, Ph.D. ¶ <u><strong>President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation)</p><p></strong>Judging by congressional reaction</u> to the trade elements in the State of the Union, <u><mark>President Obama still has his work cut out for him</u></mark> ift he's going to sell his plan to reticent Democrats (who remain unconvinced of the benefits of trade) and <u><mark>Republicans</u></mark> (who <u><strong><mark>may not want to give him a big "win" in an election year).</p></u></strong></mark> | null | 1nr | Winners Win | 423,540 | 2 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,932 | Root Causality arguments are flawed-Wars don’t have single causes – consensus of experts | Cashman 00 | Cashman 00 | Greg, “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9
Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence. | multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, never explainable through a single factor research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war | Greg, Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9
Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence. | 967 | <h4>Root Causality arguments are flawed-<u>Wars don’t have single causes – consensus of experts</h4><p><strong>Cashman 00</p><p></strong>Greg,</u><strong> Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University<u></strong> “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9</p><p>Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, <mark>multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex,</mark> they are almost <mark>never explainable through a single factor</mark>. Decades of <mark>research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war</mark>. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.</p></u> | null | 1nc | Case | 62,856 | 22 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,933 | b. empirics for Obama | Eberly, 2013 | Todd Eberly, 2013 (“The presidential power trap,” http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-party-support-public-opinion/2, Accessed 1/24/2013, rwg) | The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government. | The president initially enjoyed strong approval and was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. | Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and, with a Democratic Congress, was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government. | 867 | <h4><strong>b. empirics for Obama</h4><p></strong>Todd <strong>Eberly, 2013</strong> (“The presidential power trap,” http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-party-support-public-opinion/2, Accessed 1/24/2013, rwg)</p><p>Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. <u><strong><mark>The president initially enjoyed strong </mark>public <mark>approval and</u></strong></mark>, with a Democratic Congress, <u><strong><mark>was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year </mark>and early into his second, </u></strong>capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. <u><strong><mark>But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. </mark>His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government.</p></u></strong> | null | 1nr | Winners Win | 220,919 | 4 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,934 | Life is improving-more evidence | Pinker 11 | Pinker 11 Steven Pinker is Professor of psychology at Harvard University "Violence Vanquished" Sept 24 online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html | On the day this article appears, you will read about a shocking act of violence. there will be a terrorist bombing, a senseless murder, a bloody insurrection. It's impossible to learn about these catastrophes without thinking, "What is the world coming to?"¶ Believe it or not, the world of the past was much worse Violence has been in decline for thousands of years, today we may be living in the most peaceable era The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. It has not brought violence down to zero, and it is not guaranteed to continue But it is a persistent historical development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood.¶ Today the decline in these brutal practices can be quantified over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with six major declines of violence.¶ The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy to the first agricultural civilizations Forensic archeology—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—can estimate rates of violence from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls ethnographers can tally the causes of death in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control.¶ These investigations show that, on average, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal violence subsides when a state or empire imposes control over a territory, leading to the various "paxes" (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history.¶ The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a 10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide.¶ Historians attribute this decline to the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. Criminal justice was nationalized, and zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors the Enlightenment and The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.¶ At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason The fourth major transition is the respite from major interstate war that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia. centuries ago, the great powers were almost always at war The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" ignores the second half of the century (and may not even be true of the first half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population).¶ Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. Political scientists point instead to the growth of democracy, trade and international organizations—all of which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—have declined throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously.¶ The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peace the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature?¶ This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels The most obvious of these pacifying forces has been the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe Another pacifying force has been commerce, a game in which everybody can win. As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas other people become more valuable alive than dead. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential partners in reciprocal altruism.¶ For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa , they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money.¶ These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won. | the world of the past was much worse. Violence has been in decline the most peaceable era It has not brought violence to zero, But is persistent development, visible from millennia to years, from wars to spanking the decline can be quantified Forensic archeology can estimate rates of violence ethnographers can tally the causes of death violence subsides when a empire imposes control leading to the various "paxes" Historians attribute this decline to centralized authority and commerce. respite from major interstate war centuries ago, great powers were almost always at war, Political scientists point to democracy, trade and international organizations which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression have declined deaths from political violence is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point The most obvious of pacifying forces has been the state, with monopoly on force Another pacifying force has been commerce people | On the day this article appears, you will read about a shocking act of violence. Somewhere in the world there will be a terrorist bombing, a senseless murder, a bloody insurrection. It's impossible to learn about these catastrophes without thinking, "What is the world coming to?"¶ But a better question may be, "How bad was the world in the past?"¶ Believe it or not, the world of the past was much worse. Violence has been in decline for thousands of years, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in the existence of our species.¶ The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. It has not brought violence down to zero, and it is not guaranteed to continue. But it is a persistent historical development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children.¶ This claim, I know, invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. We tend to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood.¶ Evidence of our bloody history is not hard to find. Consider the genocides in the Old Testament and the crucifixions in the New, the gory mutilations in Shakespeare's tragedies and Grimm's fairy tales, the British monarchs who beheaded their relatives and the American founders who dueled with their rivals.¶ Today the decline in these brutal practices can be quantified. A look at the numbers shows that over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with six major declines of violence.¶ The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy of the hunting, gathering and horticultural societies in which our species spent most of its evolutionary history to the first agricultural civilizations, with cities and governments, starting about 5,000 years ago.¶ For centuries, social theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau speculated from their armchairs about what life was like in a "state of nature." Nowadays we can do better. Forensic archeology—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—can estimate rates of violence from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls, decapitations or arrowheads embedded in bones. And ethnographers can tally the causes of death in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control.¶ These investigations show that, on average, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal violence commonly subsides when a state or empire imposes control over a territory, leading to the various "paxes" (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history.¶ It's not that the first kings had a benevolent interest in the welfare of their citizens. Just as a farmer tries to prevent his livestock from killing one another, so a ruler will try to keep his subjects from cycles of raiding and feuding. From his point of view, such squabbling is a dead loss—forgone opportunities to extract taxes, tributes, soldiers and slaves.¶ The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a 10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide.¶ The numbers are consistent with narrative histories of the brutality of life in the Middle Ages, when highwaymen made travel a risk to life and limb and dinners were commonly enlivened by dagger attacks. So many people had their noses cut off that medieval medical textbooks speculated about techniques for growing them back.¶ Historians attribute this decline to the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. Criminal justice was nationalized, and zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade. People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors.¶ The third transition, sometimes called the Humanitarian Revolution, took off with the Enlightenment. Governments and churches had long maintained order by punishing nonconformists with mutilation, torture and gruesome forms of execution, such as burning, breaking, disembowelment, impalement and sawing in half. The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.¶ At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason. And a growing wave of countries abolished blood sports, dueling, witchhunts, religious persecution, absolute despotism and slavery.¶ The fourth major transition is the respite from major interstate war that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace.¶ Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia. But centuries ago, the great powers were almost always at war, and until quite recently, Western European countries tended to initiate two or three new wars every year. The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" ignores the second half of the century (and may not even be true of the first half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population).¶ Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. Political scientists point instead to the growth of democracy, trade and international organizations—all of which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict. They also credit the rising valuation of human life over national grandeur—a hard-won lesson of two world wars.¶ The fifth trend, which I call the New Peace, involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations. Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers.¶ The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And the best news is that, since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—have declined throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously.¶ The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point. Even if we multiplied that rate to account for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%.¶ The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world stoked by the superpowers and also discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet. Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peace—not always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to fight to the bitter end.¶ Finally, the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales. In the developed world, the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms, and the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives and girlfriends.¶ In recent decades, the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse. And the campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people.¶ Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature?¶ This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit; little boys continue to play-fight; people of all ages continue to snipe and bicker, and most of them continue to harbor violent fantasies and to enjoy violent entertainment.¶ It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them—such as self-control, empathy, fairness and reason—what Abraham Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature." Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels.¶ The most obvious of these pacifying forces has been the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack, inhibit the impulse for revenge and circumvent the self-serving biases that make all parties to a dispute believe that they are on the side of the angels.¶ We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe. And we can watch the movie in reverse when violence erupts in zones of anarchy, such as the Wild West, failed states and neighborhoods controlled by mafias and street gangs, who can't call 911 or file a lawsuit to resolve their disputes but have to administer their own rough justice.¶ Another pacifying force has been commerce, a game in which everybody can win. As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas over longer distances and among larger groups of trading partners, other people become more valuable alive than dead. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential partners in reciprocal altruism.¶ For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa. Morality aside, they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money.¶ A third peacemaker has been cosmopolitanism—the expansion of people's parochial little worlds through literacy, mobility, education, science, history, journalism and mass media. These forms of virtual reality can prompt people to take the perspective of people unlike themselves and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them.¶ These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won. We devote ever more of our brainpower to guiding our better angels. It is probably no coincidence that the Humanitarian Revolution came on the heels of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, that the Long Peace and rights revolutions coincided with the electronic global village. | 11,743 | <h4>Life is improving-more evidence</h4><p><strong>Pinker 11<u></strong> Steven Pinker is Professor of psychology at Harvard University "Violence Vanquished" Sept 24 online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html</p><p>On the day this article appears, you will read about a shocking act of violence.</u> Somewhere in the world <u>there will be a terrorist bombing, a senseless murder, a bloody insurrection. It's</u> <u>impossible to learn about these catastrophes without thinking, "What is the world coming to?"¶ </u>But a better question may be, "How bad was the world in the past?"¶ <u>Believe it or not, <strong><mark>the world of the past was </strong>much worse</u>. <u>Violence has been in decline</mark> for thousands of years,</u> and <u>today we may be living in <mark>the <strong>most peaceable era</u></strong></mark> in the existence of our species.¶ <u>The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. <mark>It <strong>has not brought violence</mark> down <mark>to zero</strong>,</mark> and it <strong>is not guaranteed to continue</u></strong>. <u><mark>But</mark> it <mark>is</mark> a <mark>persistent</mark> historical <mark>development, visible</mark> on scales <mark>from millennia to years, from</mark> the waging of <mark>wars to</mark> the <mark>spanking</mark> of children</u>.¶ This claim, I know, invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. We tend to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. <u>There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood.¶ </u>Evidence of our bloody history is not hard to find. Consider the genocides in the Old Testament and the crucifixions in the New, the gory mutilations in Shakespeare's tragedies and Grimm's fairy tales, the British monarchs who beheaded their relatives and the American founders who dueled with their rivals.¶ <u>Today <mark>the decline</mark> in these brutal practices <strong><mark>can be quantified</u></strong></mark>. A look at the numbers shows that <u>over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with <strong>six major declines of violence.¶ </strong>The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy</u> of the hunting, gathering and horticultural societies in which our species spent most of its evolutionary history <u>to the first agricultural civilizations</u>, with cities and governments, starting about 5,000 years ago.¶ For centuries, social theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau speculated from their armchairs about what life was like in a "state of nature." Nowadays we can do better. <u><mark>Forensic archeology</mark>—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—<mark>can estimate rates</mark> <mark>of violence</mark> from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls</u>, decapitations or arrowheads embedded in bones. And <u><mark>ethnographers can</mark> <mark>tally the causes of death</mark> in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control.¶ These investigations show that, on average, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal <mark>violence</u></mark> commonly <u><mark>subsides when a <strong></mark>state or <mark>empire </strong>imposes control</mark> over a territory<strong>, <mark>leading to the various "paxes</strong>"</mark> (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history.¶ </u>It's not that the first kings had a benevolent interest in the welfare of their citizens. Just as a farmer tries to prevent his livestock from killing one another, so a ruler will try to keep his subjects from cycles of raiding and feuding. From his point of view, such squabbling is a dead loss—forgone opportunities to extract taxes, tributes, soldiers and slaves.¶ <u>The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a <strong>10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide</strong>.¶ </u>The numbers are consistent with narrative histories of the brutality of life in the Middle Ages, when highwaymen made travel a risk to life and limb and dinners were commonly enlivened by dagger attacks. So many people had their noses cut off that medieval medical textbooks speculated about techniques for growing them back.¶ <u><mark>Historians attribute this decline to</mark> the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with <mark>centralized authority and</mark> an infrastructure of <mark>commerce.</mark> Criminal justice was nationalized, and <strong>zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade</u></strong>. <u>People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors</u>.¶ The third transition, sometimes called the Humanitarian Revolution, took off with <u>the Enlightenment</u>. Governments and churches had long maintained order by punishing nonconformists with mutilation, torture <u>and</u> gruesome forms of execution, such as burning, breaking, disembowelment, impalement and sawing in half. <u>The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.¶ At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason</u>. And a growing wave of countries abolished blood sports, dueling, witchhunts, religious persecution, absolute despotism and slavery.¶ <u>The fourth major transition is the <mark>respite from major interstate war</mark> that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace</u>.¶ <u>Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia.</u> But <u><mark>centuries ago,</mark> the <strong><mark>great powers were almost always at war</u></strong>,</mark> and until quite recently, Western European countries tended to initiate two or three new wars every year. <u>The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" <strong>ignores the second half</strong> of the century (<strong>and may not even be true of the first</strong> half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population).¶ Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. <mark>Political scientists point </mark>instead <mark>to</mark> the growth of <mark>democracy<strong>, </strong>trade<strong> and international organizations</strong></mark>—<strong>all of <mark>which, the </strong>statistical evidence<strong> shows, </strong>reduce the likelihood of conflict</u></mark>. They also credit the rising valuation of human life over national grandeur—a hard-won lesson of two world wars.¶ The fifth trend, which I call the New Peace, involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations. Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers.¶ The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And the best news is that, <u>since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, <strong><mark>organized conflicts of all kinds</strong>—civil wars, genocides, repression</mark> by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—<mark>have declined</mark> throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously.¶ The rate of documented direct <strong><mark>deaths from political violence</mark> (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade <mark>is an </strong>unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point</u></mark>. Even if we multiplied that rate to account for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%.¶ <u>The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world</u> stoked by the superpowers and also discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet. <u>Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which <strong>really do keep the peace</u></strong>—not always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to fight to the bitter end.¶ Finally, <u>the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales</u>. In the developed world, <u>the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms</u>, and <u>the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives</u> and girlfriends.¶ In recent decades, <u>the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse</u>. And the <u>campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people</u>.¶ <u>Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature?¶ This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit</u>; little boys continue to play-fight; people of all ages continue to snipe and bicker, and most of them continue to harbor violent fantasies and to enjoy violent entertainment.¶ <u>It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them</u>—such as self-control, empathy, fairness and reason—what Abraham Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature." <u>Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels</u>.¶ <u><strong><mark>The most obvious of</mark> these <mark>pacifying forces has been </strong>the state<strong>, with</mark> its </strong><mark>monopoly on</mark> the legitimate use of <mark>force</mark>. A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack</u>, inhibit the impulse for revenge and circumvent the self-serving biases that make all parties to a dispute believe that they are on the side of the angels.¶ <u>We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe</u>. And we can watch the movie in reverse when violence erupts in zones of anarchy, such as the Wild West, failed states and neighborhoods controlled by mafias and street gangs, who can't call 911 or file a lawsuit to resolve their disputes but have to administer their own rough justice.¶ <u><mark>Another pacifying force has been commerce</mark>, a game in which everybody can win. As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas</u> over longer distances and among larger groups of trading partners, <u>other <strong><mark>people</mark> become more valuable alive than dead</strong>. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential partners in reciprocal altruism.¶ For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are <strong>unlikely to declare war</strong> on them or vice versa</u>. Morality aside<u>, they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money.¶ </u>A third peacemaker has been cosmopolitanism—the expansion of people's parochial little worlds through literacy, mobility, education, science, history, journalism and mass media. These forms of virtual reality can prompt people to take the perspective of people unlike themselves and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them.¶ <u>These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won.</u><strong> We devote ever more of our brainpower to guiding our better angels. It is probably no coincidence that the Humanitarian Revolution came on the heels of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, that the Long Peace and rights revolutions coincided with the electronic global village.</p></strong> | null | 1nc | Case | 88,819 | 23 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,935 | c. causes backlash and media spin | Purdum, 10 – Award winning journalist who spent 23 years with the NY Times (12/20/10, Todd S., Vanity Affair, “Obama Is Suffering Because of His Achievements, Not Despite Them,” http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2010/12/obama-is-suffering-because-of-his-achievements-not-despite-them.html) | Purdum, 10 – Award winning journalist who spent 23 years with the NY Times (12/20/10, Todd S., Vanity Affair, “Obama Is Suffering Because of His Achievements, Not Despite Them,” http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2010/12/obama-is-suffering-because-of-his-achievements-not-despite-them.html)
With this weekend’s decisive Senate repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy for gay service members, can anyone seriously doubt Barack Obama’s patient willingness to play the long game? Or his remarkable success in doing so? In less than two years in office—often against the odds and the smart money’s predictions at any given moment—Obama has managed to achieve a landmark overhaul of the nation’s health insurance system; the most sweeping change in the financial regulatory system since the Great Depression; the stabilization of the domestic auto industry; and the repeal of a once well-intended policy that even the military itself had come to see as unnecessary and unfair. So why isn’t his political standing higher? | Precisely because of the raft of legislative victories he’s achieved. he has suffered not because he hasn’t “done” anything but because he’s done so much—way, way too much in the eyes of his most conservative critics. With each victory, Obama’s opponents grow more frustrated, filling the airwaves and what passes for political discourse with fulminations about some supposed sin or another the guy is bleeding To him, the merit of all these programs has been self-evident, he has not always done all he could to explain them, There is a price for everything in politics, and Obama knows that, too. Finally, Obama is hardly in anything close to disastrous political shape. Yes, the voters administered a shellacking to his party in December, but there are advantages to working with a hostile Republican Congress as a foil, instead of a balky Democratic one as a quarrelsome ally. His own personal likeability rating remains high—much higher than that of most politicians—and his job approval rating hovers at just a bit below 50 percent, where it has held for more than a year, nowhere near the level of a “failed presidency.” Sarah Palin’s presence for the moment assures an uncertain and divided Republican field heading into the 2012 election cycle, and the one man who could cause Obama a world of trouble if he mounted an independent campaign—Mayor Mike Bloomberg of New York—has recently made statements of non-candidacy that sound Shermanesque (even as he has remained outspokenly critical of business as usual by both parties in Washington). | because of the raft of legislative victories he’s achieved he has suffered because he’s done so much With each victory, Obama’s opponents grow more frustrated filling the airwaves the guy is bleeding he has not always done all he could to explain them | Precisely because of the raft of legislative victories he’s achieved. Obama has pushed through large and complicated new government initiatives at a time of record-low public trust in government (and in institutions of any sort, for that matter), and he has suffered not because he hasn’t “done” anything but because he’s done so much—way, way too much in the eyes of his most conservative critics. With each victory, Obama’s opponents grow more frustrated, filling the airwaves and what passes for political discourse with fulminations about some supposed sin or another. Is it any wonder the guy is bleeding a bit? For his part, Obama resists the pugilistic impulse. To him, the merit of all these programs has been self-evident, and he has been the first to acknowledge that he has not always done all he could to explain them, sensibly and simply, to the American public. But Obama is nowhere near so politically maladroit as his frustrated liberal supporters—or implacable right-wing opponents—like to claim. He proved as much, if nothing else, with his embrace of the one policy choice he surely loathed: his agreement to extend the Bush-era income tax cuts for wealthy people who don’t need and don’t deserve them. That broke one of the president’s signature campaign promises and enraged the Democratic base and many members of his own party in Congress. But it was a cool-eyed reflection of political reality: The midterm election results guaranteed that negotiations would only get tougher next month, and a delay in resolving the issue would have forced tax increases for virtually everyone on January 1—creating nothing but uncertainty for taxpayers and accountants alike. Obama saw no point in trying to score political debating points in an argument he knew he had no chance of winning. Moreover, as The Washington Post’s conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer bitterly noted, Obama’s agreement to the tax deal amounted to a second economic stimulus measure—one that he could never otherwise have persuaded Congressional Republicans to support. Krauthammer denounced it as the “swindle of the year,” and suggested that only Democrats could possibly be self-defeating enough to reject it. In the end, of course, they did not. Obama knows better than most people that politics is the art of the possible (it’s no accident that he became the first black president after less than a single term in the Senate), and an endless cycle of two steps forward, one step back. So he just keeps putting one foot in front of the other, confident that he can get where he wants to go, eventually. The short-term results are often messy and confusing. Just months ago, gay rights advocates were distraught because Obama wasn’t pressing harder to repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Now he is apparently paying a price for his victory because some Republican Senators who’d promised to support ratification of the START arms-reduction treaty—identified by Obama as a signal priority for this lame-duck session of Congress—are balking because Obama pressed ahead with repealing DADT against their wishes. There is a price for everything in politics, and Obama knows that, too. Finally, Obama is hardly in anything close to disastrous political shape. Yes, the voters administered a shellacking to his party in December, but there are advantages to working with a hostile Republican Congress as a foil, instead of a balky Democratic one as a quarrelsome ally. His own personal likeability rating remains high—much higher than that of most politicians—and his job approval rating hovers at just a bit below 50 percent, where it has held for more than a year, nowhere near the level of a “failed presidency.” Sarah Palin’s presence for the moment assures an uncertain and divided Republican field heading into the 2012 election cycle, and the one man who could cause Obama a world of trouble if he mounted an independent campaign—Mayor Mike Bloomberg of New York—has recently made statements of non-candidacy that sound Shermanesque (even as he has remained outspokenly critical of business as usual by both parties in Washington). | 4,124 | <h4><strong>c. causes backlash and <u>media spin</h4><p>Purdum, 10</u> – Award winning journalist who spent 23 years with the NY Times (12/20/10, Todd S., Vanity Affair, “Obama Is Suffering Because of His Achievements, Not Despite Them,” http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2010/12/obama-is-suffering-because-of-his-achievements-not-despite-them.html<u>)</p><p></u></strong>With this weekend’s decisive Senate repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy for gay service members, can anyone seriously doubt Barack Obama’s patient willingness to play the long game? Or his remarkable success in doing so? In less than two years in office—often against the odds and the smart money’s predictions at any given moment—<u><mark>Obama</mark> has <mark>managed to achieve a</u></mark> landmark <u><mark>overhaul of</u></mark> the nation’s <u><mark>health insurance</u></mark> system; the most <u>sweeping <mark>change in the financial</mark> regulatory <mark>system</u></mark> since the Great Depression; the <u>stabilization of the</u> domestic <u>auto industry</u>; <u>and the repeal of a once well-intended policy that even the military itself had come to see as unnecessary and unfair.</u> <u>So <mark>why isn’t his political standing higher</mark>?</p><p>Precisely <mark>because of the raft of legislative victories he’s achieved</mark>.</u> Obama has pushed through large and complicated new government initiatives at a time of record-low public trust in government (and in institutions of any sort, for that matter), and <u><mark>he has suffered</mark> not because he hasn’t “done” anything but <mark>because he’s done so much</mark>—way, way too much in the eyes of his most conservative critics.</u> <u><mark>With each victory, Obama’s opponents grow more frustrated</mark>, <mark>filling the airwaves</mark> and what passes for political discourse with fulminations about some supposed sin or another</u>. Is it any wonder <u><mark>the guy is bleeding</u></mark> a bit? For his part, Obama resists the pugilistic impulse. <u>To him, the merit of all these programs has been self-evident,</u> and he has been the first to acknowledge that <u><mark>he has not always done all he could to explain them</mark>,</u> sensibly and simply, to the American public. But Obama is nowhere near so politically maladroit as his frustrated liberal supporters—or implacable right-wing opponents—like to claim. He proved as much, if nothing else, with his embrace of the one policy choice he surely loathed: his agreement to extend the Bush-era income tax cuts for wealthy people who don’t need and don’t deserve them. That broke one of the president’s signature campaign promises and enraged the Democratic base and many members of his own party in Congress. But it was a cool-eyed reflection of political reality: The midterm election results guaranteed that negotiations would only get tougher next month, and a delay in resolving the issue would have forced tax increases for virtually everyone on January 1—creating nothing but uncertainty for taxpayers and accountants alike. Obama saw no point in trying to score political debating points in an argument he knew he had no chance of winning. Moreover, as The Washington Post’s conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer bitterly noted, Obama’s agreement to the tax deal amounted to a second economic stimulus measure—one that he could never otherwise have persuaded Congressional Republicans to support. Krauthammer denounced it as the “swindle of the year,” and suggested that only Democrats could possibly be self-defeating enough to reject it. In the end, of course, they did not. Obama knows better than most people that politics is the art of the possible (it’s no accident that he became the first black president after less than a single term in the Senate), and an endless cycle of two steps forward, one step back. So he just keeps putting one foot in front of the other, confident that he can get where he wants to go, eventually. The short-term results are often messy and confusing. Just months ago, gay rights advocates were distraught because Obama wasn’t pressing harder to repeal “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Now he is apparently paying a price for his victory because some Republican Senators who’d promised to support ratification of the START arms-reduction treaty—identified by Obama as a signal priority for this lame-duck session of Congress—are balking because Obama pressed ahead with repealing DADT against their wishes. <u>There is a price for everything in politics,<strong> and Obama knows that, too. Finally, Obama is hardly in anything close to disastrous political shape. Yes, the voters administered a shellacking to his party in December, but there are advantages to working with a hostile Republican Congress as a foil, instead of a balky Democratic one as a quarrelsome ally. His own personal likeability rating remains high—much higher than that of most politicians—and his job approval rating hovers at just a bit below 50 percent, where it has held for more than a year, nowhere near the level of a “failed presidency.” Sarah Palin’s presence for the moment assures an uncertain and divided Republican field heading into the 2012 election cycle, and the one man who could cause Obama a world of trouble if he mounted an independent campaign—Mayor Mike Bloomberg of New York—has recently made statements of non-candidacy that sound Shermanesque (even as he has remained outspokenly critical of business as usual by both parties in Washington).</p></u></strong> | null | 1nr | Winners Win | 129,598 | 22 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,936 | Illogical—a president would never lose PC | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><u><strong>Illogical—a president would never lose PC </h4></u></strong> | null | 1nr | Winners Win | 430,505 | 1 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,937 | No biopower impact | Dickinson 4 | Edward Ross Dickinson 4, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, Central European History, Vol. 37 No. 1, p. 34-36 | continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate | biopolitical discourse analysis can easily become superficial and misleading because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. the democratic state is substantively different from totalitarianism it has nowhere developed the radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with totalitarian structures this pursuit of biopolitical ends through citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed limits on coercive policies The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same. Discursive elements like elements of biopolitics) can be combined to form parts of quite different strategies they cannot be assigned one place but circulate | And it is, of course, embedded in a broader discursive complex (institutions, professions, fields of social, medical, and psychological expertise) that pursues these same aims in often even more effective and inescapable ways.89 In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable.¶ Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies.¶ In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90¶ Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. ¶ This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.91 | 4,221 | <h4><strong>No biopower impact</h4><p></strong>Edward Ross<strong> Dickinson 4</strong>, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, Central European History, Vol. 37 No. 1, p. 34-36</p><p>And it is, of course, embedded in a broader discursive complex (institutions, professions, fields of social, medical, and psychological expertise) that pursues these same aims in often even more effective and inescapable ways.89 In short, the <u><strong>continuities between early twentieth-century <mark>biopolitical discourse</mark> and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable</u></strong>.¶<u> </u>Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. <u><strong>And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that <mark>analysis can easily become superficial and misleading</mark>, <mark>because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes</u></strong>.</mark> Clearly <u><mark>the democratic </mark>welfare <mark>state <strong>is</mark> not only formally but also <mark>substantively</mark> quite <mark>different from totalitarianism</u></strong></mark>. Above all, again, <u><mark>it has nowhere developed the </mark>fateful, <mark>radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism</u></mark> (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies.¶ In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, <u><strong>there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from</strong> <strong>those of</strong> <strong>National Socialist Germany. <mark>Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and </strong>participation that is functionally incompatible with </mark>authoritarian or <mark>totalitarian structures</mark>. <strong>And <mark>this pursuit of biopolitical ends through</mark> a regime of democratic <mark>citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed </mark>increasingly narrow <mark>limits on coercive policies</mark>, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization</u></strong>. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90¶ Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, <u><strong>totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering</strong>.</u> ¶ <u><strong>This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian</strong> </u>(and Peukertian) <u><strong>theory.</strong> Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states</u>; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. <u>But they are two very different ways of organizing it. <strong><mark>The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same</u></strong>.</mark>” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” <u><strong><mark>Discursive elements</mark> (<mark>like</mark> the various <mark>elements of biopolitics) can be combined</mark> in different ways <mark>to form parts of quite different strategies</mark> (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); <mark>they cannot be assigned</mark> to <mark>one place</mark> in a structure, <mark>but</mark> rather <mark>circulate</u></mark>. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.91</p></strong> | null | 1nc | Case | 42,760 | 168 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
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741,938 | T – NOT NEARLY ALL SALE | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>T – NOT NEARLY ALL SALE</h4> | 1nc | null | T | 430,506 | 1 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
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741,939 | Obama can sustain a veto of Iran sanctions now- but it’s close- PC’s key | Politico 12/29 | Politico 12/29/2014 (GOP to move on Iran sanctions legislation, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/gop-senate-iran-sanctions-bill-113852.html) | Republicans are setting up early challenges to Obama preparing to move forward quickly on Iran The Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next year taking a confrontational stance toward Iran appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority. You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the Kirk-Menendez legislation in 2014, though Obama convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off legislation could upset ongoing negotiations While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress aides declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. the largest challenge is building veto-proof support that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House. Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP Kirk expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate | Republicans are setting up early challenges o bama Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next yea taking a confrontational stance toward Iran appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority Kirk-Menendez Obama’s convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off legislation could upset ongoing negotiations. the largest challenge is building veto-proof support Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task, given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP | Congressional Republicans are setting up early challenges to President Barack Obama in January, preparing to move forward quickly on new Iran sanctions legislation following on the heels of a vote on a bill approving the Keystone XL Pipeline. The Republican-controlled Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next year, according to Republican senators and aides. The starting point would be a bill written a year ago by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that managed to accrue the support of 60 senators in both parties despite opposition from the White House. Kirk and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said over the weekend that an Iran vote could occur in January after a vote on Keystone, which is the first bill the Republican Senate will take up and is also opposed by President Barack Obama. Republican leaders have not yet finalized their legislative schedule, but the bipartisan Iran proposal is supported by incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and all of his leadership team. And taking a confrontational stance toward Iran as diplomatic negotiations continue with a group of Western nations appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority. “It’s an important issue, a priority, and has wide bipartisan support in the Senate,” said McConnell spokesman Don Stewart on Monday. The Republican House overwhelmingly passed a sanctions bill targeting Iran’s energy industry in 2013, though that legislation was never taken up by the Senate. The Kirk-Menendez legislation would tighten economic sanctions on Iran if the country walks away from ongoing negotiations over nuclear enrichment or reneges on an interim agreement that has frozen some of Iran’s nuclear activities in return for unwinding some sanctions. In November, Western and Iranians negotiators extended that interim deal until July as they attempt to hammer out a permanent deal that would curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and relax sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and isolated the country globally. A separate bill written by Graham and incoming Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) would require Congress to approve of any final deal and could figure into the GOP’s plans next year. “You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran. You will see a Congress making sure that sanctions are real and will be reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see a Congress wanting to have any say about a final deal,” Graham said at a weekend press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the Kirk-Menendez legislation in 2014, though President Barack Obama’s administration convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off public support after warning that voting on that legislation could upset ongoing negotiations. While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress, Democratic aides on Monday declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. Indeed, the largest challenge for both supporters of Iran sanctions and the Keystone pipeline is building veto-proof levels of support in Congress that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House. White House press secretary Josh Earnest said in November that new penalties during negotiations would be “counterproductive.” Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task, given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP. But Kirk said on Sunday in an interview with Fox news that he expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate.” | 3,916 | <h4>Obama can sustain a veto of Iran sanctions now- but it’s close- PC’s key</h4><p><strong>Politico 12/29</strong>/2014 (GOP to move on Iran sanctions legislation, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/gop-senate-iran-sanctions-bill-113852.html)</p><p>Congressional <u><mark>Republicans are setting up early challenges</mark> t<mark>o</u></mark> President Barack <u>O<mark>bama</u></mark> in January, <u>preparing to move forward quickly on</u> new <u>Iran</u> sanctions legislation following on the heels of a vote on a bill approving the Keystone XL Pipeline. <u>The</u> Republican-controlled <u><mark>Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next yea</mark>r</u>, according to Republican senators and aides. The starting point would be a bill written a year ago by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that managed to accrue the support of 60 senators in both parties despite opposition from the White House. Kirk and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said over the weekend that an Iran vote could occur in January after a vote on Keystone, which is the first bill the Republican Senate will take up and is also opposed by President Barack Obama. Republican leaders have not yet finalized their legislative schedule, but the bipartisan Iran proposal is supported by incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and all of his leadership team. And <u><mark>taking a confrontational stance toward Iran</u></mark> as diplomatic negotiations continue with a group of Western nations <u><mark>appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority</mark>. </u>“It’s an important issue, a priority, and has wide bipartisan support in the Senate,” said McConnell spokesman Don Stewart on Monday. The Republican House overwhelmingly passed a sanctions bill targeting Iran’s energy industry in 2013, though that legislation was never taken up by the Senate. The Kirk-Menendez legislation would tighten economic sanctions on Iran if the country walks away from ongoing negotiations over nuclear enrichment or reneges on an interim agreement that has frozen some of Iran’s nuclear activities in return for unwinding some sanctions. In November, Western and Iranians negotiators extended that interim deal until July as they attempt to hammer out a permanent deal that would curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and relax sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and isolated the country globally. A separate bill written by Graham and incoming Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) would require Congress to approve of any final deal and could figure into the GOP’s plans next year. “<u>You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran</u>. You will see a Congress making sure that sanctions are real and will be reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see a Congress wanting to have any say about a final deal,” Graham said at a weekend press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. <u>A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the <mark>Kirk-Menendez</mark> legislation in 2014, though </u>President Barack <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong>’s</mark> administration <u><strong><mark>convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off</u></strong></mark> public support after warning that voting on that <u><strong><mark>legislation could upset ongoing negotiations</u></strong>.</mark> <u>While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress</u>, Democratic <u>aides</u> on Monday <u>declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. </u>Indeed, <u><strong><mark>the largest challenge</u></strong></mark> for both supporters of Iran sanctions and the Keystone pipeline <u><strong><mark>is building veto-proof</u></strong></mark> levels of <u><strong><mark>support</u></strong></mark> in Congress <u>that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House.</u> White House press secretary Josh Earnest said in November that new penalties during negotiations would be “counterproductive.” <u><mark>Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a <strong>steep task</u></strong>,</mark> <u><mark>given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP</u></mark>. But <u>Kirk</u> said on Sunday in an interview with Fox news that he <u>expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate</u>.”</p> | 1NC | null | 1 | 430,411 | 46 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,940 | No risk of endless warfare | Gray 7 | Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf) | In the hands of a paranoid political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraq experiences reveal clearly that the conduct of war is disciplined by public attitudes we ought not to endorse the argument the U S should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing . It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy must be nothing if not pragmatic. | In the hands of a paranoid leader prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American system was designed for the purpose of constraining the executive Vietnam and Iraq reveal war is disciplined by public attitudes the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not convincing It should be dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. | 7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic. | 3,056 | <h4><strong>No risk of endless warfare </h4><p>Gray 7</strong>—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf<u>)</p><p></u>7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. <u><mark>In the hands of a paranoid</mark> </u>or boundlessly ambitious <u>political <mark>leader</mark>, <mark>prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American </mark>political <mark>system</mark>, with its checks and balances, <mark>was designed</mark> explicitly <mark>for</mark> <mark>the purpose of constraining the executive</mark> from </u>excessive <u>folly. Both the <mark>Vietnam</mark> <mark>and</mark> the contemporary <mark>Iraq</u></mark>i<u> experiences <mark>reveal</mark> clearly that</u> although <u>the conduct of <mark>war is</u></mark> an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is <u><mark>disciplined by public attitudes</u></mark>. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But<u> we ought not to endorse the argument </u>that <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that</u> the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. <u>Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. </u>This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that <u><mark>the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search</mark> <mark>for total security is <strong>not </mark>at all <mark>convincing</u></strong></mark>. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government<u>. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. <mark>It should be</mark> recognized and <mark>dismissed for</mark> <mark>what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. </mark>And strategy</u>, though not always policy, <u><strong>must be nothing if not pragmatic.</p></u></strong> | null | 1nc | Case | 91,690 | 348 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,941 | PC finite- legislative wins don’t spillover –empirics, true for Obama, too polarized | Eberly 13 | Eberly 13 Todd is coordinator of Public Policy Studies and assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at St. Mary's College of Maryland. His email is teeberly@smcm.edu. This article is excerpted from his book, co-authored with Steven Schier, "American Government and Popular Discontent: Stability without Success," to published later this year by Routledge Press., 1-21-2013 http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-party-support-public-opinion/2 | Obama faces the stark reality little of what he hopes to accomplish will come to pass Obama occupies an office many assume all powerful but the president faces a political capital problem and a power trap presidents have found effective leadership difficult To lead well, a president needs support If presidents fail to satisfy these they face the prospect of inadequate political capital to back their power assertions two parties ideologically divergent resulted in intense polarization diminishing the possibility of compromise These introduced significant challenges to presidential leadership In recent years presidents' political capital has shrunk while their power assertions have grown, Obama's narrow re-election hardly signals a grand resurgence of political capital Presidents have been unable to prevent their political capital from eroding short-term legislative strategies may win policy success but do not serve as an antidote to declining political capital the political capital is the central political challenge confronted by modern presidents | Obama faces stark reality little of what he hopes to accomplish will pass two parties ideologically divergent result in intense polarization diminishing compromise These introduced significant challenges to leadership presidents' p c shrunk while power assertions have grown Presidents have been unable to prevent p c from eroding short-term legislative strategies do not serve as an antidote to declining p c | As Barack Obama prepares to be sworn in for the second time as president of the United States, he faces the stark reality that little of what he hopes to accomplish in a second term will likely come to pass. Mr. Obama occupies an office that many assume to be all powerful, but like so many of his recent predecessors, the president knows better. He faces a political capital problem and a power trap.¶ In the post-1960s American political system, presidents have found the exercise of effective leadership a difficult task. To lead well, a president needs support — or at least permission — from federal courts and Congress; steady allegiance from public opinion and fellow partisans in the electorate; backing from powerful, entrenched interest groups; and accordance with contemporary public opinion about the proper size and scope of government. This is a long list of requirements. If presidents fail to satisfy these requirements, they face the prospect of inadequate political support or political capital to back their power assertions.¶ What was so crucial about the 1960s? We can trace so much of what defines contemporary politics to trends that emerged then. Americans' confidence in government began a precipitous decline as the tumult and tragedies of the 1960s gave way to the scandals and economic uncertainties of the 1970s. Long-standing party coalitions began to fray as the New Deal coalition, which had elected Franklin Roosevelt to four terms and made Democrats the indisputable majority party, faded into history. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 marked the beginning of an unprecedented era of divided government. Finally, the two parties began ideologically divergent journeys that resulted in intense polarization in Congress, diminishing the possibility of bipartisan compromise. These changes, combined with the growing influence of money and interest groups and the steady "thickening" of the federal bureaucracy, introduced significant challenges to presidential leadership.¶ Political capital can best be understood as a combination of the president's party support in Congress, public approval of his job performance, and the president's electoral victory margin. The components of political capital are central to the fate of presidencies. It is difficult to claim warrants for leadership in an era when job approval, congressional support and partisan affiliation provide less backing for a president than in times past. In recent years, presidents' political capital has shrunk while their power assertions have grown, making the president a volatile player in the national political system.¶ Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush joined the small ranks of incumbents defeated while seeking a second term. Ronald Reagan was elected in two landslides, yet his most successful year for domestic policy was his first year in office. Bill Clinton was twice elected by a comfortable margin, but with less than majority support, and despite a strong economy during his second term, his greatest legislative successes came during his first year with the passage of a controversial but crucial budget bill, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. George W. Bush won election in 2000 having lost the popular vote, and though his impact on national security policy after the Sept. 11 attacks was far reaching, his greatest domestic policy successes came during 2001. Ambitious plans for Social Security reform, following his narrow re-election in 2004, went nowhere.¶ Faced with obstacles to successful leadership, recent presidents have come to rely more on their formal powers. The number of important executive orders has increased significantly since the 1960s, as have the issuance of presidential signing statements. Both are used by presidents in an attempt to shape and direct policy on their terms. Presidents have had to rely more on recess appointments as well, appointing individuals to important positions during a congressional recess (even a weekend recess) to avoid delays and obstruction often encountered in the Senate. Such power assertions typically elicit close media scrutiny and often further erode political capital.¶ Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and, with a Democratic Congress, was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government.¶ By mid-2011, Mr. Obama's job approval had slipped well below its initial levels, and Congress was proving increasingly intransigent. In the face of declining public support and rising congressional opposition, Mr. Obama, like his predecessors, looked to the energetic use of executive power. In 2012, the president relied on executive discretion and legal ambiguity to allow homeowners to more easily refinance federally backed mortgages, to help veterans find employment and to make it easier for college graduates to consolidate federal student loan debt. He issued several executive orders effecting change in the nation's enforcement of existing immigration laws. He used an executive order to authorize the Department of Education to grant states waivers from the requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act — though the enacting legislation makes no accommodation for such waivers. Contrary to the outcry from partisan opponents, Mr. Obama's actions were hardly unprecedented or imperial. Rather, they represented a rather typical power assertion from a contemporary president.