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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?
Petitioner: --No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.
Judge: Of course, the statute itself says "express", right? Talking about section 109.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>That is correct.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?
Petitioner: --No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.
Judge: Of course, the statute itself says "express", right? Talking about section 109.
Petitioner: That is correct.
Judge: So we're pretty far removed from the language of the statute, I guess.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>But, again, ever since 1908, that's a standard that this Court has not accepted. And this is based on the provision, the well-settled provision, that an earlier Congress cannot bind a later Congress.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?
Petitioner: --No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.
Judge: Of course, the statute itself says "express", right? Talking about section 109.
Petitioner: That is correct.
Judge: So we're pretty far removed from the language of the statute, I guess.
Petitioner: But, again, ever since 1908, that's a standard that this Court has not accepted. And this is based on the provision, the well-settled provision, that an earlier Congress cannot bind a later Congress.
Judge: Oh, and I understand that. But presumably -- we also have the proposition that Congress, when it enacts legislation, knows the law. They would have known section 109 required an express statement if they wanted to apply the change retroactively. So why shouldn't we hold them to that standard?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>The answer is no, I don't believe that Congress felt that that was the standard. Again relying on this Court's jurisprudence that said you give us text and if we are able to find that the fair implication and the intent of Congress through that fair implication is that this new statute applies, because an earlier Congress cannot bind the newer Congress--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: These two consolidated cases involve the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) which became law on August 3, 2010. The FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the statutory minimum sentence from 5 to 28 grams for a 5-year sentence and from 50 to 280 grams for a 10-year sentence. Police caught Edward Dorsey with 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and Corey Hill with over 50 grams. Dorsey had a prior felony drug conviction, so he triggered the 10-year minimum although he was under the pre FSA limit. Both men committed their crimes before the FSA passed, but were sentenced after the Act passed. The trial court judges refused to apply the FSA retroactively.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the relevant date for application of the FSA is the date of the crime, not the date of sentencing.
Judge: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 11-5683, Dorsey v. United States, and 11-5721, Hill v. United States. Mr. Eberhardt.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The judges of the Seventh Circuit are unanimous in their belief that this case raises a good question. And, of course, that good question is: Why would Congress want district courts to continue to impose sentences that were universally viewed as unfair and racially discriminatory? My colleague sitting on the other side of the podium, I submit to the Court, does not answer that question. Petitioners feel that the answer to that question can be found in the text of the Fair Sentencing Act. And while we admit that there is no express answer, the text gives us the required fair implication. The text in section 8, the text in section 10--
Judge: Excuse me. Is a fair implication enough? You're talking here about a repealer, essentially, of an earlier provision, section 109. And our cases uniformly say that it -- it has to be clear implication, unquestionable implication. Do you think this is really clear and unquestionable?
Petitioner: --No, it is not, but the standard from this Court, Justice Scalia, is fair implication, and it has been ever since Great -- the Great Northern case. It -- these standards began -- I'm sorry -- as a necessary implication in Great Northern, moved to plain and clear implication in Hertz and Woodman, and then Marrero, which is relied on heavily by amicus.
Judge: Of course, the statute itself says "express", right? Talking about section 109.
Petitioner: That is correct.
Judge: So we're pretty far removed from the language of the statute, I guess.
Petitioner: But, again, ever since 1908, that's a standard that this Court has not accepted. And this is based on the provision, the well-settled provision, that an earlier Congress cannot bind a later Congress.
Judge: Oh, and I understand that. But presumably -- we also have the proposition that Congress, when it enacts legislation, knows the law. They would have known section 109 required an express statement if they wanted to apply the change retroactively. So why shouldn't we hold them to that standard?
Petitioner: The answer is no, I don't believe that Congress felt that that was the standard. Again relying on this Court's jurisprudence that said you give us text and if we are able to find that the fair implication and the intent of Congress through that fair implication is that this new statute applies, because an earlier Congress cannot bind the newer Congress--
Judge: Well, on your statement that the--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Oh, absolutely, the Court is, Your Honor. And we acknowledge--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--
Judge: But suppose it were shown -- this is hypothetical. Suppose it were shown that 90 percent of all escapes under the escape statute were breakouts involving weapons; 10 percent were failure to report. Would that affect how we decide the case?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--This case?<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--
Judge: But suppose it were shown -- this is hypothetical. Suppose it were shown that 90 percent of all escapes under the escape statute were breakouts involving weapons; 10 percent were failure to report. Would that affect how we decide the case?
Petitioner: --This case?
Judge: Yes.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, since -- I think since this is not a prison breakout case, I don't know whether data about breakouts--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--
Judge: But suppose it were shown -- this is hypothetical. Suppose it were shown that 90 percent of all escapes under the escape statute were breakouts involving weapons; 10 percent were failure to report. Would that affect how we decide the case?
Petitioner: --This case?
Judge: Yes.
Petitioner: Well, since -- I think since this is not a prison breakout case, I don't know whether data about breakouts--
Judge: Do we look to the crime to see generally whether or not it involves violence and serious risk of harm?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I think you -- I think the categorical rule does require you to look at--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Deondery Chambers pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in an Illinois federal court. After finding that Chambers had committed three previous crimes of violence, the judge sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The judge based his sentencing decision on the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) which defines a crime of violence as any crime posing a serious risk of potential injury to another and imposes a sentencing hike on a defendant with three such convictions on his record. On appeal, Chambers argued that one of the prior convictions, for felonious escape under Illinois law, should not qualify as a crime of violence under the ACCA.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chambers relief. Finding that Chambers had "knowingly fail[ed] to report to a penal institution" on several occasions, the equivalent of an actual escape under Illinois law, the court affirmed his sentence. Although the court determined that its precedents compelled such a ruling, the opinion indicated that more research would be needed to determine the desirability of classifying all escapes and failures to report as crimes of violence. For the time being, however, the court perpetuated Illinois' rule that felonious escape of any kind qualifies as a crime of violence for the purposes of the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-11206, Chambers v. United States. Mr. Hochman.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Failure to report is not a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it presents neither a serious potential risk of injury to others nor involves violent and aggressive conduct. The Government argues that failure to report satisfies both the risk of injury and violent, aggressive conduct standards for the same reason: The prospect that a offender will violently resist an arrest -- resist arrest upon completion of the offense or upon -- for having done the offense. That potential and that potential risk alone is neither as a matter of fact nor law sufficient to satisfy either the risk of injury or the violent, aggressive conduct standard. Beginning with the risk of injury: The statute refers to a serious potential risk of injury, and by using the word "serious" Congress indicated not just any felony, not just any felony which carries necessarily some risk of injury would be included. The risk that must be generated must be one that's somehow greater than, something that warrants singly out this sort of offender as the sort of person who's deserving of greater punishment for his recidivism.
