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like 14

Using the state prevents their ability to discursively and materially solve medicalization

Kubiak 13

Kubiak 13

Processes, which prepared the late modern context of assisted dying and which set the tone of its discourse are: medicalisation, bureaucratisation of the dying condition rationalisation of bio-authority and death A historical project on the control over a human body resulted in an ambition to reign over nature This is expressed by the conviction that death is a defeat of medicine The phenomenon of death is rationalised as something measurable, predictable and able to be manipulated Medicalisation is accompanied by increasing bureaucratisation institutions follow strict regulative procedures replaced family physicians institutions became known as the wide array of authorities considered competent to speak and intervene in the name of life and death. codification and juridification of morality eclipses individual ethical decisions activities that violate the law are immediately noticed, restrained and penalised Bureaucratisation precludes privacy of death The value of autonomy and a person’s dignity is a crowning argument in the debate over assisted dying expanding the space of rights and freedom is followed by the process of mutually superimposing control constraints and inscribing a private life into biopolitics self-reflexivity being part of neo-liberalism and capitalisation is consistent with biopolitics , accumulation of authority instruments in the hands of medicine (having practical evidence in the form of the possibility to prescribe medicaments) and the legislation penetrating issues of life and death on the other.

ambition to reign over nature is expressed by the conviction that death is a defeat of medicine. The phenomenon of death is rationalised as something measurable Medicalisation is accompanied by increasing bureaucratisation institutions follow strict regulative procedures, replaced family physicians institutions intervene in the name of life and death codification and juridification of morality eclipses individual ethical decisions Bureaucratisation precludes privacy of death

Anna, Faculty Member at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at Polish Academy of Sciences, “Assisted dying in the context of biopower”, Inter-discipinary.net: A global network for dynamic research and publishing, http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/probing-the-boundaries/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/kubiaksspaper.pdf, pg. 8-9, AB Processes, which prepared the late modern context of assisted dying and which set the tone of its discourse are: medicalisation, bureaucratisation of the dying condition (which influences the publicity of the decisive area of medical staff), rationalisation of bio-authority, excessive juridification of issues concerning life (e.g., genetics, new reproductive technologies: in vitro, sperm’s banks) and death (e.g., abortion, euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide), pluralisation of an outlook on life and as a consequence, various understandings of issues related to life, death and suffering. Medical authority, in the scope of competence, achieved a high level of interfering in nature. A historical project on the control over a human body, whose founding fathers were Rene Descartes, La Mettrie and Francis Bacon, resulted in an ambition to reign over nature. 9 This is expressed by the conviction that death is a defeat of medicine. The phenomenon of death is rationalised as something measurable, predictable and able to be manipulated.10 As far as death is concerned, the most explicit change is a prolonged (and maximally lengthen) process of dying. Medicalisation is accompanied by increasing bureaucratisation, accompanying even the movement of hospices.11 Officials of particular institutions, institutions that follow strict reporting and regulative procedures, replaced former family physicians. In consequence, it indicates a publicity of details of death and its causes. In case of such need, institutions of court and public prosecutor are included in these proceedings. They became known as the wide array of authorities considered competent to speak and intervene in the name of life and death. Excessive codification and juridification of morality eclipses individual ethical decisions. Any activities that violate the law are immediately noticed, restrained and penalised. Bureaucratisation, along with rationality of morality precludes privacy of death, starting from its causes and condition, up to a funeral. From the other side, processes of individualisation, emancipation of ‘my wish,’ transferred the responsibility of decisions to individuals. Anthony Giddens’ elaborates the concept of self-reflexivity.12 The decay of common symbolic universe created a space of universes competing with each other. 13 At the same time there has been a growth of diagnosing and prognosing possibilities, and along with the rise of patients rights and a change of patients-doctors relations the necessity of informing patients. Thus, terminally ill people are aware of incoming experiences and are given the possibility to make a decision whether or not to become reconciled. It is specifically expressed in practice, starting from the role of patient’s rights and their decisions regarding ways of treatment, analgesics and life saving procedures, ‘living wills.’ The value of autonomy and a person’s dignity is a crowning argument in the debate over assisted dying. This debate is influenced by various approaches – depending on particular worldviews and doctrines to the issues of termination of life, medical practices, and the sense of human suffering, treating bodies of dying and the dead. Simultaneously, according to Foucault, expanding the space of rights and freedom is followed by the process of mutually superimposing control constraints and inscribing a private life into biopolitics. The right to live is strictly related to the ban to die and the obligation of caring about a biological body, corpus. In addition, other authors notice that self-reflexivity being part of neo-liberalism and capitalisation of health and life is consistent with biopolitics.14 I argue further, that it is not necessarily always the case, especially on the border of life and death. Thus, I observe aporia of cultural processes. Individualism, the value of autonomy, self-reflexivity, opening the scope of new decisions on one side, and bureaucratisation, accumulation of authority instruments in the hands of medicine (having practical evidence in the form of the possibility to prescribe medicaments) and the legislation penetrating issues of life and death on the other.

<h4><u><strong>Using the state prevents their ability to discursively and materially solve medicalization</h4><p>Kubiak 13</p><p></u></strong>Anna, Faculty Member at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at Polish Academy of Sciences, “Assisted dying in the context of biopower”, Inter-discipinary.net: A global network for dynamic research and publishing, http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/probing-the-boundaries/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/kubiaksspaper.pdf, pg. 8-9, AB </p><p><u>Processes, which prepared the late modern context of assisted dying and which set the tone of its discourse are: medicalisation, bureaucratisation of the dying condition</u> (which influences the publicity of the decisive area of medical staff), <u>rationalisation of bio-authority</u>, excessive juridification of issues concerning life (e.g., genetics, new reproductive technologies: in vitro, sperm’s banks) <u>and death</u> (e.g., abortion, euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide), pluralisation of an outlook on life and as a consequence, various understandings of issues related to life, death and suffering. Medical authority, in the scope of competence, achieved a high level of interfering in nature. <u>A historical project on the control over a human body</u>, whose founding fathers were Rene Descartes, La Mettrie and Francis Bacon, <u><strong>resulted in an <mark>ambition to reign over nature</u></strong></mark>. 9 <u>This <mark>is expressed by the conviction that death is a defeat of medicine</u>. <u>The phenomenon of <strong>death is rationalised</strong> as something <strong>measurable</mark>, predictable and able to be manipulated</u></strong>.10 As far as death is concerned, the most explicit change is a prolonged (and maximally lengthen) process of dying. <u><strong><mark>Medicalisation is accompanied by increasing bureaucratisation</u></strong></mark>, accompanying even the movement of hospices.11 Officials of particular institutions, <u><mark>institutions</u></mark> that <u><mark>follow <strong>strict</u></strong></mark> reporting and <u><strong><mark>regulative procedures</u></strong>, <u><strong>replaced</u></strong></mark> former <u><strong><mark>family physicians</u></strong></mark>. In consequence, it indicates a publicity of details of death and its causes. In case of such need, <u><mark>institutions</u></mark> of court and public prosecutor are included in these proceedings. They <u>became known as the wide array of authorities considered competent to speak and <strong><mark>intervene in the name of life and death</strong></mark>.</u> Excessive <u><strong><mark>codification and juridification of morality eclipses individual ethical decisions</u></strong></mark>. Any <u>activities that violate the law are immediately noticed, restrained and penalised</u>. <u><strong><mark>Bureaucratisation</u></strong></mark>, along with rationality of morality <u><strong><mark>precludes privacy of death</u></strong></mark>, starting from its causes and condition, up to a funeral. From the other side, processes of individualisation, emancipation of ‘my wish,’ transferred the responsibility of decisions to individuals. Anthony Giddens’ elaborates the concept of self-reflexivity.12 The decay of common symbolic universe created a space of universes competing with each other. 13 At the same time there has been a growth of diagnosing and prognosing possibilities, and along with the rise of patients rights and a change of patients-doctors relations the necessity of informing patients. Thus, terminally ill people are aware of incoming experiences and are given the possibility to make a decision whether or not to become reconciled. It is specifically expressed in practice, starting from the role of patient’s rights and their decisions regarding ways of treatment, analgesics and life saving procedures, ‘living wills.’ <u>The value of autonomy and a person’s dignity is a crowning argument in the debate over assisted dying</u>. This debate is influenced by various approaches – depending on particular worldviews and doctrines to the issues of termination of life, medical practices, and the sense of human suffering, treating bodies of dying and the dead. Simultaneously, according to Foucault, <u><strong>expanding the space of rights and freedom is followed by the process of mutually superimposing control constraints and inscribing a private life into biopolitics</u></strong>. The right to live is strictly related to the ban to die and the obligation of caring about a biological body, corpus. In addition, other authors notice that <u><strong>self-reflexivity</u></strong> <u>being part of neo-liberalism and capitalisation </u>of health and life <u><strong>is consistent with biopolitics</u></strong>.14 I argue further, that it is not necessarily always the case, especially on the border of life and death. Thus, I observe aporia of cultural processes. Individualism, the value of autonomy, self-reflexivity, opening the scope of new decisions on one side, and bureaucratisation<u><strong>, accumulation of authority instruments in the hands of medicine (having practical evidence in the form of the possibility to prescribe medicaments) and the legislation penetrating issues of life and death on the other. </p></u></strong>

1NR

Case

Medicalization

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx

N

UMKC

7

ASU ChRa

Brian McBride

1ac was foucault PAS 1nc was forget foucault the plan pik and case 2nc was forget foucault 1nr was the plan pik and case 2nr was case and forget foucault

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx

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NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

FORM AND CONTENT CANNOT BE SEPARATED – there is no conditionality

Bleiker 2000

Bleiker 2000 [Roland, Nude Sunbather, Senior Lecturer @ Queensland, Popular Dissent. Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press, pp. 280-281]

To recognize that language is politics is to acknowledge that form and substance cannot be separated. The manner in which a text is written, a speech is uttered, a though is though, is integral to its content. There is no neutral form of representing the world, a form that is somehow detached from the linguistic and social practices in which the speaker or writer is embedded Being built on specific grammatical and rhetorical structures, all of these stories and accounts, Michael Shapiro points out, implicitly advance political arguments. This is not to say that every account of social dynamics is equally insightful or valid. But it is to accept that linguistic practices are metaphorical. Some tropes, however, have been so extensively rehearsed and are so deeply entrenched in linguistic and cultural traditions that they appear as authentic representations of the real. Dissent in global politics is the process that interferes with such objectifications.

language is politics form and substance cannot be separated. The manner in which a speech is uttered is integral to its content. There is no neutral form of representing the world detached from the linguistic and social practices in which the speaker is embedded all accounts, implicitly advance political arguments Some tropes are so deeply entrenched in linguistic and cultural traditions that they appear as authentic representations of the real. Dissent in global politics is the process that interferes with such objectifications.

To recognize that language is politics is to acknowledge that form and substance cannot be separated. The manner in which a text is written, a speech is uttered, a though is though, is integral to its content. There is no neutral form of representing the world, a form that is somehow detached from the linguistic and social practices in which the speaker or writer is embedded. Science and philosophy, empirical analyses and literature, mathematics and poetry, are all bound by the form through which they convey their ideas. Being built on specific grammatical and rhetorical structures, all of these stories and accounts, Michael Shapiro points out, implicitly advance political arguments. All of them, ‘no matter how much their style might protest innocence, contain a mythical level—that is they have a job to do, a perspective to promote, a kind of world to affirm or deny’. This is not to say that every account of social dynamics is equally insightful or valid. But it is to accept that linguistic practices are metaphorical. Some tropes, however, have been so extensively rehearsed and are so deeply entrenched in linguistic and cultural traditions that they appear as authentic representations of the real. Dissent in global politics is the process that interferes with such objectifications.

<h4>FORM AND CONTENT CANNOT BE SEPARATED – there is no conditionality </h4><p><u><strong>Bleiker 2000</u> </strong>[Roland, Nude Sunbather, Senior Lecturer @ <u>Queensland, Popular Dissent. Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press, pp. 280-281]</p><p>To recognize that <mark>language is politics </mark>is to acknowledge that <mark>form and substance cannot be separated. The manner in which </mark>a text is written, <mark>a speech is uttered</mark>, a though is though, <mark>is integral to its content. <strong>There is no neutral form of representing the world</strong></mark>, a form that is somehow <mark>detached from the linguistic and social practices in which the speaker </mark>or writer <mark>is embedded</u></mark>. Science and philosophy, empirical analyses and literature, mathematics and poetry, are all bound by the form through which they convey their ideas. <u>Being built on specific grammatical and rhetorical structures, <mark>all </mark>of these stories and <mark>accounts, </mark>Michael Shapiro points out, <strong><mark>implicitly advance political arguments</mark>.</u></strong> All of them, ‘no matter how much their style might protest innocence, contain a mythical level—that is they have a job to do, a perspective to promote, a kind of world to affirm or deny’. <u>This is not to say that every account of social dynamics is equally insightful or valid. But it is to accept that linguistic practices are metaphorical. <mark>Some tropes</mark>, however, have been so extensively rehearsed and <mark>are so deeply entrenched in linguistic and cultural traditions that they appear as authentic representations of the real. Dissent in global politics is the process that interferes with such objectifications.</mark> </p></u>

Fernando

Condo

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx

A

NDT

7

NYU IZ

Mathis, Pasquinelli, Dunn

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Aff-NDT-Round7.docx

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cx

college

Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political

Spanos 8

Spanos 8 (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified)

We must think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. I do not simply mean “the nothing” “the ontological difference” “existence” “the absolutely other” “the differance” or “trace” “the differend” the “invisible” or “absent cause” that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking I also mean “the pariah” “the nomad” “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” “the nonbeings” the subaltern “the emigré” “the denizen” “the refugee” “the queer” “the multitude” and “the darkness” that haunt “white”/imperial culture politics images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency images of [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia to veritas

We must think the “ghostly” ontological exile a way of “errant” thinking able to resist the imperialism of technological logic with the displaced emigré by refusal to be answerable to the Occident focus on historical politics betrays indifference to imperial politics of representation praxisoriented discourse tends to separate praxis from the political over the ontological praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being constitutes a continuum, which traverses its sites to sociopolitics This haunting suggests the complex and contradictory situation writers found themselves I have overdetermined the ontological of the the errant thinker in the interregnum to make visible the role ontological representation has played in the West’s imperial project I would suggest resuming the abandoned destructive genealogy of the post-Enlightenment Occident Such will show that American polity constitutes the fulfillment of the “ontotheological tradition

On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must, rather, think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that this Left’s focus on historically specific politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do not simply mean “the nothing” (das Nichts) or “the ontological difference” (Heidegger), “existence” (Sartre), “the absolutely other” (Levinas), “the differance” or “trace” (Derrida), “the differend” (Lyotard), the “invisible” or “absent cause” (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean “the pariah” (Arendt), “the nomad” (Deleuze and Guattari), “the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin” (Bhabha), “the nonbeings” (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha), “the emigré” (Said), “the denizen” (Hammar), “the refugee” (Agamben), “the queer” (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), “the multitude” (Negri and Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, “the darkness” (Morrison) that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/imperial culture politics: The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these images of blinding [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex and contradictory situation in which American writers found themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature.38 In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.

<h4>Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing cracks in dominant knowledge – in this debate, privileging theoretical abstraction recaptures the political</h4><p><u><strong>Spanos 8</u></strong> (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30, ableist language modified)</p><p>On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation of Western ontology are now painfully clear. <u><mark>We must</u></mark>, rather, <u><mark>think</mark> the Abgeschiedene—<mark>the “ghostly” ontological exile</mark> evolving <mark>a way of “errant” thinking</mark> that would be <mark>able to resist the</mark> global <mark>imperialism of</mark> Occidental/<mark>technological logic</mark>—<mark>with</mark>, say, Said’s political Deleuzian nomad: <mark>the displaced</mark> political <mark>emigré</mark> evolving, <mark>by</mark> way of his or her <mark>refusal to be answerable to the</mark> “Truth” of the <mark>Occident</mark>, a politics capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant, the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities; they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the same world-historical event</u>. The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different, “destabilizing” cultures, that <u>this Left’s <mark>focus on historical</mark>ly specific <mark>politics betrays</mark> a disabling <mark>indifference to</mark> the polyvalent <mark>imperial politics</mark> <mark>of</mark> ontological <mark>representation</mark>. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged <mark>praxisoriented discourse</mark>, that is, <mark>tends</mark>—even as it unconsciously employs in its critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing the practices it opposes—<mark>to separate praxis from</mark> and to privilege it over theory, <mark>the political over the ontological</u></mark>. Which is to say, it continues, in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling— disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project proper.35 In so doing, this <u><mark>praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that</mark> <mark>being</mark>, however it is represented, <mark>constitutes a continuum, which</mark>, though unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless <mark>traverses its </mark>indissolubly related “<mark>sites</mark>” from being as such and the epistemological subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender, and race), <mark>to sociopolitics</mark> (including the nation and the international or global sphere).</u> As a necessary result, <u>it fails to perceive the emancipatory political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized) by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary representation of being.</u> By this relay of positively potential differences <u>I do not simply mean “the nothing”</u> (das Nichts) or <u>“the ontological difference” </u>(Heidegger), <u>“existence”</u> (Sartre), <u>“the absolutely other”</u> (Levinas), <u>“the differance” or “trace”</u> (Derrida), <u>“the differend”</u> (Lyotard), <u>the “invisible” or “absent cause”</u> (Althusser) <u>that belong contradictorily to and haunt “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking</u>.36 <u>I also mean “the pariah” </u>(Arendt), <u>“the nomad”</u> (Deleuze and Guattari), <u>“the hybrid” or “the minus in the origin”</u> (Bhabha), <u>“the nonbeings”</u> (Dussel), <u>the subaltern</u> (Guha), <u>“the emigré”</u> (Said), <u>“the denizen”</u> (Hammar), <u>“the refugee”</u> (Agamben), <u>“the queer”</u> (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), <u>“the multitude”</u> (Negri and Hardt),37 <u>and</u>, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern” black American literature, <u>“the darkness”</u> (Morrison) <u>that</u> belong contradictorily to and <u>haunt “white”/imperial culture politics</u>: The <u>images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency</u>. Because they appear almost always in conjunction with representations of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or under complete control, these <u>images of </u>blinding<u> [disorienting] whiteness seem to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear and longing. <mark>This haunting</mark>, a darkness from which our early literature seemed unable to extricate itself, <mark>suggests the complex and contradictory situation</mark> in which American <mark>writers found themselves</mark> during the formative years of the nation’s literature</u>.38 In this chapter, <u><mark>I have overdetermined the ontological</mark> perspective <mark>of the</mark> Abgeschiedene, <mark>the errant thinker in the interregnum</mark> who would think the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to know nothing” about</u>,39 <u>not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been <mark>to make visible</mark> and operational <mark>the </mark>substantial and increasingly complex practical <mark>role</mark> that <mark>ontological representation has played</mark> and continues to play <mark>in the West’s</mark> perennial global <mark>imperial project</mark>, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. </u>In accordance with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture, <u><mark>I would suggest</mark>, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of <mark>resuming the</mark> virtually <mark>abandoned destructive genealogy of</mark> the truth discourse of <mark>the post-Enlightenment Occident</mark>, now, however, reconstellated into the post-Cold War conjuncture</u>. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy and the end of history. <u><mark>Such</mark> a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested, <mark>will show that</mark> this “triumphant” post-Cold War <mark>American polity constitutes the fulfillment</mark> (end) <mark>of</mark> the last (anthropological) phase of a continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary </u>(Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment liberal humanist), <u>has called <mark>the “ontotheological tradition</mark>.” It will also show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post- Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia</u> (unconcealment) <u>to veritas</u> (the adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized) the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.</p>

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1ac was mj with cartels and hemp advantages 1nc was legalism and security and case 2nc was legalism 1nr was case 2nr was legalism and case

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Capitalism causes continual global warfare and destroys value to life

Robinson 14

Robinson 14 (William I. Robinson, professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism Is In the Midst of Its Most Severe Crisis” 02 Jul 2014, KB)

US intervention entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001. This should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism. Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in a century the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states. global inequalities have never been as acute and grotesque we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings about including the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy as a response by the US-led transnational state and capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. There is currently a global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly across countries and has not taken any clear form or direction. We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits 80 percent experience of insecurity, impoverishment, and increasingly inhabiting a “planet of slums.” apologists of capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful. But 300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps. Foxcomm makes your iPads and iPhones. We are headed towards a global police state organized by global elites and led by the US state to contain the potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms because they have been pressured from below to do so the natural tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been escalation of worldwide inequalities Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.” this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. We cannot understand intensified militarization and the rise of this complex outside of the crisis of global capitalism. It is a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy extreme inequality and social polarization means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus? Unloading the surplus through financial speculation aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. the mass production and distribution of vaccines and medications for diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases tuberculosis, measles, etc that previously were under control. Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent. capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable which is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. it becomes profitable to turn to wars the surplus that the global economy has been and is producing but that cannot be absorbed by the world market, has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies. The US occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital. The prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes is enormously profitable for private corporations we are now living in a global war economy in which the threat of stagnation is offset by the militarization of global economy and society and the spread of systems of mass social control A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts and the spread of social control systems, from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants in the United States and Europe, must be ideologically legitimated. This is where bogus “wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where enemies must be conjured up, in which populations must be led to believe they are threatened So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is the devil, and so on. One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply of raw materials, machinery and service inputs come from other global corporations the global economy is kept running through violence and conflict the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global econom with the petroleum complex that is coming under pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. This is a new transnational power bloc this complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc. the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent. All this and much more are part of the militarization and “securitization” of global society We face doctrines, ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state the “war on drugs,” the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then the US state is the world’s leading terrorist.

capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis global inequalities have never been as grotesque we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings as a response by the capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. There is global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly and has not taken any clear direction There have been countless studies documenting the escalation of inequalities 80 percent experience insecurity impoverishment and inhabit a “planet of slums.” We are headed towards a global police state The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for obedience States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms because they have been pressured from below to do so the tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been escalation of worldwide inequalities billions have been thrown off the land or out of employment relegated to migration We cannot understand intensified militarization outside of capitalism extreme inequality and social polarization means that the global market cannot absorb expanding output The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and absorb is growing this leads to a crisis of overproduction Unloading the surplus aggravates the solution as we saw with the collapse of 08 it becomes profitable to turn to wars the surplus cannot be absorbed has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction we are living in a global war economy in which the threat of stagnation is offset by militarization A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants must be ideologically legitimated This is where enemies must be conjured up populations must believe they are threatened One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance the economy is kept running through violence and conflict This is a new transnational power bloc the polarization of the world population generates new social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and controlled while guards protect that 20 percent this and more are part of the “securitization” of global society We face doctrines ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state the “war on drugs,”

However, and this is the key point I wish to highlight here, US intervention around the world clearly entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001. This new period should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism. Global capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis in close to a century, and in many ways the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is also extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states. On the other hand, global inequalities have never been as acute and grotesque as they are today. So, in simplified terms, we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings about, including what you mention – the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy – as a response by the US-led transnational state and the transnational capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis. You ask me who is going to compensate for these losses. That will depend on how the world’s people respond. There is currently a global revolt from below underway, but it is spread unevenly across countries and has not taken any clear form or direction. Can the popular majority of humanity force the transnational capitalist class and the US/transnational state to be accountable for its crimes? Mao Zedong once said that “power flows through the barrel of a gun.” What he meant by this, in a more abstract than literal way, I believe, is that in the end it is the correlation of real forces that will determine outcomes. Because the United States has overwhelming and “full spectrum” military dominance, it can capture, execute, or bring to trial people anywhere around the world… it has “free license”, so to speak, to act as an international outlaw. We don’t even have to take the more recent examples. In December 1989 the United States undertook an illegal and criminal invasion of Panama, kidnapped Manuel Noriega – whether or not he was a dictator is not the point, as the United States puts in power and defends dictators that defend US and transnational elite interests, and brought him back to US territory for trial. What country in the world now has the naked power “flowing through the barrel of a gun” to invade the United States, capture George Bush, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other war criminals, and bring them somewhere to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Q: In your writings, you’ve warned against the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the slant accumulation of the global wealth in the hands of an affluent few and the impoverishment of the suppressed majority. What do you think are the reasons for this stark inequality and the disturbing dispossession of millions of people in the capitalist societies? You wrote that the participants of the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos were worried that the current situation raises the specter of worldwide instability and civil wars. Is it really so? A: We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots, such grotesque levels of inequality, within and among countries. There have been countless studies in recent years documenting the escalation of inequalities, among them, the current bestseller by Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” The pattern we see is that the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth that humanity produces and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits, but as well that some 20 percent of the population in each countries has integrated into the global economy as middle class and affluent consumers while the remaining 80 percent has experienced rising levels of insecurity, impoverishment, and precariousness, increasingly inhabiting what some have called a “planet of slums.” The apologists of global capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful. But in China, 300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. Such is this exploitation that a couple years ago, you may remember, Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps. This is the Foxcomm that makes your iPads and iPhones. The 80 percent is then subject to all sorts of sophisticated systems of social control and repression. We are headed in this regard towards a global police state, organized by global elites and led by the US state, to contain the real or potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority. Such structures of inequality and exploitation cannot be contained over time without both ideological and coercive apparatuses; conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence, organized by states and private security forces. Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which we are now living in a global social control state, a global panoptical surveillance state. George Orwell wrote about such a state in his famous novel “1984.” The Orwellian society has arrived. Yet it is worse than Orwell imagined, because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for their obedience and conformity. How do we explain such stark inequality? Capitalism is a system that by its very internal dynamic generates wealth yet polarizes and concentrates that wealth. Historically a de-concentration of wealth through redistribution has come about by state intervention to offset the natural tendency for capital accumulation to result in such polarization. States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms both because they have been pressured from below to do so – whether by trade unions, social movements, socialist struggles, or so on – or because states must do so in order to retain legitimacy and preserve at least enough social peace for the reproduction of the system. A great variety of redistributive models emerged in the 20th century around the world, and went by a great many names – socialism, communism, social democracy, New Deal, welfare states, developmental states, populism, the social wage, and so on. All these models shared two things in common. One was state intervention in the economy to regulate capital accumulation and thus to bring under some control the most anarchic and most destructive elements of unrestrained capitalism. The other was redistribution through numerous policies, ranging from minimum legal wages and unemployment insurance, to public enterprises, the social wages of public health, education, transportation, and housing, welfare programs, land reform in agrarian countries, low cost credit, and so on. But capital responded to the last major crisis of the system, that of the 1970s, by “going global,” by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation and undermining models of state regulation and redistribution. Neo-liberalism is a set of policies that facilitate the rise of transnational capital. As transnational capital has broken free of the confine of the nation-state, the natural tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. The result has been this dizzying escalation of worldwide inequalities as wealth concentrates within the transnational capitalist class and, to a much lesser extent, the better off strata of middle classes and professionals. There are other related factors that account for the intensification of worldwide inequalities. One is the defeat of the worldwide left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led the ruling groups to declare that global neo-liberal capitalism was “The End of History.” A second is the rise of a globally integrated financial system in which capital in its liquid, that is money, form can move frictionless across the planet with no controls whatsoever. Transnational finance capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a global scale, and it engages in unfathomable levels of speculation, turning the global economy into one giant casino. Transnational finance capital has come to control the levers of the global economy, to get around and to undermine any effort at regulation, and to concentrate wealth in its liquid form in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. A third factor is the rise of a mass of surplus humanity. Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps billions, have been made “superfluous”, thrown off the land or out of productive employment, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and relegated to migration and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.” In turn, this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. Q: In one of your articles, you talked of an “ever-expanding military-prison-industrial-security-financial complex” that generates enormous profits through waging wars, selling weapons and then taking part in reconstruction activities in the war-torn countries. How does this complex operate? Is it really reliant on waging wars? A: We cannot understand intensified militarization and the rise of this complex outside of the crisis of global capitalism. This crisis is structural, in the first instance. It is what we call a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy driven by new technologies, especially computer, information, and communications technologies, but also by the revolution in transportation and containerization, by robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and more recently, by 3D printing, among other aspects, has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy, and to bring about a huge increase in productivity worldwide and an enormous expansion of the capacity of the global economy to churn out goods and services. But extreme inequality and social polarization in the global system means that the global market cannot absorb the expanding output of the global economy. The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic. The gap between what the global economy can produce and what the global market can absorb is growing and this leads to a crisis of overproduction: where and how to unload the surplus? How can transnational capital continue to accumulate and generate profits if this output is not unloaded, that is, profitably marketed? Unloading the surplus through financial speculation, which has skyrocketed in recent years, only aggravates the solution, as we saw with the collapse of 2008. Now, if only 20 percent of humanity can consume in any significant quantity it is not very profitable to go into the business of mass, inexpensive public transportation, health and education, or the production of practical goods that the world’s population needs because very simply even if people need these things they do not have the income to purchase them. A global civilian economy geared to the basic needs of humanity is simply not profitable for the transnational capitalist class. Look at it like this: the mass production and distribution of vaccines and other medications for communicable and treatable diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are simply not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases – tuberculosis, measles, etc. – that previously were under control. Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry, including the giant pharmaceutical, biotechnology and related branches to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent. The lesson here is that capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable, according to the structure of the market and of income, which in turn is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. It is in this context that it becomes quite profitable to turn to wars, conflicts, systems of repression and social control to generate profit, to produce goods and systems that can repress that 80 percent of humanity that is not your consumer, not your customer so to say, because they do not have the purchasing power to sustain your drive to accumulate by producing goods and services for them that they actually need. Global capitalism is a perverted and irrational system. Putting aside geo-political considerations, the surplus that the global economy has been and is producing but that cannot be absorbed by the world market, has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction, and new systems of social control and repression, independent of geo-political considerations, that is, simply as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies. The US invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan – although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital. The prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes in the United States – and let us recall that the United States holds some 25-30 percent of the world’s prisoners – is enormously profitable for private corporations that run almost all of the immigrant detention centers, some of the general prisons, supply everything from guards to food, build the installations, erect border walls, and so on. Let us recall that the US National Security Agency – and we now know from Edward Snowden just how vast are its operations – subcontracts out its activities to private corporations, as do the CIA, the Pentagon, and so on. Global security corporations are one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and there are now more private security guards in the world than police officers. All of this is to say that we are now living in a global war economy, in which the threat of stagnation is offset in part by the militarization of global economy and society and the introduction and spread of systems of mass social control. Of course this involves all kinds of cultural, ideological, and political dimensions as well. A global war economy based on a multitude of endless conflicts and the spread of social control systems, from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants in the United States and Europe, must be ideologically legitimated. This is where bogus and farcical “wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where enemies must be conjured up, in which populations must be led to believe they are threatened, and so on. So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is now the devil, and so on. One “threat” replaces another but the system needs to keep a population in permanent compliance through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy has involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation, towards those global corporate conglomerates involved in the production of war materials, of security, of engineering (for example, Bechtel and Halliburton), and other activities that involve making profit out of conflict and control. Remember by way of example that each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on and so forth, is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply, in turn, of raw materials, machinery and service inputs in turn come from other global corporations or local firms. So the whole global economy is kept running through violence and conflict. But the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global economy, together with the petroleum complex that is coming under much pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. This is a new transnational power bloc – this complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control, together with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc. Remember also that the polarization of the world population into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated generates new spatial social relations, so that the privileged occupy gated communities and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and carefully controlled, while surveillance systems and security guards must patrol and protect that 20 percent. All this and much more are part of the militarization and “securitization” of global society by the powers that be. We face new doctrines, ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state – “fourth generation warfare,” “humanitarian intervention,” the “war on drugs,” among others, and above all, the so-called “war on terror.” I say so-called because, the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They indeed do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then the US state is the world’s leading terrorist. The powers that be in global society and that control the global political discourse attach the label “terrorist” to violence that they do not approve of, and they attach the label of “freedom and democracy and security” to violence that they do approve of, or that they commit themselves. Moreover, increasingly “terrorism” is used to simply describe political dissent, so that legitimate social movements and political struggles against global capitalism become labeled as “terrorism” in order to justify their suppression.

<h4><u><strong>Capitalism causes continual global warfare and destroys value to life </h4><p>Robinson 14</p><p></u></strong>(William I. Robinson, professor of sociology, global and international studies, and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism Is In the Midst of Its Most Severe Crisis” 02 Jul 2014, KB)</p><p>However, and this is the key point I wish to highlight here, <u><strong>US intervention</u></strong> around the world clearly <u><strong>entered a qualitatively new period after September 11, 2001.</u></strong> <u>This</u> new period <u>should be seen in the context of emergent 21st century global capitalism.</u> <u>Global <mark>capitalism is in the midst of its most severe crisis </mark>in</u> close to <u>a century</u>, and in many ways <u>the current crisis is much worse than that of the 1930s because we are on <strong>the precipice of an ecological holocaust that threatens the very earth system and the ability to sustain life</strong>, ours included, because the means of violence and social control have never before been so concentrated within a single powerful state, and because the global means of communication is</u> also <u>extraordinarily concentrated in the hands of transnational capital and a few powerful states.</u> On the other hand, <u><strong><mark>global inequalities have never been as</mark> acute and <mark>grotesque</u></strong></mark> as they are today. So, in simplified terms, <u><mark>we need to see the escalation of US interventionism and the untold suffering it brings</mark> about</u>, <u>including</u> what you mention – <u>the killing of unarmed civilians, the destruction of the environment, forced migration and displacement, undermining democracy</u> – <u><mark>as a response by the</mark> US-led transnational state and</u> the transnational<u> <mark>capitalist class to contain the explosive contradictions of a global capitalist system that is out of control and in deep crisis.</mark> </u>You ask me who is going to compensate for these losses. That will depend on how the world’s people respond. <u><strong><mark>There is</mark> currently a <mark>global revolt from below underway</strong>, but it is spread unevenly</mark> across countries <mark>and has not taken any clear</mark> form or <mark>direction</mark>.</u> Can the popular majority of humanity force the transnational capitalist class and the US/transnational state to be accountable for its crimes? Mao Zedong once said that “power flows through the barrel of a gun.” What he meant by this, in a more abstract than literal way, I believe, is that in the end it is the correlation of real forces that will determine outcomes. Because the United States has overwhelming and “full spectrum” military dominance, it can capture, execute, or bring to trial people anywhere around the world… it has “free license”, so to speak, to act as an international outlaw. We don’t even have to take the more recent examples. In December 1989 the United States undertook an illegal and criminal invasion of Panama, kidnapped Manuel Noriega – whether or not he was a dictator is not the point, as the United States puts in power and defends dictators that defend US and transnational elite interests, and brought him back to US territory for trial. What country in the world now has the naked power “flowing through the barrel of a gun” to invade the United States, capture George Bush, Dick Chaney, Donald Rumsfeld, and other war criminals, and bring them somewhere to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity? Q: In your writings, you’ve warned against the growing gap between the rich and the poor, the slant accumulation of the global wealth in the hands of an affluent few and the impoverishment of the suppressed majority. What do you think are the reasons for this stark inequality and the disturbing dispossession of millions of people in the capitalist societies? You wrote that the participants of the 2011 World Economic Forum in Davos were worried that the current situation raises the specter of worldwide instability and civil wars. Is it really so? A: <u><strong>We have never in the history of humanity seen such a sharp social polarization between the haves and the have-nots</u></strong>, such grotesque levels of inequality, within and among countries. <u><mark>There have been countless studies</mark> in recent years <mark>documenting the escalation of inequalities</u></mark>, among them, the current bestseller by Thomas Piketty, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” The pattern we see is that <u>the notorious “1 percent” monopolizes a huge portion of the wealth</u> that humanity produces <u>and transnational corporations and banks are registering record profits</u>, but as well that some 20 percent of the population in each countries has integrated into the global economy as middle class and affluent consumers while the remaining <u><mark>80 percent</u></mark> has <u><mark>experience</u></mark>d rising levels <u>of <mark>insecurity</mark>, <mark>impoverishment</mark>, <mark>and</u></mark> precariousness, <u>increasingly <mark>inhabit</mark>ing</u> what some have called <u><strong><mark>a “planet of slums.”</u></strong></mark> The <u>apologists of</u> global <u>capitalism point to the rise of a middle class in China to claim that the system is successful.</u> <u>But</u> in China, <u>300-400 million people have entered the ranks of the global middle and consuming class while the other 800-900 million have faced downward mobility, immiseration, insecurity, unemployment and extreme levels of exploitation. </u>Such is this exploitation that a couple years ago, you may remember, <u>Foxcomm workers preferred to commit suicide by jumping off the roof of their factories than to remain in their labor camps.</u> This is the <u>Foxcomm</u> that <u>makes your iPads and iPhones.</u> The 80 percent is then subject to all sorts of sophisticated systems of social control and repression. <u><strong><mark>We are headed</u></strong></mark> in this regard <u><strong><mark>towards a global police state</u></strong></mark>, <u>organized by global elites and led by the US</u> <u>state</u>, <u>to contain the</u> real or <u>potential rebellion of a dispossessed majority</u>. Such structures of inequality and exploitation cannot be contained over time without both ideological and coercive apparatuses; <u>conformity to a system of structural violence must be compelled through direct violence</u>, organized by states and private security forces. Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which we are now living in a global social control state, a global panoptical surveillance state. George Orwell wrote about such a state in his famous novel “1984.” <u><strong><mark>The Orwellian society has arrived.</u></strong> <u>Yet it is worse</mark> than Orwell imagined, <mark>because at least the members of Orwell’s society had their basic needs met in return for</mark> their <mark>obedience</mark> and conformity. </u>How do we explain such stark inequality? Capitalism is a system that by its very internal dynamic generates wealth yet polarizes and concentrates that wealth. Historically a de-concentration of wealth through redistribution has come about by state intervention to offset the natural tendency for capital accumulation to result in such polarization. <u><mark>States have turned to an array of redistributive mechanisms</u></mark> both <u><strong><mark>because they have been pressured from below to do so</u></strong></mark> – whether by trade unions, social movements, socialist struggles, or so on – or because states must do so in order to retain legitimacy and preserve at least enough social peace for the reproduction of the system. A great variety of redistributive models emerged in the 20th century around the world, and went by a great many names – socialism, communism, social democracy, New Deal, welfare states, developmental states, populism, the social wage, and so on. All these models shared two things in common. One was state intervention in the economy to regulate capital accumulation and thus to bring under some control the most anarchic and most destructive elements of unrestrained capitalism. The other was redistribution through numerous policies, ranging from minimum legal wages and unemployment insurance, to public enterprises, the social wages of public health, education, transportation, and housing, welfare programs, land reform in agrarian countries, low cost credit, and so on. But capital responded to the last major crisis of the system, that of the 1970s, by “going global,” by breaking free of nation-state constraints to accumulation and undermining models of state regulation and redistribution. Neo-liberalism is a set of policies that facilitate the rise of transnational capital. As transnational capital has broken free of the confine of the nation-state, <u><mark>the</mark> natural <mark>tendency for capitalism to concentrate wealth has been unleashed without any countervailing restraints. <strong>The result has been</u></strong></mark> this dizzying <u><strong><mark>escalation of worldwide inequalities</u></strong></mark> as wealth concentrates within the transnational capitalist class and, to a much lesser extent, the better off strata of middle classes and professionals. There are other related factors that account for the intensification of worldwide inequalities. One is the defeat of the worldwide left in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which led the ruling groups to declare that global neo-liberal capitalism was “The End of History.” A second is the rise of a globally integrated financial system in which capital in its liquid, that is money, form can move frictionless across the planet with no controls whatsoever. Transnational finance capital has become the hegemonic fraction of capital on a global scale, and it engages in unfathomable levels of speculation, turning the global economy into one giant casino. Transnational finance capital has come to control the levers of the global economy, to get around and to undermine any effort at regulation, and to concentrate wealth in its liquid form in a way that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. A third factor is the rise of a mass of surplus humanity. <u>Hundreds of millions of people, perhaps <mark>billions</mark>, <mark>have been</mark> made “superfluous”, <mark>thrown off the land or out of</mark> productive <mark>employment</mark>, replaced by machines and rising productivity, marginalized and <mark>relegated to migration</mark> and to trying to scratch by an existence in the “planet of slums.”</u> In turn, <u>this mass of humanity places those that are employed in a very vulnerable situation, drives down wage levels everywhere, facilitates the “flexibilization” and precarious nature of wage labor, and thereby further aggravating inequalities. </u>Q: In one of your articles, you talked of an “ever-expanding military-prison-industrial-security-financial complex” that generates enormous profits through waging wars, selling weapons and then taking part in reconstruction activities in the war-torn countries. How does this complex operate? Is it really reliant on waging wars? A: <u><strong><mark>We cannot understand intensified militarization</mark> and the rise of this complex <mark>outside of</mark> the crisis of global <mark>capitalism</mark>.</u></strong> This crisis is structural, in the first instance. <u>It is</u> what we call <u>a crisis of over-accumulation. The rise of the global economy</u> driven by new technologies, especially computer, information, and communications technologies, but also by the revolution in transportation and containerization, by robotics, aerospace, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and more recently, by 3D printing, among other aspects, <u>has allowed the transnational capitalist class to restructure and reorganize the whole world economy</u>, and to bring about a huge increase in productivity worldwide and an enormous expansion of the capacity of the global economy to churn out goods and services. But <u><mark>extreme inequality and social polarization</u></mark> in the global system <u><mark>means that the global market cannot absorb</mark> the <mark>expanding output</mark> of the global economy. <strong><mark>The result is a stagnation that is becoming chronic.</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>The gap between what the global economy can produce and </mark>what the global market can <mark>absorb is growing</mark> and <mark>this leads to a crisis of overproduction</mark>: where and how to unload the surplus?</u> How can transnational capital continue to accumulate and generate profits if this output is not unloaded, that is, profitably marketed? <u><mark>Unloading the surplus</mark> through financial speculation</u>, which has skyrocketed in recent years, only <u><mark>aggravates the solution</mark>, <mark>as we saw with the collapse of</mark> 20<mark>08</mark>. </u>Now, if only 20 percent of humanity can consume in any significant quantity it is not very profitable to go into the business of mass, inexpensive public transportation, health and education, or the production of practical goods that the world’s population needs because very simply even if people need these things they do not have the income to purchase them. A global civilian economy geared to the basic needs of humanity is simply not profitable for the transnational capitalist class. Look at it like this: <u>the mass production and distribution of vaccines and</u> other <u>medications for</u> communicable and treatable <u>diseases that affect masses of poor people around the world are</u> simply <u>not profitable and as a result we even have new pandemics of diseases</u> – <u>tuberculosis, measles, etc</u>. – <u>that previously were under control.</u> <u>Yet it is profitable for the global capitalist medical industry</u>, including the giant pharmaceutical, biotechnology and related branches <u>to spend billions on developing plastic surgery and every imaginable treatment for the vanity of a small portion of humanity, or to develop incredibly expensive treatments for diseases that afflict the affluent.</u> The lesson here is that <u>capital will seek to accumulate where it is profitable</u>, according to the structure of the market and of income, <u>which</u> in turn <u>is shaped by the balance of class and social power and what we call the relations of production and irrespective of rational use of resources and irrespective of human need. </u>It is in this context that <u><strong><mark>it becomes</u></strong></mark> quite <u><strong><mark>profitable to turn to wars</u></strong></mark>, conflicts, systems of repression and social control to generate profit, to produce goods and systems that can repress that 80 percent of humanity that is not your consumer, not your customer so to say, because they do not have the purchasing power to sustain your drive to accumulate by producing goods and services for them that they actually need. Global capitalism is a perverted and irrational system. Putting aside geo-political considerations, <u><mark>the</u> <u>surplus</mark> that the global economy has been and is producing but that <mark>cannot be absorbed</mark> by the world market, <mark>has been channeled into wars and conflicts that involve endless rounds of destruction and reconstruction</u></mark>, and new systems of social control and repression, independent of geo-political considerations, that is, simply <u>as a way of sustaining capital accumulation and profit making in the face of stagnation tendencies.</u> <u>The US </u>invasions and <u>occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan</u> – <u>although legitimated in the name of fighting “terrorism” – have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts and profits for transnational capital.</u> <u>The prison-industrial</u> <u>and immigrant-detention complexes</u> in the United States – and let us recall that the United States holds some 25-30 percent of the world’s prisoners – <u>is enormously profitable for private corporations</u> that run almost all of the immigrant detention centers, some of the general prisons, supply everything from guards to food, build the installations, erect border walls, and so on. Let us recall that the US National Security Agency – and we now know from Edward Snowden just how vast are its operations – subcontracts out its activities to private corporations, as do the CIA, the Pentagon, and so on. Global security corporations are one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy and there are now more private security guards in the world than police officers. All of this is to say that <u><strong><mark>we are </mark>now <mark>living in a global war economy</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>in which the threat of stagnation is offset</u></mark> in part <u><mark>by</mark> the <mark>militarization</mark> of global economy and society and the</u> introduction and <u>spread of systems of mass social control</u>. Of course this involves all kinds of cultural, ideological, and political dimensions as well. <u><mark>A global war economy based on <strong>a multitude of endless conflicts</u></strong></mark> <u>and the spread of social control systems, <strong><mark>from full-scale wars to the repression of racial minorities and immigrants</mark> in the United States and Europe</strong>, <mark>must be ideologically legitimated</mark>.</u> <u><mark>This is where</mark> bogus</u> and farcical <u>“wars on drugs and terrorism” come in, where <mark>enemies must be conjured up</mark>, in which <mark>populations must </mark>be led to <mark>believe they are threatened</u></mark>, and so on. <u>So the US public must believe that Iran is a threat, that Putin is</u> now <u>the devil, and so on.</u> <u><strong><mark>One “threat” replaces another</u></strong> <u>but the system needs to keep a population <strong>in permanent compliance</strong></mark> through the manipulation of emotion and the senses. This transition into a permanent global war economy</u> has <u>involved some shifts in the gravitational centers of capital accumulation</u>, towards those global corporate conglomerates involved in the production of war materials, of security, of engineering (for example, Bechtel and Halliburton), and other activities that involve making profit out of conflict and control. Remember by way of example that <u>each drone that flies, each missile fired, each round of ammunition, each tank deployed, each soldier equipped and fed, each prison that is constructed, each surveillance system put into place, each border wall installed, and so on</u> and so forth, <u>is produced in factories and through production chains by global corporations whose supply</u>, in turn, <u>of raw materials, machinery and service inputs</u> in turn <u>come from other global corporations</u> or local firms. So <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> whole <u><strong>global <mark>economy is kept running through violence and conflict</u></strong></mark>. But <u>the global war economy also involves the global financial institutions that are at the very heart of the global econom</u>y, together <u>with the petroleum complex that is coming under</u> much <u>pressure from the environmental movement yet is showing all-time record profits in the past few years. <strong><mark>This is a new transnational power bloc</u></strong></mark> – <u>this</u> <u>complex of corporate interests brought around a global war economy and global systems of repression and social control</u>, together <u>with elites and state managers brought into or representing the power bloc.</u> Remember also that <u><mark>the polarization of the world population</mark> into 20 percent affluent and 80 percent immiserated <mark>generates new</mark> spatial <mark>social relations, <strong>so that the privileged occupy gated communities</strong> and those displaced by gentrification must be violently suppressed and</mark> carefully <mark>controlled</mark>, <mark>while</mark> surveillance systems and security <mark>guards</mark> must patrol and <mark>protect</mark> <mark>that 20 percent</mark>.</u> <u>All <mark>this</mark> <mark>and</mark> much <mark>more are part of the</mark> militarization and <strong><mark>“securitization” of global society</u></strong></mark> by the powers that be. <u><mark>We face</u></mark> new <u><mark>doctrines</mark>, <mark>ideologies and political discourse that legitimize the construction of a global police state</u></mark> – “fourth generation warfare,” “humanitarian intervention,” <u><strong><mark>the “war on drugs,”</u></strong></mark> among others, and above all, the so-called “war on terror.” I say so-called because, <u>the US state is the biggest perpetrator of terror in the world. It is not that Al-Qaida and other groups do not carry out condemnable violence against innocent civilians. They</u> indeed <u>do. But if we define terrorism as the use of violence against civilians for political objectives, then <strong>the US state is the world’s leading terrorist.</u></strong> The powers that be in global society and that control the global political discourse attach the label “terrorist” to violence that they do not approve of, and they attach the label of “freedom and democracy and security” to violence that they do approve of, or that they commit themselves. Moreover, increasingly “terrorism” is used to simply describe political dissent, so that legitimate social movements and political struggles against global capitalism become labeled as “terrorism” in order to justify their suppression.</p>