¶ Many looked to the 2012 election as a means to break present trends. But Barack Obama's narrow re-election victory, coupled with the re-election of a somewhat-diminished Republican majority House and Democratic majority Senate, hardly signals a grand resurgence of his political capital. The president's recent issuance of multiple executive orders to deal with the issue of gun violence is further evidence of his power trap. Faced with the likelihood of legislative defeat in Congress, the president must rely on claims of unilateral power. But such claims are not without limit or cost and will likely further erode his political capital.¶ Only by solving the problem of political capital is a president likely to avoid a power trap. Presidents in recent years have been unable to prevent their political capital from eroding. When it did, their power assertions often got them into further political trouble. Through leveraging public support, presidents have at times been able to overcome contemporary leadership challenges by adopting as their own issues that the public already supports. Bill Clinton's centrist "triangulation" and George W. Bush's careful issue selection early in his presidency allowed them to secure important policy changes — in Mr. Clinton's case, welfare reform and budget balance, in Mr. Bush's tax cuts and education reform — that at the time received popular approval.¶ However, short-term legislative strategies may win policy success for a president but do not serve as an antidote to declining political capital over time, as the difficult final years of both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies demonstrate. None of Barack Obama's recent predecessors solved the political capital problem or avoided the power trap. It is the central political challenge confronted by modern presidents and one that will likely weigh heavily on the current president's mind today as he takes his second oath of office. | 8,113 | <h4><strong>PC finite- legislative wins don’t spillover –empirics, true for Obama, too polarized </h4><p>Eberly 13</strong> Todd is coordinator of Public Policy Studies and assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at St. Mary's College of Maryland. His email is teeberly@smcm.edu. This article is excerpted from his book, co-authored with Steven Schier, "American Government and Popular Discontent: Stability without Success," to published later this year by Routledge Press., 1-21-2013 http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-21/news/bs-ed-political-capital-20130121_1_political-system-party-support-public-opinion/2</p><p>As Barack <u><mark>Obama</u></mark> prepares to be sworn in for the second time as president of the United States, he <u><mark>faces</u></mark> <u>the <mark>stark</u> <u>reality</u></mark> that <u><strong><mark>little of what he hopes to accomplish</u></strong></mark> in a second term <u><strong><mark>will</u></strong></mark> likely <u><strong>come to <mark>pass</u></strong></mark>. Mr. <u>Obama occupies</u> <u>an office</u> that <u>many</u> <u>assume</u> to be <u>all powerful</u>, <u>but</u> like so many of his recent predecessors, <u>the president</u> knows better. He <u>faces a political capital problem and a power trap</u>.¶ In the post-1960s American political system, <u>presidents have found</u> the exercise of <u>effective leadership</u> a <u>difficult</u> task. <u>To lead well, a president needs support</u> — or at least permission — from federal courts and Congress; steady allegiance from public opinion and fellow partisans in the electorate; backing from powerful, entrenched interest groups; and accordance with contemporary public opinion about the proper size and scope of government. This is a long list of requirements. <u>If presidents fail to satisfy these</u> requirements, <u>they face the</u> <u>prospect of inadequate</u> political support or <u>political capital to back their power assertions</u>.¶ What was so crucial about the 1960s? We can trace so much of what defines contemporary politics to trends that emerged then. Americans' confidence in government began a precipitous decline as the tumult and tragedies of the 1960s gave way to the scandals and economic uncertainties of the 1970s. Long-standing party coalitions began to fray as the New Deal coalition, which had elected Franklin Roosevelt to four terms and made Democrats the indisputable majority party, faded into history. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 marked the beginning of an unprecedented era of divided government. Finally, the <u><mark>two parties</u></mark> began <u><mark>ideologically</mark> <mark>divergent</u></mark> journeys that <u><mark>result</mark>ed</u> <u><mark>in</u> <u>intense polarization</u></mark> in Congress, <u><mark>diminishing</u></mark> <u>the possibility of</u> bipartisan <u><mark>compromise</u></mark>. <u><mark>These</u></mark> changes, combined with the growing influence of money and interest groups and the steady "thickening" of the federal bureaucracy, <u><mark>introduced</u> <u>significant</u> <u>challenges to </mark>presidential <mark>leadership</u></mark>.¶ Political capital can best be understood as a combination of the president's party support in Congress, public approval of his job performance, and the president's electoral victory margin. The components of political capital are central to the fate of presidencies. It is difficult to claim warrants for leadership in an era when job approval, congressional support and partisan affiliation provide less backing for a president than in times past. <u>In recent years</u>, <u><strong><mark>presidents' p</mark>olitical <mark>c</mark>apital has <mark>shrunk while</mark> their <mark>power</mark> <mark>assertions</mark> <mark>have</mark> <mark>grown</mark>,</u></strong> making the president a volatile player in the national political system.¶ Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush joined the small ranks of incumbents defeated while seeking a second term. Ronald Reagan was elected in two landslides, yet his most successful year for domestic policy was his first year in office. Bill Clinton was twice elected by a comfortable margin, but with less than majority support, and despite a strong economy during his second term, his greatest legislative successes came during his first year with the passage of a controversial but crucial budget bill, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. George W. Bush won election in 2000 having lost the popular vote, and though his impact on national security policy after the Sept. 11 attacks was far reaching, his greatest domestic policy successes came during 2001. Ambitious plans for Social Security reform, following his narrow re-election in 2004, went nowhere.¶ Faced with obstacles to successful leadership, recent presidents have come to rely more on their formal powers. The number of important executive orders has increased significantly since the 1960s, as have the issuance of presidential signing statements. Both are used by presidents in an attempt to shape and direct policy on their terms. Presidents have had to rely more on recess appointments as well, appointing individuals to important positions during a congressional recess (even a weekend recess) to avoid delays and obstruction often encountered in the Senate. Such power assertions typically elicit close media scrutiny and often further erode political capital.¶ Barack Obama's election in 2008 seemed to signal a change. Mr. Obama's popular vote majority was the largest for any president since 1988, and he was the first Democrat to clear the 50 percent mark since Lyndon Johnson. The president initially enjoyed strong public approval and, with a Democratic Congress, was able to produce an impressive string of legislative accomplishments during his first year and early into his second, capped by enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. But with each legislative battle and success, his political capital waned. His impressive successes with Congress in 2009 and 2010 were accompanied by a shift in the public mood against him, evident in the rise of the tea party movement, the collapse in his approval rating, and the large GOP gains in the 2010 elections, which brought a return to divided government.¶ By mid-2011, Mr. Obama's job approval had slipped well below its initial levels, and Congress was proving increasingly intransigent. In the face of declining public support and rising congressional opposition, Mr. Obama, like his predecessors, looked to the energetic use of executive power. In 2012, the president relied on executive discretion and legal ambiguity to allow homeowners to more easily refinance federally backed mortgages, to help veterans find employment and to make it easier for college graduates to consolidate federal student loan debt. He issued several executive orders effecting change in the nation's enforcement of existing immigration laws. He used an executive order to authorize the Department of Education to grant states waivers from the requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act — though the enacting legislation makes no accommodation for such waivers. Contrary to the outcry from partisan opponents, Mr. Obama's actions were hardly unprecedented or imperial. Rather, they represented a rather typical power assertion from a contemporary president.¶ Many looked to the 2012 election as a means to break present trends. But Barack <u>Obama's narrow re-election</u> victory, coupled with the re-election of a somewhat-diminished Republican majority House and Democratic majority Senate, <u>hardly signals a grand resurgence of</u> his <u>political capital</u>. The president's recent issuance of multiple executive orders to deal with the issue of gun violence is further evidence of his power trap. Faced with the likelihood of legislative defeat in Congress, the president must rely on claims of unilateral power. But such claims are not without limit or cost and will likely further erode his political capital.¶ Only by solving the problem of political capital is a president likely to avoid a power trap. <u><strong><mark>Presidents</u></strong></mark> in recent years <u><strong><mark>have been unable to prevent</mark> their <mark>p</mark>olitical <mark>c</mark>apital <mark>from eroding</u></strong></mark>. When it did, their power assertions often got them into further political trouble. Through leveraging public support, presidents have at times been able to overcome contemporary leadership challenges by adopting as their own issues that the public already supports. Bill Clinton's centrist "triangulation" and George W. Bush's careful issue selection early in his presidency allowed them to secure important policy changes — in Mr. Clinton's case, welfare reform and budget balance, in Mr. Bush's tax cuts and education reform — that at the time received popular approval.¶ However, <u><mark>short-term legislative</mark> <mark>strategies</u></mark> <u>may win policy success</u> for a president <u>but <mark>do not serve as an antidote to</u> <u>declining <strong>p</strong></mark>olitical <strong><mark>c</strong></mark>apital</u> over time, as the difficult final years of both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies demonstrate. None of Barack Obama's recent predecessors solved <u>the political capital</u> problem or avoided the power trap. It <u>is the central political challenge</u> <u>confronted by modern presidents</u><strong> and one that will likely weigh heavily on the current president's mind today as he takes his second oath of office.</p></strong> | null | 1nr | Winners Win | 217,599 | 30 | 17,063 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | 565,289 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 9 | Missouri State Brower-Freeman-Hamaker | Fitzmier | Politics DA - Iran (2NR)
Organ Supply CP
Property Rights DA | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round9.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,942 | A. interpretation – the affirmative must legal close to all possible sales | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>A. interpretation – the affirmative must legal close to all possible sales</h4> | 1nc | null | T | 430,507 | 1 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,943 | They cause massive backlash | Jeffries 13 ; June 19, 2013; http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/19/4444738/online-gambling-haters-mellow-out-but-federal-law-still-hung-up-on-special-interests | Jeffries 13 Adrianne, reporter, The Verge; “Fierce opposition to online gambling fades, but don't bet on legalization” The Verge; June 19, 2013; http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/19/4444738/online-gambling-haters-mellow-out-but-federal-law-still-hung-up-on-special-interests | Advocates are not optimistic. There are many special interests such as casinos and tribes, which both want special rights that will allow them to cash in on online gambling, as well as a long list of less-obvious interests such as state lotteries and charities, which have carved out exceptions in federal gambling statutes. There are also family and Christian conservative groups that object on moral grounds. Even the NFL lobbied hard against internet gambling in the past. major push to pass federal legislation legalizing online poker failed last year, even though it earned the support of conservative groups. even with states putting pressure on the federal government, national legislation seems like a longshot I think this bill is a big underdog still — they always are," All these different stakeholders are trying to get the biggest slice of the pie possible, and some are willing to settle for no pie." there are still some groups that say online gambling is a gateway drug for money laundering and the corruption of minors There are some powerful opponents, such as casino mogul Sheldon Adelson, who some suspect is responsible for an anti-online gambling provision in the 2012 Republican party platform. | Advocates are not optimistic. many special interests such as casinos and tribes, which both want special rights well as a long list of less-obvious interests such as state lotteries and charities There are also family and Christian conservative groups that object on moral grounds. Even the NFL lobbied hard against internet gambling in the past A major push to pass federal legislation legalizing online poker failed last year, even though it earned the support of conservative groups even with states putting pressure on the federal government, national legislation seems like a longshot. All these different stakeholders are trying to get the biggest slice of the pie possible, and some are willing to settle for no pie." There are some powerful opponents | So will King’s bill finally put the issue to rest? Advocates are not optimistic. There are many special interests such as casinos and tribes, which both want special rights that will allow them to cash in on online gambling, as well as a long list of less-obvious interests such as state lotteries and charities, which have carved out exceptions in federal gambling statutes. There are also family and Christian conservative groups that object on moral grounds. Even the NFL lobbied hard against internet gambling in the past. The theory was that online gambling would pave the way for sports betting, which the league considers detrimental to the game (although it also fought for an exception for fantasy leagues). A major push to pass federal legislation legalizing online poker introduced by Sen. Harry Reid (D-NV) and Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ) failed last year, even though it earned the support of conservative groups. Sources familiar with the legalization efforts speculated that the bill became too heavily politicized due to the election. It was also criticized for being too weighted toward Nevada’s interests. Things are different this year, said Rich Muny, the vice president of player relations for the Poker Players Alliance, which has been one of the loudest voices in the debate over online gambling. "Cards are hitting the virtual felt right now in Nevada and they’re going to be hitting in New Jersey," he said. "What was a theoretical possibility before now is reality." But even with states putting pressure on the federal government, national legislation seems like a longshot. "I think this bill is a big underdog still — they always are," he said. "All these different stakeholders are trying to get the biggest slice of the pie possible, and some are willing to settle for no pie." The online gambling industry is estimated to grow to $1.5 billion in New Jersey alone in the next five years. It’s hard to say whether online gambling proponents outnumber opponents, or the other way around. Public opinion varies by state; 53 percent of voters in California approve, while 73 percent in Iowa do not. Beyond that, there are powerful interests on both sides. The revenue is attractive to states, and casinos such as Caesars are itching to get online. Furthermore, the knee-jerk moral opposition to online gambling is not as strong as it was in the past — although there are still some groups that say online gambling is a gateway drug for money laundering and the corruption of minors. There are some powerful opponents, such as casino mogul Sheldon Adelson, who some suspect is responsible for an anti-online gambling provision in the 2012 Republican party platform. | 2,683 | <h4>They cause massive backlash</h4><p><strong>Jeffries 13 </strong>Adrianne, reporter, The Verge; “Fierce opposition to online gambling fades, but don't bet on legalization” The Verge<u><strong>; June 19, 2013; http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/19/4444738/online-gambling-haters-mellow-out-but-federal-law-still-hung-up-on-special-interests</p><p></u></strong>So will King’s bill finally put the issue to rest? <u><mark>Advocates are not optimistic.</mark> There are <mark>many special interests such as casinos and tribes, which both want special rights</mark> that will allow them to cash in on online gambling, as <mark>well as a long list of less-obvious interests such as state lotteries and charities</mark>, which have carved out exceptions in federal gambling statutes.</u> <u><strong><mark>There are also family and Christian conservative groups that object on moral grounds.</u></strong> <u><strong>Even the NFL lobbied hard against internet gambling in the past</mark>.</u></strong> The theory was that online gambling would pave the way for sports betting, which the league considers detrimental to the game (although it also fought for an exception for fantasy leagues). <mark>A <u>major push to pass federal legislation legalizing online poker</u></mark> introduced by Sen. Harry Reid (D-NV) and Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ) <u><mark>failed last year, even though it earned the support of conservative groups</mark>. </u>Sources familiar with the legalization efforts speculated that the bill became too heavily politicized due to the election. It was also criticized for being too weighted toward Nevada’s interests. Things are different this year, said Rich Muny, the vice president of player relations for the Poker Players Alliance, which has been one of the loudest voices in the debate over online gambling. "Cards are hitting the virtual felt right now in Nevada and they’re going to be hitting in New Jersey," he said. "What was a theoretical possibility before now is reality." But <u><mark>even with states putting pressure on the federal government, national legislation seems like a <strong>longshot</u></strong>.</mark> "<u>I think this bill is a big underdog still — they always are,"</u> he said. "<u><strong><mark>All these different stakeholders are trying to get the biggest slice of the pie possible, and some are willing to settle for no pie."</u></strong></mark> The online gambling industry is estimated to grow to $1.5 billion in New Jersey alone in the next five years. It’s hard to say whether online gambling proponents outnumber opponents, or the other way around. Public opinion varies by state; 53 percent of voters in California approve, while 73 percent in Iowa do not. Beyond that, there are powerful interests on both sides. The revenue is attractive to states, and casinos such as Caesars are itching to get online. Furthermore, the knee-jerk moral opposition to online gambling is not as strong as it was in the past — although <u><strong>there are still some groups that say online gambling is a gateway drug for money laundering and the corruption of minors</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>There are some powerful opponents</mark>, such as casino mogul Sheldon Adelson, who some suspect is responsible for an anti-online gambling provision in the 2012 Republican party platform.</p></u></strong> | 1NC | null | 1 | 430,508 | 7 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,944 | The thesis of bio-political governmentality is wrong---it’s based on a faulty understanding of liberal peace-building | Selby 13 | Jan Selby 13, Senior Lecturer of IR at the University of Sussex, "The myth of liberal peace-building", March 13, www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14678802.2013.770259 | it has been claimed that contemporary peace-building is rooted in liberal ‘international norms’ it has been argued that the liberal peace-building project is an exercise in global bio-politics or governmentality, which aims to govern and construct liberal populations From a post-colonial perspective, liberal peace-building has been described as a colonial project and aiming to restructure Southern societies in accordance with Northern ideology peace-building has been critiqued as part of a transnational neo-liberal project, ‘reflecting the hegemony of liberal values that reigns in global politics’ Yet for all this these shared emphases within liberal peace- building discourse constitute a questionable foundation for analysis the above parameters are unnecessarily limiting, and can generate significant interpretive errors peace-building is neither a discrete sphere of action, nor the dominant element within contemporary peace processes; that states, strategy and geopolitics continue to be crucial determinants of these processes; and that the influence of liberalism are significantly overstated within peace- building discourse. | it has been claimed that contemporary peace is rooted in liberal norms’ that exercise bio-politics or governmentality peace-building has been described as a colonial project these emphases within liberal discourse constitute a questionable foundation the above parameters are unnecessarily limiting, and can generate significant errors peace-building is neither a discrete sphere nor dominant within contemporary peace processes; that states, and geopolitics continue to be crucial determinants of and that the influence of liberalism are significantly overstated within discourse | Most of the above features are shared right across the liberal peace-building debate and have been advanced from any number of theoretical perspectives. Thus it has been claimed from a constructivist perspective that contemporary peace-building is rooted in liberal ‘international norms’.36 Invoking Foucault, it has been argued that the liberal peace-building project is an exercise in global bio-politics or governmentality, which aims to govern and construct liberal populations and subjectivities.37 From a post-colonial perspective, liberal peace-building has been described as a colonial project, ‘cast in the mould of colonialism’, and aiming to restructure Southern societies in accordance with Northern metropolitan ideology.38And in neo-Gramscian terms, peace-building has been critiqued as part of a transnational neo-liberal project, ‘reflecting the hegemony of liberal values that reigns in global politics’.39 Right across this variegated theoretical terrain, peace-building is represented as a liberal project, founded on liberal ideas, pushed forward by a decentralised plurality of institutions irrespective of the particularity of war-endings and peace agreements, in which global consensus is counterposed by local dissensus or disorder.¶ Yet for all this trans-theoretical consensus, these shared emphases within liberal peace- building discourse constitute a questionable foundation for the analysis of contemporary peacemaking. Again, this is not to suggest that the liberal peace-building literature is without merit: the critical literature, in particular, provides much compelling evidence of the hubris of liberal internationalism, of the destruction wrought by World Bank-IMF policies and of the frequent complicity of peace-building projects in coercive processes of state-building, dispossession and subjugation. My contention is not that liberal peace- building research is without value, but that the above parameters are unnecessarily limiting, and can generate significant interpretive errors. To advance this case, my focus in the remainder of this paper is on the relations between post-conflict peace-building on the one hand, and peace agreements and their negotiation on the other. What this will reveal is that peace-building is neither a discrete sphere of action, nor the dominant element within contemporary peace processes; that states, strategy and geopolitics continue, as ever, to be crucial determinants of these processes; and that the influence of liberalism, and the degree of global consensus over the liberal peace, are significantly overstated within liberal peace- building discourse. We start by considering one case in some depth, before generalising from this case with the aid of insights from a broader range of examples. | 2,779 | <h4><strong>The thesis of bio-political governmentality is wrong---it’s based on a faulty understanding of liberal peace-building</h4><p></strong>Jan <strong>Selby 13</strong>, Senior Lecturer of IR at the University of Sussex, "The myth of liberal peace-building", March 13, www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14678802.2013.770259</p><p>Most of the above features are shared right across the liberal peace-building debate and have been advanced from any number of theoretical perspectives. Thus <u><strong><mark>it has been claimed</u></strong></mark> from a constructivist perspective <u><strong><mark>that contemporary peace</mark>-building <mark>is rooted in liberal</mark> ‘international <mark>norms’</u></strong></mark>.36 Invoking Foucault, <u><strong>it has been argued <mark>that</mark> the liberal peace-building project is an <mark>exercise</mark> in global <mark>bio-politics or governmentality</mark>, which aims to govern and construct liberal populations</u></strong> and subjectivities.37 <u><strong>From a post-colonial perspective, liberal <mark>peace-building has been described as a colonial project</u></strong></mark>, ‘cast in the mould of colonialism’, <u><strong>and aiming to restructure Southern societies in accordance with Northern</u></strong> metropolitan <u><strong>ideology</u></strong>.38And in neo-Gramscian terms, <u><strong>peace-building has been critiqued as part of a transnational neo-liberal project, ‘reflecting the hegemony of liberal values that reigns in global politics’</u></strong>.39 Right across this variegated theoretical terrain, peace-building is represented as a liberal project, founded on liberal ideas, pushed forward by a decentralised plurality of institutions irrespective of the particularity of war-endings and peace agreements, in which global consensus is counterposed by local dissensus or disorder.¶ <u><strong>Yet for all this</u></strong> trans-theoretical consensus, <u><strong><mark>these</mark> shared <mark>emphases within liberal</mark> peace- building <mark>discourse constitute a questionable foundation </mark>for </u></strong>the <u><strong>analysis</u></strong> of contemporary peacemaking. Again, this is not to suggest that the liberal peace-building literature is without merit: the critical literature, in particular, provides much compelling evidence of the hubris of liberal internationalism, of the destruction wrought by World Bank-IMF policies and of the frequent complicity of peace-building projects in coercive processes of state-building, dispossession and subjugation. My contention is not that liberal peace- building research is without value, but that <u><strong><mark>the above parameters are unnecessarily limiting, and can generate significant</mark> interpretive <mark>errors</u></strong></mark>. To advance this case, my focus in the remainder of this paper is on the relations between post-conflict peace-building on the one hand, and peace agreements and their negotiation on the other. What this will reveal is that <u><strong><mark>peace-building is neither a discrete sphere</mark> of action, <mark>nor</mark> the <mark>dominant</mark> element <mark>within contemporary peace processes; that states,</mark> strategy <mark>and geopolitics continue</u></strong></mark>, as ever, <u><strong><mark>to be crucial determinants of</mark> these processes; <mark>and that the influence of liberalism</u></strong></mark>, and the degree of global consensus over the liberal peace, <u><strong><mark>are significantly overstated within</u></strong></mark> liberal <u><strong>peace- building <mark>discourse</mark>.</u></strong> We start by considering one case in some depth, before generalising from this case with the aid of insights from a broader range of examples.</p> | null | 1nc | Case | 160,580 | 23 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,945 | 1. Legalize means remove all restrictions | Woods 11 | Woods 11 Jordan Blair Woods, Ph.D. candidate in Criminology, University of Cambridge, expected 2013; M.Phil., University of Cambridge, 2010; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 2009; A.B., Harvard University, 2006. University of the District of Columbia Law Review Fall, 2011 15 UDC-DCSL L. Rev. 1 ARTICLE: A DECADE AFTER DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION: WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES LEARN FROM THE PORTUGUESE MODEL? lexis | ("'Legalization' means that there are no prohibitions of any kind under the law ("Legalization is defined as the complete removal of sanctions, making a certain behaviour legal and applying no criminal or administrative penalty."). | null | n30. See Greenwald, supra note 21, at 2 ("'Legalization' - which no EU state has yet adopted - means that there are no prohibitions of any kind under the law on drug manufacturing, sales, possession, or usage."); Hughes & Stevens, supra note 24, at 999 ("Legalization is defined as the complete removal of sanctions, making a certain behaviour legal and applying no criminal or administrative penalty."). | 404 | <h4>1. Legalize means remove all restrictions</h4><p><strong>Woods 11</strong> Jordan Blair Woods, Ph.D. candidate in Criminology, University of Cambridge, expected 2013; M.Phil., University of Cambridge, 2010; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 2009; A.B., Harvard University, 2006. University of the District of Columbia Law Review Fall, 2011 15 UDC-DCSL L. Rev. 1 ARTICLE: A DECADE AFTER DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION: WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES LEARN FROM THE PORTUGUESE MODEL? lexis</p><p>n30. See Greenwald, supra note 21, at 2 <u>("'Legalization'</u> - which no EU state has yet adopted - <u>means that there are no prohibitions of any kind under the law </u>on drug manufacturing, sales, possession, or usage."); Hughes & Stevens, supra note 24, at 999 <u>("Legalization is defined as the complete removal of sanctions, making a certain behaviour legal and applying no criminal or administrative penalty.").</u> </p> | 1nc | null | T | 430,509 | 7 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,946 | New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction | Borger 12/31 | Borger 12/31/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation) | There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba This deal will be about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. the parties to the talks have given themselves more time They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions That would provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment. | no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. is deal will b about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets anctions would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment | There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. This deal will not be about cash machines in the Caribbean, but about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away from the table. A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. So the parties to the talks have given themselves more time – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor. The legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. That would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, and a very volatile environment. It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year. | 3,580 | <h4>New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction</h4><p><strong>Borger 12/31</strong>/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)</p><p><u>There will be <mark>no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.</mark> In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba</u>, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. <u>Th<mark>is deal will</u></mark> not <u><mark>b</mark>e</u> about cash machines in the Caribbean, but <u><mark>about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth</u></mark>. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These <u>gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away</u> from the table. <u><strong><mark>A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel</u></strong>; <u>the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a <strong>wave of proliferation across the region and beyond</strong> as other countries hedge their bets</mark>. </u>So <u>the parties to the talks have given themselves more time</u> – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. <u>They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran</u>. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, <u>the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor</u>. The <u>legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered s<mark>anctions</u></mark>, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. <u>That</u> would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it <u><mark>would</u> also <u>provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament</u></mark>, the Majlis, <u><mark>and a very volatile environment</mark>. </u>It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.</p> | 1NC | null | 1 | 171,429 | 23 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,947 | Limited and prepared debate where both sides has an equitable distribution of arguments matters. It’s crucial to personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters sometimes defend views they do not completely agree with | Roberts-Miller ’03, (Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas) 3 | Roberts-Miller ’03, (Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas) 3
(Patricia, "Fighting Without Hatred:Hannah Ar endt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003) | the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. . Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. , Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; , Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsebility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both . Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism. Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. | the world of deliberate action is fragmented into unreflective behavior people are imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own experience obsession with one's own life prevents engaging in deliberate action Self-obsession is political because it aspires to be apolitical individuals abdicate their human capacities to a projected 'they' with consequences, the frightening aspect of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been anti-Semitic could be put to work on genocide striking was their insistence they were not responsible people who enact actions because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions In a totalitarian system, , everyone is doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can , defend policies. Arendt's solution is the agonism Arendt emphasizes competition in which qualities are not displays of one's self, but arguments, it involves passion for ideas to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy advancing argument means one must be open to criticisms agonistic because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference Eichmann was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsebility Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy denying our own agency enables the social to thrive theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling critical thinking is necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed agonism values disagreement, and equality but has the goal of reaching agreement communicability is how one tests the validity of one's thought rhetoric does not lead to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will be reconsidered. Agonism demands trust and doubt one' s own perceptions there are important positive political consequences of agonism. the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral The agonistic model' undermines conformity, it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma totalitarianism agonal rhetoric is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere | Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsebility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism. Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric. | 28,475 | <h4>Limited and prepared debate where both sides has an equitable distribution of arguments matters<u>. It’s crucial to personal agency and is only possible in a switch-side debate format where debaters sometimes defend views they do not completely agree with</h4><p></u><strong>Roberts-Miller ’03, (<u>Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas) 3</p><p></u></strong>(Patricia, "Fighting Without Hatred:Hannah Ar endt ' s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003)</p><p>Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that<u> <mark>the </mark>common <mark>world of deliberate</mark> and joint <mark>action is fragmented into </mark>solipsistic and <mark>unreflective behavior</u></mark>. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society<u> <mark>people are</mark> all <mark>imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own </mark>singular <mark>experience</mark>, </u>which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because<u> <mark>obsession with one's own</mark> self and the particularities of one's <mark>life prevents</mark> one from <mark>engaging in</mark> conscious, <mark>deliberate</mark>, collective <mark>action</mark>. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. <mark>Self-obsession</mark>, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. </u>Perhaps a better way to put it is that<u> it <mark>is political </mark>precisely <mark>because it <strong>aspires to be apolitical</strong></mark>. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated <mark>individuals</mark>, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who <mark>abdicate their human capacities</mark> and responsibilities <mark>to a projected 'they'</mark> or 'it,' <mark>with </mark>disastrous <mark>consequences,</mark> both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of <mark>the </mark>most <mark>frightening aspect</mark>s <mark>of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been</mark> extraordinarily <mark>anti-Semitic could be put to work</mark> industriously and efficiently <mark>on </mark>the <mark>genocide </mark>of the Jews. And what was <mark>striking</mark> about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, <mark>was their </mark>constant and apparently sincere <mark>insistence </mark>that <mark>they were not responsible</mark>. </u>For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility<u>. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the <mark>people who enact </mark>the <mark>actions</mark> in question, <mark>because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions</mark>. They are simply doing their jobs. <mark>In a totalitarian system,</mark> however<mark>, everyone is </mark>simply <mark>doing his or her job; <strong>there never seems to be anyone who can </mark>explain<mark>, defend</mark>, and change the <mark>policies</strong>.</mark> </u>Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems<u>, <mark>Arendt's solution is the </mark>playful and competitive space of <strong><mark>agonism</strong></mark>; </u>it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib<u>, <mark>Arendt</mark>'s public realm <mark>emphasizes </mark>the assumption of <mark>competition</mark>, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space <mark>in which</mark> one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These <mark>qualities</mark> are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they <mark>are <strong>not displays of one's self, but </mark>of ideas and <mark>arguments</strong>, </mark>of one's thought. </u>When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs.<u> Instead, <mark>it involves</mark> something like having such a <mark>passion for ideas</mark> and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries <mark>to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy</mark>, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; <mark>advancing</mark> an <mark>argument means </mark>that <mark>one must be open to </mark>the <mark>criticisms</mark> others will make of it. The situation is <mark>agonistic </mark>not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but <mark>because conflict <strong>is a necessary consequence of difference</strong></mark>. </u>This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued…<u> <mark>Eichmann</mark> perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he <mark>was able to <strong>engage in mass murder</strong> because he was <strong>able not to think about it,</strong></mark> especially <mark>not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsebility</mark> by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both</u>. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause<u>. <mark>Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a <strong>purely ideological policy</strong></mark>, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) </u>Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge:<u> <mark>denying our own agency</mark> is what <mark>enables the social to thrive</mark>. To put it another way, <strong><mark>theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling </mark>prophecies</strong>. </u>Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. <u>Hence, as Arendt says, "<mark>critical thinking</mark>, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking <mark>is</mark>, in this view, <mark>necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only <strong>where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection</strong>"</mark> (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; <mark>it must be a world into which one enters and <strong>by which one might be changed</strong></mark>. </u>Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. <u>Persuasive <mark>agonism </mark>still <mark>values </mark>conflict, <mark>disagreement, and equality</mark> among interlocutors, <mark>but </mark>it <mark>has the goal of reaching agreement</mark>, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). </u>Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it.<u> In this way, <mark>communicability</mark> serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it <strong><mark>is how one tests the validity of one's thought</strong></mark>. </u>In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism,<u> Arendt argues that <mark>rhetoric does not lead </mark>individuals or communities <mark>to ultimate Truth; <strong>it leads to decisions that will </mark>necessarily have to <mark>be reconsidered.</strong></mark> </u>Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242).<u> <mark>Agonism demands </mark>that one <strong>simultaneously <mark>trust and doubt one' s own perceptions</strong></mark>, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. </u>The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). <u>Yet, <mark>there are <strong>important positive political consequences of agonism</strong>.</mark> Arendt' s own promotion of <mark>the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system <strong>could be actively moral</strong></mark>. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. <mark>The agonistic model'</mark>s celebration of achievement and verbal skill <mark>undermines </mark>the political force of <mark>conformity, </mark>so <mark>it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma</mark>; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist <mark>totalitarianism</mark>. </u>And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that<u> <mark>agonal rhetoric</mark> (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) <mark>is the <strong>best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere</strong></mark>. </u>On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric. </p> | null | 1nc | More FW | 1,240,802 | 56 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
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741,948 | 2. Nearly all is close to 100% | Foley 98 | Foley 98 JACK FOLEY, Mercury News Staff Writer September 21, 1998 San Jose Mercury News | Unz said. `` `Nearly all' could mean 98 99 or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent. | null | Unz: District Violates Law-Bilingual education dispute crops up in Gilroy.
http://www.languagepolicy.net/archives/SJMN47.htm
Gilroy schools are violating Proposition 227, said the law's author, which means school board members and the superintendent could be sued for damages by parents.
Trustees voted unanimously in August to teach non-English-speaking students 60 percent in English and 40 percent in Spanish as they phased out bilingual programs to comply with the new law.
But Proposition 227 author Ron Unz said Friday that the law's actual wording stipulates that classroom instruction for non-English- to complying, Unz said Friday when told of the Gilroy policy. He said his office had received calls from parents asking about it.speaking students -- those enrolled in ``sheltered English immersion'' programs -- must be conducted ``nearly all'' in English.
Sixty percent does not come close
``It's completely illegal,'' Unz said. `` `Nearly all' could mean 98 percent or 99 percent or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent. The law is very clear and the district seems to be ignoring the law.'' | 1,115 | <h4><strong>2. Nearly all is close to 100%</h4><p>Foley 98</strong> JACK FOLEY, Mercury News Staff Writer<strong> </strong>September 21, 1998 San Jose Mercury News </p><p>Unz: District Violates Law-Bilingual education dispute crops up in Gilroy.</p><p>http://www.languagepolicy.net/archives/SJMN47.htm</p><p>Gilroy schools are violating Proposition 227, said the law's author, which means school board members and the superintendent could be sued for damages by parents.</p><p>Trustees voted unanimously in August to teach non-English-speaking students 60 percent in English and 40 percent in Spanish as they phased out bilingual programs to comply with the new law.</p><p>But Proposition 227 author Ron Unz said Friday that the law's actual wording stipulates that classroom instruction for non-English- to complying, Unz said Friday when told of the Gilroy policy. He said his office had received calls from parents asking about it.speaking students -- those enrolled in ``sheltered English immersion'' programs -- must be conducted ``nearly all'' in English.</p><p>Sixty percent does not come close </p><p>``It's completely illegal,'' <u>Unz said. ``<strong> `Nearly all' could mean 98 </u></strong>percent or<u><strong> 99 </u></strong>percent<u><strong> or even 97 percent, but it does not mean 60 percent.</u></strong> The law is very clear and the district seems to be ignoring the law.''</p> | 1nc | null | T | 430,510 | 11 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,949 | The United States should amend the Interstate Horseracing Act to prohibit all online gambling on horseracing and make all online gambling in the United States illegal. The United States should pay annual compensation to Antigua and Barbuda for its online gambling including but not limited to the amount specified by the World Trade Organization. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>The United States should amend the Interstate Horseracing Act to prohibit all online gambling on horseracing and make all online gambling in the United States illegal. The United States should pay annual compensation to Antigua and Barbuda for its online gambling including but not limited to the amount specified by the World Trade Organization. </h4></strong> | 1NC | null | 2 | 430,511 | 1 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,950 | Roleplaying is good: The skills we learn in this activity are used to mediate conflicts in our daily lives. Those skills are in play right now which answers their link arguments about not participating in politics in the present. All of their link arguments are guilty of a form/content error. The content of debate does not undermine the benefits of the form that teaches us valuable nonviolence skills as well as providing us with a forum to engage personally with others. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Roleplaying is good: The skills we learn in this activity are used to mediate conflicts in our daily lives. Those skills are in play right now which answers their link arguments about not participating in politics in the present. All of their link arguments are guilty of a form/content error. The content of debate does not undermine the benefits of the form that teaches us valuable nonviolence skills as well as providing us with a forum to engage personally with others. </h4> | null | 2nc/1nr | More FW | 430,512 | 1 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,951 | B. Cadaver organs violates -- they are not nearly all. Organs from living donors are a large portion of current trasnplants and an even larger source of orgsans from sales. | Jefferson-Jones 13 | Jefferson-Jones 13 Jamila Jefferson-Jones, J.D., Harvard Law School, Assistant Professor of Law at Barry University's Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law in Orlando The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice Winter, 2013 16 J. Gender Race & Just. 105 ARTICLE: The Exchange of Inmate Organs for Liberty: Diminishing the "Yuck Factor" in the Bioethics Repugnance Debate lexis | a little more than one-third of the kidneys that are transplanted come from living donors, although living-donor kidneys are of a higher overall quality, and survive in a recipient on average for twice as long as deceased-donor kidneys | null | There were over 115,000 people on the United States organ transplant waiting list by the beginning of the first quarter of 2012. n30 Of those, nearly a third - approximately 93,000 - are waiting for a kidney. n31 However, only approximately 16,000 kidney transplants are performed each year. n32 Additionally, only a little more than one-third of the kidneys that are transplanted come from living donors, n33 although living-donor kidneys are of a higher overall quality, and survive in a recipient on average for twice as long as deceased-donor kidneys. n34 | 559 | <h4>B. Cadaver organs violates -- they are not nearly all. Organs from living donors are a large portion of current trasnplants and an even larger source of orgsans from sales.</h4><p><strong>Jefferson-Jones 13</strong> Jamila Jefferson-Jones, J.D., Harvard Law School, Assistant Professor of Law at Barry University's Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law in Orlando The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice Winter, 2013 16 J. Gender Race & Just. 105 ARTICLE: The Exchange of Inmate Organs for Liberty: Diminishing the "Yuck Factor" in the Bioethics Repugnance Debate lexis</p><p>There were over 115,000 people on the United States organ transplant waiting list by the beginning of the first quarter of 2012. n30 Of those, nearly a third - approximately 93,000 - are waiting for a kidney. n31 However, only approximately 16,000 kidney transplants are performed each year. n32 Additionally, only<u> a little more than one-third of the kidneys that are transplanted come from living donors,</u> n33 <u>although living-donor kidneys are of a higher overall quality, and survive in a recipient on average for twice as long as deceased-donor kidneys</u>. n34</p> | 1nc | null | T | 430,514 | 2 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,952 | CP solves the case—preserves WTO legitimacy AND prevents cross-retaliation by ending the dispute | Bloom ‘8 | Bloom, J.D., 2008, The George Washington University Law School; B.A., Georgetown University, ‘8 | To comply with GATS, the U.S. should clarify that the UIGEA applies to betting on horseracing, as well as amend the IHA to prohibit internet gambling the U.S. should adjust the UIGEA to fit within the GATS public morals exception The following suggestions are the most practical measures for the U.S. to take yet are significant enough to prevent further complaints from member countries Amending the UIGEA would put the U.S. in a better position should future complaints arise
Currently, the IHA discriminates against foreign service suppliers
a WTO panel would likely find that the UIGEA satisfies the first prong of the public morals test the U.S. should amend the statute to clarify that the purpose of the UIGEA is not only to target debt collection and to improve law enforcement, but to prevent fraud, money laundering, and underage gambling the U.S. should amend the UIGEA to ban all forms of remote internet gambling Prohibiting offshore internet gambling is a more "WTO-consistent alternative measure" that the U.S. should take the best way for the U.S. to prohibit is to apply the ban to horseracing
THE U.S. SHOULD COMPLY WITH THE WTO TO A VOID FUTURE COMPLAINTS AND RETALIATION FROM MEMBER COUNTRIES, AND TO SUPPORT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE WTO
compliance would help avoid future complaints from larger WTO member countries or the European Union Future complaints will most likely focus on whether the new UIGEA excludes betting on horseracing and meets the public morals exception
complying with GATS is important to avoid patent retaliation WTO arbitration panel gave Antigua the right to disregard U.S. copyrights This will pose serious ramifications for the U.S. if larger WTO member countries bring internet gambling complaints
a WTO panel might find that the public morals exception cannot encompass the UIGEA The problem with this argument is that the UIGEA's reference to money laundering and corruption in section 803 suggests that there are moral-based purposes behind the statute
critics argue that prohibiting all types of internet gambling is not a less trade-restrictive alternative, because the Wire Act already prohibits internet gambling This reasoning conflicts with the A B Report as well as the In re MasterCard decision
The UIGEA violates GATS To comply with GATS, the U.S. should modify the law to include interstate gambling on horseracing and to satisfy the public morals exception the U.S. should amend the UIGEA to avoid future WTO complaints | To comply with GATS, the U.S. should amend the IHA to prohibit internet gambling The following suggestions are significant enough to prevent further complaints
the IHA discriminates against foreign service suppliers
the U.S. should ban all forms of internet gambling Prohibiting is a WTO-consistent alternative measure
Future complaints will focus on whether the UIGEA excludes horseracing and meets the morals exception
critics argue prohibiting gambling is not less trade-restrictive because the Wire Act already prohibits gambling This conflicts with the A B Report
the U.S. should modify the law to avoid future complaints | (Heather A., “UPPING THE ANTE: THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT'S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION LAW”, Fall 2008, South Carolina Journal of International Law & Business, 5 S.C. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 75, Lexis)
[*101] VI. PROPOSED MEASURES THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE TO COMPLY WITH GATS AND WHY COMPLIANCE IS NECESSARY
A. PROPOSED MEASURES
To comply with GATS, the U.S. should first clarify that the UIGEA applies to betting on horseracing, as well as amend the IHA to prohibit internet gambling on pari-mutuel wagering. Second, the U.S. should adjust the UIGEA to fit within the GATS public morals exception. The following suggestions are the most practical measures for the U.S. to take because they involve little change to existing U.S law, yet are significant enough to prevent further internet gambling complaints from member countries. n160 Amending the UIGEA would put the U.S. in a better position should future WTO complaints against the U.S. arise. Modifying existing U.S. law is necessary because it is difficult to amend the list of GATS commitments. n161
1. THE U.S. SHOULD MODIFY THE IHA AND UIGEA TO APPLY TO ONLINE WAGERING ON HORSERACING
First, the U.S. should amend the IHA and clarify that the UIGEA applies to betting on horseracing. n162 Currently, the IHA discriminates against foreign service suppliers: it permits "domestic, but not foreign, services suppliers to offer remote betting service in relation to certain horse races." n163 Despite the DOJ's position that all types of remote internet gambling are illegal under existing federal law, the U.S. should follow the Appellate Body's interpretation and modify the IHA and [*102] UIGEA. n164 The DOJ's position conflicts with (1) the Fifth Circuit's holding in In re MasterCard; n165 (2) general principles of statutory construction; n166 and (3) the exceptions carved out in the UIGEA. n167
2. THE U.S. SHOULD MODIFY THE UIGEA TO ENSURE THAT IT FALLS WITHIN THE PUBLIC MORALS EXCEPTION
Second, the U.S. should adjust the UIGEA to fit within the public morals exception. Although a WTO panel would likely find that the UIGEA satisfies the first prong of the public morals test, the scope of public morals exception, the U.S. should nevertheless amend the statute to clarify that the purpose of the UIGEA is not only to target debt collection and to improve law enforcement, but also to prevent fraud, money laundering, and underage gambling. n168 With respect to the second prong of the public morals test, the necessity requirement, the U.S. should amend the UIGEA to ban all forms of remote internet gambling. Prohibiting all offshore internet gambling is a more "WTO-consistent alternative measure" that the U.S. should take, given the likelihood that future complaints against the U.S. would focus on this second prong. n169 Thus, the best way for the U.S. to prohibit all forms of remote internet gambling is to apply the ban to horseracing. n170
[*103] B. THE U.S. SHOULD COMPLY WITH THE WTO TO A VOID FUTURE COMPLAINTS AND RETALIATION FROM MEMBER COUNTRIES, AND TO SUPPORT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE WTO
The U.S. should comply with GATS and the Appellate Body's decision in the Antigua case for three reasons. First, compliance would help avoid future complaints from larger WTO member countries or the European Union. n171 For example, the European Union has already considered raising a prospective WTO claim regarding the new law. n172 Future complaints will most likely focus on whether the new UIGEA excludes pari-mutuel betting on horseracing and meets both prongs of the public morals exception.
Second, complying with GATS is important to avoid patent retaliation from member countries. Under WTO law, if the U.S. ignores a WTO finding or decision, member countries will have the option to disregard treaties requiring them to comply with U.S. patent laws. n173 For example, because the U.S. refused to follow the Compliance Panel's findings in the Antigua case, WTO arbitration panel gave Antigua the right to disregard U.S. copyrights on (e.g.,) videos, music, electronics, or software. n174 This type of retaliation will pose serious ramifications for the U.S. if larger WTO member countries bring internet gambling complaints. Moreover, member countries [*104] might also retaliate by refusing to allow U.S. companies to use certain geographical indications. n175
Third, the U.S. has "interests in supporting the legitimacy of the WTO." n176 Continuing to ignore its commitments under the WTO with respect to the new law will cost the U.S. "significant trade capital" and lead to trade sanctions or concessions. n177 If the U.S. ignores its WTO obligations, then other countries might ignore their WTO obligations toward the U.S. n178
C. CRITICISM
There are three main counterarguments in response to this proposal that focus on the public morals exception. First, critics might argue that a WTO panel should hold that the U.S. has not met the first prong of the public morals exception, and find that the U.S. intent behind the UIGEA is economic-based. Second, existing U.S. federal laws are the most WTO-consistent measures available. Third, the U.S. should not prohibit online wagering on horseracing.
1. THE U.S. HAS NOT MET THE FIRST PRONG OF THE PUBLIC MORALS EXCEPTION
First, because the UIGEA presents no clear moral or cultural rationale in either its text or legislative history, a WTO panel might find that the public morals exception cannot encompass the UIGEA. Proponents of this view argue that the purpose behind the UIGEA is almost entirely "economic in nature." n179 The problem with this argument, however, is that the UIGEA's reference to money laundering and corruption in section 803 suggests that there are moral-based purposes behind the statute. n180 Moreover, because the WTO tends to [*105] loosely interpret the public morals exception's scope, section 803's reference to morals will be enough to satisfy this prong. n181
2. EXISTING FEDERAL LAWS ARE WTO-CONSISTENT
Second, another area of contention centers on whether the U.S. could use any less trade-restrictive alternatives. n182 In line with the DOJ's position, critics argue that prohibiting all types of internet gambling is not a less trade-restrictive alternative, because the Wire Act already prohibits all forms of internet gambling. This reasoning, however, conflicts with the Appellate Body Report as well as the In re MasterCard decision. n183
3. THE U.S. SHOULD NOT PROHIBIT INTERNET WAGERING ON HORSERACING
Lastly, the U.S. should not prohibit pari-mutuel wagering on horseracing. n184 Proponents of the horseracing industry have argued that horseracing is a major industry in the United States, whose "fastest growing segment" is the pari-mutuel business. n185 Carving out an exception for the IHA, however, discriminates against foreign internet [*106] service providers. If the U.S. does not wish to outlaw online betting on horseracing, its only other option is to allow "foreign racebooks to take [horseracing] bets" from the U.S., which would have "virtually no [negative] impact" on the current status of internet gambling. n186 Yet, Congress is not likely to pass a law expanding the scope of legal internet gambling. n187 Thus, the most realistic option for the U.S. is to include pari-mutuel wagering on horses within the overall reach of the UIGEA.