Judge: I take it you concede that a breakout as opposed to a failure to report would be covered by the statute?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor, I think it would. I think that in fact one of the critical errors that the courts of appeals have made and that the Government made here is equating breakout, prison escape, with failure to report. They are entirely different. They are importantly different, both again as a matter of analytically the categorical rule and what would you look at to determine whether this sort of person satisfied the violent and aggressive standard. And we now know, in light of the Sentencing Commission's report that was filed just last -- that was filed with the Court just last week, that the risk of injury associated with a prison breakout escape and failure to report is dramatically different. And that mistake--
Judge: But suppose it were shown -- this is hypothetical. Suppose it were shown that 90 percent of all escapes under the escape statute were breakouts involving weapons; 10 percent were failure to report. Would that affect how we decide the case?
Petitioner: --This case?
Judge: Yes.
Petitioner: Well, since -- I think since this is not a prison breakout case, I don't know whether data about breakouts--
Judge: Do we look to the crime to see generally whether or not it involves violence and serious risk of harm?
Petitioner: --I think you -- I think the categorical rule does require you to look at--
Judge: So that, in my hypothetical, it would be a more difficult case than the case we have here or would it be the same?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I think in your hypothetical, where a prison breakout -- where a prison breakout is involved--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>this mo- Do you...<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?
Petitioner: this mo- Do you...
Judge: I'm asking whether the State of Alabama concedes that it can't ever impose that original sentence.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Your Honor, obviously that is not a court a a question that this Court has directly addressed in either Argersinger or Scott.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?
Petitioner: this mo- Do you...
Judge: I'm asking whether the State of Alabama concedes that it can't ever impose that original sentence.
Petitioner: Your Honor, obviously that is not a court a a question that this Court has directly addressed in either Argersinger or Scott.
Judge: what happens in Alabama if if a a criminal defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor and placed on probation and then violates probation? Does that enable the State to impose the original sentence for violation of the probation?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Our reading of of Scott is that th- that we cannot activate the suspended sentence.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?
Petitioner: this mo- Do you...
Judge: I'm asking whether the State of Alabama concedes that it can't ever impose that original sentence.
Petitioner: Your Honor, obviously that is not a court a a question that this Court has directly addressed in either Argersinger or Scott.
Judge: what happens in Alabama if if a a criminal defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor and placed on probation and then violates probation? Does that enable the State to impose the original sentence for violation of the probation?
Petitioner: Our reading of of Scott is that th- that we cannot activate the suspended sentence.
Judge: Well, then we're jumping probably ahead into wh- what you're going to tell us, but while we're at this point,<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, ordinarily it would.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Lereed Shelton represented himself in an Alabama Circuit Court criminal trial. The court warned Shelton about the difficulties that self-representation entailed, but at no time offered him assistance of counsel at state expense. Ultimately, Shelton was convicted of misdemeanor assault and sentenced to a 30-day jail term, which the trial court suspended, placing Shelton on two years' unsupervised probation. Shelton appealed on Sixth Amendment grounds. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed Shelton's suspended jail sentence, reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, and Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, require provision of counsel in any petty offense, misdemeanor, or felony prosecution, "that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period." The court concluded that, because a defendant may not be imprisoned absent provision of counsel, Shelton's suspended sentence could never be activated and was therefore invalid.
Judge: We'll hear argument now in number oh oh twelve fourteen, Alabama versus LeReed Shelton. General Pryor. [Inaudible]
Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Thirty years ago in Argersinger versus Hamlin and then more than twenty years ago in Scott versus Illinois, this Court established the principle that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a State is not obligated to provide an indigent defendant in a misdemeanor case court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel, provided that the defendant is not actually imprisoned upon conviction. Eight years ago, in Nichols versus the United States, this Court reaffirmed that principle. The Supreme Court of Alabama distorted this well established and workable rule and held that a probated or suspended sentence, which actually liberates a defendant to return to free society, nevertheless triggers a right to court appointed and taxpayer funded counsel. There're three arguments that I would like to address...
Judge: do you concede that the State can never impose the original sentence of time in jail?
Petitioner: this mo- Do you...
Judge: I'm asking whether the State of Alabama concedes that it can't ever impose that original sentence.
Petitioner: Your Honor, obviously that is not a court a a question that this Court has directly addressed in either Argersinger or Scott.
Judge: what happens in Alabama if if a a criminal defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor and placed on probation and then violates probation? Does that enable the State to impose the original sentence for violation of the probation?
Petitioner: Our reading of of Scott is that th- that we cannot activate the suspended sentence.
Judge: Well, then we're jumping probably ahead into wh- what you're going to tell us, but while we're at this point,
Petitioner: Yes, ordinarily it would.
Judge: It It It seems to me that if i- if you say that the s- sentence cannot be reim- im- imposed, you're saying that the State courts are in the position of imposing a sentence th- th- that is s- s- s- s- s- s- s- s- something of a ruse.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Right...<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?
Petitioner: Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.
Judge: If Congress made a finding that crack and cocaine are equally dangerous and passed a statute that said, for sentencing purposes, every district judge shall treat cases involving these two substances exactly the same, would there be a Sixth Amendment problem with that? Or do you think every district judge gets the right to make that policy decision individually?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Justice Alito, Congress certainly can cabin the discretion of judges. But once they set a floor and a ceiling, pursuant to this Court's remedial holding in Booker, judges must be free to consider the entire range of punishment. And Booker relies on the notion that the Guidelines are now fully advisory and, therefore, judges without having to identify specific facts have to have the discretion to disagree with policies or identify things unique to the case in order to fashion an appropriate punishment.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?