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1ac was simony of organs 1nc was framing spec the cap k the undercommons k the release the relics cp and case 2nc was undercommons and case 1nr was cap and relics 2nr was cap and relics

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The CP solves best – criticizing their normative form opens up a space for reflection where true solvency becomes impossible

Winter 91

Winter 91 (Steven L. June, Prof of Law @ U. of Miami, Texas Law Review ”On Building Houses”)

the focus on the complex, systemic nature of affairs need condemn us neither to stasis nor to undecidability , there remains the quite substantial risk that decision makers will evaluate those dissenting arguments or counter-narratives unreflectively and, thus, will be disabled from appreciating, let alone adopting, the perspective that is being offered In contrast moving beyond mere critique to explore instead the role of cultural, cognitive, and socio-linguistic form in channelling, structuring, and configuring practice investigate the concrete ways in which animating form can and does have a distinctive politics This is what is meant by "the politics of form The idea is to examine the prevailing structures of thought , in an attempt to reveal the way in which normative precommitment are always already embedded in form , it is by opening a space for reflection in this way that legal theory can have a progressive political payoff. n68 Through these examinations of form and its practical-political consequences, we attempt to map the possibilities of a different, less empty frame for practice

there remains the substantial risk decision makers will evaluate dissenting arguments unreflectively and disabled from appreciating the perspective that is offered The idea is to examine the prevailing structures of thought in an attempt to reveal the way in which normative precommitment are embedded in form it is by opening a space for reflection that legal theory can have a progressive political payoff Through examinations of form we attempt to map the possibilities of a different, less empty frame for practice

As this last argument suggests, the focus on the complex, systemic nature of affairs need condemn us neither to stasis nor to undecidability. Rather, the insight that cultural forms both constrain and enable subjectivity provides an alternative way of thinking about the problems of law and social structure. If, as some suggest, "[c]ritique is all there is," n63 then we hazard the kind of political quandary so poignantly illustrated by the legal decisions examined by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic: no matter how eloquent the appeal to an alternative vision, there remains the quite substantial risk that decision makers will evaluate those dissenting arguments or counter-narratives unreflectively -- that is, through the prism of the dominant cultural assumptions and beliefs that make them who they are -- and, thus, will be disabled from appreciating, let alone adopting, the perspective that is being offered. n64 In contrast, the essays in this symposium offer a way of moving beyond mere critique to explore instead the role of cultural, cognitive, and socio-linguistic form in channelling, structuring, and configuring practice. We propose to investigate the concrete ways in which, both in the realm of thought and of action, animating form can and does have a distinctive politics. n65 This is what is meant by "the politics of form." n66 The idea is to [*1610] examine the prevailing structures of thought "on the bias," so to speak, in an attempt to reveal the way in which directionality, predilection, and normative precommitment are always already embedded in form. n67 As Jeremy Paul suggests, it is by opening a space for reflection in this way that legal theory can have a progressive political payoff. n68 Through these examinations of form and its practical-political consequences, we attempt to map the possibilities of a different, less empty frame for practice. n69 Sixty years ago, Karl Llewellyn put the challenge gravely: "Life struggling against form, or through form to its will -- 'pity and terror --.' Law means so pitifully little to life. Life is so terrifyingly dependent on law."

<h4>The CP solves best – criticizing their normative form opens up a space for reflection where true solvency becomes impossible</h4><p><u><strong>Winter 91</u> </strong>(Steven L. June, Prof of Law @ U. of Miami, Texas Law Review ”On Building Houses”) </p><p>As this last argument suggests, <u>the focus on the complex, systemic nature of affairs need condemn us neither to stasis nor to undecidability</u>. Rather, the insight that cultural forms both constrain and enable subjectivity provides an alternative way of thinking about the problems of law and social structure. If, as some suggest, "[c]ritique is all there is," n63 then we hazard the kind of political quandary so poignantly illustrated by the legal decisions examined by Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic: no matter how eloquent the appeal to an alternative vision<u>, <mark>there remains</mark> <mark>the</mark> quite <mark>substantial risk</mark> that <mark>decision makers will evaluate</mark> those <mark>dissenting</u> <u>arguments</mark> or counter-narratives <mark>unreflectively</u><strong></mark> </strong>-- that is, through the prism of the dominant cultural assumptions and beliefs that make them who they are -- <u><mark>and</mark>, thus, will be <mark>disabled</mark> <mark>from appreciating</mark>, let alone adopting, <mark>the perspective that is</mark> being <mark>offered</u></mark>. n64 <u>In contrast</u>, the essays in this symposium offer a way of <u>moving beyond mere critique to explore instead the role of cultural, cognitive, and socio-linguistic form in channelling, structuring, and configuring practice</u>. We propose to <u>investigate the concrete ways in which</u>, both in the realm of thought and of action, <u>animating form can and does have a distinctive politics</u>. n65 <u>This is what is meant by "the politics of form</u>." n66 <u><mark>The idea is to</u></mark> [*1610] <u><mark>examine the prevailing</mark> <mark>structures of thought</u></mark> "on the bias," so to speak<u>, <mark>in an attempt to reveal the way in which</u></mark> directionality, predilection, and <u><mark>normative</mark> <mark>precommitment</mark> <mark>are</mark> always already <mark>embedded</mark> <mark>in</mark> <mark>form</u></mark>. n67 As Jeremy Paul suggests<u>, <mark>it is by opening a space for reflection</mark> in this way <mark>that legal theory can have a progressive</mark> <mark>political</mark> <mark>payoff</mark>. n68 <mark>Through</mark> these <mark>examinations</mark> <mark>of form</mark> and its practical-political consequences, <mark>we attempt to map the possibilities of a different, less empty frame for practice</u></mark>. n69 Sixty years ago, Karl Llewellyn put the challenge gravely: "Life struggling against form, or through form to its will -- 'pity and terror --.' Law means so pitifully little to life. Life is so terrifyingly dependent on law." </p>

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1AC was marijuana 1NC was politics of pain the plan pik and case 2nc was politics of pain 1nr was the pik and case 2nr was case and the pik

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Ending your genealogy with the simple recommendation of “legalizes marijuana” ruins the entire point of genealogical investigation in the first place – the goal of genealogy is to make you feel uncomfortable with everything about how we are currently acting, and that uneasiness cannot be achieved if you’re told exactly what to do

Flyvberg & Richardon 2

Flyvberg & Richardon 2 – dept of development @ Aalborg University

theory shifts from what should be done to what is actually done. It becomes meaningless, or misleading - for politicians and researchers alike - to operate with a concept of rationality in which power is absent Foucault is a declared opponent of definitive answers to Kant’s question, ‘What ought I to do?’ or Lenin’s ‘What is to be done?’ Foucault’s norms are to challenge ‘every abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the victims’ and in this way ‘to give new impetus to the undefined work of freedom’ Foucault is the Nietzschean democrat, for whom any form of government - liberal or totalitarian - must be subjected to analysis and critique Such norms cannot be given a universal grounding Nor would such grounding be desirable, since it would entail an ethical uniformity with totalitarian implications Foucault’s explanation of power as productive and local suggests real opportunities for agency and change ‘[The juridical system] is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power,’ The law, institutions - or policies and plans - provide no guarantee of freedom, equality or democracy. Not even entire institutional systems can ensure freedom ‘[People] reproach me for not presenting an overall theory,’ says Foucault ‘I am attempting, to the contrary to open up problems that are as concrete and general as possible’. What Foucault calls his ‘political task’ is ‘to criticise institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them’ This is an effective approach to institutional change, including change in the institutions of civil society. Foucault seeks out a genealogical understanding of actual power relations For Foucault freedom are derived not from universals or theories. Freedom is a practice Whereas Habermas emphasises macro politics, Foucault stresses substantive micro politics Foucault would prescribe neither process nor outcome; he would only recommend a focus on conflict and power relations as the most effective point for the fight against domination. Foucault has been described as non-action oriented. Foucault says It’s true that people who work in the prison...are not likely to find instructions in my books to tell them ‘what is to be done.’ But my project is precisely to bring it about that they ‘no longer know what to do,’ so that the acts, gestures, discourses that up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous Foucault hesitates to give directives for action, and directly distances himself from the universal ‘What is to be done?’ formulas Foucault believes that ‘solutions’ of this type are part of the problem. Seeing Foucault as non-action oriented would be misleading, however, insofar as Foucault’s genealogical studies are carried out to show how things can be done differently to ‘separate out The establishment of genealogy opens possibilities for action by describing the genesis of a given situation and showing that this is not connected to absolute historical necessity. Foucault’s genealogical studies of prisons, hospitals and sexuality demonstrate that social practices may always take an alternative form Understanding how power works is the first prerequisite for action, because action is the exercise of power.

theory shifts from what should be done to what is actually done. Foucault is a declared opponent of definitive answers to Lenin’s ‘What is to be done?’ Foucault’s norms are to challenge ‘every abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the victims’ and to give impetus to the undefined work of freedom’ Foucault is the Nietzschean democrat, for whom any form of government must be subjected to analysis and critique Such norms cannot be given a universal grounding Nor would such grounding be desirable, since it would entail an ethical uniformity with totalitarian implications ‘political task’ is ‘to criticise institutions which appear to be neutral and independent such that political violence will be unmasked freedom are derived not from universals or theories. Freedom is a practice Foucault would prescribe neither process nor outcome; he would only recommend a focus on power relations Foucault has been described as non-action oriented. Foucault says It’s true that people who work in the prison...are not likely to find instructions in my books to tell them ‘what is to be done.’ But my project is precisely to bring it about that they ‘no longer know what to do,’ so that the acts, gestures, discourses become problematic, difficult, dangerous Foucault hesitates to give directives for action, and directly distances himself from the universal ‘What is to be done?’ formulas Foucault believes that ‘solutions’ of this type are part of the problem. Seeing Foucault as non-action oriented would be misleading, however, insofar as Foucault’s genealogical studies show how things can be done differently genealogy opens possibilities for action by describing the genesis of a given situation and showing that this is not connected to absolute historical necessity. Understanding how power works is the first prerequisite for action, because action is the exercise of power

(Bent, Aalborg University, Department of Development and Planning & Tim, University of Sheffield, Department of Town and Regional Planning, Planning and Foucault: In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory, http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf.) 3. Towards Foucault Instead of side-stepping or seeking to remove the traces of power from planning, an alternative approach accepts power as unavoidable, recognising its all pervasive nature, and emphasising its productive as well as destructive potential. Here, theory engages squarely with policy made on a field of power struggles between different interests, where knowledge and truth are contested, and the rationality of planning is exposed as a focus of conflict. This is what Flyvbjerg has called realrationalität, or ‘real-life’ rationality (Flyvbjerg 1996), where the focus shifts from what should be done to what is actually done. This analysis embraces the idea that ‘rationality is penetrated by power’, and the dynamic between the two is critical in understanding what policy is about. It therefore becomes meaningless, or misleading - for politicians, administrators and researchers alike - to operate with a concept of rationality in which power is absent (Flyvbjerg 1998, 164-65). Both Foucault and Habermas are political thinkers. Habermas’s thinking is well developed as concerns political ideals, but weak in its understanding of actual political processes. Foucault’s thinking, conversely, is weak with reference to generalised ideals--Foucault is a declared opponent of ideals, understood as definitive answers to Kant’s question, ‘What ought I to do?’ or Lenin’s ‘What is to be done?’--but his work reflects a sophisticated understanding of Realpolitik. Both Foucault and Habermas agree that in politics one must ‘side with reason.’ Referring to Habermas and similar thinkers, however, Foucault (1980b) warns that ‘to respect rationalism as an ideal should never constitute a blackmail to prevent the analysis of the rationalities really at work’ (Rajchman 1988, 170). Habermas’s main complaint about Foucault is what Habermas sees as Foucault’s relativism. Thus Habermas (1987, 276) harshly dismisses Foucault’s genealogical historiographies as ‘relativistic, cryptonormative illusory science’. Such critique for relativism is correct, if by relativistic we mean unfounded in norms that can be rationally and universally grounded. Foucault’s norms are not foundationalist like Habermas’s: they are expressed in a desire to challenge ‘every abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the victims’ (Miller 1993, 316) and in this way ‘to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom’ (Foucault 1984a, 46). Foucault here is the Nietzschean democrat, for whom any form of government - liberal or totalitarian - must be subjected to analysis and critique based on a will not to be dominated, voicing concerns in public and withholding consent about anything that appears to be unacceptable. Such norms cannot be given a universal grounding independent of those people and that context, according to Foucault. Nor would such grounding be desirable, since it would entail an ethical uniformity with the kind of utopian-totalitarian implications that Foucault would warn against in any context, be it that of Marx, Rousseau or Habermas: ‘The search for a form of morality acceptable by everyone in the sense that everyone would have to submit to it, seems catastrophic to me’ (Foucault 1984c, 37 quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986, 119). In a Foucauldian interpretation, such a morality would endanger freedom, not empower it. Instead, Foucault focuses on the analysis of evils and shows restraint in matters of commitment to ideas and systems of thought about what is good for man, given the historical experience that few things have produced more suffering among humans than strong commitments to implementing utopian visions of the good. For Foucault the socially and historically conditioned context, and not fictive universals, constitutes the most effective bulwark against relativism and nihilism, and the best basis for action. Our sociality and history, according to Foucault, is the only foundation we have, the only solid ground under our feet. And this socio-historical foundation is fully adequate. Foucault, perhaps more than any recent philosopher, reminded us of the crucial importance of power in the shaping and control of discourses, the production of knowledge, and the social construction of spaces. His analysis of modern power has often been read by planning theorists as negative institutionalised oppression, expressed most chillingly in his analysis of the disciplinary regime of the prison in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1979). However, it is Foucault’s explanation of power as productive and local, rather than oppressive and hierarchical, that suggests real opportunities for agency and change (McNay 1994). Whilst Foucault saw discourse as a medium which transmits and produces power, he points out that it is also ‘a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy’. So, at the same time as discourse reinforces power, it also ‘undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it’ (Foucault 1990, 101). Foucault rarely separated knowledge from power, and the idea of ‘power/knowledge’ was of crucial importance: ‘ we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests ... we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit rather that power produced knowledge .. that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge ...’ (Foucault 1979, 27). For Foucault, then, rationality was contingent, shaped by power relations, rather than context-free and objective. According to Foucault, Habermas’s (undated, 8) ‘authorisation of power by law’ is inadequate (emphasis deleted). ‘[The juridical system] is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power,’ says Foucault (1980a, 89), ‘methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus... Our historical gradient carries us further and further away from a reign of law.’ The law, institutions - or policies and plans - provide no guarantee of freedom, equality or democracy. Not even entire institutional systems, according to Foucault, can ensure freedom, even though they are established with that purpose. Nor is freedom likely to be achieved by imposing abstract theoretical systems or ‘correct’ thinking. On the contrary, history has demonstrated--says Foucault--horrifying examples that it is precisely those social systems which have turned freedom into theoretical formulas and treated practice as social engineering, i.e., as an epistemically derived techne, that become most repressive. ‘[People] reproach me for not presenting an overall theory,’ says Foucault (1984b, 375-6), ‘I am attempting, to the contrary, apart from any totalisation - which would be at once abstract and limiting - to open up problems that are as concrete and general as possible’. What Foucault calls his ‘political task’ is ‘to criticise the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them’ (Chomsky and Foucault 1974, 171). This is what, in a Foucauldian interpretation, would be seen as an effective approach to institutional change, including change in the institutions of civil society. With direct reference to Habermas, Foucault (1988, 18) adds: ‘The problem is not of trying to dissolve [relations of power] in the utopia of a perfectly transparent communication, but to give...the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the ethics...which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination.’ Here Foucault overestimates his differences with Habermas, for Habermas also believes that the ideal speech situation cannot be established as a conventional reality in actual communication. Both thinkers see the regulation of actual relations of dominance as crucial, but whereas Habermas approaches regulation from a universalistic theory of discourse, Foucault seeks out a genealogical understanding of actual power relations in specific contexts. Foucault is thus oriented towards phronesis, whereas Habermas’s orientation is towards episteme. For Foucault praxis and freedom are derived not from universals or theories. Freedom is a practice, and its ideal is not a utopian absence of power. Resistance and struggle, in contrast to consensus, is for Foucault the most solid basis for the practice of freedom. Whereas Habermas emphasises procedural macro politics, Foucault stresses substantive micro politics, though with the important shared feature that neither Foucault nor Habermas venture to define the actual content of political action. This is defined by the participants. Thus, both Habermas and Foucault are ‘bottom-up’ thinkers as concerns the content of politics, but where Habermas thinks in a ‘top-down’ moralist fashion as regards procedural rationality - having sketched out the procedures to be followed - Foucault is a ‘bottom-up’ thinker as regards both process and content. In this interpretation, Habermas would want to tell individuals and groups how to go about their affairs as regards procedure for discourse. He would not want, however, to say anything about the outcome of this procedure. Foucault would prescribe neither process nor outcome; he would only recommend a focus on conflict and power relations as the most effective point of departure for the fight against domination. It is because of his double ‘bottom-up’ thinking that Foucault has been described as non-action oriented. Foucault (1981) says about such criticism, in a manner that would be pertinent to those who work in the institutional setting of planning: It’s true that certain people, such as those who work in the institutional setting of the prison...are not likely to find advice or instructions in my books to tell them ‘what is to be done.’ But my project is precisely to bring it about that they ‘no longer know what to do,’ so that the acts, gestures, discourses that up until then had seemed to go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous (Miller 1993, 235). The depiction of Foucault as non-action oriented is correct to the extent that Foucault hesitates to give directives for action, and he directly distances himself from the kinds of universal ‘What is to be done?’ formulas which characterise procedure in Habermas’s communicative rationality. Foucault believes that ‘solutions’ of this type are themselves part of the problem. Seeing Foucault as non-action oriented would be misleading, however, insofar as Foucault’s genealogical studies are carried out only in order to show how things can be done differently to ‘separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think’ (Foucault 1984a, 45-7). Thus Foucault was openly pleased when during a revolt in some of the French prisons the prisoners in their cells read his Discipline and Punish. ‘They shouted the text to other prisoners’, Foucault told an interviewer. ‘I know it’s pretentious to say’, Foucault said, ‘but that’s a proof of a truth--a political and actual truth--which started after the book was written’ (Dillon 1980, 5). This is the type of situated action Foucault would endorse, and as a genealogist, Foucault saw himself as highly action oriented, as ‘a dealer in instruments, a recipe maker, an indicator of objectives, a cartographer, a sketcher of plans, a gunsmith’ (Ezine 1985, 14). The establishment of a concrete genealogy opens possibilities for action by describing the genesis of a given situation and showing that this particular genesis is not connected to absolute historical necessity. Foucault’s genealogical studies of prisons, hospitals and sexuality demonstrate that social practices may always take an alternative form, even where there is no basis for voluntarism or idealism. Combined with Foucault’s focus on domination, it is easy to understand why this insight has been embraced by feminists and minority groups. Elaborating genealogies of, for instance, gender and race leads to an understanding of how relations of domination between women and men, and between different peoples, can be changed (McNay 1992, Bordo and Jaggar 1990, Fraser 1989, Benhabib and Cornell 1987). The value of Foucault’s approach is his emphasis on the dynamics of power. Understanding how power works is the first prerequisite for action, because action is the exercise of power. And such an understanding can best be achieved by focusing on the concrete. Foucault can help us with a materialist understanding of Realpolitik and Realrationalität, and how these might be changed in a specific context. The problem with Foucault is that because understanding and action have their points of departure in the particular and the local, we may come to overlook more generalised conditions concerning, for example, institutions, constitutions and structural issues. In sum, Foucault and Habermas agree that rationalisation and the misuse of power are among the most important problems of our time. They disagree as to how one can best understand and act in relation to these problems. From the perspective of the history of philosophy and political theory, the difference between Foucault and Habermas lies in the fact that Foucault works within a particularistic and contextualist tradition, with roots in Thucydides via Machiavelli to Nietzsche. Foucault is one of the more important twentieth century exponents of this tradition. Habermas is the most prominent living exponent of a universalistic and theorising tradition derived from Socrates and Plato, proceeding over Kant. In power terms, we are speaking of ‘strategic’ versus ‘constitution’ thinking, about struggle versus control, conflict versus consensus.

<h4>Ending your genealogy with the simple recommendation of “legalizes marijuana” ruins the entire point of genealogical investigation in the first place – the goal of genealogy is to make you feel uncomfortable with everything about how we are currently acting, and that uneasiness cannot be achieved if you’re told exactly what to do</h4><p><u><strong>Flyvberg & Richardon 2 </u></strong>– dept of development @ Aalborg University</p><p>(Bent, Aalborg University, Department of Development and Planning & Tim, University of Sheffield, Department of Town and Regional Planning, Planning and Foucault: In Search of the Dark Side of Planning Theory, http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/DarkSide2.pdf.)</p><p>3. Towards Foucault Instead of side-stepping or seeking to remove the traces of power from planning, an alternative approach accepts power as unavoidable, recognising its all pervasive nature, and emphasising its productive as well as destructive potential. Here, <u><strong><mark>theory</u></strong></mark> engages squarely with policy made on a field of power struggles between different interests, where knowledge and truth are contested, and the rationality of planning is exposed as a focus of conflict. This is what Flyvbjerg has called realrationalität, or ‘real-life’ rationality (Flyvbjerg 1996), where the focus <u><strong><mark>shifts from what </strong>should be done<strong> to what </strong>is actually done.</u></mark> This analysis embraces the idea that ‘rationality is penetrated by power’, and the dynamic between the two is critical in understanding what policy is about. <u><strong>It</u></strong> therefore <u><strong>becomes meaningless, or misleading - for politicians</u></strong>, administrators <u><strong>and researchers alike - to operate with a concept of rationality in which power is absent</u></strong> (Flyvbjerg 1998, 164-65). Both Foucault and Habermas are political thinkers. Habermas’s thinking is well developed as concerns political ideals, but weak in its understanding of actual political processes. Foucault’s thinking, conversely, is weak with reference to generalised ideals--<u><strong><mark>Foucault is a declared opponent of</u></strong></mark> ideals, understood as <u><mark>definitive answers<strong> to</mark> Kant’s question, </strong>‘What ought I to do?’<strong> or <mark>Lenin’s </strong>‘What is to be done?’</u></mark>--but his work reflects a sophisticated understanding of Realpolitik. Both Foucault and Habermas agree that in politics one must ‘side with reason.’ Referring to Habermas and similar thinkers, however, Foucault (1980b) warns that ‘to respect rationalism as an ideal should never constitute a blackmail to prevent the analysis of the rationalities really at work’ (Rajchman 1988, 170). Habermas’s main complaint about Foucault is what Habermas sees as Foucault’s relativism. Thus Habermas (1987, 276) harshly dismisses Foucault’s genealogical historiographies as ‘relativistic, cryptonormative illusory science’. Such critique for relativism is correct, if by relativistic we mean unfounded in norms that can be rationally and universally grounded. <u><strong><mark>Foucault’s norms are</u></strong></mark> not foundationalist like Habermas’s: they are expressed in a desire <u><strong><mark>to challenge </strong>‘every abuse of power, whoever the author, whoever the victims’</u></mark> (Miller 1993, 316) <u><strong><mark>and</mark> in this way ‘<mark>to give</mark> new <mark>impetus</u></strong></mark>, as far and wide as possible, <u><strong><mark>to the undefined work of freedom’</u></strong></mark> (Foucault 1984a, 46). <u><strong><mark>Foucault</u></strong></mark> here <u><strong><mark>is the Nietzschean democrat, for whom any form of government</mark> - liberal or totalitarian - </strong><mark>must be subjected to analysis and critique</u></mark> based on a will not to be dominated, voicing concerns in public and withholding consent about anything that appears to be unacceptable. <u><strong><mark>Such norms cannot be given a universal grounding</u></strong></mark> independent of those people and that context, according to Foucault. <u><strong><mark>Nor would such grounding be desirable, since it would entail an ethical uniformity with</u></strong></mark> the kind of utopian-<u><strong><mark>totalitarian implications</u></strong></mark> that Foucault would warn against in any context, be it that of Marx, Rousseau or Habermas: ‘The search for a form of morality acceptable by everyone in the sense that everyone would have to submit to it, seems catastrophic to me’ (Foucault 1984c, 37 quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1986, 119). In a Foucauldian interpretation, such a morality would endanger freedom, not empower it. Instead, Foucault focuses on the analysis of evils and shows restraint in matters of commitment to ideas and systems of thought about what is good for man, given the historical experience that few things have produced more suffering among humans than strong commitments to implementing utopian visions of the good. For Foucault the socially and historically conditioned context, and not fictive universals, constitutes the most effective bulwark against relativism and nihilism, and the best basis for action. Our sociality and history, according to Foucault, is the only foundation we have, the only solid ground under our feet. And this socio-historical foundation is fully adequate. Foucault, perhaps more than any recent philosopher, reminded us of the crucial importance of power in the shaping and control of discourses, the production of knowledge, and the social construction of spaces. His analysis of modern power has often been read by planning theorists as negative institutionalised oppression, expressed most chillingly in his analysis of the disciplinary regime of the prison in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1979). However, it is <u><strong>Foucault’s explanation of power as productive and local</u></strong>, rather than oppressive and hierarchical, that <u><strong>suggests real opportunities for agency and change</u></strong> (McNay 1994). Whilst Foucault saw discourse as a medium which transmits and produces power, he points out that it is also ‘a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy’. So, at the same time as discourse reinforces power, it also ‘undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it’ (Foucault 1990, 101). Foucault rarely separated knowledge from power, and the idea of ‘power/knowledge’ was of crucial importance: ‘ we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests ... we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit rather that power produced knowledge .. that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge ...’ (Foucault 1979, 27). For Foucault, then, rationality was contingent, shaped by power relations, rather than context-free and objective. According to Foucault, Habermas’s (undated, 8) ‘authorisation of power by law’ is inadequate (emphasis deleted). <u><strong>‘[The juridical system] is </strong>utterly incongruous<strong> with the new methods of power,’</u></strong> says Foucault (1980a, 89), ‘methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus... Our historical gradient carries us further and further away from a reign of law.’ <u><strong>The law, institutions - or policies and plans - provide no guarantee of freedom, equality or democracy. Not even entire institutional systems</u></strong>, according to Foucault, <u><strong>can ensure freedom</u></strong>, even though they are established with that purpose. Nor is freedom likely to be achieved by imposing abstract theoretical systems or ‘correct’ thinking. On the contrary, history has demonstrated--says Foucault--horrifying examples that it is precisely those social systems which have turned freedom into theoretical formulas and treated practice as social engineering, i.e., as an epistemically derived techne, that become most repressive. <u><strong>‘[People] reproach me for not presenting an overall theory,’ says Foucault</u></strong> (1984b, 375-6), <u><strong>‘I am attempting, to the contrary</u></strong>, apart from any totalisation - which would be at once abstract and limiting - <u><strong>to open up problems that are as concrete and general as possible’. What Foucault calls his <mark>‘political task’ is ‘to criticise</u></strong></mark> the working of <u><strong><mark>institutions which appear to be</mark> both </strong><mark>neutral and independent<strong></mark>; to criticise them in <mark>such</mark> a manner <mark>that</mark> the <mark>political violence</mark> which has always exercised itself</u></strong> obscurely <u><strong>through them <mark>will be unmasked</mark>, so that one can fight them’</u></strong> (Chomsky and Foucault 1974, 171). <u><strong>This is</u></strong> what, in a Foucauldian interpretation, would be seen as <u><strong>an </strong>effective approach to institutional change<strong>, including change in the institutions of civil society.</u></strong> With direct reference to Habermas, Foucault (1988, 18) adds: ‘The problem is not of trying to dissolve [relations of power] in the utopia of a perfectly transparent communication, but to give...the rules of law, the techniques of management, and also the ethics...which would allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination.’ Here Foucault overestimates his differences with Habermas, for Habermas also believes that the ideal speech situation cannot be established as a conventional reality in actual communication. Both thinkers see the regulation of actual relations of dominance as crucial, but whereas Habermas approaches regulation from a universalistic theory of discourse, <u><strong>Foucault seeks out a genealogical understanding of actual power relations</u></strong> in specific contexts. Foucault is thus oriented towards phronesis, whereas Habermas’s orientation is towards episteme. <u><strong>For Foucault</u></strong> praxis and <u><strong><mark>freedom are derived not from universals or theories. </strong>Freedom is a practice</u></mark>, and its ideal is not a utopian absence of power. Resistance and struggle, in contrast to consensus, is for Foucault the most solid basis for the practice of freedom. <u><strong>Whereas Habermas emphasises</u></strong> procedural <u><strong>macro politics, Foucault stresses substantive micro politics</u></strong>, though with the important shared feature that neither Foucault nor Habermas venture to define the actual content of political action. This is defined by the participants. Thus, both Habermas and Foucault are ‘bottom-up’ thinkers as concerns the content of politics, but where Habermas thinks in a ‘top-down’ moralist fashion as regards procedural rationality - having sketched out the procedures to be followed - Foucault is a ‘bottom-up’ thinker as regards both process and content. In this interpretation, Habermas would want to tell individuals and groups how to go about their affairs as regards procedure for discourse. He would not want, however, to say anything about the outcome of this procedure. <u><strong><mark>Foucault would </strong>prescribe neither process nor outcome<strong>; he would only recommend </strong>a focus on</mark> conflict and <mark>power relations<strong></mark> as the most effective point</u></strong> of departure <u><strong>for the fight against domination.</u></strong> It is because of his double ‘bottom-up’ thinking that <u><strong><mark>Foucault has been described as </strong>non-action oriented.</u> <u><strong>Foucault</u></strong></mark> (1981) <u><strong><mark>says</u></strong></mark> about such criticism, in a manner that would be pertinent to those who work in the institutional setting of planning: <u><strong><mark>It’s true that</u></strong></mark> certain <u><strong><mark>people</u></strong></mark>, such as those <u><strong><mark>who work in the</u></strong></mark> institutional setting of the <u><strong><mark>prison...are not likely to find</u></strong></mark> advice or <u><strong><mark>instructions in my books to tell them ‘what is to be done.’ But my project is precisely to bring it about that </strong>they ‘no longer know what to do,’ so that the acts, gestures, discourses</mark> that up until then had seemed to go without saying <mark>become problematic, difficult, dangerous</u></mark> (Miller 1993, 235). The depiction of Foucault as non-action oriented is correct to the extent that <u><strong><mark>Foucault hesitates to give directives for action, and</u></strong></mark> he <u><mark>directly distances himself from the</u></mark> kinds of <u><mark>universal ‘What is to be done?’ formulas</u></mark> which characterise procedure in Habermas’s communicative rationality. <u><strong><mark>Foucault believes that ‘solutions’ of this type are</u></strong></mark> themselves <u><mark>part of the problem.</u> <u><strong>Seeing Foucault as non-action oriented would be misleading, however, insofar as Foucault’s genealogical studies</mark> are carried out</u></strong> only in order <u><strong>to <mark>show how things </strong>can<strong> be done differently</mark> to ‘separate out</u></strong>, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think’ (Foucault 1984a, 45-7). Thus Foucault was openly pleased when during a revolt in some of the French prisons the prisoners in their cells read his Discipline and Punish. ‘They shouted the text to other prisoners’, Foucault told an interviewer. ‘I know it’s pretentious to say’, Foucault said, ‘but that’s a proof of a truth--a political and actual truth--which started after the book was written’ (Dillon 1980, 5). This is the type of situated action Foucault would endorse, and as a genealogist, Foucault saw himself as highly action oriented, as ‘a dealer in instruments, a recipe maker, an indicator of objectives, a cartographer, a sketcher of plans, a gunsmith’ (Ezine 1985, 14). <u><strong>The establishment of</u></strong> a concrete <u><strong><mark>genealogy opens </strong>possibilities<strong> for action by describing the genesis of a given situation and showing that this</u></strong></mark> particular genesis <u><strong><mark>is not connected to absolute historical necessity.</mark> Foucault’s genealogical studies of prisons, hospitals and sexuality demonstrate that social practices may always take an alternative form</u></strong>, even where there is no basis for voluntarism or idealism. Combined with Foucault’s focus on domination, it is easy to understand why this insight has been embraced by feminists and minority groups. Elaborating genealogies of, for instance, gender and race leads to an understanding of how relations of domination between women and men, and between different peoples, can be changed (McNay 1992, Bordo and Jaggar 1990, Fraser 1989, Benhabib and Cornell 1987). The value of Foucault’s approach is his emphasis on the dynamics of power. <u><strong><mark>Understanding how power works is the </strong>first prerequisite for action<strong>, because action is the exercise of power</mark>.</u></strong> And such an understanding can best be achieved by focusing on the concrete. Foucault can help us with a materialist understanding of Realpolitik and Realrationalität, and how these might be changed in a specific context. The problem with Foucault is that because understanding and action have their points of departure in the particular and the local, we may come to overlook more generalised conditions concerning, for example, institutions, constitutions and structural issues. In sum, Foucault and Habermas agree that rationalisation and the misuse of power are among the most important problems of our time. They disagree as to how one can best understand and act in relation to these problems. From the perspective of the history of philosophy and political theory, the difference between Foucault and Habermas lies in the fact that Foucault works within a particularistic and contextualist tradition, with roots in Thucydides via Machiavelli to Nietzsche. Foucault is one of the more important twentieth century exponents of this tradition. Habermas is the most prominent living exponent of a universalistic and theorising tradition derived from Socrates and Plato, proceeding over Kant. In power terms, we are speaking of ‘strategic’ versus ‘constitution’ thinking, about struggle versus control, conflict versus consensus. </p>

1NC

Off

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Geoff Lundeen

1ac was marijuana prison industrial complex 1nc was damage centrism k plan pik legalization da and case 2nc was damage centrism and the legalization da 1nr was the pik and case 2nr was damage centrism the legalization da and the case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round4.docx

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That turns biopolitics

Salem 99

Salem 99

Subjecting the individual to medical norms introduces a tension for one of the central questions of liberal philosophers Dworkin argue that because autonomy must be protected and preserved physician-assisted suicide must be regulated Under certain conditions the state has the power to override individual rights to protect patients from undue pressures, even internal ones. In the context of assisted suicide how is it possible to reconcile the assertion that paternalistic influences are unacceptable with the concept that the state may deny assistance what it reasonably judges to be the best interest of the potential suicide”? It could be argued that guidelines for physician-assisted suicide do not injure -determination since the request emanates from a patient who knows the rules this seems to admit that ultimately assisted suicide has to do with something beyond strict self-determination autonomy is not the primary moral foundation, autonomy demands constant external oversight physician-assisted suicide ends up reinforcing a power external to the self. It reinforces medical power at the expense of the individual

Subjecting the individual to medical norms introduces a tension for central questions of liberal philosophers because autonomy must be protected and preserved physician-assisted suicide must be regulated the state has the power to override individual rights to protect patients from undue pressures, even internal ones. how is it possible to reconcile the assertion that paternalistic influences are unacceptable with the concept that the state may deny assistance what it reasonably judges to be the best interest of the potential suicide”?27 this seems to admit that ultimately assisted suicide has to do with something beyond strict self-determination autonomy is not the primary moral foundation, autonomy demands constant external oversight physician-assisted suicide ends up reinforcing a power external to the self. It reinforces medical power

Tania, Associate at Hospital Operations & Compliance at The Advisory Group W.L.L, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide? Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36, AB One of the most dramatic aspects of medicine's extended power over contemporary sensibilities has been precisely medicine's ability to mold our conceptions about dying. Subjecting the individual to medical norms in this way also introduces a tension for one of the central questions of liberal philosophers. If, as the liberal argument claims, the morality or immorality of decisions at the end of life rests on the competent patient's wishes rather than on a distinction between killing and allowing to die,26 protocols that may ultimately deny a patient's request for assistance in dying assert, in effect, that moral authority resides outside the patient's choice. And if medicine may, morally, reject patients’ autonomous requests for aid, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the value of patient autonomy becomes more rhetorical than real. Admittedly, even liberal theorists emphasize that there are limits to autonomy, and that like other important rights, the right to physician-assisted suicide is not absolute and can properly be restricted under certain circumstances. Indeed, Ronald Dworkin and others argue precisely that because autonomy must be protected and preserved physician-assisted suicide must be regulated. Under certain conditions the state has the power to override individual rights to protect patients from undue pressures, even internal ones. The tension remains, however. In the context of assisted suicide, how is it possible to reconcile the assertion that paternalistic influences are unacceptable with the concept that in some situations the state (or the medical establishment) may deny assistance in suicide in the name of “what it reasonably judges to be the best interest of the potential suicide”?27 Alexander Capron has argued that decisions on behalf of others should rest on a best interest standard of what the “‘average reasonable person’ would do under the given circumstances.”28 Doesn't this permit the tyranny of the majority over the individual? Doesn't this menace the right, so praised by liberal theorists, to exercise our singularities in a radical way? As Yale Kamisar has asked, “[I]f self-determination and autonomy is the major force driving the right to assisted suicide, why should a competent person's firm conclusion that life has become unendurable for her have to be ‘objectively reasonable’? Why should not a competent person's own evaluation of her situation suffice?”29 To phrase this in terms of the argument I make here, is it ever possible to reconcile medicalizing suicide with autonomy? It could reasonably be argued that guidelines for physician-assisted suicide do not injure the patient's self-determination since the request emanates from a patient who supposedly knows the rules of the game in advance. And, the argument would continue, if one does not wish to submit to those rules, “do it yourself” remains a way out. But this seems to admit that ultimately assisted suicide has to do with something beyond strict self-determination, that autonomy is not the primary moral foundation, or at least that if autonomy is to be exercised it demands constant external oversight. In sum, although advocated in the name of self-sovereignty, physician-assisted suicide ends up reinforcing a power external to the self. It reinforces medical power at the expense of the individual in a very sensitive realm: one's decision to die.

