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The only issue was discrimination---that law applied differently between U.S. and foreign operators---which the CP solves.

Chander 9

Chander 9 – Anupam Chander, Visiting Professor, The University of Chicago Law School; Professor, University of California, Davis. Yale Law School, J.D. Harvard College, “Trade 2.0”, The Yale Journal of International Law, Summer, 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 281, Lexis

Antigua responded filed a claim against the U S before the WTO the market access requirement, the U S argued, did not bar a total prohibition on a particular service The Appellate Body, held that a blanket prohibition operated as a "zero quota," and thus presented a quantitative restraint prohibited by the market access commitment GATS, however, permits derogation where "necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order." This clause serves as a crucial regulatory safety valve, ensuring that liberalizing commitments do not unintentionally jeopardize important local public policies The Appellate Body accepted the American contention that the restraints on online gambling were necessary to protect concerns related to "(1) organized crime; (2) money laundering; (3) fraud; (4) risks to youth, including underage gambling; and (5) public health. Appellate Body agreed that the "distinctive characteristics of the remote supply of gambling services may call for distinctive regulatory methods." But the U S stumbled on an inconsistency: U.S. law "authorizes domestic service suppliers, but not foreign service suppliers, to offer remote betting services in relation to certain horse races." With the U S stubborn in its resistance to resolving this inconsistency, the WTO granted Antigua the right to retaliate by suspending Antigua's TRIPS obligation to respect U.S. intellectual property rights in an amount corresponding to the estimated lost revenues from online horse-racing

A B held a blanket prohibition operated as a "zero quota," GATS, however, permits derogation where "necessary to protect public morals This clause serves as a crucial regulatory safety valve The A B accepted the contention that restraints on online gambling were necessary distinctive characteristics of gambling call for distinctive regulatory methods But the U S stumbled on inconsistency law "authorizes domestic suppliers not foreign

Antigua responded to U.S. enforcement efforts like any country that found its exports hampered by legal restrictions elsewhere: it filed a claim against the United States before the WTO. Antigua's claim, however, was novel: it was the first brought under GATS, n34 and the first to challenge barriers to trade via the Internet. Antigua argued that the requirement of physical establishment in certain specified zones in the United States ran afoul of the national treatment obligation by disadvantaging foreign providers. n35 Antigua further argued that the United States violated its commitment to provide market access to trade in "other recreational services." n36 The United States protested that it never agreed to open up trade in gambling services, specifically excluding "sporting" from its liberalization commitment. n37 Canvassing a number of sources, the Appellate Body concluded that the United States had indeed committed to open up gambling services. n38 Controversy over whether a country committed to liberalize a particular service might seem awkward; after all, should not the parties to the trade agreement know what economic activities each side has agreed to liberalize? But because it is often possible to characterize a particular service in multiple ways, some liberalized and some not, this most basic of disputes (is there a liberalization commitment?) will prove a consistent thorn in the side of net-work. More importantly, changes in tradability make possible cross-border [*289] competition in services that nation-states may not have anticipated when they committed to liberalization. The United States argued that, even if it had committed to liberalize gambling, it had met its obligations. After all, Antiguan corporations were welcome - like any American national - to provide gambling to Americans, as long as they set up shop in Las Vegas or another permissive American jurisdiction. n39 The United States also insisted that, because of their differing consumer experiences and regulatory risks, offline gambling and online gambling were two distinct services, and thus opening up one and not the other did not effectively deny national treatment. Moreover, the market access requirement, the United States argued, did not bar a total prohibition on a particular service. Seized of the dispute, the WTO's Appellate Body confined its analysis to the market access complaint, finding it unnecessary to resolve the national treatment complaint. The United States argued that its rules against online gambling were merely rules regulating the form or manner in which services are delivered, not quantitative constraints on services or suppliers. n40 Under this reasoning, the United States would meet its market access commitment for a service even if it barred the provision of that service online entirely. The Appellate Body, however, held that a blanket prohibition operated as a "zero quota," and thus presented a quantitative restraint prohibited by the market access commitment. n41 GATS, however, permits derogation where "necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order." n42 This clause serves as a crucial regulatory safety valve, ensuring that liberalizing commitments do not unintentionally jeopardize important local public policies. The Appellate Body accepted the American contention that the restraints on online gambling were necessary to protect concerns related to "(1) organized crime; (2) money laundering; (3) fraud; (4) risks to youth, including underage gambling; and (5) public health." n43 Gambling via the Internet posed special concerns: "(i) the volume, speed and international reach of remote gambling transactions; (ii) the virtual anonymity of such transactions; (iii) low barriers to entry in the context of the remote supply of gambling and betting services; and the (iv) isolated and anonymous environment in which such gambling takes place." n44 [*290] The Appellate Body agreed that the "distinctive characteristics of the remote supply of gambling services may call for distinctive regulatory methods." n45 But the United States stumbled on an inconsistency: U.S. law "authorizes domestic service suppliers, but not foreign service suppliers, to offer remote betting services in relation to certain horse races." n46 With the United States stubborn in its resistance to resolving this inconsistency, the WTO granted Antigua the right to retaliate by suspending Antigua's TRIPS obligation to respect U.S. intellectual property rights in an amount corresponding to the estimated lost revenues from online horse-racing. n47 Antigua can now truly become a Pirate of the Caribbean.

<h4><strong>The only issue was <u>discrimination</u>---that law applied differently between U.S. and foreign operators---which the CP solves.</h4><p>Chander 9</strong> – Anupam Chander, Visiting Professor, The University of Chicago Law School; Professor, University of California, Davis. Yale Law School, J.D. Harvard College, “Trade 2.0”, The Yale Journal of International Law, Summer, 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 281, Lexis</p><p><u><strong>Antigua responded</u></strong> to U.S. enforcement efforts like any country that found its exports hampered by legal restrictions elsewhere: it <u><strong>filed a claim against the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>before the WTO</u></strong>. Antigua's claim, however, was novel: it was the first brought under GATS, n34 and the first to challenge barriers to trade via the Internet. Antigua argued that the requirement of physical establishment in certain specified zones in the United States ran afoul of the national treatment obligation by disadvantaging foreign providers. n35 Antigua further argued that the United States violated its commitment to provide market access to trade in "other recreational services." n36 The United States protested that it never agreed to open up trade in gambling services, specifically excluding "sporting" from its liberalization commitment. n37 Canvassing a number of sources, the Appellate Body concluded that the United States had indeed committed to open up gambling services. n38 Controversy over whether a country committed to liberalize a particular service might seem awkward; after all, should not the parties to the trade agreement know what economic activities each side has agreed to liberalize? But because it is often possible to characterize a particular service in multiple ways, some liberalized and some not, this most basic of disputes (is there a liberalization commitment?) will prove a consistent thorn in the side of net-work. More importantly, changes in tradability make possible cross-border [*289] competition in services that nation-states may not have anticipated when they committed to liberalization. The United States argued that, even if it had committed to liberalize gambling, it had met its obligations. After all, Antiguan corporations were welcome - like any American national - to provide gambling to Americans, as long as they set up shop in Las Vegas or another permissive American jurisdiction. n39 The United States also insisted that, because of their differing consumer experiences and regulatory risks, offline gambling and online gambling were two distinct services, and thus opening up one and not the other did not effectively deny national treatment. Moreover, <u><strong>the market access requirement, the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>argued, did not bar a total prohibition on a particular service</u></strong>. Seized of the dispute, the WTO's Appellate Body confined its analysis to the market access complaint, finding it unnecessary to resolve the national treatment complaint. The United States argued that its rules against online gambling were merely rules regulating the form or manner in which services are delivered, not quantitative constraints on services or suppliers. n40 Under this reasoning, the United States would meet its market access commitment for a service even if it barred the provision of that service online entirely. <u><strong>The <mark>A</mark>ppellate <mark>B</mark>ody,</u></strong> however, <u><strong><mark>held</mark> that <mark>a blanket prohibition operated as a "zero quota,"</mark> and thus presented a quantitative restraint prohibited by the market access commitment</u></strong>. n41 <u><strong><mark>GATS, however, permits derogation where "necessary to protect public morals</mark> or to maintain public order."</u></strong> n42 <u><strong><mark>This clause serves as a crucial regulatory safety valve</mark>, ensuring that liberalizing commitments do not unintentionally jeopardize important local public policies</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The A</mark>ppellate <mark>B</mark>ody <mark>accepted the</mark> American <mark>contention that</mark> the <mark>restraints on online gambling were necessary</mark> to protect concerns related to "(1) organized crime; (2) money laundering; (3) fraud; (4) risks to youth, including underage gambling; and (5) public health.</u></strong>" n43 Gambling via the Internet posed special concerns: "(i) the volume, speed and international reach of remote gambling transactions; (ii) the virtual anonymity of such transactions; (iii) low barriers to entry in the context of the remote supply of gambling and betting services; and the (iv) isolated and anonymous environment in which such gambling takes place." n44 [*290] The <u><strong>Appellate Body agreed that the "<mark>distinctive characteristics</mark> of the remote supply <mark>of gambling</mark> services may <mark>call for distinctive regulatory methods</mark>."</u></strong> n45 <u><strong><mark>But the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>stumbled on</mark> an <mark>inconsistency</mark>: U.S. <mark>law "authorizes domestic</mark> service <mark>suppliers</mark>, but <mark>not foreign</mark> service suppliers, to offer remote betting services in relation to certain horse races."</u></strong> n46 <u><strong>With the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>stubborn in its resistance to resolving this inconsistency, the WTO granted Antigua the right to retaliate by suspending Antigua's TRIPS obligation to respect U.S. intellectual property rights in an amount corresponding to the estimated lost revenues from online horse-racing</u></strong>. n47 Antigua can now truly become a Pirate of the Caribbean.</p>

2NC

Solves - Laundering

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

N

Hurricanedebates2015

1

Indiana Tally-Liu

Weil

Ban OG CP Politics - Iran (2NR) Security K Heg bad (2NR)

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

KrAh

Dartmouth KrAh

Da.....

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Pi.....

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Dartmouth

Dartmouth

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Try or die evidence is in the context of super-volcano eruptions—you should disregard extremely low risk future indeterminate impacts out of hand—AND—GM would only be able to resolve one effect of a super-volcano eruption

<h4>Try or die evidence is in the context of <u>super-volcano eruptions</u>—you should disregard extremely low risk future indeterminate impacts out of hand—AND—GM would only be able to resolve <u>one effect</u> of a super-volcano eruption</h4>

1nc

1NC Property Rights DA

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

N

Hurricanedebates2015

3

Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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Dartmouth KrAh

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Pi.....

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Dartmouth

Dartmouth

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

The scope of the aff is laughably small – several waves of federal financial services regulations in other sectors swamp the aff - banks are resiliently adapting now anyway

DCFS 2013

DCFS (Deloitte Center for Financial Services) 2013 “2014 Banking Industry Outlook Repositioning for growth Agility in a re-regulated world” http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CC0QFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.deloitte.com%2Fassets%2FDcom-UnitedStates%2FLocal%2520Assets%2FDocuments%2FFSI%2Fus_fsi_DCFS2014BankingIndustryOutlook_111113.pdf&ei=NKcpVOjlN_a1sQSt3IGoAw&usg=AFQjCNHiNozpwkRrLTPwW0hlFPM_9hOsPw&sig2=FkSz2LPEeBfOk4_T59DV0w

Regulations and compliance continue to dominate the attention of bank executives. In 2013 , the industry faced a new wave of rules covering capital, liquidity, consumer protection, anti-money laundering and risk management other regulations in the euro area further complicated the global regulatory landscape. Extensive enforcement of regulations in 2013 also created additional stress The CFPB) has added to this pressure with various new rules on mortgages, credit cards, and student loans. Furthermore, the industry has been adjusting to the new era of macroprudential oversight, evident in regulators’ broad focus on systemic risk. Most compliance efforts have focused on remediation and redesign of the banks’ operations banks have increased investment in their compliance infrastructure . In light of regulatory pressure, banks have focused on building more robust and comprehensive data systems to better drive risk, business, and compliance decisions. In 2014, the industry is likely to get more acclimated to the regulatory climate “2014 will be the year of getting it done, and getting it right.” , banks are likely to pay greater attention to data and analytics. These investments could empower banks to have an enterprise-wide view of customers and to proactively identify and address any problems. They will also help in having more informed conversations with regulators, and enable them to appreciate the specific nuances of different business decisions. Firms that institutionalize compliance could create competitive advantages, Boards are likely to become more engaged in risk governance in order to reshape bank risk culture Boards could be more emboldened to challenge management,

Regulations dominate the attention of bank s In 2013 the industry faced a new wave of rules covering capital liquidity AML), and risk management regulations created additional stress The CFPB) added pressure with rules on mortgages, credit cards, and student loans banks have increased investment in their compliance infrastructure the industry get more acclimated to the regulatory climate 2014 will be the year of getting it done

Regulations and compliance continue to dominate the attention of bank executives. In 2013, three years after the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, the industry faced a new wave of rules covering capital, liquidity, consumer protection, anti-money laundering (AML), and risk management. Basel III rules and various other regulations in the U.K. and the euro area further complicated the global regulatory landscape. Extensive enforcement of regulations in 2013 also created additional stress, particularly for large institutions, which were the main targets of attention until recently. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has added to this pressure with various new rules on mortgages, credit cards, and student loans. Furthermore, the industry has been adjusting to the new era of macroprudential oversight, evident in regulators’ broad focus on systemic risk. “Most compliance efforts have focused on remediation and redesign of the banks’ operations,” said J.H. Caldwell, partner, Deloitte & Touche LLP. Many banks have increased investment in their compliance infrastructure and made efforts to build improved risk cultures within their institutions. In light of regulatory pressure, banks have focused on building more robust and comprehensive data systems to better drive risk, business, and compliance decisions. Despite many improvements – and more than $100 billion in restitution, fines, and litigation costs paid to date – much work remains to be done to excel in risk management and governance.15 Continuation of these efforts may be essential as the regulatory pressure is not expected to dissipate in the near future. What's new for 2014 In 2014, the industry is likely to get more acclimated to the regulatory climate by moving past remediation issues to focus on instituting strong compliance programs across the organization. In “getting to strong” in their risk management programs, banks should continue bolstering their risk practices and governance.16 According to Deborah Bailey, director, Deloitte & Touche LLP, “2014 will be the year of getting it done, and getting it right.” In seeking to improve their risk infrastructure, banks are likely to pay greater attention to data and analytics. These investments could empower banks to have an enterprise-wide view of customers and to proactively identify and address any problems. They will also help in having more informed conversations with regulators, and enable them to appreciate the specific nuances of different business decisions. In 2014, regulatory pressure is expected to flow downstream to smaller institutions, encouraging them to retool their compliance infrastructure. Proposed stress tests for midsized banks may expose deficiencies, forcing some to restructure their risk profiles. Smaller institutions may need to invest in new talent and training to ensure that adequate compliance resources are available. As a result, regulatory compliance could become more ingrained in the broader industry culture. Firms that are able to institutionalize compliance in an effective and efficient manner could create competitive advantages, allowing them to best pursue their growth agenda. But as Tom Rollauer, executive director, Deloitte Center for Regulatory Strategies, Deloitte & Touche LLP, said, “It is also essential that banks continue to work more collaboratively with regulators in strengthening their compliance programs.” Boards are likely to become more engaged in risk governance in order to reshape bank risk culture and to review business strategies with a sharper focus on risk controls. Boards could be more emboldened to challenge management, particularly regarding risk appetites, and document their recommendations for regulators. It is also expected that they will interact more with staff below the executive level, to ensure the tone at the top is well reflected in the firm’s culture.

<h4><strong>The scope of the aff is laughably small – several waves of federal financial services regulations in other sectors swamp the aff - banks are resiliently adapting now anyway</h4><p>DCFS</strong> (Deloitte Center for Financial Services) <strong>2013</strong> “2014 Banking Industry Outlook Repositioning for growth Agility in a re-regulated world” http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CC0QFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.deloitte.com%2Fassets%2FDcom-UnitedStates%2FLocal%2520Assets%2FDocuments%2FFSI%2Fus_fsi_DCFS2014BankingIndustryOutlook_111113.pdf&ei=NKcpVOjlN_a1sQSt3IGoAw&usg=AFQjCNHiNozpwkRrLTPwW0hlFPM_9hOsPw&sig2=FkSz2LPEeBfOk4_T59DV0w</p><p><u><strong><mark>Regulations</mark> and compliance continue to <mark>dominate the attention of bank</mark> executive<mark>s</mark>. <mark>In 2013</u></strong></mark>, three years after the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted<u><strong>, <mark>the industry faced a new wave of rules</mark> <mark>covering capital</mark>, <mark>liquidity</mark>, consumer protection, anti-money laundering</u></strong> (<mark>AML), <u><strong>and risk management</u></strong></mark>. Basel III rules and various <u><strong>other regulations in the</u></strong> U.K. and the <u><strong>euro area further complicated the global regulatory landscape. Extensive enforcement of <mark>regulations</mark> in 2013 also <mark>created additional stress</u></strong></mark>, particularly for large institutions, which were the main targets of attention until recently. <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong></mark> Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (<u><strong><mark>CFPB)</mark> has <mark>added</mark> to this <mark>pressure with</mark> various new <mark>rules on mortgages, credit cards, and student loans</mark>. Furthermore, the industry has been adjusting to the new era of macroprudential oversight, evident in regulators’ broad focus on systemic risk. </u></strong>“<u><strong>Most compliance efforts have focused on remediation and redesign of the banks’ operations</u></strong>,” said J.H. Caldwell, partner, Deloitte & Touche LLP. Many <u><strong><mark>banks have increased investment in their compliance infrastructure</mark> </u></strong>and made efforts to build improved risk cultures within their institutions<u><strong>. In light of regulatory pressure, banks have focused on building more robust and comprehensive data systems to better drive risk, business, and compliance decisions. </u></strong>Despite many improvements – and more than $100 billion in restitution, fines, and litigation costs paid to date – much work remains to be done to excel in risk management and governance.15 Continuation of these efforts may be essential as the regulatory pressure is not expected to dissipate in the near future. What's new for 2014 <u><strong>In 2014, <mark>the industry</mark> is likely to <mark>get more acclimated to the regulatory climate</u></strong></mark> by moving past remediation issues to focus on instituting strong compliance programs across the organization. In “getting to strong” in their risk management programs, banks should continue bolstering their risk practices and governance.16 According to Deborah Bailey, director, Deloitte & Touche LLP, <u><strong>“<mark>2014 will be the year of getting it done</mark>, and getting it right.”</u></strong> In seeking to improve their risk infrastructure<u><strong>, banks are likely to pay greater attention to data and analytics. These investments could empower banks to have an enterprise-wide view of customers and to proactively identify and address any problems. They will also help in having more informed conversations with regulators, and enable them to appreciate the specific nuances of different business decisions. </u></strong>In 2014, regulatory pressure is expected to flow downstream to smaller institutions, encouraging them to retool their compliance infrastructure. Proposed stress tests for midsized banks may expose deficiencies, forcing some to restructure their risk profiles. Smaller institutions may need to invest in new talent and training to ensure that adequate compliance resources are available. As a result, regulatory compliance could become more ingrained in the broader industry culture. <u><strong>Firms that</u></strong> are able to <u><strong>institutionalize compliance</u></strong> in an effective and efficient manner <u><strong>could create competitive advantages,</u></strong> allowing them to best pursue their growth agenda. But as Tom Rollauer, executive director, Deloitte Center for Regulatory Strategies, Deloitte & Touche LLP, said, “It is also essential that banks continue to work more collaboratively with regulators in strengthening their compliance programs.” <u><strong>Boards are likely to become more engaged in risk governance in order to reshape bank risk culture</u></strong> and to review business strategies with a sharper focus on risk controls. <u><strong>Boards could be more emboldened to challenge management,</u></strong> particularly regarding risk appetites, and document their recommendations for regulators. It is also expected that they will interact more with staff below the executive level, to ensure the tone at the top is well reflected in the firm’s culture.</p>

2NC

adv 1

Solves - Laundering

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

N

Hurricanedebates2015

1

Indiana Tally-Liu

Weil

Ban OG CP Politics - Iran (2NR) Security K Heg bad (2NR)

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

KrAh

Dartmouth KrAh

Da.....

Kr.....

Pi.....

Ah.....

Dartmouth

Dartmouth

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Technological adaptation is coming now and solves

Moore ’08

Moore ’08 Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Stanford, (Thomas Gale 7/9/12 “Global warming; the good, the bad and the ugly and the efficient” EMBO reports http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3317379/?tool=pmcentrez)KG

Even if the pessimists are correct human beings will be better able to handle such terrible conditions than they are now because technology will advance and people will become richer over the next century. Evidence of an increasing rate of technological advancement comes from patents; the number of patents issued for inventions has continued to rise at an increasing rate since 1790 Although patented inventions are only a crude measure of technological growth, they do indicate that technology will continue to change the world in which we live. Thus progress will allow our descendants to deal with almost any difficulties that climate change brings.

Even if the pessimists are correct human beings will be better able to handle terrible conditions because technology will advance and people will become richer patented inventions indicate technology will continue to change the world in which we live progress will allow our descendants to deal with almost any difficulties that climate change brings

Even if the pessimists are correct and future climate change reduces food production, wicked storms lash much of the planet, summers are plagued by terrible heat waves, and floods and droughts inundate large areas of the world and reduce the availability of clean water, human beings will be better able to handle such terrible conditions than they are now because technology will advance and people will become richer over the next century. Evidence of an increasing rate of technological advancement comes from patents; the number of patents issued for inventions has continued to rise at an increasing rate since 1790 (Fig 2). Although patented inventions are only a crude measure of technological growth, they do indicate that technology will continue to change the world in which we live. Consider the world 200 years ago when the fastest means of communication was by horseback, or just 100 years ago when telephones were only slowly spreading and radio, much less TV or the internet, were almost undreamed of. Thus progress will allow our descendants to deal with almost any difficulties that climate change brings.

<h4>Technological adaptation is coming now and solves</h4><p><strong>Moore ’08</strong> Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Stanford, (Thomas Gale 7/9/12 “Global warming; the good, the bad and the ugly and the efficient” EMBO<u> reports http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3317379/?tool=pmcentrez)KG</p><p><mark>Even if the pessimists are correct</mark> </u>and future climate change reduces food production, wicked storms lash much of the planet, summers are plagued by terrible heat waves, and floods and droughts inundate large areas of the world and reduce the availability of clean water, <u><mark>human beings will be better able to handle</mark> such <mark>terrible conditions</mark> than they are now <mark>because technology will advance and people will become richer</mark> over the next century. Evidence of an increasing rate of technological advancement comes from patents; the number of patents issued for inventions has continued to rise at an increasing rate since 1790</u> (Fig 2). <u>Although <mark>patented inventions</mark> are only a crude measure of technological growth, they do <mark>indicate</mark> that <mark>technology will continue to change the world in which we live</mark>.</u> Consider the world 200 years ago when the fastest means of communication was by horseback, or just 100 years ago when telephones were only slowly spreading and radio, much less TV or the internet, were almost undreamed of. <u>Thus <mark>progress will allow our descendants to deal with almost any difficulties that climate change brings</mark>.</p></u>

1nc

1NC Property Rights DA

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

N

Hurricanedebates2015

3

Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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Dartmouth KrAh

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Dartmouth

Dartmouth

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

No climate modeling – states lack infrastructural capacity

Levi 11

Levi 11 [Michael A. Levi David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment Why Don’t States Cooperate More on Energy and Climate? Posted on Tuesday, January 18, 2011 http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2011/01/18/why-dont-states-cooperate-more-on-energy-and-climate/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+mlevi+%28Michael+Levi%27s+Blog%29&utm_content=Google+Reader]

states’ capacity to cooperate when it comes to energy and climate, it’s one of the bigger blind spots in how practitioners and scholars think about cooperation. Beijing doesn’t have many of the needed statistics Badgering them won’t change that; until they develop the capacity cooperation will fail. India won’t be able to force power plants to internalize pollution costs until it develops a serious environmental regulator. Brazil won’t get deforestation under control without stronger capacity to enforce laws China won’t improve its IPR protection until its innovation system becomes much more capable of developing tech Our view of international politics tends to focus much more on pure ambition than on these sorts of features that directly influence results.

India won’t be able to internalize pollution costs until it develops a serious environmental regulator. Brazil won’t get deforestation under control without stronger capacity to enforce laws China won’t improve IPR protection until its more capable of developing tech Our view of international politics tends to focus more on ambition than these features that directly influence results.

I spent Friday and Saturday at an excellent (largely academic) workshop on international institutions and global governance. In our discussions about why states do and don’t cooperate, I was struck by how absent states’ capacity to cooperate was from the discussion. In particular, when it comes to energy and climate, it’s one of the bigger blind spots in how both practitioners and scholars think about cooperation. Here’s a simple example of what I’m referring to: People argue that international oil markets would function more smoothly if states would publish basic data on their domestic markets (supply, demand, stocks, etc). They observe that China (among others) doesn’t do that. The immediate conclusion is that Beijing doesn’t want to. The only policy recourse, then, is to pressure or persuade China to change tack. But in more than one recent conversation, people have emphasized to me that Beijing doesn’t have many of the needed statistics itself (though it’s working on developing its capacity). Badgering them won’t change that; until they develop the capacity to collect the right statistics, cooperation will fail. The same thing is true much more broadly. India, for example, won’t be able to force power plants to internalize pollution costs until it develops a serious environmental regulator. Brazil won’t get deforestation properly under control without stronger capacity to enforce the laws that it puts on the books. One might even argue that China won’t improve its IPR protection until its innovation system becomes much more capable of developing technologies itself. Our view of international politics, though, tends to focus much more on pure ambition than on these sorts of features that directly influence results.

<h4>No climate modeling – states lack infrastructural capacity</h4><p><u><strong>Levi 11</strong><mark> [Michael A. Levi David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment Why Don’t States Cooperate More on Energy and Climate? Posted on Tuesday, January 18, 2011 http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2011/01/18/why-dont-states-cooperate-more-on-energy-and-climate/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+mlevi+%28Michael+Levi%27s+Blog%29&utm_content=Google+Reader]</p><p></u></mark>I spent Friday and Saturday at an excellent (largely academic) workshop on international institutions and global governance. In our discussions about why states do and don’t cooperate, I was struck by how absent <u>states’ capacity to cooperate</u> was from the discussion. In particular, <u>when it comes to energy and climate, it’s one of the bigger blind spots in how</u> both <u>practitioners and scholars think about cooperation. </u> Here’s a simple example of what I’m referring to: People argue that international oil markets would function more smoothly if states would publish basic data on their domestic markets (supply, demand, stocks, etc). They observe that China (among others) doesn’t do that. The immediate conclusion is that Beijing doesn’t want to. The only policy recourse, then, is to pressure or persuade China to change tack. But in more than one recent conversation, people have emphasized to me that <u>Beijing doesn’t have many of the needed statistics</u> itself (though it’s working on developing its capacity). <u>Badgering them won’t change that; until they develop the capacity</u> to collect the right statistics, <u>cooperation will fail.</u> The same thing is true much more broadly. <u><mark>India</u></mark>, for example, <u><mark>won’t be able to </mark>force power plants to<mark> internalize pollution costs until it develops a serious environmental regulator. Brazil won’t get deforestation</u></mark> properly <u><mark>under control without stronger capacity to enforce</u></mark> the <u><mark>laws</u></mark> that it puts on the books. One might even argue that <u><mark>China won’t improve</mark> its <mark>IPR protection until its</mark> innovation system becomes much <mark>more capable of developing tech</u></mark>nologies itself. <u><mark>Our view of international politics</u></mark>, though, <u><mark>tends to focus </mark>much<mark> more on </mark>pure<mark> ambition than </mark>on<mark> these </mark>sorts of<mark> features that directly influence results.</p></u></mark>

1nc

1NC Property Rights DA

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Hurricanedebates2015

3

Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Global institutions like the WTO, IMF, and World Bank will retain legitimacy even if US influence decline

Maher, 2011

Maher, 2011, Orbis, Winter, [Ph.D. political science candidate at Brown, Richard], p. 65-6

We know that institutions acquire a certain ‘‘stickiness’’ that allow them to exist long after the features or forces at the time of their creation give way to a new landscape of global politics. . Institutions such as the (IMF), World Bank, and (WTO have near-universal membership and overwhelming legitimacy Even China, Russia, and Iran have strongly desired membership in these institutions. these institutions will disproportionately benefit the United States long after the demise of its unparalleled position in world politics. the United States will be able to ‘‘lock in’’ a durable international order that will continue to reflect its own basic interests and values.

institutions acquire a ‘‘stickiness’’ that allow them to exist long after the features or forces at the time of their creation give way to a new landscape of global politics Institutions such as the (IMF), World Bank, and WTO have near-universal membership and overwhelming legitimacy. Even China, Russia, and Iran strongly desired membership in these institutions

We know that institutions acquire a certain ‘‘stickiness’’ that allow them to exist long after the features or forces at the time of their creation give way to a new landscape of global politics. The transaction costs of creating a whole new international—or even regional— institutional architecture that would compete with the American post-World War II vintage would be enormous. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO), all reflect basic American preferences for an open trading system and, with a few exceptions, have near-universal membership and overwhelming legitimacy. Even states with which the United States has significant political, economic, or diplomatic disagreement—China, Russia, and Iran—have strongly desired membership in these ‘‘Made in USA’’ institutions. Shifts in the global balance of power will be reflected in these institutions—such as the decision at the September 2009 Pittsburgh G-20 summit to increase China’s voting weight in the IMF by five percentage points, largely at the expense of European countries such as Britain and France. Yet these institutions, if their evolution is managed with deftness and skill, will disproportionately benefit the United States long after the demise of its unparalleled position in world politics. In this sense, the United States will be able to ‘‘lock in’’ a durable international order that will continue to reflect its own basic interests and values.

<h4>Global institutions like the WTO, IMF, and World Bank will retain legitimacy even if US influence decline</h4><p><strong>Maher, 2011</strong>, Orbis, Winter, [Ph.D. political science candidate at Brown, Richard], p. 65-6</p><p><u><strong>We know that <mark>institutions acquire a</mark> certain <mark>‘‘stickiness’’ that allow them to exist long after the features or forces at the time of their creation give way to a new landscape of global politics</mark>.</u></strong> The transaction costs of creating a whole new international—or even regional— institutional architecture that would compete with the American post-World War II vintage would be enormous<u><strong>. <mark>Institutions such as the</u></strong></mark> International Monetary Fund <u><strong><mark>(IMF), World Bank, and</u></strong></mark> World Trade Organization <u><strong>(<mark>WTO</u></strong></mark>), all reflect basic American preferences for an open trading system and, with a few exceptions, <u><strong><mark>have near-universal membership and overwhelming legitimacy</u></strong>. <u><strong>Even</u></strong></mark> states with which the United States has significant political, economic, or diplomatic disagreement—<u><strong><mark>China, Russia, and Iran</u></strong></mark>—<u><strong>have <mark>strongly desired membership</u></strong> <u><strong>in these</u></strong></mark> ‘‘Made in USA’’ <u><strong><mark>institutions</mark>.</u></strong> Shifts in the global balance of power will be reflected in these institutions—such as the decision at the September 2009 Pittsburgh G-20 summit to increase China’s voting weight in the IMF by five percentage points, largely at the expense of European countries such as Britain and France. Yet <u><strong>these institutions</u></strong>, if their evolution is managed with deftness and skill, <u><strong>will disproportionately benefit the United States long after the demise of its unparalleled position in world politics.</u></strong> In this sense, <u><strong>the United States will be able to ‘‘lock in’’ a durable international order that will continue to reflect its own basic interests and values.</p></u></strong>

2NC

adv 1

AT: Solves Global Institutions

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Hurricanedebates2015

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Indiana Tally-Liu

Weil

Ban OG CP Politics - Iran (2NR) Security K Heg bad (2NR)

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college

No global pandemic.

Ridley 8/17

Ridley 8/17 [Matt Ridley (rationaloptimist.com) is a columnist for The Wall Street Journal and the author, most recently, of The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves. Apocalypse Not: Here’s Why You Shouldn’t Worry About End Times By Matt RidleyEmail Author August 17, 2012 http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/08/ff_apocalypsenot/all]

Repeatedly the past five decades, the imminent advent of a new pandemic has been foretold. a new global pandemic is growing less likely, not more. Water- and insect-borne infections—generally the most lethal—are declining as living standards improve. Even if a lethal virus does go global, the ability of medical science to sequence its genome and devise a vaccine or cure is getting better all the time.

Repeatedly the past five decades, the imminent advent of a new pandemic has been foretold. a new global pandemic is growing less likely, not more. Water- and insect-borne infections—generally the most lethal—are declining as living standards improve. Even if a lethal virus does go global, the ability of medical science to sequence its genome and devise a vaccine or cure is getting better all the time.