Petitioner: Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.
Judge: If Congress made a finding that crack and cocaine are equally dangerous and passed a statute that said, for sentencing purposes, every district judge shall treat cases involving these two substances exactly the same, would there be a Sixth Amendment problem with that? Or do you think every district judge gets the right to make that policy decision individually?
Petitioner: Justice Alito, Congress certainly can cabin the discretion of judges. But once they set a floor and a ceiling, pursuant to this Court's remedial holding in Booker, judges must be free to consider the entire range of punishment. And Booker relies on the notion that the Guidelines are now fully advisory and, therefore, judges without having to identify specific facts have to have the discretion to disagree with policies or identify things unique to the case in order to fashion an appropriate punishment.
Judge: What's your answer simply to the very simple argument that because the floor was set on the assumption of a 100 to 1 ratio, set by Congress, that any other sentencing assumption, regardless of the particular justifications in a given case, is simply incoherent with the statutory scheme and for that reason should be regarded as unreasonable?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, Your Honor.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?
Petitioner: Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.
Judge: If Congress made a finding that crack and cocaine are equally dangerous and passed a statute that said, for sentencing purposes, every district judge shall treat cases involving these two substances exactly the same, would there be a Sixth Amendment problem with that? Or do you think every district judge gets the right to make that policy decision individually?
Petitioner: Justice Alito, Congress certainly can cabin the discretion of judges. But once they set a floor and a ceiling, pursuant to this Court's remedial holding in Booker, judges must be free to consider the entire range of punishment. And Booker relies on the notion that the Guidelines are now fully advisory and, therefore, judges without having to identify specific facts have to have the discretion to disagree with policies or identify things unique to the case in order to fashion an appropriate punishment.
Judge: What's your answer simply to the very simple argument that because the floor was set on the assumption of a 100 to 1 ratio, set by Congress, that any other sentencing assumption, regardless of the particular justifications in a given case, is simply incoherent with the statutory scheme and for that reason should be regarded as unreasonable?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor.
Judge: It is the coherence problem that is bothering us.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes. There are several answers to that question, Justice Souter. The first is that this Court has recognized with the same statute which has the same structure that the government argues can only logically be understood one way, that with regard to the weight for LSD in the case of Neal versus United States, it is perfectly appropriate for there to be two different methods of calculating weight for purposes of punishment. The Guidelines calculate weight based on a presumed weight of the combination of the LSD and the blotter paper or the carrier medium. And the statute defines the method for calculating the mandatory minimum by the combined weight of the LSD and the blotter paper, regardless of whether it is heavy or whether it is light.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1986, during the Reagan administration's anti-drug initiative, Congress enacted a federal sentencing policy of punishing crimes involving crack cocaine at a 100-to-1 ratio compared to crimes involving powder cocaine. For example, the sentencing guidelines prescribe the same sentence for a defendant convicted of dealing 500 grams of powder cocaine as they do for a defendant convicted of dealing only five grams of crack cocaine. Congress declined to repeal the 100-to-1 ratio despite the U.S. Sentencing Commission's contention that the ratio led to exaggerated sentences for crack dealers.
Derrick Kimbrough pleaded guilty to distributing fifty or more grams of crack cocaine, along with other drug-and firearm-related offenses. The federal sentencing guidelines prescribed a sentence of between 19 and 22.5 years, but the district court judge considered this sentence "ridiculous." Citing the Sentencing Commission's reports, the judge decided to depart from the 100-to-1 ratio and hand down a sentence of 15 years. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker the sentencing guidelines have been advisory only, but the guidelines range is still among the factors a court must consider before handing down a reasonable sentence.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the below-guidelines sentence as unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit ruled that trial judges act unreasonably when they depart from the guidelines on the basis of a disagreement with a congressional sentencing policy. Therefore, judges cannot hand down below-guidelines sentences merely in order to avoid the sentencing disparity caused by the 100-to-1 ratio.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6330, Kimbrough versus United States. Mr. Nachmanoff.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Derrick Kimbrough's case is about what a district court may consider when imposing sentence in conformity with Section 3553(a). That statute directs sentencing courts to do exactly what Judge Jackson did in this case. He properly calculated and considered the advisory guideline range, the Sentencing Commission's reports, Mr. Kimbrough's personal history and background, and the offense itself, as directed by the statute. He then made case-specific findings to impose an appropriate sentence, and he did not make any categorical determinations. The Fourth Circuit reversed, applying a per se rule prohibiting disagreement with the crack cocaine guideline. The government, on the other hand, argues that Congress has implicitly directed sentencing courts to adhere to the crack guidelines. Both of these positions are wrong. With respect to the Fourth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied a rigid rule that prohibited any disagreement with the crack guideline, which is determined solely by drug type and quantity. They then prohibited the imposition of any sentence outside the guideline range, either above it or below it, unless the court identified facts specific to the defendant or the offense. This ruling is inconsistent with the Court's holdings in Cunningham and Rita, which hold that the courts must be free to disagree with policies. Finally, the Fourth Circuit required that those facts be atypical, which mirrors the exact language that was excised in 3553(b)(1).
Judge: Could the Congress have mandated the result and the rationale that the Fourth Circuit used here?
Petitioner: Your Honor, Congress can certainly speak explicitly through its statutes to impose further refinements on the penalty structure that it set out in 841. Section 841, on its face, does no more than set mandatory minimums and maximums at two triggering quantities. If Congress wanted to specify further triggering quantities which would cabin the discretion of sentencing courts, they could do so, but they have not done so and there is no canon of statutory construction that the government identifies or that I'm aware of that would justify the notion of the implicit binding directive.
Judge: If Congress made a finding that crack and cocaine are equally dangerous and passed a statute that said, for sentencing purposes, every district judge shall treat cases involving these two substances exactly the same, would there be a Sixth Amendment problem with that? Or do you think every district judge gets the right to make that policy decision individually?