<h4><u><strong>That turns biopolitics</h4><p>Salem 99</p><p></u></strong>Tania, Associate at Hospital Operations & Compliance at The Advisory Group W.L.L, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Promoting Autonomy—Or Medicalizing Suicide? Hastings Center Report, 29: 30–36, AB </p><p>One of the most dramatic aspects of medicine's extended power over contemporary sensibilities has been precisely medicine's ability to mold our conceptions about dying. <u><mark>Subjecting the individual to medical norms</u></mark> in this way also <u><mark>introduces a tension for</mark> one of the <mark>central questions of liberal philosophers</u></mark>. If, as the liberal argument claims, the morality or immorality of decisions at the end of life rests on the competent patient's wishes rather than on a distinction between killing and allowing to die,26 protocols that may ultimately deny a patient's request for assistance in dying assert, in effect, that moral authority resides outside the patient's choice. And if medicine may, morally, reject patients’ autonomous requests for aid, in the context of physician-assisted suicide the value of patient autonomy becomes more rhetorical than real. Admittedly, even liberal theorists emphasize that there are limits to autonomy, and that like other important rights, the right to physician-assisted suicide is not absolute and can properly be restricted under certain circumstances. Indeed, Ronald <u>Dworkin</u> and others <u>argue</u> precisely <u>that <mark>because autonomy must be protected and preserved physician-assisted suicide must be regulated</u></mark>. <u><strong>Under certain conditions <mark>the state has the power to override individual rights to protect patients from undue pressures, even internal ones.</u></strong></mark> </p><p>The tension remains, however. <u>In the context of assisted suicide</u>, <u><mark>how is it possible to reconcile the assertion that paternalistic influences are unacceptable</u> <u>with the concept that</u></mark> in some situations <u><mark>the state</u></mark> (or the medical establishment) <u><mark>may deny</u> <u>assistance</u></mark> in suicide in the name of “<u><mark>what it reasonably judges to be the best interest of the potential suicide”?</u>27</mark> Alexander Capron has argued that decisions on behalf of others should rest on a best interest standard of what the “‘average reasonable person’ would do under the given circumstances.”28 Doesn't this permit the tyranny of the majority over the individual? Doesn't this menace the right, so praised by liberal theorists, to exercise our singularities in a radical way? As Yale Kamisar has asked, “[I]f self-determination and autonomy is the major force driving the right to assisted suicide, why should a competent person's firm conclusion that life has become unendurable for her have to be ‘objectively reasonable’? Why should not a competent person's own evaluation of her situation suffice?”29 To phrase this in terms of the argument I make here, is it ever possible to reconcile medicalizing suicide with autonomy? <u>It could</u> reasonably <u>be argued that guidelines for physician-assisted suicide do not injure</u> the patient's self<u>-determination since the request emanates from a patient who</u> supposedly<u> knows the rules</u> of the game in advance. And, the argument would continue, if one does not wish to submit to those rules, “do it yourself” remains a way out. But <u><mark>this seems to admit that ultimately assisted suicide has to do with something <strong>beyond strict self-determination</u></strong></mark>, that <u><strong><mark>autonomy is not the primary moral foundation,</u></strong></mark> or at least that if <u><mark>autonomy</u></mark> is to be exercised it <u><strong><mark>demands constant external oversight</u></strong></mark>. In sum, although advocated in the name of self-sovereignty, <u><strong><mark>physician-assisted suicide ends up reinforcing a power external to the self. It reinforces medical power</u></strong></mark> <u>at the expense of the individual</u> in a very sensitive realm: one's decision to die.</p>

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Brian McBride

1ac was foucault PAS 1nc was forget foucault the plan pik and case 2nc was forget foucault 1nr was the plan pik and case 2nr was case and forget foucault

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Marijuana not key to cartels---squo legalization solves and cartels sell hard drugs

Miroff 15

Nick Miroff 15, Latin America correspondent for The Post, Losing marijuana business, Mexican cartels push heroin and meth, www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/losing-marijuana-business-mexican-cartels-push-heroin-and-meth/2015/01/11/91fe44ce-8532-11e4-abcf-5a3d7b3b20b8_story.html

Mexican traffickers are sending a flood of cheap heroin and methamphetamine across the U.S. border, the latest drug seizure statistics show, in a new sign that America’s marijuana decriminalization trend is upending the North American narcotics trade cannabis seized along the boundary has fallen 37 percent since 2011 during which American consumers turned to higher-grade domestic varieties cultivated under legal and quasi-legal protections in more than two dozen U.S. states. Made-in-the-USA marijuana is quickly displacing Mexico That has prompted Mexican drug farmers to plant more opium poppies off­ering addicts a $10 alternative to $80-a-pill oxycodone. Legalization has given U.S. consumers access to high-quality marijuana said Benitez-Manaut, a drug-war expert at Mexico’s National Autonomous University. Mexican cartels are switching to heroin and meth.” law enforcement agents seized 2,181 kilograms of heroin last year coming from Mexico, nearly three times the amount confiscated in 2009. “The days of the large-scale U.S. meth labs are pretty much gone, given how much the Mexicans have taken over production south of the border and distribution into the United States,” said Payne, a DEA spokesman. “Their product is far superior, cheaper and more pure.” Criminal organizations are no longer going for marijuana said Aki, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection port director “Hard drugs are the growing trend the profitability of the marijuana trade has slumped on falling demand for Mexico’s “brick weed,” Drug farmers in the Sierra Madre say that they can barely make money planting mota anymore. This reflects lower demand for the drug in the United States, experts say, as well as a cartel business preference for heroin and meth

cannabis seized has fallen 37 percent during which American consumers turned to domestic varieties USA marijuana is displacing Mexico That prompted Mexican farmers to plant opium said Benitez-Manaut Mexican cartels are switching to heroin and meth agents seized three times the amount confiscated in 2009. Criminal organizations are no longer going for marijuana said Aki profitability of marijuana has slumped This reflects lower demand experts say, as well as a cartel preference for heroin and meth

Mexican traffickers are sending a flood of cheap heroin and methamphetamine across the U.S. border, the latest drug seizure statistics show, in a new sign that America’s marijuana decriminalization trend is upending the North American narcotics trade. The amount of cannabis seized by U.S. federal, state and local officers along the boundary with Mexico has fallen 37 percent since 2011, a period during which American marijuana consumers have increasingly turned to the more potent, higher-grade domestic varieties cultivated under legal and quasi-legal protections in more than two dozen U.S. states. Made-in-the-USA marijuana is quickly displacing the cheap, seedy, hard-packed version harvested by the bushel in Mexico’s Sierra Madre mountains. That has prompted Mexican drug farmers to plant more opium poppies, and the sticky brown and black “tar” heroin they produce is channeled by traffickers into the U.S. communities hit hardest by prescription painkiller abuse, off­ering addicts a $10 alternative to $80-a-pill oxycodone. “Legalization of marijuana for recreational use has given U.S. consumers access to high-quality marijuana, with genetically improved strains, grown in greenhouses,” said Raul Benitez-Manaut, a drug-war expert at Mexico’s National Autonomous University. “That’s why the Mexican cartels are switching to heroin and meth.” U.S. law enforcement agents seized 2,181 kilograms of heroin last year coming from Mexico, nearly three times the amount confiscated in 2009. Methamphetamine, too, has surged, mocking the Hollywood image of backwoods bayou labs and “Breaking Bad” chemists. The reality, according to Drug Enforcement Administration figures, is that 90 percent of the meth on U.S. streets is cooked in Mexico, where precursor chemicals are far easier to obtain. “The days of the large-scale U.S. meth labs are pretty much gone, given how much the Mexicans have taken over production south of the border and distribution into the United States,” said Lawrence Payne, a DEA spokesman. “Their product is far superior, cheaper and more pure.” Last year, 15,803 kilograms of the drug was seized along the border, up from 3,076 kilos in 2009. “Criminal organizations are no longer going for bulk marijuana,” said Sidney Aki, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection port director here at the agency’s busiest crossing for pedestrians and passenger vehicles, just south of San Diego. “Hard drugs are the growing trend, and they’re profitable in small amounts.” Voters in the District of Columbia and 23 U.S. states have approved marijuana for recreational or medical use, with Colorado, Washington state, Alaska and Oregon opting for full legalization. Estimates of the size of America’s marijuana harvest vary widely, and DEA officials say they do not know how quickly it may be increasing as a result of decriminalization. Mexican cartels continue to deploy people as “mules” strapped with 50-pound marijuana backpacks to hike through the Arizona borderlands and send commercial trucks into Texas with bales of shrink-wrapped cannabis so big they need to be taken out on a forklift. But the profitability of the marijuana trade has slumped on falling demand for Mexico’s “brick weed,” so called because it is crushed into airtight bundles for transport across the border. Drug farmers in the Sierra Madre say that they can barely make money planting mota anymore. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agents share a fist bump after a dog identified a vehicle as potentially carrying hidden narcotics. (Nick Miroff/The Washington Post) The cartels, and consumers, are turning away from cocaine, too. Last year, U.S. agents confiscated 11,917 kilograms of cocaine along the Mexico border, down from 27,444 kilos in 2011. This reflects lower demand for the drug in the United States, experts say, as well as a cartel business preference for heroin and meth. Those two substances can be cheaply produced in Mexico, unlike cocaine, which is far pricier, and therefore riskier, because it must be smuggled from South America.

<h4>Marijuana not key to cartels---squo legalization solves and cartels sell hard drugs </h4><p>Nick <u><strong>Miroff 15</u></strong>, Latin America correspondent for The Post, Losing marijuana business, Mexican cartels push heroin and meth, www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/losing-marijuana-business-mexican-cartels-push-heroin-and-meth/2015/01/11/91fe44ce-8532-11e4-abcf-5a3d7b3b20b8_story.html</p><p><u>Mexican traffickers are sending a flood of cheap heroin and methamphetamine across the U.S. border, the latest drug seizure statistics show, in a new sign that America’s marijuana decriminalization trend is upending the North American narcotics trade</u>. The amount of <u><mark>cannabis seized</u></mark> by U.S. federal, state and local officers <u>along the boundary</u> with Mexico <u><mark>has fallen 37 percent</mark> since 2011</u>, a period <u><mark>during which American</u></mark> marijuana <u><mark>consumers</u></mark> have increasingly <u><mark>turned to</u></mark> the more potent, <u>higher-grade <mark>domestic varieties</mark> cultivated under legal and quasi-legal protections in more than two dozen U.S. states. Made-in-the-<mark>USA marijuana is</mark> quickly <mark>displacing</u></mark> the cheap, seedy, hard-packed version harvested by the bushel in <u><mark>Mexico</u></mark>’s Sierra Madre mountains. <u><mark>That </mark>has <mark>prompted Mexican </mark>drug <mark>farmers to plant </mark>more <mark>opium</mark> poppies</u>, and the sticky brown and black “tar” heroin they produce is channeled by traffickers into the U.S. communities hit hardest by prescription painkiller abuse, <u>off­ering addicts a $10 alternative to $80-a-pill oxycodone. </u>“<u>Legalization</u> of marijuana for recreational use <u>has given U.S. consumers access to high-quality marijuana</u>, with genetically improved strains, grown in greenhouses,” <u><mark>said</u></mark> Raul <u><mark>Benitez-Manaut</mark>, a drug-war expert at Mexico’s National Autonomous University. </u>“That’s why the<u> <strong><mark>Mexican cartels are switching to heroin and meth</strong></mark>.” </u>U.S. <u>law enforcement <mark>agents seized</mark> 2,181 kilograms of heroin last year coming from Mexico, nearly <mark>three times the amount confiscated in 2009.</mark> </u>Methamphetamine, too, has surged, mocking the Hollywood image of backwoods bayou labs and “Breaking Bad” chemists. The reality, according to Drug Enforcement Administration figures, is that 90 percent of the meth on U.S. streets is cooked in Mexico, where precursor chemicals are far easier to obtain. <u>“The days of the large-scale U.S. meth labs are pretty much gone, given how much the Mexicans have taken over production south of the border and distribution into the United States,” said</u> Lawrence <u>Payne, a DEA spokesman. “Their product is far superior, cheaper and more pure.”</u> Last year, 15,803 kilograms of the drug was seized along the border, up from 3,076 kilos in 2009. “<u><strong><mark>Criminal organizations are no longer going for</mark> </u></strong>bulk <u><strong><mark>marijuana</u></strong></mark>,” <u><mark>said</u></mark> Sidney <u><mark>Aki</mark>, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection port director</u> here at the agency’s busiest crossing for pedestrians and passenger vehicles, just south of San Diego. <u>“Hard drugs are the growing trend</u>, and they’re profitable in small amounts.” Voters in the District of Columbia and 23 U.S. states have approved marijuana for recreational or medical use, with Colorado, Washington state, Alaska and Oregon opting for full legalization. Estimates of the size of America’s marijuana harvest vary widely, and DEA officials say they do not know how quickly it may be increasing as a result of decriminalization. Mexican cartels continue to deploy people as “mules” strapped with 50-pound marijuana backpacks to hike through the Arizona borderlands and send commercial trucks into Texas with bales of shrink-wrapped cannabis so big they need to be taken out on a forklift. But <u>the <mark>profitability of </mark>the <mark>marijuana</mark> trade <mark>has slumped</mark> on falling demand for Mexico’s “brick weed,”</u> so called because it is crushed into airtight bundles for transport across the border. <u>Drug farmers in the Sierra Madre say that they can barely make money planting mota anymore.</u> U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agents share a fist bump after a dog identified a vehicle as potentially carrying hidden narcotics. (Nick Miroff/The Washington Post) The cartels, and consumers, are turning away from cocaine, too. Last year, U.S. agents confiscated 11,917 kilograms of cocaine along the Mexico border, down from 27,444 kilos in 2011. <u><mark>This reflects lower demand</mark> for the drug in the United States, <mark>experts say, as well as a <strong>cartel </mark>business <mark>preference for heroin and meth</u></strong></mark>. Those two substances can be cheaply produced in Mexico, unlike cocaine, which is far pricier, and therefore riskier, because it must be smuggled from South America.</p>

1NC

Cartels

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-D3-Round1.docx

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Steve Pointer

1ac was mj with cartels and hemp advantages 1nc was legalism and security and case 2nc was legalism 1nr was case 2nr was legalism and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-D3-Round1.docx

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The alt is to reject the aff

Engler 08

Engler 08 [Mark, author and analyst with foreign policy in focus, “There is an alternative to corporate rule”]

as long as democratic movements do not have the power to overrule political and economic elites, there exists an important case for just saying "no" -- for first insisting that those now in power stop doing harm. When Wall Street neoliberals and Washington militarists ask, "What is the alternative?" they base the question on faulty assumptions. Their question serves to naturalize very radical agendas of empire and corporate rule, suggesting that these are normal and acceptable states of affairs. They are not. In a situation where power is grossly imbalanced, where crimes are being perpetuated in the name of democracy, and where ever larger sections of public life are being handed over to the market, saying "no" to these radical agendas can be a perfectly worthy task in itself. In an important respect, the alternative to invading Iraq is not invading Iraq. The alternative to NAFTA is no NAFTA. Given the disastrous history of U.S. interventions -- not just in Iraq, but also, to mention some particularly ignoble examples of the past 60 years, in Vietnam, Indonesia, Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, Iran, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua -- calling for a moratorium on such military actions, official and covert, is a first step in stemming the damage of imperial globalization. The agenda of corporate globalization, , has relied on forceful maneuvering to come into existence. Neoliberalism involves aggressively opening markets, clearing the way for a previously unheard of level of speculative capital transfer, and dictating the restructuring of local economies. None of these things occur naturally, and they deserve opposition. A moratorium on harmful deals and on further expansion , is a vital immediate demand. Simply refusing each of the mandates of the Washington Consensus -- or at least rejecting the idea that they should be imposed world as a one-size-fits-all uniform would itself allow for a substantial restructuring of globalization politics. The true utopians in the global economy are people who embraced the market fundamentalist fantasy that unchecked capital would serve the common good. Refuting this idea can be fairly straightforward. When the Washington Consensus demands the privatization of public industry and the division of the commons into private property, an alternative is to keep these things in the hands of the public, defending the provision of public goods as a way of ensuring economic human rights -- If it calls for cuts in social services, an alternative is to reject the cuts, And when IMF bailouts for wealthy investors create a situation in which, to paraphrase author Eduardo Galeano, "risk is socialized while profit is privatized," an alternative is simply to end these bailouts, making speculators bear the cost of their gambles. The demand to reverse neoliberal structural adjustment policies proposes a fundamentally different relationship between wealthy nations and the global South than currently exists. It would grant countries the freedom to determine their own economic policies, priorities for government spending, and rules for controlling foreign investment. Instead of imposing a single hegemonic model on the entire world, this new relationship would allow for broader diversity and experimentation in international development It alone would likely bring change of great enough magnitude to make the politics of the global economy look virtually unrecognizable to those who have grown accustomed to Washington-dictated corporate globalization. ever-larger swaths of the globe view the neoliberal doctrine of corporate expansion as a failed and discredited vision. This creates unique opportunities for citizens to fight to bring a democratic globalization into existence many people are already doing so, and, on key issues they are winning. For there is nothing so dangerous to those who insist that the world must remain as it is as the simple, stubbornly defiant doctrine of hope.

there exists an important case for just saying "no" insisting that those in power stop doing harm When neoliberals ask, "What is the alternative?" they base the question on faulty assumptions serves to naturalize radical agendas of empire and corporate rule, suggesting that these are normal saying "no" to these radical agendas can be a perfectly worthy task in itself the alternative to invading Iraq is not invading Iraq. The alternative to NAFTA is no NAFTA Given the disastrous history of U.S. interventions calling for a moratorium on actions is a first step in stemming the damage of imperial globalization Simply refusing mandates would itself allow for a substantial restructuring of globalization politics. The demand to reverse neoliberal structural adjustment policies proposes a fundamentally different relationship between wealthy nations and the global South Instead of imposing a single hegemonic model on the entire world, this new relationship would allow for broader diversity and experimentation in international development. It alone would likely bring change of great enough magnitude to make the politics of the global economy look unrecognizable there is nothing so dangerous to those who insist that the world must remain as it is as the simple, stubbornly defiant doctrine of hope.

The ideas, experiences, and proposals of the World Social Forum provide a trove of information for all those who want to construct a new agenda for the global economy. At the same time, as long as democratic movements do not have the power to overrule political and economic elites, there exists an important case for just saying "no" -- for first insisting that those now in power stop doing harm.¶ When Wall Street neoliberals and Washington militarists ask, "What is the alternative?" they base the question on faulty assumptions. Their question serves to naturalize very radical agendas of empire and corporate rule, suggesting that these are normal and acceptable states of affairs. They are not. In a situation where power is grossly imbalanced, where crimes are being perpetuated in the name of democracy, and where ever larger sections of public life are being handed over to the market, saying "no" to these radical agendas can be a perfectly worthy task in itself.¶ In an important respect, the alternative to invading Iraq is not invading Iraq. The alternative to NAFTA is no NAFTA. The neocons' invasion of Iraq has cost thousands of American lives, taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians, produced some two million refugees, and is set to squander over a trillion dollars of public funds. It has generated heightened regional tensions, greater instability, and more terrorism.Given the disastrous history of U.S. interventions -- not just in Iraq, but also, to mention some particularly ignoble examples of the past 60 years, in Vietnam, Indonesia, Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, Iran, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua -- calling for a moratorium on such military actions, official and covert, is a first step in stemming the damage of imperial globalization.¶ The agenda of corporate globalization, which unfortunately thrived during the Clinton presidency and is still popular within the right wing of the Democratic Party, is subtler. But this, too, has relied on forceful maneuvering to come into existence. Neoliberalism involves aggressively opening markets, clearing the way for a previously unheard of level of speculative capital transfer, and dictating the restructuring of local economies. None of these things occur naturally, and they deserve opposition. A moratorium on harmful "free trade" deals and on further expansion of the WTO, especially into areas beyond the traditional realm of trade, is a vital immediate demand.¶ Simply refusing each of the mandates of the Washington Consensus -- or at least rejecting the idea that they should be imposed world as a one-size-fits-all uniform for development -- would itself allow for a substantial restructuring of globalization politics. The true utopians in the global economy are people who embraced the market fundamentalist fantasy that unchecked capital would serve the common good. Refuting this idea can be fairly straightforward.¶ Neoliberal corporate globalization prescribes the elimination of tariffs and other protections for local enterprises. An alternative would be to allow poorer countries to keep these intact, reviving what is known in trade agreements as "special and differential treatment." This model would give developing countries more flexibility in choosing to nurture infant industries and to protect agricultural commodities that are important to traditional cultures and to the security of their food supply. When the Washington Consensus demands the privatization of public industry and the division of the commons into private property, an alternative is to keep these things in the hands of the public, defending the provision of public goods as a way of ensuring economic human rights -- including guaranteed public access to water, electricity, and health care.If it calls for cuts in social services, an alternative is to reject the cuts, maintaining or bolstering these services and instead pushing for a redistributive tax system that makes the wealthy pay their fair share.¶ When Washington mandates a more "flexible" labor market -- one without unions or worker protections -- an alternative is to defend living wages, collective bargaining, and the right to associate. And when IMF bailouts for wealthy investors create a situation in which, to paraphrase author Eduardo Galeano, "risk is socialized while profit is privatized," an alternative is simply to end these bailouts, making speculators bear the cost of their gambles.¶ The demand to reverse neoliberal structural adjustment policies proposes a fundamentally different relationship between wealthy nations and the global South than currently exists. It would grant countries the freedom to determine their own economic policies, priorities for government spending, and rules for controlling foreign investment. Instead of imposing a single hegemonic model on the entire world, this new relationship would allow for broader diversity and experimentation in international development. While this does not by itself constitute a vision for ensuring human rights or protecting the environment, it nevertheless represents an important strategic gain. It alone would likely bring change of great enough magnitude to make the politics of the global economy look virtually unrecognizable to those who have grown accustomed to Washington-dictated corporate globalization.¶ Those who reject corporate and imperial models of globalization have a wealth of ideas at their disposal, a healthy internal debate to refine their strategies, and a vibrant, growing international network of citizens that see their efforts as part an interconnected whole. They also have very powerful enemies. Fortunately, as we enter the post-Bush era, the international community has voiced a firm rejection of unilateralism and preemptive war. Likewise, ever-larger swaths of the globe view the neoliberal doctrine of corporate expansion as a failed and discredited vision. This creates unique opportunities for citizens to fight to bring a democratic globalization into existence. More exciting still is that many people are already doing so, and, on key issues like debt relief and across entire regions like the Latin America, they are winning. The punditry is increasingly taking notice. For there is nothing so dangerous to those who insist that the world must remain as it is as the simple, stubbornly defiant doctrine of hope.

<h4>The alt is to reject the aff</h4><p><u><strong>Engler 08</u></strong> [Mark, author and analyst with foreign policy in focus, “There is an alternative to corporate rule”]</p><p> </p><p>The ideas, experiences, and proposals of the World Social Forum provide a trove of information for all those who want to construct a new agenda for the global economy. At the same time, <u>as long as democratic movements do not have the power to overrule political and economic elites, <mark>there exists an important case for just saying "no"</mark> -- for first <mark>insisting that those</mark> now <mark>in power stop doing harm</mark>.</u>¶ <u><mark>When</mark> Wall Street <mark>neoliberals</mark> and Washington militarists <mark>ask, "What is the alternative?" they base the question on faulty assumptions</mark>. Their question <mark>serves to naturalize</mark> very <mark>radical agendas of empire and corporate rule, suggesting that these are normal</mark> and acceptable states of affairs. They are not. In a situation where power is grossly imbalanced, where crimes are being perpetuated in the name of democracy, and where ever larger sections of public life are being handed over to the market, <mark>saying "no" to these radical agendas can be a perfectly worthy task in itself</mark>.</u>¶ <u>In an important respect, <mark>the alternative to invading Iraq is not invading Iraq. The alternative to NAFTA is no NAFTA</mark>.</u> The neocons' invasion of Iraq has cost thousands of American lives, taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians, produced some two million refugees, and is set to squander over a trillion dollars of public funds. It has generated heightened regional tensions, greater instability, and more terrorism.<u><mark>Given the disastrous history of U.S. interventions</mark> -- not just in Iraq, but also, to mention some particularly ignoble examples of the past 60 years, in Vietnam, Indonesia, Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, Iran, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua --</u> <u><mark>calling for a moratorium on</mark> such military <mark>actions</mark>, official and covert, <mark>is a first step in stemming the damage of imperial globalization</mark>.</u>¶ <u>The agenda of corporate globalization,</u> which unfortunately thrived during the Clinton presidency and is still popular within the right wing of the Democratic Party, is subtler. But this, too<u>, has relied on forceful maneuvering to come into existence. Neoliberalism involves aggressively opening markets, clearing the way for a previously unheard of level of speculative capital transfer, and dictating the restructuring of local economies. None of these things occur naturally, and they deserve opposition. A moratorium on harmful</u> "free trade" <u>deals and on further expansion</u> of the WTO, especially into areas beyond the traditional realm of trade<u>, is a vital immediate demand.</u>¶ <u><mark>Simply refusing</mark> each of the <mark>mandates</mark> of the Washington Consensus -- or at least rejecting the idea that they should be imposed world as a one-size-fits-all uniform </u>for development -- <u><strong><mark>would itself allow for a substantial restructuring of globalization politics.</strong></mark> The true utopians in the global economy are people who embraced the market fundamentalist fantasy that unchecked capital would serve the common good. Refuting this idea can be fairly straightforward.</u>¶ Neoliberal corporate globalization prescribes the elimination of tariffs and other protections for local enterprises. An alternative would be to allow poorer countries to keep these intact, reviving what is known in trade agreements as "special and differential treatment." This model would give developing countries more flexibility in choosing to nurture infant industries and to protect agricultural commodities that are important to traditional cultures and to the security of their food supply. <u>When the Washington Consensus demands the privatization of public industry and the division of the commons into private property, an alternative is to keep these things in the hands of the public, defending the provision of public goods as a way of ensuring economic human rights --</u> including guaranteed public access to water, electricity, and health care.<u>If it calls for cuts in social services, an alternative is to reject the cuts,</u> maintaining or bolstering these services and instead pushing for a redistributive tax system that makes the wealthy pay their fair share.¶ When Washington mandates a more "flexible" labor market -- one without unions or worker protections -- an alternative is to defend living wages, collective bargaining, and the right to associate. <u>And when IMF bailouts for wealthy investors create a situation in which, to paraphrase author Eduardo Galeano, "risk is socialized while profit is privatized," an alternative is simply to end these bailouts, making speculators bear the cost of their gambles.</u>¶ <u><mark>The demand to reverse neoliberal structural adjustment policies proposes a fundamentally different relationship between wealthy nations and the global South</mark> than currently exists. It would grant countries the freedom to determine their own economic policies, priorities for government spending, and rules for controlling foreign investment. <mark>Instead of imposing a single hegemonic model on the entire world, this new relationship would allow for broader diversity and experimentation in international development</u>.</mark> While this does not by itself constitute a vision for ensuring human rights or protecting the environment, it nevertheless represents an important strategic gain. <u><mark>It alone would likely bring change of great enough magnitude to make the politics of the global economy look</mark> virtually <mark>unrecognizable</mark> to those who have grown accustomed to Washington-dictated corporate globalization.</u>¶ Those who reject corporate and imperial models of globalization have a wealth of ideas at their disposal, a healthy internal debate to refine their strategies, and a vibrant, growing international network of citizens that see their efforts as part an interconnected whole. They also have very powerful enemies. Fortunately, as we enter the post-Bush era, the international community has voiced a firm rejection of unilateralism and preemptive war. Likewise, <u>ever-larger swaths of the globe view the neoliberal doctrine of corporate expansion as a failed and discredited vision. This creates unique opportunities for citizens to fight to bring a democratic globalization into existence</u>. More exciting still is that <u>many people are already doing so, and, on key issues</u> like debt relief and across entire regions like the Latin America, <u>they are winning.</u> The punditry is increasingly taking notice. <u>For <mark>there is nothing so dangerous to those who insist that the world must remain as it is as the simple, stubbornly defiant doctrine of hope.</p></u></mark>

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Iowa HS

Shooter

1ac was simony of organs 1nc was framing spec the cap k the undercommons k the release the relics cp and case 2nc was undercommons and case 1nr was cap and relics 2nr was cap and relics

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

Sa.....

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Legalization does not nothing to affect the structure of anti-blackness- the movement is an attempt to profit off of the drug war which upholds the policing power of civil society

Short ’14

Short ’14 (April, Associate Editor at AlterNet, “Michelle Alexander: White Men Get Rich from Legal Pot, Black Men Stay in Prison”, [SG])

Several other states are now looking to follow suit and legalize. the faces of the movement are primarily white and male. Meanwhile, many of the more than 210,000 people who were arrested for marijuana possession in Colorado between 1986 and 2010 according to a report from the Marijuana Arrest Research Project, remain behind bars. Thousands of black men and boys still sit in prisons for possession of the very plant that's making those white guys on TV rich. Here are white men poised to run big marijuana businesses, dreaming of cashing in big—big money, big businesses selling weed—after 40 years of impoverished black kids getting prison time for selling weed, and their families and futures destroyed. Now, white men are planning to get rich doing precisely the same thing?” for 40 years poor communities of color have experienced the wrath of the war on drugs. “Black men and boys” have been the target of the war on drugs’ racist policies—stopped, frisked and disturbed—“often before they’re old enough to vote,” They can be discriminated against [when it comes to] employment, housing, access to education, public benefits. They're locked into a permanent second-class status for life. And we’ve done this in precisely the communities that were most in need of our support.” That these communities are poor and have failing schools and have broken rules is not because of their personal failings but because we’ve declared war on them,” After waging a brutal war on poor communities of color, a drug war that has decimated families, spread despair and hopelessness through entire communities, and a war that has fanned the flames of the very violence it was supposedly intended to address and control; after pouring billions of dollars into prisons and allowing schools to fail; we’re gonna simply say, we’re done now?” “I think we have to be willing, as we’re talking about legalization, to also start talking about reparations for the war on drugs, how to repair the harm caused Obama has perpetuated the backward way of framing the situation when he talks about the issues facing those communities. "I am worried that much of the initiative is more based in rhetoric than in meaningful commitment to address the structures and institutions that have created the conditions in these communities some new system of racial and social control will have emerged again because we have not yet learned the core lesson that our racial history has been trying to teach us.”

other states are looking to legalize. the faces of the movement are primarily white and male Meanwhile, 210,000 people remain behind bars. for possession of the very plant that's making those white guys rich. for 40 years poor communities of color have experienced the wrath of the war on drugs racist policies—stopped, frisked and disturbed They're locked into a permanent second-class status for life we’ve declared war on them,” we have to be willing to also start talking about reparations for the war on drugs, Obama has perpetuated the backward way of framing the situation the initiative is more based in rhetoric than in meaningful commitment to address the structures and institutions that have created the conditions in these communities new racial and social control will have emerged because we have not yet learned our racial history

Ever since Colorado and Washington made the unprecedented move to legalize recreational pot last year, excitement and stories of unfettered success have billowed into the air. Colorado's marijuana tax revenue far exceeded expectations, bringing a whopping $185 million to the state and tourists are lining up to taste the budding culture (pun intended). Several other states are now looking to follow suit and legalize. But the ramifications of this momentous shift are left unaddressed. When you flick on the TV to a segment about the flowering pot market in Colorado, you'll find that the faces of the movement are primarily white and male. Meanwhile, many of the more than 210,000 people who were arrested for marijuana possession in Colorado between 1986 and 2010 according to a report from the Marijuana Arrest Research Project, remain behind bars. Thousands of black men and boys still sit in prisons for possession of the very plant that's making those white guys on TV rich. “In many ways the imagery doesn't sit right,” said Michelle Alexander, associate professor of law at Ohio State University and author of The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness in a public conversation on March 6 with Asha Bandele of the Drug Policy Alliance. “Here are white men poised to run big marijuana businesses, dreaming of cashing in big—big money, big businesses selling weed—after 40 years of impoverished black kids getting prison time for selling weed, and their families and futures destroyed. Now, white men are planning to get rich doing precisely the same thing?” Alexander said she is “thrilled” that Colorado and Washington have legalized pot and that Washington D.C. decriminalized possession of small amounts earlier this month. But she said she’s noticed "warning signs" of a troubling trend emerging in the pot legalization movement: Whites—men in particular—are the face of the movement, and the emerging pot industry. (A recent In These Times article titled “ The Unbearable Whiteness of Marijuana Legalization,” summarize this trend.) Alexander said for 40 years poor communities of color have experienced the wrath of the war on drugs. “Black men and boys” have been the target of the war on drugs’ racist policies—stopped, frisked and disturbed—“often before they’re old enough to vote,” she said. Those youths are arrested most often for nonviolent first offenses that would go ignored in middle-class white neighborhoods. “We arrest these kids at young ages, saddle them with criminal records, throw them in cages, and then release them into a parallel social universe in which the very civil and human rights supposedly won in the Civil Rights movement no longer apply to them for the rest of their lives,” she said. “They can be discriminated against [when it comes to] employment, housing, access to education, public benefits. They're locked into a permanent second-class status for life. And we’ve done this in precisely the communities that were most in need of our support.” As Asha Bandele of DPA pointed out during the conversation, the U.S. has 5% of the world’s population and 25% of the world’s prisoners. Today, 2.2 million people are in prison or jail and 7.7 million are under the control of the criminal justice system, with African American boys and men—and now women—making up a disproportionate number of those imprisoned. Alexander’s book was published four years ago and spent 75 weeks on the New York Timesbestseller list, helping to bring mass incarceration to the forefront of the national discussion. Alexander said over the last four years, as she’s been traveling from state to state speaking to audiences from prisons to universities about her book, she’s witnessed an “awakening.” More and more people are talking about mass incarceration, racism and the war on drugs. Often when people talk about the reasons certain communities are impoverished or lack education they blame the personal choices or moral shortcomings of the people in those communities, but that way of looking at things has got it backwards, she said. “That these communities are poor and have failing schools and have broken rules is not because of their personal failings but because we’ve declared war on them,” she said. “We’ve spent billions of dollars building prisons and allowing schools to fail. We’ve decimated these communities by shuttling young people from their underfunded schools to these brand new, high tech prisons. We’ve begun targeting children in these communities at young ages.” Alexander cautioned that drug policy activists need to keep this disparity in mind and cultivate a conversation about repairing the damages done by the systemic racism of the war on drugs, before cashing in on legalization. “After waging a brutal war on poor communities of color, a drug war that has decimated families, spread despair and hopelessness through entire communities, and a war that has fanned the flames of the very violence it was supposedly intended to address and control; after pouring billions of dollars into prisons and allowing schools to fail; we’re gonna simply say, we’re done now?” Alexander said. “I think we have to be willing, as we’re talking about legalization, to also start talking about reparations for the war on drugs, how to repair the harm caused.” Alexander used the example of post-apartheid reparations in South Africa to point out the way a society can and should own up to its past mistakes. After apartheid ended, the nation passed a law called the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995. Under the new law, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was formed to "elicit truth" about the human rights violations that had occurred. The commission recorded the statements of witnesses who endured "gross human rights violations" and facilitated public hearings. Those who had committed violence could request amnesty from civil and criminal prosecution in order to share testimony about what they'd done with the commission. “At the end of apartheid in South Africa there was an understanding that there could be no healing, no progress, no reconciliation without truth,” she said. “You can’t just destroy a people and then say ‘It’s over, we’re stopping now.’ You have to be willing to deal with the truth, deal with the history openly and honestly.” Alexander pointed to America’s tendency to shove its racist legacies under the rug rather than own up to them. When the civil war ended, slaves were free on paper but they were left with nothing—“no 40 acres and a mule, nothing,” Alexander said. The only option was to work low-paying contract jobs for the same slave owners who had previously brutalized them. “And after a brief period of reconstruction a new caste system was imposed—Jim Crow—and another extraordinary movement arose and brought the old Jim Crow to its knees,” she said. “Americans said, OK, we’ll stop now. We’ll take down the whites-only signs, we’ll stop doing that. But there were not reparations for slavery, not for Jim Crow, and scarcely an acknowledgement of the harm done except for Martin Luther King Day, one day out of the year. And I feel like, here we go again.” Last week, Obama pushed out an initiative called My Brother’s Keeper, focused on helping black boys who have fallen down the social ladder. Alexander said she’s glad Obama is shining a spotlight on the crisis facing black communities. However, she said Obama has perpetuated the backward way of framing the situation when he talks about the issues facing those communities. "I am worried that much of the initiative is more based in rhetoric than in meaningful commitment to address the structures and institutions that have created the conditions in these communities," she said. Asked about the unlikely relationship forming between U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder and Kentucky’s Tea Party senator Rand Paul, both of whom are standing together to end mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders, Alexander responded she is wary of whether these politicians are making the right decisions for the wrong reasons. She cautioned that politicians across the political spectrum are “highly motivated” to downsize prisons because the U.S. can no longer afford to maintain a massive prison state without raising taxes “on the predominantly white middle class.” That shortsighted way of thinking fails to recognize the larger societal patterns that keep the U.S. cycling through various “caste-like” systems. “If we're going to downsize these prisons and change marijuana laws and all that, in order to save some cash, but in that process to change these laws, we haven't woken up to the magnitude of the harm that we have done,” she said. “Ultimately, at least from my perspective, this movement to end mass incarceration and this movement to end the drug war is about breaking our nation’s habit of creating caste-like systems in America,” she said. She added that regardless of whether they’re struggling with addiction and drug abuse or have a felony on their record, people deserve to be treated with basic human rights. “How were we able to permanently lock out of mainstream society tens of millions of people, destroy families?” she said. “If we’re not going to have a real conversation about that and ultimately be willing to care for ‘them,’ the ‘others,’ those ‘ghetto dwellers’ who’ve been demonized in this rush to declare war, we’re going to find ourselves years from now either still having a slightly downsized system of mass incarceration that continues to hum along very well, or we will have managed to downsize our prisons but some new system of racial and social control will have emerged again because we have not yet learned the core lesson that our racial history has been trying to teach us.”