Repeatedly throughout the past five decades, the imminent advent of a new pandemic has been foretold. The 1976 swine flu panic was an early case. Following the death of a single recruit at Fort Dix, the Ford administration vaccinated more than 40 million Americans, but more people probably died from adverse reactions to the vaccine than died of swine flu. A few years later, a fatal virus did begin to spread at an alarming rate, initially through the homosexual community. AIDS was soon, rightly, the focus of serious alarm. But not all the dire predictions proved correct. “Research studies now project that one in five—listen to me, hard to believe—one in five heterosexuals could be dead from AIDS at the end of the next three years. That’s by 1990. One in five,” Oprah Winfrey warned in 1987. Bad as AIDS was, the broad-based epidemic in the Americas, Europe, and Asia never materialized as feared, though it did in Africa. In 2000 the US National Intelligence Council predicted that HIV/AIDS would worsen in the developing world for at least 10 years and was “likely to aggravate and, in some cases, may even provoke economic decay, social fragmentation and political destabilization in the hardest hit countries in the developing and former communist worlds.” Yet the peak of the epidemic had already passed in the late 1990s, and today AIDS is in slow retreat throughout the world. New infections were 20 percent lower in 2010 than in 1997, and the lives of more than 2.5 million people have been saved since 1995 by antiretroviral treatment. “Just a few years ago, talking about ending the AIDS epidemic in the near term seemed impossible, but science, political support, and community responses are starting to deliver clear and tangible results,” UNAIDS executive director Michel Sidibé wrote last year. The emergence of AIDS led to a theory that other viruses would spring from tropical rain forests to wreak revenge on humankind for its ecological sins. That, at least, was the implication of Laurie Garrett’s 1994 book, The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance. The most prominent candidate was Ebola, the hemorrhagic fever that starred in Richard Preston’s The Hot Zone, published the same year. Writer Stephen King called the book “one of the most horrifying things I’ve ever read.” Right on cue, Ebola appeared again in the Congo in 1995, but it soon disappeared. Far from being a harbinger, HIV was the only new tropical virus to go pandemic in 50 years. In the 1980s British cattle began dying from mad cow disease, caused by an infectious agent in feed that was derived from the remains of other cows. When people, too, began to catch this disease, predictions of the scale of the epidemic quickly turned terrifying: Up to 136,000 would die, according to one study. A pathologist warned that the British “have to prepare for perhaps thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, of cases of vCJD [new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, the human manifestation of mad cow] coming down the line.” Yet the total number of deaths so far in the UK has been 176, with just five occurring in 2011 and none so far in 2012. In 2003 it was SARS, a virus from civet cats, that ineffectively but inconveniently led to quarantines in Beijing and Toronto amid predictions of global Armageddon. SARS subsided within a year, after killing just 774 people. In 2005 it was bird flu, described at the time by a United Nations official as being “like a combination of global warming and HIV/AIDS 10 times faster than it’s running at the moment.” The World Health Organization’s official forecast was 2 million to 7.4 million dead. In fact, by late 2007, when the disease petered out, the death toll was roughly 200. In 2009 it was Mexican swine flu. WHO director general Margaret Chan said: “It really is all of humanity that is under threat during a pandemic.” The outbreak proved to be a normal flu episode. The truth is, a new global pandemic is growing less likely, not more. Mass migration to cities means the opportunity for viruses to jump from wildlife to the human species has not risen and has possibly even declined, despite media hype to the contrary. Water- and insect-borne infections—generally the most lethal—are declining as living standards slowly improve. It’s true that casual-contact infections such as colds are thriving—but only by being mild enough that their victims can soldier on with work and social engagements, thereby allowing the virus to spread. Even if a lethal virus does go global, the ability of medical science to sequence its genome and devise a vaccine or cure is getting better all the time.

<h4>No global pandemic.</h4><p><u><strong>Ridley 8/17</u></strong> [Matt Ridley (rationaloptimist.com) is a columnist for The Wall Street Journal and the author, most recently, of The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves. Apocalypse Not: Here’s Why You Shouldn’t Worry About End Times By Matt RidleyEmail Author August 17, 2012 http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/08/ff_apocalypsenot/all<u><mark>]</p><p>Repeatedly</u></mark> throughout <u><mark>the past five decades, the imminent advent of a new pandemic has been foretold. </u></mark>The 1976 swine flu panic was an early case. Following the death of a single recruit at Fort Dix, the Ford administration vaccinated more than 40 million Americans, but more people probably died from adverse reactions to the vaccine than died of swine flu. A few years later, a fatal virus did begin to spread at an alarming rate, initially through the homosexual community. AIDS was soon, rightly, the focus of serious alarm. But not all the dire predictions proved correct. “Research studies now project that one in five—listen to me, hard to believe—one in five heterosexuals could be dead from AIDS at the end of the next three years. That’s by 1990. One in five,” Oprah Winfrey warned in 1987. Bad as AIDS was, the broad-based epidemic in the Americas, Europe, and Asia never materialized as feared, though it did in Africa. In 2000 the US National Intelligence Council predicted that HIV/AIDS would worsen in the developing world for at least 10 years and was “likely to aggravate and, in some cases, may even provoke economic decay, social fragmentation and political destabilization in the hardest hit countries in the developing and former communist worlds.” Yet the peak of the epidemic had already passed in the late 1990s, and today AIDS is in slow retreat throughout the world. New infections were 20 percent lower in 2010 than in 1997, and the lives of more than 2.5 million people have been saved since 1995 by antiretroviral treatment. “Just a few years ago, talking about ending the AIDS epidemic in the near term seemed impossible, but science, political support, and community responses are starting to deliver clear and tangible results,” UNAIDS executive director Michel Sidibé wrote last year. The emergence of AIDS led to a theory that other viruses would spring from tropical rain forests to wreak revenge on humankind for its ecological sins. That, at least, was the implication of Laurie Garrett’s 1994 book, The Coming Plague: Newly Emerging Diseases in a World Out of Balance. The most prominent candidate was Ebola, the hemorrhagic fever that starred in Richard Preston’s The Hot Zone, published the same year. Writer Stephen King called the book “one of the most horrifying things I’ve ever read.” Right on cue, Ebola appeared again in the Congo in 1995, but it soon disappeared. Far from being a harbinger, HIV was the only new tropical virus to go pandemic in 50 years. In the 1980s British cattle began dying from mad cow disease, caused by an infectious agent in feed that was derived from the remains of other cows. When people, too, began to catch this disease, predictions of the scale of the epidemic quickly turned terrifying: Up to 136,000 would die, according to one study. A pathologist warned that the British “have to prepare for perhaps thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, of cases of vCJD [new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, the human manifestation of mad cow] coming down the line.” Yet the total number of deaths so far in the UK has been 176, with just five occurring in 2011 and none so far in 2012. In 2003 it was SARS, a virus from civet cats, that ineffectively but inconveniently led to quarantines in Beijing and Toronto amid predictions of global Armageddon. SARS subsided within a year, after killing just 774 people. In 2005 it was bird flu, described at the time by a United Nations official as being “like a combination of global warming and HIV/AIDS 10 times faster than it’s running at the moment.” The World Health Organization’s official forecast was 2 million to 7.4 million dead. In fact, by late 2007, when the disease petered out, the death toll was roughly 200. In 2009 it was Mexican swine flu. WHO director general Margaret Chan said: “It really is all of humanity that is under threat during a pandemic.” The outbreak proved to be a normal flu episode. The truth is, <u><strong><mark>a new global pandemic is growing less likely, not more.</u></strong></mark> Mass migration to cities means the opportunity for viruses to jump from wildlife to the human species has not risen and has possibly even declined, despite media hype to the contrary. <u><mark>Water- and insect-borne infections—generally the most lethal—are declining as living standards</u></mark> slowly <u><mark>improve.</u></mark> It’s true that casual-contact infections such as colds are thriving—but only by being mild enough that their victims can soldier on with work and social engagements, thereby allowing the virus to spread. <u><mark>Even if a lethal virus does go global, the ability of medical science to sequence its genome and devise a vaccine or cure is getting better all the time.</p></u></mark>

1nc

1NC Property Rights DA

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

N

Hurricanedebates2015

3

Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Decline causes peaceful retrenchment—prolonging hegemony makes a stable transition less likely

MacDonald, 11

MacDonald, 11 - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Paul K, Spring 2011, "Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment", International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)

Our findings are directly relevant to an impending great power transition between China and the U S Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record the U S should be able to retrench In the next few years, the U S is ripe to overhaul its military shift burdens to its allies, and decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this fearing the erosion of U.S. credibility Yet our analysis suggests retrenchment need not signal weakness Holding on to expensive commitments for the sake of reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble Some observers dispute argu that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this hegemonic powers should find it easier to manage acute relative decline Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions and they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation hegemonic powers should be able to identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations the empirical record supports these conclusions periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone similar factors may cushion the impending Sino-American transition Both are large secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition the U S will experience a "moderate" decline Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The U S would still possess of a third of the share of great power GDP and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy it is unclear how Beijing could consolidate or expand its advantageous position through confrontation

Our findings are relevant to power transition between China and the U S Many scholars foresee conflict analysis suggests grounds for optimism the U S is ripe to overhaul its military and decrease international commitments It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes and settle these more amicably retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to commitments for reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble Some argu hegemonic transitions are conflict prone there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens any state that tries them hegemonic powers eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities the empirical record supports these conclusions hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone The U S would have little to gain from provoking a crisis China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two.91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America's superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, "[N]o amount [End Page 40] of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia."92 Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one's reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United [End Page 41] States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a "moderate" decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation.

<h4>Decline causes <u>peaceful retrenchment</u>—<u>prolonging</u> hegemony makes a <u>stable transition</u> less likely </h4><p><strong>MacDonald, 11</strong> - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Paul K, Spring 2011, "Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment", International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)</p><p><u><mark>Our findings are</mark> directly <mark>relevant to</u></mark> what appears to be <u><strong>an impending great <mark>power transition</u></strong> <u>between China and the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two.91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. <u><mark>Many scholars foresee</mark> major <mark>conflict</mark> during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition</u>. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America's superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, "[N]o amount [End Page 40] of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia."92 <u>Contrary to these predictions, our <mark>analysis suggests</u></mark> some <u><strong><mark>grounds for optimism</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Based on the historical track record</u> of great powers facing acute relative decline, <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>should be able to</u> <u>retrench</u> in the coming decades. <u><strong>In the next few years,</u></strong> <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>is ripe to overhaul its military</u></mark>, <u>shift burdens to its allies, <mark>and</u></mark> work to <u><mark>decrease</mark> costly <mark>international commitments</mark>.</u> <u><mark>It is</u> <u><strong>likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes</u></strong></mark> <u>than the average great power <mark>and</u></mark> to <u><strong><mark>settle these</mark> disputes <mark>more amicably</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Some might view this</u> prospect with apprehension, <u>fearing the</u> steady <u><strong>erosion of U.S. credibility</u></strong>. <u>Yet our analysis suggests</u> that <u><strong><mark>retrenchment need not signal weakness</u></strong>. <u><strong>Holding on to</u></strong></mark> exposed and <u>expensive <strong><mark>commitments</mark> </u></strong>simply <u><mark>for</mark> the sake of</u> one's <u><mark>reputation is a</u> <u><strong>greater geopolitical gamble</u></strong></mark> than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. <u><mark>Some</mark> observers</u> might <u>dispute</u> our conclusions, <u><mark>argu</u></mark>ing <u>that</u> <u><mark>hegemonic transitions are</mark> more <mark>conflict prone</u></mark> than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that <u><mark>there are</u> <u><strong>deductive and empirical reasons</u></strong> <u>to doubt this</u></mark> argument. Theoretically, <u>hegemonic powers should</u> actually <u>find it easier to</u> <u>manage acute relative decline</u>. <u><mark>Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability</u>, <u>which</u> <u><strong>threatens</mark> grave harm</u></strong> <u>to <mark>any state that tries</mark> to cross <mark>them</u></mark>. Further, <u>they are</u> <u>no longer the top target for balancing coalitions</u>, <u>and</u> recovering hegemons may be influential because <u>they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation</u>. In addition, <u><mark>hegemonic powers</u></mark>, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they <u>should be able to</u> more readily <u>identify and <mark>eliminate extraneous burdens</u> <u><strong>without exposing vulnerabilities</u></strong></mark> <u>or exciting domestic populations</u>. We believe <u><mark>the empirical record supports these conclusions</u></mark>. In particular, <u>periods of <mark>hegemonic transition</u> <u><strong>do not appear more conflict prone</u></strong></mark> than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United [End Page 41] States differ in regime type, <u>similar factors may</u> work to <u>cushion the impending Sino-American transition</u>. <u>Both are large</u>, relatively <u>secure continental great powers, a fact that</u> <u>mitigates potential geopolitical competition</u>.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>will</u> <u><strong>experience a "moderate" decline</u></strong>, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 <u>Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline</u> relative to China, the <u><strong>incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal.</u></strong> <u><mark>The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>would still possess</u> upwards <u>of a third of the share of great power GDP</u>, <u>and <mark>would have</u> <u><strong>little to gain from provoking a crisis</u></strong></mark> <u>over a peripheral issue</u>. Conversely, <u><mark>China has</u> <u><strong>few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness</u></strong></mark>.96 <u>Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy</u>, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, <u>it is unclear how Beijing could</u> hope to <u>consolidate or expand its</u> increasingly <u>advantageous position through</u> direct <u>confrontation</u>.</p>

2NC

adv 1

AT: Solves Global Institutions

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Hurricanedebates2015

1

Indiana Tally-Liu

Weil

Ban OG CP Politics - Iran (2NR) Security K Heg bad (2NR)

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

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college

No resource wars.

Tertrais 12

Tertrais 12 [Bruno, Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Strat gique (FRS) The Demise of Ares: The End of War as We Know It? The Washington Quarterly • 35:3 pp. 722]

resource wars are unlikely. two fallacies. One is scarcity, a notion challenged by many energy experts. As prices rise, previously untapped reserves and non-conventional hydrocarbons become economically attractive. The other is spilling blood is a rational way to access resources. the economic rationale for war has always been overstated. because of globalization, it has become cheaper to buy than to steal. In an era of liberalizing trade, many natural resources are fungible goods. It is the abundance of resources, not their scarcity, which fuels conflicts.

resource wars are unlikely. two fallacies. One is scarcity, a notion challenged by many energy experts. As prices rise, previously untapped reserves and non-conventional hydrocarbons become economically attractive. The other is spilling blood is a rational way to access resources. the economic rationale for war has always been overstated. because of globalization, it has become cheaper to buy than to steal. In an era of liberalizing trade, many natural resources are fungible goods. It is the abundance of resources, not their scarcity, which fuels conflicts.

Future resource wars are unlikely. There are fewer and fewer conquest wars. Between the Westphalia peace and the end of World War II, nearly half of conflicts were fought over territory. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been less than 30 percent. 61 The invasion of Kuwaita nationwide bank robberymay go down in history as being the last great resource war. The U.S.-led intervention of 1991 was partly driven by the need to maintain the free flow of oil, but not by the temptation to capture it. (Nor was the 2003 war against Iraq motivated by oil.) As for the current tensions between the two Sudans over oil, they are the remnants of a civil war and an offshoot of a botched secession process, not a desire to control new resources. China’s and India’s energy needs are sometimes seen with apprehension: in light of growing oil and gas scarcity, is there not a risk of military clashes over the control of such resources? This seemingly consensual idea rests on two fallacies. One is that there is such a thing as oil and gas scarcity, a notion challenged by many energy experts. 62 As prices rise, previously untapped reserves and non-conventional hydrocarbons become economically attractive. The other is that spilling blood is a rational way to access resources. As shown by the work of historians and political scientists such as Quincy Wright, the economic rationale for war has always been overstated. And because of globalization, it has become cheaper to buy than to steal. We no longer live in the world of 1941, when fear of lacking oil and raw materials was a key motivation for Japan’s decision to go to war. In an era of liberalizing trade, many natural resources are fungible goods. (Here, Beijing behaves as any other actor: 90 percent of the oil its companies produce outside of China goes to the global market, not to the domestic one.) 63 There may be clashes or conflicts in regions in maritime resource-rich areas such as the South China and East China seas or the Mediterranean, but they will be driven by nationalist passions, not the desperate hunger for hydrocarbons. Only in civil wars does the question of resources such as oil, diamonds, minerals, and the like play a significant role; this was especially true as Cold War superpowers stopped their financial patronage of local actors. 64 Indeed, as Mueller puts it in his appropriately titled The Remnants of War, ‘‘Many [existing wars] have been labeled ‘new war,’ ‘ethnic conflict,’ or, most grandly ‘clashes of civilization.’ But in fact, most. . .are more nearly opportunistic predation by packs, often remarkably small ones, of criminals, bandits, and thugs.’’ 65 It is the abundance of resources, not their scarcity, which fuels such conflicts. The risk is particularly high when the export of natural resources represents at least a third of the country’s GDP. 66

<h4>No resource wars.</h4><p><u><strong>Tertrais 12</u></strong> [Bruno, Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Strat gique (FRS) The Demise of Ares: The End of War as We Know It? The Washington Quarterly • 35:3 pp. 722]</p><p>Future <u><strong><mark>resource wars are unlikely.</u></strong></mark> There are fewer and fewer conquest wars. Between the Westphalia peace and the end of World War II, nearly half of conflicts were fought over territory. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been less than 30 percent. 61 The invasion of Kuwaita nationwide bank robberymay go down in history as being the last great resource war. The U.S.-led intervention of 1991 was partly driven by the need to maintain the free flow of oil, but not by the temptation to capture it. (Nor was the 2003 war against Iraq motivated by oil.) As for the current tensions between the two Sudans over oil, they are the remnants of a civil war and an offshoot of a botched secession process, not a desire to control new resources. China’s and India’s energy needs are sometimes seen with apprehension: in light of growing oil and gas scarcity, is there not a risk of military clashes over the control of such resources? This seemingly consensual idea rests on <u><mark>two fallacies. One is</u></mark> that there is such a thing as oil and gas <u><mark>scarcity, a notion challenged by many energy experts.</u></mark> 62 <u><mark>As prices rise, previously untapped reserves and non-conventional hydrocarbons become economically attractive. The other is</u></mark> that <u><mark>spilling blood is a rational way to access resources.</u></mark> As shown by the work of historians and political scientists such as Quincy Wright, <u><mark>the economic rationale for war <strong>has always been overstated.</u></strong></mark> And <u><mark>because of globalization, it has become cheaper to buy than to steal.</u></mark> We no longer live in the world of 1941, when fear of lacking oil and raw materials was a key motivation for Japan’s decision to go to war. <u><mark>In an era of liberalizing trade, many natural resources are fungible goods.</u></mark> (Here, Beijing behaves as any other actor: 90 percent of the oil its companies produce outside of China goes to the global market, not to the domestic one.) 63 There may be clashes or conflicts in regions in maritime resource-rich areas such as the South China and East China seas or the Mediterranean, but they will be driven by nationalist passions, not the desperate hunger for hydrocarbons. Only in civil wars does the question of resources such as oil, diamonds, minerals, and the like play a significant role; this was especially true as Cold War superpowers stopped their financial patronage of local actors. 64 Indeed, as Mueller puts it in his appropriately titled The Remnants of War, ‘‘Many [existing wars] have been labeled ‘new war,’ ‘ethnic conflict,’ or, most grandly ‘clashes of civilization.’ But in fact, most. . .are more nearly opportunistic predation by packs, often remarkably small ones, of criminals, bandits, and thugs.’’ 65 <u><mark>It is the abundance of resources, not their scarcity, which fuels</u></mark> such <u><mark>conflicts.</u></mark> The risk is particularly high when the export of natural resources represents at least a third of the country’s GDP. 66 </p>

1nc

1NC Property Rights DA

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Hurricanedebates2015

3

Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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Heg causes economic collapse

Eland, 09 , KONTOPOULOS)

Eland, 09 – Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute (Ivan, 5/11/09, “How the U.S. Empire Contributed to the Economic Crisis”, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2498, KONTOPOULOS)

only a few prescient commentators have questioned whether the U.S. can sustain its informal global empire in the wake of the most severe economic crisis since World War II the U.S. Empire helped cause the meltdown in the first place. War has a history of causing financial and economic calamities. It does so directly by almost always causing inflation too much money chasing too few goods. During wartime, governments usually commandeer resources from the private sector into the government realm to fund the fighting. This action leaves shortages of resources to make consumer goods and their components, therefore pushing prices up governments often times print money to fund the war, thus adding to the amount of money chasing the smaller number of consumer goods. Such “make-believe” wealth has funded many U.S. wars We have seen that war ultimately causes the creation of both economic problems and nefarious government financial institutions that cause those difficulties. And of course, the modern day U.S. Empire also creates such economic maladies and wars that allow those institutions to wreak havoc on the economy. The Fed caused the current collapse in the real estate credit market, which has led to a more general global financial and economic meltdown, by earlier flooding the market with excess credit. That money went into real estate, thus creating an artificial bubble that eventually came crashing down in 2008. But what caused the Fed to vastly expand credit? To prevent a potential economic calamity after 9/11 and soothe jitters surrounding the risky and unneeded U.S. invasion of Iraq Greenspan began a series of interest rate cuts that vastly increased the money supply the interest rate cuts culminated in the extraordinary policy of lowering the federal funds rate Much of this excess money ended up creating the real estate bubble that eventually caused the meltdown. So the causal arrow goes from these imperial behaviors—and blowback there from—to increases in the money supply to prevent related economic slowdown, which in turn caused even worse eventual financial and economic calamities. These may be indirect effects of empire, but they cannot be ignored. Get rid of the overseas empire because we can no longer afford it, especially when it is partly responsible for the economic distress that is making us poorer.

the U.S. Empire helped cause the meltdown War has a history of causing economic calamities. It does so by causing inflation During wartime, governments usually commandeer resources from the private sector to fund the fighting. This leaves shortages of resources to make consumer goods and their components, pushing prices up governments print money to fund the war, adding to the amount of money chasing the smaller number of consumer goods. war causes the creation of economic problems The Fed caused the current collapse in the real estate credit market, which has led to a more general global financial and economic meltdown, by flooding the market with excess credit. the causal arrow goes from these imperial behaviors—and blowback to increases in the money supply to prevent related economic slowdown, which caused even worse eventual financial calamities

A few—and only a few—prescient commentators have questioned whether the U.S. can sustain its informal global empire in the wake of the most severe economic crisis since World War II. And the simultaneous quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan are leading more and more opinion leaders and taxpayers to this question. But the U.S. Empire helped cause the meltdown in the first place. War has a history of causing financial and economic calamities. It does so directly by almost always causing inflation—that is, too much money chasing too few goods. During wartime, governments usually commandeer resources from the private sector into the government realm to fund the fighting. This action leaves shortages of resources to make consumer goods and their components, therefore pushing prices up. Making things worse, governments often times print money to fund the war, thus adding to the amount of money chasing the smaller number of consumer goods. Such “make-believe” wealth has funded many U.S. wars. For example, the War of 1812 had two negative effects on the U.S. financial system. First, in 1814, the federal government allowed state-chartered banks to suspend payment in gold and silver to their depositors. In other words, according Tom J. DiLorenzo in Hamilton’s Curse, the banks did not have to hold sufficient gold and silver reserves to cover their loans. This policy allowed the banks to loan the federal government more money to fight the war. The result was an annual inflation rate of 55 percent in some U.S. cities. The government took this route of expanding credit during wartime because no U.S. central bank existed at the time. Congress, correctly questioning The Bank of the United States’ constitutionality, had not renewed its charter upon expiration in 1811. But the financial turmoil caused by the war led to a second pernicious effect on the financial system—the resurrection of the bank in 1817 in the form of the Second Bank of the United States. Like the first bank and all other government central banks in the future, the second bank flooded the market with new credit. In 1818, this led to excessive real estate speculation and a consequent bubble. The bubble burst during the Panic of 1819, which was the first recession in the nation’s history. Sound familiar? Although President Andrew Jackson got rid of the second bank in the 1830s and the U.S. economy generally flourished with a freer banking system until 1913, at that time yet another central bank—this time the Federal Reserve System—rose from the ashes. We have seen that war ultimately causes the creation of both economic problems and nefarious government financial institutions that cause those difficulties. And of course, the modern day U.S. Empire also creates such economic maladies and wars that allow those institutions to wreak havoc on the economy. The Fed caused the current collapse in the real estate credit market, which has led to a more general global financial and economic meltdown, by earlier flooding the market with excess credit. That money went into real estate, thus creating an artificial bubble that eventually came crashing down in 2008. But what caused the Fed to vastly expand credit? To prevent a potential economic calamity after 9/11 and soothe jitters surrounding the risky and unneeded U.S. invasion of Iraq, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan began a series of interest rate cuts that vastly increased the money supply. According to Thomas E. Woods, Jr. in Meltdown, the interest rate cuts culminated in the extraordinary policy of lowering the federal funds rate (the rate at which banks lend to one another overnight, which usually determines other interest rates) to only one percent for an entire year (from June 2003 to June 2004). Woods notes that more money was created between 2000 and 2007 than in the rest of U.S. history. Much of this excess money ended up creating the real estate bubble that eventually caused the meltdown. Ben Bernanke, then a Fed governor, was an ardent advocate of this easy money policy, which as Fed Chairman he has continued as his solution to an economic crisis he helped create using the same measures. Of course, according to Osama bin Laden, the primary reasons for the 9/11 attacks were U.S. occupation of Muslim lands and U.S. propping up of corrupt dictators there. And the invasion of Iraq was totally unnecessary because there was never any connection between al Qaeda or the 9/11 attacks and Saddam Hussein, and even if Saddam had had biological, chemical, or even nuclear weapons, the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal would have likely deterred him from using them on the United States. So the causal arrow goes from these imperial behaviors—and blowback there from—to increases in the money supply to prevent related economic slowdown, which in turn caused even worse eventual financial and economic calamities. These may be indirect effects of empire, but they cannot be ignored. Get rid of the overseas empire because we can no longer afford it, especially when it is partly responsible for the economic distress that is making us poorer.

<h4>Heg causes economic collapse</h4><p><strong>Eland, 09</strong> – Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute (Ivan, 5/11/09, “How the U.S. Empire Contributed to the Economic Crisis”, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2498<u><strong>, KONTOPOULOS)</p><p></u></strong>A few—and <u><strong>only a few</u></strong>—<u><strong>prescient commentators have questioned whether the U.S. can sustain its informal global empire in the wake of the most severe economic crisis since World War II</u></strong>. And the simultaneous quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan are leading more and more opinion leaders and taxpayers to this question. But <u><strong><mark>the U.S. Empire helped cause the meltdown</mark> in the first place. <mark>War has a history of causing</mark> financial and <mark>economic calamities. It does so </mark>directly <mark>by</mark> almost always <mark>causing inflation</u></strong></mark>—that is, <u><strong>too much money chasing too few goods. <mark>During wartime, governments usually commandeer resources from the private sector</mark> into the government realm <mark>to fund the fighting. This</mark> action <mark>leaves shortages of resources to make consumer goods and their components,</mark> therefore <mark>pushing prices up</u></strong></mark>. Making things worse, <u><strong><mark>governments</mark> often times <mark>print money to fund the war,</mark> thus<mark> adding to the amount of money chasing the smaller number of consumer goods.</mark> Such “make-believe” wealth has funded many U.S. wars</u></strong>. For example, the War of 1812 had two negative effects on the U.S. financial system. First, in 1814, the federal government allowed state-chartered banks to suspend payment in gold and silver to their depositors. In other words, according Tom J. DiLorenzo in Hamilton’s Curse, the banks did not have to hold sufficient gold and silver reserves to cover their loans. This policy allowed the banks to loan the federal government more money to fight the war. The result was an annual inflation rate of 55 percent in some U.S. cities. The government took this route of expanding credit during wartime because no U.S. central bank existed at the time. Congress, correctly questioning The Bank of the United States’ constitutionality, had not renewed its charter upon expiration in 1811. But the financial turmoil caused by the war led to a second pernicious effect on the financial system—the resurrection of the bank in 1817 in the form of the Second Bank of the United States. Like the first bank and all other government central banks in the future, the second bank flooded the market with new credit. In 1818, this led to excessive real estate speculation and a consequent bubble. The bubble burst during the Panic of 1819, which was the first recession in the nation’s history. Sound familiar? Although President Andrew Jackson got rid of the second bank in the 1830s and the U.S. economy generally flourished with a freer banking system until 1913, at that time yet another central bank—this time the Federal Reserve System—rose from the ashes. <u><strong>We have seen that <mark>war</mark> ultimately <mark>causes the creation of</mark> both <mark>economic problems</mark> and nefarious government financial institutions that cause those difficulties. And of course, the modern day U.S. Empire also creates such economic maladies and wars that allow those institutions to wreak havoc on the economy. <mark>The Fed caused the current collapse in the real estate credit market, which has led to a more general global financial and economic meltdown, by</mark> earlier <mark>flooding the market with excess credit.</mark> That money went into real estate, thus creating an artificial bubble that eventually came crashing down in 2008. But what caused the Fed to vastly expand credit? To prevent a potential economic calamity after 9/11 and soothe jitters surrounding the risky and unneeded U.S. invasion of Iraq</u></strong>, Fed Chairman Alan <u><strong>Greenspan began a series of interest rate cuts that vastly increased the money supply</u></strong>. According to Thomas E. Woods, Jr. in Meltdown, <u><strong>the interest rate cuts culminated in the extraordinary policy of lowering the federal funds rate </u></strong>(the rate at which banks lend to one another overnight, which usually determines other interest rates) to only one percent for an entire year (from June 2003 to June 2004). Woods notes that more money was created between 2000 and 2007 than in the rest of U.S. history. <u><strong>Much of this excess money ended up creating the real estate bubble that eventually caused the meltdown. </u></strong>Ben Bernanke, then a Fed governor, was an ardent advocate of this easy money policy, which as Fed Chairman he has continued as his solution to an economic crisis he helped create using the same measures. Of course, according to Osama bin Laden, the primary reasons for the 9/11 attacks were U.S. occupation of Muslim lands and U.S. propping up of corrupt dictators there. And the invasion of Iraq was totally unnecessary because there was never any connection between al Qaeda or the 9/11 attacks and Saddam Hussein, and even if Saddam had had biological, chemical, or even nuclear weapons, the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal would have likely deterred him from using them on the United States. <u><strong>So <mark>the causal arrow goes from these imperial behaviors—and blowback</mark> there from—<mark>to increases in the money supply to prevent related economic slowdown, which</mark> in turn <mark>caused even worse eventual financial</mark> and economic <mark>calamities</mark>. These may be indirect effects of empire, but they cannot be ignored. Get rid of the overseas empire because we can no longer afford it, especially when it is partly responsible for the economic distress that is making us poorer.</p></u></strong>

2NC

adv 1

AT: Solves Global Institutions

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Hurricanedebates2015

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Indiana Tally-Liu

Weil

Ban OG CP Politics - Iran (2NR) Security K Heg bad (2NR)

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

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college

Can’t solve food shocks – political reforms are a prerequisite.

Tipson 12 ]

Tipson 12 [Frederick, special advisor to the Center for Science,Technology and Peacebuilding at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where hewas a 2011-12 Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow. He worked previously for the UN Development Programme, Microsoft, the MarkleFoundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, Hongkong Telecom,AT&T, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the University ofVirginia School of Law. Global Food Insecurity and "Political Malnutrition," June 2012, Number 7, German Marshall Fund Connections, http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1339595984Tipson_GlobalFoodInsecurity_Jun12.pdf]

conditions that affect ag productivity depend on “public goods” that effective governments facilitate Political capacity becomes the “gating factor” in determining how ag reform can be undertaken. Even the best combinations of seeds, irrigation, fertilizer, and crop rotation will not succeed without the political underpinnings that enable their implementation. principal impediments to increased productivity are not technical or economic but political — problems of land tenure, water access, ethnic hostility, community organization, or corruption. Up against these broader challenges, even the best extension services can only go so far. Without addressing political factors, the prospects for substantial improvements can be severely limited.

conditions that affect ag productivity depend on “public goods” that effective governments facilitate Political capacity becomes the “gating factor” in determining how ag reform can be undertaken. Even the best combinations of seeds, irrigation, fertilizer, and crop rotation will not succeed without the political underpinnings that enable their implementation. principal impediments to increased productivity are not technical or economic but political — problems of land tenure, water access, ethnic hostility, community organization, or corruption. Up against these broader challenges, even the best extension services can only go so far. Without addressing political factors, the prospects for substantial improvements can be severely limited.

All farming, like all politics (so the saying goes), is local. The conditions that affect agricultural productivity begin with the water, climate, soil, diet, community and family structure, land tenure system, and other localized factors that account for the distinctive farming cultures of particular locales. But they also depend on those “public goods” that effective governments facilitate, including regional infrastructure, reliable land transfer systems, available credit options, and some minimum level of public order — not to mention, in the best cases, schools, clinics, and municipal services. Unfortunately, under the strain of population growth and economic competition, it is exactly these kinds of political support systems that are lacking in many of the communities that need them most. Political capacity therefore often becomes the “gating factor” in determining how ambitious an agricultural reform agenda can be undertaken. Even the best combinations of seeds, irrigation, fertilizer, and crop rotation will not succeed in enhancing yields and resilience without the political underpinnings (and “readiness” to change) 4 that enable their implementation. One promising approach for increasing local political capacity is to expand and supplement the resources and capabilities of “agricultural extension” agencies. The traditional channels for technical assistance to farmers have centered around extension agents, who are generally employees of local, provincial, or national governments, but who may also be experts employed by suppliers, international development agencies, or NGOs. The ideal agent has the knowledge and skills to assist local farmers in increasing their productivity and reducing their risk of crop or financial failure. Drawing on the latest science to improve crop varieties, create safer fertilizers and pesticides, reduce losses both before and after harvests, and apply more productive farming methods, extension services may be the best hope for achieving the scale of increases necessary to feed the planet. In many locations, however, the principal impediments to increased productivity and profitability are not technical or economic but political — problems of land tenure, water access, ethnic hostility, community organization, or corruption. Up against these broader challenges, even the best extension services can only go so far. Without progress in addressing the political factors, the prospects for substantial improvements in agricultural performance can be severely limited.