VII. CONCLUSION
The UIGEA violates GATS, in particular as examined against the backdrop of the Appellate Body Report. To comply with GATS, the U.S. should modify the law to include interstate gambling on horseracing and to satisfy the public morals exception. Instead of evading its WTO commitments altogether, the U.S. should amend the UIGEA as soon as possible to avoid future WTO complaints from larger member countries or the European Union. | 7,819 | <h4><strong>CP solves the case—preserves WTO legitimacy AND prevents cross-retaliation by ending the dispute</h4><p>Bloom</strong>, J.D., 2008, The George Washington University Law School; B.A., Georgetown University, <strong>‘8</p><p></strong>(Heather A., “UPPING THE ANTE: THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT'S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION LAW”, Fall 2008, South Carolina Journal of International Law & Business, 5 S.C. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 75, Lexis)</p><p>[*101] VI. PROPOSED MEASURES THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE TO COMPLY WITH GATS AND WHY COMPLIANCE IS NECESSARY</p><p>A. PROPOSED MEASURES</p><p><u><mark>To <strong>comply with GATS</strong>, the U.S. should</u></mark> first <u><strong>clarify that the UIGEA applies to betting on horseracing</strong>, as well as <strong><mark>amend the IHA to prohibit internet gambling</u></strong></mark> on pari-mutuel wagering. Second, <u>the U.S. should <strong>adjust the UIGEA</strong> to fit within the GATS public morals exception</u>. <u><mark>The following suggestions are</mark> the <strong>most practical measures</strong> for the U.S. to take</u> because they involve little change to existing U.S law, <u>yet are <strong><mark>significant enough</strong> to <strong>prevent further</u></strong></mark> internet gambling <u><strong><mark>complaints</strong></mark> from member countries</u>. n160 <u>Amending the UIGEA would put the U.S. in a better position should future</u> WTO <u>complaints</u> against the U.S. <u>arise</u>. Modifying existing U.S. law is necessary because it is difficult to amend the list of GATS commitments. n161</p><p>1. THE U.S. SHOULD MODIFY THE IHA AND UIGEA TO APPLY TO ONLINE WAGERING ON HORSERACING</p><p>First, the U.S. should amend the IHA and clarify that the UIGEA applies to betting on horseracing. n162 <u>Currently, <mark>the IHA <strong>discriminates against foreign service suppliers</u></strong></mark>: it permits "domestic, but not foreign, services suppliers to offer remote betting service in relation to certain horse races." n163 Despite the DOJ's position that all types of remote internet gambling are illegal under existing federal law, the U.S. should follow the Appellate Body's interpretation and modify the IHA and [*102] UIGEA. n164 The DOJ's position conflicts with (1) the Fifth Circuit's holding in In re MasterCard; n165 (2) general principles of statutory construction; n166 and (3) the exceptions carved out in the UIGEA. n167</p><p>2. THE U.S. SHOULD MODIFY THE UIGEA TO ENSURE THAT IT FALLS WITHIN THE PUBLIC MORALS EXCEPTION</p><p>Second, the U.S. should adjust the UIGEA to fit within the public morals exception. Although <u>a WTO panel would likely find that the UIGEA satisfies the first prong of the public morals test</u>, the scope of public morals exception, <u>the U.S. should</u> nevertheless <u>amend the statute to clarify that the purpose of the UIGEA is not only to target debt collection and to improve law enforcement, but</u> also <u>to prevent fraud, money laundering, and underage gambling</u>. n168 With respect to the second prong of the public morals test, the necessity requirement, <u><strong><mark>the U.S. should</mark> amend the UIGEA to <mark>ban all forms of</mark> remote <mark>internet gambling</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Prohibiting</u></mark> all <u>offshore internet gambling <mark>is a</mark> more "<strong><mark>WTO-consistent alternative measure</strong></mark>" that the U.S. should take</u>, given the likelihood that future complaints against the U.S. would focus on this second prong. n169 Thus, <u>the best way for the U.S. to prohibit</u> all forms of remote internet gambling <u>is to apply the ban to horseracing</u>. n170</p><p>[*103] B. <u>THE U.S. SHOULD COMPLY WITH THE WTO TO A VOID FUTURE COMPLAINTS AND RETALIATION FROM MEMBER COUNTRIES, AND TO SUPPORT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE WTO</p><p></u>The U.S. should comply with GATS and the Appellate Body's decision in the Antigua case for three reasons. First, <u>compliance would help avoid future complaints from larger WTO member countries or the European Union</u>. n171 For example, the European Union has already considered raising a prospective WTO claim regarding the new law. n172 <u><strong><mark>Future complaints </strong>will</mark> most likely <mark>focus on whether the</mark> new <mark>UIGEA excludes</u></mark> pari-mutuel <u>betting on <mark>horseracing and</u></mark> <u><mark>meets</u></mark> both prongs of <u><mark>the</mark> public <mark>morals exception</u></mark>.</p><p>Second, <u>complying with GATS is important to avoid patent retaliation</u> from member countries. Under WTO law, if the U.S. ignores a WTO finding or decision, member countries will have the option to disregard treaties requiring them to comply with U.S. patent laws. n173 For example, because the U.S. refused to follow the Compliance Panel's findings in the Antigua case, <u>WTO arbitration panel gave Antigua the right to disregard U.S. copyrights</u> on (e.g.,) videos, music, electronics, or software. n174 <u>This</u> type of retaliation <u>will pose serious ramifications for the U.S. if larger WTO member countries bring internet gambling complaints</u>. Moreover, member countries [*104] might also retaliate by refusing to allow U.S. companies to use certain geographical indications. n175</p><p>Third, the U.S. has "interests in supporting the legitimacy of the WTO." n176 Continuing to ignore its commitments under the WTO with respect to the new law will cost the U.S. "significant trade capital" and lead to trade sanctions or concessions. n177 If the U.S. ignores its WTO obligations, then other countries might ignore their WTO obligations toward the U.S. n178</p><p>C. CRITICISM</p><p>There are three main counterarguments in response to this proposal that focus on the public morals exception. First, critics might argue that a WTO panel should hold that the U.S. has not met the first prong of the public morals exception, and find that the U.S. intent behind the UIGEA is economic-based. Second, existing U.S. federal laws are the most WTO-consistent measures available. Third, the U.S. should not prohibit online wagering on horseracing.</p><p>1. THE U.S. HAS NOT MET THE FIRST PRONG OF THE PUBLIC MORALS EXCEPTION</p><p>First, because the UIGEA presents no clear moral or cultural rationale in either its text or legislative history, <u>a WTO panel might find that the public morals exception cannot encompass the UIGEA</u>. Proponents of this view argue that the purpose behind the UIGEA is almost entirely "economic in nature." n179 <u>The problem with this argument</u>, however, <u>is that the UIGEA's reference to money laundering and corruption in section 803 suggests that there are <strong>moral-based purposes</strong> behind the statute</u>. n180 Moreover, because the WTO tends to [*105] loosely interpret the public morals exception's scope, section 803's reference to morals will be enough to satisfy this prong. n181</p><p>2. EXISTING FEDERAL LAWS ARE WTO-CONSISTENT</p><p>Second, another area of contention centers on whether the U.S. could use any less trade-restrictive alternatives. n182 In line with the DOJ's position, <u><mark>critics argue</mark> that <mark>prohibiting</mark> all types of internet <mark>gambling is not</mark> a <mark>less trade-restrictive</mark> alternative, <mark>because the Wire Act already prohibits</u></mark> all forms of <u>internet <mark>gambling</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>This</mark> reasoning</u></strong>, however, <u><strong><mark>conflicts with the A</u></strong></mark>ppellate <u><strong><mark>B</u></strong></mark>ody <u><strong><mark>Report</strong></mark> as well as the In re MasterCard decision</u>. n183</p><p>3. THE U.S. SHOULD NOT PROHIBIT INTERNET WAGERING ON HORSERACING</p><p>Lastly, the U.S. should not prohibit pari-mutuel wagering on horseracing. n184 Proponents of the horseracing industry have argued that horseracing is a major industry in the United States, whose "fastest growing segment" is the pari-mutuel business. n185 Carving out an exception for the IHA, however, discriminates against foreign internet [*106] service providers. If the U.S. does not wish to outlaw online betting on horseracing, its only other option is to allow "foreign racebooks to take [horseracing] bets" from the U.S., which would have "virtually no [negative] impact" on the current status of internet gambling. n186 Yet, Congress is not likely to pass a law expanding the scope of legal internet gambling. n187 Thus, the most realistic option for the U.S. is to include pari-mutuel wagering on horses within the overall reach of the UIGEA.</p><p>VII. CONCLUSION</p><p><u>The UIGEA violates GATS</u>, in particular as examined against the backdrop of the Appellate Body Report. <u>To comply with GATS, <mark>the U.S. should modify the law</mark> to include interstate gambling on horseracing and to satisfy the public morals exception</u>. Instead of evading its WTO commitments altogether, <u>the U.S. should amend the UIGEA</u> as soon as possible <u><mark>to <strong>avoid future</mark> WTO <mark>complaints</u></mark> from larger member countries or the European Union.</p></strong> | 1NC | null | 2 | 429,660 | 26 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,953 | ( ) Even if roleplaying’s bad, our offense is still applicable – to vote negative is to lobby the United States federal government to reject the plan. Using the contest round to learn about government policy ensures better activism skills, regardless of the sphere in which we use them. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>( ) Even if roleplaying’s bad, our offense is still applicable – to vote negative is to <u>lobby</u> the United States federal government to reject the plan. Using the contest round to learn about government policy ensures better activism skills, regardless of the sphere in which we use them. </h4> | null | 2nc/1nr | More FW | 430,513 | 1 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,954 | ( ) They will say our framework produces observers instead of participants—we’ll impact turn this. | Coverstone ‘95 | Coverstone ‘95 | ]
Proper training requires time. While there is a tremendous variation in the amount of training required for effective navigation of the public sphere, the relative isolation of academic debate is one of its virtues. Instead of turning students of debate immediately outward, we should be encouraging more to enter the oasis. A thirsty public, drunk on the product of anyone who claims a decision, needs to drink from the pool of decision-making skills. Teaching these skills is our virtue. | null | [Alan. Former Debater @ Wake, Former Debate Coach at Montgomery Bell Academy. “An Inward Glance” 1995. groups.wfu.edu/debate]
Mitchell's reflections are necessarily more accurate in his own situation. Over a decade of debate has well positioned him to participate actively and directly in the political process. Yet the skills he has did not develop overnight. Proper training requires time. While there is a tremendous variation in the amount of training required for effective navigation of the public sphere, the relative isolation of academic debate is one of its virtues. Instead of turning students of debate immediately outward, we should be encouraging more to enter the oasis. A thirsty public, drunk on the product of anyone who claims a decision, needs to drink from the pool of decision-making skills. Teaching these skills is our virtue. | 851 | <h4><strong>( ) They will say our framework produces observers instead of participants—we’ll impact turn this. </h4><p>Coverstone ‘95</p><p></strong>[Alan. Former Debater @ Wake, Former Debate Coach at Montgomery Bell Academy. “An Inward Glance” 1995. groups.wfu.edu/debate<u>]</p><p></u>Mitchell's reflections are necessarily more accurate in his own situation. Over a decade of debate has well positioned him to participate actively and directly in the political process. Yet the skills he has did not develop overnight. <u>Proper training requires time. While there is a tremendous variation in the amount of training required for effective navigation of the public sphere, the relative isolation of academic debate is one of its virtues. Instead of turning students of debate immediately outward, we should be encouraging more to enter the oasis. A thirsty public, drunk on the product of anyone who claims a decision, needs to drink from the pool of decision-making skills. Teaching these skills is our virtue.</p></u> | null | 2nc/1nr | More FW | 90,070 | 12 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,955 | Solves trade---the issue is discrimination, not legality---CP’s universal ban causes WTO compliance | Rose 5 www.gamblingandthelaw.com/index.php/columns/65-109wto | Nelson Rose 5, professor, recognized as one of the world's leading authorities on gambling law, Internet Gaming: U.S. Beats Antigua in WTO, www.gamblingandthelaw.com/index.php/columns/65-109wto | As for federal law, with just a little tweaking of the I H A the U.S. will be in complete compliance with its WTO treaty obligations The WTO held that the federal laws prohibiting interstate and international betting were necessary it said that the U.S. had established "a specific connection between the remote supply of gambling services" and dangers to the American public. It found the U.S. had presented evidence showing "a link in relation to money laundering, fraud, compulsive gambling and underage gambling." But the U.S. laws had to pass one more test. A nation can enact laws to protect its residents from the perceived evils of gambling, but it cannot discriminate against foreigners just to protect its local businesses. One federal law failed this test the Interstate Horseracing Act ("IHA") allow betting on horse races by phone or computer. But the law on its face is limited to states in the U.S. where it is legal to place and accept bets.¶ Since foreign operators were expressly excluded, the WTO found the U.S. had failed to show there was no discrimination. The WTO held the U.S. had not shown that it applied its prohibition on remote wagering on horseraces in a nondiscriminatory manner.¶ the solution is easy. Congress should amend the IHA to allow what is already being done: expressly allow Americans to bet on foreign races and allow foreign bettors to wager on American races. The U.S. could then safely prohibit all other forms of Internet gambling, foreign and domestic. | with a little tweaking of the I H A U.S. will be in complete compliance with WTO obligations WTO held federal laws prohibiting betting were necessary it said U.S. had established "a connection between the remote gambling " and dangers U.S. had presented a link to laundering and underage gambling."¶ but it cannot discriminate against foreigners the IHA allow betting on horse races limited to states in the U.S. Since foreign operators were excluded, the WTO found discrimination WTO held the U.S. had not applied its prohibition on remote wagering on horseraces in a nondiscriminatory manner the solution is easy. The U.S. could prohibit all Internet gambling, foreign and domestic | First, the WTO decided not to look at U.S. state laws, which outlaw all unlicenced commercial gambling.¶ As for federal law, with just a little tweaking of the Interstate Horseracing Act, the U.S. will be in complete compliance with its WTO treaty obligations.¶ The entire controversy can be traced back to a mistake the U.S. federal government keeps making: It does not take gambling seriously.¶ Nations that sign trade treaties like the ones creating the WTO agree that they will let in some types of goods and services of other signatories. One category was "Recreational, Cultural & Sporting Services," which included everything from circuses to news agencies. Some other countries expressly stated that they were not agreeing to open their doors to foreign gambling operations. But the U.S. agreed to let in every recreational service, "except sporting."¶ Sporting" services were undoubtedly excluded to keep out foreign sports teams. The U.S. argued that "sporting" includes gambling. It didn't work.¶ The funny thing is that the U.S. did want to keep out gambling. And all it had to do was say so.¶ The U.S. signed the WTO treaty in 1994. Maybe the federal government did not know about Internet gaming then, but it should have. It certainly did know that foreign operators were trying to gain patrons from the U.S.: The federal government was seizing a million pieces of foreign lottery mail at the borders each year.¶ But the U.S. could still keep out Internet gambling if it could show that this was "necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order."¶ The first panel held the U.S. had failed to show this because the U.S. had refused to talk with Antigua about changing its laws against Internet gaming. On appeal the WTO ruled that whether or not the U.S. had met with Antigua was irrelevant to the legal of question of whether the anti-gambling laws were necessary.¶ The WTO held that the federal laws prohibiting interstate and international betting were necessary. Specifically, it said that the U.S. had established "a specific connection between the remote supply of gambling services" and dangers to the American public. It found the U.S. had presented evidence showing "a link in relation to money laundering, fraud, compulsive gambling and underage gambling."¶ This does not mean that any of this is true. Only that the federal government was able to show that it had reason to be concerned about foreign operators taking bets from at-home Americans. It focused on Internet gambling's "volume, speed and international reach," "virtual anonymity," "low barriers to entry," and "isolated and anonymous environment."¶ The WTO did reject the federal government=s concern for organized crime, finding the U.S. had not submitted concrete evidence to show that remote gambling, as opposed to other forms of gambling, was particularly vulnerable to mob involvement.¶ This WTO ruling was the first ever to discuss "public morals," but it follows established international law. The High Court of Europe has consistently ruled that the nations of the European Community cannot keep out trade from other members - except gambling. Even in the U.S., we have long had the concept of a state's Police Power, the state's right to do just about anything to protect the health, safety, welfare and morality of that state's citizens.¶ But the U.S. laws had to pass one more test. A nation can enact laws to protect its residents from the perceived evils of gambling, but it cannot discriminate against foreigners just to protect its local businesses. One federal law failed this test.¶ In December 2000, Congress amended the Interstate Horseracing Act ("IHA") to allow parimutuel betting on horse races by phone or computer. But the law on its face is limited to states in the U.S. where it is legal to place and accept bets.¶ Since foreign operators were expressly excluded, the WTO found the U.S. had failed to show there was no discrimination. The government lawyers did not help by making the silly argument that the IHA was only civil and that it did not repeal the criminal anti-gambling laws. Of course it did. That was why it was amended, so that off-tracking betting parlors would not be arrested for taking out-of-state bets.¶ Once again, the government did not bother to talk to anyone in the business. If it had, it would have learned that international betting on horseracing has been around for decades. Betting on the Kentucky Derby is very big in Canada and France, and I personally saw Hollywood Park taking bets on races in Hong Kong.¶ ¶ The WTO held the U.S. had not shown that it applied its prohibition on remote wagering on horseraces in a nondiscriminatory manner.¶ But the solution is easy. Congress should immediately amend the IHA to allow what is already being done: expressly allow Americans to bet on foreign races and allow foreign bettors to wager on American races. The U.S. could then safely prohibit all other forms of Internet gambling, foreign and domestic. | 5,009 | <h4><strong>Solves trade---the issue is <u>discrimination</u>, not <u>legality</u>---CP’s <u>universal ban</u> causes WTO compliance</h4><p></strong>Nelson <strong>Rose 5</strong>, professor, recognized as one of the world's leading authorities on gambling law, Internet Gaming: U.S. Beats Antigua in WTO, <u><strong>www.gamblingandthelaw.com/index.php/columns/65-109wto</p><p></u></strong>First, the WTO decided not to look at U.S. state laws, which outlaw all unlicenced commercial gambling.¶ <u><strong>As for federal law, <mark>with</mark> just <mark>a little tweaking of the I</u></strong></mark>nterstate <u><strong><mark>H</u></strong></mark>orseracing <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>ct, <u><strong>the <mark>U.S. will be in complete compliance with</mark> its <mark>WTO</mark> treaty <mark>obligations</u></strong></mark>.¶ The entire controversy can be traced back to a mistake the U.S. federal government keeps making: It does not take gambling seriously.¶ Nations that sign trade treaties like the ones creating the WTO agree that they will let in some types of goods and services of other signatories. One category was "Recreational, Cultural & Sporting Services," which included everything from circuses to news agencies. Some other countries expressly stated that they were not agreeing to open their doors to foreign gambling operations. But the U.S. agreed to let in every recreational service, "except sporting."¶ Sporting" services were undoubtedly excluded to keep out foreign sports teams. The U.S. argued that "sporting" includes gambling. It didn't work.¶ The funny thing is that the U.S. did want to keep out gambling. And all it had to do was say so.¶ The U.S. signed the WTO treaty in 1994. Maybe the federal government did not know about Internet gaming then, but it should have. It certainly did know that foreign operators were trying to gain patrons from the U.S.: The federal government was seizing a million pieces of foreign lottery mail at the borders each year.¶ But the U.S. could still keep out Internet gambling if it could show that this was "necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order."¶ The first panel held the U.S. had failed to show this because the U.S. had refused to talk with Antigua about changing its laws against Internet gaming. On appeal the WTO ruled that whether or not the U.S. had met with Antigua was irrelevant to the legal of question of whether the anti-gambling laws were necessary.¶ <u><strong>The <mark>WTO held</mark> that the <mark>federal laws prohibiting </mark>interstate and international <mark>betting were necessary</u></strong></mark>. Specifically, <u><strong><mark>it said</mark> that the <mark>U.S. had established "a </mark>specific <mark>connection between the remote </mark>supply of <mark>gambling </mark>services<mark>" and dangers</mark> to the American public. It found the <mark>U.S. had presented</mark> evidence showing "<mark>a link </mark>in relation <mark>to</mark> money <mark>laundering</mark>, fraud, compulsive gambling <mark>and underage gambling."</u></strong>¶ </mark>This does not mean that any of this is true. Only that the federal government was able to show that it had reason to be concerned about foreign operators taking bets from at-home Americans. It focused on Internet gambling's "volume, speed and international reach," "virtual anonymity," "low barriers to entry," and "isolated and anonymous environment."¶ The WTO did reject the federal government=s concern for organized crime, finding the U.S. had not submitted concrete evidence to show that remote gambling, as opposed to other forms of gambling, was particularly vulnerable to mob involvement.¶ This WTO ruling was the first ever to discuss "public morals," but it follows established international law. The High Court of Europe has consistently ruled that the nations of the European Community cannot keep out trade from other members - except gambling. Even in the U.S., we have long had the concept of a state's Police Power, the state's right to do just about anything to protect the health, safety, welfare and morality of that state's citizens.¶ <u><strong>But the U.S. laws had to pass one more test. A nation can enact laws to protect its residents from the perceived evils of gambling, <mark>but it cannot discriminate against foreigners</mark> just to protect its local businesses. One federal law failed this test</u></strong>.¶ In December 2000, Congress amended <u><strong><mark>the</mark> Interstate Horseracing Act ("<mark>IHA</mark>")</u></strong> to <u><strong><mark>allow</u></strong></mark> parimutuel <u><strong><mark>betting on horse races</mark> by phone or computer. But the law on its face is <mark>limited to states in the U.S.</mark> where it is legal to place and accept bets.¶</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>Since foreign operators were</mark> expressly <mark>excluded, the WTO</mark> <mark>found</mark> the U.S. had failed to show there was no <mark>discrimination</mark>.</u></strong> The government lawyers did not help by making the silly argument that the IHA was only civil and that it did not repeal the criminal anti-gambling laws. Of course it did. That was why it was amended, so that off-tracking betting parlors would not be arrested for taking out-of-state bets.¶ Once again, the government did not bother to talk to anyone in the business. If it had, it would have learned that international betting on horseracing has been around for decades. Betting on the Kentucky Derby is very big in Canada and France, and I personally saw Hollywood Park taking bets on races in Hong Kong.¶ ¶ <u><strong>The <mark>WTO held the U.S. had not</mark> shown that it <mark>applied its prohibition on remote wagering on horseraces in a nondiscriminatory manner</mark>.¶</u></strong> But <u><strong><mark>the solution is easy.</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>Congress should</u></strong> immediately <u><strong>amend the IHA to allow what is already being done: expressly allow Americans to bet on foreign races and allow foreign bettors to wager on American races. <mark>The U.S. could</mark> then safely <mark>prohibit all</mark> other forms of <mark>Internet gambling, foreign and domestic</mark>.</p></u></strong> | 1NC | null | 2 | 430,517 | 23 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,956 | C. The affirmative interpretation is bad for debate. Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash, and the affirmative unlimits. They permit a huge number of policies that are all the possible specification of less than nearly all sales , and all of the permutations of all those possible specifications | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>C. The affirmative interpretation is bad for debate. Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash, and the affirmative unlimits. They permit a huge number of policies that are all the possible specification of less than nearly all sales , and all of the permutations of all those possible specifications</h4> | 1nc | null | T | 430,515 | 1 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,957 | Heg isn’t benign—attempt to seize hegemony undermine foreign relations and establish a violent security-driven international order. | Marsella 11 | Marsella (Department of Psychology, University of Hawaii; paper delivered on the occasion of receiving the Lifetime Contribution Award by the International Academy for Intercultural Research) 11 | In a world that is in desperate need for global cooperation and harmony at the risk of nuclear annihilation, the continued efforts by the United States to pursue the hegemony of empire must be questioned U.S. foreign bases inflame U.S. foreign relations, generating resentment against the prostitution, environmental damage, petty crime, and everyday ethnocentrism that are their inevitable corollaries the United States, there is ample evidence to conclude that it is addicted to violence and war. That these actions have now become an almost reflexive response used to resolve any national or international tension. A number of writers have argued that the U.S. culture has evolved to the point that its citizens have been socialized to believe that there will never be end to war and to learn to tolerate this state of affairs; that U.S. citizens are seduced by war We have begun to talk casually about our wars The process of brainwashing and desensitization by the military begins affecting children in the US from a very early age the U.S. is now seduced by the militarism To a degree without precedent in US history, Americans have come to define the nation’s strength and well being in terms of military preparedness, military action | In a world in desperate need for global cooperation the continued efforts to pursue heg must be questioned, U.S bases inflame foreign relations, generating resentment against prostitution environmental damage petty crime, and ethnocentrism that are their inevitable corollaries the U S is addicted to war these actions have become reflexive response to resolve any tension citizens have been socialized to believe there will never be end to war citizens are seduced by war We talk casually about wars the U.S. is seduced by the militarism To a degree without precedent Americans have come to define the nation’s strength in terms of military preparedness | (Anthony J., United States of America: “A culture of war”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations 35 (2011) 714–728)
In a world that is in desperate need for global cooperation and harmony at the risk of nuclear annihilation, the continued efforts by the United States to pursue the hegemony of empire must be questioned, as must its sources and means. 2.2. A militarized “empire” The term “empire,” with all of its unfortunate denotations and connotations, is now widely applied to describe the U.S., and perhaps, like other empires that have come before, the U.S. awaits a similar fate of decline and collapse, a historical footnote that joins it with other nations and civilizations that lost sight of the tragic consequences of the very course they were pursuing. There is no reason to believe that the USA will be able to escape the inevitable collapse similar to others. Chalmers Johnson (2004), writing in his volume, “The sorrows of empire: Militarism, secrecy, and the end of the republic,” traces the rise of the American empire and predicts its imminent demise. In describing the evolution of empire in the USA, Johnson (2004) writes: Our militarized empire is a physical reality with a distinct way of life but it is also a network of economic and political interests tied in a thousand different ways to American corporations, universities, and communities but kept separate from what passes for everyday life back in what has recently come to be known as ‘the homeland.’ And yet, even that sense of separation is disappearing – for the changing nature of empire is changing society as well. For example, slowly the Department of Defense is obscuring and displacing the Department of State as the primary agency for making and administering foreign policy. We now station innumerably more uniformed military officers than civilian diplomats, aid workers, or environmental specialists in foreign countries. Our garrisons send a daily message that the United States prefers to deal with nations through the use of or threat of force rather than negotiations, commerce, or cultural interactions and through military-to-military, not civilian-to-civilian relations (Johnson, 2004, p. 5). In contrast to old views of “empire” as an imperialistic occupation of nations (e.g., Great Britain, France, Spain), the United States is an “empire of bases” (Gusterson, 2009; Johnson, 2008). Gusterson (2009) states we are an “empire” of foreign military bases that number in excess of 1000 bases in more than 130 countries that serve the purposes of “empire:” The old way of doing colonialism, practiced by the Europeans, was to take over entire countries and administer them. But this was clumsy. The United States has pioneered a leaner approach to global empire. . . Its “empire of bases” gives the United States global reach, but the shape of this empire, insofar as it tilts toward Europe, is a bloated and anachronistic holdover from the Cold War. Many of these bases are a luxury the United States can no longer afford at a time of record budget deficits. Moreover, U.S. foreign bases have a double edge: they project American power across the globe, but they also inflame U.S. foreign relations, generating resentment against the prostitution, environmental damage, petty crime, and everyday ethnocentrism that are their inevitable corollaries (Gusterson, 2009, p. 3). 2.3. Is the USA addicted to war? Addiction is the term generally used to refer to compulsive reliance on drugs or other substances or activities (i.e., exercise, computer games) to the point of loss of control. In the case of the United States, there is ample evidence to conclude that it is addicted to violence and war. That these actions have now become an almost reflexive response used to resolve any national or international tension. A number of writers have argued that the U.S. culture has evolved to the point that its citizens have been socialized to believe that there will never be end to war and to learn to tolerate this state of affairs; that U.S. citizens are seduced by war (e.g., Bacevich, 2005; Bromwich, 2010; Jamail & Coppola, 2009). Bromwich (2010) writes: “We have begun to talk casually about our wars; and this should be surprising for several reasons. To begin with, in the history of the United States war has never been considered the normal state of things. For two centuries, Americans were taught to think war itself an aberration, and ‘wars’ in the plural could only have seemed doubly aberrant. Younger generations of Americans, however, are now being taught to expect no end of war –and no end of wars” (Bromwich, 2010, p. 1). Jamail and Coppola (200 9, p. 1) state: “The process of brainwashing and desensitization by the military begins affecting children in the US from a very early age. It is not insignificant that little boys wear camouflage and run around playing with toy guns whenever they get an opportunity.” Bacevich (2005), concludes that the U.S. is now seduced by the militarism, a glorification and celebration of all things martial including history, music, celebrations, uniforms, guns, and the very idea that military might itself insures power: Bacevich writes: Americans in our own time have fallen prey to militarism, manifesting itself in a romanticized view of soldiers, a tendency to see military power as the truest measure of national greatness, and outsized expectations regarding the efficacy of force. To a degree without precedent in US history, Americans have come to define the nation’s strength and well being in terms of military preparedness, military action, and the fostering of (or nostalgia for) military ideals.” (Bacevich, 2005, p. 2). | 5,842 | <h4><strong>Heg isn’t benign—attempt to seize hegemony undermine foreign relations and establish a violent security-driven international order.</h4><p><u>Marsella</u></strong> (Department of Psychology, University of Hawaii; paper delivered on the occasion of receiving the Lifetime Contribution Award by the International Academy for Intercultural Research)<u><strong> 11</p><p></u></strong>(Anthony J., United States of America: “A culture of war”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations 35 (2011) 714–728)</p><p><u><mark>In a world</mark> that is <mark>in desperate need for global cooperation</mark> and harmony at the risk of nuclear annihilation, <mark>the continued efforts</mark> by the United States <mark>to pursue</mark> the <mark>heg</mark>emony of empire <mark>must be questioned</u>,</mark> as must its sources and means. 2.2. A militarized “empire” The term “empire,” with all of its unfortunate denotations and connotations, is now widely applied to describe the U.S., and perhaps, like other empires that have come before, the U.S. awaits a similar fate of decline and collapse, a historical footnote that joins it with other nations and civilizations that lost sight of the tragic consequences of the very course they were pursuing. There is no reason to believe that the USA will be able to escape the inevitable collapse similar to others. Chalmers Johnson (2004), writing in his volume, “The sorrows of empire: Militarism, secrecy, and the end of the republic,” traces the rise of the American empire and predicts its imminent demise. In describing the evolution of empire in the USA, Johnson (2004) writes: Our militarized empire is a physical reality with a distinct way of life but it is also a network of economic and political interests tied in a thousand different ways to American corporations, universities, and communities but kept separate from what passes for everyday life back in what has recently come to be known as ‘the homeland.’ And yet, even that sense of separation is disappearing – for the changing nature of empire is changing society as well. For example, slowly the Department of Defense is obscuring and displacing the Department of State as the primary agency for making and administering foreign policy. We now station innumerably more uniformed military officers than civilian diplomats, aid workers, or environmental specialists in foreign countries. Our garrisons send a daily message that the United States prefers to deal with nations through the use of or threat of force rather than negotiations, commerce, or cultural interactions and through military-to-military, not civilian-to-civilian relations (Johnson, 2004, p. 5). In contrast to old views of “empire” as an imperialistic occupation of nations (e.g., Great Britain, France, Spain), the United States is an “empire of bases” (Gusterson, 2009; Johnson, 2008). Gusterson (2009) states we are an “empire” of foreign military bases that number in excess of 1000 bases in more than 130 countries that serve the purposes of “empire:” The old way of doing colonialism, practiced by the Europeans, was to take over entire countries and administer them. But this was clumsy. The United States has pioneered a leaner approach to global empire. . . Its “empire of bases” gives the United States global reach, but the shape of this empire, insofar as it tilts toward Europe, is a bloated and anachronistic holdover from the Cold War. Many of these bases are a luxury the United States can no longer afford at a time of record budget deficits. Moreover, <u><mark>U.S</mark>. foreign <mark>bases</u></mark> have a double edge: they project American power across the globe, but they also <u><mark>inflame</mark> U.S. <mark>foreign relations, generating resentment against</mark> the <mark>prostitution</mark>, <mark>environmental</mark> <mark>damage</mark>, <mark>petty crime, and</mark> everyday <mark>ethnocentrism that are their inevitable corollaries</u></mark> (Gusterson, 2009, p. 3). 2.3. Is the USA addicted to war? Addiction is the term generally used to refer to compulsive reliance on drugs or other substances or activities (i.e., exercise, computer games) to the point of loss of control. In the case of <u><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, there <mark>is</mark> ample evidence to conclude that it is <mark>addicted to</mark> violence and <mark>war</mark>. That <mark>these actions</mark> <mark>have</mark> now <mark>become</mark> an almost <mark>reflexive response</mark> used <mark>to resolve any</mark> national or international <mark>tension</mark>. A number of writers have argued that the U.S. culture has evolved to the point that its <mark>citizens have been socialized to believe</mark> that <mark>there will never be end to war</mark> and to learn to tolerate this state of affairs; that U.S. <mark>citizens are seduced by war</u></mark> (e.g., Bacevich, 2005; Bromwich, 2010; Jamail & Coppola, 2009). Bromwich (2010) writes: “<u><mark>We</mark> have begun to <mark>talk casually about</mark> our <mark>wars</u></mark>; and this should be surprising for several reasons. To begin with, in the history of the United States war has never been considered the normal state of things. For two centuries, Americans were taught to think war itself an aberration, and ‘wars’ in the plural could only have seemed doubly aberrant. Younger generations of Americans, however, are now being taught to expect no end of war –and no end of wars” (Bromwich, 2010, p. 1). Jamail and Coppola (200 9, p. 1) state: “<u>The process of brainwashing and desensitization by the military begins affecting children in the US from a very early age</u>. It is not insignificant that little boys wear camouflage and run around playing with toy guns whenever they get an opportunity.” Bacevich (2005), concludes that <u><mark>the U.S. is</mark> now <mark>seduced by the militarism</u></mark>, a glorification and celebration of all things martial including history, music, celebrations, uniforms, guns, and the very idea that military might itself insures power: Bacevich writes: Americans in our own time have fallen prey to militarism, manifesting itself in a romanticized view of soldiers, a tendency to see military power as the truest measure of national greatness, and outsized expectations regarding the efficacy of force. <u><mark>To a degree without precedent</mark> in US history, <mark>Americans have come to define the nation’s strength</mark> and well being <mark>in terms of military preparedness</mark>, military action</u>, and the fostering of (or nostalgia for) military ideals.” (Bacevich, 2005, p. 2). </p> | 1NC | null | 3 – k | 68,134 | 4 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,958 | D. T is a voter because it is necessary for good clash and debate | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>D. T is a voter because it is necessary for good clash and debate</h4> | 1nc | null | T | 430,516 | 1 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,959 | ( ) Policy simulation key to creativity and decisionmaking—the detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits | Eijkman ‘12 | Eijkman ‘12 | Participation in policy games proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity which is precisely what innovation requires Gaming, is liberating parties accepted the invitation to participate revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strateg Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life This is exactly what good policy simulations provide participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. participants engage in extensive debate to guide the policy process | null | [Henk. Prof Academic Development at Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering (India). “The Role of Simulations in the Authentic Learning for National Security Policy Development: Implications for Practice” 2012, http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf ]
Policy simulations stimulate Creativity Participation in policy games has proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity, which is precisely what innovation requires (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). Gaming, whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and is one of the most engaging and liberating ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many parties involved accepted the invitation to participate in what was a revolutionary and politically very sensitive experiment precisely because it was a game’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strategy (Geurts et al. 2007). Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation, where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion. The progression through learning cycles can also be much faster than in real-life (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. This is exactly what good policy simulations provide (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective or that of one dominant stakeholder (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols. In consensus building, participants engage in extensive debate and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs to guide the policy process in the desired direction | 2,855 | <h4><strong>( ) Policy simulation key to creativity and decisionmaking—the detachment that they criticize is key to its revolutionary benefits</h4><p>Eijkman ‘12</p><p></strong>[Henk. Prof Academic Development at Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering (India). “The Role of Simulations in the Authentic Learning for National Security Policy Development: Implications for Practice” 2012, <strong>http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf</strong> ]</p><p>Policy simulations stimulate Creativity <u>Participation in <strong>policy games</u></strong> has <u>proved to be a highly effective way of developing new combinations of experience and creativity</u>, <u>which is precisely what innovation requires </u>(Geurts et al. 2007: 548). <u><strong>Gaming,</u></strong> whether in analog or digital mode, has the power to stimulate creativity, and <u>is </u>one of the most engaging and <u>liberating</u> ways for making group work productive, challenging and enjoyable. Geurts et al. (2007) cite one instance where, in a National Health Care policy change environment, ‘the many <u>parties</u> involved <u><strong>accepted the </strong>invitation to participate</u> in what was a <u><strong>revolutionary </strong>and <strong>politically very sensitive experiment</u></strong> <u><strong>precisely because it was a game’</u></strong> (Geurts et al. 2007: 547). <u>Data from other policy simulations also indicate the uncovering of issues of which participants were not aware</u>, the emergence of new ideas not anticipated, <u>and a perception that policy simulations are also an enjoyable way to formulate strateg</u>y (Geurts et al. 2007). <u>Gaming puts the players in an ‘experiential learning’ situation,</u> where they discover a concrete, realistic and complex initial situation, and the gaming process of going through multiple learning cycles helps them work through the situation as it unfolds. <u>Policy gaming stimulates ‘learning how to learn’, as in a game, and learning by doing alternates with reflection and discussion</u>. <u>The progression through learning cycles can also be <strong>much faster</strong> than in real-life</u> (Geurts et al. 2007: 548). The bottom line is that problem solving in policy development processes requires creative experimentation. This cannot be primarily taught via ‘camp-fire’ story telling learning mode but demands hands-on ‘veld learning’ that allow for safe creative and productive experimentation. <u>This is exactly what good policy simulations provide</u> (De Geus, 1997; Ringland, 2006). In simulations <u><strong>participants cannot view issues solely from either their own perspective</u></strong> <u>or that of one dominant stakeholder</u> (Geurts et al. 2007). Policy simulations enable the seeking of Consensus Games are popular because historically people seek and enjoy the tension of competition, positive rivalry and the procedural justice of impartiality in safe and regulated environments. <u>As in games, simulations temporarily remove the participants from their daily routines, political pressures, and the restrictions of real-life protocols.</u> In consensus building, <u><strong>participants engage in extensive debate</u></strong> and need to act on a shared set of meanings and beliefs <u>to guide the policy process</u> in the desired direction</p> | null | 2nc/1nr | More FW | 13,203 | 66 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,960 | The United States should issue a narrow ruling applying strict scrutiny to overrule current restrictions on stem cell research on the grounds that the United States Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to safe and effective medical treatment to protect life. The United States should not remove current bans on the sales of human organs. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>The United States should issue a narrow ruling applying strict scrutiny to overrule current restrictions on stem cell research on the grounds that the United States Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to safe and effective medical treatment to protect life. The United States should not remove current bans on the sales of human organs.</h4> | 1nc | null | CP | 430,518 | 1 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,961 | Discourse of the ‘violent terrorist’ is used to perpetuate aggressive foreign policy which re-creates hostility and perpetuates violence by and against the US. | Cortright 8 | Cortright 8 [David, President of the Fourth Freedom Forum and research fellow for the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, 2008 (“Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas.” Pg. 125] | terrorism has replaced communism as the frame of dehumanization. to lump together all considered enemies. The victims of US bombing and attack in Iraq are branded terrorists, regardless of circumstances The so-called war on terror” is used to justify all measures – invasion, war, military occupation, torture, indefinite internment, warrantless wiretapping – whatever may be deemed necessary to defeat “evil” . Fighting terrorism offers a rationalization for what is otherwise unjustifiable | null | In recent years terrorism has replaced communism as the new frame of dehumanization. It has been used to lump together all those who are considered enemies. The victims of US bombing and attack in Iraq are branded terrorists, regardless of the specific circumstances involved. The so-called “global war on terror” is used to justify any and all measures – invasion, war, military occupation, torture, indefinite internment, warrantless wiretapping – whatever may be deemed necessary by government officials to defeat the “evil” enemy. Fighting terrorism offers a rationalization for what is otherwise unjustifiable, just as during the cold war the fight against communism provided the justification for the unthinkable. | 719 | <h4>Discourse of the ‘violent terrorist’ is used to perpetuate aggressive foreign policy which re-creates hostility and perpetuates violence by and against the US.</h4><p><u><strong>Cortright 8</u></strong> [David, President of the Fourth Freedom Forum and research fellow for the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, 2008 (“Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas.” Pg. 125]</p><p>In recent years <u>terrorism has replaced communism as the </u>new<u><strong> frame of dehumanization</strong>. </u>It has been used<u> to lump together all </u>those who are <u>considered enemies. The victims of US bombing and attack in Iraq are branded terrorists, regardless of</u> the specific<u> circumstances</u> involved. <u>The so-called </u>“global<u> war on terror” is used to justify </u>any and<u> all measures – invasion, war, military occupation, torture, indefinite internment, warrantless wiretapping – whatever may be deemed necessary </u>by government officials<u> to defeat </u>the<u> “evil” </u>enemy<u>. Fighting terrorism offers a rationalization for what is otherwise unjustifiable</u>, just as during the cold war the fight against communism provided the justification for the unthinkable.</p> | 1NC | null | 3 – k | 430,519 | 5 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,962 | ( ) That allows us to influence state policy AND is key to agency | Eijkman ‘12 | Eijkman ‘12 | policy simulations derive their power from their combination of simulation and gaming the unique combination of simulation with role-playing The mix enables participants to create possible futures relevant to the topic being studied This is diametrically opposed to the more traditional approaches in which a future is produced for them In policy simulations, possible futures are much more than an object of tabletop discussion No other technique allows a group of participants to engage in collective action in a safe environment to create the futures they want to explore’ The game element: a policy simulation is a dedicated game constructed in collaboration with practitioners to achieve a high level of proficiency policy development simulation are particularly effective in developing participant knowledge | null | [Henk. Prof Academic Development at Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering (India). “The Role of Simulations in the Authentic Learning for National Security Policy Development: Implications for Practice” 2012, http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf ]
However, whether as an approach to learning, innovation, persuasion or culture shift, policy simulations derive their power from two central features: their combination of simulation and gaming (Geurts et al. 2007). 1. The simulation element: the unique combination of simulation with role-playing. The unique simulation/role-play mix enables participants to create possible futures relevant to the topic being studied. This is diametrically opposed to the more traditional, teacher-centric approaches in which a future is produced for them. In policy simulations, possible futures are much more than an object of tabletop discussion and verbal speculation. ‘No other technique allows a group of participants to engage in collective action in a safe environment to create and analyse the futures they want to explore’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 536). 2. The game element: the interactive and tailor-made modelling and design of the policy game. The actual run of the policy simulation is only one step, though a most important and visible one, in a collective process of investigation, communication, and evaluation of performance. In the context of a post-graduate course in public policy development, for example, a policy simulation is a dedicated game constructed in collaboration with practitioners to achieve a high level of proficiency in relevant aspects of the policy development process. To drill down to a level of finer detail, policy development simulations—as forms of interactive or participatory modelling— are particularly effective in developing participant knowledge and skills in the five key areas of the policy development process (and success criteria), namely: Complexity, Communication, Creativity, Consensus, and Commitment to action (‘the five Cs’). The capacity to provide effective learning support in these five categories has proved to be particularly helpful in strategic decision-making (Geurts et al. 2007). Annexure 2.5 contains a detailed description, in table format, of the synopsis below. | 2,309 | <h4><strong>( ) That allows us to influence state policy AND is key to agency</h4><p>Eijkman ‘12</p><p></strong>[Henk. Prof Academic Development at Annasaheb Dange College of Engineering (India). “The Role of Simulations in the Authentic Learning for National Security Policy Development: Implications for Practice” 2012, <strong>http://nsc.anu.edu.au/test/documents/Sims_in_authentic_learning_report.pdf</strong> ]</p><p>However, whether as an approach to learning, innovation, persuasion or culture shift, <u>policy simulations derive their power from </u>two central features: <u>their combination of simulation and gaming </u>(Geurts et al. 2007). 1. The simulation element: <u>the unique combination of simulation with role-playing</u>. <u>The</u> unique simulation/role-play <u>mix</u> <u>enables participants to create <strong>possible futures</strong> relevant to the topic being studied</u>. <u>This is diametrically opposed to the more traditional</u>, teacher-centric <u>approaches in which a future is produced for them</u>. <u>In policy simulations, possible futures are much more than an object of tabletop discussion</u> and verbal speculation. ‘<u><strong>No other technique</u></strong> <u>allows a group of participants to engage in collective action in a safe environment to create</u> and analyse <u>the futures they want to explore’ </u>(Geurts et al. 2007: 536). 2. <u><strong>The game element:</u></strong> the interactive and tailor-made modelling and design of the policy game. The actual run of the policy simulation is only one step, though a most important and visible one, in a collective process of investigation, communication, and evaluation of performance. In the context of a post-graduate course in public policy development, for example, <u>a policy simulation is a dedicated game constructed in collaboration with practitioners to achieve a high level of proficiency</u> in relevant aspects of the policy development process. To drill down to a level of finer detail, <u><strong>policy development simulation</u></strong>s—as forms of interactive or participatory modelling— <u>are particularly effective in developing participant knowledge </u>and skills in the five key areas of the policy development process (and success criteria), namely: Complexity, Communication, Creativity, Consensus, and Commitment to action (‘the five Cs’). The capacity to provide effective learning support in these five categories has proved to be particularly helpful in strategic decision-making (Geurts et al. 2007). Annexure 2.5 contains a detailed description, in table format, of the synopsis below.</p> | null | 2nc/1nr | More FW | 82,276 | 105 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,963 | Obama can sustain a veto of Iran sanctions now- but it’s close- PC’s key | Politico 12/29 | Politico 12/29/2014 (GOP to move on Iran sanctions legislation, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/gop-senate-iran-sanctions-bill-113852.html) | Republicans are setting up early challenges to Obama preparing to move forward quickly on Iran The Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next year taking a confrontational stance toward Iran appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority. You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the Kirk-Menendez legislation in 2014, though Obama convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off legislation could upset ongoing negotiations While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress aides declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. the largest challenge is building veto-proof support that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House. Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP Kirk expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate | Republicans are setting up early challenges o bama Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next yea taking a confrontational stance toward Iran appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority Kirk-Menendez Obama’s convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off legislation could upset ongoing negotiations. the largest challenge is building veto-proof support Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task, given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP | Congressional Republicans are setting up early challenges to President Barack Obama in January, preparing to move forward quickly on new Iran sanctions legislation following on the heels of a vote on a bill approving the Keystone XL Pipeline. The Republican-controlled Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next year, according to Republican senators and aides. The starting point would be a bill written a year ago by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that managed to accrue the support of 60 senators in both parties despite opposition from the White House. Kirk and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said over the weekend that an Iran vote could occur in January after a vote on Keystone, which is the first bill the Republican Senate will take up and is also opposed by President Barack Obama. Republican leaders have not yet finalized their legislative schedule, but the bipartisan Iran proposal is supported by incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and all of his leadership team. And taking a confrontational stance toward Iran as diplomatic negotiations continue with a group of Western nations appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority. “It’s an important issue, a priority, and has wide bipartisan support in the Senate,” said McConnell spokesman Don Stewart on Monday. The Republican House overwhelmingly passed a sanctions bill targeting Iran’s energy industry in 2013, though that legislation was never taken up by the Senate. The Kirk-Menendez legislation would tighten economic sanctions on Iran if the country walks away from ongoing negotiations over nuclear enrichment or reneges on an interim agreement that has frozen some of Iran’s nuclear activities in return for unwinding some sanctions. In November, Western and Iranians negotiators extended that interim deal until July as they attempt to hammer out a permanent deal that would curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and relax sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and isolated the country globally. A separate bill written by Graham and incoming Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) would require Congress to approve of any final deal and could figure into the GOP’s plans next year. “You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran. You will see a Congress making sure that sanctions are real and will be reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see a Congress wanting to have any say about a final deal,” Graham said at a weekend press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the Kirk-Menendez legislation in 2014, though President Barack Obama’s administration convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off public support after warning that voting on that legislation could upset ongoing negotiations. While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress, Democratic aides on Monday declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. Indeed, the largest challenge for both supporters of Iran sanctions and the Keystone pipeline is building veto-proof levels of support in Congress that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House. White House press secretary Josh Earnest said in November that new penalties during negotiations would be “counterproductive.” Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a steep task, given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP. But Kirk said on Sunday in an interview with Fox news that he expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate.” | 3,916 | <h4>Obama can sustain a veto of Iran sanctions now- but it’s close- PC’s key</h4><p><strong>Politico 12/29</strong>/2014 (GOP to move on Iran sanctions legislation, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/gop-senate-iran-sanctions-bill-113852.html)</p><p>Congressional <u><mark>Republicans are setting up early challenges</mark> t<mark>o</u></mark> President Barack <u>O<mark>bama</u></mark> in January, <u>preparing to move forward quickly on</u> new <u>Iran</u> sanctions legislation following on the heels of a vote on a bill approving the Keystone XL Pipeline. <u>The</u> Republican-controlled <u><mark>Senate is expected to vote on legislation that would impose additional economic penalties on Iran in the first few weeks of next yea</mark>r</u>, according to Republican senators and aides. The starting point would be a bill written a year ago by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) that managed to accrue the support of 60 senators in both parties despite opposition from the White House. Kirk and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said over the weekend that an Iran vote could occur in January after a vote on Keystone, which is the first bill the Republican Senate will take up and is also opposed by President Barack Obama. Republican leaders have not yet finalized their legislative schedule, but the bipartisan Iran proposal is supported by incoming Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) and all of his leadership team. And <u><mark>taking a confrontational stance toward Iran</u></mark> as diplomatic negotiations continue with a group of Western nations <u><mark>appears to be top of mind for the new Senate Republican majority</mark>. </u>“It’s an important issue, a priority, and has wide bipartisan support in the Senate,” said McConnell spokesman Don Stewart on Monday. The Republican House overwhelmingly passed a sanctions bill targeting Iran’s energy industry in 2013, though that legislation was never taken up by the Senate. The Kirk-Menendez legislation would tighten economic sanctions on Iran if the country walks away from ongoing negotiations over nuclear enrichment or reneges on an interim agreement that has frozen some of Iran’s nuclear activities in return for unwinding some sanctions. In November, Western and Iranians negotiators extended that interim deal until July as they attempt to hammer out a permanent deal that would curtail Iran’s nuclear ambitions and relax sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economy and isolated the country globally. A separate bill written by Graham and incoming Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) would require Congress to approve of any final deal and could figure into the GOP’s plans next year. “<u>You will see a very vigorous Congress when it comes to Iran</u>. You will see a Congress making sure that sanctions are real and will be reimposed at the drop of a hat. You will see a Congress wanting to have any say about a final deal,” Graham said at a weekend press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. <u>A dozen returning Senate Democrats officially signed on in support of the <mark>Kirk-Menendez</mark> legislation in 2014, though </u>President Barack <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong>’s</mark> administration <u><strong><mark>convinced other on-the-fence members to hold off</u></strong></mark> public support after warning that voting on that <u><strong><mark>legislation could upset ongoing negotiations</u></strong>.</mark> <u>While the Kirk-Menendez legislation could very well accrue 60 votes to clear the Senate in the new Congress</u>, Democratic <u>aides</u> on Monday <u>declined to estimate the level of enthusiasm for fresh sanctions in the new year. </u>Indeed, <u><strong><mark>the largest challenge</u></strong></mark> for both supporters of Iran sanctions and the Keystone pipeline <u><strong><mark>is building veto-proof</u></strong></mark> levels of <u><strong><mark>support</u></strong></mark> in Congress <u>that would require dozens of Democrats in the House and Senate to oppose the White House.</u> White House press secretary Josh Earnest said in November that new penalties during negotiations would be “counterproductive.” <u><mark>Garnering 67 votes in the Senate for the Kirk-Menendez bill could be a <strong>steep task</u></strong>,</mark> <u><mark>given the defeat of several moderate Democratic supporters, opposition from Obama and lack of unanimous support in the GOP</u></mark>. But <u>Kirk</u> said on Sunday in an interview with Fox news that he <u>expects “really bipartisan votes” and predicted having a “shot of even getting to a veto-proof majority in the Senate</u>.”</p> | 1nc | null | politics | 430,411 | 46 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,964 | Security politics causes global destruction. | Der Derian ’98 | Der Derian ’98 (James, Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”, On Security, CIAO) | No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated sovereign states to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature In its name, w m d have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact in its name millions killed while intellectual dissent muted We have inherited an ontotheology of security an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it within security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security in recognition of the world as it is I am not in search of an "alternative security." everything is dangerous in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers we might be able to construct a form of security based on appreciation rather than the extirpation of difference method is to destabilize the fictional identities created out of fear and to affirm differences the terror of death triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness | w m d have been developed which transfigured into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact millions killed while dissent muted everything is dangerous in interpretation of pressing dangers we might construct a form of security based on appreciation rather than extirpation of difference the terror of death triggers a futile cycle of identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. | No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... 7 In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " HYPERLINK "http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note8" 8 By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. | 5,118 | <h4>Security politics causes global destruction.</h4><p><strong>Der Derian ’98</strong> (James, Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”, On Security, CIAO)</p><p><u>No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor</u> commands the <u>disciplinary power of "security."</u> <u>In its name, peoples have alienated</u> their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, <u>sovereign states</u>, all <u>to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature</u>--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. <u>In its name,</u> <u><strong><mark>w</u></strong></mark>eapons of <u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>ass <u><strong><mark>d</u></strong></mark>estruction <u><mark>have been developed which</mark> have <mark>transfigured</mark> national interest <mark>into a security dilemma based on a <strong>suicide pact</u></strong></mark>. And, less often noted in international relations, <u>in its name</u> billions have been made and <u><strong><mark>millions killed</strong> while</u></mark> scientific knowledge has been furthered and <u>intellectual <mark>dissent muted</u></mark>. <u>We have inherited an ontotheology of security</u>, that is, <u>an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it</u>. Indeed, <u>within</u> the concept of <u>security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics</u>, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... 7 In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " HYPERLINK "http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note8" 8 By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. <u>What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security</u>, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but <u>in recognition of the world as it is</u>, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that <u>I am not in search of an "alternative security."</u> An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that <u><strong><mark>everything is dangerous</u></strong></mark>, then we always have something to do. The hope is that <u><mark>in</mark> the <mark>interpretation of</mark> the most <mark>pressing dangers</u></mark> of late modernity <u><mark>we might </mark>be able to <mark>construct a form of security based on</u></mark> the <u><mark>appreciation</u></mark> and articulation <u><mark>rather than</mark> the</u> normalization or <u><strong><mark>extirpation of difference</u></strong></mark>. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His <u>method is</u> not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but <u>to</u> <u>destabilize the</u> intolerable <u>fictional identities</u> of the past which have been <u>created out of fear</u>, <u>and to affirm</u> the creative <u>differences</u> which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, <u><mark>the terror of death</u></mark> which, once generalized and nationalized, <u><mark>triggers a <strong>futile</strong> <strong>cycle</strong> of</mark> collective <mark>identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees</u>. <u>It</u> <u>is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness</u>.</mark> </p> | 1NC | null | 3 – k | 4,065 | 134 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,965 | ( ) Dialogic democracy is the best way to dismantle racism—our vision of debate is the opposite of exclusion | Gooding-Williams ‘3 | Gooding-Williams ‘3 | ostering the capacity for democratic deliber- ation is a central aim of education successful deliberation requires that co-deliberators cultivate a mutual understanding of the differences in conviction that divide them eliberation encourages people with conflicting perspectives to understand each other's point of view, mutual understanding across cultural differences fostering and strengthening citizens' capacities for democratic deliberation multicultural education can cultivate citizens' abilities to "reverse perspectives." Acquiring a know-how and a feel for cross-cultural hermeneutical conversation is likely to reinforce a student's inclination to understand and learn from the self- interpretations of cultural "others" one cultivates a skill which is motivationally conducive to the sort of mutual understanding that is crit- ical to the flourishing of deliberative democracy in a multicultural society. deliberative debate is an appropriate medium for seeking and forging common grounds and ideals. through cross-cultural dialogue it is not predicated off an imperative to preserve an uncomplicated national or ethnic identity understanding invites increasing complexity by suggesting that educational insights may alter identities a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America justifies a form of multicultural education that is, specifically race-conscious
(Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)
unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern suffers from three fatal flaws It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. and it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
90
there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism. utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing . The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. Without or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
(Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19)
Imagine an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? ? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences? Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.
Jonas challenges two well-entrenched dogmas: that there is no metaphysical truth, and that there is no path from the "is" to the "ought". To escape from ethical nihilism, we must show that there is a metaphysical ground of ethics, an objective basis for value Jonas pursues "this underlying theme of all of life through the ascending order of organic powers metabolism, moving and desiring, sensing and perceiving, imagination, art, and mind 'Freedom' must denote an objectively discernible mode of being Jonas goes "so far as to maintain that metabolism is the first form freedom takes freedom, inwardness, and selfhood manifest themselves in human beings in a distinctive manner freedom, inwardness, and selfhood are objective modes of being, so values and ends are objective modes of being There is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human ac-tion so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for We need a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life" Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth | moral goodness undercuts political responsibility three fatal flaws fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure achievement 2) it fails to see real violence moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences t is the effects of action, rather than the motives that is most significant the pursuit of “good” it is not enough it is important to ask about the effects Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment
utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. we are likely to to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons
To escape from ethical nihilism, we must show that there is a metaphysical ground of ethics, an objective basis for value Jonas pursues "this underlying theme of all of life through metabolism, moving and desiring, sensing and perceiving, imagination, art, and mind 'Freedom' must denote an objectively discernible mode of being There is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life | [Robert. “Race, Multiculturalism, and Democracy." Constellations, Vol 5 No 1. 2003. Robert Gooding-Williams (Ph.D., Yale, 1982) is the Ralph and Mary Otis Isham Professor of Political Science and the College. He is also a Faculty Associate of the Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory and an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Race, Politics and Culture. His areas of interest include Du Bois, Critical Race Theory, the History of African-American Political Thought, 19th Century German Philosophy (especially Nietzsche), Existentialism, and Aesthetics (including literature and philosophy, representations of race in film, and the literary theory and criticism of African-American literature). Before coming to the University of Chicago he taught at Northwestern University (1998-2005), where he was Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Alice Berline Kaplan Center for the Humanities (2003-2005), Adjunct Professor of African American Studies, and an affiliate of the Program in Critical Theory. Before coming to Northwestern he taught at Amherst College (1988-98), where he was Professor of Black Studies and the George Lyman Crosby 1896 Professor of Philosophy, and at Simmons College (1983-88), where he taught philosophy and directed the program in Afro-American Studies.]
