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Lupovici votes neg—deterrence is culturally contingent and provokes conflict

Lupovici, 10

Lupovici, 10 – PhD, Department of International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, under the supervision of Professor Emanuel Adler. (Amir, Sept 7, 2010, The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Toward a New Research Agenda, Wiley)

deterrence is a textual field The language and discourse of deterrence includes rules and routines that allow for interpretation by a audience the discourse of deterrence represents this and constructs it the difficulty of translating the word “deterrence into different languages suggests concepts of deterrence are the outcome of a social process actors do not necessarily share the same notion of deterrence with their opponents while one actor declares that it aims to practice deterrence, the opponent may perceive it as a provocation discourse is part of the mechanism through which actors can become attached to their strategies Actors may act not only for strategic reasons, but also to (re)validate their identity as a deterrer actor this need to deter may enhance the practices of deterrence it aggravates the sense of insecurity and intensifies the need to use force (rather than to avoid violence social context is created through socialization and social constructions producing a discourse

deterrence is a textual field the difficulty of translating the word “deterrence into different languages suggests concepts of deterrence are the outcome of a social process actors do not necessarily share the same notion of deterrence with their opponents the opponent may perceive it as a provocation the practices of deterrence aggravates the sense of insecurity and intensifies the need to use force (rather than to avoid violence

It has been suggested that the discourse of deterrence is more than just a means of communication. As Jeonniemi argues, deterrence is a textual field. The language and discourse of deterrence includes rules and routines that allow for interpretation by a domestic and internal audience. In this manner, the discourse of deterrence both represents this practice and constructs it (Dillon 1989:97; Jeonniemi 1989:45; Dauber 1993; Gusterson 1996:2; see also Cohn 1987). The discourse of deterrence helps actors to better understand reality and better interpret their opponents’ actions. Moreover, while deterrence is self-evident in that it is used so widely in societies, this discourse as elaborated in theory and practice is affected by contemporary processes of learning, socialization, and social constructions. One of the fascinating facts about the language of deterrence is the difficulty of translating the word “deterrence” (and deter) into different languages (for example, French, German, Russian) (see Jukes 1975:484; Vigor 1975; Trofimenko 1980:53, note 29; Chilton 1985:104, 107–110).48 This suggests that concepts of deterrence are not the outcome of a neutral language but of a social process (Chilton 1985:116). The lack of this word in some languages demonstrates not only the difficulty of thinking in terms of deterrence, but the absence of a linguistic need for such a word. It is not merely that actors tend to see themselves as the defenders and their opponents as the aggressors (for example, Falk 1989:65; Lebow and Stein 1989:221, 223), but that actors do not necessarily share the same notion of deterrence with their opponents. In such cases, while one actor declares that it aims to practice deterrence, the opponent may perceive it as a provocation. Furthermore, because an actor’s identity depends upon discourse, discourse is also part of the mechanism through which actors can become attached to their strategies. By practicing the strategy of deterrence, actors shape their own and others’ perceptions of their role in the international arena. This constitutive effect, acknowledged to some extent by scholars (Wendt 1999:358–359; Bially-Mattern 2005:22–23; see also Tannenwald 2007:45–46), is closely related to the concept of role identity.49 Actors may thus act not only for strategic reasons, but also to (re)validate their identity (that is, as a deterrer actor). In some cases, this need to deter may enhance the practices of deterrence; however, in other cases, it aggravates the sense of insecurity and intensifies the need to use force (rather than to avoid violence).50 To sum up this section, social context is created through learning, socialization, and social constructions, producing a discourse and even constituting the actors themselves. Acknowledging the importance of this context allows us to better establish the connections between the strategy of deterrence and the avoidance of violence, and helps to clarify and explain contradictions in deterrence research. It also provides scholars with a richer framework through which to understand how deterrent threats may influence the behavior of actors.

<h4>Lupovici votes neg—deterrence is culturally contingent and provokes conflict</h4><p><strong>Lupovici, 10</strong> – PhD, Department of International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, under the supervision of Professor Emanuel Adler. (Amir, Sept 7, 2010, The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Toward a New Research Agenda, Wiley)</p><p>It has been suggested that the discourse of deterrence is more than just a means of communication. As Jeonniemi argues, <u><mark>deterrence is a textual field</u></mark>. <u>The language and discourse of deterrence includes rules and routines that allow for interpretation by a</u> domestic and internal <u>audience</u>. In this manner, <u>the discourse of deterrence</u> both <u>represents this</u> practice <u>and constructs it</u> (Dillon 1989:97; Jeonniemi 1989:45; Dauber 1993; Gusterson 1996:2; see also Cohn 1987). The discourse of deterrence helps actors to better understand reality and better interpret their opponents’ actions. Moreover, while deterrence is self-evident in that it is used so widely in societies, this discourse as elaborated in theory and practice is affected by contemporary processes of learning, socialization, and social constructions. One of the fascinating facts about the language of deterrence is <u><mark>the difficulty of translating the word “deterrence</u></mark>” (and deter) <u><mark>into different languages</u></mark> (for example, French, German, Russian) (see Jukes 1975:484; Vigor 1975; Trofimenko 1980:53, note 29; Chilton 1985:104, 107–110).48 This <u><mark>suggests</u></mark> that <u><mark>concepts of deterrence are</mark> </u>not<u> <mark>the outcome of</mark> </u>a neutral language but of<u> <mark>a social process</u></mark> (Chilton 1985:116). The lack of this word in some languages demonstrates not only the difficulty of thinking in terms of deterrence, but the absence of a linguistic need for such a word. It is not merely that actors tend to see themselves as the defenders and their opponents as the aggressors (for example, Falk 1989:65; Lebow and Stein 1989:221, 223), but that <u><mark>actors do not necessarily share the same notion of deterrence with their opponents</u></mark>. In such cases, <u>while one actor declares that it aims to practice deterrence, <mark>the opponent may perceive it as a provocation</u></mark>. Furthermore, because an actor’s identity depends upon discourse, <u>discourse is</u> also <u>part of the mechanism through which actors can become attached to their strategies</u>. By practicing the strategy of deterrence, actors shape their own and others’ perceptions of their role in the international arena. This constitutive effect, acknowledged to some extent by scholars (Wendt 1999:358–359; Bially-Mattern 2005:22–23; see also Tannenwald 2007:45–46), is closely related to the concept of role identity.49 <u>Actors may</u> thus <u>act not only for strategic reasons, but also to (re)validate their identity</u> (that is, <u>as a deterrer actor</u>). In some cases, <u>this need to deter may enhance <mark>the practices of deterrence</u></mark>; however, in other cases, <u>it <strong><mark>aggravates the sense of insecurity</strong> and <strong>intensifies the need to use force (rather than to avoid violence</u></strong></mark>).50 To sum up this section, <u>social context is created through</u> learning, <u>socialization</u>, <u>and social constructions</u>, <u>producing a discourse</u> and even constituting the actors themselves. Acknowledging the importance of this context allows us to better establish the connections between the strategy of deterrence and the avoidance of violence, and helps to clarify and explain contradictions in deterrence research. It also provides scholars with a richer framework through which to understand how deterrent threats may influence the behavior of actors. </p>

Block

AT: Empirics

AT: Lupovici

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Wake Forest Nasar-Raudenbush

Ridley

1AC OG (WTO Banks) 1NC Security K

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We affirm the legalization of suicide within the generative context of a symbolic reorientation of death

<h4>We affirm the legalization of suicide within the generative context of a symbolic reorientation of death</h4>

Off

CP

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Florida Cone-Marchini

Corrigan

1AC PAS Biopower 1NC Foucault K Physician PIC Ableism Turns 2NR Ableism

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Our alternative is to vote negative to refuse to participate in activities which support capitalism. We must hollow out capitalist structures by refusing to invest our energy in reforms and rescue operations

Herod 2004

Herod 2004

) destroying capitalism calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. capitalist structures are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support the capitalist world In this way our new democratic , non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a , realistic strategy Our new social world must grow in opposition until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. It will happen because we want it to Capitalism must be explicitly refused . This constitutes War a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life

destroying capitalism calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization emptying out capitalist structures draining meaning out of them We stop participating in activities that support the capitalist world This is a realistic strategy Our new social world must grow in opposition to capitalist relations This constitutes a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life,

(James, Getting Free, http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm) It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we’re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can’t simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It’s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods.

<h4><strong>Our alternative is to vote negative to refuse to participate in activities which support capitalism. We must hollow out capitalist structures by refusing to invest our energy in reforms and rescue operations</h4><p>Herod 2004</p><p></strong>(James, Getting Free, http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm<u>)</p><p></u>   It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for <u><strong><mark>destroying capitalism</u></strong></mark>. This strategy, at its most basic, <u><strong><mark>calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization</u></strong></mark> and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one <u><strong>of <mark>emptying out capitalist structures</mark>, hollowing them out, by <mark>draining</mark> wealth, power, and <mark>meaning out of them</mark> until there is nothing left but shells.</p><p>      This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want.</p><p></u></strong>      Thus <u><strong>capitalist structures</u></strong> (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) <u><strong>are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. <mark>We stop participating in activities that support</u></strong></mark> (finance, condone) <u><strong><mark>the capitalist world</u></strong></mark> and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations. <u><strong>In this way our new democratic</u></strong>, non-hierarchical<u><strong>, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence.</p><p></u></strong>      <u><strong>This is how it has to be done. <mark>This is a</u></strong></mark> plausible<u><strong>, <mark>realistic strategy</u></strong></mark>. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. <u><strong><mark>Our new social world must grow</u></strong></mark> within the old, and <u><strong><mark>in opposition</u></strong></mark> to it, <u><strong>until it is strong enough <mark>to</mark> dismantle and abolish <mark>capitalist relations</mark>.</u></strong> Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. <u><strong>It will happen</u></strong>, and only happen, <u><strong>because we want it to</u></strong>, and because we know what we’re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs.</p><p>      But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can’t simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). <u><strong>Capitalism must be explicitly refused</u></strong> and replaced by something else<u><strong>. <mark>This constitutes</mark> War</u></strong>, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but <u><strong><mark>a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life</u></strong>,</mark> by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly.</p><p>      We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work.</p><p>      It’s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods.</p>

Cap

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Gonzaga Skoog-Weinhardt

Allen

1AC - PAS (pain) 1NC - Cap Physicians PIC Politics 2NR - Politics

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We legalize sales, not purchases – their turns don’t apply

Gill 2

Gill 2 Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45

/v012/12.1gill.html it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation; We assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market. A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die. Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate The important point is that our proposal will not be affected either way. our proposal can be reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well.

are not arguing that it ought to be legal to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that buyers be the agencies in charge of procurement allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria not an unregulated market the purchase of kidneys, is a separate question. Many arguments against legalizing the purchase do not apply to the sale . , one argument against permitting buying kidneys is that it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that have no supporting evidence. our proposal will increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one

Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal/v012/12.1gill.html First, we are arguing for the claim that it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We are not arguing that it ought to be legal for a potential recipient to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that the buyers of kidneys be the agencies in charge of kidney procurement or transplantation; that is, we propose that such agencies should be allowed to use financial incentives to acquire kidneys. We assume that allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs. Kidneys will not be traded in an unregulated market. 2 A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products, but one's chances of receiving blood are distinct from one's financial status. We further note that transplant recipients or their agents—e.g., insurance companies, Medicaid—pay for organs now, compensating the organ procurement organization that organizes the organ retrieval, the surgeon who removes the organ, the hospital where the organ is procured, and so forth. The only component of the organ procurement process not currently paid is the most critical component, the possessor of the kidney, who is sine qua non for organ availability. Second, we believe the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die. We base this belief on two views that seem to us very plausible: first, that financial incentives will induce some people to give up a kidney for transplantation who would otherwise not have done so; and second, that the existence of financial incentives will not decrease significantly the current level of live kidney donations. The first view seems to us to follow from the basic idea that people are more likely to do something if they are going to get paid for it. The second view seems to us to follow from the fact that a very large majority of live kidney donations occur between family members and the idea that the motivation of a sister who donates a kidney to a brother, or a parent who donates a kidney to a child, will not be altered by the existence of financial incentives. Although we think these views are plausible, we acknowledge that there is no clear evidence that they are true. If subsequent research were to establish that the legalization of kidney sales would lead to a decrease in the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year, some of the arguments we make would be substantially weakened. 3 Third, we are arguing for allowing payment to living kidney donors, but many of the kidneys available for transplantation come from cadavers. [End Page 19] We believe that payment for cadaveric organs also ought to be legalized, but we will not discuss that issue here. If we successfully make the case for allowing payment to living donors, the case for payment for cadaveric kidneys should follow easily. The Prima Facie Case for Kidney Sales With these preliminary points in mind, we will proceed to the initial argument for permitting payment for kidneys. 4 This argument is based on two claims: the "good donor claim" and the "sale of tissue claim." The good donor claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for a living person to donate one of his or her kidneys to someone else who needs a kidney in order to survive. These donations typically consist of someone giving a kidney to a sibling, spouse, or child, but there are also cases of individuals donating to strangers. Such donations account for about half of all kidney transplants. 5 Our society, moreover, does not simply allow such live kidney donations. Rather, we actively praise and encourage them. 6 We typically take them to be morally unproblematic cases of saving a human life. The sale of tissue claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for living persons to sell parts of their bodies. We can sell such tissues as hair, sperm, and eggs, but the body parts we focus on here are blood products. A kidney is more like blood products than other tissues because both are physical necessities: people need them in order to survive. Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys. We do not typically praise people who sell their plasma as we do people who donate a kidney to save the life of a sibling. At the same time, most people do not brand commercial blood banks as moral abominations. We generally take them to be an acceptable means of acquiring a resource that is needed to save lives. 7 It is doubtful, for instance, that there would be widespread support for the abolition of payment for plasma if the result were a reduction in supply so severe that thousands of people died every year for lack of blood products. If both the good donor claim and the sale of tissue claim are true, we have at least an initial argument, or prima facie grounds, for holding that payment for kidneys ought to be legal. The good donor claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or [End Page 20] her kidneys to someone else, while the sale of tissue claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer part of his or her body to someone else for money. It thus seems initially plausible to hold that the two claims together imply that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or her kidneys to someone else for money. Of course, there seems to be an obvious difference between donating a kidney and selling one: motive. Those who donate typically are motivated by benevolence or altruism, while those who sell typically are motivated by monetary self-interest. 8 The sale of tissue claim suggests, however, that this difference on its own is irrelevant to the question of whether kidney sales ought to be legal, because the sale of tissue claim establishes that it ought to be legal to transfer a body part in order to make money. If donating a kidney ought to be legal (the good donor claim), and if the only difference between donating a kidney and selling one is the motive of monetary self-interest, and if the motive of monetary self-interest does not on its own warrant legal prohibition (the sale of tissue claim), then the morally relevant part of the analogy between donating and selling should still obtain and we still have grounds for holding that selling kidneys ought to be legal. There is also an obvious difference between selling a kidney and selling plasma: the invasiveness of the procedure. Phlebotomy for sale of plasma is simple and quick, with no lasting side effects, while parting with a kidney involves major surgery and living with only one kidney thereafter. It is very unlikely, however, that there will be any long-term ill effects from the surgery itself or from life with a single kidney. 9 Indeed, the laws allowing live kidney donations presuppose that the risk to donors is very small and thus morally acceptable. The good donor claim implies, then, that the invasiveness of the procedure of transferring a kidney is not in and of itself a sufficient reason to legally prohibit live kidney transfer. If the only difference between selling plasma and selling a kidney is the risk of the procedure, and if that risk does not constitute grounds for prohibiting live kidney transfers, then the morally relevant part of the analogy between selling plasma and selling a kidney still should obtain and we still have grounds for holding that kidney sales ought to be legal. The point of the preceding two paragraphs is this: if we oppose the sale of kidneys because we think it is too dangerous, then we also should oppose live kidney donations. But we do not oppose live kidney donations because we realize that the risks are acceptably low and worth taking [End Page 21] in order to save lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because of the possible dangers while at the same time endorsing the good donor claim. Similarly, if we oppose kidney sales because we think people should not sell body parts, then we should also oppose commercial blood banks. But most people do not oppose blood banks because they realize that the banks play an important role in saving lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because it involves payment while at the same time endorsing the sale of tissue claim. 10 The considerable emotional resistance to permitting kidney sales may be based on a combination of distaste for payment and worry about risk. But if neither of these concerns on its own constitutes defensible grounds for opposing payment, then it seems unlikely that the two of them together will do so. This initial argument does not imply that we should legalize the sale of hearts and livers. The initial argument holds only that, if it is medically safe for living people to donate an organ, then people should also be allowed to sell that organ. But it is not medically safe for a living person to donate his or her heart or liver. Our reliance on the good donor claim does, however, commit us to the idea that if it is morally correct to allow someone to donate an organ or part of an organ, then it is morally correct to allow someone to sell that organ or organ part. If, therefore, it is morally correct to allow people to donate liver lobes and parts of lungs, then, according to our initial argument, it ought to be legal for a person to sell a liver lobe or part of a lung as well. Our proposal does not address the purchase of kidneys, which is a separate question. Many of the arguments against legalizing the purchase of kidneys do not apply to the sale of kidneys. For example, one argument against permitting the buying of kidneys is that it will lead to fewer kidneys for transplantation overall. Another argument is that while allowing individuals to purchase kidneys might not reduce the overall number of kidneys available for transplantation, it will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford to buy a kidney. Both arguments rest on empirical claims that are often stated as fact, yet have no supporting evidence. Even if the empirical claims were accurate, moreover, their moral importance could be disputed. Perhaps there are powerful moral reasons to legalize the buying of organs even if doing so leads to fewer organs overall or reduces the chances of a poor person's receiving a kidney transplant. Then again, perhaps a negative effect on the overall supply of kidneys or on the transplantation prospects [End Page 22] for the poor will turn out to be a conclusive reason not to legalize the buying of kidneys. The important point is that our proposal will not be affected either way. As already noted in our preliminary points, our proposal can be reasonably expected both to increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and to increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well.

<h4>We legalize sales, not purchases – their turns don’t apply</h4><p><strong>Gill 2</strong> Michael Gill, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, College of Charleston AND Robert Sade, M.D.,Professor in the Department of Surgery and Director of the Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 17-45</p><p>Paying for Kidneys: The Case against Prohibition http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/kennedy_institute_ of_ethics_journal<u>/v012/12.1gill.html</p><p></u>First, we are arguing for the claim that<u> it ought to be legal for a person to be paid for one of his or her kidneys. We <mark>are not arguing that it ought to be legal </mark>for a potential recipient <mark>to buy a kidney in an open market. We propose that </mark>the <mark>buyers </mark>of kidneys <mark>be the agencies in charge of </mark>kidney <mark>procurement </mark>or transplantation; </u>that is, we propose that such agencies should be allowed to use financial incentives to acquire kidneys. <u>We assume that <mark>allocation of kidneys will be based on medical criteria</mark>, as in the existing allocation system for cadaveric organs. Kidneys will <mark>not </mark>be traded in <mark>an unregulated market</mark>.</u> 2 <u>A similar system is currently in place for blood products: a person can receive money for providing blood products</u>, but one's chances of receiving blood are distinct from one's financial status. We further note that transplant recipients or their agents—e.g., insurance companies, Medicaid—pay for organs now, compensating the organ procurement organization that organizes the organ retrieval, the surgeon who removes the organ, the hospital where the organ is procured, and so forth. The only component of the organ procurement process not currently paid is the most critical component, the possessor of the kidney, who is sine qua non for organ availability. Second, we believe <u>the legalization of kidney sales will increase the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year and thus save the lives of people who would otherwise die.</u> We base this belief on two views that seem to us very plausible: first, that financial incentives will induce some people to give up a kidney for transplantation who would otherwise not have done so; and second, that the existence of financial incentives will not decrease significantly the current level of live kidney donations. The first view seems to us to follow from the basic idea that people are more likely to do something if they are going to get paid for it. The second view seems to us to follow from the fact that a very large majority of live kidney donations occur between family members and the idea that the motivation of a sister who donates a kidney to a brother, or a parent who donates a kidney to a child, will not be altered by the existence of financial incentives. Although we think these views are plausible, we acknowledge that there is no clear evidence that they are true. If subsequent research were to establish that the legalization of kidney sales would lead to a decrease in the number of kidneys that are transplanted each year, some of the arguments we make would be substantially weakened. 3 Third, we are arguing for allowing payment to living kidney donors, but many of the kidneys available for transplantation come from cadavers. [End Page 19] We believe that payment for cadaveric organs also ought to be legalized, but we will not discuss that issue here. If we successfully make the case for allowing payment to living donors, the case for payment for cadaveric kidneys should follow easily. The Prima Facie Case for Kidney Sales With these preliminary points in mind, we will proceed to the initial argument for permitting payment for kidneys. 4 This argument is based on two claims: the "good donor claim" and the "sale of tissue claim." The good donor claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for a living person to donate one of his or her kidneys to someone else who needs a kidney in order to survive. These donations typically consist of someone giving a kidney to a sibling, spouse, or child, but there are also cases of individuals donating to strangers. Such donations account for about half of all kidney transplants. 5 Our society, moreover, does not simply allow such live kidney donations. Rather, we actively praise and encourage them. 6 We typically take them to be morally unproblematic cases of saving a human life. The sale of tissue claim contends that it is and ought to be legal for living persons to sell parts of their bodies. We can sell such tissues as hair, sperm, and eggs, but the body parts we focus on here are blood products. A kidney is more like blood products than other tissues because both are physical necessities: people need them in order to survive. <u>Our proposed kidney sales are more like the sale of blood products in that both involve the market only in acquisition and not in allocation: the current system pays people for plasma while continuing to distribute blood products without regard to patients' economic status, just as we propose for kidneys</u>. We do not typically praise people who sell their plasma as we do people who donate a kidney to save the life of a sibling. At the same time, most people do not brand commercial blood banks as moral abominations. We generally take them to be an acceptable means of acquiring a resource that is needed to save lives. 7 It is doubtful, for instance, that there would be widespread support for the abolition of payment for plasma if the result were a reduction in supply so severe that thousands of people died every year for lack of blood products. If both the good donor claim and the sale of tissue claim are true, we have at least an initial argument, or prima facie grounds, for holding that payment for kidneys ought to be legal. The good donor claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or [End Page 20] her kidneys to someone else, while the sale of tissue claim implies that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer part of his or her body to someone else for money. It thus seems initially plausible to hold that the two claims together imply that it ought to be legal for a living person to decide to transfer one of his or her kidneys to someone else for money. Of course, there seems to be an obvious difference between donating a kidney and selling one: motive. Those who donate typically are motivated by benevolence or altruism, while those who sell typically are motivated by monetary self-interest. 8 The sale of tissue claim suggests, however, that this difference on its own is irrelevant to the question of whether kidney sales ought to be legal, because the sale of tissue claim establishes that it ought to be legal to transfer a body part in order to make money. If donating a kidney ought to be legal (the good donor claim), and if the only difference between donating a kidney and selling one is the motive of monetary self-interest, and if the motive of monetary self-interest does not on its own warrant legal prohibition (the sale of tissue claim), then the morally relevant part of the analogy between donating and selling should still obtain and we still have grounds for holding that selling kidneys ought to be legal. There is also an obvious difference between selling a kidney and selling plasma: the invasiveness of the procedure. Phlebotomy for sale of plasma is simple and quick, with no lasting side effects, while parting with a kidney involves major surgery and living with only one kidney thereafter. It is very unlikely, however, that there will be any long-term ill effects from the surgery itself or from life with a single kidney. 9 Indeed, the laws allowing live kidney donations presuppose that the risk to donors is very small and thus morally acceptable. The good donor claim implies, then, that the invasiveness of the procedure of transferring a kidney is not in and of itself a sufficient reason to legally prohibit live kidney transfer. If the only difference between selling plasma and selling a kidney is the risk of the procedure, and if that risk does not constitute grounds for prohibiting live kidney transfers, then the morally relevant part of the analogy between selling plasma and selling a kidney still should obtain and we still have grounds for holding that kidney sales ought to be legal. The point of the preceding two paragraphs is this: if we oppose the sale of kidneys because we think it is too dangerous, then we also should oppose live kidney donations. But we do not oppose live kidney donations because we realize that the risks are acceptably low and worth taking [End Page 21] in order to save lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because of the possible dangers while at the same time endorsing the good donor claim. Similarly, if we oppose kidney sales because we think people should not sell body parts, then we should also oppose commercial blood banks. But most people do not oppose blood banks because they realize that the banks play an important role in saving lives. So, it is inconsistent to oppose selling kidneys because it involves payment while at the same time endorsing the sale of tissue claim. 10 The considerable emotional resistance to permitting kidney sales may be based on a combination of distaste for payment and worry about risk. But if neither of these concerns on its own constitutes defensible grounds for opposing payment, then it seems unlikely that the two of them together will do so. This initial argument does not imply that we should legalize the sale of hearts and livers. The initial argument holds only that, if it is medically safe for living people to donate an organ, then people should also be allowed to sell that organ. But it is not medically safe for a living person to donate his or her heart or liver. Our reliance on the good donor claim does, however, commit us to the idea that if it is morally correct to allow someone to donate an organ or part of an organ, then it is morally correct to allow someone to sell that organ or organ part. If, therefore, it is morally correct to allow people to donate liver lobes and parts of lungs, then, according to our initial argument, it ought to be legal for a person to sell a liver lobe or part of a lung as well. <u>Our proposal does not address <mark>the purchase of kidneys, </mark>which <mark>is a separate question. Many </mark>of the <mark>arguments against legalizing the purchase </mark>of kidneys <mark>do not apply to the sale </mark>of kidneys<mark>.</u> <u></mark>For example<mark>, one argument against permitting </mark>the <mark>buying </mark>of <mark>kidneys is that it</u></mark> will lead to fewer kidneys for transplantation overall. Another argument is that while allowing individuals to purchase kidneys might not reduce the overall number of kidneys available for transplantation, it <u><mark>will reduce the number of donated kidneys and harm the poor who will not be able to afford </mark>to buy <mark>a kidney.</u> <u>Both arguments rest on empirical claims that </mark>are often stated as fact, yet<mark> have no supporting evidence. </mark>Even if the empirical claims were accurate</u>, moreover, their moral importance could be disputed. Perhaps there are powerful moral reasons to legalize the buying of organs even if doing so leads to fewer organs overall or reduces the chances of a poor person's receiving a kidney transplant. Then again, perhaps a negative effect on the overall supply of kidneys or on the transplantation prospects [End Page 22] for the poor will turn out to be a conclusive reason not to legalize the buying of kidneys. <u>The important point is that <mark>our proposal will </mark>not be affected either way.</u> As already noted in our preliminary points, <u>our proposal can be reasonably expected both to<mark> increase the overall number of kidneys for transplantation and </mark>to <mark>increase the chances that a poor person who needs a kidney will receive one</mark>. Therefore, in arguing for the legalization of kidney sales, we put aside the separate question of whether buying kidneys ought to be legal as well. </p></u>

Contention 3 The Plan solves

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A

Ndt

3

Gonzaga Newton-Spraker

Deming, Gramzinski, Susko

1AC - Organs (Shortages Illegal Markets) 1NC - T-Sales Property Rights DA TPA DA Tax Incentives CP 2NC - CP Case 1NR - Property Rights DA 2NR - DA Case

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx

KrMa

Dartmouth KrMa

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NDT/CEDA 2014-15

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Claimed inevitability is the worst act of closure – alternative discourse is key and empirically solves

Kraig 02 – Robert Alexander is Wisconsin state political director for Service Employees International Union (SEIU). He is also an instructor in the Communication Department at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Rhetoric & Public Affairs 5.1 1-30

Given the claimed inevitability of realism's description one might think that nations need not look to expert guidance realist/idealist dichotomy dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who dare to consider transcending or transforming established patterns It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be rationally and objectively established The science This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved , is fate Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations. World leaders are actively encouraged to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement. . Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated imparted through the back door. It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description. matter of first principles denies all others alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences amateurs. no standing in debate those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate determinism of political realism, even though it is grounded in human social nature, is antihumanist democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity is self-determining. Society as social contract is a joint project which, over time, is subject to dialectical improvement beyond the power of humans to mediate ] face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism symbolic ammunition What is needed is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric. It must be said, in the strongest possible terms, that realism engenders an attitude of cynicism and fatalism in those who would otherwise engage the great moral and political questions of our age. History is replete with ideals that, matured into new social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance on a mass scale and socially active government were empirical impossibilities. However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, they suggest the power of ideals and the possibility of human social transformation. On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself. The surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so.