<h4>Can’t solve food shocks – political reforms are a prerequisite.</h4><p><u><strong>Tipson 12</u></strong> [Frederick, special advisor to the Center for Science,Technology and Peacebuilding at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where hewas a 2011-12 Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow. He worked previously for the UN Development Programme, Microsoft, the MarkleFoundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, Hongkong Telecom,AT&T, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the University ofVirginia School of Law. Global Food Insecurity and "Political Malnutrition," June 2012, Number 7, German Marshall Fund Connections, http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1339595984Tipson_GlobalFoodInsecurity_Jun12.pdf<u><strong><mark>]</p><p></u></strong></mark>All farming, like all politics (so the saying goes), is local. The <u><mark>conditions that affect ag</u></mark>ricultural <u><mark>productivity</u></mark> begin with the water, climate, soil, diet, community and family structure, land tenure system, and other localized factors that account for the distinctive farming cultures of particular locales. But they also <u><mark>depend on</u></mark> those <u><mark>“public goods” that effective governments facilitate</u></mark>, including regional infrastructure, reliable land transfer systems, available credit options, and some minimum level of public order — not to mention, in the best cases, schools, clinics, and municipal services. Unfortunately, under the strain of population growth and economic competition, it is exactly these kinds of political support systems that are lacking in many of the communities that need them most. <u><mark>Political capacity</u></mark> therefore often <u><mark>becomes the “gating factor” in determining how</u></mark> ambitious an <u><mark>ag</u></mark>ricultural <u><mark>reform</u></mark> agenda <u><mark>can be undertaken. Even the best combinations of seeds, irrigation, fertilizer, and crop rotation will not succeed</u></mark> in enhancing yields and resilience <u><mark>without the political underpinnings</u></mark> (and “readiness” to change) 4 <u><mark>that enable their implementation.</u></mark> One promising approach for increasing local political capacity is to expand and supplement the resources and capabilities of “agricultural extension” agencies. The traditional channels for technical assistance to farmers have centered around extension agents, who are generally employees of local, provincial, or national governments, but who may also be experts employed by suppliers, international development agencies, or NGOs. The ideal agent has the knowledge and skills to assist local farmers in increasing their productivity and reducing their risk of crop or financial failure. Drawing on the latest science to improve crop varieties, create safer fertilizers and pesticides, reduce losses both before and after harvests, and apply more productive farming methods, extension services may be the best hope for achieving the scale of increases necessary to feed the planet. In many locations, however, the <u><mark>principal impediments to increased productivity</u></mark> and profitability <u><mark>are not technical or economic but <strong>political</strong> — problems of land tenure, water access, ethnic hostility, community organization, or corruption. Up against these broader challenges, even the best extension services can <strong>only go so far.</strong> Without</u></mark> progress in <u><mark>addressing</u></mark> the <u><mark>political factors, the prospects for substantial improvements</u></mark> in agricultural performance <u><mark>can be <strong>severely limited.</p></u></strong></mark>

1nc

1NC Property Rights DA

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Hurricanedebates2015

3

Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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cx

college

Heg causes terrorism

Sapolsky, 09

Sapolsky, 09 – Professor of Public Policy at MIT (Harvey, Fall 2009, “Restraining Order: For Strategic Modesty”, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2009-Fall/full-Sapolsky-etal-Fall-2009.html, KONTOPOULOS)

restraint distinguishes terrorists who attack the U S from those who do not. We should work with states around the world to combat all terrorists The U.S. government should share information on suspected terrorists track their movements freeze their bank accounts, arrest them and encourage other nations’ counterterrorism efforts. Terrorists who target America and its citizens are another matter a restraint strategy would employ all of the above policy tools while pressuring countries to act against these organizations within their own borders. If a host country is unable or unwilling to hunt terrorists who attack America, the United States itself should act declaring war on terrorists who do not target Americans invites obscure violent groups around the world to make us their enemies. A lack of discrimination in choosing whom to attack also strengthens terrorists by granting them recognition and encourages alliances between otherwise separate terror groups. Our enemies are those who attack Americans and those who shelter them American participation in the political conflicts in the Islamic world makes the U S a target of the terrorists involved in those conflicts, and American involvement feeds the conspiracy theories that make supposed evildoers in Washington the excuse for all that goes wrong in the Middle East we should model democracy rather than insisting that others adopt it. the blowback from cooperation with law enforcement and intelligence agencies will be much less severe than that generated by the current American strategy

restraint distinguishes terrorists who attack the U S from those who do not. We should work with states around the world to combat all terrorists a restraint strategy would employ policy tools while pressuring countries to act against these organizations within their own borders. declaring war on terrorists who do not target Americans invites violent groups to make us their enemies. American participation in political conflicts makes the U S a target blowback will be much less severe than the current American strategy

The restraint strategy distinguishes terrorists who attack the United States from those who do not. We should work with states around the world to combat all terrorists—those who intentionally target noncombatants. The U.S. government should share information on suspected terrorists with other states, track their movements across borders, freeze their bank accounts, arrest them when they enter U.S. territory, and encourage other nations’ counterterrorism efforts. Terrorists who target America and its citizens are another matter. In pursuing them, a restraint strategy would employ all of the above policy tools while also pressuring countries to act against these organizations within their own borders. If a host country is unable or unwilling to hunt terrorists who attack America, the United States itself should act. That could include covert action directed at the terrorists, air strikes, small-scale raids, or in extreme circumstances an invasion. By contrast, declaring war on terrorists who do not target Americans invites obscure violent groups around the world to make us their enemies. A lack of discrimination in choosing whom to attack also strengthens terrorists by granting them recognition and encourages alliances between otherwise separate terror groups. Our enemy today, for instance, is not Islam, not Islamism, not Islamic fundamentalism, not Wahabism, not Salafists, and not even jihadists, per se. Our enemies are those who attack Americans and those who shelter them. Most jihadists are fighting their local governments. In the long term, their struggle will probably fail. But their defeat will have to come at the hands of their compatriots, not from the liberal forces led by the United States. American participation in the political conflicts in the Islamic world makes the United States a target of the terrorists involved in those conflicts, and American involvement feeds the conspiracy theories that make supposed evildoers in Washington the excuse for all that goes wrong in the Middle East. Non-intervention in Middle Eastern politics should not be regarded as appeasement, but as a key component of counterterrorism. In the rare circumstances in which the United States needs to invade or even occupy part of the Muslim world, as in Afghanistan, the U.S. military should diminish its footprint and limit its stay. The United States should not shrink from stating that we believe that liberal democracy is a good form of government, but we should model democracy rather than insisting that others adopt it. Though we should not be mute in the face of egregious human rights violations, Americans should stop telling people in the Muslim world how to run their countries. Overseas, foreign intelligence organizations and policemen collect the most useful counterterrorism intelligence and do most of the work apprehending and interrogating terrorists, because they have local contacts and language skills. The United States should continue to provide intelligence support, particularly technical support, to these foreign counterterrorist agencies. Such cooperation may occasionally cause the kind of blowback that a policy of restraint seeks to avoid, but in cases like Pakistan’s, where the terrorist threat is high enough, the benefit of intelligence cooperation outweighs this cost. In any case, the blowback from cooperation with law enforcement and intelligence agencies will be much less severe than that generated by the current American strategy with its emphasis on military force and occupation. The principal military role in counterterrorism should be the use of special operations forces to assist foreign governments in attacking anti-American terrorists. In some circumstances, U.S. special forces might direct air strikes or directly attack terrorist facilities when local forces are unable or unwilling to do so. But locals should take the lead.

<h4>Heg causes terrorism</h4><p><strong>Sapolsky, 09</strong> – Professor of Public Policy at MIT (Harvey, Fall 2009, “Restraining Order: For Strategic Modesty”, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2009-Fall/full-Sapolsky-etal-Fall-2009.html, KONTOPOULOS)</p><p>The <u><strong><mark>restraint</u></strong></mark> strategy <u><strong><mark>distinguishes terrorists who attack the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>from those who do not. We should work with states around the world to combat all terrorists</u></strong></mark>—those who intentionally target noncombatants. <u><strong>The U.S. government should share information on suspected terrorists</u></strong> with other states, <u><strong>track their movements</u></strong> across borders, <u><strong>freeze</u></strong> <u><strong>their bank accounts, arrest them</u></strong> when they enter U.S. territory, <u><strong>and encourage other nations’ counterterrorism efforts. Terrorists who target America and its citizens are another matter</u></strong>. In pursuing them, <u><strong><mark>a restraint strategy would employ</mark> all of the above <mark>policy tools while</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>pressuring countries to act against these organizations within their own borders.</mark> If a host country is unable or unwilling to hunt terrorists who attack America, the United States itself should act</u></strong>. That could include covert action directed at the terrorists, air strikes, small-scale raids, or in extreme circumstances an invasion. By contrast, <u><strong><mark>declaring war on terrorists who do not target Americans invites</mark> obscure <mark>violent groups</mark> around the world <mark>to make us their enemies.</mark> A lack of discrimination in choosing whom to attack also strengthens terrorists by granting them recognition and encourages alliances between otherwise separate terror groups.</u></strong> Our enemy today, for instance, is not Islam, not Islamism, not Islamic fundamentalism, not Wahabism, not Salafists, and not even jihadists, per se. <u><strong>Our enemies are those who attack Americans and those who shelter them</u></strong>. Most jihadists are fighting their local governments. In the long term, their struggle will probably fail. But their defeat will have to come at the hands of their compatriots, not from the liberal forces led by the United States. <u><strong><mark>American participation in</mark> the <mark>political conflicts</mark> in the Islamic world <mark>makes the U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>a target</mark> of the terrorists involved in those conflicts, and American involvement feeds the conspiracy theories that make supposed evildoers in Washington the excuse for all that goes wrong in the Middle East</u></strong>. Non-intervention in Middle Eastern politics should not be regarded as appeasement, but as a key component of counterterrorism. In the rare circumstances in which the United States needs to invade or even occupy part of the Muslim world, as in Afghanistan, the U.S. military should diminish its footprint and limit its stay. The United States should not shrink from stating that we believe that liberal democracy is a good form of government, but <u><strong>we should model democracy rather than insisting that others adopt it.</u></strong> Though we should not be mute in the face of egregious human rights violations, Americans should stop telling people in the Muslim world how to run their countries. Overseas, foreign intelligence organizations and policemen collect the most useful counterterrorism intelligence and do most of the work apprehending and interrogating terrorists, because they have local contacts and language skills. The United States should continue to provide intelligence support, particularly technical support, to these foreign counterterrorist agencies. Such cooperation may occasionally cause the kind of blowback that a policy of restraint seeks to avoid, but in cases like Pakistan’s, where the terrorist threat is high enough, the benefit of intelligence cooperation outweighs this cost. In any case, <u><strong>the <mark>blowback</mark> from cooperation with law enforcement and intelligence agencies <mark>will be much less severe than</mark> that generated by <mark>the current American strategy</mark> </u></strong>with its emphasis on military force and occupation. The principal military role in counterterrorism should be the use of special operations forces to assist foreign governments in attacking anti-American terrorists. In some circumstances, U.S. special forces might direct air strikes or directly attack terrorist facilities when local forces are unable or unwilling to do so. But locals should take the lead.</p>

2NC

adv 1

AT: Solves Global Institutions

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

N

Hurricanedebates2015

1

Indiana Tally-Liu

Weil

Ban OG CP Politics - Iran (2NR) Security K Heg bad (2NR)

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

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NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

It’s inevitable—defense cuts

Donnelly et. Al 12

Donnelly et. Al 12- *Resident Fellow and Co-Director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, **Resident Scholar and Co-Director of the Marily Ware Center for Security Studies and Director of the Program on American Citizenship at the American Enterprise Institute and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, AND ***Resident Fellow at the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Insitute (*Thomas, **Gary J., AND **Mackenzie, 5/7/12, "Defending Defense: Sequestration Must Be Stopped", http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/defending-defense-sequestration-must-be-stopped/, KONTOPOULOS)

America is nearing a decisive moment. Unless Congress acts to change current law, automatic sequestration cuts will slash future spending on national defense Combined with the cuts already put forward America’s military will see its budget drop Panetta warned sequestration will be “devastating,” yielding “[t]he smallest ground forces since 1940,” “a fleet of fewer than 230 ships, the smallest since 1915,” and “[t]he smallest tactical fighter force in the history of the Air Force.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Congress that the sequester’s reductions create “very high risk” to national security. these cuts effects will be felt almost immediately — by units preparing to fight in Afghanistan and operate elsewhere in the world. "[S]equestration leaves three places to go to get the money: operations, maintenance and training. That’s the definition of a hollow force.” There will be the inevitable effects of sequestration on America’s defense industrial base The impact on industry would be devastating, with a significant disruption of programs and initiatives, facility closures and substantial additional personnel reductions that would severely impact advanced manufacturing operations, erode engineering expertise, and accelerate the loss of skills and knowledge, directly undermining a key provision of our new national security strategy

America is nearing a decisive moment sequestration will be “devastating,” yielding “[t]he smallest ground forces since 1940,” “a fleet of fewer than 230 ships, the smallest since 1915,” and “[t]he smallest tactical fighter force in the history of the Air Force.” reductions create “very high risk” to national security. these cuts effects will be felt almost immediately There will be the effects of sequestration on America’s defense industrial base The impact would be devastating, with significant disruption undermining a key provision of our new national security strategy

America is nearing a decisive moment. Unless Congress acts to change current law, automatic sequestration cuts will slash future spending on national defense across-the-board by over $500 billion beginning early next year. Combined with the $487 billion in cuts already put forward by the President in February, America’s military will see its budget drop on average by $100 billion annually over the next decade. As Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned lawmakers in a November 2011 letter, sequestration will be “devastating,” yielding “[t]he smallest ground forces since 1940,” “a fleet of fewer than 230 ships, the smallest level since 1915,” and “[t]he smallest tactical fighter force in the history of the Air Force.” General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, bluntly told Congress that the sequester’s mandated reductions create “very high risk” to national security. Although these cuts will not be implemented until January 2013, their effects will be felt almost immediately — by units preparing to fight in Afghanistan and operate elsewhere in the world. As General Dempsey has pointed out, "[S]equestration leaves me three places to go to get the money: operations, maintenance and training. That’s the definition of a hollow force.” There will be the inevitable effects of sequestration on America’s defense industrial base as well. As outgoing Lockheed Martin CEO Bob Stevens recently remarked: “The impact on industry would be devastating, with a significant disruption of ongoing programs and initiatives, facility closures and substantial additional personnel reductions that would severely impact advanced manufacturing operations, erode engineering expertise, and accelerate the loss of skills and knowledge, directly undermining a key provision of our new national security strategy, which is to preserve the industrial base, not dismantle it."

<h4>It’s inevitable—defense cuts</h4><p><strong>Donnelly et. Al 12</strong>- *Resident Fellow and Co-Director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, **Resident Scholar and Co-Director of the Marily Ware Center for Security Studies and Director of the Program on American Citizenship at the American Enterprise Institute and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, AND ***Resident Fellow at the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Insitute (*Thomas, **Gary J., AND **Mackenzie, 5/7/12, "Defending Defense: Sequestration Must Be Stopped", http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/defense/defending-defense-sequestration-must-be-stopped/, KONTOPOULOS)</p><p><u><strong><mark>America is nearing a decisive moment</mark>. Unless Congress acts to change current law, automatic sequestration cuts will slash future spending on national defense</u></strong> across-the-board by over $500 billion beginning early next year. <u><strong>Combined with the</u></strong> $487 billion in <u><strong>cuts already put forward</u></strong> by the President in February, <u><strong>America’s military will see its budget drop</u></strong> on average by $100 billion annually over the next decade. As Secretary of Defense Leon <u><strong>Panetta warned</u></strong> lawmakers in a November 2011 letter, <u><strong><mark>sequestration will be “devastating,” yielding “[t]he smallest ground forces since 1940,” “a fleet of fewer than 230 ships, the smallest</u></strong></mark> level <u><strong><mark>since 1915,” and “[t]he smallest tactical fighter force in the history of the Air Force.”</u></strong></mark> General Martin Dempsey, <u><strong>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</u></strong>, bluntly <u><strong>told Congress that the sequester’s</u></strong> mandated <u><strong><mark>reductions create “very high risk” to national security.</mark> </u></strong>Although <u><strong><mark>these cuts</u></strong></mark> will not be implemented until January 2013, their <u><strong><mark>effects will be felt almost immediately</mark> — by units preparing to fight in Afghanistan and operate elsewhere in the world.</u></strong> As General Dempsey has pointed out, <u><strong>"[S]equestration leaves</u></strong> me <u><strong>three places to go to get the money: operations, maintenance and training. That’s the definition of a hollow force.”</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>There will be the</mark> inevitable <mark>effects of sequestration on America’s defense industrial base</u></strong></mark> as well. As outgoing Lockheed Martin CEO Bob Stevens recently remarked: “<u><strong><mark>The impact</mark> on industry <mark>would be devastating, with</mark> a <mark>significant disruption</mark> of</u></strong> ongoing <u><strong>programs and initiatives, facility closures and substantial additional personnel reductions that would severely impact advanced manufacturing operations, erode engineering expertise, and accelerate the loss of skills and knowledge, directly <mark>undermining a key provision of our new national security strategy</u></strong></mark>, which is to preserve the industrial base, not dismantle it."</p>

2nc

1NC Property Rights DA

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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Hurricanedebates2015

3

Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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college

Hegemony destroys effective institutions global public goods.

Ikenberry et al 9 - , State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences”, World Politics, 61.1, Jan, MUSE

Ikenberry et al 9 - G. John Ikenberry is a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, Michael Mastanduno is a professor of government and associate dean for social sciences at Dartmouth College, William C. Wohlforth is a professor of government at Dartmouth College, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences”, World Politics, 61.1, Jan, MUSE

The stability of any international system depends significantly on the degree to which the major powers are satisfied with the status quo leading states “will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs But the territorial status quo is only a part of what Gilpin meant by “international system.” The other part comprises the rules, institutions, and standards of legitimacy that frame daily interactions Jervis argues that unipolarity offers powerful structural incentives for the leading state to be revisionist. These include the absence of countervailing power, the tendency for both the interests and the fears of the leading state to increase as its relative capabilities increase, and the psychological tendency to worry more about the future to the extent the present situation is desirable. Jervis also suggests that these structural incentives are reinforced by particular features of the American approach to unipolarity—the sense after the attacks of September 11, 2001, that the world could and must be transformed and the enduring and widespread belief that international peace and cooperation will be sustained only when all other important states are democratic. We should expect a unipolar power to underproduce public goods despite its preponderant capabilities. The fact that it is unthreatened by peer competitors and relatively unconstrained by other states creates incentives for the unipole to pursue more parochial interests even at the expense of a stable international order. The fact that it is extraordinarily powerful means that the unipole will be more inclined to force adjustment costs on others, rather than bear disproportionate burdens itself. it will seek simultaneously to provide public goods and to exploit its advantageous structural position for parochial gain. because the unipole has wide discretion in determining the nature and the extent of the goods provided, its efforts are likely to be perceived by less powerful states as hypocritical attempts to mask the actual pursuit of private goods.

leading states “will change institutions unipolarity offers powerful incentives to be revisionist. absence of countervailing power, tendency for interests and the fears of the state to increase as capabilities increase reinforced by the sense after September 11 the world must be transformed and the widespread belief peace will be only when all states are democratic We should expect a unipolar power to underproduce public goods to pursue parochial interests at the expense of a stable international order the unipole will be more inclined to force adjustment costs on others its efforts are perceived as hypocritical attempts to mask private goods

Unipolarity and Revisionism: Is the Unipole a Satisfied State? The stability of any international system depends significantly on the degree to which the major powers are satisfied with the status quo.17 In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin argued that leading states “will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs.”18 In the quarter century since that book’s publication, international relations scholars have never seriously debated whether the “expected net gain” of systemic revisionism might be positive for the United States. It is hardly surprising that scholars set aside the question of revising the territorial status quo—it is hard to imagine plausible arguments for the utility of large-scale conquest in an age of nuclear weapons and economic globalization. But the territorial status quo is only a part of what Gilpin meant by “international system.” The other part comprises the rules, institutions, and standards of legitimacy that frame daily interactions. Why has there been no scholarly debate on whether the United States might seek to revise that aspect of the system? In the 1980s, to be sure, the question did not seem relevant. Scholars believed that the United States was in relative decline, so the costs of changing the system were simply assumed to be high, and a U.S. preference for the status quo appeared obvious. The transition from bipolarity to unipolarity arguably represented a dramatic power shift in favor of the United States, altering Gilpin’s equation toward revisionism. Yet the question of whether, as a new unipole, the United States might adopt a more revisionist stance has not figured centrally in international relations research. The reason was a key assumption built into almost all research on hegemonic stability and power transition theory: that the leading state in any international system is bound to be satisfied. Hence, research on the origins of satisfaction and revisionism is soverwhelmingly about subordinate states, not the dominant state.19 [End Page 12] Robert Jervis’s article in this issue demonstrates that this assumption is no longer tenable. While the case can be made that a unipole—particularly one that achieved this status in an international system already strongly shaped by its power and preferences—might rationally opt for conservatism,20 international relations scholarship is rich with hypotheses proposing that the opposite is equally if not more likely. Jervis argues that unipolarity offers powerful structural incentives for the leading state to be revisionist. These include the absence of countervailing power, the tendency for both the interests and the fears of the leading state to increase as its relative capabilities increase, and the psychological tendency to worry more about the future to the extent the present situation is desirable. Jervis also suggests that these structural incentives are reinforced by particular features of the American approach to unipolarity—the sense after the attacks of September 11, 2001, that the world could and must be transformed and the enduring and widespread belief that international peace and cooperation will be sustained only when all other important states are democratic. The structural and contingent features of contemporary unipolarity point plausibly in the direction of a revisionist unipole, one simultaneously powerful, fearful, and opportunistic. Unipolarity and the Provision of Public Goods Public or collective goods may be consumed by multiple actors without those actors necessarily having to pay the full costs of producing them. The classic theoretical insight is that if enough actors follow their rational self-interest and choose to free ride on the efforts of others, public goods will be underproduced or not produced at all.21 Overcoming the free-rider problem therefore requires cooperation among self-interested actors.22 A good part of the ir literature, in particular that associated with hegemonic stability theory, hypothesizes that cooperation in international relations requires the leadership of a dominant state.23 [End Page 13] Given its preponderance of economic and military resources, the dominant state has the ability to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of providing international collective goods such as an open world economy or a stable security order. The dominant state has an interest in bearing those costs because it benefits disproportionately from promoting systemwide outcomes that reflect its values and interests. During the cold war the United States took on the responsibilities that Kindleberger argued were needed to promote international economic stability, such as serving as an open market of last resort and allowing the use of its currency for exchange and reserve purposes. International economic stability among the Western powers reinforced their security alliance against the Soviet Union. The United States also bore a disproportionate share of the direct costs of Western alliance security. The Soviet Union, on its side of the international divide, ultimately shouldered disproportionate alliance costs as well.24 Waltz took the argument a step further, arguing that in the bipolar system the United States and the Soviet Union may have been adversaries but, as the two dominant powers, shared a mutual interest in system stability, an interest that prompted them to cooperate in providing public goods such as nuclear nonproliferation.25 Hedley Bull makes a similar point in his classic study of the international system as a society of states.26 How might the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar system affect the inclination of the now singularly dominant state to provide international public goods? Two hypotheses arise, with contradictory behavioral expectations. First, we might expect a unipole to take on an even greater responsibility for the provision of international public goods. The capabilities of a unipole relative to other major states are greater than those of either dominant power in a bipolar structure. The unipole’s incentive should be stronger as well, since it now has the opportunity to influence international outcomes globally, not just in its [End Page 14] particular subsystem. We should expect the unipole to try to “lock in” a durable international order that reflects its interests and values.27 A second hypothesis, however, suggests the opposite. We should expect a unipolar power to underproduce public goods despite its preponderant capabilities. The fact that it is unthreatened by peer competitors and relatively unconstrained by other states creates incentives for the unipole to pursue more parochial interests even at the expense of a stable international order. The fact that it is extraordinarily powerful means that the unipole will be more inclined to force adjustment costs on others, rather than bear disproportionate burdens itself. Two of the contributions below address these issues. Michael Mastanduno’s analysis of the global political economy shows that the dominant state will be both system maker and privilege taker—it will seek simultaneously to provide public goods and to exploit its advantageous structural position for parochial gain. It enlists the cooperation of other states and seeks, with varying degrees of success, to force adjustment burdens upon them. Jervis suggests that because the unipole has wide discretion in determining the nature and the extent of the goods provided, its efforts are likely to be perceived by less powerful states as hypocritical attempts to mask the actual pursuit of private goods.

<h4>Hegemony destroys effective institutions global public goods. </h4><p><u><strong><mark>Ikenberry et al 9</u> -</strong></mark> G. John Ikenberry is a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, Michael Mastanduno is a professor of government and associate dean for social sciences at Dartmouth College, William C. Wohlforth is a professor of government at Dartmouth College, “Unipolarity<u><strong>, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences”, World Politics, 61.1, Jan, MUSE</p><p></u></strong>Unipolarity and Revisionism: Is the Unipole a Satisfied State? <u><strong>The stability of any international system depends significantly on the degree to which the major powers are satisfied with the status quo</u></strong>.17 In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin argued that <u><strong><mark>leading states “will</mark> attempt to <mark>change</mark> the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs</u></strong>.”18 In the quarter century since that book’s publication, international relations scholars have never seriously debated whether the “expected net gain” of systemic revisionism might be positive for the United States. It is hardly surprising that scholars set aside the question of revising the territorial status quo—it is hard to imagine plausible arguments for the utility of large-scale conquest in an age of nuclear weapons and economic globalization. <u><strong>But the territorial status quo is only a part of what Gilpin meant by “international system.” The other part comprises the rules, <mark>institutions</mark>, and standards of legitimacy that frame daily interactions</u></strong>. Why has there been no scholarly debate on whether the United States might seek to revise that aspect of the system? In the 1980s, to be sure, the question did not seem relevant. Scholars believed that the United States was in relative decline, so the costs of changing the system were simply assumed to be high, and a U.S. preference for the status quo appeared obvious. The transition from bipolarity to unipolarity arguably represented a dramatic power shift in favor of the United States, altering Gilpin’s equation toward revisionism. Yet the question of whether, as a new unipole, the United States might adopt a more revisionist stance has not figured centrally in international relations research. The reason was a key assumption built into almost all research on hegemonic stability and power transition theory: that the leading state in any international system is bound to be satisfied. Hence, research on the origins of satisfaction and revisionism is soverwhelmingly about subordinate states, not the dominant state.19 [End Page 12] Robert Jervis’s article in this issue demonstrates that this assumption is no longer tenable. While the case can be made that a unipole—particularly one that achieved this status in an international system already strongly shaped by its power and preferences—might rationally opt for conservatism,20 international relations scholarship is rich with hypotheses proposing that the opposite is equally if not more likely.<u><strong> Jervis argues that <mark>unipolarity offers powerful </mark>structural <mark>incentives </mark>for the leading state<mark> to be revisionist. </mark>These include the <mark>absence of countervailing power, </mark>the <mark>tendency for </mark>both the <mark>interests and the fears of the </mark>leading <mark>state to increase as</mark> its relative <mark>capabilities increase</mark>, and the psychological tendency to worry more about the future to the extent the present situation is desirable. Jervis also suggests that these structural incentives are <mark>reinforced by </mark>particular features of the American approach to unipolarity—<mark>the sense after </mark>the attacks of <mark>September 11</mark>, 2001, that <mark>the world </mark>could and <mark>must be transformed and the </mark>enduring and <mark>widespread belief </mark>that international <mark>peace </mark>and cooperation <mark>will</mark> <mark>be </mark>sustained <mark>only when all </mark>other important <mark>states are democratic</mark>.</u></strong> The structural and contingent features of contemporary unipolarity point plausibly in the direction of a revisionist unipole, one simultaneously powerful, fearful, and opportunistic. Unipolarity and the Provision of Public Goods Public or collective goods may be consumed by multiple actors without those actors necessarily having to pay the full costs of producing them. The classic theoretical insight is that if enough actors follow their rational self-interest and choose to free ride on the efforts of others, public goods will be underproduced or not produced at all.21 Overcoming the free-rider problem therefore requires cooperation among self-interested actors.22 A good part of the ir literature, in particular that associated with hegemonic stability theory, hypothesizes that cooperation in international relations requires the leadership of a dominant state.23 [End Page 13] Given its preponderance of economic and military resources, the dominant state has the ability to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of providing international collective goods such as an open world economy or a stable security order. The dominant state has an interest in bearing those costs because it benefits disproportionately from promoting systemwide outcomes that reflect its values and interests. During the cold war the United States took on the responsibilities that Kindleberger argued were needed to promote international economic stability, such as serving as an open market of last resort and allowing the use of its currency for exchange and reserve purposes. International economic stability among the Western powers reinforced their security alliance against the Soviet Union. The United States also bore a disproportionate share of the direct costs of Western alliance security. The Soviet Union, on its side of the international divide, ultimately shouldered disproportionate alliance costs as well.24 Waltz took the argument a step further, arguing that in the bipolar system the United States and the Soviet Union may have been adversaries but, as the two dominant powers, shared a mutual interest in system stability, an interest that prompted them to cooperate in providing public goods such as nuclear nonproliferation.25 Hedley Bull makes a similar point in his classic study of the international system as a society of states.26 How might the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar system affect the inclination of the now singularly dominant state to provide international public goods? Two hypotheses arise, with contradictory behavioral expectations. First, we might expect a unipole to take on an even greater responsibility for the provision of international public goods. The capabilities of a unipole relative to other major states are greater than those of either dominant power in a bipolar structure. The unipole’s incentive should be stronger as well, since it now has the opportunity to influence international outcomes globally, not just in its [End Page 14] particular subsystem. We should expect the unipole to try to “lock in” a durable international order that reflects its interests and values.27 A second hypothesis, however, suggests the opposite. <u><strong><mark>We should expect a unipolar power to underproduce public goods</mark> despite its preponderant capabilities. The fact that it is unthreatened by peer competitors and relatively unconstrained by other states creates incentives for the unipole <mark>to pursue </mark>more <mark>parochial interests </mark>even <mark>at the expense of a stable international order</mark>. The fact that it is extraordinarily powerful means that <mark>the unipole will be more inclined to force adjustment costs on others</mark>, rather than bear disproportionate burdens itself. </u></strong>Two of the contributions below address these issues. Michael Mastanduno’s analysis of the global political economy shows that the dominant state will be both system maker and privilege taker—<u><strong>it will seek simultaneously to provide public goods and to exploit its advantageous structural position for parochial gain. </u></strong>It enlists the cooperation of other states and seeks, with varying degrees of success, to force adjustment burdens upon them. Jervis suggests that <u><strong>because the unipole has wide discretion in determining the nature and the extent of the goods provided, <mark>its efforts are </mark>likely to be <mark>perceived </mark>by less powerful states <mark>as hypocritical attempts to mask </mark>the actual pursuit of <mark>private goods</mark>.</p></u></strong>

2NC

adv 1

AT: Solves Global Institutions

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N

Hurricanedebates2015

1

Indiana Tally-Liu

Weil

Ban OG CP Politics - Iran (2NR) Security K Heg bad (2NR)

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

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college

Decline causes peaceful retrenchment—prolonging hegemony makes a stable transition less likely

MacDonald, 11

MacDonald, 11 - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Paul K, Spring 2011, "Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment", International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)

Our findings are directly relevant to an impending great power transition between China and the U S Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record the U S should be able to retrench In the next few years, the U S is ripe to overhaul its military shift burdens to its allies, and decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this fearing the erosion of U.S. credibility Yet our analysis suggests retrenchment need not signal weakness Holding on to expensive commitments for the sake of reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble Some observers dispute argu that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this hegemonic powers should find it easier to manage acute relative decline Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions and they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation hegemonic powers should be able to identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations the empirical record supports these conclusions periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone similar factors may cushion the impending Sino-American transition Both are large secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition the U S will experience a "moderate" decline Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The U S would still possess of a third of the share of great power GDP and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy it is unclear how Beijing could consolidate or expand its advantageous position through confrontation

Our findings are relevant to power transition between China and the U S Many scholars foresee conflict analysis suggests grounds for optimism the U S is ripe to overhaul its military and decrease international commitments It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes and settle these more amicably retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to commitments for reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble Some argu hegemonic transitions are conflict prone there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens any state that tries them hegemonic powers eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities the empirical record supports these conclusions hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone The U S would have little to gain from provoking a crisis China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two.91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America's superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, "[N]o amount [End Page 40] of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia."92 Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one's reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United [End Page 41] States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a "moderate" decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation.

<h4>Decline causes <u>peaceful retrenchment</u>—<u>prolonging</u> hegemony makes a <u>stable transition</u> less likely </h4><p><strong>MacDonald, 11</strong> - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Paul K, Spring 2011, "Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment", International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)</p><p><u><mark>Our findings are</mark> directly <mark>relevant to</u></mark> what appears to be <u><strong>an impending great <mark>power transition</u></strong> <u>between China and the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two.91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. <u><mark>Many scholars foresee</mark> major <mark>conflict</mark> during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition</u>. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America's superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, "[N]o amount [End Page 40] of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia."92 <u>Contrary to these predictions, our <mark>analysis suggests</u></mark> some <u><strong><mark>grounds for optimism</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Based on the historical track record</u> of great powers facing acute relative decline, <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>should be able to</u> <u>retrench</u> in the coming decades. <u><strong>In the next few years,</u></strong> <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>is ripe to overhaul its military</u></mark>, <u>shift burdens to its allies, <mark>and</u></mark> work to <u><mark>decrease</mark> costly <mark>international commitments</mark>.</u> <u><mark>It is</u> <u><strong>likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes</u></strong></mark> <u>than the average great power <mark>and</u></mark> to <u><strong><mark>settle these</mark> disputes <mark>more amicably</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Some might view this</u> prospect with apprehension, <u>fearing the</u> steady <u><strong>erosion of U.S. credibility</u></strong>. <u>Yet our analysis suggests</u> that <u><strong><mark>retrenchment need not signal weakness</u></strong>. <u><strong>Holding on to</u></strong></mark> exposed and <u>expensive <strong><mark>commitments</mark> </u></strong>simply <u><mark>for</mark> the sake of</u> one's <u><mark>reputation is a</u> <u><strong>greater geopolitical gamble</u></strong></mark> than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. <u><mark>Some</mark> observers</u> might <u>dispute</u> our conclusions, <u><mark>argu</u></mark>ing <u>that</u> <u><mark>hegemonic transitions are</mark> more <mark>conflict prone</u></mark> than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that <u><mark>there are</u> <u><strong>deductive and empirical reasons</u></strong> <u>to doubt this</u></mark> argument. Theoretically, <u>hegemonic powers should</u> actually <u>find it easier to</u> <u>manage acute relative decline</u>. <u><mark>Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability</u>, <u>which</u> <u><strong>threatens</mark> grave harm</u></strong> <u>to <mark>any state that tries</mark> to cross <mark>them</u></mark>. Further, <u>they are</u> <u>no longer the top target for balancing coalitions</u>, <u>and</u> recovering hegemons may be influential because <u>they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation</u>. In addition, <u><mark>hegemonic powers</u></mark>, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they <u>should be able to</u> more readily <u>identify and <mark>eliminate extraneous burdens</u> <u><strong>without exposing vulnerabilities</u></strong></mark> <u>or exciting domestic populations</u>. We believe <u><mark>the empirical record supports these conclusions</u></mark>. In particular, <u>periods of <mark>hegemonic transition</u> <u><strong>do not appear more conflict prone</u></strong></mark> than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United [End Page 41] States differ in regime type, <u>similar factors may</u> work to <u>cushion the impending Sino-American transition</u>. <u>Both are large</u>, relatively <u>secure continental great powers, a fact that</u> <u>mitigates potential geopolitical competition</u>.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>will</u> <u><strong>experience a "moderate" decline</u></strong>, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 <u>Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline</u> relative to China, the <u><strong>incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal.</u></strong> <u><mark>The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>would still possess</u> upwards <u>of a third of the share of great power GDP</u>, <u>and <mark>would have</u> <u><strong>little to gain from provoking a crisis</u></strong></mark> <u>over a peripheral issue</u>. Conversely, <u><mark>China has</u> <u><strong>few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness</u></strong></mark>.96 <u>Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy</u>, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, <u>it is unclear how Beijing could</u> hope to <u>consolidate or expand its</u> increasingly <u>advantageous position through</u> direct <u>confrontation</u>.</p>

2nc

1NC Property Rights DA

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

N

Hurricanedebates2015

3

Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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Extinction.