I begin with the assumption that fostering the capacity for democratic deliber- ation is a central aim of public education in a democratic society.531 also follow a number of contemporary political theorists in supposing that democratic deliber- ation is a form of public reasoning geared towards adducing considerations that all parties to a given deliberation can find compelling.54 On this view, successful deliberation requires that co-deliberators cultivate a mutual understanding of the differences in conviction that divide them, so that they can formulate reasons (say for implementing or not implementing a proposed policy) that will be generally acceptable despite those differences.55 In the words of one theorist, "[deliberation encourages people with conflicting perspectives to understand each other's point of view, to minimize their moral disagreements, and to search for common ground."56 Lorenzo Simpson usefully glosses the pursuit of mutual understanding when he writes that it requires "a 'reversibility of perspectives,' not in the sense of my collapsing into yon or you into me, but in the sense that I try to understand - but not necessarily agree with - what you take your life to be about and you do the same for me . . . [i]n such a . . . mutual understanding you may come to alter the way in which you understand yourself and I . . . may find that listening to you leads me to alter my self-understanding."57 According to Simpson, the search for common ground need not leave us with the convictions with which we began. On the contrary, the process of democratic deliberation can be a source of self-trans- formation that enriches one's view of the issues at hand and even alters one's conception of the demands of social justice.58 In multicultural America, multicultural public education is a good that promotes mutual understanding across cultural differences, thereby fostering and strengthening citizens' capacities for democratic deliberation. In essence, multi- cultural education is a form of pedagogy whereby students study the histories and cultures of differently cultured fellow citizens, many of whose identities have a composite, multicultural character. More exactly, it is a form of cross-cultural hermeneutical dialogue, and therefore a way of entering into conversation with those histories and cultures.59 By disseminating the cultural capital of cross- cultural knowledge, multicultural education can cultivate citizens' abilities to "reverse perspectives." By facilitating mutual understanding, it can help them to shape shared vocabularies for understanding their moral and cultural identities and for finding common ground in their deliberations.60 By strengthening a student's ability to reverse perspectives, multicultural education may bolster her disposition to engage the self-understandings of differ- ently cultured others, even if the particulars of her multicultural education have not involved an engagement with the cultures of precisely those others (consider, e.g., someone whose multicultural education has included courses in Asian- American literatures, but who knows nothing of American Latino subcultures). Acquiring a know-how and a feel for cross-cultural hermeneutical conversation is likely to reinforce a student's inclination to understand and learn from the self- interpretations of cultural "others" in just the way that the cultivation of an athletic skill (e.g., the ability to "head" a soccer ball) tends to reinforce one's inclination to participate in the sports for which having that skill is an advantage (e.g. playing soccer). In the case of multicultural education, one cultivates a skill which is motivationally conducive to the sort of mutual understanding that is crit- ical to the flourishing of deliberative democracy in a multicultural society.61 Let me summarize my argument so far. In contrast to Schlesinger. who yearns for a society 111 which the understanding of key political ideals remains immune from deliberative debate animated by cultural and other group differences, I have been suggesting that deliberative debate of this sort is an appropriate medium for seeking and forging common grounds and ideals. I have also been arguing (1) that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America entails a commitment to promoting the mutual understanding of differences through cross-cultural dialogue and (2) that such a commitment justifies the institution of multicultural education. The promotion of mutual understanding avoids Schlesinger's and Asante's kitsch, because it is not predicated off an imperative to preserve an uncomplicated national or ethnic identity in the face of cultural and social complexity. Indeed, the ideal of mutual understanding invites increasing complexity by suggesting that cross-cultural educational insights, since they can effect changes in the self-understandings of persons who have benefitted from a multicultural education, may alter and further complicate those persons' identities, perhaps making them more multicultural. In what follows, I further explore the implications of this ideal by proposing that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America justifies a form of multicultural education that is, specifically race-conscious.
Must weigh consequences – their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize
Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2
(Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)
As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.
1. Utilitarianism is inevitable it will indefinitely permeate human thought
Allison 90, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 1990 (Lincoln, “The Utilitarianism Response”)
And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism. As Raymond Frey puts it, utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing ... [and] has come to have a significant impact upon the moral thinking of many laymen. The simple core of the doctrine lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and that the best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes therefore, is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people. Without a serious God (one, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason, we are likely to turn towards Bentham and to judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being.
2. Utilitarianism is the only moral framework
Nye, 86 (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19)
The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34 Imagine that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point of the story is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless others? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences? Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.
There is an inherent value to life- death destroys it
Bernstein ‘2 (Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)
This is precisely what Jonas does in The Phenomenon of Life, his rethinking of the meaning of organic life. He tealizes that his philosophical project goes against many of the deeply embedded prejudices and dogmas of contemporary philosophy. He challenges two well-entrenched dogmas: that there is no metaphysical truth, and that there is no path from the "is" to the "ought". To escape from ethical nihilism, we must show that there is a metaphysical ground of ethics, an objective basis for valueand purpose in being itself. These are strong claims; and, needless to say, they are extremely controversial. In defense of Jonas, it should be said that he approaches this task with both boldness and intellectual modesty. He frequently acknowledges that he cannot "prove" his claims, but he certainly believes that his "premises" do "more justice to the total phenomenon of man and Being in general" than the prevailing dualist or reductionist alternatives. "But in the last analysis my argument can do no more than give a rational grounding to an option it presents as a choice for a thoughtful person — an option that of course has its own inner power of persuasion. Unfortunately I have nothing better to offer. Perhaps a future metaphysics will be able to do more." 8 To appreciate how Jonas's philosophical project unfolds, we need to examine his philosophical interpretation of life. This is the starting point of his grounding of a new imperative of responsibility. It also provides the context for his speculations concerning evil. In the foreword to The Phenomenon of Life, Jonas gives a succinct statement of his aim. Put at its briefest, this volume offers an "existential" interpretation of biological facts. Contemporary existentialism, obsessed with man alone, is in the habit of claiming as his unique privilege and predicament much of what is rooted in organic existence as such: in so doing, it withholds from the organic world the insights to be learned from the awareness of self. On its part, scientific biology, by its rules confined to the physical, outward facts, must ignore the dimension of inwardness that belongs to life: in so doing, it submerges the distinction of "animate" and "inanimate." A new reading of the biological record may recover the inner dimension — that which we know best -- for the understanding of things organic and so reclaim for psycho-physical unity of life that place in the theoretical scheme which it had lost through the divorce of the material and the mental since Descartes. p. ix) Jonas, in his existential interpretation of bios, pursues "this underlying theme of all of life in its development through the ascending order of organic powers and functions: metabolism, moving and desiring, sensing and perceiving, imagination, art, and mind — a progressive scale of freedom and peril, culminating in man, who may understand his uniqueness anew when he no longer sees himself in metaphysical isolation" (PL, p. ix). The way in which Jonas phrases this theme recalls the Aristotelian approach to bios, and it is clear that Aristotle is a major influence on Jonas. There is an even closer affinity with the philosophy of nature that Schelling sought to elaborate in the nineteenth century. Schelling (like many post- Kantian German thinkers) was troubled by the same fundamental dichotomy that underlies the problem for Jonas. The dichotomy that Kant introduced between the realm of "disenchanted" nature and the realm of freedom leads to untenable antinomies. Jonas differs from both Aristotle and Schelling in taking into account Darwin and contemporary scientific biology. A proper philosophical understanding of biology must always be compatible with the scientific facts. But at the same time, it must also root out misguided materialistic and reductionist interpretations of those biological facts. In this respect, Jonas's naturalism bears a strong affinity with the evolutionary naturalism of Peirce and Dewey. At the same time, Jonas is deeply skeptical of any theory of evolutionary biology that introduces mysterious "vital forces" or neglects the contingencies and perils of evolutionary development.' Jonas seeks to show "that it is in the dark stirrings of primeval organic substance that a principle of freedom shines forth for the first time within the vast necessity of the physical universe" (PL 3). Freedom, in this broad sense, is not identified exclusively with human freedom; it reaches down to the first glimmerings of organic life, and up to the type of freedom manifested by human beings. " 'Freedom' must denote an objectively discernible mode of being, i.e., a manner of executing existence, distinctive of the organic per se and thus shared by all members but by no nonmembers of the class: an ontologically descriptive term which can apply to mere physical evidence at first" (PL 3). This coming into being of freedom is not just a success story. "The privilege of freedom carries the burden of need and means precarious being" (PL 4). It is with biological metabolism that this principle of freedom first arises. Jonas goes "so far as to maintain that metabolism, the basic stratum of all organic existence, already displays freedom — indeed that it is the first form freedom takes." 1 ° With "metabolism — its power and its need — not-being made its appearance in the world as an alternative embodied in being itself; and thereby being itself first assumes an emphatic sense: intrinsically qualified by the threat of its negative it must affirm itself, and existence affirmed is existence as a concern" (PL 4). This broad, ontological understanding of freedom as a characteristic of all organic life serves Jonas as "an Ariadne's thread through the interpretation of Life" (PL 3). The way in which Jonas enlarges our understanding of freedom is indicative of his primary argumentative strategy. He expands and reinterprets categories that are normally applied exclusively to human beings so that we can see that they identify objectively discernible modes of being characteristic of everything animate. Even inwardness, and incipient forms of self; reach down to the simplest forms of organic life. 11 Now it may seem as if Jonas is guilty of anthropomorphism, of projecting what is distinctively human onto the entire domain of living beings. He is acutely aware of this sort of objection, but he argues that even the idea of anthropomorphism must be rethought. 12 We distort Jonas's philosophy of life if we think that he is projecting human characteristics onto the nonhuman animate world. Earlier I quoted the passage in which Jonas speaks of a "third way" — "one by which the dualistic rift can be avoided and yet enough of the dualistic insight saved to uphold the humanity of man" (GEN 234). We avoid the "dualistic rift" by showing that there is genuine continuity of organic life, and that such categories as freedom, inwardness, and selfhood apply to everything that is animate. These categories designate objective modes of being. But we preserve "enough dualistic insight" when we recognize that freedom, inwardness, and selfhood manifest themselves in human beings in a distinctive manner. I do not want to suggest that Jonas is successful in carrying out this ambitious program. He is aware of the tentativeness and fallibility of his claims, but he presents us with an understanding of animate beings such that we can discern both continuity and difference.' 3 It should now be clear that Jonas is not limiting himself to a regional philosophy of the organism or a new "existential" interpretation of biological facts. His goal is nothing less than to provide a new metaphysical understanding of being, a new ontology. And he is quite explicit about this. Our reflections [are] intended to show in what sense the problem of life, and with it that of the body, ought to stand in the center of ontology and, to some extent, also of epistemology. . . The central position of the problem of life means not only that it must be accorded a decisive voice in judging any given ontology but also that any treatment of itself must summon the whole of ontology. (PL 25) The philosophical divide between Levinas and Jonas appears to be enormous. For Levinas, as long as we restrict ourselves to the horizon of Being and to ontology (no matter how broadly these are conceived), there is no place for ethics, and no answer to ethical nihilism. For Jonas, by contrast, unless we can enlarge our understanding of ontology in such a manner as would provide an objective grounding for value and purpose within nature, there is no way to answer the challenge of ethical nihilism. But despite this initial appearance of extreme opposition, there is a way of interpreting Jonas and Levinas that lessens the gap between them. In Levinasian terminology, we can say that Jonas shows that there is a way of understanding ontology and the living body that does justice to the nonreducible alterity of the other (l'autrui). 14 Still, we might ask how Jonas's "existential" interpretation of biological facts and the new ontology he is proposing can provide a metaphysical grounding for a new ethics. Jonas criticizes the philosophical prejudice that there is no place in nature for values, purposes, and ends. Just as he maintains that freedom, inwardness, and selfhood are objective modes of being, so he argues that values and ends are objective modes of being. There is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life" (IR 81). 15 "The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics.Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human ac-tion so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth"; or again turned positive: "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will." (IR 11) | 25,425 | <h4>( ) Dialogic democracy is the best way to dismantle racism—our vision of debate is <strong>the opposite of exclusion</h4><p>Gooding-Williams ‘3</p><p></strong>[Robert. “Race, Multiculturalism, and Democracy." Constellations, Vol 5 No 1. 2003. Robert Gooding-Williams (Ph.D., Yale, 1982) is the Ralph and Mary Otis Isham Professor of Political Science and the College. He is also a Faculty Associate of the Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory and an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Race, Politics and Culture. His areas of interest include Du Bois, Critical Race Theory, the History of African-American Political Thought, 19th Century German Philosophy (especially Nietzsche), Existentialism, and Aesthetics (including literature and philosophy, representations of race in film, and the literary theory and criticism of African-American literature). Before coming to the University of Chicago he taught at Northwestern University (1998-2005), where he was Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Alice Berline Kaplan Center for the Humanities (2003-2005), Adjunct Professor of African American Studies, and an affiliate of the Program in Critical Theory. Before coming to Northwestern he taught at Amherst College (1988-98), where he was Professor of Black Studies and the George Lyman Crosby 1896 Professor of Philosophy, and at Simmons College (1983-88), where he taught philosophy and directed the program in Afro-American Studies.]</p><p> I begin with the assumption that f<u>ostering the capacity for democratic deliber- ation is a central aim of</u> public <u>education</u> in a democratic society.531 also follow a number of contemporary political theorists in supposing that democratic deliber- ation is a form of public reasoning geared towards adducing considerations that all parties to a given deliberation can find compelling.54 On this view, <u>successful deliberation requires that co-deliberators cultivate a mutual understanding of the differences in conviction that divide them</u>, so that they can formulate reasons (say for implementing or not implementing a proposed policy) that will be generally acceptable despite those differences.55 In the words of one theorist, "[d<u>eliberation encourages people with conflicting perspectives to understand each other's point of view,</u> to minimize their moral disagreements, and to search for common ground."56 Lorenzo Simpson usefully glosses the pursuit of mutual understanding when he writes that it requires "a 'reversibility of perspectives,' not in the sense of my collapsing into yon or you into me, but in the sense that I try to understand - but not necessarily agree with - what you take your life to be about and you do the same for me . . . [i]n such a . . . mutual understanding you may come to alter the way in which you understand yourself and I . . . may find that listening to you leads me to alter my self-understanding."57 According to Simpson, the search for common ground need not leave us with the convictions with which we began. On the contrary, the process of democratic deliberation can be a source of self-trans- formation that enriches one's view of the issues at hand and even alters one's conception of the demands of social justice.58 In multicultural America, multicultural public education is a good that promotes <u>mutual understanding across cultural differences</u>, thereby <u>fostering and strengthening citizens' capacities for democratic deliberation</u>. In essence, multi- cultural education is a form of pedagogy whereby students study the histories and cultures of differently cultured fellow citizens, many of whose identities have a composite, multicultural character. More exactly, it is a form of cross-cultural hermeneutical dialogue, and therefore a way of entering into conversation with those histories and cultures.59 By disseminating the cultural capital of cross- cultural knowledge, <u>multicultural education can cultivate citizens' abilities to "reverse perspectives."</u> By facilitating mutual understanding, it can help them to shape shared vocabularies for understanding their moral and cultural identities and for finding common ground in their deliberations.60 By strengthening a student's ability to reverse perspectives, multicultural education may bolster her disposition to engage the self-understandings of differ- ently cultured others, even if the particulars of her multicultural education have not involved an engagement with the cultures of precisely those others (consider, e.g., someone whose multicultural education has included courses in Asian- American literatures, but who knows nothing of American Latino subcultures). <u>Acquiring a know-how and a feel for cross-cultural hermeneutical conversation is likely to reinforce a student's inclination to understand and learn from the self- interpretations of cultural "others"</u> in just the way that the cultivation of an athletic skill (e.g., the ability to "head" a soccer ball) tends to reinforce one's inclination to participate in the sports for which having that skill is an advantage (e.g. playing soccer). In the case of multicultural education, <u>one cultivates a skill which is motivationally conducive to the sort of mutual understanding that is crit- ical to the flourishing of deliberative democracy in a multicultural society.</u>61 Let me summarize my argument so far. In contrast to Schlesinger. who yearns for a society 111 which the understanding of key political ideals remains immune from deliberative debate animated by cultural and other group differences, I have been suggesting that <u><strong>deliberative debate</u></strong> of this sort <u><strong>is an appropriate medium</strong> for seeking and forging common grounds and ideals. </u>I have also been arguing (1) that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America entails a commitment to promoting the mutual understanding of differences <u>through cross-cultural dialogue</u> and (2) that such a commitment justifies the institution of multicultural education. The promotion of mutual understanding avoids Schlesinger's and Asante's kitsch, because <u>it is <strong>not</strong> predicated off an imperative to preserve an uncomplicated national or ethnic identity </u>in the face of cultural and social complexity. Indeed, the ideal of mutual <u>understanding invites increasing complexity by suggesting that</u> cross-cultural <u>educational insights</u>, since they can effect changes in the self-understandings of persons who have benefitted from a multicultural education, <u>may alter</u> and further complicate those persons' <u>identities</u>, perhaps making them more multicultural. In what follows, I further explore the implications of this ideal by proposing that <u>a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America justifies a form of multicultural education that is, <strong>specifically race-conscious</u></strong>.</p><p>Must weigh consequences – their moral tunnel vision is complicit with the evil they criticize</p><p><strong>Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University 2</strong> </p><p><u>(Jeffrey C, Dissent Magazine, 49(2), “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, Proquest)</p><p></u>As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an <u>unyielding concern with <mark>moral goodness undercuts political responsibility</mark>. The concern </u>may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it <u>suffers from <mark>three fatal flaws</u></mark>: (1) <u>It <mark>fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure</mark> the <mark>achievement</mark> of what one intends. </u>Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if <u>such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters;</u> (<mark>2) <u>it fails to see </mark>that in a world of <mark>real violence</mark> and injustice, <mark>moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity</mark> in injustice.</u> This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; <u>and</u> (3) <u>it <mark>fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences</mark> as it is about intentions; i<mark>t is the effects of action, rather than the motives</mark> of action, <mark>that is most significant</mark>.</u> Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, <u>it is often <mark>the pursuit of “good”</mark> that generates evil</u>. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: <u><mark>it is not enough</mark> that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; <mark>it is </mark>equally <mark>important</mark>, always, <mark>to ask about the effects</mark> of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. <mark>Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment<strong></mark>. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.</p><p></u>1. Utilitarianism is inevitable it will indefinitely permeate human thought</p><p>Allison 90</strong>, Professor of Political Philosophy at University of Warwick, 19<u>90</u> (Lincoln, “The Utilitarianism Response”) </p><p>And yet if an idea can be compared to a castle, though we find a breached wall, damaged foundation and a weapons spiked where not actually destroyed, <u>there still remains a keep, some thing central and defensible, with in utilitarianism.</u> As Raymond Frey puts it, <u><mark>utilitarianism has never ceased to occupy a central place in moral theorizing</mark> .</u>.. [and] has come to have a significant impact upon the moral thinking of many laymen. The simple core of the doctrine lies in the ideas that actions should be judged by their consequences and that the best actions are those which make people, as-a whole, better off than do the alternatives. What utilitarianism always excludes therefore, is any idea-about the Tightness or wrongness of actions which is not explicable in terms of the consequences of those actions. <u><mark>The wide acceptance of utilitarianism in this broad sense may well be residual for many people.</u></mark> <u>Without</u> a serious God (one, this is, prepared to reveal Truth and instruction) <u>or a convincing deduction of ethical prescription from pure reason,</u> <u><mark>we are likely to</mark> </u>turn towards Bentham and <mark>to<u> judge actions on there consequences for people's well-being<strong>.</p><p></u></mark>2. Utilitarianism is the only moral framework </p><p>Nye, 86<u></strong> (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19)</p><p></u>The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34 <u>Imagine </u>that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where <u><mark>an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants</mark> lined up against a wall.</u> When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle <u><mark>and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other</mark>.</u> Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. <u><mark>Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity</mark> by refusing to play his dirty game? The point</u> of the story <u>is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But <mark>at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden?</u></mark> Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? <u><mark>What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons</mark> from a terrorists' nuclear device?</u> At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless others<u>? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences?</u> Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. <u>Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.</p><p></u><strong>There is an inherent value to life- death destroys it</p><p>Bernstein ‘2</strong> (Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)</p><p>This is precisely what <u>Jonas</u> does in The Phenomenon of Life, his rethinking of the meaning of organic life. He tealizes that his philosophical project goes against many of the deeply embedded prejudices and dogmas of contemporary philosophy. He <u>challenges two well-entrenched dogmas: that there is no metaphysical truth, and that there is no path from the "is" to the "ought". <mark>To escape from ethical nihilism, we must show that there is a metaphysical ground of ethics, an objective basis for value</u></mark>and purpose in being itself. These are strong claims; and, needless to say, they are extremely controversial. In defense of Jonas, it should be said that he approaches this task with both boldness and intellectual modesty. He frequently acknowledges that he cannot "prove" his claims, but he certainly believes that his "premises" do "more justice to the total phenomenon of man and Being in general" than the prevailing dualist or reductionist alternatives. "But in the last analysis my argument can do no more than give a rational grounding to an option it presents as a choice for a thoughtful person — an option that of course has its own inner power of persuasion. Unfortunately I have nothing better to offer. Perhaps a future metaphysics will be able to do more." 8 To appreciate how Jonas's philosophical project unfolds, we need to examine his philosophical interpretation of life. This is the starting point of his grounding of a new imperative of responsibility. It also provides the context for his speculations concerning evil. In the foreword to The Phenomenon of Life, Jonas gives a succinct statement of his aim. Put at its briefest, this volume offers an "existential" interpretation of biological facts. Contemporary existentialism, obsessed with man alone, is in the habit of claiming as his unique privilege and predicament much of what is rooted in organic existence as such: in so doing, it withholds from the organic world the insights to be learned from the awareness of self. On its part, scientific biology, by its rules confined to the physical, outward facts, must ignore the dimension of inwardness that belongs to life: in so doing, it submerges the distinction of "animate" and "inanimate." A new reading of the biological record may recover the inner dimension — that which we know best -- for the understanding of things organic and so reclaim for psycho-physical unity of life that place in the theoretical scheme which it had lost through the divorce of the material and the mental since Descartes. p. ix) <u><mark>Jonas</u></mark>, in his existential interpretation of bios, <u><mark>pursues "this underlying theme of all of life</u></mark> in its development <u><mark>through</mark> the ascending order of organic powers</u> and functions: <u><mark>metabolism, moving and desiring, sensing and perceiving, imagination, art, and mind</mark> </u>— a progressive scale of freedom and peril, culminating in man, who may understand his uniqueness anew when he no longer sees himself in metaphysical isolation" (PL, p. ix). The way in which Jonas phrases this theme recalls the Aristotelian approach to bios, and it is clear that Aristotle is a major influence on Jonas. There is an even closer affinity with the philosophy of nature that Schelling sought to elaborate in the nineteenth century. Schelling (like many post- Kantian German thinkers) was troubled by the same fundamental dichotomy that underlies the problem for Jonas. The dichotomy that Kant introduced between the realm of "disenchanted" nature and the realm of freedom leads to untenable antinomies. Jonas differs from both Aristotle and Schelling in taking into account Darwin and contemporary scientific biology. A proper philosophical understanding of biology must always be compatible with the scientific facts. But at the same time, it must also root out misguided materialistic and reductionist interpretations of those biological facts. In this respect, Jonas's naturalism bears a strong affinity with the evolutionary naturalism of Peirce and Dewey. At the same time, Jonas is deeply skeptical of any theory of evolutionary biology that introduces mysterious "vital forces" or neglects the contingencies and perils of evolutionary development.' Jonas seeks to show "that it is in the dark stirrings of primeval organic substance that a principle of freedom shines forth for the first time within the vast necessity of the physical universe" (PL 3). Freedom, in this broad sense, is not identified exclusively with human freedom; it reaches down to the first glimmerings of organic life, and up to the type of freedom manifested by human beings. " <u><mark>'Freedom' must denote an objectively discernible mode of being</u></mark>, i.e., a manner of executing existence, distinctive of the organic per se and thus shared by all members but by no nonmembers of the class: an ontologically descriptive term which can apply to mere physical evidence at first" (PL 3). This coming into being of freedom is not just a success story. "The privilege of freedom carries the burden of need and means precarious being" (PL 4). It is with biological metabolism that this principle of freedom first arises. <u>Jonas goes "so far as to maintain that metabolism</u>, the basic stratum of all organic existence, already displays freedom — indeed that it <u>is the first form freedom takes</u>." 1 ° With "metabolism — its power and its need — not-being made its appearance in the world as an alternative embodied in being itself; and thereby being itself first assumes an emphatic sense: intrinsically qualified by the threat of its negative it must affirm itself, and existence affirmed is existence as a concern" (PL 4). This broad, ontological understanding of freedom as a characteristic of all organic life serves Jonas as "an Ariadne's thread through the interpretation of Life" (PL 3). The way in which Jonas enlarges our understanding of freedom is indicative of his primary argumentative strategy. He expands and reinterprets categories that are normally applied exclusively to human beings so that we can see that they identify objectively discernible modes of being characteristic of everything animate. Even inwardness, and incipient forms of self; reach down to the simplest forms of organic life. 11 Now it may seem as if Jonas is guilty of anthropomorphism, of projecting what is distinctively human onto the entire domain of living beings. He is acutely aware of this sort of objection, but he argues that even the idea of anthropomorphism must be rethought. 12 We distort Jonas's philosophy of life if we think that he is projecting human characteristics onto the nonhuman animate world. Earlier I quoted the passage in which Jonas speaks of a "third way" — "one by which the dualistic rift can be avoided and yet enough of the dualistic insight saved to uphold the humanity of man" (GEN 234). We avoid the "dualistic rift" by showing that there is genuine continuity of organic life, and that such categories as freedom, inwardness, and selfhood apply to everything that is animate. These categories designate objective modes of being. But we preserve "enough dualistic insight" when we recognize that <u>freedom, inwardness, and selfhood manifest themselves in human beings in a distinctive manner</u>. I do not want to suggest that Jonas is successful in carrying out this ambitious program. He is aware of the tentativeness and fallibility of his claims, but he presents us with an understanding of animate beings such that we can discern both continuity and difference.' 3 It should now be clear that Jonas is not limiting himself to a regional philosophy of the organism or a new "existential" interpretation of biological facts. His goal is nothing less than to provide a new metaphysical understanding of being, a new ontology. And he is quite explicit about this. Our reflections [are] intended to show in what sense the problem of life, and with it that of the body, ought to stand in the center of ontology and, to some extent, also of epistemology. . . The central position of the problem of life means not only that it must be accorded a decisive voice in judging any given ontology but also that any treatment of itself must summon the whole of ontology. (PL 25) The philosophical divide between Levinas and Jonas appears to be enormous. For Levinas, as long as we restrict ourselves to the horizon of Being and to ontology (no matter how broadly these are conceived), there is no place for ethics, and no answer to ethical nihilism. For Jonas, by contrast, unless we can enlarge our understanding of ontology in such a manner as would provide an objective grounding for value and purpose within nature, there is no way to answer the challenge of ethical nihilism. But despite this initial appearance of extreme opposition, there is a way of interpreting Jonas and Levinas that lessens the gap between them. In Levinasian terminology, we can say that Jonas shows that there is a way of understanding ontology and the living body that does justice to the nonreducible alterity of the other (l'autrui). 14 Still, we might ask how Jonas's "existential" interpretation of biological facts and the new ontology he is proposing can provide a metaphysical grounding for a new ethics. Jonas criticizes the philosophical prejudice that there is no place in nature for values, purposes, and ends. Just as he maintains that <u>freedom, inwardness, and selfhood are objective modes of being,</u> <u>so</u> he argues that <u>values and ends are objective modes of being</u>. <u><strong><mark>There is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life</u></strong></mark>" (IR 81). 15 "<u><strong><mark>The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being</strong></mark>. . . . <mark>The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being</u></mark>" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — <u><strong>this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings</strong>. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man,</u> who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. <u><mark>He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power</u></mark>. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics.<u>Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human ac-tion so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid</u>. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. <u>Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the</u> even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained <u>use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for</u> life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." <u>We need</u>, Jonas argued, <u>a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "<mark>Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life</mark>";</u> or expressed negatively: "<u>Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"</u>; or simply: "<u><strong>Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth</u></strong>"; or again turned positive: "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will." (IR 11)</p> | null | 2nc/1nr | More FW | 105,466 | 37 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,966 | Organ sales would become a wedge issue – partisan. | Gregory, ’11 | Gregory, ’11 Anthony, “Why Legalizing Organ Sales Would Help to Save Lives, End Violence”, The Atlantic, 10-9-11, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/11/why-legalizing-organ-sales-would-help-to-save-lives-end-violence/248114/, RSR | The very idea of legalization sound gruesome to most Many protest an organ market will lead to unfair advantages for the rich Many will protest that an organ market will lead to exploitation and unfair advantages for the rich and powerful. In Japan, you can buy livers and kidneys harvested from executed Chinese prisoners Witnessing the horror stories, many are calling on governments to crack down even more severely. The most fundamental case for legalizing organ sales -- an appeal to civil liberty -- has proven highly controversial. Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice," and conservatives claim to favor free markets, this has become a matter of life and death. | legalization sound gruesome to most Many protes an organ market will lead to unfair advantages In Japan you can buy livers from executed prisoners itnessing the horror stories, many are calling on governments to crack down The case for legalizing organ sales has proven highly controversial. this has become a matter of life and death. | The very idea of legalization might sound gruesome to most people, but it shouldn't, especially since research shows it would save lives. In the United States, where the 1984 National Organ Transplantation Act prohibits compensation for organ donating, there are only about 20,000 kidneys every year for the approximately 80,000 patients on the waiting list. In 2008, nearly 5,000 died waiting. Many protest that an organ market will lead to unfair advantages for the rich, but this is a characteristic of the current trade. A global perspective shows how big the problem is. "Millions of people suffer from kidney disease, but in 2007 there were just 64,606 kidney-transplant operations in the entire world," according to George Mason University professor and Independent Institute research director Alexander Tabarrok, writing in the Wall Street Journal. Almost every other country has prohibitions like America's. In Iran, however, selling one's kidney for profit is legal. There are no patients anguishing on the waiting list. The Iranians have solved their kidney shortage by legalizing sales. Many will protest that an organ market will lead to exploitation and unfair advantages for the rich and powerful. But these are the characteristics of the current illicit organ trade. Moreover, as with drug prohibition today and alcohol prohibition in the 1920s, pushing a market underground is the way to make it rife with violence and criminality. In Japan, for the right price, you can buy livers and kidneys harvested from executed Chinese prisoners. Three years ago in India, police broke up an organ ring that had taken as many as 500 kidneys from poor laborers. The World Health Organization estimates that the black market accounts for 20 percent of kidney transplants worldwide. Everywhere from Latin America to the former Soviet Republics, from the Philippines to South Africa, a huge network has emerged typified by threats, coercion, intimidation, extortion, and shoddy surgeries. Although not every black market transaction is exploitative -- demonstrating that organ sales, in and of themselves, are not the problem -- the most unsavory parts of the trade can be attributed to the fact that it is illegal. Witnessing the horror stories, many are calling on governments to crack down even more severely. Unfortunately, prohibition drives up black-market profits, turns the market over to organized crime, and isolates those harmed in the trade from the normal routes of recourse. Several years ago, transplant surgeon Nadley Hakim at St. Mary's Hospital in London pointed out that "this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer." Bringing the market into the open is the best way to ensure the trade's appropriate activity. Since the stakes would be very high, market forces and social pressure would ensure that people are not intimidated or defrauded. In the United States, attitudes are not so casual as to allow gross degeneracy. Enabling a process by which consenting people engage in open transactions would mitigate the exploitation of innocent citizens and underhanded dealing by those seeking to skirt the law. The most fundamental case for legalizing organ sales -- an appeal to civil liberty -- has proven highly controversial. Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice," and conservatives claim to favor free markets, but true self-ownership would include the right to sell one's body parts, and genuine free enterprise would imply a market in human organs. In any event, studies show that this has become a matter of life and death. | 3,714 | <h4>Organ sales would become a wedge issue – partisan.</h4><p><strong>Gregory, ’11<u></strong> Anthony, “Why Legalizing Organ Sales Would Help to Save Lives, End Violence”, The Atlantic, 10-9-11, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/11/why-legalizing-organ-sales-would-help-to-save-lives-end-violence/248114/, RSR</p><p>The very idea of <mark>legalization</mark> </u>might<u> <mark>sound gruesome to most</mark> </u>people, but it shouldn't, especially since research shows it would save lives. In the United States, where the 1984 National Organ Transplantation Act prohibits compensation for organ donating, there are only about 20,000 kidneys every year for the approximately 80,000 patients on the waiting list. In 2008, nearly 5,000 died waiting. <u><mark>Many</mark> <mark>protes</mark>t</u> that <u><mark>an organ market will lead to unfair advantages</mark> for the rich</u>, but this is a characteristic of the current trade. A global perspective shows how big the problem is. "Millions of people suffer from kidney disease, but in 2007 there were just 64,606 kidney-transplant operations in the entire world," according to George Mason University professor and Independent Institute research director Alexander Tabarrok, writing in the Wall Street Journal. Almost every other country has prohibitions like America's. In Iran, however, selling one's kidney for profit is legal. There are no patients anguishing on the waiting list. The Iranians have solved their kidney shortage by legalizing sales. <u>Many will protest that an organ market will lead to exploitation and unfair advantages for the rich and powerful.</u> But these are the characteristics of the current illicit organ trade. Moreover, as with drug prohibition today and alcohol prohibition in the 1920s, pushing a market underground is the way to make it rife with violence and criminality. <u><mark>In</mark> <mark>Japan</mark>,</u> for the right price, <u><mark>you can buy livers</mark> and kidneys harvested <mark>from executed</mark> Chinese <mark>prisoners</u></mark>. Three years ago in India, police broke up an organ ring that had taken as many as 500 kidneys from poor laborers. The World Health Organization estimates that the black market accounts for 20 percent of kidney transplants worldwide. Everywhere from Latin America to the former Soviet Republics, from the Philippines to South Africa, a huge network has emerged typified by threats, coercion, intimidation, extortion, and shoddy surgeries. Although not every black market transaction is exploitative -- demonstrating that organ sales, in and of themselves, are not the problem -- the most unsavory parts of the trade can be attributed to the fact that it is illegal. <u>W<mark>itnessing the horror stories,</u> <u>many are calling on governments to crack down</mark> even more severely.</u> Unfortunately, prohibition drives up black-market profits, turns the market over to organized crime, and isolates those harmed in the trade from the normal routes of recourse. Several years ago, transplant surgeon Nadley Hakim at St. Mary's Hospital in London pointed out that "this trade is going on anyway, why not have a controlled trade where if someone wants to donate a kidney for a particular price, that would be acceptable? If it is done safely, the donor will not suffer." Bringing the market into the open is the best way to ensure the trade's appropriate activity. Since the stakes would be very high, market forces and social pressure would ensure that people are not intimidated or defrauded. In the United States, attitudes are not so casual as to allow gross degeneracy. Enabling a process by which consenting people engage in open transactions would mitigate the exploitation of innocent citizens and underhanded dealing by those seeking to skirt the law. <u><mark>The</mark> most fundamental <mark>case for legalizing organ sales</mark> -- an appeal to civil liberty -- <mark>has proven <strong>highly controversial</strong>.</u></mark> <u>Liberals like to say, "my body, my choice," and conservatives claim to favor free markets,</u> but true self-ownership would include the right to sell one's body parts, and genuine free enterprise would imply a market in human organs. In any event, studies show that <u><mark>this has become a matter of life and death.</p></u></mark> | 1nc | null | politics | 109,344 | 24 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,967 | Alternative – Reject The Affirmative’s Security Logic – This Allows for Actual Political Thought – Accepting Their Descriptions and Responses Colonizes the Debate. | Neocleous ’08 | Neocleous ’08, Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6] | The only way to escape the fetish, is to eschew the logic of security altogether to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought should be pressed to give it up. That ould never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises debates that animate political life The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told what might count as having achieved it Security politics is an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human being We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? maybe there is no hole." The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently reaffirm the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security The real task is to fight for an alternative political language which does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' ) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives To situate ourselves against security would allow us to forge another kind of politics What this might mean, must be open to debate. But it requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion ; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty and learning to tolerate the uncertainties | The only way is to eschew the logic of security That could never even be imagined by the security intellectual security has become so all-encompassing that it marginalises debates that animate political life Security turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', an anti-politics," The mistake has been to think that there is a hole needs to be filled with a revision of security All of these reaffirm the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is to fight for an alternative political language the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths would allow us to forge another kind of politics What this might mean must be open But it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and giving up the search for the certainty and learning to tolerate the uncertainties | The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iterationn of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."' | 5,274 | <h4>Alternative – Reject The Affirmative’s Security Logic – This Allows for Actual Political Thought – Accepting Their Descriptions and Responses Colonizes the Debate.</h4><p><strong>Neocleous ’08</strong>, Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security<u>, 185-6]</p><p><mark>The only way</u></mark> out of such a dilemma, <u>to escape the fetish, <mark>is</u></mark> perhaps <u><mark>to eschew the logic of security</mark> altogether</u> - <u>to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought</u> other than the authoritarian and reactionary <u>should be pressed to give it up. <mark>That</u></mark> is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus <mark>c<u>ould <strong>never even </mark>begin to <mark>be imagined by the security intellectual</u></strong></mark>. It is also something that the constant iterationn of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security.<u> This impasse exists because <mark>security has</mark> now <mark>become so all-encompassing that it marginalises</u></mark> all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, <u><mark>debates</u></mark> and discussions <u><mark>that animate political life</u></mark>. <u>The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end</u> - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - <u>that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. <mark>Security</u></mark> politics simply removes this; worse, <u>it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and <mark>turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security',</mark> despite the fact that we are never quite told</u> - never could be told - <u>what might count as having achieved it</u>. <u>Security politics is</u>, in this sense, <u><mark>an anti-politics,"</mark>' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human being</u>s, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. <u>We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add</u> yet <u>more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state</u> and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: <u>if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind?</u> But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: <u>maybe there is no hole."</u>' <u><mark>The mistake has been to think that there is a hole </mark>and that this hole <mark>needs to be filled with a </mark>new vision or <mark>revision of security</u></mark> in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. <u><mark>All of these</mark> ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently</u> end up <u><mark>reaffirm</u></mark>ing <u><mark>the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security</u>. <u>The real task is</u></mark> not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but <u><strong><mark>to fight for an alternative political language</strong></mark> which </u>takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore <u>does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state</u>. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that<u> <mark>the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths</u></mark>. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then <u>to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security'</u> (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty<u>) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives</u> to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. <u>To situate ourselves against security</u> politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It <u><mark>would</u></mark> also <u><mark>allow us to forge another kind of politics</u></mark> centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. <u><mark>What this might mean</mark>, </u>precisely, <u><mark>must be open</mark> to debate. <mark>But it</mark> </u>certainly <u>requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion</u>; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity<u>; it <mark>requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and</mark> thus <mark>giving up the search for the certainty</u></mark> of security <u><mark>and</u></mark> instead <u><mark>learning to tolerate the uncertainties</u></mark>, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'</p> | 1NC | null | 3 – k | 2,525 | 266 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,968 | Consequentialism key to progressivism – their moralism guarantees alienating potential allies and makes progressive reform impossible | null | A – identifications don’t change people they just show that there is a counter-movement | professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” Dissent, Spring)
what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of “anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states identifications with starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live It is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society in which it operates Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next It is because of a debilitating moralism because it is easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently peace” demonstrations a sign of their organizers’ lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy on the evils of the American government Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was The predictable consequences did not matter What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of “solidarity” and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism | Americans do not believe anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives identifications allow activists to express a genuine solidarity But these symbolic avowals are not effective It is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions because of a debilitating moralism it i easier to oppose a remote evil it exhibits little interest in why Americans think differently they focused their energy on the evils of the American government they alienated anyone What mattered was the expression of righteous indignation The discourse of the left is a universalist discourse it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms This is linked to pacifism | B – moralism is satisfied with saying that is wrong but doesn’t do anything about it
C – focus on moralism means the focus goes on what the government did wrong and anyone who did that is alienated
Isaac, 02 - professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” Dissent, Spring)
But what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of “anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states—including most workers and the poor—value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jürgen Habermas has called “constitutional patriotism”: a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an alltoo- familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. It is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society in which it operates (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that “the United States Government is the world’s greatest terror organization,” and suggest that “homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government” engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any “disloyalty.” Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating moralism; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently. The “peace” demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks—in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role—were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers’ lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn’t really happened. Whatever one thinks about America’s deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global politics. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of “solidarity” with certain oppressed groups—Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans—and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism. | 4,652 | <h4>Consequentialism key to <u>progressivism</u> – their moralism guarantees alienating potential allies and makes progressive reform impossible</h4><p>A – identifications don’t change people they just show that there is a counter-movement</p><p>B – moralism is satisfied with saying that is wrong but doesn’t do anything about it</p><p>C – focus on moralism means the focus goes on what the government did wrong and anyone who did that is alienated</p><p><strong>Isaac, 02</strong> - <u>professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University (Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and politics,” Dissent, Spring)</p><p></u>But <u><strong>what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of <mark>Americans</mark>, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who <mark>do not believe</mark> that the discourse of “<mark>anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives</mark>. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states</u></strong>—including most workers and the poor—value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jürgen Habermas has called “constitutional patriotism”: a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious <u><strong><mark>identifications</mark> with</u></strong> Subcommandante Marcos or <u><strong>starving Iraqi children <mark>allow</mark> left <mark>activists to express a genuine solidarity</u></strong></mark> with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. <u><strong><mark>But these symbolic avowals are not</mark> an <mark>effective</mark> way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live</u></strong>. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an alltoo- familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. <u><strong><mark>It is a sign of this left’s alienation from the society</mark> in which it operates</u></strong> (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that “the United States Government is the world’s greatest terror organization,” and suggest that “homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government” engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). <u><strong>Many left <mark>activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions</mark> of) Iraqi</u></strong> or Afghan <u><strong>civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next</u></strong>. This is not because of any “disloyalty.” Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. <u><strong>It is <mark>because of a debilitating moralism</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong>because <mark>it i</mark>s</u></strong> easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, <u><strong><mark>easier to</mark> locate and to <mark>oppose a remote evil</mark> than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But <mark>it exhibits little interest in</mark> how and <mark>why</mark> so many <mark>Americans think differently</u></strong></mark>. The “<u><strong>peace” demonstrations</u></strong> organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks—in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role—were, whatever else they were, <u><strong>a sign of their organizers’ lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, <mark>they focused their energy</u></strong></mark> not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather <u><strong><mark>on the evils of the American government</u></strong></mark> and its widely supported response to the terror. <u><strong>Hardly anyone was paying attention, but <mark>they alienated anyone</mark> who was</u></strong>. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. <u><strong>The predictable consequences did not matter</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>What mattered was</mark> simply <mark>the expression of righteous indignation</u></strong></mark> about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn’t really happened. Whatever one thinks about America’s deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global politics. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But <u><strong>politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of “solidarity”</u></strong> with certain oppressed groups—Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans—<u><strong>and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. <mark>The</mark> economic <mark>discourse of the</mark> campus <mark>left is a universalist discourse</mark> of human needs and workers rights; but <mark>it is accompanied by a refusal to think in political terms</mark> about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. <mark>This</mark> refusal <mark>is linked to</mark> a peculiar strain of <mark>pacifism</mark>, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism</u></strong>.<u> </p></u> | null | 2nc/1nr | More FW | 301,621 | 8 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,969 | Court action gets tied to the president | Harrison 2005 | Harrison 2005 (Lindsay, Jenner and Block Litigation associate, “Does the Court Act as "Political Cover" for the Other Branches?” 11-18 legaldebate.blogspot.com) | While the Supreme Court may have historically been able to act as political cover for the President and/or Congress, that is not true in a world post-Bush v. Gore. The Court is seen today as a politicized body, and especially now that we are in the era of the Roberts Court, with a Chief Justice hand picked by the President and approved by the Congress, it is highly unlikely that Court action will not, at least to some extent, be blamed on and/or credited to the President and Congress it is preposterous to argue that the Court is entirely insulated from politics, and equally preposterous to argue that Bush and the Congress would not receive at least a large portion of the blame for a Court ruling that, for whatever reason, received the attention of the public. | the Court may have been able to act as cover that is not true in a world post-Bush v. Gore. The Court is politicized and now that we are in the era of the Roberts Court, it is highly unlikely that Court action will not be blamed or credited the President and Congress | While the Supreme Court may have historically been able to act as political cover for the President and/or Congress, that is not true in a world post-Bush v. Gore. The Court is seen today as a politicized body, and especially now that we are in the era of the Roberts Court, with a Chief Justice hand picked by the President and approved by the Congress, it is highly unlikely that Court action will not, at least to some extent, be blamed on and/or credited to the President and Congress. The Court can still get away with a lot more than the elected branches since people don't understand the technicalities of legal doctrine like they understand the actions of the elected branches; this is, in part, because the media does such a poor job of covering legal news. Nevertheless, it is preposterous to argue that the Court is entirely insulated from politics, and equally preposterous to argue that Bush and the Congress would not receive at least a large portion of the blame for a Court ruling that, for whatever reason, received the attention of the public. | 1,061 | <h4>Court action gets tied to the president</h4><p><strong>Harrison 2005 <u></strong>(Lindsay, Jenner and Block Litigation associate, “Does the Court Act as "Political Cover" for the Other Branches?” 11-18 legaldebate.blogspot.com)</p><p>While <mark>the</mark> Supreme <mark>Court</mark> <mark>may have</mark> historically <mark>been able to act as</mark> political <mark>cover</mark> for the President and/or Congress, <mark>that is not true in a world post-Bush v. Gore.</mark> <mark>The</mark> <mark>Court</mark> <mark>is</mark> seen today as a <mark>politicized</mark> body, <mark>and </mark>especially <mark>now that we are in the era of the Roberts Court,</mark> with a Chief Justice hand picked by the President and approved by the Congress, <mark>it is highly unlikely that Court action will not</mark>, at least to some extent, <mark>be</mark> <mark>blamed</mark> on and/<mark>or credited</mark> to <mark>the President and Congress</u></mark>. The Court can still get away with a lot more than the elected branches since people don't understand the technicalities of legal doctrine like they understand the actions of the elected branches; this is, in part, because the media does such a poor job of covering legal news. Nevertheless, <u>it is preposterous to argue that the Court is entirely insulated from politics, and equally preposterous to argue that Bush and the Congress would not receive at least a large portion of the blame for a Court ruling that, for whatever reason, received the attention of the public. </p></u> | 1nc | null | politics | 36,501 | 70 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,970 | Banks growing now---postdates their evidence | Palmer 14 | Kimberly Palmer 14, senior editor for U.S. News Money, 2/5/14, “Why Finance Jobs Are Growing Fast,” http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/alpha-consumer/2014/02/05/why-finance-jobs-are-growing-fast | Demand for money-related jobs is picking up quickly 35 percent of employers in the financial services sector will be adding positions in 2014 the financial services sector is enjoying a growth rate above that of other occupations
growth is a direct result of the stock market improvement and monthly job creation
Financial professionals help companies stay on top of their own finances, which is a top priority in the wake of the recession | Demand for money-related jobs is picking up 35 percent of employers in financial services will be adding positions in 2014 the sector is enjoying a growth rate above other occupations
a result of stock market improvement and job creation
Financial professionals help companies stay on top of their finances a top priority in the wake of recession | Demand for money-related jobs is picking up quickly, according to a new survey from CareerBuilder and the related moneyjobs.com, which reports that 35 percent of employers in the financial services sector will be adding positions in 2014. In fact, Kevin Knapp, chief financial officer for Career Builder, says the financial services sector is enjoying a growth rate above that of other occupations.
That’s good news for job seekers, especially given that CareerBuilder also found that one in five people working in the financial services field plan to switch jobs this year. The growth, Knapp says, is a direct result of the stock market improvement and monthly job creation, which has improved since the height of the Great Recession.