<h4>Legalization does not nothing to affect the structure of anti-blackness- the movement is an attempt to profit off of the drug war which upholds the policing power of civil society </h4><p><u><strong>Short ’14</strong> (April, Associate Editor at AlterNet, “Michelle Alexander: White Men Get Rich from Legal Pot, Black Men Stay in Prison”, [SG]) </p><p></u>Ever since Colorado and Washington made the unprecedented move to legalize recreational pot last year, excitement and stories of unfettered success have billowed into the air. Colorado's marijuana tax revenue far exceeded expectations, bringing a whopping $185 million to the state and tourists are lining up to taste the budding culture (pun intended). <u>Several <mark>other states are</mark> now <mark>looking to</mark> follow suit and <mark>legalize.</mark> </u> But the ramifications of this momentous shift are left unaddressed. When you flick on the TV to a segment about the flowering pot market in Colorado, you'll find that <u><mark>the faces of the movement are primarily white and male</mark>. <mark>Meanwhile,</mark> many of the more than <mark>210,000 people</mark> who were arrested for marijuana possession in Colorado between 1986 and 2010 according to a report from the Marijuana Arrest Research Project, <mark>remain behind bars.</mark> Thousands of black men and boys still sit in prisons <mark>for possession of the very plant that's making those white guys</mark> on TV <mark>rich.</u></mark> “In many ways the imagery doesn't sit right,” said Michelle Alexander, associate professor of law at Ohio State University and author of The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness in a public conversation on March 6 with Asha Bandele of the Drug Policy Alliance. “<u>Here are white men poised to run big marijuana businesses, dreaming of cashing in big—big money, big businesses selling weed—after 40 years of impoverished black kids getting prison time for selling weed, and their families and futures destroyed. Now, white men are planning to get rich doing precisely the same thing?”</u> Alexander said she is “thrilled” that Colorado and Washington have legalized pot and that Washington D.C. decriminalized possession of small amounts earlier this month. But she said she’s noticed "warning signs" of a troubling trend emerging in the pot legalization movement: Whites—men in particular—are the face of the movement, and the emerging pot industry. (A recent In These Times article titled “ The Unbearable Whiteness of Marijuana Legalization,” summarize this trend.) Alexander said <u><mark>for 40 years poor communities of color have experienced the wrath of the war on drugs</mark>. “Black men and boys” have been the target of the war on drugs’ <mark>racist policies—stopped, frisked and disturbed</mark>—“often before they’re old enough to vote,”</u> she said. Those youths are arrested most often for nonviolent first offenses that would go ignored in middle-class white neighborhoods. “We arrest these kids at young ages, saddle them with criminal records, throw them in cages, and then release them into a parallel social universe in which the very civil and human rights supposedly won in the Civil Rights movement no longer apply to them for the rest of their lives,” she said. “<u>They can be discriminated against [when it comes to] employment, housing, access to education, public benefits. <mark>They're locked into a permanent second-class status for life</mark>. And we’ve done this in precisely the communities that were most in need of our support.”</u> As Asha Bandele of DPA pointed out during the conversation, the U.S. has 5% of the world’s population and 25% of the world’s prisoners. Today, 2.2 million people are in prison or jail and 7.7 million are under the control of the criminal justice system, with African American boys and men—and now women—making up a disproportionate number of those imprisoned. Alexander’s book was published four years ago and spent 75 weeks on the New York Timesbestseller list, helping to bring mass incarceration to the forefront of the national discussion. Alexander said over the last four years, as she’s been traveling from state to state speaking to audiences from prisons to universities about her book, she’s witnessed an “awakening.” More and more people are talking about mass incarceration, racism and the war on drugs. Often when people talk about the reasons certain communities are impoverished or lack education they blame the personal choices or moral shortcomings of the people in those communities, but that way of looking at things has got it backwards, she said. “<u>That these communities are poor and have failing schools and have broken rules is not because of their personal failings but because <mark>we’ve declared war on them,”</mark> </u>she said. “We’ve spent billions of dollars building prisons and allowing schools to fail. We’ve decimated these communities by shuttling young people from their underfunded schools to these brand new, high tech prisons. We’ve begun targeting children in these communities at young ages.” Alexander cautioned that drug policy activists need to keep this disparity in mind and cultivate a conversation about repairing the damages done by the systemic racism of the war on drugs, before cashing in on legalization. “<u>After waging a brutal war on poor communities of color, a drug war that has decimated families, spread despair and hopelessness through entire communities, and a war that has fanned the flames of the very violence it was supposedly intended to address and control; after pouring billions of dollars into prisons and allowing schools to fail; we’re gonna simply say, we’re done now?”</u> Alexander said. <u>“I think <mark>we have to be willing</mark>, as we’re talking about legalization, <mark>to also start talking about reparations for the war on drugs,</mark> how to repair the harm caused</u>.” Alexander used the example of post-apartheid reparations in South Africa to point out the way a society can and should own up to its past mistakes. After apartheid ended, the nation passed a law called the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995. Under the new law, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was formed to "elicit truth" about the human rights violations that had occurred. The commission recorded the statements of witnesses who endured "gross human rights violations" and facilitated public hearings. Those who had committed violence could request amnesty from civil and criminal prosecution in order to share testimony about what they'd done with the commission. “At the end of apartheid in South Africa there was an understanding that there could be no healing, no progress, no reconciliation without truth,” she said. “You can’t just destroy a people and then say ‘It’s over, we’re stopping now.’ You have to be willing to deal with the truth, deal with the history openly and honestly.” Alexander pointed to America’s tendency to shove its racist legacies under the rug rather than own up to them. When the civil war ended, slaves were free on paper but they were left with nothing—“no 40 acres and a mule, nothing,” Alexander said. The only option was to work low-paying contract jobs for the same slave owners who had previously brutalized them. “And after a brief period of reconstruction a new caste system was imposed—Jim Crow—and another extraordinary movement arose and brought the old Jim Crow to its knees,” she said. “Americans said, OK, we’ll stop now. We’ll take down the whites-only signs, we’ll stop doing that. But there were not reparations for slavery, not for Jim Crow, and scarcely an acknowledgement of the harm done except for Martin Luther King Day, one day out of the year. And I feel like, here we go again.” Last week, Obama pushed out an initiative called My Brother’s Keeper, focused on helping black boys who have fallen down the social ladder. Alexander said she’s glad Obama is shining a spotlight on the crisis facing black communities. However, she said <u><mark>Obama has perpetuated the backward way of framing the situation</mark> when he talks about the issues facing those communities. "I am worried that much of <mark>the initiative is more based in rhetoric than in meaningful commitment to address the structures and institutions that have created the conditions in these communities</u></mark>," she said. Asked about the unlikely relationship forming between U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder and Kentucky’s Tea Party senator Rand Paul, both of whom are standing together to end mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders, Alexander responded she is wary of whether these politicians are making the right decisions for the wrong reasons. She cautioned that politicians across the political spectrum are “highly motivated” to downsize prisons because the U.S. can no longer afford to maintain a massive prison state without raising taxes “on the predominantly white middle class.” That shortsighted way of thinking fails to recognize the larger societal patterns that keep the U.S. cycling through various “caste-like” systems. “If we're going to downsize these prisons and change marijuana laws and all that, in order to save some cash, but in that process to change these laws, we haven't woken up to the magnitude of the harm that we have done,” she said. “Ultimately, at least from my perspective, this movement to end mass incarceration and this movement to end the drug war is about breaking our nation’s habit of creating caste-like systems in America,” she said. She added that regardless of whether they’re struggling with addiction and drug abuse or have a felony on their record, people deserve to be treated with basic human rights. “How were we able to permanently lock out of mainstream society tens of millions of people, destroy families?” she said. “If we’re not going to have a real conversation about that and ultimately be willing to care for ‘them,’ the ‘others,’ those ‘ghetto dwellers’ who’ve been demonized in this rush to declare war, we’re going to find ourselves years from now either still having a slightly downsized system of mass incarceration that continues to hum along very well, or we will have managed to downsize our prisons but <u>some <mark>new</mark> system of <mark>racial and social control will have emerged</mark> again <mark>because we have not yet learned</mark> the core lesson that <mark>our racial history</mark> has been trying to teach us.”</p></u>

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Geoff Lundeen

1ac was marijuana prison industrial complex 1nc was damage centrism k plan pik legalization da and case 2nc was damage centrism and the legalization da 1nr was the pik and case 2nr was damage centrism the legalization da and the case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round4.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

Sa.....

Ev.....

Gr.....

Zo.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Their abolition of individuality stratifies the socius and causes microfascism

Kulynych 1997 , and postmodern participation Polity, Winter 1997 v30 n2)

Kulynych 1997 (JESSICA, Performing politics: Foucault, Habermas, and postmodern participation Polity, Winter 1997 v30 n2)

Bureaucratic power is not a power that is possessed by any individual or agency, but exists in the exercise of decisionmaking. we must "analyze the exercise of power [in contemporary societies] as the effect of often liberal and humane practices the conscious actions of many individuals daily contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression, but those people are simply doing their jobs or living their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression."(8) Colonization and bureaucratization also fit the pattern of a power that is not primarily repressive but productive. Disciplinary technologies are, as Sawicki describes, not.... repressive mechanisms ... [that] operate primarily through violence ... or seizure ... but rather [they operate] by producing new objects and subjects of knowledge, by inciting and channeling desires, generating and focusing individual and group energies, and establishing bodily norms and techniques for observing, monitoring and controlling bodily movements, processes, and capacities.(9 Rather than simply holding people back, bureaucratization breaks up, categorizes, and systemizes projects and people. It creates new categories of knowledge and expertise. Bureaucratization and colonization also create new subjects as the objects of bureaucratic expertise. The social welfare client and the consumer citizen are the creation of bureaucratic power, not merely its target. These disciplinary techniques not only control us, but also enable us to be more efficient and more productive, and often more powerful.

Bureaucratic power exists in decisionmaking the conscious actions of many individuals contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression those people are simply doing their jobs Colonization and bureaucratization fit the pattern of a power that is productive Disciplinary technologies operate] by producing new subjects of knowledge by channeling desires bureaucratization breaks up, and systemizes projects and people It creates new categories of knowledge and expertise

Bureaucratic power is not a power that is possessed by any individual or agency, but exists in the exercise of decisionmaking. As Iris Young points out, we must "analyze the exercise of power [in contemporary societies] as the effect of often liberal and humane practices of education, bureaucratic administration, production and distribution of consumer goods, medicine and so on."(7) The very practices that Habermas chronicles are exemplary of a power that has no definitive subject. As Young explains, "the conscious actions of many individuals daily contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression, but those people are simply doing their jobs or living their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression."(8) Colonization and bureaucratization also fit the pattern of a power that is not primarily repressive but productive. Disciplinary technologies are, as Sawicki describes, not.... repressive mechanisms ... [that] operate primarily through violence ... or seizure ... but rather [they operate] by producing new objects and subjects of knowledge, by inciting and channeling desires, generating and focusing individual and group energies, and establishing bodily norms and techniques for observing, monitoring and controlling bodily movements, processes, and capacities.(9) The very practices of administration, distribution, and decisionmaking on which Habermas focuses his attention can and must be analyzed as productive disciplinary practices. Although these practices can clearly be repressive, their most insidious effects are productive. Rather than simply holding people back, bureaucratization breaks up, categorizes, and systemizes projects and people. It creates new categories of knowledge and expertise. Bureaucratization and colonization also create new subjects as the objects of bureaucratic expertise. The social welfare client and the consumer citizen are the creation of bureaucratic power, not merely its target. The extension of lifeworld gender norms into the system creates the possibility for sexual harassment, job segregation, parental leave, and consensual corporate decisionmaking. Created as a part of these subjectivities are new gestures and norms of bodily behavior, such as the embarrassed shuffling of food stamps at the grocery checkout and the demeaning sexual reference at the office copier. Bodily movements are monitored and regularized by means of political opinion polls, welfare lists, sexual harassment protocols, flex-time work schedules, and so forth. Modern disciplinary power, as described by Foucault and implied by Habermas, does not merely prevent us from developing, but creates us differently as the effect of its functioning. These disciplinary techniques not only control us, but also enable us to be more efficient and more productive, and often more powerful.

<h4>Their abolition of individuality stratifies the socius and causes microfascism</h4><p><u><strong>Kulynych 1997</u></strong> (JESSICA, Performing politics: Foucault, Habermas<u><strong>, and postmodern participation Polity, Winter 1997 v30 n2)</p><p></strong><mark>Bureaucratic</mark> <mark>power</mark> is not a power that is possessed by any individual or agency, but <mark>exists in</mark> the exercise of <mark>decisionmaking</mark>.</u> As Iris Young points out, <u>we must "analyze the exercise of power [in contemporary societies] as the effect of often liberal and humane practices</u> of education, bureaucratic administration, production and distribution of consumer goods, medicine and so on."(7) The very practices that Habermas chronicles are exemplary of a power that has no definitive subject. As Young explains, "<u><mark>the</mark> <mark>conscious actions of many individuals</mark> daily <mark>contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression</mark>, but <mark>those people are</mark> <mark>simply doing their jobs</mark> or living their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression."(8) <mark>Colonization and bureaucratization</mark> also <mark>fit the pattern of a power that is</mark> not primarily repressive but <mark>productive</mark>. <mark>Disciplinary</mark> <mark>technologies</mark> are, as Sawicki describes, not.... repressive mechanisms ... [that] operate primarily through violence ... or seizure ... but rather [they <mark>operate] by producing new</mark> objects and <mark>subjects of knowledge</mark>, <mark>by</mark> inciting and <mark>channeling desires</mark>, generating and focusing individual and group energies, and establishing bodily norms and techniques for observing, monitoring and controlling bodily movements, processes, and capacities.(9</u>) The very practices of administration, distribution, and decisionmaking on which Habermas focuses his attention can and must be analyzed as productive disciplinary practices. Although these practices can clearly be repressive, their most insidious effects are productive. <u>Rather than simply holding people back, <mark>bureaucratization breaks up, </mark>categorizes, <mark>and systemizes</mark> <mark>projects and people</mark>. <mark>It creates new categories of knowledge and</mark> <mark>expertise</mark>. Bureaucratization and colonization also create new subjects as the objects of bureaucratic expertise. The social welfare client and the consumer citizen are the creation of bureaucratic power, not merely its target.</u> The extension of lifeworld gender norms into the system creates the possibility for sexual harassment, job segregation, parental leave, and consensual corporate decisionmaking. Created as a part of these subjectivities are new gestures and norms of bodily behavior, such as the embarrassed shuffling of food stamps at the grocery checkout and the demeaning sexual reference at the office copier. Bodily movements are monitored and regularized by means of political opinion polls, welfare lists, sexual harassment protocols, flex-time work schedules, and so forth. Modern disciplinary power, as described by Foucault and implied by Habermas, does not merely prevent us from developing, but creates us differently as the effect of its functioning. <u>These disciplinary techniques not only control us, but also enable us to be more efficient and more productive, and often more powerful.</p></u>

1NR

Plan PIK

OV

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round1.docx

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UMKC

1

Kansas HaRe

Lindsey Van Luvanee

1AC was marijuana 1NC was politics of pain the plan pik and case 2nc was politics of pain 1nr was the pik and case 2nr was case and the pik

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round1.docx

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Right to die laws broaden to include people who didn’t consent

Wright 2000

Wright 2000 - Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Clark University (Walter, “Historical Analogies, Slippery Slopes, and the Question of Euthanasia” foumal of Law, Medicine &Ethics, 28 (2000): 176-186, Wiley)

Singer responds by citing the example of Holland. n Singer asserts: Euthanasia in these circumstances is strongly sup- ported The guide- lines make murder in the guise of euthanasia rather far-fetched, and there is no evidence of an increase in the murder rate in the Netherlands. for Singer, the Dutch experience of permitting euthanasia, without abuses supports the claim that the German experience was unique When we examine the details, the Dutch example presents a much more ambigu- ous picture During the last two decades physician practice and case law have extended the catego- ries of patients for whom physician-assisted dying was “not legally forbidden” well beyond the guidelines posited in 1981 Recent court cases have acquitted doc- tors who killed patients in cases of transient psychological as well as persistent physical distress, cases of chronic as well as terminal illness, and involuntary as well as volun- tary euthanasia The prevailing argument has been the claim that it would be unfair to allow euthanasia for some and to deny it to similar cases. This is the archetypal engine for a slippery slope. The Dutch government has conducted two studies The tenor of both these reports is favorable However, this con- clusion requires overlooking significant contrary evidence. doctors killed 2,300 people who requested it. However, doctors also killed 1,040 people who did not know or consent to what was happening. despite the fact that 14% of these patients were fully competent, and 72% had never given any indication that they would want their lives terminated physicians indicated that they con- sulted another physician in only 11% of cases Almost 20% of these unreported cases in that report involved ending a life without the patient’s explicit request approximately 25% of physicians reported that they had “terminated the lives of patients without an explicit reques In their analysis of the data, Dutch investigators claimed that cases “terminated without an explicit request” had decreased but by citing only the cases “without explicit request.” They ignored another listed category—cases in which phy- sicians gave pain medication with the explicit intent of end- ing a patient’s life. These increased In more than 80% of these cases the patient had made no request for death there has been an increase in the number of patients killed without having requested it/ a large number of euthanasia cases in Holland go unreported doctors falsify death certificates The guideline calling for a persistent re- quest is obviously ignored While Dutch have not produced a Nazi holocaust, their experience does provide reasons to think that once allowed killing will expand what happened in Germany may not be a unique and excep- tional circumstance, and that the euthanasia slope may be slippery indeed

the Dutch example presents a much more ambigu- ous picture During the last two decades physician practice and case law extended catego- ries of patients for whom physician-assisted dying was “not legally forbidden” well beyond guidelines court cases acquitted doc- tors who killed patients in cases of transient psychological as well as persistent physical distress, cases of chronic as well as terminal illness, and involuntary as well as volun- tary euthanasia This is archetypal engine for a slippery slope.6* The Dutch government conducted two studies tenor , is favorable this con- clusion requires overlooking significant contrary evidence. doctors killed 2,300 people who requested it. However, doctors also killed 1,040 people who did not know or consent to what was happening despite the fact that 14% of these patients were fully competent, and 72% had never given any indication that they would want their lives terminated physicians indicated that they con- sulted another physician in only 11% of cases Almost 20% of these unreported cases in that report involved ending a life without the patient’s explicit request approximately 25% of physicians reported that they had “terminated the lives of patients without an explicit request While Dutch have not produced a Nazi holocaust, their experience does provide reasons to think that once allowed killing will expand what happened in Germany may not be a unique and excep- tional circumstance, and that the euthanasia slope may be slippery indeed

In Practical Ethics, Singer responds to this sort of chal- lenge by citing the example of Holland. Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide have been illegal in that country since 1886 under articles 293 and 294 of the Penal Code.56 The issue entered public discussion there in 1973 when a criminal court at Leeuwarden convicted a physician of ad- ministering a fatal injection to her mother, but imposed a suspended sentence. The court found it permissible to ad- minister drugs that shorten a patient’s life so long as the goal was relief of pain. In that same year, the KNMG (Koninklijke Nederlandse Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst—the Royal Dutch Medical Association) issued a statement that paralleled the court decision. In the next twenty-seven years, case law and KNMG policy statements have evolved in tandem, setting guidelines protecting phy- sicians who conduct euthanasia, so long as the physician carries out the act according to “rules of careful medical practice.”17 The only statute law bearing on the matter has been an act adopted by the Dutch Parliament (November 30,1993) amending the Burial Act and giving formal legal status to the notification procedure in cases of euthanasia (and physician-assisted suicide). In 1981, the court at Rotterdam convicted a layperson of assisting in the suicide of a terminally ill patient. In its decision, the court set the basic criteria that, with modifications, have governed Holland’s active euthanasia practice since. These guidelines included several factors. For an act of euthanasia to be permissible for such a terminally ill patient, the patient must be conscious and experiencing unbearable pain. There must be no other reasonable solutions. The patient must make a well-informed, entirely voluntary, and durable request for death. The attending doctor must consult with an inde- pendent professional, who concurs. Finally, only a doctor may administer the means of death. After listing the guidelines developed by the KNMG and the Dutch courts, Singer asserts: Euthanasia in these circumstances is strongly sup- ported by the Royal Dutch Medical Association, and by the general public in the Netherlands. The guide- lines make murder in the guise of euthanasia rather far-fetched, and there is no evidence of an increase in the murder rate in the Netherlands.5® Thus, for Singer, the Dutch experience of permitting euthanasia, without (in his account) the arising of atten- dant abuses and extensions of the practice, supports the claim that the German experience was a unique, one-time occurrence, and not a precedent for the future.59 Singer is correct that the KNMG60 and public opinion generally sup- port the current practices, but he is too optimistic in his reading of the other facts. In particular, he is simply too optimistic about the ability of procedural safeguards to pre- vent abuses. When we examine the details, the Dutch example that he cites to support his view presents a much more ambigu- ous picture.61 During the last two decades in Holland, physician practice and case law have extended the catego- ries of patients for whom physician-assisted dying was “not legally forbidden” well beyond the guidelines posited in the 1981 decision. Recent court cases have acquitted doc- tors who killed patients in cases of transient psychological as well as persistent physical distress, cases of chronic as well as terminal illness, and involuntary as well as volun- tary euthanasia.62 The prevailing argument for these ex- tensions has been the claim that it would be discriminatory and unfair to allow euthanasia for some and to deny it to other closely similar cases. This is the archetypal engine for a slippery slope.6* The Dutch government has conducted two studies (1990 and 1995) supported by the Royal Dutch Medical Association with the promise that participating physicians would be immune from prosecution for anything they re- vealed. The authors of the 1995 study claim that, “sub- stantial progress in the oversight of physician assisted death has been achieved in the Netherlands.”64 The tenor of both these reports, as well as Marcia Angell’s 1996 editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine*- about them, is largely favorable for Dutch euthanasia. However, this con- clusion requires overlooking significant contrary evidence. According to the 1990 Remmelink Report, doctors killed 2,300 people who requested it. However, doctors also killed 1,040 people who did not know or consent to what was happening. They did this despite the fact that 14% of these patients were fully competent, and 72% had never given any indication that they would want their lives terminated. In the 1995 reports, physicians indicated that they con- sulted another physician in only 11% of cases not reported to the government. Almost 20% of these unreported cases in that report involved ending a life without the patient’s explicit request. Both in 1990 and 1995, approximately 25% of physicians reported that they had “terminated the lives of patients without an explicit request” from the pa- tient to do so.66 In their analysis of the data, Dutch investigators claimed that cases “terminated without an explicit request” had decreased between 1990 and 1995,67 but they reached this result by citing only the cases “without explicit request.” They ignored another listed category—cases in which phy- sicians gave pain medication with the explicit intent of end- ing a patient’s life. These increased from 1350 to nearly 1900. In more than 80% of these cases the patient had made no request for death. If we count these deaths, too, as non-voluntary, then there has been an increase (and not a decrease) in the number of patients killed without having requested it/8 Even today, a large number of euthanasia cases in Holland go unreported. In these cases, doctors falsify death certificates to show death by natural causes, thus making regulation of euthanasia impossible. The guideline calling for a persistent and repeated re- quest by patients before they can be killed is obviously be- ing ignored in practice. As indicated, practice continues to stretch the other guidelines as well. While Dutch have not produced a Nazi holocaust, their experience does indeed provide reasons to think that once allowed under strict lim- its, killing will expand beyond them. This independent contemporary example supports the argument that what happened in Germany may not be a unique and excep- tional circumstance, and that the euthanasia slope may be slippery indeed. Certainly, the Dutch experience provides little support for Singer’s claim that it is not one.

<h4>Right to die laws broaden to include people who didn’t consent </h4><p><strong>Wright 2000</strong> - Associate Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Clark University (Walter, “Historical Analogies, Slippery Slopes, and the Question of Euthanasia” foumal of Law, Medicine &Ethics, 28 (2000): 176-186, Wiley)</p><p>In Practical Ethics, <u><strong>Singer responds</u></strong> to this sort of chal- lenge <u><strong>by citing the example of Holland. </u></strong>Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide have been illegal in that country since 1886 under articles 293 and 294 of the Penal Code.56 The issue entered public discussion there in 1973 when a criminal court at Leeuwarden convicted a physician of ad- ministering a fatal injection to her mother, but imposed a suspended sentence. The court found it permissible to ad- minister drugs that shorten a patient’s life so long as the goal was relief of pai<u><strong>n</u></strong>. In that same year, the KNMG (Koninklijke Nederlandse Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst—the Royal Dutch Medical Association) issued a statement that paralleled the court decision. In the next twenty-seven years, case law and KNMG policy statements have evolved in tandem, setting guidelines protecting phy- sicians who conduct euthanasia, so long as the physician carries out the act according to “rules of careful medical practice.”17 The only statute law bearing on the matter has been an act adopted by the Dutch Parliament (November 30,1993) amending the Burial Act and giving formal legal status to the notification procedure in cases of euthanasia (and physician-assisted suicide). In 1981, the court at Rotterdam convicted a layperson of assisting in the suicide of a terminally ill patient. In its decision, the court set the basic criteria that, with modifications, have governed Holland’s active euthanasia practice since. These guidelines included several factors. For an act of euthanasia to be permissible for such a terminally ill patient, the patient must be conscious and experiencing unbearable pain. There must be no other reasonable solutions. The patient must make a well-informed, entirely voluntary, and durable request for death. The attending doctor must consult with an inde- pendent professional, who concurs. Finally, only a doctor may administer the means of death. After listing the guidelines developed by the KNMG and the Dutch courts, <u><strong>Singer asserts: Euthanasia in these circumstances is strongly sup- ported </u></strong>by the Royal Dutch Medical Association, and by the general public in the Netherlands. <u><strong>The guide- lines make murder in the guise of euthanasia rather far-fetched, and there is no evidence of an increase in the murder rate in the Netherlands.</u></strong>5® Thus, <u><strong>for Singer, the Dutch experience of permitting euthanasia, without</u></strong> (in his account) the arising of atten- dant <u><strong>abuses</u></strong> and extensions of the practice, <u><strong>supports the claim that the German experience was</u></strong> a <u><strong>unique</u></strong>, one-time occurrence, and not a precedent for the future.59 Singer is correct that the KNMG60 and public opinion generally sup- port the current practices, but he is too optimistic in his reading of the other facts. In particular, he is simply too optimistic about the ability of procedural safeguards to pre- vent abuses. <u><strong>When we examine the details, <mark>the Dutch example</u></strong></mark> that he cites to support his view <u><strong><mark>presents a much more ambigu- ous picture</u></strong></mark>.61 <u><strong><mark>During the last two decades</u></strong></mark> in Holland, <u><strong><mark>physician practice and case law</mark> have <mark>extended </mark>the <mark>catego- ries of patients for whom physician-assisted dying was “not legally forbidden” well beyond</mark> the <mark>guidelines</mark> posited in </u></strong>the <u><strong>1981</u></strong> decision. <u><strong>Recent <mark>court cases</mark> have <mark>acquitted doc- tors who killed patients in cases of transient psychological as well as persistent physical distress, cases of chronic as well as terminal illness, and involuntary as well as volun- tary euthanasia</u></strong></mark>.62 </p><p><u><strong>The prevailing argument</u></strong> for these ex- tensions <u><strong>has been the claim that it would be </u></strong>discriminatory and <u><strong>unfair to allow euthanasia for some and to deny it to </u></strong>other closely <u><strong>similar cases. <mark>This is</mark> the <mark>archetypal engine for a slippery slope.</u></strong>6* <u><strong>The Dutch government</mark> has <mark>conducted two studies</mark> </u></strong>(1990 and 1995) supported by the Royal Dutch Medical Association with the promise that participating physicians would be immune from prosecution for anything they re- vealed. The authors of the 1995 study claim that, “sub- stantial progress in the oversight of physician assisted death has been achieved in the Netherlands.”64 <u><strong>The <mark>tenor </mark>of both these reports</u></strong>, as well as Marcia Angell’s 1996 editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine*- about them<mark>, <u><strong>is</u></strong></mark> largely <u><strong><mark>favorable</u></strong></mark> for Dutch euthanasia. <u><strong>However, <mark>this con- clusion requires overlooking significant contrary evidence.</mark> </u></strong>According to the 1990 Remmelink Report, <u><strong><mark>doctors killed 2,300 people who requested it. However, doctors also killed 1,040 people who did not know or consent to what was happening</mark>.</u></strong> They did this <u><strong><mark>despite the fact that 14% of these patients were fully competent, and 72% had never given any indication that they would want their lives terminated</u></strong></mark>. In the 1995 reports, <u><strong><mark>physicians indicated that they con- sulted another physician in only 11% of cases</u></strong></mark> not reported to the government. <u><strong><mark>Almost 20% of these unreported cases in that report involved ending a life without the patient’s explicit request</u></strong></mark>. Both in 1990 and 1995, <u><strong><mark>approximately 25% of physicians reported that they had “terminated the lives of patients without an explicit reques</u></strong>t</mark>” from the pa- tient to do so.66 <u><strong>In their analysis of the data, Dutch investigators claimed that cases “terminated without an explicit request” had decreased </u></strong>between 1990 and 1995,67 <u><strong>but </u></strong>they reached this result <u><strong>by citing only the cases “without explicit request.” They ignored another listed category—cases in which phy- sicians gave pain medication with the explicit intent of end- ing a patient’s life. These increased</u></strong> from 1350 to nearly 1900. <u><strong>In more than 80% of these cases the patient had made no request for death</u></strong>. If we count these deaths, too, as non-voluntary, then <u><strong>there has been an increase</u></strong> (and not a decrease) <u><strong>in the number of patients killed without having requested it/</u></strong>8 Even today, <u><strong>a large number of euthanasia cases in Holland go unreported</u></strong>. In these cases, <u><strong>doctors falsify death certificates</u></strong> to show death by natural causes, thus making regulation of euthanasia impossible. <u><strong>The guideline calling for a persistent</u></strong> and repeated <u><strong>re- quest </u></strong>by patients before they can be killed <u><strong>is obviously</u></strong> be- ing <u><strong>ignored</u></strong> in practice. As indicated, practice continues to stretch the other guidelines as well. <u><strong><mark>While Dutch have not produced a Nazi holocaust, their experience does</u></strong></mark> indeed <u><strong><mark>provide reasons to think that once allowed</u></strong></mark> under strict lim- its, <u><strong><mark>killing will expand</u></strong></mark> beyond them. This independent contemporary example supports the argument that <u><strong><mark>what happened in Germany may not be a unique and excep- tional circumstance, and that the euthanasia slope may be slippery indeed</u></strong></mark>. Certainly, the Dutch experience provides little support for Singer’s claim that it is not one.</p>

1NR

Case

Ableism

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx

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UMKC

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ASU ChRa

Brian McBride

1ac was foucault PAS 1nc was forget foucault the plan pik and case 2nc was forget foucault 1nr was the plan pik and case 2nr was case and forget foucault

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UMKC-Round7.docx

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college

Counterplan: do not hide away catholic relics

<h4>Counterplan: do not hide away catholic relics</h4>

1NC

Off

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

N

UNLV

7

Iowa HS

Shooter

1ac was simony of organs 1nc was framing spec the cap k the undercommons k the release the relics cp and case 2nc was undercommons and case 1nr was cap and relics 2nr was cap and relics

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

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Baylor EvZo

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NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

No scenario for oil shocks

Krauss 13

Clifford Krauss 13, staff writer for NYT, October 8, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/business/energy-environment/oil-shocks-ahead-probably-not.html?pagewanted=all, “Oil Shocks Ahead? Probably Not”, AB

Oil prices at about $100 a barrel is at a sweet spot the underlying factor of relatively modest economic growth seems to be with us for quite a while Predictions about oil prices are precarious when there are so many political and security hazards the world has already entered a period of relatively predictable crude prices Even at their highest point oil prices remained 25 percent below levels of five years ago and prices on Labor Day weekend were at multiyear lows while oil slightly above $100 are high by historical measures, they are at a surprisingly benign level given the on-and-off disruptions in the Middle East and North Africa over the last three years. No doubt there will still be bumps like this summer’s. But there are reasons to believe the inevitable tensions in oil-producing countries will be manageable over the years the world now has sturdier shock absorbers than at any time over at least the last decade The new oil equation combines multiple factors that span the globe more oil production in the United States, Canada, Iraq and Saudi Arabia has compensated for the loss of exports from Iran, Libya and other trouble spots. The spread of American shale-drilling technology promises to raise oil production in non-OPEC countries with large untapped shale fields like Mexico, Argentina, China, Australia and Russia.

Oil prices at 100 is a sweet spot Predictions about oil prices are precarious the world has already entered a period of relatively predictable crude prices oil prices are at a benign level given the disruptions in the Middle East No doubt there will still be bumps But the inevitable tensions will be manageable over the years the world has sturdier shock absorbers than at any time more oil production in the U S Canada and Saudi compensated for loss of exports from trouble spots The spread of shale tech promises to raise production in non-OPEC countries with untapped fields

“Oil prices at about $100 a barrel is at a sweet spot,” said Paul Bledsoe, senior fellow in the Climate and Energy Program at the German Marshall Fund. “It’s high enough to incentivize remarkable investment in new production techniques and equally large investments in efficiency improvements. And the underlying factor of relatively modest economic growth seems to be with us for quite a while.” Predictions about oil and gasoline prices are precarious when there are so many political and security hazards. But it is likely that the world has already entered a period of relatively predictable crude prices. Even at their highest point in late summer, oil prices remained roughly 25 percent below levels of five years ago, not counting inflation, and gasoline prices on Labor Day weekend were at multiyear lows. And while oil slightly above $100 a barrel oil and nearly $3.50-a-gallon gasoline are high by historical measures, they are at a surprisingly benign level given the on-and-off disruptions in the Middle East and North Africa over the last three years. No doubt there will still be bumps like this summer’s. But there are reasons to believe the inevitable tensions in oil-producing countries will be manageable over at least the next few years, because the world now has sturdier shock absorbers than at any time over at least the last decade. The new oil equation combines multiple factors that span the globe, and most promise to be more permanent than the lackluster performance of the global economy, which no doubt has suppressed energy demand. On the supply side, more oil production in the United States, Canada, Iraq and Saudi Arabia has compensated for the loss of exports from Iran, Libya and other trouble spots. The spread of American shale-drilling technology and skill to developing countries promises to raise oil production around the world, particularly in non-OPEC countries with large untapped shale fields like Mexico, Argentina, China, Australia and Russia.

<h4>No scenario for oil shocks</h4><p>Clifford <u><strong>Krauss 13</strong>, staff writer for NYT, October 8, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/business/energy-environment/oil-shocks-ahead-probably-not.html?pagewanted=all, “Oil Shocks Ahead? Probably Not”, AB </p><p></u>“<u><strong><mark>Oil prices</strong> at</mark> about $<mark>100</mark> a barrel <mark>is </mark>at <mark>a sweet spot</u></mark>,” said Paul Bledsoe, senior fellow in the Climate and Energy Program at the German Marshall Fund. “It’s high enough to incentivize remarkable investment in new production techniques and equally large investments in efficiency improvements. And <u>the underlying factor of relatively modest economic growth seems to be with us for quite a while</u>.” <u><mark>Predictions about oil</u></mark> and gasoline <u><mark>prices are precarious</u></mark> <u>when</u> <u>there are so many political and security hazards</u>. But it is likely that <u><strong><mark>the world has already entered a period of relatively predictable crude prices</u></strong></mark>. <u>Even at their highest point</u> in late summer, <u><mark>oil prices</mark> remained</u> roughly <u>25 percent below levels of five years ago</u>, not counting inflation, <u>and</u> gasoline <u>prices on Labor Day weekend were at multiyear lows</u>. And <u>while oil slightly above $100 </u>a barrel oil and nearly $3.50-a-gallon gasoline <u>are high by historical measures, they <mark>are at a</mark> surprisingly <mark>benign level given the</mark> on-and-off <mark>disruptions in the Middle East</mark> and North Africa over the last three years. <strong><mark>No doubt there will still be bumps</strong></mark> like this summer’s.</u> <u><strong><mark>But</u></strong></mark> <u>there are reasons to believe <strong><mark>the inevitable tensions</strong></mark> in oil-producing countries <strong><mark>will be manageable over</u></strong></mark> at least <u><strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> next few <u><strong><mark>years</u></strong></mark>, because <u><mark>the world</mark> now <strong><mark>has sturdier shock absorbers than at any time</mark> over </strong>at least the <strong>last decade</u></strong>. <u>The new oil equation combines multiple factors that span the globe</u>, and most promise to be more permanent than the lackluster performance of the global economy, which no doubt has suppressed energy demand. On the supply side, <u><mark>more oil production in the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, <mark>Canada</mark>, Iraq <mark>and</mark> <mark>Saudi</mark> Arabia has <mark>compensated for</mark> the <mark>loss of exports from</mark> Iran, Libya and other <strong><mark>trouble spots</strong></mark>.</u> <u><mark>The spread of</mark> American <mark>shale</mark>-drilling <mark>tech</mark>nology</u> and skill to developing countries <u><mark>promises</u> <u>to raise</mark> oil <mark>production</u></mark> around the world, particularly <u><mark>in <strong>non-OPEC countries</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>with</mark> large <mark>untapped</mark> shale <mark>fields</mark> like Mexico, Argentina, China, Australia and Russia.</p></u>

1NC

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1ac was mj with cartels and hemp advantages 1nc was legalism and security and case 2nc was legalism 1nr was case 2nr was legalism and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-D3-Round1.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

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college

The plan reaffirms civil society through the locking of marked bodies out of the legal market- they can only further criminalize bodies of color

Burns ’14

Burns ’14 (Rebecca, Associate Editor at In These Times, “The Unbearable Whiteness of Marijuana Legalization”, [SG])

Washington state is set to implement similar laws later this year, and nationwide, the tide of public opinion seems to be turning Many have hailed the easing of marijuana laws as a breakthrough in the fight to end the War on Drugs. I want the [drug war] to fall as one complete edifice. If they manage to let a few white middle-class people off the hook, that’s very dangerous.” it still looks a long way off in states with the highest numbers of incarcerated African Americans, such as Iowa, where African Americans are more than eight times as likely as whites to be arrested for marijuana possession I’m very concerned about how this is going to play out on the ground. Young people who are selling drugs because they have no other job opportunities are definitively not going to be able to participate in the formal economy through the dispensaries I am concerned that distribution charges will increase. Whenever you make change, especially against law enforcement’s status quo, it often finds a way to circumvent that change and maintain its budget. Any changes in the War on Drugs will require continued organizing and agitation, because history has shown that one step forward has also resulted in two steps back [for] communities of color. the way the law was written provided the foundation for stop-and-frisk, because the law made it a misdemeanor for marijuana to be in public view, which basically fostered incentives to stop blacks and Latinos and tell them to empty their pockets. as the prices of marijuana start climbing [because of legalization] and [poor] people turn to using other kinds of drugs, those drugs then get painted as the worst possible drugs on the planet. The people who are doing the “worst” drugs somehow always happen to be the most marginalized people within our culture. That’s why it’s so important that we focus on uprooting the whole architecture of the War on Drugs. If we’re not talking about the root issues of racism and classism, there are bound to be unintended consequences. It’s difficult for people to find work if they have a drug conviction on their record, especially a felony, and that’s still the case within the marijuana industry in Colorado What’s fundamental to understanding the War on Drugs and the broader prison industrial complex is that it is a complex — an interrelated system

Many have hailed the easing of marijuana laws as the fight to end the War on Drugs If they manage to let a few white middle-class people off the hook, that’s very dangerous.” still looks a long way off in states with the highest numbers of incarcerated African Americans people selling drugs because they have no job are not going to be able to participate distribution charges will increase. Whenever you make change, law enforcement circumvent that change and maintain its budget history has shown that one step forward has also resulted in two steps back [for] communities of color the way the law was written provided the foundation for stop-and-frisk which fostered incentives to stop blacks and Latinos as the prices of marijuana start climbing people turn to using other kinds of drugs, The people who are doing the “worst” drugs happen to be the most marginalized people within our culture we’re not talking about the root of racism there are bound to be consequences. the War on Drugs and the broader prison industrial complex is an interrelated system

More than half of all drug arrests are for marijuana-related offenses, according to a June 2013 study by the American Civil Liberties Union. So it was big news for drug-lawreform activists when, in January, legal sales of marijuana for recreational use commenced in Colorado. Thanks to a 2012 state ballot initiative, the drug will now be taxed and regulated like alcohol. Washington state is set to implement similar laws later this year, and nationwide, the tide of public opinion seems to be turning: An October 2013 Gallup poll found that a majority of Americans now support marijuana legalization. Many have hailed the easing of marijuana laws as a breakthrough in the fight to end the War on Drugs. But others are skeptical. David Simon, creator of the popular television show "The Wire," suggested that marijuana reforms could actually set back broader efforts, telling an audience in London last summer, “I want the [drug war] to fall as one complete edifice. If they manage to let a few white middle-class people off the hook, that’s very dangerous.” While voters in the relatively white states of Colorado and Washington have backed reform, it still looks a long way off in states with the highest numbers of incarcerated African Americans, such as Iowa, where African Americans are more than eight times as likely as whites to be arrested for marijuana possession, according to the ACLU report. In These Times asked three experts to discuss whether people of color will reap the benefits of marijuana legalization. Joining the discussion were Chicago-based activist Mariame Kaba, founding director of the non-profit Project NIA, which works to decrease youth incarceration; David J. Leonard, associate professor in the department of critical culture, gender and race studies at Washington State University, and Art Way, senior drug policy manager at the Drug Policy Alliance in Colorado, which lobbied for legalization. In These Times: What impact can we expect Colorado and Washington’s new laws to have on drug-related arrests? Art Way: There will be a disproportionate benefit for those who have borne the brunt of marijuana prohibition. African Americans are about three and a half times more likely to be arrested [in the United States for marijuana-related offenses] than their white counterparts; Latinos are about two times more likely. We’re setting a paradigm that hopefully many other states will follow. ITT: One worry has been that the high price of legalized marijuana will encourage a black market and that arrests for illegal distribution could actually increase. Mariame Kaba: I’m very concerned about how this is going to play out on the ground. Young people who are selling drugs because they have no other job opportunities are definitively not going to be able to participate in the formal economy through the dispensaries. Is law enforcement going to go after those young people 20 times harder now? AW: Yes, I am concerned that distribution charges will increase. Whenever you make change, especially against law enforcement’s status quo, it often finds a way to circumvent that change and maintain its budget. But we haven’t seen anything that will lead us to believe that is taking place right now. And you have to realize that these new marijuana laws are part of a much broader reform movement: Colorado has also been revising its criminal justice laws. The first thing we did once Amendment 64 passed [in Colorado] was to lower criminal penalties for those [between the ages of] 18 and 20 possessing marijuana. So we are already working on preempting any type of net-widening. ITT: What impact will marijuana legalization have on the War on Drugs as a whole? David J. Leonard: Any changes in the War on Drugs will require continued organizing and agitation, because history has shown that one step forward has also resulted in two steps back [for] communities of color. New York decriminalized marijuana in 1977. That clearly did not lead to the end of the War on Drugs in New York, or lessen its effects on communities of color. Instead, the way the law was written provided the foundation for stop-and-frisk, because the law made it a misdemeanor for marijuana to be in public view, which basically fostered incentives to stop blacks and Latinos and tell them to empty their pockets. So I have a number of concerns about the impact of these reforms on the War on Drugs. To give just one other example: Does decriminalization apply to those who are on probation and being drug-tested? MK: Another concern is whether, as the prices of marijuana start climbing [because of legalization] and [poor] people turn to using other kinds of drugs, those drugs then get painted as the worst possible drugs on the planet. The people who are doing the “worst” drugs somehow always happen to be the most marginalized people within our culture. That’s why it’s so important that we focus on uprooting the whole architecture of the War on Drugs. If we’re not talking about the root issues of racism and classism, there are bound to be unintended consequences. AW: It’s true that marijuana reform is just one aspect. The whole question is: Why are we criminalizing people for what they decide to put in their bodies? It’s also important to note that the drug war is a federal policy; states receive money from D.C. to engage. When Washington and Colorado legalized marijuana, they basically removed themselves from federal policy regarding marijuana prohibition. I think that will provide momentum to change federal policy regarding other substances. I don’t see the unintended consequence [that the War on Drugs would] somehow become more and more entrenched when it comes to cocaine and other drugs. ITT: Legalization is expected to be a boon for state coffers, as well as wealthy investors and so-called “ganjapreneurs” now flocking to Colorado. But do you think it will create jobs or other economic benefits in communities of color? DJL: In some ways this looks like a gentrification of the drug — those who always benefit will still benefit. AW: I’m not aware of any industries that began with the intention to create jobs for African Americans or poor people of color. No one said that this was some type of panacea for the various root problems that African Americans face. It’s difficult for people to find work if they have a drug conviction on their record, especially a felony, and that’s still the case within the marijuana industry in Colorado — although there was a successful push to make sure that only people with felonies relating to distribution of drugs are kept out. Many of the concerns about who benefits are valid, but I don’t think they should overshadow that we’re moving in the right direction. ITT: What comes next for reformers? AW: You are likely to see medical marijuana [initiatives] in Florida within a year’s time that will break open the discussion down South and begin reform efforts there. It doesn’t change the day-to-day reality in Louisiana and the South Side of Chicago right now, but persuasive reform efforts will start to plant seeds across the country, as well as in our federal government. DJL: What’s fundamental to understanding the War on Drugs and the broader prison industrial complex is that it is a complex — an interrelated system — and changing the laws in two states, while a step forward, does not cut off the legs of this broader system. MK: I’m hopeful that these [laws] are going to have a real positive impact on reducing the prison population. I’m interested to see whether the young people who are selling — and who need to in order to survive and take care of their families — would be able to participate in the formal rather than the informal [drug] economy. I’m interested to understand how the incentives for law enforcement will change in terms of going after our young people. But I tend to be suspicious of using laws to bring social justice, because I don’t think law and justice are the same. That ambivalence is born out of experience of seeing laws pass, and seeing them not do what they were supposed to do for the young people that I care about and love. There’s always been a decoupling of the laws we have on the books from the very oppressive ways that they’re enforced against people who have no political power. So I’m interested to see how this all plays out.