Petitioner: Justice Alito, Congress certainly can cabin the discretion of judges. But once they set a floor and a ceiling, pursuant to this Court's remedial holding in Booker, judges must be free to consider the entire range of punishment. And Booker relies on the notion that the Guidelines are now fully advisory and, therefore, judges without having to identify specific facts have to have the discretion to disagree with policies or identify things unique to the case in order to fashion an appropriate punishment.
Judge: What's your answer simply to the very simple argument that because the floor was set on the assumption of a 100 to 1 ratio, set by Congress, that any other sentencing assumption, regardless of the particular justifications in a given case, is simply incoherent with the statutory scheme and for that reason should be regarded as unreasonable?
Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor.
Judge: It is the coherence problem that is bothering us.
Petitioner: Yes. There are several answers to that question, Justice Souter. The first is that this Court has recognized with the same statute which has the same structure that the government argues can only logically be understood one way, that with regard to the weight for LSD in the case of Neal versus United States, it is perfectly appropriate for there to be two different methods of calculating weight for purposes of punishment. The Guidelines calculate weight based on a presumed weight of the combination of the LSD and the blotter paper or the carrier medium. And the statute defines the method for calculating the mandatory minimum by the combined weight of the LSD and the blotter paper, regardless of whether it is heavy or whether it is light.
Judge: But is that an argument for saying, well, in the LSD case, you approved of incoherence and irrationality, therefore, you want to do it across the board? I mean, there is still an argument here on the merits regardless of Neal that there is an incoherence between the minimum and the kind of discretion that you're talking about.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, Your Honor, I think what Neal reflects is that there's no implicit binding policy directive in 841 itself that requires either the Commission or sentencing courts to follow in lock step on a graduated proportionate scheme, whatever it is that Congress decided with respect to two specific triggers should be the case.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?
Petitioner: I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.
Judge: Well, the California Supreme Court has said that an element of the burglary statute is the violation of some possessory interest. Now, I know there is some disagreement between you and the government about that. But assuming for the sake of argument that that is an element, one way for the California court to express that is to say simply, as it has, that an element is the violation of the possessory interest. Another way of saying exactly the same thing would be to say that the term “ enters ” under the California burglary statute means either breaking into a structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Okay.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?
Petitioner: I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.
Judge: Well, the California Supreme Court has said that an element of the burglary statute is the violation of some possessory interest. Now, I know there is some disagreement between you and the government about that. But assuming for the sake of argument that that is an element, one way for the California court to express that is to say simply, as it has, that an element is the violation of the possessory interest. Another way of saying exactly the same thing would be to say that the term “ enters ” under the California burglary statute means either breaking into a structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.
Petitioner: Okay.
Judge: Those are exactly equivalent. Now, if they were to say the latter, would a conviction under this statute potentially qualify under the Armed Career Criminal Act?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, I don't believe it would, because I don't believe possessory interest equates to Taylor definition.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?
Petitioner: I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.
Judge: Well, the California Supreme Court has said that an element of the burglary statute is the violation of some possessory interest. Now, I know there is some disagreement between you and the government about that. But assuming for the sake of argument that that is an element, one way for the California court to express that is to say simply, as it has, that an element is the violation of the possessory interest. Another way of saying exactly the same thing would be to say that the term “ enters ” under the California burglary statute means either breaking into a structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.
Petitioner: Okay.
Judge: Those are exactly equivalent. Now, if they were to say the latter, would a conviction under this statute potentially qualify under the Armed Career Criminal Act?
Petitioner: Well, I don't believe it would, because I don't believe possessory interest equates to Taylor definition.
Judge: No, but they -- they set out alternative elements, either breaking into the structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, if -- if the elements are shown, and if that's the definition, then yes. But I don't think California possessory interest is the same thing.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On September 13, 2007, a jury found Matthew R. Descamps guilty of felony possession of a firearm and ammunition. Descamps already had five previous felony convictions. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), criminals with three prior convictions for violent felonies must receive a minimum sentence of 15 years for any subsequent felony conviction. The ACCA defines a violent felony as any crime involving threatened use of physical force—or burglary—and punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington concluded that Descamps' prior convictions of robbery, burglary, and felony harassment constituted three predicate violent felonies under the ACCA. Subsequently, the district court sentenced Descamps to 262 months in custody with 5 years of supervised release.
Descamps appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that all prior convictions used to enhance a sentence under the ACCA must be charged in the indictment and submitted to a jury. A judge may only increase the sentence if the three prior convictions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the sentence.
Judge: We will hear argument first this morning in Case 11-9540, Descamps v. United States. Mr. Johnson.
Petitioner: May it -- Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: In this case it doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in 1978 in the State of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're -- to be convicted of a crime, elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. In California, burglary -- unlawful entry as defined by the Court in Taylor on what a generic burglary consists of, is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime, a theft, or a felony will do. A California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the Taylor sense. Regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not by its elements Taylor burglary for Armed Career Criminal Act.
Judge: You don't take issue, do you, with the argument that in determining what the State law is you can take account not only of the words of the statute, but how the State Supreme Court interprets those words?
Petitioner: I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I think if the State courts clearly state something is an element of a crime, I -- you know, I agree with that.
Judge: Well, the California Supreme Court has said that an element of the burglary statute is the violation of some possessory interest. Now, I know there is some disagreement between you and the government about that. But assuming for the sake of argument that that is an element, one way for the California court to express that is to say simply, as it has, that an element is the violation of the possessory interest. Another way of saying exactly the same thing would be to say that the term “ enters ” under the California burglary statute means either breaking into a structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.
Petitioner: Okay.
Judge: Those are exactly equivalent. Now, if they were to say the latter, would a conviction under this statute potentially qualify under the Armed Career Criminal Act?
Petitioner: Well, I don't believe it would, because I don't believe possessory interest equates to Taylor definition.
Judge: No, but they -- they set out alternative elements, either breaking into the structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.