Knapp says another factor is at play, too. Financial professionals help companies stay on top of their own finances, which is a top priority in the wake of the recession. “We sense that both American households and businesses are more conscientious than ever about their bottom lines, and are consequently looking to skilled professionals to achieve their respective financial goals. The list of the fastest-growing occupations in this sector, including personal financial advisors and financial analysts, reflects that demand,” he says. | 1,273 | <h4><strong>Banks growing now---postdates their evidence</h4><p></strong>Kimberly <strong>Palmer 14</strong>, senior editor for U.S. News Money, 2/5/14, “Why Finance Jobs Are Growing Fast,” http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/alpha-consumer/2014/02/05/why-finance-jobs-are-growing-fast</p><p><u><strong><mark>Demand for money-related jobs is</u></strong> <u><strong>picking up </mark>quickly</u></strong>, according to a new survey from CareerBuilder and the related moneyjobs.com, which reports that <u><strong><mark>35 percent of employers in</mark> the <mark>financial services</mark> sector <mark>will be adding positions in 2014</u></strong></mark>. In fact, Kevin Knapp, chief financial officer for Career Builder, says <u><strong><mark>the</mark> financial services <mark>sector is</u></strong> <u><strong>enjoying a growth rate above</mark> that of <mark>other occupations</u></strong></mark>. </p><p>That’s good news for job seekers, especially given that CareerBuilder also found that one in five people working in the financial services field plan to switch jobs this year. The <u><strong>growth</u></strong>, Knapp says, <u><strong>is <mark>a</mark> direct <mark>result of</mark> the <mark>stock market improvement and</mark> monthly <mark>job creation</u></strong></mark>, which has improved since the height of the Great Recession. </p><p>Knapp says another factor is at play, too. <u><strong><mark>Financial professionals help companies stay on top of their</mark> own <mark>finances</mark>, which is <mark>a top priority in the wake of </mark>the <mark>recession</u></strong></mark>. “We sense that both American households and businesses are more conscientious than ever about their bottom lines, and are consequently looking to skilled professionals to achieve their respective financial goals. The list of the fastest-growing occupations in this sector, including personal financial advisors and financial analysts, reflects that demand,” he says.</p> | 1NC | null | adv 1 | 430,520 | 2 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,971 | “Responsibility to the other” depoliticizes action – means horrible atrocities are justified in the name of the other and that the perpetual victimhood of the other must be maintained | null | A – bombing on moral and ethical justification depoliticizes it | the bombing of Yugoslavia did not come into being in some irresponsible way It happened about of respect for rights, for rights that stand above those which are protected by the sovereignty of states In other words: NATO can violate international law because it is acting as the immediate instrument of God's "higher law." If that's not religious fundamentalism, the concept has no meaning The problem is also not that the targets of the bombing weren't chosen on entirely moral grounds. The real problem is that a purely humanitarian, purely ethical justification for NATO's intervention completely depoliticizes it. NATO has shied away from a clearly defined political solution. Its intervention has been cloaked and justified exclusively in the depoliticized language of universal human rights. In this context, men and women are no longer political subjects, but helpless victims, robbed of all political identity and reduced to their naked suffering. In my opinion, this idealist subject-victim is an ideological construct of NATO the ideology of victimization is the real problem: it's perfectly fine to help the helpless Albanians against the Serbian monsters, but under no circumstances must they be permitted to throw off this helplessness, to get a hold on themselves as a sovereign and independent political subject The strategy of NATO is thus perverse in the precise Freudian sense of the word: The other will stay protected so long as it remains the victim
If evacuation were to result in a prolonged relocation, divisive social conflicts, would be likely in Great Britain during World War II, relationships between evacuees and their hosts degenerated quickly under the influence of prolonged stress Japan and Germany experienced these type of conflicts decisions about who will be evacuated and when could become politically explosive -- fraught with fears of one group or another becoming the expendable victims
[Michelle, research staff at the Conflict Research Consortium, July, The Beyond Intractability Project: Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess” http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/dehumanization/]
Dehumanization is process whereby opponents view each other as less than human and thus not deserving of moral consideration Protracted conflict strains relationships and makes it difficult for parties to recognize that they are part of a shared human community conditions often lead to feelings of intense hatred and alienation among conflicting parties. for individuals viewed as outside the scope of morality and justice Any harm that befalls such individuals seems warranted, and perhaps even morally justified Psychologically, it is necessary to categorize one's enemy as sub-human in order to legitimize increased violence or justify the violation of basic human rights Moral exclusion reduces restraints against harming or exploiting certain groups of peopl dehumanization makes the violation of generally accepted norms of behavior regarding one's fellow man seem reasonable, or even necessary | bombing happened about respect for rights targets of the bombing weren't chosen on moral grounds a purely ethical justification for intervention depoliticizes it. intervention has been justified in the depoliticized language of universal rights men and women are helpless victims, robbed of all identity the ideology of victimization is the real problem The other will stay protected so long as it remains the victim
Dehumanization is process whereby opponents view each other as less than human and thus not deserving of moral consideration Protracted conflict strains relationships and makes it difficult for parties to recognize that they are part of a shared human community conditions often lead to feelings of intense hatred and alienation among conflicting parties Any harm that befalls such individuals seems warranted, and perhaps even morally justified | B – this mean the people that you are helping are not longer political subjects but helpless victims which kills their identity
C – this means their help is predicated on the fact that the other is the victim
Zizek, 99 - (Slavoj, “NATO, the left hand of God?” June 29, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/zizek/zizek-nato-the-left-hand-of-god.html)
Not long ago, Vaclev Havel maintained (in an essay titled "Kosovo and the End of the Nation State") that the bombing of Yugoslavia, for which there was no UN mandate, "placed human rights above the rights of states. . . . But this did not come into being in some irresponsible way, as an act or aggression or in contempt of international law. On the contrary. It happened about of respect for rights, for rights that stand above those which are protected by the sovereignty of states. The Alliance acted out of respect for human rights, in a way commanded not only by conscience but by the relevant documents of international law." This "higher law" has its "deepest roots outside the perceptible world." "While the state is the work of man, man is the work of God." In other words: NATO can violate international law because it is acting as the immediate instrument of God's "higher law." If that's not religious fundamentalism, the concept has no meaning. Havel's statement is a great example of what Ulrich Beck back in April called "military humanism" or "military pacifism" (in a feuilleton in the _Sueddeutscher Zeitung_). The problem is not so much one of Orwellian oxymora like the famous "War is Peace." (In my opinion the term "pacificism" was never meant seriously. When people buck up and are honest with themselves, the paradox of military pacificism disappears.) [Translators note: "pacifism" has a broader meaning in German than it does in English -- it includes roughly everything we would think of as "anti-war sentiment" or "anti-war movement." So a free translation of "military pacificism" would be roughly "war by people that have always said they were against it." But Beck's phrase is kind of famous, so let's leave it.] The problem is also not that the targets of the bombing weren't chosen on entirely moral grounds. The real problem is that a purely humanitarian, purely ethical justification for NATO's intervention completely depoliticizes it. NATO has shied away from a clearly defined political solution. Its intervention has been cloaked and justified exclusively in the depoliticized language of universal human rights. In this context, men and women are no longer political subjects, but helpless victims, robbed of all political identity and reduced to their naked suffering. In my opinion, this idealist subject-victim is an ideological construct of NATO. Not only NATO, But Also Nostalgics on the Left, Misunderstand the Causes of the War Today we can see that the paradox of the bombing of Yugoslavia is not the one that Western pacifists have been complaining about -- that NATO set off the very ethnic cleansing that it was supposed to be preventing. No, the ideology of victimization is the real problem: it's perfectly fine to help the helpless Albanians against the Serbian monsters, but under no circumstances must they be permitted to throw off this helplessness, to get a hold on themselves as a sovereign and independent political subject - -- a subject that doesn't need the kindly shelter of NATO's "protectorate." No, they have to stay victims. The strategy of NATO is thus perverse in the precise Freudian sense of the word: The other will stay protected so long as it remains the victim.
Nuclear war exacerbates racism – evacuations force choices on which groups to save
Katz and Osdoby 82 [Arthur M. Katz and Sima R. Osdoby, author of Life After Nuclear War and graduate student at Johns Hopkins respectively, Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa009.html]
If evacuation were to result in a prolonged relocation, divisive social conflicts, as well as economic and social dislocation, would be likely. Under much more favorable conditions in Great Britain during World War II, relationships between evacuees and their hosts degenerated quickly under the influence of prolonged stress, uncertainty, substantial class and urban-rural differences, and inadequate social service resources. This experience was not unique. Japan and Germany in World War II, and even the Netherlands in peacetime, experienced these type of conflicts. Under a limited war scenario in the United States, to absorb the evacuated population the number of people living in a single house or apartment in the host areas would have to increase six times (from three people to eighteen). It is not hard to imagine the conflict and stress that type for crowding would create.[7] Thus these problems are likely to be much more intractable under the "limited" war scenarios because of insufficient social services and the massive numbers of people involved. In threatened but unaffected metropolitan areas, decisions about who will be evacuated and when could become politically explosive -- fraught with fears of one group or another becoming the expendable victims. This is not to mention the problem of deciding when and how to evacuate special populations -- prisoners, patients in acute and chronic care facilities, etc.
Turns case-War causes dehumanization and legitimizes social exclusion
Maiese, 03 [Michelle, research staff at the Conflict Research Consortium, July, The Beyond Intractability Project: Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess” http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/dehumanization/]
Dehumanization is a psychological process whereby opponents view each other as less than human and thus not deserving of moral consideration. Jews in the eyes of Nazis and Tutsis in the eyes of Hutus (in the Rwandan genocide) are but two examples. Protracted conflict strains relationships and makes it difficult for parties to recognize that they are part of a shared human community. Such conditions often lead to feelings of intense hatred and alienation among conflicting parties. The more severe the conflict, the more the psychological distance between groups will widen. Eventually, this can result in moral exclusion. Those excluded are typically viewed as inferior, evil, or criminal.[1] We typically think that all people have some basic human rights that should not be violated. Innocent people should not be murdered, raped, or tortured. Rather, international law suggests that they should be treated justly and fairly, with dignity and respect. They deserve to have their basic needs met, and to have some freedom to make autonomous decisions. In times of war, parties must take care to protect the lives of innocent civilians on the opposing side. Even those guilty of breaking the law should receive a fair trial, and should not be subject to any sort of cruel or unusual punishment. However, for individuals viewed as outside the scope of morality and justice, "the concepts of deserving basic needs and fair treatment do not apply and can seem irrelevant."[2] Any harm that befalls such individuals seems warranted, and perhaps even morally justified. Those excluded from the scope of morality are typically perceived as psychologically distant, expendable, and deserving of treatment that would not be acceptable for those included in one's moral community. Common criteria for exclusion include ideology, skin color, and cognitive capacity. We typically dehumanize those whom we perceive as a threat to our well-being or values.[3] Psychologically, it is necessary to categorize one's enemy as sub-human in order to legitimize increased violence or justify the violation of basic human rights. Moral exclusion reduces restraints against harming or exploiting certain groups of people. In severe cases, dehumanization makes the violation of generally accepted norms of behavior regarding one's fellow man seem reasonable, or even necessary | 7,930 | <h4>“Responsibility to the other” <u>depoliticizes action</u> – means horrible atrocities are justified in the name of the other and that the perpetual victimhood of the other must be maintained</h4><p>A – bombing on moral and ethical justification depoliticizes it</p><p>B – this mean the people that you are helping are not longer political subjects but helpless victims which kills their identity</p><p>C – this means their help is predicated on the fact that the other is the victim</p><p><strong>Zizek, 99</strong> - (Slavoj, “NATO, the left hand of God?” June 29, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/zizek/zizek-nato-the-left-hand-of-god.html)</p><p>Not long ago, Vaclev Havel maintained (in an essay titled "Kosovo and the End of the Nation State") that <u><strong>the <mark>bombing</mark> of Yugoslavia</u></strong>, for which there was no UN mandate, "placed human rights above the rights of states. . . . But this <u><strong>did not come into being in some irresponsible way</u></strong>, as an act or aggression or in contempt of international law. On the contrary. <u><strong>It <mark>happened about </mark>of <mark>respect for rights</mark>, for rights that stand above those which are protected by the sovereignty of states</u></strong>. The Alliance acted out of respect for human rights, in a way commanded not only by conscience but by the relevant documents of international law." This "higher law" has its "deepest roots outside the perceptible world." "While the state is the work of man, man is the work of God." <u><strong>In other words: NATO can violate international law because it is acting as the immediate instrument of God's "higher law." If that's not religious fundamentalism, the concept has no meaning</u></strong>. Havel's statement is a great example of what Ulrich Beck back in April called "military humanism" or "military pacifism" (in a feuilleton in the _Sueddeutscher Zeitung_). The problem is not so much one of Orwellian oxymora like the famous "War is Peace." (In my opinion the term "pacificism" was never meant seriously. When people buck up and are honest with themselves, the paradox of military pacificism disappears.) [Translators note: "pacifism" has a broader meaning in German than it does in English -- it includes roughly everything we would think of as "anti-war sentiment" or "anti-war movement." So a free translation of "military pacificism" would be roughly "war by people that have always said they were against it." But Beck's phrase is kind of famous, so let's leave it.] <u><strong>The problem is also not that the <mark>targets of the bombing weren't chosen on</mark> entirely <mark>moral grounds</mark>. The real problem is that <mark>a purely</mark> humanitarian, purely <mark>ethical justification for</mark> NATO's <mark>intervention</mark> completely <mark>depoliticizes it.</mark> NATO has shied away from a clearly defined political solution. Its <mark>intervention has been</mark> cloaked and <mark>justified</mark> exclusively <mark>in the depoliticized language of universal</mark> human <mark>rights</mark>. In this context, <mark>men and women are</mark> no longer political subjects, but <mark>helpless victims, robbed of all</mark> political <mark>identity</mark> and reduced to their naked suffering. In my opinion, this idealist subject-victim is an ideological construct of NATO</u></strong>. Not only NATO, But Also Nostalgics on the Left, Misunderstand the Causes of the War Today we can see that the paradox of the bombing of Yugoslavia is not the one that Western pacifists have been complaining about -- that NATO set off the very ethnic cleansing that it was supposed to be preventing. No, <u><strong><mark>the ideology of victimization is the real problem</mark>: it's perfectly fine to help the helpless Albanians against the Serbian monsters, but under no circumstances must they be permitted to throw off this helplessness, to get a hold on themselves as a sovereign and independent political subject</u></strong> - -- a subject that doesn't need the kindly shelter of NATO's "protectorate." No, they have to stay victims. <u><strong>The strategy of NATO is thus perverse in the precise Freudian sense of the word: <mark>The other will stay protected so long as it remains the victim</u></mark>. </p><p>Nuclear war exacerbates racism – evacuations force choices on which groups to save</p><p>Katz and Osdoby 82 </strong>[Arthur M. Katz and Sima R. Osdoby, author of Life After Nuclear War and graduate student at Johns Hopkins respectively, Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa009.html]</p><p><u><strong>If evacuation were to result in a prolonged relocation, divisive social conflicts,</u></strong> as well as economic and social dislocation, <u><strong>would be likely</u></strong>. Under much more favorable conditions <u><strong>in Great Britain during World War II, relationships between evacuees and their hosts degenerated quickly under the influence of prolonged stress</u></strong>, uncertainty, substantial class and urban-rural differences, and inadequate social service resources. This experience was not unique. <u><strong>Japan and Germany</u></strong> in World War II, and even the Netherlands in peacetime, <u><strong>experienced these type of conflicts</u></strong>. Under a limited war scenario in the United States, to absorb the evacuated population the number of people living in a single house or apartment in the host areas would have to increase six times (from three people to eighteen). It is not hard to imagine the conflict and stress that type for crowding would create.[7] Thus these problems are likely to be much more intractable under the "limited" war scenarios because of insufficient social services and the massive numbers of people involved. In threatened but unaffected metropolitan areas, <u><strong>decisions about who will be evacuated and when could become politically explosive -- fraught with fears of one group or another becoming the expendable victims</u>. This is not to mention the problem of deciding when and how to evacuate special populations -- prisoners, patients in acute and chronic care facilities, etc.</p><p>Turns case-War causes dehumanization and legitimizes social exclusion</p><p>Maiese, 03 <u>[Michelle, research staff at the Conflict Research Consortium, July, The Beyond Intractability Project: Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess” http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/dehumanization/] </p><p><mark>Dehumanization is</mark> </u></strong>a psychological<u><strong> <mark>process whereby opponents view each other as less than human and thus not deserving of moral consideration</u></strong></mark>. Jews in the eyes of Nazis and Tutsis in the eyes of Hutus (in the Rwandan genocide) are but two examples. <u><strong><mark>Protracted conflict strains relationships and makes it difficult for parties to recognize that they are part of a shared human community</u></strong></mark>. Such <u><strong><mark>conditions often lead to feelings of intense hatred and alienation among conflicting parties</mark>.</u></strong> The more severe the conflict, the more the psychological distance between groups will widen. Eventually, this can result in moral exclusion. Those excluded are typically viewed as inferior, evil, or criminal.[1] We typically think that all people have some basic human rights that should not be violated. Innocent people should not be murdered, raped, or tortured. Rather, international law suggests that they should be treated justly and fairly, with dignity and respect. They deserve to have their basic needs met, and to have some freedom to make autonomous decisions. In times of war, parties must take care to protect the lives of innocent civilians on the opposing side. Even those guilty of breaking the law should receive a fair trial, and should not be subject to any sort of cruel or unusual punishment. However, <u><strong>for individuals viewed as outside the scope of morality and justice</u></strong>, "the concepts of deserving basic needs and fair treatment do not apply and can seem irrelevant."[2] <u><strong><mark>Any harm that befalls such individuals seems warranted, and perhaps even morally justified</u></strong></mark>. Those excluded from the scope of morality are typically perceived as psychologically distant, expendable, and deserving of treatment that would not be acceptable for those included in one's moral community. Common criteria for exclusion include ideology, skin color, and cognitive capacity. We typically dehumanize those whom we perceive as a threat to our well-being or values.[3] <u><strong>Psychologically, it is necessary to categorize one's enemy as sub-human in order to legitimize increased violence or justify the violation of basic human rights</u></strong>. <u><strong>Moral exclusion reduces restraints against harming or exploiting certain groups of peopl</u></strong>e. In severe cases, <u><strong>dehumanization makes the violation of generally accepted norms of behavior regarding one's fellow man seem reasonable, or even necessary </p></u></strong> | null | 2nc/1nr | More FW | 130,318 | 10 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,972 | New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction | Borger 12/31 | Borger 12/31/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation) | There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba This deal will be about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. the parties to the talks have given themselves more time They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions That would provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment. | no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. is deal will b about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets anctions would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament and a very volatile environment | There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. This deal will not be about cash machines in the Caribbean, but about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away from the table. A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets. So the parties to the talks have given themselves more time – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor. The legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. That would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, and a very volatile environment. It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year. | 3,580 | <h4>New sanctions destroy the Iran deal- causes prolif and Israel strikes- extinction</h4><p><strong>Borger 12/31</strong>/2014 (Julian, the Guardian's diplomatic editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation)</p><p><u>There will be <mark>no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.</mark> In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba</u>, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. <u>Th<mark>is deal will</u></mark> not <u><mark>b</mark>e</u> about cash machines in the Caribbean, but <u><mark>about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth</u></mark>. An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief. Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times. The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react. However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo. These <u>gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away</u> from the table. <u><strong><mark>A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel</u></strong>; <u>the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a <strong>wave of proliferation across the region and beyond</strong> as other countries hedge their bets</mark>. </u>So <u>the parties to the talks have given themselves more time</u> – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. <u>They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran</u>. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side. This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, <u>the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor</u>. The <u>legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered s<mark>anctions</u></mark>, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. <u>That</u> would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it <u><mark>would</u> also <u>provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament</u></mark>, the Majlis, <u><mark>and a very volatile environment</mark>. </u>It is possible that the Republican leadership in the Senate will choose other battles to fight with the president before trying to build a veto-proof majority on sanctions, but the pressure will build exponentially if there is no deal on the table on 1 March. It could be the most important diplomatic date of the year.</p> | 1nc | null | politics | 171,429 | 23 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,973 | Banking sector is only 6.4% of the US economy—even total collapse wouldn’t damage US dollar heg | null | FT ’14, “Wall Street Less Important to US economy than thought” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c1ec53b4-a938-11e3-9b71-00144feab7de.html#axzz3NfVKF658 | On the one hand they suggest the financial sector is less productive than previously thought but they also mean its growth as a share of the economy was overstated. On the new estimates, finance makes up 6.4 per cent of the US economy, compared with about 7 per cent before the revisions. | the financial sector is less productive than previously thought but they also mean its growth as a share of the economy was overstated. On the new estimates, finance makes up 6.4 per cent of the US economy, compared with about 7 per cent before the revisions. | On the one hand they suggest the financial sector is less productive than previously thought but they also mean its growth as a share of the economy was overstated. On the new estimates, finance makes up 6.4 per cent of the US economy, compared with about 7 per cent before the revisions. | 288 | <h4>Banking sector is only 6.4% of the US economy—even <u>total collapse</u> wouldn’t damage US dollar heg</h4><p>FT ’14, “Wall Street Less Important to US economy than thought” <u>http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c1ec53b4-a938-11e3-9b71-00144feab7de.html#axzz3NfVKF658</p><p>On the one hand they suggest <mark>the financial sector is less productive than previously thought but they also mean its growth as a share of the economy was overstated. On the new estimates, finance makes up 6.4 per cent of the US economy, compared with about 7 per cent before the revisions.</p></u></mark> | 1NC | null | adv 1 | 430,522 | 1 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,974 | Nuclear war outweighs – possibility of extinction outweighs all ethical principles | Kateb, 84 | Kateb, 84 - professor @ Princeton University (George, “The Inner Ocean”) | the possibility of extinction is carried by any use of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited or how seemingly rational or seemingly morally justified The doctrine of no-use is based on the possibility of extinction. Schell's perspective transforms the subject. He takes us away from the arid stretches of strategy and asks us to feel continuously, if we can, and feel keenly if only for an instant now and then, how utterly distinct the nuclear world is If it is not impossible it must be treated as certain: the loss signified by extinction nullifies all calculations of probability as it nullifies all calculations of costs and benefits the considerations of extinction cannot rest with the possibility of a sizeable exchange of strategic weapons. It cannot rest with the imperative that a sizeable exchange must not take place. A so-called tactical or “theater” use, or a so-called limited use, is also prohibited absolutely, because of the possibility of immediate escalation into a sizeable exchange of because, even if there were not an immediate escalation, the possibility of extinction would reside in the precedent for future use set by any use whatever in a world in which more than one power possesses nuclear weapons | the possibility of extinction is carried by any use of nuclear weapons, Schell's perspective transforms the subject He asks us to feel how distinct the nuclear world is. the loss signified by extinction nullifies all calculations A tactical use is prohibited because of the possibility of immediate escalation even if there were not an immediate escalation, the possibility of extinction would reside in the precedent for future use | Schell's work attempts to force on us an acknowledgment that sounds far-fetched and even ludicrous an acknowledgment that the possibility of extinction is carried by any use of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited or how seemingly rational or seemingly morally justified. He himself acknowledges that there is a difference between possibility and certainty. But in a matter that is more than a matter, more than one practical matter in a vast series of practical matters, in the "matter" of extinction, we are obliged to treat a possibility—a genuine possibility— as a certainty. Humanity is not to take any step that contains even the slightest risk of extinction. The doctrine of no-use is based on the possibility of extinction. Schell's perspective transforms the subject. He takes us away from the arid stretches of strategy and asks us to feel continuously, if we can, and feel keenly if only for an instant now and then, how utterly distinct the nuclear world is. Nuclear discourse must vividly register that distinctive-ness. It is of no moral account that extinction may be only a slight possibility. No one can say how great the possibility is, but no one has yet credibly denied that by some sequence or other a particular use of nuclear weapons may lead to human and natural extinction. If it is not impossible it must be treated as certain: the loss signified by extinction nullifies all calculations of probability as it nullifies all calculations of costs and benefits. Abstractly put, the connections between any use of nuclear weapons and human and natural extinction are several. Most obviously, a sizeable exchange of strategic nuclear weapons can, by a chain of events in nature, lead to earth’s uninhabitability, to “nuclear winter,” or as Schell’s “republic of insects and grass.” But the considerations of extinction cannot rest with the possibility of a sizeable exchange of strategic weapons. It cannot rest with the imperative that a sizeable exchange must not take place. A so-called tactical or “theater” use, or a so-called limited use, is also prohibited absolutely, because of the possibility of immediate escalation into a sizeable exchange of because, even if there were not an immediate escalation, the possibility of extinction would reside in the precedent for future use set by any use whatever in a world in which more than one power possesses nuclear weapons. Add other consequences: the contagious effect of nonnuclear powers who may feel compelled by a mixture of fear and vanity to try to acquire their own weapons, thus increasing the possibility of use by increasing the number of nuclear powers; and the unleashed emotions of indignation, retribution, and revenge which, if not acted on immediately in the form of escalation, can be counter on to seek expression later. | 2,819 | <h4>Nuclear war outweighs – possibility of extinction outweighs all ethical principles</h4><p><strong>Kateb, 84</strong> - professor @ Princeton University (George, “The Inner Ocean”)</p><p>Schell's work attempts to force on us an acknowledgment that sounds far-fetched and even ludicrous an acknowledgment that <u><strong><mark>the possibility of extinction is carried by any use of nuclear weapons,</mark> no matter how limited or how seemingly rational or seemingly morally justified</u></strong>. He himself acknowledges that there is a difference between possibility and certainty. But in a matter that is more than a matter, more than one practical matter in a vast series of practical matters, in the "matter" of extinction, we are obliged to treat a possibility—a genuine possibility— as a certainty. Humanity is not to take any step that contains even the slightest risk of extinction. <u><strong>The doctrine of no-use is based on the possibility of extinction. <mark>Schell's perspective transforms the subject</mark>. <mark>He</mark> takes us away from the arid stretches of strategy and <mark>asks us to feel</mark> continuously, if we can, and feel keenly if only for an instant now and then, <mark>how</mark> utterly <mark>distinct the nuclear world is</u></strong>.</mark> Nuclear discourse must vividly register that distinctive-ness. It is of no moral account that extinction may be only a slight possibility. No one can say how great the possibility is, but no one has yet credibly denied that by some sequence or other a particular use of nuclear weapons may lead to human and natural extinction. <u><strong>If it is not impossible it must be treated as certain: <mark>the loss signified by extinction nullifies all calculations</mark> of probability as it nullifies all calculations of costs and benefits</u></strong>. Abstractly put, the connections between any use of nuclear weapons and human and natural extinction are several. Most obviously, a sizeable exchange of strategic nuclear weapons can, by a chain of events in nature, lead to earth’s uninhabitability, to “nuclear winter,” or as Schell’s “republic of insects and grass.” But <u><strong>the considerations of extinction cannot rest with the possibility of a sizeable exchange of strategic weapons. It cannot rest with the imperative that a sizeable exchange must not take place. <mark>A</mark> so-called <mark>tactical</mark> or “theater” <mark>use</mark>, or a so-called limited use, <mark>is</mark> also <mark>prohibited</mark> absolutely, <mark>because of the possibility of immediate escalation</mark> into a sizeable exchange of because, <mark>even</mark> <mark>if there were not an immediate escalation, the possibility of extinction would reside in the precedent for future use</mark> set by any use whatever in a world in which more than one power possesses nuclear weapons</u></strong>. Add other consequences: the contagious effect of nonnuclear powers who may feel compelled by a mixture of fear and vanity to try to acquire their own weapons, thus increasing the possibility of use by increasing the number of nuclear powers; and the unleashed emotions of indignation, retribution, and revenge which, if not acted on immediately in the form of escalation, can be counter on to seek expression later.</p> | null | 2nc/1nr | More FW | 46,315 | 43 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,975 | Online gambling regulations costs are negligible compared to total revenue and profit-- | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4><strong>Online gambling regulations costs are negligible compared to total revenue and profit--</h4></strong> | 1NC | null | adv 1 | 430,521 | 1 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,976 | Heg isn’t benign—attempt to seize hegemony undermine foreign relations and establish a violent security-driven international order. | Marsella 11 | Marsella (Department of Psychology, University of Hawaii; paper delivered on the occasion of receiving the Lifetime Contribution Award by the International Academy for Intercultural Research) 11 | In a world that is in desperate need for global cooperation and harmony at the risk of nuclear annihilation, the continued efforts by the United States to pursue the hegemony of empire must be questioned U.S. foreign bases inflame U.S. foreign relations, generating resentment against the prostitution, environmental damage, petty crime, and everyday ethnocentrism that are their inevitable corollaries the United States, there is ample evidence to conclude that it is addicted to violence and war. That these actions have now become an almost reflexive response used to resolve any national or international tension. A number of writers have argued that the U.S. culture has evolved to the point that its citizens have been socialized to believe that there will never be end to war and to learn to tolerate this state of affairs; that U.S. citizens are seduced by war We have begun to talk casually about our wars The process of brainwashing and desensitization by the military begins affecting children in the US from a very early age the U.S. is now seduced by the militarism To a degree without precedent in US history, Americans have come to define the nation’s strength and well being in terms of military preparedness, military action | In a world in desperate need for global cooperation the continued efforts to pursue heg must be questioned, U.S bases inflame foreign relations, generating resentment against prostitution environmental damage petty crime, and ethnocentrism that are their inevitable corollaries the U S is addicted to war these actions have become reflexive response to resolve any tension citizens have been socialized to believe there will never be end to war citizens are seduced by war We talk casually about wars the U.S. is seduced by the militarism To a degree without precedent Americans have come to define the nation’s strength in terms of military preparedness | (Anthony J., United States of America: “A culture of war”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations 35 (2011) 714–728)
In a world that is in desperate need for global cooperation and harmony at the risk of nuclear annihilation, the continued efforts by the United States to pursue the hegemony of empire must be questioned, as must its sources and means. 2.2. A militarized “empire” The term “empire,” with all of its unfortunate denotations and connotations, is now widely applied to describe the U.S., and perhaps, like other empires that have come before, the U.S. awaits a similar fate of decline and collapse, a historical footnote that joins it with other nations and civilizations that lost sight of the tragic consequences of the very course they were pursuing. There is no reason to believe that the USA will be able to escape the inevitable collapse similar to others. Chalmers Johnson (2004), writing in his volume, “The sorrows of empire: Militarism, secrecy, and the end of the republic,” traces the rise of the American empire and predicts its imminent demise. In describing the evolution of empire in the USA, Johnson (2004) writes: Our militarized empire is a physical reality with a distinct way of life but it is also a network of economic and political interests tied in a thousand different ways to American corporations, universities, and communities but kept separate from what passes for everyday life back in what has recently come to be known as ‘the homeland.’ And yet, even that sense of separation is disappearing – for the changing nature of empire is changing society as well. For example, slowly the Department of Defense is obscuring and displacing the Department of State as the primary agency for making and administering foreign policy. We now station innumerably more uniformed military officers than civilian diplomats, aid workers, or environmental specialists in foreign countries. Our garrisons send a daily message that the United States prefers to deal with nations through the use of or threat of force rather than negotiations, commerce, or cultural interactions and through military-to-military, not civilian-to-civilian relations (Johnson, 2004, p. 5). In contrast to old views of “empire” as an imperialistic occupation of nations (e.g., Great Britain, France, Spain), the United States is an “empire of bases” (Gusterson, 2009; Johnson, 2008). Gusterson (2009) states we are an “empire” of foreign military bases that number in excess of 1000 bases in more than 130 countries that serve the purposes of “empire:” The old way of doing colonialism, practiced by the Europeans, was to take over entire countries and administer them. But this was clumsy. The United States has pioneered a leaner approach to global empire. . . Its “empire of bases” gives the United States global reach, but the shape of this empire, insofar as it tilts toward Europe, is a bloated and anachronistic holdover from the Cold War. Many of these bases are a luxury the United States can no longer afford at a time of record budget deficits. Moreover, U.S. foreign bases have a double edge: they project American power across the globe, but they also inflame U.S. foreign relations, generating resentment against the prostitution, environmental damage, petty crime, and everyday ethnocentrism that are their inevitable corollaries (Gusterson, 2009, p. 3). 2.3. Is the USA addicted to war? Addiction is the term generally used to refer to compulsive reliance on drugs or other substances or activities (i.e., exercise, computer games) to the point of loss of control. In the case of the United States, there is ample evidence to conclude that it is addicted to violence and war. That these actions have now become an almost reflexive response used to resolve any national or international tension. A number of writers have argued that the U.S. culture has evolved to the point that its citizens have been socialized to believe that there will never be end to war and to learn to tolerate this state of affairs; that U.S. citizens are seduced by war (e.g., Bacevich, 2005; Bromwich, 2010; Jamail & Coppola, 2009). Bromwich (2010) writes: “We have begun to talk casually about our wars; and this should be surprising for several reasons. To begin with, in the history of the United States war has never been considered the normal state of things. For two centuries, Americans were taught to think war itself an aberration, and ‘wars’ in the plural could only have seemed doubly aberrant. Younger generations of Americans, however, are now being taught to expect no end of war –and no end of wars” (Bromwich, 2010, p. 1). Jamail and Coppola (200 9, p. 1) state: “The process of brainwashing and desensitization by the military begins affecting children in the US from a very early age. It is not insignificant that little boys wear camouflage and run around playing with toy guns whenever they get an opportunity.” Bacevich (2005), concludes that the U.S. is now seduced by the militarism, a glorification and celebration of all things martial including history, music, celebrations, uniforms, guns, and the very idea that military might itself insures power: Bacevich writes: Americans in our own time have fallen prey to militarism, manifesting itself in a romanticized view of soldiers, a tendency to see military power as the truest measure of national greatness, and outsized expectations regarding the efficacy of force. To a degree without precedent in US history, Americans have come to define the nation’s strength and well being in terms of military preparedness, military action, and the fostering of (or nostalgia for) military ideals.” (Bacevich, 2005, p. 2). | 5,842 | <h4><strong>Heg isn’t benign—attempt to seize hegemony undermine foreign relations and establish a violent security-driven international order.</h4><p><u>Marsella</u></strong> (Department of Psychology, University of Hawaii; paper delivered on the occasion of receiving the Lifetime Contribution Award by the International Academy for Intercultural Research)<u><strong> 11</p><p></u></strong>(Anthony J., United States of America: “A culture of war”, International Journal of Intercultural Relations 35 (2011) 714–728)</p><p><u><mark>In a world</mark> that is <mark>in desperate need for global cooperation</mark> and harmony at the risk of nuclear annihilation, <mark>the continued efforts</mark> by the United States <mark>to pursue</mark> the <mark>heg</mark>emony of empire <mark>must be questioned</u>,</mark> as must its sources and means. 2.2. A militarized “empire” The term “empire,” with all of its unfortunate denotations and connotations, is now widely applied to describe the U.S., and perhaps, like other empires that have come before, the U.S. awaits a similar fate of decline and collapse, a historical footnote that joins it with other nations and civilizations that lost sight of the tragic consequences of the very course they were pursuing. There is no reason to believe that the USA will be able to escape the inevitable collapse similar to others. Chalmers Johnson (2004), writing in his volume, “The sorrows of empire: Militarism, secrecy, and the end of the republic,” traces the rise of the American empire and predicts its imminent demise. In describing the evolution of empire in the USA, Johnson (2004) writes: Our militarized empire is a physical reality with a distinct way of life but it is also a network of economic and political interests tied in a thousand different ways to American corporations, universities, and communities but kept separate from what passes for everyday life back in what has recently come to be known as ‘the homeland.’ And yet, even that sense of separation is disappearing – for the changing nature of empire is changing society as well. For example, slowly the Department of Defense is obscuring and displacing the Department of State as the primary agency for making and administering foreign policy. We now station innumerably more uniformed military officers than civilian diplomats, aid workers, or environmental specialists in foreign countries. Our garrisons send a daily message that the United States prefers to deal with nations through the use of or threat of force rather than negotiations, commerce, or cultural interactions and through military-to-military, not civilian-to-civilian relations (Johnson, 2004, p. 5). In contrast to old views of “empire” as an imperialistic occupation of nations (e.g., Great Britain, France, Spain), the United States is an “empire of bases” (Gusterson, 2009; Johnson, 2008). Gusterson (2009) states we are an “empire” of foreign military bases that number in excess of 1000 bases in more than 130 countries that serve the purposes of “empire:” The old way of doing colonialism, practiced by the Europeans, was to take over entire countries and administer them. But this was clumsy. The United States has pioneered a leaner approach to global empire. . . Its “empire of bases” gives the United States global reach, but the shape of this empire, insofar as it tilts toward Europe, is a bloated and anachronistic holdover from the Cold War. Many of these bases are a luxury the United States can no longer afford at a time of record budget deficits. Moreover, <u><mark>U.S</mark>. foreign <mark>bases</u></mark> have a double edge: they project American power across the globe, but they also <u><mark>inflame</mark> U.S. <mark>foreign relations, generating resentment against</mark> the <mark>prostitution</mark>, <mark>environmental</mark> <mark>damage</mark>, <mark>petty crime, and</mark> everyday <mark>ethnocentrism that are their inevitable corollaries</u></mark> (Gusterson, 2009, p. 3). 2.3. Is the USA addicted to war? Addiction is the term generally used to refer to compulsive reliance on drugs or other substances or activities (i.e., exercise, computer games) to the point of loss of control. In the case of <u><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, there <mark>is</mark> ample evidence to conclude that it is <mark>addicted to</mark> violence and <mark>war</mark>. That <mark>these actions</mark> <mark>have</mark> now <mark>become</mark> an almost <mark>reflexive response</mark> used <mark>to resolve any</mark> national or international <mark>tension</mark>. A number of writers have argued that the U.S. culture has evolved to the point that its <mark>citizens have been socialized to believe</mark> that <mark>there will never be end to war</mark> and to learn to tolerate this state of affairs; that U.S. <mark>citizens are seduced by war</u></mark> (e.g., Bacevich, 2005; Bromwich, 2010; Jamail & Coppola, 2009). Bromwich (2010) writes: “<u><mark>We</mark> have begun to <mark>talk casually about</mark> our <mark>wars</u></mark>; and this should be surprising for several reasons. To begin with, in the history of the United States war has never been considered the normal state of things. For two centuries, Americans were taught to think war itself an aberration, and ‘wars’ in the plural could only have seemed doubly aberrant. Younger generations of Americans, however, are now being taught to expect no end of war –and no end of wars” (Bromwich, 2010, p. 1). Jamail and Coppola (200 9, p. 1) state: “<u>The process of brainwashing and desensitization by the military begins affecting children in the US from a very early age</u>. It is not insignificant that little boys wear camouflage and run around playing with toy guns whenever they get an opportunity.” Bacevich (2005), concludes that <u><mark>the U.S. is</mark> now <mark>seduced by the militarism</u></mark>, a glorification and celebration of all things martial including history, music, celebrations, uniforms, guns, and the very idea that military might itself insures power: Bacevich writes: Americans in our own time have fallen prey to militarism, manifesting itself in a romanticized view of soldiers, a tendency to see military power as the truest measure of national greatness, and outsized expectations regarding the efficacy of force. <u><mark>To a degree without precedent</mark> in US history, <mark>Americans have come to define the nation’s strength</mark> and well being <mark>in terms of military preparedness</mark>, military action</u>, and the fostering of (or nostalgia for) military ideals.” (Bacevich, 2005, p. 2). </p> | 1nc | null | k | 68,134 | 4 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,977 | Debate inevitably involves exclusions---making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary to foster democratic habits and critical thinking---this process outweighs the content of the aff | Anderson 6—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 25-8) | Anderson 6—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 25-8) | substantive normative guidance through appeal to the principles of respect and reciprocity Attempt to redress the overwhelmingly negative forms of critique characteristic of poststructuralist traditions, he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute “a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life The potential is the potential for mutual understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language Habermas acknowledges the dominance of instrumental reason his project is largely devoted to a systematic analysis of the conditions of that dominance yet he wishes to retrieve an emancipatory model of communicative reason derived from a linguistic understanding of intersubjective relations he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of such norms is possible he insists instead that we view the normative constraints of speech community as “universal pragmatic presuppositions” Benhabib promot a self-conscious universalism that locates the ethical principles of respect and reciprocity as “constituents of the moral point of view Benhabib constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of modernity differs in two key respects Habermas’s emphasis on consensus distorts his account of communicative ethics Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus Benhabib champions a discourse model of ethics that is geared toward keeping the conversation going:¶ When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethics from consensus to the idea of an ongoing conversation, we begin to ask not what all would agree to as a result of practical discourses to be morally permissible or impermissible but what would be allowed from the standpoint of continuing and sustaining the practice of the conversation The emphasis now is less on rational agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish Benhabib opposes any politics that privileges the detached self over the concrete, embodied, self she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”: Interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and differences among humans without endorsing all these pluralities as valid While agreeing that normative disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are necessary conditions interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection In this sense, “universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied identity but aims at developing moral attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a point of view acceptable to all Universality is not consensus but the concrete process in politics Benhabib’s position attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm enabling crucial distinctions between notions of the good life that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.” It understands identity as “embodied and promotes encounters with otherness to nurture a moral attitude that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”¶ Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “all” here cannot coherently include those who have forfeited their place as equal participants in the ethicopolitical community redefinition of universalism insists on inevitable exclusion but not in the sense that poststructuralist critics do as the hardwired effect of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness, and as victimizing those disempowered by race, class, gender, or sexuality Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness which prove self-undermining in their toleration of practices that exclude others arbitrarily, interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are not only justified, but indeed required by the principles of recognition and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices. | substantive normative guidance through appeal to reciprocity wishes to retrieve emancipatory communicative reason derived from intersubjective relations he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of norms is possible instead we view the normative constraints of speech community as “ pragmatic presuppositions Benhabib promot a self-conscious universalism that locates reciprocity as “constituents of the moral view Benhabib champions a model geared toward keeping the conversation going: When we shift the burden of the moral test to the idea of an ongoing conversation we begin to ask not what all would agree to be morally impermissible but what would be allowed from the standpoint of sustaining the practice of conversation The emphasis now is on sustaining normative practices within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish Interactive universalism acknowledges differences agreeing that disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are necessary universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied identity but aims at developing attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a view acceptable to all Universality is not consensus but the process in politics all cannot include those who have forfeited their place as participants in the community redefinition of universalism insists on exclusion but not in the sense of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness victimizing those disempowered by race Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness which prove self-undermining in their toleration of practices that exclude others arbitrarily interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are required by the principles of recognition that underpin democratic practices | 25¶ Whether such a procedural approach actually helps to yield any substantive normative guidance is an issue of debate. Habermas has sought to justify communicative ethics through appeal to the principles of respect and reciprocity that he claims are inherent in linguistic practices geared toward reaching understanding. Attempting to redress the overwhelmingly negative forms of critique characteristic of both the Frankfurt School and poststructuralist traditions, he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the powerful instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute “a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life.” The potential he refers to is the potential for mutual understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language.” 7 Habermas acknowledges the dominance and reach of instrumental reason—his project is largely devoted to a systematic analysis of the historical conditions and social effects of that dominance—yet at the same time he wishes to retrieve an emancipatory model of communicative¶ ¶ 26¶ reason derived from a linguistic understanding of intersubjective relations. As Benhabib argues, this form of communicative action, embodied in the highly controversial and pervasively misunderstood concept of the “ideal speech situation,” entails strong ethical assumptions, namely the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (SS, 29).¶ Habermas has famously argued that he does not believe any metaphysical grounding of such norms is possible; he insists instead that we view the normative constraints of the ideal speech community as “universal pragmatic presuppositions” of competent moral actors who have reached the postconventional stage of moral reasoning. Habermas’s theory combines a “weak transcendental argument” concerning the four types of validity claims operative in speech acts with an empirical reconstruction of psychosocial development derived from Lawrence Kohlberg. Benhabib, though she, too, appeals to socialization processes, distinguishes her position from Habermas’s “weak transcendental argument” by promoting a “historically self-conscious universalism” that locates the ethical principles of respect and reciprocity as “constituents of the moral point of view from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (SS, 30). Benhabib’s work thus constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of specific potentialities of modernity. She differs from him in two key respects, besides the emphasis already outlined. First, she believes that Habermas’s emphasis on consensus seriously distorts his account of communicative ethics. Like others who have argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus, Benhabib champions instead a discourse model of ethics that is geared toward keeping the conversation going:¶ When we shift the burden of the moral test in communicative ethics from consensus to the idea of an ongoing moral conversation, we begin to ask not what all would or could agree to as a result of practical discourses to be morally permissible or impermissible, but what would be allowed and perhaps even necessary from the standpoint of continuing and sustaining the practice of the moral conversation among us. The emphasis now is less on rational agreement, but more on sustaining those normative practices and moral relationships within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue. (SS, 38)8¶ ¶ 27¶ The second significant difference between Habermas and Benhabib is that Benhabib rejects Habermas’s rigid opposition between justice and the good life, an opposition that effectively relegates identity-based politics to a lower plane of moral practice, and that for Benhabib undercuts our ability to apprehend the radical particularity of the other. While she believes in the importance of self-reflexive interrogations of conventional identities and roles, she strongly opposes any ethics or politics that privileges the unencumbered or detached self over the concrete, embodied, situated self. She argues in particular against those liberal models that imagine that conversations of moral justification should take place between individuals who have bracketed their strongest cultural or social identifications and attachments. Instead she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”:¶ Interactive universalism acknowledges the plurality of modes of being human, and differences among humans, without endorsing all these pluralities and differences as morally and politically valid. While agreeing that normative disputes can be settled rationally, and that fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are constituents, that is, necessary conditions of the moral standpoint, interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection and action. In this sense, “universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied and embedded identity, but aims at developing moral attitudes and encouraging political transformations that can yield a point of view acceptable to all. Universality is not the ideal consensus of fictitiously defined selves, but the concrete process in politics and morals of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy. (SS, 153) ¶ This passage encapsulates the core of Benhabib’s position, which attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism as traditionally understood. On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm, enabling crucial distinctions between those notions of the good life that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles. It insists, in other words, that there is a specifiable moral standpoint from which—to take a few prominent examples—Serbian aggression, neo-Nazism, and gay bashing can be definitively condemned. On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.” It understands identity as “embodied and embedded” and promotes encounters with otherness so as to nurture the development of a moral attitude that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”¶ Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “all” here cannot coherently include those who have, according to universalism’s own principles, forfeited their place as equal participants in the ethicopolitical¶ ¶ 28¶ community. Ironically, then, Benhabib’s redefinition of universalism insists on inevitable exclusion, but not in the sense that many poststructuralist and postmodernist cultural critics do, as the hardwired effect of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness, and as victimizing those disempowered by race, class, gender, or sexuality. Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness and plurality, which ultimately prove self-undermining in their toleration of communities, individuals, and practices that exclude others arbitrarily, interactive universalism claims that certain exclusions are not only justified, but indeed required by the principles of recognition and respect that underpin democratic institutions and practices. | 7,287 | <h4>Debate inevitably involves exclusions---making sure that those exclusions occur along reciprocal lines is necessary to foster democratic habits and critical thinking---this process outweighs the content of the aff </h4><p><strong>Anderson 6<u>—prof of English at Johns Hopkins (Amanda, The Way We Argue Now, 25-8)</p><p></u></strong>25¶ Whether such a procedural approach actually helps to yield any <u><mark>substantive normative guidance</u></mark> is an issue of debate. Habermas has sought to justify communicative ethics <u><mark>through appeal to </mark>the principles of respect and <strong><mark>reciprocity</u></strong></mark> that he claims are inherent in linguistic practices geared toward reaching understanding. <u>Attempt</u>ing <u>to redress the</u> <u><strong>overwhelmingly negative forms of critique</u></strong> <u>characteristic of </u>both the Frankfurt School and <u>poststructuralist traditions,</u> <u>he argues that the logocentrism of Western thought and the</u> powerful <u>instrumentality of reason are not absolute but rather constitute</u> <u>“a systematic foreshortening and distortion of a potential always already operative in the communicative practice of everyday life</u>.” <u>The potential</u> he refers to <u>is the potential for mutual</u> <u>understanding “inscribed into communication in ordinary language</u>.” 7 <u>Habermas acknowledges the dominance</u> and reach <u>of instrumental reason</u>—<u>his project is largely devoted to a</u> <u>systematic analysis of the</u> historical <u>conditions</u> and social effects <u>of that</u> <u>dominance</u>—<u>yet</u> at the same time <u>he <mark>wishes to retrieve </mark>an <strong><mark>emancipatory</mark> model of <mark>communicative</u></strong></mark>¶ ¶ 26¶ <u><strong><mark>reason derived from</mark> a linguistic understanding of <mark>intersubjective relations</u></strong></mark>. As Benhabib argues, this form of communicative action, embodied in the highly controversial and pervasively misunderstood concept of the “ideal speech situation,” entails strong ethical assumptions, namely the principles of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity (SS, 29).¶ Habermas has famously argued that <u><mark>he does not believe any metaphysical grounding</mark> <mark>of</mark> such <mark>norms is possible</u></mark>; <u>he insists <mark>instead </mark>that</u> <u><mark>we view the <strong>normative constraints of</u></strong> </mark>the ideal <u><strong><mark>speech community</u></strong> <u>as “<strong></mark>universal</strong> <strong><mark>pragmatic</strong></mark> <strong><mark>presuppositions</strong></mark>” </u>of competent moral actors who have reached the postconventional stage of moral reasoning. Habermas’s theory combines a “weak transcendental argument” concerning the four types of validity claims operative in speech acts with an empirical reconstruction of psychosocial development derived from Lawrence Kohlberg. <u><mark>Benhabib</u></mark>, though she, too, appeals to socialization processes, distinguishes her position from Habermas’s “weak transcendental argument” by <u><mark>promot</u></mark>ing <u><mark>a</mark> </u>“historically <u><strong><mark>self-conscious universalism</u></strong></mark>” <u><mark>that locates</mark> the ethical</u> <u>principles of <strong>respect and <mark>reciprocity</strong> as “constituents of the moral </mark>point of <mark>view</mark> </u>from within the normative hermeneutic horizon of modernity” (SS, 30). <u>Benhabib</u>’s work thus <u>constitutes, like Habermas’s, a strong defense of</u> specific potentialities of <u>modernity</u>. She <u>differs</u> from him <u>in two key respects</u>, besides the emphasis already outlined. First, she believes that <u>Habermas’s emphasis</u> <u>on</u> <u>consensus</u> seriously <u>distorts his account of communicative ethics</u>. <u>Like others who have <strong>argued against the conflation of understanding and consensus</u></strong>,<mark> <u>Benhabib champions</u></mark> instead <u><mark>a</mark> discourse <mark>model</mark> of ethics that is <mark>geared toward <strong>keeping the conversation going</strong>:</mark>¶ <strong><mark>When we shift the burden of the moral test</strong></mark> in communicative ethics from consensus <mark>to the idea of an <strong>ongoing</strong></mark> </u>moral<u> <strong><mark>conversation</strong></mark>,</u> <u><strong><mark>we begin to ask not what all would</u></strong></mark> or could <u><strong><mark>agree</strong></mark> to as a result of practical discourses <strong><mark>to be morally </mark>permissible </strong>or <strong><mark>impermissible</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>but what would be allowed</mark> </u></strong>and perhaps even necessary<u><strong> <mark>from the standpoint of </mark>continuing and <mark>sustaining the practice of </mark>the</u></strong> moral <u><strong><mark>conversation</u></strong></mark> among us. <u><mark>The emphasis now is</mark> less on rational agreement, but more <mark>on <strong>sustaining</mark> those <mark>normative</u></strong> <u><strong>practices</u></strong></mark> and moral relationships <u><strong><mark>within which reasoned agreement as a way of life can flourish</u></strong></mark> and continue. (SS, 38)8¶ ¶ 27¶ The second significant difference between Habermas and Benhabib is that Benhabib rejects Habermas’s rigid opposition between justice and the good life, an opposition that effectively relegates identity-based politics to a lower plane of moral practice, and that for <u>Benhabib</u> undercuts our ability to apprehend the radical particularity of the other. While she believes in the importance of self-reflexive interrogations of conventional identities and roles, she strongly <u>opposes any </u>ethics or <u>politics that privileges the</u> unencumbered or <u>detached self over the concrete, embodied,</u> situated <u>self</u>. She argues in particular against those liberal models that imagine that conversations of moral justification should take place between individuals who have bracketed their strongest cultural or social identifications and attachments. Instead <u>she promotes what she calls an “interactive universalism”:</u>¶ <u><mark>Interactive universalism acknowledges</mark> the plurality of modes of being human, and <mark>differences</mark> among humans</u>, <u>without endorsing all</u> <u>these pluralities</u> and differences <u>as</u> morally and politically <u>valid</u>. <u>While <mark>agreeing that</mark> normative <mark>disputes can be settled rationally, <strong>and </strong>that<strong> fairness, reciprocity and some procedure of universalizability are</mark> </u></strong>constituents, that is, <u><strong><mark>necessary </mark>conditions </u></strong>of the moral standpoint, <u>interactive universalism regards difference as a starting point for reflection</u> and action. <u>In this sense, <strong>“<mark>universality” is a regulative ideal that does not deny our embodied</mark> </u></strong>and embedded<u><strong> <mark>identity</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>but aims at developing</u></mark> <u>moral <mark>attitudes and <strong>encouraging political transformations that can yield a </mark>point of <mark>view acceptable to all</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Universality is not</mark> </u>the ideal<u> <mark>consensus</mark> </u>of fictitiously defined selves, <u><mark>but the </mark>concrete <strong><mark>process in politics</u></strong></mark> and morals of the struggle of concrete, embodied selves, striving for autonomy. (SS, 153) ¶ This passage encapsulates the core of <u>Benhabib’s position</u>, which <u>attempts to mediate between universalism and particularism</u> as traditionally understood. <u>On the one hand, universalism’s informing principles of rational argumentation, fairness, and reciprocity adjudicate between different positions in the ethicopolitical realm</u>, <u>enabling crucial distinctions between </u>those<u> notions of the good life</u> <u>that promote interactive universalism and those that threaten its key principles</u>. It insists, in other words, that there is a specifiable moral standpoint from which—to take a few prominent examples—Serbian aggression, neo-Nazism, and gay bashing can be definitively condemned. <u>On the other hand, universalism “regards difference as a starting point.”</u> <u>It understands identity as “embodied</u> and embedded” <u>and promotes encounters with otherness</u> so as <u>to nurture</u> the development of <u>a moral attitude</u> <u>that will “yield a point of view acceptable to all.”¶ <strong>Of course it must simultaneously be recognized that the “<mark>all</mark>” here <mark>cannot</mark> coherently <mark>include those who have</u></strong></mark>, according to universalism’s own principles,<u><strong> <mark>forfeited their place as </mark>equal <mark>participants in the </mark>ethicopolitical</u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>¶ 28¶ <u><strong><mark>community</u></strong></mark>. Ironically, then, Benhabib’s <u><mark>redefinition of universalism insists on </mark>inevitable <mark>exclusion</u></mark>, <u><strong><mark>but not in the sense </mark>that </u></strong>many <u><strong>poststructuralist</u></strong> and postmodernist cultural <u><strong>critics</u></strong> <u><strong>do</u></strong>, <u>as the hardwired effect <mark>of universalism’s false claims to inclusiveness</mark>, and</u> <u>as <mark>victimizing those</mark> <mark>disempowered by race</mark>, class, gender, or sexuality</u>. <u><strong><mark>Against naive conceptions of inclusiveness</strong></mark> </u>and plurality, <u><mark>which</u></mark> ultimately <u><strong><mark>prove self-undermining in their toleration of</mark> </u></strong>communities, individuals, and <u><strong><mark>practices that exclude others arbitrarily</mark>,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>interactive universalism</mark> <mark>claims that certain</mark> <mark>exclusions are</mark> not only justified, but indeed <mark>required by the</mark> <mark>principles of recognition</mark> and respect <mark>that underpin democratic </mark>institutions and <mark>practices</mark>.</p></u></strong> | null | 2nc/1nr | More FW | 74,354 | 284 | 17,065 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | 565,287 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 7 | Florida Cone-Marchini | Lee | FW (2NR)
Ban PAS CP
Politics DA - Iran | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round7.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,978 | Security politics causes global destruction. | Der Derian ’98 | Der Derian ’98 (James, Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”, On Security, CIAO) | No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated sovereign states to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature In its name, w m d have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact in its name millions killed while intellectual dissent muted We have inherited an ontotheology of security an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it within security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security in recognition of the world as it is I am not in search of an "alternative security." everything is dangerous in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers we might be able to construct a form of security based on appreciation rather than the extirpation of difference method is to destabilize the fictional identities created out of fear and to affirm differences the terror of death triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness | w m d have been developed which transfigured into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact millions killed while dissent muted everything is dangerous in interpretation of pressing dangers we might construct a form of security based on appreciation rather than extirpation of difference the terror of death triggers a futile cycle of identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. | No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... 7 In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " HYPERLINK "http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note8" 8 By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness. | 5,118 | <h4>Security politics causes global destruction.</h4><p><strong>Der Derian ’98</strong> (James, Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”, On Security, CIAO)</p><p><u>No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor</u> commands the <u>disciplinary power of "security."</u> <u>In its name, peoples have alienated</u> their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, <u>sovereign states</u>, all <u>to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature</u>--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. <u>In its name,</u> <u><strong><mark>w</u></strong></mark>eapons of <u><strong><mark>m</u></strong></mark>ass <u><strong><mark>d</u></strong></mark>estruction <u><mark>have been developed which</mark> have <mark>transfigured</mark> national interest <mark>into a security dilemma based on a <strong>suicide pact</u></strong></mark>. And, less often noted in international relations, <u>in its name</u> billions have been made and <u><strong><mark>millions killed</strong> while</u></mark> scientific knowledge has been furthered and <u>intellectual <mark>dissent muted</u></mark>. <u>We have inherited an ontotheology of security</u>, that is, <u>an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it</u>. Indeed, <u>within</u> the concept of <u>security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics</u>, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... 7 In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " HYPERLINK "http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html" \l "note8" 8 By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. <u>What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security</u>, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but <u>in recognition of the world as it is</u>, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that <u>I am not in search of an "alternative security."</u> An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that <u><strong><mark>everything is dangerous</u></strong></mark>, then we always have something to do. The hope is that <u><mark>in</mark> the <mark>interpretation of</mark> the most <mark>pressing dangers</u></mark> of late modernity <u><mark>we might </mark>be able to <mark>construct a form of security based on</u></mark> the <u><mark>appreciation</u></mark> and articulation <u><mark>rather than</mark> the</u> normalization or <u><strong><mark>extirpation of difference</u></strong></mark>. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His <u>method is</u> not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but <u>to</u> <u>destabilize the</u> intolerable <u>fictional identities</u> of the past which have been <u>created out of fear</u>, <u>and to affirm</u> the creative <u>differences</u> which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, <u><mark>the terror of death</u></mark> which, once generalized and nationalized, <u><mark>triggers a <strong>futile</strong> <strong>cycle</strong> of</mark> collective <mark>identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees</u>. <u>It</u> <u>is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness</u>.</mark> </p> | 1nc | null | k | 4,065 | 134 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,979 | Impact is exaggerated—burden of proving legality is on site operators, not financial institutions | Digital Transactions 08 | Digital Transactions 11/25/08 (Cites Behnam Dayanim, JD, partner in the global banking and financial institutions practice of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP, “Burden of Final UIGEA Rule May Not Be As Heavy As Some Expected”, http://digitaltransactions.net/news/story/Burden-of-Final-UIGEA-Rule-May-Not-Be-As-Heavy-As-Some-Expected) | the UIGEA represents another set of requirements But for banks and processors, the burden may not be as heavy as anticipated says Dayanim, partner in the global banking and financial institutions practice of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP
If a bank or processor already has done extensive due-diligence on its commercial customers they comply with the rule
banks' and processors' primary responsibility will be to ensure the legality of the commercial sites only, rather than tracking the transactions of individual gamblers
the rule shifts the burden of proving legality to the site operator, rather than the financial institution The operator is required to provide to banks a license or a "reasoned legal opinion" that the site is legal
At the end of the day, the resolution of that issue is one that shouldn't impose a huge burden on the banks | But for banks and processors, the burden may not be as heavy as anticipated, says Dayanim, partner in the global banking and financial institutions practice of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP.