<h4>The plan reaffirms civil society through the locking of marked bodies out of the legal market- they can only further criminalize bodies of color </h4><p><u><strong>Burns ’14</u> </strong>(Rebecca, Associate Editor at In These Times, “The Unbearable Whiteness of Marijuana Legalization”, [SG]) </p><p>More than half of all drug arrests are for marijuana-related offenses, according to a June 2013 study by the American Civil Liberties Union. So it was big news for drug-lawreform activists when, in January, legal sales of marijuana for recreational use commenced in Colorado. Thanks to a 2012 state ballot initiative, the drug will now be taxed and regulated like alcohol. <u>Washington state is set to implement similar laws later this year, and nationwide, the tide of public opinion seems to be turning</u>: An October 2013 Gallup poll found that a majority of Americans now support marijuana legalization. <u><mark>Many have hailed the easing of marijuana laws as</mark> a breakthrough in <mark>the fight to end the War on Drugs</mark>.</u> But others are skeptical. David Simon, creator of the popular television show "The Wire," suggested that marijuana reforms could actually set back broader efforts, telling an audience in London last summer, “<u>I want the [drug war] to fall as one complete edifice. <mark>If they manage to let a few white middle-class people off the hook, that’s very dangerous.”</u></mark> While voters in the relatively white states of Colorado and Washington have backed reform, <u>it <mark>still looks a long way off in states with the highest numbers of incarcerated African Americans</mark>, such as Iowa, where African Americans are more than eight times as likely as whites to be arrested for marijuana possession</u>, according to the ACLU report. In These Times asked three experts to discuss whether people of color will reap the benefits of marijuana legalization. Joining the discussion were Chicago-based activist Mariame Kaba, founding director of the non-profit Project NIA, which works to decrease youth incarceration; David J. Leonard, associate professor in the department of critical culture, gender and race studies at Washington State University, and Art Way, senior drug policy manager at the Drug Policy Alliance in Colorado, which lobbied for legalization. In These Times: What impact can we expect Colorado and Washington’s new laws to have on drug-related arrests? Art Way: There will be a disproportionate benefit for those who have borne the brunt of marijuana prohibition. African Americans are about three and a half times more likely to be arrested [in the United States for marijuana-related offenses] than their white counterparts; Latinos are about two times more likely. We’re setting a paradigm that hopefully many other states will follow. ITT: One worry has been that the high price of legalized marijuana will encourage a black market and that arrests for illegal distribution could actually increase. Mariame Kaba: <u>I’m very concerned about how this is going to play out on the ground. Young <mark>people</mark> who are <mark>selling drugs because they have no</mark> other <mark>job</mark> opportunities <mark>are</mark> definitively <mark>not going to be able to participate</mark> in the formal economy through the dispensaries</u>. Is law enforcement going to go after those young people 20 times harder now? AW: Yes, <u>I am concerned that <mark>distribution charges will increase. Whenever you make change,</mark> especially against <mark>law enforcement</mark>’s status quo, it often finds a way to <mark>circumvent that change and maintain its budget</mark>.</u> But we haven’t seen anything that will lead us to believe that is taking place right now. And you have to realize that these new marijuana laws are part of a much broader reform movement: Colorado has also been revising its criminal justice laws. The first thing we did once Amendment 64 passed [in Colorado] was to lower criminal penalties for those [between the ages of] 18 and 20 possessing marijuana. So we are already working on preempting any type of net-widening. ITT: What impact will marijuana legalization have on the War on Drugs as a whole? David J. Leonard: <u>Any changes in the War on Drugs will require continued organizing and agitation, because <mark>history has shown that one step forward has also resulted in two steps back [for] communities of color</mark>.</u> New York decriminalized marijuana in 1977. That clearly did not lead to the end of the War on Drugs in New York, or lessen its effects on communities of color. Instead, <u><mark>the way the law was written provided the foundation for stop-and-frisk</mark>, because the law made it a misdemeanor for marijuana to be in public view, <mark>which</mark> basically <mark>fostered incentives to stop blacks and Latinos</mark> and tell them to empty their pockets.</u> So I have a number of concerns about the impact of these reforms on the War on Drugs. To give just one other example: Does decriminalization apply to those who are on probation and being drug-tested? MK: Another concern is whether, <u><mark>as the prices of marijuana start climbing</mark> [because of legalization] and [poor] <mark>people turn to using other kinds of drugs,</mark> those drugs then get painted as the worst possible drugs on the planet. <mark>The people who are doing the “worst” drugs</mark> somehow always <mark>happen to be the most marginalized people within our culture</mark>. That’s why it’s so important that we focus on uprooting the whole architecture of the War on Drugs.</u> <u>If <mark>we’re not talking about the root</mark> issues <mark>of racism</mark> and classism, <mark>there are bound to be</mark> unintended <mark>consequences.</u></mark> AW: It’s true that marijuana reform is just one aspect. The whole question is: Why are we criminalizing people for what they decide to put in their bodies? It’s also important to note that the drug war is a federal policy; states receive money from D.C. to engage. When Washington and Colorado legalized marijuana, they basically removed themselves from federal policy regarding marijuana prohibition. I think that will provide momentum to change federal policy regarding other substances. I don’t see the unintended consequence [that the War on Drugs would] somehow become more and more entrenched when it comes to cocaine and other drugs. ITT: Legalization is expected to be a boon for state coffers, as well as wealthy investors and so-called “ganjapreneurs” now flocking to Colorado. But do you think it will create jobs or other economic benefits in communities of color? DJL: In some ways this looks like a gentrification of the drug — those who always benefit will still benefit. AW: I’m not aware of any industries that began with the intention to create jobs for African Americans or poor people of color. No one said that this was some type of panacea for the various root problems that African Americans face. <u>It’s difficult for people to find work if they have a drug conviction on their record, especially a felony, and that’s still the case within the marijuana industry in Colorado </u>— although there was a successful push to make sure that only people with felonies relating to distribution of drugs are kept out. Many of the concerns about who benefits are valid, but I don’t think they should overshadow that we’re moving in the right direction. ITT: What comes next for reformers? AW: You are likely to see medical marijuana [initiatives] in Florida within a year’s time that will break open the discussion down South and begin reform efforts there. It doesn’t change the day-to-day reality in Louisiana and the South Side of Chicago right now, but persuasive reform efforts will start to plant seeds across the country, as well as in our federal government. DJL: <u>What’s fundamental to understanding <mark>the War on Drugs and the broader prison industrial complex is</mark> that it is a complex — <mark>an interrelated system</u></mark> — and changing the laws in two states, while a step forward, does not cut off the legs of this broader system. MK: I’m hopeful that these [laws] are going to have a real positive impact on reducing the prison population. I’m interested to see whether the young people who are selling — and who need to in order to survive and take care of their families — would be able to participate in the formal rather than the informal [drug] economy. I’m interested to understand how the incentives for law enforcement will change in terms of going after our young people. But I tend to be suspicious of using laws to bring social justice, because I don’t think law and justice are the same. That ambivalence is born out of experience of seeing laws pass, and seeing them not do what they were supposed to do for the young people that I care about and love. There’s always been a decoupling of the laws we have on the books from the very oppressive ways that they’re enforced against people who have no political power. So I’m interested to see how this all plays out.</p>

1NC

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Geoff Lundeen

1ac was marijuana prison industrial complex 1nc was damage centrism k plan pik legalization da and case 2nc was damage centrism and the legalization da 1nr was the pik and case 2nr was damage centrism the legalization da and the case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round4.docx

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Additionally, the 1ac’s plan text maintains a faith in modernism which always reentrenches ableism (yellow)

Campbell 5

Campbell 5 (Fiona Kumari Senior Lecturer in Disability Studies at the School of Human Services & Social Work Griffith University (Brisbane) and Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies, Faculty of Medicine, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka, Legislating Disability Negative Ontologies and the Government of Legal Identities, Foucault and the Government of Disability, 108-133) *gender modified

In order for the notion of “ableness” to exist and to transmogrify into the sovereign subject of liberalism it must have a constitutive outside—that is, it must participate in a logic of supplementarity Although we can speak in ontological terms of the history of disability as a history of that which is unthought, this figuring should not be confused with erasure that occurs due to total absence or complete exclusion. On the contrary, disability is always present (despite its seeming absence) in the ableist talk of normalcy, normalization, and humanness the truth claims that surround disability are dependent upon discourses of ableism for their very legitimation. The logic of supplementarity, which is infused within modernism’s unitary subject and which produces the Other in a liminal space, deploys what we might call a “compulsion toward terror”: a terror, ontological and actual, of “falling away” and “crossing over” into an uncertain void of disease. Such effects of terror may produce instances of disability hate crimes, disability vilification, and disability panic. The manifestations of this terror rarely enter judicial domains, but rather are excluded from law’s permissible inquiry and codification. this erasure forecloses the possibility of pursuing legal remedies through the refusal of law’s power to name and countenance oppositional disability discourses Disability “harms” and “injuries” are only deemed bona fide within a framework of scaled-down disability definitions elevated to indisputable truth-claims and rendered viable in law.

In order for the notion of “ableness” to exist and to transmogrify into the sovereign subject of liberalism it must have a constitutive outside—that is, it must participate in a logic of supplementarity Although we can speak in ontological terms of the history of disability as a history of that which is unthought, this figuring should not be confused with erasure that occurs due to total absence or complete exclusion. On the contrary, disability is always present (despite its seeming absence) in the ableist talk of normalcy, normalization, and humanness the truth claims that surround disability are dependent upon discourses of ableism for their very legitimation. The logic of supplementarity, which is infused within modernism’s unitary subject and which produces the Other in a liminal space, deploys what we might call a “compulsion toward terror”: a terror, ontological and actual, of “ crossing over” into an uncertain void of disease. Such effects of terror may produce instances of hate crimes vilification, and disability panic. The manifestations of this terror are excluded from law’s permissible inquiry and codification this erasure forecloses the possibility of pursuing legal remedies through the refusal to name and countenance oppositional disability discourses.

In order for the notion of “ableness” to exist and to transmogrify into the sovereign subject of liberalism it must have a constitutive outside—that is, it must participate in a logic of supplementarity. Although we can speak in ontological terms of the history of disability as a history of that which is unthought, this figuring should not be confused with erasure that occurs due to total absence or complete exclusion. On the contrary, disability is always present (despite its seeming absence) in the ableist talk of normalcy, normalization, and humanness. Indeed, the truth claims that surround disability are dependent upon discourses of ableism for their very legitimation. The logic of supplementarity, which is infused within modernism’s unitary subject and which produces the Other in a liminal space, deploys what we might call a “compulsion toward terror”: a terror, ontological and actual, of “falling away” and “crossing over” into an uncertain void of disease. Such effects of terror may produce instances of disability hate crimes, disability vilification, and disability panic. The manifestations of this terror rarely enter judicial domains, but rather are excluded from law’s permissible inquiry and codification. In short, this erasure forecloses the possibility of pursuing legal remedies through the refusal of law’s power to name and countenance oppositional disability discourses. Disability “harms” and “injuries” are only deemed bona fide within a framework of scaled-down disability definitions (read: ‹ctions) elevated to indisputable truth-claims and rendered viable in law.

<h4>Additionally, the 1ac’s plan text maintains a faith in modernism which always reentrenches ableism (yellow)</h4><p><strong>Campbell 5</strong> (Fiona Kumari Senior Lecturer in Disability Studies at the School of Human Services & Social Work Griffith University (Brisbane) and Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies, Faculty of Medicine, University of Kelaniya<u>, Sri Lanka, Legislating Disability Negative Ontologies and the Government of Legal Identities, Foucault and the Government of Disability, 108-133) *gender modified </p><p><mark>In order for the notion of “ableness” to exist and to <strong>transmogrify into the sovereign subject of liberalism</strong> it must have a constitutive outside—that is, <strong>it must participate in a logic of supplementarity</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Although we can speak in ontological terms of the history of disability as a history of that which is unthought, this figuring should not be confused with erasure that occurs due to total absence or complete exclusion. On the contrary, disability is always present (despite its seeming absence) in the ableist talk of normalcy, normalization, and humanness</u></mark>. Indeed, <u><mark>the truth claims that surround disability are dependent upon discourses of ableism for their very legitimation.</mark> <mark>The logic of supplementarity, which is infused within <strong>modernism’s unitary subject</strong> and which produces the Other in a liminal space, deploys what we might call a “compulsion toward terror”: a terror, ontological and actual, of “</mark>falling away” and “<mark>crossing over” into an uncertain void of disease.</u> <u>Such effects of terror may produce instances of</mark> disability <mark>hate crimes</mark>, disability <mark>vilification, and disability panic. The manifestations of this terror</mark> rarely enter judicial domains, but rather <mark>are excluded from law’s permissible inquiry and codification</mark>.</u> In short, <u><strong><mark>this erasure forecloses the possibility of pursuing legal remedies through the refusal </strong></mark>of law’s power<strong> <mark>to name and countenance oppositional disability discourses</u></strong>.</mark> <u>Disability “harms” and “injuries” are only deemed bona fide within a framework of scaled-down disability definitions </u>(read: ‹ctions) <u>elevated to indisputable truth-claims and rendered viable in law.</p></u>

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Ableism

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Brian McBride

1ac was foucault PAS 1nc was forget foucault the plan pik and case 2nc was forget foucault 1nr was the plan pik and case 2nr was case and forget foucault

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college

Zero solvency advocate for the 1AC – even if enchantment is necessary for orientation of objects there’s no reason why simony results in enchantment – if the dominant attitudes towards holy objects are truly pervasive it means that just affirming simony doesn’t solve that

<h4>Zero solvency advocate for the 1AC – even if enchantment is necessary for orientation of objects there’s no reason why simony results in enchantment – if the dominant attitudes towards holy objects are truly pervasive it means that just affirming simony doesn’t solve that</h4>

1NC

Off

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

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UNLV

7

Iowa HS

Shooter

1ac was simony of organs 1nc was framing spec the cap k the undercommons k the release the relics cp and case 2nc was undercommons and case 1nr was cap and relics 2nr was cap and relics

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

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ndtceda14

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college

No econ collapse impact

Drezner 14

Daniel Drezner 14, Professor of IR at Tufts, “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession”, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164

hasn't barked During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force whether through repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007 Interstate violence has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict The decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed the crisis has not generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected

analysts asserted the crisis would lead states to use of force through diversionary wars, arms races, or great power conflict. The aggregate data suggest otherwise the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is the same as 2007 Interstate violence declined as have military expenditures studies confirm the Recession has not triggered violent conflict the crisis has not generated protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

<h4>No econ collapse impact </h4><p>Daniel <u><strong>Drezner 14</u></strong>, Professor of IR at Tufts, “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession”, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164</p><p>The final significant outcome addresses a dog that <u>hasn't barked</u>: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. <u>During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple <mark>analysts asserted</mark> that <mark>the</mark> financial <mark>crisis would lead states to</mark> increase their <mark>use of force</u></mark> as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—<u>whether <mark>through</u></mark> greater internal <u>repression, <mark>diversionary wars, arms races, or</mark> a ratcheting up of <mark>great power conflict.</u></mark> Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. <u><strong><mark>The aggregate data suggest otherwise</strong></mark>, however</u>. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "<u><mark>the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is</mark> approximately <mark>the same as</mark> it was in <mark>2007</u></mark>."43 <u><mark>Interstate violence</u></mark> in particular <u>has <mark>declined</mark> since the start of the financial crisis, <mark>as have military expenditures</u></mark> in most sampled countries. Other <u><mark>studies confirm</mark> that</u> <u><mark>the</mark> Great <mark>Recession has not triggered</mark> any increase in <mark>violent conflict</u></mark>, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 <u>The</u> secular <u>decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed</u>. Rogers Brubaker observes that "<u><mark>the crisis has not</u></mark> to date <u><mark>generated</mark> the surge in <mark>protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion</mark> that might have been expected</u>."43</p>

1NC

Cartels

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D3

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UTD BF

Steve Pointer

1ac was mj with cartels and hemp advantages 1nc was legalism and security and case 2nc was legalism 1nr was case 2nr was legalism and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-D3-Round1.docx

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college

The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt assuasion

Chow 1993

Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in an opposition against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed) but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words The predicament we face in the West Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper?

The question is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony in oppositional against dominant power but how they can resist the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return claims of oppression and victimization are used to guilt-trip and to control; affirmations of diversities that are made in the name of righteousness create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are not changing the lives of those who seek survival What academic intellectuals must confront is not their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed but the privilege that accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper

(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but how they can resist, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises remain unquestioned. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate from their “oppositional” viewpoint, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

<h4>The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff – this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation whilst perpetuating stasis through guilt assuasion</h4><p><u><strong>Chow</u></strong> – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - <u><strong>1993</p><p></u></strong>(Rey, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17) </p><p><u>While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary</u> for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. <u><mark>The question</u></mark> for me <u><mark>is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony</u></mark> (a question that positions them <u><mark>in</mark> an <mark>opposition</u>al</mark> light <u><mark>against dominant power</u></mark> and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), <u><mark>but <strong>how they can resist</u></strong></mark>, as Michel Foucault said, “<u><mark>the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse</u></mark>.’ “ Putting it another way, <u><mark>how do intellectuals struggle against <strong>a hegemony which already includes them</u></strong></mark> and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? <u>As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,”</u> <u>and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and <mark>as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, <strong>many</strong> deep-rooted, <strong>politically reactionary forces return</u></strong></mark> <u>to haunt us.</u> <u>Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested <strong><mark>claims</strong></mark> <strong><mark>of oppression and victimization</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>are used</u></strong></mark> merely <u><strong><mark>to guilt-trip and to control</strong>; </mark>sexist and racist re<mark>affirmations of </mark>sexual and racial <mark>diversities that are made</mark> merely <mark>in the name of righteousness</mark>—all these forces <mark>create new “solidarities whose ideological premises <strong>remain unquestioned</u></strong></mark>. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. <u>The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense,</u> <u>We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are <strong>battles of words</u></strong>. <u><mark>Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are</mark> </u>most certainly <u><strong><mark>not</u></strong></mark> directly<u> <strong><mark>changing the</strong></mark> </u>downtrodden<u> <strong><mark>lives of those who seek</strong></mark> </u>their<u> <strong><mark>survival</strong></mark> </u>in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike.<u> <mark>What academic intellectuals must confront is</mark> thus <mark>not their</mark> </u>victimization by society at large (<u>or their <mark>victimization-in-solidarlty-with-the oppressed</mark>)</u>, <u><mark>but the</mark> power, wealth, and <mark>privilege that</mark> Ironically <mark>accumulate <strong>from their</strong> “oppositional” <strong>viewpoint</strong></mark>, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words</u>. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) <u>The predicament we face in the West</u>, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, <u>Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business</u>, . . . <u>he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen.</u> “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? <u><mark>How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses</u></mark>, <u><mark>when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper</mark>?</u> How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?</p>

1NC

Case

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UNLV

4

UNT CS

Geoff Lundeen

1ac was marijuana prison industrial complex 1nc was damage centrism k plan pik legalization da and case 2nc was damage centrism and the legalization da 1nr was the pik and case 2nr was damage centrism the legalization da and the case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round4.docx

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Baylor EvZo

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

*Crumbles piece of paper and throws it on the ground*

<h4>*Crumbles piece of paper and throws it on the ground*</h4>

1NC

Off

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

N

UNLV

7

Iowa HS

Shooter

1ac was simony of organs 1nc was framing spec the cap k the undercommons k the release the relics cp and case 2nc was undercommons and case 1nr was cap and relics 2nr was cap and relics

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

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NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Mexican economy resilient and squo reforms solve

Videgaray 14 (Luis, finance minister of Mexico, "MEXICAN FINANCE MINISTER LUIS VIDEGARAY IS INTERVIEWED ON PBS'S "CHARLIE ROSE SHOW" REGARDING THE ECONOMY," Financial Markets Regulatory Wire, 2/11, lexis)

Videgaray 14 (Luis, finance minister of Mexico, "MEXICAN FINANCE MINISTER LUIS VIDEGARAY IS INTERVIEWED ON PBS'S "CHARLIE ROSE SHOW" REGARDING THE ECONOMY," Financial Markets Regulatory Wire, 2/11, lexis)

The Mexican economy has remained resilient during a turbulent time drug-related violence continues to affect parts of the country. 2013 was a remarkable year -- remarkable year in terms of reforms that the congress approved. We think that the potential growth rate for Mexico should be around 5 percent over the next decade or two. And the reform agenda that the president is pushing as congress has approved last year is exactly designed for that purpose. If you look at our energy reform, telecommunications reform, labor, financial reform -- all these reforms have come a theme which is increased productivity and therefore increased growth.

The Mexican economy has remained resilient during a turbulent time drug-related violence continues to affect parts of the country 2013 was a remarkable year -- remarkable year in terms of reforms that the congress approved We think that the potential growth rate for Mexico should be around 5 percent over the next decade or two If you look at our energy reform, telecommunications reform, labor, financial reform -- all these reforms have come a theme which is increased productivity and therefore increased growth.

ROSE: Luis Videgaray is here. And he has been the finance minister of Mexico since the election of President Enrique Pena Nieto in 2012. The Mexican economy has remained resilient during a turbulent time for emerging markets. Meanwhile drug-related violence continues to affect parts of the country. The government has started cooperating with vigilante groups in an effort to fight drug cartels. Later this month President Obama will be attending the North American Leaders Summit in Mexico. This year marks the 20th anniversary of NAFTA, the free trade agreement between the U.S., Canada and Mexico. I am pleased to have Luis Videgaray at this table for the first time. Welcome. VIDEGARAY: Thank you, it is an honor... ROSE: It's good to see you again. VIDEGARAY: ... it's an honor to be here, thank you. ROSE: Yes you told me a wonderful story which I share even though it's a little bit flattering to me that when you were at MIT working on your Ph.D... VIDEGARAY: Yes. ROSE: That our show on PBS was a companion for dinner because you were living at that time alone in a very small apartment and it brought a little bit of the world. VIDEGARAY: That is correct. I thank you now in front of your audience for that because you were a great companion for those lonely years back at MIT. ROSE: Thank you. VIDEGARAY: Particularly in the winter. ROSE: Yes, indeed. You've had an interesting life from an academic to investment banking, to now someone said the President has four important advisers -- you, you, you and you. And you went to him; it was in the state of Mexico and worked with him there. Tell me about his and your vision for Mexico. VIDEGARAY: Charlie, thank you again. And the thing is this a time for Mexico to move ahead. And to change and to address the changes that for many years were not addressed. 2013 was a remarkable year -- remarkable year in terms of reforms that the congress approved. And that stems out of the commitment of President Pena Nieto has to changing things in a way that will improve the quality of living for Mexicans. For many years, Mexico was known as a stable economy; as an open economy, very open to trade and to financial flows but with a little, with little growth. ROSE: About 2 percent, over 20 years. VIDEGARAY: The last 30 years the average growth of Mexico has been only 2.4 percent. That is very low for an emerging economy. That is not what you expect of an economy with the characteristics and fundamentals that Mexico has. ROSE: And you believe it can get to 5 percent over how long a time? VIDEGARAY: We think that the potential growth rate for Mexico should be around 5 percent over the next decade or two. And the reform agenda that the president is pushing as congress has approved last year is exactly designed for that purpose. To increase our growth potential, to create jobs -- better paying jobs and not only for the regions that are now more competitive throughout the whole country. If you look at our energy reform, telecommunications reform, labor, financial reform -- all these reforms have come a theme which is increased productivity and therefore increased growth.

<h4>Mexican economy resilient and squo reforms solve </h4><p><u><strong>Videgaray 14 (Luis, finance minister of Mexico, "MEXICAN FINANCE MINISTER LUIS VIDEGARAY IS INTERVIEWED ON PBS'S "CHARLIE ROSE SHOW" REGARDING THE ECONOMY," Financial Markets Regulatory Wire, 2/11, lexis)</p><p></u></strong>ROSE: Luis Videgaray is here. And he has been the finance minister of Mexico since the election of President Enrique Pena Nieto in 2012. <u><strong><mark>The Mexican economy has remained resilient</u></strong> <u>during a turbulent time</mark> </u>for emerging markets. Meanwhile <u><mark>drug-related violence continues to affect parts of the country</mark>.</u> The government has started cooperating with vigilante groups in an effort to fight drug cartels. Later this month President Obama will be attending the North American Leaders Summit in Mexico. This year marks the 20th anniversary of NAFTA, the free trade agreement between the U.S., Canada and Mexico. I am pleased to have Luis Videgaray at this table for the first time. Welcome. VIDEGARAY: Thank you, it is an honor... ROSE: It's good to see you again. VIDEGARAY: ... it's an honor to be here, thank you. ROSE: Yes you told me a wonderful story which I share even though it's a little bit flattering to me that when you were at MIT working on your Ph.D... VIDEGARAY: Yes. ROSE: That our show on PBS was a companion for dinner because you were living at that time alone in a very small apartment and it brought a little bit of the world. VIDEGARAY: That is correct. I thank you now in front of your audience for that because you were a great companion for those lonely years back at MIT. ROSE: Thank you. VIDEGARAY: Particularly in the winter. ROSE: Yes, indeed. You've had an interesting life from an academic to investment banking, to now someone said the President has four important advisers -- you, you, you and you. And you went to him; it was in the state of Mexico and worked with him there. Tell me about his and your vision for Mexico. VIDEGARAY: Charlie, thank you again. And the thing is this a time for Mexico to move ahead. And to change and to address the changes that for many years were not addressed. <u><mark>2013 was a remarkable year -- remarkable year in terms of reforms that the congress approved</mark>.</u> And that stems out of the commitment of President Pena Nieto has to changing things in a way that will improve the quality of living for Mexicans. For many years, Mexico was known as a stable economy; as an open economy, very open to trade and to financial flows but with a little, with little growth. ROSE: About 2 percent, over 20 years. VIDEGARAY: The last 30 years the average growth of Mexico has been only 2.4 percent. That is very low for an emerging economy. That is not what you expect of an economy with the characteristics and fundamentals that Mexico has. ROSE: And you believe it can get to 5 percent over how long a time? VIDEGARAY: <u><mark>We think that the potential growth rate for Mexico should be around 5 percent over the next decade or two</mark>. And the reform agenda that the president is pushing as congress has approved last year is exactly designed for that purpose. </u>To increase our growth potential, to create jobs -- better paying jobs and not only for the regions that are now more competitive throughout the whole country. <u><strong><mark>If you look at our energy reform,</strong> telecommunications reform, labor, financial reform -- all these reforms have come a theme which is increased productivity and <strong>therefore increased growth</strong>.</p></u></mark>

1NC

Cartels

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-D3-Round1.docx

N

D3

1

UTD BF

Steve Pointer

1ac was mj with cartels and hemp advantages 1nc was legalism and security and case 2nc was legalism 1nr was case 2nr was legalism and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-D3-Round1.docx

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college

GIROUX’S NOTION OF EDUCATION ENSURES HEIRARCHICAL POWER RELATIONS IN EDUCATION.

Gur-Ze'ev 98

[ilan, faculty of education @ university of haifa, “toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy”, educational theory, fall, v48 n4, blackwellsynergy] educational theory anchors its utopianism in the transcendent and a dialogical struggle over the realization of (potential)reasoned human autonomy This is a teleological project committed to universal emancipation.Its limits are the historical horizons,andittreatsthelocaleventatthe end through its meaning in and contribution to the total transformation of present reality. This position leaves no room for anti-hierarchical relations between the educator and those he or she is committed to liberate Their transcendentalism was theoretically realized in an educational project denoting the absence of truth and negating the illusions and the over-optimistic and shallow encouragements of present and future revolutionaries, who use standard theoretical manipulations and terror, manifestingthe power of the purpose principle against which they intend to revolt.

educational theory anchors its utopianism in the transcendent dialogical struggle over autonomy This teleological project s limits are the historical horizons, This position leaves no room for anti-hierarchical relations between the educator and those he or she is committed to liberate theoretically realized in an educational project denoting the absence of truth and negating the illusions and the over-optimistic and shallow encouragements of present and future revolutionaries, who use standard theoretical manipulations and terror, manifestingthe power of the purpose principle against which they intend to revolt.

[ilan, faculty of education @ university of haifa, “toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy”, educational theory, fall, v48 n4, blackwellsynergy] From here a nonfashioned educational theory is constituted that anchors its utopianism in the transcendent [as well as in sthe acknowledgment of the impossi- bility of essential social transformation in the present reality),on the one hand, and in the imperative of a dialogical struggle over the realization of (potential)reasoned human autonomy, on the other. This is a teleological project committed to universal emancipation.Its limits are the historical horizons,andittreatsthelocaleventatthe end through its meaning in and contribution to the total transformation of present reality. This position leaves no room for anti-hierarchical relations between the educator and those he or she is committed to liberate. Marcusian “education” is committed to counter-manipulationsand rejection of a quick revelation or creation of truth or consensus within the dialogical framework of ecstatic revolutionaries. This is in contrast to Nicholas Burbules, Freire, Giroux, and other disciples of critical pedagogy’s concept of dialogue. The Marcusian latent philosophy of education is committed to Ephraim Lessing’s concept of Educating the Human Race in a historical process in which truth does not reveal itself fully and directly; educators with good intentions are manipulated in the service of humanistic education as a trans-historical process that is understood merely in its fullest unfolding, as a Hegelian or Marxian metanarrative.,’”Adorno and Horltheimer represented a differ- ent philosophy of education from the viewpoint of their philosophy’s commitment to a negative utopianism. Their transcendentalism was theoretically realized in an educational project denoting the absence of truth and negating the illusions and the over-optimistic and shallow encouragements of present and future revolutionaries, who use standard theoretical manipulations and terror, manifestingthe power of the purpose principle against which they intend to revolt.

<h4><u><strong>GIROUX’S NOTION OF EDUCATION ENSURES HEIRARCHICAL POWER RELATIONS IN EDUCATION. </h4><p></u></strong>Gur-Ze'ev 98</p><p><u>[ilan, faculty of education @ university of haifa, “toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy”, educational theory, fall, v48 n4, blackwellsynergy]</p><p></u>From here a nonfashioned <u><mark>educational theory </u></mark>is constituted that <u><mark>anchors its utopianism in the transcendent</mark> </u>[as well as in sthe acknowledgment of the impossi- bility of essential social transformation in the present reality),on the one hand, <u>and </u>in the imperative of <u>a <mark>dialogical struggle over</mark> the realization of (potential)reasoned human <mark>autonomy</u></mark>, on the other. <u><mark>This </mark>is a <mark>teleological project </mark>committed to universal emancipation.It<mark>s</mark> <mark>limits are the historical horizons,</mark>andittreatsthelocaleventatthe end through its meaning in and contribution to the total transformation of present reality. <mark>This position leaves no room for anti-hierarchical relations between the educator and those he or she is committed to liberate</u></mark>. Marcusian “education” is committed to counter-manipulationsand rejection of a quick revelation or creation of truth or consensus within the dialogical framework of ecstatic revolutionaries. This is in contrast to Nicholas Burbules, Freire, Giroux, and other disciples of critical pedagogy’s concept of dialogue. The Marcusian latent philosophy of education is committed to Ephraim Lessing’s concept of Educating the Human Race in a historical process in which truth does not reveal itself fully and directly; educators with good intentions are manipulated in the service of humanistic education as a trans-historical process that is understood merely in its fullest unfolding, as a Hegelian or Marxian metanarrative.,’”Adorno and Horltheimer represented a differ- ent philosophy of education from the viewpoint of their philosophy’s commitment to a negative utopianism.<u> Their transcendentalism was <mark>theoretically realized in an educational project denoting the absence of truth and negating the illusions and the over-optimistic and shallow encouragements of present and future revolutionaries, who use standard theoretical manipulations and terror, manifestingthe power of the purpose principle against which they intend to revolt.</p></u></mark>

1NC

Case

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Geoff Lundeen

1ac was marijuana prison industrial complex 1nc was damage centrism k plan pik legalization da and case 2nc was damage centrism and the legalization da 1nr was the pik and case 2nr was damage centrism the legalization da and the case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round4.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

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Zo.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

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college

Economic disaster serves as the quilting point for modern virtualized preemption; the transformation of economics into a risk factory – this operative logic of speculative mastery ensures cycles of death-making and self-actualization

Calkivik 10

Calkivik 10 (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/99479/Calkivik_umn_0130E_11576.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y) gz

the contemporary politics of security is additionally characterized by its futurity and virtuality Reaching beyond the question of the actual, the realm of security has now expanded to include “the potential to become dangerous”—a phenomenon that the notion of “virtual security” aims to capture Virtual is real, concretely present to the extent that it exists potentially immanent in every object. The non-existence of what has not yet happened becomes more real than what has observably taken place Operative logic designates an abstract matrix of power that combines its own ontology and epistemology. In other words, it brings together a mode of being and ways of knowing. It is at the level of this operative logic that preemption as definitive of the present age is differentiated from its Cold War predecessor—the logic of deterrence epistemology of preemption is one of contingency and uncertainty; the danger in question is still potential, and not yet fully formed. What this means ontologically is that neither the nature of the threat nor the enemy can be specified. For the preemptive episteme that this logic brings into being, nothing is perceived to be safe the enemy is no longer “a who, where, when or even what. The enemy is a whatnot this logic is not limited to a specific military doctrine of a specific administration. Rather, the field of operation of preemption has become much more extensive under the contemporary global security project. Preemption is also the point where security meets capital in a world interlocked by webs of life, death, and debt preemption (i.e., bringing future into the present) has been the guiding principle for U.S. fiscal policy since the late 1970s preemption is put to work as the operational logic in tandem with the rise of finance and speculative capitalism new financial service industries that emerged after the demise of Bretton Woods made a virtue out of risk while speculation was being installed as a productive force for a globally circulating economy of credit and debt. Ruled by risk management and harvesting volatility for gain, finance creates the environment wherein all investments are made on the basis of anticipated price movements in the future. Investment by taking risks today requires a new belief in the future: a belief that the future will not be unpredictably different, but that it will be calculably the same preemption converts potential threats into actual conflicts making “contingencies of the future to be lived out in present, blurring the distinction between the not-yet and the now It transforms future uncertainty into present risk—where risk denotes the expected outcomes that can be quantified in terms of likelihood and value governing through contingency by rendering uncertainty productive for power and profit becomes the defining feature of contemporary politics of security and capital accumulation neoliberalism is premised on non-equilibrium models neoliberal theories of economic growth are more likely to be interested in the concepts of the non-normalizable accident and the fractal curve Preemption entails bringing the future into the present rather than acting in the present to avoid an occurrence in the future the consequences precede the actualization of the event: potential threats —the specter of future inflation that would shake the confidence in the value of investment portfolios or the specter of a terrorist strike—are rendered with a tangible presence that call for preemptive strikes Preemption, hence, puts in place a specific form of relation to the future: contingency, uncertainty entailed by the notion of future—future as what is yet to come—arrives in its coded form as an already written future Future as present risk gets integrated within the realm of the calculable, measurable, and the profitable. Codified as risk, uncertainty becomes an opportunity to be cashed in the market place of global values

contemporary security is characterized by futurity and virtuality Reaching beyond the actual to the potential Virtual is immanent in every object what has not yet happened becomes more real than what has taken place an abstract matrix that combines its own ontology and epistemology one of contingency and uncertainty neither threat nor the enemy can be specified nothing is safe The enemy is a whatnot Preemption is where security meets capital interlocked by webs of life, death, and debt speculative capitalism Ruled by risk and volatility the future will be calculably the same preemption converts potential threats into actual conflicts rendering uncertainty productive for power and profit becomes the defining feature of contemporary politics consequences precede actualization Preemption arrives in its coded form as an already written future. Future as present risk integrated within the realm of the calculable, measurable, and the profitable uncertainty becomes cashed in the market place of global values