DC 4

DC 4 – Magazine for Development and Cooperation, funded by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Where Markets Fail, March, http://www.inwent.org/E+Z/content/archive-eng/03-2004/edit_art1.html

public goods at the global level. They include the control of dangerous diseases, fair rules to govern international trade, protection of the atmosphere and of biodiversity, peace and security, as well as a stable finance system. Only multilateral coordination can handle deficits that arise globally , the unfulfilled need for international coordination is evidence of the weaknesses of the current multilateral system we are dealing with correctly defined issues of humankind’s welfare and survival. The converging global society must meet enormous challenges – and that implies that governments have to pursue strategies of cross-border cooperation The challenges of globalisation, however, will not be mastered with individual bilateral projects – no matter how successful they might turn out.

public goods at the global level include control of diseases, fair rules to govern trade protection of the atmosphere and biodiversity peace as well as a stable finance system unfulfilled need for international coordination is evidence of the weaknesses of the current system we are dealing with issues of humankind’s survival governments have to pursue cross-border cooperation challenges will not be mastered with individual projects no matter how successful

There are also public goods at the global level. They include the control of dangerous diseases, fair rules to govern international trade, protection of the atmosphere and of biodiversity, peace and security, as well as a stable finance system. Only multilateral coordination can handle deficits that arise globally. In political and conceptual terms, an International Task Force on Global Public Goods is working on getting a clearer grip of humankind’s shared interests. The aim is to improve the capacity for action at intergovernmental and supranational levels. The German Development Ministry supports the Task Force (Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, p. 100). The UNDP Director who has drawn international attention to the concept of public goods emphasises the useful impact it might have on multilateral politics (interview with Inge Kaul, p. 104). However, the unfulfilled need for international coordination is evidence of the weaknesses of the current multilateral system (Dirk Messner, p. 111). Moreover, the debate does not, of course, take place in a power vacuum. The question is how to make the Global Public Goods agenda palatable for developing countries. Many of them have so far experienced multilateral politics subjected to orders from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and as wallflowers in the World Trade Organisation rather than as partners with equal rights (Mariama Williams, p. 113). Without doubt, a utopian element of hope marks the debate on Global Public Goods. However, its core of the – economically defined – public interest is brilliantly rational. After all, economics is originally the science of the intelligent use of resources. Unfortunately, economics jargon is far too often abused for non-sense rhetoric with the intention of making political cases seem irrefutable. Citizens then become customers, public administrations are turned into management agencies, and matters of public interest are reduced to objects of narrow-minded bean-counting. This is not so in the case of Global Public Goods. Here we are dealing with correctly defined issues of humankind’s welfare and survival. The very fact that the concept has not yet been made operational in political terms makes the debate about Global Public Goods all the more relevant. The converging global society must meet enormous challenges – and that implies that governments have to pursue strategies of cross-border cooperation. It may be impossible to check what happens with every single German tax euro in a multilateral policy context and, indeed, the negotiations are prone to be more complicated and time-consuming than in the case of bilateral agreements. The challenges of globalisation, however, will not be mastered with individual bilateral projects – no matter how successful they might turn out.

<h4>Extinction. </h4><p><u><strong>DC 4</u></strong> – Magazine for Development and Cooperation, funded by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Where Markets Fail, March, http://www.inwent.org/E+Z/content/archive-eng/03-2004/edit_art1.html</p><p>There are also <u><strong><mark>public goods at the global level</mark>. They <mark>include </mark>the <mark>control of </mark>dangerous <mark>diseases, fair rules to govern </mark>international <mark>trade</mark>, <mark>protection of the atmosphere and </mark>of <mark>biodiversity</mark>, <mark>peace </mark>and security, <mark>as well as a stable finance system</mark>. Only multilateral coordination can handle deficits that arise globally</u></strong>. In political and conceptual terms, an International Task Force on Global Public Goods is working on getting a clearer grip of humankind’s shared interests. The aim is to improve the capacity for action at intergovernmental and supranational levels. The German Development Ministry supports the Task Force (Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, p. 100). The UNDP Director who has drawn international attention to the concept of public goods emphasises the useful impact it might have on multilateral politics (interview with Inge Kaul, p. 104). However<u><strong>, the <mark>unfulfilled need for international coordination is evidence of the weaknesses of the current </mark>multilateral <mark>system</u></strong> </mark>(Dirk Messner, p. 111). Moreover, the debate does not, of course, take place in a power vacuum. The question is how to make the Global Public Goods agenda palatable for developing countries. Many of them have so far experienced multilateral politics subjected to orders from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and as wallflowers in the World Trade Organisation rather than as partners with equal rights (Mariama Williams, p. 113). Without doubt, a utopian element of hope marks the debate on Global Public Goods. However, its core of the – economically defined – public interest is brilliantly rational. After all, economics is originally the science of the intelligent use of resources. Unfortunately, economics jargon is far too often abused for non-sense rhetoric with the intention of making political cases seem irrefutable. Citizens then become customers, public administrations are turned into management agencies, and matters of public interest are reduced to objects of narrow-minded bean-counting. This is not so in the case of Global Public Goods. Here <u><strong><mark>we are dealing with </mark>correctly defined <mark>issues of humankind’s</mark> welfare and <mark>survival</mark>. </u></strong>The very fact that the concept has not yet been made operational in political terms makes the debate about Global Public Goods all the more relevant. <u><strong>The converging global society must meet enormous challenges – and that implies that <mark>governments have to pursue </mark>strategies of <mark>cross-border cooperation</u></strong></mark>. It may be impossible to check what happens with every single German tax euro in a multilateral policy context and, indeed, the negotiations are prone to be more complicated and time-consuming than in the case of bilateral agreements. <u><strong>The <mark>challenges </mark>of globalisation, however, <mark>will not be mastered with individual </mark>bilateral <mark>projects </mark>– <mark>no matter how successful </mark>they might turn out.</p></u></strong>

2NC

adv 1

AT: Solves Global Institutions

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

N

Hurricanedebates2015

1

Indiana Tally-Liu

Weil

Ban OG CP Politics - Iran (2NR) Security K Heg bad (2NR)

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

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Best data proves unipolar systems are substantially more war-prone than multipolar alternatives

Monteiro, 12

Monteiro, 12 - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (Nuno P., Winter 2012, “Unrest Assured Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful”, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064, KONTOPOULOS)

How well does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18 more than four times higher These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful

Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all systems, according to percentage of years great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were at war In unipolarity 59 percent This is by far the highest during multipolarity the probability war involving a great power would break out was 4 percent Under unipolarity, it is 18

How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity.46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher.47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful.48

<h4>Best data proves unipolar systems are substantially more war-prone than multipolar alternatives </h4><p><strong>Monteiro, 12</strong> - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (Nuno P., Winter 2012, “Unrest Assured Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful”, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064, KONTOPOULOS)</p><p><u>How well</u>, then, <u>does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War?</u> Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity.46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. <u><strong><mark>Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all</mark> the <mark>systems, </strong>according to</mark> at least two important criteria<strong>: the <mark>percentage of years</mark> that <mark>great powers spend at war</strong> and the <strong>incidence of war involving great powers</strong>.<strong> </strong>In multipolarity,</u> <u>18 percent of great power years were</mark> spent <mark>at war</mark>.</u> <u>In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent</u>. <u><mark>In unipolarity</mark>, however<strong>, a remarkable <mark>59 percent</mark> of great power years until now were spent at war</strong>.<strong> </strong><mark>This is</u> <u>by far the highest</mark> percentage in all three systems</u>. Furthermore, <u><mark>during</mark> periods of <mark>multipolarity</mark> and bipolarity</u>, <u><mark>the probability</mark> that <mark>war involving a great power would break out</mark> in any given year <mark>was</u></mark>, respectively, <u><mark>4</mark>.2<strong> <mark>percent</mark> </strong>and 3.4 percent<strong>. <mark>Under unipolarity, it is 18</u></strong></mark>.2 percent—or <u>more than<strong> four times higher</u></strong>.47 <u>These figures provide</u> <u><strong>no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful</u></strong>.48</p>

2nc

1NC Property Rights DA

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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Hurricanedebates2015

3

Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

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We control time frame and magnitude – deal failure draws in global powers and goes nuclear within months

PressTV 13

PressTV 13

Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in months should the world powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran If the talks fail then there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before Obama leaves office The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear weapons failure in talks with Iran could lead to war

Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in months should the world powers fail to reach a deal with Iran If the talks fail there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran The U S could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other those conditions can lead to miscalculation

Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail, 11/13/13, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/ A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the world powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, an American analyst says.¶ “If the talks fail, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before [US President Barack] Obama leaves office and that’s a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of,” senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on Wednesday. ¶ “The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation and general roar,” Steinberg said. ¶ “So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months and years and that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear weapons,” he warned. ¶ The warning came one day after the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions against Tehran because failure in talks with Iran could lead to war.

<h4><strong>We control time frame and magnitude – deal failure draws in global powers and goes nuclear within months </h4><p>PressTV 13</p><p><u></strong><mark>Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail</u></mark>, 11/13/13, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/</p><p><u><mark>A <strong>global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in </u></strong></mark>the coming<u><strong><mark> months should the world powers fail to reach a</mark> nuclear <mark>deal with Iran</u></strong></mark>, an American analyst says.¶ “<u><mark>If the talks fail</u></mark>, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, <u>then <mark>there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran</mark> before</u> [US President Barack] <u>Obama leaves office</u> and that’s a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of,” senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on Wednesday. ¶ “<u><mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other</mark> and <mark>those</mark> are the kinds of <mark>conditions</mark> that <mark>can <strong>lead to miscalculation</u></strong></mark> and general roar,” Steinberg said. ¶ “So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, <u>we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months</u> and years and <u>that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear weapons</u>,” he warned. ¶ The warning came one day after the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions against Tehran because <u>failure in talks with Iran could lead to war</u>.</p>

1NR

adv 1

AT: Solves Global Institutions

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

N

Hurricanedebates2015

1

Indiana Tally-Liu

Weil

Ban OG CP Politics - Iran (2NR) Security K Heg bad (2NR)

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

KrAh

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college

Hegemony destroys effective institutions global public goods.

Ikenberry et al 9 - G. John Ikenberry is a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, Michael Mastanduno is a professor of government and associate dean for social sciences at Dartmouth College, William C. Wohlforth is a professor of government at Dartmouth College, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences”, World Politics, 61.1, Jan, MUSE

Ikenberry et al 9 - G. John Ikenberry is a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, Michael Mastanduno is a professor of government and associate dean for social sciences at Dartmouth College, William C. Wohlforth is a professor of government at Dartmouth College, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences”, World Politics, 61.1, Jan, MUSE

The stability of any international system depends significantly on the degree to which the major powers are satisfied with the status quo leading states “will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs But the territorial status quo is only a part of what Gilpin meant by “international system.” The other part comprises the rules, institutions, and standards of legitimacy that frame daily interactions Jervis argues that unipolarity offers powerful structural incentives for the leading state to be revisionist. These include the absence of countervailing power, the tendency for both the interests and the fears of the leading state to increase as its relative capabilities increase, and the psychological tendency to worry more about the future to the extent the present situation is desirable. Jervis also suggests that these structural incentives are reinforced by particular features of the American approach to unipolarity—the sense after the attacks of September 11, 2001, that the world could and must be transformed and the enduring and widespread belief that international peace and cooperation will be sustained only when all other important states are democratic. We should expect a unipolar power to underproduce public goods despite its preponderant capabilities. The fact that it is unthreatened by peer competitors and relatively unconstrained by other states creates incentives for the unipole to pursue more parochial interests even at the expense of a stable international order. The fact that it is extraordinarily powerful means that the unipole will be more inclined to force adjustment costs on others, rather than bear disproportionate burdens itself. it will seek simultaneously to provide public goods and to exploit its advantageous structural position for parochial gain. because the unipole has wide discretion in determining the nature and the extent of the goods provided, its efforts are likely to be perceived by less powerful states as hypocritical attempts to mask the actual pursuit of private goods.

leading states “will change institutions unipolarity offers powerful incentives to be revisionist. absence of countervailing power, tendency for interests and the fears of the state to increase as capabilities increase reinforced by the sense after September 11 the world must be transformed and the widespread belief peace will be only when all states are democratic We should expect a unipolar power to underproduce public goods to pursue parochial interests at the expense of a stable international order the unipole will be more inclined to force adjustment costs on others its efforts are perceived as hypocritical attempts to mask private goods

Unipolarity and Revisionism: Is the Unipole a Satisfied State? The stability of any international system depends significantly on the degree to which the major powers are satisfied with the status quo.17 In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin argued that leading states “will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs.”18 In the quarter century since that book’s publication, international relations scholars have never seriously debated whether the “expected net gain” of systemic revisionism might be positive for the United States. It is hardly surprising that scholars set aside the question of revising the territorial status quo—it is hard to imagine plausible arguments for the utility of large-scale conquest in an age of nuclear weapons and economic globalization. But the territorial status quo is only a part of what Gilpin meant by “international system.” The other part comprises the rules, institutions, and standards of legitimacy that frame daily interactions. Why has there been no scholarly debate on whether the United States might seek to revise that aspect of the system? In the 1980s, to be sure, the question did not seem relevant. Scholars believed that the United States was in relative decline, so the costs of changing the system were simply assumed to be high, and a U.S. preference for the status quo appeared obvious. The transition from bipolarity to unipolarity arguably represented a dramatic power shift in favor of the United States, altering Gilpin’s equation toward revisionism. Yet the question of whether, as a new unipole, the United States might adopt a more revisionist stance has not figured centrally in international relations research. The reason was a key assumption built into almost all research on hegemonic stability and power transition theory: that the leading state in any international system is bound to be satisfied. Hence, research on the origins of satisfaction and revisionism is soverwhelmingly about subordinate states, not the dominant state.19 [End Page 12] Robert Jervis’s article in this issue demonstrates that this assumption is no longer tenable. While the case can be made that a unipole—particularly one that achieved this status in an international system already strongly shaped by its power and preferences—might rationally opt for conservatism,20 international relations scholarship is rich with hypotheses proposing that the opposite is equally if not more likely. Jervis argues that unipolarity offers powerful structural incentives for the leading state to be revisionist. These include the absence of countervailing power, the tendency for both the interests and the fears of the leading state to increase as its relative capabilities increase, and the psychological tendency to worry more about the future to the extent the present situation is desirable. Jervis also suggests that these structural incentives are reinforced by particular features of the American approach to unipolarity—the sense after the attacks of September 11, 2001, that the world could and must be transformed and the enduring and widespread belief that international peace and cooperation will be sustained only when all other important states are democratic. The structural and contingent features of contemporary unipolarity point plausibly in the direction of a revisionist unipole, one simultaneously powerful, fearful, and opportunistic. Unipolarity and the Provision of Public Goods Public or collective goods may be consumed by multiple actors without those actors necessarily having to pay the full costs of producing them. The classic theoretical insight is that if enough actors follow their rational self-interest and choose to free ride on the efforts of others, public goods will be underproduced or not produced at all.21 Overcoming the free-rider problem therefore requires cooperation among self-interested actors.22 A good part of the ir literature, in particular that associated with hegemonic stability theory, hypothesizes that cooperation in international relations requires the leadership of a dominant state.23 [End Page 13] Given its preponderance of economic and military resources, the dominant state has the ability to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of providing international collective goods such as an open world economy or a stable security order. The dominant state has an interest in bearing those costs because it benefits disproportionately from promoting systemwide outcomes that reflect its values and interests. During the cold war the United States took on the responsibilities that Kindleberger argued were needed to promote international economic stability, such as serving as an open market of last resort and allowing the use of its currency for exchange and reserve purposes. International economic stability among the Western powers reinforced their security alliance against the Soviet Union. The United States also bore a disproportionate share of the direct costs of Western alliance security. The Soviet Union, on its side of the international divide, ultimately shouldered disproportionate alliance costs as well.24 Waltz took the argument a step further, arguing that in the bipolar system the United States and the Soviet Union may have been adversaries but, as the two dominant powers, shared a mutual interest in system stability, an interest that prompted them to cooperate in providing public goods such as nuclear nonproliferation.25 Hedley Bull makes a similar point in his classic study of the international system as a society of states.26 How might the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar system affect the inclination of the now singularly dominant state to provide international public goods? Two hypotheses arise, with contradictory behavioral expectations. First, we might expect a unipole to take on an even greater responsibility for the provision of international public goods. The capabilities of a unipole relative to other major states are greater than those of either dominant power in a bipolar structure. The unipole’s incentive should be stronger as well, since it now has the opportunity to influence international outcomes globally, not just in its [End Page 14] particular subsystem. We should expect the unipole to try to “lock in” a durable international order that reflects its interests and values.27 A second hypothesis, however, suggests the opposite. We should expect a unipolar power to underproduce public goods despite its preponderant capabilities. The fact that it is unthreatened by peer competitors and relatively unconstrained by other states creates incentives for the unipole to pursue more parochial interests even at the expense of a stable international order. The fact that it is extraordinarily powerful means that the unipole will be more inclined to force adjustment costs on others, rather than bear disproportionate burdens itself. Two of the contributions below address these issues. Michael Mastanduno’s analysis of the global political economy shows that the dominant state will be both system maker and privilege taker—it will seek simultaneously to provide public goods and to exploit its advantageous structural position for parochial gain. It enlists the cooperation of other states and seeks, with varying degrees of success, to force adjustment burdens upon them. Jervis suggests that because the unipole has wide discretion in determining the nature and the extent of the goods provided, its efforts are likely to be perceived by less powerful states as hypocritical attempts to mask the actual pursuit of private goods.

<h4>Hegemony destroys effective institutions global public goods. </h4><p><u><strong><mark>Ikenberry et al 9</u> -<u></mark> G. John Ikenberry is a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, Michael Mastanduno is a professor of government and associate dean for social sciences at Dartmouth College, William C. Wohlforth is a professor of government at Dartmouth College, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences”, World Politics, 61.1, Jan, MUSE</p><p></u></strong>Unipolarity and Revisionism: Is the Unipole a Satisfied State? <u><strong>The stability of any international system depends significantly on the degree to which the major powers are satisfied with the status quo</u></strong>.17 In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin argued that <u><strong><mark>leading states “will</mark> attempt to <mark>change</mark> the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs</u></strong>.”18 In the quarter century since that book’s publication, international relations scholars have never seriously debated whether the “expected net gain” of systemic revisionism might be positive for the United States. It is hardly surprising that scholars set aside the question of revising the territorial status quo—it is hard to imagine plausible arguments for the utility of large-scale conquest in an age of nuclear weapons and economic globalization. <u><strong>But the territorial status quo is only a part of what Gilpin meant by “international system.” The other part comprises the rules, <mark>institutions</mark>, and standards of legitimacy that frame daily interactions</u></strong>. Why has there been no scholarly debate on whether the United States might seek to revise that aspect of the system? In the 1980s, to be sure, the question did not seem relevant. Scholars believed that the United States was in relative decline, so the costs of changing the system were simply assumed to be high, and a U.S. preference for the status quo appeared obvious. The transition from bipolarity to unipolarity arguably represented a dramatic power shift in favor of the United States, altering Gilpin’s equation toward revisionism. Yet the question of whether, as a new unipole, the United States might adopt a more revisionist stance has not figured centrally in international relations research. The reason was a key assumption built into almost all research on hegemonic stability and power transition theory: that the leading state in any international system is bound to be satisfied. Hence, research on the origins of satisfaction and revisionism is soverwhelmingly about subordinate states, not the dominant state.19 [End Page 12] Robert Jervis’s article in this issue demonstrates that this assumption is no longer tenable. While the case can be made that a unipole—particularly one that achieved this status in an international system already strongly shaped by its power and preferences—might rationally opt for conservatism,20 international relations scholarship is rich with hypotheses proposing that the opposite is equally if not more likely.<u><strong> Jervis argues that <mark>unipolarity offers powerful </mark>structural <mark>incentives </mark>for the leading state<mark> to be revisionist. </mark>These include the <mark>absence of countervailing power, </mark>the <mark>tendency for </mark>both the <mark>interests and the fears of the </mark>leading <mark>state to increase as</mark> its relative <mark>capabilities increase</mark>, and the psychological tendency to worry more about the future to the extent the present situation is desirable. Jervis also suggests that these structural incentives are <mark>reinforced by </mark>particular features of the American approach to unipolarity—<mark>the sense after </mark>the attacks of <mark>September 11</mark>, 2001, that <mark>the world </mark>could and <mark>must be transformed and the </mark>enduring and <mark>widespread belief </mark>that international <mark>peace </mark>and cooperation <mark>will</mark> <mark>be </mark>sustained <mark>only when all </mark>other important <mark>states are democratic</mark>.</u></strong> The structural and contingent features of contemporary unipolarity point plausibly in the direction of a revisionist unipole, one simultaneously powerful, fearful, and opportunistic. Unipolarity and the Provision of Public Goods Public or collective goods may be consumed by multiple actors without those actors necessarily having to pay the full costs of producing them. The classic theoretical insight is that if enough actors follow their rational self-interest and choose to free ride on the efforts of others, public goods will be underproduced or not produced at all.21 Overcoming the free-rider problem therefore requires cooperation among self-interested actors.22 A good part of the ir literature, in particular that associated with hegemonic stability theory, hypothesizes that cooperation in international relations requires the leadership of a dominant state.23 [End Page 13] Given its preponderance of economic and military resources, the dominant state has the ability to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of providing international collective goods such as an open world economy or a stable security order. The dominant state has an interest in bearing those costs because it benefits disproportionately from promoting systemwide outcomes that reflect its values and interests. During the cold war the United States took on the responsibilities that Kindleberger argued were needed to promote international economic stability, such as serving as an open market of last resort and allowing the use of its currency for exchange and reserve purposes. International economic stability among the Western powers reinforced their security alliance against the Soviet Union. The United States also bore a disproportionate share of the direct costs of Western alliance security. The Soviet Union, on its side of the international divide, ultimately shouldered disproportionate alliance costs as well.24 Waltz took the argument a step further, arguing that in the bipolar system the United States and the Soviet Union may have been adversaries but, as the two dominant powers, shared a mutual interest in system stability, an interest that prompted them to cooperate in providing public goods such as nuclear nonproliferation.25 Hedley Bull makes a similar point in his classic study of the international system as a society of states.26 How might the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar system affect the inclination of the now singularly dominant state to provide international public goods? Two hypotheses arise, with contradictory behavioral expectations. First, we might expect a unipole to take on an even greater responsibility for the provision of international public goods. The capabilities of a unipole relative to other major states are greater than those of either dominant power in a bipolar structure. The unipole’s incentive should be stronger as well, since it now has the opportunity to influence international outcomes globally, not just in its [End Page 14] particular subsystem. We should expect the unipole to try to “lock in” a durable international order that reflects its interests and values.27 A second hypothesis, however, suggests the opposite. <u><strong><mark>We should expect a unipolar power to underproduce public goods</mark> despite its preponderant capabilities. The fact that it is unthreatened by peer competitors and relatively unconstrained by other states creates incentives for the unipole <mark>to pursue </mark>more <mark>parochial interests </mark>even <mark>at the expense of a stable international order</mark>. The fact that it is extraordinarily powerful means that <mark>the unipole will be more inclined to force adjustment costs on others</mark>, rather than bear disproportionate burdens itself. </u></strong>Two of the contributions below address these issues. Michael Mastanduno’s analysis of the global political economy shows that the dominant state will be both system maker and privilege taker—<u><strong>it will seek simultaneously to provide public goods and to exploit its advantageous structural position for parochial gain. </u></strong>It enlists the cooperation of other states and seeks, with varying degrees of success, to force adjustment burdens upon them. Jervis suggests that <u><strong>because the unipole has wide discretion in determining the nature and the extent of the goods provided, <mark>its efforts are </mark>likely to be <mark>perceived </mark>by less powerful states <mark>as hypocritical attempts to mask </mark>the actual pursuit of <mark>private goods</mark>.</p></u></strong>

2nc

1NC Property Rights DA

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Hurricanedebates2015

3

Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

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Turns terror

Brookes 07,

Brookes 07, National security affairs senior fellow, 07 (Peter, 4-2-07, “Iran Emboldened: Tehran Seeks to Dominate Middle East Politics”, DOA: 10-10-13, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2007/04/iran-emboldened-tehran-seeks-to-dominate-middle-east-politics, llc)

According to the State Department, Iran continues to be the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security and Revolutionary Guard Corps support terrorist groups with funding, training and weapons. Tehran may fund Hezbollah to 100 million per year Hezbollah fired as many as 10,000 Iran-supplied rockets and missiles Hezbollah is threatening to topple Lebanon's government Iran has made a number of not-so-veiled threats that it would deploy its irregular forces and terrorist allies against the U.S This is likely not an idle threat It is almost without question that Tehran sees its ability to hold U.S. interests at risk across the globe as leverage against American military action over its nuclear program or meddling in Iraq Iran could transfer nuclear capability to a Hezbollah-dominated government The insurgency's recent use of chlorine gas is evidence of a terrorist group's willingness to employ WMD.

Iran continues to be the world's sponsor of terrorism Iran's Ministry of Intelligence support terrorist groups Tehran fund Hezbollah to topple Lebanon This is not an idle threat Tehran sees its ability to hold U.S. interests at risk across the globe as leverage against American action Iran could transfer nuclear capability use of chlorine is evidence of willingness to employ WMD

According to the U.S. State Department, Iran continues to be the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism. At the request of senior Iranian leadership, Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) support Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command with funding, training and weapons. Hezbollah - a Lebanese Shiite terrorist group - is a particular favorite. In fact, Iran established Hezbollah to parry Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Tehran may fund Hezbollah to the tune of $100 million per year. Last summer, Tehran's military support for Hezbollah was evident. Iran likely gave Hezbollah the green light to ambush an Israeli patrol and kidnap soldiers, which ultimately kicked off the monthlong conflict. In the ensuing days, Hezbollah indiscriminately fired as many as 10,000 Iran-supplied rockets and missiles into Israel. In addition, many were stunned when a C-802 cruise missile struck an Israeli naval vessel off the coast of Lebanon. While the shooter was never identified, the Chinese C-802 is in Iran's inventory. It could have been fired by either Hezbollah or the IRGC. Today, Hezbollah, with Iranian and Syrian support, is threatening to topple Lebanon's democratically elected government unless it is given additional cabinet seats - potentially giving it veto power over Beirut's decisions. Iran would love to add Lebanon to Syria as a client state in its effort to form an arc of Iranian influence across the region. Iran has made a number of not-so-veiled threats that it would deploy its irregular forces and terrorist allies against the U.S. and American interests, if necessary. This is likely not an idle threat. American blood is already on the hands of Iran and its terrorist proxies as a result of the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks attack and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq today. It is almost without question that Tehran sees its ability to hold U.S. interests at risk across the globe - including in the U.S. - as leverage against American military action over its nuclear program or meddling in Iraq. Perhaps the most frightening scenario is that Iran might transfer weapons of mass destruction capability to a terrorist ally. While this is risky behavior, it is a possibility. Iran could transfer nuclear capability to a Hezbollah-dominated government in Lebanon, or a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, significantly increasing the threat to Israeli security. Osama bin Laden has not been shy about his desire for WMD or al-Qaida's readiness to use them. The insurgency's recent use of chlorine gas in Iraq is evidence of a terrorist group's willingness to employ WMD.

<h4>Turns terror </h4><p><strong>Brookes 07,</strong> National security affairs senior fellow, 07</p><p>(Peter, 4-2-07, “Iran Emboldened: Tehran Seeks to Dominate Middle East Politics”, DOA: 10-10-13, http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2007/04/iran-emboldened-tehran-seeks-to-dominate-middle-east-politics, llc)</p><p><u>According to the</u> U.S. <u>State Department, <strong><mark>Iran continues to be the world's</mark> most active state <mark>sponsor of terrorism</u></strong></mark>. At the request of senior Iranian leadership, <u><mark>Iran's Ministry of Intelligence</mark> and Security</u> (MOIS) <u>and</u> Islamic <u>Revolutionary Guard Corps</u> (IRGC) <u><mark>support</u></mark> Palestinian <u><mark>terrorist groups</u></mark> such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command <u>with funding, training and weapons.</u> Hezbollah - a Lebanese Shiite terrorist group - is a particular favorite. In fact, Iran established Hezbollah to parry Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. <u><mark>Tehran</mark> may <mark>fund Hezbollah</mark> to</u> the tune of $<u>100 million per year</u>. Last summer, Tehran's military support for Hezbollah was evident. Iran likely gave Hezbollah the green light to ambush an Israeli patrol and kidnap soldiers, which ultimately kicked off the monthlong conflict. In the ensuing days, <u>Hezbollah</u> indiscriminately <u>fired as many as 10,000 Iran-supplied rockets and missiles</u> into Israel. In addition, many were stunned when a C-802 cruise missile struck an Israeli naval vessel off the coast of Lebanon. While the shooter was never identified, the Chinese C-802 is in Iran's inventory. It could have been fired by either Hezbollah or the IRGC. Today, <u>Hezbollah</u>, with Iranian and Syrian support, <u>is threatening <mark>to topple Lebanon</mark>'s </u>democratically elected <u>government</u> unless it is given additional cabinet seats - potentially giving it veto power over Beirut's decisions. Iran would love to add Lebanon to Syria as a client state in its effort to form an arc of Iranian influence across the region. <u>Iran has made a number of not-so-veiled threats that it would deploy its irregular forces and terrorist allies against the U.S</u>. and American interests, if necessary. <u><mark>This is</mark> likely <mark>not an idle threat</u></mark>. American blood is already on the hands of Iran and its terrorist proxies as a result of the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks attack and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq today. <u>It is almost without question that <mark>Tehran sees its ability to hold U.S. interests at risk across the globe</u></mark> - including in the U.S. - <u><mark>as leverage against American </mark>military <mark>action</mark> over its nuclear program or meddling in Iraq</u>. Perhaps the most frightening scenario is that Iran might transfer weapons of mass destruction capability to a terrorist ally. While this is risky behavior, it is a possibility. <u><mark>Iran could transfer nuclear capability</mark> to a Hezbollah-dominated government</u> in Lebanon, or a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, significantly increasing the threat to Israeli security. Osama bin Laden has not been shy about his desire for WMD or al-Qaida's readiness to use them. <u>The insurgency's recent <mark>use of chlorine</mark> gas</u> in Iraq <u><mark>is evidence of</mark> a terrorist group's <mark>willingness to employ WMD</mark>.</u><strong> </p></strong>

1NR

adv 1

AT: Solves Global Institutions

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Hurricanedebates2015

1

Indiana Tally-Liu

Weil

Ban OG CP Politics - Iran (2NR) Security K Heg bad (2NR)

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Extinction. DC 4 – Magazine for Development and Cooperation, funded by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Where Markets Fail, March, http://www.inwent.org/E+Z/content/archive-eng/03-2004/edit_art1.html

DC 4

<h4>Extinction. </h4><p><u><strong>DC 4</u></strong> – Magazine for Development and Cooperation, funded by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Where Markets Fail, March, http://www.inwent.org/E+Z/content/archive-eng/03-2004/edit_art1.html</p>

2nc

1NC Property Rights DA

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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Hurricanedebates2015

3

Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

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Aggressive actions toward Iran heighten the risk of Iran strikes—Israel would perceive support

McConnell 13 Scott, Founding Editor, The American Conservative; PhD, History, Columbia University; “Schumer-Menendez-Kirk Open the Back Door to War” The American Conservative

McConnell 13 Scott, Founding Editor, The American Conservative; PhD, History, Columbia University; “Schumer-Menendez-Kirk Open the Back Door to War” The American Conservative; December 20, 2013; http://www.theamericanconservative.com/schumer-menendez-kirk-open-the-back-door-to-war/

Schumer and Menendez (N.J.) have joined Kirk (Ill.) in placing a ticking bomb under Obama The bill requires the U S to “stand with Israel” in the event Netanyahu decides to start a war with Iran. The purpose of the bill is to scuttle diplomacy with Tehran, the bill “outsources any decision about resort to military action to the government of Israel, by These are the two central points. Netanyahu wants war with Iran, but he doesn’t want to fight it by himself. Schumer, Menendez, and Kirk hope to compel the United States to step in and finish the job after Israel throws the first punch. even if such a war were just (which it isn’t), the aftermath with blood There is no realistic scenario under which Iran’s government is going abandon entirely its nuclear program Their resolution is a backdoor to war

Schumer and Menendez joined Kirk placing a ticking bomb under Obama The bill requires the U S to “stand with Israel” in the event Netanyahu decides to start a war with Iran the bill “outsources any decision about military action to Israel Netanyahu wants war with Iran, but he doesn’t want to fight it by himself Schumer, Menendez, and Kirk hope to compel the United States to step in and finish the job Their resolution is a backdoor to war

Democrats Charles Schumer (N.Y.) and Robert Menendez (N.J.) have joined Republican Mark Kirk (Ill.) in placing a ticking bomb under President Obama’s Christmas tree. The bomb is an AIPAC-sponsored bill that commits the United States to stop Iran from enriching any uranium at all, and also requires the United States to “stand with Israel” in the event Netanyahu decides, for reasons of “self-defense,” to start a war with Iran. The purpose of the bill is transparent: to scuttle the P5+1 (U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China) diplomacy with Tehran, because it is well known to everyone concerned that Iran is not going to abandon completely a nuclear energy program underway since the Shah was in power. Gary Sick, the Columbia University Iran expert, has posted on his website an open letter to Schumer, noting that the bill seeks to “remove any negotiating authority from the U.S. government by specifying in advance the terms of an impossible settlement.” Further, Sick observes, the bill “outsources any decision about resort to military action to the government of Israel, by committing the United States in advance to support any military action by Israel.” These are the two central points. Netanyahu wants war with Iran, but he doesn’t want to fight it by himself. Schumer, Menendez, and Kirk hope to compel the United States to step in and finish the job after Israel throws the first punch. But even if such a war were just (which it isn’t), or even if we had allies besides Israel (which we wouldn’t), the aftermath of such a war ends most likely (as the former hawk Kenneth Pollack argues in his exhaustive analysis “Unthinkable“) with an American occupation of Iran. At a cost in blood and treasure many times the invasion of Iraq. There is no realistic scenario under which Iran’s government is going abandon entirely its nuclear program. Schumer, Kirk, and Menendez know this perfectly well. Their resolution is a backdoor to war. They just don’t have the courage, as yet, to say so.

