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SauRabM

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SauRabM_petitioner

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<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Carlos Dominguez Benitez confessed to selling drugs to an informant. He made a plea agreement with the government in which he would plead guilty to conspiracy to sell drugs, which normally carried a 10-year minimum sentence. However, the government agreed to ask the judge to reduce the sentence below that minimum. The plea agreement also said that, if the judge did not agree to the government's request to lower the sentence, Dominguez could not withdraw his guilty plea. During discussions of the plea, the judge failed to mention the fact that it prohibited him from withdrawing his plea (the written statement, which did contain the fact, was read to him at another time). When the judge ruled that he could not lower the sentence, Dominguez appealed. He argued that the judge's failure to tell him that he would be unable to withdraw his appeal was a "plain error" under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 and therefore required reversal. The prosecutors countered that, in order to show that the judge had made a "plain error" Dominguez would need to show not just that he had made a mistake but also that it was reasonably likely that, without the error, Dominguez would not have pled guilty. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, siding with Dominguez to reverse the decision. Judge: We'll hear argument now in No. 03-167, United States v. Carlos Dominguez Benitez. Mr. Himmelfarb. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court has consistently held in both harmless error and plain error cases that an error affects substantial rights if it affected the outcome of the district court proceeding. Applying that principle to a violation of rule 11 at a guilty plea proceeding, 9 of the 12 courts of appeals that hear criminal cases have concluded that a rule 11 error affects substantial rights if it affected the defendant's decision to plead guilty, which means that the defendant would not have gone forward with his plea if the error had not occurred. That standard is correct. The Ninth Circuit standard which the-- Judge: May I just ask this one question? Because I'm... I'm not at all sure of the... is it perfectly clear that the... in terms... effect of the decision necessarily is equated to the fact he would not have otherwise have pleaded guilty? Petitioner: --In the context of a guilty plea, I think it is, Justice Stevens. That's the relevant decision. This Court's cases have applied the harmless error and plain error effect on substantial rights element in a variety of circumstances: at a detention hearing, during the course of a grand jury proceeding, most frequently a trial, of course, and also at sentencing. Each of those four circumstances, the Court made clear that the relevant question was whether the effect of that particular proceeding would have been the same-- Judge: Well--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--if the error had not been made.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Carlos Dominguez Benitez confessed to selling drugs to an informant. He made a plea agreement with the government in which he would plead guilty to conspiracy to sell drugs, which normally carried a 10-year minimum sentence. However, the government agreed to ask the judge to reduce the sentence below that minimum. The plea agreement also said that, if the judge did not agree to the government's request to lower the sentence, Dominguez could not withdraw his guilty plea. During discussions of the plea, the judge failed to mention the fact that it prohibited him from withdrawing his plea (the written statement, which did contain the fact, was read to him at another time). When the judge ruled that he could not lower the sentence, Dominguez appealed. He argued that the judge's failure to tell him that he would be unable to withdraw his appeal was a "plain error" under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 and therefore required reversal. The prosecutors countered that, in order to show that the judge had made a "plain error" Dominguez would need to show not just that he had made a mistake but also that it was reasonably likely that, without the error, Dominguez would not have pled guilty. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, siding with Dominguez to reverse the decision. Judge: We'll hear argument now in No. 03-167, United States v. Carlos Dominguez Benitez. Mr. Himmelfarb. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court has consistently held in both harmless error and plain error cases that an error affects substantial rights if it affected the outcome of the district court proceeding. Applying that principle to a violation of rule 11 at a guilty plea proceeding, 9 of the 12 courts of appeals that hear criminal cases have concluded that a rule 11 error affects substantial rights if it affected the defendant's decision to plead guilty, which means that the defendant would not have gone forward with his plea if the error had not occurred. That standard is correct. The Ninth Circuit standard which the-- Judge: May I just ask this one question? Because I'm... I'm not at all sure of the... is it perfectly clear that the... in terms... effect of the decision necessarily is equated to the fact he would not have otherwise have pleaded guilty? Petitioner: --In the context of a guilty plea, I think it is, Justice Stevens. That's the relevant decision. This Court's cases have applied the harmless error and plain error effect on substantial rights element in a variety of circumstances: at a detention hearing, during the course of a grand jury proceeding, most frequently a trial, of course, and also at sentencing. Each of those four circumstances, the Court made clear that the relevant question was whether the effect of that particular proceeding would have been the same-- Judge: Well-- Petitioner: --if the error had not been made. Judge: --Except that we... I mean, the... the meaning of that term varies. In... in some contexts, we say, well, it's... it's enough if... if confidence in... in that the result would have been the same has been shattered. In... in the case at the other extreme with a case... we... I think that is strongest for you, we... we've said in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, yes, you've got to show that he wouldn't have pleaded guilty or he's got to show that he wouldn't have pleaded guilty otherwise. And... and it seems to me that the... the issue here is, is this enough... is the context here enough like the context in ineffective assistance of counsel to... to put the heaviest burden on the petitioner, or is it... are there... are enough distinctions so that maybe the burden shouldn't be quite that heavy?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>We think the... we think it's directly analogous to the ineffective assistance of counsel context. In that context, you have a deficient performance by the defendant's lawyer in connection with advice about a guilty plea. And this Court's decision in Hill v. Lockhart makes clear that the next step of the Strickland analysis, the prejudice analysis, is whether but for that deficient performance, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have gone forward to trial.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Carlos Dominguez Benitez confessed to selling drugs to an informant. He made a plea agreement with the government in which he would plead guilty to conspiracy to sell drugs, which normally carried a 10-year minimum sentence. However, the government agreed to ask the judge to reduce the sentence below that minimum. The plea agreement also said that, if the judge did not agree to the government's request to lower the sentence, Dominguez could not withdraw his guilty plea. During discussions of the plea, the judge failed to mention the fact that it prohibited him from withdrawing his plea (the written statement, which did contain the fact, was read to him at another time). When the judge ruled that he could not lower the sentence, Dominguez appealed. He argued that the judge's failure to tell him that he would be unable to withdraw his appeal was a "plain error" under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 and therefore required reversal. The prosecutors countered that, in order to show that the judge had made a "plain error" Dominguez would need to show not just that he had made a mistake but also that it was reasonably likely that, without the error, Dominguez would not have pled guilty. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, siding with Dominguez to reverse the decision. Judge: We'll hear argument now in No. 03-167, United States v. Carlos Dominguez Benitez. Mr. Himmelfarb. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court has consistently held in both harmless error and plain error cases that an error affects substantial rights if it affected the outcome of the district court proceeding. Applying that principle to a violation of rule 11 at a guilty plea proceeding, 9 of the 12 courts of appeals that hear criminal cases have concluded that a rule 11 error affects substantial rights if it affected the defendant's decision to plead guilty, which means that the defendant would not have gone forward with his plea if the error had not occurred. That standard is correct. The Ninth Circuit standard which the-- Judge: May I just ask this one question? Because I'm... I'm not at all sure of the... is it perfectly clear that the... in terms... effect of the decision necessarily is equated to the fact he would not have otherwise have pleaded guilty? Petitioner: --In the context of a guilty plea, I think it is, Justice Stevens. That's the relevant decision. This Court's cases have applied the harmless error and plain error effect on substantial rights element in a variety of circumstances: at a detention hearing, during the course of a grand jury proceeding, most frequently a trial, of course, and also at sentencing. Each of those four circumstances, the Court made clear that the relevant question was whether the effect of that particular proceeding would have been the same-- Judge: Well-- Petitioner: --if the error had not been made. Judge: --Except that we... I mean, the... the meaning of that term varies. In... in some contexts, we say, well, it's... it's enough if... if confidence in... in that the result would have been the same has been shattered. In... in the case at the other extreme with a case... we... I think that is strongest for you, we... we've said in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, yes, you've got to show that he wouldn't have pleaded guilty or he's got to show that he wouldn't have pleaded guilty otherwise. And... and it seems to me that the... the issue here is, is this enough... is the context here enough like the context in ineffective assistance of counsel to... to put the heaviest burden on the petitioner, or is it... are there... are enough distinctions so that maybe the burden shouldn't be quite that heavy? Petitioner: We think the... we think it's directly analogous to the ineffective assistance of counsel context. In that context, you have a deficient performance by the defendant's lawyer in connection with advice about a guilty plea. And this Court's decision in Hill v. Lockhart makes clear that the next step of the Strickland analysis, the prejudice analysis, is whether but for that deficient performance, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have gone forward to trial. Judge: All right. No. Your... we--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>We think the same rule applies here.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Carlos Dominguez Benitez confessed to selling drugs to an informant. He made a plea agreement with the government in which he would plead guilty to conspiracy to sell drugs, which normally carried a 10-year minimum sentence. However, the government agreed to ask the judge to reduce the sentence below that minimum. The plea agreement also said that, if the judge did not agree to the government's request to lower the sentence, Dominguez could not withdraw his guilty plea. During discussions of the plea, the judge failed to mention the fact that it prohibited him from withdrawing his plea (the written statement, which did contain the fact, was read to him at another time). When the judge ruled that he could not lower the sentence, Dominguez appealed. He argued that the judge's failure to tell him that he would be unable to withdraw his appeal was a "plain error" under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 and therefore required reversal. The prosecutors countered that, in order to show that the judge had made a "plain error" Dominguez would need to show not just that he had made a mistake but also that it was reasonably likely that, without the error, Dominguez would not have pled guilty. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, siding with Dominguez to reverse the decision. Judge: We'll hear argument now in No. 03-167, United States v. Carlos Dominguez Benitez. Mr. Himmelfarb. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This Court has consistently held in both harmless error and plain error cases that an error affects substantial rights if it affected the outcome of the district court proceeding. Applying that principle to a violation of rule 11 at a guilty plea proceeding, 9 of the 12 courts of appeals that hear criminal cases have concluded that a rule 11 error affects substantial rights if it affected the defendant's decision to plead guilty, which means that the defendant would not have gone forward with his plea if the error had not occurred. That standard is correct. The Ninth Circuit standard which the-- Judge: May I just ask this one question? Because I'm... I'm not at all sure of the... is it perfectly clear that the... in terms... effect of the decision necessarily is equated to the fact he would not have otherwise have pleaded guilty? Petitioner: --In the context of a guilty plea, I think it is, Justice Stevens. That's the relevant decision. This Court's cases have applied the harmless error and plain error effect on substantial rights element in a variety of circumstances: at a detention hearing, during the course of a grand jury proceeding, most frequently a trial, of course, and also at sentencing. Each of those four circumstances, the Court made clear that the relevant question was whether the effect of that particular proceeding would have been the same-- Judge: Well-- Petitioner: --if the error had not been made. Judge: --Except that we... I mean, the... the meaning of that term varies. In... in some contexts, we say, well, it's... it's enough if... if confidence in... in that the result would have been the same has been shattered. In... in the case at the other extreme with a case... we... I think that is strongest for you, we... we've said in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, yes, you've got to show that he wouldn't have pleaded guilty or he's got to show that he wouldn't have pleaded guilty otherwise. And... and it seems to me that the... the issue here is, is this enough... is the context here enough like the context in ineffective assistance of counsel to... to put the heaviest burden on the petitioner, or is it... are there... are enough distinctions so that maybe the burden shouldn't be quite that heavy? Petitioner: We think the... we think it's directly analogous to the ineffective assistance of counsel context. In that context, you have a deficient performance by the defendant's lawyer in connection with advice about a guilty plea. And this Court's decision in Hill v. Lockhart makes clear that the next step of the Strickland analysis, the prejudice analysis, is whether but for that deficient performance, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have gone forward to trial. Judge: All right. No. Your... we-- Petitioner: We think the same rule applies here. Judge: --Let me... let me suggest at least a reason why maybe it isn't. I'd like your comment on it. In... in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, one reason for putting a high... you know, the heaviest burden on the defendant is that it is so very difficult to police effective assistance as you go along. The judge watching the... the plea hearing has no way of knowing what's going on or has gone on between the lawyer and... and the client. Here, we're in a different position. There... there are a couple of people in a position to... to avoid the kind of problem that we've got here. One obviously is the Federal judge. If he had a checklist in front of him, something like this wouldn't have happened. The second is counsel for the Government. The counsel for the Government can get up in a case like this and say, Judge, you forgot something, and avoid this problem. So it may be that because there are easier ways to avoid this, the burden on the defendant shouldn't have to be so heavy. What do you say to that?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, this Court's decision makes clear in Vonn that the defendant has a burden, of course, rejected the contention in that case that no matter when... regardless of the circumstances of when a rule 11 error occurs, the Government bears the burden of showing that there was no effect on substantial rights. The holding of Vonn is that the defendant bears the burden. The only question in this case is what that standard is, and we think again it's directly analogous to the ineffective assistance of counsel context.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Under West Virginia law, it is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm. In 1994, Randy Hayes pled guilty in West Virginia to a misdemeanor battery offense after striking his wife. Ten years later, in 2004, police responded to a domestic violence call at Hayes' home. While conducting a search of the premises the police uncovered a Winchester rifle. They arrested Hayes for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence based on the 1994 plea. Hayes argued that his prior conviction for misdemeanor battery did not constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of violence under the statute. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia rejected this argument and Hayes entered a conditional guilty plea to reserve his claim for appeal. Hayes' strategy was a success, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. The court held that conviction of a misdemeanor battery does not qualify as a crime of domestic violence, noting that the legislative intent and plain meaning of the statute indicated that the original offense must involve a "domestic" relationship between the victim and offender. Finding this requirement unfulfilled in the case, the Fourth Circuit reversed Hayes' conviction. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 07-608, United States v. Hayes. Ms. Saharsky.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Respondent's conviction for battering his wife is a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence primarily for two reasons: First, the statutory text is most naturally read that way. Second, a contrary reading would defeat Congress's purposes. Nine courts of appeals have determined that the text does not require a domestic relationship to be an element to the predicate offense. That's because the statute's text uses only one element, using the singular word "element", which relates to mode of aggression. It then introduces a new concept related to domestic relationship, using a comma and the word "committed". The word "committed" naturally modifies the word "offense". In common usage, a person commits an offense; he doesn't commit a use or attempted use of physical force. Under Respondent's reading of the statute, when it was enacted it would have become immediately a dead letter in two-thirds of the States, and it wouldn't have any application to the Federal Government. And--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Under West Virginia law, it is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm. In 1994, Randy Hayes pled guilty in West Virginia to a misdemeanor battery offense after striking his wife. Ten years later, in 2004, police responded to a domestic violence call at Hayes' home. While conducting a search of the premises the police uncovered a Winchester rifle. They arrested Hayes for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence based on the 1994 plea. Hayes argued that his prior conviction for misdemeanor battery did not constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of violence under the statute. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia rejected this argument and Hayes entered a conditional guilty plea to reserve his claim for appeal. Hayes' strategy was a success, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. The court held that conviction of a misdemeanor battery does not qualify as a crime of domestic violence, noting that the legislative intent and plain meaning of the statute indicated that the original offense must involve a "domestic" relationship between the victim and offender. Finding this requirement unfulfilled in the case, the Fourth Circuit reversed Hayes' conviction. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 07-608, United States v. Hayes. Ms. Saharsky. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Respondent's conviction for battering his wife is a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence primarily for two reasons: First, the statutory text is most naturally read that way. Second, a contrary reading would defeat Congress's purposes. Nine courts of appeals have determined that the text does not require a domestic relationship to be an element to the predicate offense. That's because the statute's text uses only one element, using the singular word "element", which relates to mode of aggression. It then introduces a new concept related to domestic relationship, using a comma and the word "committed". The word "committed" naturally modifies the word "offense". In common usage, a person commits an offense; he doesn't commit a use or attempted use of physical force. Under Respondent's reading of the statute, when it was enacted it would have become immediately a dead letter in two-thirds of the States, and it wouldn't have any application to the Federal Government. And-- Judge: Well, Respondent says that may be because a lot of people in Congress wanted it to be a dead letter. They would have wanted the whole thing to be a dead letter. There are a lot of people who didn't like this statute because it was a gun control statute.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--But Congress did act this statute, and this Court presumes two things: First--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Under West Virginia law, it is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm. In 1994, Randy Hayes pled guilty in West Virginia to a misdemeanor battery offense after striking his wife. Ten years later, in 2004, police responded to a domestic violence call at Hayes' home. While conducting a search of the premises the police uncovered a Winchester rifle. They arrested Hayes for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence based on the 1994 plea. Hayes argued that his prior conviction for misdemeanor battery did not constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of violence under the statute. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia rejected this argument and Hayes entered a conditional guilty plea to reserve his claim for appeal. Hayes' strategy was a success, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. The court held that conviction of a misdemeanor battery does not qualify as a crime of domestic violence, noting that the legislative intent and plain meaning of the statute indicated that the original offense must involve a "domestic" relationship between the victim and offender. Finding this requirement unfulfilled in the case, the Fourth Circuit reversed Hayes' conviction. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 07-608, United States v. Hayes. Ms. Saharsky. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Respondent's conviction for battering his wife is a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence primarily for two reasons: First, the statutory text is most naturally read that way. Second, a contrary reading would defeat Congress's purposes. Nine courts of appeals have determined that the text does not require a domestic relationship to be an element to the predicate offense. That's because the statute's text uses only one element, using the singular word "element", which relates to mode of aggression. It then introduces a new concept related to domestic relationship, using a comma and the word "committed". The word "committed" naturally modifies the word "offense". In common usage, a person commits an offense; he doesn't commit a use or attempted use of physical force. Under Respondent's reading of the statute, when it was enacted it would have become immediately a dead letter in two-thirds of the States, and it wouldn't have any application to the Federal Government. And-- Judge: Well, Respondent says that may be because a lot of people in Congress wanted it to be a dead letter. They would have wanted the whole thing to be a dead letter. There are a lot of people who didn't like this statute because it was a gun control statute. Petitioner: --But Congress did act this statute, and this Court presumes two things: First-- Judge: Well, if it's a compromise with the people who wanted no statute at all and you come out with a statute that covers one-third of the States anyway, I mean that's, you know -- that's the deal.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--There was a compromise made, but it wasn't with respect to whether there needed to be a domestic relationship element. It was with respect to how violent the offense had to be.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Under West Virginia law, it is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm. In 1994, Randy Hayes pled guilty in West Virginia to a misdemeanor battery offense after striking his wife. Ten years later, in 2004, police responded to a domestic violence call at Hayes' home. While conducting a search of the premises the police uncovered a Winchester rifle. They arrested Hayes for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence based on the 1994 plea. Hayes argued that his prior conviction for misdemeanor battery did not constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of violence under the statute. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia rejected this argument and Hayes entered a conditional guilty plea to reserve his claim for appeal. Hayes' strategy was a success, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. The court held that conviction of a misdemeanor battery does not qualify as a crime of domestic violence, noting that the legislative intent and plain meaning of the statute indicated that the original offense must involve a "domestic" relationship between the victim and offender. Finding this requirement unfulfilled in the case, the Fourth Circuit reversed Hayes' conviction. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 07-608, United States v. Hayes. Ms. Saharsky. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Respondent's conviction for battering his wife is a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence primarily for two reasons: First, the statutory text is most naturally read that way. Second, a contrary reading would defeat Congress's purposes. Nine courts of appeals have determined that the text does not require a domestic relationship to be an element to the predicate offense. That's because the statute's text uses only one element, using the singular word "element", which relates to mode of aggression. It then introduces a new concept related to domestic relationship, using a comma and the word "committed". The word "committed" naturally modifies the word "offense". In common usage, a person commits an offense; he doesn't commit a use or attempted use of physical force. Under Respondent's reading of the statute, when it was enacted it would have become immediately a dead letter in two-thirds of the States, and it wouldn't have any application to the Federal Government. And-- Judge: Well, Respondent says that may be because a lot of people in Congress wanted it to be a dead letter. They would have wanted the whole thing to be a dead letter. There are a lot of people who didn't like this statute because it was a gun control statute. Petitioner: --But Congress did act this statute, and this Court presumes two things: First-- Judge: Well, if it's a compromise with the people who wanted no statute at all and you come out with a statute that covers one-third of the States anyway, I mean that's, you know -- that's the deal. Petitioner: --There was a compromise made, but it wasn't with respect to whether there needed to be a domestic relationship element. It was with respect to how violent the offense had to be. Judge: How do we know -- how do we know that?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, if you look at the statute's drafting history, there were two versions considered. One used the term "crime of violence" to discuss how violent the statute had to be, and then the second substituted in the new language: "has as an element the use or attempted use of physical force or threatened use of a deadly weapon. "<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Under West Virginia law, it is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm. In 1994, Randy Hayes pled guilty in West Virginia to a misdemeanor battery offense after striking his wife. Ten years later, in 2004, police responded to a domestic violence call at Hayes' home. While conducting a search of the premises the police uncovered a Winchester rifle. They arrested Hayes for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence based on the 1994 plea. Hayes argued that his prior conviction for misdemeanor battery did not constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of violence under the statute. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia rejected this argument and Hayes entered a conditional guilty plea to reserve his claim for appeal. Hayes' strategy was a success, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. The court held that conviction of a misdemeanor battery does not qualify as a crime of domestic violence, noting that the legislative intent and plain meaning of the statute indicated that the original offense must involve a "domestic" relationship between the victim and offender. Finding this requirement unfulfilled in the case, the Fourth Circuit reversed Hayes' conviction. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 07-608, United States v. Hayes. Ms. Saharsky. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Respondent's conviction for battering his wife is a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence primarily for two reasons: First, the statutory text is most naturally read that way. Second, a contrary reading would defeat Congress's purposes. Nine courts of appeals have determined that the text does not require a domestic relationship to be an element to the predicate offense. That's because the statute's text uses only one element, using the singular word "element", which relates to mode of aggression. It then introduces a new concept related to domestic relationship, using a comma and the word "committed". The word "committed" naturally modifies the word "offense". In common usage, a person commits an offense; he doesn't commit a use or attempted use of physical force. Under Respondent's reading of the statute, when it was enacted it would have become immediately a dead letter in two-thirds of the States, and it wouldn't have any application to the Federal Government. And-- Judge: Well, Respondent says that may be because a lot of people in Congress wanted it to be a dead letter. They would have wanted the whole thing to be a dead letter. There are a lot of people who didn't like this statute because it was a gun control statute. Petitioner: --But Congress did act this statute, and this Court presumes two things: First-- Judge: Well, if it's a compromise with the people who wanted no statute at all and you come out with a statute that covers one-third of the States anyway, I mean that's, you know -- that's the deal. Petitioner: --There was a compromise made, but it wasn't with respect to whether there needed to be a domestic relationship element. It was with respect to how violent the offense had to be. Judge: How do we know -- how do we know that? Petitioner: Well, if you look at the statute's drafting history, there were two versions considered. One used the term "crime of violence" to discuss how violent the statute had to be, and then the second substituted in the new language: "has as an element the use or attempted use of physical force or threatened use of a deadly weapon. " Judge: But it also substituted this structure that we are -- that we are discussing today. Didn't that come in at the same time?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>The--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Under West Virginia law, it is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence to possess a firearm. In 1994, Randy Hayes pled guilty in West Virginia to a misdemeanor battery offense after striking his wife. Ten years later, in 2004, police responded to a domestic violence call at Hayes' home. While conducting a search of the premises the police uncovered a Winchester rifle. They arrested Hayes for possessing a firearm after being convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence based on the 1994 plea. Hayes argued that his prior conviction for misdemeanor battery did not constitute a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of violence under the statute. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia rejected this argument and Hayes entered a conditional guilty plea to reserve his claim for appeal. Hayes' strategy was a success, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. The court held that conviction of a misdemeanor battery does not qualify as a crime of domestic violence, noting that the legislative intent and plain meaning of the statute indicated that the original offense must involve a "domestic" relationship between the victim and offender. Finding this requirement unfulfilled in the case, the Fourth Circuit reversed Hayes' conviction. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 07-608, United States v. Hayes. Ms. Saharsky. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Respondent's conviction for battering his wife is a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence primarily for two reasons: First, the statutory text is most naturally read that way. Second, a contrary reading would defeat Congress's purposes. Nine courts of appeals have determined that the text does not require a domestic relationship to be an element to the predicate offense. That's because the statute's text uses only one element, using the singular word "element", which relates to mode of aggression. It then introduces a new concept related to domestic relationship, using a comma and the word "committed". The word "committed" naturally modifies the word "offense". In common usage, a person commits an offense; he doesn't commit a use or attempted use of physical force. Under Respondent's reading of the statute, when it was enacted it would have become immediately a dead letter in two-thirds of the States, and it wouldn't have any application to the Federal Government. And-- Judge: Well, Respondent says that may be because a lot of people in Congress wanted it to be a dead letter. They would have wanted the whole thing to be a dead letter. There are a lot of people who didn't like this statute because it was a gun control statute. Petitioner: --But Congress did act this statute, and this Court presumes two things: First-- Judge: Well, if it's a compromise with the people who wanted no statute at all and you come out with a statute that covers one-third of the States anyway, I mean that's, you know -- that's the deal. Petitioner: --There was a compromise made, but it wasn't with respect to whether there needed to be a domestic relationship element. It was with respect to how violent the offense had to be. Judge: How do we know -- how do we know that? Petitioner: Well, if you look at the statute's drafting history, there were two versions considered. One used the term "crime of violence" to discuss how violent the statute had to be, and then the second substituted in the new language: "has as an element the use or attempted use of physical force or threatened use of a deadly weapon. " Judge: But it also substituted this structure that we are -- that we are discussing today. Didn't that come in at the same time? Petitioner: The-- Judge: So, why -- why say it's only the former provision that was the compromise and not the addition of this later language?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Both the original structure and the statute as enacted had the same structure in that they had a "committed by" clause that modified the word "offense". Now, it's true that the use -- (i) and the Romanette (ii), but that all came in because there was a discussion about how violent the offense had to be, both -- in the original statute that was considered, you have an offense committed by a certain person, an offense of a certain type committed by a certain person, and in the statute that was enacted you have an offense of a certain type committed by a certain person. Now, Congress put more detail in, in terms of what that certain type of offense is. This has as an "element" language, but it just didn't go to domestic relationship. And to get back to one of the earlier points in your question, you know, this Court presumes when Congress passes a statute two things are true: First, it knows the legal backdrop on which it enacts the law; and second, that it's presumed that its law is going to have effect. And that should be especially true here where Congress was dealing with a serious nationwide problem of domestic violence using firearms. Congress--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (a “Hobbs Act robbery”) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants’ challenges and affirming the district court’s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contains both an “elements clause” and a “residual clause.” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Dimaya, the Court addressed (and invalidated) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924(c) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924(c) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause. Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-431, United States versus Davis. Mr. Feigin.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In order to render Section 940 -- 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutional, Respondents need to show that the only plausible construction is one in which a defendant's guilt or innocence hinges on a judge's imagination about how an ordinary defendant might act rather than a jury's finding about how a particular defendant acted. That's a very unusual way to draw a line between criminal and non-criminal conduct in the context of a jury trial, and I don't think lower courts would readily have accepted it if Section 924(c) were the only or the first context to present a choice between a categorical approach and a circumstance-specific one. The operative language of the statute --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (a “Hobbs Act robbery”) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants’ challenges and affirming the district court’s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contains both an “elements clause” and a “residual clause.” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Dimaya, the Court addressed (and invalidated) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924(c) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924(c) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause. Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-431, United States versus Davis. Mr. Feigin. Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In order to render Section 940 -- 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutional, Respondents need to show that the only plausible construction is one in which a defendant's guilt or innocence hinges on a judge's imagination about how an ordinary defendant might act rather than a jury's finding about how a particular defendant acted. That's a very unusual way to draw a line between criminal and non-criminal conduct in the context of a jury trial, and I don't think lower courts would readily have accepted it if Section 924(c) were the only or the first context to present a choice between a categorical approach and a circumstance-specific one. The operative language of the statute -- Judge: Mr. Feigin, what do you think Congress intended in 1986?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I -- I think Congress in 1986 probably didn't focus on this question --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (a “Hobbs Act robbery”) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants’ challenges and affirming the district court’s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contains both an “elements clause” and a “residual clause.” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Dimaya, the Court addressed (and invalidated) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924(c) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924(c) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause. Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-431, United States versus Davis. Mr. Feigin. Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In order to render Section 940 -- 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutional, Respondents need to show that the only plausible construction is one in which a defendant's guilt or innocence hinges on a judge's imagination about how an ordinary defendant might act rather than a jury's finding about how a particular defendant acted. That's a very unusual way to draw a line between criminal and non-criminal conduct in the context of a jury trial, and I don't think lower courts would readily have accepted it if Section 924(c) were the only or the first context to present a choice between a categorical approach and a circumstance-specific one. The operative language of the statute -- Judge: Mr. Feigin, what do you think Congress intended in 1986? Petitioner: I -- I think Congress in 1986 probably didn't focus on this question -- Judge: I -- I --<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>-- particularly heavily.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (a “Hobbs Act robbery”) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants’ challenges and affirming the district court’s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contains both an “elements clause” and a “residual clause.” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Dimaya, the Court addressed (and invalidated) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924(c) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924(c) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause. Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-431, United States versus Davis. Mr. Feigin. Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In order to render Section 940 -- 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutional, Respondents need to show that the only plausible construction is one in which a defendant's guilt or innocence hinges on a judge's imagination about how an ordinary defendant might act rather than a jury's finding about how a particular defendant acted. That's a very unusual way to draw a line between criminal and non-criminal conduct in the context of a jury trial, and I don't think lower courts would readily have accepted it if Section 924(c) were the only or the first context to present a choice between a categorical approach and a circumstance-specific one. The operative language of the statute -- Judge: Mr. Feigin, what do you think Congress intended in 1986? Petitioner: I -- I think Congress in 1986 probably didn't focus on this question -- Judge: I -- I -- Petitioner: -- particularly heavily. Judge: -- I understand it didn't.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>But I think if Congress had thought about it -- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (a “Hobbs Act robbery”) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants’ challenges and affirming the district court’s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contains both an “elements clause” and a “residual clause.” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Dimaya, the Court addressed (and invalidated) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924(c) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924(c) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause. Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-431, United States versus Davis. Mr. Feigin. Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In order to render Section 940 -- 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutional, Respondents need to show that the only plausible construction is one in which a defendant's guilt or innocence hinges on a judge's imagination about how an ordinary defendant might act rather than a jury's finding about how a particular defendant acted. That's a very unusual way to draw a line between criminal and non-criminal conduct in the context of a jury trial, and I don't think lower courts would readily have accepted it if Section 924(c) were the only or the first context to present a choice between a categorical approach and a circumstance-specific one. The operative language of the statute -- Judge: Mr. Feigin, what do you think Congress intended in 1986? Petitioner: I -- I think Congress in 1986 probably didn't focus on this question -- Judge: I -- I -- Petitioner: -- particularly heavily. Judge: -- I understand it didn't. Petitioner: But I think if Congress had thought about it -- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No. Judge: I didn't ask "had," because that's rewriting their intent. Given the circumstances in 1986, that 16(b) had been read in the categorical approach, that they adopted it for the Bail Reform Act, and you're not challenging that that's a categorical approach, that for decades you have been saying that 16(b) is better read as the categorical approach, what do you think Congress intended in 1986?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>No?<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Maurice Lamont Davis guilty on six counts, including the illegal use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (a “Hobbs Act robbery”) and the illegal use or carrying of a firearm to aid and abet conspiracy to commit a crime of violence. Also on November 19, 2015, a jury found defendant Andre Levon Glover guilty on seven counts, including the two counts described above. On appeal, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion on January 31, 2017, denying both defendants’ challenges and affirming the district court’s judgment below. The defendants petitioned the US Supreme Court for certiorari, and following the Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. __ (2018), the Court remanded their case back to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of that decision. After requesting supplemental briefing from the parties on the effect of Dimaya, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) contains both an “elements clause” and a “residual clause.” The elements clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” and the residual clause defines an offense as a crime of violence if it, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” In Dimaya, the Court addressed (and invalidated) a residual clause identical to the residual clause in § 924(c) but did not address the elements clause. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held the residual clause in 924(c) unconstitutionally vague under Dimaya but did not invalidate the elements clause in that section. As a result of this holding, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its prior judgment as to the Hobbs Act robbery count but vacated as to the aiding and abetting conspiracy count, because the former relies on the elements clause while the latter relies on the residual clause. Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-431, United States versus Davis. Mr. Feigin. Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In order to render Section 940 -- 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutional, Respondents need to show that the only plausible construction is one in which a defendant's guilt or innocence hinges on a judge's imagination about how an ordinary defendant might act rather than a jury's finding about how a particular defendant acted. That's a very unusual way to draw a line between criminal and non-criminal conduct in the context of a jury trial, and I don't think lower courts would readily have accepted it if Section 924(c) were the only or the first context to present a choice between a categorical approach and a circumstance-specific one. The operative language of the statute -- Judge: Mr. Feigin, what do you think Congress intended in 1986? Petitioner: I -- I think Congress in 1986 probably didn't focus on this question -- Judge: I -- I -- Petitioner: -- particularly heavily. Judge: -- I understand it didn't. Petitioner: But I think if Congress had thought about it -- JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No. Judge: I didn't ask "had," because that's rewriting their intent. Given the circumstances in 1986, that 16(b) had been read in the categorical approach, that they adopted it for the Bail Reform Act, and you're not challenging that that's a categorical approach, that for decades you have been saying that 16(b) is better read as the categorical approach, what do you think Congress intended in 1986? Petitioner: No? Judge: Without reference to our later holding.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, a couple of points, Your Honor. First --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Herman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing sexual assault in Maryland while on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After serving his sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not register as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required by state law. In January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release. The 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the U.S. Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 to impose the law’s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted. Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 17-6086, Gundy versus the United States. Ms. Baumgartel.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: SORNA's delegation provision grants unguided power to the nation's top prosecutor to expand the scope of criminal laws and to impose burdensome, sometimes lifetime registration requirements on hundreds of thousands of individuals. It combines criminal law-making and executive power in precisely the way that the Constitution was designed to prohibit. This delegation is unconstitutional. This delegation can be distinguished from every delegation that has previously been upheld by this Court due to a combination of its total lack of standard and the nature and power -- nature and significance of the delegated power. Unlike other delegations that this Court has approved, SORNA has no standard to guide the Attorney General's exercise of discretion.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Herman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing sexual assault in Maryland while on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After serving his sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not register as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required by state law. In January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release. The 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the U.S. Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 to impose the law’s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted. Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 17-6086, Gundy versus the United States. Ms. Baumgartel. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: SORNA's delegation provision grants unguided power to the nation's top prosecutor to expand the scope of criminal laws and to impose burdensome, sometimes lifetime registration requirements on hundreds of thousands of individuals. It combines criminal law-making and executive power in precisely the way that the Constitution was designed to prohibit. This delegation is unconstitutional. This delegation can be distinguished from every delegation that has previously been upheld by this Court due to a combination of its total lack of standard and the nature and power -- nature and significance of the delegated power. Unlike other delegations that this Court has approved, SORNA has no standard to guide the Attorney General's exercise of discretion. Judge: Well, the government says that they do have a standard and it's the -- apply the prohibition or the requirements in the law to the maximum extent feasible.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Your Honor, that language does not appear anywhere in the statutory text, nor can it be derived from the sources that the government cites.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Herman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing sexual assault in Maryland while on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After serving his sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not register as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required by state law. In January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release. The 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the U.S. Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 to impose the law’s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted. Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 17-6086, Gundy versus the United States. Ms. Baumgartel. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: SORNA's delegation provision grants unguided power to the nation's top prosecutor to expand the scope of criminal laws and to impose burdensome, sometimes lifetime registration requirements on hundreds of thousands of individuals. It combines criminal law-making and executive power in precisely the way that the Constitution was designed to prohibit. This delegation is unconstitutional. This delegation can be distinguished from every delegation that has previously been upheld by this Court due to a combination of its total lack of standard and the nature and power -- nature and significance of the delegated power. Unlike other delegations that this Court has approved, SORNA has no standard to guide the Attorney General's exercise of discretion. Judge: Well, the government says that they do have a standard and it's the -- apply the prohibition or the requirements in the law to the maximum extent feasible. Petitioner: Your Honor, that language does not appear anywhere in the statutory text, nor can it be derived from the sources that the government cites. Judge: What about the list that's contained in, what is it, 20901, the -- the list of past offenders? On your view, none of those people would be required to register?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>That's not correct. So one important thing about this case is that every -- every state had an existing sex offender registration system prior to SORNA's enactment, and those registration systems would remain in effect regardless of whether SORNA existed or not. And so, for example, Petitioner was required to register under existing Maryland law, and so would the vast majority of sex offenders who were also then required to reregister under SORNA. These state registration systems had been in existence, many of them, since the early '90s, but since 1996, every state had its own registration system.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Herman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing sexual assault in Maryland while on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After serving his sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not register as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required by state law. In January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release. The 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the U.S. Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 to impose the law’s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted. Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 17-6086, Gundy versus the United States. Ms. Baumgartel. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: SORNA's delegation provision grants unguided power to the nation's top prosecutor to expand the scope of criminal laws and to impose burdensome, sometimes lifetime registration requirements on hundreds of thousands of individuals. It combines criminal law-making and executive power in precisely the way that the Constitution was designed to prohibit. This delegation is unconstitutional. This delegation can be distinguished from every delegation that has previously been upheld by this Court due to a combination of its total lack of standard and the nature and power -- nature and significance of the delegated power. Unlike other delegations that this Court has approved, SORNA has no standard to guide the Attorney General's exercise of discretion. Judge: Well, the government says that they do have a standard and it's the -- apply the prohibition or the requirements in the law to the maximum extent feasible. Petitioner: Your Honor, that language does not appear anywhere in the statutory text, nor can it be derived from the sources that the government cites. Judge: What about the list that's contained in, what is it, 20901, the -- the list of past offenders? On your view, none of those people would be required to register? Petitioner: That's not correct. So one important thing about this case is that every -- every state had an existing sex offender registration system prior to SORNA's enactment, and those registration systems would remain in effect regardless of whether SORNA existed or not. And so, for example, Petitioner was required to register under existing Maryland law, and so would the vast majority of sex offenders who were also then required to reregister under SORNA. These state registration systems had been in existence, many of them, since the early '90s, but since 1996, every state had its own registration system. Judge: But they would be -- they would not come under the federal registration system, which was the purpose of SORNA to create. None of those examples would be covered by the federal registration requirement.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, as -- as this Court held in Reynolds, the Congress left it to the Attorney General to determine whether SORNA would apply retroactively at all. And so Congress declined to make the initial decision as to whether any pre-Act offender should be required to register. This was consistent with how Congress had approached registration schemes in the past. Congress had previously enacted registration legislation that conditioned state funding on requiring certain things from sex offender registries, and in each of those prior cases, Congress had not made the law retroactive. And so there's -- there's nothing strange about Congress doing this. As the Court held in Reynolds, it then gave the Attorney General full authority to decide whether the law should be applied retroactively, so the initial on/off determination, but then as well how it should apply, which offenders should be included, if it should extend all the way back to 20, 30, 40 years. There was absolutely no guidance provided to the Attorney General in making --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Herman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing sexual assault in Maryland while on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After serving his sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not register as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required by state law. In January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release. The 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the U.S. Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 to impose the law’s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted. Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 17-6086, Gundy versus the United States. Ms. Baumgartel. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: SORNA's delegation provision grants unguided power to the nation's top prosecutor to expand the scope of criminal laws and to impose burdensome, sometimes lifetime registration requirements on hundreds of thousands of individuals. It combines criminal law-making and executive power in precisely the way that the Constitution was designed to prohibit. This delegation is unconstitutional. This delegation can be distinguished from every delegation that has previously been upheld by this Court due to a combination of its total lack of standard and the nature and power -- nature and significance of the delegated power. Unlike other delegations that this Court has approved, SORNA has no standard to guide the Attorney General's exercise of discretion. Judge: Well, the government says that they do have a standard and it's the -- apply the prohibition or the requirements in the law to the maximum extent feasible. Petitioner: Your Honor, that language does not appear anywhere in the statutory text, nor can it be derived from the sources that the government cites. Judge: What about the list that's contained in, what is it, 20901, the -- the list of past offenders? On your view, none of those people would be required to register? Petitioner: That's not correct. So one important thing about this case is that every -- every state had an existing sex offender registration system prior to SORNA's enactment, and those registration systems would remain in effect regardless of whether SORNA existed or not. And so, for example, Petitioner was required to register under existing Maryland law, and so would the vast majority of sex offenders who were also then required to reregister under SORNA. These state registration systems had been in existence, many of them, since the early '90s, but since 1996, every state had its own registration system. Judge: But they would be -- they would not come under the federal registration system, which was the purpose of SORNA to create. None of those examples would be covered by the federal registration requirement. Petitioner: Well, as -- as this Court held in Reynolds, the Congress left it to the Attorney General to determine whether SORNA would apply retroactively at all. And so Congress declined to make the initial decision as to whether any pre-Act offender should be required to register. This was consistent with how Congress had approached registration schemes in the past. Congress had previously enacted registration legislation that conditioned state funding on requiring certain things from sex offender registries, and in each of those prior cases, Congress had not made the law retroactive. And so there's -- there's nothing strange about Congress doing this. As the Court held in Reynolds, it then gave the Attorney General full authority to decide whether the law should be applied retroactively, so the initial on/off determination, but then as well how it should apply, which offenders should be included, if it should extend all the way back to 20, 30, 40 years. There was absolutely no guidance provided to the Attorney General in making -- Judge: Well, suppose the -- the statute said that the Attorney General shall have the authority to determine the application of this subchapter to pre-enactment offenders as public safety and fairness requires. Would that be a -- a violation of the Non-Delegation Doctrine?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, Your Honor. Given the subject matter of this delegation, Congress needs to provide more guidance than something along the lines of "in the public interest." And --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Herman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing sexual assault in Maryland while on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After serving his sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not register as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required by state law. In January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release. The 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the U.S. Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 to impose the law’s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted. Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 17-6086, Gundy versus the United States. Ms. Baumgartel. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: SORNA's delegation provision grants unguided power to the nation's top prosecutor to expand the scope of criminal laws and to impose burdensome, sometimes lifetime registration requirements on hundreds of thousands of individuals. It combines criminal law-making and executive power in precisely the way that the Constitution was designed to prohibit. This delegation is unconstitutional. This delegation can be distinguished from every delegation that has previously been upheld by this Court due to a combination of its total lack of standard and the nature and power -- nature and significance of the delegated power. Unlike other delegations that this Court has approved, SORNA has no standard to guide the Attorney General's exercise of discretion. Judge: Well, the government says that they do have a standard and it's the -- apply the prohibition or the requirements in the law to the maximum extent feasible. Petitioner: Your Honor, that language does not appear anywhere in the statutory text, nor can it be derived from the sources that the government cites. Judge: What about the list that's contained in, what is it, 20901, the -- the list of past offenders? On your view, none of those people would be required to register? Petitioner: That's not correct. So one important thing about this case is that every -- every state had an existing sex offender registration system prior to SORNA's enactment, and those registration systems would remain in effect regardless of whether SORNA existed or not. And so, for example, Petitioner was required to register under existing Maryland law, and so would the vast majority of sex offenders who were also then required to reregister under SORNA. These state registration systems had been in existence, many of them, since the early '90s, but since 1996, every state had its own registration system. Judge: But they would be -- they would not come under the federal registration system, which was the purpose of SORNA to create. None of those examples would be covered by the federal registration requirement. Petitioner: Well, as -- as this Court held in Reynolds, the Congress left it to the Attorney General to determine whether SORNA would apply retroactively at all. And so Congress declined to make the initial decision as to whether any pre-Act offender should be required to register. This was consistent with how Congress had approached registration schemes in the past. Congress had previously enacted registration legislation that conditioned state funding on requiring certain things from sex offender registries, and in each of those prior cases, Congress had not made the law retroactive. And so there's -- there's nothing strange about Congress doing this. As the Court held in Reynolds, it then gave the Attorney General full authority to decide whether the law should be applied retroactively, so the initial on/off determination, but then as well how it should apply, which offenders should be included, if it should extend all the way back to 20, 30, 40 years. There was absolutely no guidance provided to the Attorney General in making -- Judge: Well, suppose the -- the statute said that the Attorney General shall have the authority to determine the application of this subchapter to pre-enactment offenders as public safety and fairness requires. Would that be a -- a violation of the Non-Delegation Doctrine? Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor. Given the subject matter of this delegation, Congress needs to provide more guidance than something along the lines of "in the public interest." And -- Judge: What about the most famous regulation, that I think people in this room would imagine, Rule 10b-5? I mean, Rule 10b-5 is promulgated under a statute that says the SEC can forbid the use of any manipulative device -- that's like the sex offender part -- in contravention of such rules as are appropriate in the public interest.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>So there are -- there are a few distinctions. One is that the SEC, obviously, is a different body than the Attorney General, and so this is a point where the Court's due process and delegation concerns converge. And it's important from the Constitution to have a separation between the body that is the regulatory lawmaker and the body that is the prosecutor.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: The United States Sentencing Guidelines define a career offender as one with at least two prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes and provides that a sentencing judge must count as a single prior conviction all "related" convictions. Convictions may also be functionally related, if they were factually or logically related and sentencing was joint. After Paula Buford pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, the sentencing judge had to determine whether her five prior state convictions were "related" or whether they should count as more than one. At sentencing, the government conceded that her four prior robbery convictions were related. The government did not concede that her prior drug conviction was related to the robberies. The District Court concluded that Buford's drug and robbery cases had not been either formally or functionally consolidated. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision deferentially rather than de novo, giving deference to the District Court. Judge: We'll hear argument now in Number 99-9073, Paula Buford v. The United States. Mr. Strang.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Paula Buford's case presents the very type of mixed question well-suited to de novo review, and that's particularly true here because of the overriding, indeed the pervasive importance of uniformity in the current Federal sentencing scheme. Paula Buford serves a prison sentence roughly twice as long as it would have been because of the way in which the district court interpreted and applied guidelines and commentary on relatedness and consolidation. In her view, the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit erred by declining to give independent review to the question of consolidation incorporated into the meaning of relatedness, specifically declined to review de novo whether her prior convictions, her prior cases in fact had been consolidated. I think there are several specific reasons that make this an appropriate case, an appropriate mixed question application of the guidelines--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: The United States Sentencing Guidelines define a career offender as one with at least two prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes and provides that a sentencing judge must count as a single prior conviction all "related" convictions. Convictions may also be functionally related, if they were factually or logically related and sentencing was joint. After Paula Buford pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, the sentencing judge had to determine whether her five prior state convictions were "related" or whether they should count as more than one. At sentencing, the government conceded that her four prior robbery convictions were related. The government did not concede that her prior drug conviction was related to the robberies. The District Court concluded that Buford's drug and robbery cases had not been either formally or functionally consolidated. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision deferentially rather than de novo, giving deference to the District Court. Judge: We'll hear argument now in Number 99-9073, Paula Buford v. The United States. Mr. Strang. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Paula Buford's case presents the very type of mixed question well-suited to de novo review, and that's particularly true here because of the overriding, indeed the pervasive importance of uniformity in the current Federal sentencing scheme. Paula Buford serves a prison sentence roughly twice as long as it would have been because of the way in which the district court interpreted and applied guidelines and commentary on relatedness and consolidation. In her view, the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit erred by declining to give independent review to the question of consolidation incorporated into the meaning of relatedness, specifically declined to review de novo whether her prior convictions, her prior cases in fact had been consolidated. I think there are several specific reasons that make this an appropriate case, an appropriate mixed question application of the guidelines-- Judge: Well, Mr. Strang, isn't there one, perhaps, factor that cuts against your argument the fact that district courts probably see this kind of case... kind of an argument in connection with sentencing, a typical district judge, much more often than a typical judge of a court of appeals?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--It is true, Your... Mr. Chief Justice that but a fraction of sentences ever are appealed on any ground, but there is no reason to assume that the district judge would be reviewing the act of a State court in his own district or her own district or of any court familiar to that district judge. The fact that the prior convictions here arose in Milwaukee County, the seat of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, I think is fairly described an accident.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: The United States Sentencing Guidelines define a career offender as one with at least two prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes and provides that a sentencing judge must count as a single prior conviction all "related" convictions. Convictions may also be functionally related, if they were factually or logically related and sentencing was joint. After Paula Buford pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, the sentencing judge had to determine whether her five prior state convictions were "related" or whether they should count as more than one. At sentencing, the government conceded that her four prior robbery convictions were related. The government did not concede that her prior drug conviction was related to the robberies. The District Court concluded that Buford's drug and robbery cases had not been either formally or functionally consolidated. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision deferentially rather than de novo, giving deference to the District Court. Judge: We'll hear argument now in Number 99-9073, Paula Buford v. The United States. Mr. Strang. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Paula Buford's case presents the very type of mixed question well-suited to de novo review, and that's particularly true here because of the overriding, indeed the pervasive importance of uniformity in the current Federal sentencing scheme. Paula Buford serves a prison sentence roughly twice as long as it would have been because of the way in which the district court interpreted and applied guidelines and commentary on relatedness and consolidation. In her view, the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit erred by declining to give independent review to the question of consolidation incorporated into the meaning of relatedness, specifically declined to review de novo whether her prior convictions, her prior cases in fact had been consolidated. I think there are several specific reasons that make this an appropriate case, an appropriate mixed question application of the guidelines-- Judge: Well, Mr. Strang, isn't there one, perhaps, factor that cuts against your argument the fact that district courts probably see this kind of case... kind of an argument in connection with sentencing, a typical district judge, much more often than a typical judge of a court of appeals? Petitioner: --It is true, Your... Mr. Chief Justice that but a fraction of sentences ever are appealed on any ground, but there is no reason to assume that the district judge would be reviewing the act of a State court in his own district or her own district or of any court familiar to that district judge. The fact that the prior convictions here arose in Milwaukee County, the seat of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, I think is fairly described an accident. Judge: That's where the Federal judge sits, is it not?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: The United States Sentencing Guidelines define a career offender as one with at least two prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes and provides that a sentencing judge must count as a single prior conviction all "related" convictions. Convictions may also be functionally related, if they were factually or logically related and sentencing was joint. After Paula Buford pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, the sentencing judge had to determine whether her five prior state convictions were "related" or whether they should count as more than one. At sentencing, the government conceded that her four prior robbery convictions were related. The government did not concede that her prior drug conviction was related to the robberies. The District Court concluded that Buford's drug and robbery cases had not been either formally or functionally consolidated. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision deferentially rather than de novo, giving deference to the District Court. Judge: We'll hear argument now in Number 99-9073, Paula Buford v. The United States. Mr. Strang. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Paula Buford's case presents the very type of mixed question well-suited to de novo review, and that's particularly true here because of the overriding, indeed the pervasive importance of uniformity in the current Federal sentencing scheme. Paula Buford serves a prison sentence roughly twice as long as it would have been because of the way in which the district court interpreted and applied guidelines and commentary on relatedness and consolidation. In her view, the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit erred by declining to give independent review to the question of consolidation incorporated into the meaning of relatedness, specifically declined to review de novo whether her prior convictions, her prior cases in fact had been consolidated. I think there are several specific reasons that make this an appropriate case, an appropriate mixed question application of the guidelines-- Judge: Well, Mr. Strang, isn't there one, perhaps, factor that cuts against your argument the fact that district courts probably see this kind of case... kind of an argument in connection with sentencing, a typical district judge, much more often than a typical judge of a court of appeals? Petitioner: --It is true, Your... Mr. Chief Justice that but a fraction of sentences ever are appealed on any ground, but there is no reason to assume that the district judge would be reviewing the act of a State court in his own district or her own district or of any court familiar to that district judge. The fact that the prior convictions here arose in Milwaukee County, the seat of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, I think is fairly described an accident. Judge: That's where the Federal judge sits, is it not? Petitioner: Yes. Judge: In Milwaukee County?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, and that's an accident of the facts here. There's no reason that Ms. Buford's prior convictions could not have arisen in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, or San Fernando, California--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: The United States Sentencing Guidelines define a career offender as one with at least two prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes and provides that a sentencing judge must count as a single prior conviction all "related" convictions. Convictions may also be functionally related, if they were factually or logically related and sentencing was joint. After Paula Buford pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, the sentencing judge had to determine whether her five prior state convictions were "related" or whether they should count as more than one. At sentencing, the government conceded that her four prior robbery convictions were related. The government did not concede that her prior drug conviction was related to the robberies. The District Court concluded that Buford's drug and robbery cases had not been either formally or functionally consolidated. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision deferentially rather than de novo, giving deference to the District Court. Judge: We'll hear argument now in Number 99-9073, Paula Buford v. The United States. Mr. Strang. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Paula Buford's case presents the very type of mixed question well-suited to de novo review, and that's particularly true here because of the overriding, indeed the pervasive importance of uniformity in the current Federal sentencing scheme. Paula Buford serves a prison sentence roughly twice as long as it would have been because of the way in which the district court interpreted and applied guidelines and commentary on relatedness and consolidation. In her view, the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit erred by declining to give independent review to the question of consolidation incorporated into the meaning of relatedness, specifically declined to review de novo whether her prior convictions, her prior cases in fact had been consolidated. I think there are several specific reasons that make this an appropriate case, an appropriate mixed question application of the guidelines-- Judge: Well, Mr. Strang, isn't there one, perhaps, factor that cuts against your argument the fact that district courts probably see this kind of case... kind of an argument in connection with sentencing, a typical district judge, much more often than a typical judge of a court of appeals? Petitioner: --It is true, Your... Mr. Chief Justice that but a fraction of sentences ever are appealed on any ground, but there is no reason to assume that the district judge would be reviewing the act of a State court in his own district or her own district or of any court familiar to that district judge. The fact that the prior convictions here arose in Milwaukee County, the seat of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, I think is fairly described an accident. Judge: That's where the Federal judge sits, is it not? Petitioner: Yes. Judge: In Milwaukee County? Petitioner: Yes, and that's an accident of the facts here. There's no reason that Ms. Buford's prior convictions could not have arisen in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, or San Fernando, California-- Judge: Let me ask you another question. I guess that the guidelines provide that sentences are related where the offenses occurred on the same occasion, or were part of a common scheme or plan, and those questions seem to involve certain factual determinations. Do you think that on appellate review there would be a de novo review?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Never of historical facts, regardless which path one takes to relatedness. The basic, or what this Court has called historical facts, would be subject only to clear error review.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: The United States Sentencing Guidelines define a career offender as one with at least two prior felony convictions for violent or drug-related crimes and provides that a sentencing judge must count as a single prior conviction all "related" convictions. Convictions may also be functionally related, if they were factually or logically related and sentencing was joint. After Paula Buford pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery, the sentencing judge had to determine whether her five prior state convictions were "related" or whether they should count as more than one. At sentencing, the government conceded that her four prior robbery convictions were related. The government did not concede that her prior drug conviction was related to the robberies. The District Court concluded that Buford's drug and robbery cases had not been either formally or functionally consolidated. In affirming, the Court of Appeals reviewed the decision deferentially rather than de novo, giving deference to the District Court. Judge: We'll hear argument now in Number 99-9073, Paula Buford v. The United States. Mr. Strang. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Paula Buford's case presents the very type of mixed question well-suited to de novo review, and that's particularly true here because of the overriding, indeed the pervasive importance of uniformity in the current Federal sentencing scheme. Paula Buford serves a prison sentence roughly twice as long as it would have been because of the way in which the district court interpreted and applied guidelines and commentary on relatedness and consolidation. In her view, the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit erred by declining to give independent review to the question of consolidation incorporated into the meaning of relatedness, specifically declined to review de novo whether her prior convictions, her prior cases in fact had been consolidated. I think there are several specific reasons that make this an appropriate case, an appropriate mixed question application of the guidelines-- Judge: Well, Mr. Strang, isn't there one, perhaps, factor that cuts against your argument the fact that district courts probably see this kind of case... kind of an argument in connection with sentencing, a typical district judge, much more often than a typical judge of a court of appeals? Petitioner: --It is true, Your... Mr. Chief Justice that but a fraction of sentences ever are appealed on any ground, but there is no reason to assume that the district judge would be reviewing the act of a State court in his own district or her own district or of any court familiar to that district judge. The fact that the prior convictions here arose in Milwaukee County, the seat of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, I think is fairly described an accident. Judge: That's where the Federal judge sits, is it not? Petitioner: Yes. Judge: In Milwaukee County? Petitioner: Yes, and that's an accident of the facts here. There's no reason that Ms. Buford's prior convictions could not have arisen in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, or San Fernando, California-- Judge: Let me ask you another question. I guess that the guidelines provide that sentences are related where the offenses occurred on the same occasion, or were part of a common scheme or plan, and those questions seem to involve certain factual determinations. Do you think that on appellate review there would be a de novo review? Petitioner: --Never of historical facts, regardless which path one takes to relatedness. The basic, or what this Court has called historical facts, would be subject only to clear error review. Judge: How about mixed questions of fact and law?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>The particular mixed question of consolidation, which is the third prong of the definition here, yes.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, the so-called "Millennium Bomber," was arrested attempting to cross the Canadian-U.S. border in a rental car loaded with explosives and other bomb-making materials. Ressam planned to detonate the explosives at Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve. Ressam was charged with several crimes, including carrying an explosive device during the commission of a felony under 18 U.S.C. Section 844. The felony charge was lying to a customs agent. Ressam argued, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the statute required the explosive device to be carried in relation to the underlying felony and, therefore, should not be applied to Ressam in this case. The Ninth Circuit noted Congressional amendment of a substantially similar statute to include such "in relation to" language, indicating the legislature's intent that a connection between the explosives and the underlying felony is indispensable to the claim. The government, noting the case's importance in the realm of terror prosecutions, urged the Court to grant certiorari based on decisions reaching the opposite conclusion in both the Third and Fifth Circuits. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 07-455, United States versus Ressam. General Mukasey.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The question in this case is whether a panel of the Ninth Circuit was correct when it added the words 844 of Title 18, and we think for at least four reasons, the answer to that question is no. First, and principally, those words are not in the statute that Congress wrote, and this Court has said many times that courts should not add words or elements to criminal statutes. Second, Congress knows how to include a relational element when it wants to, and in fact, did that in section 924(c) after which section 844 is otherwise patterned. And that shows that when Congress chose to leave 844 it did that intentionally. Third, when section 844 was amended in 1988, one court of appeals, the only court of appeals to rule directly on the question of whether there was a relationship between the carrying of explosives in the commission of a felony, had held that there was no relational element. Congress was on notice of that fact--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, the so-called "Millennium Bomber," was arrested attempting to cross the Canadian-U.S. border in a rental car loaded with explosives and other bomb-making materials. Ressam planned to detonate the explosives at Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve. Ressam was charged with several crimes, including carrying an explosive device during the commission of a felony under 18 U.S.C. Section 844. The felony charge was lying to a customs agent. Ressam argued, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the statute required the explosive device to be carried in relation to the underlying felony and, therefore, should not be applied to Ressam in this case. The Ninth Circuit noted Congressional amendment of a substantially similar statute to include such "in relation to" language, indicating the legislature's intent that a connection between the explosives and the underlying felony is indispensable to the claim. The government, noting the case's importance in the realm of terror prosecutions, urged the Court to grant certiorari based on decisions reaching the opposite conclusion in both the Third and Fifth Circuits. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 07-455, United States versus Ressam. General Mukasey. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The question in this case is whether a panel of the Ninth Circuit was correct when it added the words 844 of Title 18, and we think for at least four reasons, the answer to that question is no. First, and principally, those words are not in the statute that Congress wrote, and this Court has said many times that courts should not add words or elements to criminal statutes. Second, Congress knows how to include a relational element when it wants to, and in fact, did that in section 924(c) after which section 844 is otherwise patterned. And that shows that when Congress chose to leave 844 it did that intentionally. Third, when section 844 was amended in 1988, one court of appeals, the only court of appeals to rule directly on the question of whether there was a relationship between the carrying of explosives in the commission of a felony, had held that there was no relational element. Congress was on notice of that fact-- Judge: Your argument relies on the notion that the word "during" in the statute is solely temporal. In other words, it just refers to the time?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Correct.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, the so-called "Millennium Bomber," was arrested attempting to cross the Canadian-U.S. border in a rental car loaded with explosives and other bomb-making materials. Ressam planned to detonate the explosives at Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve. Ressam was charged with several crimes, including carrying an explosive device during the commission of a felony under 18 U.S.C. Section 844. The felony charge was lying to a customs agent. Ressam argued, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the statute required the explosive device to be carried in relation to the underlying felony and, therefore, should not be applied to Ressam in this case. The Ninth Circuit noted Congressional amendment of a substantially similar statute to include such "in relation to" language, indicating the legislature's intent that a connection between the explosives and the underlying felony is indispensable to the claim. The government, noting the case's importance in the realm of terror prosecutions, urged the Court to grant certiorari based on decisions reaching the opposite conclusion in both the Third and Fifth Circuits. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 07-455, United States versus Ressam. General Mukasey. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The question in this case is whether a panel of the Ninth Circuit was correct when it added the words 844 of Title 18, and we think for at least four reasons, the answer to that question is no. First, and principally, those words are not in the statute that Congress wrote, and this Court has said many times that courts should not add words or elements to criminal statutes. Second, Congress knows how to include a relational element when it wants to, and in fact, did that in section 924(c) after which section 844 is otherwise patterned. And that shows that when Congress chose to leave 844 it did that intentionally. Third, when section 844 was amended in 1988, one court of appeals, the only court of appeals to rule directly on the question of whether there was a relationship between the carrying of explosives in the commission of a felony, had held that there was no relational element. Congress was on notice of that fact-- Judge: Your argument relies on the notion that the word "during" in the statute is solely temporal. In other words, it just refers to the time? Petitioner: --Correct. Judge: So... that's not always the case. If I say, you know, I hung lights during the holiday season, you wouldn't think that I hung a chandelier, right? There'd be not simply a temporal connection, but also a relation.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>In that instance, that would be correct. On the other hand, when Congress in... in 924(c) said "during and in relation to", it meant something more than a temporal relationship. It did not say the same thing in 844, and it failed to say the same thing in 844(f) or the amended 924(c).<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, the so-called "Millennium Bomber," was arrested attempting to cross the Canadian-U.S. border in a rental car loaded with explosives and other bomb-making materials. Ressam planned to detonate the explosives at Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve. Ressam was charged with several crimes, including carrying an explosive device during the commission of a felony under 18 U.S.C. Section 844. The felony charge was lying to a customs agent. Ressam argued, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the statute required the explosive device to be carried in relation to the underlying felony and, therefore, should not be applied to Ressam in this case. The Ninth Circuit noted Congressional amendment of a substantially similar statute to include such "in relation to" language, indicating the legislature's intent that a connection between the explosives and the underlying felony is indispensable to the claim. The government, noting the case's importance in the realm of terror prosecutions, urged the Court to grant certiorari based on decisions reaching the opposite conclusion in both the Third and Fifth Circuits. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 07-455, United States versus Ressam. General Mukasey. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The question in this case is whether a panel of the Ninth Circuit was correct when it added the words 844 of Title 18, and we think for at least four reasons, the answer to that question is no. First, and principally, those words are not in the statute that Congress wrote, and this Court has said many times that courts should not add words or elements to criminal statutes. Second, Congress knows how to include a relational element when it wants to, and in fact, did that in section 924(c) after which section 844 is otherwise patterned. And that shows that when Congress chose to leave 844 it did that intentionally. Third, when section 844 was amended in 1988, one court of appeals, the only court of appeals to rule directly on the question of whether there was a relationship between the carrying of explosives in the commission of a felony, had held that there was no relational element. Congress was on notice of that fact-- Judge: Your argument relies on the notion that the word "during" in the statute is solely temporal. In other words, it just refers to the time? Petitioner: --Correct. Judge: So... that's not always the case. If I say, you know, I hung lights during the holiday season, you wouldn't think that I hung a chandelier, right? There'd be not simply a temporal connection, but also a relation. Petitioner: In that instance, that would be correct. On the other hand, when Congress in... in 924(c) said "during and in relation to", it meant something more than a temporal relationship. It did not say the same thing in 844, and it failed to say the same thing in 844(f) or the amended 924(c). Judge: General, could... could Congress pass a law that said if you wear a wristwatch during the commission of any crime, you get another ten years?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>A statute like that would be entirely unreasonable. It was not entirely unreasonable for Congress to have said if you carry an explosive during the commission of a felony, you've added something enormously volatile.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, the so-called "Millennium Bomber," was arrested attempting to cross the Canadian-U.S. border in a rental car loaded with explosives and other bomb-making materials. Ressam planned to detonate the explosives at Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve. Ressam was charged with several crimes, including carrying an explosive device during the commission of a felony under 18 U.S.C. Section 844. The felony charge was lying to a customs agent. Ressam argued, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the statute required the explosive device to be carried in relation to the underlying felony and, therefore, should not be applied to Ressam in this case. The Ninth Circuit noted Congressional amendment of a substantially similar statute to include such "in relation to" language, indicating the legislature's intent that a connection between the explosives and the underlying felony is indispensable to the claim. The government, noting the case's importance in the realm of terror prosecutions, urged the Court to grant certiorari based on decisions reaching the opposite conclusion in both the Third and Fifth Circuits. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 07-455, United States versus Ressam. General Mukasey. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The question in this case is whether a panel of the Ninth Circuit was correct when it added the words 844 of Title 18, and we think for at least four reasons, the answer to that question is no. First, and principally, those words are not in the statute that Congress wrote, and this Court has said many times that courts should not add words or elements to criminal statutes. Second, Congress knows how to include a relational element when it wants to, and in fact, did that in section 924(c) after which section 844 is otherwise patterned. And that shows that when Congress chose to leave 844 it did that intentionally. Third, when section 844 was amended in 1988, one court of appeals, the only court of appeals to rule directly on the question of whether there was a relationship between the carrying of explosives in the commission of a felony, had held that there was no relational element. Congress was on notice of that fact-- Judge: Your argument relies on the notion that the word "during" in the statute is solely temporal. In other words, it just refers to the time? Petitioner: --Correct. Judge: So... that's not always the case. If I say, you know, I hung lights during the holiday season, you wouldn't think that I hung a chandelier, right? There'd be not simply a temporal connection, but also a relation. Petitioner: In that instance, that would be correct. On the other hand, when Congress in... in 924(c) said "during and in relation to", it meant something more than a temporal relationship. It did not say the same thing in 844, and it failed to say the same thing in 844(f) or the amended 924(c). Judge: General, could... could Congress pass a law that said if you wear a wristwatch during the commission of any crime, you get another ten years? Petitioner: A statute like that would be entirely unreasonable. It was not entirely unreasonable for Congress to have said if you carry an explosive during the commission of a felony, you've added something enormously volatile. Judge: Surely it depends on what the felony is. If the felony is the filing of a dishonest tax return and... and you have a can of gasoline with you when you mail the letter, it seems to me quite as absurd as saying wearing a wristwatch in the course of a felony. That's what troubles me about this. I'm... I'm tempted to... I think everybody is tempted to distort the "during" to... to mean something else, simply because the consequences of performing a completely lawful act wearing a wristwatch, carrying explosives... given the broad definition of explosives, I guess it would include having... having some cartridges, explosive cartridges?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>It would. But the temptation--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, the so-called "Millennium Bomber," was arrested attempting to cross the Canadian-U.S. border in a rental car loaded with explosives and other bomb-making materials. Ressam planned to detonate the explosives at Los Angeles International Airport on New Year's Eve. Ressam was charged with several crimes, including carrying an explosive device during the commission of a felony under 18 U.S.C. Section 844. The felony charge was lying to a customs agent. Ressam argued, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, that the statute required the explosive device to be carried in relation to the underlying felony and, therefore, should not be applied to Ressam in this case. The Ninth Circuit noted Congressional amendment of a substantially similar statute to include such "in relation to" language, indicating the legislature's intent that a connection between the explosives and the underlying felony is indispensable to the claim. The government, noting the case's importance in the realm of terror prosecutions, urged the Court to grant certiorari based on decisions reaching the opposite conclusion in both the Third and Fifth Circuits. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 07-455, United States versus Ressam. General Mukasey. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The question in this case is whether a panel of the Ninth Circuit was correct when it added the words 844 of Title 18, and we think for at least four reasons, the answer to that question is no. First, and principally, those words are not in the statute that Congress wrote, and this Court has said many times that courts should not add words or elements to criminal statutes. Second, Congress knows how to include a relational element when it wants to, and in fact, did that in section 924(c) after which section 844 is otherwise patterned. And that shows that when Congress chose to leave 844 it did that intentionally. Third, when section 844 was amended in 1988, one court of appeals, the only court of appeals to rule directly on the question of whether there was a relationship between the carrying of explosives in the commission of a felony, had held that there was no relational element. Congress was on notice of that fact-- Judge: Your argument relies on the notion that the word "during" in the statute is solely temporal. In other words, it just refers to the time? Petitioner: --Correct. Judge: So... that's not always the case. If I say, you know, I hung lights during the holiday season, you wouldn't think that I hung a chandelier, right? There'd be not simply a temporal connection, but also a relation. Petitioner: In that instance, that would be correct. On the other hand, when Congress in... in 924(c) said "during and in relation to", it meant something more than a temporal relationship. It did not say the same thing in 844, and it failed to say the same thing in 844(f) or the amended 924(c). Judge: General, could... could Congress pass a law that said if you wear a wristwatch during the commission of any crime, you get another ten years? Petitioner: A statute like that would be entirely unreasonable. It was not entirely unreasonable for Congress to have said if you carry an explosive during the commission of a felony, you've added something enormously volatile. Judge: Surely it depends on what the felony is. If the felony is the filing of a dishonest tax return and... and you have a can of gasoline with you when you mail the letter, it seems to me quite as absurd as saying wearing a wristwatch in the course of a felony. That's what troubles me about this. I'm... I'm tempted to... I think everybody is tempted to distort the "during" to... to mean something else, simply because the consequences of performing a completely lawful act wearing a wristwatch, carrying explosives... given the broad definition of explosives, I guess it would include having... having some cartridges, explosive cartridges? Petitioner: It would. But the temptation-- Judge: That's perfectly lawful, and you get another 10 years for it just because you're... you're mailing a letter to the IRS at the same time.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--It is perfectly lawful. Congress was aware that Title 18, not to mention all the other titles, are chockablock with felonies. There are thousands of them out there. But nonetheless, it wanted to make sure that the mainstream that it was concerned with, which is nicely illustrated by the facts of this case, were taken care of; and so it passed a very broad statute. We concede that it was a very broad statute. "Any felony" couldn't be broader. But that was Congress's choice. And if Congress chooses to amend the statute, respectfully, it ought to be Congress that amends it.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 2013, Adaucto Chavez-Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At the time of his sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines range was 135–168 months. The government recommended the minimum 135-month sentence, and the sentencing court accepted that recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez-Meza subsequently sought and was granted a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He requested that the court reduce his sentence to 108 months, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 114 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating it had “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Chavez-Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the § 3553(a) factors in deciding on the 114-month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. There is a circuit split as to whether a district court must explain how it applies the § 3553(a) factors. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the district court must provide some explanation for its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the form language is sufficient. Judge: We'll hear argument next today in Case 17-5639, Chavez-Meza versus United States. Mr. Coberly.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Judicial discretion is not a whim. It is to be guided by sound legal principles and subject to meaningful appellate review. And if appellate review for abuse of discretion is to mean anything, it is axiomatic that there must be a reason for the district court's decision apparent in the record. This is particularly true where Congress has channeled the exercise of a district court's discretion by directing the district court to consider certain factors when making a discretionary choice. As the Court understood in Taylor, a district court in such circumstances must clearly articulate not only that it considered -- in fact, considered the relevant factors but how those factors impacted its decision.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 2013, Adaucto Chavez-Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At the time of his sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines range was 135–168 months. The government recommended the minimum 135-month sentence, and the sentencing court accepted that recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez-Meza subsequently sought and was granted a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He requested that the court reduce his sentence to 108 months, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 114 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating it had “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Chavez-Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the § 3553(a) factors in deciding on the 114-month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. There is a circuit split as to whether a district court must explain how it applies the § 3553(a) factors. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the district court must provide some explanation for its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the form language is sufficient. Judge: We'll hear argument next today in Case 17-5639, Chavez-Meza versus United States. Mr. Coberly. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Judicial discretion is not a whim. It is to be guided by sound legal principles and subject to meaningful appellate review. And if appellate review for abuse of discretion is to mean anything, it is axiomatic that there must be a reason for the district court's decision apparent in the record. This is particularly true where Congress has channeled the exercise of a district court's discretion by directing the district court to consider certain factors when making a discretionary choice. As the Court understood in Taylor, a district court in such circumstances must clearly articulate not only that it considered -- in fact, considered the relevant factors but how those factors impacted its decision. Judge: I -- I suppose you're not arguing that that's true in every case. For example, if the record or the proceedings indicated exactly what the people were talking about, they were debating a particular point and that would explain it, that would be enough, right?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, we do believe that it would be enough. There's -- oftentimes, as the Court recognized in Rita, how much explanation a district court judge needs to give depends so much on circumstances and context. And I --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 2013, Adaucto Chavez-Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At the time of his sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines range was 135–168 months. The government recommended the minimum 135-month sentence, and the sentencing court accepted that recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez-Meza subsequently sought and was granted a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He requested that the court reduce his sentence to 108 months, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 114 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating it had “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Chavez-Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the § 3553(a) factors in deciding on the 114-month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. There is a circuit split as to whether a district court must explain how it applies the § 3553(a) factors. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the district court must provide some explanation for its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the form language is sufficient. Judge: We'll hear argument next today in Case 17-5639, Chavez-Meza versus United States. Mr. Coberly. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Judicial discretion is not a whim. It is to be guided by sound legal principles and subject to meaningful appellate review. And if appellate review for abuse of discretion is to mean anything, it is axiomatic that there must be a reason for the district court's decision apparent in the record. This is particularly true where Congress has channeled the exercise of a district court's discretion by directing the district court to consider certain factors when making a discretionary choice. As the Court understood in Taylor, a district court in such circumstances must clearly articulate not only that it considered -- in fact, considered the relevant factors but how those factors impacted its decision. Judge: I -- I suppose you're not arguing that that's true in every case. For example, if the record or the proceedings indicated exactly what the people were talking about, they were debating a particular point and that would explain it, that would be enough, right? Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, we do believe that it would be enough. There's -- oftentimes, as the Court recognized in Rita, how much explanation a district court judge needs to give depends so much on circumstances and context. And I -- Judge: What is the standard of review that the court of appeals uses for sentence -- for sentences?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Justice Ginsburg, it -- it's -- it's reasonableness, which this Court understands in the original sentencing context to mean --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 2013, Adaucto Chavez-Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At the time of his sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines range was 135–168 months. The government recommended the minimum 135-month sentence, and the sentencing court accepted that recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez-Meza subsequently sought and was granted a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He requested that the court reduce his sentence to 108 months, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 114 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating it had “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Chavez-Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the § 3553(a) factors in deciding on the 114-month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. There is a circuit split as to whether a district court must explain how it applies the § 3553(a) factors. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the district court must provide some explanation for its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the form language is sufficient. Judge: We'll hear argument next today in Case 17-5639, Chavez-Meza versus United States. Mr. Coberly. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Judicial discretion is not a whim. It is to be guided by sound legal principles and subject to meaningful appellate review. And if appellate review for abuse of discretion is to mean anything, it is axiomatic that there must be a reason for the district court's decision apparent in the record. This is particularly true where Congress has channeled the exercise of a district court's discretion by directing the district court to consider certain factors when making a discretionary choice. As the Court understood in Taylor, a district court in such circumstances must clearly articulate not only that it considered -- in fact, considered the relevant factors but how those factors impacted its decision. Judge: I -- I suppose you're not arguing that that's true in every case. For example, if the record or the proceedings indicated exactly what the people were talking about, they were debating a particular point and that would explain it, that would be enough, right? Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, we do believe that it would be enough. There's -- oftentimes, as the Court recognized in Rita, how much explanation a district court judge needs to give depends so much on circumstances and context. And I -- Judge: What is the standard of review that the court of appeals uses for sentence -- for sentences? Petitioner: Justice Ginsburg, it -- it's -- it's reasonableness, which this Court understands in the original sentencing context to mean -- Judge: I thought that what -- doesn't the statute say, 3742, "imposed in violation of law"?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>It --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 2013, Adaucto Chavez-Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At the time of his sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines range was 135–168 months. The government recommended the minimum 135-month sentence, and the sentencing court accepted that recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez-Meza subsequently sought and was granted a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He requested that the court reduce his sentence to 108 months, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 114 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating it had “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Chavez-Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the § 3553(a) factors in deciding on the 114-month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. There is a circuit split as to whether a district court must explain how it applies the § 3553(a) factors. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the district court must provide some explanation for its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the form language is sufficient. Judge: We'll hear argument next today in Case 17-5639, Chavez-Meza versus United States. Mr. Coberly. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Judicial discretion is not a whim. It is to be guided by sound legal principles and subject to meaningful appellate review. And if appellate review for abuse of discretion is to mean anything, it is axiomatic that there must be a reason for the district court's decision apparent in the record. This is particularly true where Congress has channeled the exercise of a district court's discretion by directing the district court to consider certain factors when making a discretionary choice. As the Court understood in Taylor, a district court in such circumstances must clearly articulate not only that it considered -- in fact, considered the relevant factors but how those factors impacted its decision. Judge: I -- I suppose you're not arguing that that's true in every case. For example, if the record or the proceedings indicated exactly what the people were talking about, they were debating a particular point and that would explain it, that would be enough, right? Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, we do believe that it would be enough. There's -- oftentimes, as the Court recognized in Rita, how much explanation a district court judge needs to give depends so much on circumstances and context. And I -- Judge: What is the standard of review that the court of appeals uses for sentence -- for sentences? Petitioner: Justice Ginsburg, it -- it's -- it's reasonableness, which this Court understands in the original sentencing context to mean -- Judge: I thought that what -- doesn't the statute say, 3742, "imposed in violation of law"? Petitioner: It -- Judge: The question is whether the sentence is imposed in violation of law?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, Your Honor. And as the Court has understood in -- in -- from Booker, through Rita, through Gall, ultimately, what that means, is was the -- was the sentence reasonable? And there's two components: The procedural reasonableness and substantive reasonableness. And, ultimately, this Court has understood that what -- what reasonableness means is, did the district court abuse its discretion?<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 2013, Adaucto Chavez-Meza pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At the time of his sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines range was 135–168 months. The government recommended the minimum 135-month sentence, and the sentencing court accepted that recommendation. In 2014, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce the relevant offense levels. Chavez-Meza subsequently sought and was granted a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He requested that the court reduce his sentence to 108 months, the new minimum, but the court reduced his sentence to 114 months. In issuing the new sentence, the court issued a standard form stating it had “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth at USSG § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Chavez-Meza appealed the reduced sentence, claiming that the district court did not adequately explain how it applied the § 3553(a) factors in deciding on the 114-month sentence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. There is a circuit split as to whether a district court must explain how it applies the § 3553(a) factors. The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the district court must provide some explanation for its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record. The Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the form language is sufficient. Judge: We'll hear argument next today in Case 17-5639, Chavez-Meza versus United States. Mr. Coberly. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Judicial discretion is not a whim. It is to be guided by sound legal principles and subject to meaningful appellate review. And if appellate review for abuse of discretion is to mean anything, it is axiomatic that there must be a reason for the district court's decision apparent in the record. This is particularly true where Congress has channeled the exercise of a district court's discretion by directing the district court to consider certain factors when making a discretionary choice. As the Court understood in Taylor, a district court in such circumstances must clearly articulate not only that it considered -- in fact, considered the relevant factors but how those factors impacted its decision. Judge: I -- I suppose you're not arguing that that's true in every case. For example, if the record or the proceedings indicated exactly what the people were talking about, they were debating a particular point and that would explain it, that would be enough, right? Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, we do believe that it would be enough. There's -- oftentimes, as the Court recognized in Rita, how much explanation a district court judge needs to give depends so much on circumstances and context. And I -- Judge: What is the standard of review that the court of appeals uses for sentence -- for sentences? Petitioner: Justice Ginsburg, it -- it's -- it's reasonableness, which this Court understands in the original sentencing context to mean -- Judge: I thought that what -- doesn't the statute say, 3742, "imposed in violation of law"? Petitioner: It -- Judge: The question is whether the sentence is imposed in violation of law? Petitioner: Yes, Your Honor. And as the Court has understood in -- in -- from Booker, through Rita, through Gall, ultimately, what that means, is was the -- was the sentence reasonable? And there's two components: The procedural reasonableness and substantive reasonableness. And, ultimately, this Court has understood that what -- what reasonableness means is, did the district court abuse its discretion? Judge: But how could that be if the -- the district court sentenced within -- within the guidelines? It wasn't the same range, and it wasn't the same point within the guidelines as the original sentence, but it was still within the guidelines. So how could a within-the-guidelines sentence be imposed in violation of law?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, I think that's the government's position, which is, well, in a sentence reduction, when it's reduced and it falls within the guidelines, the government's position, as I understand it, is essentially that that decision is unreviewable. And we disagree with that -- that proposition. No matter what, as the Court has made clear in Gall, within-guideline sentences, outside-guideline sentences, the district court has -- has an obligation to explain the reason for the sentence. And that holds, we believe, in the -- in the sentence reduction context of 3582(c)(2).<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Michael Watson was arrested for trading illegal drugs for an unloaded semi-automatic pistol. He was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 262 months in prison. Since Watson's crime involved a gun, his sentence included an additional 60 months. The extra jail time was imposed under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), which punishes any drug trafficker who "uses or carries" a firearm during a drug deal. In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court had ruled that a defendant who trades a gun for drugs "uses" it for purposes of the statute. However, the Court clarified in Bailey v. United States that "use" means "active employment" of a firearm; mere possession of the firearm does not necessarily constitute use. On appeal, Watson argued that the firearm was not used in his case. He stressed that the gun was never loaded and was in his possession for only moments before he was arrested. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Watson's arguments and affirmed the lower court. Following Circuit precedents, it ruled that Watson had used the gun under the statute's meaning of "use." Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-571, Watson v. United States. Mr. Koch.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Mr. Watson's receipt of a firearm in exchange for drugs does not constitute the use of that firearm as the word 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1) for two principal reasons. First, applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "use", the receipt of a thing is not the use of that thing. There is no grammatically proper way to say that someone uses a firearm when all that person does is receive it. Second, treating receipt as use under the statute conflicts with this Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, which held that use requires active employment. And I'll address those two points in turn.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Michael Watson was arrested for trading illegal drugs for an unloaded semi-automatic pistol. He was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 262 months in prison. Since Watson's crime involved a gun, his sentence included an additional 60 months. The extra jail time was imposed under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), which punishes any drug trafficker who "uses or carries" a firearm during a drug deal. In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court had ruled that a defendant who trades a gun for drugs "uses" it for purposes of the statute. However, the Court clarified in Bailey v. United States that "use" means "active employment" of a firearm; mere possession of the firearm does not necessarily constitute use. On appeal, Watson argued that the firearm was not used in his case. He stressed that the gun was never loaded and was in his possession for only moments before he was arrested. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Watson's arguments and affirmed the lower court. Following Circuit precedents, it ruled that Watson had used the gun under the statute's meaning of "use." Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-571, Watson v. United States. Mr. Koch. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Mr. Watson's receipt of a firearm in exchange for drugs does not constitute the use of that firearm as the word 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1) for two principal reasons. First, applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "use", the receipt of a thing is not the use of that thing. There is no grammatically proper way to say that someone uses a firearm when all that person does is receive it. Second, treating receipt as use under the statute conflicts with this Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, which held that use requires active employment. And I'll address those two points in turn. Judge: Would you address first whether receipt of the gun constitutes possession of the gun?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, ma'am. I believe receipt does constitute possession. However, of course, possession standing alone under this Court's decision in Bailey does not constitute use.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Michael Watson was arrested for trading illegal drugs for an unloaded semi-automatic pistol. He was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 262 months in prison. Since Watson's crime involved a gun, his sentence included an additional 60 months. The extra jail time was imposed under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), which punishes any drug trafficker who "uses or carries" a firearm during a drug deal. In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court had ruled that a defendant who trades a gun for drugs "uses" it for purposes of the statute. However, the Court clarified in Bailey v. United States that "use" means "active employment" of a firearm; mere possession of the firearm does not necessarily constitute use. On appeal, Watson argued that the firearm was not used in his case. He stressed that the gun was never loaded and was in his possession for only moments before he was arrested. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Watson's arguments and affirmed the lower court. Following Circuit precedents, it ruled that Watson had used the gun under the statute's meaning of "use." Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-571, Watson v. United States. Mr. Koch. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Mr. Watson's receipt of a firearm in exchange for drugs does not constitute the use of that firearm as the word 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1) for two principal reasons. First, applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "use", the receipt of a thing is not the use of that thing. There is no grammatically proper way to say that someone uses a firearm when all that person does is receive it. Second, treating receipt as use under the statute conflicts with this Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, which held that use requires active employment. And I'll address those two points in turn. Judge: Would you address first whether receipt of the gun constitutes possession of the gun? Petitioner: Yes, ma'am. I believe receipt does constitute possession. However, of course, possession standing alone under this Court's decision in Bailey does not constitute use. Judge: But under the statute as amended, possession is also indictable.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Possession in furtherance of the offense is... is... would be indictable. That... that was not charged in this particular case. And I would suggest that the... that the circumstances of this case might not call that into... into play simply because his possession really was... was incidental, and it was following the conclusion of the drug transaction. So I think... I question whether the possession in furtherance would necessarily apply here. Of course, it was not charged.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Michael Watson was arrested for trading illegal drugs for an unloaded semi-automatic pistol. He was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 262 months in prison. Since Watson's crime involved a gun, his sentence included an additional 60 months. The extra jail time was imposed under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), which punishes any drug trafficker who "uses or carries" a firearm during a drug deal. In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court had ruled that a defendant who trades a gun for drugs "uses" it for purposes of the statute. However, the Court clarified in Bailey v. United States that "use" means "active employment" of a firearm; mere possession of the firearm does not necessarily constitute use. On appeal, Watson argued that the firearm was not used in his case. He stressed that the gun was never loaded and was in his possession for only moments before he was arrested. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Watson's arguments and affirmed the lower court. Following Circuit precedents, it ruled that Watson had used the gun under the statute's meaning of "use." Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-571, Watson v. United States. Mr. Koch. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Mr. Watson's receipt of a firearm in exchange for drugs does not constitute the use of that firearm as the word 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1) for two principal reasons. First, applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "use", the receipt of a thing is not the use of that thing. There is no grammatically proper way to say that someone uses a firearm when all that person does is receive it. Second, treating receipt as use under the statute conflicts with this Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, which held that use requires active employment. And I'll address those two points in turn. Judge: Would you address first whether receipt of the gun constitutes possession of the gun? Petitioner: Yes, ma'am. I believe receipt does constitute possession. However, of course, possession standing alone under this Court's decision in Bailey does not constitute use. Judge: But under the statute as amended, possession is also indictable. Petitioner: Possession in furtherance of the offense is... is... would be indictable. That... that was not charged in this particular case. And I would suggest that the... that the circumstances of this case might not call that into... into play simply because his possession really was... was incidental, and it was following the conclusion of the drug transaction. So I think... I question whether the possession in furtherance would necessarily apply here. Of course, it was not charged. Judge: Well, I'm not sure. I have the same question as Justice Ginsburg. It seems to me, absent some precedents which narrows this definition, that that would have been the way to charge your client. That's not what was charged; that's not the indictment; that's not what you're arguing. So I guess the question is more appropriate for the government. But, if, following Justice Ginsburg's question, this covers it, and it seems to me that it does, then we're not arguing about very much.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I understand, Your Honor. My only point, again, would be, that recognizing that "in furtherance", at least by the authors of that language, would suggest it to mean something more than "in relation to, ". I think the question could legitimately be asked in a... in a transaction like this, where the possession basically is what he was attempting to achieve and did, in fact, achieve, but after the... at the end transaction. I don't... I can't answer whether or not, ultimately, that would be... deemed to be in furtherance or not.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Michael Watson was arrested for trading illegal drugs for an unloaded semi-automatic pistol. He was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 262 months in prison. Since Watson's crime involved a gun, his sentence included an additional 60 months. The extra jail time was imposed under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), which punishes any drug trafficker who "uses or carries" a firearm during a drug deal. In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court had ruled that a defendant who trades a gun for drugs "uses" it for purposes of the statute. However, the Court clarified in Bailey v. United States that "use" means "active employment" of a firearm; mere possession of the firearm does not necessarily constitute use. On appeal, Watson argued that the firearm was not used in his case. He stressed that the gun was never loaded and was in his possession for only moments before he was arrested. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Watson's arguments and affirmed the lower court. Following Circuit precedents, it ruled that Watson had used the gun under the statute's meaning of "use." Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-571, Watson v. United States. Mr. Koch. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Mr. Watson's receipt of a firearm in exchange for drugs does not constitute the use of that firearm as the word 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1) for two principal reasons. First, applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "use", the receipt of a thing is not the use of that thing. There is no grammatically proper way to say that someone uses a firearm when all that person does is receive it. Second, treating receipt as use under the statute conflicts with this Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, which held that use requires active employment. And I'll address those two points in turn. Judge: Would you address first whether receipt of the gun constitutes possession of the gun? Petitioner: Yes, ma'am. I believe receipt does constitute possession. However, of course, possession standing alone under this Court's decision in Bailey does not constitute use. Judge: But under the statute as amended, possession is also indictable. Petitioner: Possession in furtherance of the offense is... is... would be indictable. That... that was not charged in this particular case. And I would suggest that the... that the circumstances of this case might not call that into... into play simply because his possession really was... was incidental, and it was following the conclusion of the drug transaction. So I think... I question whether the possession in furtherance would necessarily apply here. Of course, it was not charged. Judge: Well, I'm not sure. I have the same question as Justice Ginsburg. It seems to me, absent some precedents which narrows this definition, that that would have been the way to charge your client. That's not what was charged; that's not the indictment; that's not what you're arguing. So I guess the question is more appropriate for the government. But, if, following Justice Ginsburg's question, this covers it, and it seems to me that it does, then we're not arguing about very much. Petitioner: I understand, Your Honor. My only point, again, would be, that recognizing that "in furtherance", at least by the authors of that language, would suggest it to mean something more than "in relation to, ". I think the question could legitimately be asked in a... in a transaction like this, where the possession basically is what he was attempting to achieve and did, in fact, achieve, but after the... at the end transaction. I don't... I can't answer whether or not, ultimately, that would be... deemed to be in furtherance or not. Judge: Mr. Koch, let's say that the parties to the transaction are concerned about avoiding exposure under the money-laundering statute, and so they got together and said: All right, we are going to have this deal. What can we use besides money? And they say: Well, let's use guns, or let's use a gun. And the seller of the drugs says: Okay. I'm willing to use that. Isn't he using the gun in furtherance of the transaction?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I don't believe that the... that, given what the... what this Court has said in Bailey, that that would constitute active employment still. The--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Michael Watson was arrested for trading illegal drugs for an unloaded semi-automatic pistol. He was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to 262 months in prison. Since Watson's crime involved a gun, his sentence included an additional 60 months. The extra jail time was imposed under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), which punishes any drug trafficker who "uses or carries" a firearm during a drug deal. In Smith v. United States, the Supreme Court had ruled that a defendant who trades a gun for drugs "uses" it for purposes of the statute. However, the Court clarified in Bailey v. United States that "use" means "active employment" of a firearm; mere possession of the firearm does not necessarily constitute use. On appeal, Watson argued that the firearm was not used in his case. He stressed that the gun was never loaded and was in his possession for only moments before he was arrested. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Watson's arguments and affirmed the lower court. Following Circuit precedents, it ruled that Watson had used the gun under the statute's meaning of "use." Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 06-571, Watson v. United States. Mr. Koch. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Mr. Watson's receipt of a firearm in exchange for drugs does not constitute the use of that firearm as the word 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(1) for two principal reasons. First, applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "use", the receipt of a thing is not the use of that thing. There is no grammatically proper way to say that someone uses a firearm when all that person does is receive it. Second, treating receipt as use under the statute conflicts with this Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, which held that use requires active employment. And I'll address those two points in turn. Judge: Would you address first whether receipt of the gun constitutes possession of the gun? Petitioner: Yes, ma'am. I believe receipt does constitute possession. However, of course, possession standing alone under this Court's decision in Bailey does not constitute use. Judge: But under the statute as amended, possession is also indictable. Petitioner: Possession in furtherance of the offense is... is... would be indictable. That... that was not charged in this particular case. And I would suggest that the... that the circumstances of this case might not call that into... into play simply because his possession really was... was incidental, and it was following the conclusion of the drug transaction. So I think... I question whether the possession in furtherance would necessarily apply here. Of course, it was not charged. Judge: Well, I'm not sure. I have the same question as Justice Ginsburg. It seems to me, absent some precedents which narrows this definition, that that would have been the way to charge your client. That's not what was charged; that's not the indictment; that's not what you're arguing. So I guess the question is more appropriate for the government. But, if, following Justice Ginsburg's question, this covers it, and it seems to me that it does, then we're not arguing about very much. Petitioner: I understand, Your Honor. My only point, again, would be, that recognizing that "in furtherance", at least by the authors of that language, would suggest it to mean something more than "in relation to, ". I think the question could legitimately be asked in a... in a transaction like this, where the possession basically is what he was attempting to achieve and did, in fact, achieve, but after the... at the end transaction. I don't... I can't answer whether or not, ultimately, that would be... deemed to be in furtherance or not. Judge: Mr. Koch, let's say that the parties to the transaction are concerned about avoiding exposure under the money-laundering statute, and so they got together and said: All right, we are going to have this deal. What can we use besides money? And they say: Well, let's use guns, or let's use a gun. And the seller of the drugs says: Okay. I'm willing to use that. Isn't he using the gun in furtherance of the transaction? Petitioner: I don't believe that the... that, given what the... what this Court has said in Bailey, that that would constitute active employment still. The-- Judge: It's being actively employed as the consideration in the sale.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--However, the... from the standpoint--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: This is 2018_17-646. Judge: We will hear argument this morning in Case 17-646, Gamble versus United States. Mr. Chaiten.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The separate sovereigns exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause is inconsistent with the text and original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. There is no dispute that the text of the clause was understood to incorporate English practice. And there was no practice of intersovereign successive prosecutions in all of English history or in American history for the first century of this republic after their framing. There's also a mountain of affirmative evidence that in England, even a foreign acquittal by a court of competent and current -- concurrent jurisdiction bars a subsequent prosecution in England for the -- for the same offense.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: This is 2018_17-646. Judge: We will hear argument this morning in Case 17-646, Gamble versus United States. Mr. Chaiten. Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The separate sovereigns exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause is inconsistent with the text and original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. There is no dispute that the text of the clause was understood to incorporate English practice. And there was no practice of intersovereign successive prosecutions in all of English history or in American history for the first century of this republic after their framing. There's also a mountain of affirmative evidence that in England, even a foreign acquittal by a court of competent and current -- concurrent jurisdiction bars a subsequent prosecution in England for the -- for the same offense. Judge: You think that's fair to --<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, there's overwhelming evidence, as I said, that that is the English rule, and there's no dispute that the framers were incorporating English practice into the Double Jeopardy Clause. And --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: This is 2018_17-646. Judge: We will hear argument this morning in Case 17-646, Gamble versus United States. Mr. Chaiten. Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The separate sovereigns exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause is inconsistent with the text and original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. There is no dispute that the text of the clause was understood to incorporate English practice. And there was no practice of intersovereign successive prosecutions in all of English history or in American history for the first century of this republic after their framing. There's also a mountain of affirmative evidence that in England, even a foreign acquittal by a court of competent and current -- concurrent jurisdiction bars a subsequent prosecution in England for the -- for the same offense. Judge: You think that's fair to -- Petitioner: Well, there's overwhelming evidence, as I said, that that is the English rule, and there's no dispute that the framers were incorporating English practice into the Double Jeopardy Clause. And -- Judge: Well, your --<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Any country in the world?<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: This is 2018_17-646. Judge: We will hear argument this morning in Case 17-646, Gamble versus United States. Mr. Chaiten. Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The separate sovereigns exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause is inconsistent with the text and original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. There is no dispute that the text of the clause was understood to incorporate English practice. And there was no practice of intersovereign successive prosecutions in all of English history or in American history for the first century of this republic after their framing. There's also a mountain of affirmative evidence that in England, even a foreign acquittal by a court of competent and current -- concurrent jurisdiction bars a subsequent prosecution in England for the -- for the same offense. Judge: You think that's fair to -- Petitioner: Well, there's overwhelming evidence, as I said, that that is the English rule, and there's no dispute that the framers were incorporating English practice into the Double Jeopardy Clause. And -- Judge: Well, your -- Petitioner: Any country in the world? Judge: Excuse me, Chief.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Well, it -- I'm sorry.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: This is 2018_17-646. Judge: We will hear argument this morning in Case 17-646, Gamble versus United States. Mr. Chaiten. Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The separate sovereigns exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause is inconsistent with the text and original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. There is no dispute that the text of the clause was understood to incorporate English practice. And there was no practice of intersovereign successive prosecutions in all of English history or in American history for the first century of this republic after their framing. There's also a mountain of affirmative evidence that in England, even a foreign acquittal by a court of competent and current -- concurrent jurisdiction bars a subsequent prosecution in England for the -- for the same offense. Judge: You think that's fair to -- Petitioner: Well, there's overwhelming evidence, as I said, that that is the English rule, and there's no dispute that the framers were incorporating English practice into the Double Jeopardy Clause. And -- Judge: Well, your -- Petitioner: Any country in the world? Judge: Excuse me, Chief. Petitioner: Well, it -- I'm sorry. Judge: Your leading authority is a foreign prosecution in England of the -- in the Spanish case. And the argument on the other side, which has some traction, I think, is that it would be quite unusual or surprising for the new American republic to look to Europe in a question like that because one concern, and it applies both in the English situation as well, is that it would be a significant intrusion on sovereignty, a particular concern of the new -- new American republic, to allow a foreign prosecution to limit the authority of -- of the -- the United States. It -- and, frankly, it would be surprising even in the -- the English case. I mean, the -- the relations between Spain and England were not exactly the -- the best. And why -- I mean, if it -- if it were a Spanish case involving the murder of Englishmen, would the English court really have said, well, he was tried in Spain, so we're -- our hands are tied?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>So -- so there are a few requirements. One, it would have to be the same offense, so you would have to meet the English standard, which is, in fact, the standard of this Court today.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: This is 2018_17-646. Judge: We will hear argument this morning in Case 17-646, Gamble versus United States. Mr. Chaiten. Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The separate sovereigns exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause is inconsistent with the text and original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. There is no dispute that the text of the clause was understood to incorporate English practice. And there was no practice of intersovereign successive prosecutions in all of English history or in American history for the first century of this republic after their framing. There's also a mountain of affirmative evidence that in England, even a foreign acquittal by a court of competent and current -- concurrent jurisdiction bars a subsequent prosecution in England for the -- for the same offense. Judge: You think that's fair to -- Petitioner: Well, there's overwhelming evidence, as I said, that that is the English rule, and there's no dispute that the framers were incorporating English practice into the Double Jeopardy Clause. And -- Judge: Well, your -- Petitioner: Any country in the world? Judge: Excuse me, Chief. Petitioner: Well, it -- I'm sorry. Judge: Your leading authority is a foreign prosecution in England of the -- in the Spanish case. And the argument on the other side, which has some traction, I think, is that it would be quite unusual or surprising for the new American republic to look to Europe in a question like that because one concern, and it applies both in the English situation as well, is that it would be a significant intrusion on sovereignty, a particular concern of the new -- new American republic, to allow a foreign prosecution to limit the authority of -- of the -- the United States. It -- and, frankly, it would be surprising even in the -- the English case. I mean, the -- the relations between Spain and England were not exactly the -- the best. And why -- I mean, if it -- if it were a Spanish case involving the murder of Englishmen, would the English court really have said, well, he was tried in Spain, so we're -- our hands are tied? Petitioner: So -- so there are a few requirements. One, it would have to be the same offense, so you would have to meet the English standard, which is, in fact, the standard of this Court today. Judge: Any -- any country in the world?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>So --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing, a serial offender with a long history of criminal convictions, was arrested for stealing three golf clubs, each worth $399, from a Los Angeles-area golf course. At the time of his arrest, Ewing was on parole from a 9-year prison term for convictions in three burglaries and one robbery. Under California's three strikes law, another felony conviction would require a sentence of 25 years to life. Ewing was charged with and convicted of one count of felony grand theft for the incident at the golf course. During sentencing, Ewing requested the judge in the case exercise discretion permitted under California law and reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor. The judge declined and sentenced Ewing in accordance with the three strikes law. On appeal, Ewing argued the sentence of 25 years to life was grossly disproportionate to the crime and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments. The court, reasoning that the three strikes law served the state's legitimate interests, rejected this claim. The California Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Judge: We'll hear argument now on number 01-6978, Gary Albert Ewing versus California. Mr. Denvir.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In March 2000, Gary Ewing walked into a Los Angeles pro shop, took three golf clubs, stuck them down the pants legs, and walked out. He was quickly apprehended for that crime. For that crime--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing, a serial offender with a long history of criminal convictions, was arrested for stealing three golf clubs, each worth $399, from a Los Angeles-area golf course. At the time of his arrest, Ewing was on parole from a 9-year prison term for convictions in three burglaries and one robbery. Under California's three strikes law, another felony conviction would require a sentence of 25 years to life. Ewing was charged with and convicted of one count of felony grand theft for the incident at the golf course. During sentencing, Ewing requested the judge in the case exercise discretion permitted under California law and reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor. The judge declined and sentenced Ewing in accordance with the three strikes law. On appeal, Ewing argued the sentence of 25 years to life was grossly disproportionate to the crime and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments. The court, reasoning that the three strikes law served the state's legitimate interests, rejected this claim. The California Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Judge: We'll hear argument now on number 01-6978, Gary Albert Ewing versus California. Mr. Denvir. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In March 2000, Gary Ewing walked into a Los Angeles pro shop, took three golf clubs, stuck them down the pants legs, and walked out. He was quickly apprehended for that crime. For that crime-- Judge: What was the value of the golf clubs?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Because the value of the golf clubs was approximately $1200, it was grand theft under California law. For grand theft, as a general matter, California provides a maximum sentence of three years. It also... because Mr. Ewing had served a prior prison sentence, he would be subject to a recidivism enhancement of one year, so the maximum sentence that he would have faced under California law, but for the so-called "three-strikes law", would have been four years in prison, which could have been reduced by one-half by his conduct in prison and his work in prison. However, because Mr. Ewing had a prior conviction for first-degree burglary, which has been classified as a serious felony by California, and for robbery, which has been classified as a violent felony by California--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing, a serial offender with a long history of criminal convictions, was arrested for stealing three golf clubs, each worth $399, from a Los Angeles-area golf course. At the time of his arrest, Ewing was on parole from a 9-year prison term for convictions in three burglaries and one robbery. Under California's three strikes law, another felony conviction would require a sentence of 25 years to life. Ewing was charged with and convicted of one count of felony grand theft for the incident at the golf course. During sentencing, Ewing requested the judge in the case exercise discretion permitted under California law and reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor. The judge declined and sentenced Ewing in accordance with the three strikes law. On appeal, Ewing argued the sentence of 25 years to life was grossly disproportionate to the crime and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments. The court, reasoning that the three strikes law served the state's legitimate interests, rejected this claim. The California Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Judge: We'll hear argument now on number 01-6978, Gary Albert Ewing versus California. Mr. Denvir. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In March 2000, Gary Ewing walked into a Los Angeles pro shop, took three golf clubs, stuck them down the pants legs, and walked out. He was quickly apprehended for that crime. For that crime-- Judge: What was the value of the golf clubs? Petitioner: --Because the value of the golf clubs was approximately $1200, it was grand theft under California law. For grand theft, as a general matter, California provides a maximum sentence of three years. It also... because Mr. Ewing had served a prior prison sentence, he would be subject to a recidivism enhancement of one year, so the maximum sentence that he would have faced under California law, but for the so-called "three-strikes law", would have been four years in prison, which could have been reduced by one-half by his conduct in prison and his work in prison. However, because Mr. Ewing had a prior conviction for first-degree burglary, which has been classified as a serious felony by California, and for robbery, which has been classified as a violent felony by California-- Judge: Was it armed robbery?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--He was armed with a knife at that time. And because of those two convictions, he came under the California "three strikes and you're out" law. And as a result of that, he received a sentence of life imprisonment and with a... with an added bar that he could not even be considered for parole for 25 years.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing, a serial offender with a long history of criminal convictions, was arrested for stealing three golf clubs, each worth $399, from a Los Angeles-area golf course. At the time of his arrest, Ewing was on parole from a 9-year prison term for convictions in three burglaries and one robbery. Under California's three strikes law, another felony conviction would require a sentence of 25 years to life. Ewing was charged with and convicted of one count of felony grand theft for the incident at the golf course. During sentencing, Ewing requested the judge in the case exercise discretion permitted under California law and reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor. The judge declined and sentenced Ewing in accordance with the three strikes law. On appeal, Ewing argued the sentence of 25 years to life was grossly disproportionate to the crime and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments. The court, reasoning that the three strikes law served the state's legitimate interests, rejected this claim. The California Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Judge: We'll hear argument now on number 01-6978, Gary Albert Ewing versus California. Mr. Denvir. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In March 2000, Gary Ewing walked into a Los Angeles pro shop, took three golf clubs, stuck them down the pants legs, and walked out. He was quickly apprehended for that crime. For that crime-- Judge: What was the value of the golf clubs? Petitioner: --Because the value of the golf clubs was approximately $1200, it was grand theft under California law. For grand theft, as a general matter, California provides a maximum sentence of three years. It also... because Mr. Ewing had served a prior prison sentence, he would be subject to a recidivism enhancement of one year, so the maximum sentence that he would have faced under California law, but for the so-called "three-strikes law", would have been four years in prison, which could have been reduced by one-half by his conduct in prison and his work in prison. However, because Mr. Ewing had a prior conviction for first-degree burglary, which has been classified as a serious felony by California, and for robbery, which has been classified as a violent felony by California-- Judge: Was it armed robbery? Petitioner: --He was armed with a knife at that time. And because of those two convictions, he came under the California "three strikes and you're out" law. And as a result of that, he received a sentence of life imprisonment and with a... with an added bar that he could not even be considered for parole for 25 years. Judge: Would it be fair to add that another reason for the sentence was that the judge did not disregard the priors, and that was because the judge had the record in front of him and the record showed other... a history of other offenses? Would that be a fair statement?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>It is correct, Your Honor. It... the judge did have discretion to strike the priors or to reduce this wobbler offense to a misdemeanor. She declined to do so, partly on the basis of his prior record. His prior record were all misdemeanor convictions prior to that time. But--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing, a serial offender with a long history of criminal convictions, was arrested for stealing three golf clubs, each worth $399, from a Los Angeles-area golf course. At the time of his arrest, Ewing was on parole from a 9-year prison term for convictions in three burglaries and one robbery. Under California's three strikes law, another felony conviction would require a sentence of 25 years to life. Ewing was charged with and convicted of one count of felony grand theft for the incident at the golf course. During sentencing, Ewing requested the judge in the case exercise discretion permitted under California law and reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor. The judge declined and sentenced Ewing in accordance with the three strikes law. On appeal, Ewing argued the sentence of 25 years to life was grossly disproportionate to the crime and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments. The court, reasoning that the three strikes law served the state's legitimate interests, rejected this claim. The California Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Judge: We'll hear argument now on number 01-6978, Gary Albert Ewing versus California. Mr. Denvir. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In March 2000, Gary Ewing walked into a Los Angeles pro shop, took three golf clubs, stuck them down the pants legs, and walked out. He was quickly apprehended for that crime. For that crime-- Judge: What was the value of the golf clubs? Petitioner: --Because the value of the golf clubs was approximately $1200, it was grand theft under California law. For grand theft, as a general matter, California provides a maximum sentence of three years. It also... because Mr. Ewing had served a prior prison sentence, he would be subject to a recidivism enhancement of one year, so the maximum sentence that he would have faced under California law, but for the so-called "three-strikes law", would have been four years in prison, which could have been reduced by one-half by his conduct in prison and his work in prison. However, because Mr. Ewing had a prior conviction for first-degree burglary, which has been classified as a serious felony by California, and for robbery, which has been classified as a violent felony by California-- Judge: Was it armed robbery? Petitioner: --He was armed with a knife at that time. And because of those two convictions, he came under the California "three strikes and you're out" law. And as a result of that, he received a sentence of life imprisonment and with a... with an added bar that he could not even be considered for parole for 25 years. Judge: Would it be fair to add that another reason for the sentence was that the judge did not disregard the priors, and that was because the judge had the record in front of him and the record showed other... a history of other offenses? Would that be a fair statement? Petitioner: It is correct, Your Honor. It... the judge did have discretion to strike the priors or to reduce this wobbler offense to a misdemeanor. She declined to do so, partly on the basis of his prior record. His prior record were all misdemeanor convictions prior to that time. But-- Judge: They were all misdemeanors?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Yes, Your Honor. All his... he had... the prior convictions that he had were felonies were four felonies, all occurred within one year, in 19... in one month, in 1993. There were three first-degree burglary convictions, and then there was one robbery conviction. He had other--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: On March 12, 2000, Gary Ewing, a serial offender with a long history of criminal convictions, was arrested for stealing three golf clubs, each worth $399, from a Los Angeles-area golf course. At the time of his arrest, Ewing was on parole from a 9-year prison term for convictions in three burglaries and one robbery. Under California's three strikes law, another felony conviction would require a sentence of 25 years to life. Ewing was charged with and convicted of one count of felony grand theft for the incident at the golf course. During sentencing, Ewing requested the judge in the case exercise discretion permitted under California law and reduce the conviction to a misdemeanor. The judge declined and sentenced Ewing in accordance with the three strikes law. On appeal, Ewing argued the sentence of 25 years to life was grossly disproportionate to the crime and therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments. The court, reasoning that the three strikes law served the state's legitimate interests, rejected this claim. The California Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Judge: We'll hear argument now on number 01-6978, Gary Albert Ewing versus California. Mr. Denvir. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: In March 2000, Gary Ewing walked into a Los Angeles pro shop, took three golf clubs, stuck them down the pants legs, and walked out. He was quickly apprehended for that crime. For that crime-- Judge: What was the value of the golf clubs? Petitioner: --Because the value of the golf clubs was approximately $1200, it was grand theft under California law. For grand theft, as a general matter, California provides a maximum sentence of three years. It also... because Mr. Ewing had served a prior prison sentence, he would be subject to a recidivism enhancement of one year, so the maximum sentence that he would have faced under California law, but for the so-called "three-strikes law", would have been four years in prison, which could have been reduced by one-half by his conduct in prison and his work in prison. However, because Mr. Ewing had a prior conviction for first-degree burglary, which has been classified as a serious felony by California, and for robbery, which has been classified as a violent felony by California-- Judge: Was it armed robbery? Petitioner: --He was armed with a knife at that time. And because of those two convictions, he came under the California "three strikes and you're out" law. And as a result of that, he received a sentence of life imprisonment and with a... with an added bar that he could not even be considered for parole for 25 years. Judge: Would it be fair to add that another reason for the sentence was that the judge did not disregard the priors, and that was because the judge had the record in front of him and the record showed other... a history of other offenses? Would that be a fair statement? Petitioner: It is correct, Your Honor. It... the judge did have discretion to strike the priors or to reduce this wobbler offense to a misdemeanor. She declined to do so, partly on the basis of his prior record. His prior record were all misdemeanor convictions prior to that time. But-- Judge: They were all misdemeanors? Petitioner: --Yes, Your Honor. All his... he had... the prior convictions that he had were felonies were four felonies, all occurred within one year, in 19... in one month, in 1993. There were three first-degree burglary convictions, and then there was one robbery conviction. He had other-- Judge: Well, now, those surely are not misdemeanors.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--No, Your Honor. I was... I thought Justice Kennedy's question was directed not to the... what they call the "strike priors", but to the fact that he did have other--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Akio Kawashima and Fusako Kawashima are natives and citizens of Japan. The Kawashimas were admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents in 1984. Nearly 10 years later, Akio Kawashima pleaded guilty to subscribing to a false statement on a federal tax return, and Fusako Kawashima pleaded guilty to aiding and assisting in preparing the false tax return statement. Immigration officials began proceedings to deport the couple who had failed to report more than $245,126 in taxable income from two restaurants they own. Anything more than $10,000 is considered an aggravated felony, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld their deportation. Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-577, Kawashima v. Holder. Mr. Whalen.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Mr. and Mrs. Kawashima came here to the United States as legal immigrants in 1985. And later on they pled guilty to filing a false statement under a corporate tax return. The issue we bring to the Court is whether that conviction under 26 U.S.C. 7206 is an aggravated felony, specifically under (M)(i) of the aggravated felony statute. This Court many times has held that it is the elements of the crime of conviction that determine whether a crime is an aggravated felony. And the elements of 7206 do not change when they go over to the immigration statute. And the terms of that statute is basically as the Department of Justice has written in its Tax Manual. It is basically a tax perjury statute. If you don't tell the truth, and you know what you are saying is false, and you do it under oath, that's perjury. There are other statutes, perjury statutes, which in essence say the same thing. And 18 U.S.C. 1001 is also a perjury statute. And none of them require the Justice Department or a court to determine whether fraud and deceit was an element of that crime.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Akio Kawashima and Fusako Kawashima are natives and citizens of Japan. The Kawashimas were admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents in 1984. Nearly 10 years later, Akio Kawashima pleaded guilty to subscribing to a false statement on a federal tax return, and Fusako Kawashima pleaded guilty to aiding and assisting in preparing the false tax return statement. Immigration officials began proceedings to deport the couple who had failed to report more than $245,126 in taxable income from two restaurants they own. Anything more than $10,000 is considered an aggravated felony, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld their deportation. Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-577, Kawashima v. Holder. Mr. Whalen. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Mr. and Mrs. Kawashima came here to the United States as legal immigrants in 1985. And later on they pled guilty to filing a false statement under a corporate tax return. The issue we bring to the Court is whether that conviction under 26 U.S.C. 7206 is an aggravated felony, specifically under (M)(i) of the aggravated felony statute. This Court many times has held that it is the elements of the crime of conviction that determine whether a crime is an aggravated felony. And the elements of 7206 do not change when they go over to the immigration statute. And the terms of that statute is basically as the Department of Justice has written in its Tax Manual. It is basically a tax perjury statute. If you don't tell the truth, and you know what you are saying is false, and you do it under oath, that's perjury. There are other statutes, perjury statutes, which in essence say the same thing. And 18 U.S.C. 1001 is also a perjury statute. And none of them require the Justice Department or a court to determine whether fraud and deceit was an element of that crime. Judge: How would you prove fraud and deceit beyond proving that the person lied, intentionally lied? What is added to intentionally lying to convert that into fraud or deceit?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>It's the intention to deceive or the intention to defraud. And simply--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Akio Kawashima and Fusako Kawashima are natives and citizens of Japan. The Kawashimas were admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents in 1984. Nearly 10 years later, Akio Kawashima pleaded guilty to subscribing to a false statement on a federal tax return, and Fusako Kawashima pleaded guilty to aiding and assisting in preparing the false tax return statement. Immigration officials began proceedings to deport the couple who had failed to report more than $245,126 in taxable income from two restaurants they own. Anything more than $10,000 is considered an aggravated felony, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld their deportation. Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-577, Kawashima v. Holder. Mr. Whalen. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Mr. and Mrs. Kawashima came here to the United States as legal immigrants in 1985. And later on they pled guilty to filing a false statement under a corporate tax return. The issue we bring to the Court is whether that conviction under 26 U.S.C. 7206 is an aggravated felony, specifically under (M)(i) of the aggravated felony statute. This Court many times has held that it is the elements of the crime of conviction that determine whether a crime is an aggravated felony. And the elements of 7206 do not change when they go over to the immigration statute. And the terms of that statute is basically as the Department of Justice has written in its Tax Manual. It is basically a tax perjury statute. If you don't tell the truth, and you know what you are saying is false, and you do it under oath, that's perjury. There are other statutes, perjury statutes, which in essence say the same thing. And 18 U.S.C. 1001 is also a perjury statute. And none of them require the Justice Department or a court to determine whether fraud and deceit was an element of that crime. Judge: How would you prove fraud and deceit beyond proving that the person lied, intentionally lied? What is added to intentionally lying to convert that into fraud or deceit? Petitioner: It's the intention to deceive or the intention to defraud. And simply-- Judge: Isn't intentionally lying -- doesn't that mean that you intend to deceive?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--It does not, Your Honor.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Akio Kawashima and Fusako Kawashima are natives and citizens of Japan. The Kawashimas were admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents in 1984. Nearly 10 years later, Akio Kawashima pleaded guilty to subscribing to a false statement on a federal tax return, and Fusako Kawashima pleaded guilty to aiding and assisting in preparing the false tax return statement. Immigration officials began proceedings to deport the couple who had failed to report more than $245,126 in taxable income from two restaurants they own. Anything more than $10,000 is considered an aggravated felony, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld their deportation. Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-577, Kawashima v. Holder. Mr. Whalen. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Mr. and Mrs. Kawashima came here to the United States as legal immigrants in 1985. And later on they pled guilty to filing a false statement under a corporate tax return. The issue we bring to the Court is whether that conviction under 26 U.S.C. 7206 is an aggravated felony, specifically under (M)(i) of the aggravated felony statute. This Court many times has held that it is the elements of the crime of conviction that determine whether a crime is an aggravated felony. And the elements of 7206 do not change when they go over to the immigration statute. And the terms of that statute is basically as the Department of Justice has written in its Tax Manual. It is basically a tax perjury statute. If you don't tell the truth, and you know what you are saying is false, and you do it under oath, that's perjury. There are other statutes, perjury statutes, which in essence say the same thing. And 18 U.S.C. 1001 is also a perjury statute. And none of them require the Justice Department or a court to determine whether fraud and deceit was an element of that crime. Judge: How would you prove fraud and deceit beyond proving that the person lied, intentionally lied? What is added to intentionally lying to convert that into fraud or deceit? Petitioner: It's the intention to deceive or the intention to defraud. And simply-- Judge: Isn't intentionally lying -- doesn't that mean that you intend to deceive? Petitioner: --It does not, Your Honor. Judge: It doesn't?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>It does not mean, because you are saying a false -- making a false statement, that that is evidence of an intent to deceive.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Akio Kawashima and Fusako Kawashima are natives and citizens of Japan. The Kawashimas were admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents in 1984. Nearly 10 years later, Akio Kawashima pleaded guilty to subscribing to a false statement on a federal tax return, and Fusako Kawashima pleaded guilty to aiding and assisting in preparing the false tax return statement. Immigration officials began proceedings to deport the couple who had failed to report more than $245,126 in taxable income from two restaurants they own. Anything more than $10,000 is considered an aggravated felony, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld their deportation. Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-577, Kawashima v. Holder. Mr. Whalen. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Mr. and Mrs. Kawashima came here to the United States as legal immigrants in 1985. And later on they pled guilty to filing a false statement under a corporate tax return. The issue we bring to the Court is whether that conviction under 26 U.S.C. 7206 is an aggravated felony, specifically under (M)(i) of the aggravated felony statute. This Court many times has held that it is the elements of the crime of conviction that determine whether a crime is an aggravated felony. And the elements of 7206 do not change when they go over to the immigration statute. And the terms of that statute is basically as the Department of Justice has written in its Tax Manual. It is basically a tax perjury statute. If you don't tell the truth, and you know what you are saying is false, and you do it under oath, that's perjury. There are other statutes, perjury statutes, which in essence say the same thing. And 18 U.S.C. 1001 is also a perjury statute. And none of them require the Justice Department or a court to determine whether fraud and deceit was an element of that crime. Judge: How would you prove fraud and deceit beyond proving that the person lied, intentionally lied? What is added to intentionally lying to convert that into fraud or deceit? Petitioner: It's the intention to deceive or the intention to defraud. And simply-- Judge: Isn't intentionally lying -- doesn't that mean that you intend to deceive? Petitioner: --It does not, Your Honor. Judge: It doesn't? Petitioner: It does not mean, because you are saying a false -- making a false statement, that that is evidence of an intent to deceive. Judge: Mr. Whalen, the common definition of deceit is acting -- intentionally giving a false impression, intentionally giving a false impression with the intent that someone will act on it. So it seems that's exactly what filing a false return is. You give a false impression of what your income is with the intent that the IRS will accept it.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Justice Ginsburg, the difference I'm trying to ask the Court to consider, it is the intent which is an element of fraud and deceit. Under section 7201, the tax evasion statute, that includes both a requirement or a finding of fraud and deceit. Section 7206 does not.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Akio Kawashima and Fusako Kawashima are natives and citizens of Japan. The Kawashimas were admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents in 1984. Nearly 10 years later, Akio Kawashima pleaded guilty to subscribing to a false statement on a federal tax return, and Fusako Kawashima pleaded guilty to aiding and assisting in preparing the false tax return statement. Immigration officials began proceedings to deport the couple who had failed to report more than $245,126 in taxable income from two restaurants they own. Anything more than $10,000 is considered an aggravated felony, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld their deportation. Judge: We will hear argument next in Case 10-577, Kawashima v. Holder. Mr. Whalen. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Mr. and Mrs. Kawashima came here to the United States as legal immigrants in 1985. And later on they pled guilty to filing a false statement under a corporate tax return. The issue we bring to the Court is whether that conviction under 26 U.S.C. 7206 is an aggravated felony, specifically under (M)(i) of the aggravated felony statute. This Court many times has held that it is the elements of the crime of conviction that determine whether a crime is an aggravated felony. And the elements of 7206 do not change when they go over to the immigration statute. And the terms of that statute is basically as the Department of Justice has written in its Tax Manual. It is basically a tax perjury statute. If you don't tell the truth, and you know what you are saying is false, and you do it under oath, that's perjury. There are other statutes, perjury statutes, which in essence say the same thing. And 18 U.S.C. 1001 is also a perjury statute. And none of them require the Justice Department or a court to determine whether fraud and deceit was an element of that crime. Judge: How would you prove fraud and deceit beyond proving that the person lied, intentionally lied? What is added to intentionally lying to convert that into fraud or deceit? Petitioner: It's the intention to deceive or the intention to defraud. And simply-- Judge: Isn't intentionally lying -- doesn't that mean that you intend to deceive? Petitioner: --It does not, Your Honor. Judge: It doesn't? Petitioner: It does not mean, because you are saying a false -- making a false statement, that that is evidence of an intent to deceive. Judge: Mr. Whalen, the common definition of deceit is acting -- intentionally giving a false impression, intentionally giving a false impression with the intent that someone will act on it. So it seems that's exactly what filing a false return is. You give a false impression of what your income is with the intent that the IRS will accept it. Petitioner: Justice Ginsburg, the difference I'm trying to ask the Court to consider, it is the intent which is an element of fraud and deceit. Under section 7201, the tax evasion statute, that includes both a requirement or a finding of fraud and deceit. Section 7206 does not. Judge: But why isn't it obvious? What proof would you need? You submit a document because you want to convey a false impression for someone to act on. Why do you have to have anything more than that to establish deceit?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Because the requirements, Your Honor, of 7206 is a finding of -- of simply making a false statement. That's all that's required. The IRS, when they go after a taxpayer because they have not provided -- they have not disclosed all of their income, the IRS comes in, or rather the Department of Justice, and all they have to prove is that it's false. They don't have to prove--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B-2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies: aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable (deportable) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges. Barton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” This residency requirement is subject to a “stop-time rule” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “inadmissible” or “removable.” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time-stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop-time rule because as an already-admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “rendered inadmissible” within the meaning of § 1229b(a). The immigration judge ruled in the government’s favor, and in a non-precedential single-member decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission (or readmission) to be “rendered inadmissible.” Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-725, Barton versus Barr. Mr. Unikowsky.