In addition to its enduring religiosity, the contemporary politics of security is additionally characterized by its futurity and virtuality. The politics of security no longer merely revolve around the question of being, of securing a life as it is. Reaching beyond the question of the actual, the realm of security has now expanded to include “the potential to become dangerous”—a phenomenon that the notion of “virtual security” aims to capture.79 As opposed to the actual, “virtual” here does not denote the non-existent. Virtual is real, concretely present to the extent that it exists potentially immanent in every object. The non-existence of what has not yet happened becomes more real than what has observably taken place. Massumi explores the concept of the virtual in his discussion of preemption as the primary operative logic of the contemporary politics of security.80 Operative logic designates an abstract matrix of power that combines its own ontology and epistemology. In other words, it brings together a mode of being and ways of knowing. It is at the level of this operative logic that preemption as definitive of the present age is differentiated from its Cold War predecessor—the logic of deterrence. Like deterrence, where mutually assured destruction assures the present stockpiling of nuclear bombs so as to defer the potential of global annihilation, preemption also entails action in the present against a future threat. Yet, unlike its predecessor that relies on epistemological certainty that assumes knowable, objective measurability, epistemology of preemption is one of contingency and uncertainty; the danger in question is still potential, and not yet fully formed. What this means ontologically is that neither the nature of the threat nor the enemy can be specified. For the preemptive episteme that this logic brings into being, nothing is perceived to be safe. Consequently, the global situation becomes not threatening, but threat-generating; the enemy is no longer “a who, where, when or even what. The enemy is a whatnot.”81 While Massumi focuses on U.S. foreign policy under the Bush administration within the context of the so-called Global War on Terror in his discussion of preemption, this logic is not limited to a specific military doctrine of a specific administration. Rather, the field of operation of preemption has become much more extensive under the contemporary global security project. Taking as its ground a potential, preemption makes up for its absent cause by putting to work an actual affect in its fight against enemies of “global humanity”, whether it be fundamentalist terrorists or infected birds. As I elaborated in the prelude to the first chapter, in the case of the avian flu, states, international organizations, philanthropic actors, and media mobilized across local, national, regional, and global networks and rendered the flu an emergency before it became an emergency.82 The future threat of a pandemic is held in the present in a perpetual state of potential emergency. Hence, the fact that the pandemic has not yet happened does not mean that it is no less present and real. Preemption is also the point where security meets capital in a world interlocked by webs of life, death, and debt. As Randy Martin notes, preemption (i.e., bringing future into the present) has been the guiding principle for U.S. fiscal policy since the late 1970s.83 Before it becomes a blueprint for action against terrorists, preemption is put to work as the operational logic in tandem with the rise of finance and speculative capitalism. Martin argues that the new financial service industries that emerged after the demise of Bretton Woods made a virtue out of risk while speculation was being installed as a productive force for a globally circulating economy of credit and debt. Ruled by risk management and harvesting volatility for gain, finance, as Martin explains, creates the environment wherein all investments are made on the basis of anticipated price movements in the future. Investment by taking risks today requires a new belief in the future: a belief that the future will not be unpredictably different, but that it will be calculably the same.84 In this context, inflation is treated as a distortion to the economic environment that renders loss unpredictable. Monetarism, which emphasizes regulating the amount of money in circulation, is the form preemptive action takes in the realm of political economy. It becomes the predominant policy tool to guarantee that the worth of investment portfolios would not be undermined. What makes the fight against inflation resemble contemporary wars against undefined enemies is that, like terror, Martin notes, inflation needs only to be present in prospect for its menacing effects to be felt. In both cases, preemption converts potential threats into actual conflicts making “contingencies of the future to be lived out in present, blurring the distinction between the not-yet and the now.”85 It transforms future uncertainty into present risk—where risk denotes the expected outcomes that can be quantified in terms of likelihood and value. In her account of biotechnology and capitalism under contemporary neoliberal rule, Melinda Cooper provides a similar account to Martin’s and explores the way in which governing through contingency by rendering uncertainty productive for power and profit becomes the defining feature of contemporary politics of security and capital accumulation.86 Distinguishing neoliberalism from Keynesian understanding of growth, Cooper suggests that unlike the latter—where the neoclassical presumption of market equilibrium is treated as a law of nature—neoliberalism is premised on non-equilibrium models. As she explains Where welfare state biopolitics speaks the language of Gaussian curves and normalizable risk, neoliberal theories of economic growth are more likely to be interested in the concepts of the non-normalizable accident and the fractal curve. Where Keynesian economics attempts to safeguard the productive economy against fluctuations of financial capital, neoliberalism installs speculation at the very core of production. 87 What is striking in these analyses of risk and government through contingency is the temporal framework that is enacted through the hegemonic articulation of preemption as the meeting point of accumulation strategies and global governance of in/securities. Security entails a relation to the future, but the nature of this relation does not remain the same because the way in which the future is assessed, calculated, and mastered can take different forms.88 As Massumi usefully notes, “[p]reemption is not prevention.” 89 Preemption entails bringing the future into the present rather than acting in the present to avoid an occurrence in the future. In the preemptive framework, the consequences precede the actualization of the event: potential threats —the specter of future inflation that would shake the confidence in the value of investment portfolios or the specter of a terrorist strike—are rendered with a tangible presence that call for preemptive strikes. Preemption, hence, puts in place a specific form of relation to the future: contingency, uncertainty entailed by the notion of future—future as what is yet to come—arrives in its coded form as an already written future. Future as present risk gets integrated within the realm of the calculable, measurable, and the profitable. Codified as risk, uncertainty becomes an opportunity to be cashed in the market place of global values.90

<h4>Economic disaster serves as the quilting point for modern virtualized preemption; the transformation of economics into a risk factory – this operative logic of speculative mastery ensures cycles of death-making and self-actualization</h4><p><u><strong>Calkivik 10</u></strong> (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/99479/Calkivik_umn_0130E_11576.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y) gz</p><p>In addition to its enduring religiosity, <u>the <mark>contemporary</mark> politics of <mark>security is</mark> additionally <mark>characterized by</mark> its <strong><mark>futurity and virtuality</u></strong></mark>. The politics of security no longer merely revolve around the question of being, of securing a life as it is. <u><mark>Reaching <strong>beyond the</mark> question of the <mark>actual</strong></mark>, the realm of security has now expanded <mark>to</mark> include “<strong><mark>the potential</mark> to become dangerous</strong>”—a phenomenon that the notion of “virtual security” aims to capture</u>.79 As opposed to the actual, “virtual” here does not denote the non-existent. <u><mark>Virtual is</mark> real, concretely present to the extent that it exists potentially <strong><mark>immanent in every object</strong></mark>. The non-existence of <mark>what has not yet happened becomes <strong>more real than what has</mark> observably <mark>taken place</u></strong></mark>. </p><p>Massumi explores the concept of the virtual in his discussion of preemption as the primary operative logic of the contemporary politics of security.80 <u>Operative logic designates <mark>an abstract matrix</mark> of power <mark>that <strong>combines its own ontology and epistemology</strong></mark>. In other words, it brings together a mode of being and ways of knowing. It is at the level of this operative logic that preemption as definitive of the present age is differentiated from its Cold War predecessor—the logic of deterrence</u>. Like deterrence, where mutually assured destruction assures the present stockpiling of nuclear bombs so as to defer the potential of global annihilation, preemption also entails action in the present against a future threat. Yet, unlike its predecessor that relies on epistemological certainty that assumes knowable, objective measurability, <u>epistemology of preemption is <mark>one of <strong>contingency and uncertainty</strong></mark>; the danger in question is still potential, and not yet fully formed. What this means ontologically is that <strong><mark>neither</mark> the nature of the <mark>threat nor the enemy can be specified</strong></mark>. For the preemptive episteme that this logic brings into being, <strong><mark>nothing is</mark> perceived to be <mark>safe</u></strong></mark>. Consequently, the global situation becomes not threatening, but threat-generating; <u>the enemy is no longer “a who, where, when or even what. <strong><mark>The enemy is a whatnot</u></strong></mark>.”81</p><p>While Massumi focuses on U.S. foreign policy under the Bush administration within the context of the so-called Global War on Terror in his discussion of preemption, <u>this logic is not limited to a specific military doctrine of a specific administration. Rather, the field of operation of preemption has become much more extensive under the contemporary global security project.</u> Taking as its ground a potential, preemption makes up for its absent cause by putting to work an actual affect in its fight against enemies of “global humanity”, whether it be fundamentalist terrorists or infected birds. As I elaborated in the prelude to the first chapter, in the case of the avian flu, states, international organizations, philanthropic actors, and media mobilized across local, national, regional, and global networks and rendered the flu an emergency before it became an emergency.82 The future threat of a pandemic is held in the present in a perpetual state of potential emergency. Hence, the fact that the pandemic has not yet happened does not mean that it is no less present and real.</p><p><u><mark>Preemption is</mark> also the point <mark>where <strong>security meets capital</strong></mark> in a world <strong><mark>interlocked by webs of life, death, and debt</u></strong></mark>. As Randy Martin notes, <u>preemption (i.e., bringing future into the present) has been the <strong>guiding principle for U.S. fiscal policy</strong> since the late 1970s</u>.83 Before it becomes a blueprint for action against terrorists, <u>preemption is put to work as the operational logic in tandem with the rise of finance and <strong><mark>speculative capitalism</u></strong></mark>. Martin argues that the <u>new financial service industries that emerged after the demise of Bretton Woods made a virtue out of risk while speculation was being installed as a productive force for a globally circulating economy of credit and debt. <mark>Ruled by risk </mark>management <mark>and</mark> harvesting <mark>volatility</mark> for gain, finance</u>, as Martin explains, <u>creates the environment wherein all investments are made on the basis of anticipated price movements in the future. Investment by taking risks today requires a new belief in the future: a belief that <mark>the future will</mark> <strong>not be unpredictably different, but that it will <mark>be calculably the same</u></strong></mark>.84 In this context, inflation is treated as a distortion to the economic environment that renders loss unpredictable. Monetarism, which emphasizes regulating the amount of money in circulation, is the form preemptive action takes in the realm of political economy. It becomes the predominant policy tool to guarantee that the worth of investment portfolios would not be undermined. What makes the fight against inflation resemble contemporary wars against undefined enemies is that, like terror, Martin notes, inflation needs only to be present in prospect for its menacing effects to be felt. In both cases, <u><mark>preemption <strong>converts potential threats into actual conflicts</strong></mark> making “contingencies of the future to be lived out in present, blurring the distinction between the not-yet and the now</u>.”85 <u>It transforms future uncertainty into present risk—where risk denotes the expected outcomes that can be quantified in terms of likelihood and value</u>. </p><p>In her account of biotechnology and capitalism under contemporary neoliberal rule, Melinda Cooper provides a similar account to Martin’s and explores the way in which <u>governing through contingency by <strong><mark>rendering uncertainty productive for power and profit</strong> becomes the defining feature of contemporary politics</mark> of security and capital accumulation</u>.86 Distinguishing neoliberalism from Keynesian understanding of growth, Cooper suggests that unlike the latter—where the neoclassical presumption of market equilibrium is treated as a law of nature—<u>neoliberalism is premised on <strong>non-equilibrium models</u></strong>. As she explains</p><p>Where welfare state biopolitics speaks the language of Gaussian curves and normalizable risk, <u>neoliberal theories of economic growth are more likely to be interested in the concepts of the <strong>non-normalizable accident</strong> and the fractal curve</u>. Where Keynesian economics attempts to safeguard the productive economy against fluctuations of financial capital, neoliberalism installs speculation at the very core of production. 87</p><p>What is striking in these analyses of risk and government through contingency is the temporal framework that is enacted through the hegemonic articulation of preemption as the meeting point of accumulation strategies and global governance of in/securities. Security entails a relation to the future, but the nature of this relation does not remain the same because the way in which the future is assessed, calculated, and mastered can take different forms.88 As Massumi usefully notes, “[p]reemption is not prevention.” 89 <u>Preemption entails bringing the future into the present <strong>rather than acting in the present to avoid an occurrence in the future</u></strong>. In the preemptive framework, <u><strong>the <mark>consequences precede</mark> the <mark>actualization</mark> of the event:</strong> potential threats —the specter of future inflation that would shake the confidence in the value of investment portfolios or the specter of a terrorist strike—are rendered with a tangible presence that <strong>call for preemptive strikes</u></strong>. <u><mark>Preemption</mark>, hence, puts in place a specific form of relation to the future: contingency, uncertainty entailed by the notion of future—future as <strong>what is yet to come—<mark>arrives in its coded form as an already written future</u></strong>. <u><strong>Future as present risk</u></strong></mark> <u>gets <mark>integrated within the realm of the calculable, measurable, and the profitable</mark>. Codified as risk, <mark>uncertainty becomes</mark> an opportunity to be <strong><mark>cashed in the market place of global values</u></strong></mark>.90</p>

1NC

Cartels

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Steve Pointer

1ac was mj with cartels and hemp advantages 1nc was legalism and security and case 2nc was legalism 1nr was case 2nr was legalism and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-D3-Round1.docx

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cx

college

The affirmative is a systemization of value that attempts to organize all difference into a structure of univocal meaning. The aff is part and parcel of a system of cultural interpellation reduces singularity to mere difference and forecloses the possibility of becoming away from subjectivity as relationality and affect must be predetermined toward all objects

Baudrillard ’02

Baudrillard ’02 (Jean, “BETWEEN DIFFERENCE AND SINGULARITY: AN OPEN DISCUSSION WITH JEAN BAUDRILLARD”, June 2002, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/between-difference-and-singularity/, [SG])

It would be a fantasy to cryogenize culture, in order to resurrect it in a hundred years, like Disney in his cryogenic grave. Why not do the same with human beings? it generates itself and it perishes by itself. It is a singularity, it has its birth and death, you don't need to attempt to save it. it's useless to attempt to artificially perpetuate a system, because culture became a system of values, it's no more an organic, symbolic organization of sociality, now it's a system of market values, but of aesthetic values, not so much economic values. Isn't differance the key to culture? No, we are in a culture of difference, of culture as difference, a multicultural organization. Culture as singularity is more than difference. Difference can be easily organized into a system which generates structure and meaning. Culture as such has no finality, no meaning, it's a symbolic act and in this sense it's beyond differences which are only oppositional structures. Today, all cultures of the world are in multicultural ensembles as differences, together as the megaculture of difference, which is very opposed to the original singularity of culture. They can be juxtaposed and collected altogether in a museum. An extension of art action today, in a very general sense, is performance. Maybe art is everywhere at this point, and as such it's possible to make art of everything. I'm afraid that's a pure extension of the readymade. As a game traditional art has a rule, it has to invent a scene other than reality. It must not work so much in the real world, to transform it in political, social, therapeutic ways, that's not art, art has a stronger, more radical definition for me. Today, it's a fact, art is an interacting, multi-directional activity, but that's a very degenerated art. Radical would be the separation apart from any meaning, any finality, any causality. Art would be a thing itself, nothing but a singularity, and as such it cannot be anything in the real world. The art world would be anything else, it should be incompatible with reality. Traditional art was integrated in the symbolic order of the culture, but it was a radical illusion. In old times there wasn't reality. Now this illusion is lost, and art has lost its privileged position inside this symbolic order. Now we have to do with reality, and unfortunately contemporary art has fallen into the trap of reality, it becomes real, and soon it will be hyperreal in accordance with our surroundings. I would say rather than evolution it is an involution. in order to have singularity you need to have, a relation to otherness. That otherness is not to be confused with globalism or globalization, but we need some way to be capable of differentiating yourself from another in order to be single. singularity has paradoxically to do with alterity. It's a paradigm which is highly opposed to "identity/difference" Singularity and alterity is a double game we can oppose this paradigm of the totality of globalization, where all differences can be integrated, but as differences, not as singularities. One of the strategies of this new order of the world is to transform singularities into differences. As differences they are able to be integrated into the global. As singularities they cannot. It's an immense attempt of this global world to reduce and annihilate all singularities in order to be integrated into an undifferentiated world. This world of differences, this culture of differences is an alibi for a culture of indifferentiation. where is the room for the artist to have resistance? you must create your underground, because now there is no more underground, no more avant-garde, no more marginality. You can create your personal underground, your own black hole, your own singularity. but it will never create a collective symbolic order, it will be an exceptional, special creation, and today we can see that. Creative initiative maybe as a subjective act is very original but it doesn't create a symbolic movement. That's the problem. Is it possible still to have an authentic form of subjectivity? This arrangement doesn't need a subject anymore, on the contrary, it must destroy subjectivity, and we can see that in this shifting from the subject to the individual. Today we speak always of the individual, the rights of the individual and so on. You are a by-product of the system as individual, instead of a subject with thoughts that generate actions. As a subject you were divided and alienated, of course, a subject is alienated, it is another subject. It effaces the other subjects. The individual has no other, everyone is individual. The other individual is not an other, it has no otherness, no alterity. We try to save subjectivity through intersubjectivity, interaction, but I don't believe in this escape. the order of things is nihilistic, it's the place for the exchange of nothing. The salvation is in the form, not the content, even when you say even the most pessimistic things. The content maybe pessimistic or nihilistic, but the form, if it succeeds, is never either one, it is a transfiguration of the content seduction is in the question itself We are changing our system of values, changing all our identities, our partners, our illusions, and so on. We are obliged to change, but changing is something other than becoming, they are different things. We are in a "changing" time, where it is the moral law of all individuals, but changing is not becoming. We can change everything, we can change ourselves, but in this time we don't become anything. We are in a chameleonesque era, able to change but not able to become. This is our challenge. By an excess of potential changing, any possibility is there, but becoming is not a choice, becoming someone is another fatal strategy We are far away from becoming as a symbolic metamorphosis, as the symbolic return of things. radical changing is also free from any finality, but it's simply a metastasis, it's not a metamorphosis, not becoming. On either side we have changing and becoming, both have no finality but are radical opposites. Of course, nothing is excluded from singularity. It's a question of complexity we can have a determined frame for analysis, from what we subtracted: the noise, the meaning, the motion. a pure image is a fantasy What constitutes singularity is exactly not this immanence, this overall possibility of play with identity, with communication. This is precisely the contrary of a singularity. There is inter-individual interaction, there is interaction with oneself, but no alterity, no challenge in this sense, but it can be a place for infinite complexity, yes. I don't have a model of seduction, it's a form, a dual relation, not a model. Of course it's a pact, not a contract. When you break the pact, one form of challenge and reversibility is revenge. Revenge is a vital acting-out. It preserves the status of the other, maybe in a violent form a pact which allows us to see that there is a deeper complicity in revenge than in indifference. Indifference is a very despisal of the other. That's our reaction, today, the most frequent reaction to all negative happening is an indifferent response, not revenge.

Schirmacher: This is the bad news. What is the good news? Many of your questions have to do with "is there anything positive?" Baudrillard: It's very optimistic. Schirmacher: He uses the Heidegger defense, "I don't want to criticize, only to describe!" Audience: I liked your comment about the Ministry of Culture as being a kind of joke. I think the situation is very well typified by the fact that the Ministry of Culture is required to subsidize cultural production. However, cultural production in its best forms can be stockpiled, it's not perishable, it doesn't have to be consumed at once. At a certain point you say it's simply illogical to say that we won't be saturated by cultural products. My point is, I think that cultural products can be stockpiled without perishing. What is the difference between cultural products and market products? Baudrillard: It would be a fantasy to cryogenize culture, in order to resurrect it in a hundred years, like Disney in his cryogenic grave. Why not do the same with human beings? They are about to become consumer goods, too, and maybe if we freeze human beings maybe there's a chance in a century they can be resurrected as "real" human beings… Now, why do you try to save culture? As an anthropological reality it generates itself and it perishes by itself. It is a singularity, it has its birth and death, you don't need to attempt to save it. It has its own way. For me it's useless to attempt to artificially perpetuate a system, because culture became a system of values, it's no more an organic, symbolic organization of sociality, now it's a system of market values, but of aesthetic values, not so much economic values. As a system of aesthetic values it is a very antinomic proposition, because culture perishes from this mixture of the symbolic and of values. The symbolic order of culture is not value, value is an economic structure. With infiltration or contamination of signs by an aesthetic circulation, and the rise of cultural goods as aesthetic goods, that's the beginning of the end. Schirmacher: Exactly because you stockpile it, it's not culture. Culture should die. That's its honor. It's an anthropological event and should not be preserved for eternity, even if it sometimes happens. Baudrillard: I'm only pessimistic, but you are a murderer. [laughter and applause] Audience: Isn't differance the key to culture? Baudrillard: No, we are in a culture of difference, of culture as difference, a multicultural organization. Culture as singularity is more than difference. Difference can be easily organized into a system which generates structure and meaning. Culture as such has no finality, no meaning, it's a symbolic act and in this sense it's beyond differences which are only oppositional structures. Singularity is a symbolic acting, a collective acting. Primitive societies and cultures are not different, they're very singular, it's not the same. Today, all cultures of the world are in multicultural ensembles as differences, together as the megaculture of difference, which is very opposed to the original singularity of culture. Schirmacher: They are more like different brands. Baudrillard: They can be juxtaposed and collected altogether in a museum. Audience: Do you think it's time that artists use their strengths for something else than making objects? Is there something an artist can do better than just contributing to the art market? Baudrillard: An extension of art action today, in a very general sense, is performance. Maybe art is everywhere at this point, and as such it's possible to make art of everything. I'm afraid that's a pure extension of the readymade. As a game traditional art has a rule, it has to invent a scene other than reality. It must not work so much in the real world, to transform it in political, social, therapeutic ways, that's not art, art has a stronger, more radical definition for me. Today, it's a fact, art is an interacting, multi-directional activity, but that's a very degenerated art. Schirmacher: What do you mean by radical? Baudrillard: Radical would be the separation apart from any meaning, any finality, any causality. Art would be a thing itself, nothing but a singularity, and as such it cannot be anything in the real world. The art world would be anything else, it should be incompatible with reality. Traditional art was integrated in the symbolic order of the culture, but it was a radical illusion. In old times there wasn't reality. Now this illusion is lost, and art has lost its privileged position inside this symbolic order. Now we have to do with reality, and unfortunately contemporary art has fallen into the trap of reality, it becomes real, and soon it will be hyperreal in accordance with our surroundings. I would say rather than evolution it is an involution. Ulfers: I agree with your notion with the singularity of culture, I'm wondering though if you are, I don't think you are, talking about a closed system here, because in order to have singularity you need to have, just for the sake of comparison, a relation to otherness. That otherness is not to be confused with globalism or globalization, but we need some way to be capable of differentiating yourself from another in order to be single. Baudrillard: I agree that the singularity has paradoxically to do with alterity. It's a paradigm which is highly opposed to "identity/difference", which is our paradigm, I would say. Singularity and alterity is a double game, I agree. Ulfers: But that's not to be confused with what you have defined as globalization, or multiculturalism. Baudrillard: Yes because we can oppose this paradigm of the totality of globalization, where all differences can be integrated, but as differences, not as singularities. One of the strategies of this new order of the world is to transform singularities into differences. As differences they are able to be integrated into the global. As singularities they cannot. It's an immense attempt of this global world to reduce and annihilate all singularities in order to be integrated into an undifferentiated world. This world of differences, this culture of differences is an alibi for a culture of indifferentiation. Audience: Regarding the stockpiling of culture, where is the room for the artist to have resistance? Do we go underground, like the rat? True culture, like evil, cannot truly be suppressed. Baudrillard: Of course, you may, or can, or must, but you must create your underground, because now there is no more underground, no more avant-garde, no more marginality. You can create your personal underground, your own black hole, your own singularity. The bad fate is that everyone can do that, but it will never create a collective symbolic order, it will be an exceptional, special creation, and today we can see that. Creative initiative maybe as a subjective act is very original but it doesn't create a symbolic movement. That's the problem. Schirmacher: How do you see subjectivity coming to being? Is it possible still to have an authentic form of subjectivity? Baudrillard: Why not, but today it would be a perversion. We are in a virtually positive, immanent world, where all is implicated in functional operations, and so on. This arrangement doesn't need a subject anymore, on the contrary, it must destroy subjectivity, and we can see that in this shifting from the subject to the individual. Today we speak always of the individual, the rights of the individual and so on. The individual is not the subject, the subject is over. The individual has no originality, it is a particular molecular fragment of an ensemble, and when you are in this system you are not a subject anymore, you can be individual as an abstract configuration, but you are a pure operation, deducted from the functioning of a system. You are a by-product of the system as individual, instead of a subject with thoughts that generate actions. As a subject you were divided and alienated, of course, a subject is alienated, it is another subject. It effaces the other subjects. The individual has no other, everyone is individual. The other individual is not an other, it has no otherness, no alterity. We try to save subjectivity through intersubjectivity, interaction, but I don't believe in this escape. Schirmacher: You would agree that in the future there could be another Baudrillard, as a by-product. Baudrillard: As a clone. I am already a simulacrum of myself. You are not dealing with the real Baudrillard, I have sent a clone. Audience: You said that the crisis is going to be intensified by globalization, but you are not pessimistic. What are the reasons for not being pessimistic? Baudrillard: It's not because I described or analyzed a state of things this way, the order of things is nihilistic, it's the place for the exchange of nothing. I describe it but I take a distance from it. The form in the discourse, it's not only an analytic discourse, the theoretical discourse also is a form which is never pessimistic or optimistic, it's just a form. The salvation is in the form, not the content, even when you say even the most pessimistic things. The content maybe pessimistic or nihilistic, but the form, if it succeeds, is never either one, it is a transfiguration of the content. You do that in the writing. It's always a challenge between content and form, and that's the difference between a rational, discursive discourse and a theoretical approach. I, for my part, say the most nihilistic things, yes, but the resolution of this pessimistic content is in a very glorious form. Then the writing is not an innocent act, it is a transmutation of the content. That's why language is something very singular, it is always more than what it signifies and you must take into account this transfiguration of language. It's always a challenge, you can describe the most apocalyptic system, but you can do it in a way that is not at all apocalyptic. The form can retain the singularity at the same time that it says something which is not singular but describes a non-singularity. It's always a duel. Schirmacher: This kind of answers two questions I have here, concerning "What happens in a simulated world where we have freedom from radical uncertainty, is there still a need for questions? After the orgy do we still need to ask questions? What kind of questions would these be?" You say that the content is not important, but the form can help you, you use the form of questioning. Baudrillard: You take the example of the orgy, "What are you doing after the orgy?" That is a question. There is no answer. The seduction, the paradox, the challenge is in the question itself. But we presuppose that the orgy is over, we are at the end, or beyond the orgy, the orgy as a model of total liberation and integration. After that, there is no more a question of freedom, liberation, and so on, That's all achieved, we are all liberated, liberated of needs, of language, of sex, but what is new after that? Maybe it needs no answer to this question. The orgy was an acting-out of all finalities, it was a model of the liberation of all things, it is a vanishing point. As a vanishing point it is very interesting, because after that we don't know what we are, but it's not very dangerous, to not know what we will and what we want and so on were the categories of Enlightenment and modern man. We are beyond that and maybe it's a chance. We are free from freedom, free from liberation, That's over. Maybe now there's another chance, not for a new servitude.. but maybe, maybe unknown models of servitude. We cannot have a radical moral judgment about these alternatives. Schirmacher: So it's not that we are, as one question has here, "just changing one set of truths for another." Baudrillard: We are changing our system of values, changing all our identities, our partners, our illusions, and so on. We are obliged to change, but changing is something other than becoming, they are different things. We are in a "changing" time, where it is the moral law of all individuals, but changing is not becoming. We can change everything, we can change ourselves, but in this time we don't become anything. It was an opposition put forth by Nietzsche, he spoke about the era of chameleons. We are in a chameleonesque era, able to change but not able to become. This is our challenge. By an excess of potential changing, any possibility is there, but becoming is not a choice, becoming someone is another fatal strategy. For Nietzsche it would be the sovereign hypothesis. He speaks of four hypotheses. The first one would be inertia, motionless, and so on. The second would be changing, the third one would be history, and the last one is the sovereign one, it is becoming. We are far away from becoming as a symbolic metamorphosis, as the symbolic return of things. Ulfers: The sovereignty consists in being free of some teleological perspective, becoming a sovereign consists in coming into being and passing away. Baudrillard: In a sense, radical changing is also free from any finality, but it's simply a metastasis, it's not a metamorphosis, not becoming. Sovereignty has no finality, and changing doesn't either. Between the two we have a world with finality, meaning and so on. On either side we have changing and becoming, both have no finality but are radical opposites. Schirmacher: Some specific questions. Does film possess the possibility to become an event, an ereignis, as a pure image can become an event?” Baudrillard: I cannot say. I don't have enough experience with cinema. I enjoy it purely as a spectator, and I maintain this position as a stranger, which I would not sacrifice. Of course, nothing is excluded from singularity. It's a question of complexity - with the pure image in photography, we can have a determined frame for analysis, from what we subtracted: the noise, the meaning, the motion. If we go to the moving image I don't know what happens exactly. For me it's too complex to be analyzed as pure. Of course a pure image is a fantasy. Cinema has prestige as a progress from photography - in our rational consideration, there is a progress which is supposed to lead to a sophistication, a perfection. I think the contrary, every progress in this area is at the same time a danger. It's always a risk of degeneration. That is not nostalgic, I don't consider the pure image as a lost object. We must judge any complexification at the same time as a plus and as a minus. Schirmacher: Would that also apply to another question: "Do you see the internet as a manifestation of singularity." You say on the one hand it's not complexity as such, you have to judge by looking closely at what happens on the internet. Are there not singularities, people setting up their own space… Baudrillard: At this point I'm sure there is no singularity on the internet. That's not because I don't use the internet, I'm technically, physically not able to use it, but that's not a doctrine, my refusal is not ideological. What constitutes singularity is exactly not this immanence, this overall possibility of play with identity, with communication. This is precisely the contrary of a singularity. It's rather an artistic activity. That's not a pejorative. In this virtual secluded world, there is no alterity at all, no dual relation. There is inter-individual interaction, there is interaction with oneself, but no alterity, no challenge in this sense, but it can be a place for infinite complexity, yes. Schirmacher: You are the best example. I think there are eight hundred websites concerning you, and all of them are very different, they all say "My Baudrillard"… Baudrillard: It's not a compliment, I am a hostage on the internet. Schirmacher: We have many questions on the topic of seduction. "In your model of seduction, why is vengeance necessary when the pact is broken?" Baudrillard: First I don't have a model of seduction, it's a form, a dual relation, not a model. Of course it's a pact, not a contract. When you break the pact, one form of challenge and reversibility is revenge. Revenge is a vital acting-out. It preserves the status of the other, maybe in a violent form, in a murder for example. A murder can be a very dualistic act, a pact which allows us to see that there is a deeper complicity in revenge than in indifference. Indifference is a very despisal of the other. That's our reaction, today, the most frequent reaction to all negative happening is an indifferent response, not revenge. Schirmacher: Finally, here is an interesting hypothetical situation. "What if the United States, in an enormous celebration, destroyed the Statue of Liberty itself, before terrorists had the chance? Would this be a sufficient counter-gift to Sept. 11, by reclaiming the "privilege of death"?" Baudrillard: That's a good idea… Schirmacher: "…if so, what ground, if any, would terrorism have left, once the destruction of the exceptional has lost its power as a singular event?" Baudrillard: I would very much like to see the Statue of Liberty destroyed. It would not be an event because it would not be the first event, it would be a clone event of the Twin Towers…too bad, too bad. It would not be the end of terrorism just because there would be nothing more to destroy with planes, terrorism has multiple forms of appearances. We are now fantastically obsessed with this figure of the Twin Towers, it's impermissible to imagine other forms of terrorism which would be not so spectacular. It's a very exceptional event, a very exceptional acting-out, but maybe it's still spectacular, in the sense that it's a global event and a symptom of globalization. Maybe there are more viral, more underground forms of terrorism than this one. This one opened an era of a new type of violence, a violence of the third type. There will be more subtle modes of terrorism and I doubt if Pentagon strategists have any idea of that.

<h4>The affirmative is a systemization of value that attempts to organize all difference into a structure of univocal meaning. The aff is part and parcel of a system of cultural interpellation reduces singularity to mere difference and forecloses the possibility of becoming away from subjectivity as relationality and affect must be predetermined toward all objects  </h4><p><u><strong>Baudrillard ’02</u> </strong>(Jean, “BETWEEN DIFFERENCE AND SINGULARITY: AN OPEN DISCUSSION WITH JEAN BAUDRILLARD”, June 2002, http://www.egs.edu/faculty/jean-baudrillard/articles/between-difference-and-singularity/, [SG])</p><p> Schirmacher: This is the bad news. What is the good news? Many of your questions have to do with "is there anything positive?" Baudrillard: It's very optimistic. Schirmacher: He uses the Heidegger defense, "I don't want to criticize, only to describe!" Audience: I liked your comment about the Ministry of Culture as being a kind of joke. I think the situation is very well typified by the fact that the Ministry of Culture is required to subsidize cultural production. However, cultural production in its best forms can be stockpiled, it's not perishable, it doesn't have to be consumed at once. At a certain point you say it's simply illogical to say that we won't be saturated by cultural products. My point is, I think that cultural products can be stockpiled without perishing. What is the difference between cultural products and market products? Baudrillard: <u>It would be a fantasy to cryogenize culture, in order to resurrect it in a hundred years, like Disney in his cryogenic grave. Why not do the same with human beings?</u> They are about to become consumer goods, too, and maybe if we freeze human beings maybe there's a chance in a century they can be resurrected as "real" human beings… Now, why do you try to save culture? As an anthropological reality <u>it generates itself and it perishes by itself. It is a singularity, it has its birth and death, you don't need to attempt to save it.</u> It has its own way. For me <u>it's useless to attempt to artificially perpetuate a system, because culture became a system of values, it's no more an organic, symbolic organization of sociality, now it's a system of market values, but of aesthetic values, not so much economic values.</u> As a system of aesthetic values it is a very antinomic proposition, because culture perishes from this mixture of the symbolic and of values. The symbolic order of culture is not value, value is an economic structure. With infiltration or contamination of signs by an aesthetic circulation, and the rise of cultural goods as aesthetic goods, that's the beginning of the end. Schirmacher: Exactly because you stockpile it, it's not culture. Culture should die. That's its honor. It's an anthropological event and should not be preserved for eternity, even if it sometimes happens. Baudrillard: I'm only pessimistic, but you are a murderer. [laughter and applause] Audience: <u>Isn't differance the key to culture?</u> Baudrillard: <u>No, we are in a culture of difference, of culture as difference, a multicultural organization. Culture as singularity is more than difference. Difference can be easily organized into a system which generates structure and meaning. Culture as such has no finality, no meaning, it's a symbolic act and in this sense it's beyond differences which are only oppositional structures.</u> Singularity is a symbolic acting, a collective acting. Primitive societies and cultures are not different, they're very singular, it's not the same. <u>Today, all cultures of the world are in multicultural ensembles as differences, together as the megaculture of difference, which is very opposed to the original singularity of culture.</u> Schirmacher: They are more like different brands. Baudrillard: <u>They can be juxtaposed and collected altogether in a museum.</u> Audience: Do you think it's time that artists use their strengths for something else than making objects? Is there something an artist can do better than just contributing to the art market? Baudrillard: <u>An extension of art action today, in a very general sense, is performance. Maybe art is everywhere at this point, and as such it's possible to make art of everything. I'm afraid that's a pure extension of the readymade. As a game traditional art has a rule, it has to invent a scene other than reality. It must not work so much in the real world, to transform it in political, social, therapeutic ways, that's not art, art has a stronger, more radical definition for me. Today, it's a fact, art is an interacting, multi-directional activity, but that's a very degenerated art.</u> Schirmacher: What do you mean by radical? Baudrillard: <u><strong>Radical would be the separation apart from any meaning</strong>, any finality, any causality.</u> <u>Art would be a thing itself, nothing but a singularity, and as such it cannot be anything in the real world. The art world would be anything else, it should be incompatible with reality. Traditional art was integrated in the symbolic order of the culture, but it was a radical illusion. In old times there wasn't reality. Now this illusion is lost, and art has lost its privileged position inside this symbolic order. Now we have to do with reality, and unfortunately contemporary art has fallen into the trap of reality, it becomes real, and soon it will be hyperreal in accordance with our surroundings. I would say rather than evolution it is an involution.</u> Ulfers: I agree with your notion with the singularity of culture, I'm wondering though if you are, I don't think you are, talking about a closed system here, because <u>in order to have singularity you need to have,</u> just for the sake of comparison, <u>a relation to otherness. That otherness is not to be confused with globalism or globalization, but we need some way to be capable of differentiating yourself from another in order to be single.</u> Baudrillard: I agree that the <u>singularity has paradoxically to do with alterity. It's a paradigm which is highly opposed to "identity/difference"</u>, which is our paradigm, I would say. <u>Singularity and alterity is a double game</u>, I agree. Ulfers: But that's not to be confused with what you have defined as globalization, or multiculturalism. Baudrillard: Yes because <u>we can oppose this paradigm of the totality of globalization, where all differences can be integrated, but as differences, not as singularities. One of the strategies of this new order of the world is to transform singularities into differences. As <strong>differences</u></strong> <u><strong>they</u></strong> <u><strong>are able to be integrated into the global</strong>. As singularities they cannot.</u> <u>It's an immense attempt of this global world to reduce and annihilate all singularities in order to be integrated into an undifferentiated world. This world of differences, this culture of differences is an alibi for a culture of indifferentiation.</u> Audience: Regarding the stockpiling of culture, <u>where is the room for the artist to have resistance?</u> Do we go underground, like the rat? True culture, like evil, cannot truly be suppressed. Baudrillard: Of course, you may, or can, or must, but <u>you must create your underground, because now there is no more underground, no more avant-garde, no more marginality. You can create your personal underground, your own black hole, your own singularity.</u> The bad fate is that everyone can do that, <u>but it will never create a collective symbolic order, it will be an exceptional, special creation, and today we can see that. Creative initiative maybe as a subjective act is very original but it doesn't create a symbolic movement. That's the problem.</u> Schirmacher: How do you see subjectivity coming to being? <u>Is it possible still to have an authentic form of subjectivity?</u> Baudrillard: Why not, but today it would be a perversion. We are in a virtually positive, immanent world, where all is implicated in functional operations, and so on. <u>This arrangement doesn't need a subject anymore, on the contrary, <strong>it must destroy subjectivity</strong>, and we can see that in this shifting from the subject to the individual. Today we speak always of the individual, the rights of the individual and so on.</u> The individual is not the subject, the subject is over. The individual has no originality, it is a particular molecular fragment of an ensemble, and when you are in this system you are not a subject anymore, you can be individual as an abstract configuration, but you are a pure operation, deducted from the functioning of a system. <u>You are a by-product of the system as individual, instead of a subject with thoughts that generate actions. As a subject you were divided and alienated, of course, a subject is alienated, it is another subject. It effaces the other subjects. The individual has no other, everyone is individual. The other individual is not an other, it has no otherness, no alterity. We try to save subjectivity through intersubjectivity, interaction, but I don't believe in this escape.</u> Schirmacher: You would agree that in the future there could be another Baudrillard, as a by-product. Baudrillard: As a clone. I am already a simulacrum of myself. You are not dealing with the real Baudrillard, I have sent a clone. Audience: You said that the crisis is going to be intensified by globalization, but you are not pessimistic. What are the reasons for not being pessimistic? Baudrillard: It's not because I described or analyzed a state of things this way, <u>the order of things is nihilistic, <strong>it's the place for the exchange of nothing</strong>.</u> I describe it but I take a distance from it. The form in the discourse, it's not only an analytic discourse, the theoretical discourse also is a form which is never pessimistic or optimistic, it's just a form. <u>The salvation is in the form, not the content, even when you say even the most pessimistic things. The content maybe pessimistic or nihilistic, but the form, if it succeeds, is never either one, it is a transfiguration of the content</u>. You do that in the writing. It's always a challenge between content and form, and that's the difference between a rational, discursive discourse and a theoretical approach. I, for my part, say the most nihilistic things, yes, but the resolution of this pessimistic content is in a very glorious form. Then the writing is not an innocent act, it is a transmutation of the content. That's why language is something very singular, it is always more than what it signifies and you must take into account this transfiguration of language. It's always a challenge, you can describe the most apocalyptic system, but you can do it in a way that is not at all apocalyptic. The form can retain the singularity at the same time that it says something which is not singular but describes a non-singularity. It's always a duel. Schirmacher: This kind of answers two questions I have here, concerning "What happens in a simulated world where we have freedom from radical uncertainty, is there still a need for questions? After the orgy do we still need to ask questions? What kind of questions would these be?" You say that the content is not important, but the form can help you, you use the form of questioning. Baudrillard: You take the example of the orgy, "What are you doing after the orgy?" That is a question. There is no answer. The <u>seduction</u>, the paradox, the challenge <u>is in the question itself</u>. But we presuppose that the orgy is over, we are at the end, or beyond the orgy, the orgy as a model of total liberation and integration. After that, there is no more a question of freedom, liberation, and so on, That's all achieved, we are all liberated, liberated of needs, of language, of sex, but what is new after that? Maybe it needs no answer to this question. The orgy was an acting-out of all finalities, it was a model of the liberation of all things, it is a vanishing point. As a vanishing point it is very interesting, because after that we don't know what we are, but it's not very dangerous, to not know what we will and what we want and so on were the categories of Enlightenment and modern man. We are beyond that and maybe it's a chance. We are free from freedom, free from liberation, That's over. Maybe now there's another chance, not for a new servitude.. but maybe, maybe unknown models of servitude. We cannot have a radical moral judgment about these alternatives. Schirmacher: So it's not that we are, as one question has here, "just changing one set of truths for another." Baudrillard: <u>We are changing our system of values, changing all our identities, our partners, our illusions, and so on. We are obliged to change, <strong>but changing is something other than becoming</strong>, they are different things.</u> <u>We are in a "changing" time, where it is the moral law of all individuals, but changing is not becoming. We can change everything, we can change ourselves, but in this time we don't become anything.</u> It was an opposition put forth by Nietzsche, he spoke about the era of chameleons. <u>We are in a chameleonesque era, able to change but not able to become. This is our challenge. By an excess of potential changing, any possibility is there, but becoming is not a choice, becoming someone is another fatal strategy</u>. For Nietzsche it would be the sovereign hypothesis. He speaks of four hypotheses. The first one would be inertia, motionless, and so on. The second would be changing, the third one would be history, and the last one is the sovereign one, it is becoming. <u>We are far away from becoming as a symbolic metamorphosis, as the symbolic return of things.</u> Ulfers: The sovereignty consists in being free of some teleological perspective, becoming a sovereign consists in coming into being and passing away. Baudrillard: In a sense, <u>radical changing is also free from any finality, but <strong>it's simply a metastasis,</strong> it's not a metamorphosis, not becoming.</u> Sovereignty has no finality, and changing doesn't either. Between the two we have a world with finality, meaning and so on. <u>On either side we have changing and becoming, both have no finality but are radical opposites.</u> Schirmacher: Some specific questions. Does film possess the possibility to become an event, an ereignis, as a pure image can become an event?” Baudrillard: I cannot say. I don't have enough experience with cinema. I enjoy it purely as a spectator, and I maintain this position as a stranger, which I would not sacrifice. <u>Of course, nothing is excluded from singularity. It's a question of complexity</u> - with the pure image in photography, <u>we can have a determined frame for analysis, from what we subtracted: the noise, the meaning, the motion.</u> If we go to the moving image I don't know what happens exactly. For me it's too complex to be analyzed as pure. Of course <u>a pure image is a fantasy</u>. Cinema has prestige as a progress from photography - in our rational consideration, there is a progress which is supposed to lead to a sophistication, a perfection. I think the contrary, every progress in this area is at the same time a danger. It's always a risk of degeneration. That is not nostalgic, I don't consider the pure image as a lost object. We must judge any complexification at the same time as a plus and as a minus. Schirmacher: Would that also apply to another question: "Do you see the internet as a manifestation of singularity." You say on the one hand it's not complexity as such, you have to judge by looking closely at what happens on the internet. Are there not singularities, people setting up their own space… Baudrillard: At this point I'm sure there is no singularity on the internet. That's not because I don't use the internet, I'm technically, physically not able to use it, but that's not a doctrine, my refusal is not ideological. <u>What constitutes singularity is exactly not this immanence, this overall possibility of play with identity, with communication. This is precisely the contrary of a singularity.</u> It's rather an artistic activity. That's not a pejorative. In this virtual secluded world, there is no alterity at all, no dual relation. <u>There is inter-individual interaction, there is interaction with oneself, but no alterity, no challenge in this sense, but it can be a place for infinite complexity, yes.</u> Schirmacher: You are the best example. I think there are eight hundred websites concerning you, and all of them are very different, they all say "My Baudrillard"… Baudrillard: It's not a compliment, I am a hostage on the internet. Schirmacher: We have many questions on the topic of seduction. "In your model of seduction, why is vengeance necessary when the pact is broken?" Baudrillard: First <u>I don't have a model of seduction, it's a form, a dual relation, not a model. Of course it's a pact, not a contract. When you break the pact, one form of challenge and <strong>reversibility is revenge</strong>. Revenge is a vital acting-out. It preserves the status of the other, maybe in a violent form</u>, in a murder for example. A murder can be a very dualistic act, <u>a pact which allows us to see that there is a deeper complicity in revenge than in indifference. Indifference is a very despisal of the other. That's our reaction, today, the most frequent reaction to all negative happening is an indifferent response, not revenge.</u> Schirmacher: Finally, here is an interesting hypothetical situation. "What if the United States, in an enormous celebration, destroyed the Statue of Liberty itself, before terrorists had the chance? Would this be a sufficient counter-gift to Sept. 11, by reclaiming the "privilege of death"?" Baudrillard: That's a good idea… Schirmacher: "…if so, what ground, if any, would terrorism have left, once the destruction of the exceptional has lost its power as a singular event?" Baudrillard: I would very much like to see the Statue of Liberty destroyed. It would not be an event because it would not be the first event, it would be a clone event of the Twin Towers…too bad, too bad. It would not be the end of terrorism just because there would be nothing more to destroy with planes, terrorism has multiple forms of appearances. We are now fantastically obsessed with this figure of the Twin Towers, it's impermissible to imagine other forms of terrorism which would be not so spectacular. It's a very exceptional event, a very exceptional acting-out, but maybe it's still spectacular, in the sense that it's a global event and a symptom of globalization. Maybe there are more viral, more underground forms of terrorism than this one. This one opened an era of a new type of violence, a violence of the third type. There will be more subtle modes of terrorism and I doubt if Pentagon strategists have any idea of that.</p>

1NC

Case

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

N

UNLV

7

Iowa HS

Shooter

1ac was simony of organs 1nc was framing spec the cap k the undercommons k the release the relics cp and case 2nc was undercommons and case 1nr was cap and relics 2nr was cap and relics

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Giroux’s theory of dialogue and critique engages in positive utopianism and ignores how his positive model of power reproduces the control of life his critique attempts to dismantle. turns the case.