<h4>Aggressive actions toward Iran heighten the risk of Iran strikes—Israel would perceive support</h4><p><strong>McConnell 13 Scott, Founding Editor, The American Conservative; PhD, History, Columbia University; “Schumer-Menendez-Kirk Open the Back Door to War” The American Conservative<u></strong>; December 20, 2013; http://www.theamericanconservative.com/schumer-menendez-kirk-open-the-back-door-to-war/</p><p></u>Democrats Charles <u><mark>Schumer</u></mark> (N.Y.) <u><mark>and</mark> </u>Robert<u> <mark>Menendez</mark> (N.J.) have <mark>joined</mark> </u>Republican<u> </u>Mark<u> <mark>Kirk</mark> (Ill.) in <mark>placing a ticking bomb under</mark> </u>President <u><mark>Obama</u></mark>’s Christmas tree. <u><mark>The</u></mark> bomb is an AIPAC-sponsored <u><mark>bill</u></mark> that commits the United States to stop Iran from enriching any uranium at all, and also <u><mark>requires the</u> <u>U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>to “stand with Israel” in the event Netanyahu decides</u></mark>, for reasons of “self-defense,” <u><mark>to start a war with Iran</mark>.</u> <u>The purpose of the bill is</u> transparent: <u>to scuttle</u> the P5+1 (U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China) <u>diplomacy with Tehran,</u> because it is well known to everyone concerned that Iran is not going to abandon completely a nuclear energy program underway since the Shah was in power. Gary Sick, the Columbia University Iran expert, has posted on his website an open letter to Schumer, noting that the bill seeks to “remove any negotiating authority from the U.S. government by specifying in advance the terms of an impossible settlement.” Further, Sick observes, <u><mark>the bill “outsources any decision about</mark> resort to <mark>military action to</mark> the government of <mark>Israel</mark>, by</u> committing the United States in advance to support any military action by Israel.” <u>These are the two central points. <mark>Netanyahu wants war with Iran, but he doesn’t want to fight it by himself</mark>. <mark>Schumer, Menendez, and Kirk hope to compel the United States to step in and finish the job</mark> after Israel throws the first punch.</u> But <u>even if such a war were just (which it isn’t),</u> or even if we had allies besides Israel (which we wouldn’t), <u>the aftermath</u> of such a war ends most likely (as the former hawk Kenneth Pollack argues in his exhaustive analysis “Unthinkable“) <u>with</u> an American occupation of Iran. At a cost in <u>blood</u> and treasure many times the invasion of Iraq. <u>There is no realistic scenario under which Iran’s government is going abandon entirely its nuclear program</u>. Schumer, Kirk, and Menendez know this perfectly well. <u><mark>Their resolution is a backdoor to war</u><strong></mark>. They just don’t have the courage, as yet, to say so.</p></strong>

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There are also public goods at the global level. They include the control of dangerous diseases, fair rules to govern international trade, protection of the atmosphere and of biodiversity, peace and security, as well as a stable finance system. Only multilateral coordination can handle deficits that arise globally. In political and conceptual terms, an International Task Force on Global Public Goods is working on getting a clearer grip of humankind’s shared interests. The aim is to improve the capacity for action at intergovernmental and supranational levels. The German Development Ministry supports the Task Force (Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, p. 100). The UNDP Director who has drawn international attention to the concept of public goods emphasises the useful impact it might have on multilateral politics (interview with Inge Kaul, p. 104). However, the unfulfilled need for international coordination is evidence of the weaknesses of the current multilateral system (Dirk Messner, p. 111). Moreover, the debate does not, of course, take place in a power vacuum. The question is how to make the Global Public Goods agenda palatable for developing countries. Many of them have so far experienced multilateral politics subjected to orders from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and as wallflowers in the World Trade Organisation rather than as partners with equal rights (Mariama Williams, p. 113). Without doubt, a utopian element of hope marks the debate on Global Public Goods. However, its core of the – economically defined – public interest is brilliantly rational. After all, economics is originally the science of the intelligent use of resources. Unfortunately, economics jargon is far too often abused for non-sense rhetoric with the intention of making political cases seem irrefutable. Citizens then become customers, public administrations are turned into management agencies, and matters of public interest are reduced to objects of narrow-minded bean-counting. This is not so in the case of Global Public Goods. Here we are dealing with correctly defined issues of humankind’s welfare and survival. The very fact that the concept has not yet been made operational in political terms makes the debate about Global Public Goods all the more relevant. The converging global society must meet enormous challenges – and that implies that governments have to pursue strategies of cross-border cooperation. It may be impossible to check what happens with every single German tax euro in a multilateral policy context and, indeed, the negotiations are prone to be more complicated and time-consuming than in the case of bilateral agreements

Science diplomacy high now

Science diplomacy high now

“science diplomacy” concept it has been defined as ¶ “the use and application of science cooperation to help build bridges and enhance relationships ¶ between and amongst societies, with a particular interest in working in areas where there might ¶ not be other mechanisms for engagement at an official level.”1¶ In the United States, this policy ¶ shift has been reflected notably by the appointment of science envoys resuming a ¶ dialogue with Middle East, Africa, and Asia and offering opportunities The new global landscape of science is more distributed and networked he United States needs to look around at such linkages scientific advances ropelled not just by individuals but increasingly by overlapping, fluid, networks of scientists These networks frequently extend across and beyond research intensive institutions Networks of scientists are already being supported, by the NSF and through HESN) undertaken by USAID HESN is building diverse international, teams to tackle significant development challenges, Investments in the life sciences pay off in three broad areas, observe MIT President Hockfield. They improve human health. They foster industries addressing a wide range of challenges. And they further human understanding of systems NIH) has invested about $4 per American per year in cardiovascular research. That investment has helped reduce the rate of death from heart disease and stroke by more than half Similar advances have produced benefits throughout medicine Greater understanding of the role of tumor necrosis factor in inflammatory disease has led to antibody treatments If we as a country hadn’t made the investment in the basic science, in the understanding of retroviruses, we would probably still today have a rapidly expanding global AIDS epidemic Continued basic research into fundamental biological processes could yield a wealth of new medical advances Yet biotech crops are today being on 20 percent of and the percentage is projected to double as new crops are introduced and countries like India and China move toward full adoption of the technology This is the most rapidly adopted new technology in the history of agriculture , it is really just the beginning.” life sciences answer fundamental questions biological systems are found in the oceans, new tools have become available to explore the oceans These technologies have revealed the oceans

science diplomacy In the U S this policy has been reflected by the appointment of science envoys resuming a ¶ dialogue with Middle East, Africa, and Asia and offering opportunities The new global landscape of science is networked Networks of scientists are already being supported by t NSF and HESN) undertaken by USAID HESN is building diverse international, teams to tackle significant development challenge Investments in the life sciences pay off in human health. industries And human understanding of systems NIH invested in cardiovascular research. That helped reduce the rate of death from heart disease by half Similar advances produced benefits throughout medicine If we as a country hadn’t made investment in basic science we would still have expanding AIDS Continued basic research could yield new advances biotech crops are on 20 percent of and projected to double as new countries like India and China move toward full adoption new tools have become available to explore the oceans

French Ministry of Global Affairs 13 http://www.france-science.org/IMG/pdf/science-diplomacy-for-france-2013.pdf, “Science Diplomacy for France, 2013, French Ministry of Global Affairs France, who for many decades has viewed scientific cooperation as contributing to the ¶ dialogue between peoples and a means of developing and strengthening national excellence, ¶ sees her approach bolstered by the emergence of the “science diplomacy” concept. Developed in ¶ the United States and widely disseminated in the English-speaking world, it has been defined as ¶ “the use and application of science cooperation to help build bridges and enhance relationships ¶ between and amongst societies, with a particular interest in working in areas where there might ¶ not be other mechanisms for engagement at an official level.”1¶ In the United States, this policy ¶ shift has been reflected notably by the appointment of science envoys tasked with resuming a ¶ dialogue with the elites in the Muslim world (Middle East, Africa, and South-East Asia) and offering ¶ them opportunities 2. Networks and funding now Colglazier and Lyons 14 – E. William Colglazier is the science and technology adviser to the U.S. secretary of state. Elizabeth E. Lyons is a senior adviser in the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Science and Technology Adviser and its Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. She is on detail with support from the National Science Foundation to the Department of State. (E. William, Elizabeth E., 2014, “The United States Looks to the Global Science, Technology, and Innovation Horizon”, Science and Diplomacy, http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2014/united-states-looks-global-science-technology-and-innovation-horizon)//sb Looking around: The new global landscape of science is more distributed and networked—the United States needs to look around at such linkages. Many scientific advances are now propelled not just by individuals working within individual labs, but increasingly by overlapping, fluid, and largely self-organizing networks of scientists, engineers, technologists, and entrepreneurs. These networks frequently extend across and beyond research intensive institutions. Networks of scientists are already being supported, for example, by the National Science Foundation (NSF) Research Coordination Networks and through initiatives such as the Higher Education Solutions Network (HESN) undertaken by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). HESN is building diverse, often international, teams to tackle significant development challenges, making more information on development projects available domestically and internationally, and tying together people and results for stronger impact. biotech inevitable globally and solves all their impacts Their Author NAS 8 (National Academy of Sciences, “The Role of the Life Sciences in Transforming America's Future Summary of a Workshop” December 3, 2008, Board on Life Sciences Division on Earth and Life Studies, National Research Council) //trepka The Promise of the Biological Sciences Investments in the life sciences pay off in three broad areas, observed Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) President Susan Hockfield. They improve human health. They foster industries that boost the economy while addressing a wide range of environmental, energy, health, and agricultural challenges. And they further human understanding of some of the most fascinating systems in the universe. ¶ Improving Human Health ¶ The biological sciences have enabled most of the world’s population to enjoy higher living standards and longer life spans than ever before, said National Academies President Ralph Cicerone. New understanding of the links between disease and sanitation, the role trace nutrients play in health, and the potential of vaccines and antibiotics, among many other research results, have improved the lives of people everywhere. The progress made in combating heart disease is a prime example of the payoffs from investment in the life sciences, said Hockfield. Over the past 30 years, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has invested about $4 per American per year in cardiovascular research. That investment has helped reduce the rate of death from heart disease and stroke by more than half. Knowledge of cholesterol metabolism led to the development of the drugs known as statins, which have reduced heart attacks and strokes. The development of drug-eluting stents has enabled physicians to open occluded blood vessels. Study of receptors on the surface of nerve cells has led to new beta blockers that are being used to treat hypertension and heart disease. Similar advances have produced benefits throughout medicine, observed Thomas Cech, President of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, and Harold Varmus, President of the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center. Greater understanding of the role of tumor necrosis factor in inflammatory disease has led to antibody treatments that have changed the lives of many people with rheumatoid arthritis. Materials science is producing spare parts for bones, arteries, and other tissues and organs. Basic research into retroviruses motivated by their role in some cancers built the base of understanding that proved critical in first identifying the cause of the AIDS epidemic and then developing drugs to control the disease. “If we as a country hadn’t made the investment in the basic science, in the understanding of retroviruses, we would probably still today have a rapidly expanding global AIDS epidemic,” Cech said. Continued basic research into fundamental biological processes could yield a wealth of new medical advances. ¶ Investigations of bacterial genetics could provide new treatments for infectious diseases, including diseases caused by microbes that have evolved mechanisms to evade existing treatments. Bioengineered stem cells could provide regulated insulin secretion in people with diabetes, for example, or repair severed spinal cord nerves. Study of chronic diseases such as cancer, heart disease, and mental illness, which now account for the bulk ¶ 3 of health care costs, could lead to personalized treatments that reflect a disease’s unique characteristics in each individual. However, the translation of basic research findings to applications is not always straightforward or quick, Cech observed. Even where understanding of biological processes is extensive, vast amounts of work must be done, often by people in different disciplines and sectors working collaboratively, to apply new knowledge in medicine. The life sciences have applications in areas that range far beyond human health. Life-science based approaches could contribute to advances in many industries, from energy production and pollution remediation, to clean manufacturing and the production of new biologically inspired materials. In fact, biological systems could provide the basis for new products, services and industries that we cannot yet imagine. Microbes are already producing biofuels and could, through further research, provide a major component of future energy supplies. Marine and terrestrial organisms extract carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, which suggests that biological systems could be used to help manage climate change. Study of the complex systems encountered in biology is ¶ producing insights into similarly interconnected networks encountered in many other areas of science – and vice versa. Take agriculture as an example. The agricultural biotechnology industry is just a little more than a decade old, said Robert Fraley, Executive Vice President and Chief Technology Officer at Monsanto – the first bioengineered crop, a soybean seed with a gene providing tolerance for a common herbicide, was launched in 1996. Yet biotechnology crops are today being planted on 20 percent of the world’s farmland, and the percentage is projected to double as new crops are introduced and countries like India and China move toward full adoption of the technology. “This is the most rapidly adopted new technology in the history of agriculture,” Fraley said. The ability to introduce multiple genes into an ever-expanding array of crops has not only increased yields but has produced significant environmental benefits. By altering the characteristics of crops, agricultural biotechnology has made it possible for farmers to use fewer pesticides and other chemicals. Fewer trips through the fields on tractors mean less greenhouse gas emissions and reduced compaction of soils. Furthermore, the revolution in agricultural biotechnology has just begun, Fraley said. Within a few years, agricultural companies will be selling seeds with ten or more introduced genes. Crops can be modified to improve human health; for example, soybeans have been genetically modified to produce healthy rather than unhealthy fatty acids. Future crops will need far less water, a crucial consideration as climate change alters rainfall patterns and groundwater aquifers are depleted. As Fraley said, “As much as we have seen happen in the last decade, it is really just the beginning.” The life sciences can answer some of the most fundamental, interesting, and difficult questions that human beings can ask. How did the great diversity of living things come to be? How do cells function on a molecular level? What is the role of life in changing the surface of the earth? Consider this last question, said James Collins, who is currently on leave from Arizona State University to serve as Assistant Director for Biological Sciences at the National Science Foundation. According to a recent estimate, of the approximately 4,300 types of minerals on the earth, about 3,000 are the products of biological processes. The evolution of life “put earth under new management,” Collins said. Understanding the future state of the planet will require understanding the biological systems that have shaped the planet. Many of these biological systems are found in the oceans, which cover 70 percent of the earth’s surface and have a crucial impact on weather, climate, and the composition of the atmosphere. In the past decade, new tools have become available to explore the microbial processes that drive the chemistry of the oceans, observed David Kingsbury, Chief Program Officer for Science at the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. These technologies have revealed that a large proportion of the planet’s genetic diversity resides in the oceans. In addition, many organisms in the oceans readily exchange genes, creating evolutionary forces that can have global effects. The oceans are currently under great stress, Kingsbury pointed out. Nutrient runoff from agriculture is helping to create huge and expanding “dead zones” where oxygen levels are too low to sustain life. Toxic algal blooms are occurring with higher frequency in areas where they have not been seen in the past. Exploitation of ocean resources is disrupting ecological balances that have formed over many millions of years. Human-induced changes in the chemistry of the atmosphere are changing the chemistry of the oceans, with potentially catastrophic consequences. “If we are not careful, we are not going to have a sustainable planet to live on,” said Kingsbury. Only by understanding the basic biological processes at work in the oceans can humans live sustainably on earth.

<h4>There are also <u><mark>public goods at the global level</mark>. They <mark>include </mark>the <mark>control of </mark>dangerous <mark>diseases, fair rules to govern </mark>international <mark>trade</mark>, <mark>protection of the atmosphere and </mark>of <mark>biodiversity</mark>, <mark>peace </mark>and security, <mark>as well as a stable finance system</mark>. Only multilateral coordination can handle deficits that arise globally</u>. In political and conceptual terms, an International Task Force on Global Public Goods is working on getting a clearer grip of humankind’s shared interests. The aim is to improve the capacity for action at intergovernmental and supranational levels. The German Development Ministry supports the Task Force (Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, p. 100). The UNDP Director who has drawn international attention to the concept of public goods emphasises the useful impact it might have on multilateral politics (interview with Inge Kaul, p. 104). However<u>, the <mark>unfulfilled need for international coordination is evidence of the weaknesses of the current </mark>multilateral <mark>system</u> </mark>(Dirk Messner, p. 111). Moreover, the debate does not, of course, take place in a power vacuum. The question is how to make the Global Public Goods agenda palatable for developing countries. Many of them have so far experienced multilateral politics subjected to orders from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and as wallflowers in the World Trade Organisation rather than as partners with equal rights (Mariama Williams, p. 113). Without doubt, a utopian element of hope marks the debate on Global Public Goods. However, its core of the – economically defined – public interest is brilliantly rational. After all, economics is originally the science of the intelligent use of resources. Unfortunately, economics jargon is far too often abused for non-sense rhetoric with the intention of making political cases seem irrefutable. Citizens then become customers, public administrations are turned into management agencies, and matters of public interest are reduced to objects of narrow-minded bean-counting. This is not so in the case of Global Public Goods. Here <u><mark>we are dealing with </mark>correctly defined <mark>issues of humankind’s</mark> welfare and <mark>survival</mark>. </u>The very fact that the concept has not yet been made operational in political terms makes the debate about Global Public Goods all the more relevant. <u>The converging global society must meet enormous challenges – and that implies that <mark>governments have to pursue </mark>strategies of <mark>cross-border cooperation</u><strong></mark>. It may be impossible to check what happens with every single German tax euro in a multilateral policy context and, indeed, the negotiations are prone to be more complicated and time-consuming than in the case of bilateral agreements</h4><p>Science diplomacy high now </p><p>French Ministry of Global Affairs 13 </strong>http://www.france-science.org/IMG/pdf/science-diplomacy-for-france-2013.pdf, “Science Diplomacy for France, 2013, French Ministry of Global Affairs</p><p>France, who for many decades has viewed scientific cooperation as contributing to the ¶ dialogue between peoples and a means of developing and strengthening national excellence, ¶ sees her approach bolstered by the emergence of the<u> “<mark>science diplomacy</mark>” concept</u>. Developed in ¶ the United States and widely disseminated in the English-speaking world, <u>it has been defined as ¶ “the use and application of science cooperation to help build bridges and enhance relationships ¶ between and amongst societies, with a particular interest in working in areas where there might ¶ not be other mechanisms for engagement at an official level.”1¶ <mark>In the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, <mark>this policy</mark> ¶ shift <mark>has been reflected</mark> notably <mark>by the appointment of science envoys</u></mark> tasked with <u><mark>resuming a ¶ dialogue with</u></mark> the elites in the Muslim world (<u><mark>Middle East, Africa, and </u></mark>South-East<u><mark> Asia</u></mark>) <u><mark>and offering </u></mark>¶ them <u><mark>opportunities</u><strong></mark> 2. </p><p></strong>Networks and funding now</p><p><strong>Colglazier </strong>and Lyons<strong> 14</strong> – E. William Colglazier is the science and technology adviser to the U.S. secretary of state. Elizabeth E. Lyons is a senior adviser in the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Science and Technology Adviser and its Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. She is on detail with support from the National Science Foundation to the Department of State. (E. William, Elizabeth E., 2014, “The United States Looks to the Global Science, Technology, and Innovation Horizon”, Science and Diplomacy, http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2014/united-states-looks-global-science-technology-and-innovation-horizon)//sb</p><p>Looking around: <u><mark>The new global landscape of science is</mark> more distributed and <mark>networked</u></mark>—t<u>he United States needs to look around at such linkages</u>. Many <u>scientific</u> <u>advances</u> are now p<u>ropelled not just by individuals</u> working within individual labs, <u>but increasingly by overlapping, fluid, </u>and largely self-organizing <u><strong>networks of scientists</u></strong>, engineers, technologists, and entrepreneurs. <u><strong>These networks frequently extend across and beyond research intensive institutions</u></strong>. <u><mark>Networks of scientists are already being supported</mark>, </u>for example, <u><mark>by t</mark>he</u> National Science Foundation (<u><mark>NSF</u></mark>) Research Coordination Networks <u><mark>and</mark> through</u> initiatives such as the Higher Education Solutions Network (<u><mark>HESN)</u> <u>undertaken</u> <u>by</u></mark> the U.S. Agency for International Development (<u><mark>USAID</u></mark>). <u><strong><mark>HESN is building diverse</u></strong></mark>, often <u><strong><mark>international, teams to tackle significant development challenge</mark>s,</u></strong> <strong>making more information on development projects available domestically and internationally, and tying together people and results for stronger impact.</p><p>biotech inevitable globally and solves all their impacts</p><p>Their Author NAS 8</strong> <strong>(National Academy of Sciences, “The Role of the Life Sciences in Transforming America's Future Summary of a Workshop” December 3, 2008, Board on Life Sciences Division on Earth and Life Studies, National Research Council) </strong>//trepka</p><p>The Promise of the Biological Sciences <u><mark>Investments in the life sciences pay off in</mark> three broad areas, observe</u>d Massachusetts Institute of Technology (<u>MIT</u>) <u>President</u> Susan <u>Hockfield. They improve <mark>human <strong>health</strong>.</mark> They foster <strong><mark>industries</u></strong></mark> that boost the economy while <u>addressing a wide range of</u> environmental, energy, health, and agricultural <u>challenges. <mark>And</mark> they further <mark>human understanding of</u></mark> some of the most fascinating <u><strong><mark>systems</u></strong></mark> in the universe. ¶ Improving Human Health ¶ The biological sciences have enabled most of the world’s population to enjoy higher living standards and longer life spans than ever before, said National Academies President Ralph Cicerone. New understanding of the links between disease and sanitation, the role trace nutrients play in health, and the potential of vaccines and antibiotics, among many other research results, have improved the lives of people everywhere. The progress made in combating heart disease is a prime example of the payoffs from investment in the life sciences, said Hockfield. Over the past 30 years, the National Institutes of Health (<u><mark>NIH</mark>) has <mark>invested</mark> about $4 per American per year <mark>in cardiovascular research. That</mark> investment has <mark>helped reduce the rate of death from heart disease</mark> and stroke <mark>by</mark> more than <mark>half</u></mark>. Knowledge of cholesterol metabolism led to the development of the drugs known as statins, which have reduced heart attacks and strokes. The development of drug-eluting stents has enabled physicians to open occluded blood vessels. Study of receptors on the surface of nerve cells has led to new beta blockers that are being used to treat hypertension and heart disease. <u><mark>Similar advances </mark>have <mark>produced benefits <strong>throughout medicine</u></strong></mark>, observed Thomas Cech, President of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, and Harold Varmus, President of the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center. <u>Greater understanding of the role of tumor necrosis factor in inflammatory disease has led to antibody treatments</u> that have changed the lives of many people with rheumatoid arthritis. Materials science is producing spare parts for bones, arteries, and other tissues and organs. Basic research into retroviruses motivated by their role in some cancers built the base of understanding that proved critical in first identifying the cause of the AIDS epidemic and then developing drugs to control the disease. “<u><mark>If we as a country hadn’t made</mark> the <mark>investment in</mark> the <mark>basic science</mark>, in the understanding of retroviruses, <mark>we would</mark> probably <mark>still</mark> today <mark>have</mark> a rapidly <mark>expanding</mark> global <mark>AIDS</mark> epidemic</u>,” Cech said. <u><strong><mark>Continued basic research</strong></mark> into fundamental biological processes <mark>could yield</mark> a wealth of <mark>new</mark> medical <mark>advances</u></mark>. ¶ Investigations of bacterial genetics could provide new treatments for infectious diseases, including diseases caused by microbes that have evolved mechanisms to evade existing treatments. Bioengineered stem cells could provide regulated insulin secretion in people with diabetes, for example, or repair severed spinal cord nerves. Study of chronic diseases such as cancer, heart disease, and mental illness, which now account for the bulk ¶ 3 of health care costs, could lead to personalized treatments that reflect a disease’s unique characteristics in each individual. However, the translation of basic research findings to applications is not always straightforward or quick, Cech observed. Even where understanding of biological processes is extensive, vast amounts of work must be done, often by people in different disciplines and sectors working collaboratively, to apply new knowledge in medicine. The life sciences have applications in areas that range far beyond human health. Life-science based approaches could contribute to advances in many industries, from energy production and pollution remediation, to clean manufacturing and the production of new biologically inspired materials. In fact, biological systems could provide the basis for new products, services and industries that we cannot yet imagine. Microbes are already producing biofuels and could, through further research, provide a major component of future energy supplies. Marine and terrestrial organisms extract carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, which suggests that biological systems could be used to help manage climate change. Study of the complex systems encountered in biology is ¶ producing insights into similarly interconnected networks encountered in many other areas of science – and vice versa. Take agriculture as an example. The agricultural biotechnology industry is just a little more than a decade old, said Robert Fraley, Executive Vice President and Chief Technology Officer at Monsanto – the first bioengineered crop, a soybean seed with a gene providing tolerance for a common herbicide, was launched in 1996. <u>Yet <mark>biotech</u></mark>nology<u><mark> crops are</mark> today being </u>planted<u><mark> on 20 percent of </u></mark>the world’s farmland,<u><mark> and</mark> the percentage is <strong><mark>projected to double </strong>as <strong>new</mark> crops are introduced and <mark>countries like India and China move toward full adoption</mark> </strong>of the technology</u>. “<u>This is the most rapidly adopted new technology in the history of agriculture</u>,” Fraley said. The ability to introduce multiple genes into an ever-expanding array of crops has not only increased yields but has produced significant environmental benefits. By altering the characteristics of crops, agricultural biotechnology has made it possible for farmers to use fewer pesticides and other chemicals. Fewer trips through the fields on tractors mean less greenhouse gas emissions and reduced compaction of soils. Furthermore, the revolution in agricultural biotechnology has just begun, Fraley said. Within a few years, agricultural companies will be selling seeds with ten or more introduced genes. Crops can be modified to improve human health; for example, soybeans have been genetically modified to produce healthy rather than unhealthy fatty acids. Future crops will need far less water, a crucial consideration as climate change alters rainfall patterns and groundwater aquifers are depleted. As Fraley said, “As much as we have seen happen in the last decade<u>, it is really just the beginning.” </u>The <u>life sciences</u> can <u>answer</u> some of the most <u>fundamental</u>, interesting, and difficult <u>questions</u> that human beings can ask. How did the great diversity of living things come to be? How do cells function on a molecular level? What is the role of life in changing the surface of the earth? Consider this last question, said James Collins, who is currently on leave from Arizona State University to serve as Assistant Director for Biological Sciences at the National Science Foundation. According to a recent estimate, of the approximately 4,300 types of minerals on the earth, about 3,000 are the products of biological processes. The evolution of life “put earth under new management,” Collins said. Understanding the future state of the planet will require understanding the biological systems that have shaped the planet. Many of these <u>biological systems are found in the oceans,</u> which cover 70 percent of the earth’s surface and have a crucial impact on weather, climate, and the composition of the atmosphere. In the past decade, <u><strong><mark>new tools</strong> have become available to explore </u></mark>the microbial processes that drive the chemistry of<u> <strong><mark>the oceans</u></strong></mark>, observed David Kingsbury, Chief Program Officer for Science at the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. <u>These technologies have revealed</u> that a large proportion of the planet’s genetic diversity resides in <u>the oceans</u>. In addition, many organisms in the oceans readily exchange genes, creating evolutionary forces that can have global effects. The oceans are currently under great stress, Kingsbury pointed out. Nutrient runoff from agriculture is helping to create huge and expanding “dead zones” where oxygen levels are too low to sustain life. Toxic algal blooms are occurring with higher frequency in areas where they have not been seen in the past. Exploitation of ocean resources is disrupting ecological balances that have formed over many millions of years. Human-induced changes in the chemistry of the atmosphere are changing the chemistry of the oceans, with potentially catastrophic consequences. “If we are not careful, we are not going to have a sustainable planet to live on,” said Kingsbury. Only by understanding the basic biological processes at work in the oceans can humans live sustainably on earth.<strong> </p></strong>

2nc

1NC Property Rights DA

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

N

Hurricanedebates2015

3

Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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Da.....

Kr.....

Pi.....

Ah.....

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Dartmouth

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

US support for a first strike increases Israeli aggression exponentially. Absent US support, Israel won’t risk attack

Giraldi 12

Giraldi 12 Philip, executive director, Council for the National Interest; former CIA officer; PhD, European History, University of London; “Entangled With Israel” The American Conservative; September 3, 2012; http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/entangled-with-israel/

Israel’s attempt to steer American foreign policy has been nowhere more evident than in the sustained campaign to move the U S in the direction of war with Iran, Israel is essentially demanding a commitment from Washington to attack Iran unless the issue of Iran’s ability to enrich uranium is resolved through negotiation or through Iranian surrender of that right Israel knows it cannot successfully attack Iran unilaterally and must have the United States along to do the heavy lifting. . If Israel obtains a virtual commitment from the United States to go to w it would mean enjoying the benefits of having a powerful patron to do its fighting without any obligation in return A guarantee from Washington for Israel’s security which still permits unilateral action by Netanyahu is reminiscent of the entangling arrangements that led to World War I. If the United States commits to unconditional support for an Israeli attack on Iran, it will be a surrender of one of the defining attributes of national sovereignty: the power to choose when and where to go to war A guarantee precludes any consideration that the United States might actually have an overriding national interest to avoid a war. It denies that the United States should be able to exercise complete sovereignty over the issue of Iran, and it also freezes the status quo, as if new ways of looking at the problem of the Iranian nuclear program could not evolve over the next few months. Washington should make no commitment to anyone about what it will do vis-à-vis Iran We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow

Israel’s attempt to steer American foreign policy has been evident in the sustained campaign to move the U S the direction of war with Iran Israel is demanding a commitment from Washington to attack Israel knows it cannot successfully attack Iran unilaterally and must have the U S to do the heavy lifting. If Israel obtains a commitment from the U S to go to war it would mean enjoying the benefits of a powerful patron to fight without any obligation in return A guarantee is reminiscent of the entangling arrangements that led to World War I.

Israel’s attempt to steer American foreign policy has been nowhere more evident than in the sustained campaign to move the United States in the direction of war with Iran,a war that serves no American interest unless one believes that Tehran is willing to spend billions of dollars to develop a nuclear weapon only to hand off the result to a terrorist group. The most recent overtures by the Israeli government have pushed the United States to make a declaration that negotiations with Iran have failed and will not be continued. For Israel, this is a necessary first step towards an American military intervention, as failed negotiations mean there is no way out of the impasse but by war, if the Iranians do not unilaterally concede on every disputed point. Two recent op-eds have elaborated the argument, promoting the necessity of convincing the Israelis that the United States is absolutely serious about using military force against Iran if the Iranians seek to retain any capacity to enrich uranium. One might note in passing that this new red line, sometimes also called the abstract “capability” to create a nuclear weapon, has been achieved by moving the goal posts back considerably. At one time Iran was threatened with a military response if it actually acquired a nuclear weapon (which is still the official position of the Obama administration), but earlier benchmarks within that policy saying that enrichment should not exceed 20 percent or that the enrichment should not take place on Iranian soil have been abandoned in favor of what now amounts to zero tolerance. Those who note that Iran, which is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is under IAEA inspection, has a clear legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes have been ignored in favor of those who believe that Iran is somehow a special case. On August 17, the Washington Post and The New York Times featured op-eds explaining why the United States must do more to convince Israel not to attack Iran this year. Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israel’s military intelligence who is believed to be close to the country’s political leadership, argued in the Post that Obama must basically convince the Israelis that he will use force against Iran if sanctions do not convince the country’s leadership to abandon enrichment of nuclear fuel. Over at the Times, Dennis Ross, a former senior U.S. diplomat who has been described as Israel’s lawyer, made pretty much the same arguments. Both advocated giving Israel refueling tankers and special munitions that would enable an attack on Iran to be more effective, thereby widening the window of opportunity for sanctions to work, in light of Israeli arguments that hardened Iranian sites might soon be invulnerable to attack. Ross advocates giving Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu effectively a blank check, asking him what he will need to attack Iran and granting the Israeli government commitments for a full range of U.S. military support. Both Yadlin and Ross argue that it is necessary to create the conditions for Israel to delay a possible attack until 2013. As Yadlin puts it, “if the United States wants Israel to give sanctions and diplomacy more time, Israelis must know that they will not be left high and dry if these options fail.” Assuming that Ross and Yadlin are speaking for the Israeli government, which is almost certainly the case, Israel is essentially demanding a commitment from Washington to attack Iran unless the issue of Iran’s ability to enrich uranium is resolved through negotiation or through Iranian surrender of that right. In return, Israel will not attack Iran before the American election. So in effect, Washington would be promising to fight a war later if Israel does not start one now. Israel knows it cannot successfully attack Iran unilaterally and must have the United States along to do the heavy lifting. It also knows that the threat to attack Iran before the election is a powerful weapon, with neither Mitt Romney nor Barack Obama welcoming such a potentially game-changing diversion from their debate on the economy and jobs. Critics like Arnaud de Borchgrave have correctly noted that many former generals and intelligence officers in the United States and Israel have, in fact, decided that the basic premise is wrong. Iran does not pose a threat that could not be contained even if it does some day make the political decision to obtain a crude nuclear device. Launching a new war in the Middle East to prevent it from doing so would create “mayhem” throughout the region, guarantee a breakdown in Egypt-Israel relations, and create a perfect breeding ground for the civil war in Syria to spill out and lead to turmoil among all of its neighbors. American ships in the Persian Gulf would be attacked, unrest in Bahrain would turn to revolution, and the Palestinians would stage a new intifada. Israel would be bombarded from Lebanon and from Iran. Gas prices would soar, economic recovery would stall worldwide, and European nations now struggling to deal with unprecedented unemployment levels would watch the eurozone collapse before the rage of hundreds of thousands protesters in the streets. Americans would again become the targets of international terrorism. And there is another serious objection to going along with the Israeli government’s thinking. Israel is by its own volition not an ally of the United States in any technical sense because alliances are troublesome things that require rules of engagement and reciprocity, limiting the partners’ ability to act independently. If Israel obtains a virtual commitment from the United States to go to war in 2013, it would mean enjoying the benefits of having a powerful patron to do its fighting without any obligation in return, beyond delaying unilateral military action until a more suitable time. A guarantee from Washington for Israel’s security which still permits unilateral action by Netanyahu is all too reminiscent of the entangling arrangements that led to World War I. The fact that the murder of an Austrian Archduke in the Balkans led to a world war that killed tens of millions was due to promises not unlike what Israel is demanding today. If the United States commits to unconditional support for an Israeli attack on Iran, it will be a surrender of one of the defining attributes of national sovereignty: the power to choose when and where to go to war. Amos Yadlin suggests at one point that President Obama go to Congress and get approval in advance to take military action “to prevent Iran’s acquisition of a military nuclear capability.” Such a pre-approval for war certainly raises constitutional issues, but it also creates a virtual casus belli because Iran already has the “capability” to enrich uranium for potential military uses. A guarantee precludes any consideration that the United States might actually have an overriding national interest to avoid a war. It denies that the United States should be able to exercise complete sovereignty over the issue of Iran, and it also freezes the status quo, as if new ways of looking at the problem of the Iranian nuclear program could not evolve over the next few months. Washington should make no commitment to anyone about what it will do vis-à-vis Iran in 2013 no matter what inducements are offered. As the 19th-century British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston put it, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” Let America’s actual interests dictate U.S. foreign policy.

