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5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Charlotte, North Carolina (the United States of America). 6. The case concerns “non-contentious” proceedings for the return of the child instituted on 13 October 2011 in which the domestic courts refused to order the return of the applicant’s son to the United States after the child’s mother (a Croatian national and the applicant’s former wife) had in August 2011 “wrongfully retained” him in Croatia within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”). 7. Specifically, on 15 March 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu), without holding a single hearing, dismissed the applicant’s request for the return of the child. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 2 July 2012 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) quashed the Municipal Court’s decision and remitted the case. In so deciding it, inter alia, instructed the Municipal Court to hold a hearing. The relevant part of the County Court’s decision reads as follows: “... the first-instance court based [its] decision in part on undisputed facts, and in the relevant part on the arguments and evidence submitted by the counterparty ... even though it failed to give an opportunity to the petitioner to comment on them ... [T]herefore, the petitioner’s appeal has to be allowed, the first-instance decision quashed and the case remitted ... In the fresh proceedings, the first-instance court shall correct the above error by scheduling a hearing (section 309(5) of the Family Act) at which it shall, together with the parties (sections 297-298 of the Civil Procedure Act), examine the circumstances of the case.” 8. In the fresh proceedings the Municipal Court obtained an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry on whether returning the child to the United States would expose him to psychological harm – that is, to a risk envisaged in Article 13 paragraph 1 (b) of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 27 below with further references). On 21 May 2014 that court, without holding a hearing, again dismissed the applicant’s request for his son to be returned to the United States. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Zagreb County Court on 22 October 2014. The Municipal Court justified its decision not to hold a hearing in the following way: “... the court did not take evidence by hearing the parties because that would significantly protract the proceedings, bearing in mind that in their testimonies – precisely because they have a personal stake in the outcome of the proceedings and their objectivity is very questionable – the parties mostly want to praise and present themselves in the best light while discrediting the opposing party ... [S]uch testimonies are [therefore] generally not at all suitable [in terms of assisting a court in establishing the facts of a case] and reaching a decision.” 9. Those return proceedings (see paragraphs 6-8 above) were already subject to the examination by the Court. In the first Adžić case the Court in the judgment of 12 March 2015 held that the domestic authorities had failed to act expeditiously in the proceedings in question. The Court had accordingly found a violation of the State’s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention (see Adžić v. Croatia, no. 22643/14, §§ 96-99, 12 March 2015). At the time the Court adopted its judgment, i.e. 17 February 2015, the proceedings were still pending before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) upon a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant. 10. In his constitutional complaint the applicant complained of a violation of his right to fair procedure, in particular of a breach of his right to an oral hearing and a breach of the principle of equality of arms and the adversarial principle. More specifically, the applicant submitted that the ordinary courts had not held a single hearing in the case and that the first‑instance court had not informed him of its decision to obtain an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry, thus preventing him from objecting to the choice of expert. He further complained that he had not been involved in the expert’s assessment, even though he had previously expressed his willingness to make himself available for such an assessment. The applicant also complained that the domestic court’s refusal to order the return of his son constituted a violation of his right to respect for family life. 11. By a decision of 28 October 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. It served its decision on his representative on 4 December 2015. The Constitutional Court examined only the alleged violation of the applicant’s right to fair procedure, because it considered that the alleged violation of his right to family life had been addressed by the Court in the first Adžić case (see paragraph 9 above). 12. The other relevant facts of the case are set out in detail in the Court’s judgment in the first Adžić case (see Adžić, cited above, §§ 6-57).

6. The Bektashi Order has existed and practised its religion in the respondent State for many centuries. The applicant association’s headquarters were at the “Teke Sersem Ali-Harabati Baba” in Tetovo. Until the applicant association was refused registration in 2010 (see paragraphs 23-33 below), it practised its religion in full compliance with the relevant legislation applicable at the time. In the past, it was also known under the name “Islamic Bektashi Community”. 7. On 31 July 1997 the Religious Communities and Groups Act (“the 1997 Act”) entered into force. It repealed the Legal Status of Religious Communities Act 1977 (“the 1977 Act”) and provided that the Commission for Religious Communities and Groups (Комисија за односи со верските заедници и религиозните групи – “the Commission”) would be responsible for dealing with religious matters, which up until then had been the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior (“the Ministry”). 8. On 25 August 1997 the Commission requested that the applicant association submit a copy of its application (копија од пријавата) to be listed in the register of the Ministry and the related certificate of registration (потврда за постојано пријавување) so that it could “transfer (into its register) the religious communities and groups of which the Ministry of the Interior had been notified (пријавени)” (section 35 of the 1997 Act, see paragraph 37 below). 9. On 4 September 1997 the applicant association (under the name “Islamic Bektashi Community” in Tetovo) contacted the Ministry, seeking a copy of all relevant documents related to its application submitted in 1993. According to the applicant association, on 16 September 1997 it forwarded to the Commission all the documents obtained from the Ministry save for the certificate, which had never been issued. 10. At the request of the applicant association, on 1 March 1999 the Ministry issued a certificate (потврда) attesting that on 17 February 1993 the applicant association (under the name “Islamic Bektashi Community” in Tetovo) had submitted an “application for registration” (барање за регистрација) and other relevant documents. On 5 April 1999 the applicant association forwarded the certificate to the Commission. No information was provided as to the follow-up procedure, if any, concerning the Commission’s request for the applicant association to be registered under section 35 of the 1997 Act. 11. On 23 June 2000 the Commission issued a certificate (“the 2000 certificate”), attesting that on 13 June 2000 the applicant association had filed “an application (пријава) in accordance with the 1997 Act”. The certificate further stated: “Since the statutory conditions are met, the Bektashi Community of the Republic of Macedonia is listed (пријавена).” 12. By a decision of 18 July 2000, the State Statistics Office specified the applicant association’s main activities (“the activities of religious organisations”), its headquarters (the “Arabati Baba” site); and attributed corresponding indexes and business codes. 13. In a letter of 13 June 2002 sent to a trial court regarding unrelated proceedings, the Commission confirmed that “the Bektashi Community of the Republic of Macedonia [had been] registered (регистрирана) ...” 14. In 2003 a local non-governmental organisation (“the Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation”) published the “Directory of Religious Communities in Macedonia”, which included the religious entities recorded in the Commission’s register. The applicant association was listed on the basis of the 2000 certificate. 15. On 20 February 2007 the Commission authorised the first applicant to carry out “religious ceremonies and rituals on authorised premises of the Bektashi Community of the Republic of Macedonia”. 16. On 28 September 2007 the Legal Status of Churches, Religious Communities and Religious Groups Act 2007 (“the 2007 Act”) entered into force. It came into operation on 1 May 2008 (section 36). It specified that the Skopje Court of First Instance (“the registration court”) would be competent to deal with religious matters (section 11). It also provided that the Commission would transfer all documents regarding the existing religious entities recorded in its register to the registration court. All religious organisations registered by the Commission up until 1998 could retain their existing legal personality and status. 17. On 10 June 2008 the applicant association, represented by a local lawyer, requested information from the Commission about its status. In reply the Commission stated that it had only been required to transfer to the registration court information regarding existing religious communities registered up until 1998. Since it had only been notified about the applicant association in 2000, the latter should have made an application for re‑registration in the Single Court Register (“the court register”) in accordance with the 2007 Act. 18. On 4 June 2009 the applicant association requested, under section 35 of the 2007 Act, that the registration court recognise its continuing legal status and record it in the court register. 19. On 2 October 2009 the registration court dismissed the applicant association’s request. Referring to section 35(1) of the 1997 Act, it held that “[the Commission] had been obliged (должнa) to transfer to its register the religious communities and groups of which the Ministry had been notified up until the 1997 Act had entered into force. However, since the applicant association had not given notice to the Ministry, at the time, it had not been transferred to the Commission’s records, as provided for in that provision.” 20. It further established that in June 2000 the applicant association had given notice to the Commission, which the latter had acknowledged with the 2000 certificate. That practice had been in compliance with decision U.br.223/97 of December 1998 (see paragraph 42 below), in which the Constitutional Court had declared unconstitutional the statutory provisions which had provided for registration of new religious entities conferring on them legal status. 21. The court also established that the applicant association had never been recorded (запишан) and registered (регистрирана) by the Commission either before 1998, as required under section 35(2) of the 2007 Act, or up until the 2007 Act had entered into force. The applicant association had only given notice (пријавена) to the Commission in 2000. Consequently, the Commission had not been required, as specified in section 35(1) of the 2007 Act, to transfer the data “recorded in its register” to the registration court. That requirement concerned only registered religious organisations and not entities which were listed by the Commission. The court concluded that the applicant association had never obtained the legal status it sought to have recognised in the request. 22. On 18 February 2010 the Skopje Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) dismissed an appeal by the applicant association and upheld the established facts and reasoning given by the registration court. 23. On 22 November 2010 the applicant association, represented by local lawyers authorised to act on its behalf by the second applicant, filed an application for registration in the court register as “Bektashi Religious Community of the Republic of Macedonia”. It also enclosed several documents, including a description of the doctrinal sources. On 30 November 2010 the registration court requested further documents to complete the application. The applicant association submitted the requested documents. 24. On 20 December 2010 the court refused to register the applicant association on the following grounds: (a) the name “Bektashi” had already been used by another religious entity registered in the court register; (b) the doctrinal sources were the same as the doctrinal sources of another already registered religious entity; and (c) the applicant association had not submitted proof of ownership of the “Arabati Baba” site in Tetovo, indicated as its headquarters in the application for registration. 25. The applicant association appealed against this decision and asked the Court of Appeal to hold a public hearing. 26. At a hearing held in private on 14 April 2011, the court allowed the applicant association’s appeal and quashed the lower court’s decision as it had not specified which registered religious entity used the name “Bektashi” or which statutory provision forbade the use of identical doctrinal sources by multiple religious communities and groups. Furthermore, there was no statutory provision under which an application for registration could be refused owing to lack of proof of ownership of the headquarters of a religious community. 27. On 27 May 2011 the registration court again refused to register the applicant association as its intended name contained the term “Bektashi”, which had already been used by another religious entity, namely the “Ehlibeyt Bektashi Religious Group of Macedonia” registered in the court register on 10 September 2010. The court stated that “the existing Act [did] not allow for the registration of a new religious entity under a name that [had] already been recorded in the register for another registered religious entity”. Furthermore, its doctrinal sources were no different from the doctrinal sources of the Islamic Religious Community, which had existed for centuries and which had been registered in the court register on 14 November 2008. As to the doctrinal sources as described by the applicant association, the court stated as follows: “... [they consist of] the Islamic religion and the teaching of the Holy Koran, which is supplemented and interpreted by the knowledge and practices of prophet Mohamed and Imam Ali, the Holy Ehlibeyt (the prophet’s family) and the Holy Journey of Haji Bektash Veli ... it is about the sources of the Islamic religion, for which there is already a registered religious community ... whose teaching includes the Koran and the practices of Mohamed Aleyhisselam. According to Islamic teaching, Ali was his son-in-law and a member of the family (or ehlibeyt), the fourth elected caliph who ruled the Islamic state, and Haji Bektash Veli was the founder of the Bektashi Order of Islam and one of the prominent Islamic philosophers. In other words, the doctrinal sources of [the applicant association] are not at all different from the doctrinal sources of the ... Islamic Religious Community ... In the court’s opinion, the doctrinal sources are to be regarded as official insignia of a church, religious community or group within the meaning of section 10(1) of the 2007 Act. It would be a violation of [that provision] if they did not differ i.e. did not have specific characteristics, elements that were different from the doctrinal sources of the teachings of an already registered [religious entity].” 28. In such circumstances, the court held that the “substantive conditions” for registration of the applicant association in the court register had not been fulfilled. Accordingly, it refused its application for registration under section 16 of the 2007 Act (see paragraph 38 below). 29. The applicant association challenged the grounds on which the registration court had based the refusal of registration. It argued that there was no other religious entity registered under the same name. In this connection, it submitted that there were six registered religious entities that contained the term “Christian” in their name and two registered entities that used the term “Islamic”. The intention of the 2007 Act was not to ban the use of terms that had a generic and not exclusive meaning. Otherwise, it would mean that the law would only allow the registration of one religious entity containing the term Christian, Islamic, Bektashi, Jewish, Tarikat, Buddhist, Zen or Zoroastric. It also argued that it had sought registration as a religious community, as opposed to “Ehlibeyt Bektashi”, which was registered as a religious group. Its intended name was substantially different from the name of that entity; it had existed for decades and centuries, as was evident from the directory and correspondence with various State institutions. As regards the doctrinal sources, it argued that they could not be regarded as official insignia within the meaning of section 10(1) of the 2007 Act. Doctrinal sources could be identical for multiple religious entities (as the Bible was common for Orthodox Christians and Catholics, and the Koran was common for the Islamic Religious Community, the Bektashi Order and Shia or Sunni Muslims). They were of an ideological nature and were not constant, nor could they be interpreted in that way. Official insignia concerned symbols (crosses, crescents, graphic symbols), a flag or a totem that represented something. In this connection, it stated that the interpretation which the court had given regarding its doctrinal sources, namely that they were identical to the doctrinal sources of all Islamic teaching, was wrong. The mere fact that the court had interpreted its doctrinal sources implied that the State was not separated from religion. Furthermore, if that interpretation had been based on some material, it had not been communicated to the applicant association. Nor had it been given the opportunity to present its views at a public hearing. In this connection, it requested that the Court of Appeal hold a public hearing. Lastly, it complained that the refusal of registration was discriminatory. 30. At a hearing held in private on 17 November 2011, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld the lower court’s decision. It held that although the intended name of the applicant association was not entirely identical to the name of the “Ehlibeyt Bektashi Religious Group of Macedonia”, it contained the term “Bektashi”, which was “decisive and represented a synonym for the religious entity”. Consequently, the registration of the applicant association could create confusion among the believers. The Court of Appeal made no mention as to the lower court’s findings regarding the doctrinal sources of the applicant association. It accordingly held that section 16 of the 2007 Act had been correctly applied. 31. On 20 February 2012 the applicant association and the second applicant (and two other individuals) lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court complaining that they had been discriminated against contrary to Article 110 § 3 of the Constitution. They summarised the factual background described above and reiterated the arguments raised in the appeal against the court’s decision of 27 May 2011 (see paragraph 29 above). They complained that the use of the term “Bektashi” could not be exclusive (like the use of “Christian” and “Islamic”). Furthermore, the registration of the “Ehlibeyt Bektashi Religious Group of Macedonia” implied that the domestic authorities had implicitly accepted that the doctrinal sources of that religious group were allegedly identical to the teaching of the Islamic Religious Community. They requested that the Constitutional Court hold a public hearing (јавна расправа) in accordance with section 55 of the Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 41 below). 32. At a hearing held on 20 November 2012 in the absence of the parties, the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional appeal. The relevant parts of its decision (U.br.24/12) read as follows: “... in the present case, the court considers that it should examine whether the refusal to register the Bektashi Religious Community violated freedom of religion and whether there are elements of discrimination on religious grounds. As regards the first part of the question and having regard to section 9 of the Legal Status of Churches, Religious Communities and Religious Groups Act, it appears that registration in the Single Court Register is a requirement for a religious entity to obtain legal status, but it is not a precondition for religious ceremonies, rituals and prayers, which believers ... can hold irrespective of whether they are organised as a registered religious legal entity. In the present case, having regard to the arguments put forward in the application and the established facts, it appears that the applicants, who define themselves as members of the Bektashi Community, have freely practised their religion for many years. They participate in public life, communicate with State bodies, and participate in religious gatherings and conferences. This leads to the conclusion that, although they are not formally registered under the [2007 Act], they can practise their religion freely and hold religious ceremonies in accordance with the Islamic religion, without any pressure or persecution. Consequently, the applicants’ freedom of religion has not been violated. In order to reply whether there are elements of discrimination in the dismissal of the application for registration of the Bektashi Religious Community, the Constitutional Court assesses whether the courts which decided in the registration proceedings ... gave sufficient reasons and whether the refusal to register the Bektashi Religious Community was based on relevant and reasonable grounds, namely whether the refusal of registration pursued a legitimate aim and whether there was a measure of proportionality between the means used and the aim pursued ...” 33. The court then referred to the grounds on which the registration court had based its decision and stated as follows: “... the [registration] court refused to register the [applicant association] on two grounds: (1) the intended name of the [applicant association] contained the term ‘Bektashi’ which had been incorporated into the name of an already registered religious entity, the ‘Ehlibeyt Bektashi Religious Group of Macedonia’ ... and (2) its doctrinal sources were the same as the doctrinal sources of an already registered religious entity, the Islamic Religious Community. The refusal to register the [applicant association] was based on grounds specified by law ... which, in the court’s view, was correctly applied. The [dismissal decision was based on] section 10(1) of [the 2007 Act] ... The Constitutional Court endorses the findings of the first-instance court that the name and the doctrinal sources are official insignia of a religious entity and distinctive elements through which it is identified and recognised by the public ... This particularly concerns smaller religious entities, namely [those] that ... manifest their distinctiveness through these two elements. Hence, equating the complainant [the applicant association] with another already registered religious entity can mislead the public, that is, it can confuse believers, which is at the same time itself a violation of their religious beliefs. It is not in dispute that the right of a religious entity to be registered should be secured in the context of freedom of religion, but nor should it violate the religious rights and feelings of the members of already registered religious entities. ... Each religious entity, church, religious community or group has the right to be distinct and be recognised in public by its identity. The absence of such [distinctiveness] or competition leads to confusion and misunderstanding by the public.[Such is the case] if there are multiple similar entities which are in competition, indefinite parallelism and division. The aim of the statutory requirement for the name and official insignia of religious entities, including doctrinal sources, not to be identical (неидентичност на името и официјалните обележја) ... is to prevent confusion among believers, incorrect perceptions, and lawful indefinite division of same-faith believers in several religious communities or entities. In the court’s view, these aims are legitimate and necessary in order to protect the freedoms and rights of others, to secure religious tolerance and prevent religious conflicts, as part of ensuring public safety, which is the responsibility of the State. In view of the foregoing, the Constitutional Court considers that the refusal to register the Bektashi Religious Community did not violate [the applicants’] freedom of religion of the applicants, nor were they discriminated against on the basis of their religion.”

7. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, and as they appear from the documents submitted by them may be summarised as follows. 8. The applicants and/or their relatives were owners of apartments in Yalova. The permits for the building of those apartments were issued on 23 March 1987. 9. On 17 August 1999 an earthquake of a magnitude of 7.4 on the Richter scale hit the city of Yalova, causing the collapse of the applicants’ apartments (see M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, no. 14350/05 and 2 others, 17 November 2015, and Hayati Çelebi and Others v. Turkey, no. 582/05, 9 February 2016, for further details about the earthquake). 10. On different dates in 1999 and 2000 the applicants brought actions for compensation against the contractors responsible for their apartments and their business associates before the Yalova Civil Court (see appended table for some details of the proceedings). 11. The applicants maintained, in their petition to the court, that the defendants had failed to construct their apartments in conformity with the applicable laws and regulations and therefore they must be held liable for the losses they had caused in accordance with section 41 of the Code of Obligations (Law no. 818) in force at the material time (“the former Code of Obligations”) (see paragraph 21 below). The applicants claimed pecuniary damages with interest starting from the date of the earthquake and reserved their right to further compensation. 12. By decisions dated 19 July 2001, the Yalova Civil Court dismissed the claims, without an examination on the merits, and held that they had been introduced out of time. It held that the ten-year limitation period for introducing an action for damages, provided in sections 125 and 126 § 4 of the former Code of Obligations, had started running from the date on which the building use permit had been issued, that is 23 March 1987, and that the lawsuit had been filed after the expiry of the limitation period. 13. The relevant parts of the court’s decision read as follows: “(...) As a result of the earthquake of 17 August 1999 the apartment that the claimant bought from the defendants was damaged and collapsed. The representatives of the claimant filed the present lawsuit to claim the value of the damaged apartment. It is a known phenomenon that Turkey is located in an earthquake zone. Therefore, earthquake-resistant buildings must be built. The public conscience has been hurt because of the earthquake. Due to the pain, suffering and losses caused by such an incident it is expected that justice be served. And the judge must be conscious of his responsibility towards society in his or her actions. However, when justice is being served, objective and subjective elements in the laws are taken into account. The judge is bound by the legal rules. Doing the opposite would be against the law. Thus, the judgment of the 2nd Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation No. E (2001/7015) and 2001/4778, dated 21 March 2001, shows the most correct and clear path by holding: “(...) whereas, for a building, it is necessary to prepare the plan and the project, especially to make healthy static calculations, to build the building in accordance with such plan and project by using appropriate material in terms of both quality and quantity, and to inspect the compliance of all these features with the legislation in force; (...) that for example in a building considered as having a hidden defect, section 125 of the Code of Obligations, by the reference to the fourth paragraph of section 126 of the same law, prescribes a ten-year limitation period which starts from the date of the end of the construction works, that is the date of obtaining the building use permit or the date it is supposed to have been obtained; and that if the building collapses during this period, criminal liability may be invoked; but if the building collapses after the expiry of this period due to a defect because the criminal liability of the (authors) can no longer be invoked in so far as legally they no longer have the faculty to solve the problem, it is considered that there is no longer a causal link; that these considerations are also valid in case of grave fault (...).” Our court also endorses this approach. It is observed that the building use permit for the building of the claimant’s apartment was obtained on 23 March 1987. The ten-year limitation period for filing a lawsuit has elapsed a long time ago. For the purposes of the economy of the procedure and to the extent that there would be no impact on the result, an on-site survey was not ordered. The unfounded objections of the claimant’s representatives [against this decision] were [thus] inadmissible. In conclusion, while the claimant’s representatives claimed compensation for the damaged apartment, their claim must be rejected because of the expiry of the ten-year limitation period (...).” 14. On 9 December 2003 the applicants lodged an appeal against the Yalova Civil Court’s decision with the Court of Cassation. In their petition of appeal, they firstly argued that even if the dates of the building use permit were to be taken as the starting period of the ten-year limitation period, because the permit issued for their apartments had been renewed in the 1990s, they had introduced their actions within time. They further maintained that, in any event, the date of the earthquake should have been taken as the starting point of the limitation period since the damage caused by the hidden defects in their buildings had become known to them upon the occurrence of the earthquake. 15. On different dates in 2004 and 2005 (see appended table) the 13th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the Yalova Civil Court’s decisions of 19 July 2001. The 13th Civil Chamber ruled that, having regard to the documents and evidence in the case file, which were relied on by the first-instance court, and in particular to the expiry of the limitation period prescribed by section 125 of the former Code of Obligations, which started running from the date of the transfer of ownership of the properties in question, the applicants’ grounds for appeal had been unfounded. 16. Meanwhile, on 1 July 2004, the 4th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in a similar case lodged by the applicants’ representative on behalf of other claimants, held that the limitation periods for claiming damages started running from the date of the earthquake, since at the time the unlawful act was committed by the defendants, that is, when the construction of the defective buildings was completed, the claimants had not suffered any actual loss. The 4th Civil Chamber, by applying section 60 of the former Code of Obligations, ruled that the claimants’ action had been introduced less than one year following the occurrence of the earthquake and therefore it had been introduced within the one-year limitation period. On that basis, it quashed the first-instance court’s judgment which had found, applying section 125 of the former Code of Obligations, that the lawsuit had been introduced following the expiry of a period of ten years from the issuance of the building use permit (see Hayati Çelebi and Others, cited above, § 37, for the relevant parts of a similar decision by the 4th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation dated 11 December 2001). 17. On 5 September 2004 the applicants, except Mr Süleyman Öner Erdoğan, Mr Can Erdoğan and Ms Nevzer Zorlu, referring to, inter alia, the 4th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation’s decision of 1 July 2004 (see paragraph 16 above), made an application to the First Presidency of the Court of Cassation requesting the harmonisation of the case-law of the 4th and 13th Civil Chambers of the Court of Cassation on the application of the limitation period to claims for damages arising from the earthquake of 17 August 1999. 18. On the same date, all applicants, except Ms Nevzer Zorlu, requested rectification of the 13th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation’s decisions, drawing its attention to the discrepancy between its approach and that of the 4th Civil Chamber in respect of the starting date of the limitation periods. They also asked the 13th Civil Chamber to wait for the outcome of their application to the First Presidency of the Court of Cassation for harmonisation of the case-law. 19. On 23 June 2005 the First Presidency of the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ application, holding that there was no need for harmonisation of the case-law having regard to the content and nature of the judgments in question. 20. On unspecified dates in 2005 the 13th Civil Chamber dismissed the applicants’ request for rectification.

4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5. The applicant was born in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in 1971 and came to Russia in 1993. He graduated from a vocational training college in the Arkhangelsk Region. He has no identity documents. 6. On 14 August 2014 the Directorate of the Federal Migration Service for the Arkhangelsk Region declared applicant’s stay in the Russia undesirable (“the exclusion order”). This order was based on his multiple convictions in the administrative and criminal proceedings. The applicant was required to leave Russia voluntarily by 14 September 2014. He was informed of this decision on 27 August 2014. 7. Since the applicant failed to depart voluntarily, on 2 October 2014 the Plesetskiy District Court in the Arkhangelsk Region found him guilty of failing to leave Russia within the specified time-limit, which was an offence Article 18.8 § 1.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, imposed a fine on him and ordered his administrative removal from Russia. Pending his removal, the applicant was to be detained in a special facility for the detention of aliens. The removal and detention order indicated that the applicant was an apatride. 8. The applicant was initially placed in one such facility in Arkhangelsk. A few days later the building was damaged by fire. On 7 October the applicant was transferred to the Krasnoye Selo facility in the Leningrad Region (СУВСИГ УФМС по СПб и ЛО). 9. Replying to an inquiry from the Federal Migration Service, on 12 November 2014 the Embassy of Tajikistan confirmed that the applicant was not a national of that State. Subsequently, a bailiff asked the District Court in St Petersburg to discontinue the enforcement proceedings because the applicant could not be issued with travel documents or removed from Russia. On 4 December 2014 the Oktyabrskiy District Court refused her application, finding that it had not been shown that the bailiff had taken sufficient measures to secure the applicant’s removal. 10. On 8 May 2015 counsel for the applicant asked the Plesetskiy District Court to discontinue the enforcement of the removal and detention order. He submitted that the applicant was an apatride, that no State was willing to accept him, and that he had already spent seven months in custody in poor conditions. 11. On 4 June 2015 the District Court rejected the application. It considered that even an apatride could be removed from Russia and that the length of the applicant’s detention had not been unreasonable. 12. On appeal from counsel, the Arkhangelsk Regional Court set aside the District Court’s decision. Referring to the case-law of the Russian Constitutional Court prohibiting indefinite detention of individuals (judgment no. 6-P of 17 February 1998), it held that the removal and detention order should have set the maximum period of the applicant’s detention. 13. On 31 July 2015 the District Court carried out a fresh determination of the application. It found that enforcement was no longer feasible because the applicant was not a national of Tajikistan and that he had already spent a long time in the detention centre. The District Court discontinued the execution of the removal and detention order and ordered the applicant’s release. He was released on the same day. 14. In so far as the parties’ descriptions of the conditions of the applicant’s detention coincided or were undisputed, they may be summarised as follows. The applicant shared the cell with three other detainees. Its floor surface was given as fifteen square metres by the applicant and as twenty-seven square metres by the Government. Each detainee had his own bed and bed linen. A squat toilet and a sink were placed inside the cell and separated with a one-metre-high wall. Detainees were allowed to spend up to fifteen minutes outside per week, in the courtyard of the facility. Food was brought in pre-cooked, the ration did not include fish, dairy products or fresh fruit.

5. The applicant was born in 1976 and is detained in Poarta Albă Prison. 6. On 19 July 2007 the authorities initiated an investigation of their own motion in connection with a network of drug dealers coordinated by C.B.S. 7. On the same day the prosecutor’s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice authorised the police division responsible for combatting organised crime and drug trafficking to use an undercover agent in order to identify members of the network. The justification given for such an operation was that, on the basis of information gathered during a preliminary criminal investigation, there was a strong indication that the applicant belonged to a drug-dealing network which provided drugs such as cannabis, ecstasy and hashish to drug users known to him in Craiova. 8. The authorisation for the operation was extended three times, on 18 August, 17 September and 16 October 2007 respectively. 9. The interception and recording of the applicant’s phone conversations was also authorised. The meetings between the applicant and the undercover agent were recorded. 10. On 19 July 2007 the undercover agent approached the applicant, asking to buy cannabis or any other drug from him. According to the report drafted by the agent on the same day, the applicant confirmed that he had a small amount of cannabis and hashish in his possession and offered to sell it to the agent. He sold to the undercover agent on that occasion 1.59 grams of cannabis, 0.23 grams of hashish and a cigarette containing cannabis. 11. At the undercover agent’s request they met again on 25 July 2007. The undercover agent asked for more drugs. The applicant informed him that he had none, but promised to find a supplier. He subsequently bought two ecstasy pills from C.B.S. and on 27 July 2007 he met the undercover agent and sold him the pills. 12. After the undercover agent telephoned him again requesting more drugs, the applicant bought three pills of ecstasy from N.F. and handed them over to the undercover agent on 2 August 2007. 13. On 9 August 2007 the applicant supplied the undercover agent with 0.43 grams of cannabis. 14. On 17 August 2007 the police officers, acting in league with the undercover agent, caught the applicant red-handed while he was selling 7.54 grams of cannabis to the undercover agent. 15. The applicant also had in his possession five small packages of cannabis and a small envelope containing hashish. 16. The applicant was immediately remanded in police custody. His home was searched on the same day and the police officers found 350 grams of cannabis. 17. The applicant gave a statement in the presence of a lawyer appointed on his behalf. He pleaded guilty to the accusation of drug trafficking. The next day the applicant was questioned again in the presence of a lawyer of his own choosing. He stated that initially he had only been a user (but not a seller) of drugs. In 2003 he had decided to stop using drugs. In 2007 he had encountered some financial difficulties and had accordingly decided to sell cannabis that he had found growing wild on public spaces in Craiova and a village in the city’s neighbourhood. On several occasions he had gathered the cannabis and sold it to different buyers. He also acknowledged selling hashish that he had procured from C.B.S., one of his friends. He had also sold ecstasy pills that he had obtained from N.F., a girl he had met in May 2007 in a holiday resort. She had told him that she had bought ecstasy pills while living in Spain and that before returning home she had sent a parcel containing ecstasy pills to her home address. They had met again several times after the holiday and she had informed him that she could obtain more ecstasy pills from her brother, who was living abroad. 18. Five co-defendants (who were allegedly members of the same network of drug dealers) were taken into police custody on the same day. Arrest warrants were issued in their names and their pre-trial detention for thirty days was ordered on 18 October 2007 by the Dolj County Court. 19. On 12 September 2007 the prosecutor’s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice issued an indictment naming the applicant and five co-accused, and the case was registered with the Dolj County Court. 20. On 17 October 2007 the prosecutor in charge decided to join the applicant’s file to another criminal file concerning other offences involving drug-trafficking allegedly committed by one of the applicant’s co‑defendants. In that file another undercover agent and his collaborator were authorised to operate. 21. The applicant gave evidence again on 5 March 2008 before the Dolj County Court. He partly maintained the statement that he had given earlier, during the criminal investigation. He contended that the cannabis he had gathered from the public space located near Craiova’s stadium had been for his own use and not for selling. He also stated that he had not sold drugs to anyone other than the undercover agent. 22. On 14 May 2008 the county court heard evidence from the undercover agent, in the presence of the applicant who was assisted by his lawyer. The undercover agent stated that he had been introduced to the applicant by a drug user, who had informed him that the applicant had been trying to find buyers for hashish and cannabis. He also stated that it had been the applicant who had proposed that he obtain a large quantity of ecstasy pills for him. 23. In his last oral and written submissions the applicant’s lawyer contended that the use of an undercover agent had been illegal. 24. By a judgment of 5 September 2008 the Dolj County Court convicted the applicant of drug trafficking under Article 2 of Law no. 143/2000 and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. When determining his sentence, the court – referring to Articles 74 (a) and (c) and 76 of the Romanian Criminal Code – took into account as mitigating circumstances the applicant’s good behavior before and after committing the crime. 25. The court based its findings on (i) the statements given by the co‑defendants, the undercover agent and witnesses, (ii) the transcripts of the recorded phone conversations, and (iii) technical and search reports. It held that the applicant’s defence argument – according to which he had acted at the undercover agent’s instigation – was not viable as the undercover agent had not forced the applicant to sell him drugs. He had merely called the applicant several times and asked him to sell him different drugs. Moreover, the defence argument was contradicted by the statements given by the applicant during the criminal investigation and by C.B.S., one of the co-accused. Accordingly, the court concluded that the use of the undercover agent in the case had been lawful. 26. The court furthermore noted the extensive criminal activity engaged in by the applicant’s co-defendants, including C.B.S. (who provided most of the drugs that the applicant sold to the undercover agent) and imposed on them prison sentences. It also noted that the investigating authorities had found out that the cannabis sold by the co-accused had been gathered from a park located in Craiova and that it had been cultivated by C.B.S. Moreover, C.B.S. had been caught red-handed with 102 ecstasy pills when taking delivery of a parcel received by post. 27. The applicant appealed, complaining, inter alia, that the undercover agent had overstepped the legitimate limits of investigation by influencing him and inciting him to sell drugs. He also contended that he had merely been a drug user and not a drug dealer. 28. On 19 November 2008 the Craiova Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal and partly set aside the judgment of the first‑instance court. It reduced the applicant’s sentence to four years’ imprisonment, suspended, and placed him on probation. The appeal court upheld the lower court’s reasoning in dismissing the entrapment plea. 29. The prosecutor’s office and all the accused, including the applicant, lodged appeals on points of law. 30. The applicant submitted that – as was clear from the transcripts of the recorded phone conversations – all the drug transactions had taken place at the initiative of the undercover agent. He argued that prior to 19 July 2007, when he had been approached by the latter (see paragraph 10 above), he had not been known as a drug dealer. He also claimed that even though he had been under police surveillance between July and November 2007, no buyer other than the undercover agent had been identified. 31. The High Court of Cassation and Justice allowed the prosecutor’s office’s appeal and dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It quashed the decision of 19 November 2008 (see paragraph 28 above) and upheld the judgment of 5 September 2008 (see paragraph 24 above). The court of last resort addressed all the arguments submitted by the applicant and his lawyer, including the matter of his having been incited by an agent provocateur. It considered the applicant’s plea of entrapment to be unfounded.

10. The applicant was born on 6 July 1948 and lives in Kyiv. 11. The applicant’s judicial career started in 1976, when he was first elected to the post of judge of a district court. During his judicial career the applicant held the position of president in several courts. 12. On 22 December 2005 the applicant was elected to the post of judge of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal by the Ukrainian Parliament. 13. On 10 November 2006 the applicant was appointed, by the President of Ukraine, as acting president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal. On 6 February 2009 he was appointed president of that court by the Council of Judges of Ukraine (a body of judicial self-governance). He was appointed for a five-year term, it being understood that he would reach the retirement age in July 2013, before the end of that term. 14. In February 2011 the Council of Administrative Court Judges (another body of judicial self-governance) decided, among other issues, to review the functioning of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal. The review was carried out in February and March 2011 and concerned the years 2009 and 2010, as well as the period between January and February 2011. 15. On 24 May 2011 the Council of Administrative Court Judges, chaired by Judge K., made a submission to the High Council of Justice (“the HCJ”) proposing the applicant’s dismissal from the position of president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal for failure to perform his administrative duties properly. The proposal was based on the results of the aforementioned review. 16. The HCJ scheduled hearings on 30 and 31 May 2011 and the applicant was invited to attend them. However, in view of information received from the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal on 27 May 2011 that the applicant was on annual leave until 8 July 2011, the HCJ adjourned the examination of the case. It sent the applicant a summons for the next hearing, which was scheduled on 14 June 2011. In reply, the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal informed the HCJ once again that the applicant was on holiday until 8 July 2011. 17. On 14 June 2011 the HCJ examined the case in the applicant’s absence and decided to dismiss him from the post of president of the court, relying on section 20 of the Judiciary and Status of Judges Act and section 32-1 of the High Council of Justice Act. The HCJ noted that “significant shortcomings, omissions and errors, and grave violations of the foundations of the organisation and administration of justice set forth by law [had] been found in the organisation of the work of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal”. It stated that “the improper organisation of the court’s work was the result of the failure by the president of the court, Mr A. Denisov, to comply with the provisions of the applicable laws concerning the fulfilment of his administrative duties”. It also found that “administrative documents issued by Mr A. Denisov regarding the distribution of duties between the vice-presidents of the court, the setting-up of court chambers and panels and the distribution of cases among judges, as well as personnel-related and other documents in certain cases, [violated] the provisions of [the domestic legislation]”. It lastly stated that the applicant’s failures as president of the court involved a “lack of proper planning, control and effective use of human resources”. 18. The decision was voted on by the HCJ, whose members present on that occasion included Judge K., the Prosecutor General and other judicial and non-judicial members. Out of the eighteen members present, eight were judges. Fourteen votes were cast in favour of the applicant’s dismissal. 19. According to the applicant, the composition of the HCJ in his case included two members who on earlier occasions had initiated proceedings for his dismissal from the post of judge for an alleged “breach of oath”. Furthermore, the applicant alleged that the President of the HCJ and another member of the HCJ had previously communicated with him, attempting – albeit without success – to influence him in the course of his professional activities. 20. On 17 June 2011 the President of the HCJ asked the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal to ensure that the HCJ’s decision on the applicant’s dismissal was executed and that information about its execution was provided to the HCJ immediately. On 23 June 2011 the applicant was dismissed from his administrative position, remaining in office as a judge of the same court. 21. The applicant challenged the decision of the HCJ before the Higher Administrative Court (“the HAC”), arguing that the decision on his dismissal was unlawful and unfounded. In his claim the applicant submitted that the HCJ had failed to comply with the requirements of an independent and impartial tribunal. He emphasised that those requirements were part of the procedural safeguards provided for by Article 6 of the Convention, which was applicable to his case in its civil limb because the impugned decision had substantially affected his right to work and his professional dignity. The applicant further argued that his right to participate in the hearings had not been secured. He alleged that the decision of the HCJ was worded in general terms and that it did not refer to any specific facts or indicate a specific time when those facts had taken place. The applicant then asked the HAC to take into account the fact that his judicial career had exceeded thirty-five years, that he had held positions of president at several courts for twenty-five years, that he had been given awards for his judicial service and that during the initial period of his presidency of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal that court had moved from a demolished military barracks to premises in the city centre with proper equipment and a sufficient number of hearing rooms. 22. The applicant also claimed compensation for the pecuniary damage caused by the ensuing reduction in his remuneration, which, at the date of the claim, had amounted to 4,034.33 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) [1] in relation to the period which had elapsed in July and August 2011. 23. On 25 August 2011 the HAC held a hearing in the presence of the applicant and decided to dismiss his claim in respect of pecuniary damage without considering it. The HAC adopted a decision to that effect, stating that it had no jurisdiction to determine that issue. 24. On 11 October 2011 the HAC rejected the applicant’s claim concerning his dismissal from the administrative position as unsubstantiated. In its decision the HAC specified, in particular, that it had competence to review whether the impugned decision had been taken lawfully, reasonably, proportionately and, among other requirements, impartially. The HAC stated that the applicant had not contested the facts forming the grounds for his dismissal and therefore those facts had been taken as established. The HAC then reiterated the failings attributed to the applicant and concluded that the HCJ’s decision had been lawful and that the applicant’s right to participate in the proceedings in person had not been violated because the HCJ had taken all the necessary measures to inform him about the hearings and the applicant had not had any valid reason for being absent from the hearings. The HAC found that the HCJ had acted in accordance with the Constitution, the Judiciary and Status of Judges Act and the High Council of Justice Act. It had also complied with the Rules of the HCJ, which provided that one of the grounds for the dismissal of a judge from an administrative position was a “breach of official duties”. In conclusion, the HAC stated that the HCJ had not violated the Constitution or the laws of Ukraine. 25. Following his dismissal from the position of president of the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal, the applicant continued to work as a regular judge in the same court until 20 June 2013, when Parliament dismissed him from the post of judge after he had tendered a statement of resignation.

5. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in St Petersburg. 6. On 4 June 2010 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery committed in an organised group. 7. On 5 June 2010 the Vyborgskiy District Court of St Petersburg (“the District Court”) remanded the applicant in custody. The District Court relied on the particularly serious nature of the crime with which the applicant had been charged and his position on the merits of the arrest and the charges brought against him. The court also relied on the risk that he might flee from the investigating authorities and the court, exert pressure on victims, witnesses and other participants in the criminal proceedings, or otherwise hamper the administration of justice in the case. 8. On 4 August 2010 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 24 August 2010[1]. 9. On 20 August and 23 August 2010, at the request of the applicant’s lawyer, the District Court adjourned the review of the applicant’s detention until 23 August and 24 August 2010, respectively. 10. On 24 August 2010 the applicant retained another lawyer to defend him. The newly appointed lawyer joined the proceedings at 4 p.m. on the same day. 11. On 24 August 2010 the applicant’s lawyer asked the District Court to adjourn the hearing until 25 August 2010 so as to enable her to review the prosecution material and discuss her position with the applicant. The judge refused to adjourn the hearing until 25 August 2010, but granted a two-hour adjournment until 6 p.m. 12. On 24 August 2010 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 24 November 2010, having found no grounds for altering or lifting the custodial measure and having taken note of the particular complexity of the case. The applicant’s argument to the effect that no investigative measures were being carried out with his participation was rejected with reference to the investigator’s discretion to lead the investigation. 13. The applicant appealed against the above decision, claiming, inter alia, that the two-hour adjournment of the hearing on 24 August 2010 had not permitted him to consult his lawyer in private; nor had it allowed his lawyer to have sufficient time to review the prosecution material. 14. On 11 October 2010 the St Petersburg City Court (“the City Court”) found that there were no reasons to vary the preventive measure, and it upheld the decision of 24 August 2010 on appeal. The City Court held that the two-hour adjournment granted by the District Court had been sufficient for studying the prosecution file consisting of 153 pages. Most of the file consisted of procedural documents concerning issues relating to the institution of the criminal proceedings, the extension of the time-limit for the investigation, the joinder of criminal cases, and documents which had been previously handed to the applicant. Besides, all these documents had been examined in the hearing on 24 August 2010. As regards the applicant’s complaint as to his inability to have a confidential exchange with his lawyer before the hearing of 24 August 2010, the City Court held that the applicant and his lawyer had been given the opportunity to communicate in the courtroom. However, they had refused to communicate in such conditions. This did not amount to a breach of the applicant’s right to defence, because the applicant’s lawyer could have had a confidential meeting with the applicant in the remand prison without any restrictions, and they could have developed their defence position beforehand. In any event, the hearing could not have been adjourned until 25 August 2010, since the time-limit for the applicant’s detention had been due to expire on 24 August 2010, and therefore the decision on the preventive measure had had to be taken before then. Both the applicant and his lawyer participated in the appeal hearing. 15. On the same date, 11 October 2010, charges in respect of two counts of large-scale robbery committed in an organised group under Article 161 § 3 (a) and (b) of the Russian Criminal Code were brought against the applicant. 16. On 15 October 2010 the applicant and his lawyer were informed that the pre-trial investigation had been terminated, and on 16 November 2010 they were given access to the case file. 17. On an unspecified date in November 2010 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 24 February 2011[2]. 18. On 21 February 2011 the applicant’s lawyer was informed that a review of the preventive measure was to take place on the following day. 19. On 22 February 2011 the applicant’s lawyer did not appear for the hearing. The applicant asked the court to adjourn the hearing owing to the lawyer’s illness. However, the adjournment was refused. Legal aid counsel was appointed for the applicant. 20. On 22 February 2011, reiterating the reasons which had prompted the application of the custodial measure in the applicant’s case, the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 24 May 2011 pending examination of the case file. 21. The applicant appealed, complaining, inter alia, about the refusal to adjourn the hearing so as to enable his lawyer to defend him. 22. On 6 April 2011 the City Court found that there were no reasons to vary the preventive measure, and it upheld the decision of 22 February 2011 on appeal. As regards the applicant’s complaint regarding the alleged violation of his right to defence by the refusal to adjourn the hearing of 22 February 2011, the City Court held that the applicant’s lawyer had failed to prove her sickness by providing a medical certificate. This made the examination of the issue of the applicant’s detention in her absence lawful under domestic law, as legal aid counsel had been appointed for the applicant. Both the applicant and his lawyer participated in the appeal hearing, the applicant by means of a video link from the remand prison. 23. On 30 May 2011 the District Court further extended the applicant’s detention until 24 August 2011 pending examination of the case file. The court noted that the grounds which had prompted the application of the custodial measure in the applicant’s case had not changed, and referred to the considerable size of the case file, a case file which neither the applicant, nor his co-defendants or their lawyers had been able to examine in full. 24. On 28 June 2011 the City Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 25. On 11 January 2013 the City Court acquitted the applicant of all charges in a jury trial. The judgment became final on 23 July 2013. 26. Between 5 June 2010 and 29 July 2011 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-47/4 in St Petersburg. The prison was overcrowded. Thus, cell 76, measuring 18 sq. m, was equipped with eight sleeping places and accommodated up to ten inmates, and cell 145, measuring 18 sq. m, was designed for eight people and housed up to ten individuals. Cell 164, measuring 15 sq. m, offered six places, and up to six detainees occupied those places. 27. As mentioned above, on 6 April and 28 June 2011 respectively the City Court examined the applicant’s appeals against the decisions of the District Court of 22 February and 30 May 2011 extending his detention. He participated in the appeals by means of a video link from the remand prison, where he was confined in a metal cage.

5. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Baku. 6. The applicant worked as an investigative journalist since 2005. She worked as a staff reporter and director at the Azerbaijani service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (“Azadliq Radio”), whose broadcasts were often critical of the government, covering various topics, including corruption and violations of human rights. In addition, she worked as a regional coordinator for the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, where she trained journalists in investigation techniques and cross-border reporting. She has received a number of international awards for her journalistic activity. 7. In August 2010 and June 2011, before the events giving rise to the present case, the applicant had published and contributed to articles concerning the alleged involvement of the President’s daughters in various commercial ventures. In early 2012 the applicant claimed that her research had uncovered that the presidential family controlled a mining consortium which had just been awarded a lucrative extraction licence by the Azerbaijani government. 8. During the events giving rise to the present case, the applicant continued to report on the above matters. In particular, on 3 May 2012 she published an article on the above-mentioned mining consortium. On 7 May 2012 she published an article entitled “President’s family benefits from Eurovision Hall”. On 11 October 2012 she wrote about the alleged investments of the presidential family in an article entitled “Azerbaijani enclave in the Czech Republic”. On 3 April 2013 she published an investigative report entitled “Offshore companies provide link between corporate mogul and Azerbaijan’s president”. 9. According to the applicant, since she began reporting critically on the government she has been threatened and intimidated in various ways. 10. On 7 March 2012 the applicant received a letter enclosing six still images from a video taken in her bedroom with a hidden camera. Those images showed her engaged in sexual intercourse with a man who, according to the applicant, was her then boyfriend. The message accompanying the images stated: “Whore, refrain from what you are doing, otherwise you will be shamed! ” (“Qəhbə, özüvü yığışdır. Əks halda rüsvay olacaqsan! ”). The letter had been sent by post from an address in Moscow. The sender’s name as noted on the envelope was “Valeriy Mardanov”. 11. The same images were also sent to two opposition newspapers, Yeni Müsavat and Azadliq, which did not publish them. 12. On the same day the applicant made a statement, distributed through social media, that she would not cease her journalistic activity and would not be silenced. 13. On 9 March 2012 the applicant reported the above-mentioned letter to the prosecution authorities and lodged a formal request for an investigation, arguing that the letter amounted to blackmail related to her recent journalistic activities. She also requested measures to protect her safety. The investigation was formally launched on 15 March 2012 (see section C below). 14. In the meantime, on 13 March 2012 the newspaper Yeni Azərbaycan (the official newspaper of the ruling New Azerbaijan Party) published an article titled “Khadija Ismayilova as she seems and as she is”. The article began with a reference to the applicant’s statement about receiving the threatening letter. It further criticised the applicant and those who had spoken in her support. In particular, it criticised both her and a colleague at Azadliq Radio for lack of professionalism and anti-government bias. Moreover, citing another former employee of Azadliq Radio, it also insinuated that the applicant was a person of immoral behaviour who spent a great deal of her time in bars and clubs and regularly held all-night parties and “orgies” with her friends in her office. The same article was published in the newspaper İki Sahil on 15 March 2012. 15. On 14 March 2012 a video was posted online on a website named “musavat.tv”, featuring scenes of a sexual nature involving the applicant and her then boyfriend, taken with the same camera hidden in her bedroom. Müsavat is a political opposition party, which indicated that it had nothing to do with the website and condemned the posting of the video. According to the applicant, the domain name “musavat.tv” was apparently chosen solely for the posting of the video, to create the suggestion of a link with the Müsavat party or its newspaper, Yeni Müsavat. 16. On 16 March 2012 the newspaper Səs published an article titled “Not surprising”. The article spoke about a number of scandals in which various opposition politicians had been involved. At the end, the article briefly alluded to the incident involving the applicant, without going into much detail about it, but stating that it was not surprising that many opposition-oriented individuals were involved in “sex scandals”. 17. On 5 April 2012 Səs published another article titled “Who should Khadija sue?” attacking the applicant for “immoral behaviour” and suggesting that the video scandal had been created by herself and her friends at “musavat.tv”. 18. Several more articles attacking the applicant were published later in Səs. 19. In April 2013 another video purporting to show the applicant engaged in sexual activities was posted on a website named “ictimaipalatka.com” where, according to the applicant, similar videos of other activists and anti-government figures had been posted previously. This particular video did not in fact involve the applicant, but rather a woman meant to resemble her. 20. While the investigation in connection with the threatening letter and the posting of the first video was under way (see below), in July 2013 another video of the applicant and her then boyfriend filmed in the applicant’s bedroom was posted on “ictimaipalatka.com”. This video actually featured the applicant, and had been taken with the same hidden camera used for the first video. According to the applicant, the webpage of the video was contained in a frame marked “SesTV Player”. 21. As noted above, on 9 March 2012 the applicant reported the threatening letter received on 7 March 2012 to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General’s Office, complaining that it was blackmail in connection with her journalistic activity, and asking the prosecution authorities to ensure her safety, to investigate the matter, and to hold those responsible for the threat and the video accountable. 22. On 15 March 2012, one week after the applicant’s formal complaint and a day after the video was posted, the Prosecutor General’s Office launched criminal proceedings under Article 156 (breach of inviolability of private life) of the Criminal Code on the basis of the applicant’s request, and assigned the case to the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office. 23. On 17 March 2012 the applicant was questioned by Mr N.A., an investigator of the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office. 24. On 17 March 2012 the applicant found out, with the help of friends, that as well as the camera in the bedroom there were multiple other hidden cameras installed in her flat. Moreover, they found a newly installed second telephone line and data wires which had evidently been used for transmitting the footage shot with the hidden cameras. 25. According to the applicant, she and her friends returned to the flat the next day and discovered several signs indicating that someone had been in it overnight. 26. On 19 March 2012 the applicant went to the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office to request an inspection of her flat. According to the applicant, the investigators visited her flat, but refused to comment on the purpose or implications of the wires, indicating that they did not possess the technical expertise to do so. They also refused to arrange for an inspection by an expert, but agreed that the applicant would herself contact the Automatic Telephone Station No. 538 (ATS), operated by Baktelekom, a State-owned communications company, which was responsible for the telephone box outside the flat to which the wires were connected. 27. The applicant was told at the ATS that the designated service engineer for the applicant’s building was Mr N.J., an employee of the ATS. The applicant managed to track down Mr N.J. and arranged to meet him in her flat the same day. She also arranged for two investigators from the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, Mr N.A. and his assistant, to be present during the meeting. 28. According to the applicant, during the meeting in her flat on 19 March 2012, Mr N.J. admitted, in the presence of the investigators, the applicant, her lawyer and three of her friends, that in July 2011, on a day off work, Saturday (either 2 or 9 July 2011), on the instructions of his supervisor, he had installed a second telephone line and connected the wires from the ATS to the telephone box outside the applicant’s flat. He had been asked by an unknown man he had met outside the flat to leave an extra fifteen metres of wire so that they could be connected inside the flat. He had also heard other people at work with the wires inside the flat. According to the applicant, during the conversation the investigator Mr N.A. appeared to be recording the engineer’s statements. However, he later tore up his handwritten investigation record and made a new document that did not contain the engineer’s account. He also asked the engineer to remove the second phone line, without documenting its removal. According to the applicant, despite her objections, he did not include Mr N.J.’s statements in the investigation case file and did not mention in the investigation record that there had been a meeting with Mr N.J. at the applicant’s flat. 29. On 21 March 2012 the applicant asked the Chief Prosecutor’s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office to question Mr N.J. Then, according to her, on 3 April and 12 April 2012 she visited the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office to get an update on the status of the investigation, but to no avail. 30. According to the documents submitted by the Government, on 30 March 2012 Mr N.A., the investigator of the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, took a formal decision granting the applicant’s request to have Mr N.J. questioned and to take investigative steps to determine who had instructed him to install wires leading to the applicant’s flat. The Government did not submit any records of Mr N.J.’s questioning or any further decisions by the prosecuting authorities taken in this regard. 31. In the meantime, on 19 March 2012 the investigator ordered an expert examination of gloves, pieces of newspaper and a lock found in the applicant’s flat. 32. Between April 2012 and August 2013, the investigator issued a series of decisions ordering expert examinations of the following items: the still images sent to the applicant and the Yeni Müsavat newspaper; wires found in the applicant’s flat; a disc containing the video recording published on “mustavat.tv”; the postal packaging in which the threatening letter and the still images had been sent to the applicant and the Yeni Müsavat newspaper; and a disc containing the video recording published on “ictimaipalatka.com”. 33. The Government did not submit any expert reports or other documents relating to the above-mentioned decisions. No further documents concerning the investigative steps taken have been made available to the Court by the parties. 34. On 4 April 2012 the applicant published a press release in which she criticised the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office for failing to conduct an adequate investigation, and stated that her access to the investigation material was “extremely limited”. 35. On 13 April 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office against the officials of the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, complaining that the latter were refusing to take obvious and simple investigative steps. 36. The Prosecutor General’s Office did not act on the applicant’s complaint. Instead, on 26 April 2012 the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office published a joint public statement on the status of the investigation (“the status report”). The content of the status report and the proceedings relating to it are described in section D below. 37. On 12 November 2012 the applicant requested from the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office information on the status of the investigation, and copies of any decisions taken. According to the applicant, by letters of 14 and 21 November 2012 the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office replied that the investigation was being conducted and that decisions on the applicant’s various requests had been taken on 31 March and 3 April 2012 (no copies of those letters or decisions are available in the case file). According to the applicant, she wrote a letter dated 28 November 2012 asking for copies of those decisions, since she had not received them. 38. Having received no further replies, on 2 April 2013 the applicant again requested information from the prosecuting authorities on the status of the investigation. On 4 April 2013 the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office replied that decisions taken in respect of her requests had been sent to her on 30 March 2012 and 3 December 2012 (no copy of a decision taken on the latter date is available in the case file). The letter further stated that a number of investigative steps, including various expert examinations, had been taken, and that the investigation was under way. By a letter of 30 April 2013 the Prosecutor General’s Office gave the applicant a similar reply. 39. On 12 August 2013, after the publication of the second hidden video recording in July 2013 (see paragraph 20 above), the applicant lodged a complaint against the prosecuting authorities with the Sabail District Court under the judicial supervision procedure, noting that there had been no effective investigation for over a year, and that the prosecuting authorities had limited themselves to vague indications to the effect that the investigation was ongoing. She asked the court to find the prosecuting authorities’ inactivity unlawful, and sought monetary compensation. 40. By a decision of 13 August 2013 the Sabail District Court refused to examine the complaint, finding that it had no competence to examine it under the judicial supervision procedure, because the matter complained of was not among the exclusive list of types of decisions and steps by the prosecuting authorities, established by Articles 449.3.1 to 449.3.7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”), that could be challenged under the judicial supervision procedure. The court noted that a complaint concerning the alleged inactivity of the prosecuting authorities should be made under the rules of administrative procedure. 41. On 16 August 2013 the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, ruling on a request by the applicant, refused to allow her access to the investigation case file until the investigation was complete, relying on Articles 87, 281.3 and 284-286 of the CCrP. On the same day, it refused her request for the criminal offence to be reclassified as falling under Article 163.1 (hindrance of a journalist’s lawful professional activity) of the Criminal Code. 42. On 28 August 2013 the applicant lodged another complaint with the Sabail District Court under the judicial supervision procedure, with content similar to that of the previous complaint of 12 August 2013. On 30 August 2013 the Sabail District Court rejected the complaint, for the same reasons as in the decision of 13 August 2013. On 9 September 2013 the applicant appealed. On 18 September 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Sabail District Court’s inadmissibility decision. 43. On 18 September 2013 the applicant lodged a third complaint with the Sabail District Court under the judicial supervision procedure, which was again rejected by that court on 30 September 2013, and by the Baku Court of Appeal on 17 October 2013. 44. In the meantime, as recommended by the Sabail District Court, on 28 August 2013 the applicant lodged a complaint against the prosecuting authorities with the Baku Economic Administrative Court no. 1 under the rules of administrative procedure. 45. On 19 September 2013 the Baku Economic Administrative Court no. 1 refused to hear the complaint, finding that under the Code of Administrative Procedure and the Law on Administrative Proceedings it had no competence to examine complaints concerning the activities of criminal prosecution authorities in criminal proceedings. 46. On 14 October 2013 the applicant appealed, stating that she had been instructed to pursue the administrative procedure by the Sabail District Court. 47. On 4 December 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the Baku Economic Administrative Court no. 1. 48. On 20 December 2013 the applicant lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Court, which was rejected on 6 February 2014. 49. As mentioned above, in response to the applicant’s complaint of 13 April 2012, on 26 April 2012 the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office published a status report on the investigation (see paragraph 36 above). The status report noted that the applicant and her lawyer had been spreading false information in the media about the alleged inadequacy of the investigation and, as such, had attempted to “create a negative opinion” among the public concerning the investigation. It further noted that the investigating authorities had taken a number of investigative steps, in particular: “At the request of [the applicant], on 15 March 2012 the Prosecutor General’s Office opened a criminal case under Article 156.1 of the Criminal Code and assigned the investigation to the Investigation Department of the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office. At the initial stages of the investigation [the applicant] was questioned in the presence of her representative A. Ismayilov; she was designated a victim of crime, and her rights and obligations were explained to her. Thereafter, in order to discover the traces of crime and material evidence and to determine other circumstances important for the case, [the investigating authorities] conducted, with the participation of an expert, a criminalist, [the applicant], her representative and attesting witnesses, an inspection of the place of the incident, namely the flat located at ..., and owned by ..., where the applicant lived as a tenant, took relevant material evidence from the place of the incident, ordered and obtained expert reports, and made relevant inquiries and issued instructions relating to the case.” 50. The status report then provided information about the period during which the applicant had rented the flat, as well as the identities of individuals to whom she had subsequently sublet the flat, and the financial arrangements between them. 51. The status report proceeded as follows: “In addition to this, the investigation also established that envelopes containing photographs of [the applicant] were mailed under the name of Valeriy Mardanov from Moscow to [the applicant’s] registered address at ... and to the editorial office of the Yeni Müsavat newspaper. The envelopes were seized by the investigation and added to the case material. [The applicant’s] request for additional persons to be questioned as witnesses, received by the investigation on 28 March 2012, was granted, and those persons were questioned.” 52. The status report then noted that in addition to the above steps being taken, a number of other persons were also questioned. The report disclosed the full names of those individuals, as well as their professional occupations or their relation to the applicant. They included reference to the man with whom, according to the report, the applicant was “in a liaison”, her sister, her brother, her friends and her colleagues who had visited her flat. In all, the report gave the full names of fifteen people, as well as the professional occupations of most of them. 53. The status report concluded as follows: “On 13 and 17 April 2012 [the applicant] was invited to the investigation department in connection with the necessary investigative steps, but she did not appear; she only appeared for questioning on 26 April 2012. Since the beginning of the investigation, in addition to [the applicant] and her representative being summoned by the investigation, on 17 March, 3 April and 14 April 2012 the administration of the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office received visits from her and her representative during which they heard her requests and gave specific instructions to the investigation team for full, impartial and comprehensive conduct of the investigation.” 54. As to the information mentioned in paragraphs 50 and 52 above, according to the applicant she herself had reluctantly provided much of the above information to the investigators at the request of a prosecutor, in order to assist the investigation, expecting that the information would be kept confidential. She had been promised by officials of the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office that the information would remain confidential. 55. On 27 April 2012 the spokesman of the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office indicated in an interview that the status report had been released in response to the applicant’s public complaints about the lack of an effective investigation. He also stated that there was nothing unlawful in the contents of the status report. 56. On 21 June 2012 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Sabail District Court against the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, Mr N.A. (an investigator at the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office) and Mr A.A. (the Baku City Deputy Prosecutor). She argued that the publication of detailed information concerning her private life in the status report of 26 April 2012 constituted an unlawful and unjustified interference with her right to respect for private life and freedom of expression, arguing that the status report was an integral part of the “slander campaign” against her, which also included the release of the “sex video” and the newspaper articles. She argued that the publication of this information had been in breach of, inter alia, Article 32 of the Constitution, Article 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and Article 8 of the Convention. She sought compensation for distress in the amount of 40,000 Azerbaijani manats (AZN) and a public apology by the defendants. 57. By a judgment of 27 July 2012 the Sabail District Court dismissed the applicant’s claims, finding that the purpose of the status report had been to counter the possibility of the public forming a negative opinion about the investigating authorities as a result of the applicant’s public complaints that the investigation was ineffective. The court found that the information in the status report was of a “general character”, and had not breached the requirements of the domestic law concerning individuals’ privacy. Specifically, it found as follows: “[The status report] contained information of a general character in order to prevent creation of a negative opinion among the public; when the information was written, the requirements of the domestic legislation concerning the protection of Khadija Ismayilova’s private and family confidentiality were not breached. Therefore, the information in [the status report] cannot be considered damaging to the plaintiff’s reputation or her private and family life.” 58. The court also held that the applicant had been unable to demonstrate that she had suffered any non-pecuniary damage under the provisions of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure as interpreted by the Plenum of the Supreme Court. 59. On 24 September 2012 the applicant appealed, reiterating her arguments and complaining further that the first-instance court had ignored her legal and factual arguments and had failed to rely on any legal provisions in arriving at its decision. 60. On 20 November 2012 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance court’s judgment, agreeing with its reasoning. 61. On 29 March 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and upheld the lower courts’ judgments, finding that the publication of the status report had not interfered with the applicant’s private or family life and had not been in breach of the relevant domestic legal provisions. 62. In December 2014 the applicant was arrested and detained on the charge that she had incited a former colleague to commit suicide. In February 2015 she was additionally charged with the criminal offences of large-scale misappropriation, illegal entrepreneurship, large-scale tax evasion and abuse of power in connection with her activity as the director of Azadliq Radio during the period from 1 July 2008 to 1 October 2010. The events relating to her arrest and detention are the subject of a separate application (no. 30778/15), in which the applicant raised complaints under Articles 5, 6 § 2, 10 and 18 of the Convention. 63. On 1 September 2015 the applicant was sentenced to seven and a half years’ imprisonment. After a series of appeals, on 25 May 2016 she was acquitted in part and her sentence was reduced to three and a half years’ imprisonment, conditionally suspended for five years. She was released from prison on the same day.

5. The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Chișinău. 6. On 15 June 2014 the applicant had an altercation with two persons, one of whom was in an advanced state of intoxication. During the altercation, the applicant pushed the intoxicated person and punched the other one. As a result, the intoxicated person fell to the ground and received a serious head trauma. The scene was witnessed by the wife of the intoxicated person and a neighbour. 7. On the same day the applicant was arrested and placed in detention. On 18 June 2014 the Ialoveni District Court ordered the applicant’s remand in custody pending trial for a period of thirty days. The court considered that the detention was necessary because the applicant was accused of a serious offence and there appeared to be a risk of his interfering with the investigation, absconding and re-offending. 8. The applicant appealed against the detention order and argued, inter alia, that he had a permanent abode, an employment and no history of violent behaviour. He also submitted that he could not influence any witnesses because they were in another village and that a restraining order to quit his town of residence would be sufficient to eliminate that risk. He also submitted that he had cooperated with the investigators from the beginning of the investigation and that he could not leave the country because his travel documents had been seized. 9. On 1 July 2014 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 10. On 11 July 2014 the Ialoveni District Court examined the Prosecutor’s request for a prolongation of the applicant’s detention and a habeas corpus request lodged by the applicant. It found no reasons to detain the applicant in custody and ordered his immediate release under judicial control. The applicant had no right to leave the town without approval by the court and to communicate with the persons involved in the criminal investigation. The Prosecutor’s Office appealed. 11. On 22 July 2014 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld the Prosecutor’s appeal, quashed the above decision and ordered the applicant’s remand in custody for a period of thirty days. The reasons given by the Court of Appeal were that the applicant could abscond, interfere with the investigation and re-offend. The applicant was not arrested and, according to him, was told to go home. 12. On 25 August 2014 the applicant was arrested at home and placed in detention. 13. On 1 September 2014 the applicant lodged a habeas corpus request with the Ialoveni District Court. He argued, inter alia, that the case was not complex and that all witnesses had been heard in the beginning of the investigation. 14. On 17 September 2014 the Prosecutor’s Office lodged an application for the prolongation of the applicant’s detention arguing, inter alia, that between 22 July 2014 and 25 August 2014 the applicant had absconded from the investigating authority. 15. On 23 September 2014 the Ialoveni District Court upheld the Prosecutor’s request and prolonged the applicant’s detention for a period of thirty days. The reasons for detention were the same as before: risk of absconding, risk of interfering with the investigation and re-offending. 16. The applicant appealed against the above decision and argued, inter alia, that there was no risk of absconding or interfering with the investigation. He submitted that, on 22 July 2014, when the Chișinău Court of Appeal had quashed the Ialoveni District Court’s decision of 11 July 2014 and had ordered the prolongation of his detention, he had not been arrested but advised to go home. He went home and nobody came after him until 25 August 2014. Between 11 July and 25 August 2014 he had not attempted to abscond or interfere with the investigation. 17. On 7 October 2014 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The court found that the risk of the applicant’s absconding was real because he had absconded from investigating authorities between 22 July and 25 August 2014. 18. On 17 October 2014 the Public Prosecutor’s Office applied to the Ialoveni District Court for a prolongation of the applicant’s detention for another thirty days. One of the reasons relied upon by the Prosecutor was that the applicant had absconded from investigating authorities between 22 July and 25 August 2014. 19. On 22 October 2014 the applicant requested access to the casefile with a view to obtaining a copy of the materials filed by the public prosecutor together with his application of 7 October 2014. He argued that the public prosecutor’s application was accompanied by a set of documents, while he had only received a copy of the application. The applicant lodged on the same date a habeas corpus request. 20. On 22 October 2014 the Ialoveni District Court upheld the public prosecutor’s application and ordered the prolongation of the applicant’s detention for thirty days on the ground that there was a risk of absconding and interfering with the investigation. The applicant’s habeas corpus request was rejected while his request for access to the materials of the file was not examined. The applicant appealed and complained about the lack of relevant and sufficient reasons for detention. He did not complain in his appeal about the lack of access to the materials in the casefile. 21. On 4 November 2014 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 22. On 14 November 2014 the Public Prosecutor’s Office applied again to the Ialoveni District Court for a prolongation of the applicant’s detention. 23. On 20 November 2014 the applicant lodged a habeas corpus request. 24. On 20 November 2014 the Ialoveni District Court dismissed the public prosecutor’s request and upheld the applicant’s habeas corpus request. The applicant was released from detention and ordered not to leave his town and not to interfere with the investigation. 25. Throughout his detention the applicant was held in Prison no. 13. 26. According to the applicant, he was detained in overcrowded cells which lacked ventilation. His co-detainees smoked in the cells. The cells were equipped with squat toilets which were not properly separated. There was a sink with a rusted tap and the quality of water was very bad. The food was insufficient. 27. On 9 March 2017 the Supreme Court of Justice convicted the applicant for hooliganism and unintentional infliction of severe bodily harm and sentenced him to a suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment.

5. The applicants were both born in 1968 and live in Marsalforn and Naxxar, respectively. 6. The applicants are owners (each own a half undivided share) of the property at number 85, St. Francis Square, Alley No. 3, Qormi, Malta. 7. On 18 November 1986 the applicants granted the property on emphyteusis for twenty‑one years to Mr and Ms E. at a rent of approximately 230 euros (EUR). 8. On 31 December 1992, the property was requisitioned by the Director of Social Housing by virtue of requisition order no. RO53704 (hereinafter referred to as “the requisition order”). No reason for the requisition was set out in the order. The property was allocated to Mr and Ms A. At the request of the Housing Authority, on 26 March 1997, the emphyteutical grant in favour of Mr and Ms E. was transferred to Mr and Ms A. 9. The contract of emphyteusis expired in 2007. However, given Article 12A, of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance, Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta (see Relevant domestic law), which provided for the automatic conversion of the emphyteusis into a lease, Mr and Ms A. continued to occupy the property by title of lease. 10. Mr and Ms A. paid the applicants EUR 279.52 annually by way of rent pursuant to the rent control legislation. However, the applicants did not accept this rental amount on the ground that it was insignificant when compared to the rental value which the property would have fetched on the open market. Due to this refusal the rent was to be deposited with the court registry. The rental amount was never revised in the subsequent years, the 2010 amendments (see Relevant domestic law) not being applicable as the rent exceeded the EUR 185 stipulated by law. 11. On 9 March 2009 the applicants filed proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence. The applicants claimed that their rights, as protected under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, were being violated because they had not received adequate compensation for the forced occupation of their property and because the authorities had failed to properly look after the property after taking possession of it. 12. On 26 March 2013 the court decided in favour of the applicants. The court found a violation of the applicants’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. It confirmed that the applicants were the legitimate owners of the property, it declared the requisition order null and void, and ordered the release of the premises with vacant possession in favour of the applicants, as well as the eviction of Mr and Ms A. from the property within one month. It awarded EUR 50,000 in compensation (kumpens dovut) to the applicants to be paid by the Housing Authority. The costs of the proceedings were to be paid by the Housing Authority and Mr and Mrs A. 13. The court held that keeping the requisition order in place was unjustifiable since Mr and Ms A. had left the property in an abandoned state and left it to deteriorate without carrying out any acts of ordinary maintenance. Thus, the very scope of requisitioning a property for the purpose of “supplying housing accommodation” was not met in the present case given that Mr and Ms A. had abandoned the property. Furthermore, a disproportionate and excessive burden was being imposed on the applicants, since they had been required to bear most of the social and financial costs of supplying housing accommodation. A balance had not been struck between the interests of the applicants (as owners of the property) and the interests of the public especially since the property lay abandoned. 14. The court‑appointed architect estimated that it would require 25,000 Maltese liri (MTL) (equivalent to EUR 58,234) to make the property habitable again and he estimated the property’s sale value on the market (in 2010) to be EUR 139,800 and its rental value (for the same year) to be EUR 4,893 annually. Against that background, the court considered that the discrepancy between that amount and the rental sum offered by Mr and Ms A. rendered the situation devoid of any proportionality as required under the Convention. 15. Mr and Ms A. did not file an appeal but the Attorney General and the Housing Authority both appealed against the decision of the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence. The applicants made submissions in reply to the appeal lodged by the defendants, and asked the Constitutional Court to confirm the first‑instance judgment. 16. On 18 July 2014 the Constitutional Court upheld the first‑instance judgment in part. It confirmed that the requisition order constituted an interference with the applicants’ property and amounted to a violation of the applicants’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. However, the Constitutional Court revoked the first‑intance court’s order to evict Mr and Ms A. from the premises, and revoked the annulment of the requisition order. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court reduced the compensation due as non‑pecuniary damages from EUR 50,000 to EUR 12,000. One‑fifth of the costs of the appeal were to be borne by the applicants. 17. The Constitutional Court confirmed that the applicants had proved ownership of the property and noted that as a result of the requisition order the applicants’ father lost possession of the property and had no means of regaining possession as long as the requisition order remained in force. It further noted that the court‑appointed architect had described the property as having been neglected for a long time and left without ordinary maintenance; it was (at the time of the judgment) uninhabitable. It followed that the first‑instance court’s conclusion, to the effect that the property was not being lived in, was correct. The deterioration of the property also caused damage to the owners as substantial costs would have to be incurred in order to carry out repairs. 18. In the light of these circumstances, the Constitutional Court considered that the requisition order was putting a disproportionate and excessive burden on the applicants, who, moreover, were precluded from taking judicial action before the ordinary courts against Mr and Ms A., with the aim of protecting their interests. This was even more so given that the Housing Authority did nothing, and did not appear to have the will to do anything, to remedy the damage done to the property. Indeed it appeared that the requisition order was kept in place because the Housing Authority wanted to exclude the possibility of Mr and Ms A. being evicted from the property. Nevertheless the court considered that Mr and Ms A., could still be protected through the lease agreement. 19. As to redress, the Constitutional Court observed that the first‑instance court had awarded compensation in the light of the court‑appointed architect’s valuations of the property and the expenses required to rehabilitate the property. However, it considered that while the applicants deserved compensation for the violation of their rights, namely non‑pecuniary damages, the quantum established by the court of first‑instance was excessive. In its view, constitutional redress proceedings should not serve as a replacement to ordinary remedies available to the applicants. Once the requisition order was annulled (by means of a judicial review procedure), the applicants had other remedies to deal with both the eviction of Mr and Ms A. and the award of material damages before the ordinary courts. The Constitutional Court also observed that the applicants took a long time before taking action to protect their fundamental rights, namely, in 2009, around seventeen years after the violation of their rights first occurred. Therefore, as a result of this delay the Constitutional Court considered that the amount of EUR 12,000 was just and equitable as compensation for non‑pecuniary damage. In relation to practical measures, the Constitutional Court considered that since the applicants still had a remedy under Article 469A, by means of which they could attack the requisition order before the ordinary courts, it was not for it to annul the requisition order. 20. On 5 August 2014 the Housing Authority derequisitioned the property of the applicants. However, up to the date of the lodging of the application, the property still had not been returned to the applicants. No keys were returned to them and they had no means of taking possession of the property unilaterally. 21. On 31 October 2014, the applicants wrote to the Housing Authority requesting that a declaration be made on whether the premises were vacant and requesting the Housing Authority to prepare a condition report detailing the state of the premises at the end of the requisition period. According to the applicants, the Housing Authority failed to reply. 22. During the observations stage of proceedings before the Court the parties submitted an update of the situation. On 31 August 2015 the Housing Authority wrote to the applicants informing them that they could collect the keys of the property. The applicants refused to withdraw the keys in the absence of the drawing up of a condition report in the presence of the authorities since ‑ as had already transpired in the domestic proceedings ‑ the property had suffered huge damage while subject to the requisition order. The applicants thus wanted a condition report to be drawn up, in the presence of the authority, to enable them to obtain compensation for the damage incurred which was the responsibility of the State in line with Article 5 of the Housing Act (see Relevant domestic law below). The authorities refused to co-operate and informed the applicants that if they wished they could draw up a report at their own expense. In the Government’s view if the applicants wished to obtain compensation for damage it was for them to lodge the relevant domestic proceedings. The applicants having failed to withdraw the keys, on 7 September 2016 the Housing Authority deposited the keys in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1976 and is currently serving a prison sentence. 5. On 14 March 2007 criminal proceedings were initiated into the disappearance of A.S. in Irkutsk. The applicant was suspected of having committed aggravated murder against A.S. The applicant was arrested in Ussuriysk at around 9 a.m. on 8 April 2007 by traffic police officers, taken to the Ussuriysk town police station and held in a temporary detention cell overnight. Next day he was taken to Irkutsk by aeroplane. 6. There are no indications in statements by four traffic police officers who arrested the applicant (made on 16 April 2007 to an investigator of the Ussuriysk town prosecutor’s office) that the applicant resisted arrest or that any force or handcuffs were used in the course of his arrest. 7. At around 11 p.m. on 9 April 2007 the applicant was taken to the Sverdlovskiy district police department of Irkutsk. 8. His account of subsequent events is the following. He was placed in a room on the third floor, where seven police officers were waiting. They shackled him to a chair and subjected him to beatings during the night of 9 April 2007. They placed a gas mask over his head and closed off the air flow. He was kicked in the chest, punched in the ears and given electric shocks. He lost consciousness several times. The applicant agreed to sign papers given to him by the police officers on the condition that they stopped physically assaulting him. 9. According to a record of the applicant’s arrest for murder signed by the applicant in the absence of a lawyer, it was drawn up at 12.30 a.m. on 10 April 2007 by investigator A.M. from the Sverdlovskiy district prosecutor’s office of Irkutsk. It indicates that the applicant was arrested at 10 p.m. on 9 April 2007 at the Sverdlovskiy district police department. 10. Next morning, from 10.30 a.m. to 2.20 p.m., investigator P. from the Sverdlovskiy district prosecutor’s office questioned the applicant as a suspect in the presence of a lawyer appointed by investigator P. According to the record of the questioning, the applicant gave statements voluntarily, he had injuries from handcuffs because “he had put up resistance”, and he was not subjected to any violence. The applicant gave self-incriminating statements in relation to the crimes against A.S. Later, during his trial, the applicant claimed that the State-appointed lawyer had not been present during his questioning and had only signed the record of his questioning at the end. On an unspecified date (before 6 June 2007) another lawyer started representing the applicant. 11. At 11.20 p.m. on 10 April 2007 the applicant was placed in an Irkutsk temporary detention facility (IVS). 12. On 11 April 2007 the Sverdlovskiy District Court of Irkutsk remanded the applicant in custody. On the same day the applicant was placed in a pre-trial detention facility in Irkutsk (IZ 38/1/2). 13. According to a certificate signed by the IVS doctor, the applicant was examined on 11 April 2007 and had bruises in the area of the left collarbone, left shoulder and left lumbar region, and abrasions in the area of the elbow joints, both hands and wrists. The certificate referred to a home accident without any further details. 14. On 11 April 2007 investigator P. ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant in connection with the criminal case against him. According to report no. 4046 completed on 11 April 2007 by the Irkutsk Regional Forensic Medical Bureau, he was examined that day. The applicant had the following injuries: (i) ten irregularly shaped bruises measuring between 9 x 7 cm and 3 x 2 cm on his chest, left shoulder, left iliac bone, both forearms, elbows, right of the lower spine and outside of the left ear, which had been caused by hard, blunt objects with a limited surface area; and (ii) eleven abrasions in stripe-like shapes measuring between 3 x 0.2 cm and 1 x 0.2 cm on his right wrist and wrist joints, which had been caused by hard objects with an explicitly limited surface area. All injuries had been caused approximately two days before the examination and were classified as injuries not occasioning actual bodily harm. In reply to the investigator’s question whether the injuries could have been self-inflicted by the applicant’s own hand, the expert stated that the injuries were not of the kind which could be inflicted by one’s own hand. 15. According to records from IZ 38/1/2, on arrival on 11 April 2007 the applicant was examined and had (i) a contusion to soft tissues in the area of the right elbow joint; (ii) abrasions on both wrist joints; and (iii) abrasions on the right wrist. 16. According to the applicant, soon after his arrival at the pre-trial detention facility he lodged a complaint with the Irkutsk regional prosecutor’s office requesting that the police officers be prosecuted for their unlawful conduct. 17. According to a letter of 29 May 2009 from IZ 38/1/2, on 16 April 2007 the material in relation to the applicant’s injuries recorded on his arrival at IZ 38/1/2 was forwarded to the Ussuriysk town police department for an inquiry. According to a letter of 10 June 2009 from the Ussuriysk town police department, the applicant’s complaint was examined and a refusal to institute criminal proceedings was issued pursuant to Article 24 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCrP”) for lack of the elements of a crime. 18. On 12 March 2008 the investigative committee for the Irkutsk region refused to initiate criminal proceedings based on a pre-investigation inquiry into the applicant’s injuries which had been recorded by the forensic medical expert. The investigator noted the applicant’s statements that he had had injuries from handcuffs because “he had put up resistance” and that he had not been subjected to any violence. The investigator concluded that the injuries on his wrists had been caused as a result of the justified use of handcuffs because under the domestic law the police had a right to use handcuffs to suppress resistance and escort arrested individuals to a police station safely. The investigator further noted that the applicant’s statements had not contained any explanations in relation to the remainder of the applicant’s injuries or a request to prosecute those responsible. He stated that an assault not occasioning actual bodily harm (Article 116 § 1 of the Criminal Code) was a case of private prosecution which could not be opened without a relevant complaint against those responsible. He concluded that no criminal proceedings should be initiated pursuant to Article 24 § 1 (5) of the CCrP since no such complaint had been lodged by the applicant. 19. On 28 April 2010 the Irkutsk Regional Court received the applicant’s appeal dated 16 April 2010 against the refusal to institute criminal proceedings of 12 March 2008. In his appeal the applicant stated that his complaint about the police ill-treatment dated 5 May 2007 had been dispatched by the pre-trial detention facility on 7 May 2007. 20. On 3 December 2013 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Irkutsk examined the applicant’s complaint that a timely investigation into his ill‑treatment by the police officers had not been conducted and that the decision of 12 March 2008 refusing to open a criminal case was unlawful. The court held that the decision of 12 March 2008 was lawful and well‑founded and that there had been no inactivity on the part of the investigating authority in dealing with the applicant’s complaint. 21. It appears that on 12 March, 23 April and 17 August 2009 refusals to open a criminal case were issued in relation to the applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment by the investigative committee for the Sverdlovsk district of Irkutsk pursuant to Article 24 § 1 (2) of the CCrP, as none of the elements of the crime under Article 116 § 1 of the Criminal Code were present. The former two refusals were annulled on unspecified dates. 22. On 12 April 2011 the acting head of the investigative committee for the Sverdlovsk district of Irkutsk overruled the refusal to open a criminal case of 17 August 2009 as unsubstantiated and unlawful, and ordered an additional inquiry. She pointed out the need to interview the applicant, identify the police officers he had resisted during his arrest, interview those police officers, assess police officers’ alleged misconduct under Articles 286 § 3 (a) and 302 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers with the use of violence and forced extraction of confession respectively), and carry out other activities in order to ensure a full inquiry. 23. In a letter of 12 October 2011 the Irkutsk regional prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that on 22 April 2011 the investigative committee for the Sverdlovskiy district of Irkutsk had refused to open a criminal case in relation to the applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment by the police officers from the Sverdlovskiy district police department of Irkutsk pursuant to Article 24 § 1 (2) of the CCrP, as none of the elements of the crime under Article 286 § 3 (a) of the Criminal Code were present. 24. On 24 June 2008 the Irkutsk Regional Court convicted the applicant of A.S.’s murder, theft and other offences and sentenced him to nineteen years’ imprisonment, to run from 9 April 2007. It relied, in particular, on the applicant’s self-incriminating statements made during his questioning as a suspect. 25. At his trial, the applicant pleaded guilty in part. He alleged that unlawful investigation techniques and violence had been used to force him to confess to the crimes. In particular, he stated that when he had been taken to the Sverdlovskiy district police station, a gas mask had been placed over his head and he had been given electric shocks to extract a confession. According to the applicant, he had been questioned all night long, had lost consciousness, and had been ready to sign any papers. His hands had been injured by handcuffs. 26. The trial court dismissed the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment, noting that he had not indicated who had allegedly used violence against him, and had not explained why violence had been used against him after he had given his self-incriminating statements about the crimes. 27. On 11 December 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia partly modified this judgment on appeal and sentenced the applicant to eighteen years’ and six months’ imprisonment. The appellate court relied on the refusal to open a criminal case of 12 March 2008, noting the applicant’s statements that the injuries on the wrists had been caused as a result of the use of handcuffs to suppress the applicant’s resistance. It fully endorsed the trial court’s findings concerning the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment and its use of the applicant’s self-incriminating statements at the preliminary investigation as evidence. 28. On 24 November 2009 a judge of the Supreme Court of Russia rejected the applicant’s request for supervisory review of his case, stating that the decisions of the courts of both instances to dismiss the applicant’s complaint that he had been coerced by violence to give his self‑incriminating statements were well-founded. 29. On 9 June 2012 the Irkutsk Regional Court ordered that the term of the applicant’s imprisonment should run from 8 April 2007, the day when he had actually been arrested.