Given claimed inevitability of realism one might think nations need not look to expert guidance realist dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who consider transcending established patterns Tremendous suffering can be rationalized away as the product of the impersonal system of power leaders are encouraged to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of politics realists deny these questions can be debated determinism of realism is antihumanist democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity i self-determining. Society as social contract which is subject to dialectical improvement What is needed is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric. that realism engenders cynicism and fatalism in those who would engage moral questions History is replete with ideals that matured into social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance and socially active government were impossibilities. they suggest possibility of human social transformation surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so.

Given the claimed inevitability of realism's description of international politics, one might think that nations need not look to expert guidance because power interests will inevitably determine governmental policy. But the realists, while embracing determinism, simultaneously argue that human nature is repeatedly violated. One traditional claim has been that America, because of its unique history, has been ever in danger of ignoring the dictates of the foreign policy scene. This argument is offered by Henry Kissinger in his avowedly Morgenthauian work Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. 21 Realists also argue that there are idealists in all human societies who refuse to see the reality of power. As Richard W. Cottam, a trenchant critic of orthodox realism, explained the argument: "Every era has its incorrigible idealists who persist in seeing evil man as good. When they somehow gain power and seek to put their ideas into effect, Machiavellians who understand man's true nature appear and are more than willing and more than capable of exploiting this eternal naivete." 22 Cottam was referring to one of the central ideological constructs of international relations theory—the realist/idealist dichotomy. First explicated in detail by Morgenthau in his Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 23 this dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who dare to consider transcending or transforming established patterns of global competition. This construct is enriched by the narratives of failed idealists—most prominently Tsar Alexander the First, Woodrow Wilson, Neville Chamberlain, and Jimmy Carter—men who, despite and in fact because of their good intentions, caused untold human suffering. After World War II, realists built their conception of leadership on a negative caricature of Woodrow Wilson. 24 As George Kennan, one of the primary architects of Cold War policy, warned in 1945: "If we insist at this moment in our history in wandering about with our heads in the clouds of Wilsonean idealism . . . we run the risk of losing even that bare minimum of security which would be assured to us by the maintenance of humane, stable, and cooperative forms of society on the immediate European shores of the Atlantic." 25 Wilson's supposed idealism was said by the emerging realist scholars to have led to the unstable international political structure that caused World War II [End Page 6] and now threatened the postwar balance of forces. Despite convincing refutations by the leading historians of Wilson's presidency, most recently John Milton Cooper Jr. in his definitive study of the League of Nations controversy, realists continue to caricature Wilson as a fuzzy-headed idealist. 26 Idealists, in realist writings, all share a fatal flaw: an inability to comprehend the realities of power. They live in a world of unreality, responding to nonexistent scenes. As Riker put it, "Unquestionably, there are guilt-ridden and shame-conscious men who do not desire to win, who in fact desire to lose. These are irrational ones in politics." 27 It is here that the realist expert comes in. It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be rationally and objectively established. According to Kissinger, a theorist who later became a leading practitioner, "it is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy." The science of international relations claims the capacity to chart the foreign policy scene and then establish the ends and means of national policy. This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics. Realism's scenic character makes it a radically empirical science. As Morgenthau put it, the political realist "believes in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgement." Avowedly modernist in orientation, realism claims to be rooted not in a theory of how international relations ought to work, but in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment. 28 In its orthodox form political realism assumes that international politics are and must be dominated by the will to power. Moral aspirations in the international arena are merely protective coloration and propaganda or the illusions that move hopeless idealists. What is most revealing about this assessment of human nature is not its negativity but its fatalism. There is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility. Like environmental determinism—most notably the social darwinism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—political realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved upon. From the stationary perspective of social scientific realism in its pure form, the fatal environment of human social interaction can be navigated but not conquered. Description, in other words, is fate. All who dare to challenge the order—Carter's transgression—will do much more damage than good. The idealist makes a bad situation much worse by imagining a better world in the face of immutable realities. As one popular saying among foreign policy practitioners goes: "Without vision, men die. With it, more men die." 70 (continued) The implications of this social philosophy are stark. Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations. World leaders are actively encouraged by the realists to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement. This deliberate limitation of interest excuses leaders from making hard moral choices. While a moralist Protestant like Jimmy Carter sees history as a progressive moral struggle to realize abstract ideals in the world, the realist believes that it is dangerous to struggle against the inexorable. The moral ambiguities of political and social ethics that have dogged philosophy and statesmanship time out of mind are simply written out of the equation. Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true. The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated. First, realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself. There is exceedingly narrow ground, particularly in the technical vocabulary of the social sciences, for discussing the moral potential of humanity or the limitations of human action. Yet, as we have seen in the tragedy of Jimmy Carter, a philosophical perspective on these very questions is imparted through the back door. It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description. The purveyors of this philosophical outlook will not admit this to themselves, let alone to potential interlocutors. [End Page 21] Second, and most importantly, alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities—realism is a perspective that as a matter of first principles denies all others. There is, as we have seen in the Carter narrative, alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences. Those who do not see this underlying order of things are idealists or amateurs. Such people have no standing in debate because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action. Dialogue is permissible within the parameters of the presumed order, but those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate. Third, the environmental determinism of political realism, even though it is grounded in human social nature, is antihumanist. Much of the democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity is in some sense socially self-determining. Society as social contract is a joint project which, over time, is subject to dialectical improvement. Foreign policy realism, as we have seen, presupposes that there is an order to human relations that is beyond the power of humans to mediate. 71 When you add to this the moral imperative to be faithful to the order (the moral of the Carter narrative), then democratic forms lose a great deal of their value. Indeed, there has been a great deal of hand wringing in international relations literature about how the masses are inexorably drawn to idealists like Carter and Wilson. Morgenthau states this much more frankly than most of his intellectual descendants: [the] thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy can be diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and action by which the masses and their representatives are likely to be moved. . . . The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. 72 Some realists, based on this empirical observation, openly propose that a realist foreign policy be cloaked in a moral facade so that it will be publicly palatable. Kissinger's mistake, they say, was that he was too honest. Morgenthau concludes that "the simple philosophy and techniques of the moral crusade are useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling public opinion behind a given policy; they are but blunt weapons in the struggle of nations for dominance over the minds of men." If one believes that social scientists have unique access to an inexorable social reality which is beyond the control of humanity—and which it is social suicide to ignore—it is easy to see how democratic notions of consent and self-determination can give way to the reign of manipulative propaganda. 73 There is another lesson that can be drawn from the savaging of Carter in international relations scholarship for those who seek to broaden the terms of American foreign policy thought and practice. Those who would challenge the realist orthodoxy [End Page 22] face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism. Careful and balanced academic critiques, although indispensable, are unlikely to be a match for such formidable symbolic ammunition. Post-realism, if it is to make any advance against the realist battlements, must marshal equally powerful symbolic resources. What is needed, in addition to academic critiques aimed at other scholars, is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric. It must be said, in the strongest possible terms, that realism engenders an attitude of cynicism and fatalism in those who would otherwise engage the great moral and political questions of our age. 74 History is replete with ideals that, after much time and effort, matured into new social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance on a mass scale and socially active government were empirical impossibilities. However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, they suggest the power of ideals and the possibility of human social transformation. On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself. The surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so. This is a tragic irony we should strive to avoid, no matter how aesthetically fitting it may be.

<h4>Claimed inevitability is the worst act of closure – alternative discourse is key and empirically solves </h4><p>Kraig 02 – Robert Alexander is Wisconsin state political director for Service Employees International Union (SEIU). He is also an instructor in the Communication Department at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Rhetoric & Public Affairs 5.1 1<u>-30</p><p><mark>Given</mark> the <mark>claimed inevitability of realism</mark>'s description</u> of international politics, <u><mark>one might think </mark>that <mark>nations need not look to expert guidance</mark> </u>because power interests will inevitably determine governmental policy. But the realists, while embracing determinism, simultaneously argue that human nature is repeatedly violated. One traditional claim has been that America, because of its unique history, has been ever in danger of ignoring the dictates of the foreign policy scene. This argument is offered by Henry Kissinger in his avowedly Morgenthauian work Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. 21 Realists also argue that there are idealists in all human societies who refuse to see the reality of power. As Richard W. Cottam, a trenchant critic of orthodox realism, explained the argument: "Every era has its incorrigible idealists who persist in seeing evil man as good. When they somehow gain power and seek to put their ideas into effect, Machiavellians who understand man's true nature appear and are more than willing and more than capable of exploiting this eternal naivete." 22 Cottam was referring to one of the central ideological constructs of international relations theory—the<u> <mark>realist</mark>/idealist dichotomy</u>. First explicated in detail by Morgenthau in his Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 23 this <u><mark>dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who</mark> dare to <mark>consider transcending</mark> or transforming <mark>established patterns</u></mark> of global competition. This construct is enriched by the narratives of failed idealists—most prominently Tsar Alexander the First, Woodrow Wilson, Neville Chamberlain, and Jimmy Carter—men who, despite and in fact because of their good intentions, caused untold human suffering. After World War II, realists built their conception of leadership on a negative caricature of Woodrow Wilson. 24 As George Kennan, one of the primary architects of Cold War policy, warned in 1945: "If we insist at this moment in our history in wandering about with our heads in the clouds of Wilsonean idealism . . . we run the risk of losing even that bare minimum of security which would be assured to us by the maintenance of humane, stable, and cooperative forms of society on the immediate European shores of the Atlantic." 25 Wilson's supposed idealism was said by the emerging realist scholars to have led to the unstable international political structure that caused World War II [End Page 6] and now threatened the postwar balance of forces. Despite convincing refutations by the leading historians of Wilson's presidency, most recently John Milton Cooper Jr. in his definitive study of the League of Nations controversy, realists continue to caricature Wilson as a fuzzy-headed idealist. 26 Idealists, in realist writings, all share a fatal flaw: an inability to comprehend the realities of power. They live in a world of unreality, responding to nonexistent scenes. As Riker put it, "Unquestionably, there are guilt-ridden and shame-conscious men who do not desire to win, who in fact desire to lose. These are irrational ones in politics." 27 It is here that the realist expert comes in.<u> It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be <strong>rationally and objectively established</u></strong>. According to Kissinger, a theorist who later became a leading practitioner, "it is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy." <u><strong>The science</u> </strong>of international relations claims the capacity to chart the foreign policy scene and then establish the ends and means of national policy<strong>. <u>This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics</u>.</strong> Realism's scenic character makes it a radically empirical science. As Morgenthau put it, the political realist "believes in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgement." Avowedly modernist in orientation, realism claims to be rooted not in a theory of how international relations ought to work, but in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment. 28 In its orthodox form political realism assumes that international politics are and must be dominated by the will to power. Moral aspirations in the international arena are merely protective coloration and propaganda or the illusions that move hopeless idealists. What is most revealing about this assessment of human nature is not its negativity but its fatalism. There is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility. Like environmental determinism—most notably the social darwinism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—political <u>realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved </u>upon. From the stationary perspective of social scientific realism in its pure form, the fatal environment of human social interaction can be navigated but not conquered. Description, in other words<u><strong>, is fate</u></strong>. All who dare to challenge the order—Carter's transgression—will do much more damage than good. The idealist makes a bad situation much worse by imagining a better world in the face of immutable realities. As one popular saying among foreign policy practitioners goes: "Without vision, men die. With it, more men die." 70 (continued) The implications of this social philosophy are stark. <u><strong><mark>Tremendous</mark> human <mark>suffering can be rationalized away as the</mark> inevitable <mark>product of the impersonal</mark> international <mark>system of power</mark> relations. </strong>World <mark>leaders are</mark> actively <mark>encouraged</u></mark> by the realists <u><mark>to put aside moral pangs of doubt and <strong>play the game</strong> of</mark> international <mark>politics</mark> according to the established rules of political engagement. </u>This deliberate limitation of interest excuses leaders from making hard moral choices. While a moralist Protestant like Jimmy Carter sees history as a progressive moral struggle to realize abstract ideals in the world, the realist believes that it is dangerous to struggle against the inexorable. The moral ambiguities of political and social ethics that have dogged philosophy and statesmanship time out of mind are simply written out of the equation<u>. Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true</u>.<u> The greatest barrier to engaging the <mark>realists </mark>in serious dialogue about their premises is that they <strong><mark>deny</mark> that <mark>these questions can be</mark> seriously <mark>debated</u></strong></mark>. First, realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself. There is exceedingly narrow ground, particularly in the technical vocabulary of the social sciences, for discussing the moral potential of humanity or the limitations of human action. Yet, as we have seen in the tragedy of Jimmy Carter, a philosophical perspective on these very questions is <u><strong>imparted through the back door.</u> <u>It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description.</u></strong> The purveyors of this philosophical outlook will not admit this to themselves, let alone to potential interlocutors. [End Page 21] Second, and most importantly, alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities—realism is a perspective that as a <u><strong>matter of first principles denies all others</u></strong>. There is, as we have seen in the Carter narrative, <u><strong>alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences</u></strong>. Those who do not see this underlying order of things are idealists or <u><strong>amateurs.</u></strong> Such people have <u><strong>no standing in debate</u></strong> because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action. Dialogue is permissible within the parameters of the presumed order, but <u><strong>those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate</u>.</strong> Third, the environmental<u> <mark>determinism of</mark> political <mark>realism</mark>, even though it is grounded in human social nature, <mark>is antihumanist</u></mark>. Much of the <u><mark>democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity i</mark>s</u> in some sense socially <u><mark>self-determining. Society as social contract</mark> is a joint project <mark>which</mark>, over time, <mark>is subject to dialectical improvement</u></mark>. Foreign policy realism, as we have seen, presupposes that there is an order to human relations that is <u><strong>beyond the power of humans to mediate</u>.</strong> 71 When you add to this the moral imperative to be faithful to the order (the moral of the Carter narrative), then democratic forms lose a great deal of their value. Indeed, there has been a great deal of hand wringing in international relations literature about how the masses are inexorably drawn to idealists like Carter and Wilson. Morgenthau states this much more frankly than most of his intellectual descendants: [the] thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy can be diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and action by which the masses and their representatives are likely to be moved. . . . The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman's thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. 72 Some realists, based on this empirical observation, openly propose that a realist foreign policy be cloaked in a moral facade so that it will be publicly palatable. Kissinger's mistake, they say, was that he was too honest. Morgenthau concludes that "the simple philosophy and techniques of the moral crusade are useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling public opinion behind a given policy; they are but blunt weapons in the struggle of nations for dominance over the minds of men." If one believes that social scientists have unique access to an inexorable social reality which is beyond the control of humanity—and which it is social suicide to ignore—it is easy to see how democratic notions of consent and self-determination can give way to the reign of manipulative propaganda. 73 There is another lesson that can be drawn from the savaging of Carter in international relations scholarship for those who seek to broaden the terms of American foreign policy thought and practice. Those who would challenge the realist orthodoxy [End Page 22<u><strong>] face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism</u>.</strong> Careful and balanced academic critiques, although indispensable, are unlikely to be a match for such formidable <u><strong>symbolic ammunition</u></strong>. Post-realism, if it is to make any advance against the realist battlements, must marshal equally powerful symbolic resources. <u><mark>What is needed</u></mark>, in addition to academic critiques aimed at other scholars, <u><strong><mark>is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric</strong>.</mark> It must be said, in the <strong>strongest possible terms,</strong> <mark>that realism engenders</mark> an attitude of <mark>cynicism and fatalism in those who</mark> <mark>would</mark> otherwise <mark>engage</mark> the great <mark>moral</mark> and political <mark>questions</mark> of our age.</u> 74 <u><mark>History is replete with ideals that</mark>,</u> after much time and effort, <u><mark>matured into</mark> new <mark>social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance</mark> on a mass scale <mark>and socially active government were</mark> empirical <mark>impossibilities.</u> <u></mark>However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, <mark>they suggest</mark> the power of ideals and the <mark>possibility of human social transformation</mark>. On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself. <strong>The <mark>surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so</strong>. </u><strong></mark>This is a tragic irony we should strive to avoid, no matter how aesthetically fitting it may be.</p></strong>

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Wake Forest Nasar-Raudenbush

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1AC OG (WTO Banks) 1NC Security K

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Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system.

<h4>  <u><strong>Another clarification is needed.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else.</mark> <mark>It calls for replacing capitalism</mark>, totally</u></strong>, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because <u><strong><mark>capitalism has proved impervious to reforms</mark>, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but <mark>we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system</strong></mark>.</h4></u>

Cap

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Gonzaga Skoog-Weinhardt

Allen

1AC - PAS (pain) 1NC - Cap Physicians PIC Politics 2NR - Politics

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The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage

Williams 14

Williams 14 Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver

Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the U S Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number requiring organs is likely higher This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains

many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organ more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number is higher The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations a severe organ shortage remains.

Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514 Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organs.1 Currently, more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted for organs in the United States.2 Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number of Americans requiring organs is likely higher.3 This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen.4 The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors. The National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs to be used for transplantation.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations.9 Despite the implementation of these strategies, a severe organ shortage remains.

<h4>The ban on organ sales for transplant has created a large and growing shortage</h4><p><strong>Williams 14</strong> Kristy L. Williams, University of Houston Law Center, Health Law & Policy Institute; University of Texas Medical Branch, Institute of Medical Humanities.; Marisa Finley, Baylor Scott & White Health Center for Health Care Policy; J. James Rohack, Baylor Scott & White Health March 31, 2014 American Journal of Law and Medicine, Forthcoming Just Say No to NOTA: Why the Prohibition of Compensation for Human Transplant Organs in NOTA Should Be Repealed and a Regulated Market for Cadaver </p><p>Organs Instituted http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418514</p><p><u>Organ transplantation saves thousands of lives every year. However, <mark>many individuals die waiting for transplants due to an insufficiency of organ</mark>s</u>.1 <u>Currently, <mark>more than 122,000 individuals are waitlisted</mark> for organs in the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.2 <u><mark>Due to financial and other barriers to becoming waitlisted, the actual number</mark> </u>of Americans <u>requiring organs <mark>is</mark> likely <mark>higher</u></mark>.3 <u>This gap between available organs and the need for organs continues to widen</u>.4 <u>The supply of organs is limited as only a small number of individuals die in circumstances medically eligible for organ donation, </u>and less than sixty-eight percent of eligible individuals donate.5 As a result of those long waitlists and limited supply there is a substantial need to increase organ donations. This paper will focus on increasing consent rates for cadaveric organ donation in the Unites States by repealing current law prohibiting cadaveric donors and their estates from being financially compensated.6 <u><mark>The current organ donation system in the United States relies on the altruism of donors.</mark> The</u> National Organ Transplantation Act <u>(<mark>NOTA) prohibits the receipt of any form of valuable consideration in exchange for organs</mark> to be used for transplantation</u>.7 State statutes also prohibit the sale of certain organs and tissue for transplantation; however, state laws vary widely as to what body parts are covered.8 As paying for organs is prohibited, <u><mark>other methods have been employed in attempts to increase donations</u></mark>.9 <u>Despite the implementation of these strategies, <mark>a severe organ shortage remains</u>.</p></mark>

Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives

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George Mason Call-Mohney

Steiner

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CP PICs out of “physician assisted” part of plan---solves the case while avoiding our net-benefits.

<h4>CP PICs out of “physician assisted” part of plan---solves the case while avoiding our net-benefits.</h4>

Off

CP

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5

Florida Cone-Marchini

Corrigan

1AC PAS Biopower 1NC Foucault K Physician PIC Ableism Turns 2NR Ableism

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Review of literature concludes that sales will increase supply

Beard et al 13

Beard et al 13 T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses

On balance, a fair-minded reading of the evidence suggests that compensation for donors, if done correctly and sensibly, would increase, probably substantially, the number of organs available for transplant. In the cases of both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors, available evidence confirms the observation that people respond to incentives

On balance a fair reading of the evidence suggests that compensation for donors would increase substantially the number of organs available for transplant both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors respond to incentives

On balance, a fair-minded reading of the evidence suggests that compensation for donors, if done correctly and sensibly, would increase, probably substantially, the number of organs available for transplant. In the cases of both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors, available evidence confirms the observation that people respond to incentives.

<h4>Review of literature concludes that sales will increase supply</h4><p><strong>Beard et al 13</strong> T. Randolph "Randy" Beard, Professor of Economics at Auburn University.; Rigmar Osterkamp, Fellow at the School for Political Studies at University of Munich.; And David L. Kaserman, Torchmark Professor of Economics at Auburn University.2013 The Global Organ Shortage: Economic Causes, Human Consequences, Policy Responses</p><p><u><mark>On balance</mark>, <mark>a fair</mark>-minded <mark>reading of</mark> <mark>the evidence suggests that compensation for donors</mark>, if done correctly and sensibly, <mark>would increase</mark>, probably <mark>substantially</mark>, <mark>the number of organs available for transplant</mark>. In the cases of <mark>both deceased donors (and their families) and living donors</mark>, available evidence confirms the observation that people <mark>respond to incentives</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong>

Contention 3 The Plan solves

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Ndt

3

Gonzaga Newton-Spraker

Deming, Gramzinski, Susko

1AC - Organs (Shortages Illegal Markets) 1NC - T-Sales Property Rights DA TPA DA Tax Incentives CP 2NC - CP Case 1NR - Property Rights DA 2NR - DA Case

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Heres a bunch of counterexamples

Wright 5

Wright 5 Logan doctoral candidate in Chinese politics and U.S.-China relations at George Washington University in Washington, DC. http://survivedsars.typepad.com/survivedsars/2005/11/offensive_reali_1.html 11-18-05

Mearsheimer, the godfather of offensive realist theory provided a rejection of the idea of China's peaceful rise This article could have been written in 1985, 1995, or 2005. Mearsheimer was well-known for predicting the collapse of NATO and breakup of Europe Why would China have so few nuclear weapons? Why would Russia agree to sell China significant quantities of military hardware, if they were concerned about great power competition? Why would China's military modernization efforts be focused intensely on the Taiwan question, rather than larger issues of great-power competition Why would China attempt to join international institutions, Why would China have negotiated border settlements with India, Russia, and Kazakhstan on terms that were generally unfavorable to China How long do we have to wait, Dr. Mearsheimer, before your predictions begin to make sense? how do you explain the collapse of the Soviet Union again

offensive realist theory was well-known for predicting collapse of NATO and breakup of Europe Why would China have few nuclear weapons? Why would Russia sell China military hardware, Why would military modernization be focused on Taiwan rather than larger issues Why would China join international institutions Why would China negotiate settlements with India on terms that were unfavorable to China How long do we have to wait, Dr. Mearsheimer, before predictions make sense how do you explain collapse of the Soviet Union

It would take something like this to bring me out of my blogging slumber, which resulted from a trip to England and a general feeling that I'm behind on other work, so that I should stay away from blogging for a while. John Mearsheimer, the godfather of offensive realist theory, has provided a completely deductive, completely theoretical rejection of the idea of China's peaceful rise into the international system. When I read this article, I didn't even know where to start, and how to concisely summarize my criticism. I'm sure I'll fail to be brief, but I'll start this way: This article could have been written in 1985, 1995, or 2005. Mearsheimer was well-known for predicting the collapse of NATO at the end of the Cold War (he still claims he's right, given US-European tension) and the breakup of European integration into hypernationalist or ethnic conflict (again, Mearsheimer claims violence in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s provides support for his argument). There is a significant debate over whether theories should attempt to explain, predict, or contribute to understanding of international phenomena, but offensive realism is definitely in the "predictive" category, if only because its prescriptions are so unidirectional. In contrast to defensive realists like Robert Jervis, offensive realists argue that security, ultimately, is scarce, and states, in order to preserve their own security, must actually maximize their power. Note: not maintain, but maximize. This is what is so frustrating about this article. Mearsheimer lays out the case for great power competition between the United States and China. China - whether it remains authoritarian or becomes democratic - is likely to try to dominate Asia the way the US dominates the Western hemisphere. Specifically, China will seek to maximise the power gap between itself and its neighbours, especially Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries, although that is always possible. Instead, it is more likely that it will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behaviour to neighbouring countries, much the way the US makes it clear to other states in the Americas that it is the boss. Gaining regional hegemony, I might add, is probably the only way that China will get Taiwan back. An increasingly powerful China is also likely to try to push the US out of Asia, much the way the US pushed the European great powers out of the Western hemisphere. We should expect China to come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as Japan did in the 1930s. These policy goals make good strategic sense for China. Beijing should want a militarily weak Japan and Russia as its neighbours, just as the US prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. Note what Mearsheimer said. "China will seek to maximise the power gap between itself and its neighbours, especially Japan and Russia." Maximize? Really? Keep in mind, this is the essential prediction of this theory, which is parsimonious, to Mearsheimer's credit. In light of this, I have a number of questions for Dr. Mearsheimer. If your theory is correct... Why would China have so few nuclear weapons? Why would Russia agree to sell China significant quantities of military hardware, if they were concerned about great power competition? Why would China's military modernization efforts be focused intensely on the Taiwan question, rather than larger issues of great-power competition (a blue-water navy, more ICBMs, etc.)? Why would China attempt to join international institutions, if they are concerned that these institutions are part of the global economic and political order dominated by the United States? Why would Chinese officials openly claim that they are not interested in pushing the United States out of Asia, as the US presence provides a level of security essential for China's economic growth? Why would China have negotiated border settlements with India, Russia, and Kazakhstan on terms that were generally unfavorable to China, given their past historical positions? Why would China attempt to work within existing international institutions, and campaign actively to join them, rather than attempting to create their own? Why would a democratic China still be interested in a military solution to the Taiwan issue? Why would Taiwan be opposed to reunification in such a scenario? Keep in mind, in offensive realism, the character of the state involved is not relevant to the analysis. How long do we have to wait, Dr. Mearsheimer, before your predictions begin to make sense? How would this article have been different in 1985 or 1995, rather than 2005? Are we all just engaging in the Popperian "inductivist illusion" by having the audacity to look at empirical evidence, rather than living in our deductive theoretical cocoons? Or is the theory simply a cut too thin, designed to maximize parsimony at the expense of explaining independent observations? And by the way, how do you explain the collapse of the Soviet Union again?

<h4>Heres a bunch of counterexamples</h4><p><strong>Wright 5</strong> Logan doctoral candidate in Chinese politics and U.S.-China relations at George Washington University in Washington, DC. http://survivedsars.typepad.com/survivedsars/2005/11/offensive_reali_1.html 11-18-05</p><p>It would take something like this to bring me out of my blogging slumber, which resulted from a trip to England and a general feeling that I'm behind on other work, so that I should stay away from blogging for a while. John <u>Mearsheimer, the godfather of <mark>offensive realist theory</u></mark>, has <u>provided a </u>completely deductive, completely theoretical <u>rejection of the idea of China's peaceful rise </u>into the international system. When I read this article, I didn't even know where to start, and how to concisely summarize my criticism. I'm sure I'll fail to be brief, but I'll start this way: <u>This article could have been written in 1985, 1995, or 2005. Mearsheimer <mark>was well-known for predicting </mark>the <mark>collapse of NATO </u></mark>at the end of the Cold War (he still claims he's right, given US-European tension) <u><mark>and</u> </mark>the <u><mark>breakup of Europe</u></mark>an integration into hypernationalist or ethnic conflict (again, Mearsheimer claims violence in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s provides support for his argument). There is a significant debate over whether theories should attempt to explain, predict, or contribute to understanding of international phenomena, but offensive realism is definitely in the "predictive" category, if only because its prescriptions are so unidirectional. In contrast to defensive realists like Robert Jervis, offensive realists argue that security, ultimately, is scarce, and states, in order to preserve their own security, must actually maximize their power. Note: not maintain, but maximize. This is what is so frustrating about this article. Mearsheimer lays out the case for great power competition between the United States and China. China - whether it remains authoritarian or becomes democratic - is likely to try to dominate Asia the way the US dominates the Western hemisphere. Specifically, China will seek to maximise the power gap between itself and its neighbours, especially Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries, although that is always possible. Instead, it is more likely that it will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behaviour to neighbouring countries, much the way the US makes it clear to other states in the Americas that it is the boss. Gaining regional hegemony, I might add, is probably the only way that China will get Taiwan back. An increasingly powerful China is also likely to try to push the US out of Asia, much the way the US pushed the European great powers out of the Western hemisphere. We should expect China to come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as Japan did in the 1930s. These policy goals make good strategic sense for China. Beijing should want a militarily weak Japan and Russia as its neighbours, just as the US prefers a militarily weak Canada and Mexico on its borders. Note what Mearsheimer said. "China will seek to maximise the power gap between itself and its neighbours, especially Japan and Russia." Maximize? Really? Keep in mind, this is the essential prediction of this theory, which is parsimonious, to Mearsheimer's credit. In light of this, I have a number of questions for Dr. Mearsheimer. If your theory is correct... <u><mark>Why would China have </mark>so <mark>few nuclear weapons? Why would Russia</mark> agree to <mark>sell China </mark>significant quantities of <mark>military hardware, </mark>if they were concerned </p><p>about great power competition? <mark>Why would</mark> China's <mark>military modernization</mark> efforts <mark>be focused</mark> intensely <mark>on</mark> the <mark>Taiwan</mark> question, <mark>rather than</mark> <mark>larger issues</mark> of great-power competition </u>(a blue-water navy, more ICBMs, etc.)? <u><mark>Why would China </mark>attempt to <mark>join international institutions</mark>, </u>if they are concerned that these institutions are part of the global economic and political order dominated by the United States? Why would Chinese officials openly claim that they are not interested in pushing the United States out of Asia, as the US presence provides a level of security essential for China's economic growth? <u><mark>Why would China </mark>have <mark>negotiate</mark>d border <mark>settlements with India</mark>, Russia, and Kazakhstan <mark>on terms that were </mark>generally <mark>unfavorable to China</u></mark>, given their past historical positions? Why would China attempt to work within existing international institutions, and campaign actively to join them, rather than attempting to create their own? Why would a democratic China still be interested in a military solution to the Taiwan issue? Why would Taiwan be opposed to reunification in such a scenario? Keep in mind, in offensive realism, the character of the state involved is not relevant to the analysis.<u> <mark>How long do we have to wait, Dr. Mearsheimer,</mark> <mark>before</mark> your <mark>predictions</mark> begin to <mark>make sense</mark>? </u>How would this article have been different in 1985 or 1995, rather than 2005? Are we all just engaging in the Popperian "inductivist illusion" by having the audacity to look at empirical evidence, rather than living in our deductive theoretical cocoons? Or is the theory simply a cut too thin, designed to maximize parsimony at the expense of explaining independent observations? And by the way,<u> <mark>how do you explain </mark>the <mark>collapse of the Soviet Union </mark>again</u>?</p>

Block

AT: Empirics

AT: Inevitable

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Navy

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Wake Forest Nasar-Raudenbush

Ridley

1AC OG (WTO Banks) 1NC Security K

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The United States should legalize non-physician assisted suicide and cyanide pills for all persons who qualify as terminally ill.