<h4><strong>US support for a first strike increases Israeli aggression exponentially. Absent US support, Israel won’t risk attack</h4><p>Giraldi 12 <u></strong>Philip, executive director, Council for the National Interest; former CIA officer; PhD, European History, University of London; “Entangled With Israel” The American Conservative; September 3, 2012; http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/entangled-with-israel/</p><p><mark>Israel’s attempt to steer American foreign policy has been</mark> nowhere more <mark>evident</mark> than <mark>in the sustained campaign to move the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u>in <mark>the direction of war with Iran</mark>,</u>a war that serves no American interest unless one believes that Tehran is willing to spend billions of dollars to develop a nuclear weapon only to hand off the result to a terrorist group. The most recent overtures by the Israeli government have pushed the United States to make a declaration that negotiations with Iran have failed and will not be continued. For Israel, this is a necessary first step towards an American military intervention, as failed negotiations mean there is no way out of the impasse but by war, if the Iranians do not unilaterally concede on every disputed point. Two recent op-eds have elaborated the argument, promoting the necessity of convincing the Israelis that the United States is absolutely serious about using military force against Iran if the Iranians seek to retain any capacity to enrich uranium. One might note in passing that this new red line, sometimes also called the abstract “capability” to create a nuclear weapon, has been achieved by moving the goal posts back considerably. At one time Iran was threatened with a military response if it actually acquired a nuclear weapon (which is still the official position of the Obama administration), but earlier benchmarks within that policy saying that enrichment should not exceed 20 percent or that the enrichment should not take place on Iranian soil have been abandoned in favor of what now amounts to zero tolerance. Those who note that Iran, which is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is under IAEA inspection, has a clear legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes have been ignored in favor of those who believe that Iran is somehow a special case. On August 17, the Washington Post and The New York Times featured op-eds explaining why the United States must do more to convince Israel not to attack Iran this year. Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israel’s military intelligence who is believed to be close to the country’s political leadership, argued in the Post that Obama must basically convince the Israelis that he will use force against Iran if sanctions do not convince the country’s leadership to abandon enrichment of nuclear fuel. Over at the Times, Dennis Ross, a former senior U.S. diplomat who has been described as Israel’s lawyer, made pretty much the same arguments. Both advocated giving Israel refueling tankers and special munitions that would enable an attack on Iran to be more effective, thereby widening the window of opportunity for sanctions to work, in light of Israeli arguments that hardened Iranian sites might soon be invulnerable to attack. Ross advocates giving Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu effectively a blank check, asking him what he will need to attack Iran and granting the Israeli government commitments for a full range of U.S. military support. Both Yadlin and Ross argue that it is necessary to create the conditions for Israel to delay a possible attack until 2013. As Yadlin puts it, “if the United States wants Israel to give sanctions and diplomacy more time, Israelis must know that they will not be left high and dry if these options fail.” Assuming that Ross and Yadlin are speaking for the Israeli government, which is almost certainly the case, <u><mark>Israel is</mark> essentially <mark>demanding a commitment from Washington to attack</mark> Iran unless the issue of Iran’s ability to enrich uranium is resolved through negotiation or through Iranian surrender of that right</u>. In return, Israel will not attack Iran before the American election. So in effect, Washington would be promising to fight a war later if Israel does not start one now. <u><mark>Israel knows it cannot successfully attack Iran unilaterally and must have the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates along <mark>to do the heavy lifting. </u></mark>It also knows that the threat to attack Iran before the election is a powerful weapon, with neither Mitt Romney nor Barack Obama welcoming such a potentially game-changing diversion from their debate on the economy and jobs. Critics like Arnaud de Borchgrave have correctly noted that many former generals and intelligence officers in the United States and Israel have, in fact, decided that the basic premise is wrong. Iran does not pose a threat that could not be contained even if it does some day make the political decision to obtain a crude nuclear device. Launching a new war in the Middle East to prevent it from doing so would create “mayhem” throughout the region, guarantee a breakdown in Egypt-Israel relations, and create a perfect breeding ground for the civil war in Syria to spill out and lead to turmoil among all of its neighbors. American ships in the Persian Gulf would be attacked, unrest in Bahrain would turn to revolution, and the Palestinians would stage a new intifada. Israel would be bombarded from Lebanon and from Iran. Gas prices would soar, economic recovery would stall worldwide, and European nations now struggling to deal with unprecedented unemployment levels would watch the eurozone collapse before the rage of hundreds of thousands protesters in the streets. Americans would again become the targets of international terrorism. And there is another serious objection to going along with the Israeli government’s thinking. Israel is by its own volition not an ally of the United States in any technical sense because alliances are troublesome things that require rules of engagement and reciprocity, limiting the partners’ ability to act independently<u>. <mark>If Israel obtains a</mark> virtual <mark>commitment from the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>to go to w</u>ar</mark> in 2013, <u><mark>it would mean enjoying the benefits of</mark> having <mark>a powerful patron</mark> <mark>to</mark> do its <mark>fight</mark>ing <mark>without any obligation in return</u></mark>, beyond delaying unilateral military action until a more suitable time. <u><mark>A guarantee</mark> from Washington for Israel’s security which still permits unilateral action by Netanyahu <mark>is</u></mark> all too <u><mark>reminiscent</u> <u>of the entangling arrangements that led to World War I.</u></mark> The fact that the murder of an Austrian Archduke in the Balkans led to a world war that killed tens of millions was due to promises not unlike what Israel is demanding today. <u>If the United States commits to unconditional support for an Israeli attack on Iran, it will be a surrender of one of the defining attributes of national sovereignty: the power to choose when and where to go to war</u>. Amos Yadlin suggests at one point that President Obama go to Congress and get approval in advance to take military action “to prevent Iran’s acquisition of a military nuclear capability.” Such a pre-approval for war certainly raises constitutional issues, but it also creates a virtual casus belli because Iran already has the “capability” to enrich uranium for potential military uses. <u>A guarantee precludes any consideration that the United States might actually have an overriding national interest to avoid a war.</u> <u>It denies that the United States should be able to exercise complete sovereignty over the issue of Iran, and it also freezes the status quo, as if new ways of looking at the problem of the Iranian nuclear program could not evolve over the next few months.</u> <u>Washington should make no commitment to anyone about what it will do vis-à-vis Iran</u> in 2013 no matter what inducements are offered. As the 19th-century British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston put it, “<u>We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow</u>.” Let America’s actual interests dictate U.S. foreign policy.</p>

1NR

adv 1

AT: Solves Global Institutions

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

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Hurricanedebates2015

1

Indiana Tally-Liu

Weil

Ban OG CP Politics - Iran (2NR) Security K Heg bad (2NR)

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

KrAh

Dartmouth KrAh

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

4—Framing determines policy effectiveness --- 90% of policy errors emerge from the flawed and deterministic lens of security.

Lowth 2011

Lowth 2011

A frame is ‘a perspective from which a problematic situation can be made sense of’ Framing shapes perceptions, and influences thinking and behaviour The re-framing of issues is also potentially transformative.6 Much mistaken thinking and associated flawed behaviour is attributed, with authority, to mis-perception: ‘Around 90% of errors in thinking ... arise from errors of perception The ways in which problems are articulated and interpreted, in terms of their essential ‘form or origin’, fundamentally affects the strategies developed to resolve them The process of framing influences strategic thinking because it shapes a priori understanding, organisation and explanation: ‘Problems arise as much from the meaning that people involved give them as from the facts of the situation’ The language of security is similarly evocative, partial and inherently political The theory of securitization within international relations – the use of the term ‘security’ to elevate an issue above and beyond normal politics – is remarkably similar to that of framing: The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure ... the staging of existential issues as of supreme priority Both the generic process of framing and the specific example of securitization: ‘construct discourses through which the world comes to be perceived’ Starting from the premise that: ‘By saying the word [security], something is done this matters A conscious process of de-securitization can re-frame thinking (with potentially beneficial results). The increasing breadth of affairs portrayed as ‘security issues’ – food, water, the environment, as well as energy – makes it imperative, in an ‘era of security obsessionism’ for policy makers and strategists to appreciate the cognitive influence of securitization Designating an issue as a matter of security is not just a theoretical question but caries ‘real-world’ significance

Framing shapes perceptions, and influences thinking and behaviour The re-framing of issues is transformative Much mistaken thinking is attributed to mis-perception: ‘Around 90% of errors in thinking arise from errors of perception A conscious process of de-securitization can re-frame thinking The increasing breadth of affairs portrayed as ‘security issues’ an ‘era of security obsessionism’ for policy makers and strategists Designating an issue as a matter of security caries ‘real-world’ significance’

Colonel R. G., British Army, ‘Securitization’ and its effect on Strategic Thinking, SEAFORD HOUSE PAPER, Royal Defense Studies A frame is ‘a perspective from which a problematic situation can be made sense of’.4 Framing sets a particular context. It shapes perceptions, and influences thinking and behaviour (Haider-Markel et al, 2006; Bradley, 2011).5 The re-framing of issues (ie. ‘reinterpreting their meaning and re-perceiving the situation’ (ibid)) is also potentially transformative.6 Much mistaken thinking and associated flawed behaviour is attributed, with authority, to mis-perception: ‘Around 90% of errors in thinking ... arise from errors of perception (Carr, 2010:5).7 Indeed some afford perceptions not just a primary but an exclusive explanatory role: ‘Perception is all there is’ (Peters and Austin, 1994:71). The ways in which problems are articulated and interpreted, in terms of their essential ‘form or origin’, fundamentally affects the strategies developed to resolve them (Goffman, 1986:10). The process of framing influences strategic thinking because it shapes a priori understanding, organisation and explanation: ‘Problems arise as much from the meaning that people involved give them as from the facts of the situation’ (Martin, 2002:28). Framed thinking is inherently convergent, focused and directed as if by a lens, but the process is neither objective nor universal; it varies between individuals and communities, and alters over time. Framing involves (re)definition. Words are critical and their impact, albeit invariably subconscious, can be profound: ‘There is nothing outside the text’ (Derrida, 1976:158). The cognitive linguist George Lakoff challenged his students not to think of an elephant – but none could avoid doing so. The word alone created an irresistible frame: Every word, like elephant, evokes a frame, which can be an image or other kinds of knowledge ... the word is defined relative to that frame (Lakoff, 2004:3). Framing is more than just associative, however; it also tends to be partial: When the word tax is added to relief, the result is a metaphor: Taxation is an affliction, the person who takes it away is a hero, and anyone who tries to stop him is a bad guy. This is a frame ... made up of ideas, like affliction and hero (ibid). Moreover, framing – as a form of linguistic construction – can be purposefully partial: Framing is about language that fits your worldview, [but] it is not just language. Ideas are primary — and the language carries those ideas, evokes those ideas (ibid). The language of security is similarly evocative, partial and inherently political. The theory of securitization within international relations – the use of the term ‘security’ to elevate an issue above and beyond normal politics – is remarkably similar to that of framing: The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure ... the staging of existential issues as of supreme priority. The process ... a speech-act ... causes the actor to operate in a different mode than he would have otherwise (Buzan et al, 1998:26,30). Both the generic process of framing and the specific example of securitization: ‘construct discourses through which the world comes to be perceived’ (Henry, 2002:68). They are both potentially powerful forms of sense-making. And yet, curiously, the two are seldom connected explicitly.8 Debates about securitisation are conducted within the milieu of security studies; they tend to focus on how issues become characterised as threats, rather than on the ramifications. Those concerned about framing, on the other hand, operating principally within psychology and its fields of application (behavioural sciences, sociology, media studies etc) tend to address much more keenly the cognitive implications, especially the creation of alternative world views, the colouring of perceptions, and associated influences on decision-making. This paper draws upon both fields of research to explore the framing effect of securitization on strategic thinking.9 Starting from the premise that: ‘By saying the word [security], something is done’ (Wæver, 1995:55), it is argued that: − (A part of) what securitization – as a form of discourse – ‘does’, is frame − In the context of strategy, this matters (so strategists should be aware). thinking. − A conscious process of de-securitization can re-frame thinking (with potentially beneficial results). The increasing breadth of affairs portrayed as ‘security issues’ – food, water, the environment, as well as energy – makes it imperative, in an ‘era of security obsessionism’ (Charrett, 2009:11), for policy makers and strategists to appreciate the cognitive influence of securitization. However, while both framing and securitization are periodically characterised as negative, this dissertation makes no such judgment – either in general, or in relation to European energy supply. The intention here is to demonstrate instead that securitization does frame strategic thinking, and that this matters: ‘Designating an issue as a matter of security is not just a theoretical question but caries ‘real-world’ significance’ (Hough, 2004:14).

<h4><strong>4—<u>Framing determines policy effectiveness</u> --- 90% of policy errors emerge from the flawed and deterministic lens of security. </h4><p>Lowth 2011</p><p></strong>Colonel R. G., British Army, ‘Securitization’ and its effect on Strategic Thinking, SEAFORD HOUSE PAPER, Royal Defense Studies</p><p><u>A frame is ‘a perspective from which a problematic situation can be made sense of’</u>.4 <u><mark>Framing</u></mark> sets a particular context. It <u><mark>shapes perceptions, and influences thinking and behaviour</u></mark> (Haider-Markel et al, 2006; Bradley, 2011).5 <u><mark>The re-framing of issues</u></mark> (ie. ‘reinterpreting their meaning and re-perceiving the situation’ (ibid)) <u><mark>is</mark> also potentially <mark>transformative</mark>.6 <mark>Much mistaken thinking</mark> and associated flawed behaviour <mark>is attributed</mark>, with authority, <mark>to mis-perception: ‘Around 90% of errors in thinking</mark> ... <mark>arise from errors of perception</u></mark> (Carr, 2010:5).7 Indeed some afford perceptions not just a primary but an exclusive explanatory role: ‘Perception is all there is’ (Peters and Austin, 1994:71). <u>The ways in which problems are articulated and interpreted, in terms of their essential ‘form or origin’, fundamentally affects the strategies developed to resolve them</u> (Goffman, 1986:10). <u>The process of framing influences strategic thinking because it shapes a priori understanding, organisation and explanation: ‘Problems arise as much from the meaning that people involved give them as from the facts of the situation’</u> (Martin, 2002:28). Framed thinking is inherently convergent, focused and directed as if by a lens, but the process is neither objective nor universal; it varies between individuals and communities, and alters over time. Framing involves (re)definition. Words are critical and their impact, albeit invariably subconscious, can be profound: ‘There is nothing outside the text’ (Derrida, 1976:158). The cognitive linguist George Lakoff challenged his students not to think of an elephant – but none could avoid doing so. The word alone created an irresistible frame: Every word, like elephant, evokes a frame, which can be an image or other kinds of knowledge ... the word is defined relative to that frame (Lakoff, 2004:3). Framing is more than just associative, however; it also tends to be partial: When the word tax is added to relief, the result is a metaphor: Taxation is an affliction, the person who takes it away is a hero, and anyone who tries to stop him is a bad guy. This is a frame ... made up of ideas, like affliction and hero (ibid). Moreover, framing – as a form of linguistic construction – can be purposefully partial: Framing is about language that fits your worldview, [but] it is not just language. Ideas are primary — and the language carries those ideas, evokes those ideas (ibid). <u>The language of security is similarly evocative, partial and inherently political</u>. <u>The theory of securitization within international relations – the use of the term ‘security’ to elevate an issue above and beyond normal politics – is remarkably similar to that of framing: The distinguishing feature of securitization is a specific rhetorical structure ... the staging of existential issues as of supreme priority</u>. The process ... a speech-act ... causes the actor to operate in a different mode than he would have otherwise (Buzan et al, 1998:26,30). <u>Both the generic process of framing and the specific example of securitization: ‘construct discourses through which the world comes to be perceived’</u> (Henry, 2002:68). They are both potentially powerful forms of sense-making. And yet, curiously, the two are seldom connected explicitly.8 Debates about securitisation are conducted within the milieu of security studies; they tend to focus on how issues become characterised as threats, rather than on the ramifications. Those concerned about framing, on the other hand, operating principally within psychology and its fields of application (behavioural sciences, sociology, media studies etc) tend to address much more keenly the cognitive implications, especially the creation of alternative world views, the colouring of perceptions, and associated influences on decision-making. This paper draws upon both fields of research to explore the framing effect of securitization on strategic thinking.9 <u>Starting from the premise that: ‘By saying the word [security], something is done</u>’ (Wæver, 1995:55), it is argued that: − (A part of) what securitization – as a form of discourse – ‘does’, is frame − In the context of strategy, <u>this matters</u> (so strategists should be aware). thinking. − <u><mark>A conscious process of de-securitization can re-frame thinking</mark> (with potentially beneficial results). <mark>The increasing breadth of</mark> <mark>affairs portrayed as ‘security issues’</mark> – food, water, the environment, as well as energy – makes it imperative, in <mark>an ‘era of security obsessionism’</u></mark> (Charrett, 2009:11), <u><mark>for</mark> <mark>policy makers and strategists</mark> to appreciate the cognitive influence of securitization</u>. However, while both framing and securitization are periodically characterised as negative, this dissertation makes no such judgment – either in general, or in relation to European energy supply. The intention here is to demonstrate instead that securitization does frame strategic thinking, and that this matters: ‘<u><mark>Designating an issue as a matter of security </mark>is not just a theoretical question but <mark>caries ‘real-world’ significance</u>’</mark> (Hough, 2004:14).</p>

2nc

1NC Property Rights DA

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

N

Hurricanedebates2015

3

Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

KrAh

Dartmouth KrAh

Da.....

Kr.....

Pi.....

Ah.....

Dartmouth

Dartmouth

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Israel won’t attack without US support – extremely sensitive to US concerns

Zanotti et al 12

Zanotti et al 12 (Jim Zanotti, Coordinator Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities. CRS. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R42443.pdf)

policymakers in the Obama Administration and Congress regarding an attack. Not surprisingly, Israeli leaders are extremely sensitive to U.S. views for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to: • Strong U.S.-Israel relations dating back to when the United States was the first country to recognize Israel upon its declaration of statehood in May 1948; • Robust ongoing military and security cooperation, including significant U.S. arms sales and other forms of support; and • Trade ties and important bilateral economic and scientific cooperation.141 Israeli leaders’ perspectives about the possible effects of a strike on U.S. political and material assistance , possible negative security consequences for the United States from a potential Iranian retaliation, and the probability of future U.S. military action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran may, among other considerations, influence the Israeli decisionmaking process An Israeli journalist wrote in March 2012 that Israel did not ask permission when it acted to prevent Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Asad from obtaining nuclear weapons, but that “the [Obama] administration can credibly counter that in neither case did Israeli unilateralism threaten to draw America into an armed conflict, as it does now.”142 According to three Israeli analysts (including two former officials) mentioned above: Even after the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq, the U.S. remains extremely exposed to Iranian retaliation—either directly against its forces in the area or by Iran’s attempting to ignite a broader conflict in the region—so an Israeli strike would harm U.S. interests in the region and would place many U.S. lives at risk. And while in an election year America’s political reaction to such a strike may be mitigated by domestic political considerations, the reaction of the U.S. defense community to an Israeli military strike might be extremely negative, as such an action might be seen as representing Israeli insensitivity to and disregard of U.S. priorities and concerns.143 Some reports have speculated that an Israeli decision to attack, if it occurs, could come before the U.S. presidential election in November 2012, with one Israeli report stating, “A second-term president, not constrained by electoral necessities, will be able to apply a lot more pressure on the Israeli government not to attack.”144 Separate from the question of whether the United States might support an Israeli strike on Iran, Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by how they anticipate the United States would respond after an attack, including in the event of retaliation by Iran and its allies. Although the United States does not have a formal treaty obligation to defend Israel in the event it is attacked, successive Administrations have either stated or implied that the United States would act to protect Israel’s security if it were endangered—including by Iran—and have worked with Congress to ensure and bolster Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over regional security threats.145

Israeli leaders are extremely sensitive to U.S. views for a variety of reasons Strong U.S.-Israel relations Robust ongoing military and security cooperation Trade ties bilateral economic and scientific cooperation Israeli perspectives about the effects of a strike on U.S. political and material assistance possible negative security consequences the U.S. remains extremely exposed to Iranian retaliation Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by how they anticipate the U St would respond after an attack,

Despite the reference by Defense Minister Barak to the possible need for “overt or tacit support, particularly from America” before approving an Israel strike, it is unclear to what extent Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by the stated positions and anticipated responses of U.S. policymakers in the Obama Administration and Congress regarding an attack. Not surprisingly, Israeli leaders are extremely sensitive to U.S. views for a variety of reasons, including but not limited to: • Strong U.S.-Israel relations dating back to when the United States was the first country to recognize the provisional Jewish government as the de facto government of Israel upon its declaration of statehood in May 1948; • Robust ongoing military and security cooperation, including significant U.S. arms sales and other forms of support; and • Trade ties and important bilateral economic and scientific cooperation.141 Israeli leaders’ perspectives about the possible effects of a strike on U.S. political and material assistance to Israel, possible negative security consequences for the United States from a potential Iranian retaliation, and the probability of future U.S. military action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran may, among other considerations, influence the Israeli decisionmaking process An Israeli journalist wrote in March 2012 that Israel did not ask permission when it acted to prevent Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Asad from obtaining nuclear weapons, but that “the [Obama] administration can credibly counter that in neither case did Israeli unilateralism threaten to draw America into an armed conflict, as it does now.”142 According to three Israeli analysts (including two former officials) mentioned above: Even after the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq, the U.S. remains extremely exposed to Iranian retaliation—either directly against its forces in the area or by Iran’s attempting to ignite a broader conflict in the region—so an Israeli strike would harm U.S. interests in the region and would place many U.S. lives at risk. And while in an election year America’s political reaction to such a strike may be mitigated by domestic political considerations, the reaction of the U.S. defense community to an Israeli military strike might be extremely negative, as such an action might be seen as representing Israeli insensitivity to and disregard of U.S. priorities and concerns.143 Some reports have speculated that an Israeli decision to attack, if it occurs, could come before the U.S. presidential election in November 2012, with one Israeli report stating, “A second-term president, not constrained by electoral necessities, will be able to apply a lot more pressure on the Israeli government not to attack.”144 Separate from the question of whether the United States might support an Israeli strike on Iran, Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by how they anticipate the United States would respond after an attack, including in the event of retaliation by Iran and its allies. Although the United States does not have a formal treaty obligation to defend Israel in the event it is attacked, successive Administrations have either stated or implied that the United States would act to protect Israel’s security if it were endangered—including by Iran—and have worked with Congress to ensure and bolster Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over regional security threats.145

<h4><u>Israel won’t attack without US support – extremely sensitive to US concerns</h4><p></u><strong>Zanotti et al 12<u></strong> (</u>Jim Zanotti, Coordinator Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. Israel: Possible Military Strike Against<u> Iran’s Nuclear Facilities. CRS. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R42443.pdf)</p><p></u>Despite the reference by Defense Minister Barak to the possible need for “overt or tacit support, particularly from America” before approving an Israel strike, it is unclear to what extent Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by the stated positions and anticipated responses of U.S.<u> policymakers in the Obama Administration and Congress regarding an attack. Not surprisingly, <mark>Israeli leaders are <strong>extremely sensitive</strong> to U.S. views for a variety of reasons</mark>, including but not limited to: • <mark>Strong U.S.-Israel relations</mark> dating back to when the United States was the first country to recognize </u>the provisional Jewish government as the de facto government of <u> Israel upon its declaration of statehood in May 1948; • <strong><mark>Robust ongoing military and security cooperation</strong></mark>, including significant U.S. arms sales and other forms of support; and • <strong><mark>Trade ties</strong> </mark>and important <strong><mark>bilateral economic and scientific cooperation</strong></mark>.141 <mark>Israeli </mark>leaders’ <mark>perspectives about the </mark>possible <mark>effects of a strike on U.S. political and material assistance</mark> </u>to Israel<u>, <mark>possible negative security consequences</mark> for the United States from a potential Iranian retaliation, and the probability of future U.S. military action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran may, among other considerations, influence the Israeli decisionmaking process An Israeli journalist wrote in March 2012 that Israel did not ask permission when it acted to prevent Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Asad from obtaining nuclear weapons, but that “the [Obama] administration can credibly counter that in neither case did Israeli unilateralism threaten to draw America into an armed conflict, as it does now.”142 According to three Israeli analysts (including two former officials) mentioned above: Even after the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq, <mark>the U.S. remains extremely exposed to Iranian retaliation</mark>—either directly against its forces in the area or by Iran’s attempting to ignite a broader conflict in the region—so an Israeli strike would harm U.S. interests in the region and would place many U.S. lives at risk. And while in an election year America’s political reaction to such a strike may be mitigated by domestic political considerations, the reaction of the U.S. defense community to an Israeli military strike might be extremely negative, as such an action might be seen as representing Israeli insensitivity to and disregard of U.S. priorities and concerns.143 Some reports have speculated that an Israeli decision to attack, if it occurs, could come before the U.S. presidential election in November 2012, with one Israeli report stating, “A second-term president, not constrained by electoral necessities, will be able to apply a lot more pressure on the Israeli government not to attack.”144 Separate from the question of whether the United States might support an Israeli strike on Iran, <mark>Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by how they anticipate the U</mark>nited <mark>St</mark>ates <mark>would respond after an attack,</mark> including in the event of retaliation by Iran and its allies. Although the United States does not have a formal treaty obligation to defend Israel in the event it is attacked, successive Administrations have either stated or implied that the United States would act to protect Israel’s security if it were endangered—including by Iran—and have worked with Congress to ensure and bolster Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over regional security threats.145</p></u>

1NR

adv 1

AT: Solves Global Institutions

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

N

Hurricanedebates2015

1

Indiana Tally-Liu

Weil

Ban OG CP Politics - Iran (2NR) Security K Heg bad (2NR)

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

KrAh

Dartmouth KrAh

Da.....

Kr.....

Pi.....

Ah.....

Dartmouth

Dartmouth

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

This is not just defense. Their reliance on security suffers from serial policy failure – and the attendant endless production of new threats to be countered creates an endless politics of war

09

Dillon and Reed 09 (IR professor @ Lancaster University; Lecturer @ King’s College London, “The Liberal Way of Killing: Killing to Make Live”)

The liberal way of rule and war has become the preparedness to make war on whatever threatens life’s capacity to live the emergency of its emergence societies are increasingly ruled by fear; elites are governed by the very grid of intelligibility furnished by the account of life as an emergency of emergence this is not a condition that can be resolved simply by ‘throwing the rascals out’) this complex adaptive emergent life exists in the permanent state of emergence. Its politics of security and war now revolve around this state of emergency Politics becomes subject to the urgent and compelling political economy, the logistical and technical dynamics, of war. You cannot, however, debate emergency. You can only interrogate the futile demand it makes on you,

The liberal way of war has thus become the preparedness to make war on whatever threatens life’s capacity to live the emergency of its emergence this complex adaptive emergent life exists now revolve around this state of emergency Politics becomes subject to the urgent and compelling political economy, the logistical and technical dynamics, of war You cannot, however, debate emergency. You can only interrogate the futile demand it makes on you,

There is, third, the additional critical attribute of contingency. It is this feature which does not merely add governing through contingency to the political rationalities and governmental technologies of contemporary liberal rule. It lends its own distinctive infection to them; one which has had a profound impact on the nature of liberal rule and war in relation, especially, to its current hyperbolicization of security and its newly problematized and proliferating accounts of dangers, threats and enemies. For if the biopolitical imperative is that of making life live, the martial expression of that imperative, the drive to liberal war, is preparedness to make war on the enemies of life. The biopoltiical imperative to make life live finds its expression today, however in making life live the emergency of its emergence; for that is what species life is now said to be. The liberal way of rule and war has thus become the preparedness to make war on whatever threatens life’s capacity to live the emergency of its emergence. For allied to the radical contingency of species existence is an account of species existence as a life of continuous complex adaptation and emergence. From the perspective of security and war, in particular, such a pluripotent life, characterized by its continuously unfolding potential, is a life that is continuously becoming-dangerous to itself, and to other life forms. Such danger is not merely actual; because life itself, here has become not merely actual. The emphasis in the problematization of danger which accompanies such a politics of life itself therefore also shifts dramatically from the actual to the virtual. Only this explains the astonishing degree to which the historically secure lives of the Atlantic basin have come to construe themselves, politically, as radically endangered by as many unknown as there are unknowable dangers; a point regularly and frankly admitted, officially, from terror to health mandarins, nationally and internationally. Many have observed that the societies of the Atlantic basin are now increasingly ruled by fear; that there is a politics of fear. But they interpret this politics of fear in political naïve ways, as the outcome of deliberate machination by political and economic elites. They may well be correct to some degree. But what is perfectly evident, also, is that the elites themselves are governed by the very grid of intelligibility furnished by the account of life as an emergency of emergence. It is not simply a matter, therefore, of leaders playing on fears. The leadership itself is in the grip of a conjugation of government and rule whose very generative principle of formation is permanent emergency. In other words, fear is no longer simply an affect open to regular manipulation by leadership cadres. It is, but it is not only that, and not even most importantly that. More importantly (because this is not a condition that can be resolved simply by ‘throwing the rascals out’) in the permanent emergency of emergence, fear becomes a generative principle of formation for rule. The emergency of emergence therefore poses a found crisis in western understandings of the political, and in the hopes and expectations invested in political as opposed to other forms of life. Given the wealth and given the vast military preponderance in weapons of mass destruction and other forms of global deployed military capabilities of the societies of the Atlantic basin, notably, of course, the United States, this poses a world crisis as well. In short, then, this complex adaptive emergent life exists in the permanent state of emergence. Its politics of security and war, which is to say its very foundational politics of rule as well, now revolve around this state of emergency. Here, that in virtue of which a ‘we’ comes to belong together, its very generative principle of formation (our shorthand definition of politics), has become this emergency. What happens, we also therefore ask of the biopoliticization of rule, when emergency becomes the generative principle of formation of community and rule? Our answer has already been given. Politics becomes subject to the urgent and compelling political economy, the logistical and technical dynamics, of war. No longer a ‘we’ in virtue of abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by the rule of the emergency itself; and that is where the political crisis, the crisis of the political itself is that a ‘we’ can belong together not only in terms of agreeing to abide by the rule of its generative principles of formation but also by the willingness to keep the nature of operation of those generative principles of formation under common deliberative scrutiny. You cannot, however, debate emergency. You can only interrogate the futile demand it makes on you, and all the episteme challenges it poses, acceding to those demands according both to how well you can come to know them, and how well you have also adapted you affects to suffering them, or perish. The very exigencies of emergency thus militate profoundly against the promise of ‘politics’ as it has been commonly understood in the western tradition; not simply as a matter of rule, but as a matter of self-rule in which it was possible to debate the nature of the self in terms of the good for and of the self. Note, also, how much the very idea of the self has disappeared from view in this conflation of life with species life. The only intelligence, the only self-knowledge, the only culture which qualifies in the permanence of this emergency is the utilitarian and instrumental technologies said to be necessary to endure it. We have been here before in the western tradition and we have experienced the challenges of this condition as tyranny (Arendt 1968). The emergency of emergence, the generative principle of formation, the referential matrix of contemporary biopolitics globally, is a newly formed, pervasive and insidiously complex, soft totalitarian regime of power relations made all the more difficult to contest precisely because, governing through the contingent emergency of emergence, it is a governing through the transactional freedoms of contingency

<h4>This is not just defense. Their reliance on security suffers from serial policy failure – and the attendant endless production of new threats to be countered creates an endless politics of war</h4><p><u>Dillon and Reed <strong>09</u></strong> (IR professor @ Lancaster University; Lecturer @ King’s College London, “The Liberal Way of Killing: Killing to Make Live”)</p><p>There is, third, the additional critical attribute of contingency. It is this feature which does not merely add governing through contingency to the political rationalities and governmental technologies of contemporary liberal rule. It lends its own distinctive infection to them; one which has had a profound impact on the nature of liberal rule and war in relation, especially, to its current hyperbolicization of security and its newly problematized and proliferating accounts of dangers, threats and enemies. For if the biopolitical imperative is that of making life live, the martial expression of that imperative, the drive to liberal war, is preparedness to make war on the enemies of life. The biopoltiical imperative to make life live finds its expression today, however in making life live the emergency of its emergence; for that is what species life is now said to be. <u><mark>The liberal way of</mark> rule and <mark>war has </u>thus<u> become the preparedness to make war on whatever threatens life’s capacity to live the emergency of its emergence</u></mark>. For allied to the radical contingency of species existence is an account of species existence as a life of continuous complex adaptation and emergence. From the perspective of security and war, in particular, such a pluripotent life, characterized by its continuously unfolding potential, is a life that is continuously becoming-dangerous to itself, and to other life forms. Such danger is not merely actual; because life itself, here has become not merely actual. The emphasis in the problematization of danger which accompanies such a politics of life itself therefore also shifts dramatically from the actual to the virtual. Only this explains the astonishing degree to which the historically secure lives of the Atlantic basin have come to construe themselves, politically, as radically endangered by as many unknown as there are unknowable dangers; a point regularly and frankly admitted, officially, from terror to health mandarins, nationally and internationally. Many have observed that the<u> societies </u>of the Atlantic basin<u> are </u>now<u> increasingly ruled by fear; </u>that there is a politics of fear. But they interpret this politics of fear in political naïve ways, as the outcome of deliberate machination by political and economic elites. They may well be correct to some degree. But what is perfectly evident, also, is that the<u> elites </u>themselves<u> are governed by the very grid of intelligibility furnished by the account of life as an emergency of emergence</u>. It is not simply a matter, therefore, of leaders playing on fears. The leadership itself is in the grip of a conjugation of government and rule whose very generative principle of formation is permanent emergency. In other words, fear is no longer simply an affect open to regular manipulation by leadership cadres. It is, but it is not only that, and not even most importantly that. More importantly (because<u> this is not a condition that can be resolved simply by ‘throwing the rascals out’) </u>in the permanent emergency of emergence, fear becomes a generative principle of formation for rule. The emergency of emergence therefore poses a found crisis in western understandings of the political, and in the hopes and expectations invested in political as opposed to other forms of life. Given the wealth and given the vast military preponderance in weapons of mass destruction and other forms of global deployed military capabilities of the societies of the Atlantic basin, notably, of course, the United States, this poses a world crisis as well. In short, then,<u> <mark>this complex adaptive emergent life exists</mark> in the permanent state of emergence. Its politics of security and war</u>, which is to say its very foundational politics of rule as well,<u> <mark>now revolve around this state of emergency</u></mark>. Here, that in virtue of which a ‘we’ comes to belong together, its very generative principle of formation (our shorthand definition of politics), has become this emergency. What happens, we also therefore ask of the biopoliticization of rule, when emergency becomes the generative principle of formation of community and rule? Our answer has already been given. <u><mark>Politics becomes subject to the urgent and compelling political economy, the logistical and technical dynamics, of war</mark>. </u>No longer a ‘we’ in virtue of abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by the rule of the emergency itself; and that is where the political crisis, the crisis of the political itself is that a ‘we’ can belong together not only in terms of agreeing to abide by the rule of its generative principles of formation but also by the willingness to keep the nature of operation of those generative principles of formation under common deliberative scrutiny. <u><mark>You cannot, however, debate emergency. You can only interrogate the futile demand it makes on you,</mark> </u>and all the episteme challenges it poses, acceding to those demands according both to how well you can come to know them, and how well you have also adapted you affects to suffering them, or perish. The very exigencies of emergency thus militate profoundly against the promise of ‘politics’ as it has been commonly understood in the western tradition; not simply as a matter of rule, but as a matter of self-rule in which it was possible to debate the nature of the self in terms of the good for and of the self. Note, also, how much the very idea of the self has disappeared from view in this conflation of life with species life. The only intelligence, the only self-knowledge, the only culture which qualifies in the permanence of this emergency is the utilitarian and instrumental technologies said to be necessary to endure it. We have been here before in the western tradition and we have experienced the challenges of this condition as tyranny (Arendt 1968). The emergency of emergence, the generative principle of formation, the referential matrix of contemporary biopolitics globally, is a newly formed, pervasive and insidiously complex, soft totalitarian regime of power relations made all the more difficult to contest precisely because, governing through the contingent emergency of emergence, it is a governing through the transactional freedoms of contingency </p>

2nc

1NC Property Rights DA

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

N

Hurricanedebates2015

3

Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

KrAh

Dartmouth KrAh

Da.....