Gur-Ze'ev 98

[ilan, faculty of education @ university of haifa, “toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy”, educational theory, fall, v48 n4, blackwellsynergy] Giroux He addresses progressive modern critical themes such as ideology critique, which he presents as an important practice for resistance to the hegemony of the school systein and its normalization practices."' He also retains critical theory's ambition of enhancing students' reflective power and ability to reconstruct the sociocultural context that blocks their abilities to create and realize their own meanings But he explicitly rejects the Enlightenment's and critical theory's concept of emancipation, and the essence of his pedagogy is to recognize the ''other" Whereas critical theory recognized the “other” in its otherness, in its unfulfilled needs and untruthfulness, Giroux sees that “other” as the starting point of the nonrepressive work of critical pedagogy, and negates modernistic “metanarratives” 'Giroux’s educational theory becomes nondialectical and optimistic in a manner that enables him to declare his crossing from the language of critique to the “language of possibility.” Contrary to his assertions, he distances himself from the essentials of the Enlightenment’s emancipatory project, while staying faithful to some of its harmful characteristics: its positive utopianism, its hasty optimism, and its arrogance as to the possibility of liberating the repressed and constituting a better world within current reality. While criticizing functionalist-positivistic attitudes, he abandons philosophy for political success in his critical pedagogy. In his own words, “schooling for self and social empowerment is ethically prior to questions of epistemology. Giroux constructs an original synthesis of the Enlightenment’s universalistic commitment to liberate the repressed and a rejection of such concepts as the universality of reason, the validity of a general theory, and resistance against constructions and dynamics that are to be reconstructed and negated, if not defeated or domesticated Giroux accepts the postmodern understanding of the plurality and inconsistency of difference; yet he still insists on the possibilities of emancipation here and now. Implicitly, in his thought these possibilities for emancipation are actual and universal, and his positive utopianism and his new epistemic assumptions are inconsistent. Here arise violent potentialities in his concept of dialogue between teachers and students. He has not found a theoretical solution to the conflict between the authority of the self- evident knowledge, criteria, goals, and interests of individual students of repressed collectives and the principles of his own critical pedagogy. While paying tribute to the self-evident knowledge of popular culture and criticizing elitist culture and critical theory, his own theory is elitist, sophisticated, and far from the reflective reach of those normalized and manipulated by popular culture and other manifestations of the culture industry. It’s a typical representative of both feminist and “patriarchal” critical pedagogy

[ilan, faculty of education @ university of haifa, “toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy”, educational theory, fall, v48 n4, blackwellsynergy] Giroux presents resistance to the hegemony of the school systein and its normalization practices But he explicitly rejects the Enlightenment's and critical theory's concept of emancipation, and the essence of his pedagogy is to recognize the ''other" Giroux sees that “other” as the starting point 'Giroux’s educational theory becomes nondialectical and optimistic in a manner that enables him to declare his crossing from the language of critique to possibility Contrary to his assertions, he distances himself from the Enlightenment’s emancipatory project, while staying faithful to some of its harmful characteristics: its positive utopianism, its hasty optimism, and its arrogance as to the possibility of liberating the repressed and constituting a better world within current reality. he abandons philosophy for political success in his critical pedagogy. In his own words, “schooling for self and social empowerment is ethically prior to questions of epistemology. Giroux constructs an original synthesis of the Enlightenment’s universalistic commitment to liberate the repressed and a rejection of such concepts as the universality of reason, the validity of a general theory, and resistance against constructions and dynamics that are to be reconstructed and negated, if not defeated or domesticated his own theory is elitist, sophisticated, and far from the reflective reach of those normalized and manipulated by popular culture and other manifestations of the culture industry. It’s a typical representative of both feminist and “patriarchal” critical pedagogy

[ilan, faculty of education @ university of haifa, “toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy”, educational theory, fall, v48 n4, blackwellsynergy] Giroux realizes and develops critical theory through schooling as a political arena with a major role in the production of discourses, meanings, and subjects, as well as in their control and distribution. In the second stage of development, Giroux is strongly influenced by postmodernists such as Foucault. In his projects he synthesizes elements from educational thinkers such as Burbules, Freire, and Michael Apple, in suggesting the school as a site of sociocultural reproduction and the distortion of dialogical possibilities in current Western societies. Giroux does not present a one-dimensional postmodern position, whereby dynamic symbolic inter- change and cultural reproduction use individuals and groups solely in the interest of the system. He addresses progressive modern critical themes such as ideology critique, which he presents as an important practice for resistance to the hegemony of the school systein and its normalization practices."' He also retains critical theory's ambition of enhancing students' reflective power and ability to reconstruct the sociocultural context that blocks their abilities to create and realize their own meanings.38 But he explicitly rejects the Enlightenment's and critical theory's concept of emancipation, and the essence of his pedagogy is to recognize the ''other" in his or her culture and the full implications of difference. Whereas critical theory recognized the “other” in its otherness, in its unfulfilled needs and untruthfulness, Giroux, in accordance with postmodern popular formulations, sees that “other” as the starting point of the nonrepressive work of critical pedagogy, and negates modernistic “metanarratives” and general theories that could have serve as a framework for reasoned critique and dialogue to which he remains committed. This draws him into the difficulties that Burbules identifies as challenging all ”postmodern” critical thinkers. 'Giroux’s educational theory becomes nondialectical and optimistic in a manner that enables him to declare his crossing from the language of critique to the “language of possibility.” Contrary to his assertions, he distances himself from the essentials of the Enlightenment’s emancipatory project, while staying faithful to some of its harmful characteristics: its positive utopianism, its hasty optimism, and its arrogance as to the possibility of liberating the repressed and constituting a better world within current reality. While criticizing functionalist-positivistic attitudes, he abandons philosophy for political success in his critical pedagogy. In his own words, “schooling for self and social empowerment is ethically prior to questions of epistemology. Giroux constructs an original synthesis of the Enlightenment’s universalistic commitment to liberate the repressed and a rejection of such concepts as the universality of reason, the validity of a general theory, and resistance against constructions and dynamics that are to be reconstructed and negated, if not defeated or domesticated. Today Giroux accepts the postmodern understanding of the plurality and inconsistency of time fields, the different epistemological structure of different communities, and the legitimacy of political and epistemic difference; yet he still insists on the possibilities of emancipation here and now. Implicitly, in his thought these possibilities for emancipation are actual and universal, and his positive utopianism and his new epistemic assumptions are inconsistent. Here arise violent potentialities in his concept of dialogue between teachers and students. He has not found a theoretical solution to the conflict between the authority of the self- evident knowledge, criteria, goals, and interests of individual students of repressed collectives and the principles of his own critical pedagogy. While paying tribute to the self-evident knowledge of popular culture and criticizing elitist culture and critical theory, his own theory is elitist, sophisticated, and far from the reflective reach of those normalized and manipulated by popular culture and other manifestations of the culture industry. It’s a typical representative of both feminist and “patriarchal” critical pedagogy.44

<h4><u><strong>Giroux’s theory of dialogue and critique engages in positive utopianism and ignores how his positive model of power reproduces the control of life his critique attempts to dismantle. turns the case.</h4><p></u></strong>Gur-Ze'ev 98</p><p><u><mark>[ilan, faculty of education @ university of haifa, “toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy”, educational theory, fall, v48 n4, blackwellsynergy]</p><p></u></mark>Giroux realizes and develops critical theory through schooling as a political arena with a major role in the production of discourses, meanings, and subjects, as well as in their control and distribution. In the second stage of development, <u><mark>Giroux </u></mark>is strongly influenced by postmodernists such as Foucault. In his projects he synthesizes elements from educational thinkers such as Burbules, Freire, and Michael Apple, in suggesting the school as a site of sociocultural reproduction and the distortion of dialogical possibilities in current Western societies. Giroux does not present a one-dimensional postmodern position, whereby dynamic symbolic inter- change and cultural reproduction use individuals and groups solely in the interest of the system. <u>He addresses progressive modern critical themes such as ideology critique, which he <mark>presents </mark>as an important practice for <mark>resistance to the hegemony of the school systein and its normalization practices</mark>."' He also retains critical theory's ambition of enhancing students' reflective power and ability to reconstruct the sociocultural context that blocks their abilities to create and realize their own meanings</u>.38 <u><mark>But he explicitly rejects the Enlightenment's and critical theory's concept of emancipation, and the essence of his pedagogy is to recognize the ''other" </u></mark>in his or her culture and the full implications of difference. <u>Whereas critical theory recognized the “other” in its otherness, in its unfulfilled needs and untruthfulness, <mark>Giroux</u></mark>, in accordance with postmodern popular formulations, <u><mark>sees that “other” as the starting point </mark>of the nonrepressive work of critical pedagogy, and negates modernistic “metanarratives”</u> and general theories that could have serve as a framework for reasoned critique and dialogue to which he remains committed. This draws him into the difficulties that Burbules identifies as challenging all ”postmodern” critical thinkers. <u><mark>'Giroux’s educational theory becomes nondialectical and optimistic in a manner that enables him to declare his crossing from the language of critique to </mark>the “language of <mark>possibility</mark>.” <mark>Contrary to his assertions, he distances himself from</mark> the essentials of <mark>the Enlightenment’s emancipatory project, while staying faithful to some of its harmful characteristics: its positive utopianism, its hasty optimism, and its arrogance as to the possibility of liberating the repressed and constituting a better world within current reality. </mark>While criticizing functionalist-positivistic attitudes, <mark>he abandons philosophy for political success in his critical pedagogy. In his own words, “schooling for self and social empowerment is ethically prior to questions of epistemology.</p><p>Giroux constructs an original synthesis of the Enlightenment’s universalistic commitment to liberate the repressed and a rejection of such concepts as the universality of reason, the validity of a general theory, and resistance against constructions and dynamics that are to be reconstructed and negated, if not defeated or domesticated</u></mark>. Today <u>Giroux accepts the postmodern understanding of the plurality and inconsistency of </u>time fields, the different epistemological structure of different communities, and the legitimacy of political and epistemic <u>difference; yet he still insists on the possibilities of emancipation here and now. Implicitly, in his thought these possibilities for emancipation are actual and universal, and his positive utopianism and his new epistemic assumptions are inconsistent. Here arise violent potentialities in his concept of dialogue between teachers and students. He has not found a theoretical solution to the conflict between the authority of the self- evident knowledge, criteria, goals, and interests of individual students of repressed collectives and the principles of his own critical pedagogy. While paying tribute to the self-evident knowledge of popular culture and criticizing elitist culture and critical theory, <mark>his own theory is elitist, sophisticated, and far from the reflective reach of those normalized and manipulated by popular culture and other manifestations of the culture industry. It’s a typical representative of both feminist and “patriarchal” critical pedagogy</u></mark>.44</p>

1NC

Case

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round4.docx

N

UNLV

4

UNT CS

Geoff Lundeen

1ac was marijuana prison industrial complex 1nc was damage centrism k plan pik legalization da and case 2nc was damage centrism and the legalization da 1nr was the pik and case 2nr was damage centrism the legalization da and the case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round4.docx

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The affirmative’s emphasis on material objects and organs can only serve as a distraction from wonder and the holy.

Hatab 1985

Lawrence J. Hatab. Nietzsche and Eternal Return: The Redemption of Time and Becoming. 1985. Page 56-57.

The soul, being attached to the lower realm, is too weak to grasp the Truth. The Truth blinds the soul at this level of awareness. Hence the lower admonitions cannot take the soul to the Truth The uppermost part of the soul is still in contact with the divine realm, but the soul has become blind to that state. Memory is never a vision in the past. It is an illumination in the present we find in Augustine the soul as both fallen and unfallen In the soul's unfallenness The soul is turned back to a remembrance to its origins, and within “Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells the Truth.

The soul, being attached to the lower realm, is too weak to grasp the Truth. The Truth blinds the soul at this level of awareness lower admonitions cannot take the soul to Truth The uppermost part of the soul is still in contact with the divine realm, but the soul has become blind to that state we find in Augustine the soul as both fallen and unfallen The soul is turned back to a remembrance to its origins, and within Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells the Truth.

The soul, being attached to the lower realm, is too weak to grasp the Truth. The Truth blinds the soul at this level of awareness. Hence the lower admonitions cannot take the soul directly to the Truth, and it has to pass through the levels of the soul's nature. Here is where the nature of contemplation comes to light, as the vehicle for the soul's ascent and return. With the notion of remembrance and recognition it is obvious that the soul is never entirely fallen. The uppermost part of the soul is still in contact with the divine realm, but the soul in its attachment has become blind to that state. Memory, given precision in Book X of the Confessions, is never merely a vision in the past. It is also an illumination in the present. Here we find in Augustine the Plotinian paradox of the soul seen as both fallen and unfallen, which incidentally never ceased to give Augustine problems. From this paradox can be viewed Augustine's two main sources of revelation. In the soul's unfallenness can be seen the workings of illumination. The soul is turned back to a remembrance to its origins, and within to the basis of its being still upholding it. Here appears one of Augustine's basic insights – the inwardness of spiritual experience. “Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells the Truth.”

<h4>The affirmative’s emphasis on material objects and organs can only serve as a distraction from wonder and the holy.</h4><p>Lawrence J. <u><strong>Hatab</u></strong>. Nietzsche and Eternal Return: The Redemption of Time and Becoming. <u><strong>1985</u></strong>. Page 56-57.</p><p><u><mark>The soul, being attached to the lower realm, is too weak to grasp the Truth. The Truth blinds the soul at this level of awareness</mark>. Hence the <mark>lower admonitions cannot take the soul</u></mark> directly <u><mark>to</mark> the <mark>Truth</u></mark>, and it has to pass through the levels of the soul's nature. Here is where the nature of contemplation comes to light, as the vehicle for the soul's ascent and return.</p><p>With the notion of remembrance and recognition it is obvious that the soul is never entirely fallen. <u><mark>The uppermost part of the soul is still in contact with the divine realm, but the soul</u></mark> in its attachment <u><mark>has become blind to that state</mark>. Memory</u>, given precision in Book X of the Confessions, <u>is never</u> merely <u>a vision in the past. It is</u> also <u>an illumination in the present</u>. Here <u><mark>we find in Augustine</u></mark> the Plotinian paradox of <u><mark>the soul</u></mark> seen <u><mark>as both fallen and unfallen</u></mark>, which incidentally never ceased to give Augustine problems. From this paradox can be viewed Augustine's two main sources of revelation. <u>In the soul's unfallenness</u> can be seen the workings of illumination. <u><mark>The soul is turned back to a remembrance to its origins, and within</u></mark> to the basis of its being still upholding it. Here appears one of Augustine's basic insights – the inwardness of spiritual experience. <u>“<mark>Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells the Truth.</u></mark>”</p>

1NC

Case

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

N

UNLV

7

Iowa HS

Shooter

1ac was simony of organs 1nc was framing spec the cap k the undercommons k the release the relics cp and case 2nc was undercommons and case 1nr was cap and relics 2nr was cap and relics

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round7.docx

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and the External Impact: THAT ENLIGHTENMENT MODEL OF EMANCIPATION HAS BEEN RESPONSBILE FOR PROGRAMS OF MASS EXTERMINATION, ASSIMILATION AND COLONIZATION AROUND THE GLOBE THROUGHOUT HUMAN HISTORY.

Orozco-Mendoza ‘8

Orozco-Mendoza ‘8 (Elva Fabiola, thesis: “Borderlands Theory: Producing Border Epistomologies with Gloria Anzaldua, Virgina Polytechnic Institute and State University, April 24, p. 8-9.

[T]he rhetoric of modernity (and ) of salvation continues to be implemented on the assumption of the inferiority intentions of the other and, therefore, continues to justify oppression and exploitation as well as the eradication of the difference (Mignolo and Tlostanova, 2006: 206). Change, in the European view, consisted of turning “savages” into "gentlemen" and of bringing them into civilization. However, until the moment when that change actually happened, Europeans did not take into account the voice, contributions, and knowledge of the colonized. In that way, the epistemologies of indigenous peoples were shadowed in obscurantism, and reason was considered a characteristic exclusively associated with whiteness, where epistemologies of colored people were denied as such. Accounts of this have been recorded by researchers such as Dwight Conquergood who explains, “[s]ince the enlightenment project of modernity, the first way of knowing has been preeminent. Marching under the banner of science and reason, it has disqualified and repressed other ways of knowing that are rooted inembodied experience, orality and local contingencies” (Conquergood, 2002: 146). On similar lines, we find Mignolo and Tlostanova (2006), who complain that the epistemologies of the colonized were erased from world history, since they held no value in the eyes of Europeans. Thus, the following step in colonization consisted of imposing assimilation into European settler cultures; that is how the Nahuatl and Maya languages were changed into Spanish, the Congolese, Kituba, or Lingala into French, or the Dahomeyan into English. This was also the reason why millions of people were forced to abandon their religion in order to be converted into Christianity. In sum, the culture, traditions, and religion of colonized people were used against them to justify oppression. For instance, the art and writing of the Maya civilization was destroyed under the justification that Maya texts were considered pagan. Similarly, the religious rites and human sacrifices of the Aztec culture were used as a justification for the destruction and subjugation of the Aztec people.

[T]he rhetoric of modernity (and salvation continues to be implemented on the assumption of the inferiority of the other and continues to justify oppression and exploitation as well as the eradication of the difference s]ince the enlightenment project of modernity, the first way of knowing has been preeminent that the epistemologies of the colonized were erased from world history, since they held no value in the eyes of Europeans. ; that is how the Nahuatl and Maya languages were changed into Spanish, the Congolese, Kituba, or Lingala into French millions of people were forced to abandon their religion in order to be converted into Christianity used against them to justify oppressio

[T]he rhetoric of modernity (and globalization) of salvation continues to be implemented on the assumption of the inferiority or devilish intentions of the other and, therefore, continues to justify oppression and exploitation as well as the eradication of the difference (Mignolo and Tlostanova, 2006: 206). Change, in the European view, consisted of turning “savages” into "gentlemen" and of bringing them into civilization. However, until the moment when that change actually happened, Europeans did not need to take into account the voice, contributions, and knowledge of the colonized. In that way, the epistemologies of indigenous peoples were shadowed in obscurantism, and reason was considered a characteristic exclusively associated with whiteness, where epistemologies of colored people were denied as such. Accounts of this have been recorded by researchers such as Dwight Conquergood who explains, “[s]ince the enlightenment project of modernity, the first way of knowing has been preeminent. Marching under the banner of science and reason, it has disqualified and repressed other ways of knowing that are rooted inembodied experience, orality and local contingencies” (Conquergood, 2002: 146). On similar lines, we find Mignolo and Tlostanova (2006), who complain that the epistemologies of the colonized were erased from world history, since they held no value in the eyes of Europeans. Thus, the following step in colonization consisted of imposing assimilation into European settler cultures; that is how the Nahuatl and Maya languages were changed into Spanish, the Congolese, Kituba, or Lingala into French, or the Dahomeyan into English. This was also the reason why millions of people were forced to abandon their religion in order to be converted into Christianity. In sum, the culture, traditions, and religion of colonized people were used against them to justify oppression. For instance, the art and writing of the Maya civilization was destroyed under the justification that Maya texts were considered pagan. Similarly, the religious rites and human sacrifices of the Aztec culture were used as a justification for the destruction and subjugation of the Aztec people.

<h4><strong>and the External Impact: THAT ENLIGHTENMENT MODEL OF EMANCIPATION HAS BEEN RESPONSBILE FOR PROGRAMS OF MASS EXTERMINATION, ASSIMILATION AND COLONIZATION AROUND THE GLOBE THROUGHOUT HUMAN HISTORY.</h4><p><u>Orozco-Mendoza ‘8</u> </strong>(Elva Fabiola, thesis: “Borderlands Theory: Producing Border Epistomologies with Gloria Anzaldua, Virgina Polytechnic Institute and State University, <u>April 24, p. 8-9.</p><p><mark>[T]he rhetoric of modernity (and </u></mark>globalization<u>) of <mark>salvation continues to be implemented on the assumption of the inferiority </u></mark>or devilish<u> intentions <mark>of the other and</mark>, therefore, <mark>continues to justify oppression and exploitation as well as the eradication of the difference</mark> (Mignolo and Tlostanova, 2006: 206). </p><p>Change, in the European view, consisted of turning “savages” into "gentlemen" and of bringing them into civilization. However, until the moment when that change actually happened, Europeans did not </u>need to<u> take into account the voice, contributions, and knowledge of the colonized. In that way, <strong>the epistemologies of indigenous peoples were shadowed in obscurantism, and reason was considered a characteristic exclusively associated with whiteness, where epistemologies of colored people were denied as such.</strong> Accounts of this have been recorded by researchers such as Dwight Conquergood who explains, “[<mark>s]ince the enlightenment project of modernity, the first way of knowing has been preeminent</mark>. <strong>Marching under the banner of science and reason, it has disqualified and repressed other ways of knowing that are rooted inembodied experience, orality and local contingencies”</strong> (Conquergood, 2002: 146). On similar lines, we find Mignolo and Tlostanova (2006), who complain <mark>that the epistemologies of the colonized were erased from world history, since they held no value in the eyes of Europeans.</mark> Thus, the following step in colonization consisted of imposing assimilation into European settler cultures<mark>; that is how the Nahuatl and Maya languages were changed into Spanish, the Congolese, Kituba, or Lingala into French</mark>, or the Dahomeyan into English. This was also the reason why <mark>millions of people were forced to abandon their religion in order to be converted into Christianity</mark>. In sum, the culture, traditions, and religion of colonized people were <mark>used against them to justify oppressio</mark>n. For instance, the art and writing of the Maya civilization was destroyed under the justification that Maya texts were considered pagan. Similarly, the religious rites and human sacrifices of the Aztec culture were used as a justification for the destruction and subjugation of the Aztec people.</p></u>

1NC

Case

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round4.docx

N

UNLV

4

UNT CS

Geoff Lundeen

1ac was marijuana prison industrial complex 1nc was damage centrism k plan pik legalization da and case 2nc was damage centrism and the legalization da 1nr was the pik and case 2nr was damage centrism the legalization da and the case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round4.docx

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

December legislation solves hemp

Ferner 12/14

Matt Ferner 12/14 is a national reporter for the Huffington Post, December 10th 2014, “Congress Blocks Feds from Targeting Medical Marijuana, Hemp Cultivation”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/10/congress-blocks-feds-from_n_6302530.html, [AB]

States with legal hemp cultivation just got historic support from Congress Included in the federal spending bill released Tuesday are amendments that prohibit the Department of Justice and the D E A from using funds to interfere in state-legal industrial hemp research this legislation will mark the first time in decades that the federal government has curtailed its oppressive prohibition of marijuana and has instead taken an approach to respect states But marijuana's "sober cousin," hemp also received protections in the spending bill The farm bill legalized industrial hemp production in states that permit it. Eighteen states have legalized industrial hemp production and a dozen others have introduced legislation that would authorize research, set up a regulatory framework or legalize the growing of industrial hemp. Congress is letting states set their own hemp policies a huge step forward for sensible drug policy Congress will be forced to accommodate them

hemp just got historic support from Congress the spending bill prohibit the D o J and D E A from using funds to interfere hemp research this legislation will mark the first time the fed curtailed prohibition and taken an approach to respect states marijuana's hemp received protections The farm bill legalized industrial hemp Eighteen have and others introduced legislation that would legalize hemp Congress is letting states set their own hemp policies a huge step forward Congress will accommodate them

States with legal hemp cultivation and medical marijuana programs just got historic support from Congress. Included in the federal spending bill released late Tuesday are amendments that prohibit the Department of Justice from using funds to go after state medical marijuana operations and that block the Drug Enforcement Administration from using funds to interfere in state-legal industrial hemp research. “The enactment of this legislation will mark the first time in decades that the federal government has curtailed its oppressive prohibition of marijuana and has instead taken an approach to respect the many states that have permitted the use of medical marijuana to some degree," Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif.), who in May introduced the medical marijuana protections amendment with co-sponsor Rep. Sam Farr (D-Calif.), told The Huffington Post Wednesday. “This is a victory for so many, including scores of our wounded veterans, who have found marijuana to be an important medicine for some of the ailments they suffer, such as PTSD, epilepsy and MS," Rohrabacher added. If passed, the bill would protect medical marijuana programs in the 23 states that have legalized marijuana for medical purposes, as well as 11 additional states that have legalized CBD oils, a non-psychoactive ingredient in marijuana that may be therapeutically beneficial in severe cases of epilepsy. A number of studies in recent years have shown the medical potential of cannabis. Purified forms may attack some forms of aggressive cancer. Marijuana use also has been tied to better blood sugar control and may help slow the spread of HIV. Still, under the Obama administration, the DEA and several U.S. attorneys have raided marijuana dispensaries that complied with state laws. The DEA still classifies marijuana as a Schedule I substance with "no currently accepted medical use." But marijuana's "sober cousin," hemp, also received protections in the spending bill. Hemp is the same plant species as marijuana -- cannabis sativa -- but it contains little to no THC, the psychoactive ingredient in marijuana associated with the "high" sensation. The farm bill, which President Barack Obama signed into law in February, legalized industrial hemp production in states that permit it. Eighteen states have legalized industrial hemp production, and more than a dozen others have introduced legislation that would authorize research, set up a regulatory framework or legalize the growing of industrial hemp. The spending bill represents a last-minute effort by Congress to prevent a government shutdown after funding expires Thursday, and the medical marijuana and hemp sections are two of several political issues addressed in the omnibus bill. “For the first time, Congress is letting states set their own medical marijuana and hemp policies, a huge step forward for sensible drug policy," said Bill Piper, director of national affairs for the Drug Policy Alliance. “States will continue to reform their marijuana laws and Congress will be forced to accommodate them. It’s not a question of if, but when, federal marijuana prohibition will be repealed."

<h4>December legislation solves hemp</h4><p>Matt <u><strong>Ferner 12/14</u></strong> is a national reporter for the Huffington Post, December 10th 2014, “Congress Blocks Feds from Targeting Medical Marijuana, Hemp Cultivation”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/10/congress-blocks-feds-from_n_6302530.html, [AB]</p><p><u>States with legal <mark>hemp</mark> cultivation</u> and medical marijuana programs <u><mark>just got <strong>historic support from Congress</u></strong></mark>. <u>Included in <mark>the</mark> federal <mark>spending bill</mark> released</u> late <u>Tuesday are amendments that</u> <u><strong><mark>prohibit the</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>D</strong></mark>epartment <strong><mark>o</strong></mark>f <strong><mark>J</strong></mark>ustice</u> from using funds to go after state medical marijuana operations <u><mark>and</u></mark> that block <u>the</u> <u><strong><mark>D</u></strong></mark>rug <u><strong><mark>E</u></strong></mark>nforcement <u><strong><mark>A</u></strong></mark>dministration <u><mark>from <strong>using funds to interfere </mark>in state-legal industrial <mark>hemp research</u></strong></mark>. “The enactment of <u><mark>this legislation will</mark> <mark>mark the <strong>first time</mark> in decades</u></strong> <u>that <strong><mark>the fed</strong></mark>eral government has <strong><mark>curtailed</mark> its oppressive <mark>prohibition</mark> of marijuana</strong> <mark>and</mark> has instead <mark>taken an approach to respect</u></mark> the many <u><mark>states</u></mark> that have permitted the use of medical marijuana to some degree," Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif.), who in May introduced the medical marijuana protections amendment with co-sponsor Rep. Sam Farr (D-Calif.), told The Huffington Post Wednesday. “This is a victory for so many, including scores of our wounded veterans, who have found marijuana to be an important medicine for some of the ailments they suffer, such as PTSD, epilepsy and MS," Rohrabacher added. If passed, the bill would protect medical marijuana programs in the 23 states that have legalized marijuana for medical purposes, as well as 11 additional states that have legalized CBD oils, a non-psychoactive ingredient in marijuana that may be therapeutically beneficial in severe cases of epilepsy. A number of studies in recent years have shown the medical potential of cannabis. Purified forms may attack some forms of aggressive cancer. Marijuana use also has been tied to better blood sugar control and may help slow the spread of HIV. Still, under the Obama administration, the DEA and several U.S. attorneys have raided marijuana dispensaries that complied with state laws. The DEA still classifies marijuana as a Schedule I substance with "no currently accepted medical use." <u>But <mark>marijuana's</mark> "sober cousin," <strong><mark>hemp</u></strong></mark>, <u>also</u> <u><strong><mark>received protections</u></strong></mark> <u>in the spending bill</u>. Hemp is the same plant species as marijuana -- cannabis sativa -- but it contains little to no THC, the psychoactive ingredient in marijuana associated with the "high" sensation. <u><mark>The farm bill</u></mark>, which President Barack Obama signed into law in February, <u><strong><mark>legalized industrial hemp</u></strong></mark> <u>production in states that permit it. <mark>Eighteen</u></mark> <u>states <mark>have</u></mark> <u><strong>legalized industrial hemp production</u></strong>, <u><mark>and</u></mark> more than <u>a dozen <mark>others</mark> have <mark>introduced legislation that would</u></mark> <u>authorize research, set up a regulatory framework or <strong><mark>legalize</mark> the growing of industrial <mark>hemp</strong></mark>.</u> The spending bill represents a last-minute effort by Congress to prevent a government shutdown after funding expires Thursday, and the medical marijuana and hemp sections are two of several political issues addressed in the omnibus bill. “For the first time, <u><strong><mark>Congress is letting states set their own</u></strong></mark> medical marijuana and <u><strong><mark>hemp</mark> <mark>policies</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>a</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>huge step forward</u></strong></mark> <u>for</u> <u>sensible drug policy</u>," said Bill Piper, director of national affairs for the Drug Policy Alliance. “States will continue to reform their marijuana laws and <u><strong><mark>Congress will</mark> be forced to <mark>accommodate them</u></strong></mark>. It’s not a question of if, but when, federal marijuana prohibition will be repealed."</p>

1NC

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1ac was mj with cartels and hemp advantages 1nc was legalism and security and case 2nc was legalism 1nr was case 2nr was legalism and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-D3-Round1.docx

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Hemp fails

Wishnia 13

Steven Wishnia 13, Alternet Writer, 2/16/13, “Can hemp save the economy?” http://www.salon.com/2013/02/16/politicians_are_pushing_to_bring_back_the_hemp_partner/

One problem for the industry is that hemp’s decades of illegality left almost no infrastructure for growing, processing and selling it This lack of infrastructure has been a major barrier to producing hemp Hemp oil for biofuel is unlikely to be practical. At 50 gallons per acre, even if every acre of U.S. cropland were used for hemp, it would supply current U.S. demand for oil for less than three weeks. Canada’s experience illustrates the problems of developing a new industry, says Murphy. Hemp farming there has been through two boom-and-bust cycles since it was legalized

hemp’s illegality left almost no infrastructure for growing, processing and selling it This lack of infrastructure has been a major barrier Hemp oil for biofuel is unlikely to be practical. even if every acre of U.S. cropland were used for hemp, it would supply current U.S. demand for oil for less than three weeks. Canada’s experience illustrates the problems of developing a new industry Hemp farming there has been through two boom-and-bust cycles since it was legalized

One problem for the industry is that hemp’s decades of illegality have left almost no infrastructure for growing, processing and selling it. As no hemp has been grown legally in the U.S. since 1957, says Murphy, many parts of the industry would have to be re-established virtually from scratch. To begin with, all the seed stock is gone, except for feral ditchweed. “You’d have to breed again for varieties that work well here,” he says. Kentucky was once a major hemp producer, and it also provided seeds for strains better suited to different latitudes, such as Wisconsin. There were also strains bred for fiber or for larger seeds that yielded more oil. Currently, Murphy says, Canada uses mostly Russian and European stock. Those seeds could also be cross-bred with local feral strains. This lack of infrastructure has been a major barrier to producing hemp clothing and paper. Building a new decorticator mill for hemp paper would cost more than $100 million, says Murphy. Several small companies are using hemp for specialized products such as archival-quality, filter, or cigarette papers, but its most likely general use will be when mixed with recycled paper, says Steenstra. “Blend in 10 to 15 percent hemp, and it’s great for making better-quality recycled paper,” he says. When paper gets recycled, he explains, its fibers get shorter, and the long fibers of hemp strengthen it. There are similar issues with clothing. Though Calvin Klein, Ralph Lauren, Giorgio Armani, and several lesser-known manufacturers are using hemp in clothes, “the whole textile industry is built on short-fiber cotton and synthetics,” says Steenstra. “There’s no infrastructure for processing hemp fiber into textiles.” Hemp oil for biofuel, another use dreamed of in the ‘90s, is unlikely to be practical. At 50 gallons per acre, even if every acre of U.S. cropland were used for hemp, it would supply current U.S. demand for oil for less than three weeks. On the other hand, the hemp-food industry is “pretty well settled,” says Murphy. If hemp growing were legalized in the U.S., he adds, a lot of Canadian processors would probably open facilities here. Legalization would also help hemp food break out of its niche-market status. If it received “GRAS” (Generally Recognized As Safe) status from the Food and Drug Administration, major brands would be less reluctant to use it. Until then, he says, Coca-Cola won’t put hemp milk in Odwalla Future Shakes, and we’re not likely to see hempseed Clif Bars. Canada’s experience illustrates the problems of developing a new industry, says Murphy. Hemp farming there has been through two boom-and-bust cycles since it was legalized in 1998. The nation’s production leaped to 35,000 acres in 1999 and plummeted to about 4,000 in 2001, according to a report by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in Alberta, Canada’s main hemp-producing province. It soared to 48,000 acres in 2006 and fell to less than 10,000 two years later.

<h4><strong>Hemp fails </h4><p></strong>Steven <u><strong>Wishnia 13</u></strong>, Alternet Writer, 2/16/13, “Can hemp save the economy?” http://www.salon.com/2013/02/16/politicians_are_pushing_to_bring_back_the_hemp_partner/</p><p><u>One problem for the industry is that <mark>hemp’s</mark> decades of <mark>illegality</u></mark> have <u><strong><mark>left almost no infrastructure for growing, processing and selling it</u></strong></mark>. As no hemp has been grown legally in the U.S. since 1957, says Murphy, many parts of the industry would have to be re-established virtually from scratch. To begin with, all the seed stock is gone, except for feral ditchweed. “You’d have to breed again for varieties that work well here,” he says. Kentucky was once a major hemp producer, and it also provided seeds for strains better suited to different latitudes, such as Wisconsin. There were also strains bred for fiber or for larger seeds that yielded more oil. Currently, Murphy says, Canada uses mostly Russian and European stock. Those seeds could also be cross-bred with local feral strains. <u><mark>This lack of infrastructure has been a major barrier</mark> to producing hemp</u> clothing and paper. Building a new decorticator mill for hemp paper would cost more than $100 million, says Murphy. Several small companies are using hemp for specialized products such as archival-quality, filter, or cigarette papers, but its most likely general use will be when mixed with recycled paper, says Steenstra. “Blend in 10 to 15 percent hemp, and it’s great for making better-quality recycled paper,” he says. When paper gets recycled, he explains, its fibers get shorter, and the long fibers of hemp strengthen it. There are similar issues with clothing. Though Calvin Klein, Ralph Lauren, Giorgio Armani, and several lesser-known manufacturers are using hemp in clothes, “the whole textile industry is built on short-fiber cotton and synthetics,” says Steenstra. “There’s no infrastructure for processing hemp fiber into textiles.” <u><mark>Hemp oil for biofuel</u></mark>, another use dreamed of in the ‘90s, <u><strong><mark>is unlikely to be practical.</u></strong></mark> <u>At 50 gallons per acre, <mark>even if every acre of U.S. cropland were used for hemp, it would supply current U.S. demand for oil <strong>for less than three weeks.</u></strong></mark> On the other hand, the hemp-food industry is “pretty well settled,” says Murphy. If hemp growing were legalized in the U.S., he adds, a lot of Canadian processors would probably open facilities here. Legalization would also help hemp food break out of its niche-market status. If it received “GRAS” (Generally Recognized As Safe) status from the Food and Drug Administration, major brands would be less reluctant to use it. Until then, he says, Coca-Cola won’t put hemp milk in Odwalla Future Shakes, and we’re not likely to see hempseed Clif Bars. <u><mark>Canada’s experience illustrates the problems of developing a new industry</mark>, says Murphy. <mark>Hemp farming there has been through <strong>two boom-and-bust cycles</strong> since it was legalized</u></mark> in 1998. The nation’s production leaped to 35,000 acres in 1999 and plummeted to about 4,000 in 2001, according to a report by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in Alberta, Canada’s main hemp-producing province. It soared to 48,000 acres in 2006 and fell to less than 10,000 two years later.</p>

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1ac was mj with cartels and hemp advantages 1nc was legalism and security and case 2nc was legalism 1nr was case 2nr was legalism and case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-D3-Round1.docx

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Academia is a pollution of the affirmative project—an inoculation and re-scripting of the very terms of contestation such that nothing is left but the continued propagation of social death

Occupied UC Berkeley ‘9 ) [m leap]

Occupied UC Berkeley ‘9 (“The Necrosocial – Civic Life, Social Death, and the University of California,” November 2009, Craccum Magazine – University of Auckland Student Magazine. Iss. 4, 2012. http://craccum.ausa.auckland.ac.nz/?p=286) [m leap]

here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict. Who knew that behind so much civic life (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether—that is, meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of—when we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us Each day passes in this way, the administration out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless The university steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also steals and homogenizes meaning. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. Social death is, of course, simply the power source, the generator, of civic life with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death the university is a graveyard, but it is also a factory: a factory of meaning which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; which everywhere reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property). Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, discourse designed to make our very moments here together into a set of legible and fruitless demands. Totally managed death. A machine for administering death As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations. This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us. We form teams, schools ideologies, identities each group gets its own designated burial plot Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard? In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination. It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never feel terrible to diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying, completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this same dream of domination. After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this. We are convinced, owned, broken. The values create popular images and ideals (healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education) while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. They sell the practice through the image. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice. Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just how dead we are willing to play, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous. Each bulging institutional value longing to become more than its sentiment through us, each of our empty gestures of feigned-anxiety to appear under pressure, or of cool-ambivalence to appear accustomed to horror, every moment of student life, is the management of our consent to social death. Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. It’s the positions we thoughtlessly enact. It’s the particular nature of being owned. Social rupture is the initial divorce between the owners and the owned. A social movement is a function of war. War contains the ability to create a new frame, to build a new tension for the agents at play, new dynamics in the battles both for the meaning and the material. When we move without a return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war. For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures We are an antagonistic dead.

the university manages our social death, translating what we once knew into acceptable forms of social conflict. the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where meaning is ripped from action to perpetually deliberate when we push the boundaries they reconfigure themselves to contain us the administration out to shape student discourse It becomes banal, thoughtless The university steals and homogenizes meaning the university is a graveyard a factory of meaning which reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students discourse designed to make our moments together into a set of legible and fruitless demands Totally managed death. A machine for administering death each which seek to absorb more of our energy they perpetuate the inertia of meaning detached from social context these discourses and research programs play their role, co-opting and containing radical potential The university gladly permits precautionary lectures A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us the university’s ghosts are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs We form teams, identities each group gets its own designated burial plot . Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures We are an antagonistic dead.