4. The first applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Qormi. The second applicant is a limited liability company incorporated in 1996 and registered in Marsa, Malta. The second applicant is owned by the first applicant. 5. On 27 July 2011, the Court of Magistrates as a court of criminal judicature found M. (the first applicant’s son, who lives under the same roof as the first applicant) guilty of involuntary grievous bodily harm of two minors, and of driving a Peugeot van with registration number HBD096 (hereinafter referred to as “the Peugeot”) without a licence. The Peugeot was registered in the name of Maxkim Limited (the second applicant). M. was not an employee of the company. The Court of Magistrates sentenced M. to a term of imprisonment and disqualified him from obtaining a driving licence for a period of time. Furthermore, it ordered the confiscation of the Peugeot, in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 (2) (c) (i) of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Ordinance (hereinafter “the Ordinance”) (see Relevant Domestic Law), since this was more than the third time in which M. was being found guilty of a crime under Article 3 of the Ordinance. 6. M. appealed the decision. 7. On 24 October 2011, the Court of Criminal Appeal reversed the first‑instance court judgment in part, namely lowering the disqualification period to six months. The rest of the judgment was confirmed. As to the confiscation of the Peugeot, the Court of Criminal Appeal noted that the confiscation was a result of the above‑mentioned provision of law which provided that both the person as well as the vehicle must be insured. 8. The authorities eventually took physical possession of the Peugeot. However, by this time, the Peugeot had been returned to the importer following an agreement between him and the second applicant which provided that the latter would not pay any further instalments in connection with the hire purchase agreement with which the car had been acquired. The Government submitted that since this had never happened the vehicle remained owned by the importer, who was in 2018 pursuing proceedings before the domestic courts, and it therefore followed that the second applicant could not be considered to have had a possession. 9. On 6 January 2012 the Court of Magistrates as a court of criminal judicature found M. guilty under Article 61(1) of the Traffic Regulations Ordinance of driving away, with the intention to use, a vehicle of the make Toyota (Vitz) with registration number KIM324 (hereinafter referred to as “the Toyota”). The Toyota was registered in the name of the first applicant. It is not disputed that the Toyota was owned by him. The Court of Magistrates did not order the confiscation of the Toyota (which had already been seized by the police since 9 November 2011) on the ground that M. had used it without the consent of the owner, and thus ordered its release. 10. Despite the above finding, the car was not released by the authorities. 11. The Attorney General (hereinafter referred to as “the AG”) appealed against part of the decision of the Court of Magistrates, requesting the Court of Criminal Appeal to order the confiscation of the Toyota; he also appealed with respect to the punishment imposed. 12. It appears that during these appeal proceedings the first applicant requested the court to release the Toyota. He argued that there was no reason for the Toyota not to be returned to him, since the first‑instance court had not ordered its confiscation and, according to law, the AG’s appeal did not suspend the execution of the judgment of the first‑instance court (Article 416(4) of the Criminal Code) (See Relevant Domestic Law). The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected this request. 13. On 26 March 2014 the Court of Criminal Appeal rejected the AG’s appeal in toto. 14. On 27 March 2014 the Toyota was returned to the first applicant. 15. In the meantime, on 28 November 2012, the applicants (Mr Ciantar in his name and on behalf of Maxkim Limited) filed proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence. They claimed, inter alia, that both the above-mentioned criminal proceedings against M. violated their rights under Articles 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 16. It was argued, in connection with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, that the confiscation of the Peugeot in the first set of criminal proceedings and the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the second set of criminal proceedings rejecting the request to release the Toyota, pending the appeal proceedings, had been ‘unlawful’. 17. Under Article 6 the applicants argued that they had never been accused of a crime and had not had the opportunity to defend themselves before a court; however, they had nonetheless suffered the imposition of a penal punishment upon them. Furthermore, the Court of Criminal Appeal had refused to grant back to the first applicant possession of the Toyota in violation of the law. 18. The applicants requested that the two vehicles be released, and that they be awarded just satisfaction for the violations suffered and the lost use of the two vehicles. 19. On 23 October 2013 the court rejected the applicants’ claims except for that concerning the release of the Toyota. It ordered the Toyota to be released immediately (since the Court of Magistrates had not ordered its confiscation), at least until the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal on the AG’s appeal, which was still pending at the time. 20. In regard to the alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the court held that the confiscation of the Peugeot had been ordered by a final judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the first set of criminal proceedings and therefore there could be no doubt that the confiscation was in compliance with the law (Article 3 of the Ordinance). It noted that Article 3 was aimed at protecting innocent citizens from abuse by people who broke the law by driving vehicles without a licence or without insurance. The fact that the provision ordered the confiscation of a vehicle used by a person caught driving without a licence or without insurance, even if the vehicle belonged to a company the perpetrator worked for, or the vehicle belonged to a family member with whom that perpetrator lived, struck the necessary balance and was an appropriate deterrent to the commission of crime. It followed that it was not in violation of the invoked provisions. 21. Regarding the claim for damages, the court concluded that the applicants must demand them from M., since M. was the one who had violated the law leading to the institution of the criminal proceedings with the ensuing consequences. 22. On 7 November 2013 the applicants filed an appeal before the Constitutional Court. It was argued that in both sets of criminal proceedings the applicants had been unlawfully deprived of their property. According to the applicants, Article 3 was inapplicable to the confiscation of the Peugeot, which could only be possible if, differently from M., the accused had been an employee of Maxkim Limited. The applicants further contended that the withholding of the Toyota by the Court of Criminal Appeal in the second set of criminal proceedings lacked a legal basis, which had not been remedied by the temporary order of the first‑instance constitutional jurisdiction. Further, the latter court had failed to effectively consider their complaints under Article 6 of the Convention. 23. The AG also filed an appeal. 24. On 11 August 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the AG’s appeal and declared that the applicants had suffered a violation of their rights as protected under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In connection with both vehicles, the court found that Article 3 of the Ordinance violated the same right in so far it permitted the confiscation of a vehicle, without the owner of the vehicle being given the opportunity to effectively contest the confiscation. Article 3 of the Ordinance was therefore declared null and void in regard to such consequences. The Constitutional Court ordered the release of both vehicles, and the payment of non‑pecuniary damages in the sum of 300 euros (EUR) to each of the applicants. The rest of the applicants’ claims were rejected. The cost of the appeal proceedings before the Constitutional Court filed by the applicants were to be borne in the proportion of one fifth by the applicants and four fifths by the AG, and the costs of the appeal proceedings before the Constitutional Court filed by the AG were to be borne by him. The applicants’ share of costs amounted to EUR 1,129.46 (of which 425.79 were registry fees). 25. The Constitutional Court noted that, simply because the courts in the first set of criminal proceedings had applied the law did not necessarily mean that there had not been a violation of the applicants’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. While the confiscation of the Peugeot had been lawful, it had however placed a disproportionate and excessive burden upon the applicant [company] thereby leading to a violation of its rights (especially since the applicants had no possibility of defending themselves in order to prevent the confiscation of the vehicle which was mandatory). Furthermore, there existed no adequate or effective remedy to prevent the confiscation of the Peugeot, and third parties were not protected by any procedural safeguards. 26. As for the Toyota, the same last‑mentioned considerations applied. Furthermore, as a result of the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the second set of criminal proceedings, the Constitutional Court concluded that the seizure of that vehicle had been unnecessary and could not be justified as having been done in the interests of justice since no third party had suffered any damage. 27. The confiscation/seizure of both vehicles amounted to, according to the Constitutional Court, a lack of balance between the interests of the general community and the rights of the applicants. Therefore a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had occurred. 28. In regard to the alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention, the court noted that the fact that measures resulting from an act for which a third party (in this case M.) was prosecuted, affecting in an adverse manner the property rights of the applicants, could not in themselves lead to the conclusion that, during the course of the criminal proceedings complained of, any “criminal charge”, for the purpose of Article 6, was brought against the applicants. Therefore, the court concluded that Article 6 in its criminal head was inapplicable and the applicants had not invoked this provision under its civil head. Thus, the claim of a lack of access to court had been unfounded. Furthermore, the court concluded that Article 3 of the Ordinance did not create any presumption of guilt and the applicants had not been found guilty of a crime. 29. In the meantime on 15 October 2012 the importer of the Peugeot started civil proceedings against the applicants for fraudulent behaviour and bad faith when they agreed to return the Peugeot which was potentially subject to a confiscation order. The importer also started proceedings against the Commissioner of Police, as a result of which the above‑mentioned civil proceedings were adjourned sine die. 30. On an unspecified date following the constitutional redress proceedings, the Peugeot was released but remained under the authority of the court due to the above-mentioned issues, and payment of the award of EUR 300 was made to each applicant. On 9 January 2017 the Government paid their share of expenses of the constitutional redress proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Yerevan. 6. On 2 January 2007 M.G. and V.G., two elderly sisters, were found dead in V.G.’s apartment, where they lived together following which the prosecution started an investigation into their death. It appears that the applicant had known V.G., who had drawn up a will on 5 April 2006 according to which she had bequeathed her apartment to the applicant. 7. On the same day forensic medical examinations, including autopsies, were ordered to determine, inter alia, the cause of death of the two sisters. 8. On 2 February 2007 the expert A.D. issued two opinions (nos. 22 and 23). According to the first one, M.G. had died as a result of acute heart failure brought about by low body temperature while opinion no. 23 stated that V.G. had died as a result of hypothermia. 9. On 9 February 2007 the prosecutor decided to terminate the investigation. Relying on forensic medical opinions nos. 22 and 23, the prosecutor found that the sisters’ death had not been intentional or caused by negligence. 10. On 14 February 2007 the applicant submitted V.G.’s will to the notary and gave his acceptance to inherit her apartment. 11. On 1 June 2007 M.G. and V.G.’s niece applied to the prosecutor’s office, stating that although V.G. had bequeathed the apartment to her by the will certified by a public notary back in 1991, she had been informed that the applicant had submitted another will in respect of the same apartment according to which the apartment was to pass down to him. She alleged that her aunt’s signature had been forged on that will. 12. It appears that on 11 July 2007 additional post-mortem forensic medical examinations following the exhumation of the bodies of M.G. and V.G. were ordered to determine, inter alia, whether forensic opinions nos. 22 and 23 had correctly determined the causes of their death and, if not, whether it was possible that they had died as a result of having been poisoned. 13. On 7 August 2007 the investigator decided to start an investigation on account of forgery. 14. It appears that at some point during the investigation the applicant stated that he had never visited the apartment where M.G. and V.G. had lived and did not know its location. Sometime in 2006 V.G., whom he knew, had visited him in his home to hand over some documents to him, namely a will and other documents from the notary informing him that she had bequeathed her apartment to him. 15. On 25 September 2007 G.H and A.B. delivered expert opinions nos. 13/631/K and 14/630/K according to which both sisters had died as a result of poisoning by compounds containing phosphorous. 16. On 26 September 2007 the applicant was charged with fraud and two counts of murder committed for gain. The following day he was detained. 17. On 21 December 2007 a forensic technical and toxicological examination was completed. The results of the applicant’s psychiatric and psychological forensic inpatient examinations were received on 8 February 2008. Three experts G.H., A.D. and M.A. gave expert statements on 6 December 2007, 25 January and 5 February 2008 respectively. 18. On 26 May 2008 further post-mortem forensic medical examinations on additional exhumation of the bodies of M.G. and V.G. were ordered, and they were completed on 27 June 2008. Expert opinions nos. 12/525/K and 13/526/K delivered by S.H. and S.S. confirmed the presence of phosphorous compounds in the bodies of the two victims. 19. On 8 July 2008 the applicant’s case was transferred to the Yerevan Criminal Court for trial. 20. At the hearing of 26 August 2008, the opinions of all expert witnesses were read out aloud. The applicant then orally requested for a possibility to have examined, in court, the expert witnesses A.D., S.H. and S.S., who had delivered the conflicting opinions, in order to clarify a number of issues that required specialist knowledge. The court decided to adjourn the case. 21. At the hearing of 25 September 2008, the applicant’s representative requested again the examination of the expert witnesses but his request was orally rejected by the trial court judge. The judge reasoned this decision by stating that as the subsequent expert opinions already explained the content of the first opinion issued by A.D., it was not necessary to call the expert witnesses. 22. On 21 October 2008 the Yerevan Criminal Court found the applicant guilty of two counts of aggravated murder committed for gain and sentenced him to life imprisonment. In doing so, it mostly relied on the trial statements of the victims’ relatives and neighbours, who confirmed that the applicant had visited the sisters in their apartment several times; on the expert opinions; and on material evidence seized from the applicant’s apartment, namely the originals of the ownership certificate in respect of V.G.’s apartment, V.G.’s will drawn up on 5 April 2006 and a duplicate of V.G.’s death certificate. In finding the applicant guilty, the trial court also took into account the fact that he had previously been convicted of murder carried out for financial gain for killing an elderly woman to obtain possession of her apartment. 23. The applicant lodged an appeal arguing, inter alia, that he had been deprived of the opportunity to examine the experts with regard to their contradictory opinions. 24. On 12 February 2009 the Criminal Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal without addressing the complaint about his inability to have the experts examined during his trial. 25. On 2 July 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar complaints as before. 26. On 28 July 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.

5. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Prague. 6. In 2004 the applicant arrived in Russia, where in 2005 she married Mr I.P., a Russian citizen, with whom in 2009 she had a daughter, also a Russian national. The applicant and her family lived in St Petersburg. 7. The applicant lived in Russia on the basis of regularly extended residence permits. On 17 February 2010 the St Petersburg department of the Federal Migration Service (hereinafter “the FMS”) issued the applicant with a five-year residence permit valid until 17 February 2015. 8. On 15 October 2013 the applicant applied for Russian citizenship. 9. On 18 March 2014 the St Petersburg department of the Federal Security Service (hereinafter “the FSB”) issued a report stating that the applicant posed a national security threat and that her application should therefore be rejected. 10. On 28 March 2014 the FMS rejected the applicant’s citizenship application on the grounds that she posed a threat to national security. 11. On 17 June 2014 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 23 June 2014) the FSB wrote to the FMS recommending that they revoke the applicant’s residence permit. 12. On 21 July 2014 the FMS revoked the applicant’s residence permit, referring to the FSB’s recommendation. The decision stated, in particular, that in view of information received from the FSB, the applicant’s residence permit must be revoked under section 9(1)(1) of the Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners in the Russian Federation (hereinafter “the Foreigners Act”), which provided that a resident permit issued to a foreign national should be revoked if he or she advocated a radical change in the constitutional order of the Russian Federation or otherwise posed a threat to the security of the Russian Federation or its citizens. 13. On 5 August 2014 the applicant was informed by FMS that this revocation decision had been taken. No explanation was provided. She was further informed that she had to leave Russia within fifteen days of the decision (that is, no later than 5 August 2014) and would be subjected to deportation should she fail to comply. A foreign national who had been deported or administratively removed from Russia was not allowed to re-enter the country for five years following such deportation or removal (section 27 § 2 of the Law on the Procedure for Entering and Leaving the Russian Federation, no. 114-FZ of 15 August 1996, as amended on 1 April 2014, “the Entry Procedure Act”). 14. On 23 August 2014 the applicant and her daughter left Russia. 15. The applicant instituted two sets of proceedings in an attempt to obtain a judicial review of the decision to revoke her residence permit. 16. On 6 August 2014 the applicant complained before the Frunzenskiy District Court of St Petersburg (hereinafter “the District Court”), alleging that the decision to annul her residence permit had been groundless. It had violated her right to respect for her family life, as it had compelled her to leave Russia where her husband and minor child were living. The applicant urged the District Court to stay the enforcement of the decision until her complaint had been examined. 17. On 8 August 2014 the District Court refused to stay the enforcement of the decision. The applicant appealed and on 12 November 2014 the St Petersburg City Court (hereinafter “the City Court”) upheld the District Court’s refusal (see paragraph 21 below). 18. On 14 August 2014 the applicant’s counsel asked the District Court to request a copy of the FSB report of 18 March 2014 (see paragraph 9 above) on which the decision to revoke the residence permit had been based. The request was refused. 19. On 19 August 2014 the District Court examined the applicant’s complaint concerning the revocation of her residence permit and rejected it. In its decision, the court did not refer to any documents which had served as the basis for the impugned decision, other than mentioning that the measure had been imposed following the FSB’s recommendation of 17 June 2014 (see paragraph 11 above). The court noted that the FMS was the proper authority to impose the measure and that the relevant procedure had been complied with. It emphasised that the factual information which had served as the basis for the decision was not amenable to judicial scrutiny and that the scope of the court’s review was limited to assessing whether the statutory procedure had been complied with. As to whether the measure amounted to an interference with the applicant’s family life, the court noted that it was open to the applicant to obtain a visa so that she could come to Russia to visit her family. The court neither examined the effect of the impugned measure on the applicant’s family life, nor balanced the public and private interests involved, but stated, in particular: “... given that the residence permit of Ms Gaspar was revoked on the basis of her actions representing a threat to the security of the Russian Federation ... which necessitates taking measures by the Russian Federation for the protection of its interests and those of its citizens, the court believes that when taking the impugned decision, the Federal Migration Service balanced public and private interests.” 20. The applicant’s counsel appealed against the above-mentioned decision to the City Court, stating, amongst other things, that the District Court had unlawfully refrained from judicial scrutiny of the factual circumstances which had served as the basis for the measure imposed on the applicant. He further stated that no evidence whatsoever had been produced in order to prove that the applicant posed a security threat, and she had been given no opportunity to refute those allegations. Lastly, he argued that the District Court had failed to properly examine the interference with the applicant’s family life and to balance the interests at stake. 21. On 12 November 2014 the City Court upheld the decision of 19 August 2014, stating that the District Court had duly examined the necessary legal basis for the measure and that its decision had been lawful and reasonable. As for the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for family life, the court stated: “... the allegations of the applicant’s representative that the implementation of the impugned decision [to revoke the residence permit] would lead to the destruction of the family, cannot serve as the basis for overruling it. These arguments were examined by the court of first instance and were duly rejected.” 22. On 9 October 2014 the applicant’s counsel challenged the legality of the FSB report of 18 March 2014 and its recommendation of 17 June 2014, claiming that those documents had been the basis for the decision to revoke the residence permit. He asked the courts to get hold of a full copy of the FSB report and other relevant documents in order to examine them at a hearing. 23. On 10 November 2014 the complaint was forwarded to the City Court, as the domestic regulations stipulated that the courts at regional level were to examine cases involving State secrets. 24. On 18 December 2014 the City Court examined the complaint in camera. It held that the FSB report and the recommendation had been issued in accordance with the statutory procedure and that they had therefore been lawful. At the hearing, the applicant’s counsel asked the City Court to examine the factual grounds for the decision to exclude the applicant and to urge the FSB to produce evidence showing that the applicant indeed posed a threat to national security. The City Court dismissed the request, stating that as the matter was within the FSB’s exclusive competence, it fell outside of the scope of judicial review and that “the evidence presented to the court did not disclose a violation of the applicant’s rights by the FSB”. In its decision, the court stated, in particular: “... the allegations of the applicant’s representatives concerning the failure of the representatives of the Federal Security Service to submit proof showing the necessity to send the impugned letter [recommending that the residence permit be revoked] to the Federal Migration Service are unsubstantiated, as the Federal Security Service’s information note on Ms Gaspar as presented to the court does not contain any such information.” 25. The applicant’s counsel appealed against the above-mentioned decision to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (hereinafter “the Supreme Court”). He alleged, in particular, that the City Court had rejected the complaint without having properly examined its subject matter, as a full copy of the FSB report and other documents on which the revocation had been based had not been furnished at the hearing. Counsel stated that neither he nor the applicant had been given the chance to familiarise themselves with the contents of the FSB report or with any other documents containing details concerning the nature of the applicant’s activity which allegedly posed a risk to national security. Lastly, counsel stated that the decision at issue had disrupted the applicant’s family life. In a separate request, he asked the Supreme Court to retrieve a full copy of the report and the relevant documents. 26. On 29 April 2015 the Supreme Court examined the appeal in camera and upheld the decision of the City Court. Prior to the hearing, the applicant’s counsel had signed a confidentiality undertaking not to disclose the information examined in the course of the hearing. The FSB provided the court with a copy of its report of 18 March 2014. The Supreme Court perused it and found it lawful. It further held that the information contained in the report was a State secret and that it could not be disclosed. Consequently, the applicant’s counsel was not allowed access to the document, in spite of the confidentiality undertaking. In response to the applicant’s grounds for appeal, the Supreme Court held as follows: “... the applicant’s argument concerning a violation of her right to respect for private and family life by the [FSB] decision cannot be taken into account, as this decision did not concern the applicant’s entry into the Russian Federation to see her family members who were Russian nationals in Russia ... ... the State has the right to take decisions limiting certain rights of foreign citizens, including the right to request residence permits and the right to request the nationality of that State, in the interests of the public, including that of national security. The [lower] court concluded correctly that the guarantees provided to the applicant by the Russian legislation and international laws had been respected in full. Therefore, the impugned decision is lawful and substantiated, and the appeal against it does not provide reasons to overrule it ...” 27. In reply to the Court’s request for the information and documents that served as the basis for the decision to revoke the applicant’s residence permit, including the FSB’s recommendation of 17 June 2014, the Government furnished copies of two documents totalling six pages: the FMS’s decision to reject the applicant’s Russian citizenship application of 28 March 2014 (see paragraph 10 above), and the decision of 21 July 2014 to revoke her residence permit (see paragraph 12 above).

5. The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Pogradec. 6. According to the applicant, on 6 August 2012 he witnessed a violent verbal altercation between N.P., a relative of his, and A.S. in one of the main streets of Pogradec. The applicant’s intervention to calm down N.P. and A.S. was unsuccessful. The verbal exchange became increasingly heated and ended in the use of physical violence. 7. After the eruption of the physical violence, a special police unit of the Rapid Reaction Force (Forcat e Ndërhyrjes së Shpejtë, hereinafter “the RRF”) intervened to put an end to the violence. As a result, the applicant and the other two individuals were taken to the local police station. In his application form, the applicant submitted that he had sustained injuries as a result of the police intervention, and that on the way to the police station he had been insulted, threatened and ill-treated by RRF police officers. His requests to be taken to a hospital to receive medical treatment had gone unanswered. 8. The relevant criminal file, which was submitted by the Government as part of their observations, indicated that two investigations had been opened into the criminal offence of the commission of arbitrary actions by a person vested with public powers in the exercise of his duties, as provided for in Article 250 of the Criminal Code (Kodi Penal, hereinafter “the CC”). 9. A patrol report (raport shërbimi) drawn up by the RRF officers’ team leader, V.B., and dated 6 August 2012 stated that RRF forces had been informed of a violent physical dispute in one of the main streets of Pogradec at around 7.40 p.m. As a result, they had intervened and taken three people to the local police station. According to the report, N.P. and the applicant had physically and verbally resisted the RRF officers. The report further stated that the applicant had sustained an injury to the back of his head. 10. The escort record (formulari i raportit të shoqërimit) in respect of the applicant, which bore the date 6 August 2012 and the time 8.10 p.m., stated that “he was bleeding from the back of his head and physically and verbally resisted the police officers.” 11. It would appear that on 6 August 2012 at 8.30 p.m. the applicant telephoned a certain N.L., who was a judicial police officer working for the Minister of the Interior’s Internal Control Service in Pogradec (Shërbimi i Kontrollit të Brendshëm, hereinafter “the ICS”), and informed him of his intention to lodge a criminal complaint against the RRF officers who had allegedly beaten him on the shoulder, leg and head with a rubber truncheon. 12. On 7 August 2012 N.L. took a statement from the applicant, who stated that he had intervened to break up a brawl between A.S. and N.P. At that moment RRF officers had arrived at the scene. The RRF officers had subsequently intervened without assessing the situation, and had beaten him with a rubber truncheon on the head, shoulder and legs. Consequently, he had sustained an open wound to his head. He had been forcibly put into a police vehicle, where he had been subjected to psychological pressure and insulted by the RRF officers, and subsequently taken to Pogradec’s police station together with N.P. and A.S. He had stayed at the police station for four hours, and the authorities had not offered him any medical aid, despite the wound on his head and other injuries to his shoulder and leg which he had sustained (see also paragraph 38 below). The applicant further stated that a certain M.S. had been present at the scene. 13. On the same day N.L. took a statement from A.S., who stated that he had met N.P. and had asked to be paid for work he had carried out in N.P.’s café bar. N.P. had made a telephone call to the applicant for help. After some moments the applicant had appeared at the scene. As they had not agreed on the sum to be paid, the applicant and N.P. had engaged in a brawl with A.S. After the RRF officers had intervened, the applicant and N.P. had objected to the orders given by the officers to get into the police vehicle, and had not complied with those orders. In A.S.’s view, the actions of the police officers had been lawful (see also paragraph 31 below). 14. On the same day at 12.20 p.m. N.L. contacted V.B. by telephone. As recorded in the patrol report (raport shërbimi) drawn up on 7 August 2012, V.B. stated the following: “Petri Pihoni, A.S. and N.P. had been involved in an argument. They [the RRF officers] were called upon to put an end to the argument, which had become more intense. In such circumstances, we [stopped them from arguing] and took them to Pogradec police station in the police vehicle. ... I would point out that N.P. and Petri Pihoni verbally and physically resisted us as they were taken to the police station. From the outset, it was noted that Petri Pihoni had sustained an injury to the back of his head (Shtetasi Petri Pihoni që në momentin e pare të konstatimit nga ana jone ishte i dëmtuar në pjesën e pasme të kokës). A patrol report was drawn up in relation to this event, which we will make available.” 15. On 7 August 2012 N.L. drew up a record for the inspection of documents relating to the registration log (libri i marrjes së informacionit` dhe dhënies së urdhrave) of the local police station. The record contained entry no. 270, according to which V.B. had reported the dispute on 6 August 2012 at 8.10 p.m., and three people, namely the applicant, A.S. and N. P., had been taken to the police station. 16. On 10 August 2012 N.L. referred a criminal offence to the Pogradec prosecutor’s office. His report described the events as mentioned in the statement made by the applicant on 7 August 2012 (see paragraph 12 above) and the statement made by A.S. on the same day (see paragraph 13 above). The report also referred to the registration log of the police station and the telephone conversation N.L. had had with V.B. (see paragraph 14 above). N.L. had been unable to question the RRF officers, as they had left for Tirana on the morning of 7 August 2012. 17. On 10 August 2012 the Pogradec district prosecutor (hereinafter “the district prosecutor”) opened criminal file no. 303 in response to the information transmitted by the ICS for a preliminary investigation into the offence of the commission of arbitrary actions as provided for in Article 250 of the CC. 18. On 13 August 2012 the district prosecutor ordered that a number of procedural actions should be taken, such as: the examination of a forensic medical report in respect of the applicant (see paragraph 20 below), the questioning of the applicant, the examination of the four people who had knowledge of the events, the collection of information about the identity of the RRF police officers, and any other action as appropriate. 19. On 3 September 2012 the Pogradec prosecutor’s office opened criminal file no. 347 in response to a criminal complaint lodged by the applicant on 8 August 2012 against the RRF police officers in relation to the criminal offence of the commission of arbitrary actions as provided for in Article 250 of the CC. The applicant’s criminal complaint stated the following: “... at the time I intervened to break up the fight [between N.P. and A.S.], Rapid Reaction Force officers, without enquiring about the situation, came from behind and physically attacked me without any warning, beating me with hard objects on my back, legs and head, also causing a wound which was later treated at the hospital. At the time I was physically attacked, I told police officers not to use any violence, as I was not part of the dispute and had simply intervened to prevent it. ... despite my statements, and without enquiring about the situation, they took me by force and used psychological pressure [by threatening me with] the rubber truncheon as I was taken to the local police station. After [I asked them] not to insult me and exert pressure on me, the team leader said, ‘we’ll see to you, shut up and give me your name’ (ta tregojmë neve ty po qepe dhe më jep emrin këtu). No medical aid was offered to me, despite the serious injuries which I had sustained. It would appear that the RRF officers had come from Tirana.” 20. The applicant had submitted a forensic medical report (no. 204) dated 7 August 2012, which had been ordered by N.L., the judicial police officer, in support of the criminal complaint. The medical examination had found that the applicant had been injured by a hard, blunt object (mjet i fortë mbretës), which had caused a wound requiring stitches, three scratches (dërrmishje), an oedema and an ecchymosis. The above injuries had resulted in the applicant being unable to work for nine days. 21. The district prosecutor decided that further investigation was required in order to identify the perpetrators and determine criminal responsibility in respect of the offence of the commission of arbitrary actions under Article 250 of the CC. On 3 September 2012 the district prosecutor ordered that a number of procedural actions should be taken, such as: the inspection of the registration log of the police station, the collection of information about the identity of the RRF police officers, the holding of an identification parade to identify the police officers, the taking of statements from the applicant and other people who had knowledge of the events, and any other action as appropriate. 22. On 6 September 2012 the applicant made another statement in which he said that he had seen a group of police officers wearing uniforms of the State police getting out of a police car, but had not noticed when they had arrived at the scene. Afterwards he had been beaten with a rubber truncheon on the head and on the back of his body. He was unable to name any of the police officers, given the events, but stated that he would be able to recognise them at an identification parade. He had noticed that they were part of an RRF unit. In spite of his explanations that he was a bailiff, he had been pulled by the arm and put inside a police vehicle and taken to the local police station. On the way to the police station one of the police officers had remained standing with his arm raised, ready to hit the applicant with the rubber truncheon he had in his hand. No reasons had been given to the applicant for his detention at the police station. Despite the fact that he had been bleeding from the back of his head as a result of blows received from rubber truncheons, no medical assistance had been offered. He had been released from the police station at around 11.15 p.m., after which time he had gone to hospital to receive treatment. He stated that the events might have been recorded by the security cameras of a nearby bank. 23. On 10 September 2012 the district prosecutor requested that video footage be provided by a nearby bank whose security cameras were believed to have registered images of the events of 6 August 2012. On 14 September 2012 the bank submitted video footage on a CD-ROM. A record dated 30 January 2013 on the examination and collection of evidence recorded an expert’s findings to the effect that the video footage was not relevant to the investigation (nuk paraqesin asnjë interes për hetimin). 24. On 10 September 2012 the district prosecutor asked the local police station to provide information relating to the identity of the RRF officers who had been on duty in Pogradec on 6 August 2012. On 17 September 2012 the Pogradec police station responded that the RRF team had been led by V.B., who was responsible for disclosing the information relating to the identity of the members. 25. On 18 September 2012 the district prosecutor decided to join both criminal files under file no. 303. 26. On 18 September 2012 the district prosecutor ordered that a number of procedural actions should be taken, such as: questioning of the applicant, inspection of the registration log of the police station, inspection of the registration log of the local hospital’s emergency ward, examination of the forensic medical report in respect of the applicant (presumably the report set out in paragraph 20 above), collection of information about the identity of the RRF officers, questioning of four people who had knowledge of the events, examination of video footage from the nearby bank, and any other action as appropriate. 27. Most likely on 17 October 2012, although the date on the record reads 17 January 2012 (17/01/2012), A.E., who owned a bar close to the site where the brawl had taken place, made a statement. He stated that two people had been having a fight with a third person. RRF officers had intervened to break up the fight. They had not used any rubber truncheons, in spite of the resistance shown by some of the people put into the police vehicle. 28. On 7 November 2012 a judicial police officer inspected an order for the deployment of RRF forces (urdhër për daljen me shërbim). According to that order, a team of six RRF police officers from Tirana, led by V.B., had been made available to the local police station to assist with random patrols during the busy summer season. 29. On 13 December 2012 N.P., one of the parties involved in the fight, stated that he had sustained blows from a rubber truncheon used by the RRF officers. They had forcibly put him, the applicant and A.S. into a police vehicle. The police officers had not introduced themselves when they had arrived at the scene, and had not warned any of them by saying “Stop, police”. On the same day Ni.P., a relative of the applicant and N.P., stated that the RRF officers had used rubber truncheons on the applicant, N.P. and A.S. 30. On 4 January 2013 P.B., who had been on duty at the local police station on 6 August 2012, stated that the applicant and two other people (N.P. and A.S.) had been brought to the police station at 8.00 p.m., following the RRF intervention to break up a fight amongst them. None of those people had made any complaints. P.B. had provided them with a decision directing them to have a medical examination. 31. On 15 January 2013 A.S. gave another statement and stated that he had been hit on his back by the applicant. As a result, he had reacted and hit back. The fight had continued for a few minutes and A.S. had targeted the applicant. N.P. had been been drunk and had collapsed on the ground (see also paragraph 13 above). On the same day J.K., an eyewitness and a relative of A.S., stated that the RRF officers had intervened to break up the fight, but had not used any force or hit the three people. A.S. had been hit on his back by N.P. Afterwards, he had been attacked by the applicant. A.S. had reacted and hit both of them back. He also stated that it had been N.P. who had made a telephone call to the applicant for help. 32. On 21 January 2013 V.B., who had been the RRF officers’ team leader at the time of the events, gave a statement. According to that statement, on 6 August 2012 at 7.40 p.m. he and his team had been informed by a plain-clothed police officer that a brawl was taking place in one of Pogradec’s main streets. When the team had arrived at the scene, they had seen that seven to eight people were involved in a violent fight, hitting each other with blunt objects such as beer bottles and wooden sticks. Three of them (the applicant, N.P. and A.S.) had been the most aggressive. Two of them (the applicant and N.P.) had subdued the third person (A.S.) and were kicking him. The RRF officers had intervened, broken up the fight and escorted the three people to the local police station. The three people had claimed that they had sustained injuries, some of which were visible. As a result, N.P. had been taken to hospital for treatment. The applicant had subsequently been released. On 7 August 2012, following instructions they had received, V.B. and his team had left Pogradec. On the same day V.B. had received a telephone call from a certain N.L., to whom he had given an explanation about the intervention (see paragraph 14 above). V.B. further stated that on 25 December 2012 he had complied with a summons to appear at the Pogradec police station to give a further explanation. Upon his arrival, he had run into the applicant, who had continued to watch him and his colleague closely at the police station for more than an hour. He had refused to take part in an identification parade, owing to the fact that he had not been informed of such a procedural action, he and his colleague had been the only police officers wearing distinct RRF uniforms, and the applicant had been observing them for more than an hour. In his view, an identification parade would have been contrary to the provisions of Articles 171 and 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kodi i Procedurës Penale, hereinafter “the CCP”) and decision (no. 7/2005) of the Constitutional Court. 33. S.H., who was one of the RRF officers, had also complied with the summons to appear on 25 December 2012 at the Pogradec police station to give a further explanation. He had also declined to take part in an identification parade, for the same reasons as those mentioned above by V.B.. On 21 January 2013 S.H. gave a statement. In addition to confirming the facts set out in V.B.’s statement, he added that the applicant had actively resisted their order for him to get into the police vehicle. The applicant had also exerted psychological pressure on the officers, stating “You’ll see what I’ll do to you”. Given the circumstances, the police officers had been unable to use any equipment (rubber truncheons, automatic weapons or tear gas canisters) or handcuff the people inside the vehicle. 34. On 21 January 2013 G.B., I.M. and A.D., who were the three other RRF officers, gave statements which contained the same information that had been provided by V.B and S.H. No mention was made of their being summoned to give explanations on 25 December 2012. 35. On 22 January 2013 a judicial police officer inspected Pogradec police station’s registration log, according to which the applicant had entered the police station at 8.20 p.m. and had made no complaints (nuk kam pretendime). It would appear that the applicant had left the police station at 10.30 p.m. The registration log of the local hospital showed that the applicant had reported to the emergency ward at 11.00 p.m. with a wound caused by tearing and a contusion on the back of his head (vulnus laceratum, contusio capitis regionis occipitalis). 36. On 13 February 2013 the district prosecutor decided that another expert report should be produced by a group of specialist doctors from the Forensic Medicine Institute (Instituti i Mjekësisë Ligjore, hereinafter “the FMI”). That decision referred to the first forensic medical report (no. 204) which had been issued in respect of the applicant (see paragraph 20 above). It further mentioned that the RRF police officers had stated that they had not used any objects or equipment to break up the fight. It also referred to the statements given by A.S. and J.K., according to which A.S. had exchanged blows with both the applicant and N.P. In such circumstances, it was important to identify the blunt object that had been used to cause the applicant’s injuries as stated in the first forensic medical report. 37. On 5 March 2013 the FMI informed the prosecutor’s office that they had been unable to identify the object that had caused the applicant’s injuries. 38. On 12 April 2013, during questioning by a judicial police officer, the applicant stated, among other things, that he had not been involved in a dispute, nor had he been struck by A.S. or struck back at A.S himself. The applicant denied having received a telephone call from his relative N.P. for help. He confirmed that he had not been able to identify the police officers, since he had been hit from behind (see also paragraph 12 above). 39. On 13 May 2013 the district prosecutor, by a reasoned decision, decided to stay the investigation in accordance with Article 326 of the CCP, and referred the case file to the ICS for further actions to identify the perpetrators. The decision described all the evidence that had been obtained, as well as the statements that had been given by the applicant and the other people who had either been involved in or had witnessed the brawl on 6 August 2012. In so far as relevant, the decision stated the following: “J.K. gave information about the event, stating that Petri Pihoni had been involved in the dispute, having been informed [about it] by telephone by N.P. ... Petri had struck A., who had hit back in response ... the police officers had escorted A.S., N.P. and Petri [to the police station]. [J.K.] saw that both N.P. and Petri resisted the police officers by declining to get into the police vehicle ... [J.K.] confirmed that the officers’ actions were correct ... none of them touched or used force against them [A.S., N.P. and the applicant]. ... A.E. was questioned in relation to the events. He runs a private business close to the site. His statement indicates that a physical dispute was taking place between three people. All the people were having a fight [by the time] an RRF police car arrived. The police officers called on those people to stop fighting, but they continued to have a fist fight until the officers intervened, pulled them by their arms and got them into the [police] vehicle. [A.E.] stated that he had not seen any officers using rubber truncheons. ... Drawing on the facts and evidence collected during the course of [the investigation in respect of] criminal file no. 303, the result is that we are not confronted with the criminal offence of the commission of arbitrary actions as provided for by Article 250 of the Criminal Code. ... In the instant case, it was proved that Petri Pihoni was involved in a physical argument with some people. Despite his own statements, the statements given by A.S., J.K. and A.E. indicate that N.P. called Petri, who appeared at the scene and became involved in a debate about the sum that N.P. owed A.S. The debate escalated into a physical dispute in which Petri struck A.S., who hit back in response. In such circumstances, the RRF officers witnessed a violent dispute and took the three people to the police station with a view to [their] giving explanations about its causes. I consider that the officers’ actions ... are in compliance with (sections 4, 92, 95 and 96 of) the State Police Act and cannot be classified as arbitrary actions which affect the freedom of citizens. As regards the criminal complaint that physical violence was used by the RRF officers when Petri was taken to the police station, I consider that doubts arise as to whether the offence of abuse of power as provided for by Article 248 of the CC has been committed. This is the case, given the injuries sustained by Petri, which may have been caused while he was escorted [to the police station] by RRF officers ... During the investigation, Petri Pihoni was questioned on several occasions as to whether he could identify the RRF officers who might have struck him. He responded that he was unable to proceed with the identification [procedure] because the blows had come from behind and he was unable to identify the officer who had struck the blows. The remaining evidence obtained during the investigation does not shed any light on this [incident]. Having regard to the fact that criminal responsibility is individual and not collective, I consider that the investigation should be stayed.” 40. Having not received any response from the Pogradec prosecutor’s office about the progress of the investigation, on 27 December 2012 the applicant sought the assistance of the Albanian Rehabilitation Centre for Trauma and Torture (“the Centre”). On the same date the Centre unsuccessfully asked the prosecutor’s office to provide it information about the applicant’s case. 41. On 11 May 2013 the Centre repeated its request to the Pogradec prosecutor’s office. It also complained to the Prosecutor General’s office that no information had been provided to the applicant about the progress of the investigation eight months after the incident. It does not appear that a reply was given. 42. On 7 June 2013 the Pogradec prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that on 13 May 2013 it had stayed the investigation. A copy of the decision of 13 May 2013 was enclosed. 43. On 27 November 2013 the Centre asked the prosecutor’s office to provide it with a copy of the investigation file. No reply was given. 44. On 7 July 2017, under Rule 54 § 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, the Court asked the parties to submit any new factual information that might have come to light after the prosecutor’s decision of 13 May 2013. 45. On 27 July 2017 the district prosecutor replied to the applicant that the investigation in respect of criminal file no. 303 into the criminal offence of the commission of arbitrary actions was still stayed, and the file was still with the Korca Police Directorate. The district prosecutor further informed the applicant that it had not been possible to identify the perpetrators of the criminal offence. 46. On 6 September 2017 the district prosecutor, having regard to his decision of 13 May 2013, replied to the Government that no criminal offence of the commission of arbitrary actions had been committed. Furthermore, he informed the Government that doubts had arisen as to whether the offence of abuse of power had been committed. In any event, the evidence obtained had not shed any light in this regard. The criminal file had been sent to the ICS for further actions. The latter had not identified any need to reinitiate the investigation. It had not identified any new facts which had come to light after the proceedings had been stayed. The applicant had been duly informed about the outcome of the investigation.

5. The applicants were born in 1945 and 1951 respectively and live in Sliema. 6. Pursuant to the terms of a contract of 11 April 1962 a house (of fourteen rooms, including four double bedrooms) in Sliema (hereinafter “the property”) owned by a third party was rented out under a contract of temporary sub-emphyteusis to J.G. for twenty-five years as from 15 June 1962 at 100 Maltese liras (MTL – approximately 233 euros (EUR)) per year. According to the contract the tenant was responsible for all maintenance work, both ordinary and extraordinary, internally and externally. 7. On 15 June 1987, by operation of law (Act XXII of 1979), that contract was converted into one of lease, and the owner continued to receive rent. 8. On 11 January 1988 the applicants acquired the property from the above mentioned third party at the price of MTL 11,000 (approximately EUR 25,600) in the full knowledge that the property was occupied under title of lease and that J.G. had three children, one of whom was unmarried. However since all the descendants had settled lives of their own, the applicants expected that the property would be returned to them after the tenant’s and his wife’s death. At the time the applicants lived in the United Kingdom. Initially they asked J.G. whether he was willing to vacate the property, but he did not consent to do so. Eventually the applicants agreed that J.G. and his wife, at the time 76 and 77 years old respectively, would continue to reside in the property against the rent as adjusted by law. They thus recognised them as tenants and regularly received the rent in question ((EUR 466 per year) which had been adjusted once and could not be readjusted further since it had reached the maximum amount allowed by law, namely double the original rent). 9. In 1993 the applicants returned to Malta. In out-of-court discussions they asked J.G. and his wife to vacate the premises. Eventually, given their advanced age (80 and 81 respectively) and the fact that their children owned properties of their own – thus making it unlikely that they would return to live in the premises – the applicants decided not to take formal steps to have them evicted. 10. However, the applicants were unable to find an apartment to rent in Malta given that, at the time, owners were reluctant to lease property to Maltese residents because of the rent laws in force. In consequence the applicants had to reside in their smaller apartment on the island of Gozo and the first applicant was obliged to commute by boat on a daily basis to get to work. 11. In 1995 the Maltese rent laws were amended and a free and open market was re-established for new leases. Subsequent to the change, the applicants found an apartment in Malta which they rented at EUR 2,795 annually. Allegedly the applicants spent EUR 12,000 in maintenance and furnishings. 12. In 2003, P.G., the daughter of J.G. and his wife, who had been living in the United Kingdom for thirty years in a house she owned, returned to live with her parents in the property in Malta. In 2004 and 2008 respectively her parents passed away. 13. On 6 June 2008 the applicants asked P.G. to vacate the property. She refused and requested that she be recognised as a tenant in accordance with Article 2 of Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta, as she had been residing in the property at the date of her father’s death. 14. The applicants refused to recognise P.G. as a tenant and refused to accept rent from her. They also insisted she had to undertake repair work in the property pursuant to the original contract. 15. P.G., a seventy-year old pensioner, had a constant and considerable income (a monthly pension of 900 pounds sterling (GBP), and during her stay in Malta she was letting her property in the UK at GBP 1,000 a month); she eventually sold her property in the UK for GBP 305,000. She went on to inherit various assets and sold them for a considerable sum. In the constitutional redress proceedings (mentioned below), she declared that she needed the property which was spacious in order to store her parent’s furniture. 16. In 2009, the enactment of Act X of 2009 was meant to ameliorate the position of land owners whose properties were subject to controlled rents. The amendments operated to bring rates of rent up to EUR 185 per year where these were below that figure; however this increase did not apply to the applicants’ property, the rent of which was already more than EUR 185. Pursuant to the current law the rent applicable in the applicants’ case is increased every three years in accordance with the increase in the inflation index (capped at a 100%). 17. On 17 February 2010 the applicants instituted constitutional redress proceedings. They claimed that they were suffering a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention as a result of the laws in force which allowed the tenant to enjoy a title of lease over their property and made it impossible for them to regain possession of it despite their own need for housing. They noted that they were renting a property at EUR 2,795 per year, while they were only earning around EUR 39 per month (EUR 466 per year) from their own house, which had a lease market value of EUR 3,500 per month. The applicants further relied on Article 14 of the Convention. The applicants asked the court to order the eviction of the tenant and the latter to pay for ordinary and extraordinary repairs, and to award damages for the loss sustained as a result of the low amount of rent received, and in connection with the disbursements they had to make for their own housing. 18. By a judgment of 31 October 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention as a result of the application of Articles 2 and 12 of Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta and ordered that the tenant be evicted within four months of the date of judgment. It considered that the rent payable, namely EUR 466 per year in accordance with the law was derisory, bearing in mind that such property had a rental market value of EUR 3,000 per month – the court noted that while an architect’s valuation would have been preferable the latter sum appeared to be an appropriate rent. Furthermore, the burden on the applicants was greater as this arrangement had gone on beyond the death of the original lessor, and was now benefitting his daughter. 19. The court rejected the remainder of the claims. 20. The Government and the tenant appealed and the applicants cross‑appealed. 21. By a judgment of 22 February 2013 the Constitutional Court reversed the first-instance judgment and found no violation of the said provision, and rejected the remainder of the applicants’ appeal. It considered that Act XXII of 1979, which provided for the conversion of a temporary emphyteusis into a lease, had constituted interference with the applicants’ right of property as it had created a forced landlord-tenant relationship for an indeterminate time, during which they had not been able to use their own property and during which they had suffered financial losses as a result of the low amount of rent received, which had been established by law. The interference pursued a legitimate social‑policy aim, specifically the social protection of tenants. However, the applicants, fully aware of the factual and legal situation, opted of their own free will to purchase the property and to enter into the existing agreement with J.G., whose emphyteusis had just been converted into a lease on 15 June 1987, and from whom they continued to receive rent. The court concluded that the applicants had not suffered any imposition in so far as they had willingly entered into that contract at a point where the law had been crystal clear as to the consequences which would ensue. 22. The applicants are now of pensionable age. In or around 2013 the applicants were given notice to vacate the property which they had been leasing as their ordinary residence since 1996 (see paragraph 11 above), as there were plans to demolish the property in 2014. At the time when they were renting this property, the second applicant’s mother had been one of five co-owners of the dwelling, and it appears that the second applicant has since become a co-owner. The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to prove that they had been paying rent and, if so, what rent they had been paying for these premises. According to the applicants, they have since moved to a different property.

6. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Louvencourt. 7. He was hired in 1976 by the French national railway company (Société nationale des chemins de fer – “the SNCF”), where he last worked as Deputy Head of the Amiens Regional Surveillance Unit. He stated that in 2007 he had complained to senior management about the conduct of one of his subordinates, who, he alleged, had used extreme language when addressing a colleague. The employee in question had then filed a complaint against him, following which the applicant had been charged with making false accusations. The applicant had subsequently been suspended from duty by the SNCF on grounds of that charge. 8. The proceedings were discontinued a few months later, whereupon the applicant notified his employers of his wish to be reinstated in his former post. He received a reply inviting him to consider appointment to another post, but maintained his original request. 9. On the day of his reinstatement, on 17 March 2008, the applicant found that his work computer had been seized. After being summoned by his superiors, he was informed on 5 April 2008 that the hard disk on the computer had been analysed and that “address change certificates drawn up for third persons and bearing the Lille General Security Service logo” had been found, as well as a large number of files containing pornographic images and films. It can be seen from the judgment of the Amiens Court of Appeal of 15 December 2010 (see paragraphs 14-15 below) that the person who had replaced the applicant during his suspension from post had found “documents which had caught his attention” on the computer, and that he had alerted his superiors in March 2007 and January 2008. 10. A request for a written explanation was sent to the applicant on 7 May 2008. He replied that in 2006, following problems with his personal computer, he had transferred the contents of one of his USB keys to his work computer. He added that the files containing pornographic material had been sent to him by people he did not know, via the SNCF’s Intranet. 11. The applicant was summoned to a disciplinary hearing, which took place on 21 May 2008. On 9 June 2008 he was informed by the “resources management director” of Amiens head office that a proposal had been made to dismiss him from the service and that he would be summoned to appear before the disciplinary board. The board convened on 15 July 2008. 12. On 17 July 2008 the SNCF regional director decided to dismiss the applicant from the service. His decision was worded as follows: “ ... the analysis of the files stored on the hard disk of [the applicant’s] work computer, used for his professional duties, contained the following: i) change of address certificate, signed in his name, certifying the transfer on 01/11/2003 of Ms Catherine [T.] to the Lille General Security Service; the original certificate, sent to ICF North-East enabled the notice period for vacating her flat to be shortened; ii) change of address certificate, bearing the Ministry of Justice logo, in the name of M. [S.-J.], governor of Fresnes Prison, certifying the transfer of M. [P.] Frédéric to Strasbourg Prison, from 1 November 2006; iii) draft documents drawn up in the name of Michel [V.], director of the SOCRIF, certifying his financial situation with regard to that company; iv) a very large number of files containing pornographic images and films (zoophilia and scatophilia). These facts are in breach of the special obligation of exemplary conduct inherent in the duties formerly performed by him within the General Security Service, and of the following provisions: i) Article 5.2 of the RH 0006 on the principles governing the conduct of SNCF officials; ii) the general security database RG 0029 (information systems security policy – user’s charter); iii) the RA 0024 “code of professional conduct” - conduct to be observed with regard to the company’s information system; iv) Article 441-1 of the Criminal Code.” 13. On 28 October 2008 the applicant brought proceedings before the Amiens Industrial Tribunal (conseil des prud’hommes) seeking a ruling that he had been dismissed without genuine or serious cause. On 10 May 2010 the Industrial Tribunal held that the decision dismissing the applicant from the service had been justified and, accordingly, rejected his claims. 14. On 15 December 2010 the Amiens Court of Appeal upheld the substance of that judgment. It held, in particular, as follows: “ ... [The applicant] submitted that the SNCF had infringed his private life by opening, in his absence, files identified as personal in his computer. As a matter of policy, documents kept by employees in the company’s office, save those identified by them as personal, are presumed to be for professional use, meaning that the employer can have access to them in the employee’s absence. It can be seen from the report drawn up by the SEF that the pornographic photos and videos were found in a file called “fun” stored on a hard disk labelled “D:/personal data”. The SNCF explained, without being challenged, that the “D” drive was called “D:/data” by default and was traditionally used by staff to store their work documents. An employee cannot use an entire hard disk, which is supposed to record professional data, for his or her private use. The SNCF were therefore entitled to consider that the description “personal data” appearing on the hard disk could not validly prohibit their access to it. In any event, the generic term “personal data” could have referred to work files being personally processed by the employee and did not therefore explicitly designate elements relating to his private life. That had been the case here, moreover, since the analysis of the hard disk yielded numerous work documents (“LGV photos” file, “warehouse photos” ... . The term “fun”, moreover, does not clearly convey that the file in question is necessarily private. The term can denote exchanges between colleagues at work or work documents kept as “bloopers” by the employee. The employer also rightly pointed out that the user’s charter provided that “private information [had to] be clearly identified as such (“private” option in the Outlook criteria)” and that the same was true of the media receiving that information (“private” folder). The lower court was therefore correct in considering that the file had not been identified as personal. The same applies to the files containing the impugned certificates registered under the names “Fred [P.]”, “SOCRIF” and “Catherine”.” 15. The Court of Appeal also held that the applicant’s dismissal from the service had not been disproportionate. It observed that both the SNCF’s Code of Professional Conduct and the internal rules provided that staff were required to use the computers provided to them for exclusively professional ends, with the occasional private use being merely tolerated. It found that the applicant had committed a “massive breach of those rules, going as far as using his work tools to produce a forged document”. In the court’s view, those acts had been particularly serious because, as an official responsible for general surveillance, he would have been expected to be of exemplary conduct. 16. The applicant appealed on points of law. He submitted, in particular, that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The Social Division of the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal in a judgment of 4 July 2012. It held as follows: “ ... whilst files created by an employee with the assistance of the computer facilities supplied to him by his employer for work purposes are presumed to be professional in nature, meaning that the employer is entitled to open them in the employee’s absence, unless they are identified as personal, the description given to the hard disk itself cannot confer privacy on all the data contained in it. The Court of Appeal, which found that labelling the hard disk in the employee’s computer “D:/ personal data” could not enable him to use it for purely private purposes and prohibit access by the employer, drew the legitimate conclusion that the files in question, which had not been identified as “private” according to the recommendations of the IT charter, could be lawfully opened by the employer. The Court of Appeal, which found that the employee had stored 1,562 pornographic files representing a volume of 787 megabytes over a period of four years, and that he had also used his work computer to produce forged certificates, rightly held that such misuse of his office equipment in breach of the rules in force at the SNCF amounted to a breach of his contractual obligations. ...”. ...

4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Bijela, Montenegro. 5. On 1 March 2012 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court rendered a judgment in favour of the applicant and ordered the applicant’s employer “Vektra Boka” AD Herceg Novi (hereinafter “the debtor”) to carry out a re‑allocation of plots for the construction of apartments. This judgment became final on 21 December 2012. 6. On 15 January 2013 the applicant requested enforcement of the above judgment and the Herceg Novi First Instance Court issued an enforcement order on 31 January 2013. 7. On 12 June 2015 the Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. 8. On 28 January 2016 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court transferred the case to the Commercial Court for further action. 9. On 22 March 2016 the Commercial Court suspended (obustavio) the enforcement due to the opening of the insolvency proceedings, which decision became final on 11 May 2016. 10. The judgement in question remains unenforced to the present day. 11. On 8 February 2013 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings seeking, on the basis of the above judgment, the removal of competing titles from the Land Register. 12. On 29 July 2015 the Real Estate Directorate terminated (prekinuo) the administrative proceedings because the Commercial Court had commenced insolvency proceeding in respect of the debtor. 13. On 7 September 2015 the applicant submitted an objection against the above decision. This objection was rejected as being out of time by the Real Estate Directorate on 5 October 2015. 14. The administrative proceedings are still pending. 15. On an unspecified day in 2003, the applicant instituted separate civil proceedings against the debtor, as his former employer, seeking reinstatement and damages. Following three remittals, on 3 March 2014 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court rendered a judgment in the applicant’s favour. 16. On 22 September 2015 the High Court upheld this judgment on the merits, but quashed it as regards the costs. 17. On 31 October 2016 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court transferred the case to the Commercial Court for further action due to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. 18. On 22 February 2017 the Commercial Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant regarding the costs. 19. The parties did not inform the Court about when the Commercial Court’s decision became final and was served on the applicant.

6. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Skopje. 7. At birth the applicant was registered as a girl, with a clearly female name. The applicant submitted that from an early age he became aware that he was male rather than female. Not being able to obtain appropriate medical treatment in the respondent State, in 2010 the applicant went to a specialist clinic in Belgrade, where a psychologist and sexologist diagnosed him with “transsexuality”. A medical certificate dated 20 September 2010 included a recommendation that the applicant pursue hormone treatment with a view to eventual genital reassignment surgery. The applicant started taking hormones to increase his testosterone levels. 8. On 1 June 2011 the applicant applied for a change of his first and family name. In a decision of 7 June 2011 the Ministry of the Interior allowed that application, registering the applicant under a clearly male forename (the applicant also changed his surname). Soon after, it issued the applicant with a new identity card bearing his new name. However, the sex/gender marker and numerical personal code (composed of ten digits, some of which indicate the person’s sex) remained the same, identifying the applicant as a female. 9. On 5 July 2011 the applicant lodged an application to have the sex/gender marker and the numerical personal code on his birth certificate corrected (корекција) to indicate that he was male. In support of his application he submitted copies of a medical report by a surgeon at the specialist clinic in Belgrade (see paragraph 7 above) and referred to the paper entitled “Human rights and gender identity” of October 2009 issued by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (see paragraph 34 below) and the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. 10. In a decision of the same date, the Civil Status Registry (“the Registry”) – a body within the Ministry of Justice (“the Ministry”) ‑ dismissed the applicant’s application, stating that “no certificate [has been] issued by a competent authority [attesting to the fact] that [the applicant’s] sex [had] been changed, the application having been corroborated only with a certificate that gender reassignment surgery [was] in preparation, which cannot be regarded as proof that it [would] take place.” 11. The applicant appealed to the Ministry, alleging that there was no statutory provision that regulated the matter in hand. Sex reassignment surgery was unavailable in the respondent State and unjustified in his case. Furthermore, such a requirement would subject him to unwanted medical treatment and sterilisation, in breach of his rights. He argued that he had already been diagnosed as transsexual, which was sufficient to obtain legal gender recognition. In a decision of 17 October 2011 the Ministry dismissed the appeal, finding that the impugned decision had been based on section 23 of the Civil Status Registration Act (Закон за матичната евиденција) (“the Act”; under the 2016 amendment this provision became section 22(2) – see paragraph 25 below) and that the evidence produced had not been “sufficient and relevant” in respect of the alteration (промена) sought. 12. In November 2011 the applicant challenged the refusal of the lower administrative authorities to modify his sex/gender marker on the birth certificate before the Administrative Court. He argued that there was no statutory provision proscribing or specifying any conditions for the alteration of a person’s sex/gender marker and personal code. 13. On 28 February 2013 the Administrative Court quashed the Ministry’s decision. Since the applicant’s request had not been in the case file, the court could not ascertain whether the applicant had sought the rectification or alteration of the sex/gender marker only or also of the personal code, the latter having not been addressed in the impugned decision. It also held that the Ministry should have specified the appropriate evidence required and set a time-limit for the applicant to provide it. Lastly, the court found that the Ministry had neither established the relevant facts nor provided adequate reasons for its decision. In this connection it held that section 23 of the Civil Status Registration Act did not specify any requirement to have the sex/gender marker changed; it only contained an instruction to administrative authorities regarding the evidence to be adduced and assessed in such proceedings. 14. On 11 June 2013 the applicant underwent a double mastectomy (breast removal) in Belgrade and continued his hormonal therapy. 15. In the resumed proceedings, the Registry instructed the Forensic Institute (Институт за судска медицина) to examine the applicant. As reported in the Registry’s decision (see paragraph 17 below), on 20 June 2014 the Forensic Institute drew up a report, which stated: “[O]wing to his mastectomy and on-going hormonal therapy, [the applicant] displays male sexual characteristics which affect his everyday life. Although there is no statutory regulation ... and the second genital surgery has not been carried out, [the experts] consider that [the applicant] should be provided with a document attesting to his new sex ...” 16. The Registry also requested that the Ministry of Health specify the nature of the certificate and the authority competent to attest to the change of the applicant’s sex. In reply, the Ministry of Health stated that the sex alteration procedure was not specified in health-related regulations and suggested that evidence regarding prior medical intervention in respect of the applicant should be taken into consideration. 17. On 29 December 2014 the Registry, referring to section 23 of the Act, dismissed the applicant’s request for the alteration of the sex/gender marker on the birth register, holding that despite its requests to competent authorities it had not obtained “evidence of an actual change of sex (не прибави доказ со кој ќе утврди фактичка состојба која укажува на промена на полот)”. 18. The applicant appealed against that decision. On 16 October 2015 the Ministry dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the Registry. 19. On 11 November 2015 the applicant challenged the latter decision before the Administrative Court, arguing that section 23 of the Act did not specify any requirement for an alteration of the sex/gender marker in civil ‑ status documents. He furthermore submitted that the Registry had authority to administer civil-status records and accordingly to decide on the matter. The applicant also referred to the Court’s case-law on the matter. 20. On 28 April 2017 the Administrative Court set aside the Ministry’s decision since it had failed to forward the case file. 21. On 28 February 2018 the Registry rejected (отфрла) the applicant’s application for lack of jurisdiction (ненадлежност), holding that it did not concern the rectification of an error in an entry, but the alteration of the sex/gender marker in the civil status register. On 13 July 2018 the State Commission, which had become competent to decide such issues in second instance, upheld that decision. The proceedings before the Administrative Court are underway. 22. The applicant submitted several reports from 2012 and 2016 in which psychologists had found that the protracted procedure in respect of seeking legal recognition of the applicant’s gender identity was having negative consequences on his psychosocial and mental health and everyday life.

5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Sofia. He is a lawyer practising in Sofia. 6. The applicant signed a contract with the then Bulgarian Ministry of Agriculture and Forests (hereafter “the Ministry”) on 15 July 2004. According to the terms of the contract the applicant undertook to act as a legal representative for the Ministry in a case before the International Court of Arbitration in Paris, for which the Ministry was to pay him 58,100 Bulgarian Levs (BGN, about EUR 29,600). This sum comprised a legal fee and all related costs and expenses incurred by him in connection with the representation. 7. The Ministry paid the applicant half of the amount due on the day the contract was signed. The contract stipulated that the second half was to be paid to him at the end of the proceedings. 8. The proceedings before the International Court of Arbitration in Paris ended on 28 November 2005. On 19 December 2005 the applicant asked the Ministry to pay him the balance due, but the Ministry failed to reply. The applicant then asked the Sofia District Court to issue him with a writ of enforcement against the Ministry. On 23 February 2006 the court issued the writ on the basis of the contract of 15 July 2004 for the amount of BGN 29,631, comprising BGN 29,050 due on the basis of the contract and BGN 581 for costs related to the enforcement proceedings, plus the legal interest rate for the period from 1 February 2006 until full payment. 9. On 24 February 2006, in compliance with Article 399 of the 1952 Code, a notary acting for the applicant served the original writ of enforcement on the Ministry and requested that the institution pay. As the Ministry still did not reply, the applicant sought the assistance of the Ombudsman. Subsequently, the Ministry confirmed to the Ombudsman in a letter of 27 March 2006 that it had received a notarial request for payment and the writ of enforcement in the applicant’s case. It also stated that, if money for the honouring of debts of the Ministry had not been included in the current year’s budget, this would be done in the following year’s budget. 10. In July 2006 the Ministry asked the Sofia Bar Association to open disciplinary proceedings against the applicant for acting against the interests of his client, the Ministry. The Sofia Bar Association terminated those proceedings the same year after establishing that the applicant had not acted contrary to the interests of the Ministry. 11. The Ministry did not pay the balance due to the applicant. Instead, on 26 July 2006 the Ministry brought a civil claim against him in court, seeking damages for his failure to carry out the duties ensuing from the contract of 15 July 2004. The amounts sought in damages were 568,897.90 United States dollars (USD) and BGN 29,500 (approximately EUR 15,000), the latter explicitly referred to as corresponding to the first half of the fee due to the applicant which had been paid to him by the Ministry upon signing the contract. In addition, the Ministry sought BGN 4,648 (about EUR 2,300) by way of penalty, representing 8% of the total amount of BGN 58,100 (about EUR 29,600) due to the applicant in fees; that penalty had been provided for in the contract in case the applicant were to default on his contractual obligations. In its claim before the court the Ministry made no mention of the balance of the fee it owed the applicant on conclusion of the contract of 2004; a sum subject to a writ of enforcement and served on the Ministry earlier in 2006. 12. In a judgment of 3 August 2009 the Sofia City Court, acting as a first-instance court, rejected the Ministry’s claim in respect of all amounts. The court found that although the Ministry had indeed incurred losses in the amount of USD 568,897.90 in the context of the arbitration proceedings in Paris, those losses had not been the result of the applicant’s conduct. The court found further that, because the applicant had complied with his contractual obligations, the payment he had received, corresponding to the first half of the agreed fee, had been owed and duly paid to him by the Ministry. Similarly, given that the applicant had complied with his contractual obligations, imposition of the penalty which had been agreed in the contract in the event of failure to deliver was not justified. 13. Following an appeal by the Ministry, in a judgment of 30 April 2010, the Sofia Court of Appeal rejected the Ministry’s claim in respect of the two amounts sought in damages (see paragraph 11 above). As regards the first half of the fee paid to the applicant, in particular, the court observed that the Ministry had not claimed that the contract it had concluded with the applicant had been cancelled and found that the first half of the fee paid could not be considered as damages. The court held, however, that the applicant owed the Ministry the amount of BGN 4,648 (about EUR 2,300) by way of penalty because during the arbitration proceedings he had omitted to transmit to the Ministry a request by the arbitrator that the original of a document be submitted to the latter. The penalty agreed in the contract between the Ministry and the applicant was payable in the event of the failure of the applicant to comply with his obligations and the Ministry did not need to prove that it had incurred any loss as a result of the applicant’s conduct. The court therefore allowed the Ministry’s claim for the amount of BGN 5,102.88, which corresponded to BGN 4,648 by way of penalty and BGN 418.88 for case-related costs. Since the Ministry’s claim did not mention the balance of the fee due to the applicant, at no point did the court examine in that judgment whether the second half of the payment of the legal fee agreed in the contract was due to him following its conclusion. 14. In a final decision of 28 June 2011, the Supreme Court of Cassation (SCC) did not allow a cassation review, finding that the statutory conditions for this were not met. The judgment of the Sofia Court of Appeal thus became final on that date. 15. On 12 July 2011 the applicant again asked the Ministry, through a duly served notarial request, to pay to him the amount of BGN 57,964.81, which represented BGN 29,050 (the principal amount, corresponding to the balance of the fee due to him), BGN 12,874.58 (default penalty agreed in the contract in case of the Ministry’s failure to fulfil its contractual obligations), BGN 20,143.23 (legal interest rate) and BGN 581 (costs and expenses), minus the 8% default penalty in the amount of BGN 4,648 which the Sofia Court of Appeal had ordered the applicant to pay to the Ministry in its judgment. 16. On 15 July 2011 the Ministry replied that its debts were to be paid from its annual budget and, in the event of the non-availability of funds, money for outstanding debts was to be included at the latest in the following year’s budget. The Ministry also asked the applicant to submit the original writ of execution. The applicant wrote to the Ministry on 28 July 2011 stating that he had already served it on them and specified the date and reference number of the notarial document with which that had been done (see paragraphs 8-9 above). 17. On 2 August 2013 the applicant again asked the Ministry in writing to pay him the outstanding amount. They replied in writing the same month stating that they had received the original writ of enforcement on 24 February 2006 but could not trace what had happened to it thereafter.

6. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Katyr-Yurt, the Chechen Republic. He is the father of Mr R., who died of tuberculosis in a prison hospital. 7. In 2004 Mr R. arrived at correctional colony no. 4 in the Arkhangelsk Region where he was to serve his twelve-year sentence. On admission to that facility, he underwent a general medical check-up permed by a prison doctor who concluded that he was healthy. Two routine chest X-ray examinations in March and October 2004 confirmed that conclusion. 8. On 10 March 2005 Mr R. complained to the prison medical authorities of fatigue and a cough. Acute rhinopharyngitis was diagnosed and a standard treatment for that condition was prescribed, but the symptoms persisted. Eleven days later, the prison doctor diagnosed acute pneumonia of the left lung. Mr R. was admitted to the prison medical unit and prescribed medication and a special dietary regime. 9. On 6 April 2005, in view of the absence of any positive changes in Mr R.’s health, he was moved to a prison tuberculosis hospital. A chest X‑ray examination performed on the day of his admission showed a massive infiltration in the lungs. 10. The next day Mr R. underwent a sputum test, which revealed his affliction with tuberculosis combined with pneumonia. Treatment with five first-line drugs was prescribed. It was started about two weeks later, but had no effect on Mr R.’s health. 11. On 12 April 2005 a drug susceptibility test was performed. The test result was only received on 18 July 2005 (see paragraph 15 below). An additional chest X-ray examination on 18 April 2005 indicated further progress of the diseases. 12. In the light of the above, on 23 April 2005 Mr R. was transferred to the Arkhangelsk regional prison tuberculosis hospital (“regional prison hospital”), where his treatment continued as previously prescribed. 13. According to the applicant, Mr R. was unsatisfied with the quality of his treatment. In early May 2005 both the applicant and Mr R. unsuccessfully sought the latter’s transfer to a medical facility located in a southern region, where Mr R. could have been provided with adequate treatment in a more suitable climate. 14. In the meantime, regular chest X-ray examinations showed that Mr R.’s health was continuing to deteriorate. By mid-July 2005 pulmonary cavities had appeared, and his condition had become serious. 15. On 18 July 2005 the regional prison hospital received the result of the drug susceptibility test of 12 April 2005. It revealed that Mr R.’s tuberculosis was resistant to four antibiotics being used in his treatment. 16. According to a medical entry made at the top of a page outside the related fields in Mr R.’s medical file, on 28 July 2005 he was prescribed treatment with advanced antibiotics. There are no regular entries showing the actual intake of the new drugs. 17. In August 2005 Mr R.’s condition was assessed as “of medium gravity”, but on 10 September 2005 he died. According to an autopsy report drawn up two days later, the cause of death was cardio-respiratory insufficiency provoked by tuberculosis. 18. In September 2006 the applicant asked for criminal proceedings to be instituted into the circumstances leading to his son’s death. He alleged that the authorities responsible for protecting the life and well‑being of his son had failed to comply with their obligations. 19. On 21 October 2006 the Primorskiy Inter-District Prosecutor’s Office refused to open a criminal case. Its page-long decision was based on the autopsy report and general information on Mr R.’s treatment submitted by the prison medical authorities. The investigator concluded that Mr R. had died of tuberculosis for which he had received medical treatment, and that the patient’s detention in a northern region had not breached Russian law. 20. In November 2006 the applicant repeated his request, having argued that the custodial authorities bore responsibility for his son’s death because they had failed to protect him from tuberculosis and to ensure prompt diagnosis of the disease. 21. By a letter of 9 January 2007 a prosecutor informed the applicant that a criminal inquiry had established that his son had contracted tuberculosis in early March 2005. The correctional colony had promptly identified the disease and had ensured treatment keeping the disease under control. The investigating authorities did not assess the quality of the medical services provided between late April and September 2005. 22. The applicant appealed against the decision of 21 October 2006, insisting that the investigator’s finding had not been supported by expert evidence. He further argued that the detention authorities had failed not only to diagnose his son’s tuberculosis promptly, but also to provide him with adequate care in the regional prison hospital. 23. On 3 July 2007 the Isakogorskiy District Court of Arkhangelsk examined the claim. Ms B., the head of the regional prison hospital’s unit responsible for Mr R.’s treatment, was heard. She stated that Mr R. had been admitted to the hospital on 23 April 2005. Shortly thereafter he had undergone medical testing. Ms B. stressed that the testing had been complex and that the hospital had only received the test result in August 2005. On 26 August 2005 the doctors had learned that Mr R.’s tuberculosis had been drug resistant. They had prescribed treatment with advanced antibiotics. However, by that time pathological changes in the patient’s body had already become irreversible. 24. Having regard to the investigation file, the court noted that the investigating authorities had solicited neither the autopsy report nor medical documents concerning Mr R.’s treatment and that they had not interviewed any doctor involved in the treatment. The court thus concluded that the criminal inquiry had not been thorough. It overruled the prosecutor’s decision of 21 October 2006 not to open a criminal case. 25. On 14 August 2007 the Arkhangelsk Regional Court quashed the District Court’s decision on appeal. It noted that it was not for the investigative authorities to assess all possible versions of the events and that there was no obligation on them to resolve each inconsistency in the case. The court found that the documents obtained by the first‑instance court and the statement by Ms B. had remedied the alleged shortcomings in the investigation. The case was remitted to the District Court for a fresh examination. 26. Ten days later the District Court re-examined the case. It concluded that the criminal inquiry had been carried out in compliance with the requirements of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the impugned decision of 21 October 2006 had been based on sufficient evidence duly assessed by the investigating authorities. The applicant’s claim was accordingly rejected. 27. On 23 November 2007 the Regional Court upheld the above‑mentioned decision on appeal.

4. The applicants were born in 1935, 1945 and 1956 respectively and live in Ploieşti. 5. In 1975 a group of engineers patented an invention concerning a method for separating hydrocarbon. The first applicant is one of the inventors. The second and third applicants are heirs of the other members of the group. 6. On 26 January 1995 the applicants lodged an action for compensation against company R., a privately-owned former State company which had used the 1975 invention between 1985 and 1988 (for details about those proceedings, see Farcaş and Others v. Romania, no. 67020/01, §§ 7-22, 10 November 2005). 7. In a decision of 24 June 2002 the Braşov County Court allowed in part the action lodged by the applicants against company R., and ordered the latter to pay to the first applicant 2,284,679,617 Romanian lei (ROL), an amount representing compensation for the use, between 1985 and 1988, of the invention patented in 1975. The second and third applicants appealed, and in a decision of 8 November 2002 the Braşov Court of Appeal also awarded them compensation – ROL 2,230,620,676 to the second applicant and ROL 1,669,759,157 to the third applicant. 8. On 10 March 2004 the applicants and company R. signed an agreement for the payment of the compensation awarded by the court. Between 2 and 21 April 2004 the company paid about 20% of the amounts granted. 9. On 5 May 2005 the High Court of Cassation and Justice took note of the terms of the agreement of 10 March 2004 and concluded that company R. had withdrawn its appeal on points of law against the decision of 8 November 2002 (see paragraph 7 above), which thus became final. 10. Meanwhile, on 31 March 2004 company R. had sought its judicial reorganisation under a procedure provided for by Law no. 64/1995 on judicial reorganisation and bankruptcy. 11. On 28 April 2004 the Bacău County Court allowed the application, started the reorganisation proceedings and nominated a judicial administrator. The applicants’ claims were accepted by the County Court and recorded in the register of claims compiled by the judicial administrator in conformity with the provisions of the applicable law (tabloul creditorilor, hereinafter “the register of claims”). 12. The applicants lodged an objection to the register of claims, asking to be recognised as priority creditors (creditori privilegiaţi). Eleven other creditors also lodged objections against the records in the register of claims. 13. Meanwhile, on 24 November 2004 the judicial administrator had submitted a reorganisation plan to a vote by the creditors. It was proposed that the priority claims (creanţe privilegiate) be paid in full, and the remaining unsecured non-priority claims (creanţe chirografare) be paid at a rate of 20% of their value. In an interlocutory judgment of 8 December 2004 the Bacău County Court validated the plan after examining the objections raised by the unsecured creditors (creditori chirografari). In 2006 company R. paid its debts in accordance with the plan. 14. On 11 October 2007 the Braşov County Court held a hearing on the objections to the register of claims lodged by the applicants. The first applicant was present at the hearing to represent both himself and the other applicants. The County Court gave the parties until 18 October 2007 to submit written observations. On that date, in the applicants’ absence, it adjourned delivery of the judgment to 1 November 2007. The County Court gave its judgment on 1 November 2007; it found against the applicants. 15. On 23 January 2008, in accordance with the rules on notification in relation to court documents in insolvency proceedings (see paragraph 20 below), the judgment of 1 November 2007 was published in the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings (Buletinul Procedurilor de Insolvenţă, “the Bulletin”). 16. On an unspecified date the applicants enquired about the judgment’s date of delivery and asked the County Court to provide them with a copy of the judgment, which was sent to them on 31 January 2008; they received it on 4 February 2008. On 13 February 2008 they lodged an appeal by post. 17. Before the Braşov Court of Appeal, the applicants argued that, as they had not had access to the Bulletin, they had not been able to know on which date the judgment had been published. 18. In a final decision of 17 April 2008 the Court of Appeal dismissed that argument and concluded that the appeal had been made out of time, as it had been lodged more than ten days after 23 January 2008, the date on which the Braşov County Court’s judgment had been published (see paragraph 15 above). Relying on the Constitutional Court’s decision no. 1137 of 4 December 2007 (see paragraph 21 below), the Court of Appeal considered that the notification procedure via the Bulletin had offered sufficient safeguards to the participants in the proceedings, and had been justified by the nature of the insolvency procedure. 19. On 21 June 2010 the County Court closed the insolvency proceedings and noted that company R. had complied with all the obligations set out in the reorganisation plan (see paragraph 13 above), and thus it no longer had any debts.

5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Vilnius. 6. In 1989 the applicant and R.Ž. started a company which imported and sold various goods. D.A., who was the stepson of the applicant’s sister, sometimes worked as a security guard on the company’s premises and as the applicant’s bodyguard. 7. In July 1993 R.Ž. and another individual, A.Č., were found murdered in R.Ž.’s flat in Vilnius. 8. In August 1993, while the applicant was in a car with D.A., the latter threatened him with a firearm. When the applicant tried to escape, D.A. hit him with the barrel of the gun, fired some shots into the ground, took the applicant’s Rolex watch and fired at several passers-by, injuring them. 9. On an unspecified date the authorities opened a pre-trial investigation into the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č. (see paragraph 7 above) and the incident between the applicant and D.A. in the car (see paragraph 8 above). 10. In September 1993 the Lithuanian authorities issued a search warrant in respect of D.A. It appears that he had left Lithuania and lived in several different countries. In July 2009 D.A. was apprehended in Ukraine and subsequently extradited to the Lithuanian authorities. 11. In December 2007 the applicant was officially notified that he was suspected of having organised the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č. for personal gain while they were in a helpless state, as set out in Article 129 § 2 (2), (5), (6) and (9) of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 34 below). It was suspected that the applicant had acted together with D.A. Further details were subsequently added to that notice in September 2012 and March 2013. 12. In October 2009 D.A. was officially notified that he was suspected of having murdered R.Ž. and A.Č. for personal gain while they were in a helpless state. D.A. was also notified that he was suspected of having attempted to murder the applicant and several other individuals, as set out in Article 129 § 2 (5), (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11) of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 8 above and 34 below). 13. In May 2010 the prosecutor decided to separate the pre‑trial investigation against the applicant and D.A. (see paragraph 37 below). He noted that the investigation concerned two criminal offences – the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č. (see paragraph 7 above) and the attempted murder of the applicant and other individuals (see paragraph 8 above). The prosecutor observed that the applicant had been suspected of the former offence and that he had been granted victim status in respect of the latter offence, and the prosecutor considered that one person could not have dual status in the same investigation. He also noted that the investigation in respect of D.A. was almost complete and the case would soon be ready for trial, whereas the investigation in respect of the applicant was still ongoing. For those reasons, the prosecutor concluded that it was necessary to separate the investigation against the applicant from that against D.A. 14. D.A. was charged with the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č. for personal gain while they were in a helpless state (hereinafter “the first charge”) and with the attempted murder of the applicant and several other individuals (hereinafter “the second charge”). The criminal case was transferred to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits. With regard to the first charge, the applicant had the status of witness, and with regard to the second charge, he had the status of victim. 15. The Vilnius Regional Court issued its judgment on 20 June 2011. It found D.A. guilty of the first charge as set out in Article 129 § 2 (2), (5) and (9) of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 34 below). The court based its conclusion on multiple witness testimonies, the examination of various material objects, and conclusions delivered by forensic experts. 16. One of the documents examined by the court was a handwritten letter which D.A. had addressed to the applicant at some point in 1993. The applicant had received that letter from D.A.’s father and presented it to the police. A forensic examination revealed that the letter had indeed been written by D.A. In the letter, D.A. stated that he had killed R.Ž. on the applicant’s orders so that the applicant would get all the profit from their business. D.A. also alleged that the applicant had bought him weapons to carry out unspecified criminal activities for the applicant’s benefit, and had bribed judges and prosecutors in order to help D.A. avoid criminal responsibility for some unspecified offences. D.A. further alleged that the applicant had promised to pay him for the murder, but had still not done so, and that that had been the reason for their conflict in the car (see paragraph 8 above). He threatened to forward the letter to various newspapers if the applicant failed to pay him. 17. When questioned by the court, D.A. submitted that the contents of the letter were false. He claimed that the applicant had owed him some money for another debt, so he had made up the story in the letter in order to scare the applicant into paying him back. The applicant, who was questioned as a witness in respect of that charge, also denied all the allegations in the letter and stated that he had no connection to the murder. 18. However, the court held that the letter constituted D.A.’s confession to the murder. The court considered it unlikely that D.A., who at the time of writing the letter had already been suspected of the murder, would falsely incriminate himself in the letter to the applicant, especially as their relationship at that time had not been friendly. It then stated that several of the allegations in the letter had been proved – for example, the applicant had admitted to having bought weapons for D.A., and there had indeed been several sets of criminal proceedings against D.A. which had eventually been discontinued. The court concluded: “As the facts laid out in the letter are consistent and objective, there are no grounds to doubt the truthfulness of the contents of the letter; the statement in the letter that [D.A.] – upon the orders of the individual in respect of whom a separate pre‑trial investigation was opened – killed [R.Ž.] so that all the profit would go to that individual alone, and that all the money which they had jointly owned would belong to the individual in respect of whom a separate pre-trial investigation was opened, must be considered true.” 19. The descriptive part of the judgment also stated that D.A. had killed R.Ž. and A.Č. while acting with unidentified accomplices. However, the court did not take that into account as an aggravating circumstance. 20. As for the second charge against D.A., the court changed its legal classification. The court considered that it had not been proved that D.A. had intended to kill the applicant or any of the passers-by (see paragraph 8 above). However, it found D.A. guilty of stealing the applicant’s property of high value (the Rolex watch) while threatening him with a firearm, and of negligently injuring several other individuals in his attempt to escape. D.A. was given a cumulative sentence of sixteen years’ imprisonment. The court also allowed the applicant’s civil claim submitted in respect of the second charge in its entirety, and ordered D.A. to pay him 40,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 11,600 euros (EUR)) in pecuniary damages for the stolen watch. 21. The prosecutor, D.A., the applicant and another victim submitted appeals against the Vilnius Regional Court’s judgment of 20 June 2011. In his appeal, the applicant argued that the court had de facto found him guilty of having instigated the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č., despite the fact that he had not been the accused in that case and had not been able to defend himself. The applicant asked the Court of Appeal to remove from the descriptive part of the judgment all the passages which alleged his involvement in the murder, in particular those which discussed D.A.’s letter (see paragraphs 16-18 above). 22. In its judgment of 12 June 2012 the Court of Appeal amended the first-instance judgment in part. It held that the Vilnius Regional Court had erred in changing the legal classification of the second charge, found D.A. guilty of the second charge as it had been originally presented (see paragraph 14 above), and increased the sentence to nineteen years’ imprisonment. In addition, the court removed from the descriptive part of the judgment the phrase that D.A. had killed R.Ž. and A.Č. while acting with unidentified accomplices (see paragraph 19 above) – it held that, without identifying such individuals, inter alia, it could not be determined whether there had been an intention for them to act together. 23. The court dismissed D.A.’s appeal contesting his guilt in respect of both charges. With regard to the first charge, D.A. argued, inter alia, that his letter to the applicant (see paragraphs 16-18 above) should not have been considered evidence of his guilt. In response to D.A.’s arguments, the court stated: “D.A.’s guilt in respect of the charge against him – the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č. for personal gain while they were in a helpless state – has been proved by a series of pieces of indirect evidence collected in the case and adequately assessed in the [first‑instance] judgment, as well as one of the main pieces of direct evidence ‑ D.A.’s letter to [the applicant], allowing [the court] to make well-founded conclusions regarding the nature of the convicted individual’s actions and the form of his guilt. ... It is underlined that the principal statements of the letter, assessed together with the other evidence collected in the case, correspond to the events which took place at that time ... The chamber concludes that the facts indicated in D.A.’s letter are not made up, he refers to actual events which took place in his life, and there is no indication that he intended to threaten [the applicant] with that letter to make the latter pay him money.” 24. As to the applicant’s appeal, the court stated: “Contrary to what is alleged in [the applicant’s] appeal, the first-instance court, while examining the evidence related to [D.A.’s] guilt in respect of the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č., did not assess [the applicant’s] actions relating to the organisation of the murder of those individuals. As can be seen from the case file, on 22 December 2007 [the applicant] was notified that he was suspected of having organised the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č. ... [The applicant] is entitled to exercise his defence rights and defend himself against the accusation in that criminal investigation. Only that investigation can determine [the applicant’s] guilt in respect of the criminal offence of which he is suspected ... [The applicant] essentially contests his guilt in respect of the part of the judgment in which he does not have the status of either convicted individual or victim ... and his request goes beyond his procedural rights as a witness ... [The applicant’s appeal] is thereby dismissed.” 25. D.A. and the applicant submitted appeals on points of law against the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 12 June 2012. The applicant raised essentially the same arguments as in his previous appeal (see paragraph 21 above). 26. On 28 February 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. In response to the applicant’s submissions, the Supreme Court stated that the criminal proceedings in question concerned D.A.’s and not the applicant’s guilt in respect of the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č., and the applicant had not had victim status with regard to that charge, so he was not legally entitled to submit an appeal on points of law (see paragraph 40 below). 27. On 11 April 2013 the applicant was served with an indictment and charged with having incited D.A. and another unidentified individual to murder R.Ž. and A.Č. for personal gain while they were in a helpless state, as set out in Article 24 § 5 and Article 129 § 2 (2), (5), (6) and (9) of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 34-35 below). The case was transferred to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits. 28. When questioned by the court, the applicant denied his guilt in respect of the murder. He submitted that all the allegations against him in D.A.’s letter had been false, and that D.A. had written the letter with the purpose of blackmailing the applicant, which was why the applicant had decided to give it to the police. D.A. was questioned as a witness and gave essentially the same statements as in the previous criminal proceedings, including those relating to his letter (see paragraph 17 above). 29. On 9 October 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court acquitted the applicant. It considered that neither direct nor indirect evidence adequately proved that he was guilty of having instigated the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č. The court underlined that it had not been proved that the death of R.Ž., who had been the applicant’s business partner, had been beneficial to the applicant; on the contrary, after his death, their company had suffered great losses and had eventually ceased operating. In addition, the court considered that the prosecution had not established any motive for the applicant to kill A.Č. 30. With regard to D.A.’s letter, the court stated that, although the letter included facts which were true, some of its other contents appeared to be “characteristic of blackmail”, in particular those which alleged that the applicant had bought D.A. weapons specifically to commit criminal offences, or that he had bribed some officials to help D.A. avoid criminal responsibility (see paragraph 16 above). The court also considered that D.A.’s threat to forward the letter to the media further indicated that it had been written with the purpose of blackmailing the applicant. Lastly, the court underlined that the applicant had not paid D.A. the money which he had demanded, nor had he destroyed the letter, but had submitted it to the police, which confirmed that the applicant had not been connected to the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č. 31. The prosecutor appealed against that judgment. He submitted, inter alia, that the contents of D.A.’s letter had been examined in the previous criminal proceedings which had been concluded by a final court judgment (see paragraphs 18, 23 and 26 above), and the courts in the proceedings against the applicant should have followed that assessment. 32. On 5 March 2015 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s acquittal. In response to the prosecutor’s arguments concerning D.A.’s letter, it stated that the courts in the criminal proceedings against D.A. had not examined the applicant’s actions in relation to the murder of R.Ž. and A.Č., so the prosecutor’s arguments had to be dismissed. From the information which the parties submitted to the Court, it appears that no appeal against that judgment was lodged before the Supreme Court.