Kr.....

Pi.....

Ah.....

Dartmouth

Dartmouth

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Low oil prices force Iran to the table and provide better pressure- sanctions only risk derailing a deal

NYT 12/26

NYT 12/26/2014 (International New York Times, Swift drop in oil prices has rivals of U.S. reeling; Washington might gain leverage as big energy exporters are squeezed, lexis)

A plunge in oil prices has sent tremors through the global political order, setting off an abrupt shift in fortunes that has bolstered the interests of the United States and pushed Iran to the brink of financial crisis The price plunge may influence Iran's deliberations over whether to agree to a deal on its nuclear program oil prices fall was so sharp as to unsettle plans and assumptions in many governments The price drop ''is knocking down America's principal opponents without us even trying For Iran it is as if Congress had passed tougher sanctions Iran has been hit so hard that its government is offering men the option of buying their way out of military service ''The government needs money badly.

A plunge in oil prices has sent tremors through the global political order, setting off an abrupt shift in fortunes that has bolstered the interests of the United States and pushed Iran to the brink of financial crisis The price plunge may influence Iran's deliberations over whether to agree to a deal on its nuclear program For Iran it is as if Congress had passed tougher sanctions Iran has been hit so hard that its governme is offering men the option of buying their way out of military service ''The government needs money badly

A plunge in oil prices has sent tremors through the global political and economic order, setting off an abrupt shift in fortunes that has bolstered the interests of the United States and pushed several big oil-exporting nations - particularly those hostile to the West, like Russia, Iran and Venezuela - to the brink of financial crisis. The nearly 50 percent decline in oil prices since June has had the most conspicuous impact on the Russian economy and President Vladimir V. Putin. The former finance minister Aleksei L. Kudrin, a longtime friend of Mr. Putin's, warned this week of a ''full-blown economic crisis'' and called for better relations with Europe and the United States. But the ripple effects are spreading much more broadly than that. The price plunge may also influence Iran's deliberations over whether to agree to a deal on its nuclear program with the West; force the oil-rich nations of the Middle East to reassess their role in managing global supply; and give a boost to the economies of the biggest oil-consuming nations, notably the United States and China. It might even have been a late factor in Cuba's decision to seal a rapprochement with Washington. After a precipitous drop, to less than $60 a barrel from around $115 a barrel in June, oil prices settled at a low level this week. Their fall, even if partly reversed, was so sharp and so quick as to unsettle plans and assumptions in many governments. That includes Mr. Putin's apparent hope that Russia could weather Western sanctions over its intervention in Ukraine without serious economic harm, and Venezuela's aspirations for continuing the free-spending policies of Hugo Chávez, who died in 2013 while president. The price drop, said Edward N. Luttwak, a longtime Pentagon adviser and author of several books on geopolitical and economic strategy, ''is knocking down America's principal opponents without us even trying.'' For Iran, which is estimated to be losing $1 billion a month because of the fall, it is as if Congress had passed the much tougher sanctions that the White House lobbied against, he said. Iran has been hit so hard that its government, looking for ways to fill a widening hole in its budget, is offering young men the option of buying their way out of an obligatory two years of military service. ''We are on the eve of a major crisis,'' an Iranian economist, Hossein Raghfar, was quoted as saying on Sunday by the newspaper Etemaad. ''The government needs money badly.''

<h4>Low oil prices force Iran to the table and provide better pressure- sanctions only risk derailing a deal</h4><p><strong>NYT 12/26</strong>/2014 (International New York Times, Swift drop in oil prices has rivals of U.S. reeling; Washington might gain leverage as big energy exporters are squeezed, lexis)</p><p><u><mark>A plunge in oil prices has sent tremors through the global political</u></mark> and economic <u><mark>order, setting off an abrupt shift in fortunes that has bolstered the interests of the United States and pushed</u></mark> several big oil-exporting nations - particularly those hostile to the West, like Russia, <u><mark>Iran</u></mark> and Venezuela - <u><mark>to the brink of financial crisis</u></mark>. The nearly 50 percent decline in oil prices since June has had the most conspicuous impact on the Russian economy and President Vladimir V. Putin. The former finance minister Aleksei L. Kudrin, a longtime friend of Mr. Putin's, warned this week of a ''full-blown economic crisis'' and called for better relations with Europe and the United States. But the ripple effects are spreading much more broadly than that. <u><mark>The price plunge may</u></mark> also <u><strong><mark>influence Iran's deliberations over whether to agree to a deal on its nuclear program</u></strong></mark> with the West; force the oil-rich nations of the Middle East to reassess their role in managing global supply; and give a boost to the economies of the biggest oil-consuming nations, notably the United States and China. It might even have been a late factor in Cuba's decision to seal a rapprochement with Washington. After a precipitous drop, to less than $60 a barrel from around $115 a barrel in June, <u>oil prices</u> settled at a low level this week. Their <u>fall</u>, even if partly reversed, <u>was so sharp</u> and so quick <u>as to unsettle plans and assumptions in many governments</u>. That includes Mr. Putin's apparent hope that Russia could weather Western sanctions over its intervention in Ukraine without serious economic harm, and Venezuela's aspirations for continuing the free-spending policies of Hugo Chávez, who died in 2013 while president. <u>The price drop</u>, said Edward N. Luttwak, a longtime Pentagon adviser and author of several books on geopolitical and economic strategy, <u>''is knocking down America's principal opponents without us even trying</u>.'' <u><strong><mark>For Iran</u></strong></mark>, which is estimated to be losing $1 billion a month because of the fall, <u><strong><mark>it is as if Congress had passed</u></strong></mark> the much <u><strong><mark>tougher sanctions</u></strong></mark> that the White House lobbied against, he said. <u><mark>Iran has been hit so hard that its governme</mark>nt</u>, looking for ways to fill a widening hole in its budget, <u><mark>is offering</u></mark> young <u><mark>men the option of buying their way out of</u></mark> an obligatory two years of <u><mark>military service</u></mark>. ''We are on the eve of a major crisis,'' an Iranian economist, Hossein Raghfar, was quoted as saying on Sunday by the newspaper Etemaad. <u><mark>''The government needs money badly</mark>.</u><strong>''</p></strong>

1NR

adv 1

A2: Causes Prolif

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

N

Hurricanedebates2015

1

Indiana Tally-Liu

Weil

Ban OG CP Politics - Iran (2NR) Security K Heg bad (2NR)

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

KrAh

Dartmouth KrAh

Da.....

Kr.....

Pi.....

Ah.....

Dartmouth

Dartmouth

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Structural violence and inequality kills millions yearly. Probability outweighs magnitude—treat near zero risks as zero—Improbable risk scenarios are instruments used to justify militarism and mask responsibility for structural violence.

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois UPenn) 4

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) 4 (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens Peacetime crimes constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” Rampp 9 a Specific Concept of Security http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/ptb/wvw/wvw5/Rampp%20paper.pdf] The question arises whether a logic of security is appropriate I strongly doubt this. better alternative approaches to solve problems in the concrete situation are ignored by securitizing it To avoid an intransparent amalgamation of topics, I suggest to discuss practice exclusively and only then investigate connections in the real world.

it is absolutely necessary to make existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves Peacetime crimes constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the Black man, the undeserving poor it is essential that we recognize the genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible The question arises whether security is appropriate I strongly doubt this. better alternative approaches to solve problems in the concrete situation are ignored by securitizing it To avoid an intransparent amalgamation , I suggest to discuss practice exclusively and only then investigate connections in the real world.

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). Rampp 9 [Benjamin, University of Tübingen, Interdepartmental Centre for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities (IZEW). Insecurity by Impreciseness Towards a Specific Concept of Security http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/ptb/wvw/wvw5/Rampp%20paper.pdf] The question arises whether such a logic of security – which in practice comprises more terms like intentional threats, us vs. them (Wæver 1995: 63), coercion, violence and counter vio- lence, or the loss of freedoms than the idea of “peace of mind” – is appropriate for the respec- tive situations. I strongly doubt this. Rather, potentially better alternative approaches to solve problems in the concrete situation are ignored by securitizing it (Wæver 1995: 57). Of course, issues of economy, food, health, environment, and the social dimension are linked with security. To avoid an intransparent amalgamation of topics, I therefore suggest – from a methodological point of view – to discuss both definitions and fields of practice exclusively and only then investigate connections in the real world.

<h4>Structural violence and inequality kills millions yearly. Probability outweighs magnitude—treat near zero risks as zero—Improbable risk scenarios are instruments used to <u>justify</u> militarism and mask responsibility for structural violence. </h4><p><strong><mark>Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois</strong></mark> (Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ <strong><mark>UPenn) 4</p><p></strong></mark>(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22) </p><p>This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). <u>Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities</u>. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming<u> the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder.</u> We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, <u><mark>it is absolutely necessary to make</mark> just such <mark>existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times</mark>.</u> Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and <u>there is), <mark>an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves</mark>, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens</u>. <u><mark>Peacetime crimes</u></mark>, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), <u><mark>constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides</u>”</mark> to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. <u>These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite.</u> As Wittgenstein observed, <u>the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted.</u> In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. <u>Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war</u>. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. <u>The <mark>public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the</mark> mob, the mugger, the rapist, the <mark>Black man, the undeserving poor</mark>. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent?</u> What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end <u><mark>it is essential that we recognize the</mark> existence of a <mark>genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive <strong>hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted</mark>, and even rewarded <mark>everyday acts</strong> of violence that <strong>render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible</u></strong></mark> (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. <u>Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others</u>. <u>A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency”</u> (Taussig, Chapter 31).</p><p><u><strong>Rampp 9</u></strong> [Benjamin, University of Tübingen, Interdepartmental Centre for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities (IZEW). Insecurity by Impreciseness Towards<u><strong> a Specific Concept of Security http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/ptb/wvw/wvw5/Rampp%20paper.pdf]</p><p></strong><mark>The question arises whether</u></mark> such <u>a logic of <mark>security</u></mark> – which in practice comprises more terms like intentional threats, us vs. them (Wæver 1995: 63), coercion, violence and counter vio- lence, or the loss of freedoms than the idea of “peace of mind” – <u><mark>is appropriate</u></mark> for the respec- tive situations. <u><mark>I strongly doubt this.</u></mark> Rather, potentially <u><mark>better alternative approaches to solve problems in the concrete situation are ignored by securitizing it</u></mark> (Wæver 1995: 57). Of course, issues of economy, food, health, environment, and the social dimension are linked with security. <u><mark>To avoid an intransparent amalgamation </mark>of topics<mark>, I</u></mark> therefore <u><mark>suggest</u></mark> – from a methodological point of view – <u><mark>to discuss</u></mark> both definitions and fields of <u><mark>practice <strong>exclusively</strong> and <strong>only then</strong> investigate connections in the real world.</p></u></mark>

2nc

1NC Property Rights DA

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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Hurricanedebates2015

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Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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Dartmouth KrAh

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NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Yes compliance

Dahl 9/19/14

Dahl 9/19/14 --- Reuters (Fredrik, “Iran moving to comply with extended nuclear deal with powers-IAEA”, http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN0HE1RG20140919)//trepka

Iran is taking further action to comply with the terms of an extended interim agreement with six world powers over its disputed atomic activities, a U.N. nuclear watchdog report showed The findings though no major surprise may be seen as positive by the West as negotiations resumed in New York this week on ending the decade-old nuclear stand-off. Iran is continuing to meet its commitments In addition, as agreed when the deal was extended by four months in July, it is using some of its higher-grade enriched uranium in oxide form to produce fuel a step that experts say would make it more difficult to use the material for any bombs. After years of escalating tensions between Iran and the West, the election in mid-2013 of Hassan Rouhani, a pragmatist as Iranian president on a platform of ending Tehran's international isolation created new room for diplomacy that ultimately led to last year's breakthrough nuclear deal. Under the preliminary accord, Iran halted its most contested nuclear work It also converted its stockpile of the material into oxide from gas. it agreed to take some additional nuclear steps, including making nuclear fuel for a research reactor and diluting a large amount of low-enriched uranium. IAEA has inspectors on the ground in Iran who are monitoring its enrichment sites on a daily basis. Its monthly reports on the implementation of the nuclear agreement are issued to its member states and not made public.

Iran is taking further action to comply with the agreement , a U.N. nuclear report showed findings may b positive as negotiations resumed this week , it is using high grade uranium to produce fuel - a step experts say would make it more difficult to use material for bombs the election of Rouhani, a pragmatist created new diplomacy IAEA has inspectors monthly reports are issued

(Reuters) - Iran is taking further action to comply with the terms of an extended interim agreement with six world powers over its disputed atomic activities, a U.N. nuclear watchdog report obtained by Reuters on Friday showed. The findings in a monthly update by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - though no major surprise - may be seen as positive by the West as negotiations resumed in New York this week on ending the decade-old nuclear stand-off. The IAEA document made clear that Iran is continuing to meet its commitments under the preliminary accord that it reached with the United States, France, Germany, Britain, China and Russia late last year and that took effect in January. In addition, as agreed when the deal was extended by four months in July, it is using some of its higher-grade enriched uranium in oxide form to produce fuel - a step that experts say would make it more difficult to use the material for any bombs. The IAEA is tasked with checking that Iran is living up to its part of the temporary agreement, which was designed to buy time for the current talks on a comprehensive settlement of the dispute that would dispel fears of a new Middle East war. Iran denies Western allegations that it has been working to develop a capability to make atomic bombs, saying it is refining uranium to fuel a planned network of nuclear power plants. After years of escalating tensions between Iran and the West, the election in mid-2013 of Hassan Rouhani, a pragmatist, as Iranian president on a platform of ending Tehran's international isolation created new room for diplomacy that ultimately led to last year's breakthrough nuclear deal. The initial aim was for Iran and the six powers to reach a long-term agreement by a self-imposed July 20 deadline. But the talks and the interim deal were extended until Nov. 24 in view of persistently wide differences over the future size of Iran's uranium enrichment program, activity which can have both civilian and military purposes. NUCLEAR FUEL Under the preliminary accord, Iran halted its most contested nuclear work - enrichment of uranium to a higher fissile concentration of 20 percent - in exchange for a limited easing of sanctions that are hurting its oil-dependent economy. It also converted its stockpile of the material into oxide from gas. Over the four months of the deal's extension, Iran is to receive $2.8 billion in previously frozen oil revenue held in banks abroad, in addition to the $4.2 billion it got during the January-July period. In exchange, it agreed to take some additional nuclear steps, including making nuclear fuel for a research reactor and diluting a large amount of low-enriched uranium. Friday's IAEA report said Iran since July 24 had used 12.5 kg (28 lbs) of its 20 percent uranium in oxide form for manufacturing fuel. It also said Iran had begun preparatory work for diluting more than four tonnes of uranium gas enriched to up to two percent. Uranium can be used for atomic energy plants, Iran's stated aim, but can also provide material for bombs if processed to a high degree, which the West fears may be the ultimate aim. The Vienna-based IAEA has inspectors on the ground in Iran who are monitoring its enrichment sites on a daily basis. Its monthly reports on the implementation of the nuclear agreement are issued to its member states and not made public.

<h4>Yes compliance </h4><p><strong>Dahl 9/19/14 </strong>--- Reuters (Fredrik, “Iran moving to comply with extended nuclear deal with powers-IAEA”, http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN0HE1RG20140919)//trepka</p><p>(Reuters) - <u><mark>Iran is taking <strong>further action</strong> to <strong>comply</strong> with the</mark> terms of an extended interim <mark>agreement</mark> with six world powers over its disputed atomic activities<mark>, a U.N. nuclear</mark> watchdog <mark>report</u></mark> obtained by Reuters on Friday <u><mark>showed</u></mark>. <u>The <mark>findings</u></mark> in a monthly update by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - <u>though no major surprise</u> - <u><mark>may b</mark>e seen as <strong><mark>positive</u></strong></mark> <u>by the West <mark>as negotiations resumed</mark> in New York <mark>this week</mark> on ending the decade-old nuclear stand-off. </u>The IAEA document made clear that <u>Iran is <strong>continuing to meet its commitments</u></strong> under the preliminary accord that it reached with the United States, France, Germany, Britain, China and Russia late last year and that took effect in January. <u>In addition, as agreed when the deal was extended by four months in July<mark>, it is using</mark> some of its <mark>high</mark>er-<mark>grade</mark> enriched <mark>uranium</mark> in oxide form <mark>to produce fuel</u> - <u>a step</mark> that <strong><mark>experts say</strong> would make it more difficult to use</mark> the <mark>material for</mark> <strong>any <mark>bombs</strong></mark>. </u>The IAEA is tasked with checking that Iran is living up to its part of the temporary agreement, which was designed to buy time for the current talks on a comprehensive settlement of the dispute that would dispel fears of a new Middle East war. Iran denies Western allegations that it has been working to develop a capability to make atomic bombs, saying it is refining uranium to fuel a planned network of nuclear power plants. <u>After years of escalating tensions between Iran and the West, <mark>the election</mark> in mid-2013 <mark>of</mark> Hassan <mark>Rouhani, a <strong>pragmatist</u></strong></mark>, <u>as Iranian president on a platform of ending Tehran's international isolation <mark>created new</mark> room for <mark>diplomacy</mark> that ultimately led to last year's breakthrough nuclear deal. </u>The initial aim was for Iran and the six powers to reach a long-term agreement by a self-imposed July 20 deadline. But the talks and the interim deal were extended until Nov. 24 in view of persistently wide differences over the future size of Iran's uranium enrichment program, activity which can have both civilian and military purposes. NUCLEAR FUEL <u>Under the preliminary accord, Iran halted its most contested nuclear work</u> - enrichment of uranium to a higher fissile concentration of 20 percent - in exchange for a limited easing of sanctions that are hurting its oil-dependent economy. <u>It also converted its stockpile of the material into oxide from gas. </u>Over the four months of the deal's extension, Iran is to receive $2.8 billion in previously frozen oil revenue held in banks abroad, in addition to the $4.2 billion it got during the January-July period. In exchange, <u>it agreed to take some additional nuclear steps, including making nuclear fuel for a research reactor and diluting a large amount of low-enriched uranium. </u>Friday's IAEA report said Iran since July 24 had used 12.5 kg (28 lbs) of its 20 percent uranium in oxide form for manufacturing fuel. It also said Iran had begun preparatory work for diluting more than four tonnes of uranium gas enriched to up to two percent. Uranium can be used for atomic energy plants, Iran's stated aim, but can also provide material for bombs if processed to a high degree, which the West fears may be the ultimate aim. The Vienna-based <u><mark>IAEA</u> <u>has inspectors</mark> on the ground in Iran who are monitoring its enrichment sites on a daily basis. Its <strong><mark>monthly reports</strong></mark> on the implementation of the nuclear agreement <mark>are issued</mark> to its member states and not made public.</p></u>

1NR

adv 1

A2: Causes Prolif

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

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Indiana Tally-Liu

Weil

Ban OG CP Politics - Iran (2NR) Security K Heg bad (2NR)

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

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First is heg

Hossein-Zadeh 10

Hossein-Zadeh 10 [ISMAEL HOSSEIN-ZADEH,author of The Political Economy of U.S. Militarism (Palgrave-Macmillan 2007), teaches economics at Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa, “The Globalization of Militarism”, 2011, http://hamsayeh.net/archive/144-the-globalization-of-militarism.htm]

In response to the escalation of US military spending, which has tripled the last 10 years Russia has drastically increased its military spending military encirclement of China has led that country to also further strengthen its military capabilities. US geopolitical ambitions have compelled countries such as Iran, Venezuela and North Korea to strengthen their armed forces US militarization of the world is the source of a largely redundant and disproportionately large allocation of the world’s precious resources to war to justify this lopsided allocation beneficiaries of war dividends create fear, suspicion and hostility among peoples and nations of the world sowing the seeds of war, international conflicts and global instability.

The expansion of NATO to include most of the Eastern Europe has led Russia, which had curtailed its military spending during the 1990s in the hope that, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the US would also do the same, to once again increase its military spending. In response to the escalation of US military spending, which has nearly tripled during the last 10 years (from $295 billion when George W. Bush went to the White House in January 2001 to the current figure of nearly one trillion dollars), Russia too has drastically increased its military spending during the same time period (from about $22 billion in 2000 to $61 billion today). In a similar fashion, US military encirclement of China (through a number of military alliances and partnerships that range from Pakistan, Afghanistan and India to South China Sea/Southeast Asia, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Cambodia, Malaysia, New Zealand and most recently Vietnam) has led that country to also further strengthen its military capabilities. Just as the US military and geopolitical ambitions have led Russia and China to reinforce their military capabilities, so have they compelled other countries such as Iran, Venezuela and North Korea to likewise strengthen their armed forces and buttress their military preparedness. Not only does aggressive US militarism compel its “adversaries” to allocate a disproportionately large share of their precious resources to military spending, but it also coerces its “allies” to likewise embark on a path of militarization. Thus, countries like Japan and Germany, whose military capabilities were reduced to purely defensive postures following the atrocities of World War II, have once again been re-militarizing in recent years under the impetus of what US military strategists call “the need to share the burden of global security.” Thus, while Germany and Japan still operate under a “peace constitution,” their military expenditures on a global scale now rank sixth and seventh, respectively (behind the US, China, France, UK and Russia). US militarization of the world (both directly through the spread of its own military apparatus across the globe and indirectly by compelling both “friends” and “foe” to militarize) has a number of ominous consequences for the overwhelming majority or the population the world. For one thing, it is the source of a largely redundant and disproportionately large allocation of the world’s precious resources to war, militarism and wasteful production of the means of death and destruction. Obviously, as this inefficient, class-biased disbursement of resources drains public finance and accumulates national debt, it also brings tremendous riches and treasures to war profiteers, that is, the beneficiaries of the military capital and the finance capital. Secondly, to justify this lopsided allocation of the lion’s share of national resources to military spending, beneficiaries of war dividends tend to create fear, suspicion and hostility among peoples and nations of the world, thereby sowing the seeds of war, international conflicts and global instability.

<h4><strong>First is heg</h4><p>Hossein-Zadeh 10<u></strong> [ISMAEL HOSSEIN-ZADEH,author of The Political Economy of U.S. Militarism (Palgrave-Macmillan 2007), teaches economics at Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa, “The Globalization of Militarism”, 2011, http://hamsayeh.net/archive/144-the-globalization-of-militarism.htm]</p><p></u>The expansion of NATO to include most of the Eastern Europe has led Russia, which had curtailed its military spending during the 1990s in the hope that, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the US would also do the same, to once again increase its military spending. <u>In response to the escalation of US military spending, which has</u> nearly <u>tripled</u> during <u>the last 10 years</u> (from $295 billion when George W. Bush went to the White House in January 2001 to the current figure of nearly one trillion dollars), <u>Russia</u> too <u>has drastically increased its military spending</u> during the same time period (from about $22 billion in 2000 to $61 billion today). In a similar fashion, US <u>military encirclement of China</u> (through a number of military alliances and partnerships that range from Pakistan, Afghanistan and India to South China Sea/Southeast Asia, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Cambodia, Malaysia, New Zealand and most recently Vietnam) <u>has led that country to also further strengthen its military capabilities.</u> Just as the <u>US</u> military and <u>geopolitical ambitions</u> have led Russia and China to reinforce their military capabilities, so <u>have</u> they <u>compelled</u> other <u>countries such as Iran, Venezuela and North Korea to</u> likewise <u>strengthen their armed forces</u> and buttress their military preparedness. Not only does aggressive US militarism compel its “adversaries” to allocate a disproportionately large share of their precious resources to military spending, but it also coerces its “allies” to likewise embark on a path of militarization. Thus, countries like Japan and Germany, whose military capabilities were reduced to purely defensive postures following the atrocities of World War II, have once again been re-militarizing in recent years under the impetus of what US military strategists call “the need to share the burden of global security.” Thus, while Germany and Japan still operate under a “peace constitution,” their military expenditures on a global scale now rank sixth and seventh, respectively (behind the US, China, France, UK and Russia). <u>US militarization of the world</u> (both directly through the spread of its own military apparatus across the globe and indirectly by compelling both “friends” and “foe” to militarize) has a number of ominous consequences for the overwhelming majority or the population the world. For one thing, it <u>is the source of a largely redundant and disproportionately large allocation of the world’s precious resources to war</u>, militarism and wasteful production of the means of death and destruction. Obviously, as this inefficient, class-biased disbursement of resources drains public finance and accumulates national debt, it also brings tremendous riches and treasures to war profiteers, that is, the beneficiaries of the military capital and the finance capital. Secondly, <u>to justify this lopsided allocation</u> of the lion’s share of national resources to military spending, <u>beneficiaries of war dividends</u> tend to <u>create fear, suspicion and hostility among peoples and nations of the world</u>, thereby <u><strong>sowing the seeds of war, international conflicts and global instability.</p></u></strong>

1nr

Link 1—Heg

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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Hurricanedebates2015

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Vanderbilt Bilgi-Mitchell

Harrigan

Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

KrAh

Dartmouth KrAh

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Prefer it --- all their ev is rhetoric

Forbes 11/30

Forbes 11/30 (The Iranian Nuclear Deal Is A Good One http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2013/11/30/the-iranian-nuclear-deal-is-a-good-one/ James Conca 11/30/13

new deal between Iran and six superpowers. the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China (the P5+1 group) reached an interim deal with Iran to stop their nuclear weapons program. Four key provisions were obtained no enrichment of U above 5% U-235 ) no additional centrifuges are to be installed or produced stop all work on the heavy-water reactor at Arak provide design details on the reactor and do not develop the reprocessing facilities needed to separate Pu from used fuel,¶ full access by IAEA inspectors to all nuclear facilities including daily visitation to Natanz and Fordow, and continuous camera surveillance of key sites.¶ Despite all the rhetoric of horror and claims that this deal is a mistake, this deal is just what we all hoped for as the first step to resolving the Iranian nuclear weapons issue It is the first step to bringing Iran into the world’s nuclear community as a partner instead of an adversary, Iran’s theocracy embodied by their new President has decided that the cost/benefit of maintaining an expensive, useless nuclear program that is still a long way from producing a reliable weapon, while being starved by a barrage of sanctions, on the heels of a global economic meltdown, has now gone into the too-much-cost-and-not-enough-benefit category.¶ there is now an opening to change the game.¶ I’m not sure what the naysayers of this deal think the sanctions were suppose to do. The purpose of sanctions is to get a specific party to the negotiating table. Sanctions are not meant to destroy a nation, cause widespread poverty of its people and destruction of their economy, or topple governments. As much as some leaders in Israel and Saudi Arabia want to use the U.S. to decapitate their nemesis, this is not the point of these talks We need nuclear energy to spread around the world without proliferating weapons. How we handle Iran will determine the future of nuclear energy in many countries outside of the developed world, and we better get it right All other rhetoric is posturing. Isolation is the worst strategy for bringing a country into the civil world’s fold And while discussions focus on 20% U-235 as sufficiently enriched to make an atomic weapon, that is only theoretically correct. No one has made a weapon from such lowly-enriched materials and no one ever will.¶

new deal stop their nuclear program. Four key provisions were obtained no enrichment above 5% no additional centrifuges stop heavy-water reacto full access by IAEA inspectors to all facilities, including continuous surveillance Despite rhetoric of horror this deal is the first step to resolving Iranian nuclear issue It is the first step to bringing Iran into nuclear community as a partner The purpose of sanctions is to get a party to the table As much as some leaders in Israel want to use the U.S. this is not the point All rhetoric is posturing Isolation is the worst strategy

This Thanksgiving had an extra reason to be thankful – the new deal between Iran and six superpowers. Last week, the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China (the P5+1 group) reached an interim deal with Iran to stop their nuclear weapons program. Four key provisions were obtained in this deal:¶ 1) no enrichment of U above 5% U-235, and all highly-enriched materials, some as high as 20% U-235, must be blended down to less than 5% or altered to a form not usable for weapons.¶ 2) no additional centrifuges are to be installed or produced, and three-fourths of the centrifuges at Fordow and half of the centrifuges at Natanz will be inoperable,¶ 3) stop all work on the heavy-water reactor at Arak, provide design details on the reactor (which could be used to produce Pu for the other type of atomic weapon) and do not develop the reprocessing facilities needed to separate Pu from used fuel,¶ 4) full access by IAEA inspectors to all nuclear facilities, including daily visitation to Natanz and Fordow, and continuous camera surveillance of key sites.¶ Despite all the rhetoric of horror and claims that this deal is a mistake, this deal is just what we all hoped for as the first step to resolving the Iranian nuclear weapons issue, the structure of which we’ve been proposing for years. It is the first step to bringing Iran into the world’s nuclear community as a partner instead of an adversary, making Iran a compliant signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While this may make some of its neighbors nervous, there is no real alternative that does not involve lots of destruction and death.¶ Old orders are falling in the Middle East. The region is in upheaval, Shia and Sunni are as far apart as ever, and Iran’s theocracy, embodied by their new President Hassan Rouhani, has decided that the cost/benefit of maintaining an expensive, useless nuclear program that is still a long way from producing a reliable weapon, while being starved by a barrage of sanctions, on the heels of a global economic meltdown, has now gone into the too-much-cost-and-not-enough-benefit category.¶ Thus, there is now an opening to change the game.¶ This deal is not about trust, as the last point above about access addresses. No one trusts governments, even supposedly good ones. There must be unfettered access to verify that the nuclear facilities are not being used to produce weapons and that is what this deal allows, and it will be easy to determine when Iran breaks this deal (The Economist; The Guardian; Fox News).¶ But the facilities can, and will, be used to support nuclear power, as was the original purpose of Iran’s nuclear program when the United States set it up under the Shah in the 1960s, and that is the actual end point of this whole deal. Not the end of Iran’s nuclear program or the destruction of their facilities, their country or their people.¶ I’m not sure what the naysayers of this deal think the sanctions were suppose to do. The purpose of sanctions is to get a specific party to the negotiating table. Sanctions are not meant to destroy a nation, cause widespread poverty of its people and destruction of their economy, or topple governments. The fear of these happening, not the reality of them, is what gets a government to the table.¶ As much as some leaders in Israel and Saudi Arabia want to use the U.S. to decapitate their nemesis, this is not the point of these talks. And what happens here goes far beyond just Iran. We need nuclear energy to spread around the world without proliferating weapons. How we handle Iran will determine the future of nuclear energy in many countries outside of the developed world, and we better get it right. There will always be pressures to develop weapons and we need strategies and experience in diverting these programs away from weapons.¶ Besides, the art of diplomacy is the art of finding a win-win for all parties. It’s significant that the Obama Administration knows how to use diplomacy the way only the U.S. can. It is in both our and the world’s best interest, to find a solution that allows Iran nuclear energy without weapons.¶ All other rhetoric is posturing. Isolation is the worst strategy for bringing a country into the civil world’s fold. Just look at North Korea. Rouhani has to move forward in a way that does not shame Iran. The celebration in Iran over this deal is a strong indication of the win-win nature of this deal, not the ridiculous charge of the opposition that the U.S. was taken for a ride. Iran wants to, and according to international law can, have a nuclear energy program, including enrichment and production, as long as it falls under the appropriate international controls and is not producing weapons.¶ It is no wonder that Iran wants this deal as badly as it seems. It is a way out of a very tricky and dangerous situation. Countries having the bomb never seem to get attacked, but those that give up their nuclear programs completely tend to end badly. Just ask Iraq and Libya. To avoid this fate, Iran has to back away from nuclear weapons while retaining a nuclear energy program.¶ The U.S. understands that this deal is a good step toward that end. A final deal will include a structure that precludes the ability to make a weapon, such as abandoning or altering the reactor at Arak, and closing the Fordow enrichment facility because it is basically immune from attack being under a mountain. But the whole deal doesn’t have to be done all at once.¶ All things considered, this deal with Iran is a good one for the world.¶ Technical Endnotes – Just a few technical clarifications since science rarely enters media coverage of nuclear issues, yet is extremely important. The original level of U-235 in the uranium ore, that is mined like any other ore, is 0.7% U-235. 5% U-235 is the level of enrichment for nuclear fuel for power reactors. Although some reactor designs can use anything from natural uranium to highly-enriched material, most power reactor fuel is between 3% and 5% enriched as is used in Iran’s Bushehr reactor, a reactor no one cares much about for this reason. You can’t make a bomb out of these materials. This is the basis for the first key provision of the deal.¶ And while discussions focus on 20% U-235 as sufficiently enriched to make an atomic weapon, that is only theoretically correct. No one has made a weapon from such lowly-enriched materials and no one ever will.¶ Enrichment needs to be >90% to make a reliable weapon. Reliability in this case is not like having a reliable flashlight. Reliable in this case means the atomic weapon will work when you want it to. It’s why there’s so much testing associated with a weapons program. If you’re going to make the fatal decision to field a nuke, it better work, and everyone knows it has to be over 90% U-235 to be really useful.¶ Finally, an atomic weapon is fission-based such as U-235 and Pu-239 whose nuclei split to change a bit of matter into a huge amount of energy. These are what was dropped during WWII, what Iran was working towards with U, and what North Korea has developed with Pu. In contrast, a nuclear weapon is fusion-based such as a hydrogen bomb, whose nuclei fuse to change a bit of matter into even more energy.