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The question before the Court today is, what does it mean for an offense to render an alien inadmissible for purposes of the stop-time rule? The Court should hold that an offense renders an alien inadmissible if the immigration judge finds that the offense renders the alien inadmissible at the removal hearing that precipitates the need to apply the stop-time rule. If the Court disagrees with that and agrees with the Eleventh Circuit that inadmissible is a status, it should hold that an alien acquires that status when the alien is capable of being charged with inadmissibility. In this case, neither condition is satisfied. Petitioner was not found inadmissible. He wasn't capable of being found inadmissible. Therefore, he was not rendered inadmissible. So I'd like to begin this morning with a concession the government makes at pages 29 and 30 of its brief which I think narrows the issues in this case somewhat. So the government concedes that when the words "inadmissible" and "removable," which are the crucial words in the stop-time rule, when those words are used in a statute that has a connection to the alien's own removal proceeding, they're a reference to the charge against the alien at that proceeding. They're not a status. So the government agrees that in those contexts, its proposed interpretation of the words "inadmissible" and "removable" in the stop-time rule is incorrect. So, in Section 1226, the mandatory detention statute, that says that an alien who is inadmissible by reason of having committed an offense under Section 1182 is subject to mandatory detention, the government agrees there that "inadmissible" is a reference to inadmissible at the proceeding, not just the status of being inadmissible. The government says that's natural in that context, and we agree, because that's a statute with the relationship to the alien's removal. Same thing in Section 1252. That's the jurisdiction-stripping statute. That says that courts of appeals don't have jurisdiction to hear petitions for review by an alien who is removable for certain specified reasons. There, too, the government agrees removable is not the status; it's a reference to the actual charge at the hearing, and they say that's natural in that context because the statute has a connection to the alien's removal proceeding. So the question in this case boils down to whether the government has put forward a sufficient case for holding that the words "inadmissible" and "removable" in the stop-time rule mean something different from what it concedes they mean in these adjacent or nearby statutes addressing the same subject matter. And I don't think the government has put forward that case, because I think that many of the contextual clues that apply in the nearby statutes also apply in the stop-time rule, or at least there isn't a sufficient reason for construing those statutes differently. So, first of all, I think it's important to recognize that the stop-time rule is applied only in the context of removal proceedings after the immigration judge has just decided whether an alien is inadmissible or removable. So there's like two steps. At step one, the immigration judge decides whether an offense renders the alien inadmissible or removable. And then the immigration judge decides eligibility for cancellation.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B-2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies: aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable (deportable) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges. Barton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” This residency requirement is subject to a “stop-time rule” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “inadmissible” or “removable.” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time-stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop-time rule because as an already-admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “rendered inadmissible” within the meaning of § 1229b(a). The immigration judge ruled in the government’s favor, and in a non-precedential single-member decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission (or readmission) to be “rendered inadmissible.” Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-725, Barton versus Barr. Mr. Unikowsky. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The question before the Court today is, what does it mean for an offense to render an alien inadmissible for purposes of the stop-time rule? The Court should hold that an offense renders an alien inadmissible if the immigration judge finds that the offense renders the alien inadmissible at the removal hearing that precipitates the need to apply the stop-time rule. If the Court disagrees with that and agrees with the Eleventh Circuit that inadmissible is a status, it should hold that an alien acquires that status when the alien is capable of being charged with inadmissibility. In this case, neither condition is satisfied. Petitioner was not found inadmissible. He wasn't capable of being found inadmissible. Therefore, he was not rendered inadmissible. So I'd like to begin this morning with a concession the government makes at pages 29 and 30 of its brief which I think narrows the issues in this case somewhat. So the government concedes that when the words "inadmissible" and "removable," which are the crucial words in the stop-time rule, when those words are used in a statute that has a connection to the alien's own removal proceeding, they're a reference to the charge against the alien at that proceeding. They're not a status. So the government agrees that in those contexts, its proposed interpretation of the words "inadmissible" and "removable" in the stop-time rule is incorrect. So, in Section 1226, the mandatory detention statute, that says that an alien who is inadmissible by reason of having committed an offense under Section 1182 is subject to mandatory detention, the government agrees there that "inadmissible" is a reference to inadmissible at the proceeding, not just the status of being inadmissible. The government says that's natural in that context, and we agree, because that's a statute with the relationship to the alien's removal. Same thing in Section 1252. That's the jurisdiction-stripping statute. That says that courts of appeals don't have jurisdiction to hear petitions for review by an alien who is removable for certain specified reasons. There, too, the government agrees removable is not the status; it's a reference to the actual charge at the hearing, and they say that's natural in that context because the statute has a connection to the alien's removal proceeding. So the question in this case boils down to whether the government has put forward a sufficient case for holding that the words "inadmissible" and "removable" in the stop-time rule mean something different from what it concedes they mean in these adjacent or nearby statutes addressing the same subject matter. And I don't think the government has put forward that case, because I think that many of the contextual clues that apply in the nearby statutes also apply in the stop-time rule, or at least there isn't a sufficient reason for construing those statutes differently. So, first of all, I think it's important to recognize that the stop-time rule is applied only in the context of removal proceedings after the immigration judge has just decided whether an alien is inadmissible or removable. So there's like two steps. At step one, the immigration judge decides whether an offense renders the alien inadmissible or removable. And then the immigration judge decides eligibility for cancellation. Judge: That's not quite true, though. Some aliens concede removability and are seeking cancellation.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, that's correct.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B-2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies: aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable (deportable) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges. Barton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” This residency requirement is subject to a “stop-time rule” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “inadmissible” or “removable.” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time-stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop-time rule because as an already-admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “rendered inadmissible” within the meaning of § 1229b(a). The immigration judge ruled in the government’s favor, and in a non-precedential single-member decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission (or readmission) to be “rendered inadmissible.” Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-725, Barton versus Barr. Mr. Unikowsky. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The question before the Court today is, what does it mean for an offense to render an alien inadmissible for purposes of the stop-time rule? The Court should hold that an offense renders an alien inadmissible if the immigration judge finds that the offense renders the alien inadmissible at the removal hearing that precipitates the need to apply the stop-time rule. If the Court disagrees with that and agrees with the Eleventh Circuit that inadmissible is a status, it should hold that an alien acquires that status when the alien is capable of being charged with inadmissibility. In this case, neither condition is satisfied. Petitioner was not found inadmissible. He wasn't capable of being found inadmissible. Therefore, he was not rendered inadmissible. So I'd like to begin this morning with a concession the government makes at pages 29 and 30 of its brief which I think narrows the issues in this case somewhat. So the government concedes that when the words "inadmissible" and "removable," which are the crucial words in the stop-time rule, when those words are used in a statute that has a connection to the alien's own removal proceeding, they're a reference to the charge against the alien at that proceeding. They're not a status. So the government agrees that in those contexts, its proposed interpretation of the words "inadmissible" and "removable" in the stop-time rule is incorrect. So, in Section 1226, the mandatory detention statute, that says that an alien who is inadmissible by reason of having committed an offense under Section 1182 is subject to mandatory detention, the government agrees there that "inadmissible" is a reference to inadmissible at the proceeding, not just the status of being inadmissible. The government says that's natural in that context, and we agree, because that's a statute with the relationship to the alien's removal. Same thing in Section 1252. That's the jurisdiction-stripping statute. That says that courts of appeals don't have jurisdiction to hear petitions for review by an alien who is removable for certain specified reasons. There, too, the government agrees removable is not the status; it's a reference to the actual charge at the hearing, and they say that's natural in that context because the statute has a connection to the alien's removal proceeding. So the question in this case boils down to whether the government has put forward a sufficient case for holding that the words "inadmissible" and "removable" in the stop-time rule mean something different from what it concedes they mean in these adjacent or nearby statutes addressing the same subject matter. And I don't think the government has put forward that case, because I think that many of the contextual clues that apply in the nearby statutes also apply in the stop-time rule, or at least there isn't a sufficient reason for construing those statutes differently. So, first of all, I think it's important to recognize that the stop-time rule is applied only in the context of removal proceedings after the immigration judge has just decided whether an alien is inadmissible or removable. So there's like two steps. At step one, the immigration judge decides whether an offense renders the alien inadmissible or removable. And then the immigration judge decides eligibility for cancellation. Judge: That's not quite true, though. Some aliens concede removability and are seeking cancellation. Petitioner: Yes, that's correct. Judge: And then there are some that are ordered -- who are found inadmissible or removable not on the basis of a crime at all.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>So that's true, but in --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B-2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies: aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable (deportable) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges. Barton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” This residency requirement is subject to a “stop-time rule” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “inadmissible” or “removable.” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time-stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop-time rule because as an already-admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “rendered inadmissible” within the meaning of § 1229b(a). The immigration judge ruled in the government’s favor, and in a non-precedential single-member decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission (or readmission) to be “rendered inadmissible.” Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-725, Barton versus Barr. Mr. Unikowsky. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The question before the Court today is, what does it mean for an offense to render an alien inadmissible for purposes of the stop-time rule? The Court should hold that an offense renders an alien inadmissible if the immigration judge finds that the offense renders the alien inadmissible at the removal hearing that precipitates the need to apply the stop-time rule. If the Court disagrees with that and agrees with the Eleventh Circuit that inadmissible is a status, it should hold that an alien acquires that status when the alien is capable of being charged with inadmissibility. In this case, neither condition is satisfied. Petitioner was not found inadmissible. He wasn't capable of being found inadmissible. Therefore, he was not rendered inadmissible. So I'd like to begin this morning with a concession the government makes at pages 29 and 30 of its brief which I think narrows the issues in this case somewhat. So the government concedes that when the words "inadmissible" and "removable," which are the crucial words in the stop-time rule, when those words are used in a statute that has a connection to the alien's own removal proceeding, they're a reference to the charge against the alien at that proceeding. They're not a status. So the government agrees that in those contexts, its proposed interpretation of the words "inadmissible" and "removable" in the stop-time rule is incorrect. So, in Section 1226, the mandatory detention statute, that says that an alien who is inadmissible by reason of having committed an offense under Section 1182 is subject to mandatory detention, the government agrees there that "inadmissible" is a reference to inadmissible at the proceeding, not just the status of being inadmissible. The government says that's natural in that context, and we agree, because that's a statute with the relationship to the alien's removal. Same thing in Section 1252. That's the jurisdiction-stripping statute. That says that courts of appeals don't have jurisdiction to hear petitions for review by an alien who is removable for certain specified reasons. There, too, the government agrees removable is not the status; it's a reference to the actual charge at the hearing, and they say that's natural in that context because the statute has a connection to the alien's removal proceeding. So the question in this case boils down to whether the government has put forward a sufficient case for holding that the words "inadmissible" and "removable" in the stop-time rule mean something different from what it concedes they mean in these adjacent or nearby statutes addressing the same subject matter. And I don't think the government has put forward that case, because I think that many of the contextual clues that apply in the nearby statutes also apply in the stop-time rule, or at least there isn't a sufficient reason for construing those statutes differently. So, first of all, I think it's important to recognize that the stop-time rule is applied only in the context of removal proceedings after the immigration judge has just decided whether an alien is inadmissible or removable. So there's like two steps. At step one, the immigration judge decides whether an offense renders the alien inadmissible or removable. And then the immigration judge decides eligibility for cancellation. Judge: That's not quite true, though. Some aliens concede removability and are seeking cancellation. Petitioner: Yes, that's correct. Judge: And then there are some that are ordered -- who are found inadmissible or removable not on the basis of a crime at all. Petitioner: So that's true, but in -- Judge: So you have two classes of people that aren't covered by the way you're reading admissibility now.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>No, but there's still a threshold finding of inadmissibility or removability. It's true there might not be a hearing; there might be a concession. But, in the most typical cases, it's based on an offense, and in every case, there's just been a holding, an adjudication, that for some reason the alien is inadmissible or removable.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B-2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies: aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable (deportable) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges. Barton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” This residency requirement is subject to a “stop-time rule” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “inadmissible” or “removable.” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time-stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop-time rule because as an already-admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “rendered inadmissible” within the meaning of § 1229b(a). The immigration judge ruled in the government’s favor, and in a non-precedential single-member decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission (or readmission) to be “rendered inadmissible.” Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-725, Barton versus Barr. Mr. Unikowsky. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The question before the Court today is, what does it mean for an offense to render an alien inadmissible for purposes of the stop-time rule? The Court should hold that an offense renders an alien inadmissible if the immigration judge finds that the offense renders the alien inadmissible at the removal hearing that precipitates the need to apply the stop-time rule. If the Court disagrees with that and agrees with the Eleventh Circuit that inadmissible is a status, it should hold that an alien acquires that status when the alien is capable of being charged with inadmissibility. In this case, neither condition is satisfied. Petitioner was not found inadmissible. He wasn't capable of being found inadmissible. Therefore, he was not rendered inadmissible. So I'd like to begin this morning with a concession the government makes at pages 29 and 30 of its brief which I think narrows the issues in this case somewhat. So the government concedes that when the words "inadmissible" and "removable," which are the crucial words in the stop-time rule, when those words are used in a statute that has a connection to the alien's own removal proceeding, they're a reference to the charge against the alien at that proceeding. They're not a status. So the government agrees that in those contexts, its proposed interpretation of the words "inadmissible" and "removable" in the stop-time rule is incorrect. So, in Section 1226, the mandatory detention statute, that says that an alien who is inadmissible by reason of having committed an offense under Section 1182 is subject to mandatory detention, the government agrees there that "inadmissible" is a reference to inadmissible at the proceeding, not just the status of being inadmissible. The government says that's natural in that context, and we agree, because that's a statute with the relationship to the alien's removal. Same thing in Section 1252. That's the jurisdiction-stripping statute. That says that courts of appeals don't have jurisdiction to hear petitions for review by an alien who is removable for certain specified reasons. There, too, the government agrees removable is not the status; it's a reference to the actual charge at the hearing, and they say that's natural in that context because the statute has a connection to the alien's removal proceeding. So the question in this case boils down to whether the government has put forward a sufficient case for holding that the words "inadmissible" and "removable" in the stop-time rule mean something different from what it concedes they mean in these adjacent or nearby statutes addressing the same subject matter. And I don't think the government has put forward that case, because I think that many of the contextual clues that apply in the nearby statutes also apply in the stop-time rule, or at least there isn't a sufficient reason for construing those statutes differently. So, first of all, I think it's important to recognize that the stop-time rule is applied only in the context of removal proceedings after the immigration judge has just decided whether an alien is inadmissible or removable. So there's like two steps. At step one, the immigration judge decides whether an offense renders the alien inadmissible or removable. And then the immigration judge decides eligibility for cancellation. Judge: That's not quite true, though. Some aliens concede removability and are seeking cancellation. Petitioner: Yes, that's correct. Judge: And then there are some that are ordered -- who are found inadmissible or removable not on the basis of a crime at all. Petitioner: So that's true, but in -- Judge: So you have two classes of people that aren't covered by the way you're reading admissibility now. Petitioner: No, but there's still a threshold finding of inadmissibility or removability. It's true there might not be a hearing; there might be a concession. But, in the most typical cases, it's based on an offense, and in every case, there's just been a holding, an adjudication, that for some reason the alien is inadmissible or removable. Judge: But --<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I think that the word varies depending on the context in which it's being used. So I can't --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A native and citizen of Jamaica, Andre Barton was admitted to the United States in 1989 under a B-2 visitor visa. Three years later, in 1992, he became a lawful permanent resident. In 1996, a few months before he had been in the country for seven years, Barton was charged with and convicted of three felonies: aggravated assault, first-degree criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the possession of a felony. In 2007 and 2008, he was charged with and convicted of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. After these offenses, the Department of Homeland Security served Barton with a notice to appear, charging him as removable (deportable) on several grounds. Barton conceded removability as to two of the charges but denied two of them. He also gave notice of his intent to seek cancellation of removal as a lawful permanent resident. The immigration judge sustained the two conceded charges, and the government withdrew the other two charges. Barton then filed an application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), which allows the attorney general to cancel the removal of an otherwise removable lawful permanent resident if, among other things, the individual “has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status.” This residency requirement is subject to a “stop-time rule” which terminates the accrual of continuous residency when the individual commits a statutorily described crime that renders the individual “inadmissible” or “removable.” The government argued that Barton had not accrued the seven years of continuous residence since his admission to the United States in 1989 because his 1996 crimes triggered the time-stop rule. In response, Barton argued that his 1996 crimes did not trigger the stop-time rule because as an already-admitted lawful permanent resident who was not seeking admission or readmission to the United States, he could not as a matter of law be “rendered inadmissible” within the meaning of § 1229b(a). The immigration judge ruled in the government’s favor, and in a non-precedential single-member decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge’s decision. On appeal the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that a person need not seek admission (or readmission) to be “rendered inadmissible.” Judge: We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 18-725, Barton versus Barr. Mr. Unikowsky. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The question before the Court today is, what does it mean for an offense to render an alien inadmissible for purposes of the stop-time rule? The Court should hold that an offense renders an alien inadmissible if the immigration judge finds that the offense renders the alien inadmissible at the removal hearing that precipitates the need to apply the stop-time rule. If the Court disagrees with that and agrees with the Eleventh Circuit that inadmissible is a status, it should hold that an alien acquires that status when the alien is capable of being charged with inadmissibility. In this case, neither condition is satisfied. Petitioner was not found inadmissible. He wasn't capable of being found inadmissible. Therefore, he was not rendered inadmissible. So I'd like to begin this morning with a concession the government makes at pages 29 and 30 of its brief which I think narrows the issues in this case somewhat. So the government concedes that when the words "inadmissible" and "removable," which are the crucial words in the stop-time rule, when those words are used in a statute that has a connection to the alien's own removal proceeding, they're a reference to the charge against the alien at that proceeding. They're not a status. So the government agrees that in those contexts, its proposed interpretation of the words "inadmissible" and "removable" in the stop-time rule is incorrect. So, in Section 1226, the mandatory detention statute, that says that an alien who is inadmissible by reason of having committed an offense under Section 1182 is subject to mandatory detention, the government agrees there that "inadmissible" is a reference to inadmissible at the proceeding, not just the status of being inadmissible. The government says that's natural in that context, and we agree, because that's a statute with the relationship to the alien's removal. Same thing in Section 1252. That's the jurisdiction-stripping statute. That says that courts of appeals don't have jurisdiction to hear petitions for review by an alien who is removable for certain specified reasons. There, too, the government agrees removable is not the status; it's a reference to the actual charge at the hearing, and they say that's natural in that context because the statute has a connection to the alien's removal proceeding. So the question in this case boils down to whether the government has put forward a sufficient case for holding that the words "inadmissible" and "removable" in the stop-time rule mean something different from what it concedes they mean in these adjacent or nearby statutes addressing the same subject matter. And I don't think the government has put forward that case, because I think that many of the contextual clues that apply in the nearby statutes also apply in the stop-time rule, or at least there isn't a sufficient reason for construing those statutes differently. So, first of all, I think it's important to recognize that the stop-time rule is applied only in the context of removal proceedings after the immigration judge has just decided whether an alien is inadmissible or removable. So there's like two steps. At step one, the immigration judge decides whether an offense renders the alien inadmissible or removable. And then the immigration judge decides eligibility for cancellation. Judge: That's not quite true, though. Some aliens concede removability and are seeking cancellation. Petitioner: Yes, that's correct. Judge: And then there are some that are ordered -- who are found inadmissible or removable not on the basis of a crime at all. Petitioner: So that's true, but in -- Judge: So you have two classes of people that aren't covered by the way you're reading admissibility now. Petitioner: No, but there's still a threshold finding of inadmissibility or removability. It's true there might not be a hearing; there might be a concession. But, in the most typical cases, it's based on an offense, and in every case, there's just been a holding, an adjudication, that for some reason the alien is inadmissible or removable. Judge: But -- Petitioner: I think that the word varies depending on the context in which it's being used. So I can't -- Judge: Mr. Unikowsky, could I -- could -- could I possibly get an argument off the table? Do you really want to argue that the concept of inadmissibility is not a status?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>I think that it can -- the word can mean two things. I mean, I agree with you that the DLE sounds like a status at least in some contexts. I can't -- I'm not conceding -- I'm not going to argue something that's obviously wrong. There are certain contexts in which the way using that word it sounds like a status. So I agree, if you go to your lawyer before the hearing and say, hey, I want to go to Niagara Falls, am I inadmissible, in that context, it's talking about a status. That's clear. But I also think it's clear that in certain contexts when you're talking about the removal proceeding itself --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: James Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted under the California Penal Code for first-degree residential burglary; both convictions resulted in two years’ imprisonment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to deportation. The INA definition of aggravated felony includes a “crime of violence,” which is any offense that involves the use or substantial risk of physical force against another person or property.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Dimaya and claimed that his burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence under the Act. The Immigration Judge held that Dimaya was deportable and that burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it always involves a risk of physical violence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. While Dimaya’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the definition of a “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INA’s crime of violence provision was unconstitutionally vague because it was largely similar to the violent felony provision in the ACCA that the Supreme Court struck down in Johnson. The appellate court found that both provisions denied fair notice to defendants and failed to make clear when a risk of violence could be considered substantial. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 15-1498, Sessions versus Dimaya. Mr. Kneedler.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that this Court's decision in Johnson compelled the conclusion that the definition of crime of violence in the INA's broader definition of aggravated felony is unconstitutionally vague. That is so for two reasons. First, the standard for assessing vagueness in the immigration context is not the one that's applicable in criminal cases. Immigration removal is not a punishment for past conduct. It operates prospectively on the basis of the application of standards adopted by Congress under which an alien is regarded as no longer conducive to the safety and welfare.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: James Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted under the California Penal Code for first-degree residential burglary; both convictions resulted in two years’ imprisonment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to deportation. The INA definition of aggravated felony includes a “crime of violence,” which is any offense that involves the use or substantial risk of physical force against another person or property.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Dimaya and claimed that his burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence under the Act. The Immigration Judge held that Dimaya was deportable and that burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it always involves a risk of physical violence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. While Dimaya’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the definition of a “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INA’s crime of violence provision was unconstitutionally vague because it was largely similar to the violent felony provision in the ACCA that the Supreme Court struck down in Johnson. The appellate court found that both provisions denied fair notice to defendants and failed to make clear when a risk of violence could be considered substantial. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 15-1498, Sessions versus Dimaya. Mr. Kneedler. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that this Court's decision in Johnson compelled the conclusion that the definition of crime of violence in the INA's broader definition of aggravated felony is unconstitutionally vague. That is so for two reasons. First, the standard for assessing vagueness in the immigration context is not the one that's applicable in criminal cases. Immigration removal is not a punishment for past conduct. It operates prospectively on the basis of the application of standards adopted by Congress under which an alien is regarded as no longer conducive to the safety and welfare. Judge: But Mr. Kneedler, if you're -- if you're making the distinction that Johnson was a criminal case and this is a civil case, this Court has had a number of decisions saying that line is not so rigid. For example, MLB, taking away parental rights, is a civil proceeding. And yet the Court said, as in a criminal proceeding, for an indigent party, the state must give the transcript free. And so, if you had followed a rigid criminal/civil, then if it's civil, no free transcript. Only if it's criminal. But the Court said the -- the line is blurred when there is such a grave consequence. It was a grave consequence to be denied parental rights. It's a grave consequence to be removed from the United States.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>And so our submission is not just the distinction between civil and criminal, although we think this Court's cases establish that there is -- that there is a difference. But the important points here, though, are immigration is distinctive. Immigration, this Court has repeatedly said, even though it may be regarded as a harsh result or -- or can have a serious impact on a person's life, it is not punishment for a past offense. It operates prospectively because Congress has determined that the individual's presence in the United States is no longer conducive to the safety or welfare of the country.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: James Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted under the California Penal Code for first-degree residential burglary; both convictions resulted in two years’ imprisonment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to deportation. The INA definition of aggravated felony includes a “crime of violence,” which is any offense that involves the use or substantial risk of physical force against another person or property.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Dimaya and claimed that his burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence under the Act. The Immigration Judge held that Dimaya was deportable and that burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it always involves a risk of physical violence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. While Dimaya’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the definition of a “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INA’s crime of violence provision was unconstitutionally vague because it was largely similar to the violent felony provision in the ACCA that the Supreme Court struck down in Johnson. The appellate court found that both provisions denied fair notice to defendants and failed to make clear when a risk of violence could be considered substantial. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 15-1498, Sessions versus Dimaya. Mr. Kneedler. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that this Court's decision in Johnson compelled the conclusion that the definition of crime of violence in the INA's broader definition of aggravated felony is unconstitutionally vague. That is so for two reasons. First, the standard for assessing vagueness in the immigration context is not the one that's applicable in criminal cases. Immigration removal is not a punishment for past conduct. It operates prospectively on the basis of the application of standards adopted by Congress under which an alien is regarded as no longer conducive to the safety and welfare. Judge: But Mr. Kneedler, if you're -- if you're making the distinction that Johnson was a criminal case and this is a civil case, this Court has had a number of decisions saying that line is not so rigid. For example, MLB, taking away parental rights, is a civil proceeding. And yet the Court said, as in a criminal proceeding, for an indigent party, the state must give the transcript free. And so, if you had followed a rigid criminal/civil, then if it's civil, no free transcript. Only if it's criminal. But the Court said the -- the line is blurred when there is such a grave consequence. It was a grave consequence to be denied parental rights. It's a grave consequence to be removed from the United States. Petitioner: And so our submission is not just the distinction between civil and criminal, although we think this Court's cases establish that there is -- that there is a difference. But the important points here, though, are immigration is distinctive. Immigration, this Court has repeatedly said, even though it may be regarded as a harsh result or -- or can have a serious impact on a person's life, it is not punishment for a past offense. It operates prospectively because Congress has determined that the individual's presence in the United States is no longer conducive to the safety or welfare of the country. Judge: Mr. Kneedler, does that permit arbitrary removal? Can the immigration officials walk down the street and say I just don't like the way you look; out?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>No. And -- and this brings me to --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: James Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted under the California Penal Code for first-degree residential burglary; both convictions resulted in two years’ imprisonment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to deportation. The INA definition of aggravated felony includes a “crime of violence,” which is any offense that involves the use or substantial risk of physical force against another person or property.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Dimaya and claimed that his burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence under the Act. The Immigration Judge held that Dimaya was deportable and that burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it always involves a risk of physical violence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. While Dimaya’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the definition of a “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INA’s crime of violence provision was unconstitutionally vague because it was largely similar to the violent felony provision in the ACCA that the Supreme Court struck down in Johnson. The appellate court found that both provisions denied fair notice to defendants and failed to make clear when a risk of violence could be considered substantial. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 15-1498, Sessions versus Dimaya. Mr. Kneedler. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that this Court's decision in Johnson compelled the conclusion that the definition of crime of violence in the INA's broader definition of aggravated felony is unconstitutionally vague. That is so for two reasons. First, the standard for assessing vagueness in the immigration context is not the one that's applicable in criminal cases. Immigration removal is not a punishment for past conduct. It operates prospectively on the basis of the application of standards adopted by Congress under which an alien is regarded as no longer conducive to the safety and welfare. Judge: But Mr. Kneedler, if you're -- if you're making the distinction that Johnson was a criminal case and this is a civil case, this Court has had a number of decisions saying that line is not so rigid. For example, MLB, taking away parental rights, is a civil proceeding. And yet the Court said, as in a criminal proceeding, for an indigent party, the state must give the transcript free. And so, if you had followed a rigid criminal/civil, then if it's civil, no free transcript. Only if it's criminal. But the Court said the -- the line is blurred when there is such a grave consequence. It was a grave consequence to be denied parental rights. It's a grave consequence to be removed from the United States. Petitioner: And so our submission is not just the distinction between civil and criminal, although we think this Court's cases establish that there is -- that there is a difference. But the important points here, though, are immigration is distinctive. Immigration, this Court has repeatedly said, even though it may be regarded as a harsh result or -- or can have a serious impact on a person's life, it is not punishment for a past offense. It operates prospectively because Congress has determined that the individual's presence in the United States is no longer conducive to the safety or welfare of the country. Judge: Mr. Kneedler, does that permit arbitrary removal? Can the immigration officials walk down the street and say I just don't like the way you look; out? Petitioner: No. And -- and this brings me to -- Judge: But -- but let me get to that. So whether the distinction is criminal or civil, the issue for us, as I understand it under Johnson, is, is it arbitrary? Is it so arbitrary that under any standard, criminal or civil, this is vague? Now, I know you're saying it's not arbitrary for a bunch of different reasons. But please explain to me on the two grounds that Johnson used, ordinary case and type of risk, how this is not equally arbitrary.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>There are a number of -- a number of reasons why we -- why we think that's true. First of all, the Court said in Johnson it was the sum of the various attributes of the ACCA residual clause that created the problem. So whatever -- whatever might be the problem with -- with one of those, it was the combination of those. And those --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: James Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted under the California Penal Code for first-degree residential burglary; both convictions resulted in two years’ imprisonment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to deportation. The INA definition of aggravated felony includes a “crime of violence,” which is any offense that involves the use or substantial risk of physical force against another person or property.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Dimaya and claimed that his burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence under the Act. The Immigration Judge held that Dimaya was deportable and that burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it always involves a risk of physical violence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. While Dimaya’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the definition of a “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INA’s crime of violence provision was unconstitutionally vague because it was largely similar to the violent felony provision in the ACCA that the Supreme Court struck down in Johnson. The appellate court found that both provisions denied fair notice to defendants and failed to make clear when a risk of violence could be considered substantial. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 15-1498, Sessions versus Dimaya. Mr. Kneedler. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that this Court's decision in Johnson compelled the conclusion that the definition of crime of violence in the INA's broader definition of aggravated felony is unconstitutionally vague. That is so for two reasons. First, the standard for assessing vagueness in the immigration context is not the one that's applicable in criminal cases. Immigration removal is not a punishment for past conduct. It operates prospectively on the basis of the application of standards adopted by Congress under which an alien is regarded as no longer conducive to the safety and welfare. Judge: But Mr. Kneedler, if you're -- if you're making the distinction that Johnson was a criminal case and this is a civil case, this Court has had a number of decisions saying that line is not so rigid. For example, MLB, taking away parental rights, is a civil proceeding. And yet the Court said, as in a criminal proceeding, for an indigent party, the state must give the transcript free. And so, if you had followed a rigid criminal/civil, then if it's civil, no free transcript. Only if it's criminal. But the Court said the -- the line is blurred when there is such a grave consequence. It was a grave consequence to be denied parental rights. It's a grave consequence to be removed from the United States. Petitioner: And so our submission is not just the distinction between civil and criminal, although we think this Court's cases establish that there is -- that there is a difference. But the important points here, though, are immigration is distinctive. Immigration, this Court has repeatedly said, even though it may be regarded as a harsh result or -- or can have a serious impact on a person's life, it is not punishment for a past offense. It operates prospectively because Congress has determined that the individual's presence in the United States is no longer conducive to the safety or welfare of the country. Judge: Mr. Kneedler, does that permit arbitrary removal? Can the immigration officials walk down the street and say I just don't like the way you look; out? Petitioner: No. And -- and this brings me to -- Judge: But -- but let me get to that. So whether the distinction is criminal or civil, the issue for us, as I understand it under Johnson, is, is it arbitrary? Is it so arbitrary that under any standard, criminal or civil, this is vague? Now, I know you're saying it's not arbitrary for a bunch of different reasons. But please explain to me on the two grounds that Johnson used, ordinary case and type of risk, how this is not equally arbitrary. Petitioner: There are a number of -- a number of reasons why we -- why we think that's true. First of all, the Court said in Johnson it was the sum of the various attributes of the ACCA residual clause that created the problem. So whatever -- whatever might be the problem with -- with one of those, it was the combination of those. And those -- Judge: Well, I thought it was only two. The other things it mentioned were --<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>No, but, they -- they were -- they were critical attributes of the two. That's the -- that's the important point.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: James Garcia Dimaya, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1992. In 2007 and 2009, Dimaya was convicted under the California Penal Code for first-degree residential burglary; both convictions resulted in two years’ imprisonment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to deportation. The INA definition of aggravated felony includes a “crime of violence,” which is any offense that involves the use or substantial risk of physical force against another person or property.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Dimaya and claimed that his burglary convictions constituted crimes of violence under the Act. The Immigration Judge held that Dimaya was deportable and that burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it always involves a risk of physical violence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. While Dimaya’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, which held that the definition of a “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague. As a result, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the INA’s crime of violence provision was unconstitutionally vague because it was largely similar to the violent felony provision in the ACCA that the Supreme Court struck down in Johnson. The appellate court found that both provisions denied fair notice to defendants and failed to make clear when a risk of violence could be considered substantial. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 15-1498, Sessions versus Dimaya. Mr. Kneedler. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Ninth Circuit erred in holding that this Court's decision in Johnson compelled the conclusion that the definition of crime of violence in the INA's broader definition of aggravated felony is unconstitutionally vague. That is so for two reasons. First, the standard for assessing vagueness in the immigration context is not the one that's applicable in criminal cases. Immigration removal is not a punishment for past conduct. It operates prospectively on the basis of the application of standards adopted by Congress under which an alien is regarded as no longer conducive to the safety and welfare. Judge: But Mr. Kneedler, if you're -- if you're making the distinction that Johnson was a criminal case and this is a civil case, this Court has had a number of decisions saying that line is not so rigid. For example, MLB, taking away parental rights, is a civil proceeding. And yet the Court said, as in a criminal proceeding, for an indigent party, the state must give the transcript free. And so, if you had followed a rigid criminal/civil, then if it's civil, no free transcript. Only if it's criminal. But the Court said the -- the line is blurred when there is such a grave consequence. It was a grave consequence to be denied parental rights. It's a grave consequence to be removed from the United States. Petitioner: And so our submission is not just the distinction between civil and criminal, although we think this Court's cases establish that there is -- that there is a difference. But the important points here, though, are immigration is distinctive. Immigration, this Court has repeatedly said, even though it may be regarded as a harsh result or -- or can have a serious impact on a person's life, it is not punishment for a past offense. It operates prospectively because Congress has determined that the individual's presence in the United States is no longer conducive to the safety or welfare of the country. Judge: Mr. Kneedler, does that permit arbitrary removal? Can the immigration officials walk down the street and say I just don't like the way you look; out? Petitioner: No. And -- and this brings me to -- Judge: But -- but let me get to that. So whether the distinction is criminal or civil, the issue for us, as I understand it under Johnson, is, is it arbitrary? Is it so arbitrary that under any standard, criminal or civil, this is vague? Now, I know you're saying it's not arbitrary for a bunch of different reasons. But please explain to me on the two grounds that Johnson used, ordinary case and type of risk, how this is not equally arbitrary. Petitioner: There are a number of -- a number of reasons why we -- why we think that's true. First of all, the Court said in Johnson it was the sum of the various attributes of the ACCA residual clause that created the problem. So whatever -- whatever might be the problem with -- with one of those, it was the combination of those. And those -- Judge: Well, I thought it was only two. The other things it mentioned were -- Petitioner: No, but, they -- they were -- they were critical attributes of the two. That's the -- that's the important point. Judge: I mean -- I mean, what the Court said is -- I'm quoting -- "two features of the residual clause conspire to make it unconstitutionally vague." And then there's, you know, a clear holding sentence just a little bit later on in the opinion where it basically tells you exactly what two aspects it's talking about. It says, "by combining indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony. The residual clause produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause authorized tolerates." So, you know, it says, Number 1, ordinary case analysis. Number 2, combined with a fairly fuzzy standard as to the threshold level of risk. And those were the two factors. And I guess the question is, are those two factors any different here?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes, they're -- they're very different here. And as this Court's decision in Leocal demonstrates, it relied on the -- on the features that we believe are -- critically distinguished 16(b) from the ACCA residual clause.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Robert McCoy was arrested on May 9, 2008, for the first-degree murders of the son, mother, and step-father of his estranged wife in a May 5, 2008, shooting. On May 15, 2008, McCoy was found to be indigent and appointed a public defender. Throughout his representation by the public defender and his subsequent representation by retained counsel McCoy maintained his innocence and repeatedly stated his desire to plead not guilty. In December 2009, McCoy moved for his public defender to be removed due to his belief that the public defenders were doing nothing to assist him in proving his innocence. The court granted McCoy’s motion to represent himself until he could find substitute counsel. McCoy subsequently found new counsel to represent him, and his counsel advised him to take a plea. When McCoy refused to take a plea, his counsel notified him that he intended to concede guilt, after which time McCoy moved to discharge him. The court denied McCoy’s motion to discharge his attorney as untimely. His counsel proceeded to concede McCoy’s guilt and argued for verdicts of second-degree murder on a theory of diminished capacity. The jury returned a verdict of first-degree murder on all three counts and recommended the death penalty. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the convictions and the sentence, reasoning that defense counsel’s failure to follow McCoy’s direction not to concede guilt did not deny Mr. McCoy the assistance of counsel or create a conflict of interest because it did not completely abdicate the defense. Rather, the decision to concede guilt was a strategic choice by counsel. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 16-8255, McCoy versus Louisiana. Mr. Waxman.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When a defendant maintains his innocence and insists on testing the prosecution on its burden of proof, the Constitution prohibits a trial court from permitting the defendant's own lawyer, over the defendant's objection, to tell the jury that he is guilty. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a personal defense that belongs to the accused, and whether to admit or contest guilt is the paradigmatic example of that personal defense, not only because it singularly affects the life and liberty of the accused, but also because making that decision requires weighing subjective aspirations and value judgments that are unique to every individual. How --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Robert McCoy was arrested on May 9, 2008, for the first-degree murders of the son, mother, and step-father of his estranged wife in a May 5, 2008, shooting. On May 15, 2008, McCoy was found to be indigent and appointed a public defender. Throughout his representation by the public defender and his subsequent representation by retained counsel McCoy maintained his innocence and repeatedly stated his desire to plead not guilty. In December 2009, McCoy moved for his public defender to be removed due to his belief that the public defenders were doing nothing to assist him in proving his innocence. The court granted McCoy’s motion to represent himself until he could find substitute counsel. McCoy subsequently found new counsel to represent him, and his counsel advised him to take a plea. When McCoy refused to take a plea, his counsel notified him that he intended to concede guilt, after which time McCoy moved to discharge him. The court denied McCoy’s motion to discharge his attorney as untimely. His counsel proceeded to concede McCoy’s guilt and argued for verdicts of second-degree murder on a theory of diminished capacity. The jury returned a verdict of first-degree murder on all three counts and recommended the death penalty. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the convictions and the sentence, reasoning that defense counsel’s failure to follow McCoy’s direction not to concede guilt did not deny Mr. McCoy the assistance of counsel or create a conflict of interest because it did not completely abdicate the defense. Rather, the decision to concede guilt was a strategic choice by counsel. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 16-8255, McCoy versus Louisiana. Mr. Waxman. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When a defendant maintains his innocence and insists on testing the prosecution on its burden of proof, the Constitution prohibits a trial court from permitting the defendant's own lawyer, over the defendant's objection, to tell the jury that he is guilty. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a personal defense that belongs to the accused, and whether to admit or contest guilt is the paradigmatic example of that personal defense, not only because it singularly affects the life and liberty of the accused, but also because making that decision requires weighing subjective aspirations and value judgments that are unique to every individual. How -- Judge: Suppose the -- the charge is murder and -- and the lawyer says: Based on what I've looked -- I think your best case is self-defense, you know. And -- and the other guy's -- the defendant says: No, I didn't shoot the person. And the lawyer says: Well, I think the evidence is going to show that you did, self-defense. If the lawyer goes ahead and presents that defense, is -- does that fall under your theory?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, I think your question raises a question both of what defense counsel may constitutionally do and also what defense counsel may not constitutionally do. I'll also note first that your hypothetical, in dramatic contrast to this case, involves, at a minimum, the shared objective of obtaining a -- an acquittal on the charged crimes. But, in addition, our position is that the one thing that counsel in that case and in no case may do is -- this isn't about what counsel can argue. It's not about what evidence can be introduced. It's that counsel may not stand up and affirmatively vouch, admit that his client is guilty.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Robert McCoy was arrested on May 9, 2008, for the first-degree murders of the son, mother, and step-father of his estranged wife in a May 5, 2008, shooting. On May 15, 2008, McCoy was found to be indigent and appointed a public defender. Throughout his representation by the public defender and his subsequent representation by retained counsel McCoy maintained his innocence and repeatedly stated his desire to plead not guilty. In December 2009, McCoy moved for his public defender to be removed due to his belief that the public defenders were doing nothing to assist him in proving his innocence. The court granted McCoy’s motion to represent himself until he could find substitute counsel. McCoy subsequently found new counsel to represent him, and his counsel advised him to take a plea. When McCoy refused to take a plea, his counsel notified him that he intended to concede guilt, after which time McCoy moved to discharge him. The court denied McCoy’s motion to discharge his attorney as untimely. His counsel proceeded to concede McCoy’s guilt and argued for verdicts of second-degree murder on a theory of diminished capacity. The jury returned a verdict of first-degree murder on all three counts and recommended the death penalty. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the convictions and the sentence, reasoning that defense counsel’s failure to follow McCoy’s direction not to concede guilt did not deny Mr. McCoy the assistance of counsel or create a conflict of interest because it did not completely abdicate the defense. Rather, the decision to concede guilt was a strategic choice by counsel. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 16-8255, McCoy versus Louisiana. Mr. Waxman. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When a defendant maintains his innocence and insists on testing the prosecution on its burden of proof, the Constitution prohibits a trial court from permitting the defendant's own lawyer, over the defendant's objection, to tell the jury that he is guilty. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a personal defense that belongs to the accused, and whether to admit or contest guilt is the paradigmatic example of that personal defense, not only because it singularly affects the life and liberty of the accused, but also because making that decision requires weighing subjective aspirations and value judgments that are unique to every individual. How -- Judge: Suppose the -- the charge is murder and -- and the lawyer says: Based on what I've looked -- I think your best case is self-defense, you know. And -- and the other guy's -- the defendant says: No, I didn't shoot the person. And the lawyer says: Well, I think the evidence is going to show that you did, self-defense. If the lawyer goes ahead and presents that defense, is -- does that fall under your theory? Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, I think your question raises a question both of what defense counsel may constitutionally do and also what defense counsel may not constitutionally do. I'll also note first that your hypothetical, in dramatic contrast to this case, involves, at a minimum, the shared objective of obtaining a -- an acquittal on the charged crimes. But, in addition, our position is that the one thing that counsel in that case and in no case may do is -- this isn't about what counsel can argue. It's not about what evidence can be introduced. It's that counsel may not stand up and affirmatively vouch, admit that his client is guilty. Judge: That was --<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Now, your example --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Robert McCoy was arrested on May 9, 2008, for the first-degree murders of the son, mother, and step-father of his estranged wife in a May 5, 2008, shooting. On May 15, 2008, McCoy was found to be indigent and appointed a public defender. Throughout his representation by the public defender and his subsequent representation by retained counsel McCoy maintained his innocence and repeatedly stated his desire to plead not guilty. In December 2009, McCoy moved for his public defender to be removed due to his belief that the public defenders were doing nothing to assist him in proving his innocence. The court granted McCoy’s motion to represent himself until he could find substitute counsel. McCoy subsequently found new counsel to represent him, and his counsel advised him to take a plea. When McCoy refused to take a plea, his counsel notified him that he intended to concede guilt, after which time McCoy moved to discharge him. The court denied McCoy’s motion to discharge his attorney as untimely. His counsel proceeded to concede McCoy’s guilt and argued for verdicts of second-degree murder on a theory of diminished capacity. The jury returned a verdict of first-degree murder on all three counts and recommended the death penalty. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the convictions and the sentence, reasoning that defense counsel’s failure to follow McCoy’s direction not to concede guilt did not deny Mr. McCoy the assistance of counsel or create a conflict of interest because it did not completely abdicate the defense. Rather, the decision to concede guilt was a strategic choice by counsel. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 16-8255, McCoy versus Louisiana. Mr. Waxman. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When a defendant maintains his innocence and insists on testing the prosecution on its burden of proof, the Constitution prohibits a trial court from permitting the defendant's own lawyer, over the defendant's objection, to tell the jury that he is guilty. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a personal defense that belongs to the accused, and whether to admit or contest guilt is the paradigmatic example of that personal defense, not only because it singularly affects the life and liberty of the accused, but also because making that decision requires weighing subjective aspirations and value judgments that are unique to every individual. How -- Judge: Suppose the -- the charge is murder and -- and the lawyer says: Based on what I've looked -- I think your best case is self-defense, you know. And -- and the other guy's -- the defendant says: No, I didn't shoot the person. And the lawyer says: Well, I think the evidence is going to show that you did, self-defense. If the lawyer goes ahead and presents that defense, is -- does that fall under your theory? Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, I think your question raises a question both of what defense counsel may constitutionally do and also what defense counsel may not constitutionally do. I'll also note first that your hypothetical, in dramatic contrast to this case, involves, at a minimum, the shared objective of obtaining a -- an acquittal on the charged crimes. But, in addition, our position is that the one thing that counsel in that case and in no case may do is -- this isn't about what counsel can argue. It's not about what evidence can be introduced. It's that counsel may not stand up and affirmatively vouch, admit that his client is guilty. Judge: That was -- Petitioner: Now, your example -- Judge: -- a big --<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Yes.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Robert McCoy was arrested on May 9, 2008, for the first-degree murders of the son, mother, and step-father of his estranged wife in a May 5, 2008, shooting. On May 15, 2008, McCoy was found to be indigent and appointed a public defender. Throughout his representation by the public defender and his subsequent representation by retained counsel McCoy maintained his innocence and repeatedly stated his desire to plead not guilty. In December 2009, McCoy moved for his public defender to be removed due to his belief that the public defenders were doing nothing to assist him in proving his innocence. The court granted McCoy’s motion to represent himself until he could find substitute counsel. McCoy subsequently found new counsel to represent him, and his counsel advised him to take a plea. When McCoy refused to take a plea, his counsel notified him that he intended to concede guilt, after which time McCoy moved to discharge him. The court denied McCoy’s motion to discharge his attorney as untimely. His counsel proceeded to concede McCoy’s guilt and argued for verdicts of second-degree murder on a theory of diminished capacity. The jury returned a verdict of first-degree murder on all three counts and recommended the death penalty. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the convictions and the sentence, reasoning that defense counsel’s failure to follow McCoy’s direction not to concede guilt did not deny Mr. McCoy the assistance of counsel or create a conflict of interest because it did not completely abdicate the defense. Rather, the decision to concede guilt was a strategic choice by counsel. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 16-8255, McCoy versus Louisiana. Mr. Waxman. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When a defendant maintains his innocence and insists on testing the prosecution on its burden of proof, the Constitution prohibits a trial court from permitting the defendant's own lawyer, over the defendant's objection, to tell the jury that he is guilty. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a personal defense that belongs to the accused, and whether to admit or contest guilt is the paradigmatic example of that personal defense, not only because it singularly affects the life and liberty of the accused, but also because making that decision requires weighing subjective aspirations and value judgments that are unique to every individual. How -- Judge: Suppose the -- the charge is murder and -- and the lawyer says: Based on what I've looked -- I think your best case is self-defense, you know. And -- and the other guy's -- the defendant says: No, I didn't shoot the person. And the lawyer says: Well, I think the evidence is going to show that you did, self-defense. If the lawyer goes ahead and presents that defense, is -- does that fall under your theory? Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, I think your question raises a question both of what defense counsel may constitutionally do and also what defense counsel may not constitutionally do. I'll also note first that your hypothetical, in dramatic contrast to this case, involves, at a minimum, the shared objective of obtaining a -- an acquittal on the charged crimes. But, in addition, our position is that the one thing that counsel in that case and in no case may do is -- this isn't about what counsel can argue. It's not about what evidence can be introduced. It's that counsel may not stand up and affirmatively vouch, admit that his client is guilty. Judge: That was -- Petitioner: Now, your example -- Judge: -- a big -- Petitioner: Yes. Judge: -- that was a big wind-up with the --<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>That's a --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: Robert McCoy was arrested on May 9, 2008, for the first-degree murders of the son, mother, and step-father of his estranged wife in a May 5, 2008, shooting. On May 15, 2008, McCoy was found to be indigent and appointed a public defender. Throughout his representation by the public defender and his subsequent representation by retained counsel McCoy maintained his innocence and repeatedly stated his desire to plead not guilty. In December 2009, McCoy moved for his public defender to be removed due to his belief that the public defenders were doing nothing to assist him in proving his innocence. The court granted McCoy’s motion to represent himself until he could find substitute counsel. McCoy subsequently found new counsel to represent him, and his counsel advised him to take a plea. When McCoy refused to take a plea, his counsel notified him that he intended to concede guilt, after which time McCoy moved to discharge him. The court denied McCoy’s motion to discharge his attorney as untimely. His counsel proceeded to concede McCoy’s guilt and argued for verdicts of second-degree murder on a theory of diminished capacity. The jury returned a verdict of first-degree murder on all three counts and recommended the death penalty. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the convictions and the sentence, reasoning that defense counsel’s failure to follow McCoy’s direction not to concede guilt did not deny Mr. McCoy the assistance of counsel or create a conflict of interest because it did not completely abdicate the defense. Rather, the decision to concede guilt was a strategic choice by counsel. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 16-8255, McCoy versus Louisiana. Mr. Waxman. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: When a defendant maintains his innocence and insists on testing the prosecution on its burden of proof, the Constitution prohibits a trial court from permitting the defendant's own lawyer, over the defendant's objection, to tell the jury that he is guilty. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a personal defense that belongs to the accused, and whether to admit or contest guilt is the paradigmatic example of that personal defense, not only because it singularly affects the life and liberty of the accused, but also because making that decision requires weighing subjective aspirations and value judgments that are unique to every individual. How -- Judge: Suppose the -- the charge is murder and -- and the lawyer says: Based on what I've looked -- I think your best case is self-defense, you know. And -- and the other guy's -- the defendant says: No, I didn't shoot the person. And the lawyer says: Well, I think the evidence is going to show that you did, self-defense. If the lawyer goes ahead and presents that defense, is -- does that fall under your theory? Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, I think your question raises a question both of what defense counsel may constitutionally do and also what defense counsel may not constitutionally do. I'll also note first that your hypothetical, in dramatic contrast to this case, involves, at a minimum, the shared objective of obtaining a -- an acquittal on the charged crimes. But, in addition, our position is that the one thing that counsel in that case and in no case may do is -- this isn't about what counsel can argue. It's not about what evidence can be introduced. It's that counsel may not stand up and affirmatively vouch, admit that his client is guilty. Judge: That was -- Petitioner: Now, your example -- Judge: -- a big -- Petitioner: Yes. Judge: -- that was a big wind-up with the -- Petitioner: That's a -- Judge: But my particular question is obviously, when you say simply that my client shot the guy, that doesn't mean he's guilty. If he did it in self-defense, he's not guilty. And then the defense is it was self-defense. So --<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>That's right. So recognizing that that is not this case, our position is -- and I think the framers utterly would agree -- that if a defendant stands up and says, look, I did not shoot that guy, as Mr. McCoy said, I did not kill my own family members and I do not want my lawyer standing up and telling the jury that I did --<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A Massachusetts federal district court convicted Martin O'Brien and Arthur Burgess of attempted robbery and related weapons crimes. One of the weapons used by the defendants was an AK-47 assault rifle. At a pre-trial conference, the district court ruled that the nature of the weapon (i.e. semi-automatic, automatic, etc.) was an element of the crime and, thus, a matter for the jury to decide. After sentencing, the government appealed, arguing that the nature of the weapon was a sentencing element, and, thus a matter for the judge to decide. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, holding that under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) the nature of the weapon is an element of the crime that must be decided by the jury "beyond a reasonable doubt." Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 08-1569, United States v. O'Brien. Mr. Horwich.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Section 924(c)(1) starts by defining a single crime of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime. Next, it addresses sentencing, and it does that by giving the judge some rules to channel his discretion in particular cases, and among those is a requirement that a, quote, "person convicted of a violation". "shall be sentenced" to a greater minimum sentence when the firearm is of a particular type. And--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A Massachusetts federal district court convicted Martin O'Brien and Arthur Burgess of attempted robbery and related weapons crimes. One of the weapons used by the defendants was an AK-47 assault rifle. At a pre-trial conference, the district court ruled that the nature of the weapon (i.e. semi-automatic, automatic, etc.) was an element of the crime and, thus, a matter for the jury to decide. After sentencing, the government appealed, arguing that the nature of the weapon was a sentencing element, and, thus a matter for the judge to decide. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, holding that under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) the nature of the weapon is an element of the crime that must be decided by the jury "beyond a reasonable doubt." Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 08-1569, United States v. O'Brien. Mr. Horwich. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Section 924(c)(1) starts by defining a single crime of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime. Next, it addresses sentencing, and it does that by giving the judge some rules to channel his discretion in particular cases, and among those is a requirement that a, quote, "person convicted of a violation". "shall be sentenced" to a greater minimum sentence when the firearm is of a particular type. And-- Judge: Well wait. There's -- there's some sentencing stuff in -- in the first part as well. There's sentencing stuff in (A). You can't say that (A) deals only with elements and (B) deals with sentencing.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, no, and, of course--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A Massachusetts federal district court convicted Martin O'Brien and Arthur Burgess of attempted robbery and related weapons crimes. One of the weapons used by the defendants was an AK-47 assault rifle. At a pre-trial conference, the district court ruled that the nature of the weapon (i.e. semi-automatic, automatic, etc.) was an element of the crime and, thus, a matter for the jury to decide. After sentencing, the government appealed, arguing that the nature of the weapon was a sentencing element, and, thus a matter for the judge to decide. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, holding that under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) the nature of the weapon is an element of the crime that must be decided by the jury "beyond a reasonable doubt." Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 08-1569, United States v. O'Brien. Mr. Horwich. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Section 924(c)(1) starts by defining a single crime of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime. Next, it addresses sentencing, and it does that by giving the judge some rules to channel his discretion in particular cases, and among those is a requirement that a, quote, "person convicted of a violation". "shall be sentenced" to a greater minimum sentence when the firearm is of a particular type. And-- Judge: Well wait. There's -- there's some sentencing stuff in -- in the first part as well. There's sentencing stuff in (A). You can't say that (A) deals only with elements and (B) deals with sentencing. Petitioner: --Well, no, and, of course-- Judge: I mean, (A) says, "shall be sentenced to 5 years. " Or to 7 years, or to 10 years. So there's sentencing stuff in (A).<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, I agree with you that the phrase (A) as well. To the extent a statute is going to direct a particular sentence, it's going to use those words. But I think the -- we're relying a lot more on the language in the beginning of subparagraph (B), that says, "if the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation. " which necessarily presupposes, then, that there has been a conviction--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A Massachusetts federal district court convicted Martin O'Brien and Arthur Burgess of attempted robbery and related weapons crimes. One of the weapons used by the defendants was an AK-47 assault rifle. At a pre-trial conference, the district court ruled that the nature of the weapon (i.e. semi-automatic, automatic, etc.) was an element of the crime and, thus, a matter for the jury to decide. After sentencing, the government appealed, arguing that the nature of the weapon was a sentencing element, and, thus a matter for the judge to decide. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, holding that under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) the nature of the weapon is an element of the crime that must be decided by the jury "beyond a reasonable doubt." Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 08-1569, United States v. O'Brien. Mr. Horwich. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Section 924(c)(1) starts by defining a single crime of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime. Next, it addresses sentencing, and it does that by giving the judge some rules to channel his discretion in particular cases, and among those is a requirement that a, quote, "person convicted of a violation". "shall be sentenced" to a greater minimum sentence when the firearm is of a particular type. And-- Judge: Well wait. There's -- there's some sentencing stuff in -- in the first part as well. There's sentencing stuff in (A). You can't say that (A) deals only with elements and (B) deals with sentencing. Petitioner: --Well, no, and, of course-- Judge: I mean, (A) says, "shall be sentenced to 5 years. " Or to 7 years, or to 10 years. So there's sentencing stuff in (A). Petitioner: --Well, I agree with you that the phrase (A) as well. To the extent a statute is going to direct a particular sentence, it's going to use those words. But I think the -- we're relying a lot more on the language in the beginning of subparagraph (B), that says, "if the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation. " which necessarily presupposes, then, that there has been a conviction-- Judge: So does -- so does the language of (A)(ii) and (A)(iii), which is the same language: "if the firearm is brandished"; "if the firearm is discharged" -- they all apply to a conviction for carrying the firearm. There has to be a conviction before those things apply.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, I agree. That's true. That is certainly an accurate statement--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A Massachusetts federal district court convicted Martin O'Brien and Arthur Burgess of attempted robbery and related weapons crimes. One of the weapons used by the defendants was an AK-47 assault rifle. At a pre-trial conference, the district court ruled that the nature of the weapon (i.e. semi-automatic, automatic, etc.) was an element of the crime and, thus, a matter for the jury to decide. After sentencing, the government appealed, arguing that the nature of the weapon was a sentencing element, and, thus a matter for the judge to decide. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, holding that under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) the nature of the weapon is an element of the crime that must be decided by the jury "beyond a reasonable doubt." Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 08-1569, United States v. O'Brien. Mr. Horwich. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Section 924(c)(1) starts by defining a single crime of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime. Next, it addresses sentencing, and it does that by giving the judge some rules to channel his discretion in particular cases, and among those is a requirement that a, quote, "person convicted of a violation". "shall be sentenced" to a greater minimum sentence when the firearm is of a particular type. And-- Judge: Well wait. There's -- there's some sentencing stuff in -- in the first part as well. There's sentencing stuff in (A). You can't say that (A) deals only with elements and (B) deals with sentencing. Petitioner: --Well, no, and, of course-- Judge: I mean, (A) says, "shall be sentenced to 5 years. " Or to 7 years, or to 10 years. So there's sentencing stuff in (A). Petitioner: --Well, I agree with you that the phrase (A) as well. To the extent a statute is going to direct a particular sentence, it's going to use those words. But I think the -- we're relying a lot more on the language in the beginning of subparagraph (B), that says, "if the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation. " which necessarily presupposes, then, that there has been a conviction-- Judge: So does -- so does the language of (A)(ii) and (A)(iii), which is the same language: "if the firearm is brandished"; "if the firearm is discharged" -- they all apply to a conviction for carrying the firearm. There has to be a conviction before those things apply. Petitioner: --Well, I agree. That's true. That is certainly an accurate statement-- Judge: So that makes (A) the same as (B). And -- and you don't claim that the elements in (A) are just sentencing elements, do you?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, I certainly don't claim that they -- that the elements in the principal paragraph of (A) are. The point I'm -- the point I'm trying to make is that, with respect to firearm type, which is at issue here, is that the firearm type provisions are introduced by specific language that says -- that tells the reader these are relevant to a person convicted of a violation; these are not relevant to whether--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: A Massachusetts federal district court convicted Martin O'Brien and Arthur Burgess of attempted robbery and related weapons crimes. One of the weapons used by the defendants was an AK-47 assault rifle. At a pre-trial conference, the district court ruled that the nature of the weapon (i.e. semi-automatic, automatic, etc.) was an element of the crime and, thus, a matter for the jury to decide. After sentencing, the government appealed, arguing that the nature of the weapon was a sentencing element, and, thus a matter for the judge to decide. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, holding that under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) the nature of the weapon is an element of the crime that must be decided by the jury "beyond a reasonable doubt." Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 08-1569, United States v. O'Brien. Mr. Horwich. Petitioner: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Section 924(c)(1) starts by defining a single crime of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime. Next, it addresses sentencing, and it does that by giving the judge some rules to channel his discretion in particular cases, and among those is a requirement that a, quote, "person convicted of a violation". "shall be sentenced" to a greater minimum sentence when the firearm is of a particular type. And-- Judge: Well wait. There's -- there's some sentencing stuff in -- in the first part as well. There's sentencing stuff in (A). You can't say that (A) deals only with elements and (B) deals with sentencing. Petitioner: --Well, no, and, of course-- Judge: I mean, (A) says, "shall be sentenced to 5 years. " Or to 7 years, or to 10 years. So there's sentencing stuff in (A). Petitioner: --Well, I agree with you that the phrase (A) as well. To the extent a statute is going to direct a particular sentence, it's going to use those words. But I think the -- we're relying a lot more on the language in the beginning of subparagraph (B), that says, "if the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation. " which necessarily presupposes, then, that there has been a conviction-- Judge: So does -- so does the language of (A)(ii) and (A)(iii), which is the same language: "if the firearm is brandished"; "if the firearm is discharged" -- they all apply to a conviction for carrying the firearm. There has to be a conviction before those things apply. Petitioner: --Well, I agree. That's true. That is certainly an accurate statement-- Judge: So that makes (A) the same as (B). And -- and you don't claim that the elements in (A) are just sentencing elements, do you? Petitioner: --Well, I certainly don't claim that they -- that the elements in the principal paragraph of (A) are. The point I'm -- the point I'm trying to make is that, with respect to firearm type, which is at issue here, is that the firearm type provisions are introduced by specific language that says -- that tells the reader these are relevant to a person convicted of a violation; these are not relevant to whether-- Judge: No, but you're forgetting the words of this subsection. I mean--<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1992, Houston police officers found two homicide victims. The investigation led officers to Genovevo Salinas. Salinas agreed to accompany the officers to the police station where he was questioned for about one hour. Salinas was not under arrest at this time and had not been read his Miranda rights. Salinas answered every question until an officer asked whether the shotgun shells found at the scene of the crime would match the gun found in Salinas' home. According to the officer, Salinas remained silent and demonstrated signs of deception. A ballistics analysis later matched Salinas' gun with the casings at the scene. Police also found a witness who said Salinas admitted to killing the victims. In 1993, Salinas was charged with the murders, but could not be located. 15 years later, Salinas was finally captured. The first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of Salinas' silence about the gun casings. Salinas objected, arguing that he could invoke his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination whether he was in custody or not. The trial court admitted the evidence and Salinas was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison and a $5,000 fine. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Harris County, Texas affirmed, noting that the courts that have addressed this issue are divided. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 12-246, Salinas v. Texas. Mr. Fisher.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fifth Amendment prohibits using a person's silence during a noncustodial police interview against him at trial, and nothing about the specific facts of this case give this Court cause to refrain from applying that rule here. To the contrary, the State's closing argument in this case urging the jury to find Mr. Salinas guilty because, quote, "an innocent person would have denied law enforcement's accusations. " strikes at the core of everything the Griffin rule, and indeed the Fifth Amendment, is designed to prohibit. It evokes an inquisitorial system of justice. It effectively shifts the burden of proof onto the defendant, and it demeans individual dignity by conscripting the defendant as a product of his own demise. Now, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals resisted this logic and held the Fifth Amendment didn't apply, because there was supposedly no compulsion in this case in the sense that there was no physical or psychological coercion of the kind that's inherent in custody. But the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals simply misunderstood the nature of a Griffin claim and the nature of the compulsion. The compulsion that Mr. Salinas faced was when the police asked him the question about ballistics evidence, there was nothing he could do to avoid supplying the State with incriminating evidence that it could use against him. If he answered the question--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1992, Houston police officers found two homicide victims. The investigation led officers to Genovevo Salinas. Salinas agreed to accompany the officers to the police station where he was questioned for about one hour. Salinas was not under arrest at this time and had not been read his Miranda rights. Salinas answered every question until an officer asked whether the shotgun shells found at the scene of the crime would match the gun found in Salinas' home. According to the officer, Salinas remained silent and demonstrated signs of deception. A ballistics analysis later matched Salinas' gun with the casings at the scene. Police also found a witness who said Salinas admitted to killing the victims. In 1993, Salinas was charged with the murders, but could not be located. 15 years later, Salinas was finally captured. The first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of Salinas' silence about the gun casings. Salinas objected, arguing that he could invoke his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination whether he was in custody or not. The trial court admitted the evidence and Salinas was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison and a $5,000 fine. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Harris County, Texas affirmed, noting that the courts that have addressed this issue are divided. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 12-246, Salinas v. Texas. Mr. Fisher. Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fifth Amendment prohibits using a person's silence during a noncustodial police interview against him at trial, and nothing about the specific facts of this case give this Court cause to refrain from applying that rule here. To the contrary, the State's closing argument in this case urging the jury to find Mr. Salinas guilty because, quote, "an innocent person would have denied law enforcement's accusations. " strikes at the core of everything the Griffin rule, and indeed the Fifth Amendment, is designed to prohibit. It evokes an inquisitorial system of justice. It effectively shifts the burden of proof onto the defendant, and it demeans individual dignity by conscripting the defendant as a product of his own demise. Now, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals resisted this logic and held the Fifth Amendment didn't apply, because there was supposedly no compulsion in this case in the sense that there was no physical or psychological coercion of the kind that's inherent in custody. But the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals simply misunderstood the nature of a Griffin claim and the nature of the compulsion. The compulsion that Mr. Salinas faced was when the police asked him the question about ballistics evidence, there was nothing he could do to avoid supplying the State with incriminating evidence that it could use against him. If he answered the question-- Judge: Why isn't it -- why isn't it like the Berg -- is it Berghuis case? There was a case of someone who was given Miranda warnings and even so, the Court said he was silent. He didn't invoke the Fifth Amendment, therefore, his silence can be commented on.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--No, that's not the holding of the Berghuis case, with all due respect. The Berghuis case was about whether his subsequent statements could be used against him. This Court didn't hold that his silence that preceded those statements could be used against him, and indeed, that would be contrary to Miranda itself in footnote 37 where the Court said, if somebody stands mute in a custodial setting in the face of law enforcement accusations, they may not be--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1992, Houston police officers found two homicide victims. The investigation led officers to Genovevo Salinas. Salinas agreed to accompany the officers to the police station where he was questioned for about one hour. Salinas was not under arrest at this time and had not been read his Miranda rights. Salinas answered every question until an officer asked whether the shotgun shells found at the scene of the crime would match the gun found in Salinas' home. According to the officer, Salinas remained silent and demonstrated signs of deception. A ballistics analysis later matched Salinas' gun with the casings at the scene. Police also found a witness who said Salinas admitted to killing the victims. In 1993, Salinas was charged with the murders, but could not be located. 15 years later, Salinas was finally captured. The first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of Salinas' silence about the gun casings. Salinas objected, arguing that he could invoke his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination whether he was in custody or not. The trial court admitted the evidence and Salinas was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison and a $5,000 fine. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Harris County, Texas affirmed, noting that the courts that have addressed this issue are divided. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 12-246, Salinas v. Texas. Mr. Fisher. Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fifth Amendment prohibits using a person's silence during a noncustodial police interview against him at trial, and nothing about the specific facts of this case give this Court cause to refrain from applying that rule here. To the contrary, the State's closing argument in this case urging the jury to find Mr. Salinas guilty because, quote, "an innocent person would have denied law enforcement's accusations. " strikes at the core of everything the Griffin rule, and indeed the Fifth Amendment, is designed to prohibit. It evokes an inquisitorial system of justice. It effectively shifts the burden of proof onto the defendant, and it demeans individual dignity by conscripting the defendant as a product of his own demise. Now, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals resisted this logic and held the Fifth Amendment didn't apply, because there was supposedly no compulsion in this case in the sense that there was no physical or psychological coercion of the kind that's inherent in custody. But the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals simply misunderstood the nature of a Griffin claim and the nature of the compulsion. The compulsion that Mr. Salinas faced was when the police asked him the question about ballistics evidence, there was nothing he could do to avoid supplying the State with incriminating evidence that it could use against him. If he answered the question-- Judge: Why isn't it -- why isn't it like the Berg -- is it Berghuis case? There was a case of someone who was given Miranda warnings and even so, the Court said he was silent. He didn't invoke the Fifth Amendment, therefore, his silence can be commented on. Petitioner: --No, that's not the holding of the Berghuis case, with all due respect. The Berghuis case was about whether his subsequent statements could be used against him. This Court didn't hold that his silence that preceded those statements could be used against him, and indeed, that would be contrary to Miranda itself in footnote 37 where the Court said, if somebody stands mute in a custodial setting in the face of law enforcement accusations, they may not be-- Judge: Then what's the law? What is. I mean, Joe Smith leaves a -- a blank in part of his tax return. The IRS gets it, later it turns out to be relevant, and the prosecutor wants to say, hey, he left this blank. Okay? Now, Griffin doesn't apply, right?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--If the--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1992, Houston police officers found two homicide victims. The investigation led officers to Genovevo Salinas. Salinas agreed to accompany the officers to the police station where he was questioned for about one hour. Salinas was not under arrest at this time and had not been read his Miranda rights. Salinas answered every question until an officer asked whether the shotgun shells found at the scene of the crime would match the gun found in Salinas' home. According to the officer, Salinas remained silent and demonstrated signs of deception. A ballistics analysis later matched Salinas' gun with the casings at the scene. Police also found a witness who said Salinas admitted to killing the victims. In 1993, Salinas was charged with the murders, but could not be located. 15 years later, Salinas was finally captured. The first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of Salinas' silence about the gun casings. Salinas objected, arguing that he could invoke his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination whether he was in custody or not. The trial court admitted the evidence and Salinas was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison and a $5,000 fine. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Harris County, Texas affirmed, noting that the courts that have addressed this issue are divided. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 12-246, Salinas v. Texas. Mr. Fisher. Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fifth Amendment prohibits using a person's silence during a noncustodial police interview against him at trial, and nothing about the specific facts of this case give this Court cause to refrain from applying that rule here. To the contrary, the State's closing argument in this case urging the jury to find Mr. Salinas guilty because, quote, "an innocent person would have denied law enforcement's accusations. " strikes at the core of everything the Griffin rule, and indeed the Fifth Amendment, is designed to prohibit. It evokes an inquisitorial system of justice. It effectively shifts the burden of proof onto the defendant, and it demeans individual dignity by conscripting the defendant as a product of his own demise. Now, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals resisted this logic and held the Fifth Amendment didn't apply, because there was supposedly no compulsion in this case in the sense that there was no physical or psychological coercion of the kind that's inherent in custody. But the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals simply misunderstood the nature of a Griffin claim and the nature of the compulsion. The compulsion that Mr. Salinas faced was when the police asked him the question about ballistics evidence, there was nothing he could do to avoid supplying the State with incriminating evidence that it could use against him. If he answered the question-- Judge: Why isn't it -- why isn't it like the Berg -- is it Berghuis case? There was a case of someone who was given Miranda warnings and even so, the Court said he was silent. He didn't invoke the Fifth Amendment, therefore, his silence can be commented on. Petitioner: --No, that's not the holding of the Berghuis case, with all due respect. The Berghuis case was about whether his subsequent statements could be used against him. This Court didn't hold that his silence that preceded those statements could be used against him, and indeed, that would be contrary to Miranda itself in footnote 37 where the Court said, if somebody stands mute in a custodial setting in the face of law enforcement accusations, they may not be-- Judge: Then what's the law? What is. I mean, Joe Smith leaves a -- a blank in part of his tax return. The IRS gets it, later it turns out to be relevant, and the prosecutor wants to say, hey, he left this blank. Okay? Now, Griffin doesn't apply, right? Petitioner: --If the-- Judge: I mean, isn't it -- you're not going to say that any -- any time you refuse to tell the government anything, and later on it turns out to be relevant to a criminal prosecution, that that's taken as an invocation of the Fifth Amendment. I mean, do you want to go that far?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--No, I don't need to.<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1992, Houston police officers found two homicide victims. The investigation led officers to Genovevo Salinas. Salinas agreed to accompany the officers to the police station where he was questioned for about one hour. Salinas was not under arrest at this time and had not been read his Miranda rights. Salinas answered every question until an officer asked whether the shotgun shells found at the scene of the crime would match the gun found in Salinas' home. According to the officer, Salinas remained silent and demonstrated signs of deception. A ballistics analysis later matched Salinas' gun with the casings at the scene. Police also found a witness who said Salinas admitted to killing the victims. In 1993, Salinas was charged with the murders, but could not be located. 15 years later, Salinas was finally captured. The first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of Salinas' silence about the gun casings. Salinas objected, arguing that he could invoke his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination whether he was in custody or not. The trial court admitted the evidence and Salinas was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison and a $5,000 fine. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Harris County, Texas affirmed, noting that the courts that have addressed this issue are divided. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 12-246, Salinas v. Texas. Mr. Fisher. Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fifth Amendment prohibits using a person's silence during a noncustodial police interview against him at trial, and nothing about the specific facts of this case give this Court cause to refrain from applying that rule here. To the contrary, the State's closing argument in this case urging the jury to find Mr. Salinas guilty because, quote, "an innocent person would have denied law enforcement's accusations. " strikes at the core of everything the Griffin rule, and indeed the Fifth Amendment, is designed to prohibit. It evokes an inquisitorial system of justice. It effectively shifts the burden of proof onto the defendant, and it demeans individual dignity by conscripting the defendant as a product of his own demise. Now, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals resisted this logic and held the Fifth Amendment didn't apply, because there was supposedly no compulsion in this case in the sense that there was no physical or psychological coercion of the kind that's inherent in custody. But the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals simply misunderstood the nature of a Griffin claim and the nature of the compulsion. The compulsion that Mr. Salinas faced was when the police asked him the question about ballistics evidence, there was nothing he could do to avoid supplying the State with incriminating evidence that it could use against him. If he answered the question-- Judge: Why isn't it -- why isn't it like the Berg -- is it Berghuis case? There was a case of someone who was given Miranda warnings and even so, the Court said he was silent. He didn't invoke the Fifth Amendment, therefore, his silence can be commented on. Petitioner: --No, that's not the holding of the Berghuis case, with all due respect. The Berghuis case was about whether his subsequent statements could be used against him. This Court didn't hold that his silence that preceded those statements could be used against him, and indeed, that would be contrary to Miranda itself in footnote 37 where the Court said, if somebody stands mute in a custodial setting in the face of law enforcement accusations, they may not be-- Judge: Then what's the law? What is. I mean, Joe Smith leaves a -- a blank in part of his tax return. The IRS gets it, later it turns out to be relevant, and the prosecutor wants to say, hey, he left this blank. Okay? Now, Griffin doesn't apply, right? Petitioner: --If the-- Judge: I mean, isn't it -- you're not going to say that any -- any time you refuse to tell the government anything, and later on it turns out to be relevant to a criminal prosecution, that that's taken as an invocation of the Fifth Amendment. I mean, do you want to go that far? Petitioner: --No, I don't need to. Judge: Okay. Then you need a line.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>This case is--<|eot_id|>

<|begin_of_text|><|start_header_id|>system<|end_header_id|>Based on the provided fact and preceding judge dialogue, generate the petitioner's response.<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>user<|end_header_id|>Fact: In 1992, Houston police officers found two homicide victims. The investigation led officers to Genovevo Salinas. Salinas agreed to accompany the officers to the police station where he was questioned for about one hour. Salinas was not under arrest at this time and had not been read his Miranda rights. Salinas answered every question until an officer asked whether the shotgun shells found at the scene of the crime would match the gun found in Salinas' home. According to the officer, Salinas remained silent and demonstrated signs of deception. A ballistics analysis later matched Salinas' gun with the casings at the scene. Police also found a witness who said Salinas admitted to killing the victims. In 1993, Salinas was charged with the murders, but could not be located. 15 years later, Salinas was finally captured. The first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of Salinas' silence about the gun casings. Salinas objected, arguing that he could invoke his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination whether he was in custody or not. The trial court admitted the evidence and Salinas was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison and a $5,000 fine. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals, Harris County, Texas affirmed, noting that the courts that have addressed this issue are divided. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed. Judge: We'll hear argument next in Case 12-246, Salinas v. Texas. Mr. Fisher. Petitioner: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: The Fifth Amendment prohibits using a person's silence during a noncustodial police interview against him at trial, and nothing about the specific facts of this case give this Court cause to refrain from applying that rule here. To the contrary, the State's closing argument in this case urging the jury to find Mr. Salinas guilty because, quote, "an innocent person would have denied law enforcement's accusations. " strikes at the core of everything the Griffin rule, and indeed the Fifth Amendment, is designed to prohibit. It evokes an inquisitorial system of justice. It effectively shifts the burden of proof onto the defendant, and it demeans individual dignity by conscripting the defendant as a product of his own demise. Now, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals resisted this logic and held the Fifth Amendment didn't apply, because there was supposedly no compulsion in this case in the sense that there was no physical or psychological coercion of the kind that's inherent in custody. But the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals simply misunderstood the nature of a Griffin claim and the nature of the compulsion. The compulsion that Mr. Salinas faced was when the police asked him the question about ballistics evidence, there was nothing he could do to avoid supplying the State with incriminating evidence that it could use against him. If he answered the question-- Judge: Why isn't it -- why isn't it like the Berg -- is it Berghuis case? There was a case of someone who was given Miranda warnings and even so, the Court said he was silent. He didn't invoke the Fifth Amendment, therefore, his silence can be commented on. Petitioner: --No, that's not the holding of the Berghuis case, with all due respect. The Berghuis case was about whether his subsequent statements could be used against him. This Court didn't hold that his silence that preceded those statements could be used against him, and indeed, that would be contrary to Miranda itself in footnote 37 where the Court said, if somebody stands mute in a custodial setting in the face of law enforcement accusations, they may not be-- Judge: Then what's the law? What is. I mean, Joe Smith leaves a -- a blank in part of his tax return. The IRS gets it, later it turns out to be relevant, and the prosecutor wants to say, hey, he left this blank. Okay? Now, Griffin doesn't apply, right? Petitioner: --If the-- Judge: I mean, isn't it -- you're not going to say that any -- any time you refuse to tell the government anything, and later on it turns out to be relevant to a criminal prosecution, that that's taken as an invocation of the Fifth Amendment. I mean, do you want to go that far? Petitioner: --No, I don't need to. Judge: Okay. Then you need a line. Petitioner: This case is-- Judge: Then what is -- then you need a line. So where is -- there's the tax case; then we have a case they're selling tickets to the policeman's ball and somebody comes to the door and the policeman says, hey, I haven't seen you around before, and he doesn't answer. Okay? Now, that's probably not an invocation. And then we have the clear line, which in custody, and now you want to extend that line. And so what I want to know if I follow you and extend it, what line do I draw?<|eot_id|><|start_header_id|>assistant<|end_header_id|>--Well, it's sufficient to decide this case to say that a noncustodial police interview during the investigation of a crime where they're interviewing somebody about -- who is -- who is, as the State concedes, a suspect in a crime. Now, it may well be that Griffin extends a little bit further, and remember, the Solicitor General at least agrees that Griffin applies in a noncustodial setting.<|eot_id|>