5. The applicant was born in 1972. 6. The applicant arrived in Russia in 1988. He was subsequently convicted of criminal offences on several occasions. He was released on 3 December 2014 after serving his most recent prison sentence. 7. On 2 December 2014 the Russian Ministry of Justice issued an exclusion order, declaring the applicant’s presence in Russia undesirable and prohibiting his return to Russia until 2020. Further to the exclusion order, on 4 March 2015 the migration authorities issued a deportation order in respect of the applicant and he was later arrested. On 6 March 2015 a judge authorised his further detention until 10 March 2015, with a view to enforcing the deportation order. His detention was then extended until 30 August 2015. 8. On 7 May 2015 the Georgian authorities informed the Russian migration authority that the applicant was not a Georgian national and that they would not assist in his return to Georgia. The applicant was released on 30 August 2015 following the expiry of the latest detention order. 9. On 14 December 2015 the applicant was accused of an offence under Article 18.8 § 3 of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO) on account of his presence in Russia without the necessary documents. On 15 December 2015 the Kirovskiy District Court of Saint Petersburg convicted the applicant and ordered his administrative removal from Russia (without specifying the destination country). The judge noted that the applicant was a stateless person but held that he had to comply with a statutory obligation to leave Russia, having no valid legal basis for being there. Lastly, the judge ordered that the applicant be placed in a detention centre for foreigners, with a view to enforcing his administrative removal. 10. The judgment was amenable to appeal within ten days of receipt by the defendant. 11. On 25 December 2015 the applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the penalty of administrative removal could not be enforced in the absence of Georgian or any other nationality and that it was therefore unjustified to place him in detention and keep him there. 12. On 26 January 2016 the Saint Petersburg City Court upheld the judgment of 15 December 2015. The appeal court considered that the applicant could still be removed to the country from which he had arrived in Russia if there was a readmission agreement with that country; that he could be held in detention for a maximum of two years, which was the statutory period for the enforceability of a penalty; and that the CAO had not required the trial judge to set any time-limit when ordering his placement in a detention centre for foreigners. 13. On 24 March 2016 the Georgian authorities again informed the Russian migration authority that they would not assist in providing documents for the applicant’s return to Georgia as he was not a Georgian national and there were no other legal grounds for such assistance. 14. The applicant sought a review of the decisions of 15 December 2015 and 26 January 2016. On 24 June 2016 the deputy President of the City Court upheld them on review under Article 30.12 of the CAO. 15. On 22 July 2016 the District Court dismissed an application from the applicant to terminate the proceedings to enforce the judgment of 15 December 2015. The court held that there was no statutory basis in the CAO or other legislation for granting such an application. On 8 November 2016 the City Court upheld that decision. 16. In the meantime, on 1 August 2016, referring to Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, the applicant lodged an application for release and again sought termination of the enforcement proceedings. By a letter of 2 August 2016 a judge of the District Court returned his application without examination. 17. The applicant lodged an individual complaint with the Russian Constitutional Court (see paragraph 29 below). 18. On 5 June 2017 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an application with the Kirovskiy District Court of Saint Petersburg in order to obtain the applicant’s release, referring to the above-mentioned constitutional ruling. On 22 June 2017 the District Court ordered his release. 19. From 15 December 2015 to 5 August 2016 (when the application was lodged with the Court) and then further until 22 June 2017 the applicant was kept in the Сentre for the Temporary Confinement of Foreign Nationals (Центр временного содержания иностранных граждан) in Krasnoye Selo. From the start date to mid-February 2016 he was kept in cell no. 404 and from mid-February to 3 August 2016 he was in cell no. 403. According to the applicant, each cell measured eighteen square metres and accommodated four people. The cells were equipped with bedside boards and beds but there were no chairs, tables or other furniture. On 3 August 2016 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 304, measuring eight square metres, where he was kept alone. From late September 2016 to 17 January 2017 he shared cell no. 706, measuring ten square metres, with another detainee. From 17 to 22 January he was in cell no. 405 and from 22 January to 22 June 2017 he was kept in cell no. 406 with three other detainees. 20. During the period of his confinement up to 3 August 2016 the applicant was locked in his cell most of the time, being taken to a courtyard (measuring some fifteen square metres) every second day for ten to fifteen minutes. He was taken there every third day from early 2017. The yard had no equipment for sport or leisure activities, no benches and no shelter from the rain or snow. 21. The toilets in the cells were separated from the main area by a fixed partition. There was no proper, ceramic toilet bowl, just a “hole” with a flusher set on a small base so the toilet had to be used in a squatting position. According to the applicant, the partition was not high enough and the toilet area remained visible. There were also unpleasant odours. 22. Shower facilities were accessible for ten minutes every fourth day in 2016 and once every seven to ten days from early 2017. There were no facilities for washing or drying clothes and no toilet paper, toothpaste, soap or the like was provided. Bedding was changed once a month. Subsequently, the applicant also stated that the cells became infested with bugs, cockroaches and mice, although it was not clear to what period of time he referred to. He submitted a photograph showing two captured mice in containers. 23. Food was brought to the cells but was cold, particularly in winter, and of mediocre quality. In the absence of tables, detainees had to eat on their beds. There was no supply of drinking water and no facilities for boiling water or cooking food. It was not possible to purchase food. 24. He had been allowed to leave cells 304 and 706 and move within the corridor and shower area but had been prohibited from entering other cells. 25. No radio, television, newspapers or the like were provided in the detention centre. The applicant and his co-detainees were apparently allowed to have a television set during his most recent period of detention. 26. The applicant has submitted several photographs of the cells, a statement written by his cellmate after March 2017, a statement from a detainee written in 2015 and a recent news report about the detention centre. 27. In November 2016 the detention facility was visited by members of a public oversight committee. They noted that the toilets (consisting of a “hole”) in the cells on the fourth floor were separated from the main area by a low partition or curtain and that it was not possible to switch the lights on or off from inside the cells. They also noted that the detention centre had no courtyard for detainees. 28. According to the Government, as of February 2017 the applicant was being held in cell no. 403, which measured 27.4 square metres (not eighteen as submitted by the applicant). The cell was equipped with a toilet, a sink with hot and cold water, beds and a table. The main lights were switched off at night. The detention centre had a library and detainees could borrow books. Food was prepared and delivered by an external catering company. Hot food was brought in special containers.

5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Ankara. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. 7. At the time of the events giving rise to the application the applicant was serving as a chief police officer in Ankara. 8. On 12 April 2002 a woman named S.K. filed a criminal complaint with officers at Demirfırka police station, alleging that she had been taken into a police car by two officers on the pretext of her being a suspect. Afterwards, they had driven her around in the car and finally had taken her to an empty plot of land where she had been raped in the car by one of the police officers. He had been wearing glasses and had held a police radio in his hand. She identified the vehicle’s licence plate. 9. The applicant and the other police officer were immediately called into the police station for questioning as they had been assigned to the vehicle which had the licence plate identified by S.K. 10. In his statement to the police, made in the presence of his lawyer, the applicant said that he had picked up S.K. around 2 a.m. while he was patrolling with his colleague, S.A., on Talatpaşa Boulevard. He submitted that S.K., who had looked intoxicated, had hailed them, stopped their car, and told them that she worked as a “konsomatris”, a bar hostess who entertains male guests by keeping them company. She had asked for their help to go to a safe place and the applicant had offered to take her to her home, which she had declined. According to the applicant they had also offered to take her to the police station, which she had also declined. Finally, they had taken her to S.A.’s home with the intention of sobering her up. The applicant stated that when S.A. was in the kitchen preparing something to eat, S.K. had started behaving strangely, taking off her clothes and acting in a sexually inviting manner. The applicant said that as a result of being aroused he had simply ejaculated in his own hand but had not touched her. He had then called S.A. and told him that they had to leave immediately. The applicant stated that they had left S.K. in front of a hotel at 3 a.m. and had continued with their patrol until they had been called into the police station for questioning. 11. S.A. confirmed the applicant’s version of events in his statement to the police on the same day. 12. In an additional statement to the police, also made on the same day, S.K. told the police that she could not remember whether the police officers had taken her to an apartment or some other place as she had been very intoxicated. 13. A forensic medical examination of S.K. was carried out on the same day, showing that she had no bruises on her body. 14. A forensic expert report drafted on 15 April 2002 stated that the underwear that the applicant had been wearing on the night in question had S.K.’s and his own DNA on it. Furthermore, napkins found in the rubbish bin on the balcony of S.A.’s apartment had traces of the applicant’s semen. 15. On 6 June 2002 the Ankara governor decided to authorise the prosecution of the applicant and S.A. for alleged rape and abuse of authority. The applicant lodged an objection with the Ankara District Administrative Court seeking annulment of the governor’s decision, but it was dismissed. 16. On 15 November 2002 the Ankara public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance, charging the applicant and S.A. with abuse of public authority and the unlawful use of a public vehicle under Article 240 of the former Turkish Criminal Code and section 16 of the Law on Vehicles (Law no. 237). 17. In her statement in the first-instance proceedings, S.K. said that she had flagged down a police car that day to ask for help. As she had been intoxicated, she could not remember exactly what had happened later or which officer had raped her. 18. The chief public prosecutor submitted an opinion on the merits and stated that the applicant’s conduct should be reclassified as rape and unlawful detention and that of S.A. as having aided and abetted those acts. He therefore argued that the case should be referred to the Ankara Assize Court, which has jurisdiction to hear such charges. 19. On 13 July 2004 the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. It found that the offences committed by the applicant while performing his official duties were rape and the unlawful detention of an adult, which were governed, inter alia, by Articles 251, 416 § 1 and 429 § 1 of the former Criminal Code, and the unlawful use of a public vehicle, which came under section 16 of Law no. 237. It stated that those offences had to be tried by assize courts and it therefore referred the case to the Ankara Assize Court. 20. At a hearing held on 24 March 2005, the Ankara Assize Court heard S.K. who, contrary to her previous statements, submitted that the officers had not raped her and had not taken her anywhere without her consent. She then submitted that she wished to withdraw her complaint. 21. On 13 September 2005 the Ankara Assize Court acquitted the applicant and S.A. of all charges, holding that there was no evidence of force on S.K.’s body, one of the constituent elements of the offences of rape and unlawful detention. The court further held that despite S.K.’s statement of 24 March 2005, the forensic report of 15 April 2002 had established that the applicant had had intercourse with her. In the absence of evidence that corroborated the fact of the applicant having forced himself on S.K., it could not be established beyond doubt that the act of sexual intercourse itself had not been consensual. The court stated in that connection that even if S.K. had been drunk that night, her allegations of rape and of being held against her will needed to be supported by some sign of resistance. In the light of the conclusion that there had been no indication of a criminal offence committed by the police officers, the court then held that the applicant and S.A. could not be deemed to have committed the separate offence of the unlawful use of a public vehicle. It therefore acquitted them of all the charges. 22. On 21 September 2005 the acquittal became final as no appeals had been made. 23. In the aftermath of the events of 12 April 2002 a preliminary disciplinary investigation was launched against the applicant and S.A. on 24 April 2002. 24. On 2 and 29 May 2002 the applicant was questioned in relation to the allegations of rape against him. He submitted that he had not had sexual intercourse with S.K. He repeated his earlier statements that S.K. had seduced him to the point where he had had to ejaculate in his own hand. The applicant was also requested to submit a written defence statement. He wrote that he had taken S.K. into the police car with the intention of helping her and had not forced himself on her, as alleged by S.K. He pointed out that the forensic expert evidence had established that there had been no traces of violence, whether on S.K.’s body or in the form of any other type of evidence, such as damage to property or blood stains at S.A.’s apartment or inside the police car. 25. An investigation report dated 6 June 2002, prepared by the police investigator, concluded that the applicant had committed the offence of rape, while S.A. was guilty of the offence of conduct unbecoming and incompatible with the civil service and therefore recommended that the applicant be sanctioned with a deferral of advancement to a higher rank for a period of twenty-four months. The report further stated that a recommendation for a separate criminal investigation against the applicant and S.A. had already been submitted to the governor’s office for authorisation. 26. On 28 November 2002, the Supreme Disciplinary Council found the applicant guilty of abuse of his authority as a police officer and of sexually assaulting S.K. Noting that the applicant’s appraisal scores had only been average for the years 1999 and 2000, and taking account of the shameful nature of the act he had committed, it found that the applicant could not be given a penalty that was less severe than the one decided on. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows: “... the victim complained to the police and confirmed the event by giving the licence plate number of the vehicle and accurately describing the officer as wearing glasses and holding a police radio in his hand. The applicant, on the other hand, hid the facts by denying that he had had intercourse with S.K. [D]espite the fact that the vaginal examination of the victim did not reveal the presence of any active or passive semen, the victim’s statement that she was menstruating on the night in question and the forensic evidence finding traces of both the applicant’s and S.K.’s DNA on the applicant’s underwear and the two napkins found in S.A.’s apartment containing the applicant’s DNA, point to the conclusion that the applicant must have ejaculated prematurely before sexual intercourse. He has therefore committed the offence of ‘sexual assault’ and he furthermore used his position as a police officer by calling the victim a ‘suspect’ in order to lure her into the police car ... Criminal proceedings are pending against the applicant on charges of abuse of authority under Article 240 of the Turkish Criminal Code. ... It has been decided unanimously to dismiss the accused from the police force, in accordance with section 8(6) and (7) of the Disciplinary Regulation of the Security Forces on the grounds that it has been proven that he has committed the offence of sexual assault and of using his position as a police officer for personal ... advantage.” 27. On an unspecified date the applicant objected to the Supreme Disciplinary Council’s decision before the Ankara Administrative Court. The applicant argued that his dismissal on the basis of a finding that he had committed sexual assault, although he had not been found guilty of that offence by a criminal court, had violated his right to the presumption of innocence. 28. On 4 July 2003 the Ankara Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s case, holding that the decision to dismiss the applicant from the police force had been in accordance with the law. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows: “Acts, conduct and behaviour of the kind listed in section 8(6), ‘... rape, sexual assault, ... or attempting to commit any of those offences’ and in section 8 (7), ‘using his position as a police officer for his own or another person’s advantage’, are sanctioned with dismissal from the police force. After examination of the file, it appears that the case concerns the applicant’s dismissal from the police force on the basis of a disciplinary investigation which established that he had intercourse with a woman without her consent on the pretext of calling her a suspect .., by asking her to get into a police car so that he could verify her identity at the police station, although in the end he took her to a piece of empty land and had intercourse with her without her consent. On the basis of the case file, statements, the forensic report and other information, the veracity of the accusation is reinforced and therefore the decision to dismiss the applicant is in accordance with the law.” 29. On 13 March 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal by a majority by endorsing the reasons provided by the Ankara Administrative Court. One judge out of the five expressed a dissenting opinion, reasoning that the applicant had been acquitted of the charges in the parallel criminal proceedings, including of rape, and that therefore the disciplinary decision to dismiss him from the police force on those grounds could no longer be upheld. The dissenting judge further argued that the courts should have reclassified the applicant’s conduct as conduct that was incompatible with the reputation and trust inherent in the functions of an official and sanctioned him with the corresponding penalty of the deferral of moving to a higher rank for a period of sixteen months. 30. On 23 June 2006 the applicant submitted a request to rectify the decision of 13 March 2006, arguing in the main that the fact that he had been acquitted in the criminal proceedings and had been found innocent of the allegations of rape had not been taken into account in the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision. He further argued that the contradictory conclusions of the criminal and administrative courts in relation to what had happened on the night in question had cast doubt on his innocence. 31. The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s request on 17 June 2008, holding that none of the reasons for rectification he had put forth fell within the exhaustive list of permissible grounds for such a decision in section 54 (1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (Law no. 2577). 32. In their observations the Government submitted that on 26 November 2008 the applicant had brought proceedings against the Ministry of the Interior and had requested that the reopening of the proceedings for his dismissal from the police force. The applicant relied on the Ankara Assize Court’s final judgment of 13 September 2005, acquitting him of the charges of, inter alia, attempted rape and abuse of authority. He argued before the Ankara Administrative Court that the establishment of his innocence should be regarded as new grounds for reopening the dismissal proceedings. On 27 May 2009 the applicant’s request was dismissed. The Court was not provided with a copy of that decision; however, the Government provided a summary of parts of it, which was not contested by the applicant. According to the Government, the administrative court held that “the decision of the Assize Court was available on the dates the Supreme Administrative Court examined the applicant’s appellate review and request for rectification of the decision, and that accordingly the court in question made an assessment of the decision rendered by the Assize Court”. 33. According to the information submitted by the Government, the applicant did not appeal against that decision.

7. The applicants were born in 1976, 1981, 1995 and 1989 respectively and live in Karcsa. They belong to the Roma minority. 8. On 3 September 2013 the applicants, riding in a car driven by the first applicant, arrived at a petrol station in Sátoraljaújhely, at about midnight. 9. At the petrol station two police officers called on the applicants to identify themselves, for no apparent reason. When the first applicant produced his ID, the officers made derogatory remarks about the applicants’ Roma origin. Although the applicants offered no resistance, the first applicant was hit in the chest, pressed violently against the car and handcuffed with his hands behind his back. Two additional police cars arrived and the applicants were transported to the Sátoraljaújhely police station. 10. While in the car, the first applicant was hit in the spine and, once at the police station, was dragged, with his bottom against the ground, into the building while being kicked repeatedly. Inside the police station he was hit repeatedly while held in a detention room. 11. At the police station, the second applicant’s trousers were pulled off and his testicles squeezed; he was repeatedly hit and kicked and his back was injured with a sharp object. While being assaulted by four or five officers, he was also insulted and told that he, a Roma, should die, or else move away from Sátoraljaújhely. 12. The third applicant was repeatedly hit and kicked at the petrol station and in the patrol vehicle, but not at the police station. 13. The fourth applicant was handcuffed, led to a round table inside the police station, his handcuffs were attached to a leg of the table and his leg was then kicked so that he fell under the table, where he was repeatedly kicked or hit in the head. As a result of the beating, his wrist broke. 14. When the first applicant asked for a doctor, this was refused by the officers who said that he could have a doctor once he was dead. On release, the officers wanted him to sign a waiver stating he had not been assaulted; since he refused to do so, an officer signed the waiver for him. Intimidated, the other applicants signed the waiver. 15. Prior to their arrival at the petrol station, the applicants had had an altercation with the staff of a local night club where they had not been served for apparently being intoxicated. Police Officers Gy.R. and M.P., passing by the petrol station in a patrol vehicle, recognised the car described by the staff of the night club, stopped and proceeded to check the applicants’ identities at about 12.45 a.m. The applicants did not co-operate and behaved aggressively towards the officers, calling them names. The officers called in reinforcements. They isolated the first and second applicants from the others, handcuffed them with their hands behind their backs by applying physical restraint, and then placed them in the patrol car. The applicants were yelling gross insults at them. 16. As backup, Police Officers K.L.J., H.Z., M.D., B.R. and D.P.Cs. arrived at the petrol station. They applied physical restraint and handcuffed the third and fourth applicants, and placed them in the police vehicle. All applicants were then transferred to the police station where they were held until after 3 a.m. 17. In the ensuing proceedings, the first applicant stated that he had handed over his wallet containing his ID card to the officers immediately upon being requested to do so. However, two employees of the petrol station testified that the first and second applicants had refused to prove their identities and had addressed the officers in an unacceptable manner, whereas the latter had instructed the applicants in a business-like, official manner. 18. The first applicant also stated in his testimony that he must have been hit on the jaw after he had been seated in the patrol car, for he could not remember anything afterwards until he had been pulled out of the car outside the police station. However, in the original criminal complaint filed by the applicants, no mention had been made of any such blow; and no corresponding injury had been recorded in the ensuing medical report – in which it had, on the other hand, been recorded that the first applicant had not become unconscious and had been able to remember the events clearly. Similarly, the criminal complaint filed by the applicants had not contained any reference to what the first applicant stated in his subsequent testimony, namely that he had been kicked in the head – his left temple – on the flight of steps leading to the entrance of the police station. According to the first applicant, his son, the third applicant, had also seen this. However, the latter had not been able to corroborate this in his testimony. 19. The fourth applicant stated that he had been handcuffed to the leg of a round table. The on-site inspection was unable to confirm this allegation since there had been no round table in the corridor in question at the police station. Furthermore, the fourth applicant alleged that he had suffered a fracture of his left scaphoid bone after he had fallen under the table following being handcuffed to the table leg, where one of the police officers had kept kicking him every ten to fifteen minutes for four to five hours, from the beginning of his detention until his release. He alleged that most of the kicks had hit his head and that there had even been a footprint on his head. His wrist had allegedly been fractured when a kick had hit the handcuff on a hand that he had raised to protect his head. Although the medical examination revealed abrasions of different sizes on various parts of his head, none of those had exceeded 2.5 cm in length and there had been no lesions that had matched a shoe print. In the forensic expert’s opinion, the medically documented injuries of the fourth applicant – epithelial abrasions of the forehead, the left eyebrow, the area anterior to the left ear and both knees (see paragraph 24 below) – could have been caused when he had been handcuffed, a measure that he had resisted; the injuries had not been typical of a beating and had only indicated a weak impact. Redness of the wrist had also been observed but had likely been caused by the handcuffing; whereas the left scaphoid bone fracture had been a residual condition of a former fracture that could have occurred years earlier (see paragraph 28 below). 20. The third applicant stated initially that he had been hit by one of the officers at the petrol station, and that his arm had then been tightly squeezed while he had been escorted to the patrol car. Later however, he alleged that he had been hit on the back of the head and his arm while inside the patrol car but had not otherwise been assaulted. He could not give an acceptable explanation for this contradiction. 21. In their testimonies, both the first and the second applicants said that they had been placed in two adjacent detention rooms and repeatedly assaulted every ten to fifteen minutes by several officers for hours on end, involving many blows. However, the medical findings recorded in both cases had indicated only smaller abrasions and bruises. In relation to the first applicant, the fourth applicant mentioned assaults that the first applicant himself had not mentioned during his questioning and which were not described in the criminal report filed by the first applicant either: namely that upon arrival at the police building he had been pulled out of the car and kicked in the spine. 22. The applicants stated that at the petrol station, one of the officers had said over the radio that “we are taking in gypsies” or “gypsy kids”. However, the audio recordings of the radio traffic did not contain such a statement. One officer had said at one point only that “four young Roma men kicked up a fuss at the petrol station”. 23. Neither the police officers, nor the security guard on duty at the police station, nor the petrol station staff had provided any support for the allegation that the applicants, who had been under the influence of alcohol and talking to the officers in an extremely rude way, had been assaulted either at the petrol station or in the police building. 24. The applicants were examined at Sátoraljaújhely Hospital at about 6 p.m. on 4 September 2013. The first applicant was found to have suffusions in his left ear, on his face and chest, on his left arm and elbow, and on his right arm, abrasions on his buttocks, and erythema on both wrists. The second applicant sustained suffusions on his neck and right upper arm, abrasions on his back and lower right arm, and erythema on both wrists. The third applicant was found to have suffusions on his neck and around his right collar bone as well as suffusions and abrasions on both upper arms. The fourth applicant had abrasions on the forehead, above the left eye, next to his ears and on both knees, erythema on both wrists and a fracture of the left scaphoid bone; it was uncertain whether the latter was a recent or an inveterate injury. 25. The applicants lodged a criminal complaint on 18 September 2013, accusing the officers of ill-treatment. The case was investigated by the Miskolc Investigation Office and, subsequently, by the Debrecen Bureau of the Central Prosecutorial Investigation Office. The public prosecutors in charge of the case obtained video footage, a recording of the police radio traffic, medical reports, police documents, opinions of medical and graphology experts, and testimonies of witnesses, suspects and victims. 26. On 16 April 2014 the Independent Police Complaints Board, which had been approached by the applicants’ lawyer in parallel to the proceedings outlined above, issued a report on the first applicant’s case. It found that handcuffing him had not been justified in the circumstances and had been contrary to human dignity, especially since his hands had been handcuffed behind his back. It also found that his prolonged detention at the police station had breached his right to liberty. However, in terms of the entire incident, the Board was not convinced that excessive force had been applied. With regard to the remainder of the issues, namely the first applicant’s rights to health, human dignity, equal treatment and non-discrimination, the Board identified no breach of his fundamental rights, essentially for want of conclusive evidence and because there had been differing versions of events that could not be reconciled. 27. On 15 May 2014 the Board issued a report on the fourth applicant’s case. Its conclusions were similar to those in the first applicant’s case. 28. On 22 and 29 May 2014 the opinions of two forensic experts were obtained in the fourth applicant’s criminal case. One expert was of the view that the abrasions and erythema he had sustained could be explained by the melee that had occurred when he had resisted being handcuffed or by his immobilisation. As regards the broken scaphoid bone, the expert found that it was an inveterate lesion that had occurred at least six to eight months prior to the incident. In sum, the expert stated that the fourth applicant’s allegation that he had been assaulted for hours on end was not supported by the medical findings. In the other expert opinion, a radiologist stated that the broken scaphoid bone could not have been related to the incident and had occurred years earlier. 29. On 10 July 2014 the Board issued reports on the second and third applicants’ cases. Its conclusions were again similar to those in the first applicant’s case. 30. On 21 August 2014 the Investigation Office discontinued the prosecution against the police officers. It held that the testimonies of the applicants had been exaggerated, contradictory and modified several times, and that the findings of fact could not enable it to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the injuries had been deliberately caused by the officers exceeding the use of force necessitated by the applicants’ own conduct. 31. On 14 October 2014 the Attorney General’s Office rejected a complaint by the applicants against the discontinuation order. It pointed out that the witness testimonies and the audio recordings refuted the applicants’ allegations of racist motivation and utterances. It further underlined that the applicants’ injuries had not provided evidence of any use of force exceeding that which had been prompted by the applicants’ own conduct; it also observed that in the forensic medical expert’s opinion (see paragraph 28 above), the fourth applicant’s scaphoid bone fracture had been a pre-existing condition. As regards the lawfulness and proportionality of the use of force, the Attorney General’s Office held that the information available on the case was insufficient to reconcile the opposing versions. 32. The applicants’ attention was drawn to the possibility of pursuing their complaint as substitute private prosecutors, but they did not avail themselves of this legal avenue.

5. The applicant was born in 1972 and now lives in Odessa, Ukraine. 6. On 31 January 2014 the applicant sold a plot of land and a summer cottage in the Moscow Region for 4,600,000 Russian roubles (RUB). On 20 February 2014 he exchanged RUB 3,605,000 for 100,000 United States dollars (USD). 7. On 19 March 2014 the applicant travelled to Odessa from Domodedovo Airport in Moscow. He was carrying the entire USD 100,000 in his handbag. At the security check, his hand luggage was X-rayed. An officer asked him whether he was carrying any cash. The applicant acknowledged that he had money in his handbag and showed it to the officer. 8. The applicant was subsequently interviewed by a police officer and an investigator on suspicion of smuggling foreign currency. He insisted on the lawful origin of the money and claimed that he had erroneously believed that the customs control would take place after the security check. 9. On 18 April 2014 the investigator refused to initiate criminal proceedings because it could not be established that the applicant had deliberately sought to circumvent customs regulations. 10. On 6 June 2014 the Federal Customs Service prepared a report on a regulatory customs offence under Article 16.4 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The applicant was charged for his failure to make a written declaration in respect of the USD 100,000 he had been carrying on him. 11. A hearing was held on 18 December 2014 before a justice of the peace in the Domodedovo District of the Moscow Region. The court held that the customs report and statements the applicant had given to the police were sufficient evidence of the offence. It was legally irrelevant whether he had deliberately sought to circumvent customs regulations or negligently failed to abide by the applicable declaration requirements. The court issued a confiscation order for USD 90,000, reasoning as follows: “When deciding on the punishment, the court takes into account the nature and gravity of the offence which is connected to the operation of a hazardous device, the information on the character of Mr Gyrlyan, who has no previous record of similar offences, and considers it appropriate to order confiscation of the object of the administrative offence.” 12. In his grounds of appeal, the applicant relied in particular on the case-law of the Constitutional Court, which emphasised that any punishment had to be fair and proportionate to the nature of the offence, the gravity of the consequences, the extent of the damage and other relevant factors. He pointed out that the money had been lawfully obtained and that his actions had not caused any damage to the State. 13. On 14 January 2015 the Domodedovo Town Court dismissed the appeal in a summary fashion, noting that the punishment had been determined “within the range of penalties [provided for in Article 16.4 of the Code of Administrative Offences] and with regard to the character of the offender”. 14. An appeal on points of law was dismissed by the deputy president of the Moscow Regional Court on 30 April 2015. He wrote that “the defence’s allegation of a formalistic approach on the part of the [lower] courts [was their] subjective opinion that [did not] shield Mr Gyrlyan from liability.”

5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Lipetsk. 6. On 18 September 2007 the applicant signed a private contract for the purchase of a flat in Lipetsk. The seller was Ms E.M.T., acting on behalf of herself and her daughter Maria, a minor. The contract stipulated that the property was not “mortgaged, encumbered by any claims of third parties, disputed or charged”. 7. The flat in question had been allocated as social housing to Ms E.M.T. and her husband, Mr V.A.V., in 1979. They had lived there with their four children: Yelena, Mikhail, Dmitriy and Maria. Mikhail and Dmitriy were given long prison sentences in 1998 and 2004 respectively and were still serving them at the material time. Yelena moved out in 1997 to continue her studies in Dagestan. In 2006, Ms E.M.T and Maria became the sole owners of the property by way of privatisation, while Mr V.A.V., Mikhail, Dmitry and Yelena declined in writing to exercise their right to obtain their shares of the privatised flat. 8. As the seller Ms E.M.T. delayed submitting the contract for State registration, the applicant sought a court order upholding her full title to the property. The seller Ms E.M.T. brought a counterclaim. She submitted that she was unable to move out because the purchase of the new flat for herself and her daughter Maria had not yet been finalised. However, after Ms E.M.T. failed to appear in court, on 2 April 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court in Lipetsk struck out the counterclaim and granted the applicant relief in the form of an order compelling State registration of her full title to the property. On 12 November 2008 the title was registered. 9. The applicant then sued the former owner Ms E.M.T. and members of her family, seeking termination of their right to use the flat, annulment of the registration of their residence at that address, and their eviction. 10. On 7 April 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court allowed her claim in part. It ordered the eviction of Ms E.M.T. and Maria, as they were no longer owners of the property, but dismissed the claim in respect of Yelena, Mikhail and Dmitriy on the following grounds: “According to the parties, the contested property contains personal belongings and chattels of the defendants [Mikhail, Dmitriy and Yelena]; it appears from their written statements that, in declining their shares of the contested property during its privatisation, they did not intend to stop using the flat. Since there was no arrangement between the owner of the contested property and the defendants regarding the discontinuation of the right to use the property, the court considers that [Mikhail, Dmitriy and Yelena] had a right of use over the flat which was identical [in its scope] to that of the owner; accordingly, there are no legal grounds for allowing [the applicant’s] claim to declare their right of use over the flat terminated. A change in ownership of the contested property cannot serve as an independent ground for terminating [their] right to use the flat ... The plaintiff’s argument to the effect that [Mikhail, Dmitriy and Yelena] do not actually live in the contested property cannot serve as an independent ground for terminating [their] right of use over the flat ... Since the defendants’ right of use over the flat is not terminated, there are no grounds for ordering their eviction ...” 11. On 27 May 2009 the Lipetsk Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, endorsing the District Court’s judgment.

4. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Sochi. 5. The applicant obtained three judgments in her favour against various domestic authorities specified in the Appendix. 6. The judgments were either enforced with a delay or remained unenforced until the date of receipt of the parties’ latest submissions, as specified in the table below. 7. According to the Government, to enforce the judgment of 23 June 2005 the authorities held a public auction to determine a company to perform the renovation of the applicant’s flat in Yakutsk. On 3 October 2008 the applicant refused to let the employees of the winner private company in, and they were unable to start the renovation works in the flat. In November 2008 the bailiffs sent a notification to the applicant that the renovation works were scheduled for 19 November 2008, but the notification was never delivered to her, as in the meantime she had moved to a different town. In March 2009 the bailiffs and the local administration employees attempted to visit the flat in question and compiled an act on the applicant’s absence from the flat. 8. On 11 November 2004 the Justice of the Peace of the 41st Court Circuit of Yakutsk granted the applicant’s complaint about the bailiffs’ inaction in various rounds of the enforcement proceedings concerning other judgments in her favour and ordered the bailiffs’ service of Yakutsk to pay the applicant 200,000.15 Russian roubles (RUB) of compensation. 9. The applicant requested to amend the judgment, to replace the respondent authority by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. Referring to the applicant’s request, on 9 February 2005 the Justice of the Peace, of the 41st Court Circuit of Yakutsk annulled the judgment of 11 November 2004 and ordered that the proceedings be reopened. 10. In May 2005 the case was forwarded for examination to the Yakutsk Town Court according to the jurisdiction rules, on the respondent’s request. The applicant unsuccessfully challenged the decision to transfer the case; the final decision was issued on 16 June 2005 by the Yakutsk Town Court. On 28 June 2005 the proceedings were suspended on the applicant’s request. Since that date the applicant had not lodged any further applications with domestic courts. On 20 December 2005 the Yakutsk Town Court left the applicant’s action against the bailiffs without examination, for the applicant’s lack of interest in maintaining the case. The applicant did not appeal against the decision. 11. On 19 November 2004 the Yakutsk Town Court granted the applicant’s civil action against the municipal unitary enterprise “Payment Processing Centre” (МУП «ЕРКЦ») of Yakutsk. The court found that the respondent company, when calculating the communal charges, had failed to take account of the water provider’s failure to supply water to the applicant’s flat in summer, as well as of the applicant’s absence from home for a specific period of time. The court ordered the enterprise (1) to count RUB 25,500 already paid by the applicant towards her debt in respect of communal charges; to recalculate the charges on account of (2) the applicant’s long-term absence and (3) the lack of hot water supply; and (4) to provide information about communal services already paid by her. 12. On 22 December 2004 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic upheld the judgment on appeal. The court found, in particular, that the enterprise was a due respondent, as the Yakutsk administration had delegated to it the power to collect communal charges from the population. 13. The debtor company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise set up by a decision of the local administration. The company had “the right of economic control” (право хозяйственного ведения) over the assets allocated to it by the administration in order to carry out its statutory activities. The parties did not provide information on its core activities. It appears that it was, inter alia, in charge of collection of communal charges from local population. It also provided programming, data processing and IT consultancy services. 14. According to the Government, on 14 December 2004 the company’s activity was discontinued as the company was re-structured in the form of transformation (реорганизована в форме преобразования) and incorporated as open joint-stock company OAO “Payment Processing Centre” («ОАО ЕРКЦ», “the OAO”). On the same date a relevant record was made in the Register of Legal Entities. The parties did not provide information on the owners of the newly-created company’s shares, did not submit a copy of the transfer and acceptance act and did not provide any details on the legal succession issue. 15. On 21 January 2005 the writs of execution were issued in respect of the judgment of 19 November 2004, and on 1 February 2005 the enforcement proceedings were opened. 16. Referring to a “notification” dated 19 April 2005 by the municipal unitary enterprise “Payment Processing Centre”[1], the Government submitted that on an unspecified date the judgment had been enforced in part, in so far as the obligations to count the amount toward the applicant’s debt and to recalculate the charges on account of the lack of hot water were concerned. They did not submit a copy of the notification. 17. It appears that on 6 September 2007 the writs were returned to the bailiffs by an unspecified person or authority without execution. 18. On 12 September 2007 the bailiffs’ service discontinued the enforcement proceedings in respect of the remaining part of the judgment on account of the impossibility to enforce it and returned the writs of execution to the Yakutsk Town Court. The parties did not provide copies of the relevant documents. 19. According to the Government, on 23 August 2008 the OAO was liquidated.

6. The applicant was born in 1989 and is detained in Atyrau, Kazakhstan. 7. According to the applicant’s submissions, he lived in Atyrau, Kazakhstan until 2010. Between January and November 2010 the applicant was constantly harassed by the police, taken into police custody and ill-treated. In January 2010 he was asked to go to a police station as a friend of his had informed the police that the applicant had witnessed a fight between him and another friend of the applicant. On that day a statement was taken from him by the police. The next day he was once again invited to the police station, where, this time, he was beaten by the police. Subsequently, he was also accused of forcing a girl to worship in the Muslim manner and of raping her. He was eventually released from police custody. The applicant considered that he had been subjected to ill-treatment because he was a practising Muslim who worshipped and who wore a beard. On 27 November 2010 the applicant left Kazakhstan and arrived in Turkey. He then went to Syria twice and also to Georgia. On 21 May 2011 the applicant re-entered Turkey on a tourist visa. 8. On 9 June 2011 with a view to requesting a residence permit in Turkey, the applicant went to the Istanbul police headquarters, where he was arrested. The Government submitted that (i) subsequent to his arrival in Turkey 21 May 2011, an entry ban was issued in respect of the applicant, as he was considered to constitute a threat to national security, and (ii) he was detained with a view to his deportation. 9. On the same day the applicant was transferred to the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Removal Centre. 10. On unspecified dates the applicant applied to the national authorities and to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), asking to be recognised as a refugee. 11. On 15 June 2011 a police officer conducted an interview with the applicant in the context of his application to be granted asylum. 12. On 28 June 2011 the applicant was notified by the police that his asylum application had been rejected. 13. On 29 June 2011 the UNHCR issued an asylum-seeker certificate to the applicant. 14. On 5 July 2011 one of the applicant’s representatives, Mr A. Yılmaz, lodged an objection to the decision to reject the applicant’s asylum application with the police department responsible for foreigners, borders and asylum attached to the Istanbul police headquarters. The lawyer asked the authorities to review their decision and to conduct a second interview with the applicant. 15. On 11 July 2011 Mr A. Yılmaz lodged an application with the Istanbul Magistrates’ Court for his client’s release. The applicant’s lawyer also stressed that the applicant was being kept in poor detention conditions. He received no response to his application. 16. On 16 August 2011 the police conducted a second interview with the applicant, during which he claimed that he would be exposed to a real risk of death and duress at the hands of the police if deported to Kazakhstan. In his statement, the applicant claimed that he had already been ill-treated by the police in Kazakhstan and that the authorities had imprisoned religious people like him on false accusations. 17. On 22 and 25 August 2011 Mr A. Yılmaz lodged two further applications with the police for his client to be released. He submitted that the applicant was being sought for by the Kazakhstan authorities for political reasons and that he would be persecuted on the basis of his religious convictions and subjected to torture and ill-treatment if deported to his country. In support of his petition dated 22 August 2011, the applicant’s lawyer submitted a document showing that the applicant was being sought for by the public authorities in Atyrau on suspicion of having committed the offence of “hooliganism”, proscribed by Article 257 § 3 of the Kazakhstan Criminal Code, as in force at the material time. He also submitted a copy of a page of a newspaper published in Kazakhstan in April 2011 according to which an arrest warrant had been issued in respect of the applicant. 18. On 13 September 2011 the applicant was released from the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Removal Centre. The applicant was ordered to go and live in the province of Sakarya pending the determination of his asylum application. 19. On 29 September 2011 the applicant went to Sakarya, where he lived until 15 March 2012. 20. On 24 October 2011 the applicant was granted a residence permit, valid until 20 May 2012. 21. On 3 November 2011 the Interpol‑Europol Department attached to the General Police Headquarters requested the Foreigners, Borders and Asylum Department (also attached to the General Police Headquarters) to provide information regarding the applicant, noting that he was sought for by the prosecuting authorities and the Interpol bureau of Kazakhstan as he was suspected of having committed an offence in that country. On 1 December 2011 the deputy head of the Foreigners, Borders and Asylum Department informed the Interpol‑Europol Department that the applicant had requested asylum and was residing in Sakarya and that on 24 October 2011 a further entry ban had been issued in respect of him after the applicant had been prosecuted for “hooliganism”. The Foreigners, Borders and Asylum Department requested the Interpol‑Europol department not to provide any information to the Kazakhstan authorities, in the interests of the safety of the applicant and his family members in Kazakhstan. 22. On 15 March 2012 the applicant was served with a document informing him that his asylum application had been rejected on 2 March 2012 and that he could not benefit from subsidiary protection either. The document informed him that he was banned from entering Turkish territory and that if he attempted to enter Turkish territory, he would be deported. On the same day the applicant was detained. 23. On 16 and 19 March 2012 Mr A. Yılmaz lodged two applications with the Ministry of the Interior requesting that his client be released. The lawyer noted that he had received a phone call from the applicant, who had stated that he would be deported to Kazakhstan, where he would be subjected to torture. 24. On 19 March 2012 the applicant was deported to Kazakhstan. 25. In a letter dated 27 May 2013, Mr Yılmaz submitted that the applicant had been transferred to the custody of Kazakhstan’s security forces upon his return to Kazakhstan and had then been remanded in custody in Atyrau Prison. The lawyer stated that he did not have information supported by any document as to whether the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment in Kazakhstan. 26. On 22 March 2012 Mr A. Yılmaz lodged an application with the Ankara Administrative Court for the annulment of the decisions of the Ministry rejecting the applicant’s asylum application and to deport the applicant from Turkey. He requested a stay of execution of the decision to deport the applicant, pending the proceedings before the Ankara Administrative Court. In support of his petition, the applicant’s lawyer submitted a number of documents to the Ankara Administrative Court, including a document downloaded from the Atyrau police department website, according to which an arrest warrant had been issued in respect of the applicant. The document, which was also submitted to the Court, contained the applicant’s name, photograph and the charge brought against him (“hooliganism”, under Article 257 § 3 of the Kazakhstan Criminal Code). He also submitted the newspaper page (see paragraph 17 above), which he had already submitted to the police on 22 August 2011 and according to which an arrest warrant had been issued in respect of the applicant. 27. On 11 May 2012 the Ankara Administrative Court rejected the request for a stay of execution in respect of the applicant’s deportation. 28. On 13 February 2013 the Ankara Administrative Court dismissed the application lodged by the applicant on 22 March 2012. In its judgment, the administrative court noted that according to information obtained from the National Intelligence Organisation (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı), the applicant was involved in international terrorism and had carried out terrorist activities when he had been in Turkey. The Ankara Administrative Court further noted that the applicant’s asylum application had been rejected as the administrative authorities had found that there had not been any basis for the applicant’s fear of persecution and that he had not met the conditions for being considered a refugee. On the basis of the documents in the case file, the Administrative Court concluded that the administrative decision to reject the applicant’s asylum application and to deport the applicant from Turkey had been lawful. 29. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 27 April 2016 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of 13 February 2013. 30. Between 9 June and 13 September 2011 the applicant was detained at the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Removal Centre. The applicant claimed that the centre had been overcrowded at the time of his detention. He had not been allowed exercise outdoor or any other type of social activity throughout his detention. The applicant further alleged that there had been hygiene problems at the centre and that the quantity of the food provided had also been poor. 31. The Government submitted that the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Removal Centre where the applicant had been held had a capacity of 300 persons and that a total of between 100 and 150 persons had been held during the period between 9 June and 13 September 2011. Detainees were accommodated on three floors: the first two floors were reserved for male detainees, and the third floor for females. There were four dormitory rooms on the first floor, measuring 50, 58, 76 and 84 sq. m. On the second floor there were five dormitories measuring 50, 58, 69, 76 and 84 sq. m. There was a total of 120 bunk beds in the ten rooms reserved for male detainees and all rooms received natural light. There were also five showers and six toilets per floor, as well as a cafeteria measuring 69 sq. m, where breakfast, lunch and dinner were served daily on each floor. The detainees had the right to outdoor exercise if the physical conditions and the number of staff available allowed. A doctor was present on the premises every week and the detainees also had access to medical care in cases of emergency. As for the hygiene in the facility, there were six cleaning staff working full time and cleaning products, such as soap, were provided on a regular basis.

5. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Moscow. 6. The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the public event at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, §§ 7-65, 5 January 2016) and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, §§ 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties’ submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7. On 6 May 2012 a public event entitled the “March of Millions” was held in central Moscow to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it turned out that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd the police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers. There were numerous clashes between the police and protesters. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered that the meeting finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protestors from the square. 8. On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate suspected acts of mass disorder and violence against the police (Articles 212 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was transferred to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising acts of mass disorder (Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 9. The applicant is a human rights activist and a lawyer of an NGO, the Committee for Civil Rights (Комитет за гражданские права). On 6 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square to participate in the demonstration and during its dispersal kicked an unidentified police officer in the arm. After these events the applicant continued to live at his usual address and to pursue his normal activities, including taking part in authorised public events. 10. On 25 July 2012 the applicant’s flat was searched; the police seized the applicant’s clothes, domestic and international passports, other documents and his computer. On the same day the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having participated in acts of mass disorder on 6 May 2012. 11. On 26 July 2012 the Basmannyy District Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 25 September 2012 on the following grounds: “The prosecution bodies suspect [the applicant] of having committed a serious offence punishable with imprisonment of over two years. ... the court concludes that there are grounds to consider that [the applicant], if at liberty, is likely to abscond from the investigation and trial, to act in person or through proxy with the aim of avoiding criminal liability, to continue [his] criminal activity, to destroy evidence and otherwise obstruct the investigation, which is at its initial phase. Operational-search activities are now underway, aimed at establishing [the applicant’s] possible connections with other active participants of the mass disorders which took place at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow and its environs, therefore, if at liberty, [he] might co-ordinate his position with unidentified accomplices. ... No factual information excluding the detention of [the applicant] on health grounds has been submitted to the court. The court takes into account that [the applicant] may request medical assistance in the detention facility, if necessary ...” 12. The District Court dismissed an application by the applicant for an alternative preventive measure, such as house arrest, and stated that his state of health did not preclude him from detention. On 5 September 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order. 13. On 2 August 2012 the applicant was charged with the offence laid down in Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code (participation in mass disorder accompanied by violence) and accused, in particular, of having kicked a police officer. 14. On 24 September 2012 the Basmannyy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 6 November 2012, having found that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed. The District Court dismissed the applicant’s allegations of lack of medical assistance in the remand prison as unsubstantiated. It stated that the applicant’s state of health was satisfactory and did not warrant his release. On 15 October 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order. 15. On 31 October 2012 the Basmannyy District extended the applicant’s detention until 6 March 2013 on essentially the same grounds as earlier. On 26 November 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order. 16. On 4 March 2013 the Basmannyy District Court examined a new application for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The applicant complained of exacerbation of chronic diseases in detention. He asked to be released on bail and presented personal guarantees from two prominent public figures, including a human-rights activist, who vouched for him. On the same day the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 6 July 2013. It considered that a milder preventive measure, including release on bail, would not prevent the applicant from obstructing the proper administration of justice. The applicant’s allegations in respect of the deterioration of his health were dismissed; the court relied on the medical statement from the remand prison, according to which his health was satisfactory. On 17 April 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order. 17. On 24 May 2013 the applicant’s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges. 18. On 6 June 2013 that court granted another extension of the applicant’s detention, until 24 November 2013. The decision concerned eleven defendants. Along with the seriousness of the charges, the court based its decision on the findings that “the reasons which had initially warranted the detention have not changed” and that “no other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings”. The Moscow City Court upheld this extension order on 2 July 2013. 19. On 2 August 2013 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court examined the supervisory appeal lodged by the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation. It rectified the extension orders of 24 September and 31 October 2012, and 4 March and 6 June 2013 as well as the Moscow City Court’s decision of 15 October 2012. The Presidium found that the applicant’s detention had been unjustified and that the detention orders had not been supported by relevant facts; it also took account of his worsening health. The Presidium lifted the detention order and placed the applicant under the house arrest until 2 October 2013 under the following conditions: prohibition from leaving his house or changing his place of residence; prohibition from communicating with co-defendants and witnesses; prohibition from sending and receiving correspondence; prohibition from using any means of communication. On the same day the applicant was released from pre-trial detention. 20. On 26 September 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court extended the applicant’s house arrest until 2 January 2014. It referred to the seriousness of the charges and considered that as a human-rights activist the applicant could communicate with different authorities and persons and thus obstruct the course of criminal proceedings. On 28 October 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld this decision on appeal. 21. On 18 December 2013 the State Duma passed the Amnesty Act, which exempted people suspected and accused of criminal offences under Article 212 §§ 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code from criminal liability. 22. On 19 December 2013 the applicant applied for the termination of the criminal proceedings against him under the Amnesty Act. On the same day the Zamoskvoretsky District Court granted his application and lifted the house arrest. 23. Prior to his detention, the applicant was diagnosed with an organic lesion of the central nervous system, hypertensive syndrome, tonsillitis, chronic gastritis, atopic dermatitis, osteochondrosis and dorsopathy (back pain). According to the applicant, these diseases required regular medical supervision, diet and lifestyle adjustments. 24. From 27 July 2012 to 2 August 2013 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-77/2 in Moscow. Upon his admission to the prison he underwent a health check which revealed no health issues except atopic dermatitis and scoliosis. The applicant provided the detention facility with his medical records which stated his chronic ailments. 25. On 31 August 2012 the applicant underwent a medical examination by a general practitioner (“GP”). He was diagnosed with vegetative-vascular dystonia, dorsopathy, osteochondrosis, kyphoscoliosis, and first- or second‑degree obesity. He received a prescription for a special diet limiting intake of fats and quickly-absorbed carbohydrates. 26. The applicant was subsequently examined by a GP on 25 September, 19 October and 26 November 2012, and 24 January, 15 and 25 February, and 15 March 2013. The examinations revealed no negative dynamics in the state of the applicant’s health; the prescriptions for the special diet were renewed each time. 27. By letter of 2 November 2012 the head of the IZ-77/2 informed the applicant’s father that chronic gastritis was not on the list of diseases which allow patients to receive additional nutrition. 28. On 30 November 2012 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the prison chief of the deterioration of his client’s health, in particular, of his regular headaches, back pain and weight-gain. He alleged that the applicant had put on 20 kg over the five months in detention and requested an inpatient medical examination. 29. On 31 January 2013 the applicant was examined by a neurologist and received a prescription for treatment in relation to vegetative-vascular dystonia. At the regular check-up by a GP on 15 February 2013 the applicant stated that his condition had improved; he was recommended to continue the prescribed treatment. 30. On 14 February 2013 the applicant’s lawyer reiterated his application for a medical examination and asked to give the applicant access to a gym. 31. On 4 April 2013 a medical commission composed of a GP, an infection specialist, a surgeon and two administrators examined the applicant and his medical history. In addition to the previous diagnoses, they established chronic liver disorder and recommended that he continue the special diet. 32. On 14 April 2013 the applicant was temporarily transferred to the medical wing of IZ-77/1. Upon his admission he was found to be suffering from second- or third-degree obesity (at this stage he weighed 109 kg and was 178 cm in height) and was prescribed the same diet as before. 33. In IZ-77/1 the applicant underwent series of medical examinations and tests, including an abdominal ultrasound, a thyroid echography, an electrocardiogram, roentgenofluorography, X-ray examinations of his skull and spine, and blood tests. He was regularly examined by a GP who adjusted the treatment according to the results of the tests. The applicant also had a consultation with a dermatologist. 34. The public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited the applicant on 17 and 24 April and 2 May 2013. According to the journal of their visits, the applicant did not complain of inadequate medical assistance in IZ-77/1. 35. The discharge summary (выписной эпикриз) from the medical wing of IZ-77/1, issued on 17 May 2013, contained the results of the applicant’s medical examinations. He was diagnosed with osteochondrosis, dorsopathy, fatty liver, hypercholesterolemia, vegetative-vascular dystonia, acne and first-degree obesity. The applicant received a prescription for physiotherapy and a special diet; he was also recommended to undergo a magnetic resonance imaging procedure in relation to a suspected cerebral condition, which had to be carried out in a different hospital equipped with the appropriate scanning device. On the same day the applicant was transferred back to IZ‑77/2. 36. On 6 July 2013 the applicant lodged a complaint about the authorities’ failure to carry out his medical examination to the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow. On 4 September 2013 the Tverskoy District Court refused to examine this complaint. 37. The magnetic resonance imaging procedure had not been carried out before the applicant’s release from the detention facility on 2 August 2013. 38. After release the applicant had a medical examination at the town hospital and a consultation with a prominent gastroenterologist. The doctor confirmed the applicant’s previous diagnoses related to the digestive system and prescribed him medical treatment, a special diet and physical exercise. 39. The applicant’s description of the conditions of detention during his transfer from the remand prison to court and back was identical to that in the case of Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 69-73). 40. On 6 June 2013 court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 and at the end of July moved to hearing room no. 635 of the Moscow City Court. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms, as described in Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 74‑76). From 2 August 2013 the applicant was no longer placed in the glass cabin owing to a change in the measure of restraint for him.

5. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Kostino, Kirov Region. 6. The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the public event at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, §§ 7-65, 5 January 2016) and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, §§ 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties’ submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7. On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the “March of Millions” was held in central Moscow to protest against allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square, which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it turned out that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd the police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers. There were numerous clashes between the police and protesters. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered that the meeting finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protestors from the square. 8. On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate suspected acts of mass disorder and violence against the police (Articles 212 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was transferred to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising acts of mass disorder (Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 9. The applicant took part in the demonstration of 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square. He was arrested on the date indicated below and charged with participation in mass disorder. The applicant was detained and tried on those charges but subsequently exempted from liability under the Amnesty Act. The applicant’s complaints concerning the grounds and the length of his detention on remand, the poor conditions of detention and the lack of medical assistance in the remand prison were examined in the case Kovyazin and Others v. Russia (nos. 13008/13 and 2 others, 17 September 2015). 10. At the time of his arrest the applicant was working part-time as a videotape operator for a local newspaper Vyatskiy Nablyudatel. On 4 May 2012 he received an assignment from the newspaper chief editor to attend the “March of Millions” on 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square and to take a video footage of the event. 11. According to the applicant, on 6 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square, filmed the event and did not take part in any disorder or clashes with the police. After the events in question the applicant continued to live at his usual address and to work for the newspaper. 12. On 5 September 2012 the applicant was arrested and charged under Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code (participation in mass disorder accompanied by violence). He was accused of having breached public order during the demonstration on 6 May 2012, in particular, of having turned over portable toilet cabins and having piled them on the road to build a barrier obstructing the riot police. 13. On 7 September 2012 the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention where he remained one year and three months. It was found to be unjustified by the Court in the case of Kovyazin and Others (cited above, §§ 79-93). 14. On 24 May 2013 the applicant’s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges. 15. On 6 June 2013 court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 at the Moscow City Court, moving at the end of July to hearing room no. 635. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms. From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued at the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow in hearing room no. 303. It was equipped with metal cages, in which nine defendants, including the applicant, sat during the hearings. For a detailed description of the conditions in those hearing rooms see Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 74-77). 16. On 18 December 2013 the State Duma passed the Amnesty Act, which exempted persons suspected and accused of criminal offences under Article 212 §§ 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code from criminal liability. 17. On 19 December 2013 the applicant requested the termination of the criminal proceedings against him by operation of the Amnesty Act. On the same day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted the request and released him from detention.

6. The first applicant, Ms O.C.I., was born in 1978 and lives in Tulcea. In 2005 she married P.L.R., an Italian national. The couple lived together in Italy, where O.C.I. gave birth to their children: the second applicant, P.A.R., in 2008, and the third applicant, N.A.R., in 2010. 7. On 12 June 2015 the family went to Romania for the summer holidays. A few days later P.L.R. returned to Italy, expecting to go back to collect the applicants at the end of summer. On 25 June 2015 the first applicant informed her husband that she and the children would no longer return to Italy. She said that she saw no future for them there. Moreover, she told P.L.R. that he was a bad father who mistreated his children. 8. On 14 September 2015 P.L.R. lodged a criminal complaint against the first applicant in Italy for child abduction in a foreign country. 9. On 29 September 2015 P.L.R. applied to the Bucharest County Court for the return of the second and third applicants to Italy, the place of their habitual residence. He relied on the provisions of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”) and those of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (“the Brussels II bis Regulation”). He contended that he had not agreed that the second and third applicants would remain permanently in Romania. In his view, the mother had unilaterally changed the children’s residence which, he argued, constituted wrongful retention. 10. The first applicant opposed the action. She alleged that P.L.R. was a violent father who often got angry with is children when they did not obey him. According to the first applicant, P.L.R. would beat up the children, bruising their faces and giving them nose bleeds. He would pull them by the ears, slap their faces and hit their bottoms. Sometimes he would undress them and beat their bodies with hard objects. He would also call them names and humiliate them. The violence had worsened in recent years and the first applicant had become a target as well. She had tried to intervene but to no avail. She had encouraged her husband to seek medical help for his behaviour, but he had refused. Eventually, the first applicant had decided to find refuge with the children in Romania. She submitted as evidence several recordings of discussions between the applicants and P.L.R. during their common life in Italy, showing episodes similar to those described above. 11. The first applicant further explained that the children had become integrated in their new environment. They attended school in Romania and had made friends. They participated in after-school activities that they had always wanted to try but had in the past been denied by their father. She also explained that the children refused to speak with their father. They feared going back to Italy and being again subject to abuse. 12. The County Court heard evidence from the parents (hearing of 27 September 2015) and interviewed the children in the presence of a psychologist (on 16 November 2015). 13. In a judgment of 18 January 2016 the Bucharest County Court allowed the application for the return of the children to their habitual residence in Italy. It found that there was nothing to oppose the children’s return to Italy. The court concluded that the mother had influenced the children against their father. It also considered that her decision to leave Italy had been made because of marital problems and because of her own dissatisfaction. As for the allegations that the children ran a grave risk of being exposed to physical or psychological harm at their father’s hands, it found as follows: “The evidence in the file proves without doubt that the father used physical force and a raised voice to discipline his children. [P.L.R.] confirmed this in his statement before the court. The child has the right to respect for his dignity, which entails prohibition under any circumstances of any act of physical or psychological violence against the child. It is therefore evident that nothing can justify a departure from this norm.” 14. The first applicant appealed, and in a final decision of 30 March 2017 the Bucharest Court of Appeal upheld the order to return the children. The Court of Appeal considered that the existence of criminal proceedings against the first applicant in Italy did not constitute grounds for refusing the return. In fact, the Court reasoned, in accordance with the European arrest warrant procedure, a criminal sentence would have the same effect regardless of whether the first applicant lived in Romania or Italy. The Court of Appeal reassessed the allegations of grave risk for the children in Italy and concluded as follows: “... it cannot be inferred that occasional acts of violence such as those which were proved by the recordings adduced in the file, would reoccur often enough to pose a grave risk ... under Article 13 § 1 (b) of the Hague Convention ... ... it is reasonable to expect that the Italian authorities would give the assurance that they would take the measures required by the [Brussels II bis Regulation], so that the aim of the Hague Convention would be observed, namely that a child is not removed or retained in the name of rights linked to his person which are to a larger or lesser extent debatable. It is also reasonable to suppose that if after the decision is rendered the children are exposed to a risk, [the Italian authorities] would take such requisite measures, if the risk was brought to their attention and supported by evidence.” 15. On 11 July 2017 P.L.R. started enforcement proceedings through the offices of a bailiff in Romania. 16. On 28 September 2017 the bailiff together with P.L.R. and a psychologist from the Bucharest Directorate General for Social Welfare and Child Protection (“the child-protection authority”) spoke with the children, with their mother’s permission. It was noted that the children refused to go back to Italy with their father. Consequently, the child-protection authority sought a court order for a three-month psychological counselling programme for the children. On 7 December 2017 the Tulcea District Court granted the request. The enforcement proceedings were stayed during that period. 17. A report of 29 May 2018 on the results of the counselling stated that the children refused contact with their father despite the first applicant’s efforts to encourage that relationship. Therapy for the children was recommended. 18. On 29 March 2018 P.L.R. sought enforcement in Romania of a Parma District Court order granting him sole parental authority. On 10 July 2018 the first applicant lodged an objection to the enforcement. On 13 July 2018 the court stayed the enforcement proceedings, at the first applicant’s request, on the grounds that the children’s refusal to go back to Italy with their father had already been established. 19. It appears from the parties’ observations that at least on 26 September 2018 (the date of the most recent relevant information) the applicants were still living in Romania.

5. The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Kópavogur. At the material time he was a well-known personality in Iceland who for years had published articles, blogs and books and appeared in films, on television and other media, under pseudonyms. 6. Some of the applicant’s published views attracted some attention, as well as controversy. These included, inter alia, his views about women and their sexual freedom. In some instances his criticism had been directed towards named individuals, often women, and in some cases his words could have been construed to mean that he was in fact recommending that they should be subjected to sexual violence. The applicant had often justified such conduct by stating that the material had been meant in jest and that those who criticised him lacked a sense of humour (see Egill Einarsson v. Iceland, no. 24703/15, § 16, 7 November 2017). 7. In November 2011, an 18-year-old woman reported to the police that the applicant and his girlfriend had raped her. In January 2012 another woman reported to the police that the applicant had committed a sexual offence against her a few years earlier. Upon the completion of the police investigation the Public Prosecutor, on 15 June and 15 November 2012, dismissed the cases in accordance with Article 145 of the Act on Criminal Procedures, because the evidence which had been gathered was not sufficient or likely to lead to a conviction. The applicant submitted a complaint to the police about false accusations made against him by the two women. This case was also dismissed. 8. On 22 November 2012 Monitor, a magazine accompanying Morgunblaðið (a leading newspaper in Iceland), published an interview with the applicant. A picture of the applicant was published on the front page, and in the interview the applicant discussed the rape accusation against him. The applicant stated several times that the accusations were false. He stated, inter alia, that it was not a priority for him for the girl’s name to be disclosed and that he was not seeking revenge against her. He accepted that, having placed himself in the media spotlight, he had to tolerate publicity which was not always “sunshine and lollipops” but criticised the way the media had covered his case. When asked about the girl’s age, he responded that the girl had been in a club where the minimum age had been 20 years and that it had been a shock to find out later that she had been only 18 years old. When asked about his complaints against the girl for allegedly wrongful accusations, he stated again that he was not seeking revenge against those who had reported him to the police, but that it was clear that they had had ulterior motives. He hoped that the police would see that it was important to have a formal conclusion in the case and that the documents in the case were “screaming” conspiracy. 9. On the same day a Facebook page was set up for the purpose of protesting about the interview and encouraging the editor of Monitor to remove the applicant’s picture from its front page. Extensive dialogue took place on the site that day. Later that day, X posted a comment on the above‑mentioned Facebook page which stated, inter alia: “This is also not an attack on a man for saying something wrong, but for raping a teenage girl ... It is permissible to criticise the fact that rapists appear on the cover of publications which are distributed all over town ...”. 10. On 28 November 2012, the applicant’s lawyer sent a letter to X requesting that she withdraw her statements, admit they were unfounded, apologise in the media and pay the applicant punitive damages, which would be donated to charity. By letter the following day, X’s lawyer opposed the applicant’s claims and submitted that the impugned statements were not defamatory. Furthermore, the lawyer informed the applicant’s lawyer that X had removed the statement in question from Facebook. 11. On 17 December 2012, the applicant lodged defamation proceedings against X before the District Court of Reykjavík and asked for her to be punished, under the applicable provisions of the Penal Code, for publishing the statements in question. The applicant further requested that the statements “This is also not an attack on a man for saying something wrong, but for raping a teenage girl ...” and “It is permissible to criticise the fact that rapists appear on the cover of publications which are distributed all over town ...” be declared null and void. Moreover, the applicant requested that X be ordered to pay him 1,000,000 Icelandic krónur (ISK; approximately 8,800 euros (EUR)) in non-pecuniary damages under the Tort Liability Act, plus interest, ISK 150,000 (approximately 1,300 EUR) for the cost of publishing the main content and the reasoning of the final judgment in the case in the media under Article 241 of the Penal Code, and the applicant’s legal costs. 12. By a judgment of 1 November 2013, the District Court found that X’s comment on Facebook had been defamatory and declared the statements null and void. However, the court dismissed the applicant’s claim for the imposition on X of a criminal punishment under the Penal Code, as well as rejecting the claim to have X carry the cost of publishing the main content and reasoning of the judgment in a newspaper. Furthermore, the District Court did not award the applicant non-pecuniary damage and concluded, finally, that each party should bear its own legal costs. 13. The judgment contained the following reasons: “... The [applicant] claims damages in the amount of ISK 1,000,000 and bases his demand on the general rules of tort law and on Article 26 of Act no. 50/1993 [Tort Liability Act]. According to the aforementioned, it is clear that [X] made defamatory insinuations about [the applicant]. However, when assessing the damage suffered by [the applicant], it has to be taken into account how [the applicant] has built a certain reputation by his conduct in public. Notwithstanding the extensive disputes about his comment made under the name of Gillz, it cannot be seen that he took a clear stand against sexual violence until complaints against him materialised. Nevertheless [the applicant] had full reason to clarify his situation in this respect, taking into account that material stemming from him is often very ambiguous and provocative, and could easily be interpreted as an incitement to this type of violence. When assessing the possible damage to [the applicant], the distribution of the comments which was, as stated before, limited to the distribution entailed in publications on the said Facebook page, together with hundreds or thousands of other comments, has to be taken into account. Additionally, the comments were removed from the website when [the applicant] so requested. Lastly, it should be considered that by declaring the comments null and void, as this judgment concludes, [the applicant] has received full judicial satisfaction. In light of all the above-mentioned considerations there is no reason to order [X] to pay non-pecuniary damages. Furthermore, [the applicant’s] claim to have [X] carry the cost of publishing the main content and the reasoning of the judgment in a newspaper will not be accepted. The impugned comment was published on a Facebook page and therefore it is not necessary to incur the costs of publishing the judgment in any other way. In light of the conclusion of the judgment, and taking account of all the facts, it is appropriate that each party bears its own legal costs [er rétt að málskostnaður falli niður].” 14. By judgment of 18 December 2014 the majority of the Supreme Court (two out of three judges) upheld the District Court’s decision to declare the statements null and void. Furthermore, the Supreme Court upheld the District Court’s decision not to award damages to the applicant and that each party should bear its legal costs. In its assessment regarding that issue the Supreme Court referred to Article 73 (3) of the Constitution, the principle of proportionality and the reasoning of the District Court. 15. The dissenting judge agreed with the majority to declare the impugned statements null and void. However, the judge found that the criteria set out in the Tort Liability Act for the granting of non-pecuniary damages were fulfilled in the case and the applicant should be awarded 200,000 ISK in non-pecuniary damages as well as his legal costs before the District Court and the Supreme Court.

5. The first applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Strasbourg, France. The second applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Grozny, Chechnya, Russia. 6. At the relevant time the applicants were residents of Grozny, Chechnya. Their property was damaged in the course of a counterterrorist operation in 1999-2000. The applicants did not pursue criminal remedies in order to determine the exact circumstances or identify the perpetrators of the damage. Instead, they sought to obtain no-fault compensation provided for by Government Decree no. 404 (see below). The applicants complied with the requirements for applying for the compensation and submitted the relevant documents. However, for administrative reasons their claims were not processed until September 2013. Their individual situations can be summarised as follows. 7. The first applicant’s flat was damaged during the hostilities in 1994‑1995, and then destroyed in 1999-2000. It was situated in a 70-flat apartment block at 21 Tereshkova Street in Grozny, Chechnya. 8. In March 2005 the first applicant submitted an application for administrative compensation to the Commission for compensation for lost property (Комиссия по рассмотрению заявлений граждан о компенсационных выплатах за утраченное жилье и имущество, hereafter “the Commission”). She received an acknowledgment of receipt of documents (no. 22/9777). 9. In April 2005 the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny confirmed the first applicant’s title to property of flat no. 25 in the destroyed apartment block at 21 Tereshkova Street. 10. In 2007 the first applicant was registered as a person eligible for social housing because her flat had been destroyed during the hostilities. She was assigned number 742 in the waiting list; in February 2016 her number was 727. 11. In June 2010 the applicant was informed that her application had not been examined by the Commission since the building in question had not been entered in the register of destroyed buildings. The register was to be updated by the technical unit of the Federal authority on construction and municipal services (техническая группа Федерального агентства по строительству и ЖКХ по формированию перечня разрушенного жилья на территории Чеченской республики, hereafter “the technical unit”). However, in August 2005 the work of the technical unit had been put on hold and the list of destroyed housing has not been updated since that time. Hence, the first applicant’s application has not been processed and no decision has been taken. 12. The first applicant complained to a district court about the Commission’s failure to act. On 12 August 2010 the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny rejected the first applicant’s claim, pointing out that the Commission was unable to proceed in the absence of the corresponding entry in the register. On 7 September 2010 the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld that judgment on appeal. The first applicant’s subsequent attempts to obtain supervisory review were unsuccessful. 13. In 2011 she was informed by the Commission’s secretariat that the technical unit had not been operational since 2005 and that the Commission did not know whether or when it would restart its work. 14. The first applicant instituted civil proceedings, seeking damages for the destroyed property directly from the Government of Chechnya. On 21 March 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny rejected the first applicant’s claim, referring to the expiry of the time-limit and the lack of legal grounds for such claims. On 28 May 2013 the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld that decision, except the part referring to expiry of the limitation period. The Supreme Court stressed that compensation could not be paid because a new procedure for the payment of compensation was currently being devised. 15. The second applicant owned flat no. 12 in an apartment block at 53 Kavkazskaya Street, Grozny. The building was destroyed during the hostilities in 1999-2000. 16. In November 2004 the second applicant applied to the Commission and his file was assigned number 02/13975. 17. In 2008 the applicant was registered as a person eligible for social housing because his flat had been destroyed during the hostilities. He was assigned number 1599 in the waiting list; in 2016 his number was 1579. 18. In April 2010 he was informed that his application had not been examined by the Commission since the address in question had not been entered in the register of destroyed buildings. 19. The second applicant complained to a court. On 5 July 2010 the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny rejected his complaint since the Commission was unable to proceed in the absence of the technical unit’s register. On 10 August 2010 the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld the decision on appeal. 20. The second applicant sought to obtain damages from the Government of Chechnya for the damaged property and for failure to compensate the damage by alternative means. His claim was dismissed for failure to comply with the limitation period in a judgment of the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny of 27 June 2013, upheld on appeal on 7 November 2013 by the Supreme Court of Chechnya. 21. The Government submitted a letter issued by the Chechen Government on 13 January 2016, in response to a request for information in relation to the applicants’ situation. The letter stated that the Commission had ceased to exist in January 2014. It had held a final meeting on 16 September 2013 and, according to the minutes of the meeting (no. 61), had rejected all claims lodged by the owners of property which had not been entered in the register of destroyed buildings. Both applicants were in that category. In respect of the first applicant, the letter stated that her house had been inspected by the technical unit, which had confirmed its destruction (without specifying the date or any reference to the inspection record); however, for unknown reasons the building had not been entered in the register. The second applicant’s house had been inspected by the technical unit, which had found that it had not been destroyed (without specifying the date or any reference to the inspection record). The letter concluded by saying that all documents relevant to the individuals’ claims for compensation had been transferred to the Chechnya Government Archives Service for storage. No additional documents were submitted by the Government, and it is unclear whether the applicants were informed of the Commission’s decision. 22. The second applicant also submitted additional documents dating back to 2008 and 2010, confirming destruction of the apartment block where he had owned a flat. In February 2008 the local district administration examined flat no. 12 at 53 Kavkazskaya Street, Grozny, and concluded that it had been 100% destroyed. The applicant was issued with a certificate to that effect. On 24 May 2010 the local administration examined the building at 53 Kavkazskaya Street and found that it had been demolished.

5. The applicants were born in 1980 and 1986, respectively, and were detained at the Tekirdağ F-Type prison when the application was lodged. 6. On 28 and 29 October 2005 the applicants were arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. 7. On 31 October 2005 the applicants were brought before a judge at the Istanbul Assize Court which ordered their detention on remand. 8. On 23 December 2005 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicants, accusing them, inter alia, of membership of a terrorist organisation and illegal possession of explosives. 9. On 26 December 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court held a preparatory hearing and ordered the continuation of the applicants’ detention. 10. Throughout the proceedings the trial court ordered the continuation of the applicants’ detention on remand. Between the hearings, with regular intervals of one month, the court ex officio examined the applicants’ detentions on the basis of the case-file and decided to extend. 11. At the end of the hearing held on 13 October 2008, the trial court decided once again to prolong the applicants’ detention. Although the applicants’ lawyer was present at this hearing, the applicants were not brought from prison to the court. Subsequently, their lawyer filed an objection against the decision of 13 October 2008. On 11 November 2008 the 13th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed the objection, without holding an oral hearing and based on the written opinions of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicants or to their representative. 12. On 23 December 2009 the court convicted the applicants and sentenced them to imprisonment. The court also ordered the continuation of the first applicant’s detention and the release of the second applicant. 13. On 24 March 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first instance court.

5. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Smědčice. 6. On 9 November 2006 the applicant requested a building permit for temporary stables for horses. On 6 January 2011 the Rokycany Planning Office (stavební úřad) dismissed his request and on 26 May 2011 the Plzeň Regional Office (krajský úřad) upheld that decision. 7. On 29 March 2013 the Plzeň Regional Court (krajský soud) dismissed a complaint lodged by the applicant against the decision of the Plzeň Regional Office. 8. On 31 July 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court (Nejvyšší správní soud) dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant. The decision was served on the applicant on 28 August 2013. 9. On 29 October 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint (ústavní stížnost). 10. On 31 March 2014 the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) rejected the applicant’s appeal as being lodged out of time. It held that as the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision had been served on him on 28 August 2013, the last day of the two-month time-limit for lodging a constitutional appeal was 28 October 2013. 11. On 8 April 2014 the applicant wrote to the Constitutional Court urging it to set aside its decision. He argued that as 28 October 2013 had been a national holiday, domestic procedural rules provided that the last day for lodging his appeal had been the following day, namely 29 October 2013. 12. By a letter of 11 April 2014 the Registrar (generální sekretář) of the Constitutional Court acknowledged that the judge-rapporteur had undoubtedly overlooked the fact that the time-limit had been complied with. However, as the Constitutional Court did not have the power to set aside its own decision, he advised the applicant to lodge an application with the European Court of Human Rights.

6. Details concerning the applicants can be found in the Appendix. 7. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8. From 2 September 2004 until 2 January 2005 secret surveillance activities were carried out with respect to the third applicant in the context of ongoing criminal proceedings. The proceedings were later terminated without the applicant being prosecuted. On 4 December 2006 the information obtained via the secret surveillance in those proceedings was put in the surveillance file (jälitusprotokoll) of the criminal proceedings under review in the present case. 9. The criminal proceedings under review in the instant case were instituted on 18 August 2005 without the applicants being informed of the proceedings. Those proceedings concerned suspicions of high‑level corruption as regards the exchange of plots of land in conservation areas for plots in areas where development was permitted. 10. Between 23 August 2005 and 11 October 2006 the Internal Security Service (Kaitsepolitsei) carried out various surveillance activities in respect of the first applicant, the second applicant and the third applicant (with respect to the third applicant, the surveillance activities commenced on 16 December 2005). The third applicant was also acting as a member of the supervisory board of the two applicant companies at the material time. In the course of those activities, communications between the fourth applicant and the persons under surveillance were covertly intercepted and listened to. 11. The surveillance activities were based on authorisation decisions issued by either a prosecutor (forty-four authorisations altogether in respect of covert observation and requests for communication data) or by a preliminary investigation judge (twenty-one authorisations altogether in respect of covert listening in on conversations and the interception of communications). 12. The authorisation decisions issued by (different) preliminary investigation judges provided general reasons as to why the judges considered the secret surveillance necessary. As an example, one authorisation read as follows: “The judge has acquainted himself with the material gathered during the criminal proceedings and is convinced that the prosecutor’s application is justified. The Code of Criminal Procedure allows for evidence to be gathered by means of secret surveillance. Considering the gravity of the offence, the interests of protecting the legal order, and the fact that gathering evidence by other procedural means is either impossible or especially complicated, then, in the interests of elucidating the truth, the application is perfectly justified and lawful.” The other authorisations by preliminary investigation judges included variations of the same wording, occasionally also including references such as “when public officials abuse their position, it damages their credibility in the eyes of society and damages the State’s reputation” and “[t]his offence belongs to the category of offences relating to office. ... Considering that ..., this type of offence is difficult to discover and prove, and [such offences] hamper the legal rights of all people”. The relevant prosecutors’ decisions contained no reasoning at all. 13. In addition to surveillance activities, during the pre-trial proceedings, there were various queries, inspections, and home and office searches; (forensic) expert reports were ordered, requests for documents were made to various persons, and the material received was examined. Between 3 October 2006 and 12 November 2007, 202 persons (witnesses and suspects) were interviewed, some of them repeatedly. Between 17 March 2008 and 24 March 2008 the prosecutor’s office invited the applicants to inspect a copy of the criminal file (comprising 191 volumes altogether). The applicants’ representatives submitted different applications concerning the time they needed to inspect the files, ranging between six and ten months. By an order of the Office of the Prosecutor General of 13 May 2008, the applicants were given until 3 November 2008 to inspect the criminal file. Their representatives (except the first applicant’s counsel) submitted requests to the Office of the Prosecutor General, asking it to remove the material which the prosecution did not intend to rely on from the criminal file, and to specify which evidence was intended to prove which facts. The Office of the Prosecutor General dismissed those requests, explaining that the applicants had been presented with all the material gathered during the pre-trial proceedings so that they could assess which material was relevant from the perspective of defence rights. 14. During the pre-trial proceedings, the second applicant discovered a surveillance device in his office on 25 September 2005. On 3 October 2006 the offices of the third applicant, the second applicant company and the first applicant were searched, and on 20 September 2007 the premises of the first applicant company were searched. On 16 October 2007 the fourth applicant was questioned as a suspect. 15. As two of the accused – the fourth applicant and E.T. – were members of the Riigikogu (the Estonian Parliament) at the time the pre-trial proceedings were completed, the consent of a majority of the Members of Parliament had to be obtained to lift their immunity and bring charges against them. The Office of the Prosecutor General initiated the relevant procedure on 12 December 2008, and Parliament gave its consent on 24 March 2009. 16. Altogether, the pre-trial proceedings lasted three and a half years and ended on 31 March 2009 when the statement of charges against the applicants was submitted to the trial court. None of the applicants claimed that there had been periods of inactivity or other significant interruptions as regards the pre-trial proceedings. 17. From May 2009 onwards the Harju County Court heard the case over a total of ninety-two hearing days. During that time, numerous witnesses were heard: eighty witnesses requested by the prosecution, twenty-eight witnesses requested by the defence, and two people summoned by the court as experts. In May 2009 dates for hearings in November and December 2009 and January, February, April, May and June 2010 were scheduled. Further dates were scheduled in February 2010 (for dates in September and October 2010), in June 2010 (for dates in December 2010 and February and April 2011), in April 2011 (for dates in October, November and December 2011), in November 2011 (for dates in December 2011 and January, February, April and May 2012), in December 2011 (for dates in January and February 2012), and in February 2012 (for dates in March 2012). At the request of some representatives, hearings were not scheduled to take place more than three days a week. The court also took into account the representatives’ wishes that hearings not be scheduled too far in advance, as they were simultaneously involved in other criminal proceedings and therefore not always available. At the end of each hearing day, considering the evidence that was to be examined the following day, the court determined which of the accused and their representatives should appear at court the following day. This allowed persons who were not concerned by such evidence not to attend the particular hearing. Occasionally, hearings had to be rescheduled owing to illness or owing to other personal circumstances of either the accused or their representatives. In November 2009 the court noted that there was a risk that the proceedings might take too long, and decided that the number of witnesses to be heard each day must be increased. 18. An application was made to separate the first applicant’s case from the case against two other accused (including E.T.), but the representatives of the second and the fourth applicants objected to the first applicant’s case being separated in this way. They submitted that the cases were closely linked, and argued that separating the cases would hinder defence rights and force them to attend other parallel proceedings at the same time. The court dismissed the application to separate the case, referring to the need to guarantee the defence rights of the other accused. 19. By a judgment of 19 June 2012 the Harju County Court acquitted the applicants of the charges against them. The proceedings before the first-instance court lasted approximately three years and three months. The court found that the surveillance activities had been unlawful and that all the evidence collected by such activities was inadmissible. It did not address the question of whether or not the secret surveillance authorisations in the case had been sufficiently reasoned at the time they had been issued. 20. The Office of the Prosecutor General appealed to the Court of Appeal on 4 July 2012. Among other things, it challenged the first-instance court’s assessment of the lawfulness of the surveillance activities. 21. On 13 July 2012 the Tallinn Court of Appeal invited the applicants to notify it of suitable dates in October, November and December 2012, so that hearings could be scheduled. As no dates suitable for everyone could be found out of the dates proposed by the applicants’ representatives, the court invited them to propose new dates for 2013. On 17 August 2012 the dates were set for January and February 2013. In the meantime, the Court of Appeal had also granted an application by the prosecutor for a review of the lawfulness of the surveillance activities. It asked for the surveillance files, including all the prosecutors’ and preliminary investigation judges’ decisions authorising the secret surveillance, to be sent to it. 22. The Court of Appeal convicted the applicants by a judgment of 19 June 2013. After examining the surveillance files, the court found that the prosecutors’ applications for authorisation of secret surveillance had contained sufficient information to assess the need for such activities. It considered that the surveillance activities had been lawful and the evidence thereby obtained admissible. In convicting the first and the second applicant companies, the court relied on Article 14 of the Penal Code (see paragraph 56 below) and found that the third applicant had acted in the interests of the two companies. 23. Between 17 and 19 July 2013 all of the applicants lodged appeals on points of law with the Supreme Court. 24. On 17 December 2013 the Supreme Court granted the applicants leave to appeal. On 22 January 2014 it gave the parties a deadline of 19 March 2014 to submit their observations. In the meantime, the Supreme Court had asked for the surveillance files to be forwarded to it. On 10 April 2014 it was decided that the case would be transferred to the full panel of the Criminal Chamber, and the parties were given an additional deadline of 28 May 2014 to submit their observations. 25. On 30 June 2014 the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in the applicants’ criminal case (no. 3‑1‑1‑14‑14). It considered the evidence gathered by means of secret surveillance to be admissible. In substance, it upheld the applicants’ conviction. 26. In assessing whether the length of the proceedings had been reasonable, the Supreme Court relied on the criteria established in the Court’s case-law. 27. As for the period to be taken into account, the Supreme Court considered that the relevant period had not necessarily started running from the date when the first steps in the criminal proceedings had been taken, but rather when the applicants could be considered to be subject to a “charge”, or when they had been otherwise substantially affected by actions taken by the prosecuting authorities. The Supreme Court did not agree that the relevant period should be calculated from the date when the first secret surveillance activities had been carried out with respect to the applicants. This also applied to the third applicant and the applicant companies, who had suggested that the start date of the surveillance activities – carried out as of 2 September 2004 with respect to the third applicant in different criminal proceedings which were later terminated – should be taken as a starting point (see paragraph 8 above). 28. Against that background, the Supreme Court considered that the beginning of the relevant time period should be determined as follows: 25 September 2005 for the second applicant (when he had discovered a surveillance device in his office); 3 October 2006 for the first applicant (when his office had been searched); 3 October 2006 for the second applicant company and the third applicant, in relation to certain criminal incidents (when the premises of the company, including the office of the third applicant, had been searched); 20 September 2007 for the first applicant company and the third applicant, in relation to other criminal incidents (when the premises of the company had been searched); and 16 October 2007 for the fourth applicant (when he had been questioned as a suspect). 29. The proceedings ended on 30 June 2014 when the Supreme Court judgment was adopted and became final. This meant that the criminal proceedings had lasted: eight years, nine months and five days with respect to the second applicant; seven years, eight months and twenty-eight days with respect to the first applicant, the second applicant company and the third applicant (in relation to certain criminal incidents); six years, nine months and eleven days with respect to the first applicant company and the third applicant (in relation to other criminal incidents); and six years, eight months and twenty-one days with respect to the fourth applicant. 30. When assessing whether the proceedings had been excessively long, the Supreme Court firstly observed that the case had been rather complex as regards the issues of law, and very complex from an evidentiary perspective. Nine persons had been accused, two of whom had been Members of Parliament whose immunity had had to be lifted (see paragraph 15 above). Complex schemes had been used to commit the offences in question, and the activities of the accused had involved a high level of conspiracy. This had made the collection of evidence concerning the offences difficult and the analysis of the (circumstancial) evidence time-consuming. Numerous witnesses had been heard during the pre-trial proceedings and in court (see paragraphs 13 and 17 above). The proceedings before the court of first instance had entailed hearings over the course of ninety-two days, and this also indicated how many questions had needed to be addressed and how complex the questions had been. 31. Secondly, the Supreme Court stated that there had been no delays during the pre-trial and trial stage of the proceedings. Rather, the lower courts had attempted to guarantee that the proceedings would not last an excessively long time. Some procedural flexibility had been lost due to the fact that the first-instance court had allowed the accused who had not been directly concerned by particular questions and evidence to be absent from the hearings altogether (see paragraph 17 above). At the same time, this had alleviated the effect of the proceedings on the accused, and had therefore been justified. The Supreme Court admitted that the organisation of the court hearings at first instance (not planning hearings sufficiently far in advance and not deciding on procedural matters quickly enough, thus allowing for long disputes between the parties), the volume and structure of the criminal file, and the presentation of the statement of charges (which had entailed unnecessary repetition and the structure of which had been illogical to some extent) might have added to the duration of the proceedings. However, the court noted that the defence representatives had opposed hearings being planned in advance, and in that regard they too had to be considered responsible. Furthermore, although it might have been reasonable for the prosecution to remove some of the material from the criminal file, the Supreme Court also considered that it had been for the defence representatives and not for the prosecution to decide whether some of the evidence in the criminal file was relevant from the perspective of the defence. The presentation of the statement of charges had not hindered defence rights either. As for separating the criminal case of E.T. from the rest of the criminal proceedings (see paragraph 79 below), the Supreme Court considered that this had related to only one of the charges against the third applicant and the first applicant company, and the latter’s counsel had not objected to the separation. Accordingly, the decision not to separate the case of E.T. from the rest of the proceedings could not be considered justified. In conclusion, the Supreme Court found that although some time might have been lost owing to the above-mentioned issues, the overall loss of time had been relatively insignificant in the context of the total duration of the proceedings. 32. Thirdly, the Supreme Court considered that the applicants had not prolonged the proceedings. In that regard, it noted that the defence representatives could not have been expected to preventively clear their timetables for possible appeal hearings in autumn 2012. Therefore, the fact that, at the appeal stage, hearings had only taken place six months after the Court of Appeal had started planning the relevant dates (see paragraph 21 above) could not be held against the applicants. Although the applicants could not be reproached for the fact that hearings had had to be cancelled or adjourned owing to their health and other personal reasons (see paragraph 17 above), such delays could not be attributed to the State either. 33. The Supreme Court admitted that the impact of the proceedings on the applicants had undoubtedly been serious, especially given the significant public interest in the case. At the same time, the court considered that other than the two months and nineteen days that the second applicant had spent in detention, and the two days when the first applicant had been under arrest, the applicants had not been detained. Moreover, on 17 February 2010 the first-instance court had annulled a restriction imposed on the first, the second and the third applicants not to leave their place of residence. 34. Assessing all those circumstances, the Supreme Court found that the proceedings, although close to being excessively lengthy, had still been concluded within a reasonable time. 35. The Supreme Court noted that secret surveillance interfered with people’s right to privacy, and that the principle of ultima ratio served the purpose of ensuring the proportionality of such interference. 36. The Supreme Court then addressed the preliminary investigation judges’ decisions authorising the surveillance activities. Firstly, it noted that, in accordance with Article 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kriminaalmenetluse seadustik, hereinafter “the CCrP”, see paragraph 49 below) all court decisions, including decisions authorising secret surveillance activities, had to be reasoned. That meant that, in accordance with Article 110 § 1 of the CCrP (see paragraph 45 below), authorisation decisions had to contain reasoning as to why the issuing court found that there was probable cause to believe that an offence had been committed, and why it was impossible, or especially complicated, to collect evidence by other means (the principle of ultima ratio). That reasoning could not be merely declaratory. The necessary reasoning could, however, rely on general criminological knowledge, for example knowledge concerning the nature of organised crime, the high level of conspiracy involved in the case in question, a presumed lack of witnesses willing to give statements, and so on. In any event, the reasoning had to be linked to the evidence in that particular case. Owing to time pressure and the likely fragmentary nature of information available at the time, the duty to provide reasons was less extensive when authorising secret surveillance than when deciding to convict a person. 37. The Supreme Court then noted that the preliminary investigation judges’ decisions (see paragraph 12 above) had not complied with the requirement of being reasoned. However, the lack of reasoning did not amount to a lack of authorisation, and did not mean that the surveillance activities had been conducted arbitrarily and beyond judicial control. This was so because the investigating authority was not competent to assess the adequacy of reasoning. It had the right to rely on the operative part of a decision authorising surveillance activities. Therefore, the failure to give proper reasons for a decision authorising surveillance activities did not result in the inadmissibility of evidence thereby collected. The Supreme Court reasoned that it was not only during the authorisation stage that the ultima ratio nature of the secret surveillance measures could be examined. In fact, regardless of the existence of earlier decisions authorising surveillance activities, courts subsequently hearing a criminal case also had an obligation to examine whether the substantive conditions for granting the authorisation decisions had been fulfilled at the time the decisions had been issued. If necessary, the courts could then declare the evidence thereby obtained inadmissible. A lack of requisite reasoning in an initial authorisation decision required the subsequent examination to be conducted with special diligence. 38. The Supreme Court went on to note that it had directly examined the material in the surveillance file, including the prosecutors’ applications for authorisation of surveillance activities. Based on that material, it had concluded that the substantive conditions for authorising surveillance activities had been fulfilled at the time the authorisation decisions had been issued. The Supreme Court was convinced that at that time there had been probable cause to believe that offences had been committed, and that it had been impossible to collect evidence by other means to verify that suspicion. In support of its findings, the Supreme Court referred to the nature of the crimes and the high level of conspiracy involved, and considered that it was unlikely that written or electronic evidence could have been collected or that witnesses could have been found without the proceedings being jeopardised. 39. With regard to the reasoning in the prosecutors’ decisions to authorise surveillance activities, the Supreme Court observed that, despite the requirement – deriving from Article 145 of the CCrP – that such decisions also had to be reasoned, they contained only an operative part and no reasoning at all. It then reiterated its position outlined above regarding the decisions issued by a preliminary investigation judge authorising surveillance activities. The Supreme Court concluded that the conditions set out in Article 110 of the CCrP had been fulfilled at the time the decisions had been issued. 40. As the third applicant had raised the question of the compatibility of the regulation of secret surveillance with the Constitution and the Convention, the Supreme Court – also acting as a constitutional review court – analysed the regulation of the CCrP (the limitations as regards offences in respect of which secret surveillance could be conducted, the principle of foreseeability, and the permitted duration of surveillance). It found that the relevant regulation was constitutional. The Supreme Court also concluded that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the duration of the surveillance activities with respect to the second and the third applicants had not been excessively lengthy. 41. Judge Kergandberg addressed the requirement to provide reasons for decisions authorising secret surveillance. He found that the Supreme Court had altered its earlier practice by “if not 180 degrees, then 160 degrees” by accepting that the lack of reasoning in the relevant decisions could not be equated to a lack of authorisation. Up until that judgment, it had been established case-law that, in accordance with Article 111 of the CCrP, violating the ultima ratio principle when issuing secret surveillance authorisations also inevitably meant that the evidence thereby obtained was inadmissible. In the instant case, the Supreme Court had distinguished between “granting authorisation for secret surveillance activities” and “obtaining evidence via secret surveillance activities”, and had stated that a violation of law during the authorisation stage could not affect the admissibility of evidence.