<h4>The United States should legalize non-physician assisted suicide and cyanide pills for all persons who qualify as terminally ill. </h4>

CP

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Navy

2

Gonzaga Skoog-Weinhardt

Allen

1AC - PAS (pain) 1NC - Cap Physicians PIC Politics 2NR - Politics

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Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination

Beard 8

Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy

the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote At least seven such actions have been implemented INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. federal legislation requiring all hospitals to request organ donation additional legislation to refer potential organ donors the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Finally, i legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct costs incurred by onors We must conclude that none of the policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. . Rather, every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage

a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. the likelihood any of them will resolve the organ shortage is remote At least seven such actions have been implemented EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES incorporating organ donor cards on driver licenses requiring all hospitals to request organ donation the Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative Finally legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct costs incurred by donors We must conclude that none of the policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage

http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, the transplant industry has examined and adopted a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance. All of these, however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system. As a result, the likelihood that any of them, even in combination, will resolve the organ shortage is remote. At least seven such actions have been implemented over the last two decades or so: ■ INCREASED EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of incorporating organ donor cards on states’ driver licenses. The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards. ■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, federal legislation was passed in 1987 requiring all hospitals receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) to request organ donation in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, additional legislation was passed that requires hospitals to refer potential organ donors to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been the so-called “Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative,” which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. ■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS Finally, in another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct (explicit) costs incurred by such donors (e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. We must conclude that none of the above-listed policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage. We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount. Rather, our concern is that every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage.

<h4>Varied efforts to increase voluntary donations fail – individually and in combination </h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>Aware of the increasingly dire consequences of continued reliance on the existing approach to cadaveric organ procurement and alarmed at the figures shown above, <u>the transplant industry has examined and adopted <mark>a series of policy options ostensibly designed to improve the system’s performance.</mark> All of these, <mark>however, continue to maintain the basic zero-price property of the altruistic system.</mark> As a result, <mark>the likelihood</mark> that <mark>any of them</mark>, even in combination, <mark>will resolve the organ shortage is remote</u></mark>. <u><mark>At least seven such actions have been implemented</u></mark> over the last two decades or so: ■ <u>INCREASED <mark>EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES</u></mark> In the absence of financial incentives, moral suasion becomes the principal avenue through which additional supply may be motivated. Consequently, the organ procurement organizations (opos) created under the 1984 Act have launched substantial promotional campaigns. The campaigns have been designed to both educate the general public about the desperate need for donated organs and educate physicians and critical care hospital staff regarding the identification of potential deceased donors. Over the years, a substantial sum has been spent on these types of educational activities. Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that further spending on these programs is unlikely to increase supply by a significant amount. ■ ORGAN DONOR CARDS A related activity has been the process of <u><mark>incorporating organ donor cards on</mark> states’ <mark>driver licenses</mark>.</u> The cards can be easily completed and witnessed at the time the licenses are issued or renewed. They serve as a pre-mortem statement of the bearer’s wish to have his or her organs removed for transplantation purposes at the time of death. Their principal use, in practice, is to facilitate the opos’ efforts to convince surviving family members to consent to such removal by revealing the decedant’s wishes. The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act gave all states the authority to issue donor cards and incorporate them in drivers’ licenses. Moreover, a few states have recently begun to rely entirely on donor cards to infer consent without requiring the surviving family’s permission when such cards are present. Survey evidence indicates that less than 40 percent of U.S. citizens have signed their donor cards.<u> </u>■ REQUIRED REQUEST Some survey evidence published in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that in a number of cases families of potential deceased donors were not being asked to donate the organs. As a result, donation was apparently failing to occur in some of those instances simply because the request was not being presented. In response to this evidence, <u>federal legislation</u> was passed in 1987 <u><mark>requiring all hospitals</u></mark> receiving any federal funding (which, of course, is virtually all hospitals) <u><mark>to request organ donation</u></mark> in all deaths that occur under circumstances that would allow the deceased’s organs to be used in transplantation. It appears that this legal obligation is now being met in most, if not all, cases. Yet, the organ shortage has persisted and the waiting list has continued to grow. ■ REQUIRED REFERRAL While required-request legislation can compel hospitals to approach the families of recently deceased potential organ donors with an appeal for donation, it cannot ensure that the request will be made in a sincere, compassionate manner likely to elicit an agreement. Following implementation of the required-request law, there were a number of anecdotes in which the compulsory organ donation requests were presented in an insincere or even offensive manner that was clearly intended to elicit a negative response. The letter of the law was being met but not the spirit. As a result, <u>additional legislation</u> was passed that requires hospitals<u> to refer potential organ donors </u>to the regional opo so that trained procurement personnel can approach the surviving family with the donation request. This policy response has resulted in no perceptible progress in resolving the shortage. ■ COLLABORATION A fairly recent response to the organ shortage has been <u><mark>the</mark> </u>so-called “<u><mark>Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative</mark>,” </u>which was championed by then-secretary of health and human services Tommy Thompson. The program was initiated shortly after Thompson took office in 2001 and is currently continuing. The program’s basic motivation is provided by the observation of a considerable degree of variation in performance across the existing opos. Specifically, the number of deceased organ donors per thousand hospital deaths has been found to vary by a factor of almost five across the organizations. The presumption, then, is that the relatively successful opos employ superior procurement techniques and/or knowledge that, if shared with the relatively unsuccessful organizations, would significantly improve their performance. Thus, diffusion of “best practice” techniques is seen as a promising method through which cadaveric donation rates may be greatly improved. A thorough and objective evaluation of the Thompson initiative has not, to our knowledge, been conducted. Figure 1, in conjunction with a recent econometric study of observed variations in opo efficiency, suggests that such an evaluation would yield both good news and bad news. The good news is that the program appears to have had a positive (and potentially significant) impact on the number of donations. In particular, it appears that, after 2002, the growth rate of the waiting list has slowed somewhat. Whether this effect will permanently lower the growth rate of the waiting list or simply cause a temporary intercept shift remains to be seen. The bad news, however, is unequivocal— the initiative is not going to resolve the organ shortage. Even if, contrary to reasonable expectations, all opo relative inefficiencies were miraculously eliminated (i.e., if al organizations’ performance were brought up to the most efficient unit), the increase in donor collection rates would still be insufficient to eliminate the shortage. <u>■ KIDNEY EXCHANGES</u> Another approach that has received some attention recently involves the exchange of kidneys between families who have willing but incompatible living donors. Suppose, for example, a person in one family needs a kidney transplant and a sibling has offered to donate the needed organ. Further suppose that the two siblings are not compatible — perhaps their blood types differ. If this family can locate a second, similarly situated family, then it may be possible that the donor in the first family will match the recipient in the second, and vice versa. A relatively small number of such exchanges have recently occurred and a unos-based computerized system of matching such interfamily donors has been proposed to facilitate a larger number of these living donor transactions. Two observations regarding kidney exchanges are worth noting. First, such exchanges obviously constitute a crude type of market in living donor kidneys that is based upon barter rather than currency. Like all such barter markets, this exchange will be considerably less efficient than currency-based trade. Puzzlingly, some of the staunchest critics of using financial incentives for cadaveric donors have openly supported expanded use of living donor exchanges. Apparently, it is not market exchange per se that offends them but, rather, the use of money to facilitate efficient market exchange. This combination of positions merely highlights the critics’ lack of knowledge regarding the operation of market processes. It is quite apparent that living donor kidney exchanges are not going to resolve the organ shortage. Opportunities for such barter-based exchanges are simply too limited. ■ REIMBURSEMENT OF DONOR COSTS <u><mark>Finally</mark>, i</u>n another effort to encourage an increase in the number of living (primarily kidney) donors, several states have passed <u><mark>legislation authorizing reimbursement of any direct</mark> </u>(explicit) <u><mark>costs incurred by</u></mark> such <mark>d<u>onors</mark> </u>(e.g., travel expenses, lost wages, and so on). Economically, this policy action raises the price paid to living kidney donors from a negative amount to zero. As such, it should be expected to increase the quantity of organs supplied from this source. Because the explicit, out-of-pocket expenses associated with live kidney donation are unlikely to be large relative to the longer-term implicit costs of potential health risks, however, such reimbursement should not be expected to bring forth a flood of new donors. Moreover, recent empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the number of living donors may have a negative impact on the number of deceased donors because of some degree of supply-side substitutability. Again, this policy is not a solution to the organ shortage. <u><mark>We must conclude that none of the</u></mark> above-listed <u><mark>policies should be expected to resolve the transplant organ shortage</mark>.</u> We say this not because we oppose any of these policies; indeed, each appears sensible in its own right and some have unquestionably succeeded in raising the number of organ donors by some (perhaps nontrivial) amount<u>. Rather,</u> our concern is that <u><mark>every time another one of these marginalist policies is devised, it delays the only real reform that is capable of fully resolving the organ shortage</u></mark>.</p>

Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx

A

Navy

1

George Mason Call-Mohney

Steiner

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Empirically, sales would not be primarily from the poor. All income groups would participate.

Halpern 10

Halpern 10 Scott D. Halpern, MD, PhD, MBioethics, Amelie Raz, Rachel Kohn, BA, Michael Rey, BA, David A. Asch, MD, MBA, and Peter Reese, MD, MSCE, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine and Philadelphia Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Ann Intern Med. 2010 Mar 16; 152(6): 358–365. Regulated Payments for Living Kidney Donation: An Empirical Assessment of the Ethical Concerns

Higher payments increased the probabilities of donating but did so evenly across the 6 income strata, such that no evidence of an interaction between payment and income was found Even when we restricted analyses to the lowest income stratum and the highest income stratum no significant interaction emerged (OR, 0.99 [CI, 0.97 to 1.02]) (Figure 3). Among participants in the lowest income stratum, conditionally adjusted donation rates were 29.8% (CI, 19.5% to 42.7%) for $0, 44.1% (CI, 33.1% to 55.7%) for $10 000, and 47.9% (CI, 36.4% to 59.6%) for $100 000. Among participants in the highest income stratum, the rates were 15.2% (CI, 9.0% to 24.5%), 27.5% (CI, 18.8% to 38.2%), and 31.3% (CI, 21.7% to 42.9%), respectively. These results suggest that payment is not an unjust inducement for living kidney donation.

Higher payments increased the probabilities of donating but did so evenly across the 6 income strata, no evidence of an interaction between payment and income was found Even when we restricted analyses to the lowest income stratum and the highest no significant interaction emerged

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2865248/?report=classic%5Dab Unjust Inducement Higher payments increased the probabilities of donating but did so evenly across the 6 income strata, such that no evidence of an interaction between payment and income was found (OR, 1.01 [CI, 0.99 to 1.03]) (Figure 3). Even when we restricted analyses to the 57 participants in the lowest income stratum (annual household income ≤$20 000) and the 66 participants in the highest income stratum (annual household income >$100 000), no significant interaction emerged (OR, 0.99 [CI, 0.97 to 1.02]) (Figure 3). Among participants in the lowest income stratum, conditionally adjusted donation rates were 29.8% (CI, 19.5% to 42.7%) for $0, 44.1% (CI, 33.1% to 55.7%) for $10 000, and 47.9% (CI, 36.4% to 59.6%) for $100 000. Among participants in the highest income stratum, the rates were 15.2% (CI, 9.0% to 24.5%), 27.5% (CI, 18.8% to 38.2%), and 31.3% (CI, 21.7% to 42.9%), respectively. These results suggest that payment is not an unjust inducement for living kidney donation.

<h4><strong>Empirically, sales would not be primarily from the poor. All income groups would participate.</h4><p>Halpern 10</strong> Scott D. Halpern, MD, PhD, MBioethics, Amelie Raz, Rachel Kohn, BA, Michael Rey, BA, David A. Asch, MD, MBA, and Peter Reese, MD, MSCE, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine and Philadelphia Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Ann Intern Med. 2010 Mar 16; 152(6): 358–365. Regulated Payments for Living Kidney Donation: An Empirical Assessment of the Ethical Concerns</p><p>http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2865248/?report=classic%5Dab</p><p>Unjust Inducement</p><p><u><mark>Higher payments increased the probabilities of donating but did so <strong>evenly</strong> across the 6 income strata,</mark> such that <mark>no evidence of an interaction between payment and income was found</mark> </u>(OR, 1.01 [CI, 0.99 to 1.03]) (Figure 3). <u><mark>Even when we restricted analyses to the</u></mark> 57 participants in the <u><mark>lowest income stratum</u></mark> (annual household income ≤$20 000) <u><mark>and the</u></mark> 66 participants in the <u><mark>highest</mark> income stratum</u> (annual household income >$100 000), <u><mark>no significant interaction emerged<strong></mark> (OR, 0.99 [CI, 0.97 to 1.02]) (Figure 3). Among participants in the lowest income stratum, conditionally adjusted donation rates were 29.8% (CI, 19.5% to 42.7%) for $0, 44.1% (CI, 33.1% to 55.7%) for $10 000, and 47.9% (CI, 36.4% to 59.6%) for $100 000. Among participants in the highest income stratum, the rates were 15.2% (CI, 9.0% to 24.5%), 27.5% (CI, 18.8% to 38.2%), and 31.3% (CI, 21.7% to 42.9%), respectively. These results suggest that payment is not an unjust inducement for living kidney donation.</p></u></strong>

Contention 3 The Plan solves

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx

A

Ndt

3

Gonzaga Newton-Spraker

Deming, Gramzinski, Susko

1AC - Organs (Shortages Illegal Markets) 1NC - T-Sales Property Rights DA TPA DA Tax Incentives CP 2NC - CP Case 1NR - Property Rights DA 2NR - DA Case

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx

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Use of the physician subjects the patient to medical scrutiny-the aff cannot be an act of autonomy.

Salem 99

Salem 99 Tania Salem, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide?” Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full

no doubt emphasis on inner individuals prevails in contemporary arguments for physician-assisted suicide Influences from the outside are seen as pernicious in subverting the main goal: the “pure” or “true” choice reached from within self-centered ethics rests on a nonrelational conception of personhood there is a paradox underlying physician-assisted suicide It is conceived of as an intimate, existential act and indeed a response to modern medicine, but at the same time it is a request for the complicity of physicians and society What seems unusual in the debate about aid in dying is the request for public endorsement and legitimization of the act of suicide Whereas in suicide the individual “drops out” of the social order, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the individual “drops into” a system that recognizes and must even authorize this particular choice displacing suicide from the private arena to bring it under medicine's stewardship means surrendering suicide to the (medical) “establishment decision to die by suicide is treated precisely as if it were a set of clinical problems to be solved medically the “private self-determining” decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event it cannot be seen as an act that solely expresses the ideal of individual autonomy as long as it entails assistance it implies a mutual decision and even more importantly assisted suicide presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide physician-assisted suicide entails an increase of medical power over death and social morality

emphasis on inner individuals prevails in contemporary arguments for p a s Influences from the outside are seen as pernicious in subverting the pure choice self-centered ethics rests on a nonrelational conception of personhood there is a paradox underlying physician-assisted suicide it is a request for the complicity of physicians (and society Whereas in suicide the individual “drops out” of the social order, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the individual “drops into” a system that recognizes and must even authorize this particular choice displacing suicide from the private arena to bring it under medicine's stewardship means surrendering suicide to the (medical) “establishment the “private self-determining” decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event it cannot be seen as an act that solely expresses the ideal of individual autonomy as long as it entails assistance even more importantly assisted suicide presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide physician-assisted suicide entails an increase of medical power over death and social morality

There is no doubt that the emphasis on inner individuals prevails in contemporary arguments for physician-assisted suicide. Influences from the outside, whether subtle or blatant, are seen as pernicious in subverting the main goal: the “pure” or “true” choice reached from within that at bottom takes account of the interests of the decisionmaker. This self-centered ethics rests on a nonrelational conception of personhood. The second—and closely related—pillar of this discourse is the insistence that individuals be radically free to exercise their singularities and idiosyncrasies. In pluralistic societies, it is asserted, “there is far from any agreement, or near-agreement, about how one can establish as canonical a particular normative view of life.”13 Because personal styles, experiences, and beliefs are radically irreducible, it is impossible to suppose a priori that individual choices will coincide; each must find his or her own way of facing dying and death.14 Yet there is a paradox underlying physician-assisted suicide. It is conceived of as an intimate, existential act and indeed a response to modern medicine, but at the same time it is a request for the complicity of physicians (and society). In contemporary Western societies the decision to take death into one's own hands has been construed as an act that is not simply personal, private, and solitary, but contrary to social norms and expectations. From a societal perspective, the individual who commits or attempts suicide is in this sense an outsider. What seems unusual in the debate about aid in dying is the request for public endorsement and legitimization of the act of suicide. Whereas in suicide the individual “drops out” of the social order, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the individual “drops into” a system that recognizes and must even authorize this particular (ostensibly private) choice. In other words, displacing suicide from the private arena to bring it under medicine's stewardship means surrendering suicide to the (medical) “establishment.” The decision to die by suicide is treated precisely as if it were a set of clinical problems to be solved medically— the “private,” “intimate,” “self-determining” decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event. Precisely because assisted suicide requires the connivance of others (direct from doctors, indirect from society), it cannot be seen as an act that solely expresses the ideal of individual autonomy. On the contrary, as long as it entails assistance it implies a mutual decision. Additionally, and even more importantly, more than a mutual decision, assisted suicide presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide. In sum, physician-assisted suicide both introduces tensions in the principle of personal autonomy and entails an increase of medical power over death and social morality.

<h4>Use of the physician subjects the patient to medical scrutiny-the aff cannot be an act of autonomy.</h4><p><strong>Salem 99</strong> Tania Salem, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide?” Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full</p><p>There is <u>no doubt</u> that the <u><mark>emphasis on inner individuals prevails in contemporary arguments for p</mark>hysician-<mark>a</mark>ssisted <mark>s</mark>uicide</u>. <u><mark>Influences from the outside</u></mark>, whether subtle or blatant, <u><mark>are seen as pernicious in subverting the</mark> main goal: the “<mark>pure</mark>” or “true” <mark>choice</mark> reached from within</u> that at bottom takes account of the interests of the decisionmaker. This <u><mark>self-centered ethics rests on a nonrelational conception of personhood</u></mark>.</p><p>The second—and closely related—pillar of this discourse is the insistence that individuals be radically free to exercise their singularities and idiosyncrasies. In pluralistic societies, it is asserted, “there is far from any agreement, or near-agreement, about how one can establish as canonical a particular normative view of life.”13 Because personal styles, experiences, and beliefs are radically irreducible, it is impossible to suppose a priori that individual choices will coincide; each must find his or her own way of facing dying and death.14</p><p>Yet <u><mark>there is a paradox underlying physician-assisted suicide</u></mark>. <u>It is conceived of as an intimate, existential act and indeed a response to modern medicine, but at the same time <mark>it is a request for the complicity of physicians</u> (<u>and society</u></mark>). In contemporary Western societies the decision to take death into one's own hands has been construed as an act that is not simply personal, private, and solitary, but contrary to social norms and expectations. From a societal perspective, the individual who commits or attempts suicide is in this sense an outsider.</p><p><u>What seems unusual in the debate about aid in dying is the request for public endorsement and legitimization of the act of suicide</u>. <u><mark>Whereas in suicide the individual “drops out” of the social order, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the individual “drops into” a system that recognizes and must even authorize this particular</u></mark> (ostensibly private) <u><mark>choice</u></mark>. In other words, <u><mark>displacing suicide from the private arena to bring it under medicine's stewardship means surrendering suicide to the (medical) “establishment</u></mark>.”</p><p>The <u>decision to die by suicide is treated precisely as if it were a set of clinical problems to be solved medically</u>— <u><mark>the “private</u></mark>,” “intimate,” “<u><mark>self-determining” decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event</u></mark>.</p><p>Precisely because assisted suicide requires the connivance of others (direct from doctors, indirect from society), <u><mark>it cannot be seen as an act that solely expresses the ideal of individual autonomy</u></mark>. On the contrary, <u><mark>as long as it entails assistance</mark> it implies a mutual decision</u>. Additionally, <u>and <mark>even more importantly</u></mark>, more than a mutual decision, <u><mark>assisted suicide presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide</u></mark>. In sum, <u><mark>physician-assisted suicide</u></mark> both introduces tensions in the principle of personal autonomy and <u><mark>entails an increase of medical power over death and social morality</u><strong></mark>.</p></strong>

Off

CP

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N

Navy

5

Florida Cone-Marchini

Corrigan

1AC PAS Biopower 1NC Foucault K Physician PIC Ableism Turns 2NR Ableism

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college

Zero solvency for their vague “future catastrophes” impact---prediction markets are worthless for policy responses to them

HLR 9

HLR 9 – Harvard Law Review, February 2009, “Note: Prediction Markets and Law: A Skeptical Account,” 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1217

disaster might strike risks are not likely to be mitigated efficiently without national governments Some scholars have advanced prediction markets as a way to develop this information But remoteness of risk and magnitude of loss correlate inversely with a prediction market's accuracy the low probability of such disasters as in the case of bioterrorism and abrupt global warming is among the things that baffle efforts at responding rationally to them nations may be operating in the domain of uncertainty rather than risk they are able to identify the worst outcomes without being able to specify the likelihood that they will occur Information Markets Poorly Predict Catastrophic Events for two reasons prediction markets exhibit a favorite-longshot bias the favorite-longshot bias could be endemic to information markets If] bettors undervalue near certainties and overvalue low probabilities prediction markets might not be accurate with respect to highly improbable events predicting a very unlikely event presents a insurmountable design problem the contract has to have a payout trigger The occurrence or nonoccurrence of the event is essential for disciplining the market When it comes to catastrophe, the triggering event (a disaster) is at best speculative, and it is the very thing that the market is designed to help avoid when an investor purchases a contract, he may actually reduce the likelihood of the event that would allow him to cash in risks, if properly mitigated, will never materialize in a way that makes payout possible Investment in catastrophe markets would be so high-risk that individuals may not bet at more than novelty levels, like participation in a lottery With the chance of winning so slight, participants may not have a sufficient incentive to educate themselves and purchase according to the confidence of their prediction Salience, fear, and the availability heuristic are biases that are strong in the context of disaster Markets may help reduce bias, but some biases are too strong for the market to overcome

disaster might strike scholars have advanced p m s But remoteness of risk and magnitude of loss correlate inversely with a prediction market's accuracy the low probability of such disasters bioterror and warming baffle efforts at responding rationally to them Information Markets Poorly Predict Catastrophic Events predicting a very unlikely event presents a insurmountable design problem some biases are too strong for the market to overcome

3. Information Pertains to Unlikely, But Catastrophic Harms. - At any moment, disaster might strike. These risks are not likely to be mitigated efficiently without large-scale collective action, n75 probably at the level of national governments. Without coercive cost-spreading through regulation and taxation, we are sitting ducks to environmental disasters, hurricanes, and stock market crashes. Increasingly, scholars are recognizing government's responsibility to fix these market failures, n76 but to do so it needs good information about these catastrophes - risks that are inherently difficult to measure and anticipate. The more remote a risk, and the greater its potential loss, the more urgent the need for regulation becomes. Some scholars have advanced prediction markets as a way to develop this information. n77 But remoteness of risk and magnitude of loss both correlate inversely with a prediction market's accuracy. n78 [*1233] (a) The Informational Problem of Catastrophe. - Responding efficiently to potential catastrophes presents formidable analytical and institutional challenges. n79 Cost-benefit analysis of catastrophe is "a function of both the probability that one or another of [the risks] will materialize if we do nothing and the awfulness of the consequences if that happens." n80 The result - the risk times the harm - is the benefit gained by taking a measure that prevents the risk, and so would be the maximum rational amount to spend on its prevention. This number is the product of a very small number (the likelihood) and a very large number (the harm), and so is very sensitive to error. n81 The most vexing part of the equation is the smaller number: the probability. According to Judge Posner, "the low probability of such disasters - frequently the unknown probability, as in the case of bioterrorism and abrupt global warming - is among the things that baffle efforts at responding rationally to them." n82 Some disasters are unimaginable, but even those that can be imagined cannot be confidently predicted; as Professor Sunstein argues, "in the case of terrorism and climate change, nations may be operating in the domain of uncertainty rather than risk, in the sense that they are able to identify the worst outcomes without being able to specify the likelihood that they will occur." n83 The reasons for this uncertainty are diverse and controversial. Professor Sunstein cites social-scientific and psychological phenomena such as availability, probability neglect, and outrage for both under-and over-estimation of low-probability risks. n84 More controversially, Judge Posner blames scientific illiteracy, science worship, science fiction, doomsters, optimists, limited horizons, false positives, temperament, economics of innovation, global decentralization, and the tragedy of the commons. n85 But most of Judge Posner's reasons, and all of Professor Sunstein's, have something in common: they involve irrationality in thinking about worst-case scenarios. Not surprisingly, both scholars include in their prescription the need to improve the rational assessment of very small probabilities. Might prediction markets help develop good factual predicates for assessing risk? (b) Limits of a Market Solution: Information Markets Poorly Predict Catastrophic Events. - Information markets are bad at predicting very low-probability events for two reasons; one pertains to a systematic [*1234] bias exhibited in prediction markets, and the other relates to market design. First, prediction markets exhibit a favorite-longshot bias. n86 This phenomenon may explain why a prediction market predicted an 8% chance that Arnold Schwarzenegger will become president by 2022 - a number Professor Abramowicz finds implausibly high, "given that the Constitution would need to be amended for this to take place and that he would then need to win the Republican nomination and the general election." n87 According to Professor Sunstein, the favorite-longshot bias could be endemic to information markets: "[If] bettors undervalue near certainties and overvalue low probabilities ... , prediction markets might not be accurate with respect to highly improbable events." n88 Second, predicting a very unlikely event presents a potentially insurmountable design problem. For a contract to have an underlying value that accurately reflects the likelihood of an event, the contract has to have a payout trigger. Defining this event is easy in the case of contests like elections and horse races, where there is a concrete moment at which the predictions will come to fruition. n89 The occurrence or nonoccurrence of the event is essential for disciplining the market since those with good information who made accurate predictions must be rewarded and those who made foolish bets must be punished. n90 When it comes to catastrophe, the triggering event (a disaster) is at best speculative, and anyway it is the very thing that the market is designed to help avoid. Mitigation of catastrophe can come in two forms: prevention and reduction of harm. For events that can be prevented - things that are sufficiently within human control - the market may be self-defeating. When a participant purchases a share that is redeemable for cash in the event of a particular catastrophe, he signals his belief that the [*1235] event will occur. Indeed, the value of the prediction market to lawmakers would be this information. Presumably, if investors manifested enough belief in a risk to make costly prevention efficient, then the government would take preventative action. But just as these measures will prevent the harm, so they will prevent investors from benefiting from their (presumably good) information about the risk, since the catastrophe will now not occur. In short, when an investor purchases a contract, he may actually reduce the likelihood of the event that would allow him to cash in. n91 Of course, some disasters cannot be prevented but can only be mitigated. For these, the self-defeating problem goes away. Suppose a market predicted that a major asteroid would hit the Earth before 2020. Based on this information, the government built an asteroid shield in 2012. Holders of the asteroid-hits-earth contract could still experience a payout if a major asteroid struck and was successfully deflected by the shield in 2015. But most risks, if properly mitigated, will never materialize in a way that makes payout possible. Whether a catastrophe can be prevented or mitigated, it is (by definition) very unlikely to happen. For investors, payday is at best a remote possibility. Investment in catastrophe markets would be so high-risk that individuals may not bet at more than novelty levels, like participation in a lottery. With the chance of winning so slight, participants may not have a sufficient incentive to educate themselves and purchase according to the confidence of their prediction. Then again, the low probability of house fires does not prevent homeowners from mitigating their risk. In the same way that insurance companies reduce risk through aggregation, disaster firms could reduce the risk of investing in one disaster by offering diversified securities to customers. This disaster mutual fund idea is the inverse of Judge Posner's prescription for catastrophic uncertainty. He suggests that one "infer the risk of a bioterrorist attack from the premiums charged for insurance against such attacks." n92 The failure of this model in practice, however, illustrates the difficulty of getting useful information about catastrophe from a market, even if the market offered sufficiently aggregated and diversified securities to make investment rational: In the wake of 9/11, insurance companies terminated coverage of losses due to terrorism (for which previously they had charged only nominal premiums), and though they were forced to restore coverage by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, the act ... heavily subsidizes this insurance and makes it difficult to determine the industry's implicit estimate of the probability and magnitude of future terrorist attacks. n93 [*1236] Salience, fear, and the availability heuristic are biases that are strong in the context of disaster. To Americans, having just experienced an attack, the possibility of disaster seemed imminent and so the demand for insurance went up. At the same time, insurance companies' fear of a huge payout, made salient by the 9/11 attacks, caused their willingness to sell at all to plummet. Markets may help reduce bias, but some biases are too strong for the market to overcome.