If a bank or processor already has done extensive due-diligence on its commercial customers
banks' and processors' primary responsibility will be to ensure the legality of the commercial sites only, rather than tracking the transactions of individual gamblers
the rule shifts the burden of proving legality to the site operator, rather than the financial institution
the resolution of that issue is one that shouldn't impose a huge burden on the banks | For a financial-services industry in the throes of economic upheaval, the final rule for implementing the controversial Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA) issued on Nov. 12 by the U.S. Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve represents another set of requirements with which to struggle. But for many banks and processors, the burden may not be as heavy as anticipated, says Behnam Dayanim, partner in the global banking and financial institutions practice of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP.
Just how much of an additional burden the rule will impose depends on how extensive a bank's or processor's existing know-your-customer requirements are, Dayanim says. If a bank or processor already has done extensive due-diligence on its commercial customers, they may feel they comply with the rule.
But for those that don't know their customers' businesses or whether the customers act on behalf of third parties, the rule could impose a "substantial additional burden," he says. "I suspect many banks don't know the answers to all those questions, at least as with respect to gambling."
The rule clarifies that banks' and processors' primary responsibility will be to ensure the legality of the commercial sites only, rather than tracking the transactions of individual gamblers. But it doesn't define what constitutes an illegal gambling site, an issue that created "a tremendous amount of angst in the financial-services community," Dayanim says.
However, the rule shifts the burden of proving legality to the site operator, rather than the financial institution. The operator is required to provide to banks a license or a "reasoned legal opinion" that the site is legal.
"At the end of the day, the resolution of that issue is one that shouldn't impose a huge burden on the banks," Dayanim says. | 1,830 | <h4><strong>Impact is exaggerated—burden of proving legality is on site operators, not financial institutions</h4><p>Digital Transactions</strong> 11/25/<strong>08</strong> (Cites Behnam Dayanim, JD, partner in the global banking and financial institutions practice of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP, “Burden of Final UIGEA Rule May Not Be As Heavy As Some Expected”, http://digitaltransactions.net/news/story/Burden-of-Final-UIGEA-Rule-May-Not-Be-As-Heavy-As-Some-Expected)</p><p>For a financial-services industry in the throes of economic upheaval, <u><strong>the</u></strong> final rule for implementing the controversial Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (<u><strong>UIGEA</u></strong>) issued on Nov. 12 by the U.S. Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve <u><strong>represents another set of requirements</u></strong> with which to struggle. <u><strong><mark>But for</u></strong></mark> many <u><strong><mark>banks and processors, the burden may not be as heavy as anticipated</u></strong>, <u><strong>says</u></strong></mark> Behnam <u><strong><mark>Dayanim, partner in the global banking and financial institutions practice of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP</u></strong>.</mark> </p><p>Just how much of an additional burden the rule will impose depends on how extensive a bank's or processor's existing know-your-customer requirements are, Dayanim says. <u><strong><mark>If a bank or processor already has done extensive due-diligence on its commercial customers</u></strong></mark>, they may feel <u><strong>they comply with the rule</u></strong>. </p><p>But for those that don't know their customers' businesses or whether the customers act on behalf of third parties, the rule could impose a "substantial additional burden," he says. "I suspect many banks don't know the answers to all those questions, at least as with respect to gambling." </p><p>The rule clarifies that <u><strong><mark>banks' and processors' primary responsibility will be to ensure the legality of the commercial sites only, rather than tracking the transactions of individual gamblers</u></strong></mark>. But it doesn't define what constitutes an illegal gambling site, an issue that created "a tremendous amount of angst in the financial-services community," Dayanim says. </p><p>However, <u><strong><mark>the rule shifts the burden of proving legality to the site operator, rather than the financial institution</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The operator is required to provide to banks a license or a "reasoned legal opinion" that the site is legal</u></strong>. </p><p>"<u><strong>At the end of the day, <mark>the resolution of that issue is one that shouldn't impose a huge burden on the banks</u></strong></mark>," Dayanim says. </p> | 1NC | null | adv 1 | 429,680 | 6 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,980 | Alternative – Reject The Affirmative’s Security Logic – This Allows for Actual Political Thought – Accepting Their Descriptions and Responses Colonizes the Debate. | Neocleous ’08 | Neocleous ’08, Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6] | The only way to escape the fetish, is to eschew the logic of security altogether to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought should be pressed to give it up. That ould never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises debates that animate political life The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told what might count as having achieved it Security politics is an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human being We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? maybe there is no hole." The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently reaffirm the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security The real task is to fight for an alternative political language which does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' ) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives To situate ourselves against security would allow us to forge another kind of politics What this might mean, must be open to debate. But it requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion ; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty and learning to tolerate the uncertainties | The only way is to eschew the logic of security That could never even be imagined by the security intellectual security has become so all-encompassing that it marginalises debates that animate political life Security turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', an anti-politics," The mistake has been to think that there is a hole needs to be filled with a revision of security All of these reaffirm the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is to fight for an alternative political language the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths would allow us to forge another kind of politics What this might mean must be open But it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and giving up the search for the certainty and learning to tolerate the uncertainties | The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iterationn of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."' | 5,274 | <h4>Alternative – Reject The Affirmative’s Security Logic – This Allows for Actual Political Thought – Accepting Their Descriptions and Responses Colonizes the Debate.</h4><p><strong>Neocleous ’08</strong>, Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security<u>, 185-6]</p><p><mark>The only way</u></mark> out of such a dilemma, <u>to escape the fetish, <mark>is</u></mark> perhaps <u><mark>to eschew the logic of security</mark> altogether</u> - <u>to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought</u> other than the authoritarian and reactionary <u>should be pressed to give it up. <mark>That</u></mark> is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus <mark>c<u>ould <strong>never even </mark>begin to <mark>be imagined by the security intellectual</u></strong></mark>. It is also something that the constant iterationn of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security.<u> This impasse exists because <mark>security has</mark> now <mark>become so all-encompassing that it marginalises</u></mark> all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, <u><mark>debates</u></mark> and discussions <u><mark>that animate political life</u></mark>. <u>The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end</u> - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - <u>that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. <mark>Security</u></mark> politics simply removes this; worse, <u>it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and <mark>turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security',</mark> despite the fact that we are never quite told</u> - never could be told - <u>what might count as having achieved it</u>. <u>Security politics is</u>, in this sense, <u><mark>an anti-politics,"</mark>' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human being</u>s, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. <u>We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add</u> yet <u>more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state</u> and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: <u>if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind?</u> But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: <u>maybe there is no hole."</u>' <u><mark>The mistake has been to think that there is a hole </mark>and that this hole <mark>needs to be filled with a </mark>new vision or <mark>revision of security</u></mark> in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. <u><mark>All of these</mark> ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently</u> end up <u><mark>reaffirm</u></mark>ing <u><mark>the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security</u>. <u>The real task is</u></mark> not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but <u><strong><mark>to fight for an alternative political language</strong></mark> which </u>takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore <u>does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state</u>. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that<u> <mark>the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths</u></mark>. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then <u>to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security'</u> (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty<u>) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives</u> to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. <u>To situate ourselves against security</u> politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It <u><mark>would</u></mark> also <u><mark>allow us to forge another kind of politics</u></mark> centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. <u><mark>What this might mean</mark>, </u>precisely, <u><mark>must be open</mark> to debate. <mark>But it</mark> </u>certainly <u>requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion</u>; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity<u>; it <mark>requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and</mark> thus <mark>giving up the search for the certainty</u></mark> of security <u><mark>and</u></mark> instead <u><mark>learning to tolerate the uncertainties</u></mark>, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'</p> | 1nc | null | k | 2,525 | 266 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,981 | Hegemony is unsustainable | Layne, 12 | Layne, 12 - Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley (Christopher, 2012, "The Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, Ebsco, p. 2, KONTOPOULOS) | it now is evident that the declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. The Great Recession has underscored the reality of decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise. the Great Recession has accelerated forces driving trends and magnified their impact. There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The external is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia. the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domestically, the driver of change is the decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis confronting the U S and increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status. | The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. the Great Recession has accelerated forces driving trends and magnified their impact drivers of American decline is the emergence of new great powers and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia the rise of China—is the most tangible evidence of the erosion of power Domestically, the driver of change is the decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the dollar’s hold on reserve currency status | Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, it now is evident that both the 1980s declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right after all. The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. The Great Recession has underscored the reality of US decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise. To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of history. However, it is fair to say the Great Recession has both accelerated the causal forces driving these trends and magnified their impact. There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The external driver of US decline is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia. In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domestically, the driver of change is the relative—and in some ways absolute—decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis confronting the United States, and increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status. | 1,507 | <h4>Hegemony is unsustainable</h4><p><strong>Layne, 12</strong> - Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley (Christopher, 2012, "The Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, Ebsco, p. 2, KONTOPOULOS)</p><p>Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, <u><strong>it now is evident that</u></strong> both <u><strong>the</u></strong> 1980s <u><strong>declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right</u></strong> after all. <u><strong><mark>The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun.</mark> The Great Recession has underscored the reality of</u></strong> US <u><strong>decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise.</u></strong> To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of history. However, it is fair to say <u><strong><mark>the Great Recession has</u></strong></mark> both <u><strong><mark>accelerated</u></strong></mark> the causal <u><strong><mark>forces driving</u></strong></mark> these <u><strong><mark>trends and magnified their impact</mark>. There are two <mark>drivers of American decline</mark>, one external and one domestic. The external</u></strong> driver of US decline <u><strong><mark>is the emergence of new great powers</mark> in world politics <mark>and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia</mark>.</u></strong> In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: <u><strong><mark>the rise of</mark> new great powers—especially <mark>China—is</mark> in itself <mark>the most tangible evidence of the erosion of</mark> the United States’ <mark>power</mark>. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. <mark>Domestically, the driver of change is the</u></strong></mark> relative—and in some ways absolute—<u><strong><mark>decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis</mark> confronting the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> increasing <mark>doubts about the dollar’s</mark> long-term <mark>hold on reserve currency status</mark>.</p></u></strong> | 1NC | null | adv 1 | 127,282 | 17 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,982 | their author immediately cites hype of restrictions impact afterwards | null | Cyranoski 13—David, Nature correspondent, first in Tokyo and then, since December 2013, in Shanghai, he covers a variety of topics with a special interest in stem cells6/4, http://www.nature.com/news/us-scientists-chafe-at-restrictions-on-new-stem-cell-lines-1.13114 | null | the impact of US stem-cell restrictions is overestimated. Mitalipov's cell lines will not reveal much about how stem cells transform. That work can be done only with eggs that are easy to come by, allowing scientists to examine the reprogramming process at many points. In practical terms, that means relying on eggs from mice instead of humans. “ | But some scientists say that the impact of US stem-cell restrictions is overestimated. Alexander Meissner, a developmental biologist at the Harvard Stem Cell Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, says Mitalipov's cell lines will not reveal much about how stem cells transform. That work can be done only with eggs that are easy to come by, allowing scientists to examine the reprogramming process at many points. In practical terms, that means relying on eggs from mice instead of humans. “Everything is over by time you derive those cell lines,” he says of Mitalipov’s cells. “There is no signature that would tell you what has happened. It’s the wrong species.” | 664 | <h4>their author immediately cites hype of restrictions impact afterwards</h4><p><mark>Cyranoski 13</mark>—David, Nature correspondent, first in Tokyo and then, since December 2013, in Shanghai, he covers a variety of topics with a special interest in stem cells6/4, http://www.nature.com/news/us-scientists-chafe-at-restrictions-on-new-stem-cell-lines-1.13114</p><p>But some scientists say that <mark>the impact of US stem-cell restrictions is overestimated.</mark> Alexander Meissner, a developmental biologist at the Harvard Stem Cell Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, says <mark>Mitalipov's cell lines will not reveal much about how stem cells transform. That work can be done only with eggs that are easy to come by, allowing scientists to examine the reprogramming process at many points. In practical terms, that means relying on eggs from mice instead of humans.</mark> <mark>“</mark>Everything is over by time you derive those cell lines,” he says of Mitalipov’s cells. “There is no signature that would tell you what has happened. It’s the wrong species.”</p> | 1nc | null | MSD | 430,523 | 1 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,983 | Expanding the U.S. lead in material power triggers global resentment and blowback that destroys the effectiveness of U.S. heg in stabilizing every key hotspot | Maher, 11 | Maher, 11 – Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute and Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department at Brown University (Richard, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World”, Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS) | world politics has been unipolar, defined by American preponderance military, economic, and technological material advantage does not translate into America’s preferred political and diplomatic outcomes Other states are challenging U.S. power and authority the U S is finding it increasingly difficult to realize its goals and ambitions decline in the U S s’ relative position is a consequence of the burdens and susceptibilities produced by unipolarity Contrary to the conventional wisdom the U.S. position both internationally and domestically may actually be strengthened once unipolarity has passed The U.S. economy, with a GDP of over $14 trillion, is nearly three times the size of China’s, now the world’s second-largest national economy. The U S accounts for 25 percent of global economic output Among the group of six or seven great powers, this figure approaches 50 percent despite this material preeminence, the U S sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world China has adopted a new assertiveness Pakistan one of America’s closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs Brazil’s growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere relations with Japan are at their frostiest in decades America’s vast power is not translating into America’s preferred outcomes. There are many costs that come with predominance material, political, and reputational Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in one’s friends just as much as in one’s rivals it is not American predominance that produces unease but rather American predominance Predominance makes one a tempting target, and scapegoat for other countries’ problems and unrealized ambitions Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country’s economic and social woes on U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America’s own interests Predominant power breeds envy, resentment, and alienation How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics As we witness the emergence of great powers in other parts of the world the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future the U S will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the U S should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause America’s position in the world both at home and internationally could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over | military, economic, and technological advantage does not translate into America’s preferred outcomes Other states are challenging U.S. power the U S is finding it difficult to realize its goals decline in the U S s’ relative position is a consequence of the burdens produced by unipolarity despite material preeminence, the U S sees influence diminishing China has adopted a new assertiveness Pakistan is facing collapse. Russia is using energy resources to reassert dominance Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere Brazil’s growing economic and political influence Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety friends just as much as rivals American predominance. makes one a tempting target, and scapegoat for other countries’ problems Predominant power breeds envy, resentment, and alienation | Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, world politics has been unipolar, defined by American preponderance in each of the core components of state power—military, economic, and technological. Such an imbalanced distribution of power in favor of a single country is unprecedented in the modern state system. This material advantage does not automatically translate into America’s preferred political and diplomatic outcomes, however. Other states, if now only at the margins, are challenging U.S. power and authority. Additionally, on a range of issues, the United States is finding it increasingly difficult to realize its goals and ambitions. The even bigger challenge for policymakers in Washington is how to respond to signs that America’s unquestioned preeminence in international politics is waning. This decline in the United States’ relative position is in part a consequence of the burdens and susceptibilities produced by unipolarity. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the U.S. position both internationally and domestically may actually be strengthened once this period of unipolarity has passed. On pure material terms, the gap between the United States and the rest of the world is indeed vast. The U.S. economy, with a GDP of over $14 trillion, is nearly three times the size of China’s, now the world’s second-largest national economy. The United States today accounts for approximately 25 percent of global economic output, a figure that has held relatively stable despite steadily increasing economic growth in China, India, Brazil, and other countries. Among the group of six or seven great powers, this figure approaches 50 percent. When one takes discretionary spending into account, the United States today spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined. This imbalance is even further magnified by the fact that five of the next seven biggest spenders are close U.S. allies. China, the country often seen as America’s next great geopolitical rival, has a defense budget that is one-seventh of what the United States spends on its military. There is also a vast gap in terms of the reach and sophistication of advanced weapons systems. By some measures, the United States spends more on research and development for its military than the rest of the world combined. What is remarkable is that the United States can do all of this without completely breaking the bank. The United States today devotes approximately 4 percent of GDP to defense. As a percentage of GDP, the United States today spends far less on its military than it did during the Cold War, when defense spending hovered around 10 percent of gross economic output. As one would expect, the United States today enjoys unquestioned preeminence in the military realm. No other state comes close to having the capability to project military power like the United States.1 And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America’s growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America’s closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil’s growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And relations with Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in decades. To many observers, it seems that America’s vast power is not translating into America’s preferred outcomes. As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one’s preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one’s predominant position in world politics. There are many costs that come with predominance – material, political, and reputational. Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in others, in one’s friends just as much as in one’s rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily American predominance that produces unease but rather American predominance. Predominance also makes one a tempting target, and a scapegoat for other countries’ own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country’s economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America’s own interests. Predominant power likewise breeds envy, resentment, and alienation. How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy—the perception that one’s role and purpose is acceptable and one’s power is used justly—is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics. As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence) of great powers in other parts of the world, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is inevitable that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future, and that the United States will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the United States naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance, it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, America’s position in the world—both at home and internationally—could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the ‘‘post-unipolar’’ world. | 6,345 | <h4>Expanding the U.S. lead in material power triggers global resentment and blowback that destroys the <u>effectiveness</u> of U.S. heg in stabilizing every key hotspot </h4><p><strong>Maher, 11</strong> – Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute and Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department at Brown University (Richard, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World”, Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)</p><p>Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, <u><strong>world politics has been unipolar, defined by American preponderance</u></strong> in each of the core components of state power—<u><strong><mark>military,</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>economic, and technological</u></strong></mark>. Such an imbalanced distribution of power in favor of a single country is unprecedented in the modern state system. This <u><strong>material <mark>advantage</u></strong> <u><strong>does not</u></strong></mark> automatically <u><strong><mark>translate into America’s</u></strong> <u><strong>preferred</mark> political and diplomatic <mark>outcomes</u></strong></mark>, however. <u><strong><mark>Other states</u></strong></mark>, if now only at the margins, <u><strong><mark>are challenging U.S. power</mark> and authority</u></strong>. Additionally, on a range of issues, <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>is finding it</mark> increasingly <mark>difficult to realize its goals</mark> and ambitions</u></strong>. The even bigger challenge for policymakers in Washington is how to respond to signs that America’s unquestioned preeminence in international politics is waning. This <u><strong><mark>decline in the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tate<u><strong><mark>s’</mark> <mark>relative position is</u></strong></mark> in part <u><strong><mark>a consequence of the</u></strong> <u><strong>burdens</mark> and susceptibilities <mark>produced by unipolarity</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Contrary to the conventional wisdom</u></strong>, <u><strong>the U.S. position both internationally and domestically</u></strong> <u><strong>may actually be strengthened</u></strong> <u><strong>once</u></strong> this period of <u><strong>unipolarity has passed</u></strong>. On pure material terms, the gap between the United States and the rest of the world is indeed vast. <u><strong>The U.S. economy, with a GDP of over $14 trillion, is nearly three times the size of China’s, now the world’s second-largest national economy. The U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates today <u><strong>accounts for</u></strong> approximately <u><strong>25 percent of global economic output</u></strong>, a figure that has held relatively stable despite steadily increasing economic growth in China, India, Brazil, and other countries. <u><strong>Among the group of six or seven great powers, this figure approaches 50 percent</u></strong>. When one takes discretionary spending into account, the United States today spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined. This imbalance is even further magnified by the fact that five of the next seven biggest spenders are close U.S. allies. China, the country often seen as America’s next great geopolitical rival, has a defense budget that is one-seventh of what the United States spends on its military. There is also a vast gap in terms of the reach and sophistication of advanced weapons systems. By some measures, the United States spends more on research and development for its military than the rest of the world combined. What is remarkable is that the United States can do all of this without completely breaking the bank. The United States today devotes approximately 4 percent of GDP to defense. As a percentage of GDP, the United States today spends far less on its military than it did during the Cold War, when defense spending hovered around 10 percent of gross economic output. As one would expect, the United States today enjoys unquestioned preeminence in the military realm. No other state comes close to having the capability to project military power like the United States.1 And yet, <u><strong><mark>despite</mark> this <mark>material preeminence, the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>sees</mark> its political and strategic <mark>influence diminishing</mark> around the world</u></strong>. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. <u><strong><mark>China has adopted a new assertiveness</u></strong></mark> recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America’s growing debt (which China largely finances). <u><strong><mark>Pakistan</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>one of America’s closest strategic allies, <mark>is facing</mark> the threat of social and political <mark>collapse</u></strong>. <u><strong>Russia</u></strong> <u><strong>is using</mark> its vast <mark>energy resources to</u></strong> <u><strong>reassert</mark> its <mark>dominance</u></strong></mark> in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. <u><strong><mark>Negotiations with</u></strong> <u><strong>North Korea and Iran</u></strong> <u><strong>have gone nowhere</mark> in dismantling their nuclear programs</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Brazil’s</u></strong> <u><strong>growing economic and political influence</mark> offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere</u></strong>. And <u><strong>relations with Japan</u></strong>, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, <u><strong>are at their frostiest in decades</u></strong>. To many observers, it seems that <u><strong>America’s vast power is not translating into America’s preferred outcomes.</u></strong> As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one’s preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one’s predominant position in world politics. <u><strong>There are</u></strong> <u><strong>many costs that come with predominance</u></strong> – <u><strong>material, political, and reputational</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Vast imbalances of power</u></strong> <u><strong>create apprehension and anxiety</u></strong> </mark>in others, <u><strong>in one’s <mark>friends just as much as </mark>in one’s <mark>rivals</u></strong></mark>. In this view, <u><strong>it is not</u></strong> necessarily <u><strong>American predominance that produces unease but rather <mark>American predominance</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>Predominance</u></strong> also <u><strong><mark>makes one a</u></strong> <u><strong>tempting target, and</u></strong></mark> a <u><strong><mark>scapegoat</u></strong> <u><strong>for other countries’</u></strong></mark> own <u><strong><mark>problems</mark> and unrealized ambitions</u></strong>. <u><strong>Many a Third World autocrat has</u></strong> <u><strong>blamed his country’s economic and social woes on</u></strong> an ostensible <u><strong>U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient</u></strong> <u><strong>to America’s own interests</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Predominant power</u></strong></mark> likewise <u><strong><mark>breeds</u></strong> <u><strong>envy, resentment, and alienation</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor?</u></strong> <u><strong>Legitimacy</u></strong>—the perception that one’s role and purpose is acceptable and one’s power is used justly—<u><strong>is</u></strong> <u><strong>indispensable for maintaining power and influence</u></strong> <u><strong>in world politics</u></strong>. <u><strong>As we witness the emergence</u></strong> (or re-emergence) <u><strong>of great powers in other parts of the world</u></strong>, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is inevitable that <u><strong>the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future</u></strong>, and that <u><strong>the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>will necessarily see its relative power decline.</u></strong> <u><strong>While the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates naturally <u><strong>should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance</u></strong>, <u><strong>it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It</u></strong> certainly <u><strong>should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost</u></strong>, <u><strong>devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause</u></strong>. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, <u><strong>America’s position in the world</u></strong>—<u><strong>both at home and internationally</u></strong>—<u><strong>could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over</u></strong>. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the ‘‘post-unipolar’’ world.</p> | 1NC | null | adv 1 | 98,367 | 49 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,984 | GAME CHANGER- their author concludes medical self defense is insufficient to solve stem cell research | null | Hicks 8—Kristin, Harvard Law School JD“EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH AND THE THEORY OF MEDICAL SELF-DEFENSE”, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Volume 21, Number 2 Spring 2008 | null | CONCLUSION Professor Volokh’s theory of medical self-defense provides an outwardly attractive foundation on which to base a fundamental right of access to stem cell therapies. Further analysis, however, demonstrates that application of the theory to stem cell research ultimately fails. The medical self-defense theory itself suffers some weaknesses and may not be consistent with the health exception required by the Court in its abortion case law. Even if a right to medical self-defense does exist, it may exist uniquely in the abortion context | CONCLUSION In light of the considerable promise of stem cell research, it is tempting to try to protect scientists’ ability to conduct such research by claiming that laws restricting research infringe on a fundamental right of terminally ill patients to access stem cell treatments. Professor Volokh’s theory of medical self-defense, which has received considerable attention in the press and in the academic community,116 provides an outwardly attractive foundation on which to base a fundamental right of access to stem cell therapies. Further analysis, however, demonstrates that application of the theory to stem cell research ultimately fails. The medical self-defense theory itself suffers some weaknesses and may not be consistent with the health exception required by the Court in its abortion case law. Even if a right to medical self-defense does exist, it may exist uniquely in the abortion context. | 910 | <h4>GAME CHANGER- their author <u>concludes</u> medical self defense is insufficient to solve stem cell research</h4><p><mark>Hicks 8</mark>—Kristin, Harvard Law School JD“EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH AND THE THEORY OF MEDICAL SELF-DEFENSE”, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Volume 21, Number 2 Spring 2008</p><p><mark>CONCLUSION</mark> In light of the considerable promise of stem cell research, it is tempting to try to protect scientists’ ability to conduct such research by claiming that laws restricting research infringe on a fundamental right of terminally ill patients to access stem cell treatments. <mark>Professor Volokh’s theory of medical self-defense</mark>, which has received considerable attention in the press and in the academic community,116 <mark>provides an outwardly attractive foundation on which to base a fundamental right of access to stem cell therapies. Further analysis, however, demonstrates that application of the theory to stem cell research ultimately fails. The medical self-defense theory itself suffers some weaknesses and may not be consistent with the health exception required by the Court in its abortion case law. Even if a right to medical self-defense does exist, it may exist uniquely in the abortion context</mark>.</p> | 1nc | null | MSD | 430,524 | 6 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,985 | No risk of money laundering and even if there was, the plan can’t solve – regulated environments are just as susceptible and patchworks of international regulation make enforcement impossible | Banks 14 | Banks 14 (James, professor of criminology at Sheffield Hallam University, “Online Gambling and Crime: Causes, Controls and Controversies”, google books) | There is little evidence of money laundering through regulated gambling environments Levi in his assessment of the money laundering risks questions the likelihood of significant sums of money being laundered through such sites, noting that e- gaming ‘does not directly feature significantly, or indeed at all’ in published threat assessments of the policing priorities of European policing organisations generalised and understandable expressions of concern about money laundering risks posed by the Internet have not been accompanied by evidence of significant laundering via e-gaming’ This viewpoint is echoed by Sparrow, Bazelon and Jackson who note that: ‘There is little documentation by which to gauge the extent of actual money laundering in online gambling’. a 2005 report undertaken on behalf of the Interactive Gaming Council noted that there was ‘scant’ evidence of the existence of money laundering in online gambling. With no complaints of laundering having ever been recorded by the Internet Crine Complaint Centre’ the report suggests that Internet gaming does not, contribute to money laundering This suggests that ‘the risks associated with the sector are modest, due to the high traceability of e-gaming transactions and customer identification controls in the regulated sector’ (Levi, 2009: 4).
Levi suggests that e-gaming does present money laundering risks, but due to the high traceability of transactions, customer identification controls and betting limits in the regulated sector these risks are significantly lower than in land based gaming online gambling operators may credit gambling profits or unused funds back to a different account than the one from which the gambling account was funded Second, gaming transactions may be completed by ‘front people’ Third, in peer-to-peer games, money may be transferred between both electronic and human players through deliberate losses Fourth, payment to and from gambling establishments may be undertaken via financial intermediaries that adhere to anti-money laundering directives but whose Know Your Customer procedures are of modest or variable quality Fifth, laundering may occur via legal betting The Financial Action Task Force in their report Money Laundering through the Football Sector, suggest that laundering through betting is a ‘huge and increasing problem’ sports betting is a far more attractive approach to laundering money as payout rates have increased from less than 80 per cent for land based establishments to over 92 per cent it is also possible to bet with a host of different online bookmakers With money laundering costs typically exceeding 30 per cent, Internet sports betting offers an extremely attractive means of laundering money with supply costs reduced the profitability and prevalence of laundering and organised crime is increased FATF suggest that:
[The use of the Internet for online betting further increases the risk of money laundering Due to the fact that most countries have different gambling regulations, the gambling market is non-transparent Providers are established ¡n countries which allow the organisation of gambling activities or in countries that do not regulate or supervise gambling. it is however not easy to take legal action against providers who offer their services online and are established abroad This in combination with the non-transparency of the gambling market makes betting a laundering vehicle for criminals | There is little evidence of significant sums of money being laundered through e- gaming ‘There is little documentation by which to gauge laundering in online gambling’ With no complaints of laundering having ever been recorded
e-gaming money laundering risks due to the high traceability of transactions, customer identification controls and betting limits are significantly lower than in land based gaming operators may credit profits back to a different account laundering may occur via legal betting sports betting is a far more attractive approach as payout rates have increased to over 92 per cent Internet sports betting an extremely attractive means of laundering
Due to the fact that most countries have different gambling regulations, the market is non-transparent regulate or supervise gambling. it is however not easy to take legal action against providers who offer their services online and are established | There is, in fact, little evidence of money laundering through regulated gambling environments. Levi (2009: 4), in his European overview and assessment of the money laundering risks of e-gaming, questions the likelihood of significant sums of money — ‘in the billions of Euros’ — being laundered through such sites, noting that e- gaming ‘does not directly feature significantly, or indeed at all’ in published threat assessments of the policing priorities of Europol or other European policing organisations. Moreover, ‘generalised and understandable expressions of concern by Europol and by the Financial Action Task Force about money laundering risks posed by the Internet have not been accompanied by evidence of significant laundering via e-gaming’ (Levi, 2009: 4, emphasis in original). This viewpoint is echoed by Sparrow, Bazelon and Jackson (2009: 38) who note that: ‘There is little documentation by which to gauge the extent of actual money laundering in online gambling’. Examining the vulnerability of online gambling to money laundering, the US General Accounting Office (2002) concluded that the ‘views on the vulnerability of Internet gambling to money laundering are mixed’, whilst a 2005 report (NFC Global, 2005) undertaken on behalf of the Interactive Gaming Council also noted that there was ‘scant’ evidence of the existence of money laundering in online gambling. With no complaints of laundering having ever been recorded by the Internet Crine Complaint Centre’ (1C3)the report suggests that: ‘Internet gaming does not, in and of itself, contribute to money laundering. Rather, it is the financial transactions that are used to move money on the Internet that may be susceptible to money laundering’ (NFC Global, 2005: 4). This suggests that ‘the risks associated with the sector are comparatively modest, due to the high traceability of e-gaming transactions and customer identification controls in the regulated sector’ (Levi, 2009: 4).
Levi (2009), however, suggests that e-gaming does present money laundering risks, but due to the high traceability of transactions, customer identification controls and betting limits in the regulated sector these risks are significantly lower than in land based gaming and cash operated businesses. Levi identifies five areas of risk to regulated e-gaming markets. First, online gambling operators may credit gambling profits or unused funds back to a different account than the one from which the gambling account was funded. Although many operators do not allow winnings or cash-ins to be credited to a different account to that that is used for the funding of gaming transactions, they may be obliged to do so at the request of the customer. Second, gaming transactions may be completed by ‘front people’. Such individuals can undertake gaming transactions for undisclosed principals or act as ‘mules’ by allowing their personal accounts to be employed as conduits for financial transactions. Third, in peer-to-peer games, money may be transferred between both electronic and human players through deliberate losses, with little cost to the players. Despite the fact that such laundering poses little financial risk to operators, reputational and punitive damages imposed by regulators may result if such activities are identified. Fourth, payment to and from gambling establishments may be undertaken via financial intermediaries that adhere to anti-money laundering directives but whose Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures are of modest or variable quality. Fifth, laundering may occur via legal (and illegal) betting. The Financial Action Task Force (2009: 8), in their report Money Laundering through the Football Sector, suggest that laundering through betting is a ‘huge and increasing problem’. Today, sports betting is a far more attractive approach to laundering money than it was 15 years ago, as payout rates have increased from less than 80 per cent for land based establishments to over 92 per cent for many of the online companies (SportsAccord, 2011). In many countries, it is also possible to bet with a host of different online bookmakers. By spreading bets between bookmakers with the best odds, payouts of over loo per cent can be achieved (ibid.). With money laundering costs typically exceeding 30 per cent, Internet sports betting offers an extremely attractive means of laundering money. Fiedler (2013) claims that with supply costs reduced the profitability and prevalence of laundering and organised crime is increased. Although there is little empirical evidence to support such a claim, FATF suggest that:
[The use of the Internet for online betting further increases the risk of money laundering ... Due to the fact that most countries have different gambling regulations, the gambling market is non-transparent and is a heterogeneous market with a mix of private and state companies acting both nationally and internationally. Providers are often established ¡n countries which allow the organisation of gambling activities or in countries that do not regulate or supervise gambling. it is however not easy to take legal action against providers who offer their services online and are established abroad. This in combination with the non-transparency of the gambling market makes betting an interesting money laundering vehicle for criminals. (Financial Action Task Force, 2009b: 24—25) | 5,383 | <h4><strong>No risk of money laundering and <u>even if</u> there was, the plan can’t solve – regulated environments are just as susceptible and patchworks of international regulation make enforcement impossible</h4><p>Banks 14 </strong>(James, professor of criminology at Sheffield Hallam University, “Online Gambling and Crime: Causes, Controls and Controversies”, google books)</p><p><u><strong><mark>There is</u></strong></mark>, in fact, <u><strong><mark>little evidence of </mark>money laundering through regulated gambling environments</u></strong>. <u><strong>Levi</u></strong> (2009: 4), <u><strong>in his</u></strong> European overview and <u><strong>assessment of the money laundering risks</u></strong> of e-gaming, <u><strong>questions the likelihood of <mark>significant sums of money</u></strong></mark> — ‘in the billions of Euros’ — <u><strong><mark>being laundered through</mark> such sites, noting that <mark>e- gaming</mark> ‘does not directly feature significantly, or indeed at all’ in published threat assessments of the policing priorities of</u></strong> Europol or other <u><strong>European policing organisations</u></strong>. Moreover, ‘<u><strong>generalised and understandable expressions of concern</u></strong> by Europol and by the Financial Action Task Force <u><strong>about money laundering risks posed by the Internet have not been accompanied by evidence of significant laundering via e-gaming’</u></strong> (Levi, 2009: 4, emphasis in original). <u><strong>This viewpoint is echoed by Sparrow, Bazelon and Jackson</u></strong> (2009: 38) <u><strong>who note that: <mark>‘There is little documentation by which to gauge</mark> the extent of actual money <mark>laundering</mark> <mark>in online gambling’</mark>.</u></strong> Examining the vulnerability of online gambling to money laundering, the US General Accounting Office (2002) concluded that the ‘views on the vulnerability of Internet gambling to money laundering are mixed’, whilst <u><strong>a 2005 report</u></strong> (NFC Global, 2005) <u><strong>undertaken on behalf of the Interactive Gaming Council</u></strong> also <u><strong>noted that</u></strong> <u><strong>there was ‘scant’ evidence of the existence of money laundering in online gambling.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>With no complaints of laundering having ever been recorded</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>by the Internet Crine Complaint Centre’</u></strong> (1C3)<u><strong>the report suggests that</u></strong>: ‘<u><strong>Internet gaming does not,</u></strong> in and of itself, <u><strong>contribute to money laundering</u></strong>. Rather, it is the financial transactions that are used to move money on the Internet that may be susceptible to money laundering’ (NFC Global, 2005: 4). <u><strong>This suggests that ‘the risks associated with the sector are</u></strong> comparatively <u><strong>modest, due to the high traceability of e-gaming transactions and customer identification controls in the regulated sector’ (Levi, 2009: 4).</p><p>Levi</u></strong> (2009), however, <u><strong>suggests that <mark>e-gaming</mark> does present <mark>money laundering risks</mark>, but <mark>due to the high traceability of transactions, customer identification controls and betting limits</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>in the regulated sector these risks <mark>are significantly lower than in land based gaming</u></strong></mark> and cash operated businesses. Levi identifies five areas of risk to regulated e-gaming markets. First, <u><strong>online gambling <mark>operators may credit</mark> gambling <mark>profits</mark> or unused funds <mark>back to a different account</mark> than the one from which the gambling account was funded</u></strong>. Although many operators do not allow winnings or cash-ins to be credited to a different account to that that is used for the funding of gaming transactions, they may be obliged to do so at the request of the customer. <u><strong>Second, gaming transactions may be completed by ‘front people’</u></strong>. Such individuals can undertake gaming transactions for undisclosed principals or act as ‘mules’ by allowing their personal accounts to be employed as conduits for financial transactions. <u><strong>Third, in peer-to-peer games, money may be transferred between both electronic and human players through deliberate losses</u></strong>, with little cost to the players. Despite the fact that such laundering poses little financial risk to operators, reputational and punitive damages imposed by regulators may result if such activities are identified. <u><strong>Fourth, payment to and from gambling establishments may be undertaken via financial intermediaries that adhere to anti-money laundering directives but whose Know Your Customer</u></strong> (KYC) <u><strong>procedures are of modest or variable quality</u></strong>. <u><strong>Fifth, <mark>laundering may occur via legal</u></strong></mark> (and illegal) <u><strong><mark>betting</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The Financial Action Task Force</u></strong> (2009: 8), <u><strong>in their report Money Laundering through the Football Sector, suggest that</u></strong> <u><strong>laundering through betting is a ‘huge and increasing problem’</u></strong>. Today, <u><strong><mark>sports betting is a far more attractive approach</mark> to laundering money</u></strong> than it was 15 years ago, <u><strong><mark>as payout rates have increased</mark> from less than 80 per cent for land based establishments <mark>to over 92 per cent</u></strong></mark> for many of the online companies (SportsAccord, 2011). In many countries, <u><strong>it is also possible to bet with a host of different online bookmakers</u></strong>. By spreading bets between bookmakers with the best odds, payouts of over loo per cent can be achieved (ibid.). <u><strong>With money laundering costs typically exceeding 30 per cent, <mark>Internet sports betting </mark>offers <mark>an extremely attractive means of laundering </mark>money</u></strong>. Fiedler (2013) claims that <u><strong>with supply costs reduced the profitability and prevalence of laundering and organised crime is increased</u></strong>. Although there is little empirical evidence to support such a claim, <u><strong>FATF suggest that:</p><p>[The use of the Internet for online betting further increases the risk of money laundering</u></strong> ... <u><strong><mark>Due to the fact that most countries have different gambling regulations,</mark> <mark>the</mark> gambling <mark>market is non-transparent</u></strong></mark> and is a heterogeneous market with a mix of private and state companies acting both nationally and internationally. <u><strong>Providers are</u></strong> often <u><strong>established ¡n countries which allow the organisation of gambling activities or in countries that do not <mark>regulate or supervise gambling. it is however not easy to take legal action against providers who offer their services online and are established</mark> abroad</u></strong>. <u><strong>This in combination with the non-transparency of the gambling market makes betting a</u></strong>n interesting money <u><strong>laundering vehicle for criminals</u>. (Financial Action Task Force, 2009b: 24—25)</p></strong> | 1NC | null | adv 2 | 429,741 | 21 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,986 | NOTA does not apply to stem cells | Pollack 11 | Pollack 11 ANDREW POLLACK December 2, 2011 The New York Times Court Says Some Donors Of Stem Cells Can Be Paid SECTION: Section B; Column 0; Business/Financial Desk; Pg. 5 lexis | The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said that a federal law prohibiting payment for donated organs did not apply to stem cells extracted from circulating blood.