Yes, very much a cemetery. Only here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict. Who knew that behind so much civic life (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether—that is, meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of—when we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us: the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension. Each day passes in this way, the administration on the look out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history. This accumulation—every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life. A dead but restless and desirous life. The university steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also steals and homogenizes meaning. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. Social death is, of course, simply the power source, the generator, of civic life with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death: its garrulous slogans of freedom and democracy designed to obscure the shit and decay in which our feet are planted. Yes, the university is a graveyard, but it is also a factory: a factory of meaning which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; which everywhere reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property). Everywhere the same whimsical ideas of the future. Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, discourse designed to make our very moments here together into a set of legible and fruitless demands. Totally managed death. A machine for administering death, for the proliferation of technologies of death. As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place. With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the blind inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential. And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter. The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism. And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls. There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth. The university is a graveyard– así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations. This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us. Here we are at odds with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty, staff, homebums, activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/ staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be. That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders—each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning. We form teams, clubs, fraternities, majors, departments, schools, unions, ideologies, identities, and subcultures—and thankfully each group gets its own designated burial plot. Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard? In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination. We spend money and energy trying to convince ourselves we’re brighter than everyone else. Somehow, we think, we possess some trait that means we deserve more than everyone else. We have measured ourselves and we have measured others. It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never feel terrible to diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying, completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this same dream of domination. After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this. We are convinced, owned, broken. We know their values better than they do: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. This triumvirate of sacred values are ours of course, and in this moment of practiced theater—the fight between the university and its own students—we have used their words on their stages: Save public education! When those values are violated by the very institutions which are created to protect them, the veneer fades, the tired set collapses: and we call it injustice, we get indignant. We demand justice from them, for them to adhere to their values. What many have learned again and again is that these institutions don’t care for those values, not at all, not for all. And we are only beginning to understand that those values are not even our own. The values create popular images and ideals (healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education) while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. They sell the practice through the image. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice. In this crisis the Chancellors and Presidents, the Regents and the British Petroleums, the politicians and the managers, they all intend to be true to their values and capitalize on the university economically and socially—which is to say, nothing has changed, it is only an escalation, a provocation. Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just how dead we are willing to play, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous. Every institution has of course our best interest in mind, so much so that we’re willing to pay, to enter debt contracts, to strike a submissive pose in the classroom, in the lab, in the seminar, in the dorm, and eventually or simultaneously in the workplace to pay back those debts. Each bulging institutional value longing to become more than its sentiment through us, each of our empty gestures of feigned-anxiety to appear under pressure, or of cool-ambivalence to appear accustomed to horror, every moment of student life, is the management of our consent to social death. Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. It’s the positions we thoughtlessly enact. It’s the particular nature of being owned. Social rupture is the initial divorce between the owners and the owned. A social movement is a function of war. War contains the ability to create a new frame, to build a new tension for the agents at play, new dynamics in the battles both for the meaning and the material. When we move without a return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war. It is November 2009. For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures and self-propelled, unmanaged movements of wild bodies. We need, we desire occupations. We are an antagonistic dead.

<h4>Academia is a pollution of the affirmative project—an inoculation and re-scripting of the very terms of contestation such that nothing is left but the continued propagation of social death</h4><p><u><strong>Occupied UC Berkeley ‘9</u></strong> (“The Necrosocial – Civic Life, Social Death, and the University of California,” November 2009, Craccum Magazine – University of Auckland Student Magazine. Iss. 4, 2012. http://craccum.ausa.auckland.ac.nz/?p=286<u><strong>) [m leap]</p><p></u></strong>Yes, very much a cemetery. Only <u>here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like <mark>the university </mark>just like the state just like the economy <strong><mark>manages our social death</strong>, translating what we once knew</mark> from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, <mark>into acceptable forms of social conflict.</mark> Who knew that behind so much civic life</u> <u>(electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam)</u> <u>was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. </u>When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. <u>He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, <mark>the <strong>release valve</strong> of the university plunges us into an abyss where</mark> ideas are wisps of ether—that is, <strong><mark>meaning is ripped from action</strong></mark>. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: <mark>to <strong>perpetually deliberate</strong></mark>, the endless fleshing-out-of—<mark>when we push the boundaries</mark> of this form <mark>they </mark>are quick <strong>to <mark>reconfigure themselves to contain us</u></strong></mark>: the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension.<u> Each day passes in this way, <mark>the administration</mark> </u>on the look<u> <mark>out to shape student discourse</mark>—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. <mark>It becomes <strong>banal, thoughtless</u></strong></mark>. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history. This accumulation—every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life. A dead but restless and desirous life. <u><mark>The university</mark> steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also <strong><mark>steals and homogenizes meaning</strong></mark>. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. <strong>Social death is</strong>, of course, simply the power source, <strong>the generator, of civic life</strong> with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death</u>: its garrulous slogans of freedom and democracy designed to obscure the shit and decay in which our feet are planted. Yes, <u><strong><mark>the university is a graveyard</strong></mark>, but it is also a factory: <strong><mark>a factory of meaning</strong> </mark>which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; <mark>which </mark>everywhere <mark>reproduces the <strong>empty reactionary behavior of students</strong> </mark>based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property).</u> Everywhere the same whimsical ideas of the future. <u>Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, <strong><mark>discourse designed to make our </mark>very <mark>moments </mark>here <mark>together into a set of legible and fruitless demands</strong></mark>. <mark>Totally managed death. A machine for administering death</u></mark>, for the proliferation of technologies of death. <u>As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, <strong>it matters little what face one puts on the university</u></strong>—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—<u><mark>each </mark>one the product of some exploitation—<mark>which seek to absorb more of our </mark>work, more tuition, more <mark>energy</mark>.</u> The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place.<u> With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, <mark>they perpetuate the </u></mark>blind <u><strong><mark>inertia of meaning</strong></mark> ostensibly <strong><mark>detached from</strong></mark> its <strong><mark>social context</strong></mark>. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, <mark>these discourses and research programs play their</mark> own <mark>role, <strong>co-opting and containing radical potential</u></strong></mark>. And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter. <u><mark>The university gladly permits</mark> the <strong><mark>precautionary lectures</strong></mark> on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. <strong><mark>A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us</strong></mark> against any confrontational radicalism.</u> And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls. There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth. The university is a graveyard– así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. <u>Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to <strong><mark>the university’s ghosts</strong></mark>, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They <mark>are<strong> summoned forth and banished</strong> by a few well-meaning <strong>phrases and research programs</strong></mark>, given their book titles, their <strong>citations</strong>. <strong>This is our gothic</strong>—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us.</u> Here we are at odds with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty, staff, homebums, activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/ staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be. That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders—each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning. <u><mark>We form teams,</u></mark> clubs, fraternities, majors, departments, <u>schools</u>, unions, <u>ideologies, <mark>identities</u></mark>, and subcultures—and thankfully <u><strong><mark>each group gets its own designated burial plot</u></strong></mark>. <u>Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard? In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination<mark>.</mark> </u>We spend money and energy trying to convince ourselves we’re brighter than everyone else. Somehow, we think, we possess some trait that means we deserve more than everyone else. We have measured ourselves and we have measured others.<u> It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never <strong>feel terrible</strong> to <strong>diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital</strong> as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying, completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this <strong>same dream of domination.</strong> After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this. We are <strong>convinced, owned, broken.</u></strong> We know their values better than they do: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. This triumvirate of sacred values are ours of course, and in this moment of practiced theater—the fight between the university and its own students—we have used their words on their stages: Save public education! When those values are violated by the very institutions which are created to protect them, the veneer fades, the tired set collapses: and we call it injustice, we get indignant. We demand justice from them, for them to adhere to their values. What many have learned again and again is that these institutions don’t care for those values, not at all, not for all. And we are only beginning to understand that those values are not even our own. <u>The values create popular images and ideals</u> <u>(healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education)</u> <u>while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. <strong>They sell the practice through the image</strong>. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice.</u> In this crisis the Chancellors and Presidents, the Regents and the British Petroleums, the politicians and the managers, they all intend to be true to their values and capitalize on the university economically and socially—which is to say, nothing has changed, it is only an escalation, a provocation. <u>Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just <strong>how dead we are willing to play</strong>, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous. </u>Every institution has of course our best interest in mind, so much so that we’re willing to pay, to enter debt contracts, to strike a submissive pose in the classroom, in the lab, in the seminar, in the dorm, and eventually or simultaneously in the workplace to pay back those debts.<u> Each bulging institutional value longing to become more than its sentiment through us, each of our empty gestures of feigned-anxiety to appear under pressure, or of cool-ambivalence to appear accustomed to horror, every moment of student life, is the management of our consent to social death. <strong><mark>Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning. </mark>It’s the positions we thoughtlessly enact</strong>.</u> <u>It’s the particular nature of being owned. <strong>Social rupture</strong> is the initial divorce between the owners and the owned. A social movement is a <strong>function of war</strong>. War contains the ability to create a <strong>new frame</strong>, to build a <strong>new tension</strong> for the agents at play, <strong>new dynamics</strong> in the battles both for the meaning and the material. When we move without a return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.</u> It is November 2009. <u><mark>For an end to the values of social death we need ruptures </u></mark>and self-propelled, unmanaged movements of wild bodies. We need, we desire occupations. <u><strong><mark>We are an antagonistic dead.</p></u></strong></mark>

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Luis Andrade

1ac was black self love 1nc was university k faciality k and case 2nc was university 1nr was faciality 2nr was university

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round6.docx

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That takes out the whole aff

Hatab 85

Lawrence J. Hatab. Nietzsche and Eternal Return: The Redemption of Time and Becoming. 1985. Page 54-56.

We cannot express God through temporal expressions The eternity of God is a pure present without succession What man knows as divided into anticipation, attention and memory is to God a pure, undivided Now. Time is succession; but in God there is no succession; He is every-complete and indivisible in an ever-present eternity The soul is a permanence in relation to the succession of moments Time is negativity, as a dispersal of a simplicity and perfection once possessed but lost. The soul is dispersed in time, after turning away from God, and suffers as a result (from the negativity of change) the soul is “distracted,” by particular interests, from the simplicity of eternity time is the rejection and covering up of truth. Man in time is a soul fallen through the sin of pride

The eternity of God is a pure present without succession The soul is a permanence in relation to the succession of moments Time is negativity, as a dispersal of a simplicity and perfection once possessed but lost the soul is “distracted,” by particular interests, from the simplicity of eternity

In chapter xxx Augustine returns to the problem that generated his investigation of time in the first place – the nature of God. We cannot express God through any temporal expressions, i.e. “before,” “after,” “never.” The eternity of God is a pure present without succession of passage. The eternity of God can not in any way be thought of as having any “divisions” of awareness. What man knows as divided into anticipation, attention and memory, no matter how comprehensive, is known to God in a pure, undivided Now. Time is succession; but in God there is no succession; He is every-complete and indivisible in an ever-present eternity. And eternity precedes time, not in a temporal sense, but is prior as cause. Without eternity there is no time. The soul is a permanence in relation to the succession of moments it measures, and therefore the notion of soul as extended cannot be taken literally. But its knowledge is piecemeal and operates through time-divisions, so the soul is extended when compared with the simplicity of God's knowledge. The soul is permanent in regard to the motion is measures, but it is in flux in regard to the perfect permanence of God. But the soul possesses this permanent standard of measure because its true essence is to be found in the permanence of eternity; its life in flux is merely a departure from its essence. Time and eternity, for Augustine, are totally different and separate. From our interpretation of Plato, seen as the explication of something implicit in the thought of Heraclitus, we can recall that in the Platonic cosmos time exists necessarily as the eternally manifesting reflection of an eternal ground. But for Augustine, time proceeds from the will of a Creator; time is not necessarily implied in eternity, though eternity is necessary to uphold time. For Plato, eternity does imply time; only thus can time be the image of eternity. But Augustine proceeds through empirical investigation (like Aristotle, though in psychological terms) and can find no transcendental ground necessarily connected with temporality. What must be recognized is that Augustine's strict separation of time and eternity does not issue from an analytic ground but a moral one. Time for Augustine is essentially negativity, as a dispersal of a simplicity and perfection once possessed but lost. The soul is dispersed in time, after turning away from God, and suffers as a result (from the negativity of change). Time has its seat in the soul; only thus can Augustine maintain that the placement of the soul in a changing universe is ultimately the soul's own responsibility, i.e. a fall, and is not necessarily connected with God, a connection that would violate the unchangeability of eternity. The life of man is an extension, because it grasps things in succession, and morally so because the soul is “distracted,” by particular interests, from the simplicity of eternity. Augustine's purpose in considering time in the Confessions is not merely to understand time as such, but to see time as evidence of a fall, creating a temporal dispersal of an eternity once seen and turned from; i.e. time is the rejection and covering up of truth. Man in time is a soul fallen through the sin of pride – this is the main theme of the Confessions. Let us now briefly consider this moral foundation of Augustine's thought.

<h4>That takes out the whole aff</h4><p>Lawrence J. <u><strong>Hatab</u></strong>. Nietzsche and Eternal Return: The Redemption of Time and Becoming. 19<u><strong>85</u></strong>. Page 54-56.</p><p>In chapter xxx Augustine returns to the problem that generated his investigation of time in the first place – the nature of God. <u> We cannot express God through</u> any <u>temporal expressions</u>, i.e. “before,” “after,” “never.” <u><mark>The eternity of God is a pure present without succession</u></mark> of passage. The eternity of God can not in any way be thought of as having any “divisions” of awareness. <u>What man knows as divided into anticipation, attention and memory</u>, no matter how comprehensive, <u>is</u> known <u>to God</u> in <u>a pure, undivided Now. Time is succession; but in God there is no succession; He is every-complete and indivisible in an ever-present eternity</u>. And eternity precedes time, not in a temporal sense, but is prior as cause. Without eternity there is no time. <u><mark>The soul is a permanence in relation to the succession of moments</u></mark> it measures, and therefore the notion of soul as extended cannot be taken literally. But its knowledge is piecemeal and operates through time-divisions, so the soul is extended when compared with the simplicity of God's knowledge. The soul is permanent in regard to the motion is measures, but it is in flux in regard to the perfect permanence of God. But the soul possesses this permanent standard of measure because its true essence is to be found in the permanence of eternity; its life in flux is merely a departure from its essence.</p><p>Time and eternity, for Augustine, are totally different and separate. From our interpretation of Plato, seen as the explication of something implicit in the thought of Heraclitus, we can recall that in the Platonic cosmos time exists necessarily as the eternally manifesting reflection of an eternal ground. But for Augustine, time proceeds from the will of a Creator; time is not necessarily implied in eternity, though eternity is necessary to uphold time. For Plato, eternity does imply time; only thus can time be the image of eternity. But Augustine proceeds through empirical investigation (like Aristotle, though in psychological terms) and can find no transcendental ground necessarily connected with temporality.</p><p>What must be recognized is that Augustine's strict separation of time and eternity does not issue from an analytic ground but a moral one. <u><mark>Time</u></mark> for Augustine <u><mark>is</u></mark> essentially <u><mark>negativity, as a dispersal of a simplicity and perfection once possessed but lost</mark>. The soul is dispersed in time, after turning away from God, and suffers as a result (from the negativity of change)</u>. Time has its seat in the soul; only thus can Augustine maintain that the placement of the soul in a changing universe is ultimately the soul's own responsibility, i.e. a fall, and is not necessarily connected with God, a connection that would violate the unchangeability of eternity. The life of man is an extension, because it grasps things in succession, and morally so because <u><mark>the soul is “distracted,” by particular interests, from the simplicity of eternity</u></mark>. Augustine's purpose in considering time in the Confessions is not merely to understand time as such, but to see time as evidence of a fall, creating a temporal dispersal of an eternity once seen and turned from; i.e. <u>time is the rejection and covering up of truth. Man in time is a soul fallen through the sin of pride</u> – this is the main theme of the Confessions. Let us now briefly consider this moral foundation of Augustine's thought.</p>

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Shooter

1ac was simony of organs 1nc was framing spec the cap k the undercommons k the release the relics cp and case 2nc was undercommons and case 1nr was cap and relics 2nr was cap and relics

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THIS MANDATES REFUSAL OF THE AFFIRMATIVE’S EMANCIPATORY PHILOSOPHIES and enlightenment politics.

Gur-Ze'ev 98

. These different educational projects have in common the avoidance of challenging the philosophical and political difficulties that affect their own educational alternatives .They are committed to reconstruct or decipher the power relations that produce the subject, consciousness, identity, knowledge, and possibilities to act in and change reality. They demonstrate and challenge the production of marginality, impotency, and violence of individuals and groups, their control and activation for the sake of the present order of things. They all negate “neutral” positivistic and functionalist trends that prosper in Western societies and, with the help of formal and informal education, reproduce the present order. However, they all refuse philosophy and anything that hints of a “theory” or “elitism.” This is the background to their political and educational impotence, which leads to nothing but empty negativism and fruitless pessimism Optimism or the “possibility of emancipation” is presented as an argument for refusing a philosophical work as too “pessimistic.” For Giroux, for example, this is an argument strong enough to negate Adorno and Horkheimer’s late critical theory the efficiency of the concrete struggle” are enough to avoid theoretical challenges. I do not claim that all the theoretical and practical work of critical pedagogy is useless or wrong, let alone that we should prefer hegemonic educational ideologies. However, philosophy cannot supply an alternative. The philosophy I suggest is a political issue, and its educational implication demands a kind of vita activa activism, theoretical work, and educational praxis are not “postmodern,” “post-critical,” “feminist,” or “inulticultural.” The educational philosophy presented here is a negative utopianism. The “grand refusal” and utopia that demand transcendence from the current realm of self-evidence are here combined into a politico-philosophical deed. This is educational praxis as counter-education

These educational projects are committed to reconstruct or decipher the power relations and change reality . However, they all refuse philosophy and anything that hints of a “theory” or “elitism.” This is the background to their political and educational impotence, which leads to nothing but empty negativism and fruitless pessimism Optimism or the “possibility of emancipation” is presented as an argument for refusing a philosophical work as too “pessimistic.” For Giroux , this is an argument strong enough to negate Adorno and Horkheimer’s late critical theory, I do not claim we should prefer hegemonic educational ideologies. However, philosophy cannot supply an alternative. The philosophy I suggest is a political issue, and its educational implication demands a kind of vita activa activism, theoretical work, and educational praxis are not “postmodern,” “post-critical,” “feminist,” or “inulticultural.” The educational philosophy presented here is a negative utopianism. The “grand refusal” and utopia that demand transcendence from the current realm of self-evidence are here combined into a politico-philosophical deed. This is educational praxis as counter-education.

[ilan, faculty of education @ university of haifa, “toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy”, educational theory, fall, v48 n4, blackwellsynergy] In his current version of critical pedagogy, Giroux emphasizes the importance of differences among groups, persons, knowledge, and need for feminist critical pedagogy and postcritical feminist pedagogy. Giroux denotes the centrality of repressive elements in modernistic emancipatory claims. These different educational projects have in common the avoidance of challenging the philosophical and political difficulties that affect their own educational alternatives .They are committed to reconstruct or decipher the power relations that produce the subject, consciousness, identity, knowledge, and possibilities to act in and change reality. They demonstrate and challenge the production of marginality, impotency, and violence of individuals and groups, their control and activation for the sake of the present order of things. They all negate “neutral” positivistic and functionalist trends that prosper in Western societies and, with the help of formal and informal education, reproduce the present order. However, they all refuse philosophy and anything that hints of a “theory” or “elitism.” This is the background to their political and educational impotence, which leads to nothing but empty negativism and fruitless pessimism. One of the philosophical and political weaknesses of the different versions of critical pedagogy is their positive utopianism and their commitment to optimism as a condition for a meaningful educational praxis. Optimism or the “possibility of emancipation” is presented as an argument for refusing a philosophical work as too “pessimistic.” For Giroux, for example, this is an argument strong enough to negate Adorno and Horkheimer’s late critical theory, while for feminist pedagogy “political interests’’ and “the efficiency of the concrete struggle” are enough to avoid theoretical challenges. Some feminists understand this antiphilosophical orientation as problematic, since they understand that today it is wrong to separate the struggle for liberating the consciousness and changing the social order of women and other oppressed groups from serious philosophical work5” I do not claim that all the theoretical and practical work of critical pedagogy is useless or wrong, let alone that we should prefer hegemonic educational ideologies. However, philosophy cannot supply an alternative. The philosophy I suggest is a political issue, and its educational implication demands a kind of vita activa that is not alien to vita contemplativa. Such public activism, theoretical work, and educational praxis are not “postmodern,” “post-critical,” “feminist,” or “inulticultural.” The educational philosophy presented here is a negative utopianism. The “grand refusal” and utopia that demand transcendence from the current realm of self-evidence are here combined into a politico-philosophical deed. This is educational praxis as counter-education. I will try to demonstrate some of its historical and conceptual characteristics and elaborate on the potentials of some of these educational alternatives.

<h4><u><strong>THIS MANDATES REFUSAL OF THE AFFIRMATIVE’S EMANCIPATORY PHILOSOPHIES and enlightenment politics.</h4><p></u></strong>Gur-Ze'ev 98</p><p>[ilan, faculty of education @ university of haifa, “toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy”, educational theory, fall, v48 n4, blackwellsynergy]</p><p>In his current version of critical pedagogy, Giroux emphasizes the importance of differences among groups, persons, knowledge, and need for feminist critical pedagogy and postcritical feminist pedagogy. Giroux denotes the centrality of repressive elements in modernistic emancipatory claims<u>. <mark>These </mark>different <mark>educational projects </mark>have in common the avoidance of challenging the philosophical and political difficulties that affect their own educational alternatives .They <mark>are committed to reconstruct or decipher the power relations </mark>that produce the subject, consciousness, identity, knowledge, and possibilities to act in <mark>and change reality</mark>. They demonstrate and challenge the production of marginality, impotency, and violence of individuals and groups, their control and activation for the sake of the present order of things. They all negate “neutral” positivistic and functionalist trends that prosper in Western societies and, with the help of formal and informal education, reproduce the present order<mark>. However, they all refuse philosophy and anything that hints of a “theory” or “elitism.” This is the background to their political and educational impotence, which leads to nothing but empty negativism and fruitless pessimism</u></mark>. One of the philosophical and political weaknesses of the different versions of critical pedagogy is their positive utopianism and their commitment to optimism as a condition for a meaningful educational praxis. <u><mark>Optimism or the “possibility of emancipation” is presented as an argument for refusing a philosophical work as too “pessimistic.” For Giroux</mark>, for example<mark>, this is an argument strong enough to negate Adorno and Horkheimer’s late critical theory</u>, </mark>while for feminist pedagogy “political interests’’ and “<u>the efficiency of the concrete struggle” are enough to avoid theoretical challenges.</u> Some feminists understand this antiphilosophical orientation as problematic, since they understand that today it is wrong to separate the struggle for liberating the consciousness and changing the social order of women and other oppressed groups from serious philosophical work5” <u><mark>I do not claim </mark>that all the theoretical and practical work of critical pedagogy is useless or wrong, let alone that <mark>we should prefer hegemonic educational ideologies. However, philosophy cannot supply an alternative. The philosophy I suggest is a political issue, and its educational implication demands a kind of vita activa</mark> </u>that is not alien to vita contemplativa. Such public <u><mark>activism, theoretical work, and educational praxis are not “postmodern,” “post-critical,” “feminist,” or “inulticultural.” The educational philosophy presented here is a negative utopianism. The “grand refusal” and utopia that demand transcendence from the current realm of self-evidence are here combined into a politico-philosophical deed. This is educational praxis as counter-education</u>.</mark> I will try to demonstrate some of its historical and conceptual characteristics and elaborate on the potentials of some of these educational alternatives.</p>

1NC

Case

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round4.docx

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Geoff Lundeen

1ac was marijuana prison industrial complex 1nc was damage centrism k plan pik legalization da and case 2nc was damage centrism and the legalization da 1nr was the pik and case 2nr was damage centrism the legalization da and the case

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-UNLV-Round4.docx

EvZo

Baylor EvZo

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college

Bringing outlaw discourse into the open gaze of the academy straight turns the aff – we should leave it to the underground, not bring them into the public – before you vote aff, ask yourself: “what does debate and the ballot actually do to help the Aff’s method?” – you can vote negative on presumption and allow critical outlaw discourses to stay hidden – opacity is necessary for emancipation, the Affimative’s transparency must be rejected unyieldingly

Phillips ’99

Phillips ’99 (Professor; Associate Dean of Research and Graduate Studies. Communication and Rhetorical Studies, syracuse)

Kendall “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono” Philosophy and Rhetoric, \oi.i2, tio. 1,1999 The suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom for treating it more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic Or that members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation Academic discourse is not transparent Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law discourse by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic discourse to the center? the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest that incorporating the struggle into an impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy As Foucault illustrate practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification

The suggestion that out-law communities need the academic critic contradicts the disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses fail to offer an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom treating it as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy Hidden out-law discourses have good reasons to stay hidden. Academic discourse is not transparent. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law discourse by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse logics Are out-law discourses tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic discourse to the center? In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these discourses will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? incorporating the struggle into an impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy may endow institutions of confinement and objectification

Kendall “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono” Philosophy and Rhetoric, \oi.i2, tio. 1,1999 Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses. Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd view, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law discourse by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic discourse to the center? (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divo-gent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical conmninity, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further probleoiatize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Wamick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "render[ing] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Wamick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law discourse because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unrefiexively.

<h4><u>Bringing outlaw discourse into the open gaze of the academy straight turns the aff – we should leave it to the underground, not bring them into the public – before you vote aff, ask yourself: “what does debate and the ballot actually do to help the Aff’s method?” – you can vote negative on presumption and allow critical outlaw discourses to stay hidden – opacity is necessary for emancipation, the Affimative’s transparency must be rejected unyieldingly</h4><p><strong>Phillips ’99 </strong>(Professor; Associate Dean of Research and Graduate Studies. Communication and Rhetorical Studies, syracuse)</p><p><strong>Kendall “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono” Philosophy and Rhetoric, \oi.i2, tio. 1,1999</p><p></u></strong>Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses. Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd view, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. <u><mark>The</u></mark>ir <u><mark>suggestion that out-law communities</mark> are in <mark>need</mark> of <mark>the academic critic contradicts</u></mark> <u>not only <mark>the</mark> already <mark>disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses</u></mark> (the grounds for using out-law discourse), <u>but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse</u> (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. <u>What Sloop and Ono <mark>fail to offer</mark> is <mark>an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom</u></mark>, <u>for <mark>treating it</u></mark> less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and <u>more <mark>as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy</u></mark>. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) <u><mark>Hidden out-law discourses</mark> may <mark>have good reasons to stay hidden</u>.</mark> Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But <u>are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic</u>? <u>Or</u>, indeed, <u>that</u> the <u>members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation</u>? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) <u><mark>Academic</u></mark> critical <u><mark>discourse is not transparent</u>.</mark> Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. <u><mark>Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law discourse by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse</u></mark>/divergent <u><mark>logics</mark>?</u> <u><mark>Are out-law discourses</mark> merely <mark>tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic discourse to the center?</u></mark> (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, <u>the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive</u>. <u><mark>In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a</u> <u>cathexis for these</mark> out-law <mark>discourses</u></mark>. <u>It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities</u> (see Fraser 1997). But, <u><mark>will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities?</u> <u></mark>I mean to suggest</u>, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather <u>that <mark>incorporating the struggle into an</u></mark> (admittedly) <u><mark>impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative</u></mark> The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divo-gent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical conmninity, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further probleoiatize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Wamick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "render[ing] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Wamick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. <u><strong><mark>Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy</u></strong></mark>. <u>As</u> the works of Michel <u>Foucault</u> (especially 1979, 1980) aptly <u>illustrate</u>, <u>practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity <mark>may endow institutions of confinement and objectification</u></mark>. Any justification for studying out-law discourse because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unrefiexively.</p>

1NC

Off

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round6.docx

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USC

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West Virginia MO

Luis Andrade

1ac was black self love 1nc was university k faciality k and case 2nc was university 1nr was faciality 2nr was university

ndtceda14/Baylor/EvZo/Baylor-Evans-Zoda-Neg-USC-Round6.docx

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college

Warming’s inevitable even with complete halting of emissions

Rood 14 [AB]

Richard Rood 14, Professor of Atmospheric, Oceanic and Space Sciences at the University of Michigan, December 11th https://theconversation.com/what-would-happen-to-the-climate-if-we-stopped-emitting-greenhouse-gases-today-35011, “What would happen to the climate if we stopped emitting greenhouse gases today?”, [AB]

Earth’s climate is changing rapidly The primary cause of that change is the release of carbon dioxide from burning coal, oil and natural gas While negotiations about reducing emissions grind on, how much warming are we already locked into? If we stop emitting greenhouse gases tomorrow, why would the temperature continue to rise? The Arctic is warming much faster than the average global temperature Ice sheets are melting. Ecosystems on both land and in the sea are changing. What would happen to the climate if we were to stop emitting carbon dioxide today, right now? Would we return to the climate of our elders? The simple answer is no Once we release the carbon dioxide stored in the fossil fuels we burn, it accumulates in and moves amongst the atmosphere the oceans, the land, and the plants and animals of the biosphere released carbon dioxide will remain in the atmosphere for thousands of years once released the carbon dioxide is in our environment essentially forever If we stop emitting today, it’s not the end of the story for global warming. There’s a delay in temperature increase as the climate catches up with all the carbon that’s in the atmosphere increased carbon dioxide does more than heat the air. It melts ice; it heats the ocean Compared to air, it’s harder to raise the temperature of water once the ocean temperature is elevated, it adds to the warming of the Earth’s surface. even if carbon emissions stopped completely right now as the oceans catch up with the atmosphere, the Earth’s temperature would rise Ice, also responding to increasing heat in the ocean, will continue to melt That which has melted will stay melted – and more will melt Ecosystems are altered As they recover it will be in a different climate from that in which they evolved The climate in which they recover will not be stable it will be continuing to warm There will be no new normal, only more change.

If we stop emitting why would temperature continue to rise? if we stop emitting today Would we return the climate ? no carbon dioxide in fuels accumulates in the atmosphere oceans land plants and animals released carbon will remain essentially forever If we stop it’s not the end of warming There’s a delay in temperature increase increased carbon melts ice it heats the ocean once ocean temperature is elevated it adds warming even if emissions stopped completely temperature would rise Ice responding to heat in the ocean, will melt Ecosystems are altered The climate will not be stable There will be no new normal, only change

Earth’s climate is changing rapidly. We know this from billions of observations, documented in thousands of journal papers and texts and summarized every few years by the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The primary cause of that change is the release of carbon dioxide from burning coal, oil and natural gas. International climate talks in Lima this week are laying the foundation for next year’s UN climate summit in Paris. While negotiations about reducing emissions grind on, how much warming are we already locked into? If we stop emitting greenhouse gases tomorrow, why would the temperature continue to rise? Basics of carbon and climate The carbon dioxide that accumulates in the atmosphere insulates the surface of the Earth. It’s like a warming blanket that holds in heat. This energy increases the Earth’s surface average temperature, heats the oceans and melts polar ice. As consequences, sea level rises and weather changes. Global average temperature has increased. Anomalies are relative to the mean temperature of 1961-1990. Since 1880, after carbon dioxide emissions took off with the Industrial Revolution, the average global temperature has increased about 1.5F (0.85C). Each of the last three decades has been warmer than the preceding decade, as well as warmer than the entire previous century. The Arctic is warming much faster than the average global temperature; ice in the Arctic Ocean is melting and the permafrost is thawing. Ice sheets in both the Arctic and Antarctic are melting. Ecosystems on both land and in the sea are changing. The observed changes are coherent and consistent with our theoretical understanding of the Earth’s energy balance and simulations from models that are used to understand past variability and to help us think about the future. Slam on the climate brakes What would happen to the climate if we were to stop emitting carbon dioxide today, right now? Would we return to the climate of our elders? The simple answer is no. Once we release the carbon dioxide stored in the fossil fuels we burn, it accumulates in and moves amongst the atmosphere, the oceans, the land, and the plants and animals of the biosphere. The released carbon dioxide will remain in the atmosphere for thousands of years. Only after many millennia will it return to rocks, for example, through the formation of calcium carbonate – limestone – as marine organisms' shells settle to the bottom of the ocean. But on time spans relevant to humans, once released the carbon dioxide is in our environment essentially forever. It does not go away, unless we, ourselves, remove it. If we stop emitting today, it’s not the end of the story for global warming. There’s a delay in temperature increase as the climate catches up with all the carbon that’s in the atmosphere. After maybe 40 more years, the climate will stabilize at a temperature higher than what was normal for previous generations. This decades-long lag between cause and effect is due to the long time it takes to heat the the ocean’s huge mass. The energy that is held at the Earth by the increased carbon dioxide does more than heat the air. It melts ice; it heats the ocean. Compared to air, it’s harder to raise the temperature of water – it takes time, decades. However, once the ocean temperature is elevated, it adds to the warming of the Earth’s surface. So even if carbon emissions stopped completely right now, as the oceans catch up with the atmosphere, the Earth’s temperature would rise about another 1.1F (0.6C). Scientists refer to this as committed warming. Ice, also responding to increasing heat in the ocean, will continue to melt. There’s already convincing evidence that significant glaciers in the West Antarctic ice sheets are lost. Ice, water, and air – the extra heat held on the Earth by carbon dioxide affects them all. That which has melted will stay melted – and more will melt. Ecosystems are altered by natural and manmade occurrences. As they recover, it will be in a different climate from that in which they evolved. The climate in which they recover will not be stable; it will be continuing to warm. There will be no new normal, only more change.

<h4>Warming’s inevitable even with complete halting of emissions </h4><p>Richard <u><strong>Rood 14</u></strong>, Professor of Atmospheric, Oceanic and Space Sciences at the University of Michigan, December 11th https://theconversation.com/what-would-happen-to-the-climate-if-we-stopped-emitting-greenhouse-gases-today-35011, “What would happen to the climate if we stopped emitting greenhouse gases today?”,<u><strong> [AB]</p><p></strong>Earth’s climate is changing rapidly</u>. We know this from billions of observations, documented in thousands of journal papers and texts and summarized every few years by the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. <u>The primary cause of that change is the release of carbon dioxide from burning coal, oil and natural gas</u>. International climate talks in Lima this week are laying the foundation for next year’s UN climate summit in Paris. <u>While negotiations about reducing emissions grind on, how much warming are we already locked into?</u> <u><strong><mark>If we stop emitting</mark> greenhouse gases tomorrow, <mark>why would</mark> the <mark>temperature continue to</mark> <mark>rise?</u></strong></mark> Basics of carbon and climate The carbon dioxide that accumulates in the atmosphere insulates the surface of the Earth. It’s like a warming blanket that holds in heat. This energy increases the Earth’s surface average temperature, heats the oceans and melts polar ice. As consequences, sea level rises and weather changes. Global average temperature has increased. Anomalies are relative to the mean temperature of 1961-1990. Since 1880, after carbon dioxide emissions took off with the Industrial Revolution, the average global temperature has increased about 1.5F (0.85C). Each of the last three decades has been warmer than the preceding decade, as well as warmer than the entire previous century. <u>The Arctic is warming much faster than the average global temperature</u>; ice in the Arctic Ocean is melting and the permafrost is thawing. <u>Ice sheets</u> in both the Arctic and Antarctic <u>are melting. Ecosystems on both land and in the sea are changing.</u> The observed changes are coherent and consistent with our theoretical understanding of the Earth’s energy balance and simulations from models that are used to understand past variability and to help us think about the future. Slam on the climate brakes <u>What would happen to the climate <mark>if we</mark> were to <mark>stop emitting</mark> carbon dioxide <mark>today</mark>, right now?</u> <u><mark>Would we return</mark> to <mark>the climate</mark> of our elders<mark>?</u></mark> <u><strong>The simple answer is <mark>no</u></strong></mark>. <u>Once we release the <mark>carbon dioxide</mark> stored <mark>in </mark>the fossil <mark>fuels</mark> we burn, it <mark>accumulates in</mark> and moves amongst <mark>the atmosphere</u></mark>, <u>the <mark>oceans</mark>, the <mark>land</mark>, and the <mark>plants and animals</mark> of the biosphere</u>. The <u><mark>released carbon</mark> dioxide <mark>will remain</mark> in the atmosphere for <strong>thousands of years</u></strong>. Only after many millennia will it return to rocks, for example, through the formation of calcium carbonate – limestone – as marine organisms' shells settle to the bottom of the ocean. But on time spans relevant to humans, <u><strong>once released the carbon dioxide is in our environment <mark>essentially forever</u></strong></mark>. It does not go away, unless we, ourselves, remove it. <u><mark>If we stop</mark> emitting today, <mark>it’s not the end of</mark> the story for global <mark>warming</mark>. <mark>There’s a delay in temperature increase</mark> as the climate catches up with all the carbon that’s in the atmosphere</u>. After maybe 40 more years, the climate will stabilize at a temperature higher than what was normal for previous generations. This decades-long lag between cause and effect is due to the long time it takes to heat the the ocean’s huge mass. The energy that is held at the Earth by the <u><mark>increased carbon</mark> dioxide does more than heat the air. It <mark>melts ice</mark>; <mark>it heats the ocean</u></mark>. <u>Compared to air, it’s harder to raise the temperature of water</u> – it takes time, decades. However, <u><mark>once</mark> the <mark>ocean temperature is elevated</mark>, <mark>it adds</mark> to the <mark>warming</mark> of the Earth’s surface. </u>So <u><strong><mark>even if</mark> carbon <mark>emissions stopped completely</mark> right now</u></strong>, <u>as the oceans catch up with the atmosphere, the Earth’s <strong><mark>temperature would rise</strong></mark> </u>about another 1.1F (0.6C). Scientists refer to this as committed warming. <u><mark>Ice</mark>, also <mark>responding to</mark> increasing <mark>heat in the ocean, will</mark> continue to <mark>melt</u></mark>. There’s already convincing evidence that significant glaciers in the West Antarctic ice sheets are lost. Ice, water, and air – the extra heat held on the Earth by carbon dioxide affects them all. <u><strong>That which has melted will stay melted – and more will melt</u></strong>. <u><mark>Ecosystems are altered</u></mark> by natural and manmade occurrences. <u>As they recover</u>, <u>it will be in a <strong>different climate</u></strong> <u>from that in which they evolved</u>. <u><strong><mark>The climate</mark> in which they recover <mark>will not be stable</u></strong></mark>; <u>it will be continuing to warm</u>. <u><strong><mark>There will be no new normal,</u></strong> <u><strong>only</mark> more <mark>change</mark>.</p></u></strong>

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