<h4>Zero solvency for their vague “future catastrophes” impact---prediction markets are worthless for policy responses to them </h4><p><strong>HLR 9</strong> – Harvard Law Review, February 2009, “Note: Prediction Markets and Law: A Skeptical Account,” 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1217</p><p>3. Information Pertains to Unlikely, But Catastrophic Harms. - At any moment, <u><mark>disaster might strike</u></mark>. These <u>risks are not likely to be mitigated efficiently without</u> large-scale collective action, n75 probably at the level of <u>national governments</u>. Without coercive cost-spreading through regulation and taxation, we are sitting ducks to environmental disasters, hurricanes, and stock market crashes. Increasingly, scholars are recognizing government's responsibility to fix these market failures, n76 but to do so it needs good information about these catastrophes - risks that are inherently difficult to measure and anticipate. The more remote a risk, and the greater its potential loss, the more urgent the need for regulation becomes. <u>Some <mark>scholars have advanced</mark> <mark>p</mark>rediction <mark>m</mark>arket<mark>s</mark> as a way to develop this information</u>. n77 <u><mark>But</u> <u>remoteness of risk and magnitude of loss</u></mark> both <u><mark>correlate inversely with a prediction market's accuracy</u></mark>. n78</p><p> [*1233] (a) The Informational Problem of Catastrophe. - Responding efficiently to potential catastrophes presents formidable analytical and institutional challenges. n79 Cost-benefit analysis of catastrophe is "a function of both the probability that one or another of [the risks] will materialize if we do nothing and the awfulness of the consequences if that happens." n80 The result - the risk times the harm - is the benefit gained by taking a measure that prevents the risk, and so would be the maximum rational amount to spend on its prevention. This number is the product of a very small number (the likelihood) and a very large number (the harm), and so is very sensitive to error. n81</p><p>The most vexing part of the equation is the smaller number: the probability. According to Judge Posner, "<u><mark>the low probability of such disasters</u></mark> - frequently the unknown probability, <u>as in the case of <mark>bioterror</mark>ism <mark>and</mark> abrupt global <mark>warming</u></mark> - <u>is among the things that</u> <u><mark>baffle efforts at responding rationally to them</u></mark>." n82 Some disasters are unimaginable, but even those that can be imagined cannot be confidently predicted; as Professor Sunstein argues, "in the case of terrorism and climate change, <u>nations may be operating in the domain of uncertainty rather than risk</u>, in the sense that <u>they are able to</u> <u>identify the worst outcomes without being able to specify the likelihood that they will occur</u>." n83</p><p>The reasons for this uncertainty are diverse and controversial. Professor Sunstein cites social-scientific and psychological phenomena such as availability, probability neglect, and outrage for both under-and over-estimation of low-probability risks. n84 More controversially, Judge Posner blames scientific illiteracy, science worship, science fiction, doomsters, optimists, limited horizons, false positives, temperament, economics of innovation, global decentralization, and the tragedy of the commons. n85 But most of Judge Posner's reasons, and all of Professor Sunstein's, have something in common: they involve irrationality in thinking about worst-case scenarios. Not surprisingly, both scholars include in their prescription the need to improve the rational assessment of very small probabilities. Might prediction markets help develop good factual predicates for assessing risk?</p><p>(b) Limits of a Market Solution: <u><mark>Information Markets Poorly Predict Catastrophic Events</u></mark>. - Information markets are bad at predicting very low-probability events <u>for two reasons</u>; one pertains to a systematic [*1234] bias exhibited in prediction markets, and the other relates to market design. First, <u>prediction markets exhibit a favorite-longshot bias</u>. n86 This phenomenon may explain why a prediction market predicted an 8% chance that Arnold Schwarzenegger will become president by 2022 - a number Professor Abramowicz finds implausibly high, "given that the Constitution would need to be amended for this to take place and that he would then need to win the Republican nomination and the general election." n87 According to Professor Sunstein, <u>the favorite-longshot bias could be endemic to information markets</u>: "[<u>If] bettors undervalue near certainties and overvalue low probabilities</u> ... , <u>prediction markets might not be accurate with respect to highly improbable events</u>." n88</p><p>Second, <u><mark>predicting a very unlikely event presents a</u></mark> potentially <u><mark>insurmountable design problem</u></mark>. For a contract to have an underlying value that accurately reflects the likelihood of an event, <u>the contract has to have a payout trigger</u>. Defining this event is easy in the case of contests like elections and horse races, where there is a concrete moment at which the predictions will come to fruition. n89 <u>The occurrence or nonoccurrence of the event is essential for disciplining the market</u> since those with good information who made accurate predictions must be rewarded and those who made foolish bets must be punished. n90 <u>When it comes to catastrophe, the triggering event (a disaster) is at best speculative, and</u> anyway <u>it is the very thing that the market is designed to help avoid</u>.</p><p>Mitigation of catastrophe can come in two forms: prevention and reduction of harm. For events that can be prevented - things that are sufficiently within human control - the market may be self-defeating. When a participant purchases a share that is redeemable for cash in the event of a particular catastrophe, he signals his belief that the [*1235] event will occur. Indeed, the value of the prediction market to lawmakers would be this information. Presumably, if investors manifested enough belief in a risk to make costly prevention efficient, then the government would take preventative action. But just as these measures will prevent the harm, so they will prevent investors from benefiting from their (presumably good) information about the risk, since the catastrophe will now not occur. In short, <u>when an investor purchases a contract, he may actually</u> <u>reduce the likelihood of the event that would allow him to cash in</u>. n91</p><p>Of course, some disasters cannot be prevented but can only be mitigated. For these, the self-defeating problem goes away. Suppose a market predicted that a major asteroid would hit the Earth before 2020. Based on this information, the government built an asteroid shield in 2012. Holders of the asteroid-hits-earth contract could still experience a payout if a major asteroid struck and was successfully deflected by the shield in 2015. But most <u>risks, if properly mitigated, will never materialize in a way that makes payout possible</u>.</p><p>Whether a catastrophe can be prevented or mitigated, it is (by definition) very unlikely to happen. For investors, payday is at best a remote possibility. <u>Investment in catastrophe markets would be so high-risk that</u> <u>individuals may not bet at more than novelty levels, like participation in a lottery</u>. <u>With the chance of winning so slight, participants may not have a sufficient incentive to educate themselves and purchase according to the confidence of their prediction</u>. Then again, the low probability of house fires does not prevent homeowners from mitigating their risk. In the same way that insurance companies reduce risk through aggregation, disaster firms could reduce the risk of investing in one disaster by offering diversified securities to customers.</p><p>This disaster mutual fund idea is the inverse of Judge Posner's prescription for catastrophic uncertainty. He suggests that one "infer the risk of a bioterrorist attack from the premiums charged for insurance against such attacks." n92 The failure of this model in practice, however, illustrates the difficulty of getting useful information about catastrophe from a market, even if the market offered sufficiently aggregated and diversified securities to make investment rational: </p><p>In the wake of 9/11, insurance companies terminated coverage of losses due to terrorism (for which previously they had charged only nominal premiums), and though they were forced to restore coverage by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, the act ... heavily subsidizes this insurance and makes it difficult to determine the industry's implicit estimate of the probability and magnitude of future terrorist attacks. n93</p><p> [*1236] <u>Salience, fear, and the availability heuristic are biases that are strong in the context of disaster</u>. To Americans, having just experienced an attack, the possibility of disaster seemed imminent and so the demand for insurance went up. At the same time, insurance companies' fear of a huge payout, made salient by the 9/11 attacks, caused their willingness to sell at all to plummet. <u>Markets may help reduce bias, but</u> <u><mark>some biases are too strong for the market to overcome</u></mark>.</p>

Block

AT: Empirics

AT: Inevitable

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx

N

Navy

8

Wake Forest Nasar-Raudenbush

Ridley

1AC OG (WTO Banks) 1NC Security K

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college

CP PICs out of “physician assisted” part of plan---solves the case while avoiding our net-benefits.

<h4>CP PICs out of “physician assisted” part of plan---solves the case while avoiding our net-benefits.</h4>

CP

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx

N

Navy

2

Gonzaga Skoog-Weinhardt

Allen

1AC - PAS (pain) 1NC - Cap Physicians PIC Politics 2NR - Politics

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx

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NDT/CEDA 2014-15

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college

The shortage means many die

Beard 8

Beard 8 T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy

our failure to adapt our organ procurement policy suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists We run the forecasts out 10 years a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage.

more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming we are able to produce forecasts of future waiting lists 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage

http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf WAITING LISTS YET TO COME The consequences of our failure to adapt our cadaveric organ procurement policy to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, suggests that more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system. In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents thus far pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, we are able to produce forecasts of the expected size of future waiting lists for each of our sample periods. We run the forecasts out 10 years from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, a cumulative total of 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage. Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.

<h4>The shortage means many die</h4><p><strong>Beard 8</strong> T.RANDOLPH BEARD, JOHN D. JACKSON , AND DAVID L. KASERMAN, profs of economics, Auburn University Winter 2008 Regulation The Failure of US 'Organ Procurement Policy</p><p>http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2007/12/v30n4-3.pdf</p><p>WAITING LISTS YET TO COME</p><p>The consequences of <u>our failure to adapt our</u> cadaveric <u>organ procurement policy</u> to the changed technological realities of the transplant industry have been unconscionable. Figure 2, above, <u>suggests that <mark>more than 80,000 lives have now been sacrificed on the altar of our so-called “altruistic” system.</mark> In addition, the unnecessary pain and suffering of those who have been forced to wait while undergoing dialysis, unemployment, and declining health must also be reckoned along with the growing despair of family members who must witness all of this. Nonetheless, <mark>the pain, suffering, and death imposed on the innocents</mark> thus far <mark>pales in comparison to what lies ahead if more fundamental change is not forthcoming</u></mark>. In order to illustrate the severe consequences of a continuation of the altruistic system, we use the data presented in Figures 1 and 2 above to generate forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths. The forecasts represent our best guess of what the future holds if fundamental change continues to be postponed. The results should serve as a wake-up call for those who argue that we should continue tinkering with the existing procurement system while further postponing the implementation of financial incentives. The costs of such a “wait and see” approach are rapidly becoming intolerable. CHANGING VARIABLE To produce reasonable forecasts of future waiting lists and deaths, we must first confront an apparent anomaly in the reported data that could cast doubt on the accuracy of some of the more recent figures. Specifically, the reported number of deaths of patients on the waiting list (plus those too sick to receive a transplant) follows a consistently upward trend that is very close to a constant proportion of the size of the waiting list over most of the sample period. Beginning in 2002, however, the number of deaths levels off and even starts to decline, despite continued growth of the waiting list. It is not clear why there is an abrupt change in the observed trend in this variable. Our investigation of this issue yielded several plausible explanations but no definitive answer. For example, it may be the case that recent advances in medical care, such as the left ventricular assist device, have extended some patients’ lives and, thereby, reduced the number of deaths on the list. Alternatively, it may be the case that because of rising criticism of the current system, unos has taken steps to remove some of the relatively higher-risk patients from the list before they die. For example, the meld/peld program, which was introduced in February 2002, removed a number of liver patients (who have a comparatively high death rate) from the waiting list. Additionally, the increasing use of so-called “extended criteria” donor organs may have a similar effect, getting the most critically ill patients off the list prior to their deaths. Clearly, the implications of these alternative explanations for reliance on the data are not the same. For example, if patients are, in fact, simply living longer and the data accurately reflect that reality, then our analysis should incorporate the observations. But if the more recent figures are, instead, a manifestation of strategic actions taken by the reporting agency, then they should be excluded. Because we have been unable to identify a single, convincing explanation for the observed phenomenon, we elected to perform our analysis both ways — including and excluding the post-2002 observations on the number of deaths. ESTIMATES Given the two alternative sample periods, the methodology we employ to generate our forecasts is as follows: First, because the number of deaths appears to be causally driven by the number of patients on the waiting list, we begin by estimating a simple linear regression model of the former as a function of the latter. The results of that estimation are reported in Table 1 for the two sample periods described above. Next, we estimate a second linear model with the number of patients on the waiting list regressed against time, again using the two alternative sample periods. Those results are reported in Table 2. From the results, <u><mark>we are able to produce forecasts of </mark>the expected size of <mark>future waiting lists</u></mark> for each of our sample periods. <u>We run the forecasts out 10 years</u> from the end of our longer sample period, to 2015. Given the forecasted waiting list values, we are then able to use the regression results in Table 1 to generate our forecasts of the number of deaths over the same period. The two alternative sets of forecasts are shown graphically in Figures 3 and 4. Depending upon the sample period chosen, the results show the waiting list reaching 145,691 to 152,400 patients by 2015. Of the patients listed at that time, between 10,547 and 13,642 are expected to die that year. Even more tragically, over the entire period of both actual and predicted values, <u>a cumulative total of<mark> 196,310 patients are conservatively expected to die by 2015 as a consequence of the ongoing shortage</mark>.</u> Figure 5 illustrates the results. In that figure, we incorporate several historical reference points in order to put the numbers in perspective. No one directly involved in the transplant industry is likely to be surprised by our results. Thirty years of experience consistently point to a continuation of the current, long-standing trends. There is nothing on the horizon that should lead anyone to expect a sudden reversal. But our purpose is not to surprise the parties who are already knowledgeable about this increasingly severe problem. Rather, our intent is to awaken the sleeping policymakers whose continuing inaction will inevitably lead to these results. They can no longer continue to postpone meaningful reform of the U.S. organ transplant system in the futile hope that, somehow, things will improve. They will not.</p>

Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx

A

Navy

1

George Mason Call-Mohney

Steiner

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx

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Medicalization controls their impacts – if they don’t solve it they don’t solve any part of the aff

Elden 2

Stuart Elden, politics at University of Warwick, 2/29/2002 “The War of Races and the Constitution of the State: Foucault's «Il faut défendre la société» and the Politics of Calculation,” Boundary,http://boundary2.dukejournals.org/content/29/1/125.full.pdf

Racism as biologizing, as tied to a state, takes shape where the procedures of intervention ‘‘at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood Because certain groups in society are conceived of in medical terms, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power hen coupled with the mechanisms of mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely different ways. Bio-power is able to establish, between my life and the death of the other, a relation that is not warlike or confrontational but biological abnormal individuals can be eliminated the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or the degenerate or abnormal, makes life purer This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing The theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically war is no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of regenerating that race In Nazism Eugenics and medical/mathematical techniques are coupled with the fantasy of blood and the ideal of the purity of the race the old sovereign power of killing traversed the entire society

The reverse side is the power to allow death. State racism is a recoding of the old mechanisms of blood through the new procedures of regulation. Racism, as biologizing, as tied to a state, takes shape where the procedures of intervention ‘‘at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race’’ (VS, 197; WK, 149).37 For example, the old anti-Semitism based on religion is reused under the new rubric of state racism. The integrity and purity of the race is threatened, and the state apparatuses are introduced against the race that has infiltrated and introduced noxious elements into the body. The Jews are characterized as the race present in the middle of all races (FDS, 76).38 The use of medical language is important. Because certain groups in society are conceived of in medical terms, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race. What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power (FDS, 230). The recoding of old problems is made possible through new techniques.2 A break or cut (coupure) is fundamental to racism: a division or incision between those who must live and those who must die. The ‘‘biological continuum of the human species’’ is fragmented by the apparition of races, which are seen as distinguished, hierarchized, qualified as good or inferior, and so forth. The species is subdivided into subgroups that are thought of as races. In a sense, then, just as the continuum of geometry becomes divisible in Descartes,39 the human continuum is divided, that is, made calculable and orderable, two centuries later. As Anderson has persuasively argued, to suggest that racism has its roots in nationalism is a mistake. He suggests that ‘‘the dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to ‘blue’ or ‘white’ blood and breeding among aristocracies.’’40 As Stoler has noted, for Foucault, it is the other way around: ‘‘A discourse of class derives from an earlier discourse of races.’’41 But it is a more subtle distinction than that. What Foucault suggests is that discourses of class have their roots in the war of races, but so, too, does modern racism; what is different is the biological spin put on the concepts.42 But as well as emphasizing the biological, modern racism puts this another way: to survive, to live, one must be prepared to massacre one’s enemies, a relation of war. As a relation of war, this is no different from the earlier war of races that Foucault has spent so much of the course explaining. But when coupled with the mechanisms of mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely different ways. Bio-power is able to establish, between my life and the death of the other, a relation that is not warlike or confrontational but biological: ‘‘The more inferior species tend to disappear, the more abnormal individuals can be eliminated, the less the species will be degenerated, the more I— not as an individual but as a species—will live, will be strong, will be vigorous, will be able to proliferate.’’ The death of the other does not just make me safer personally, but the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or the degenerate or abnormal, makes life in general healthier and purer (FDS, 227–28). ‘‘The existence in question is no longer of sovereignty, juridical; but that of the population, biological. If genocide is truly the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a return today of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population’’ (VS, 180; WK, 136). ‘‘If the power of normalization wishes to exercise the ancient sovereign right of killing, it must pass through racism. And if, inversely, a sovereign power, that is to say a power with the right of life and death, wishes to function with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it must also pass through racism’’ (FDS, 228). This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing. While not Darwinism, this biological sense of power is based on evolutionism and enables a thinking of colonial relations, the necessity of wars, criminality, phenomena of madness and mental illness, class divisions, and so forth. The link to colonialism is central: This form of modern state racism develops first with colonial genocide. The theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically. But what is important in the shift at the end of the nineteenth century is that war is no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of regenerating that race (FDS, 228–30). As Foucault puts it in La volonté de savoir: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of all; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity. Massacres have become vital [vitaux— understood in a dual sense, both as essential and biological]. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. (VS, 180; WK, 136) The shift Foucault thinks is interesting is what might be called a shift from sanguinity to sexuality: sanguinity, in that it had an instrumental role (the shedding of blood) and a symbolic role (purity of blood, differences of blood); sexuality, when mechanisms of power are directed to the body, to life. The theme of race is present in both, but in a different form (VS, 194; WK, 147). We have moved from ‘‘a symbolics of blood to an analytics of sexuality. Clearly, nothing was more on the side of the law, death, transgression, the symbolic, and sovereignty than blood; just as sexuality was on the side of the norm, knowledge, life, meaning, the disciplines and regulations’’ (VS, 195; WK, 148). In Nazism, the two are combined. Eugenics and medical/mathematical techniques are coupled with the fantasy of blood and the ideal of the purity of the race. Foucault notes that there was immediate control of procreation and genetics in the Nazi regime, and that regulation, security, and assurance were imposed over the disciplined, ordered society; but at the same time, the old sovereign power of killing traversed the entire society. This was not simply confined to the state, nor simply to the SA or the SS, but ultimately to everyone, as, through denunciation, everyone could have this power over their neighbor (FDS, 231).

<h4><strong>Medicalization controls their impacts – if they don’t solve it they don’t solve any part of the aff</h4><p></strong>Stuart <strong>Elden</strong>, politics at University of Warwick, 2/29/200<strong>2</strong> “The War of Races and the Constitution of the State: Foucault's «Il faut défendre la société» and the Politics of Calculation,” Boundary,http://boundary2.dukejournals.org/content/29/1/125.full.pdf </p><p><strong>The reverse side is the power to allow death. State racism is a recoding of the old mechanisms of blood through the new procedures of regulation. <mark>Racism</mark>, <mark>as biologizing, as tied to a state, takes shape where the procedures of intervention ‘‘at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life,</mark> <mark>received</mark> their color and their <mark>justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood</mark> and ensuring the triumph of the race’’ (VS, 197; WK, 149).37 For example, the old anti-Semitism based on religion is reused under the new rubric of state racism. The integrity and purity of the race is threatened, and the state apparatuses are introduced against the race that has infiltrated and introduced noxious elements into the body. The Jews are characterized as the race present in the middle of all races (FDS, 76).38 The use of medical language is important. <mark>Because certain groups in society are conceived of in medical terms, society is no longer in need of being defended from the outsider but from the insider: the abnormal in behavior, species, or race</mark>. <mark>What is novel is not the mentality of power but the technology of power</mark> (FDS, 230). The recoding of old problems is made possible through new techniques.2 A break or cut (coupure) is fundamental to racism: a division or incision between those who must live and those who must die. The ‘‘biological continuum of the human species’’ is fragmented by the apparition of races, which are seen as distinguished, hierarchized, qualified as good or inferior, and so forth. The species is subdivided into subgroups that are thought of as races. In a sense, then, just as the continuum of geometry becomes divisible in Descartes,39 the human continuum is divided, that is, made calculable and orderable, two centuries later. As Anderson has persuasively argued, to suggest that racism has its roots in nationalism is a mistake. He suggests that ‘‘the dreams of racism actually have their origin in ideologies of class, rather than in those of nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to ‘blue’ or ‘white’ blood and breeding among aristocracies.’’40 As Stoler has noted, for Foucault, it is the other way around: ‘‘A discourse of class derives from an earlier discourse of races.’’41 But it is a more subtle distinction than that. What Foucault suggests is that discourses of class have their roots in the war of races, but so, too, does modern racism; what is different is the biological spin put on the concepts.42 But as well as emphasizing the biological, modern racism puts this another way: to survive, to live, one must be prepared to massacre one’s enemies, a relation of war. As a relation of war, this is no different from the earlier war of races that Foucault has spent so much of the course explaining. But w<mark>hen coupled with the mechanisms of mathematics and medicine in bio-power, this can be conceived of in entirely different ways. Bio-power is able to establish, between my life and the death of the other, a relation that is not warlike or confrontational but biological</mark>: ‘‘The more inferior species tend to disappear, the more <mark>abnormal individuals can be eliminated</mark>, the less the species will be degenerated, the more I— not as an individual but as a species—will live, will be strong, will be vigorous, will be able to proliferate.’’ The death of the other does not just make me safer personally, but <mark>the death of the other, of the bad, inferior race or the degenerate or abnormal, makes life</mark> in general healthier and <mark>purer</mark> (FDS, 227–28). ‘‘The existence in question is no longer of sovereignty, juridical; but that of the population, biological. If genocide is truly the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a return today of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population’’ (VS, 180; WK, 136). ‘‘If the power of normalization wishes to exercise the ancient sovereign right of killing, it must pass through racism. And if, inversely, a sovereign power, that is to say a power with the right of life and death, wishes to function with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it must also pass through racism’’ (FDS, 228). <mark>This holds for indirect death—the exposure to death—as much as for direct killing</mark>. While not Darwinism, this biological sense of power is based on evolutionism and enables a thinking of colonial relations, the necessity of wars, criminality, phenomena of madness and mental illness, class divisions, and so forth. The link to colonialism is central: This form of modern state racism develops first with colonial genocide. <mark>The theme of the political enemy is extrapolated biologically</mark>. But what is important in the shift at the end of the nineteenth century is that <mark>war is no longer simply a way of securing one race by eliminating the other but of regenerating that race</mark> (FDS, 228–30). As Foucault puts it in La volonté de savoir: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of all; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity. Massacres have become vital [vitaux— understood in a dual sense, both as essential and biological]. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. (VS, 180; WK, 136) The shift Foucault thinks is interesting is what might be called a shift from sanguinity to sexuality: sanguinity, in that it had an instrumental role (the shedding of blood) and a symbolic role (purity of blood, differences of blood); sexuality, when mechanisms of power are directed to the body, to life. The theme of race is present in both, but in a different form (VS, 194; WK, 147). We have moved from ‘‘a symbolics of blood to an analytics of sexuality. Clearly, nothing was more on the side of the law, death, transgression, the symbolic, and sovereignty than blood; just as sexuality was on the side of the norm, knowledge, life, meaning, the disciplines and regulations’’ (VS, 195; WK, 148). <mark>In Nazism</mark>, the two are combined. <mark>Eugenics and medical/mathematical techniques are coupled with the fantasy of blood and the ideal of the purity of the race</mark>. Foucault notes that there was immediate control of procreation and genetics in the Nazi regime, and that regulation, security, and assurance were imposed over the disciplined, ordered society; but at the same time, <mark>the old sovereign power of killing traversed the entire society</strong></mark>. This was not simply confined to the state, nor simply to the SA or the SS, but ultimately to everyone, as, through denunciation, everyone could have this power over their neighbor (FDS, 231).</p>

Off

CP

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx

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Navy

5

Florida Cone-Marchini

Corrigan

1AC PAS Biopower 1NC Foucault K Physician PIC Ableism Turns 2NR Ableism

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Coercion of the poor does not apply to central purchasing –egg donations prove

Sobota 4

Sobota 4 Margaret R. Sobota, J.D. Candidate (2005), Washington University School of Law. Washington University Law Quarterly Fall, 2004 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1225 NOTE: THE PRICE OF LIFE: $ 50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY NOT $ 1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT TO ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT lexis

, the economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns In the proposed market system for organ procurement, the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices . With only moderate prices being paid , economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections , and thus no economic coercion would occur. Additionally, the current market system for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement. A majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical risks involved." These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors.

the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices With moderate prices being paid economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections thus no economic coercion would occur dditionally the market for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women

A. Arguments Opposing a Market for Organ Procurement The main argument against establishing a market for organ procurement is economic coercion. n141 Market opponents insist that poor, destitute people from around the world will be forced into selling their organs without making an in-formed decision. n142 There are several flaws with this argument. n143 First, the economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns about becoming a donor. n144 In the proposed market system for organ procurement, either OPOs or the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices paid for organs. n145 With only moderate prices being paid to organ donors, economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections to donation, and thus no economic coercion would occur. n146 Additionally, the current market system for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement. n147 A majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical [*1246] risks involved." n148 These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors.