Petitioner: Well, if -- if the elements are shown, and if that's the definition, then yes. But I don't think California possessory interest is the same thing.
Judge: But they have said -- do you dispute the fact that saying A, an element is the violation of the possessory interest, and B, the elements are breaking or the violation of the possessory interest in same other way, are exactly the same substantively?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I don't, Your Honor, because in the Taylor sense you have to have an unlawful trespass, actually a trespass, or an invasion of a person's -- well, unlawful trespass. In California you don't have to have a trespass. And as the Court indicated in the Taylor decision, it talked about shoplifting in the State of California. So is a shoplifter someone who should be subject to an Armed Career Criminal Act enhancement?<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?
Petitioner: --I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.
Judge: Somewhat dangerous, isn't it, to subject speech to the absolute rule of no protection? Which is what you're advocating, I understand, that there are no circumstances in which this speech has value. I believe that's your bottom line.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, what -- what I would say with respect to that, Your Honor, is that this Court has said in numerous contexts, numerous contexts, that the calculated factual falsehood has no First Amendment value for its own sake.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?
Petitioner: --I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.
Judge: Somewhat dangerous, isn't it, to subject speech to the absolute rule of no protection? Which is what you're advocating, I understand, that there are no circumstances in which this speech has value. I believe that's your bottom line.
Petitioner: Well, what -- what I would say with respect to that, Your Honor, is that this Court has said in numerous contexts, numerous contexts, that the calculated factual falsehood has no First Amendment value for its own sake.
Judge: Well, I'm -- I'm not sure that that's quite correct. It has said it often, but always in context where it is well understood that speech can injure. Defamation, Gertz. At page 12 of your brief, you make this point, and it's what Justice Sotomayor is indicating. You think there's no value to falsity. But I -- I simply can't find that in our cases, and I -- I think it's a sweeping proposition to say that there's no value to falsity. Falsity is a way in which we contrast what is false and what is true.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I want to be--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?
Petitioner: --I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.
Judge: Somewhat dangerous, isn't it, to subject speech to the absolute rule of no protection? Which is what you're advocating, I understand, that there are no circumstances in which this speech has value. I believe that's your bottom line.
Petitioner: Well, what -- what I would say with respect to that, Your Honor, is that this Court has said in numerous contexts, numerous contexts, that the calculated factual falsehood has no First Amendment value for its own sake.
Judge: Well, I'm -- I'm not sure that that's quite correct. It has said it often, but always in context where it is well understood that speech can injure. Defamation, Gertz. At page 12 of your brief, you make this point, and it's what Justice Sotomayor is indicating. You think there's no value to falsity. But I -- I simply can't find that in our cases, and I -- I think it's a sweeping proposition to say that there's no value to falsity. Falsity is a way in which we contrast what is false and what is true.
Petitioner: I want to be--
Judge: And--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I want to respond with precision, Justice Kennedy, that the -- I think what this Court -- and Gertz is a good example -- has done is to draw a line, and that line -- and I think it is Gertz itself that contains this Court's statement that false statements of fact have no First Amendment value. That doesn't automatically mean that a false statement of fact lacks First Amendment protection.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.
The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.
Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-210, United States v. Alvarez. General Verrilli.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Military honors play a vital role in inculcating and sustaining the core values of our nation's armed forces. The military applies exacting criteria in awarding honors, and Congress has a long tradition of legislating to protect the integrity of the honor system. The Stolen Valor Act continues that tradition by prohibiting knowingly false statements that one has been awarded a military honor. It regulates a carefully limited and narrowly drawn category of calculated factual falsehoods. It advances a legitimate substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interest, and it chills no protected speech. This Court has recognized--
Judge: General, may I pose a hypothetical? During the Vietnam War, a protester holds up a sign that says, "I won a Purple Heart -- for killing babies. " Knowing statement. He didn't win the Purple Heart. As a reader, I can't be sure whether he did and is a combat veteran who opposes the war, or whether he's a citizen protesting the war. Is that person, if he's not a veteran, having received the medal, is he liable under this act?
Petitioner: --I think, Your Honor, it would depend on whether that was, that expression, was reasonably understood by the audience as a statement of fact or as an exercise in political theater. If it's the latter, it's not within the scope of the statute, and it wouldn't be subject to liability.
Judge: Somewhat dangerous, isn't it, to subject speech to the absolute rule of no protection? Which is what you're advocating, I understand, that there are no circumstances in which this speech has value. I believe that's your bottom line.
Petitioner: Well, what -- what I would say with respect to that, Your Honor, is that this Court has said in numerous contexts, numerous contexts, that the calculated factual falsehood has no First Amendment value for its own sake.
Judge: Well, I'm -- I'm not sure that that's quite correct. It has said it often, but always in context where it is well understood that speech can injure. Defamation, Gertz. At page 12 of your brief, you make this point, and it's what Justice Sotomayor is indicating. You think there's no value to falsity. But I -- I simply can't find that in our cases, and I -- I think it's a sweeping proposition to say that there's no value to falsity. Falsity is a way in which we contrast what is false and what is true.
Petitioner: I want to be--
Judge: And--
Petitioner: --I want to respond with precision, Justice Kennedy, that the -- I think what this Court -- and Gertz is a good example -- has done is to draw a line, and that line -- and I think it is Gertz itself that contains this Court's statement that false statements of fact have no First Amendment value. That doesn't automatically mean that a false statement of fact lacks First Amendment protection.
Judge: --But that's in the context of a defamation case.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.
Petitioner: That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--
Judge: They're not anomalies because the gun prohibition would cover them, even though they never had their civil rights taken away? Is that... is that what you're saying?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Correct. We have to read the... both clauses, the exemption clause and the unless cause. And--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.
Petitioner: That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--
Judge: They're not anomalies because the gun prohibition would cover them, even though they never had their civil rights taken away? Is that... is that what you're saying?