''The statute does not prohibit compensation for donations of blood and the substances in it, which include peripheral blood stem cells,'' Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld wrote | The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said that a federal law prohibiting payment for donated organs did not apply to stem cells extracted from circulating blood.
''The statute does not prohibit compensation for donations of blood and the substances in it, which include peripheral blood stem cells,'' Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld wrote | The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said that a federal law prohibiting payment for donated organs did not apply to stem cells extracted from circulating blood.
''The statute does not prohibit compensation for donations of blood and the substances in it, which include peripheral blood stem cells,'' Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld wrote for a unanimous three-judge panel. | 373 | <h4>NOTA does not apply to stem cells</h4><p><strong>Pollack 11</strong> ANDREW POLLACK December 2, 2011 <u>The New York Times Court Says Some Donors Of Stem Cells Can Be Paid SECTION: Section B; Column 0; Business/Financial Desk; Pg. 5 lexis</p><p><mark>The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said that a federal law prohibiting payment for donated organs did not apply to stem cells extracted from circulating blood.</mark> </p><p><mark>''The statute does not prohibit compensation for donations of blood and the substances in it, which include peripheral blood stem cells,'' Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld wrote</u> </mark>for a unanimous three-judge panel.</p> | 1nc | null | MSD | 430,525 | 2 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,987 | Legalized online gambling causes proliferation of terrorist money laundering, causing catastrophic terrorism – only prohibition solves | Thackston 14 is distinguished professor of economics at Baylor University, former senior economist for the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and author of "Gambling In America: Costs and Benefits.", http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-online-gambling-is-a-strategic-national-threat/2151317 | Thackston 14, James Thackston, is a Florida-based independent software engineer with a background in the aerospace, manufacturing and energy industries. Earl L. Grinols is distinguished professor of economics at Baylor University, former senior economist for the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and author of "Gambling In America: Costs and Benefits.", http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-online-gambling-is-a-strategic-national-threat/2151317 | Remote gambling is fundamentally different from brick-and-mortar casino gambling Using tech undetectable to operators and regulators, House Commerce Committee witnessed a demonstration in which a single remote computer took control of two computers and used them as alias machines to play poker online. The demonstration showed tech and techniques terror and crime use to operate untraceable money laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from the spread of poker online A drug cartel could arrange for buyers' machines to be remotely linked and lose to the aliased cartel machines. Drug buyers would not even need to play from their own machines. Illegal drug money would appear to be legal online winnings. A single poker game takes just a few hours to transfer $5 million An established al-Qaida poker network could extract from the U S enough untraceable money in six days to fund an operation like 9/11 The threat is real gambling regulations are no match for determined terrorists and criminals it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline. | Remote gambling Using tech undetectable to regulators a demonstration a single remote computer took control of computers and used them to play poker The demo showed tech terror and crime use to operate untraceable laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from spread of poker online. An established al-Qaida poker network could extract enough untraceable money in six days to fund 9/11 gambling regulations are no match for determined terrorists and criminals, it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline. | Remote gambling is fundamentally different from brick-and-mortar casino gambling because the website operator never has complete control. Using technology undetectable to website operators and their regulators, it is possible for gamblers to play games from physical locations that are not what they seem. We know, because we have done it. Recently, House Energy and Commerce Committee staff and others in the Capitol Hill office of U.S. Rep. Gregg Harper, R-Miss., witnessed a demonstration in which a single remote computer took control of two computers and used them as alias machines to play poker online. The Harper demonstration showed the technology and techniques that terror and crime organizations could use to operate untraceable money laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from the spread of poker online. One of us set up a website — undetectablelaundering.com — to help communicate the problem to a broader audience. No one should doubt the ability of criminals to exploit the inherent weakness in online gambling. A drug cartel could arrange for buyers' machines to be remotely linked and lose to the aliased cartel machines. Drug buyers would not even need to play from their own machines. Illegal drug money would appear to be legal online winnings. A single poker game takes just a few hours to transfer $5 million as was recently demonstrated — legally — by American player Brian Hastings with his Swedish competitor half a world away. An established al-Qaida poker network could extract from the United States enough untraceable money in six days to fund an operation like the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. The threat is real. Last month a Texas lawyer was found guilty of trying to launder $600 million in drug money for a Mexican cartel. Caesar's Entertainment is currently under investigation by the Justice Department and IRS, accused of money laundering and Bank Secrecy Act violations. In December 2012, the FBI's Tampa field office asked us to take down the website explaining the threat. We complied. This May, special agents at FBI headquarters in Washington responsible for enforcing the Wire Act and all other federal gambling laws were briefed on the vulnerability. In July, a Senate Commerce Committee hearing seemed to reinforce concerns. Rep. C.W. Bill Young wrote a letter of concern to FBI director Robert Mueller on Aug. 7. But since then action seems to have stalled. And the threat moves on. With the passing of Young, we have put the website back up and joined together in hopes of spurring action. Since it remains true that gambling regulations in Nevada, Delaware and New Jersey are no match for determined terrorists and criminals, we feel duty-bound as responsible citizens to ensure knowledge of the threat reaches as many policymakers as possible. We have proved it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline. | 2,997 | <h4><strong>Legalized online gambling causes <u>proliferation</u> of <u>terrorist money laundering</u>, causing <u>catastrophic terrorism</u> – only prohibition solves</h4><p>Thackston 14</strong>, James Thackston, is a Florida-based independent software engineer with a background in the aerospace, manufacturing and energy industries. Earl L. Grinols<u><strong> is distinguished professor of economics at Baylor University, former senior economist for the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and author of "Gambling In America: Costs and Benefits.", http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-online-gambling-is-a-strategic-national-threat/2151317</p><p><mark>Remote gambling</mark> is fundamentally different from brick-and-mortar casino gambling</u></strong> because the website operator never has complete control. <u><strong><mark>Using tech</u></strong></mark>nology <u><strong><mark>undetectable to</u></strong></mark> website <u><strong>operators and</u></strong> their <u><strong><mark>regulators</mark>,</u></strong> it is possible for gamblers to play games from physical locations that are not what they seem. We know, because we have done it. Recently, <u><strong>House</u></strong> Energy and <u><strong>Commerce Committee</u></strong> staff and others in the Capitol Hill office of U.S. Rep. Gregg Harper, R-Miss., <u><strong>witnessed <mark>a demonstration </mark>in which <mark>a single remote computer took control of </mark>two <mark>computers and used them</mark> as alias machines <mark>to play poker </mark>online. <mark>The</u></strong></mark> Harper <u><strong><mark>demo</mark>nstration <mark>showed</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>tech</u></strong></mark>nology <u><strong>and techniques</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>terror and crime</u></strong></mark> organizations could <u><strong><mark>use to operate untraceable</mark> money <mark>laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry — just the environment that will result from</mark> the <mark>spread of poker online</u></strong>.</mark> One of us set up a website — undetectablelaundering.com — to help communicate the problem to a broader audience. No one should doubt the ability of criminals to exploit the inherent weakness in online gambling. <u><strong>A drug cartel could arrange for buyers' machines to be remotely linked and lose to the aliased cartel machines. Drug buyers would not even need to play from their own machines. Illegal drug money would appear to be legal online winnings. A single poker game takes just a few hours to transfer $5 million </u></strong>as was recently demonstrated — legally — by American player Brian Hastings with his Swedish competitor half a world away. <u><strong><mark>An established al-Qaida poker network could extract</mark> from the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong><mark>enough untraceable money in six days to fund</mark> an operation like </u></strong>the <u><strong><mark>9/11</mark> </u></strong>attack on the World Trade Center. <u><strong>The threat is real</u></strong>. Last month a Texas lawyer was found guilty of trying to launder $600 million in drug money for a Mexican cartel. Caesar's Entertainment is currently under investigation by the Justice Department and IRS, accused of money laundering and Bank Secrecy Act violations. In December 2012, the FBI's Tampa field office asked us to take down the website explaining the threat. We complied. This May, special agents at FBI headquarters in Washington responsible for enforcing the Wire Act and all other federal gambling laws were briefed on the vulnerability. In July, a Senate Commerce Committee hearing seemed to reinforce concerns. Rep. C.W. Bill Young wrote a letter of concern to FBI director Robert Mueller on Aug. 7. But since then action seems to have stalled. And the threat moves on. With the passing of Young, we have put the website back up and joined together in hopes of spurring action. Since it remains true that <u><strong><mark>gambling regulations</mark> </u></strong>in Nevada, Delaware and New Jersey <u><strong><mark>are no match for determined terrorists and criminals</u></strong>,</mark> we feel duty-bound as responsible citizens to ensure knowledge of the threat reaches as many policymakers as possible. We have proved <u><strong><mark>it is possible to make money laundering undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline.</p></u></strong></mark> | 1NC | null | adv 2 | 429,685 | 23 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,988 | Cybercrime risks .7% of the global economy worst case—their evidence says it’s 500 billion globally—that’s not enough to trigger an economic collapse. | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Cybercrime risks .7% of the global economy <u>worst case</u>—their evidence says it’s 500 billion <u>globally</u><strong>—that’s not enough to trigger an economic collapse.</h4></strong> | 1NC | null | adv 2 | 430,526 | 1 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,989 | Hegemony is unsustainable | Layne, 12 | Layne, 12 - Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley (Christopher, 2012, "The Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, Ebsco, p. 2, KONTOPOULOS) | it now is evident that the declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. The Great Recession has underscored the reality of decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise. the Great Recession has accelerated forces driving trends and magnified their impact. There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The external is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia. the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domestically, the driver of change is the decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis confronting the U S and increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status. | The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. the Great Recession has accelerated forces driving trends and magnified their impact drivers of American decline is the emergence of new great powers and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia the rise of China—is the most tangible evidence of the erosion of power Domestically, the driver of change is the decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the dollar’s hold on reserve currency status | Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, it now is evident that both the 1980s declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right after all. The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. The Great Recession has underscored the reality of US decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise. To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of history. However, it is fair to say the Great Recession has both accelerated the causal forces driving these trends and magnified their impact. There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The external driver of US decline is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia. In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domestically, the driver of change is the relative—and in some ways absolute—decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis confronting the United States, and increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status. | 1,507 | <h4>Hegemony is unsustainable</h4><p><strong>Layne, 12</strong> - Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley (Christopher, 2012, "The Time It's Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana", International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, Ebsco, p. 2, KONTOPOULOS)</p><p>Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, <u><strong>it now is evident that</u></strong> both <u><strong>the</u></strong> 1980s <u><strong>declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right</u></strong> after all. <u><strong><mark>The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun.</mark> The Great Recession has underscored the reality of</u></strong> US <u><strong>decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise.</u></strong> To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of history. However, it is fair to say <u><strong><mark>the Great Recession has</u></strong></mark> both <u><strong><mark>accelerated</u></strong></mark> the causal <u><strong><mark>forces driving</u></strong></mark> these <u><strong><mark>trends and magnified their impact</mark>. There are two <mark>drivers of American decline</mark>, one external and one domestic. The external</u></strong> driver of US decline <u><strong><mark>is the emergence of new great powers</mark> in world politics <mark>and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia</mark>.</u></strong> In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: <u><strong><mark>the rise of</mark> new great powers—especially <mark>China—is</mark> in itself <mark>the most tangible evidence of the erosion of</mark> the United States’ <mark>power</mark>. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. <mark>Domestically, the driver of change is the</u></strong></mark> relative—and in some ways absolute—<u><strong><mark>decline in America’s economic power, the looming fiscal crisis</mark> confronting the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates, <u><strong><mark>and</mark> increasing <mark>doubts about the dollar’s</mark> long-term <mark>hold on reserve currency status</mark>.</p></u></strong> | 1nc | null | MSD | 127,282 | 17 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,990 | Expanding the U.S. lead in material power triggers global resentment and blowback that destroys the effectiveness of U.S. heg in stabilizing every key hotspot | Maher, 11 | Maher, 11 – Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute and Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department at Brown University (Richard, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World”, Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS) | world politics has been unipolar, defined by American preponderance military, economic, and technological material advantage does not translate into America’s preferred political and diplomatic outcomes Other states are challenging U.S. power and authority the U S is finding it increasingly difficult to realize its goals and ambitions decline in the U S s’ relative position is a consequence of the burdens and susceptibilities produced by unipolarity Contrary to the conventional wisdom the U.S. position both internationally and domestically may actually be strengthened once unipolarity has passed The U.S. economy, with a GDP of over $14 trillion, is nearly three times the size of China’s, now the world’s second-largest national economy. The U S accounts for 25 percent of global economic output Among the group of six or seven great powers, this figure approaches 50 percent despite this material preeminence, the U S sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world China has adopted a new assertiveness Pakistan one of America’s closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs Brazil’s growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere relations with Japan are at their frostiest in decades America’s vast power is not translating into America’s preferred outcomes. There are many costs that come with predominance material, political, and reputational Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in one’s friends just as much as in one’s rivals it is not American predominance that produces unease but rather American predominance Predominance makes one a tempting target, and scapegoat for other countries’ problems and unrealized ambitions Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country’s economic and social woes on U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America’s own interests Predominant power breeds envy, resentment, and alienation How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics As we witness the emergence of great powers in other parts of the world the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future the U S will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the U S should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause America’s position in the world both at home and internationally could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over | military, economic, and technological advantage does not translate into America’s preferred outcomes Other states are challenging U.S. power the U S is finding it difficult to realize its goals decline in the U S s’ relative position is a consequence of the burdens produced by unipolarity despite material preeminence, the U S sees influence diminishing China has adopted a new assertiveness Pakistan is facing collapse. Russia is using energy resources to reassert dominance Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere Brazil’s growing economic and political influence Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety friends just as much as rivals American predominance. makes one a tempting target, and scapegoat for other countries’ problems Predominant power breeds envy, resentment, and alienation | Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, world politics has been unipolar, defined by American preponderance in each of the core components of state power—military, economic, and technological. Such an imbalanced distribution of power in favor of a single country is unprecedented in the modern state system. This material advantage does not automatically translate into America’s preferred political and diplomatic outcomes, however. Other states, if now only at the margins, are challenging U.S. power and authority. Additionally, on a range of issues, the United States is finding it increasingly difficult to realize its goals and ambitions. The even bigger challenge for policymakers in Washington is how to respond to signs that America’s unquestioned preeminence in international politics is waning. This decline in the United States’ relative position is in part a consequence of the burdens and susceptibilities produced by unipolarity. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the U.S. position both internationally and domestically may actually be strengthened once this period of unipolarity has passed. On pure material terms, the gap between the United States and the rest of the world is indeed vast. The U.S. economy, with a GDP of over $14 trillion, is nearly three times the size of China’s, now the world’s second-largest national economy. The United States today accounts for approximately 25 percent of global economic output, a figure that has held relatively stable despite steadily increasing economic growth in China, India, Brazil, and other countries. Among the group of six or seven great powers, this figure approaches 50 percent. When one takes discretionary spending into account, the United States today spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined. This imbalance is even further magnified by the fact that five of the next seven biggest spenders are close U.S. allies. China, the country often seen as America’s next great geopolitical rival, has a defense budget that is one-seventh of what the United States spends on its military. There is also a vast gap in terms of the reach and sophistication of advanced weapons systems. By some measures, the United States spends more on research and development for its military than the rest of the world combined. What is remarkable is that the United States can do all of this without completely breaking the bank. The United States today devotes approximately 4 percent of GDP to defense. As a percentage of GDP, the United States today spends far less on its military than it did during the Cold War, when defense spending hovered around 10 percent of gross economic output. As one would expect, the United States today enjoys unquestioned preeminence in the military realm. No other state comes close to having the capability to project military power like the United States.1 And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America’s growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America’s closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil’s growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And relations with Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in decades. To many observers, it seems that America’s vast power is not translating into America’s preferred outcomes. As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one’s preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one’s predominant position in world politics. There are many costs that come with predominance – material, political, and reputational. Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in others, in one’s friends just as much as in one’s rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily American predominance that produces unease but rather American predominance. Predominance also makes one a tempting target, and a scapegoat for other countries’ own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country’s economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America’s own interests. Predominant power likewise breeds envy, resentment, and alienation. How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy—the perception that one’s role and purpose is acceptable and one’s power is used justly—is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics. As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence) of great powers in other parts of the world, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is inevitable that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future, and that the United States will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the United States naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance, it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, America’s position in the world—both at home and internationally—could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the ‘‘post-unipolar’’ world. | 6,345 | <h4>Expanding the U.S. lead in material power triggers global resentment and blowback that destroys the <u>effectiveness</u> of U.S. heg in stabilizing every key hotspot </h4><p><strong>Maher, 11</strong> – Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute and Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department at Brown University (Richard, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World”, Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)</p><p>Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, <u><strong>world politics has been unipolar, defined by American preponderance</u></strong> in each of the core components of state power—<u><strong><mark>military,</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>economic, and technological</u></strong></mark>. Such an imbalanced distribution of power in favor of a single country is unprecedented in the modern state system. This <u><strong>material <mark>advantage</u></strong> <u><strong>does not</u></strong></mark> automatically <u><strong><mark>translate into America’s</u></strong> <u><strong>preferred</mark> political and diplomatic <mark>outcomes</u></strong></mark>, however. <u><strong><mark>Other states</u></strong></mark>, if now only at the margins, <u><strong><mark>are challenging U.S. power</mark> and authority</u></strong>. Additionally, on a range of issues, <u><strong><mark>the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>is finding it</mark> increasingly <mark>difficult to realize its goals</mark> and ambitions</u></strong>. The even bigger challenge for policymakers in Washington is how to respond to signs that America’s unquestioned preeminence in international politics is waning. This <u><strong><mark>decline in the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tate<u><strong><mark>s’</mark> <mark>relative position is</u></strong></mark> in part <u><strong><mark>a consequence of the</u></strong> <u><strong>burdens</mark> and susceptibilities <mark>produced by unipolarity</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Contrary to the conventional wisdom</u></strong>, <u><strong>the U.S. position both internationally and domestically</u></strong> <u><strong>may actually be strengthened</u></strong> <u><strong>once</u></strong> this period of <u><strong>unipolarity has passed</u></strong>. On pure material terms, the gap between the United States and the rest of the world is indeed vast. <u><strong>The U.S. economy, with a GDP of over $14 trillion, is nearly three times the size of China’s, now the world’s second-largest national economy. The U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates today <u><strong>accounts for</u></strong> approximately <u><strong>25 percent of global economic output</u></strong>, a figure that has held relatively stable despite steadily increasing economic growth in China, India, Brazil, and other countries. <u><strong>Among the group of six or seven great powers, this figure approaches 50 percent</u></strong>. When one takes discretionary spending into account, the United States today spends more on its military than the rest of the world combined. This imbalance is even further magnified by the fact that five of the next seven biggest spenders are close U.S. allies. China, the country often seen as America’s next great geopolitical rival, has a defense budget that is one-seventh of what the United States spends on its military. There is also a vast gap in terms of the reach and sophistication of advanced weapons systems. By some measures, the United States spends more on research and development for its military than the rest of the world combined. What is remarkable is that the United States can do all of this without completely breaking the bank. The United States today devotes approximately 4 percent of GDP to defense. As a percentage of GDP, the United States today spends far less on its military than it did during the Cold War, when defense spending hovered around 10 percent of gross economic output. As one would expect, the United States today enjoys unquestioned preeminence in the military realm. No other state comes close to having the capability to project military power like the United States.1 And yet, <u><strong><mark>despite</mark> this <mark>material preeminence, the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>sees</mark> its political and strategic <mark>influence diminishing</mark> around the world</u></strong>. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. <u><strong><mark>China has adopted a new assertiveness</u></strong></mark> recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America’s growing debt (which China largely finances). <u><strong><mark>Pakistan</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>one of America’s closest strategic allies, <mark>is facing</mark> the threat of social and political <mark>collapse</u></strong>. <u><strong>Russia</u></strong> <u><strong>is using</mark> its vast <mark>energy resources to</u></strong> <u><strong>reassert</mark> its <mark>dominance</u></strong></mark> in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. <u><strong><mark>Negotiations with</u></strong> <u><strong>North Korea and Iran</u></strong> <u><strong>have gone nowhere</mark> in dismantling their nuclear programs</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Brazil’s</u></strong> <u><strong>growing economic and political influence</mark> offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere</u></strong>. And <u><strong>relations with Japan</u></strong>, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, <u><strong>are at their frostiest in decades</u></strong>. To many observers, it seems that <u><strong>America’s vast power is not translating into America’s preferred outcomes.</u></strong> As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one’s preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one’s predominant position in world politics. <u><strong>There are</u></strong> <u><strong>many costs that come with predominance</u></strong> – <u><strong>material, political, and reputational</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Vast imbalances of power</u></strong> <u><strong>create apprehension and anxiety</u></strong> </mark>in others, <u><strong>in one’s <mark>friends just as much as </mark>in one’s <mark>rivals</u></strong></mark>. In this view, <u><strong>it is not</u></strong> necessarily <u><strong>American predominance that produces unease but rather <mark>American predominance</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong>Predominance</u></strong> also <u><strong><mark>makes one a</u></strong> <u><strong>tempting target, and</u></strong></mark> a <u><strong><mark>scapegoat</u></strong> <u><strong>for other countries’</u></strong></mark> own <u><strong><mark>problems</mark> and unrealized ambitions</u></strong>. <u><strong>Many a Third World autocrat has</u></strong> <u><strong>blamed his country’s economic and social woes on</u></strong> an ostensible <u><strong>U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient</u></strong> <u><strong>to America’s own interests</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Predominant power</u></strong></mark> likewise <u><strong><mark>breeds</u></strong> <u><strong>envy, resentment, and alienation</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor?</u></strong> <u><strong>Legitimacy</u></strong>—the perception that one’s role and purpose is acceptable and one’s power is used justly—<u><strong>is</u></strong> <u><strong>indispensable for maintaining power and influence</u></strong> <u><strong>in world politics</u></strong>. <u><strong>As we witness the emergence</u></strong> (or re-emergence) <u><strong>of great powers in other parts of the world</u></strong>, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is inevitable that <u><strong>the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future</u></strong>, and that <u><strong>the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>will necessarily see its relative power decline.</u></strong> <u><strong>While the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates naturally <u><strong>should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance</u></strong>, <u><strong>it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It</u></strong> certainly <u><strong>should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost</u></strong>, <u><strong>devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause</u></strong>. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, <u><strong>America’s position in the world</u></strong>—<u><strong>both at home and internationally</u></strong>—<u><strong>could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over</u></strong>. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the ‘‘post-unipolar’’ world.</p> | 1nc | null | MSD | 98,367 | 49 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,991 | No cyberterror – discount evidence from the new Pentagon report** | Rid ’13 ” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/13/the_great_cyberscare) | Rid, Reader War Studies at King’s College, 3-13-’13 (Thomas, “The Great Cyberscare” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/13/the_great_cyberscare) | Panetta set the tone by warning again and again of an impending "cyber Pearl Harbor The world has yet to witness a single casualty, let alone fatality, as a result of a computer attack. Such statements are a plain insult to survivors of Hiroshima. Some sections of the Pentagon document offer such eye-wateringly shoddy analysis that they would not have passed as an MA dissertation in a self-respecting political science department the company should have been more careful in its overall assessment of the available evidence The media want to sell copy through threat inflation the only military-style cyberattack that has actually created physical damage was executed by the U S On cybersecurity, the nation's fiercest watchdogs too often look like hand-tame puppies eager to lap up stories from private firms as well as anonymous sources in the security establishment the intelligence community tags along with the hype because the NSA and CIA are still traumatized by missing 9/11 the intelligence community has far better information than private companies But they keep their findings and their analysis classified the quality of the public debate suffers, as experts as well as journalists have no choice but to rely on industry reports of sometimes questionable quality or anonymous informants whose veracity is hard to assess. | The world has yet to witness a single fatality the Pentagon document offer eye-wateringly shoddy analysis that they would not have passed as an MA dissertation The media want to sell through threat inflation the intel community tags along with the hype public debate suffers experts rely on industry reports of questionable quality | The Pentagon, no doubt, is the master of razzmatazz. Leon Panetta set the tone by warning again and again of an impending "cyber Pearl Harbor." Just before he left the Pentagon, the Defense Science Board delivered a remarkable report, Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat. The paper seemed obsessed with making yet more drastic historical comparisons: "The cyber threat is serious," the task force wrote, "with potential consequences similar to the nuclear threat of the Cold War." The manifestations of an all-out nuclear war would be different from cyberattack, the Pentagon scientists helpfully acknowledged. But then they added, gravely, that "in the end, the existential impact on the United States is the same." A reminder is in order: The world has yet to witness a single casualty, let alone fatality, as a result of a computer attack. Such statements are a plain insult to survivors of Hiroshima. Some sections of the Pentagon document offer such eye-wateringly shoddy analysis that they would not have passed as an MA dissertation in a self-respecting political science department. But in the current debate it seemed to make sense. After all a bit of fear helps to claim -- or keep -- scarce resources when austerity and cutting seems out-of-control. The report recommended allocating the stout sum of $2.5 billion for its top two priorities alone, protecting nuclear weapons against cyberattacks and determining the mix of weapons necessary to punish all-out cyber-aggressors. Then there are private computer security companies. Such firms, naturally, are keen to pocket some of the government's money earmarked for cybersecurity. And hype is the means to that end. Mandiant's much-noted report linking a coordinated and coherent campaign of espionage attacks dubbed Advanced Persistent Threat 1, or "APT1," to a unit of the Chinese military is a case in point: The firm offered far more details on attributing attacks to the Chinese than the intelligence community has ever done, and the company should be commended for making the report public. But instead of using cocky and over-confident language, Mandiant's analysts should have used Words of Estimative Probability, as professional intelligence analysts would have done. An example is the report's conclusion, which describes APT1's work: "Although they control systems in dozens of countries, their attacks originate from four large networks in Shanghai -- two of which are allocated directly to the Pudong New Area," the report found. Unit 61398 of the People's Liberation Army is also in Pudong. Therefore, Mandiant's computer security specialists concluded, the two were identical: "Given the mission, resourcing, and location of PLA Unit 61398, we conclude that PLA Unit 61398 is APT1." But the report conspicuously does not mention that Pudong is not a small neighborhood ("right outside of Unit 61398's gates") but in fact a vast city landscape twice the size of Chicago. Mandiant's report was useful and many attacks indeed originate in China. But the company should have been more careful in its overall assessment of the available evidence, as the computer security expert Jeffrey Carr and others have pointed out. The firm made it too easy for Beijing to dismiss the report. My class in cybersecurity at King's College London started poking holes into the report after 15 minutes of red-teaming it -- the New York Times didn't. Which leads to the next point: The media want to sell copy through threat inflation. "In Cyberspace, New Cold War," the headline writers at the Times intoned in late February. "The U.S. is not ready for a cyberwar," shrieked the Washington Post earlier this week. Instead of calling out the above-mentioned Pentagon report, the paper actually published two supportive articles on it and pointed out that a major offensive cyber capability now seemed essential "in a world awash in cyber-espionage, theft and disruption." The Post should have reminded its readers that the only military-style cyberattack that has actually created physical damage -- Stuxnet -- was actually executed by the United States government. The Times, likewise, should have asked tough questions and pointed to some of the evidential problems in the Mandiant report; instead, it published what appeared like an elegant press release for the firm. On issues of cybersecurity, the nation's fiercest watchdogs too often look like hand-tame puppies eager to lap up stories from private firms as well as anonymous sources in the security establishment. Finally, the intelligence community tags along with the hype because the NSA and CIA are still traumatized by missing 9/11. Missing a "cyber 9/11" would be truly catastrophic for America's spies, so erring on the side of caution seems the rational choice. Yes, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper's recent testimony was more nuanced than reported and toned down the threat of a very serious cyberattack. But at the same time America's top spies are not as forthcoming with more detailed information as they could be. We know that the intelligence community, especially in the United States, has far better information, better sources, better expertise, and better analysts than private companies like Symantec, McAfee, and Kaspersky Lab. But for a number of reasons they keep their findings and their analysis classified. This means that the quality of the public debate suffers, as experts as well as journalists have no choice but to rely on industry reports of sometimes questionable quality or anonymous informants whose veracity is hard to assess. | 5,614 | <h4><strong>No cyberterror – discount evidence from the new Pentagon report**</h4><p>Rid</strong>, Reader War Studies at King’s College, 3-13-<strong>’13</strong> (Thomas, “The Great Cyberscare<u><strong>” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/13/the_great_cyberscare)</p><p></u></strong>The Pentagon, no doubt, is the master of razzmatazz. Leon <u><strong>Panetta set the tone by warning again and again of an impending "cyber Pearl Harbor</u></strong>." Just before he left the Pentagon, the Defense Science Board delivered a remarkable report, Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat. The paper seemed obsessed with making yet more drastic historical comparisons: "The cyber threat is serious," the task force wrote, "with potential consequences similar to the nuclear threat of the Cold War." The manifestations of an all-out nuclear war would be different from cyberattack, the Pentagon scientists helpfully acknowledged. But then they added, gravely, that "in the end, the existential impact on the United States is the same." A reminder is in order: <u><strong><mark>The world has yet to witness a single</mark> casualty, let alone <mark>fatality</mark>, as a result of a computer attack. Such statements are a plain insult to survivors of Hiroshima. Some sections of <mark>the Pentagon document offer</mark> such <mark>eye-wateringly shoddy analysis that they would not have passed as an MA dissertation</mark> in a self-respecting political science department</u></strong>. But in the current debate it seemed to make sense. After all a bit of fear helps to claim -- or keep -- scarce resources when austerity and cutting seems out-of-control. The report recommended allocating the stout sum of $2.5 billion for its top two priorities alone, protecting nuclear weapons against cyberattacks and determining the mix of weapons necessary to punish all-out cyber-aggressors. Then there are private computer security companies. Such firms, naturally, are keen to pocket some of the government's money earmarked for cybersecurity. And hype is the means to that end. Mandiant's much-noted report linking a coordinated and coherent campaign of espionage attacks dubbed Advanced Persistent Threat 1, or "APT1," to a unit of the Chinese military is a case in point: The firm offered far more details on attributing attacks to the Chinese than the intelligence community has ever done, and the company should be commended for making the report public. But instead of using cocky and over-confident language, Mandiant's analysts should have used Words of Estimative Probability, as professional intelligence analysts would have done. An example is the report's conclusion, which describes APT1's work: "Although they control systems in dozens of countries, their attacks originate from four large networks in Shanghai -- two of which are allocated directly to the Pudong New Area," the report found. Unit 61398 of the People's Liberation Army is also in Pudong. Therefore, Mandiant's computer security specialists concluded, the two were identical: "Given the mission, resourcing, and location of PLA Unit 61398, we conclude that PLA Unit 61398 is APT1." But the report conspicuously does not mention that Pudong is not a small neighborhood ("right outside of Unit 61398's gates") but in fact a vast city landscape twice the size of Chicago. Mandiant's report was useful and many attacks indeed originate in China. But <u><strong>the company should have been more careful in its overall assessment of the available evidence</u></strong>, as the computer security expert Jeffrey Carr and others have pointed out. The firm made it too easy for Beijing to dismiss the report. My class in cybersecurity at King's College London started poking holes into the report after 15 minutes of red-teaming it -- the New York Times didn't. Which leads to the next point: <u><strong><mark>The media want to sell</mark> copy <mark>through threat inflation</u></strong></mark>. "In Cyberspace, New Cold War," the headline writers at the Times intoned in late February. "The U.S. is not ready for a cyberwar," shrieked the Washington Post earlier this week. Instead of calling out the above-mentioned Pentagon report, the paper actually published two supportive articles on it and pointed out that a major offensive cyber capability now seemed essential "in a world awash in cyber-espionage, theft and disruption." The Post should have reminded its readers that <u><strong>the only military-style cyberattack that has actually created physical damage</u></strong> -- Stuxnet -- <u><strong>was</u></strong> actually <u><strong>executed by the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates government. The Times, likewise, should have asked tough questions and pointed to some of the evidential problems in the Mandiant report; instead, it published what appeared like an elegant press release for the firm. <u><strong>On</u></strong> issues of <u><strong>cybersecurity, the nation's fiercest watchdogs too often look like hand-tame puppies eager to lap up stories from private firms as well as anonymous sources in the security establishment</u></strong>. Finally, <u><strong><mark>the intel</mark>ligence <mark>community tags along with the hype</mark> because the NSA and CIA are still traumatized by missing 9/11</u></strong>. Missing a "cyber 9/11" would be truly catastrophic for America's spies, so erring on the side of caution seems the rational choice. Yes, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper's recent testimony was more nuanced than reported and toned down the threat of a very serious cyberattack. But at the same time America's top spies are not as forthcoming with more detailed information as they could be. We know that <u><strong>the intelligence community</u></strong>, especially in the United States, <u><strong>has far better information</u></strong>, better sources, better expertise, and better analysts <u><strong>than private companies</u></strong> like Symantec, McAfee, and Kaspersky Lab. <u><strong>But</u></strong> for a number of reasons <u><strong>they keep their findings and their analysis classified</u></strong>. This means that <u><strong>the quality of the <mark>public debate suffers</mark>, as <mark>experts</mark> as well as journalists have no choice but to <mark>rely on industry reports of</mark> sometimes <mark>questionable quality</mark> or anonymous informants whose veracity is hard to assess.</p></u></strong> | 1NC | null | adv 2 | 11,244 | 39 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,992 | Squo solves science diplomacy. | Himelfarb 11 | Himelfarb 11 [Experts Sheldon Himelfarb Centers Centers of Innovation Science, Technology and Peacebuilding On the Issues: Science Diplomacy, January 2011 | On the Issues by Sheldon Himelfarb January 20, 2011 http://www.usip.org/publications/the-issues-science-diplomacy] | Where do you see science diplomacy going in the new year? Rarely have we seen such high profile expressions of hope and support for science diplomacy as a tool of conflict management, as we have from this administration - starting with Obama's Cairo speech Clinton appointed three scientific luminaries as "science envoys" to engage more extensively with the Muslim world in scientific and technical collaborations. the administration followed through by requesting new funding for global engagement programs and appointed a new class of science envoys to spearhead outreach to other countries outside of the Middle East - including in South and Southeast Asia, Africa and Central Asia/Caucuses. our political leaders have great hopes that science diplomacy will help to ease tensions around the world, and we share this optimism in the year ahead. just as the issues are too big an issue for one country to solve on its own, so too scientific cooperation needs the wisdom of many. | Rarely have we seen such high profile expressions of hope and support for science diplomacy as a tool of conflict management Clinton appointed three scientific luminaries as "science envoys" and appointed a new class of science envoys to spearhead outreach to other countries outside of the Middle East our political leaders have great hopes that science diplomacy will help to ease tensions around the world, and we share this optimism in the year ahead. just as the issues are too big an issue for one country to solve on its own, so too scientific cooperation needs the wisdom of many. | Where do you see science diplomacy going in the new year? These are exciting times for those of us working at the nexus of science diplomacy and peacebuilding. Rarely have we seen such high profile expressions of hope and support for science diplomacy as a tool of conflict management, as we have from this administration - starting with President Barack Obama's Cairo speech in 2009, where he gave science diplomacy a special role in helping to set our relationship with the Middle East and the Muslim world at large on better footing. And then, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton appointed three scientific luminaries as "science envoys" to engage more extensively with the Muslim world in scientific and technical collaborations. More recently, the administration followed through by requesting new funding for global engagement programs like this - and appointed a new class of science envoys to spearhead outreach to other countries outside of the Middle East - including in South and Southeast Asia, Africa and Central Asia/Caucuses. So clearly our political leaders have great hopes that science diplomacy will help to ease tensions around the world, and we share this optimism in the year ahead. It won't be easy; we need to learn a lot more about why some scientific and technical collaborations morph into powerful peacebuilding initiatives and why others do not, for example. And how can we leverage these scientific and technical collaborations before conflict has become intractable. These are tough questions, but the good news is that we see more and more people starting to ask them as we go into the new year. We certainly will continue to work on them with partners such as the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineers throughout the new year and with our networks in other countries. Furthermore, the upcoming Seoul Nuclear Summit, continuing concerns about Iran and North Korea, ongoing India-Pakistan challenges will inevitably spotlight what scientific cooperation can contribute to non-proliferation in the years ahead. But just as the issues are too big an issue for one country to solve on its own, so too scientific cooperation needs the wisdom of many. | 2,215 | <h4>Squo solves science diplomacy.</h4><p><u><strong>Himelfarb 11</u></strong> [Experts Sheldon Himelfarb Centers Centers of Innovation Science, Technology and Peacebuilding On the Issues: Science Diplomacy, January 2011 | On the Issues by Sheldon Himelfarb January 20, 2011 http://www.usip.org/publications/the-issues-science-diplomacy]<u> </p><p>Where do you see science diplomacy going in the new year?</u> These are exciting times for those of us working at the nexus of science diplomacy and peacebuilding. <u><mark>Rarely have we seen such high profile expressions of hope and support for science diplomacy as a tool of conflict management</mark>, as we have from this administration - starting with</u> President Barack <u>Obama's Cairo speech</u> in 2009, where he gave science diplomacy a special role in helping to set our relationship with the Middle East and the Muslim world at large on better footing. And then, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham <u><mark>Clinton appointed three scientific luminaries as "science envoys"</mark> to engage more extensively with the Muslim world in scientific and technical collaborations.</u> More recently, <u>the administration followed through by requesting new funding for global engagement programs</u> like this - <u><mark>and appointed a new class of science envoys to spearhead outreach to other countries outside of the Middle East</mark> - including in South and Southeast Asia, Africa and Central Asia/Caucuses.</u> So clearly <u><mark>our political leaders have great hopes that science diplomacy will help to ease tensions around the world, and we share this optimism in the year ahead.</u></mark> It won't be easy; we need to learn a lot more about why some scientific and technical collaborations morph into powerful peacebuilding initiatives and why others do not, for example. And how can we leverage these scientific and technical collaborations before conflict has become intractable. These are tough questions, but the good news is that we see more and more people starting to ask them as we go into the new year. We certainly will continue to work on them with partners such as the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineers throughout the new year and with our networks in other countries. Furthermore, the upcoming Seoul Nuclear Summit, continuing concerns about Iran and North Korea, ongoing India-Pakistan challenges will inevitably spotlight what scientific cooperation can contribute to non-proliferation in the years ahead. But <u><mark>just as the issues are too big an issue for one country to solve on its own, so too scientific cooperation needs the wisdom of many.</p></u></mark> | 1nc | null | MSD | 430,527 | 4 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,993 | Economic decline not cause war | Barnett ’9 | Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, 8/25/200’9, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx | When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, ensuing conflict and wars globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the ongoing conflicts can be clearly attributed to the global recession with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage but there was no great slide into "trade wars." the W T O is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order | the financial crisis struck the blogosphere was ablaze with scary predictions of, wars globalization's first worldwide recession has had no impact on security None of the ongoing conflicts can be attributed to the recession friendly cooperation on stimulus was the most notable dynamic world's major economies remain governed by center factions that remain friendly to markets and trade there was no "trade wars." the W T O is functioning , and free-trade agreements have not slowed. this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of liberal trade order | When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: * No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); * The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); * Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); * No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); * A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and * No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. | 5,823 | <h4>Economic decline not cause war </h4><p><strong><mark>Barnett</strong></mark>, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, 8/25/200<strong><mark>’9</strong></mark>, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx</p><p><u>When<mark> the </mark>global<mark> financial crisis struck </mark>roughly a year ago, <mark>the blogosphere was ablaze with </mark>all sorts of <mark>scary predictions of,</u> </mark>and commentary regarding, <u>ensuing conflict and <mark>wars</u> </mark>-- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how <u><mark>globalization's first </mark>truly <mark>worldwide recession has had</mark> virtually <mark>no impact </mark>whatsoever<mark> on </mark>the international <mark>security </mark>landscape. <mark>None of the</u> </mark>more than three-dozen <u><mark>ongoing conflicts</u> </mark>listed by GlobalSecurity.org <u><mark>can be </mark>clearly <mark>attributed to the </mark>global <mark>recession</u></mark>. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And <u>with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions</u> (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), <u>our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest</u>, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: * No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); * The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); * Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); * No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); * A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and * No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, <u>we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the <mark>friendly cooperation on </mark>such <mark>stimulus </mark>packaging <mark>was the most notable </mark>great-power <mark>dynamic </mark>caused by the crisis. </u>Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. <u>The <mark>world's major economies remain governed by center</mark>-left or center-right political <mark>factions that remain </mark>decidedly <mark>friendly to </mark>both <mark>markets and trade</u></mark>. In the short run, <u>there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage</u> (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), <u>but <mark>there was no </mark>great slide into <mark>"trade wars."</u> </mark>Instead, <u><mark>the W</u></mark>orld<u> <mark>T</u></mark>rade<u><mark> O</u></mark>rganization<u><mark> is functioning </mark>as it was designed to function<mark>, and </mark>regional efforts toward <mark>free-trade agreements have not slowed</u>.</mark> Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, <u>in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. </u>Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that <u><mark>this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of </mark>America's post-World War II international <mark>liberal trade order</u></mark>.</p> | 1NC | null | adv 2 | 63,397 | 282 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,994 | Gambling provides 3.5 million dollars to al queda, that’s actually nothing | null | null | null | null | null | null | <h4>Gambling provides 3.5 million dollars to al queda, that’s actually nothing</h4> | 1NC | null | adv 2 | 430,528 | 1 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,995 | The US has the innovation lead – China is behind in R&D, patents, and new product development | Beckley 12 | Beckley, Michael is a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a fellow at the Miller Center at the University of Virginia “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure.” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp: 41-78. | China’s high-technology exports are “not very Chinese, and not very high-tech” more than 90 percent are produced by foreign firms and consist of imported components that are merely assembled in China These percentages have increased over time Chinese technological stagnation is also evident in sales and patent statistics Chinese firms’ sales of new products as a share of total sales revenues remained at 15 percent In the U S new products account for 35 to 40 percent of sales revenue. The Chinese government grants the majority of its invention patents to foreign firms even though Chinese firms are five times more numerous Chinese firms’ total spending on R&D as a percentage of sales revenue has remained at levels seven times below the average for American firms The U S looks set to excel in emerging high-technology industries It has more nanotechnology centers than the next three nations combined The U S accounts for 20 percent of all patent applications for renewable energy, air pollution, water pollution, and waste management technologies; China accounts for 4 percent . Data on commercial R&D, patents, and profits suggest Chinese firms engage primarily in low-end activities, such as manufacturing and component supply U.S. firms seem to focus on activities in which profits and proprietary knowledge are highest This division of labor has become more pronounced | China’s high-technology exports are “not very Chinese, and high-tech”—more than 90 percent are produced by foreign firms merely assembled in China technological stagnation is also evident in sales and patent statistics total spending on R&D remained at levels seven times below American firms The U S oks set to excel in emerging high-technology industrie more nanotechnology centers than the next three nations accounts for 20 percent of all patent applications for renewable energy pollution, and waste management Chinese firms engage in low-end activities, such as manufacturing U.S. firms focus on profits and proprietary knowledge | It is far from clear, therefore, that China is catching up to the United States in terms of basic scientific research. More important, such a trend would not necessarily affect the balance of power. After all, what ultimately matters is not scientific superiority but technological superiority—the ability to produce and use commercially viable and militarily relevant innovations. In the nineteenth century, German scientists excelled at turning scientific breakthroughs into practical products, developing major innovations in the chemical, electrical, and industrial dye industries that formed what many scholars now refer to as the “second industrial revolution.” Today, scientific superiority is not necessary for technological superiority because published articles circulate globally—they sit in searchable databases and can be obtained by anyone with access to a major library—and it is insufficient because most scientific breakthroughs are useless in isolation from lower-level innovations and infrastructure. Thus, the ability to produce scientific breakthroughs may be less important than the ability to capitalize on them. On first glance, China’s emergence as the world’s leading exporter of hightechnology products suggests it has capitalized on its scientific investments and become an “advanced-technology superstate,” perhaps even “the world’s leading technology-based economy.” On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that China’s high-technology exports are “not very Chinese, and not very high-tech”—more than 90 percent are produced by foreign firms and consist of imported components that are merely assembled in China, a practice known as “export processing.” These percentages have increased over time, a trend that suggests Chinese firms are falling further behind foreign competitors. Moreover, approximately 50 percent of China’s total exports are produced by foreign enterprises (see figure 5). By comparison, foreign enterprises produced less than 25 percent of Taiwan and South Korea’s manufactured exports in the 1970s. Chinese technological stagnation is also evident in sales and patent statistics. From 1991 to 2008, Chinese firms’ sales of new products as a share of total sales revenues remained fast at 15 percent. In the United States, by contrast, new products account for 35 to 40 percent of sales revenue. The Chinese government grants the majority of its invention patents to foreign firms even though Chinese firms are five times more numerous. This result is all the more startling because many foreign firms do not seek Chinese patents. Instead they seek “triadic patents,” which are simultaneously recognized by the patent offices of the three largest markets for high-technology products (the United States, Europe, and Japan), and are thus the most secure and most difficult to obtain. Figure 6 shows that the U.S. lead in triadic patents has increased over the last twenty years. Chinese firms, moreover, do not seem to be taking genuine steps to improve their technological abilities. For the past twenty years, Chinese firms’ total spending on R&D as a percentage of sales revenue has remained at levels seven times below the average for American firms. Between 1995 and 2008, the share of Chinese enterprises engaged in scientific or technological activities declined from 59 percent to 37 percent, and the share of Chinese firms with an R&D department declined from 60 percent to 24 percent. When Chinese firms import technology, they spend a fraction of the total cost on absorbing the technology. This fraction increased recently from 4 percent to 25 percent, but it remains far lower than the 200 to 300 percent spent by Korean and Japanese firms when they were trying to catch up to the West in the 1970s. Technological leaders sometimes rest on their laurels and abandon innovative efforts in favor of “finding new markets for old products.” The United States, however, looks set to excel in emerging high-technology industries. It has more nanotechnology centers than the next three nations combined (Germany, the United Kingdom, and China) and accounts for 43 percent of the world’s nanotechnology patent applications (see figure 7). In biotechnology, the United States accounts for 41.5 percent of patent applications (China accounts for 1.6 percent) and 76 percent of global revenues. The United States accounts for 20 to 25 percent of all patent applications for renewable energy, air pollution, water pollution, and waste management technologies; China accounts for 1 to 4 percent of the patent applications in these areas (see figure 8). Since 1991, the United States has increased its lead in patent applications over China in all of these industries. Finally, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has identified ten “knowledge- and technology-intensive industries” that are capable of “altering lifestyles and the way business is conducted across a wide range of sectors.” 