<h4><strong>Coercion of the poor does not apply to central purchasing –egg donations prove</h4><p>Sobota 4</strong> Margaret R. Sobota, J.D. Candidate (2005), Washington University School of Law. Washington University Law Quarterly Fall, 2004 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1225 NOTE: THE PRICE OF LIFE: $ 50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY NOT $ 1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT TO ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT lexis</p><p>A. Arguments Opposing a Market for Organ Procurement</p><p>The main argument against establishing a market for organ procurement is economic coercion. n141 Market opponents insist that poor, destitute people from around the world will be forced into selling their organs without making an in-formed decision. n142 There are several flaws with this argument. n143 First<u>, the economic coercion argument is based on the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns </u>about becoming a donor. n144 <u>In the proposed market system for organ procurement, </u>either OPOs or<u> <mark>the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential wealthy recipients from driving up the prices</mark> </u>paid for organs<u>.</u> n145 <u><mark>With </mark>only <mark>moderate prices being paid</mark> </u>to organ donors<u>, <mark>economic incentives would likely not outweigh a donor's moral objections</mark> </u>to donation<u>, and <mark>thus no economic coercion</mark> <mark>would occur</mark>.</u> n146 <u>A<mark>dditionally</mark>, <mark>the</mark> current <mark>market</mark> system <mark>for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a problem in a market for organ procurement</mark>.</u> n147 <u><strong>A <mark>majority of egg donors are not poor or minority women</strong></mark>, and the amounts paid to them for their donations are usually not an "undue inducement to undergo the medical</u> [*1246] <u>risks involved." </u>n148<u> These facts suggest that if a system of financial compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no economic coercion of donors.</p></u>

Contention 3 The Plan solves

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx

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Ndt

3

Gonzaga Newton-Spraker

Deming, Gramzinski, Susko

1AC - Organs (Shortages Illegal Markets) 1NC - T-Sales Property Rights DA TPA DA Tax Incentives CP 2NC - CP Case 1NR - Property Rights DA 2NR - DA Case

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Governments won’t utilize prediction market data

Tunkelang 10

Daniel Tunkelang 10, Head of Search Quality at LinkedIn, 6/9/10, “Why Can’t We Just Use Prediction Markets?,” http://thenoisychannel.com/2010/06/09/why-cant-we-just-use-prediction-markets

Prediction markets were all the rage a few years ago There was a proposal to have the US government run a prediction market for terrorist attacks In principle, this framework allows any event with a quantifiable outcome to be predicted prediction markets have not had a broad impact on decision making despite all of the “anys Outside of political forecasting and sports gambling I’m not aware of any groups outside of academia that invest significantly in the use of prediction markets it’s safe to say prediction markets have had limited traction

P m s were all the rage years ago There was a proposal to have the gov run a market In principle, this allows any event to be predicted prediction markets have not had a broad impact on decision making, despite all the “anys Outside of political forecasting and sports gambling I’m not aware of any groups outside of academia that invest significantly in the use of prediction markets prediction markets have had limited traction

Prediction markets were all the rage a few years ago, two of the most notable being the Iowa Electronic Market forecasting electoral results and the now defunct Tradesports offering a similar platform for betting on sports events. There was even a proposal to have the US government run a prediction market for terrorist attacks. In a prediction market, any event with a quantifiable (e.g., binary) outcome can be converted into an asset. At any given time, the asset value corresponds to the market prediction of the probability of the outcome. Just as in any security market, participants determine the value through their buying and selling actions. In principle, this framework allows any event with a quantifiable outcome to be predicted by a marketplace. But, at least from my vantage point, prediction markets have not had a broad impact on decision making, despite all of the “anys” in the previous paragraph. Outside of political forecasting and sports gambling (and of course finance itself), I’m not aware of any groups outside of academia that invest significantly in the use of prediction markets. Sure, there’s the Hollywood Stock Exchange that applies the fantasy sports concept to the movie industry and even startup Empire Avenue that aspires to generalize this idea even further into an “online influence stock exchange”. Still, I think it’s safe to say that prediction markets have had limited traction to date.

<h4>Governments won’t <u>utilize</u> prediction market data </h4><p>Daniel <strong>Tunkelang 10</strong>, Head of Search Quality at LinkedIn, 6/9/10, “Why Can’t We Just Use Prediction Markets?,” http://thenoisychannel.com/2010/06/09/why-cant-we-just-use-prediction-markets</p><p><u><mark>P</mark>rediction <mark>m</mark>arket<mark>s were</u> <u>all the rage</mark> a few <mark>years ago</u></mark>, two of the most notable being the Iowa Electronic Market forecasting electoral results and the now defunct Tradesports offering a similar platform for betting on sports events. <u><mark>There was</u></mark> even <u><mark>a proposal to have the</mark> US <mark>gov</mark>ernment <mark>run a</mark> prediction <mark>market</mark> for terrorist attacks</u>. </p><p>In a prediction market, any event with a quantifiable (e.g., binary) outcome can be converted into an asset. At any given time, the asset value corresponds to the market prediction of the probability of the outcome. Just as in any security market, participants determine the value through their buying and selling actions. <u><mark>In principle, this</mark> framework <mark>allows any event</mark> with a quantifiable outcome <mark>to be predicted</u></mark> by a marketplace. </p><p>But, at least from my vantage point, <u><mark>prediction markets have</u> <u>not had a broad impact on decision making</u>, <u>despite all</mark> of <mark>the “anys</u></mark>” in the previous paragraph. <u><mark>Outside of political forecasting and sports gambling</u></mark> (and of course finance itself), <u><mark>I’m not aware of any groups outside of academia that invest significantly in the use of prediction markets</u></mark>. Sure, there’s the Hollywood Stock Exchange that applies the fantasy sports concept to the movie industry and even startup Empire Avenue that aspires to generalize this idea even further into an “online influence stock exchange”. Still, I think <u>it’s safe to say</u> that <u><mark>prediction markets have had limited traction</u></mark> to date.</p>

Block

AT: Empirics

AT: Inevitable

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Navy

8

Wake Forest Nasar-Raudenbush

Ridley

1AC OG (WTO Banks) 1NC Security K

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Organs from cadavers don’t solve

Fry-Revere 14

Fry-Revere 14 Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014

The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 6 Today the number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital. no matter how the process for retrieving organs from the dead improves, there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand.

kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital no matter how the process for retrieving organs improves there will never be enough

The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 6 At the time, what Congress did seemed reasonable, but over the following three decades, no matter how efficient the U.S. cadaver organ procurement sys- tem became, it could not satisfy the demand. Medical innovations keep people alive longer, and the ever-growing diabetes and hypertension epidemics contin- ually increased the number of people who could benefit from a kidney transplant. Today the number of kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. This is true because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital. Patients who die in the hospital after a car accident or similar trauma are the best potential organ donors because the appropriate medical equip- ment is at hand to switch gears from saving the patient to preserving organs for transplantation. Nevertheless, given what we know now, no matter how the process for retrieving organs from the dead improves, there will never be enough kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand.

<h4>Organs from cadavers don’t solve</h4><p><strong>Fry-Revere 14</strong> Sigrid Fry-Revere. Director of bioethics studies, CATO Institute 2014 </p><p><u>The Kidney Sellers: A Journey of Discovery in Iran p 6</p><p></u>At the time, what Congress did seemed reasonable, but over the following three decades, no matter how efficient the U.S. cadaver organ procurement sys- tem became, it could not satisfy the demand. Medical innovations keep people alive longer, and the ever-growing diabetes and hypertension epidemics contin- ually increased the number of people who could benefit from a kidney transplant. <u>Today the number of <mark>kidneys provided from cadavers could never be enough, even if every organ from every potential qualified donor could be harvested. </mark>This is true <mark>because not every death results in useable organs. Organs can be diseased or injured, or the body can be dead too long before it reaches the hospital</mark>.</u> Patients who die in the hospital after a car accident or similar trauma are the best potential organ donors because the appropriate medical equip- ment is at hand to switch gears from saving the patient to preserving organs<u> </u>for transplantation. Nevertheless, given what we know now,<u> <mark>no matter how the process for retrieving organs</mark> from the dead <mark>improves</mark>, <mark>there will never be enough</mark> kidneys to meet the ever-growing demand.</p></u>

Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx

A

Navy

1

George Mason Call-Mohney

Steiner

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Suicide isn’t a medical problem---legalizing suicide but removing the physician and medical profession as a whole from the picture is key

Szasz 99

Thomas S. Szasz 99, psychiatrist, Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association, member of the American Psychoanalytic Association, professor of psychiatry at the State University of New York, and professor emeritus of psychiatry at the SUNY Upstate Medical University in Syracuse, “Suicide as a Moral Issue”, July 1999, published by The Foundation for Economic Education, The Freeman, 49: 41-42

*edited for gender "Suicide is an event that is a part of human nature every person must confront it for himself anew, and every age must come to its own terms with it." --Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) dying voluntarily is a choice intrinsic to human existence. It is our ultimate, fatal freedom. That is not how the right-thinking person today sees voluntary death: [s]he believes that no one in his right mind kills himself, that suicide is a mental health problem. Behind that belief lies a transparent evasion: relying on physicians to prevent suicide as well as to provide suicide -- and thus avoid the subject of suicide -- is an evasion of personal responsibility fatal to freedom. the time is ripe to rethink our attitude toward suicide and its relation to the medical profession, accept suicide comfortably, and speak about it calmly we must demedicalize and destigmatize voluntary death and accept it as a behavior that has always been and will always be a part of the human condition Wanting to die cannot be a bona fide medical treatment; and it can never justify deprivation of liberty. advances in medical technology have transformed how we die machines, transplanted organs, and immunosuppressive drugs have created choices not only about whether to live or die but also about when and how to die. procreating voluntarily is a personal decision dying voluntarily is also a personal decision The state and the medical profession no longer interfere with birth control. They ought to stop interfering with death control. As a society, we can choose to let people die on their own terms or force them to die on terms decreed by the dominant ethic suicide is logically anterior to physician-assisted suicide. Over time, social attitudes toward many behaviors have changed. Suicide began as a sin, became a crime, then became a mental illness, and now some people propose transferring it into the category called "treatment," provided the cure is under the control of doctors. Is killing oneself a voluntary act or the product of mental illness? Should physicians be permitted to use force to prevent suicide? Should they be authorized to prescribe a lethal dose of a drug for the purpose of suicide? Personal careers, professional identities, multi-billion dollar industries, legal doctrines, judicial procedures, and the life and liberty of every American hangs on how we answer these questions. Answering such questions requires no specialized knowledge of medicine or law. It requires only a willingness to open our eyes and look life -- and death -- in the eye. Evading that challenge is tantamount to denying that we are just as responsible for how we die as we are for how we live. The person who kills [her]self sees suicide as a solution For the person who kills [her]self suicide is an action Psychiatrists maintain that suicide is the result of a disease Set against this mind set, the view that, a priori, suicide has nothing to do with illness or medicine risks being dismissed akin to asserting that cancer has nothing to do with illness or medicine. The evidence that suicide is not a medical matter is all around us suicide is plainly not legal if it were, it would be illegal to use force to prevent suicide Instead, coercive suicide prevention is considered a life-saving treatment and helping a person kill [her]self is a felony. For a long time, suicide was the business of the Church and the priest. Now it is the business of the State and the doctor

Suicide is an event that is a part of human nature dying voluntarily is a choice intrinsic to human existence It is our ultimate fatal freedom relying on physicians to provide suicide is an evasion of personal responsibility fatal to freedom the time is ripe to rethink our attitude toward suicide and its relation to the medical profession we must demedicalize voluntary death procreating is a personal decision dying is also The state and the medical profession ought to stop interfering with death control Over time social attitudes change For the person who kills [her]self suicide is an action Psychiatrists maintain suicide is the result of a disease Set against this mind set, the view that suicide has nothing to do with medicine risks being dismissed The evidence that suicide is not a medical matter is all around us suicide is plainly not legal if it were, it would be illegal to use force to prevent suicide Instead coercive suicide prevention is considered life-saving and helping a person kill [her]self is a felony

*edited for gender "Suicide is an event that is a part of human nature. However much may have been said and done about it in the past, every person must confront it for himself anew, and every age must come to its own terms with it." --Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) Behind Goethe's simple statement lies a profound truth: dying voluntarily is a choice intrinsic to human existence. It is our ultimate, fatal freedom. That is not how the right-thinking person today sees voluntary death: [s]he believes that no one in his right mind kills himself, that suicide is a mental health problem. Behind that belief lies a transparent evasion: relying on physicians to prevent suicide as well as to provide suicide -- and thus avoid the subject of suicide -- is an evasion of personal responsibility fatal to freedom. Not long ago the right-thinking person believed that masturbation, oral sex, homosexuality, and other "unnatural acts" were medical problems whose solution was delegated to doctors. It took us a surprisingly long time to take these behaviors back from physicians, accept them comfortably, and speak about them calmly. Perhaps the time is ripe to rethink our attitude toward suicide and its relation to the medical profession, accept suicide comfortably, and speak about it calmly. To accomplish this, we must demedicalize and destigmatize voluntary death and accept it as a behavior that has always been and will always be a part of the human condition. Wanting to die or killing oneself is sometimes blameworthy, sometimes praiseworthy, and sometimes neither; it is not a disease; it cannot be a bona fide medical treatment; and it can never justify deprivation of liberty. Increasing life expectancy, advances in medical technology, and radical changes in the regulation of drug use and the economics of health care have transformed how we die. Formerly, most people died at home. Today, most people die in a hospital. Formerly, patients who could not breathe or whose kidneys or livers or hearts failed to function died. Now, they can be kept alive by machines, transplanted organs, and immunosuppressive drugs. These developments have created choices not only about whether to live or die but also about when and how to die. Birth and death are unique phenomena. Absent celibacy or infertility, practicing birth control -- that is, procreating voluntarily -- is a personal decision. Absent accidental or sudden death, practicing death control -- that is, dying voluntarily -- is also a personal decision. The state and the medical profession no longer interfere with birth control. They ought to stop interfering with death control. Practicing birth control and practicing death control as well as abstaining from these practices have far-reaching consequences, for both the individual and others. Birth control is important for the young, death control, for the old. The young are often entrapped by abstaining from birth control, the old, by abstaining from death control. As individuals, we can choose to die actively or passively, practicing death control or dying of disease or old age. As a society, we can choose to let people die on their own terms or force them to die on terms decreed by the dominant ethic. Camus maintained that suicide is the only "truly serious philosophical problem." It would be more accurate to say that suicide is our foremost moral and political problem, logically anterior to such closely related problems as the right to reject treatment or the right to physician-assisted suicide. Faced with a particular personal conduct, we can approve, facilitate, and reward it; disapprove, hinder, and penalize it; or accept, tolerate, and ignore it. Over time, social attitudes toward many behaviors have changed. Suicide began as a sin, became a crime, then became a mental illness, and now some people propose transferring it into the category called "treatment," provided the cure is under the control of doctors. Is killing oneself a voluntary act or the product of mental illness? Should physicians be permitted to use force to prevent suicide? Should they be authorized to prescribe a lethal dose of a drug for the purpose of suicide? Personal careers, professional identities, multi-billion dollar industries, legal doctrines, judicial procedures, and the life and liberty of every American hangs on how we answer these questions. Answering such questions requires no specialized knowledge of medicine or law. It requires only a willingness to open our eyes and look life -- and death -- in the eye. Evading that challenge is tantamount to denying that we are just as responsible for how we die as we are for how we live. The person who kills [her]self sees suicide as a solution. If the observer views it as problem, he precludes understanding the suicide just as surely as he would preclude understanding a Japanese speaker if [s]he assumed that he is hearing garbled English. For the person who kills [her]self or plans to kill [her]self, suicide is, eo ipso, an action. Psychiatrists, however, maintain that suicide is a happening, the result of a disease: as coronary arteriosclerosis causes myocardial infarction, so clinical depression causes suicide. Set against this mind set, the view that, a priori, suicide has nothing to do with illness or medicine, which is my view, risks being dismissed as an act of intellectual know-nothingness, akin to asserting that cancer has nothing to do with illness or medicine. The evidence that suicide is not a medical matter is all around us. We are proud that suicide is no longer a crime, yet it is plainly not legal; if it were, it would be illegal to use force to prevent suicide and it would be legal to help a person kill himself. Instead, coercive suicide prevention is considered a life-saving treatment and helping a person kill [her]self is (in most jurisdictions) a felony. Supporters and opponents of policies concerning troubling social issues -- such as slavery, pornography, abortion -- have always invoked a sacred authority or creed to justify the policies they favored. Formerly, God, the Bible, the Church; now, the Constitution, Law, Medicine. It is an unpersuasive tactic: too many deplorable social policies have been justified by appeals to Scriptural, Constitutional, and Medical sanctions. The question of who should control when and how we die is one of the most troubling issues we face today. The debate is in full swing. Once again, the participants invoke the authority of the Bible, the Constitution, and Medicine to cast the decisive ballot in favor of their particular program. It is a spineless gambit: persons who promote particular social policies do so because they believe that their policies are superior to the policies of their adversaries. Accordingly, they ought to defend their position on the grounds of their own moral vision, instead of trying to disarm opponents by appealing to a sanctified authority. For a long time, suicide was the business of the Church and the priest. Now it is the business of the State and the doctor. Eventually we will make it our own business, regardless of what the Bible or the Constitution or Medicine supposedly tells us about it.

<h4>Suicide isn’t a medical problem---legalizing suicide but removing the physician and medical profession <u>as a whole</u> from the picture is key</h4><p>Thomas S. <strong>Szasz 99</strong>, psychiatrist, Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association, member of the American Psychoanalytic Association, professor of psychiatry at the State University of New York, and professor emeritus of psychiatry at the SUNY Upstate Medical University in Syracuse, “Suicide as a Moral Issue”, July 1999, published by The Foundation for Economic Education, The Freeman, 49: 41-42</p><p><u>*edited for gender</p><p>"<mark>Suicide is an event that is a part of human nature</u></mark>. However much may have been said and done about it in the past, <u>every person must confront it for himself anew, and every age must come to its own terms with it." </p><p><strong>--Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) </p><p></u></strong>Behind Goethe's simple statement lies a profound truth: <u><mark>dying voluntarily is a choice intrinsic to human existence</mark>. <mark>It is our ultimate</mark>, <mark>fatal freedom</mark>. That is not how the right-thinking person today sees voluntary death: [s]he believes that no one in his right mind kills himself, that suicide is a mental health problem. Behind that belief lies a transparent evasion: <strong><mark>relying on physicians</strong></mark> to prevent suicide as well as <strong><mark>to provide suicide</strong></mark> -- and thus avoid the subject of suicide -- <strong><mark>is an evasion of personal responsibility fatal to freedom</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>Not long ago the right-thinking person believed that masturbation, oral sex, homosexuality, and other "unnatural acts" were medical problems whose solution was delegated to doctors. It took us a surprisingly long time to take these behaviors back from physicians, accept them comfortably, and speak about them calmly. Perhaps <u><strong><mark>the time is ripe to rethink our attitude toward suicide and its relation to the medical profession</mark>, accept suicide comfortably, and speak about it calmly</u></strong>. To accomplish this, <u><mark>we must <strong>demedicalize</strong></mark> and destigmatize <mark>voluntary death</mark> and accept it as a behavior that has always been and will always be a part of the human condition</u>. <u>Wanting to die</u> or killing oneself is sometimes blameworthy, sometimes praiseworthy, and sometimes neither; it is not a disease; it <u>cannot be a bona fide medical treatment; and it can never justify deprivation of liberty. </p><p></u>Increasing life expectancy, <u>advances in medical technology</u>, and radical changes in the regulation of drug use and the economics of health care <u>have transformed how we die</u>. Formerly, most people died at home. Today, most people die in a hospital. Formerly, patients who could not breathe or whose kidneys or livers or hearts failed to function died. Now, they can be kept alive by <u>machines, transplanted organs, and immunosuppressive drugs</u>. These developments <u><strong>have created choices not only about whether to live or die but also about when and how to die. </p><p></u></strong>Birth and death are unique phenomena. Absent celibacy or infertility, practicing birth control -- that is, <u><mark>procreating</mark> voluntarily</u> -- <u><mark>is a personal decision</u></mark>. Absent accidental or sudden death, practicing death control -- that is, <u><mark>dying</mark> voluntarily</u> -- <u><mark>is also</mark> a personal decision</u>. <u><mark>The state and the medical profession</mark> no longer interfere with birth control. <strong>They <mark>ought to stop interfering with death control</mark>. </p><p></u></strong>Practicing birth control and practicing death control as well as abstaining from these practices have far-reaching consequences, for both the individual and others. Birth control is important for the young, death control, for the old. The young are often entrapped by abstaining from birth control, the old, by abstaining from death control. </p><p>As individuals, we can choose to die actively or passively, practicing death control or dying of disease or old age. <u>As a society, we can choose to let people die on their own terms or force them to die on terms decreed by the dominant ethic</u>. Camus maintained that suicide is the only "truly serious philosophical problem." It would be more accurate to say that <u>suicide is</u> our foremost moral and political problem, <u>logically anterior to</u> such closely related problems as the right to reject treatment or the right to <u>physician-assisted suicide. </p><p></u>Faced with a particular personal conduct, we can approve, facilitate, and reward it; disapprove, hinder, and penalize it; or accept, tolerate, and ignore it. <u><mark>Over time</mark>, <mark>social attitudes</mark> toward many behaviors have <mark>change</mark>d. Suicide began as a sin, became a crime, then became a mental illness, and now some people propose transferring it into the category called "treatment," provided the cure is under the control of doctors. </p><p>Is killing oneself a voluntary act or the product of mental illness? Should physicians be permitted to use force to prevent suicide? Should they be authorized to prescribe a lethal dose of a drug for the purpose of suicide? Personal careers, professional identities, multi-billion dollar industries, legal doctrines, judicial procedures, and the life and liberty of every American hangs on how we answer these questions. Answering such questions requires no specialized knowledge of medicine or law. It requires only a willingness to open our eyes and look life -- and death -- in the eye. Evading that challenge is tantamount to denying that we are just as responsible for how we die as we are for how we live. </p><p>The person who kills [her]self sees suicide as a solution</u>. If the observer views it as problem, he precludes understanding the suicide just as surely as he would preclude understanding a Japanese speaker if [s]he assumed that he is hearing garbled English. <u><mark>For the person who kills [her]self</u></mark> or plans to kill [her]self, <u><mark>suicide is</u></mark>, eo ipso, <u><mark>an action</u></mark>. <u><mark>Psychiatrists</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>maintain</mark> that <mark>suicide is</mark> </u>a happening, <u><mark>the result of a disease</u></mark>: as coronary arteriosclerosis causes myocardial infarction, so clinical depression causes suicide. <u><mark>Set against this mind set, the view that</mark>, a priori, <mark>suicide has <strong>nothing to do with</strong></mark> illness or <strong><mark>medicine</u></strong></mark>, which is my view, <u><mark>risks being dismissed</u></mark> as an act of intellectual know-nothingness, <u>akin to asserting that cancer has nothing to do with illness or medicine. </p><p><strong><mark>The evidence that suicide is not a medical matter is all around us</u></strong></mark>. We are proud that <u><mark>suicide</u></mark> is no longer a crime, yet it <u><strong><mark>is plainly not legal</u></strong></mark>; <u><mark>if it were, it would be illegal to use force to prevent suicide</u></mark> and it would be legal to help a person kill himself. <u><mark>Instead</mark>, <mark>coercive suicide prevention is considered</mark> a <mark>life-saving</mark> treatment <mark>and helping a person kill [her]self is</u></mark> (in most jurisdictions) <u><mark>a felony</mark>. </p><p></u>Supporters and opponents of policies concerning troubling social issues -- such as slavery, pornography, abortion -- have always invoked a sacred authority or creed to justify the policies they favored. Formerly, God, the Bible, the Church; now, the Constitution, Law, Medicine. It is an unpersuasive tactic: too many deplorable social policies have been justified by appeals to Scriptural, Constitutional, and Medical sanctions. </p><p>The question of who should control when and how we die is one of the most troubling issues we face today. The debate is in full swing. Once again, the participants invoke the authority of the Bible, the Constitution, and Medicine to cast the decisive ballot in favor of their particular program. It is a spineless gambit: persons who promote particular social policies do so because they believe that their policies are superior to the policies of their adversaries. Accordingly, they ought to defend their position on the grounds of their own moral vision, instead of trying to disarm opponents by appealing to a sanctified authority. </p><p><u>For a long time, suicide was the business of the Church and the priest. Now it is the business of the State and the doctor</u>. Eventually we will make it our own business, regardless of what the Bible or the Constitution or Medicine supposedly tells us about it.</p>

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1AC - PAS (pain) 1NC - Cap Physicians PIC Politics 2NR - Politics

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And their recentering of individual autonomy prevents an analysis of medicine as a system of power relations – links to the K and turns case even if they’re right about the act of PAS

Salem 99

Salem 99 Tania Salem, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide?” Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full

There is a certain consensus that institutionalization of death has extended physicians’ role in regulating death In the wake of the “right to die” movement doctors share end-of-life decisions and choices with patients and families 70 percent of deaths in the hospital occur after a decision has been made to withhold treatment one of the most dramatic aspects of medicine's extended power over contemporary sensibilities has been precisely medicine's ability to mold our conceptions about dying medicalization of death, is so deeply embedded in our culture that it goes unnoticed The sway of medicine should not be understood as a Machiavellian strategy devised by doctors physicians themselves are under medicine's power and not always aware of their critical role in the cultural construction of death and dying the paradox dissolves, when we recognize it as a facet of how thoroughly public conscience is imbued with medical ideology Physician-assisted suicide is widely but incorrectly represented as a further step in the demedicalization of death begun by the patients’ rights and right to die movements. It ultimately extends the power of physicians in regulating death, now under the guise of “assisting” suicide

institutionalization of death has extended physicians’ role in regulating death doctors share end-of-life decisions and choices with patients and families one of the most dramatic aspects of medicine's extended power over contemporary sensibilities has been precisely medicine's ability to mold our conceptions about dyin medicalization of death, is so deeply embedded in our culture that it goes unnoticed The sway of medicine should not be understood as a Machiavellian strategy devised by doctors physicians themselves are under medicine's power and not always aware of their critical role in the cultural construction of death and dying Physician-assisted suicide is widely but incorrectly represented as a further step in the demedicalization of death begun by the patients’ rights movements It ultimately extends the power of physicians in regulating death, now under the guise of “assisting” suicide

There is a certain consensus that the institutionalization of death, its transference from the community to the hospital setting and its medicalization, has extended physicians’ role in regulating death. Today some 80 percent of deaths in the United States take place in health care facilities, while as recently as fifty years ago only a small minority of people died in hospitals or long-term care facilities. In the wake of the “right to die” movement, today in theory—and to some extent in actual practice—doctors share end-of-life decisions and choices with patients and families. In this sense, all contrive to consolidate “managed death” as the predominant way of dying in the United States. Indeed, the American Hospital Association reported that about 70 percent of deaths in the hospital occur after a decision has been made to withhold treatment.30 Despite the space ceded to patients’ autonomous choices, one of the most dramatic aspects of medicine's extended power over contemporary sensibilities has been precisely medicine's ability to mold our conceptions about dying. This intangible aspect of medicine's power, such a crucial facet of the medicalization of death, is so deeply embedded in our culture that it goes unnoticed. The sway of medicine should not be understood as a Machiavellian strategy devised by doctors to dominate various domains of contemporary life; physicians themselves are under medicine's power and not always aware of their critical role in the cultural construction of death and dying. There is a paradox in our attitude toward modern medicine: on the one hand, we criticize and wish to counterbalance medicine's power through the enhancement of the patient's autonomy, and on the other, we open up the doors for physicians in the domain of suicide. Yet from another perspective the paradox dissolves, when we recognize it as a facet of how thoroughly public conscience is imbued with medical ideology. Physician-assisted suicide is widely but incorrectly represented as a further step in the demedicalization of death begun by the patients’ rights and right to die movements. It ultimately extends the power of physicians in regulating death, now under the guise of “assisting” suicide.