Petitioner: --Correct. We have to read the... both clauses, the exemption clause and the unless cause. And--
Judge: Mr. Coad, how are... how are civil rights which have been taken away typically restored? What is... what is the process for restoring them? Just if you don't commit another offense within a certain number of years?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--It depends on the State. In the NACDL lodging that the Court has... I believe 29 States were identified as having some type of restoration procedures. The majority of those, it is by automatic operation of law. So there's no subsequent conditions met by the offender.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.
Petitioner: That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--
Judge: They're not anomalies because the gun prohibition would cover them, even though they never had their civil rights taken away? Is that... is that what you're saying?
Petitioner: --Correct. We have to read the... both clauses, the exemption clause and the unless cause. And--
Judge: Mr. Coad, how are... how are civil rights which have been taken away typically restored? What is... what is the process for restoring them? Just if you don't commit another offense within a certain number of years?
Petitioner: --It depends on the State. In the NACDL lodging that the Court has... I believe 29 States were identified as having some type of restoration procedures. The majority of those, it is by automatic operation of law. So there's no subsequent conditions met by the offender.
Judge: Well, but even... even there I assume the law waits for a certain passage of time, and I would assume that there can be no felony committed during that interim period or the person's sentence has to be served or something? It's ongoing, it's prospective. And so restoration has a real component, in that... that is not present in the statute that we're faced with here.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, I think that there really isn't a difference between... by operation of law, a State taking away someone's rights and giving it back or allowing a offender to retain civil rights--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Four-time convicted felon James Logan received an enhanced sentence of 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) after his conviction for firearm possession. The ACCA imposes heavier penalties upon felons convicted of three or more violent crimes. Logan contended that his three battery convictions did not count toward the three-conviction threshold because none of them had resulted in the loss of his civil rights. (Battery is a misdemeanor in Wisconsin, but it qualifies as a violent crime under the ACCA.) Since the ACCA excludes those violent crime convictions for which civil rights have been restored to the felon, Logan argued that convictions that never stripped him of his civil rights should be excluded as well.
A District Court ruled against Logan because a literal reading of the ACCA excluded only those who have "had civil rights restored." The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed that it is impossible to restore civil rights that are never taken away, and that Logan's battery convictions must therefore be counted under the ACCA.
Judge: We'll hear argument next in case 06-6911, Logan v. United States. Mr. Coad.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The provision at issue determines which convictions constitute a prior felony for imposition of the Federal firearms ban and its increased penalties. Its exemption clause prescribes certain ways in which a conviction that otherwise meets that definition is nevertheless exempt. Specifically, it looks to a State's indication that an offense is deprived of any continuing effect, such as whether the status of an offender's civil rights are the same after a conviction as they were before conviction. The issue before the Court is whether the statute should be read to exempt convictions for which civil rights were lost and later regained while at the same time not exempting a conviction for which civil rights were never lost, even though both... in the end, both offenders have their civil rights following their conviction. Congress's underlying objective in drafting the exemption clause was to ensure that Federal law respected a State's considered judgment that a particular offense should not subject a person to the Federal firearms law. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation, which counted convictions for which rights were never lost, fails to respect that judgment. It disregards the State's unequivocal indication to the Federal statute that an offender is worthy of fully participating in civic life.
Judge: So if you had a statute... a State like, I'm told, Vermont, that doesn't take away any one's civil rights, not even a first degree murderer's, then that first degree murderer would be equated to someone whose civil rights were taken away and then restored.
Petitioner: That's correct. And I think that the Government points to Maine as an example where no offenders lose their civil rights, but felons lose their gun rights and certain misdemeanants also lose their gun rights, but get that gun right back. And in States like Maine and in Vermont, the "unless" clause still applies and still precludes those types of convictions. So I think when the Government alleges that there are certain anomalies that arise from our interpretation, it is simply not the case, and if they are anomalies that arise from our interpretation--
Judge: They're not anomalies because the gun prohibition would cover them, even though they never had their civil rights taken away? Is that... is that what you're saying?
Petitioner: --Correct. We have to read the... both clauses, the exemption clause and the unless cause. And--
Judge: Mr. Coad, how are... how are civil rights which have been taken away typically restored? What is... what is the process for restoring them? Just if you don't commit another offense within a certain number of years?
Petitioner: --It depends on the State. In the NACDL lodging that the Court has... I believe 29 States were identified as having some type of restoration procedures. The majority of those, it is by automatic operation of law. So there's no subsequent conditions met by the offender.
Judge: Well, but even... even there I assume the law waits for a certain passage of time, and I would assume that there can be no felony committed during that interim period or the person's sentence has to be served or something? It's ongoing, it's prospective. And so restoration has a real component, in that... that is not present in the statute that we're faced with here.
Petitioner: Well, I think that there really isn't a difference between... by operation of law, a State taking away someone's rights and giving it back or allowing a offender to retain civil rights--
Judge: Well, it is of... maybe no difference if the operation of law is 24 hours later.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--It could be a matter--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense.
Judge: Yes, but that -- is that an element of the crime?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>No. This Court has called it a defense in the Cook case, in the Oppenheimer case--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense.
Judge: Yes, but that -- is that an element of the crime?
Petitioner: No. This Court has called it a defense in the Cook case, in the Oppenheimer case--
Judge: It has to be raised by the defendant, right?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--It does have to be raised initially--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense.
Judge: Yes, but that -- is that an element of the crime?
Petitioner: No. This Court has called it a defense in the Cook case, in the Oppenheimer case--
Judge: It has to be raised by the defendant, right?
Petitioner: --It does have to be raised initially--
Judge: Which means it's not an element. It doesn't have to be charged in the indictment. Now, how can something that goes to the existence or non-existence of an affirmative defense be an element?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, I don't -- it is not an element, I agree with that; but it is -- I would say that it's engrafted onto every Federal criminal statute by statute. This is not the common law, but by Congress's decision. I would also say that even though it's not an element of defense -- of the offense, in Winship, this Court referred to the fact that the government must prove every fact necessary to prove a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It's a fact necessary--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense.
Judge: Yes, but that -- is that an element of the crime?
Petitioner: No. This Court has called it a defense in the Cook case, in the Oppenheimer case--
Judge: It has to be raised by the defendant, right?