147 The U.S. lead, in terms of value added, in knowledge- and technology-intensive manufacturing industries dipped during the 2001 recession but quickly recovered and has increased overall since 1996. Over the same time period, the United States steadily increased its lead in knowledge and technology-intensive services (see figures 9 and 10). In sum, a comparison of U.S. and Chinese innovation systems over the past twenty years provides strong evidence against declinism and in favor of the alternative perspective that China continues to lag behind the United States. China has increased its investments in basic science, but these efforts have yet to significantly enhance its innovative capabilities. Data on Chinese hightechnology exports show that Chinese firms have increased their participation in high-technology industries. Data on commercial R&D, patents, and profits, however, suggest Chinese firms engage primarily in low-end activities, such as manufacturing and component supply. By contrast, U.S. firms seem to focus on activities in which profits and proprietary knowledge are highest, such as product design, development, and branding. This division of labor has remained stable over the last two decades; if anything, it has become more pronounced. | 6,319 | <h4>The US has the innovation lead – China is behind in R&D, patents, and new product development</h4><p><u><strong>Beckley</u></strong>, Michael is a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a fellow at the Miller Center at the University of Virginia “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure.” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/<u><strong>12</u></strong>), pp: 41-78. </p><p>It is far from clear, therefore, that China is catching up to the United States in terms of basic scientific research. More important, such a trend would not necessarily affect the balance of power. After all, what ultimately matters is not scientific superiority but technological superiority—the ability to produce and use commercially viable and militarily relevant innovations. In the nineteenth century, German scientists excelled at turning scientific breakthroughs into practical products, developing major innovations in the chemical, electrical, and industrial dye industries that formed what many scholars now refer to as the “second industrial revolution.” Today, scientific superiority is not necessary for technological superiority because published articles circulate globally—they sit in searchable databases and can be obtained by anyone with access to a major library—and it is insufficient because most scientific breakthroughs are useless in isolation from lower-level innovations and infrastructure. Thus, the ability to produce scientific breakthroughs may be less important than the ability to capitalize on them. On first glance, China’s emergence as the world’s leading exporter of hightechnology products suggests it has capitalized on its scientific investments and become an “advanced-technology superstate,” perhaps even “the world’s leading technology-based economy.” On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that <u><mark>China’s high-technology exports are “not very Chinese, and</mark> not very <mark>high-tech”</u>—<u>more than 90 percent are produced by foreign firms</mark> and consist of imported components that are <mark>merely assembled in China</u></mark>, a practice known as “export processing.” <u>These percentages have increased over time</u>, a trend that suggests Chinese firms are falling further behind foreign competitors. Moreover, approximately 50 percent of China’s total exports are produced by foreign enterprises (see figure 5). By comparison, foreign enterprises produced less than 25 percent of Taiwan and South Korea’s manufactured exports in the 1970s. <u>Chinese <mark>technological stagnation is also evident in sales and patent statistics</u></mark>. From 1991 to 2008, <u>Chinese firms’ sales of new products as a share of total sales revenues remained </u>fast <u>at 15 percent</u>. <u>In the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, by contrast, <u>new products account for 35 to 40 percent of sales revenue. The Chinese government grants the majority of its invention patents to foreign firms even though Chinese firms are five times more numerous</u>. This result is all the more startling because many foreign firms do not seek Chinese patents. Instead they seek “triadic patents,” which are simultaneously recognized by the patent offices of the three largest markets for high-technology products (the United States, Europe, and Japan), and are thus the most secure and most difficult to obtain. Figure 6 shows that the U.S. lead in triadic patents has increased over the last twenty years. Chinese firms, moreover, do not seem to be taking genuine steps to improve their technological abilities. For the past twenty years, <u>Chinese firms’ <mark>total spending on R&D</mark> as a percentage of sales revenue has <mark>remained at levels seven times below</mark> the average for <mark>American firms</u></mark>. Between 1995 and 2008, the share of Chinese enterprises engaged in scientific or technological activities declined from 59 percent to 37 percent, and the share of Chinese firms with an R&D department declined from 60 percent to 24 percent. When Chinese firms import technology, they spend a fraction of the total cost on absorbing the technology. This fraction increased recently from 4 percent to 25 percent, but it remains far lower than the 200 to 300 percent spent by Korean and Japanese firms when they were trying to catch up to the West in the 1970s. Technological leaders sometimes rest on their laurels and abandon innovative efforts in favor of “finding new markets for old products.” <u><mark>The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates, however, <u>lo<mark>oks set to excel in emerging high-technology industrie</mark>s</u>. <u>It has <mark>more nanotechnology centers than the next three nations</mark> combined </u> (Germany, the United Kingdom, and China) and accounts for 43 percent of the world’s nanotechnology patent applications (see figure 7). In biotechnology, the United States accounts for 41.5 percent of patent applications (China accounts for 1.6 percent) and 76 percent of global revenues. <u>The U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u><mark>accounts for 20</mark> </u>to 25<u> <mark>percent of all patent</mark> <mark>applications for renewable energy</mark>, air pollution, water <mark>pollution, and waste management</mark> technologies; China accounts for</u> 1 to<u> 4 percent</u> of the patent applications in these areas (see figure 8). Since 1991, the United States has increased its lead in patent applications over China in all of these industries. Finally, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has identified ten “knowledge- and technology-intensive industries” that are capable of “altering lifestyles and the way business is conducted across a wide range of sectors.” 147 The U.S. lead, in terms of value added, in knowledge- and technology-intensive manufacturing industries dipped during the 2001 recession but quickly recovered and has increased overall since 1996. Over the same time period, the United States steadily increased its lead in knowledge and technology-intensive services (see figures 9 and 10). In sum, a comparison of U.S. and Chinese innovation systems over the past twenty years provides strong evidence against declinism and in favor of the alternative perspective that China continues to lag behind the United States. China has increased its investments in basic science, but these efforts have yet to significantly enhance its innovative capabilities. Data on Chinese hightechnology exports show that Chinese firms have increased their participation in high-technology industries<u>. Data on commercial R&D, patents, and profits</u>, however,<u> suggest <mark>Chinese firms engage</mark> primarily <mark>in low-end activities, such as manufacturing</mark> and component supply</u>. By contrast, <u><mark>U.S. firms</mark> seem to <mark>focus on</mark> activities in which <mark>profits and proprietary knowledge</mark> are highest</u>, such as product design, development, and branding. <u>This division of labor has</u> remained stable over the last two decades; if anything, it has <u>become more pronounced</u>. </p> | 1nc | null | MSD | 215,079 | 5 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,996 | Competitiveness is a myth – overwhelming evidence proves | Bruno 9 | Bruno 9 [Isabelle, Lille Centre for Politics and Administration (CERAPS), University of Lille, The “Indefinite Discipline” of Competitiveness Benchmarking as a Neoliberal Technology of Government Minerva A Review of Science, Learning and Policy © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009, 17 September 2009] | Krugman criticized the “competitive metaphor”— as economically meaningless The idea that a country’s economic fortunes are largely determined by its success on world markets is as a empirical matter flatly obsession with international competitiveness should be seen as a view held in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence. those who preach competitiveness support their case with careless, flawed arithmetic. | Krugman criticized the “competitive metaphor as economically meaningless idea a country’s economic fortunes are determined by its success on world markets is as a empirical matter flatly wrong obsession with international competitiveness should be seen in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence those who preach competitiveness support their case with careless, flawed arithmetic | The pertinence of discussing the national competitiveness of a country is much debated among economists. In his now famous Foreign Affairs article, Paul Krugman criticized the “competitive metaphor”—i.e. the image “that, in the words of President Clinton, each nation is like a big corporation competing in the global marketplace” (1994, p. 29)—as economically meaningless, politically misguided and socially damaging. His demonstration countered the progressively established orthodoxy, which made the design of a “competitive state” consensual, desirable, and hence free of debate. More than economic nonsense, Krugman argued that it had in fact become a “dangerous obsession”: The idea that a country’s economic fortunes are largely determined by its success on world markets is a hypothesis, not a necessary truth; and as a practical, empirical matter, that hypothesis is flatly wrong. […] The growing obsession in most advanced nations with international competitiveness should be seen, not as a well-founded concern, but as a view held in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence. And yet it is clearly a view that people very much want to hold – a desire to believe that is reflected in a remarkable tendency of those who preach the doctrine of competitiveness to support their case with careless, flawed arithmetic. (Krugman 1994, p. 30) | 1,352 | <h4>Competitiveness is a myth – overwhelming evidence proves</h4><p><u><strong>Bruno 9</u></strong> [Isabelle, Lille Centre for Politics and Administration (CERAPS), University of Lille, The “Indefinite Discipline” of Competitiveness Benchmarking as a Neoliberal Technology of Government Minerva A Review of Science, Learning and Policy © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009, 17 September 2009]</p><p>The pertinence of discussing the national competitiveness of a country is much debated among economists. In his now famous Foreign Affairs article, Paul <u><mark>Krugman criticized the “competitive metaphor</mark>”—</u>i.e. the image “that, in the words of President Clinton, each nation is like a big corporation competing in the global marketplace” (1994, p. 29)—<u><mark>as economically meaningless</u></mark>, politically misguided and socially damaging. His demonstration countered the progressively established orthodoxy, which made the design of a “competitive state” consensual, desirable, and hence free of debate. More than economic nonsense, Krugman argued that it had in fact become a “dangerous obsession”: <u>The <mark>idea</mark> that <mark>a country’s economic fortunes are</mark> largely <mark>determined by its success on world markets is</u></mark> a hypothesis, not a necessary truth; and<u> <mark>as a</mark> </u>practical,<u> <mark>empirical matter</u></mark>, that hypothesis is <u><mark>flatly </u>wrong</mark>. […] The growing<u> <mark>obsession</u></mark> in most advanced nations <u><mark>with international competitiveness should be seen</u></mark>, not as a well-founded concern, but<u> as a view held <mark>in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence</mark>.</u> And yet it is clearly a view that people very much want to hold – a desire to believe that is reflected in a remarkable tendency of <u><mark>those who preach</mark> </u>the doctrine of<u> <mark>competitiveness</u></mark> to <u><mark>support their case with careless, flawed arithmetic</mark>.</u> (Krugman 1994, p. 30)</p> | 1nc | null | MSD | 97,373 | 4 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,997 | Studies prove | Miller 2k | Miller 2k – Professor of Management, Ottawa (Morris, Poverty As A Cause Of Wars?, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG4draft1.htm , AG) | the Carnegie Endowment After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries concluded that the conventional impact of economic crises may be wrong severity of economic crisis bore no relationship to collapse In democratic states) such changes seldom lead to violence (while dictatorships responded by using one form of violence to abort another. | After studying 93 economic crisis in 22 countries concluded that conventional impact of economic crises may be wrong severity bore no relationship to collapse changes seldom lead to violence | Thus, these armed conflicts can hardly be said to be caused by poverty as a principal factor when the greed and envy of leaders and their hegemonic ambitions provide sufficient cause. The poor would appear to be more the victims than the perpetrators of armed conflict. It might be alleged that some dramatic event or rapid sequence of those types of events that lead to the exacerbation of poverty might be the catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who might be tempted to seek a diversion by finding/fabricating an enemy and going to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they concluded that Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes. A more direct role was played by political variables such as ideological polarization, labor radicalism, guerilla insurgencies and an anti-Communist military... (In democratic states) such changes seldom lead to an outbreak of violence (while) in the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another. | 1,563 | <h4>Studies prove</h4><p><strong>Miller 2k</strong> – Professor of Management, Ottawa (Morris, Poverty As A Cause Of Wars?,<u> http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG4draft1.htm , AG)</p><p></u>Thus, these armed conflicts can hardly be said to be caused by poverty as a principal factor when the greed and envy of leaders and their hegemonic ambitions provide sufficient cause. The poor would appear to be more the victims than the perpetrators of armed conflict. It might be alleged that some dramatic event or rapid sequence of those types of events that lead to the exacerbation of poverty might be the catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who might be tempted to seek a diversion by finding/fabricating an enemy and going to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of <u>the Carnegie Endowment</u> for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. <u><mark>After studying 93 </mark>episodes of <mark>economic</mark> <mark>crisis in 22 countries</mark> </u>in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II they <u><mark>concluded that</mark> </u>Much of <u>the <mark>conventional</mark> </u>wisdom about the political <u><mark>impact of economic crises may be wrong</u></mark>... The <u><mark>severity</mark> of economic crisis</u> - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - <u><mark>bore no relationship to</u></mark> the <u><mark>collapse</u></mark> of regimes. A more direct role was played by political variables such as ideological polarization, labor radicalism, guerilla insurgencies and an anti-Communist military... (<u>In democratic states) such <mark>changes seldom lead to</mark> </u>an outbreak of <u><mark>violence</mark> (while</u>) in the cases of <u>dictatorships</u> and semi-democracies, the ruling elites <u>responded</u> to crises <u>by</u> increasing repression (thereby <u>using one form of violence to abort another. </p></u> | 1NC | null | adv 2 | 75,904 | 25 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,998 | US doesn’t exercise science diplomacy even when we have the tools. | Lord et al 9 Kristin, vice president at the Center for a New American Security and a nonresident fellow of the Brookings Institution, Vaughan Turekian, chief international officer and director of the Center for Science Diplomacy at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “The Science of Diplomacy” http://www.cnas.org/node/918, 7/9/11) HD | Lord et al 9 (Kristin, vice president at the Center for a New American Security and a nonresident fellow of the Brookings Institution, Vaughan Turekian, chief international officer and director of the Center for Science Diplomacy at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “The Science of Diplomacy” http://www.cnas.org/node/918, 7/9/11) HD | the U.S. government is not well organized to take advantage of science diplomacy. The National Science Foundation apply their resources to science -- but not to its diplomatic use Obama should appoint a ambassador for science and technology cooperation in the State Department. He or she could convene coordinating the strategic use of science diplomacy. | the U.S. government is not well organized to take advantage of science diplomacy. The National Science Foundation apply their resources to science -- but not to its diplomatic use. Obama should appoint a ambassador for science and technology cooperation in the State Department. He or she could convene coordinating the strategic use of science diplomacy | Facing a complex set of foreign-policy challenges, the United States can no longer afford to overlook such a useful instrument of statecraft. Regrettably, the U.S. government is not well organized to take advantage of science diplomacy. The National Science Foundation and technical departments (Energy, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Defense) apply their resources to science -- but not to its diplomatic use. Thus, the Obama administration should appoint a senior-level ambassador for science and technology cooperation in the State Department. He or she could convene an interagency group coordinating the strategic use of science diplomacy. | 657 | <h4>US doesn’t exercise science diplomacy even when we have the tools.</h4><p><strong>Lord et al 9</strong> (<u><strong>Kristin, vice president at the Center for a New American Security and a nonresident fellow of the Brookings Institution, Vaughan Turekian, chief international officer and director of the Center for Science Diplomacy at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “The Science of Diplomacy” http://www.cnas.org/node/918, 7/9/11) HD</p><p></u></strong>Facing a complex set of foreign-policy challenges, the United States can no longer afford to overlook such a useful instrument of statecraft. Regrettably, <u><strong><mark>the U.S. government is not well organized to take advantage of science diplomacy. The National Science Foundation</u></strong></mark> and technical departments (Energy, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Defense) <u><strong><mark>apply their resources to science -- but not to its diplomatic use</u></strong>.</mark> Thus, the <u><strong><mark>Obama</u></strong></mark> administration <u><strong><mark>should</u></strong> <u><strong>appoint a</u></strong></mark> senior-level <u><strong><mark>ambassador for science and technology cooperation in the State Department. He or she could convene</u></strong></mark> an interagency group <u><strong><mark>coordinating the strategic use of science diplomacy</mark>.</p></u></strong> | 1nc | null | MSD | 224,648 | 9 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
741,999 | No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant | Mueller 10 | Mueller 10 (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html) | Politicians preach . This was dramatic risk inflation , terrorist groups have exhibited only limited desire and progress armed theft of fissile material is unlikely chase would be immediate terrorists have to transport it over unfamiliar terrain Once outside terrorists would need a well-equipped machine shop and skilled scientists technical requirements verge on the unfeasible Adopting bias in the terrorists’ favor the cumulative odds drop to one in three billion They are unlikely to be sold a bomb The terrorist group might steal a “loose nuke none exist. bombs have devices that destroy the bomb if tampered with. codes are required if a state were to collapse weapons remain under heavy guard al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond the Internet | Politicians preach This was dramatic risk inflation terrorist groups have exhibited only limited desire and progress armed theft of fissile material is unlikely chase would be immediate terrorists have to transport it over unfamiliar terrain Once outside terrorists would need a well-equipped machine shop and skilled scientists technical requirements verge on the unfeasible Adopting bias in the terrorists’ favor the cumulative odds drop to one in three billion They are unlikely to be sold a bomb The terrorist group might steal a “loose nuke none exist bombs have devices that destroy the bomb if tampered with. codes are required if a state were to collapse weapons remain under heavy guard al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond the Internet. | Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt. | 18,687 | <h4>No risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant</h4><p><u><strong>Mueller 10</u></strong> (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)</p><p><u><mark>Politicians</mark> </u>of all stripes<u> <mark>preach</mark> </u>to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York<u>. <mark>This</u> <u>was</mark> </u>an early expression of a pattern of<u> <mark>dramatic risk inflation</u></mark> that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions<u>, <mark>terrorist groups</u></mark> seem to <u><mark>have exhibited only limited desire and</mark> </u>even less<u> <mark>progress</mark> </u>in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright <u><mark>armed theft of fissile material is</u></mark> exceedingly<u><mark> unlikely</mark> </u>not only because of the resistance of guards, but because <u><mark>chase would be immediate</u></mark>. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If<u> <mark>terrorists</mark> </u>were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material,<u> </u>they would then probably <u><mark>have to transport it</u></mark> a long distance<u><mark> over unfamiliar terrain</u></mark> and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. <u><mark>Once outside</mark> </u>the country with their precious booty, <u><mark>terrorists would need</mark> </u>to set up<u> <mark>a </u></mark>large and<u><mark> well-equipped machine shop</mark> </u>to manufacture a bomb<u> <mark>and</mark> </u>then to populate it with a very select team of highly<u><mark> skilled scientists</u></mark>, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the <u><mark>technical requirements</u></mark> in several fields <u><mark>verge on the unfeasible</u></mark>. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. <u><mark>Adopting</mark> </u>probability estimates that purposely and heavily<u> <mark>bias </u></mark>the case <u><mark>in the terrorists’ favor</u></mark>—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, <u><mark>the cumulative odds</mark> </u>that they will be able to pull off the deed <u><mark>drop to one in</mark> </u>well over<u> <mark>three billion</u></mark>. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. <u><mark>They are unlikely to be</mark> </u>given or<u> <mark>sold a bomb</u></mark> by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. <u><mark>The terrorist group might</u></mark> also seek to <u><mark>steal</mark> </u>or illicitly purchase<u> <mark>a “loose nuke</u></mark>“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that <u><strong><mark>none exist</strong></mark>. </u>All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished <u><mark>bombs have</mark> </u>been out-fitted with <u><mark>devices that</u></mark> trigger a non-nuclear explosion that <u><mark>destroy</u></mark>s <u><mark>the bomb if </u></mark>it is<u><mark> tampered with.</mark> </u>And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple<u><mark> codes are required</mark> </u>not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge <u><mark>if a </u></mark>nuclear<u><mark> state were to</mark> </u>utterly<u> <mark>collapse</u></mark>; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear<u> <mark>weapons </u></mark>would probably <u><mark>remain under heavy guard</u></mark> by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that <u><mark>al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond</mark> </u>searching<u> <mark>the Internet</u>.</mark> After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.</p> | 1NC | null | adv 2 | 47,970 | 226 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
742,000 | Live donations are key--Cadaver donations will never be enough | Satel 12 | Satel 12 Sally L. Satel, a physician, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute
4 May 7, 2012 Bloomberg View Facebook’s Organ Donation Success Needs Follow-Up http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-05-07/facebook-s-organ-donation-success-needs-follow-up | Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation.
I specify kidneys because people with renal failure represent about 80 percent of those on the national organ waiting list. Last year, roughly 91,000 people needed a renal transplant, but only one fifth of them received one.
Of the roughly 2 million Americans who die annually, it has been estimated that only 10,500 to 13,000 possess organs healthy enough for transplanting. So, if every eligible person donated his organs at death, surgeons might be able to double the number of transplant surgeries. (Last year, 7,433 deceased donors yielded an average of 1.5 kidneys each, for a total of 11,043 operations | Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation
people with renal failure represent 80 percent roughly 91,000 people only one fifth of them received one.
Of the 2 million only 10,500 possess organs healthy for transplantin | Organ-donation groups are rightly thrilled with Facebook’s initiative. Yet it’s important to keep the larger picture in mind. Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation.
I specify kidneys because people with renal failure represent about 80 percent of those on the national organ waiting list. Last year, roughly 91,000 people needed a renal transplant, but only one fifth of them received one.
Transplant Math
Now look more closely at the donor math: Of the roughly 2 million Americans who die annually, it has been estimated that only 10,500 to 13,000 possess organs healthy enough for transplanting. So, if every eligible person donated his organs at death, surgeons might be able to double the number of transplant surgeries. (Last year, 7,433 deceased donors yielded an average of 1.5 kidneys each, for a total of 11,043 operations; the rest were done with organs supplied by living relatives and friends.) | 979 | <h4><strong>Live donations are key--Cadaver donations will never be enough</h4><p>Satel 12</strong> Sally L. Satel, a physician, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute</p><p>4 May 7, 2012 Bloomberg View Facebook’s Organ Donation Success Needs Follow-Up <u>http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-05-07/facebook-s-organ-donation-success-needs-follow-up</p><p></u>Organ-donation groups are rightly thrilled with Facebook’s initiative. Yet it’s important to keep the larger picture in mind. <u><mark>Even if every American agreed to be an organ donor, there still wouldn’t be enough kidneys for transplantation</mark>.</p><p>I specify kidneys because <mark>people with renal failure represent</mark> about <mark>80 percent</mark> of those on the national organ waiting list. Last year, <mark>roughly 91,000 people</mark> needed a renal transplant, but <mark>only one fifth of them received one.</p><p></u></mark>Transplant Math</p><p>Now look more closely at the donor math: <u><mark>Of the</mark> roughly <mark>2 million</mark> Americans who die annually, it has been estimated that <mark>only 10,500</mark> to 13,000 <mark>possess organs healthy</mark> enough <mark>for transplantin</mark>g. So, if every eligible person donated his organs at death, surgeons might be able to double the number of transplant surgeries. (Last year, 7,433 deceased donors yielded an average of 1.5 kidneys each, for a total of 11,043 operations</u>; the rest were done with organs supplied by living relatives and friends.)</p> | 1nc | null | MSD | 430,439 | 4 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
742,001 | Explicit prohibition solves issues with the financial industry – returns enforcement power to the federal government and sends a signal to individuals | Miller 8 | Miller 8 (Jason A., lawyer at Miller and Monroe, “Don't Bet on This Legislation: The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act Places a Bigger Burden on Financial Institutions than Internet Gambling”, 12 N.C. Banking Inst. 185, Lexis) | Since existing federal laws do not explicitly make Internet gambling illegal and Congress appears to be concerned about social harms the most obvious solution would be for Congress to enact legislation that explicitly makes Internet gambling illegal Although enforcement efforts could be difficult federal officials have developed methods for enforcing laws that ban illegal activities on the Internet Putting the general public on notice that Internet gambling is illegal and also making a visible enforcement effort could have a dramatic impact on this issue limited enforcement and the threat of penalties are sufficient to discourage many people from breaking the laws If the UIGEA is repealed, the government, not financial institutions, would assume responsibility for enforcement of the anti-gambling laws As it stands, financial institutions are forced to make this determination on their own accord a law explicitly prohibiting all Internet gambling would permit financial institutions to focus more of their resources on their own business activities and cease spending their private funds on law enforcement and law interpretation , a law explicitly prohibiting Internet gambling and repealing the UIGEA would greatly reduce the impending burden that the UIGEA creates for financial institutions express prohibition would likely be more effective in curbing Internet gambling than the UIGEA.253 | the solution would be for Congress to make Internet gambling illegal officials have developed methods for enforcing laws Putting the general public on notice that is illegal and making a visible enforcement effort could have a dramatic impact limited enforcement and the threat of penalties are sufficient to discourage many people If the UIGEA is repealed, the gov not financial institutions, would assume responsibility for enforcement a law explicitly prohibiting all Internet gambling would permit financial institutions to focus more of their resources on their own business activities and cease spending private funds on law enforcement and interpretation | Since existing federal laws do not explicitly make Internet gambling illegal for individuals242 and Congress appears to be concerned about the social harms of gambling on individual citizens,243 the most obvious solution to curb Internet gambling would be for Congress to enact legislation that explicitly makes Internet gambling illegal for individuals.244 Although enforcement efforts could be difficult due to the nature of e-commerce, federal officials have developed methods for enforcing child pornography laws and other laws that ban illegal activities on the Internet.245 Putting the general public on notice that Internet gambling is illegal and also making a visible enforcement effort could have a dramatic impact on this issue.246 Similar to the traffic laws, a limited enforcement and the threat of penalties are sufficient to discourage many people from breaking the laws.247 Under this approach, Congress could either repeal the UIGEA or leave it in place. If the UIGEA is repealed, the government, not financial institutions, would assume responsibility for enforcement of the anti-gambling laws.248 If the UIGEA remains, financial institutions would have a clear determination from Congress as to what constitutes illegal Internet gambling.249 As it stands, financial institutions are forced to make this determination on their own accord.250 Thus, whether the UIGEA is repealed or remains in effect, a law explicitly prohibiting all Internet gambling would permit financial institutions to focus more of their resources on their own business activities and cease spending their private funds on law enforcement and law interpretation.251 In this way, a law explicitly prohibiting Internet gambling and amending or repealing the UIGEA would greatly reduce the impending burden that the UIGEA, in its present state, creates for financial institutions.252 Furthermore, express prohibition would likely be more effective in curbing Internet gambling than the UIGEA.253 | 1,982 | <h4><strong>Explicit prohibition solves issues with the financial industry – returns enforcement power to the federal government and sends a signal to individuals </h4><p>Miller 8 </strong>(Jason A., lawyer at Miller and Monroe, “Don't Bet on This Legislation: The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act Places a Bigger Burden on Financial Institutions than Internet Gambling”, 12 N.C. Banking Inst. 185, Lexis)</p><p><u><strong>Since existing federal laws do not explicitly make Internet gambling illegal</u></strong> for individuals242 <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>Congress appears to be concerned about</u></strong> the <u><strong>social harms</u></strong> of gambling on individual citizens,243 <u><strong><mark>the</mark> most obvious <mark>solution</u></strong></mark> to curb Internet gambling <u><strong><mark>would be for Congress to</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>enact legislation that explicitly <mark>make</mark>s <mark>Internet gambling illegal</u></strong></mark> for individuals.244 <u><strong>Although enforcement efforts could be</u></strong> <u><strong>difficult</u></strong> due to the nature of e-commerce, <u><strong>federal <mark>officials have developed methods for enforcing</mark> </u></strong>child pornography laws and other <u><strong><mark>laws</mark> that ban illegal activities on the Internet</u></strong>.245 <u><strong><mark>Putting the general public on notice</mark> <mark>that</mark> Internet gambling <mark>is illegal</mark> <mark>and</mark> also <mark>making a visible enforcement</mark> <mark>effort</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>could have a dramatic impact</mark> on this issue</u></strong>.246 Similar to the traffic laws, a <u><strong><mark>limited enforcement and the threat of penalties are sufficient to discourage many people</mark> from breaking the laws</u></strong>.247 Under this approach, Congress could either repeal the UIGEA or leave it in place. <u><strong><mark>If the UIGEA is repealed, the gov</mark>ernment, <mark>not financial institutions, would assume responsibility for enforcement</mark> of the anti-gambling laws</u></strong>.248 If the UIGEA remains, financial institutions would have a clear determination from Congress as to what constitutes illegal Internet gambling.249 <u><strong>As it stands, financial institutions are forced to make this determination on their own accord</u></strong>.250 Thus, whether the UIGEA is repealed or remains in effect, <u><strong><mark>a law explicitly prohibiting all Internet gambling would permit financial institutions to focus more of their resources on their own business activities</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>and cease spending</mark> their <mark>private funds on law enforcement</mark> <mark>and</mark> law <mark>interpretation</u></strong></mark>.251 In this way<u><strong>, a law explicitly prohibiting Internet gambling and</u></strong> amending or <u><strong>repealing the UIGEA would greatly reduce the impending burden that the UIGEA</u></strong>, in its present state, <u><strong>creates for financial institutions</u></strong>.252 Furthermore, <u><strong>express prohibition would likely be more effective in curbing Internet gambling than the UIGEA.253</p></u></strong> | 2NC | null | Solves – Financial Industry | 429,664 | 6 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
742,002 | The ban plank is enforced – lowers risk of laundering | Conon, JD Candidate, 09 | Conon, JD Candidate, 09
(Jonathan, Associate at Ropes&Gray, JD magna cume laude, ACES AND EIGHTS: WHY THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT RESIDES IN "DEAD MAN'S" LAND IN ATTEMPTING TO FURTHER CURB ONLINE GAMBLING AND WHY EXPANDED CRIMINALIZATION IS PREFERABLE TO LEGALIZATION 99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1157 ) | the UIGEA has had an impact on the online gaming market. One of its most immediate effects was the destruction in market value of many publicly traded companies Fearing prosecution by the Justice Department, many financial providers abandoned the U.S. market as well. n88 Neteller and PayPal have stopped providing this service in the United States. Neteller chose to stop serving U.S. clients after two of its retired founders were arrested on money laundering charges | the UIGEA has had an impact on the online gaming market One of its most immediate effects was the destruction in market value of many publicly traded companies Fearing prosecution providers abandoned the U.S. market Neteller and PayPal stopped providing | Despite its circuitous route into law, the UIGEA has had an impact on the online gaming market. One of its most immediate effects was the destruction in market value of many publicly traded companies in the United Kingdom and Europe that serviced the U.S. market. n83 PartyGaming, which operated the Party Poker site and generated 80% of its revenues from the United States, lost $ 5 billion in market value as its stock plummeted 58%. n84 Similarly, Sportingbet, the operator of sportsbook.com and ParadisePoker.com, dropped 60%, and The 888 Group, operator of gambling site 888.com, fell 33%. n85 Within one month of the UIGEA's passage, Sportingbet sold its entire operation for one dollar. n86 Another online gambling provider, Pinnacle Sports, took three months to abandon the U.S. market, leaving behind 60% of its customer base. n87 Online operators were not the only casualties of the UIGEA. Fearing prosecution by the Justice Department, many financial providers abandoned the U.S. market as well. n88 Neteller and PayPal, two of the leading financial intermediaries used by online gamblers to fund their Internet accounts, have stopped providing this service in the United States. n89 They had been able to generate profits because most credit card operators restricted individuals from directly using their cards at online gambling sites. n90 Companies like Neteller allowed individuals to avoid this restriction by permitting the transfer of money from credit cards to a company-operated holding account. n91 This account could then be used to fund a gambling site. n92 Neteller made money by charging a nominal fee whenever a user withdrew funds from the holding account back to a personal account. n93 Neteller chose to stop serving U.S. clients after two of its retired founders were arrested in the Virgin Islands on money laundering charges stemming from their company's role as a facilitator of online gambling. n94 | 1,933 | <h4><strong>The ban plank is enforced – lowers risk of laundering</h4><p>Conon, JD Candidate, 09 </p><p></strong>(Jonathan, Associate at Ropes&Gray, JD magna cume laude, ACES AND EIGHTS: WHY THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT RESIDES IN "DEAD MAN'S" LAND IN ATTEMPTING TO FURTHER CURB ONLINE GAMBLING AND WHY EXPANDED CRIMINALIZATION IS PREFERABLE TO LEGALIZATION 99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1157 )</p><p>Despite its circuitous route into law, <u><mark>the UIGEA has had an impact on the online gaming market</mark>. <mark>One of its most immediate effects was the destruction in market value of many publicly traded companies</u></mark> in the United Kingdom and Europe that serviced the U.S. market. n83 PartyGaming, which operated the Party Poker site and generated 80% of its revenues from the United States, lost $ 5 billion in market value as its stock plummeted 58%. n84 Similarly, Sportingbet, the operator of sportsbook.com and ParadisePoker.com, dropped 60%, and The 888 Group, operator of gambling site 888.com, fell 33%. n85 Within one month of the UIGEA's passage, Sportingbet sold its entire operation for one dollar. n86 Another online gambling provider, Pinnacle Sports, took three months to abandon the U.S. market, leaving behind 60% of its customer base. n87 Online operators were not the only casualties of the UIGEA. <u><mark>Fearing prosecution</mark> by the Justice Department, many financial <mark>providers</mark> <mark>abandoned the U.S. market</mark> as well. n88 <mark>Neteller and PayPal</u></mark>, two of the leading financial intermediaries used by online gamblers to fund their Internet accounts, <u>have <mark>stopped providing</mark> this service in the United States.</u> n89 They had been able to generate profits because most credit card operators restricted individuals from directly using their cards at online gambling sites. n90 Companies like Neteller allowed individuals to avoid this restriction by permitting the transfer of money from credit cards to a company-operated holding account. n91 This account could then be used to fund a gambling site. n92 Neteller made money by charging a nominal fee whenever a user withdrew funds from the holding account back to a personal account. n93 <u>Neteller chose to stop serving U.S. clients after two of its retired founders were arrested</u> in the Virgin Islands <u>on money laundering charges</u><strong> stemming from their company's role as a facilitator of online gambling. n94</p></strong> | 2NC | null | Solves - Laundering | 430,529 | 2 | 17,067 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | 565,285 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 1 | Indiana Tally-Liu | Weil | Ban OG CP
Politics - Iran (2NR)
Security K
Heg bad (2NR) | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
742,003 | Property rights destroy biotech industry through prohibitive transaction costs that undermine research and commercialization | Harrison 2 | Harrison 2 (Charlotte H., Fellow in Medical Ethics, Harvard Medical School; J.D. 1984, Harvard Law School; M.P.H. 2000, Harvard School of Public Health, “ARTICLE: Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue,” 28 Am. J. L. and Med. 77, lexis) | people should be deemed the legal owners of their body parts, and compensation should be determined through a "direct market between buyer and seller This alternative entails serious ethical complications of its own, including risks to the doctor-patient or researcher-subject relationship and other negative consequences for larger society. If one accepts the Moore court's assumption that the progress of biotechnology research is highly beneficial to society, it follows that the economic efficiency of such research should be carefully protected. Not only the Moore court, but other jurists and commentators have argued that the recognition of property rights in every potentially useful tissue sample would present the biotechnology industry with an unacceptable choice: either become mired in costly and time-consuming transactions with numerous individual tissue sources, n53 or risk failing to secure clear title to the tissue samples on which patents and products may be based. In an analogous context--involving intangible or intellectual property rather than tangible, personal property--Heller and Eisenberg have detailed the inefficiencies that can result from what they regard as excessive protection of individual property rights in biomedical research they have argued that progress in biotechnology is unduly burdened by the existence of too many intellectual property rights in basic research tools. serves to highlight , problems that are likely to be exacerbated if individual tissue contributors are deemed to hold personal property rights in their blood and body parts similar tragedy of the "anti-commons" occurs when people hold too little in common--that is, when too many people have a private right to prevent others from using property of mutual interes In the biotechnology industry, companies must strike a separate bargain with every party whose intellectual or tangible property might be needed to produce a commercial product. It would be better, if fewer such property rights were recognized. Often the rights-bearing parties are academic researchers as inefficient bargainers with limited competence in the field, cognitive biases that lead them to overvalue their assets and different strategic objectives from their industrial negotiating partner . Heller and Eisenberg contend that negotiating with such parties absorbs undue time and resources from industry. These commitments can take time to negotiate and can conflict with companies' natural preference to control proprietary rights The conflict is rooted in a difference between public and private objectives rather than in mere inefficiency If individuals sought to negotiate the terms under which their body parts were made available for research, inefficiencies could result from several factors It is likely that the majority of such materials would never be used commercially in such a way as to warrant a significant royalty these circumstances, transaction costs for securing the rights to all samples from their individual contributors could be prohibitive. This would likely be true whether contributors negotiated directly with companies or with intermediaries such as academic medical centers or private physician practices. | : people deemed the legal owners of their body parts entails serious complications including risks to researcher-subject relationship and other negative consequences for larger society recognition of property rights in every potentially useful tissue sample would present the biotechnology industry with an unacceptable choice: either become mired in costly and time-consuming transactions or risk failing to secure clear title to the tissue samples on which patents and products may be based progress in biotechnology is unduly burdened by the existence of too many intellectual property rights in basic research tools. serves to highlight problems that are likely to be exacerbated if individual tissue contributors are deemed to hold personal property rights in their blood and body parts companies must strike a separate bargain with every party whose intellectual or tangible property might be needed to produce a commercial product Often the rights-bearing parties are academic researchers as inefficient bargainers with limited competence in the field, cognitive biases that lead them to overvalue their assets and different strategic objectives from their industrial negotiating partners. negotiating with such parties absorbs undue time and resources from industry These commitments can take time to negotiate and can conflict with companies' If individuals sought to negotiate the terms under which their body parts were made available for research, inefficiencies could result from several factors. transaction costs for securing the rights to all samples from their individual contributors could be prohibitive. | To the American mind, one obvious solution to the ethical inadequacies of the current system is market-based: people should be deemed the legal owners of their body parts, and compensation should be determined through a "direct market between buyer and seller with prices based on what people are willing to pay and accept." n51 This alternative, already implemented in occasional individual negotiations, n52 directly addresses some of the ethical problems just surveyed. It also entails serious ethical complications of its own, including risks to the doctor-patient or researcher-subject relationship and other negative consequences for larger society. Examination of four major objections to the property-rights approach begins to suggest the parameters of a more satisfactory alternative.¶ [*86] ¶ A. Economic Inefficiency¶ If one accepts the Moore court's assumption that the progress of biotechnology research is highly beneficial to society, it follows that the economic efficiency of such research should be carefully protected. Not only the Moore court, but other jurists and commentators have argued that the recognition of property rights in every potentially useful tissue sample would present the biotechnology industry with an unacceptable choice: either become mired in costly and time-consuming transactions with numerous individual tissue sources, n53 or risk failing to secure clear title to the tissue samples on which patents and products may be based. n54¶ In an analogous context--involving intangible or intellectual property rather than tangible, personal property--Heller and Eisenberg have detailed the inefficiencies that can result from what they regard as excessive protection of individual property rights in biomedical research. n55 In particular, they have argued that progress in biotechnology is unduly burdened by the existence of too many intellectual property rights in basic research tools. Heller and Eisenberg's analysis of this intellectual property market serves to highlight, by analogy, problems that are likely to be exacerbated if individual tissue contributors are deemed to hold personal property rights in their blood and body parts.¶ Heller and Eisenberg's argument takes its cue from Garrett Hardin's classic analysis of the problems that arise when people hold property in common. n56 Hardin concluded that people tend to overuse such "commons property" (e.g., air or water) in a way that is ultimately tragic. Without the incentives of private property or the limits of other social arrangements, each person's rational pursuit of self-interest leads to greater and greater exploitation of a common resource until the whole is exhausted or ruined. This, in Hardin's terms, is "the tragedy of the commons." n57¶ According to Heller and Eisenberg, an opposite but similar tragedy of the "anti-commons" occurs when people hold too little in common--that is, when too many people have a private right to prevent others from using property of mutual interest. n58 In the biotechnology industry, companies must strike a separate bargain with every party whose intellectual or tangible property might be needed to produce a commercial product. It would be better, Heller and Eisenberg suggest, if fewer such property rights were recognized. Often the rights-bearing parties are academic researchers, whom Heller and Eisenberg characterize as inefficient bargainers with limited competence in the field, cognitive biases that lead them to overvalue their assets and different strategic objectives from their industrial negotiating partners. Heller and Eisenberg contend that negotiating with such parties absorbs undue time and resources from industry. n59¶ In understanding the implications of this view for human tissue transactions, it is important to separate concerns about efficiency from differences in strategic or policy goals. The time-consuming nature of academic/industrial negotiations is often due, in part, to the substantive social values expressed in public technology policy. [*87] For example, existing federal policy seeks to ensure that academic inventions made under federal grants and licensed exclusively to industry are actually used in the development of products. The rights are not merely to be held defensively (i.e., to prevent competitors from marketing a similar product) or allowed to languish for too long in a company's portfolio if other projects take on greater commercial priority. n60 To implement this policy, universities commonly require their exclusive licensees to agree to "due diligence" commitments for the development and marketing of products. These commitments can take time to negotiate and can conflict with companies' natural preference to control proprietary rights. n61 The conflict is rooted in a difference between public and private objectives rather than in mere inefficiency. In addition, each party has a strategic interest in obtaining what it deems to be an acceptable financial return. Of course, both public and private parties may share a larger aim to promote the development of new and better healthcare products, and it is reasonable to consider how the allocation of property rights affects that long-term goal.¶ Individual tissue contributors may have interests analogous to those of government-funded researchers and licensors. In addition to financial considerations, these interests may include the promotion of research on a disease or condition of concern to the contributor. In a market that serves the dual purposes of medical care and entrepreneurship, the extent of protection afforded to a tissue contributor's non-economic interests is a public policy question that goes beyond the scope of this article. It should be considered in conjunction with, but not subsumed by, concerns about financial returns and efficiency.¶ On grounds of economic efficiency alone, however, criticism like Heller and Eisenberg's would likely be warranted if property rights were extended to individual tissue contributors. If individuals sought to negotiate the terms under which their body parts were made available for research, inefficiencies could result from several factors. Many tissue samples would be acquired either in clinical situations, in which research uses might not yet have been considered, or in research projects at an early stage of development, in which the eventual commercial utility of such materials could be hard to predict. n62 It is likely that the majority of such materials would never be used commercially in such a way as to warrant a significant royalty. n63 In these circumstances, transaction costs for securing the rights to all samples from their individual contributors could be prohibitive. This would likely be true whether contributors negotiated directly with companies or with intermediaries such as academic medical centers or private physician practices. | 6,908 | <h4>Property rights destroy biotech industry through prohibitive transaction costs that undermine research and commercialization</h4><p><strong>Harrison 2</strong> (Charlotte H., Fellow in Medical Ethics, Harvard Medical School; J.D. 1984, Harvard Law School; M.P.H. 2000, Harvard School of Public Health, “ARTICLE: Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue,” 28 Am. J. L. and Med. 77, lexis<u>)</p><p></u>To the American mind, one obvious solution to the ethical inadequacies of the current system is market-based<mark>: <u>people</mark> should be <mark>deemed the legal owners of their body parts</mark>, and compensation should be determined through a "direct market between buyer and seller</u> with prices based on what people are willing to pay and accept." n51 <u>This alternative</u>, already implemented in occasional individual negotiations, n52 directly addresses some of the ethical problems just surveyed. It also <u><mark>entails serious</mark> ethical <mark>complications</mark> of its own, <mark>including risks to</mark> the doctor-patient or <mark>researcher-subject relationship and other negative consequences for larger society</mark>. </u>Examination of four major objections to the property-rights approach begins to suggest the parameters of a more satisfactory alternative.¶ [*86] ¶ A. Economic Inefficiency¶ <u>If one accepts the Moore court's assumption that the progress of biotechnology research is highly beneficial to society, it follows that the economic efficiency of such research should be carefully protected. Not only the Moore court, but other jurists and commentators have argued that the <mark>recognition</mark> <mark>of property rights in every potentially useful tissue sample would present the biotechnology industry with an unacceptable choice: either become mired in costly and time-consuming transactions </mark>with numerous individual tissue sources, n53 <mark>or risk failing to secure clear title to the tissue samples on which patents and products may be based</mark>.</u> n54¶ <u>In an analogous context--involving intangible or intellectual property rather than tangible, personal property--Heller and Eisenberg have detailed the inefficiencies that can result from what they regard as excessive protection of individual property rights in biomedical research</u>. n55 In particular, <u>they have argued that <mark>progress in biotechnology is unduly burdened by the existence of too many intellectual property rights in basic research tools.</u></mark> Heller and Eisenberg's analysis of this intellectual property market <u><mark>serves to highlight</u></mark>, by analogy<u>, <mark>problems that are likely to be exacerbated if individual tissue contributors are deemed to hold personal property rights in their blood and body parts</u></mark>.¶ Heller and Eisenberg's argument takes its cue from Garrett Hardin's classic analysis of the problems that arise when people hold property in common. n56 Hardin concluded that people tend to overuse such "commons property" (e.g., air or water) in a way that is ultimately tragic. Without the incentives of private property or the limits of other social arrangements, each person's rational pursuit of self-interest leads to greater and greater exploitation of a common resource until the whole is exhausted or ruined. This, in Hardin's terms, is "the tragedy of the commons." n57¶ According to Heller and Eisenberg, an opposite but <u>similar tragedy of the "anti-commons" occurs when people hold too little in common--that is, when too many people have a private right to prevent others from using property of mutual interes</u>t. n58 <u>In the biotechnology industry, <mark>companies must strike a separate bargain with every party whose intellectual or tangible property might be needed to produce a commercial product</mark>. It would be better,</u> Heller and Eisenberg suggest, <u>if fewer such property rights were recognized. <mark>Often the rights-bearing parties are academic researchers</u></mark>, whom Heller and Eisenberg characterize <u><mark>as inefficient bargainers with limited competence in the field, cognitive biases that lead them to overvalue their assets and different strategic objectives from their industrial negotiating partner</u>s<u>. </mark>Heller and Eisenberg contend that <mark>negotiating with such parties absorbs undue time and resources from industry</mark>.</u> n59¶ In understanding the implications of this view for human tissue transactions, it is important to separate concerns about efficiency from differences in strategic or policy goals. The time-consuming nature of academic/industrial negotiations is often due, in part, to the substantive social values expressed in public technology policy. [*87] For example, existing federal policy seeks to ensure that academic inventions made under federal grants and licensed exclusively to industry are actually used in the development of products. The rights are not merely to be held defensively (i.e., to prevent competitors from marketing a similar product) or allowed to languish for too long in a company's portfolio if other projects take on greater commercial priority. n60 To implement this policy, universities commonly require their exclusive licensees to agree to "due diligence" commitments for the development and marketing of products. <u><mark>These commitments can take time to negotiate and can conflict with companies'</mark> natural preference to control proprietary rights</u>. n61 <u>The conflict is rooted in a difference between public and private objectives rather than in mere inefficiency</u>. In addition, each party has a strategic interest in obtaining what it deems to be an acceptable financial return. Of course, both public and private parties may share a larger aim to promote the development of new and better healthcare products, and it is reasonable to consider how the allocation of property rights affects that long-term goal.¶ Individual tissue contributors may have interests analogous to those of government-funded researchers and licensors. In addition to financial considerations, these interests may include the promotion of research on a disease or condition of concern to the contributor. In a market that serves the dual purposes of medical care and entrepreneurship, the extent of protection afforded to a tissue contributor's non-economic interests is a public policy question that goes beyond the scope of this article. It should be considered in conjunction with, but not subsumed by, concerns about financial returns and efficiency.¶ On grounds of economic efficiency alone, however, criticism like Heller and Eisenberg's would likely be warranted if property rights were extended to individual tissue contributors. <u><mark>If individuals sought to negotiate the terms under which their body parts were made available for research, inefficiencies could result from several factors</u>.</mark> Many tissue samples would be acquired either in clinical situations, in which research uses might not yet have been considered, or in research projects at an early stage of development, in which the eventual commercial utility of such materials could be hard to predict. n62 <u>It is likely that the majority of such materials would never be used commercially in such a way as to warrant a significant royalty</u>. n63 In <u>these circumstances, <mark>transaction costs for securing the rights to all samples from their individual contributors could be prohibitive.</mark> This would likely be true whether contributors negotiated directly with companies or with intermediaries such as academic medical centers or private physician practices.</p></u> | 1nc | null | 1NC Property Rights DA | 430,437 | 17 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |
742,004 | Worst climate impacts take decades to arrive and don’t assume adaptation | Mendelsohn 9 | Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf | Proponents argue that there is no time to waste ). These statements are largely alarmist and misleading society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic conse- quences. emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two of no mitigation acts assume that there will be no or little adaptation. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or millennium and many of these will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be develope | that there is no time to wast are largely alarmist and misleading immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic conse- quences emissions over decades will lead to only mild consequences severe impacts require a century (or two no mitigation impacts assume no adaptation severe impacts will take more than a century or millennium and will never occur because people adapt | The heart of the debate about climate change comes from numerous warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human- induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a, 2007c; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007a), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007a), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007a), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007a), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20 and 30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007a). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets, causing severe sea-level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta and others 2009). Proponents argue that there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well-being may be at risk (Stern 2006). These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic conse- quences. The science and economics of climate change are quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two, accord- ing to Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume that there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold, and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long-range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses. | 1,962 | <h4>Worst climate impacts take decades to arrive and don’t assume adaptation</h4><p>Robert O. <strong>Mendelsohn 9</strong>, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf</p><p>The heart of the debate about climate change comes from numerous warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human- induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a, 2007c; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007a), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007a), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007a), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007a), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20 and 30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007a). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets, causing severe sea-level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta and others 2009). <u>Proponents argue <mark>that there is no time to wast</mark>e</u>. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well-being may be at risk (Stern 2006<u>). These statements <mark>are largely alarmist and misleading</u></mark>. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, <u>society’s <mark>immediate behavior has an</u> <u><strong>extremely low probability</u></strong> <u>of leading to</mark> <mark>catastrophic conse- quences</mark>.</u> The science and economics of climate change are quite clear that <u><mark>emissions over</mark> the next few <mark>decades will lead to only mild consequences</u></mark>. The <u><mark>severe impacts</mark> predicted by alarmists <mark>require</u> <u><strong>a century (or two</u></strong></mark>, accord- ing to Stern 2006) <u>of <mark>no mitigation</u></mark>. Many of the predicted <mark>imp<u>acts assume</mark> that there will be <mark>no</mark> or little <mark>adaptation</mark>. </u>The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. <u>Most of the more <mark>severe impacts will take more than a century or</u></mark> even a <u><mark>millennium</u></mark> to unfold, <u><mark>and</mark> many of these</u> “potential” impacts <u><mark>will never occur because people</mark> will <mark>adapt</mark>. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be develope</u>d to thwart long-range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses.</p> | 1nc | null | 1NC Property Rights DA | 45,412 | 381 | 17,066 | ./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | 565,286 | N | Hurricanedebates2015 | 3 | Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell | Harrigan | Security K (2NR)
SCOTUS MSD CP
Politics - Iran
T - Cadavers == nearly all
Heg Bad | ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx | null | 48,457 | KrAh | Dartmouth KrAh | null | Da..... | Kr..... | Pi..... | Ah..... | 18,764 | Dartmouth | Dartmouth | null | null | 1,004 | ndtceda14 | NDT/CEDA 2014-15 | 2,014 | cx | college | 2 |