<h4>And their recentering of individual autonomy prevents an analysis of medicine as a system of power relations – links to the K and turns case even if they’re right about the act of PAS</h4><p><strong>Salem 99</strong> Tania Salem, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide?” Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full</p><p><u>There is a certain consensus that</u> the <u><mark>institutionalization of death</u></mark>, its transference from the community to the hospital setting and its medicalization, <u><mark>has extended physicians’ role in regulating death</u></mark>. Today some 80 percent of deaths in the United States take place in health care facilities, while as recently as fifty years ago only a small minority of people died in hospitals or long-term care facilities.</p><p><u>In the wake of the “right to die” movement</u>, today in theory—and to some extent in actual practice—<u><mark>doctors share end-of-life decisions and choices with patients and families</u></mark>. In this sense, all contrive to consolidate “managed death” as the predominant way of dying in the United States. Indeed, the American Hospital Association reported that about <u>70 percent of deaths in the hospital occur after a decision has been made to withhold treatment</u>.30</p><p>Despite the space ceded to patients’ autonomous choices, <u><mark>one of the most dramatic aspects of medicine's extended power over contemporary sensibilities has been precisely medicine's ability to mold our conceptions about dyin</mark>g</u>. This intangible aspect of medicine's power, such a crucial facet of the <u><mark>medicalization of death, is so deeply embedded in our culture that it goes unnoticed</u></mark>. <u><mark>The sway of medicine should not be understood as a Machiavellian strategy devised by doctors</u></mark> to dominate various domains of contemporary life; <u><mark>physicians themselves are under medicine's power and not always aware of their critical role in the cultural construction of death and dying</u></mark>.</p><p>There is a paradox in our attitude toward modern medicine: on the one hand, we criticize and wish to counterbalance medicine's power through the enhancement of the patient's autonomy, and on the other, we open up the doors for physicians in the domain of suicide. Yet from another perspective <u>the paradox dissolves, when we recognize it as a facet of how thoroughly public conscience is imbued with medical ideology</u>.</p><p><u><mark>Physician-assisted suicide is widely but incorrectly represented as a further step in the demedicalization of death begun by the patients’ rights</mark> and right to die <mark>movements</mark>. <mark>It ultimately extends the power of physicians in regulating death, now under the guise of “assisting” suicide</u></mark>.</p>

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Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4

Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. , the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. . Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified They harbor the “priming” that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life

central to our approach is a blurring of wartime and peacetime violence Close attention to the “little” violences produced in structures of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons it is absolutely necessary to make existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. an even greater risk lies in in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices daily enacted by “ordinary” citizens These are “invisible” genocides because they are right before our eyes and war crimes are ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically in the extreme context of war it is essential that we exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity of ordinary people, to enforce genocidal like crimes There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence mass violence is socially incremental and often experienced as expected, routine They harbor the priming that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22) **Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the scale of violence and the disproportionate relationship between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

<h4><strong>Structural violence is the largest proximate cause of war- creates priming that psychologically structures escalation</h4><p>Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4</p><p></strong>(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22) **Answers no root cause- because there is no root cause we must be attentative to structural inequality of all kinds because it primes people for broader violence- our impact is about the scale of violence and the disproportionate relationship between that scale and warfare, not that one form of social exclusion comes first</p><p>This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). <u>Absolutely <mark>central</mark> <mark>to our approach</mark> <mark>is a blurring of</mark> categories and distinctions between <mark>wartime and peacetime violence</mark>. <mark>Close attention to the “little” violences produced in</mark> the <mark>structures</mark>, habituses, and mentalites <mark>of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities</mark>.</u> More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. <u>The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which <strong><mark>humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons</strong></mark> and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder.</u> We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, <u><mark>it is absolutely necessary to make</mark> just such <mark>existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times.</u></mark> Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and <u>there is), <mark>an even greater</mark> <mark>risk</mark> <mark>lies in</mark> failing to sensitize ourselves, <mark>in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices</mark> and sentiments <mark>daily enacted</mark> as normative behavior <mark>by “ordinary”</mark> good-enough <mark>citizens</mark>. Peacetime crimes</u>, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), <u>constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides”</u> to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. <u><mark>These are “invisible” genocides</mark> not <mark>because they are</mark> secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite.</u> As Wittgenstein observed<u>, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are <mark>right before our eyes and</mark> therefore taken for granted.</u> In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. <u>Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that <mark>war crimes are</mark> merely <mark>ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically</mark> and dramatically <mark>in the extreme context of war</u></mark>. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. <u>The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? </u>What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end <u><mark>it is essential that we</mark> recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to <mark>exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the</mark> less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded <mark>everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts</mark> <mark>and policies</mark> <mark>possible</u></mark> (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. <u>Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency”</u> (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” <u><mark>Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence</mark> <mark>allows us to see the capacity</mark> and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - <mark>of ordinary people,</mark> the practical technicians of the social consensus, <mark>to enforce genocidal</mark>-<mark>like</mark> <mark>crimes</mark> against categories of rubbish people. <mark>There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life</mark>. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment.</u> Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence<u>. <mark>Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence</mark> and genocide.</u> But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. <u>Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations.</u> It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting <u>that <mark>mass violence</mark> is part of a continuum, and that it <mark>is socially incremental and often experienced</mark> by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - <mark>as expected, routine</mark>, even justified</u>. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. <u><mark>They harbor the</u></mark> early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the <u>“<mark>priming</mark>”</u> (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) <u><mark>that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life</u></mark> and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).</p>

Contention 4 is risk calculus

Contention 3 The Plan solves

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Deming, Gramzinski, Susko

1AC - Organs (Shortages Illegal Markets) 1NC - T-Sales Property Rights DA TPA DA Tax Incentives CP 2NC - CP Case 1NR - Property Rights DA 2NR - DA Case

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WTO non-compliance inev

Ikenson 13

Daniel J. Ikenson 13, director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, MA in economics from George Washington University, “Protectionist Antidumping Regime Is a Pox on America’s Glass House,” www.cato.org/publications/commentary/protectionist-antidumping-regime-pox-americas-glass-house

U.S. policies have been the subject of more W T O disputes 119 and have been found to violate WTO rules more frequently than any other government’s policies No government is more likely to be out of compliance with a final DSB ruling the U S remains out of compliance in cases involving U.S. subsidies to cotton farmers restrictions on Antigua’s gambling services, country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the so-called Byrd Amendment, a variety of antidumping measures, and several other issues some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. , U.S. trade partners have either retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate yet non-compliance continues

U.S. policies have been the subject of more W T O disputes 119 and violate WTO rules more than any other government the U S remains out of compliance in subsidies to cotton farmers country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the Byrd Amendment antidumping measures, and several other issues U.S. trade partners have retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate yet non-compliance continues

Other candidates come to mind when contemplating the world’s worst international trade scofflaw, but the United States makes a strong case for itself. A recent Commerce Department determination that foreign companies like Samsung, LG, and Electrolux engaged in “targeted dumping” by reducing prices on their washing machines for Black Friday sales confirms that the United States is actively seeking that ignominious distinction. U.S. policies have been the subject of more World Trade Organization disputes (119, followed by the EU with 73, then China with 30) and have been found to violate WTO rules more frequently than any other government’s policies. No government is more likely to be out of compliance with a final WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) ruling — or for a longer period — than the U.S. government. To this day, the United States remains out of compliance in cases involving U.S. subsidies to cotton farmers, restrictions on Antigua’s provision of gambling services, country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the so-called Byrd Amendment, a variety of antidumping measures, and several other issues, some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. In some of these cases, U.S. trade partners have either retaliated, or been authorized to retaliate, against U.S. exporters or asset holders, yet the non-compliance continues as though the United States considers itself above the rules.

<h4>WTO non-compliance inev </h4><p>Daniel J. <strong>Ikenson 13</strong>, director of Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies, MA in economics from George Washington University, “Protectionist Antidumping Regime Is a Pox on America’s Glass House,” www.cato.org/publications/commentary/protectionist-antidumping-regime-pox-americas-glass-house</p><p>Other candidates come to mind when contemplating the world’s worst international trade scofflaw, but the United States makes a strong case for itself. A recent Commerce Department determination that foreign companies like Samsung, LG, and Electrolux engaged in “targeted dumping” by reducing prices on their washing machines for Black Friday sales confirms that the United States is actively seeking that ignominious distinction.</p><p><u><mark>U.S. policies have been the subject of more</u> <u>W</u></mark>orld <u><mark>T</u></mark>rade <u><mark>O</u></mark>rganization <u><mark>disputes</u></mark> (<u><strong><mark>119</u></strong></mark>, followed by the EU with 73, then China with 30) <u><mark>and</mark> have been found to <mark>violate WTO rules more</mark> frequently <mark>than any other government</mark>’s policies</u>. <u>No government is more likely to be out of compliance with a final</u> WTO Dispute Settlement Body (<u>DSB</u>) <u>ruling</u> — or for a longer period — than the U.S. government. To this day, <u><mark>the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>remains out of compliance in</mark> cases involving U.S. <mark>subsidies to cotton farmers</u></mark>, <u>restrictions on Antigua’s </u>provision of<u> gambling services, <mark>country of origin labeling requirements on meat products, the </mark>so-called <mark>Byrd Amendment</mark>, a variety of <mark>antidumping measures, and <strong>several other issues</u></strong></mark>, <u>some of which were adjudicated more than a decade ago. </u>In some of these cases<u>, <mark>U.S. trade partners <strong>have</strong></mark> either <strong><mark>retaliated</strong>, or been authorized to</mark> <mark>retaliate</u></mark>, against U.S. exporters or asset holders, <u><mark>yet</u></mark> the <u><mark>non-compliance continues</u><strong></mark> as though the United States considers itself above the rules.</p></strong>

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AT: Inevitable

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The possibility of complex artificial organs that actually function is at best decades away.

Adhikari 14

Adhikari 14 Richard Adhikari has written about high-tech for leading industry publications since the 1990s

http://www.technewsworld.com/story/80198.html According to Jordan Miller at Rice "Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away from reaching human patients," . "We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs." A 3D structure will require nearly 1 billion functioning cells to approximate the function of a liver or kidney, and "there are dozens of cell types in these organs," . "We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure."

Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are several decades away from reaching human patients We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs there are dozens of cell types in these organs We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure

03/26/14 Bioprinting, Part 1: The Promise and the Pitfalls http://www.technewsworld.com/story/80198.html [According to Jordan Miller, assistant professor of bioengineering at Rice University]. "Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are still several decades away from reaching human patients," Miller said. "We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs." A 3D structure will require nearly 1 billion functioning cells to approximate the function of a liver or kidney, and "there are dozens of cell types in these organs," Miller pointed out. "We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure." NOTE SOURCE WITH QUALS EDITED INTO BEGINNING OF CARD

<h4>The possibility of complex artificial organs that actually function is at best decades away.</h4><p><strong>Adhikari 14</strong> Richard Adhikari has written about high-tech for leading industry publications since the 1990s </p><p>03/26/14 Bioprinting, Part 1: The Promise and the Pitfalls <u>http://www.technewsworld.com/story/80198.html</p><p></u>[<u>According to Jordan Miller</u>, assistant professor of bioengineering <u>at Rice</u> University]. <u>"<mark>Parts of the body which require human cells to perform biomechanical functions, such as the liver or kidney, are </mark>still <mark>several decades away from reaching human patients</mark>," </u>Miller said<u>. "<mark>We are still in the feasibility stage -- not sure how to keep cells alive at high cell density and adequate size needed to match human organs</mark>." A 3D structure will require nearly 1 billion functioning cells to approximate the function of a liver or kidney, and "<mark>there are dozens of cell types in these organs</mark>," </u>Miller pointed out<u>. "<mark>We are typically only looking at one or two cell types being put into a 3D printed structure</mark>."</p><p></u>NOTE SOURCE WITH QUALS EDITED INTO BEGINNING OF CARD</p>

Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx

A

Navy

1

George Mason Call-Mohney

Steiner

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx

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Da.....

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Use of physicans turns the aff

Salem 99

Salem 99 Tania Salem, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide?” Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full

no doubt emphasis on inner individuals prevails in contemporary arguments for physician-assisted suicide Influences from the outside are seen as pernicious in subverting the main goal: the “pure” or “true” choice reached from within self-centered ethics rests on a nonrelational conception of personhood there is a paradox underlying physician-assisted suicide It is conceived of as an intimate, existential act and indeed a response to modern medicine, but at the same time it is a request for the complicity of physicians and society What seems unusual in the debate about aid in dying is the request for public endorsement and legitimization of the act of suicide Whereas in suicide the individual “drops out” of the social order, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the individual “drops into” a system that recognizes and must even authorize this particular choice displacing suicide from the private arena to bring it under medicine's stewardship means surrendering suicide to the (medical) “establishment decision to die by suicide is treated precisely as if it were a set of clinical problems to be solved medically the “private self-determining” decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event it cannot be seen as an act that solely expresses the ideal of individual autonomy as long as it entails assistance it implies a mutual decision and even more importantly assisted suicide presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide physician-assisted suicide entails an increase of medical power over death and social morality

emphasis on inner individuals prevails in contemporary arguments for p a s Influences from the outside are seen as pernicious in subverting the pure choice self-centered ethics rests on a nonrelational conception of personhood there is a paradox underlying physician-assisted suicide it is a request for the complicity of physicians (and society Whereas in suicide the individual “drops out” of the social order, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the individual “drops into” a system that recognizes and must even authorize this particular choice displacing suicide from the private arena to bring it under medicine's stewardship means surrendering suicide to the (medical) “establishment the “private self-determining” decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event it cannot be seen as an act that solely expresses the ideal of individual autonomy as long as it entails assistance even more importantly assisted suicide presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide physician-assisted suicide entails an increase of medical power over death and social morality

There is no doubt that the emphasis on inner individuals prevails in contemporary arguments for physician-assisted suicide. Influences from the outside, whether subtle or blatant, are seen as pernicious in subverting the main goal: the “pure” or “true” choice reached from within that at bottom takes account of the interests of the decisionmaker. This self-centered ethics rests on a nonrelational conception of personhood. The second—and closely related—pillar of this discourse is the insistence that individuals be radically free to exercise their singularities and idiosyncrasies. In pluralistic societies, it is asserted, “there is far from any agreement, or near-agreement, about how one can establish as canonical a particular normative view of life.”13 Because personal styles, experiences, and beliefs are radically irreducible, it is impossible to suppose a priori that individual choices will coincide; each must find his or her own way of facing dying and death.14 Yet there is a paradox underlying physician-assisted suicide. It is conceived of as an intimate, existential act and indeed a response to modern medicine, but at the same time it is a request for the complicity of physicians (and society). In contemporary Western societies the decision to take death into one's own hands has been construed as an act that is not simply personal, private, and solitary, but contrary to social norms and expectations. From a societal perspective, the individual who commits or attempts suicide is in this sense an outsider. What seems unusual in the debate about aid in dying is the request for public endorsement and legitimization of the act of suicide. Whereas in suicide the individual “drops out” of the social order, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the individual “drops into” a system that recognizes and must even authorize this particular (ostensibly private) choice. In other words, displacing suicide from the private arena to bring it under medicine's stewardship means surrendering suicide to the (medical) “establishment.” The decision to die by suicide is treated precisely as if it were a set of clinical problems to be solved medically— the “private,” “intimate,” “self-determining” decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event. Precisely because assisted suicide requires the connivance of others (direct from doctors, indirect from society), it cannot be seen as an act that solely expresses the ideal of individual autonomy. On the contrary, as long as it entails assistance it implies a mutual decision. Additionally, and even more importantly, more than a mutual decision, assisted suicide presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide. In sum, physician-assisted suicide both introduces tensions in the principle of personal autonomy and entails an increase of medical power over death and social morality.

<h4>Use of physicans turns the aff</h4><p><strong>Salem 99</strong> Tania Salem, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide?” Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/3528193/full</p><p>There is <u>no doubt</u> that the <u><mark>emphasis on inner individuals prevails in contemporary arguments for p</mark>hysician-<mark>a</mark>ssisted <mark>s</mark>uicide</u>. <u><mark>Influences from the outside</u></mark>, whether subtle or blatant, <u><mark>are seen as pernicious in subverting the</mark> main goal: the “<mark>pure</mark>” or “true” <mark>choice</mark> reached from within</u> that at bottom takes account of the interests of the decisionmaker. This <u><mark>self-centered ethics rests on a nonrelational conception of personhood</u></mark>.</p><p>The second—and closely related—pillar of this discourse is the insistence that individuals be radically free to exercise their singularities and idiosyncrasies. In pluralistic societies, it is asserted, “there is far from any agreement, or near-agreement, about how one can establish as canonical a particular normative view of life.”13 Because personal styles, experiences, and beliefs are radically irreducible, it is impossible to suppose a priori that individual choices will coincide; each must find his or her own way of facing dying and death.14</p><p>Yet <u><mark>there is a paradox underlying physician-assisted suicide</u></mark>. <u>It is conceived of as an intimate, existential act and indeed a response to modern medicine, but at the same time <mark>it is a request for the complicity of physicians</u> (<u>and society</u></mark>). In contemporary Western societies the decision to take death into one's own hands has been construed as an act that is not simply personal, private, and solitary, but contrary to social norms and expectations. From a societal perspective, the individual who commits or attempts suicide is in this sense an outsider.</p><p><u>What seems unusual in the debate about aid in dying is the request for public endorsement and legitimization of the act of suicide</u>. <u><mark>Whereas in suicide the individual “drops out” of the social order, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the individual “drops into” a system that recognizes and must even authorize this particular</u></mark> (ostensibly private) <u><mark>choice</u></mark>. In other words, <u><mark>displacing suicide from the private arena to bring it under medicine's stewardship means surrendering suicide to the (medical) “establishment</u></mark>.”</p><p>The <u>decision to die by suicide is treated precisely as if it were a set of clinical problems to be solved medically</u>— <u><mark>the “private</u></mark>,” “intimate,” “<u><mark>self-determining” decision to commit suicide is translated into a clinical event</u></mark>.</p><p>Precisely because assisted suicide requires the connivance of others (direct from doctors, indirect from society), <u><mark>it cannot be seen as an act that solely expresses the ideal of individual autonomy</u></mark>. On the contrary, <u><mark>as long as it entails assistance</mark> it implies a mutual decision</u>. Additionally, <u>and <mark>even more importantly</u></mark>, more than a mutual decision, <u><mark>assisted suicide presupposes that medicine has passed judgment on the act of suicide</u></mark>. In sum, <u><mark>physician-assisted suicide</u></mark> both introduces tensions in the principle of personal autonomy and <u><mark>entails an increase of medical power over death and social morality</u></mark>.</p>

CP

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx

N

Navy

2

Gonzaga Skoog-Weinhardt

Allen

1AC - PAS (pain) 1NC - Cap Physicians PIC Politics 2NR - Politics

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round2.docx

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PAS opens the door to physicians killing without the patients consent—Dutch studies prove.

Hendin et al 97

Hendin et al 97 Herbert Hendin, MD (AFSP), Chris Rutenfrans, PhD (Dept. of Justice, The Hague), Zbigniew Zylicz, MD (Hospice Rosenhuyvel), “Lessons From the Dutch”, Journal of the American Medical Association, June 4, 1997-Vol 277, No. 21. , http://www.life.org.nz/euthanasia/abouteuthanasia/history-euthanasia10/ //jchen

Death Without Consent The most alarming concern, to arise from the Dutch studies, has been the documentation of cases in which patients, who have not given their consent, have their lives ended by physicians. The 1990 study revealed that in 0.8% of the deaths, more than 1000 cases in the Netherlands each year, physicians admitted they had actively caused death without the explicit consent of the patient. while pointing to the decline, concede that differences in the way this particular information was obtained, make its significance uncertain. In both studies, however, about a quarter of physicians stated that they had "terminated the lives of patients without an explicit request" from the patient to do so and a third more of the physicians could conceive of doing so. The use of the word "explicit" is somewhat inaccurate since, in 48% of these cases, there was no request of any kind, (3[pp.1704]) and in the others, there were mainly references to patients’ earlier statements of not wanting to suffer (l[pp.5l]). International attention had centered on the 1350 cases, 1% of all Dutch deaths in 1990, in which physicians gave pain medication with the explicit intention of ending the patient's life As reported by the physicians, in the 1995 study, in more than 80% of these cases (1537 deaths), no request for death was made by the patient and involuntary (if the patient was competent) euthanasia, they will see this as a striking increase in the number of cases terminated without request and a refutation of the investigators’ claim that there has been perhaps a slight decrease in the number of such cases. totals all the deaths that resulted from euthanasia, assisted suicide, ending the life of a patient without consent, and giving opioids with the explicit intention of ending life, the estimated number of deaths, caused by active intervention by physicians, has increased from 4813 (3.7% of all deaths) in 1990 to 6368 (4.7% of all deaths) Based on data from the questionnaire study, this is an increase of 27% in cases in which physicians actively intervened to cause death (the interview study documents a 20% increase). The Dutch investigators minimize the significance of the number of deaths without consent by explaining that the patients were incompeten We are not told what percentage of those patients' who were given pain medication intended to end their lives without discussing it with them, were competent, but analysis of the data for opioid administration indicates that it is likely to be at least 20%. More than 4000 additional competent patients were given pain medication in amounts likely to end their lives by physicians who did not discuss the decision with them, but whose primary intention was not to end their lives Whether the intention was to end life, or whether death was simply likely, physicians usually gave as the reason for not discussing the decisions with the patients, that they had previously had some discussion of the subject with them (3[pp.1704]). Yet, it seems incomprehensible that a physician would terminate or put at risk the life of a competent patient on the basis of a previous discussion without checking what the patient currently felt. Dutch patient with disseminated breast cancer, who had said she did not want euthanasia, had her life ended because in the physician’s words, "It could have taken another week before she died. I just needed this bed"

The most alarming concern, to arise from the Dutch studies, has been the documentation of cases in which patients, who have not given their consent, have their lives ended by physicians. in 0.8% of the deaths, more than 1000 cases in the Netherlands each year, physicians admitted they had actively caused death without the consent of the patient. about a quarter of physicians stated that they had "terminated the lives of patients without an explicit request in 48% of these cases, there was no request of any kind in more than 80% of these cases (1537 deaths), no request for death was made by the patient Based on data from the questionnaire study, this is an increase of 27% in cases in which physicians actively intervened to cause death More than 4000 additional competent patients were given pain medication in amounts likely to end their lives by physicians who did not discuss the decision with them Dutch patient with disseminated breast cancer, who had said she did not want euthanasia, had her life ended because in the physician’s words, "It could have taken another week before she died. I just needed this bed

Moreover, almost 20% of the physicians’ most recent un-reported cases involved ending of a life without the patient's consent (4[pp.1708]). Such cases, both the 1990 and 1995 studies revealed, were virtually never reported (l[pp.65],4[pl7lO]). Death Without Consent The most alarming concern, to arise from the Dutch studies, has been the documentation of cases in which patients, who have not given their consent, have their lives ended by physicians. The 1990 study revealed that in 0.8% of the deaths, more than 1000 cases in the Netherlands each year, physicians admitted they had actively caused death without the explicit consent of the patient. The 1995 figure is 0.7% (fewer than 1000 cases), but the researchers, while pointing to the decline, concede that differences in the way this particular information was obtained, make its significance uncertain. In both studies, however, about a quarter of physicians stated that they had "terminated the lives of patients without an explicit request" from the patient to do so and a third more of the physicians could conceive of doing so. The use of the word "explicit" is somewhat inaccurate since, in 48% of these cases, there was no request of any kind, (3[pp.1704]) and in the others, there were mainly references to patients’ earlier statements of not wanting to suffer (l[pp.5l]). The 1990 study documented, and the 1995 study confirms, that cases classified, as "termination of the patient without explicit request", were a fraction of the nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia cases. International attention had centered on the 1350 cases, 1% of all Dutch deaths in 1990, in which physicians gave pain medication with the explicit intention of ending the patient's life (1[pp.73],12[pp.270]) The investigators minimized the number of patients put to death who had not requested it, by not including these 1350 patients, in that category. By 1995, there had been an increase in the number of deaths in which physicians gave pain medication, with the explicit intention of ending the patient's life, from 1350 cases (1% of all Dutch deaths) to 1896 (1.4% of all Dutch deaths)(3[p1700]). These are comparisons that the Dutch investigators do not make (see Table). As reported by the physicians, in the 1995 study, in more than 80% of these cases (1537 deaths), no request for death was made by the patient (3[pp.1704]). Since researchers around the world have treated these deaths as nonvoluntary and involuntary (if the patient was competent) euthanasia, they will see this as a striking increase in the number of cases terminated without request and a refutation of the investigators’ claim that there has been perhaps a slight decrease in the number of such cases. If one totals all the deaths that resulted from euthanasia, assisted suicide, ending the life of a patient without consent, and giving opioids with the explicit intention of ending life, the estimated number of deaths, caused by active intervention by physicians, has increased from 4813 (3.7% of all deaths) in 1990 to 6368 (4.7% of all deaths) in 1995 (Table). Based on data from the questionnaire study, this is an increase of 27% in cases in which physicians actively intervened to cause death (the interview study documents a 20% increase). The Dutch investigators minimize the significance of the number of deaths without consent by explaining that the patients were incompetent (3[pp.1702]). But in the 1995 study, 21% of the individuals classified as "patients whose lives were ended without explicit request" were competent: in the 1990 study, 37% were competent [l (pp.l704)] We are not told what percentage of those patients' who were given pain medication intended to end their lives without discussing it with them, were competent, but analysis of the data for opioid administration indicates that it is likely to be at least 20%. More than 4000 additional competent patients were given pain medication in amounts likely to end their lives by physicians who did not discuss the decision with them, but whose primary intention was not to end their lives (l[pp.75],3[pp.l700,l704]). Whether the intention was to end life, or whether death was simply likely, physicians usually gave as the reason for not discussing the decisions with the patients, that they had previously had some discussion of the subject with them (3[pp.1704]). Yet, it seems incomprehensible that a physician would terminate or put at risk the life of a competent patient on the basis of a previous discussion without checking what the patient currently felt. An illustration given by the attorney for the Dutch Voluntary Euthanasia Society of why it was often necessary for physicians to end the lives of competent patients without their consent, was the case of a nun whose physician ended her life a few days before she would have died because she was in excruciating pain but her religious convictions did not permit her to ask for death (8[pp.97]). In another case, a Dutch patient with disseminated breast cancer, who had said she did not want euthanasia, had her life ended because in the physician’s words, "It could have taken another week before she died. I just needed this bed" (13).

<h4><strong>PAS opens the door to physicians killing without the patients consent—Dutch studies prove.</h4><p>Hendin et al 97</p><p></strong>Herbert Hendin, MD (AFSP), Chris Rutenfrans, PhD (Dept. of Justice, The Hague), Zbigniew Zylicz, MD (Hospice Rosenhuyvel), “Lessons From the Dutch”, Journal of the American Medical Association, June 4, 1997-Vol 277, No. 21. , http://www.life.org.nz/euthanasia/abouteuthanasia/history-euthanasia10/ //jchen</p><p>Moreover, almost 20% of the physicians’ most recent un-reported cases involved ending of a life without the patient's consent (4[pp.1708]). Such cases, both the 1990 and 1995 studies revealed, were virtually never reported (l[pp.65],4[pl7lO]).</p><p><u>Death Without Consent</p><p><mark>The most alarming concern, to arise from the Dutch studies, has been the documentation of cases in which patients, who have not given their consent, have their lives ended by physicians.</mark> The 1990 study revealed that <mark>in 0.8% of the deaths, more than 1000 cases in the Netherlands each year, physicians admitted they had actively caused death without the </mark>explicit <mark>consent of the patient.</mark> </p><p></u>The 1995 figure is 0.7% (fewer than 1000 cases), but the researchers, <u>while pointing to the decline, concede that differences in the way this particular information was obtained, make its significance uncertain. In both studies, however, <mark>about a quarter of physicians stated that they had "terminated the lives of patients without an explicit request</mark>" from the patient to do so and a third more of the physicians could conceive of doing so. </p><p>The use of the word "explicit" is somewhat inaccurate since, <mark>in 48% of these cases, there was no request of any kind</mark>, (3[pp.1704]) and in the others, there were mainly references to patients’ earlier statements of not wanting to suffer (l[pp.5l]). </p><p></u>The 1990 study documented, and the 1995 study confirms, that cases classified, as "termination of the patient without explicit request", were a fraction of the nonvoluntary and involuntary euthanasia cases. <u>International attention had centered on the 1350 cases, 1% of all Dutch deaths in 1990, in which physicians gave pain medication with the explicit intention of ending the patient's life</u> (1[pp.73],12[pp.270]) The investigators minimized the number of patients put to death who had not requested it, by not including these 1350 patients, in that category. </p><p>By 1995, there had been an increase in the number of deaths in which physicians gave pain medication, with the explicit intention of ending the patient's life, from 1350 cases (1% of all Dutch deaths) to 1896 (1.4% of all Dutch deaths)(3[p1700]). These are comparisons that the Dutch investigators do not make (see Table). </p><p><u>As reported by the physicians, in the 1995 study, <mark>in more than 80% of these cases (1537 deaths), no request for death was made by the patient</u></mark> (3[pp.1704]). </p><p>Since researchers around the world have treated these deaths as nonvoluntary<u> and involuntary (if the patient was competent) euthanasia, they will see this as a striking increase in the number of cases terminated without request and a refutation of the investigators’ claim that there has been perhaps a slight decrease in the number of such cases. </p><p></u>If one <u>totals all the deaths that resulted from euthanasia, assisted suicide, ending the life of a patient without consent, and giving opioids with the explicit intention of ending life, the estimated number of deaths, caused by active intervention by physicians, has increased from 4813 (3.7% of all deaths) in 1990 to 6368 (4.7% of all deaths)</u> in 1995 (Table). <u><mark>Based on data from the questionnaire study, this is an increase of 27% in cases in which physicians actively intervened to cause death</mark> (the interview study documents a 20% increase). </p><p>The Dutch investigators minimize the significance of the number of deaths without consent by explaining that the patients were incompeten</u>t (3[pp.1702]). But in the 1995 study, 21% of the individuals classified as "patients whose lives were ended without explicit request" were competent: in the 1990 study, 37% were competent [l (pp.l704)] <u>We are not told what percentage of those patients' who were given pain medication intended to end their lives without discussing it with them, were competent, but analysis of the data for opioid administration indicates that it is likely to be at least 20%.</p><p><mark>More than 4000 additional competent patients were given pain medication in amounts likely to end their lives by physicians who did not discuss the decision with them</mark>, but whose primary intention was not to end their lives</u> (l[pp.75],3[pp.l700,l704]). </p><p><u>Whether the intention was to end life, or whether death was simply likely, physicians usually gave as the reason for not discussing the decisions with the patients, that they had previously had some discussion of the subject with them (3[pp.1704]). </p><p>Yet, it seems incomprehensible that a physician would terminate or put at risk the life of a competent patient on the basis of a previous discussion without checking what the patient currently felt. </p><p></u>An illustration given by the attorney for the Dutch Voluntary Euthanasia Society of why it was often necessary for physicians to end the lives of competent patients without their consent, was the case of a nun whose physician ended her life a few days before she would have died because she was in excruciating pain but her religious convictions did not permit her to ask for death (8[pp.97]). </p><p>In another case, a <u><mark>Dutch patient with disseminated breast cancer, who had said she did not want euthanasia, had her life ended because in the physician’s words, "It could have taken another week before she died. I just needed this bed</mark>"</u> (13).</p>

Case

CP

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx

N

Navy

5

Florida Cone-Marchini

Corrigan

1AC PAS Biopower 1NC Foucault K Physician PIC Ableism Turns 2NR Ableism

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round5.docx

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college

Great power war is obsolete – globalization, nuclear deterrence, and the cooperative liberal order ensure no conflict

Ikenberry and Deudney 9

Ikenberry and Deudney 9 (Daniel – Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and G. John – professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, Jan/Feb, “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Issue 1, p. 8)

the picture of an international system marked by conflict and competition is an exaggeration and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces , the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are globalization institutions and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides constraints and opportunities that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. great-power expansion has become obsolete. nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. in the twenty-first century the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the U S with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China revisionist states notably China and Russia are stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power Many other global institutions are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions The pathway to modernity is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside the liberal international order. The viability of regimes hinges on their ability to sustain economic growth which is crucially dependent on international trade Not only have these states joined the world economy, but their people have increasingly joined the world community citizens of autocratic states are participating in transnational networks. the values of "us versus them" become difficult to generate and sustain. These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here China Europe, India, Japan, the United States Iran and Russia share a common interest in security . The declining utility of war and emerging environmental interdependencies undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of international integration and cooperation

the picture of an international system marked by conflict and competition is an exaggeration and ignores powerful countervailing factors the most striking features are globalization institutions and interdependence The overall structure provides constraints that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. great-power expansion has become obsolete nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the powers possessing nuclear weapons The prospect of losses has instilled level of restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts trade, investment, and production across international borders raises the costs of war revisionist states, are stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo institution are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions their people have increasingly joined the world community the values of us versus them" become difficult to generate China Europe, India, Japan Iran and Russia share a common interest in security The declining utility of and emerging environmental interdependencies undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of cooperation.