Petitioner: --It does have to be raised initially--
Judge: Which means it's not an element. It doesn't have to be charged in the indictment. Now, how can something that goes to the existence or non-existence of an affirmative defense be an element?
Petitioner: --Well, I don't -- it is not an element, I agree with that; but it is -- I would say that it's engrafted onto every Federal criminal statute by statute. This is not the common law, but by Congress's decision. I would also say that even though it's not an element of defense -- of the offense, in Winship, this Court referred to the fact that the government must prove every fact necessary to prove a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It's a fact necessary--
Judge: But you could prove the crime without a reasonable -- beyond a reasonable doubt if you never raised the statute of limitations. And statutes of limitations exist for civil claims as well as criminal claims. And in -- on the civil side, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and it's up to the plaintiff to plead and prove -- both plead and prove it, both the burden of production and persuasion. Why should it be different on the criminal side?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--I think several reasons. First of all, obviously, the burden of proof is different in criminal cases as the court said in Mullaney v. Wilbur. It has been suggested that because of the difficulties in negating an argument that a homicide was committed in the heat of passion, the burden of proof should rest on the defendant. And they said the same may be said of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of many controverted facts, but this is the traditional burden which our criminal justice system applies. I also thin k that the Court has distinguished on some grounds and is the civil statute of limitations from the criminal statute. In fact, in the number of cases, this Court has talked about the criminal statute of limitations. It has never referred to it as an affirmative defense. It has said it's a defense, but it has never said that the defendant is required to prove it. In fact, the Quick case said it's part of the merits of the case; although it doesn't have to be pleaded in the indictment, and the -- that it has to be -- the Government has to present evidence of it and proof of it.<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Calvin Smith and John Raynor, along with four others, were tried together and convicted on multiple charges including drug conspiracy and RICO act violations. The defendants filed motions for a new trial on various grounds, including that the leaders of the conspiracy, Rodney Moore and Kevin Gray, split up before the relevant statute of limitations period. Because of this, the jury did not have sufficient evidence to prove that all defendants were part of a single conspiracy. The defendants argued that the government had the burden to prove that the conspiracy continued into the valid statute of limitations period. The court denied the motions. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.
Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 11-8976, Smith v. United States. Mr. Kramer.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: From the first Congress in 1790, Congress has made the decision that all Federal statutes which are, of course, creatures that are created by Congress in statutes, should be subject to a statute of limitations; in this particular case, 5 years. When it comes to conspiracy cases, as this Court said in Hyde, the statute of limitations is treated a little differently, because conspiracy statutes are -- excuse me, conspiracy crimes -- are continuing offenses. So the Court said the way we determine -- one way to determine whether a particular defendant's involvement in a conspiracy has ended -- in other words, his membership has ended -- is by the doctrine of withdrawal. It's the statute of limitations that is the defense in the case. It's the doctrine of withdrawal that triggers -- that is the triggering event for the statute of limitations, which sets the date for when the statute of limitations starts to run. Withdrawal in and of itself is not a defense. It's the statute of limitations that's the defense.
Judge: Yes, but that -- is that an element of the crime?
Petitioner: No. This Court has called it a defense in the Cook case, in the Oppenheimer case--
Judge: It has to be raised by the defendant, right?
Petitioner: --It does have to be raised initially--
Judge: Which means it's not an element. It doesn't have to be charged in the indictment. Now, how can something that goes to the existence or non-existence of an affirmative defense be an element?
Petitioner: --Well, I don't -- it is not an element, I agree with that; but it is -- I would say that it's engrafted onto every Federal criminal statute by statute. This is not the common law, but by Congress's decision. I would also say that even though it's not an element of defense -- of the offense, in Winship, this Court referred to the fact that the government must prove every fact necessary to prove a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It's a fact necessary--
Judge: But you could prove the crime without a reasonable -- beyond a reasonable doubt if you never raised the statute of limitations. And statutes of limitations exist for civil claims as well as criminal claims. And in -- on the civil side, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and it's up to the plaintiff to plead and prove -- both plead and prove it, both the burden of production and persuasion. Why should it be different on the criminal side?
Petitioner: --I think several reasons. First of all, obviously, the burden of proof is different in criminal cases as the court said in Mullaney v. Wilbur. It has been suggested that because of the difficulties in negating an argument that a homicide was committed in the heat of passion, the burden of proof should rest on the defendant. And they said the same may be said of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of many controverted facts, but this is the traditional burden which our criminal justice system applies. I also thin k that the Court has distinguished on some grounds and is the civil statute of limitations from the criminal statute. In fact, in the number of cases, this Court has talked about the criminal statute of limitations. It has never referred to it as an affirmative defense. It has said it's a defense, but it has never said that the defendant is required to prove it. In fact, the Quick case said it's part of the merits of the case; although it doesn't have to be pleaded in the indictment, and the -- that it has to be -- the Government has to present evidence of it and proof of it.