<h4>Prefer it --- all their ev is <u>rhetoric</h4><p></u><strong>Forbes 11/30 </strong>(The Iranian Nuclear Deal Is A Good One http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2013/11/30/the-iranian-nuclear-deal-is-a-good-one/ James Conca 11/30/13 </p><p>This Thanksgiving had an extra reason to be thankful – the <u><mark>new deal </mark>between Iran and six superpowers.</u> Last week, <u>the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China (the P5+1 group) reached an interim deal with Iran to <mark>stop their nuclear </mark>weapons</u> <u><mark>program. Four key provisions were obtained</u></mark> in this deal:¶ 1) <u><mark>no enrichment </mark>of U <mark>above 5% </mark>U-235</u>, and all highly-enriched materials, some as high as 20% U-235, must be blended down to less than 5% or altered to a form not usable for weapons.¶ 2<u>) <mark>no additional centrifuges</mark> are to be installed or produced</u>, and three-fourths of the centrifuges at Fordow and half of the centrifuges at Natanz will be inoperable,¶ 3) <u><mark>stop </mark>all work on the <mark>heavy-water reacto</mark>r at Arak</u>, <u>provide design details on the reactor</u> (which could be used to produce Pu for the other type of atomic weapon) <u>and do not develop the reprocessing facilities needed to separate Pu from used fuel,¶ </u>4) <u><mark>full access by IAEA inspectors to all </mark>nuclear <mark>facilities</u>, <u>including </mark>daily visitation to Natanz and Fordow, and <mark>continuous </mark>camera <mark>surveillance</mark> of key sites.¶ <mark>Despite</mark> all the <mark>rhetoric of</mark> <mark>horror </mark>and claims that this deal is a mistake, <mark>this deal is</mark> just what we all hoped for as <mark>the first step to resolving</mark> the <mark>Iranian nuclear </mark>weapons <mark>issue</u></mark>, the structure of which we’ve been proposing for years. <u><mark>It is the first step to bringing Iran into</mark> the world’s <mark>nuclear community as a partner</mark> instead of an adversary, </u>making Iran a compliant signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While this may make some of its neighbors nervous, there is no real alternative that does not involve lots of destruction and death.¶ Old orders are falling in the Middle East. The region is in upheaval, Shia and Sunni are as far apart as ever, and <u>Iran’s theocracy</u>, <u>embodied by their new President</u> Hassan Rouhani, <u>has decided that the cost/benefit of maintaining an expensive, useless nuclear program that is still a long way from producing a reliable weapon, while being starved by a barrage of sanctions, on the heels of a global economic meltdown, has now gone into the too-much-cost-and-not-enough-benefit category.¶ </u>Thus, <u>there is now an opening to change the game.¶</u> This deal is not about trust, as the last point above about access addresses. No one trusts governments, even supposedly good ones. There must be unfettered access to verify that the nuclear facilities are not being used to produce weapons and that is what this deal allows, and it will be easy to determine when Iran breaks this deal (The Economist; The Guardian; Fox News).¶ But the facilities can, and will, be used to support nuclear power, as was the original purpose of Iran’s nuclear program when the United States set it up under the Shah in the 1960s, and that is the actual end point of this whole deal. Not the end of Iran’s nuclear program or the destruction of their facilities, their country or their people.¶ <u>I’m not sure what the naysayers of this deal think the sanctions were suppose to do. <mark>The purpose of sanctions is to get a </mark>specific <mark>party to the </mark>negotiating <mark>table</mark>. Sanctions are not meant to destroy a nation, cause widespread poverty of its people and destruction of their economy, or topple governments.</u> The fear of these happening, not the reality of them, is what gets a government to the table.¶ <u><mark>As much as some leaders in Israel </mark>and Saudi Arabia <mark>want to use the U.S. </mark>to decapitate their nemesis, <mark>this is not the point</mark> of these talks</u>. And what happens here goes far beyond just Iran. <u>We need nuclear energy to spread around the world without proliferating weapons. How we handle Iran will determine the future of nuclear energy in many countries outside of the developed world, and we better get it right</u>. There will always be pressures to develop weapons and we need strategies and experience in diverting these programs away from weapons.¶ Besides, the art of diplomacy is the art of finding a win-win for all parties. It’s significant that the Obama Administration knows how to use diplomacy the way only the U.S. can. It is in both our and the world’s best interest, to find a solution that allows Iran nuclear energy without weapons.¶ <u><mark>All</mark> other <mark>rhetoric is posturing</mark>.</u> <u><mark>Isolation is the worst strategy</u></mark> <u>for bringing a country into the civil world’s fold</u>. Just look at North Korea. Rouhani has to move forward in a way that does not shame Iran. The celebration in Iran over this deal is a strong indication of the win-win nature of this deal, not the ridiculous charge of the opposition that the U.S. was taken for a ride. Iran wants to, and according to international law can, have a nuclear energy program, including enrichment and production, as long as it falls under the appropriate international controls and is not producing weapons.¶ It is no wonder that Iran wants this deal as badly as it seems. It is a way out of a very tricky and dangerous situation. Countries having the bomb never seem to get attacked, but those that give up their nuclear programs completely tend to end badly. Just ask Iraq and Libya. To avoid this fate, Iran has to back away from nuclear weapons while retaining a nuclear energy program.¶ The U.S. understands that this deal is a good step toward that end. A final deal will include a structure that precludes the ability to make a weapon, such as abandoning or altering the reactor at Arak, and closing the Fordow enrichment facility because it is basically immune from attack being under a mountain. But the whole deal doesn’t have to be done all at once.¶ All things considered, this deal with Iran is a good one for the world.¶ Technical Endnotes – Just a few technical clarifications since science rarely enters media coverage of nuclear issues, yet is extremely important. The original level of U-235 in the uranium ore, that is mined like any other ore, is 0.7% U-235. 5% U-235 is the level of enrichment for nuclear fuel for power reactors. Although some reactor designs can use anything from natural uranium to highly-enriched material, most power reactor fuel is between 3% and 5% enriched as is used in Iran’s Bushehr reactor, a reactor no one cares much about for this reason. You can’t make a bomb out of these materials. This is the basis for the first key provision of the deal.¶ <u>And while discussions focus on 20% U-235 as sufficiently enriched to make an atomic weapon, that is only theoretically correct.</u> <u>No one has made a weapon from such lowly-enriched materials and no one ever will.¶ </u>Enrichment needs to be >90% to make a reliable weapon. Reliability in this case is not like having a reliable flashlight. Reliable in this case means the atomic weapon will work when you want it to. It’s why there’s so much testing associated with a weapons program. If you’re going to make the fatal decision to field a nuke, it better work, and everyone knows it has to be over 90% U-235 to be really useful.¶ Finally<strong>, an atomic weapon is fission-based such as U-235 and Pu-239 whose nuclei split to change a bit of matter into a huge amount of energy. These are what was dropped during WWII, what Iran was working towards with U, and what North Korea has developed with Pu. In contrast, a nuclear weapon is fusion-based such as a hydrogen bomb, whose nuclei fuse to change a bit of matter into even more energy.</p></strong>

1NR

adv 1

A2: Causes Prolif

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

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Hurricanedebates2015

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Indiana Tally-Liu

Weil

Ban OG CP Politics - Iran (2NR) Security K Heg bad (2NR)

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round1.docx

KrAh

Dartmouth KrAh

Da.....

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Pi.....

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Dartmouth

Dartmouth

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Turns the environment—US militarism will destroys the biosphere even if every other issue were solved

Scipes 09

Kim Scipes, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Purdue University North Central in Westville, Indiana, 2009, http://countercurrents.org/scipes291209.htm

Sanders focuses on the environmental costs of militarism, particularly those from the US military. Sanders recognizes the incredible threat by greenhouse gases to the worlds’ peoples well-being and, in fact, to our very survival. Sanders also knows the environment is not just threatened by greenhouse gasses, but recognizes pollution of the water, air and soil as joining with greenhouse gases to imperil us all. Yet he makes an incredibly important point, trying to put things into perspective and to focus our attention: “… here’s the awful truth: even if every person, every automobile, and every factory suddenly emitted zero emissions, the Earth would still be headed head first and at full speed toward total disaster for one major reason. The [US] military—that voracious vampire—produces enough greenhouse gases, by itself, to place the entire globe, with all its inhabitants large and small, in the most immanent danger of extinction the United States military would then rank in fuel consumption with countries like Iran, Indonesia and Spain. Sanders further discusses the military’s impact on the environment. He talks about the impact of exploding bombs, cluster bombs, napalm, cannon rounds, depleted uranium, etc. He points out that the US military estimates they need about 1.5 billion rounds for their M-16 rifles a year. “Depleted uranium is essentially U-238, the isotope after the fissionable isotope, U-235, has been extracted from uranium ore.” DU has a half-life of 4.7 billion years. He continues: “… a good deal of the country of Iraq, both its deserts and cities, hums with radioactivity .” He sees the problem being not just the illegal and immoral wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. He sees the US military as being an essential part of the US Empire, along with the major multinational corporations. He sees the military as an institution as a threat to global environmental survival. politicians won’t address the problem; they are too incorporated in the US Empire the US military can continue to launch wars and continue killing people (including Americans) around the world, or we can end war, and devote resources to the well-being of people in this country and others around the world. The choice is our’s. But we also need to realize that if we let the US military continue on its path of continual war with its on-going quest for global domination, it will destroy all the humans, animals and vegetation on the planet. Your move, good people.

if every person automobile, and factory emitted zero emissions, the Earth would still be headed head full speed toward total disaster for one reason. The [US] military that vampire produces enough g h g by itself to place the entire globe in danger of extinction U S military would rank in fuel consumption with countries like Indonesia impact of exploding bombs, napalm, cannon rounds, depleted uranium, etc. Iraq, hums with radioactivity the US military can continue to kill people or we can end war, and devote resources to the well-being of people we need to realize if the US military continue on its path it will destroy all humans, animals and vegetation on the planet.

As a US military veteran—USMC, 1969-73, who turned around while on active duty—I have been incredibly frustrated at the impotence of the anti-war movement in the United States to stop the wars in particularly Iraq, Afghanistan and, increasingly, Pakistan. I am, obviously, not alone. Many other people—veterans, as well as many more civilians—also share this frustration. Barry Sanders’ new book, The Green Zone, takes a different angle than any I’ve seen before, and I believe it’s an approach I believe we all need to consider: Sanders focuses on the environmental costs of militarism, particularly those from the US military. Sanders recognizes the incredible threat by greenhouse gases to the worlds’ peoples well-being and, in fact, to our very survival. [Percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has risen from 280 parts per million (ppm) before the industrial revolution started in 1750 to where the latest readings are 392 ppm—should it reach 450, the accompanying temperature rise would lead to uncontrollable melting of the tundra across Russia and Canada, and the release of untold amounts of methane: methane has 20 times greater impact on the atmosphere than carbon dioxide. James Hansen of NASA believes we must go below 350 ppm to prevent serious environmental damage worldwide—KS.] Sanders also knows the environment is not just threatened by greenhouse gasses, but recognizes pollution of the water, air and soil as joining with greenhouse gases to imperil us all. Yet he makes an incredibly important point, trying to put things into perspective and to focus our attention: “… here’s the awful truth: even if every person, every automobile, and every factory suddenly emitted zero emissions, the Earth would still be headed head first and at full speed toward total disaster for one major reason. The [US] military—that voracious vampire—produces enough greenhouse gases, by itself, to place the entire globe, with all its inhabitants large and small, in the most immanent danger of extinction” (p, 22). To put it plain language, that social institution that is said to protect Americans is, in fact, hastening our very extermination along with all the other people of the planet. Sanders addresses the military’s affects on the environment in many ways. He starts off with trying to figure out how much (fossil) fuel the military uses, with their resulting greenhouse emissions there from. Despite diligent efforts, he cannot find out specific numbers, so he is forced to estimate. After carefully working through different categories, he comes to what he calls a conservative estimate of 1 million barrels of oil a day, which translates to almost 20 million gallons each and every day! He puts this number into international perspective: “If that indeed turns out to be the case, the United States military would then rank in fuel consumption with countries like Iran, Indonesia and Spain. It is truly an astonishing accomplishment, especially when one considers … that the military has only about 1.5 million troops on active duty, and Iran has a population of 66 million, Indonesia a whopping 235 million” (54) The cost, incidentally, is also quite high. He quotes a US Army General as estimating that the cost of this fuel averages $300 a gallon! (55) Yet, how does this contribute to global warming? He reports that the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that “each gallon of gasoline produces 19.4 pounds of CO 2” (carbon dioxide). If his estimate of 1 million barrels of oil a day is correct, he writes, “then the combined armed forces sends into the atmosphere about 400 million pounds of greenhouse gases a day, or 200,000 tons. That totals 146 billion pounds a year—or 73 million tons of carbon a year” (67-68). And that’s just regarding fuel use. Sanders further discusses the military’s impact on the environment. He talks about the impact of exploding bombs, cluster bombs, napalm, cannon rounds, depleted uranium, etc. He points out that the US military estimates they need about 1.5 billion rounds for their M-16 rifles a year. He talks about the impact of US military bases around the world, including in the Philippines and Puerto Rico. To me, the most sickening chapter was the one on depleted uranium or DU. He explains, “Depleted uranium is essentially U-238, the isotope after the fissionable isotope, U-235, has been extracted from uranium ore.” DU has a half-life of 4.7 billion years. He continues: “… a good deal of the country of Iraq, both its deserts and cities, hums with radioactivity. For since 1991, the US has been manufacturing ‘just about all [of its] bullets, tank shells, missiles, dumb bombs, smart bombs, and 500- and 2000-pound bombs, and everything else engineered to help our side in the war of Us against Them, [with] depleted uranium in it. Lots of depleted uranium. A single cruise missile, which weighs 3,000 pounds, carries within its casing 800 pounds of depleted uranium.’ Recall that the Air Force dropped 800 of these bombs in just the first two days of the war. The math: 800 bombs multiplied by 800 pounds of depleted uranium equal 640,000 pounds, or 320 tons of radioactive waste dumped on that country in just the first two days of devastation” (83). The impact is devastating. When DU hits something, it ignites, reaching temperatures between 3,000-5,000 degrees Celsius (5,432-9,032 degrees F). It goes through metal like a hot knife through butter, making it a superb military weapon. But is also releases radiation upon impact, poisoning all around it. Its tiny particles can be inhaled—people don’t have to touch irradiated materials. Thus, Iraqis are being poisoned by simply breathing the air! And, once inhaled, DU hardens, turning into insoluble pellets than cannot be excreted. DU poisoning is a literal death sentence. It not only kills, however, but it can damage human DNA—it’s the gift that keeps on giving, to generations and generations. Yet, radiation is an equal opportunity destroyer: it also poisons those in occupying armies. Evidence from the Gulf War I (“Desert Storm”) shows the impact on American troops. Sanders quotes Arthur Bernklau, who has extensively studied the problem: “Of the 580,400 soldiers who served in Gulf War I, 11,000 are now dead. By the year 2000, there were 325,000 on permanent medical disability. More than a decade later, more than half (56 percent) who served in Gulf War I have permanent medical problems.” Bernklau then points out that the disability rate for soldiers in Vietnam was 10 percent (87). Yet the impact is not just on Iraqis, or the soldiers who fought there. Sanders points out that, according to the London Sunday Times, radiation sensors in Britain reported a four-fold increase in airborne uranium just a few days after George W. Bush launched the March 19, 2003 attack on Iraq. That sounds bad enough, that the uranium can travel the approximately 2500 miles from Baghdad to London. But what Sanders does not note is that global weather does not travel east to west: it travels west to east. In other words, this uranium had to cross North America to get from Iraq to Britain! There is much more detailed information included in this small, highly accessible book. AK Press deserves our respect and support for publishing such a worthy volume: and this is one we each should purchase and urge others to do so as well. The biggest strength of this book is Sanders’ clarity: this man is, if you will permit, “on target.” He sees the problem being not just the illegal and immoral wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. He sees the US military as being an essential part of the US Empire, along with the major multinational corporations. He sees the military as an institution as a threat to global environmental survival. He recognizes that politicians won’t address the problem; they are too incorporated in the US Empire. It says it is up to us, individually and collectively, in the US (primarily) and together with people around the world. Basically, his argument is this: the US military can continue to launch wars and continue killing people (including Americans) around the world, or we can end war, and devote resources to the well-being of people in this country and others around the world. The choice is our’s. But we also need to realize that if we let the US military continue on its path of continual war with its on-going quest for global domination, it will destroy all the humans, animals and vegetation on the planet. Your move, good people.

<h4><strong>Turns the environment—US militarism will destroys the biosphere even if every other issue were solved</h4><p></strong> Kim <strong>Scipes</strong>, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Purdue University North Central in Westville, Indiana, 20<strong>09</strong>, http://countercurrents.org/scipes291209.htm </p><p>As a US military veteran—USMC, 1969-73, who turned around while on active duty—I have been incredibly frustrated at the impotence of the anti-war movement in the United States to stop the wars in particularly Iraq, Afghanistan and, increasingly, Pakistan. I am, obviously, not alone. Many other people—veterans, as well as many more civilians—also share this frustration. Barry Sanders’ new book, The Green Zone, takes a different angle than any I’ve seen before, and I believe it’s an approach I believe we all need to consider: <u>Sanders focuses on the environmental costs of militarism, particularly those from the US military. Sanders recognizes the incredible threat by greenhouse gases to the worlds’ peoples well-being and, in fact, to our very survival.</u> [Percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has risen from 280 parts per million (ppm) before the industrial revolution started in 1750 to where the latest readings are 392 ppm—should it reach 450, the accompanying temperature rise would lead to uncontrollable melting of the tundra across Russia and Canada, and the release of untold amounts of methane: methane has 20 times greater impact on the atmosphere than carbon dioxide. James Hansen of NASA believes we must go below 350 ppm to prevent serious environmental damage worldwide—KS.] <u>Sanders also knows the environment is not just threatened by greenhouse gasses, but recognizes pollution of the water, air and soil as joining with greenhouse gases to imperil us all. Yet he makes an incredibly important point, trying to put things into perspective and to focus our attention: “… here’s the awful truth: even <mark>if every person</mark>, every <mark>automobile, and</mark> every <mark>factory</mark> suddenly <mark>emitted zero emissions, the Earth would still be headed head</mark> first and at <mark>full speed toward total disaster for one</mark> major <mark>reason. The [US] military</mark>—<mark>that</mark> voracious <mark>vampire</mark>—<mark>produces enough g</mark>reen<mark>h</mark>ouse <mark>g</mark>ases, <mark>by itself</mark>, <mark>to place the entire globe</mark>, with all its inhabitants large and small, <mark>in</mark> the most immanent <mark>danger of extinction</u></mark>” (p, 22). To put it plain language, that social institution that is said to protect Americans is, in fact, hastening our very extermination along with all the other people of the planet. Sanders addresses the military’s affects on the environment in many ways. He starts off with trying to figure out how much (fossil) fuel the military uses, with their resulting greenhouse emissions there from. Despite diligent efforts, he cannot find out specific numbers, so he is forced to estimate. After carefully working through different categories, he comes to what he calls a conservative estimate of 1 million barrels of oil a day, which translates to almost 20 million gallons each and every day! He puts this number into international perspective: “If that indeed turns out to be the case, <u>the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>military</mark> <mark>would</mark> then <mark>rank in fuel consumption with countries like</mark> Iran, <mark>Indonesia</mark> and Spain.</u> It is truly an astonishing accomplishment, especially when one considers … that the military has only about 1.5 million troops on active duty, and Iran has a population of 66 million, Indonesia a whopping 235 million” (54) The cost, incidentally, is also quite high. He quotes a US Army General as estimating that the cost of this fuel averages $300 a gallon! (55) Yet, how does this contribute to global warming? He reports that the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that “each gallon of gasoline produces 19.4 pounds of CO 2” (carbon dioxide). If his estimate of 1 million barrels of oil a day is correct, he writes, “then the combined armed forces sends into the atmosphere about 400 million pounds of greenhouse gases a day, or 200,000 tons. That totals 146 billion pounds a year—or 73 million tons of carbon a year” (67-68). And that’s just regarding fuel use. <u>Sanders further discusses the military’s impact on the environment. He talks about the <mark>impact of exploding bombs,</mark> cluster bombs, <mark>napalm, cannon rounds, depleted uranium, etc.</mark> He points out that the US military estimates they need about 1.5 billion rounds for their M-16 rifles a year. </u>He talks about the impact of US military bases around the world, including in the Philippines and Puerto Rico. To me, the most sickening chapter was the one on depleted uranium or DU. He explains, <u>“Depleted uranium is essentially U-238, the isotope after the fissionable isotope, U-235, has been extracted from uranium ore.” DU has a half-life of 4.7 billion years. He continues: “… a good deal of the country of <mark>Iraq,</mark> both its deserts and cities, <mark>hums with radioactivity</u></mark>. For since 1991, the US has been manufacturing ‘just about all [of its] bullets, tank shells, missiles, dumb bombs, smart bombs, and 500- and 2000-pound bombs, and everything else engineered to help our side in the war of Us against Them, [with] depleted uranium in it. Lots of depleted uranium. A single cruise missile, which weighs 3,000 pounds, carries within its casing 800 pounds of depleted uranium.’ Recall that the Air Force dropped 800 of these bombs in just the first two days of the war. The math: 800 bombs multiplied by 800 pounds of depleted uranium equal 640,000 pounds, or 320 tons of radioactive waste dumped on that country in just the first two days of devastation” (83). The impact is devastating. When DU hits something, it ignites, reaching temperatures between 3,000-5,000 degrees Celsius (5,432-9,032 degrees F). It goes through metal like a hot knife through butter, making it a superb military weapon. But is also releases radiation upon impact, poisoning all around it. Its tiny particles can be inhaled—people don’t have to touch irradiated materials. Thus, Iraqis are being poisoned by simply breathing the air! And, once inhaled, DU hardens, turning into insoluble pellets than cannot be excreted. DU poisoning is a literal death sentence. It not only kills, however, but it can damage human DNA—it’s the gift that keeps on giving, to generations and generations. Yet, radiation is an equal opportunity destroyer: it also poisons those in occupying armies. Evidence from the Gulf War I (“Desert Storm”) shows the impact on American troops. Sanders quotes Arthur Bernklau, who has extensively studied the problem: “Of the 580,400 soldiers who served in Gulf War I, 11,000 are now dead. By the year 2000, there were 325,000 on permanent medical disability. More than a decade later, more than half (56 percent) who served in Gulf War I have permanent medical problems.” Bernklau then points out that the disability rate for soldiers in Vietnam was 10 percent (87). Yet the impact is not just on Iraqis, or the soldiers who fought there. Sanders points out that, according to the London Sunday Times, radiation sensors in Britain reported a four-fold increase in airborne uranium just a few days after George W. Bush launched the March 19, 2003 attack on Iraq. That sounds bad enough, that the uranium can travel the approximately 2500 miles from Baghdad to London. But what Sanders does not note is that global weather does not travel east to west: it travels west to east. In other words, this uranium had to cross North America to get from Iraq to Britain! There is much more detailed information included in this small, highly accessible book. AK Press deserves our respect and support for publishing such a worthy volume: and this is one we each should purchase and urge others to do so as well. The biggest strength of this book is Sanders’ clarity: this man is, if you will permit, “on target<u>.” He sees the problem being not just the illegal and immoral wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. He sees the US military as being an essential part of the US Empire, along with the major multinational corporations. He sees the military as an institution as a threat to global environmental survival.</u> He recognizes that <u>politicians won’t address the problem; they are too incorporated in the US Empire</u>. It says it is up to us, individually and collectively, in the US (primarily) and together with people around the world. Basically, his argument is this: <u><mark>the US military can continue to</mark> launch wars and continue <mark>kill</mark>ing <mark>people</mark> (including Americans) around the world, <mark>or we can end war, and devote resources to the well-being of people</mark> in this country and others around the world. The choice is our’s. But <mark>we</mark> also <mark>need</mark> <mark>to realize</mark> that <mark>if</mark> we let <mark>the US military continue on its path</mark> of continual war with its on-going quest for global domination, <mark>it will destroy all</mark> the <mark>humans, animals and vegetation on the planet.</mark> Your move<strong>, good people. </p></u></strong>

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Security K (2NR) SCOTUS MSD CP Politics - Iran T - Cadavers == nearly all Heg Bad

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrAh/Dartmouth-Kreus-Ahmad-Neg-Hurricanedebates2015-Round3.docx

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Deal stops prolif and iran strike

Stephens, 11/14/13

Stephens, 11/14/13 – columnist for the Financial Times (Phillip, Financial Times, “The four big truths that are shaping the Iran talks” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/af170df6-4d1c-11e3-bf32-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2kkvx15JT

Tehran’s acquisition of a bomb would set off a nuclear arms race that would see Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt signing up to the nuclear club The nuclear non-proliferation treaty would be shattered. A future regional conflict could draw Israel into launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike This is not a region susceptible to cold war disciplines of deterrence neither a negotiated settlement nor air strikes can offer the rest of the world a watertight insurance policy. It should be possible to construct a deal that acts as a plausible restraint – and extends the timeframe for any breakout The best the international community can hope for is that, in return for a relaxation of sanctions, Iran will make a judgment that it is better off sticking with a threshold capability if Tehran does step back from the nuclear brink it will be because of its own calculation of the balance of advantage Iran now has a leadership that, faced with the severe and growing pain inflicted by sanctions, is prepared to talk Geneva can be counted a modest success The Geneva talks illuminated the shape of an interim agreement. Iran will not surrender the right it asserts to uranium enrichment, but will lower the level of enrichment from 20 per cent to 3 or 4 per cent It will suspend work on its heavy water reactor in Arak

a bomb set off arms race that would sign up the nuclear club The n p t would be shattered A conflict could draw Israel into a strike a deal acts as a restraint – and extends timeframe The best is in return for relaxation of sanctions, Iran will make a judgment that it is better off with threshold capability because of its own calculation Iran has leadership that is prepared to talk Iran will not surrender , but lower enrichment

The first of these is that Tehran’s acquisition of a bomb would be more than dangerous for the Middle East and for wider international security. It would most likely set off a nuclear arms race that would see Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt signing up to the nuclear club. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty would be shattered. A future regional conflict could draw Israel into launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike. This is not a region obviously susceptible to cold war disciplines of deterrence. The second ineluctable reality is that Iran has mastered the nuclear cycle. How far it is from building a bomb remains a subject of debate. Different intelligence agencies give different answers. These depend in part on what the spooks actually know and in part on what their political masters want others to hear. The progress of an Iranian warhead programme is one of the known unknowns that have often wreaked havoc in this part of the world. Israel points to an imminent threat. European agencies are more relaxed, suggesting Tehran is still two years or so away from a weapon. Western diplomats broadly agree that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has not taken a definitive decision to step over the line. What Iran has been seeking is what diplomats call a breakout capability – the capacity to dash to a bomb before the international community could effectively mobilise against it. The third fact – and this one is hard for many to swallow – is that neither a negotiated settlement nor the air strikes long favoured by Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, can offer the rest of the world a watertight insurance policy. It should be possible to construct a deal that acts as a plausible restraint – and extends the timeframe for any breakout – but no amount of restrictions or intrusive monitoring can offer a certain guarantee against Tehran’s future intentions. By the same token, bombing Iran’s nuclear sites could certainly delay the programme, perhaps for a couple of years. But, assuming that even the hawkish Mr Netanyahu is not proposing permanent war against Iran, air strikes would not end it. You cannot bomb knowledge and technical expertise. To try would be to empower those in Tehran who say the regime will be safe only when, like North Korea, it has a weapon. So when Barack Obama says the US will never allow Iran to get the bomb he is indulging in, albeit understandable, wishful thinking. The best the international community can hope for is that, in return for a relaxation of sanctions, Iran will make a judgment that it is better off sticking with a threshold capability. To put this another way, if Tehran does step back from the nuclear brink it will be because of its own calculation of the balance of advantage. The fourth element in this dynamic is that Iran now has a leadership that, faced with the severe and growing pain inflicted by sanctions, is prepared to talk. There is nothing to say that Hassan Rouhani, the president, is any less hard-headed than previous Iranian leaders, but he does seem ready to weigh the options. Seen from this vantage point – and in spite of the inconclusive outcome – Geneva can be counted a modest success. Iran and the US broke the habit of more than 30 years and sat down to talk to each other. Know your enemy is a first rule of diplomacy – and of intelligence. John Kerry has his detractors but, unlike his predecessor Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state understands that serious diplomacy demands a willingness to take risks. The Geneva talks illuminated the shape of an interim agreement. Iran will not surrender the right it asserts to uranium enrichment, but will lower the level of enrichment from 20 per cent to 3 or 4 per cent. It will suspend work on its heavy water reactor in Arak – a potential source of plutonium – negotiate about the disposal of some of its existing stocks of enriched uranium, and accept intrusive international inspections. A debate between the six powers about the strength and credibility of such pledges is inevitable, as is an argument with Tehran about the speed and scope of a run down of sanctions.

<h4>Deal stops prolif and iran strike</h4><p><strong>Stephens, 11/14/13 </strong>– columnist for the Financial Times (Phillip, Financial Times, “The four big truths that are shaping the Iran talks” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/af170df6-4d1c-11e3-bf32-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2kkvx15JT</p><p>The first of these is that <u>Tehran’s acquisition of <mark>a bomb </mark>would</u> be more than dangerous for the Middle East and for wider international security. It would most likely <u><mark>set off </mark>a nuclear <mark>arms race</mark> <mark>that would </mark>see Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt <mark>sign</mark>ing <mark>up </mark>to <mark>the nuclear club</u></mark>. <u><mark>The</mark> nuclear <mark>n</mark>on-<mark>p</mark>roliferation <mark>t</mark>reaty <mark>would be shattered</mark>. <mark>A</mark> future regional <mark>conflict could draw Israel into </mark>launching <mark>a</mark> pre-emptive nuclear <mark>strike</u></mark>. <u>This is not a region </u>obviously <u>susceptible to cold war disciplines of deterrence</u>. The second ineluctable reality is that Iran has mastered the nuclear cycle. How far it is from building a bomb remains a subject of debate. Different intelligence agencies give different answers. These depend in part on what the spooks actually know and in part on what their political masters want others to hear. The progress of an Iranian warhead programme is one of the known unknowns that have often wreaked havoc in this part of the world. Israel points to an imminent threat. European agencies are more relaxed, suggesting Tehran is still two years or so away from a weapon. Western diplomats broadly agree that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has not taken a definitive decision to step over the line. What Iran has been seeking is what diplomats call a breakout capability – the capacity to dash to a bomb before the international community could effectively mobilise against it. The third fact – and this one is hard for many to swallow – is that <u>neither a negotiated settlement nor</u> the <u>air strikes</u> long favoured by Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, <u>can offer the rest of the world a watertight insurance policy. It should be possible to construct <mark>a deal </mark>that <mark>acts as a </mark>plausible <mark>restraint – and extends </mark>the <mark>timeframe </mark>for any breakout</u> – but no amount of restrictions or intrusive monitoring can offer a certain guarantee against Tehran’s future intentions. By the same token, bombing Iran’s nuclear sites could certainly delay the programme, perhaps for a couple of years. But, assuming that even the hawkish Mr Netanyahu is not proposing permanent war against Iran, air strikes would not end it. You cannot bomb knowledge and technical expertise. To try would be to empower those in Tehran who say the regime will be safe only when, like North Korea, it has a weapon. So when Barack Obama says the US will never allow Iran to get the bomb he is indulging in, albeit understandable, wishful thinking. <u><mark>The best </mark>the international community can hope for <mark>is</mark> that, <mark>in return for</mark> a <mark>relaxation of sanctions,</mark> <mark>Iran will make a judgment that it is better off </mark>sticking <mark>with</mark> a <mark>threshold capability</u></mark>. To put this another way, <u>if Tehran does step back from the nuclear brink it will be <mark>because of its own calculation</mark> of the balance of advantage</u>. The fourth element in this dynamic is that <u><mark>Iran</mark> now <mark>has</mark> a <mark>leadership that</mark>, faced with the severe and growing pain inflicted by sanctions, <mark>is prepared to talk</u></mark>. There is nothing to say that Hassan Rouhani, the president, is any less hard-headed than previous Iranian leaders, but he does seem ready to weigh the options. Seen from this vantage point – and in spite of the inconclusive outcome – <u>Geneva can be counted a modest success</u>. Iran and the US broke the habit of more than 30 years and sat down to talk to each other. Know your enemy is a first rule of diplomacy – and of intelligence. John Kerry has his detractors but, unlike his predecessor Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state understands that serious diplomacy demands a willingness to take risks. <u>The Geneva talks illuminated the shape of an interim agreement. <mark>Iran will not surrender</mark> the right it asserts to uranium enrichment<mark>, but </mark>will <mark>lower</mark> the level of <mark>enrichment</mark> from 20 per cent to 3 or 4 per cent</u>. <u>It will suspend work on its heavy water reactor in Arak</u> – a potential source of plutonium – negotiate about the disposal of some of its existing stocks of enriched uranium, and accept intrusive international inspections. A debate between the six powers about the strength and credibility of such pledges is inevitable, as is an argument with Tehran about the speed and scope of a run down of sanctions.</p>

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A2: Causes Prolif

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