It is in combination with these factors that the regime divergence between autocracies and democracies will become increasingly dangerous. If all the states in the world were democracies, there would still be competition, but a world riven by a democratic-autocratic divergence promises to be even more conflictual. There are even signs of the emergence of an "autocrats international" in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, made up of China, Russia, and the poorer and weaker Central Asian dictatorships. Overall, the autocratic revivalists paint the picture of an international system marked by rising levels of conflict and competition, a picture quite unlike the "end of history" vision of growing convergence and cooperation. This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what trhe revivalists describe, the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure of the international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities — of pushes and pulls — that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has become largely obsolete. Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war from a routine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts. Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge. The autocratic revival thesis neglects other key features of the international system as well. In the nineteenth century, rising states faced an international environment in which they could reasonably expect to translate their growing clout into geopolitical changes that would benefit themselves. But in the twenty-first century, the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the United States with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states in Europe and East Asia whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China or even of a coalition of autocratic states. Moreover, potentially revisionist autocratic states, most notably China and Russia, are already substantial players and stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power). Many other global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions. The pathway to modernity for rising states is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside and through the flexible and accommodating institutions of the liberal international order. The fact that these autocracies are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that point toward integration and accommodation in the future. The domestic viability of these regimes hinges on their ability to sustain high economic growth rates, which in turn is crucially dependent on international trade and investment; today's autocracies may be illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on a liberal international capitalist system. It is not surprising that China made major domestic changes in order to join the WTO or that Russia is seeking to do so now. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rulebased economic system. (Although these autocratic states do pursue bilateral trade and investment deals, particularly in energy and raw materials, this does not obviate their more basic dependence on and commitment to the WTO order.) In the case of China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states. Given their position in this system, which so serves their interests, the autocratic states are unlikely to become champions of an alternative global or regional economic order, let alone spoilers intent on seriously damaging the existing one. The prospects for revisionist behavior on the part of the capitalist autocracies are further reduced by the large and growing social networks across international borders. Not only have these states joined the world economy, but their people — particularly upwardly mobile and educated elites — have increasingly joined the world community. In large and growing numbers, citizens of autocratic capitalist states are participating in a sprawling array of transnational educational, business, and avocational networks. As individuals are socialized into the values and orientations of these networks, stark: "us versus them" cleavages become more difficult to generate and sustain. As the Harvard political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston has argued, China's ruling elite has also been socialized, as its foreign policy establishment has internalized the norms and practices of the international diplomatic community. China, far from cultivating causes for territorial dispute with its neighbors, has instead sought to resolve numerous historically inherited border conflicts, acting like a satisfied status quo state. These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here. Finally, there is an emerging set of global problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization that will create common interests across states regardless of regime type. Autocratic China is as dependent on imported oil as are democratic Europe, India, Japan, and the United States, suggesting an alignment of interests against petroleum-exporting autocracies, such as Iran and Russia. These states share a common interest in price stability and supply security that could form the basis for a revitalization of the International Energy Agency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of global warming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic-democratic divide. Like the United States, China is not only a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but also likely to be a major victim of climate-induced desertification and coastal flooding. Its rapid industrialization and consequent pollution means that China, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovative solutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose global threats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration and cooperative institution building. Analogies between the nineteenth century and the twenty-first are based on a severe mischaracterization of the actual conditions of the new era. The declining utility of war, the thickening of international transactions and institutions, and emerging resource and environmental interdependencies together undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability based on autocratic-democratic rivalry and autocratic revisionism. In fact, the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of international integration and cooperation.

<h4><strong>Great power war is obsolete – globalization, nuclear deterrence, and the cooperative liberal order ensure no conflict </h4><p>Ikenberry and Deudney 9 </strong>(Daniel – Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, and G. John – professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, Jan/Feb, “The Myth of the Autocratic Revival,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Issue 1, p. 8)</p><p>It is in combination with these factors that the regime divergence between autocracies and democracies will become increasingly dangerous. If all the states in the world were democracies, there would still be competition, but a world riven by a democratic-autocratic divergence promises to be even more conflictual. There are even signs of the emergence of an "autocrats international" in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, made up of China, Russia, and the poorer and weaker Central Asian dictatorships. Overall, the autocratic revivalists paint <u><mark>the picture of an international system marked by</u></mark> rising levels of <u><mark>conflict and competition</u></mark>, a picture quite unlike the "end of history" vision of growing convergence and cooperation. This bleak outlook <u><mark>is</u></mark> based on <u><strong><mark>an exaggeration</u></strong></mark> of recent developments <u><mark>and ignores powerful <strong>countervailing factors</mark> and forces</u></strong>. Indeed, contrary to what trhe revivalists describe<u>, <mark>the most striking features</mark> of the contemporary international landscape <mark>are</u></mark> the intensification of economic <u><strong><mark>globalization</u></strong></mark>, thickening <u><strong><mark>institutions</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong>shared problems of <mark>interdependence</strong></mark>. <mark>The</u> <u>overall structure</u></mark> of the international system today <u>is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century</u>. Compared to older orders,<u> the contemporary liberal-centered international order <mark>provides</u></mark> a set of <u><mark>constraints</mark> and opportunities</u> — of pushes and pulls — <u><mark>that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving.</u></mark> Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and <u><mark>great-power expansion has become</u></mark> largely <u><strong><mark>obsolete</strong></mark>.</u> Most important, <u><strong><mark>nuclear weapons</u></strong> <u>have transformed great-power war</mark> </u>from a routine feature of international politics <u><mark>into an exercise in <strong>national suicide.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>With all of the</mark> great <mark>powers possessing nuclear weapons</mark> and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces</u>, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. <u><mark>The prospect of</mark> such great <mark>losses has instilled</mark> in the great powers a <mark>level <strong>of</mark> caution and <mark>restraint</strong> that <strong>effectively precludes major revisionist efforts</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, <u>the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory</u> inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the<u> density of <mark>trade, investment, and production</mark> networks <mark>across international borders <strong>raises</mark> even more <mark>the costs of war</strong></mark>. </u>A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge. The autocratic revival thesis neglects other key features of the international system as well. In the nineteenth century, rising states faced an international environment in which they could reasonably expect to translate their growing clout into geopolitical changes that would benefit themselves. But <u>in the twenty-first century</u>, <u>the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the</u> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u>with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states</u> in Europe and East Asia <u>whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China</u> or even of a coalition of autocratic states. Moreover, potentially <u><mark>revisionist</u></mark> autocratic <u><mark>states</u>,</mark> most <u>notably China and Russia</u>, <u><mark>are</u></mark> already substantial players and <u><strong><mark>stakeholders</strong> in</u></mark> <u><mark>an</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>ensemble of global institutions</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>that make up the status quo</mark>, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power</u>). <u>Many other global <mark>institution</mark>s</u>, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, <u><mark>are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice <strong>only by buying into the institutions</u></strong></mark>. <u>The pathway to modernity</u> for rising states <u>is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside</u> and through the flexible and accommodating institutions of <u>the liberal international order.</u> The fact that these autocracies are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that point toward integration and accommodation in the future. <u>The </u>domestic <u>viability of</u> these <u>regimes hinges on their ability to sustain</u> high <u>economic growth</u> rates, <u>which</u> in turn <u>is crucially dependent on international trade</u> and investment; today's autocracies may be illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on a liberal international capitalist system. It is not surprising that China made major domestic changes in order to join the WTO or that Russia is seeking to do so now. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rulebased economic system. (Although these autocratic states do pursue bilateral trade and investment deals, particularly in energy and raw materials, this does not obviate their more basic dependence on and commitment to the WTO order.) In the case of China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states. Given their position in this system, which so serves their interests, the autocratic states are unlikely to become champions of an alternative global or regional economic order, let alone spoilers intent on seriously damaging the existing one. The prospects for revisionist behavior on the part of the capitalist autocracies are further reduced by the large and growing social networks across international borders. <u>Not only have these states joined the world economy, but <mark>their people</u></mark> — particularly upwardly mobile and educated elites — <u><mark>have increasingly joined the world community</u></mark>. In large and growing numbers, <u>citizens of autocratic</u> capitalist <u>states are participating in</u> a sprawling array of <u>transnational </u>educational, business, and avocational <u>networks.</u> As individuals are socialized into <u><mark>the values</u></mark> and orientations <u><mark>of</u></mark> these networks, stark: <u>"<mark>us versus them"</u></mark> cleavages <u><mark>become</u></mark> more <u><strong><mark>difficult to generate</mark> and sustain</strong>.</u> As the Harvard political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston has argued, China's ruling elite has also been socialized, as its foreign policy establishment has internalized the norms and practices of the international diplomatic community. China, far from cultivating causes for territorial dispute with its neighbors, has instead sought to resolve numerous historically inherited border conflicts, acting like a satisfied status quo state. <u>These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here</u>. Finally, there is an emerging set of global problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization that will create common interests across states regardless of regime type. Autocratic <u><strong><mark>China</u></strong></mark> is as dependent on imported oil as are democratic <u><strong><mark>Europe</strong>, <strong>India</strong>, <strong>Japan</strong></mark>,</u> and <u>the United States</u>, suggesting an alignment of interests against petroleum-exporting autocracies, such as <u><strong><mark>Iran</strong> and <strong>Russia</u></strong></mark>. These states <u><strong><mark>share a common interest</strong> in</u></mark> price stability and supply <u><mark>security</u></mark> that could form the basis for a revitalization of the International Energy Agency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of global warming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic-democratic divide. Like the United States, China is not only a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but also likely to be a major victim of climate-induced desertification and coastal flooding. Its rapid industrialization and consequent pollution means that China, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovative solutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose global threats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration and cooperative institution building<u>.</u> Analogies between the nineteenth century and the twenty-first are based on a severe mischaracterization of the actual conditions of the new era. <u><strong><mark>The declining utility of</mark> war</u></strong>, the thickening of international transactions and institutions, <u><mark>and emerging</u></mark> resource and <u><mark>environmental interdependencies</u></mark> together <u><strong><mark>undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability</u></strong></mark> based on autocratic-democratic rivalry and autocratic revisionism. In fact, <u><mark>the conditions of the twenty-first century <strong>point to the renewed value</strong> of</mark> international integration and <mark>cooperation</u>.</p></mark>

Contention 4 is risk calculus

Contention 3 The Plan solves

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx

A

Ndt

3

Gonzaga Newton-Spraker

Deming, Gramzinski, Susko

1AC - Organs (Shortages Illegal Markets) 1NC - T-Sales Property Rights DA TPA DA Tax Incentives CP 2NC - CP Case 1NR - Property Rights DA 2NR - DA Case

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Ndt-Round3.docx

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college

The WTO is dead already – aff can’t solve

Donnan 8/1

Donnan 8/1, Shawn, Financial Times' World Trade Editor, “WTO plunged into crisis as doubts grow over its future,” August 1st, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bac249d0-198c-11e4-9745-00144feabdc0.html

Azevêdo the new head of the W T O announced The WTO is back Azevêdo was speaking too soon. the WTO has been plunged into an existential crisis, after India blocked the centrepiece of the Bali deal Azevêdo is now facing doubts about the future of his organisation There are bound to be efforts to revive negotiations However, the Bali agreement already amounted to a rescue operation and its failure bodes badly for the system. There is significant dysfunction India carried out a threat this week to block a procedural measure to the trade facilitation agreement The Doha round was launched in 2001 and has since repeatedly broken down Putting it back on track would mean tackling much knottier issues such as agricultural subsidies in a new climate of distrust Several members have threatened to enact the trade facilitation agreement as a “plurilateral” deal outside the WTO, a move that would further marginalise the Geneva-based organisation its future looks bleak if the Doha negotiations go back into the coma that has been their dominant state in recent years there are going to be more and more disputes that cannot be resolved [at the WTO

the WTO has been plunged into an existential crisis after India blocked the Bali deal the Bali amounted to a rescue operation its failure bodes badly for the system There is significant dysfunction Doha has repeatedly broken down Putting it back would mean tackling knottier issues such as ag subsidies in a climate of distrust its future looks bleak more and more disputes cannot be resolved [at the WTO

Roberto Azevêdo, the new head of the World Trade Organisation, struck a triumphal tone in Bali last December when he announced that the body’s 159 members had reached the first global agreement in its 18-year history. “The WTO is back!” the visibly sleep-deprived Brazilian told delegates, drawing cheers from all around. Mr Azevêdo, it turns out, was speaking too soon. Seven months later, the WTO has been plunged into an existential crisis, after India’s new government this week blocked the centrepiece of the Bali deal: a seemingly benign arrangement to reduce customs red tape around the world. As a result, Mr Azevêdo is now facing doubts about both the future of his organisation and, more broadly, the liberal vision of a multilateral trading system that has guided the postwar era in the global economy. The WTO, which took over in 1995 from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, has grown out of the agreements struck at Bretton Woods in the US in 1944, which sought to keep world leaders from repeating the protectionist mistakes of the 1930s. There are bound to be efforts to revive negotiations. The government in New Delhi has already sought to play down the implications of its stand. Announcing the failure to reach a compromise to members on Thursday, Mr Azevedo urged them to use the August break to ponder the future and return in September with ideas. However, the Bali agreement already amounted to a rescue operation and its failure bodes badly for the system. “There is an element of significant dysfunction that you can’t hide,” said one senior official on Friday. India had originally given its blessing to the deal. But that was before a new government, led by Narendra Modi, came to power two months ago. New Delhi has in recent weeks insisted it wants to renegotiate deadlines set in Bali in order to bring forward negotiations to update the WTO rules that apply to subsidies it gives to farmers as part of a massive government programme to provide cheap food to poor people. In an effort to get what it wanted, India carried out a threat this week to block a procedural measure to the trade facilitation agreement from making the July 31 deadline set in Bali for its implementation. The failure to meet the deadline means the WTO’s members are even less likely to meet another in December to come up with a plan to deliver the rest of the Doha round of negotiations for a global trade deal. The Doha round was launched in 2001 and has since repeatedly broken down as a result of the failure of rich countries, such as the US, and emerging economies, like China and India, to narrow their differences. Putting it back on track would mean tackling much knottier issues such as agricultural subsidies in a new climate of distrust, say diplomats. The irony is that India and other developing countries are likely to suffer most from any collapse of the Doha round, say trade analysts. The US, EU and other key players such as Japan all have big regional trade initiatives under way, and are likely to find moving on much easier than India or smaller and more vulnerable states. Several members have threatened to enact the trade facilitation agreement as a “plurilateral” deal outside the WTO, a move that would further marginalise the Geneva-based organisation. The text to do so has already been drafted and translated into three languages. Up to 60 countries have indicated they are keen to see it implemented. But that is a narrower issue than what happens next at the WTO. Negotiations such as those now under way between the EU and US or between the US and 11 other countries to create a Trans-Pacific Partnership are increasingly focused on more complex, non-tariff barriers to trade. In Brussels and Washington, negotiators are also starting to tackle how to guarantee the free flow of data across borders or ease the way for the global supply chains so vital to modern business. These are discussions that are years beyond what is on the agenda at the WTO. The WTO will not come crashing down tomorrow, says Kimberly Elliott, a trade analyst at the Center for Global Development think-tank in Washington. But its future looks bleak if the Doha negotiations go back into the coma that has been their dominant state in recent years. While many celebrate the WTO’s place as a venue for settling disputes, that function will be eroded if it is not updating its rules to reflect new issues. Without any progress in negotiations, “there are going to be more and more disputes that cannot be resolved [at the WTO],” said Ms Elliott.

<h4>The WTO is dead already – aff can’t solve</h4><p><strong>Donnan 8/1</strong>, Shawn, Financial Times' World Trade Editor, “WTO plunged into crisis as doubts grow over its future,” August 1st, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bac249d0-198c-11e4-9745-00144feabdc0.html</p><p>Roberto <u>Azevêdo</u>, <u>the new head of the W</u>orld <u>T</u>rade <u>O</u>rganisation, struck a triumphal tone in Bali last December when he <u>announced</u> that the body’s 159 members had reached the first global agreement in its 18-year history. “<u>The WTO is back</u>!” the visibly sleep-deprived Brazilian told delegates, drawing cheers from all around. Mr <u>Azevêdo</u>, it turns out, <u>was speaking too soon.</u> Seven months later, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> <mark>WTO has been plunged into an existential crisis</strong></mark>, <mark>after India</u></mark>’s new government this week <u><mark>blocked the</mark> centrepiece of the <mark>Bali deal</u></mark>: a seemingly benign arrangement to reduce customs red tape around the world. As a result, Mr <u>Azevêdo is now facing doubts about</u> both <u>the future of his organisation</u> and, more broadly, the liberal vision of a multilateral trading system that has guided the postwar era in the global economy. The WTO, which took over in 1995 from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, has grown out of the agreements struck at Bretton Woods in the US in 1944, which sought to keep world leaders from repeating the protectionist mistakes of the 1930s. <u>There are bound to be efforts to revive negotiations</u>. The government in New Delhi has already sought to play down the implications of its stand. Announcing the failure to reach a compromise to members on Thursday, Mr Azevedo urged them to use the August break to ponder the future and return in September with ideas. <u>However, <mark>the Bali</mark> agreement already <mark>amounted to a rescue operation</mark> and <mark>its</mark> <mark>failure bodes badly for the system</mark>. </u><strong>“<u></strong><mark>There is</u></mark> an element of <u><strong><mark>significant dysfunction</u></strong></mark> that you can’t hide,” said one senior official on Friday. India had originally given its blessing to the deal. But that was before a new government, led by Narendra Modi, came to power two months ago. New Delhi has in recent weeks insisted it wants to renegotiate deadlines set in Bali in order to bring forward negotiations to update the WTO rules that apply to subsidies it gives to farmers as part of a massive government programme to provide cheap food to poor people. In an effort to get what it wanted, <u>India carried out a threat this week to block a procedural measure to the trade facilitation agreement</u> from making the July 31 deadline set in Bali for its implementation. The failure to meet the deadline means the WTO’s members are even less likely to meet another in December to come up with a plan to deliver the rest of the Doha round of negotiations for a global trade deal. <u>The <mark>Doha</mark> round was launched in 2001 and <mark>has</mark> since <mark>repeatedly broken down</u></mark> as a result of the failure of rich countries, such as the US, and emerging economies, like China and India, to narrow their differences. <u><mark>Putting it back</mark> on track <mark>would mean tackling</mark> much <mark>knottier issues such as ag</mark>ricultural <mark>subsidies</mark> <mark>in a</mark> new <mark>climate of distrust</u><strong></mark>,</strong> say diplomats. The irony is that India and other developing countries are likely to suffer most from any collapse of the Doha round, say trade analysts. The US, EU and other key players such as Japan all have big regional trade initiatives under way, and are likely to find moving on much easier than India or smaller and more vulnerable states. <u>Several members have threatened to enact the trade facilitation agreement as a “plurilateral” deal outside the WTO, a move that would further marginalise the Geneva-based organisation</u>. The text to do so has already been drafted and translated into three languages. Up to 60 countries have indicated they are keen to see it implemented. But that is a narrower issue than what happens next at the WTO. Negotiations such as those now under way between the EU and US or between the US and 11 other countries to create a Trans-Pacific Partnership are increasingly focused on more complex, non-tariff barriers to trade. In Brussels and Washington, negotiators are also starting to tackle how to guarantee the free flow of data across borders or ease the way for the global supply chains so vital to modern business. These are discussions that are years beyond what is on the agenda at the WTO. The WTO will not come crashing down tomorrow, says Kimberly Elliott, a trade analyst at the Center for Global Development think-tank in Washington. But <u><strong><mark>its future looks bleak</strong></mark> if the Doha negotiations go back into the coma that has been their dominant state in recent years</u>. While many celebrate the WTO’s place as a venue for settling disputes, that function will be eroded if it is not updating its rules to reflect new issues. Without any progress in negotiations, “<u>there are going to be <mark>more and more disputes</mark> that <mark>cannot</mark> <mark>be resolved [at the WTO</u></mark>],” said Ms Elliott.</p>

WTO

Meta

AT: Inevitable

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx

N

Navy

8

Wake Forest Nasar-Raudenbush

Ridley

1AC OG (WTO Banks) 1NC Security K

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-Navy-Round8.docx

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Crowd-out studies are based on Titmuss, who’s wrong

Economist 11

Economist 11 The Economist Feb 16th 2011 Blood, not money http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2011/02/volunteering_and_profiteering

In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy" Titmuss compared the voluntary British system with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses, he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited

In a classic study Titmuss compared the voluntary system with the American one in which payments were made. Titmuss reckoned such created shortages and surpluses, he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited

Blood donors are also unpaid, in Britain and elsewhere. A debate over whether or not they should be compensated for their efforts has raged for at least four decades. In a classic 1970 study called "The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy" Richard Titmuss compared the voluntary British system favourably with the American one in which payments were then widely made. Titmuss reckoned such a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it created shortages and surpluses, and led eventually to a contaminated product. Although he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited, Americans mostly no longer receive payment for giving blood. Too many people in poor health lied about their medical histories in order to make a few bucks, endangering those who were to receive the blood. As the World Health Organisation notes, people who give blood voluntarily and for altruistic reasons have a lower prevalence of HIV, hepatitis viruses and other blood-borne infections than do those who seek monetary reward. Presumably that is because being rich is a great protection against disease.

<h4>Crowd-out studies are based on Titmuss, who’s wrong</h4><p><strong>Economist 11</strong> The Economist Feb 16th 2011 Blood, not money</p><p>http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2011/02/volunteering_and_profiteering</p><p>Blood donors are also unpaid, in Britain and elsewhere. A debate over whether or not they should be compensated for their efforts has raged for at least four decades. <u><mark>In a classic </mark>1970 <mark>study </mark>called "The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy"</u> Richard <u><mark>Titmuss compared the voluntary </mark>British</u> <u><mark>system</u></mark> favourably <u><mark>with the American one in which payments were </mark>then widely <mark>made. Titmuss reckoned such </mark>a market was inefficient and wasteful, that it <mark>created shortages and surpluses,</u></mark> and led eventually to a contaminated product. Although <u><mark>he was wrong, and such arguments have since been widely discredited</u></mark>, Americans mostly no longer receive payment for giving blood. Too many people in poor health lied about their medical histories in order to make a few bucks, endangering those who were to receive the blood. As the World Health Organisation notes, people who give blood voluntarily and for altruistic reasons have a lower prevalence of HIV, hepatitis viruses and other blood-borne infections than do those who seek monetary reward. Presumably that is because being rich is a great protection against disease.</p>

Contention 1 – Organ sales will save lives

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx

A

Navy

1

George Mason Call-Mohney

Steiner

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Aff-Navy-Round1.docx

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cx

college

Interpretation- both “United States” and “legalize” have no inherent meaning in the plan text- the aff needs to specify beyond that- policy specifics are articulations of motives- refusing to engage the details guarantees cooption and turns solvency

Caulkins et al 2015

Caulkins et al 2015 (Jonathan P. Caulkins, Beau Kilmer, Mark A. R. Kleiman, Robert J. MacCoun, Gregory Midgette, Pat Oglesby, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, and Peter H. Reuter, if you haven’t seen the quals for most of these people at this point in the year, I’m sure we could take a moment to look through literally any file on this section of the topic and tell you about at least Caulkins, Kleiman and Reuter, Options and Issues Regarding Marijuana Legalization, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE149/RAND_PE149.pdf)

Legalization is not simply a binary choice between making production legal and continuing prohibitions Legalization encompasses a wide range of possible regimes, distinguished along multiple dimensions Who would be allowed to supply Would marijuana be taxed How would marijuana be regulated These choices could have profound consequences for the outcomes of legalization Each of these strategies about whom the law would allow to produce and distribute marijuana is really itself a broad category of options encompassing considerable scope for fine-tuning a bad implementation of a good strategy might perform less well than a wise implementation of an inferior one picking a strategy is the beginning of a discussion and design process than an answer to the question of what should be done important consequences flow from selecting who may produce and supply marijuana it is very important to systematically consider the potential effects of each strategy the marketing and lobbying muscle of a for-profit industry is likely to influence the future trajectory of marijuana policy, whereas other options would allow legislatures and regulatory agencies to act with more regard for the public interest.