4. The applicant was born in 1972 and is detained in Belovo, Kemerovo Region. 5. Following the applicant’s arrest on suspicion of drug trafficking, on 14 November 2008 he was placed in temporary detention facility no. 70/1 in Tomsk. He remained in that facility until 20 April 2010. He was detained in cells nos. 91, 1, 7, 55, 4, 56, 51. Each cell measured approximately twenty metres and housed, for the major part of his stay, between 10 and 14 inmates. In the majority of the cells the toilet was merely a hole in the floor. A lavatory pan was installed in three cells, in the corner, and was separated from the living area by a 1.5-metre fence. The applicant was afforded an hour-long walk daily in the recreation yard. 6. According to the Government the applicant was provided with an individual sleeping place, except for the detention period between 18 November and 2 December 2008. There was artificial lighting, natural and artificial ventilation in the cells; the cells were heated. 7. On 30 December 2009 the Leninskiy District Court of Tomsk found the applicant guilty of attempted drug trafficking and sentenced him to nine years and six months’ imprisonment. 8. The applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal and asked to ensure the applicant’s presence at the appeal hearing. 9. On 17 May 2010 the Tomsk Regional Court upheld the conviction, having heard a prosecutor and the applicant’s lawyer. The applicant was not transported to the hearing. 10. On 13 February 2013 the Presidium of the Tomsk Regional Court quashed the decision of 17 May 2010 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 11. On 25 March 2013 the Tomsk Regional Court upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. The applicant and his lawyer were present at the hearing.

6. The applicant was born in 1965. When he lodged his application he was in prison serving a sentence for economic offences. 7. In 2002 the National Anti-Corruption Prosecution Service commenced proceedings against the applicant on charges of involvement in a vast criminal network operating in the economic field, involving several dozen individuals and some one hundred business companies. With the complicity of bank employees, fraudulent appropriations were granted to those companies, which money was then misused for the benefit of the accused. 8. By final judgment of 28 February 2013 the High Court of Cassation and Justice convicted the applicant on conspiracy charges, sentencing him to three years, four months’ imprisonment. 9. Meanwhile, in November 2012, the applicant had been diagnosed with prostate cancer. At that time the illness had already reached an advanced stage and the applicant displayed bone metastases, brain haematoma and intraocular haemorrhages. On 27 November 2012 the applicant had been admitted to the Bucharest Institute of Oncology, from which he had been discharged on 11 January 2013. From 14 to 18 January 2013 he had once again been admitted to hospital. He had undergone prostate surgery and begun chemotherapy. He had subsequently had several short stays in hospital. In January 2013 the diagnosis reached by the oncologist had emphasised the seriousness of the applicant’s condition. The prognosis was that he had a short time to live given that the disease had spread to the bone, for which condition the existing treatment was insufficient. On 26 February 2013 the applicant was examined by a medical board, which issued him with a certificate of severe disability. 10. On 28 February 2013 the applicant was taken into Bacău Hospital oncology department. His state had worsened and he was suffering from bone pain. The applicant continued his chemotherapy and remained in hospital until 4 March 2013, when he was handed over to police officers who had come to escort him to Bacău Prison where he was to begin serving his sentence. 11. On the same day the applicant, through the intermediary of his lawyer, applied to the Bacău County Court for an interruption of his prison sentence on health grounds. He pointed out that since he could not receive his treatment in prison, his life would be in danger. 12. On 27 March 2013 he was transferred to the Rahova Prison Hospital. On 5 April 2013 he returned to Bacău Prison. On 15 April 2013 he was readmitted to the Rahova Prison Hospital, and then transferred back to Bacău prison on 28 May 2013. 13. The court commissioned a report on the applicant’s condition from a board of the National Institute of Forensic Medicine. At the board’s request, the applicant underwent several medical examinations, which showed that his condition required radiotherapy sessions and further chemotherapy. Furthermore, it transpired from the medical documents made available to the committee that the applicant had had chemotherapy sessions at Bacău Hospital on 12 April 2013 and at the Bucharest Institute of Oncology on 10 and 17 May 2013. 14. In its report of 19 June 2013 the board concluded that the applicant’s survival depended on the medical care with which he was being provided and a complex form of treatment which he could only receive in specialised clinics operating under the Ministry of Health. Consequently, it considered that the court had to order either an interruption of the applicant’s sentence or his hospitalisation under supervision in one of the aforementioned establishments. 15. On 25 June 2013 the court allowed the applicant’s request and ordered a three-month interruption of his sentence. Having regard to the seriousness of the applicant’s illness, it ruled that hospitalisation under supervision would considerably reduce his chances of survival and recovery owing to the stress and mental suffering caused by the continued execution of his sentence. Moreover, the court emphasised that the applicant posed no threat to public order, that the sentence, one third of which had already been served, was reasonably short and that the applicant’s conduct had been good throughout the criminal proceedings. The prosecution appealed. 16. The applicant was released on the same day. On 4 and 19 July 2013 he underwent chemotherapy at Bacău Hospital and continued the treatment on 1 and 16 August 2013 at the Bucharest Institute of Oncology. 17. On 29 August 2013 the Bacău Court of Appeal considered the prosecution appeal. By final judgment delivered the same day, it allowed the appeal and dismissed the applicant’s request. Relying on Articles 455 and 453 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter “the CPP” - see paragraph 34 below), the Court of Appeal ruled that the interruption of the applicant’s sentence was unjustified provided that his treatment could continue, under guard, in a civil hospital. In a dissenting opinion, one of the judges on the trial bench considered that the sentence should be interrupted on humanitarian grounds; consequently, having regard to the applicant’s condition, he considered that his continued detention was in breach of the proportionality principle and reduced his chances of survival. 18. On 31 August 2013 the applicant was imprisoned in Bacău to serve his sentence. On 24 September 2013 he was transferred to Vaslui Prison. On 27 September 2013 he was admitted to the Rahova Prison hospital. On 3 October 2013 he returned to Vaslui Prison. 19. On 4 October 2013 the applicant was admitted to Târgu Ocna Prison hospital, diagnosed with “prostatic neoplasia with bone and brain metastases”. On the same day, noting the deterioration in the applicant’s general condition, a multidisciplinary team from the Târgu Ocna Prison hospital placed a prisoner on constant standby to assist the applicant in his everyday activities. That prisoner reportedly assisted the applicant up until the day of his last transfer to Bacău Hospital (see paragraph 28 below). 20. On 9 October 2013 the applicant was once again transferred to Bacău Prison, from whence he was taken, on the same day, to the Bacău Hospital oncology department. He was unable to move, was suffering from severe bone pain and had almost completely lost his sight and hearing. Furthermore, he was also showing signs of severe depression. His condition was so severe that he could no longer undergo chemotherapy, which was replaced by palliative care. 21. The applicant remained in the Bacău Hospital oncology department until 24 October 2013, when he was transferred to Iaşi Prison. On 28 October 2013 he was taken into the Iaşi Regional Institute of Oncology for five palliative radiotherapy sessions geared to alleviating his bone pain. He remained in the institute until 1 November 2013. He lost his sight completely and his depression continued. 22. On 5 November 2013 he was transferred to Vaslui Prison. On 6 November 2013 he was admitted to the Târgu Ocna Prison hospital where he stayed until 12 November 2013, when he was transferred to Bacău Prison. 23. On 22 November 2013 the judge delegated to Bacău Prison granted the applicant the most favourable possible detention regime, allowing him to move around inside prison and to take part in outdoor activities unsupervised. 24. Still on 22 November 2013, the applicant was admitted to the Bacău Hospital oncology department. The senior medical officer said that the applicant’s condition could deteriorate suddenly and that he therefore needed round-the-clock medical care. From 25 to 27 November 2013 the applicant received palliative care in the same hospital before being transferred to Bacău Prison and then to the Târgu Ocna Prison hospital. 25. In reply to a request from the applicant to be released on licence, the Prison Director told him that his request would be examined in 2015. 26. The applicant wrote to the President of the Romanian Republic and the Director of Târgu Ocna Prison to request their assistance regarding his release. He explained that he was dying and that he wanted to have his family present. He pointed out that he was now bedridden, blind and deaf, and that there was no one in prison to assist him in his everyday activities. He added that the doctors had been reluctant to treat him because had was keep under guard and in handcuffs. 27. The National Administration of Prison Authorities replied that only a court could order his release. 28. On 4 December 2013 the applicant was transferred to Bacău Prison and then to Bacău Hospital, where he remained until 7 December 2013. On that date he was transferred to the Târgu Ocna Prison Hospital. On 19 December 2013 he returned to Bacău Prison and the same day was admitted to the Bacău Hospital oncology department. He died there on 24 December 2013. 29. It transpires from the medical files included in the case file that between 24 January 2013 and 24 December 2013, the date of his death, the applicant was admitted to Bacău hospital eighteen times, including several hospital stays lasting several days. During those stays he had some fifteen chemotherapy sessions, usually at fortnightly intervals: prior to 24 October 2013 in the framework of the cancer treatment, and after that date, in the framework of palliative treatment. He also received various types of treatment for the illnesses caused by the metastatic progression of his prostate cancer. 30. In a report drawn up at the Government agent’s request, the senior medical officer at the Bacău Hospital oncology department highlighted certain dysfunctions in the administration of the treatment. Drawing on the medical files relating to the applicant’s stays in that hospital, he pointed out that on 14 March 2013 the applicant had begun the chemotherapy without having received the radiotherapy recommended by the doctors in his department. He added that the chemotherapy session scheduled for between 28 and 30 March 2013 had not taken place because the applicant had been absent, having been transferred to the Bucharest Institute of Oncology for examinations. Lastly, he noted that on 18 September 2013 the applicant had arrived late at the hospital to continue his chemotherapy. Furthermore, when the applicant had been hospitalised, he had been guarded by two police officers and had remained handcuffed to the bed, even after he had become blind and deaf and was suffering extreme bone pain. 31. In a report of 21 September 2015, the Iaşi Regional Institute of Oncology pointed out that between 28 October and 1 November 2013, the applicant had had five radiotherapy sessions, had kept the medical appointments made and had been neither handcuffed nor immobilised during those sessions. 32. In a report of 22 September 2015, the Bucharest Institute of Oncology pointed out that the applicant had been hospitalised several times in the institute between 27 November 2012 and 24 May 2013, primarily for chemotherapy. The institute’s senior medical officer stated in the report that the applicant had duly respected all his medical appointments and that during his stays at the institute he had not been constrained but had been guarded by prison officers. 33. According to the information provided by the prison authorities, the applicant had been held in Bacău Prison in a cell measuring 33 m2, which he had shared with six other prisoners. At Rahova Prison hospital he had shared a 38-m2 cell with four other prisoners. At Vaslui Prison, where he was held from 24 to 27 September, from 3 to 4 October and from 5 to 6 November 2013, he had occupied a 14.75-m2 cell with six other prisoners. At Târgu Ocna Prison hospital he had been held in a 48-m2 cell with eight other prisoners. At Iaşi Prison he had remained from 24 October to 5 November 2013 in a 15.92-m2 cell with three other prisoners.

5. The applicants, who are husband and wife, were born in 1970 and live in Chișinău. 6. On 29 January 2008 the applicants were involved in a street protest as a result of which they were arrested and detained for six hours and forty‑five minutes. On 18 December 2008 the first applicant was again involved in a street protest, as a result of which he was arrested and detained for approximately four hours and a half. Later both applicants were acquitted and the actions of the police were found to be unlawful. The facts concerning those protests were described in detail in Mătăsaru and Saviţchi v. Moldova, no. 38281/08, §§ 6-58, 2 November 2010. 7. On 29 January 2009 the first applicant organised again a street protest and was arrested again and detained for some six hours. Later the applicant was acquitted and the actions of the police were found to be unlawful. 8. On 2 November 2010 the Court adopted a judgment in the case of Mătăsaru and Saviţchi (cited above), in which it declared inadmissible the applicants’ complaints concerning the alleged breaches of their rights guaranteed by Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention on the ground of their failure to exhaust domestic remedies (see Mătăsaru and Saviţchi (cited above, § 75). 9. After that, the applicants brought a civil action under Law 1545 (on compensation for damage caused by illegal acts of the criminal investigation bodies, the prosecution authorities or the courts) seeking compensation in respect of the breach of their rights guaranteed by Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention in regard to all three street protests of 2008 and 2009. 10. By a final judgment of 6 February 2013 the Supreme Court of Justice acknowledged the breach of the applicnts’ rights guaranteed by Articles 5 and 11 of the Convention and awarded them the equivalent of 900 and 270 euros (EUR), respectively.

5. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Warsaw. 6. On 14 May 2010 the applicant was arrested in Kyiv by officers of the Security Service of Ukraine (“the SBU”) on suspicion of unlawfully importing equipment for the covert surveillance of telephone networks and using it to intercept private telephone conversations (see paragraph 24 below), an offence committed in collaboration with M., a Russian national. 7. An SBU investigator lodged a request with the Shevchenkivskyy District Court of Kyiv (“the District Court”) seeking that the applicant be remanded in custody pending the investigation. He submitted that the applicant’s detention was necessary in order to prevent him from absconding and interfering with the investigation, given that the applicant was a foreign national, did not have a permanent place of residence in Ukraine and was suspected of a serious offence. 8. On 17 May 2010 the District Court held a hearing in the presence of the prosecutor and his lawyer, remanded the applicant in custody, and ordered that he be placed in an SBU detention facility. It held that the arguments submitted by the investigator were sufficiently strong to allow the conclusion that the applicant should be detained. 9. On 27 May 2010 the Court of Appeal held a hearing to examine the applicant lawyer’s appeal against the order of 17 May 2010 in the presence of a prosecutor and the applicant’s lawyer and upheld the order. 10. On 13 July 2010 the District Court held a hearing in the presence of the prosecutor, the applicant and his lawyer and extended the applicant’s detention until 14 September 2010. It noted that there were no reasons to release the applicant and that the investigative authority needed time to complete the investigation. 11. On 26 July and 6 August 2010 the Court of Appeal held hearings to examine, respectively, the applicant lawyer’s and the applicant’s own appeals against the District Court’s decision of 13 July 2010. Only a prosecutor was present at the former hearing, whereas the latter hearing was attended by the prosecutor, the applicant and his lawyer. The Court of Appeal rejected both appeals and upheld the District Court’s decision on both occasions. 12. On 9 September 2010 the Court of Appeal held a hearing in the presence of the prosecutor and the applicant’s lawyer, granted the investigative authority’s request, and extended the applicant’s detention until 14 November 2010. The court noted that the charges against the applicant were serious, that there were no reasons to release him and that the investigative authority needed more time to complete the investigation. 13. On 1 November 2010 the investigator charged the applicant with several additional offences in connection with the same events: breaching the privacy of telephone communications and unlawful transfer of equipment subject to export control, committed in a group (see paragraph 24 below). 14. On 12 November 2010 the Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 14 December 2010. 15. On 14 December 2010 the applicant’s case was sent to the District Court for trial. 16. On 27 April 2011 the District Court committed the applicant for trial, rejected the applicant’s request for release and ordered his continuing detention pending trial. The court stated that the applicant was charged with a serious offence, was a foreign national and had no permanent place of residence in Ukraine. No time-limit was set for his detention. 17. On 25 August 2011 the District Court rejected the applicant’s requests for release. It gave reasons similar to those given in its decision of 27 April 2011 and added that there was no reason to set an end-date for the applicant’s detention since his detention was needed to complete the trial. 18. On 14 October, 24 November 2011, and 11 January 2012 the District Court rejected the applicant’s further requests for release. It gave reasons similar to those given in its decision of 27 April 2011. 19. On 19 March 2012 the District Court convicted the applicant as charged, sentencing him to four years’ imprisonment. 20. On 7 December 2012 the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and remitted the case for additional investigation. It ordered the applicant’s continuing detention without giving reasons. 21. On 15 January 2013 the District Court set bail for the applicant. 22. On 16 January 2013 the applicant was released on bail. 23. On 17 May 2013 the District Court approved the applicant’s plea bargain, convicted him, and sentenced him to two years and eight months’ imprisonment, which was to be considered fully served in view of the time the applicant had spent in pre-trial detention.

7. The applicants live in Kharkiv. 8. According to the applicants, in the period from 20 May to 6 July 2010 they participated in obstructive protest activities against a road-construction project, in particular tree-felling, in Gorky Park (Парк ім. Горького) in Kharkiv. 9. The following issues are raised in connection with those events and their aftermath:[1] (i) all applicants: whether alleged verbal and physical harassment on the part of the personnel involved in the project against the applicants breached their right to freedom of peaceful assembly; (ii) the first six applicants: whether their arrest and conviction for refusal to obey the orders to leave the site breached their freedom of peaceful assembly. In this respect there are two sub-groups: the first five applicants who were arrested together and the sixth applicant who was arrested on a different date; (iii) the first and second applicants: whether the above-mentioned proceedings for failure to obey the police order to leave were fair in view of the applicants’ absence from the appeal hearings; (iv) the third, seventh and ninth applicants: whether those applicants were subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment by the personnel involved in the project and, if so, whether there was a failure to protect them from such treatment and investigate it effectively. 10. On 23 June 2004 the Kharkiv City Council (“the City Council”) adopted a document entitled General Urban Development Plan until 2026, which had been drafted by the State Academic Institute for Urban Planning “Dipromisto” (“the Urban Planning Institute”). A public consultation on the plan had been held in 2003. 11. On 20 September 2007 the Kharkiv Municipal Construction Department (Департамент будівництва та шляхового господарства Харківської міської ради) published in the Kharkivsky Kuryer newspaper information about its plan to build a road from Sumska Street to Novgorodska Street, namely through the park in question, and invited comments. 12. On 10 September 2008 the City Council allocated land for the road construction to the Municipal Construction Department. 13. On 14 March 2008 the Urban Planning Institute approved the plan submitted by the Kharkiv Municipal Urban Planning Department (Департамент містобудування, архітектури та земельних відносин) envisaging construction of the road through the park and modification of the Urban Development Plan in that respect. 14. On 25 January or February 2009 the City Council approved the overall plan for the prospective road construction, including the road through the park. 15. On 27 April 2010 a commission of municipal officials examined the trees which had to be felled in order to allow the road construction and drew up a detailed list of the trees, including their varieties, ages, diameters and state of health. On 18 May 2010 the Kharkiv Regional Environmental Protection Department approved the list. 16. On 7 May 2010 the Municipal Construction Department published a notice about the planned construction of the road in Ekologiya Syogodni (Environment Today), a newspaper published by the Kharkiv Regional Environmental Inspectorate. The notice contained an indication of where the road would be sited, and stated that it would be 1,283 metres long and 16 metres wide, with a footpath and a bicycle path. The notice stated that in the process, 503 trees would be destroyed but that 75 trees and 35 bushes would be replanted along the road. Comment was solicited and the Department’s postal address given for the purpose. 17. On 17 May 2010 the Municipal Construction Department sent letters to the regional environmental protection authorities explaining that the purpose of the road construction was to relieve the problem of increasing traffic in central Kharkiv by creating a road linking two radial roads and thus circumventing the city centre. 18. On 19 May 2010 the Executive Committee of the Kharkiv City Council (the municipality’s executive authority, “the Executive Committee”) authorised the felling of 503 trees in Gorky Park. 19. On 11 or 19 May 2010 the Construction Department entered into a contract with private company P., engaging the latter as the main contractor for the road construction project (“the Main Contractor”). 20. On 19 May 2010 the Main Contractor signed an agreement with a private company to perform “preparatory works” for the road construction. On the same date the Main Contractor also subcontracted municipal company K. to do the tree-felling on the construction site. Company K. in turn engaged another municipal company as its own subcontractor (hereinafter “the subcontractors”). 21. On 26 May 2010 the Regional Architecture and Construction Inspectorate (Інспекція державного архітектурно-будівельного контролю у Харківській області) issued to the Municipal Construction Department a permit to carry out preparatory work for the road construction. 22. On 13 or 19 May 2010 the Main Contractor signed an agreement for the provision of security guard services with the local authority-owned company Municipal Guard (Munitsipalna okhorona; Комунальне підприємство «Муніципальна охорона» – hereinafter “MG”). Under the agreement MG undertook to provide services consisting of guarding the above-mentioned construction site. MG held a licence authorising it to provide commercial security guard services, issued on 2 February 2010 by the Ministry of the Interior. 23. On 19 May 2010 the Executive Committee sent a letter to the chief of the Kharkiv city police. Referring to its decision of the same date authorising the felling of trees (see paragraph 18 above), it asked him to dispatch police officers to the construction site as from 20 May 2010 to ensure public order. 24. On 19 May 2010 Kharkiv city police approved an action plan for ensuring public safety during the tree-felling work. According to the plan, twenty-seven active officers were assigned for ensuring public order and safety at the site daily from 20 May and a number of officers were to be kept in reserve at the local police station in case of need. It was mentioned in the plan that the tree felling could potentially generate picketing, demonstrations and other, unexpected action by opponents of the construction project. 25. On 21 May 2010 the Main Contractor signed an agreement for the provision of security guard services with private security company P-4 (приватне підприємство «Охоронне агентство «Р-4»). (hereinafter “PS”). The subject of the agreement was the provision of security guard services for the purpose of preventing third parties from entering the road construction site, and the services were to be provided as from 28 May 2010. PS held a licence authorising it to provide commercial security guard services, issued on 11 April 2007 by the Ministry of the Interior. 26. On 25 May 2010 the Main Contractor asked the chief of the city police to send police units to the site at 7 a.m. on 26 May 2010 to prevent third parties from infiltrating the construction site. On 29 May it asked the chief of police of the then Dzerzhinsky (presently Shevchenkivsky) District, where Gorky Park is located (hereinafter “the district”), to ensure public order on the construction site, referring to an incident the previous day in which, according to the company, unidentified people had interfered with the construction work, shouted profanities at the workers and tried to provoke a fight. 27. The tree felling commenced on 20 May 2010, attracting a number of individuals (including, according to them, the applicants) who protested against it. According to the applicants, there were “hundreds” of protesters. No formal notification had been sent to the municipal authorities. The protesters alleged, inter alia, that the felling was unjustified and not duly authorised, and demanded proof of its legality. Some protesters actively attempted to interfere with the work. In particular, they climbed the trees with the help of climbing equipment, and attached themselves to the trees to be felled or interfered with work to be carried out by machinery by placing themselves in front of it. 28. Notwithstanding the protests, the work proceeded. According to the Government’s submissions, in response to the protesters’ actions the security guards attempted to drive them away by pushing them back beyond the boundaries of the area. In some instances, clashes took place. On at least fifteen occasions ambulances were called to the site. The police officers deployed at the site allegedly remained largely passive in the face of the clashes. 29. It appears that the bulk of the protest activity was brought to an end on 2 June 2010 and most of the protesters left the site on that day (see paragraph 76 below regarding the relevant police report). However, some of the protesters apparently continued to picket the construction site until about mid‑August 2010 (see also paragraphs 64 and 65 below concerning the sixth applicant’s arrest on 6 July 2010). 30. Video and photographic evidence of the events of 20 May to 2 June 2010, described in paragraphs 31 to 35, 38, 40, 42 and 45 below, was provided by the applicants. At the time of examination of the case by this Court, similar video evidence was also publicly available online (see paragraph 45 below regarding the evidence concerning the events of 28 May, for example).[2] Certain video material was also examined in the course of the domestic proceedings (see, for example, paragraphs 51 and 82 below) but it was not provided to the Court. The Court will rely on the evidence set out below to the extent that it does not contradict the domestic authorities’ findings (see on this point paragraph 248 below) and, in particular, to the extent that it disproves the applicants’ own allegations (see, for example, paragraphs 145, 154 and 212 below). 31. Material for 20 May 2010 consists of a news report by the Kharkiv local television channel ATN concerning the events in Gorky Park. The report shows workers felling trees, apparently unobstructed. There is no sign of any protesters. The narrator says that the tree-felling work for the road construction is advancing rapidly. The project dated from 2007 but, at the time, was attracting opposition from academics, environmentalists and city residents. At this point the report shows footage of what appears to be a demonstration in front of a public building with flags and the slogan “Dobkin [Kharkiv mayor at the time], do not destroy the park”. This is marked as archive footage. The narrator goes on to say that those protests have not prevented the city authorities from pushing ahead with the project. At what appears to be a public meeting of city authorities, the head of the Municipal Construction Department is shown explaining the need for the new road in the city’s traffic scheme. In footage marked “17 September 2007” the then-mayor of Kharkiv is shown speaking at what appears to be a press conference about the sources of financing for the project. Mr Sh., a representative of Pechenigy, an NGO, discusses his concern that more trees would be felled than authorised. Mr K., a representative of another NGO, My Kharkivyany, denies that he has been shown the permits for tree felling, in particular the Executive Committee’s decision of 19 May. The acting mayor of Kharkiv is shown at a public meeting of the Executive Committee saying that the project has all the necessary permits and the NGOs have been informed. The narrator says that civil activists have complained to the police of illegal tree felling and intended to appeal to the prosecutor’s office and the courts. 32. Material for 22 May shows an area that has been cleared of some trees. Protesters are seen standing by two trees and hugging them. 33. Material for 23 May shows tree-felling work with a number of individuals standing by. An individual is seen being taken away by the police. Three individuals are surrounding a tree and facing the police. One of them says “Welcome to the picnic”. 34. Material for 24 May shows tree-felling work. Police and individuals who appear to be protesters surround the loggers who are holding chainsaws. One scene shows a logger starting to cut down a tree with a chainsaw, at which moment an individual in civilian clothing comes along and puts his foot on the tree trunk at the level where the logger is attempting to cut. The worker walks away. 35. Material for 25 May shows a large number of police officers standing in lines blocking protesters’ access to certain areas where tree felling is ongoing or pulling individual protesters away from the trees while protesters attempt to cling to them. It appears that the protesters are pushed, pulled and escorted away from the felling area and released. Another scene shows the police pushing back some protesters who appear to be trying to get closer to the area where a tall tree is being cut down. A worker starts cutting a tree with a chainsaw, he makes a short pause, a protester comes along and hugs the tree, preventing the worker from proceeding. 36. The applicants alleged a number of “attacks” on them and other protesters by the security guards and loggers in the period from 20 May to 2 June 2010. The following alleged incidents are of particular note. 37. According to the applicants, on 27 May 2010 the ninth applicant was beaten by unidentified men in orange vests. An ambulance was called and the ninth applicant was taken to hospital where he was diagnosed as having sustained injuries to the soft tissue of the head and face, and was treated as an outpatient. On the same day he lodged a complaint with the district police, alleging that he had been assaulted in the course of the Gorky Park events near the children’s railway. 38. Video and photographic material for 27 May shows the following scenes: (i) a person introducing himself as the head of the Municipal Construction Department and surrounded, apparently, by some other officials, including a police officer, is arguing with protesters; (ii) a group of protesters confront a bulldozer near railway tracks. They attempt to sit down on its blade. Several individuals in civilian clothing unsuccessfully attempt to pull the protesters off, but they manage to surround the blade and block the bulldozer; (iii) a group of individuals in orange vests and a group in civilian clothing are shown confronting and pushing each other in a chaotic fashion around an excavator. Several individuals in civilian clothing on what appears to be the protesters’ side are seen recording the events with cameras. Photographs reproduce what appear to be some aspects of the same scenes. Red-and-white warning tape is seen on some photographs for the first time. 39. According to the applicants, on 31 May 2010 the seventh applicant was assaulted by men in black wearing MG badges in response to her protests about the beating of another protester. According to her, the police officers who were standing nearby observed the assault without reacting to her cries for help. On that day she was taken to hospital by ambulance. In the hospital she was diagnosed as suffering from stress-related hypertension and soft tissue contusions in the lumbar area. She stayed in the hospital from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. that day. On 1 June 2010 the seventh applicant complained to the head of the district police that on 31 May she had been hit in the back by the MG staff. 40. Video and photographic material for 31 May shows another tumultuous scene. The sound of machinery is heard in the background and men in black with badges are seen confronting a large group of individuals in civilian clothing. They appear to be pulling some protesters away from an area they are attempting to protect. They then form an elbow-to-elbow line blocking access. Individuals in civilian clothing on the protesters’ side are seen filming the events. There are shouts of “Police!” and “Call an ambulance!” A woman (apparently the ninth applicant) is seen lying on the ground surrounded by the crowd. An ambulance team arrives and takes her away. Photographs show other scenes, supposedly from the same day: (i) individuals, apparently protesters, are seen sitting in groups around trees marked with slogans; (ii) men in black clothing with badges confront individuals in civilian clothing, pushing them away; (iii) a man in black is facing what appears to be a group of protesters sitting on the ground and holding onto a tree. 41. According to the applicants, on 2 June 2010 men in black with MG badges and loggers were attempting to clear the site of protesters. In the course of that action, the third applicant was closely approached by two loggers, subsequently identified as A. and K., employees of one of the subcontractors. They threatened him and a group of other protesters with working chainsaws. One of them nearly injured the third applicant. The Government alleged, on the contrary, that it was the protesters who had attacked the workers, trying to take away the chainsaws so that the workers had had to retreat to avoid injuries. In their statements in the course of the domestic investigation, as summarised in the decision not to institute criminal proceedings of 9 August 2010 (see paragraph 81 below), A. and K. stated that on the day in question, on arriving at the designated felling area in Gorky Park, they had observed men in black and protesters. The latter had started insulting the workers and the men in black. They had had then started to push A. and K., grabbing their arms, trying to seize their chainsaws. In order to prevent those people from approaching, A. and K. had switched on the chainsaws. However, the protesters had started approaching and in order not to injure them, A. and K. had had to step back, holding the chainsaws in front of them. 42. Video material for 2 June shows a tumultuous scene involving dozens of individuals, with men in black attempting to push the protesters away from the trees and the protesters attempting to hold their ground and push back. Several police officers observe. Some distance away from this altercation, two workers are seen starting their chainsaws. At the same time an individual identified as the third applicant approaches closely and confronts one of the workers, raising and spreading his arms. Several other individuals also closely approach the worker. The worker is shown stepping back while holding the chainsaw close and waving it in horizontal semi-circles in front of him. Shortly thereafter, a group of individuals in camouflage and in black intervene and interpose themselves in a line between the workers and the protesters. 43. On 28 May 2010 the first to fifth, the eighth and the tenth applicants, among other protesters, were arrested and taken to a police station, where charges of malicious insubordination in the face of lawful demands of a police officer were drawn up. According to those reports, the above applicants had repeatedly refused to abide by police officers’ instructions to leave the construction site and resisted the officers’ efforts to remove them, in particular by dragging their feet and attempting to break free and to remain on the site. It appears that the applicants were released shortly after the reports had been drawn up. 44. On various dates those reports were examined by the Kharkiv Dzerzhinsky District Court (“the District Court”). During the hearings, the applicants pleaded not guilty. They submitted, in particular, that on the morning of 28 May 2010 they had been in Gorky Park along with some other protesters to express their dissatisfaction with the tree felling (see, however, the first and second applicants’ statements, which differed from others in this respect, at paragraphs 52 and 53 below). The construction site had no boundary markers and they had believed that they were lawfully in a public open space. About 100 police officers had been standing nearby, and they had never asked the protesters to leave the area. A number of men in black with MG badges had surrounded the protesters and started pressing them into a tight circle. The police officers had then approached and, instead of responding to the protesters’ cries for help, had taken some of the protesters, including the applicants, out of the crowd one by one and escorted them to the police station, without any demands or explanations. The applicants had followed the officers without offering any resistance. 45. Video and photographic material for 28 May shows an individual in civilian clothing leading a group of several dozen men in black and other clothing with badges. They approach a group of protesters, who are within a zone marked off with warning tape standing by what appears to be a railroad crossing. The individual repeats several times “Please leave the construction site”. He receives the response: “This is a park, not a construction site”. Then the people with badges, having lined up elbow‑to‑elbow, start pushing, apparently attempting to push the protesters away from the crossing towards the periphery of the marked-off area. The protesters resist the pressure and some shout “Police!” and “The park is ours!” (Парк наш!) A large group of police officers arrives. On seeing them, the protesters start chanting “Police with the people!” (Милиция с народом!) By the time the police have arrived, the protesters have been moved away from the crossing and are surrounded by the people with badges, in a tight circle, but are still within the marked-off area. The police officer in charge exchanges inaudible words – he appears to be saying “Do you wish to leave [the territory]?” (Хотите покинуть?) – with a person who appears to be one of the surrounded protesters, and says to the other officers “To the police station!”. The exact exchange is difficult to hear as there is so much noise, in particular from the protesters, who continue to chant “Police with the people!” The police officers then start prising individuals from the group and lead them away from the marked-off area. Several are seen dragging their feet and arguing. Eventually, the area previously occupied by the protesters is cleared and an excavator moves through it. (a) The first and second applicants 46. In his statement to the police the first applicant said that at 7.30 a.m. on 28 May 2010 he had been in Gorky Park with his bicycle. He had been grabbed by people with MG badges and then handed over to the police. 47. In his statement to the police the second applicant said that at 7.20 a.m. on 28 May 2010 he had been in the park near the railway crossing, where he had seen a crowd and had come closer to find out what was going on. He had been unaware that construction work was being conducted there. Individuals with MG badges had pushed him and others away from the railway crossing and encircled them. Afterwards, police officers had come and dragged him out of the circle and to the police station. He had not heard any warnings to leave the site. 48. On 28 May 2010 the cases against the first and second applicants were sent to court. The applicants requested that the hearings in their cases be postponed as they needed time to appoint a lawyer. They appointed a lawyer on the same day. 49. The second applicant’s administrative-offence case file contains two versions of the report drawn up by arresting officers and addressed to their superiors concerning the circumstances of his arrest. The first version states that the second applicant was taken to the police station because he had been protesting at the construction site in Gorky Park, thus putting his life at risk and interfering with the construction work. The second version states that the applicant had been present at the construction site in Gorky Park, had refused to leave despite repeated warnings from police officers, and had struggled when police officers had attempted to escort him out of the area. 50. On 31 May 2010 the first and second applicants’ lawyer asked the court to admit to the file and examine a video recording of the events of 28 May 2010. 51. On 9 June 2010 the District Court held a hearing at which it heard the police officers, who supported the charges and the account of events set out in the offence reports. It also heard the applicants and some witnesses, and examined the video recording submitted by the applicants’ lawyer. 52. The first applicant stated that on the morning of 28 May he had been cycling through Gorky Park on his way to work. He had seen many people in the place where trees were being felled and had gone closer. There had been red-and-white tape but he had not realised that that meant that the area in question was a construction site. People with MG badges had tried to push him and others away from the railway crossing and had surrounded them, after which he had been taken away by police officers, who had not addressed any orders to him personally. 53. The second applicant stated that on the morning of 28 May he had gone to the park to look at the events surrounding the tree felling. There had been a lot of people there. There had been red-and-white tape but he had not understood that that meant it was a construction site and that his presence there could be dangerous. He described the subsequent events in terms close to those used by the first applicant. 54. At the close of the hearing the court convicted the first and second applicants as charged and sentenced them to fifteen days’ administrative detention. The court stated that, in view of the examined evidence, including that submitted by the defence, it was convinced that the applicants were guilty as charged. It further stated that the video recording submitted by the applicants’ lawyer had not exculpated them since it had pauses and did not show certain witnesses; therefore, it could not be regarded as a complete record of the events in question. Having examined the circumstances of the case and the character of the applicants, it was also convinced that a punishment less severe than detention would not be adequate. The decision was enforced immediately and the applicants were taken into custody. 55. The District Court’s judgments were served on the first and second applicants and on 10 June 2010 their lawyer appealed to the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”). He argued that the District Court had failed to set out its analysis of the evidence which had led it to the conclusion that the applicants were guilty, and had thus failed adequately to reason its judgments. He also argued that under the Code of Administrative Offences administrative detention could only be applied in exceptional cases. The court had failed to explain the exceptional nature of the applicants’ cases which would justify the severity of the punishment imposed. 56. On 14 June 2010 the District Court notified the lawyer and the applicants (through the detention centre) that their cases were being sent to the Court of Appeal. 57. According to a note in the domestic files, at 5 p.m. on 17 June 2010 a clerk from the Court of Appeal informed the applicants’ lawyer that court hearings in the first and second applicants’ cases would be held at 2 p.m. and 2.20 p.m. the following day respectively. The same day the lawyer studied the files. 58. On 18 June 2010 the Court of Appeal heard the appeals of the first and second applicants in their absence but in the presence of their lawyer, and upheld their conviction. The Court of Appeal found that the case-file material showed that the police officers had acted lawfully in directing the applicants to leave the construction site. The construction work was being conducted on the basis of valid permits and the appellants had failed to show otherwise. At the same time, the court concluded that the District Court had not had sufficient grounds to impose the maximum punishment on the applicants, having failed to sufficiently take into account the circumstances of the cases and the applicants’ personal characteristics. Accordingly, it reduced their sentence to nine days’ detention. 59. On the same day that decision became final and the first and second applicants were released. (b) The third and fourth applicants 60. In the course of the hearing before the District Court the third applicant stated that he had indeed been in Gorky Park, he had not heard any orders to leave the site from the police officers but had heard it from a person in civilian clothing. He and other protesters had been surrounded by a line of individuals in civilian clothing and he had then been dragged from the circle by police officers, who had taken him to the police station. On 14 June 2010 the District Court, having heard the police officers, who supported the charges, the third and fourth applicants and some witnesses, convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced them to fines of 136 and 170 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) respectively, at the time the equivalent of about 14 and 17 euros (EUR) respectively (see paragraph 97 below). The applicants appealed. In his appeal the third applicant argued, in particular, that he could not be held liable for failure to comply with the order of the police since he had had the right to be present in the park and the order to leave it had been without legal basis. The fourth applicant also argued that police officers had not issued any order to leave the site. 61. On 27 July and 11 August 2010 respectively the judgments in those applicants’ cases were upheld by the Court of Appeal. (c) The fifth applicant 62. On 23 June 2010 the District Court, having heard the police officers, the fifth applicant and some witnesses, convicted the fifth applicant as charged and fined him UAH 170, at the time the equivalent of about EUR 17. On 27 July 2010 the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction by a final decision and discontinued the proceedings against the fifth applicant under Article 22 of the Code of Administrative Offences (see paragraph 95 below). It found that the trial court had correctly established the facts concerning the applicant’s guilt, but that its judgment lacked reasoning as to the degree of dangerousness of the applicant’s conduct and his actions and as to his personal characteristics. The Court of Appeal found it established that the applicant’s registered residence was in Kharkiv, that he was employed and that his actions had not caused prejudice to the public interest or to individuals. Therefore, the delinquent element in his conduct had been so insignificant that an oral reprimand would have sufficed, under Article 22 of the Code of Administrative Offences (see paragraph 95 below). The court proceeded to issue the reprimand. (d) The eighth and tenth applicants 63. On 8 June and 12 July 2010 the District Court discontinued proceedings against the eight and tenth applicants. In its judgment concerning the eighth applicant the District Court noted, in particular, that his explanations were consistent with a private video recording of the events submitted by him. There were inconsistencies between various police reports in the case file and a lack of evidence that the officers had duly instructed him to leave. Concerning the tenth applicant, the court likewise pointed to inconsistencies between various police reports in the case file and the lack of evidence that the officers had duly instructed him to leave. 64. On 6 July 2010 the sixth applicant was arrested and charged with malicious insubordination in the face of orders given by police officers to leave the construction site. 65. On 7 July 2010 the sixth applicant’s case was heard by the District Court. At the hearing the police officers supported the charges. The sixth applicant acknowledged that he had been sitting on the ground in the construction area, protesting against the tree felling, which he considered unlawful. He had refused to comply with the police officers’ requests to leave the site, to the point where they had had to drag him away by the arms with his legs dragging on the ground. He further admitted that he had told the police officers that he would return to the site as soon as he could. Witnesses gave testimony to the same effect, with one adding that the applicant had also tried to break away from the police. 66. On the same day the District Court convicted the sixth applicant as charged and sentenced him to ten days’ administrative detention. The court set out the evidence describing the applicant’s conduct. In justifying the sanction, the court stated that it had taken into account the nature of the offence and its specific circumstances, the applicant’s personal characteristics, the fact that he had no employment, the absence of aggravating or attenuating circumstances, and the need to re-educate the offender and to prevent new offences. It considered that the use of sanctions less severe than imprisonment would be insufficient and that administrative detention needed to be imposed, but not for the maximum duration provided for in the law. The applicant started to serve his sentence immediately. 67. The applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal, arguing that the District Court had failed to set out its analysis of the evidence which had led it to the conclusion that the applicant was guilty, and had thus failed adequately to reason its judgment. He also argued that under the Code of Administrative Offences administrative detention could only be applied in exceptional cases (see paragraph 96 below). The District Court had failed to explain the exceptional nature of the applicant’s case which would justify the severity of the punishment imposed. He requested that the District Court’s judgment be quashed and the proceedings in the case discontinued. 68. On 15 September 2010, after a hearing at which it heard the sixth applicant and his lawyer and having examined, at the request of the defence, an additional witness, the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment. It recounted the evidence in the file and concluded that the evidence, notably the applicant’s own explanations in court, fully supported the finding of the applicant’s guilt. Contrary to the applicant’s arguments, there was no indication of illegality in the police order to leave the site, in particular because the applicant had not submitted any evidence of any challenge having been lodged concerning the police actions or the Executive Committee’s decision of 19 May 2010 authorising the tree felling. Concerning the sentence, the Court of Appeal was in no positon to reduce it, since neither the applicant nor his lawyer had asked the court to modify the District Court’s judgment in that respect, in the light of any particular circumstances of the case or of the applicant’s personal characteristics, but had rather insisted only on the applicant’s innocence. 69. On 2 June 2010 the ninth applicant informed the chief of the city police that, in protest against the destruction of trees in Gorky Park, the Kharkiv regional council would be picketed daily from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., and until further notice, by the Zelenyi Front association (объединение Зеленый фронт), which the ninth applicant represented. 70. On 14 June 2010 the Regional Environmental Protection Inspectorate informed the Municipal Construction Department that it had failed to obtain an environmental impact assessment for the road construction project from the Inspectorate. 71. On 17 June 2010 the Executive Committee ordered that 1,006 trees be planted in city parks to compensate for the trees felled in Gorky Park. 72. On 2 July 2010 the Regional Environmental Protection Department issued a positive environmental impact assessment (висновок державної екологічної експертизи) of the road construction project. 73. On various dates the protesters, including some of the applicants, complained to the law-enforcement authorities that they had been assaulted by unidentified loggers and men in black clothing with MG badges, and that the police officers stationed nearby had done nothing to protect them. Those complaints were investigated by the city prosecutor’s office. 74. On or around 3 June 2010 two television companies sent to the prosecutor’s office, at its request, their video recordings of the events in the park. 75. On 3 June 2010 the assistant prosecutor of Kharkiv questioned Mr Kl., director of MG, and the heads of four departments of that company about the presence and acts of the guards in the area. They stated, in particular, that there had been nobody from the company present in the area except them. They also stated that there had been a lot of men in black with MG badges, who, nevertheless, were not in fact the company’s employees. On 28 May 2010, after having being rebuked by Mr Kl., those individuals had taken the badges off. 76. On 3 June 2010 the chief of the Kharkiv police sent to the city prosecutor a report summarising the law-enforcement measures taken in the course of the protests. The report stated, in particular, that Sh. and K., the heads of the NGOs Pechenigy and My Kharkivyany (see paragraph 31 above), had taken part in the protests. The police chief reported that the police had invited the protesters to submit an official notification of their protest action, as required by Article 39 of the Constitution, but they had responded that they were not organising any assembly or action but were rather present in the park as ordinary citizens. Police officers had been deployed in full force, as envisaged by the law-enforcement plan (see paragraph 24 above), that is twenty-seven officers on site daily from 20 May to 2 June 2010, except for 23, 29 and 30 May 2010 when two officers had been deployed. The construction site had been marked off with tape on 28 May 2010. The “picketing” of the construction site had been discontinued at 9.45 a.m. on 2 June. 77. The prosecutor’s office questioned a number of police officers and employees of subcontractor companies, and journalists. It also examined video evidence of the events provided by the protesters and solicited information from the local hospital concerning reports of injuries sustained in the course of the events in the park. 78. On 17 and 18 June the prosecutor’s office questioned twenty PS employees (see paragraph 25 above). The latter stated that they had not assaulted the protesters, had not deployed any special gear but had indeed pushed the protesters away from the construction site. 79. On 24 June 2010 the Kharkiv city prosecutor’s office decided not to institute any criminal proceedings. 80. On 4 August 2010 the Kharkiv regional prosecutor’s office overruled the decision of 24 June 2010 and ordered a further inquiry. 81. Following an additional round of pre-investigation enquiries, on 9 August 2010 the prosecutor’s office decided not to institute criminal proceedings against loggers A. and K., managers of the Main Contractor and subcontractor companies, MG, the City Council or its executive authorities, including the Municipal Construction Department, for lack of constituent elements of a crime in their actions. The decision stated that it was the result of an investigation conducted in response to a large number of complaints in connection with the Gorky Park events, including from several members of parliament, a member of the regional council, the Pechenigy NGO (see paragraph 76 above), a number of journalists and a number of protesters, including the applicants’ then representative, Mr Bushchenko (see paragraph 2 above), and the seventh and ninth applicants. It also referred to the rulings of the District Court of 26 May and 14 July 2010 in a case brought by a certain Ms Y. against the Executive Committee concerning the construction project as being at the origin of the investigation. 82. The decision stated that in the course of the investigation more than a hundred people, including protesters, police officers, employees of the Main Contractor and subcontractors, and MG staff had been questioned. The prosecutor’s office had also examined photographs and video recordings of the events, including those provided by news outlets, complainants and NGOs. 83. As to the events of 28 May 2010, the prosecutor’s office described the facts as follows. At around 7 a.m. the Main Contractor’s staff had marked the boundaries of the construction site with tape and MG staff had taken up the duties of guarding it. The MG staff had then asked any individuals who were at the time within the perimeter to leave the area in order to avoid the risk of trauma from the construction equipment. When they refused, the Main Contractor’s management had appealed to the police for help in removing those individuals from the construction site. Some protesters had then been arrested as they had refused to leave. 84. PS staff had provided guard services on the construction site from 28 May to 2 June 2010. When questioned, the private security guards had stated that they had avoided any conflict with the protesters and had not assaulted them, despite provocative behaviour on the part of the latter. 85. The prosecutor’s office concluded that no criminal-law provision had been breached in the course of issuance of approvals for the project, tree removal, the construction work or interactions with the protesters. Loggers A. and K. had not committed any offence for the reasons set out in the Government’s version of the events of 2 June 2010 (see paragraph 41 above). 86. According to the applicants, notwithstanding their persistent efforts and requests submitted on 17 February, 5 July, 9 August and 12 September 2011, they had been unable to obtain a copy of the decision of 9 August 2010. They submitted a copy of the letter from the city prosecutor’s office of 19 August 2011, which stated that in response to Mr Bushchenko’s request of 5 July 2011 a copy of the decision of 9 August 2010 had been sent to him on 26 July 2011. On 4 October 2011 Mr Bushchenko wrote to the prosecutor’s office again, stating that in fact a copy of the decision had not been enclosed with the authorities’ previous letters. On 10 October 2011 the city prosecutor’s office sent Mr Bushchenko another copy. The applicants allege that he finally received that copy, for the first time, on 19 October 2011. On 25 October 2011 the applicants appealed against the decision of 9 August 2010. According to them, on 25 November 2011 the Kharkiv Kyivsky District Court dismissed their appeal. On 2 April 2012 the applicants appealed against that decision. They have not informed the Court of any further developments. 87. On 13 August 2010 the police refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the seventh applicant’s complaint of ill‑treatment. On 20 March 2012 the Kharkiv Dzerzhinsky District Court quashed that decision on the grounds that the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning pre-investigation enquiries (see paragraph 101 below) had not been complied with and the applicant’s allegations had not been verified. The applicants submitted a copy of a letter from their lawyer to the district police dated 3 October 2014, stating that after the court’s decision of 20 March 2012, the seventh applicant had not been informed about any further progress in the proceedings. 88. According to the Government, the prosecutor’s office investigated possible official involvement in the alleged attacks on the seventh and ninth applicants and, having found no such involvement, forwarded the material to the police to investigate the possibility that bodily injuries may have been inflicted by private parties. On 20 August 2010 the police decided not to institute criminal proceedings in that respect either. In their response of 15 November 2011 to the Government’s observations, the applicants alleged that they had learned about the decision of 20 August 2010 only from those observations and had never been provided with a copy. They submitted copies of letters addressed to the city prosecutor’s office and to the city and district police chiefs in which they had asked to be provided with a copy of the decision of 20 August 2010 and enclosed postal receipts showing that those letters had been delivered on 9 and 10 November 2010. In their comments of 1 March 2012 concerning the applicants’ observations of 15 November 2011, the Government commented on a number of factual matters raised by the applicants (notably the public consultation concerning the project, see paragraph 200 below) but not on the applicants’ alleged inability to obtain a copy of the decision of 20 August 2010. 89. On 31 July 2014, in response to the Court’s request for further observations (see paragraph 5 above), the Government informed the Court that material concerning enquiries into the seventh and the ninth’s applicants’ allegations of ill-treatment had been destroyed due to the expiry of the time-limit for their preservation. They provided a statement documenting the destruction dated 9 September 2013. 90. In November 2010 a number of protesters, including all the applicants, lodged an action with the Kharkiv Circuit Administrative Court, complaining that the police had failed to protect them against assaults during their peaceful protest against the tree felling, in particular on 28 and 31 May and 1 and 2 June 2010. According to the Government, in the course of the trial in this case the seventh applicant was examined by a representative of the police. She stated that she could not say with certitude who had hit her on 31 May 2010 and only supposed that it had been a person in black. 91. On 24 May 2011 the first-instance court rejected the applicants’ claim. On 9 December 2011 the Kharkiv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld that decision. On 26 June 2014 the High Administrative Court allowed an appeal lodged by the applicants and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination on the grounds that the lower courts’ examination of the facts had been incomplete. They had failed, in particular, to establish whether attacks on the protesters had really taken place, the list of the officers present, and whether the protesters had appealed for help. 92. As of the date of the last communication from the applicants on this point, 8 October 2014, the claim was pending before the first-instance court.