Judge: But you -- I think you -- you recognized that -- that the defendant has the burden of production, not the Government, the burden -- burden of coming forward with this defense and producing some evidence of the withdrawal.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, Justice Ginsburg, we do accept that there is a burden of production as with several other things that are not affirmative defenses like entrapment or alibi, also have a burden of production before the Government has to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. So, it's not--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-694, Judulang v. Holder. Mr. Fleming.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In Hernandez-Casillas, the Attorney General confirmed that a lawful permanent resident subject to deportation, quote, "must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary relief as an alien who has temporarily left this country and upon reentry been subject to exclusion. " 2 months later in its published decision in Matter of Meza, the BIA again confirmed that an immigrant deportable for an aggravated felony could seek relief because his conviction could also form the basis for excludability. Immigrants in situations indistinguishable from Mr. Judulang's applied for and received relief under this rule. The BIA's decision in Blake changed the law. Without explaining or even initially acknowledging that it was doing so, the Blake rule was impermissibly retroactive, and it is arbitrary and capricious on its own merits. We would submit the evidence--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-694, Judulang v. Holder. Mr. Fleming.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In Hernandez-Casillas, the Attorney General confirmed that a lawful permanent resident subject to deportation, quote, "must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary relief as an alien who has temporarily left this country and upon reentry been subject to exclusion. " 2 months later in its published decision in Matter of Meza, the BIA again confirmed that an immigrant deportable for an aggravated felony could seek relief because his conviction could also form the basis for excludability. Immigrants in situations indistinguishable from Mr. Judulang's applied for and received relief under this rule. The BIA's decision in Blake changed the law. Without explaining or even initially acknowledging that it was doing so, the Blake rule was impermissibly retroactive, and it is arbitrary and capricious on its own merits. We would submit the evidence--
Judge: How do you explain -- I mean, I think that is a principal point, whether Blake and Brieva changed the law. How do you explain the language in Matter of Wadud, which antedates by a good deal those two cases, 1984, which says: "Section 212(c) can only be invoked in a deportation hearing where the ground of deportation charged is also a ground of inadmissibility. " It seems to me that that's the basic point.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Two responses to that, Justice Scalia. I agree, Matter of Wadud is the principal response that the government has, and it does not help them at all. Wadud was deportable for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1546, and the BIA had held in a case called Matter of RG in 1958 that that conviction did not render him excludable. And that is confirmed later in the case of Matter of Jimenez-Santillano, which also involved a 1546 conviction, where the BIA says that if Mr. Jimenez had left of the country and returned it appears that he would not have been inadmissible and compares that situation to someone convicted of a firearms offense, which the board and the Attorney General had always said were not waivable. To the extent there is any ambiguity in the language that Your Honor read, it could not have survived the Attorney General's decision in Hernandez-Casillas, which I just quoted at the beginning of the presentation, which said that what one looks to is whether alien in exclusion proceedings would be able to invoke section 212(c) relief. And when the board then addressed the case of the aggravated felony in Matter of Meza, it did not even address Wadud or view it as binding at all. It looked to the conviction and whether it formed a basis for excludability. And the BIA then followed up with no fewer than eight decisions in crime of violence cases indistinguishable from this case where the BIA cited, not Wadud, not any of the other cases that the government is relying on, but cited Meza as articulating the doctrine that the focus of analysis is on the conviction. And the Court has the briefs of several former immigration officials, including two INS general counsel and several INS trial attorneys, confirming that that was the position and the basis on which the government litigated these cases--<|eot_id|> |
<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Joel Judulang was born on June 26, 1966 in the Philippines, but claims that he obtained derivative citizenship through his parents. Judulang entered the United States in 1974 at the age of eight and has continuously resided in the United States for 36 years. His parents are naturalized citizens. He has a 14-year-old daughter who is also a native-born citizen of the United States, as are his four nephews and two nieces. His two sisters are also U.S. citizens. However, Judulang's parents did not seek to obtain citizenship for him before he turned 18.
In 1988, when Judulang was 22, he was involved in a fight in which another person shot and killed someone. Although Judulang was not the shooter, he was charged as an accessory. He pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Due to his minor involvement in the crime and his cooperation with authorities, Judulang was given a suspended sentence of six years. He was released on probation immediately following his plea. On June 10, 2005, the government commenced deportation proceedings against Judulang as a result of his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, which is an aggravated felony "crime of violence." The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the deportation order, though it did not affirm the immigration judge's reasoning. Instead, it ruled that because Judulang was removable for a "crime of violence" aggravated felony, he was categorically ineligible for a Section 212(c) waiver.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Judulang's petition for review. His petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied, but Justice Anthony Kennedy stayed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit pending the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-694, Judulang v. Holder. Mr. Fleming.
Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In Hernandez-Casillas, the Attorney General confirmed that a lawful permanent resident subject to deportation, quote, "must have the same opportunity to seek discretionary relief as an alien who has temporarily left this country and upon reentry been subject to exclusion. " 2 months later in its published decision in Matter of Meza, the BIA again confirmed that an immigrant deportable for an aggravated felony could seek relief because his conviction could also form the basis for excludability. Immigrants in situations indistinguishable from Mr. Judulang's applied for and received relief under this rule. The BIA's decision in Blake changed the law. Without explaining or even initially acknowledging that it was doing so, the Blake rule was impermissibly retroactive, and it is arbitrary and capricious on its own merits. We would submit the evidence--
Judge: How do you explain -- I mean, I think that is a principal point, whether Blake and Brieva changed the law. How do you explain the language in Matter of Wadud, which antedates by a good deal those two cases, 1984, which says: "Section 212(c) can only be invoked in a deportation hearing where the ground of deportation charged is also a ground of inadmissibility. " It seems to me that that's the basic point.
Petitioner: --Two responses to that, Justice Scalia. I agree, Matter of Wadud is the principal response that the government has, and it does not help them at all. Wadud was deportable for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1546, and the BIA had held in a case called Matter of RG in 1958 that that conviction did not render him excludable. And that is confirmed later in the case of Matter of Jimenez-Santillano, which also involved a 1546 conviction, where the BIA says that if Mr. Jimenez had left of the country and returned it appears that he would not have been inadmissible and compares that situation to someone convicted of a firearms offense, which the board and the Attorney General had always said were not waivable. To the extent there is any ambiguity in the language that Your Honor read, it could not have survived the Attorney General's decision in Hernandez-Casillas, which I just quoted at the beginning of the presentation, which said that what one looks to is whether alien in exclusion proceedings would be able to invoke section 212(c) relief. And when the board then addressed the case of the aggravated felony in Matter of Meza, it did not even address Wadud or view it as binding at all. It looked to the conviction and whether it formed a basis for excludability. And the BIA then followed up with no fewer than eight decisions in crime of violence cases indistinguishable from this case where the BIA cited, not Wadud, not any of the other cases that the government is relying on, but cited Meza as articulating the doctrine that the focus of analysis is on the conviction. And the Court has the briefs of several former immigration officials, including two INS general counsel and several INS trial attorneys, confirming that that was the position and the basis on which the government litigated these cases--
Judge: Mr.--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--And in fact -- yes, Justice Kagan?<|eot_id|> |
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