Legalization is not a binary choice Who would be allowed to supply Would marijuana be taxed How would marijuana be regulated These choices have profound consequences for the outcomes of legalization a bad implementation of a good strategy might perform less well than a wise implementation of an inferior one picking a strategy is the beginning of a gn process than an answer to the question of what should be done it is very important to systematically consider the potential effects of each strategy the marketing and lobbying muscle of a for-profit industry is likely to influence the future trajectory of marijuana

Legalization is not simply a binary choice between, on the one hand, making the production, sale, and possession of the drug legal and, on the other, continuing existing prohibitions. Legalization encompasses a wide range of possible regimes, distinguished along multiple dimensions. Here we highlight three key decisions: Who would be allowed to supply legal marijuana? Would legal marijuana be taxed and, if so, how? How would legal marijuana be regulated? These choices could have profound consequences for the outcomes of legalization in terms of health and social well-being, as well as for job creation and government revenue. Who Would Be Allowed to Supply Legal Marijuana? Although Colorado and Washington have adopted the for-profit commercial (or so-called alcohol) model and Alaska and Oregon are in the process of doing the same, that strategy is just one of a dozen options available to jurisdictions seeking to change their marijuana supply laws. The figure lists 12 supply alternatives to status quo prohibition, breaking them down into three groups: • the two options most commonly discussed in the United States – Retain prohibition but decrease sanctions. – Implement an alcohol-style commercial model. • eight options that find a middle ground between those commonly discussed – Allow adults to grow their own. – Allow distribution only within small co-ops or buyers’ clubs. – Permit locally controlled retail sales without legalizing commercial production (the Dutch coffee-shop model). – Have the government operate the supply chain (government monopoly). – Have a public authority operate the supply chain. – Permit only nonprofit organizations to sell. – Permit only for-benefit companies to sell. – Have very few closely monitored for-profit licensees. • two extreme options – Increase sanctions. – Repeal the state’s prohibition without creating any new, product-specific regulations. Twelve Supply Alternatives to Status Quo Prohibition RAND PE149-1 Extreme options Commonly discussed options Middle-ground options Allow adults to grow their own Retail sales only (Dutch model) Public authority (near monopoly) For-benet companies Prohibit and increase sanctions Standard commercial model Communal own-grow and distribution Government operates the supply chain Nonprofit organizations Very few monitored for-prot licensees Prohibit and decrease sanctions Repeal-only of state prohibition Legalization encompasses a wide range of possible regimes, distinguished along multiple dimensions.5 The key point made by identifying this range of approaches is that the debate in the United States has focused largely on just two options that are near the ends of the spectrum. Policymakers have largely ignored many available intermediate options. Indeed, commercial legalization is a high-stakes choice clouded by enormous uncertainty. Until 2012, no modern jurisdiction had implemented it—not even the Netherlands, which tolerates small retail sales, not wholesale production. Commercial legalization also conflates two distinct concepts: the size or scale of the organizations that are allowed to produce and who owns them, which determines what objectives shape those organizations’ behavior. Colorado and Washington State have decided not only to allow large, professionally operated suppliers that can realize economies of scale and promote a diverse range of products but also that those suppliers can be private companies whose goal is profit maximization. There is concern that profit-maximizing marijuana companies will target heavy users. Since 80 percent of marijuana consumption is by daily or near-daily users, roughly 80 percent of marijuana companies’ profits would come from marketing to such heavy users, about half of whom currently meet clinical criteria for having substance-use disorders (either with marijuana itself or with another substance, such as alcohol). Thus, like the alcohol industry, the private marijuana industry will likely seek to serve and develop a market of heavy users. Thus, it is important to note that jurisdictions considering large-scale marijuana production have other options to consider: (1) government monopoly, (2) public authorities, (3) nonprofit organizations, and (4) socially responsible businesses (e.g., B-Corps). Indeed, if a jurisdiction decides to create a new industry, they need to decide whether they want that industry to be exclusively focused on maximizing profits. All of the large-scale production options would create the potential for even a small state to raise tens of millions of dollars annually by taxing the consumption of its residents in one way or another. If realized, that would more than offset regulatory burdens that are likely to be in the low to mid single-digit millions of dollars in a small state. (Although nonprofits do not pay income taxes, their customers would pay sales and excise taxes, just as customers of for-profit businesses would. And although government stores do not pay taxes per se, their profits accrue to the state treasury.) But with any of these retail options, the twin elephants in the room—particularly for states located in densely populated regions—would be demand from out-of-state users and competition from suppliers in nearby states that legalize but impose lower taxes or lower regulatory burdens. For example, nearly 40 times as many current marijuana users live within 200 miles of Vermont’s borders as live in Vermont. So if Vermont legalized before any other states in the Northeast, marijuana tourism and illicit exports could be substantial and could, in theory, put Vermont’s annual tax revenues in the hundreds of millions. However, if the federal government intervened to stop such cross-border traffic or if another state in the Northeast decided to Debate in the United States has focused largely on just two options that are near the ends of the spectrum. Policymakers have largely ignored many available intermediate options.6 legalize marijuana and set lower tax rates, these potential revenues might not materialize. Indeed, because legal marijuana can flow across borders in either direction, Vermont’s prospects of deriving considerable tax revenue even from its own residents would become much less promising if one of its immediate neighbors were to legalize with low taxes. One implication of this is that, although, in theory, there may be benefit in allowing each state to pursue its own policies and so discover through experimentation which policies work best, in reality, cross-border flows of users and product mean that one state’s actions could affect levels of use and tax collections in other states.4 By comparison, options that do not involve creating large-scale producers are much less risky because they are less likely to incentivize consumption increases, particularly among the most-frequent users. The simplest step is full decriminalization, meaning reducing sanctions for simple possession to noncriminal charges akin to traffic tickets. Criminal offenses for marijuana in Vermont fell more than 80 percent after it decriminalized. When we inquired in September 2014, just three people in the entire state were behind bars solely for marijuana offenses; only eight were admitted during the entire fiscal year. The cost of enforcing marijuana prohibition is now on the order of $1 million per year in Vermont. Allowing individual users to grow their own product at home and give it away, as was recently authorized by the voters in Washington, D.C., creates an option for legal supply with few downside risks if the rules are written tightly to prevent exploitation by black-market producers; for example, the number of plants that any one person can grow is usually limited. Other jurisdictions, including Alaska, have allowed home production for some time, and the effects do not appear to be dramatic. That is, there is no clear evidence of large increases in use but also no evidence of reductions in black-market activity; illegal marijuana is so ubiquitous that relatively few users bother growing their own. The co-op model, as with Spanish cannabis clubs, allows modest numbers of people to pool their own-grow rights and share or sell at cost to other members of the club. Those economies of scale make co-ops a potential threat to the black market without creating the risks of commercialization. Further, some argue that cannabis clubs stay (just barely) within international treaty obligations because sales are priced only to recoup growing costs, not to make a profit. A state could follow the Dutch coffee-shop model and allow retail sales only. A fixed number of outlets could be licensed to retail marijuana while production and trafficking are still prohibited. This would allow access and taxation but avoid promotion by producers. Even if a state were to decide to allow large-scale production and distribution, it has distinct options. A state monopoly of the whole production and distribution chain would prevent diversion to the black market; it could set the price it thinks best serves the public interest and ensure no promotion. The state monopoly, however, risks provoking the federal government. For that and other reasons, a state might prefer to set up a public authority—a single authorized seller. The state would appoint members of the public Cross-border flows of users and product mean that one state’s actions could affect levels of use and tax collections in other states.7 authority and set policy to, for instance, control diversion, control interactions with consumers, restrict sales to particular types of products, avoid advertising and product innovation, and prevent a price collapse. Yet another option is to license only nonprofit enterprises. Because they are not profit maximizers, they are less likely than private enterprise to promote the drug. Requiring that each nonprofit have representatives of health-promotion and childwelfare groups in its leadership would ensure even better alignment with the public interest. Yet other models include restricting the market to for-benefit companies or to a very limited set of for-profit corporate licensees. Each of these strategies about whom the law would allow to produce and distribute marijuana is really itself a broad category of options encompassing considerable scope for fine-tuning. Moreover, a bad implementation of a good strategy might perform less well than a wise implementation of an inferior one. Therefore, picking a strategy is more the beginning of a discussion and design process than an answer to the question of what should be done. Nevertheless, important consequences flow from selecting who may produce and supply marijuana. So it is very important to systematically consider the potential effects of each strategy. In particular, the marketing and lobbying muscle of a for-profit industry is likely to influence the future trajectory of marijuana policy, whereas other options would allow legislatures and regulatory agencies to act with more regard for the public interest.

<h4>Interpretation- both “United States” and “legalize” have no inherent meaning in the plan text- the aff needs to specify beyond that- policy specifics are articulations of motives- refusing to engage the details guarantees cooption and turns solvency</h4><p><strong>Caulkins et al 2015</strong> <u>(Jonathan P. Caulkins, Beau Kilmer, Mark A. R. Kleiman, Robert J. MacCoun, Gregory Midgette, Pat Oglesby, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, and Peter H. Reuter, if you haven’t seen the quals for most of these people at this point in the year, I’m sure we could take a moment to look through literally any file on this section of the topic and tell you about at least Caulkins, Kleiman and Reuter, Options and Issues Regarding Marijuana Legalization, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE149/RAND_PE149.pdf)</p><p><mark>Legalization is not</mark> simply <mark>a binary choice</mark> between</u>, on the one hand, <u>making</u> the <u>production</u>, sale, and possession of the drug <u>legal</u> <u>and</u>, on the other, <u>continuing</u> existing <u>prohibitions</u>. <u>Legalization</u> <u>encompasses a wide range of possible regimes, distinguished along multiple dimensions</u>. Here we highlight three key decisions: <u><mark>Who would be allowed to supply</u></mark> legal marijuana? <u><mark>Would</u></mark> legal <u><mark>marijuana</u> <u>be taxed</u></mark> and, if so, how? <u><mark>How</mark> <mark>would</u></mark> legal <u><mark>marijuana be regulated</u></mark>? <u><strong><mark>These choices </mark>could <mark>have profound consequences for the outcomes of legalization</u></strong></mark> in terms of health and social well-being, as well as for job creation and government revenue. Who Would Be Allowed to Supply Legal Marijuana? Although Colorado and Washington have adopted the for-profit commercial (or so-called alcohol) model and Alaska and Oregon are in the process of doing the same, that strategy is just one of a dozen options available to jurisdictions seeking to change their marijuana supply laws. The figure lists 12 supply alternatives to status quo prohibition, breaking them down into three groups: • the two options most commonly discussed in the United States – Retain prohibition but decrease sanctions. – Implement an alcohol-style commercial model. • eight options that find a middle ground between those commonly discussed – Allow adults to grow their own. – Allow distribution only within small co-ops or buyers’ clubs. – Permit locally controlled retail sales without legalizing commercial production (the Dutch coffee-shop model). – Have the government operate the supply chain (government monopoly). – Have a public authority operate the supply chain. – Permit only nonprofit organizations to sell. – Permit only for-benefit companies to sell. – Have very few closely monitored for-profit licensees. • two extreme options – Increase sanctions. – Repeal the state’s prohibition without creating any new, product-specific regulations. Twelve Supply Alternatives to Status Quo Prohibition RAND PE149-1 Extreme options Commonly discussed options Middle-ground options Allow adults to grow their own Retail sales only (Dutch model) Public authority (near monopoly) For-benet companies Prohibit and increase sanctions Standard commercial model Communal own-grow and distribution Government operates the supply chain Nonprofit organizations Very few monitored for-prot licensees Prohibit and decrease sanctions Repeal-only of state prohibition Legalization encompasses a wide range of possible regimes, distinguished along multiple dimensions.5 The key point made by identifying this range of approaches is that the debate in the United States has focused largely on just two options that are near the ends of the spectrum. Policymakers have largely ignored many available intermediate options. Indeed, commercial legalization is a high-stakes choice clouded by enormous uncertainty. Until 2012, no modern jurisdiction had implemented it—not even the Netherlands, which tolerates small retail sales, not wholesale production. Commercial legalization also conflates two distinct concepts: the size or scale of the organizations that are allowed to produce and who owns them, which determines what objectives shape those organizations’ behavior. Colorado and Washington State have decided not only to allow large, professionally operated suppliers that can realize economies of scale and promote a diverse range of products but also that those suppliers can be private companies whose goal is profit maximization. There is concern that profit-maximizing marijuana companies will target heavy users. Since 80 percent of marijuana consumption is by daily or near-daily users, roughly 80 percent of marijuana companies’ profits would come from marketing to such heavy users, about half of whom currently meet clinical criteria for having substance-use disorders (either with marijuana itself or with another substance, such as alcohol). Thus, like the alcohol industry, the private marijuana industry will likely seek to serve and develop a market of heavy users. Thus, it is important to note that jurisdictions considering large-scale marijuana production have other options to consider: (1) government monopoly, (2) public authorities, (3) nonprofit organizations, and (4) socially responsible businesses (e.g., B-Corps). Indeed, if a jurisdiction decides to create a new industry, they need to decide whether they want that industry to be exclusively focused on maximizing profits. All of the large-scale production options would create the potential for even a small state to raise tens of millions of dollars annually by taxing the consumption of its residents in one way or another. If realized, that would more than offset regulatory burdens that are likely to be in the low to mid single-digit millions of dollars in a small state. (Although nonprofits do not pay income taxes, their customers would pay sales and excise taxes, just as customers of for-profit businesses would. And although government stores do not pay taxes per se, their profits accrue to the state treasury.) But with any of these retail options, the twin elephants in the room—particularly for states located in densely populated regions—would be demand from out-of-state users and competition from suppliers in nearby states that legalize but impose lower taxes or lower regulatory burdens. For example, nearly 40 times as many current marijuana users live within 200 miles of Vermont’s borders as live in Vermont. So if Vermont legalized before any other states in the Northeast, marijuana tourism and illicit exports could be substantial and could, in theory, put Vermont’s annual tax revenues in the hundreds of millions. However, if the federal government intervened to stop such cross-border traffic or if another state in the Northeast decided to Debate in the United States has focused largely on just two options that are near the ends of the spectrum. Policymakers have largely ignored many available intermediate options.6 legalize marijuana and set lower tax rates, these potential revenues might not materialize. Indeed, because legal marijuana can flow across borders in either direction, Vermont’s prospects of deriving considerable tax revenue even from its own residents would become much less promising if one of its immediate neighbors were to legalize with low taxes. One implication of this is that, although, in theory, there may be benefit in allowing each state to pursue its own policies and so discover through experimentation which policies work best, in reality, cross-border flows of users and product mean that one state’s actions could affect levels of use and tax collections in other states.4 By comparison, options that do not involve creating large-scale producers are much less risky because they are less likely to incentivize consumption increases, particularly among the most-frequent users. The simplest step is full decriminalization, meaning reducing sanctions for simple possession to noncriminal charges akin to traffic tickets. Criminal offenses for marijuana in Vermont fell more than 80 percent after it decriminalized. When we inquired in September 2014, just three people in the entire state were behind bars solely for marijuana offenses; only eight were admitted during the entire fiscal year. The cost of enforcing marijuana prohibition is now on the order of $1 million per year in Vermont. Allowing individual users to grow their own product at home and give it away, as was recently authorized by the voters in Washington, D.C., creates an option for legal supply with few downside risks if the rules are written tightly to prevent exploitation by black-market producers; for example, the number of plants that any one person can grow is usually limited. Other jurisdictions, including Alaska, have allowed home production for some time, and the effects do not appear to be dramatic. That is, there is no clear evidence of large increases in use but also no evidence of reductions in black-market activity; illegal marijuana is so ubiquitous that relatively few users bother growing their own. The co-op model, as with Spanish cannabis clubs, allows modest numbers of people to pool their own-grow rights and share or sell at cost to other members of the club. Those economies of scale make co-ops a potential threat to the black market without creating the risks of commercialization. Further, some argue that cannabis clubs stay (just barely) within international treaty obligations because sales are priced only to recoup growing costs, not to make a profit. A state could follow the Dutch coffee-shop model and allow retail sales only. A fixed number of outlets could be licensed to retail marijuana while production and trafficking are still prohibited. This would allow access and taxation but avoid promotion by producers. Even if a state were to decide to allow large-scale production and distribution, it has distinct options. A state monopoly of the whole production and distribution chain would prevent diversion to the black market; it could set the price it thinks best serves the public interest and ensure no promotion. The state monopoly, however, risks provoking the federal government. For that and other reasons, a state might prefer to set up a public authority—a single authorized seller. The state would appoint members of the public Cross-border flows of users and product mean that one state’s actions could affect levels of use and tax collections in other states.7 authority and set policy to, for instance, control diversion, control interactions with consumers, restrict sales to particular types of products, avoid advertising and product innovation, and prevent a price collapse. Yet another option is to license only nonprofit enterprises. Because they are not profit maximizers, they are less likely than private enterprise to promote the drug. Requiring that each nonprofit have representatives of health-promotion and childwelfare groups in its leadership would ensure even better alignment with the public interest. Yet other models include restricting the market to for-benefit companies or to a very limited set of for-profit corporate licensees. <u>Each of these strategies about whom the law would allow to produce and distribute marijuana is really itself a broad category of options encompassing considerable scope for fine-tuning</u>. Moreover, <u><strong><mark>a bad implementation of a good strategy might perform less well than a wise implementation of an inferior one</u></strong></mark>. Therefore, <u><mark>picking a strategy is</u></mark> more <u><strong><mark>the beginning of a</mark> discussion and desi<mark>gn process</u></strong> <u>than an answer to the question of what should be done</u></mark>. Nevertheless, <u>important consequences flow from selecting who may produce and supply marijuana</u>. So <u><strong><mark>it is very important to systematically consider the potential effects of each strategy</u></strong></mark>. In particular, <u><mark>the marketing and lobbying muscle of a for-profit industry is likely to influence the future trajectory of marijuana</mark> policy, whereas other options would allow legislatures and regulatory agencies to act with more regard for the public interest.</p></u>

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round5.docx

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tournament

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NYU Dellamore-Kuzmenko

Glass, Weddington

1AC - mass mobilization against incarceration - marijuana 1NC - Reg-spec T States CP Academy K Treaties DA 2NC - K CP 1NR - T DA 2NR - T K

ndtceda14/Dartmouth/KrMa/Dartmouth-Kreus-Martin-Neg-tournament-Round5.docx

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Dartmouth KrMa

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Dartmouth

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Obama can sustain a veto of sanctions now but it’s close- PC’s key- new sanctions cause war with Iran

CNN 1/9

CNN 1/9/2015 (New Congress, new nuclear showdown over Iran, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/09/politics/iran-sanctions-fight-republican-congress/)

Iranian and American negotiators will be eying another showdown in Washington GOP lawmakers are poised to push a bill authorizing additional sanctions the majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need and the fight is already underway for the votes that could fill the gap With fewer than two months until agreement deadline, and expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors supporters know the clock is ticking the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran Kirk expects a high-profile challenge from the White House four Democrats rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House made its push on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15 needed to override a veto A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue

Iranian and American negotiators preparing to square off in Geneva next week over Iran's nuclear ambitions will also be eying another showdown brewing in Washington. One year after a Republican-led coalition in the Senate came up just short of a deal, GOP lawmakers are poised to wield their new power in the Senate to push a bill authorizing additional sanctions against Iran. But the new 54-member majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need to override a presidential veto, and the fight is already underway for the votes that could fill the gap. With fewer than two months until diplomats' March 1 framework agreement deadline, and expecting the White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors, supporters know the clock is ticking to pass a sanctions bill they say will ratchet up pressure on Iran. But for opponents of additional sanctions, the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran, they claim. For Sen. Mark Kirk, the Republican half of the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill he has pushed for the last three years, the sooner a sanctions bill hits the Senate floor, the better -- both politically and policy-wise. "If the Senate was allowed to vote tomorrow, I would be able to get two-thirds," Kirk said Sunday in a phone interview. "Now is the time to put pressure on Iran especially with oil prices so low. We are uniquely advantaged at this time to shut down this nuclear program." Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina), another major proponent of the legislation, told CNN last month the Kirk-Menendez bill "will come up for a vote in January," a pledge he made the same day to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a meeting in Jerusalem. Kirk said he backed that timing but insisted that it depends on Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. A McConnell spokesman called the legislation "a priority," but said there isn't yet a schedule for a sanctions bill. Republicans have been clamoring for additional sanctions on Iran, but with control of Congress in their hands, Republican lawmakers will also have to own the consequences of sanctions legislation -- which the President, State Department and Iranian officials have warned could derail negotiations. "We have long believed that Congress should not consider any new sanctions while negotiations are underway, in order to give our negotiators the time and space they need to fully test the current diplomatic opportunity. New sanctions threaten the diplomatic process currently underway," a senior administration official told CNN. The Kirk-Menendez bill that died in the Senate last year would reimpose sanctions on Iran if Obama couldn't certify that Iran doesn't finance terror groups that have attacked Americans and would keep Iran from maintaining low-level nuclear enrichment in a final deal, just a few terms that are much stricter than the current framework for negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 world powers. Those congressional provisions are "poison pills," according to Dylan Williams, head of government affairs at J Street, a group that bills itself as pro-Israel. It lobbied heavily on the issue last year and is ramping up for another forceful push. "All of these things are poison pills, far from the clean sanctions, just-if-things-go-wrong idea," Williams said. "We know that many if not most of the people pushing for legislation don't want diplomacy to work." Kirk has already been working with Sen. Bob Menendez, of New Jersey, his Democratic partner on the bill, to rework some of its language -- changes that could potentially draw more Democratic support. The pair are still working on final language for the bill, which drew 59 cosponsors last year, though Kirk said he is working to stave off as many changes as possible -- "The more changes, the worse," he said. The Illinois Republican expects a high-profile challenge from the White House and its allies, but he will be getting his own backup from some Capitol Hill heavyweights: the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, which typically spends more than $2.5 million a year on lobbying, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. "I think they're pretty damned strong. This would be the No. 1 thing for them," Kirk said of AIPAC. Intense lobbying from AIPAC could help the sanctions supporters win back the four Democrats who joined 13 others in cosponsoring the sanctions bill last year, but later backtracked their support. Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Chris Coons of Delaware rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations after the White House and allies made its push on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote. "I did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted upon or used upon while we were negotiating," Manchin said on MSNBC after Obama talked about Iran in his State of the Union address. "I signed it because I wanted to make sure the president had a hammer if he needed it and showed them how determined we were to do it and use it if we had to." After talks failed to materialize into an agreement by the November 2014 deadline, some Democrats have started to lose patience with the stop-and-stall pace of negotiations with Iran and are facing pressure from groups like AIPAC to support a sanctions bill, though the White House insists the negotiations have yielded tangible results: rolling back Iran's nuclear program during negotiations. But even if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15 Democrats needed to override a presidential veto. And they won't just be targeted by AIPAC. A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the toughest battle yet on this issue, and while they're clear-eyed about the uphill climb they face, they dismiss the overconfident stride of pro-sanctions leaders. These groups will look to paint any new sanctions as a step onto the warpath with Iran and show wary Democrats that they have the grassroots backing to stave off attacks from groups like AIPAC. More than 400 faith leaders and activists traveled to D.C. in late November to lobby Congress against the sanctions in a day of action organized by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker-founded organization, and the group plans to drive its 50,000 supporters to flood Congress with calls and letters in the weeks ahead. "The real trick that we have to do is really to make that opposition -- both in the public and that opposition on the Hill -- to really make it become public and to amplify those voices," said Kate Gould, the group's lead lobbyist on the issue. "Because right now you hear from, it's Lindsey Graham and (Marco) Rubio, who are very confident in their prognosis and have made it sound like it's inevitable that these sanctions will pass with a veto-proof majority."

<h4>Obama can sustain a veto of sanctions now but it’s close- PC’s key- new sanctions cause war with Iran</h4><p><strong>CNN 1/9</strong>/2015 (New Congress, new nuclear showdown over Iran, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/09/politics/iran-sanctions-fight-republican-congress/)</p><p><u>Iranian and American negotiators</u> preparing to square off in Geneva next week over Iran's nuclear ambitions <u>will</u> also <u>be eying</u> <u>another showdown</u> brewing <u>in Washington</u>. One year after a Republican-led coalition in the Senate came up just short of a deal, <u>GOP lawmakers are poised to</u> wield their new power in the Senate to <u>push a bill authorizing additional sanctions </u>against Iran. But <u>the</u> new 54-member <u>majority doesn't guarantee that Republicans can muster the 67 votes they need</u> to override a presidential veto, <u>and the <strong>fight is already underway</strong> for the votes that could fill the gap</u>. <u>With fewer than two months until</u> diplomats' March 1 framework <u>agreement deadline, and expecting the <strong>White House to start knocking on swing senators' doors</u></strong>, <u>supporters know the clock is ticking</u> to pass a sanctions bill they say will ratchet up pressure on Iran. But for opponents of additional sanctions, <u><strong>the ticking is more like a time bomb as a sanctions bill will torpedo negotiations and set the U.S. on a path to war with Iran</u></strong>, they claim. For Sen. Mark Kirk, the Republican half of the Kirk-Menendez sanctions bill he has pushed for the last three years, the sooner a sanctions bill hits the Senate floor, the better -- both politically and policy-wise. "If the Senate was allowed to vote tomorrow, I would be able to get two-thirds," Kirk said Sunday in a phone interview. "Now is the time to put pressure on Iran especially with oil prices so low. We are uniquely advantaged at this time to shut down this nuclear program." Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina), another major proponent of the legislation, told CNN last month the Kirk-Menendez bill "will come up for a vote in January," a pledge he made the same day to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in a meeting in Jerusalem. Kirk said he backed that timing but insisted that it depends on Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. A McConnell spokesman called the legislation "a priority," but said there isn't yet a schedule for a sanctions bill. Republicans have been clamoring for additional sanctions on Iran, but with control of Congress in their hands, Republican lawmakers will also have to own the consequences of sanctions legislation -- which the President, State Department and Iranian officials have warned could derail negotiations. "We have long believed that Congress should not consider any new sanctions while negotiations are underway, in order to give our negotiators the time and space they need to fully test the current diplomatic opportunity. New sanctions threaten the diplomatic process currently underway," a senior administration official told CNN. The Kirk-Menendez bill that died in the Senate last year would reimpose sanctions on Iran if Obama couldn't certify that Iran doesn't finance terror groups that have attacked Americans and would keep Iran from maintaining low-level nuclear enrichment in a final deal, just a few terms that are much stricter than the current framework for negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 world powers. Those congressional provisions are "poison pills," according to Dylan Williams, head of government affairs at J Street, a group that bills itself as pro-Israel. It lobbied heavily on the issue last year and is ramping up for another forceful push. "All of these things are poison pills, far from the clean sanctions, just-if-things-go-wrong idea," Williams said. "We know that many if not most of the people pushing for legislation don't want diplomacy to work." Kirk has already been working with Sen. Bob Menendez, of New Jersey, his Democratic partner on the bill, to rework some of its language -- changes that could potentially draw more Democratic support. The pair are still working on final language for the bill, which drew 59 cosponsors last year, though <u>Kirk</u> said he is working to stave off as many changes as possible -- "The more changes, the worse," he said. The Illinois Republican <u>expects a <strong>high-profile challenge from the White House</u></strong> and its allies, but he will be getting his own backup from some Capitol Hill heavyweights: the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, which typically spends more than $2.5 million a year on lobbying, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. "I think they're pretty damned strong. This would be the No. 1 thing for them," Kirk said of AIPAC. Intense lobbying from AIPAC could help the sanctions supporters win back the <u>four Democrats</u> who joined 13 others in cosponsoring the sanctions bill last year, but later backtracked their support. Sens. Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, Joe Manchin of West Virginia, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut and Chris Coons of Delaware <u>rejected the idea of moving forward amid negotiations <strong>after the White House</strong> </u>and allies<u> <strong>made its push</strong> on Capitol Hill to keep the measure from a floor vote</u>. "I did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted upon or used upon while we were negotiating," Manchin said on MSNBC after Obama talked about Iran in his State of the Union address. "I signed it because I wanted to make sure the president had a hammer if he needed it and showed them how determined we were to do it and use it if we had to." After talks failed to materialize into an agreement by the November 2014 deadline, some Democrats have started to lose patience with the stop-and-stall pace of negotiations with Iran and are facing pressure from groups like AIPAC to support a sanctions bill, though the White House insists the negotiations have yielded tangible results: rolling back Iran's nuclear program during negotiations. But even <u>if Kirk, Menendez and their allies can pressure those four Democrats into signing on, they will need to pull three more Senate Democrats who didn't cosponsor the bill last year to secure the 15</u> Democrats <u>needed to override a</u> presidential <u>veto</u>. And they won't just be targeted by AIPAC. <u>A coalition of dove organizations is already putting the gears in motion for what they expect to be the <strong>toughest battle yet on this issue</u></strong>, and while they're clear-eyed about the uphill climb they face, they dismiss the overconfident stride of pro-sanctions leaders. These groups will look to paint any new sanctions as a step onto the warpath with Iran and show wary Democrats that they have the <strong>grassroots backing to stave off attacks from groups like AIPAC. More than 400 faith leaders and activists traveled to D.C. in late November to lobby Congress against the sanctions in a day of action organized by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker-founded organization, and the group plans to drive its 50,000 supporters to flood Congress with calls and letters in the weeks ahead. "The real trick that we have to do is really to make that opposition -- both in the public and that opposition on the Hill -- to really make it become public and to amplify those voices," said Kate Gould, the group's lead lobbyist on the issue. "Because right now you hear from, it's Lindsey Graham and (Marco) Rubio, who are very confident in their prognosis and have made it sound like it's inevitable that these sanctions will pass with a veto-proof majority."</p></strong>

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Legalization of PAS harms the most disadvantaged – elderly and disabled and crushes value to life and inevitably leads to a slippery slope

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Lee 2013 (Patrick Lee Ph.D., is the John N. and Jamie D. McAleer Professor of Bioethics and the director of the Institute of Bioethics at Franciscan University of Steubenville. The slippery slope of physician-assisted suicide http://www.legatusmagazine.org/the-slippery-slope-of-physician-assisted-suicide/ )