5. The applicants were born in 1969, 1977 and 1980, respectively, and are currently absconding from the Moldovan authorities. 6. At the time of the events, the applicants were police officers. According to the materials of the domestic judgments, the applicants found out that a person from the Transdniestrian region of Moldova, P., intended to come to Chișinău on 8 December 2010, carrying a large amount of cash money, in order to conclude a transaction concerning immovable property. On 8 December 2010, the applicants attempted to apprehend P. in the staircase of an apartment block building. P. managed to escape, however he was chased and apprehended by the applicants, was thrown to the ground and severely beaten up until he lost consciousness. After that, he was carried by the applicants and put into a car. Several persons witnessed P.’s apprehension and beating. P. was never seen alive after that and several years later his body was found in a well. 7. The applicants claimed that they believed P. to be a criminal and intended to take him to the police station for questioning. After chasing him, they arrested him and drove him to the police station. However, P. managed to escape from their car at a busy road crossing and ran away after having waded across a small river. They submitted that they did not chase him again because the traffic light turned green and because they did not want to soil their cloths chasing P. across the river. 8. On 7 February 2011 the applicants were arrested and charged with kidnapping, murder and abuse of their authority as police officers. 9. The same day the public prosecutor applied to the Centru District Court for a warrant for the applicants’ detention in custody. The reasons relied upon by the public prosecutor were that the applicants could abscond from prosecution, interfere with the criminal investigation and re-offend. The applicants’ representative sought access to the materials submitted by the public prosecutor in support of his requests but to no avail. 10. The same day the Centru District Court issued a detention order for thirty days. In court the applicants argued that the allegations presented by the public prosecutor were not supported by any facts or materials and that no materials whatsoever were presented by the prosecution. The court found that in view of the gravity of the accusations against the applicants, of the fact that the investigation was at its initial stage and of the applicants’ position in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there was a serious risk of absconding and of interfering with the investigation by influencing witnesses, misleading the investigation and increasing the volume of work. 11. On 9 February 2011 the applicants appealed and argued, inter alia, that the orders for detention lacked reasoning and that the court had relied only on suppositions. The applicants further noted that the court had refused to provide their representative with any materials from the file other than the prosecutor’s requests. 12. On 17 February 2011 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ appeals. The court found that the materials in the file provided sufficient grounds for a reasonable suspicion that the applicants had committed the crimes they were charged with. The risk of interference with the investigation was determined by the fact that the investigation had just started and the risk of absconding resulted from the fact that the applicants were police officers and thus knew how the investigating authorities operated. The Court of Appeal did not answer the applicants’ complaint about the alleged lack of access to the materials in the case-file, relied upon by the first instance court to order their detention. 13. On 5 March 2011 the Centru District Court extended the applicants’ detention by thirty days for the same reasons as it had done earlier. The court noted that on this occasion the applicants’ representative had been given access to the materials in the file. 14. The applicants appealed and argued, inter alia, that the investigation was not advancing as claimed by the public prosecutor and that the risk of interference could just as well be mitigated by the applicants’ house arrest. On 14 March 2011 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Centru District Court of 5 March 2011 for the same reasons as it had done earlier. 15. On 16 March 2011 the charges of murder were dropped in respect of all applicants because the victim’s body was not yet found. On 29 March 2011 the case was committed for trial. 16. On 29 March 2011 the prosecutor applied for the extension of the applicants’ detention by ninety days. The prosecutor cited the same reasons as before: risk of absconding, of interfering with the investigation and of re‑offending. 17. On 7 April 2011 the applicants lodged a habeas corpus request, arguing that the risk of interfering with the investigation was no longer valid because the criminal investigation had been concluded and that there had not been any evidence indicating that the applicants might abscond. 18. The same day, judge V. of the Rîșcani District Court extended the applicants’ detention by ninety days considering that the three risks invoked by the public prosecutor resulted from the character of the charges against the applicants. 19. The applicants appealed and argued, inter alia, that the court had failed to refer to any evidence in support of the alleged risks justifying their detention. 20. On 20 April 2011 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Rîșcani District Court of 7 April 2011. The court relied on the fact that the applicants were police officers and considered that they could influence the witnesses or destroy evidence. The court also cited the risk of absconding. 21. On 10 May 2011 the applicants lodged a habeas corpus request, arguing that there were no grounds to assume that the applicants would abscond, re-offend or interfere with the trial. 22. On 25 May 2011 judge V. had withdrawn from the case because he had previously worked together with the third applicant. It is not clear from the materials of the case-file in which manner that fact affected judge V.’s impartiality and when did he realise that. 23. On 6 June 2011 the applicants lodged another habeas corpus request, noting that their previous request had still not been examined. They argued that, on 25 May 2011, judge V. had withdrawn from the case, whereas his ineligibility had existed on 7 April 2011, when he had ordered the extension of their detention and thus affected the lawfulness of that order. 24. On 5 July 2011 judge M. from the Rîșcani District Court extended the applicants’ detention by ninety days for the same reasons as had been done earlier. The court rejected the applicants’ habeas corpus request of 6 June 2011 by noting that none of the previous grounds for detention had lost their validity because the trial had not yet started. The court did not make any reference to the habeas corpus request of 10 May 2011. 25. On 6 July 2011 the applicants appealed and argued, inter alia, that the court had not examined their habeas corpus requests “speedily” as required under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention and had not replied to their contention that the detention order of 7 April 2011 had been unlawful because it had been ordered by judge V. who lacked impartiality. 26. On 15 July 2011 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Rîșcani District Court of 5 July 2011 for the same reasons as it had done before. 27. On 30 September 2011 the Rîșcani District Court acquitted the applicants of all charges and released them in the court room. 28. On 11 March 2013 the Chișinău Court of Appeal quashed that judgment, convicted the applicants of kidnapping and abuse of office and sentenced them to seven years of imprisonment. On 12 November 2013 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld that judgment in absentia. 29. It appears that on an unspecified date after the victim’s body was found, a new set of criminal proceedings based on murder charges was initiated against the applicants. The parties did not inform the Court about the outcome of those proceedings.

5. The applicants are eight Russian nationals whose particulars are listed in the appendix. 6. The applicants were living together at 35, Yuzhnaya Street, Nasyr‑Kort, Nazran, Ingushetia, Russia. They are related (three adult siblings: two brothers and a sister; and the wife and three minor children of one brother). 7. The three applicants-siblings have another brother, Mr Ali T., known as “Magas”. Since the 1990s Mr Ali T. has been suspected of participating in, and then leading, illegal armed groups operating in Ingushetia and masterminding a number of crimes and terrorist attacks. In July 2001 he was pronounced dead by the Nazran District Court; however, that information was later refuted and attributed to his use of false identity documents. On 26 November 2004 the Nazran District Court revoked the pronouncement in view of new information. 8. Mr Ali T. was arrested in Ingushetia in June 2010. The criminal investigation into his activities continued until December 2012. In February 2014 the Russian Supreme Court, in a final judgment, found him guilty of a number of terrorism-related crimes, entailing dozens of victims among civilians and security personnel. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. 9. The applicants submitted that they had had no direct contact with Mr Ali T. since 1998. The Government explained, in additional observations of 18 April 2012, that there were a number of pieces of evidence indicating that between 2004 and June 2010 Mr Ali T. had been in regular contact with his relatives in Nasyr-Kort. That evidence included witness statements collected by the criminal investigation between the end of 2010 and early 2011, including those of Mr Ali T. himself, his wife and other persons. According to the evidence, his wife had resided at the said address since 2004, a fact which the relatives must have been aware of. No copies of the documents in question have been provided by the Government. 10. The Government provided a copy of a certificate issued by the Nasyr-Kort administration on 6 July 2010 to the effect that Mr Ali T. had at the material time been registered as resident at 35, Yuzhnaya Street, Nasyr‑Kort, together with the applicants and other members of the extended family. The document did not list the third applicant among the residents at that address. The Government explained that in March 2011 the third applicant’s place of residence was recorded as 4, Zapadnaya Street, Nasyr-Kort. 11. On 18 July 2013 the Court rendered a judgment in case no. 50757/06, Taziyeva and Others v. Russia. It was lodged by nine applicants, including two of the applicants in the present case, Mr Askhab Taziyev (the fourth applicant in the present case) and Ms Zareta Taziyeva (the third applicant). The Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the fact that a search had been carried out without a warrant at the applicants’ house in Nasyr-Kort. The search had been carried out in December 2005 as part of a counter-terrorist operation aimed at apprehending Mr Ali T., and the authorities had relied on the Suppression of Terrorism Act as the only legal basis. In respect of the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court found that the applicants had failed to substantiate their complaint in this respect and dismissed it as manifestly ill-founded. 12. On 21 February 2011 a senior investigator requested authorisation to search the house at 35, Yuzhnaya Street, Nasyr‑Kort. He substantiated his request by reference to the ongoing investigation in case no. 171822 against the leaders and members of “Imarat Kavkaz” (declared a terrorist organisation by the Supreme Court in February 2008), and the possibility that documents and items relevant for the investigation, including weapons, ammunition and explosives, might be stored there. 13. On 22 February 2011 the Lefortovskiy District Court of Moscow granted the request, pursuant to Articles 165 and 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCrP”). The reasoning and operative part of the decision read as follows: “It follows from the documents submitted [number and dates] that ... [T.] Ali M., who stands accused of committing crimes under Articles 208 § 1, 279, and 222 § 3 of the Criminal Code [leadership of an armed gang, organisation of an armed revolt and unlawful handling of arms and ammunition], is one of the leaders of illegal armed group “Imarat Kavkaz” ... At his address of registration there may be objects and documents relevant for the ongoing investigation (including firearms, ammunition, explosives and explosive devices), as well as other objects and substances which are banned from free circulation ... The investigation of this criminal case is particularly complex. It is an exceptional case because it involves criminal activity of a large number of accused who have not yet been arrested, it continues to be carried out in conditions of strict secrecy on the territory of several regions of the Russian Federation and foreign states, and it relates to involvement in criminal activity organised by Umarov D.H. It involves a large number of people. Therefore, there are sufficient grounds to believe that at the address where A.M.[T.] is registered there may be objects and documents relevant for the ongoing investigation. ... The court, having examined the submitted documents and heard the opinions of the senior prosecutor and the senior investigator, authorises the search of the registered address of A.M.[T.], being satisfied that for the purposes of the investigation there is enough information to believe that there may be objects and documents relevant to the ongoing investigation (including firearms, ammunition, explosives and explosive devices), as well as other objects and substances which are banned from free circulation on the territory of the Russian Federation. ... DECIDES: To grant the request of the senior special-case investigator [name] to carry out the search on the premises in relation to case no. 171872 and to allow the search at the place of registration of [T.] Ali M at [the address]. The decision may be appealed against to the Moscow City Court within ten days.” 14. On 3 March 2011 servicemen arrived at Nasyr-Kort and surrounded the area around the applicants’ home. They used an armoured personnel carrier, several minibuses and a car. They entered the courtyard and searched the house and surrounding premises. 15. At 2 p.m. on 3 March 2011 the third applicant signed the search warrant. 16. The second and third applicants were ordered into a minibus, where they were questioned about their brother, Mr Ali T. Other applicants, their neighbours and vehicles were moved a safe distance from the house. Soon afterwards, there was an explosion. 17. The applicants’ home consisted of two dwellings: a newly finished house with a basement and garage, which was destroyed by the explosion, along with two cars parked in the courtyard; and a second house, which was damaged and rendered unfit for habitation. There were also two “technical” buildings – a garage and an old house used for storage; the latter remained intact but the applicants alleged that all valuables had gone. 18. At 3.35 p.m. a senior investigator from the Federal Security Service of Russia (“the FSB”) drew up a search report. It stated that during the search, in the basement of the dwelling situated to the right of the entrance, an improvised explosive device (“IED”) had been discovered consisting of a 125 mm artillery shell and a detonator wrapped in black cellophane tape, connected with wires. For security reasons, all persons present at the site and neighbours had been taken a safe distance from the house. The explosives experts had attempted to deactivate the device using a hydro detonator (water cannon). The deactivation had failed and the IED had exploded, causing destruction of the dwelling. Several identity documents and photographs had been collected among the debris. The report was signed by two attesting witnesses, and each page contained an indication that the third applicant had refused to sign it. 19. Later on 3 March 2011, the site and the debris were inspected by an investigator from the Nazran Interior Department and a report was drawn up. The report ran to six pages and was complete with a plan of the premises; photographs were also taken. The report stated that both dwellings located in the courtyard had been damaged: the window panes and doors were broken, the roofs and the walls were damaged. The third building, a technical shed, had been completely destroyed. Two cars located in the courtyard had also been destroyed and covered with broken bricks. The investigators had collected swabs from the site. The report was co-signed by the investigator, an explosives expert and two attesting witnesses. 20. The following day the local police reported the explosion at the applicants’ house to the media. The press release stated that FSB servicemen had located two IEDs in the basement and had called in experts. The experts had been unable to deactivate the devices and had had to destroy them with controlled blasts; as a result, the dwellings had been damaged but there were no casualties. 21. The applicants submitted that the search of 3 March 2011 had been conducted without any authorising documents or attesting witnesses, and that they had been subjected to threats and intimidation by the servicemen. 22. After the search, the superior officer had said on the radio that no explosives had been found in the yard. The second and third applicants had been ordered to proceed to one of the minibuses parked about 300 metres from the house and interrogated. They had been intimidated and forced to admit that they had been in contact with their brother and had received money from him. They had also been forced to sign several documents. 23. During the interrogation of the second and third applicants, the armed men had ordered the inhabitants of the neighbouring houses to move as far away as possible because the servicemen had been planning to blow up the house. The military vehicles had also been moved to a safe distance. Later, the applicants had witnessed an explosion. When they had returned to the house, they had seen only debris and realised that all their belongings had been destroyed (washing machine, gold items, tea sets and so on). In addition, two cars that had been parked in the courtyard had been damaged and their radios had been missing. The applicants submitted a video clip showing the state of their house and the courtyard after the explosion. 24. According to the Government, prior to the search, the third applicant had been presented with a warrant, as attested by her signature. The search had been conducted in the presence of an investigator, two attesting witnesses and the second and third applicants. The security forces had discovered improvised explosive devices in the basement of the applicants’ house and had therefore moved the applicants, as well as their neighbours, to a safe distance. A bomb-disposal expert had used a water cannon, but had failed to deactivate the device and it had exploded, causing the detonation of other explosives, which had not been found during the search. Those explosions had destroyed the dwellings. The second IED had not been recorded in the search record because the security forces had found only one explosive device; they had presumed that the first explosion had detonated the second device. 25. On 3 March 2011 the third applicant was questioned by an investigator from Nazran police station, and a report was drawn up. She stated that earlier that day armed people had come to their house in several cars and an armed personnel carrier (“APC”). She and her relatives had been escorted to a vehicle, where she had been questioned. Later she had been shown a site inspection report and had been asked to sign it. She had noted something about an explosion. She had been stressed and under pressure to sign the papers. After the armed persons had left, the applicant and her family had discovered that their residence had been destroyed, the buildings having been blown up. She categorically denied that any IEDs had been stored in the house and suggested that the explosions had been set up by the servicemen. 26. The second applicant and three neighbours were also questioned by the Nazran police on 3 March 2011. The second applicant stated that the persons who had carried out the search had asked him to show them around. Together with him, they had first entered the house to the left of the entrance to the courtyard, then the two technical buildings, and finally the dwelling that was located to the right. Once the examination of the dwellings had been completed, the second and third applicants and Mr K., a neighbour who had been at their place, had been escorted to a minibus parked nearby. One of the officers had reported to someone over the radio that “everything was ok”. Inside the vehicle, the two applicants had been questioned about their brother, Ali T., who at the time had been under arrest. Then the second applicant had heard over the radio that an explosive device had been found in the basement and an explosives expert had been called in. In the afternoon he had seen that everyone had left the premises and an explosion had followed; about ten minutes later another explosion had occurred. Both dwellings had been destroyed. After the military had left, the applicants had returned to their home and found the two dwellings destroyed, while the “technical” building had been looted – many of their belongings had gone. The applicant suggested that the explosions had been set up by the military. 27. The applicants’ neighbours confirmed that the armed men who had carried out the search at the applicants’ house had asked them to leave their houses sometime after 2 p.m. The men had explained that a bomb had been found and there was a risk of explosion. The neighbours had complied; two explosions had occurred within about ten minutes. Later in the day the servicemen had left and the neighbours had been allowed to return to their houses. 28. On 4 March 2011 the third applicant lodged several complaints with different authorities, including the State prosecutor’s office and the head of the Nazran Interior Department. She complained of the unlawful search, of intimidation during the interrogation, and the theft and destruction of their property. Throughout the following month, she sent several letters to the authorities. 29. On 12 March 2012 Mr K., the applicants’ neighbour, issued an affidavit. He explained that on 3 March 2011 he had been at the applicants’ home. At about 11 a.m. a large group of armed people and an APC had arrived at the place and a search had been conducted. The witness had not seen any documents or attesting witnesses. He had been taken to a minibus parked nearby, but when the officers had found out that he was not a member of the family, he had been asked to leave. Several hours later all the neighbours had been evacuated from their houses and then two explosions had followed, within a space of ten minutes. 30. All the complaints were forwarded to and dealt with by the military investigation division, military unit no. 68799, located in the Republic of Ingushetia. 31. On 8 April 2011 a military investigator refused to open a criminal investigation. The third applicant was informed of that decision by letters of 8 and 18 April, and 5 May 2011, indicating a possibility to appeal. 32. The decision of 8 April 2011 was revoked by a military investigator’s decision on 27 October 2011. The third applicant was informed by a letter dated 27 October 2011 that the investigation had resumed. On 14 November 2011 the third applicant was informed that the investigation had been stayed on 2 November, indicating a possibility to appeal. (b) The decision of 22 November 2011 33. On 22 November 2011 the military investigator refused to open an investigation into crimes committed under Articles 286 (exceeding official powers) and 158 (theft) of the Criminal Code. A five-page summary of the decision, forwarded to the third applicant on the same day, indicated that the following procedural measures had been taken: on 14 November 2011 a military investigator had questioned the bomb-disposal expert and the FSB investigator who had conducted the search of the premises. On 16 and 18 November 2011 he had questioned four other FSB officers who had taken part in the search, and on 17 November 2011 he had questioned two attesting witnesses. The third applicant had also been questioned. 34. The investigator noted that the third applicant had been presented with the search warrant prior to the search, and had counter-signed it. No pressure had been put on her or any other members of her family. At the beginning of the search, in the cellar of one of the buildings, the officers had discovered an IED made out of a 125 mm artillery shell. The third applicant had denied having any information about the IED. All those present had been taken to a safe distance and the bomb-disposal expert had tried to dismantle it; he had been unsuccessful and the device had exploded. It had caused the detonation of a second device, of which the officers had been unaware. Only one IED had been found and recorded in the site inspection report. 35. The bomb-disposal expert stated that he had taken part in the search and found an IED made out of a 125 mm artillery shell and a detonating device, wrapped up in black cellophane and connected to the IED with wire. The persons present had been evacuated, following which the IED had been detonated with the help of a hydro detonator. That had resulted in an explosion, the destruction of the building and a fire. About two minutes later another undiscovered IED had detonated, probably because of the fire. 36. The FSB officers confirmed their presence at the site on the day in question, the fact they had been informed about the discovery of the IED and the need to evacuate everyone to a safe distance. 37. Finally, the investigator referred to the search report and the site inspection report drawn up on the day in question. 38. The decision concluded as follows: “Drawing on the above, the [third applicant’s] allegations about the unlawful search, use of violence, explosions, damage, destruction and theft of property have not been confirmed by the results of the inquiry. It has been established that the search at the third applicant’s house was carried out by investigator F. on the basis of the decision of 22 February 2011 issued by the Lefortovskiy District Court of Moscow ... on lawful grounds, with attesting witnesses, and without any breaches of the law. During the search the investigator and the explosives expert did not issue any threats, use violence, force [people] to give statements, or otherwise cause any harm to the third applicant. Contrary to the applicant’s assertions, the circumstances did not reveal any fault in the actions of the investigator and the explosives expert. They acted lawfully, with the aim of eliminating danger to the life and health of all those present during the search and the residents of the nearby houses. ... Noting well-established facts pointing at the commission by Mr Ali [T.] (“Magas”) of a number of terrorist acts with the use of explosive devices, the investigator took a well-grounded decision to carry out the search with the participation of an explosives expert, who had been instructed to examine the dwellings in order to find potential explosive devices and deactivate them, in order to ensure the safety of all those present. The search report of 3 March 2011 indicated that the explosives expert had found an IED in the cellar of one of the dwellings. Having carefully examined the situation, and taking into account that the IED could have detonated at any moment, the investigator took a grounded decision to evacuate everyone to a safe distance. Under such circumstances, there was no time or possibility to take personal belongings out of the house. Once the evacuation was completed, the explosives expert attempted to deactivate the IED by special means. The attempt led to the IED’s detonation; the ensuing explosions destroyed the dwellings. No one was hurt, due to the security measures taken. ... Under such circumstances, the consequences of the detonation of the explosive device that had occurred while it was being deactivated, and the destruction of the dwellings and other possible damage to property, do not attest to unlawful actions on the part of the law-enforcement personnel, contrary to the applicant’s assertion. The applicant’s allegations have not been confirmed. ...the applicant’s request to open a criminal investigation for abuse of official functions by the investigator and the explosives experts should be dismissed.” 39. The decision of 22 November 2011 was communicated to the third applicant on the same day. The applicants never appealed against it. 40. On 12 March 2012 the third applicant asked military investigation unit no. 68799 to send her copies of the decisions of the military investigator of 8 April, 27 October, 2 November and 11 November 2011. On 21 March 2012 the military investigator again forwarded the copies of the requested decisions to the third applicant. It does not appear that the applicants maintained any further contact with the investigation. 41. In the meantime, on 20 June 2011 the third applicant lodged a court action under Article 125 of the CCrP with the Magas District Court. She complained of a lack of investigation into her complaints of 4 March 2011 and that no decision had yet been made on that matter. She requested the court to assess the authorities’ failure to investigate the incident. 42. On 27 June 2011 the Magas District Court held a hearing. A representative of the State prosecutor’s office informed the court and the third applicant that her complaints had been forwarded to the military investigation division and that an investigation was still ongoing. The District Court dismissed the action in view of the ongoing investigation. The applicants did not appeal against that decision. 43. In their additional observations of 18 April 2012 the Government explained, without providing copies of the relevant documents, that the criminal investigation against Mr Ali T. and other leaders of the terrorist organisation (file no. 171822) included the incident concerning storage of IEDs at the applicants’ address. At the time of submission of the observations, the criminal investigation was still ongoing, and the documents and witness statements collected within it could not be disclosed, in the interests of justice.

6. At the time of the events the applicants were all working as cashiers for M.S.A., a Spanish family-owned supermarket chain. 7. At the beginning of February 2009 the applicants’ employer noticed some irregularities between the supermarket stock levels and what was actually sold on a daily basis. In particular, the shop supervisor identified losses in excess of EUR 7,780 in February, EUR 17,971 in March, EUR 13,936 in April, EUR 18,009 in May and EUR 24,614 in June 2009. 8. In order to investigate and put an end to the economic losses, on 15 June 2009 the employer installed surveillance cameras consisting of both visible and hidden cameras. The purpose of the visible cameras was to record possible customer thefts and they were pointed toward the entrances and exits of the supermarket. The purpose of the hidden cameras was to record and control possible employee thefts and they were zoomed in on the checkout counters, which covered the area behind the cash desk. The company gave its workers prior notice of the installation of the visible cameras. Neither they nor the company’s staff committee were informed of the hidden cameras. 9. On 25 and 29 June 2009 all the workers suspected of theft were called to individual meetings. During those meetings the applicants admitted their involvement in the thefts in the presence of the union representative and the company’s legal representative. 10. Hereafter and for the sake of clarity, the applicants will be referred to as the first, second, third, fourth and fifth applicants (see the attached Annex). 11. On 25 and 29 June 2009 the applicants were dismissed on disciplinary grounds: they had been caught on video helping co-workers and customers steal items and stealing them themselves. According to their letters of dismissal, the security cameras had caught them scanning items from the grocery baskets of customers and co-workers and afterwards cancelling the purchases. Security cameras had also caught them allowing customers and co-workers to leave the store with merchandise that had not been paid for. 12. On 22 July 2009 the first applicant brought proceedings for unfair dismissal before the Granollers Employment Tribunal no.1 (hereinafter “the Employment Tribunal”). The same day the second applicant brought similar proceedings before the Employment Tribunal in a joint application with the third, fourth and fifth applicants (see paragraph 20 below). 13. In the framework of the proceedings both applicants objected to the use of the covert video surveillance, arguing that it had breached their right to protection of their privacy. 14. On 20 January 2010 the Employment Tribunal issued two judgments ruling against the applicants, declaring both dismissals fair. The main evidence supporting the fairness of their dismissals was the recordings resulting from the covert surveillance, as well as the witness statements of co-workers dismissed for their involvement in the thefts, the shop manager, the union representative and the company’s legal representative. 15. The Employment Tribunal found in both judgments – as regards these two applicants in particular – that the use of covert video surveillance in the workplace without prior notice had been in accordance with Article 20 of the Labour Regulations (Estatuto de los Trabajadores), which allowed an employer to use monitoring and surveillance measures which he or she deemed appropriate to verify that an employee was fulfilling his or her employment duties, as long as the employer respected “human dignity”. This had been confirmed by the Constitutional Court in several judgments (see, among other authorities, judgment no. 186/2000 of 10 July 2000). According to the Constitutional Court’s case-law, an employer’s right to adopt organisational arrangements and act as a disciplinary authority had to be weighed against an employee’s fundamental right to privacy recognised under Article 18 of the Constitution. In cases where there were substantiated suspicions of theft, special circumstances justified interference with an employee’s right to privacy, which was considered to be appropriate to the legitimate aim pursued, necessary and proportionate. Following this case-law, the Employment Tribunal, having regard to the evidence before it, found that the employer had had sufficient grounds to conclude that the applicants’ conduct amounted to a “breach of contractual good faith and abuse of trust” and thus declared both dismissals fair in conformity with Article 54.2.d of the Labour Regulations. 16. The applicants appealed before the High Court of Justice of Catalonia on 16 and 22 March 2010 respectively. On 28 January and 24 February 2011 the court upheld both first-instance judgments, referring to the Constitutional Court’s case-law and endorsing the Employment Tribunal’s finding that the defendant party had been authorised to carry out the covert video surveillance of the cash desks. While acknowledging that it was possible that the employer could face an administrative sanction for not informing its employees and the staff committee in advance of the installation of the cameras, that fact alone had no relevance from a constitutional point of view, since from that perspective the covert video surveillance had been justified (in that there had been reasonable suspicions of theft), appropriate to the legitimate aim pursued, necessary and proportionate. Consequently, their dismissals had been justified on the same grounds as already stated by the Employment Tribunal. 17. The applicants brought cassation appeals, which were declared inadmissible on 5 October 2011 and 7 February 2012 respectively. Ultimately the applicants lodged amparo appeals with the Constitutional Court, which were declared inadmissible on 27 June and 18 July 2012 respectively, due to the “non-existence of a violation of a fundamental right”. 18. On 25 and 29 June 2006 the applicants were dismissed on disciplinary grounds: they had been caught on video helping co-workers and customers steal items and stealing them themselves. According to the employer, the security cameras had caught the third applicant scanning items from the grocery baskets of customers and co-workers and afterwards voiding the receipts. Security cameras had also caught her allowing customers or co-workers to leave the store with merchandise that had not been paid for. As regards the fourth and fifth applicants, security cameras had caught them stealing goods with the help of their co-workers, such as the second applicant. 19. On the days that they were dismissed all three applicants signed a document called a “settlement agreement” (acuerdo transaccional), by which they committed themselves not to bring proceedings against their employer for unfair dismissal, while the employer committed itself not to bring criminal charges against them for theft. In the meetings at least one union representative and the company’s legal representative were also present. 20. Despite the settlement agreements, on 22 July 2009 the applicants, together with the second applicant (see paragraph 12 above), brought proceedings for unfair dismissal before the Employment Tribunal. According to the applicants, the settlement agreements had to be declared void. They claimed that the consent they had given was not valid, since they had been under duress at the time they had signed the settlement agreements (a company representative had allegedly threatened to bring criminal proceedings against them if they did not sign the agreements). They also argued that the evidence derived from the covert video surveillance had been obtained illegally. 21. On 20 January 2010 the Employment Tribunal ruled against the applicants and declared the dismissals fair. It carefully analysed the settlement agreements signed by the applicants. In particular, it addressed their allegation of invalid consent, finding that there was no evidence proving the existence of any kind of duress or intention to commit a crime (dolo) at the time the applicants had signed the settlement agreements. The court concluded that the applicants had signed the settlement agreements freely and voluntarily with the clear purpose of avoiding criminal proceedings for the alleged thefts they had been accused of (and to which they had already confessed). Further evidence as to the lack of any threat or coercion was the fact that other employees in the same situation as the applicants (such as the first and second applicants) had refused to sign the settlement agreements. Accordingly, the settlement agreements were declared valid under Article 1.809 of the Civil Code and, consequently, the Employment Tribunal ruled against the third, fourth and fifth applicants. As the signing of the settlement agreements rendered their dismissals fair, the use and analysis of the impugned videos as evidence in the proceedings was deemed unnecessary. 22. The applicants appealed before the High Court of Justice of Catalonia on 16 March 2010. On 24 February 2011 it upheld the first-instance judgment and endorsed the Employment Tribunal’s finding that the settlement agreement signed by the applicants was valid. The court also analysed, for the sake of clarity, the legality of the covert video surveillance. Referring to the Constitutional Court’s case-law, it confirmed that the defendant party had been authorised to carry out the covert video surveillance on the applicants. 23. The applicants brought a joint cassation appeal, which was declared inadmissible on 7 February 2012. Ultimately, they lodged a joint amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court, alleging a violation of Articles 18 and 24 of the Constitution. It was declared inadmissible on 18 July 2012 due to the “non-existence of a violation of a fundamental right”.

5. The applicant, Ms Violeta Pulfer, is an Albanian national who was born in 1967 and lives in Tirana. 6. On an unspecified date in 2011 the applicant and her husband moved to Vlora. The applicant agreed to buy a house which had been unlawfully built by S.N. In the meantime, S.N. had lodged an application for the regularisation of the house’s unlawful status. 7. On 19 October 2011 the applicant and S.N. concluded a down‑payment agreement (kontratë kapari) according to which the applicant deposited just under half of the sale price as a down-payment (kapar), the remainder to be paid upon the regularisation of the house’s status and the conclusion of the sale agreement. 8. On 8 December 2011 the applicant moved into the house on the basis of the down-payment agreement. 9. On 12 January 2012 S.N. asked the applicant to vacate the house. The applicant opposed the eviction and reminded S.N. of the obligations arising from the down-payment agreement. It appears that on the same day S.N. also destroyed some of the applicant’s movable property. 10. On 1 February 2012 S.N. lodged a civil action, requesting that the down-payment agreement be declared null and that he be allowed to retake possession of the house. 11. On 3 May 2012 the Vlora District Court dismissed the action and found that the down-payment agreement was valid and lawful. It also found that the request for the repossession of the house was not based on law. As no appeal had been lodged against it, the decision became final on 18 May 2012. 12. It would appear that on 10 July 2012 the status of the house was regularised and, consequently, S.N. obtained the ownership deeds. No subsequent sale agreement seems to have been concluded between S.N. and the applicant. 13. In the morning of 8 September 2012 S.N. forced his way into the house. According to the applicant, he put a rope around her neck and she was dragged to the ground and knocked against the surrounding walls for around ten minutes. 14. On the same day the applicant sent text messages to the chief of police and the district prosecutor, seeking the authorities’ protection against further violence. She submitted screenshots from her mobile telephone of the said text messages to the Registry of the Court as evidence. According to the applicant, the police intervened after one and a half hour. 15. On 9 September 2012 the applicant’s husband saw E.N., S.N.’s wife, removing tools and objects from the house’s garage. On the same day the applicant went to the police station to lodge a criminal complaint against S.N. for theft. 16. It would appear that on 10 September 2012 the applicant went to live in her mother’s home in Tirana. 17. On 30 October 2012, with police assistance, the applicant entered the house and found that it had been emptied. 18. On an unspecified date, in January 2012, the applicant had lodged a criminal complaint against S.N. for the offence of “self-administered justice” (vetëgjyqësia) under Article 277 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”). 19. On 12 January 2012 the prosecutor took statements from S.N. and E.N. about their efforts to evict the applicant from the house. 20. On 14 May 2012 S.N. was charged with the offence of self‑ administered justice under Article 277 of the CC. 21. On 20 June 2012 the prosecutor committed S.N. for trial. The case file was forwarded to the Vlora District Court in order for it to conduct the proceedings. 22. On 12 December 2012 the Vlora District Court decided to discontinue the proceedings on the basis of Article 387 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) as an amnesty had been granted in respect of that offence pursuant to the General Amnesty Act (Law no. 107 of 8 November 2012 on Amnesty). 23. On 8 September 2012 the applicant lodged another criminal complaint against S.N. for the offence of self-administered justice under Article 277 of the CC. On the same day the prosecutor questioned S.N as a person against whom an investigation was opened. 24. On 9 September 2012 the applicant made a statement before the prosecutor complaining about the events of 8 and 9 September 2012 (see paragraphs 13-15 above). She also complained about E.N. On the same day E.N. was questioned in that connection as a person against whom an investigation was opened. 25. Following the alleged assault of 8 September 2012, on 9 September 2012 the prosecutor ordered that the applicant undergo a medical examination. 26. On 10 September 2012 a police officer referred the offence of self‑administered justice against S.N. and E.N. to the prosecutor. 27. On 10 September 2012 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert. The medical report found visible marks on the applicant’s neck resulting from strangulation, and haematomata on the head resulting from impact with a hard object. The above injuries had made the applicant temporarily unfit for work for a period of nine days. 28. It appears from the case file that the applicant’s health started to deteriorate as a result of the assault on 8 September 2012. Afterwards, she sought expert medical advice in Greece. 29. On 14 September 2012 the prosecutor opened criminal investigation no. 1473 against S.N. for alleged infliction of bodily harm (plagosje e lehtë me dashje) and self-administered justice under Articles 89 and 277 of the CC. An investigation was also opened against E.N. for alleged self‑administered justice. 30. On 4 October 2012 the applicant lodged another criminal complaint against S.N. for, inter alia, the offences of threat, breaking and entering, insult, theft, destruction of property and malicious use of telephone calls under Articles 84, 112, 119, 134, 150 and 275 of the CC. 31. On 4 October 2012 the prosecutor opened criminal investigation no. 1588 against S.N. for the offence of malicious use of telephone calls under Article 275 of the CC. 32. On 8 October 2012 the prosecutor decided to join the two investigations, nos. 1473 and 1588. 33. On 12 October 2012 S.N. made a statement before the prosecutor. 34. According to a hospital certificate of 27 November 2012 drawn up in Greece, the applicant underwent a serious anterior cervical discectomy (an operation to remove a herniated or degenerative disc in the neck area of the spine) in Greece. She subsequently had to wear a cervical collar for two months. 35. On 6 December 2012, following the applicant’s lawyer’s statement that her health had deteriorated, and that she had undergone surgery and a magnetic resonance imaging scan of her cervical spine, the prosecutor ordered a new medical examination. The lawyer also submitted a detailed list of the applicant’s belongings which had been inside the house in September 2012. 36. On 17 January 2013 the forensic experts confirmed that strangulation marks and haematomata on the head as a result of the events of 8 September 2012 and a suture (as a result of surgery) had been found on the applicant’s body. The above injuries had rendered her temporarily unfit for work for a period of over nine days. They further stated that on the basis of the documents in the case file, namely the hospital certificate of 27 November 2012, the magnetic resonance images, and the report of a consultation with a particular neuropsychiatrist, the damage found on the magnetic resonance images was unrelated to the events of 8 September 2012; they had been caused as a result of conditions that had existed before the trauma. 37. On 15 February 2013 the prosecutor’s office found that S.N. was suspected of having committed the offences provided for in Articles 89, 275 and 277 of the CC. E.N. was suspected of having committed the offence provided for in Article 277 of the CC. However, it decided to discontinue the investigation, since an amnesty had been granted in respect of the alleged offences pursuant to the General Amnesty Act. The decision also made reference to two forensic examinations of 10 September 2012 and 17 January 2013. The decision, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “... on the basis of the forensic examination of 10 September 2012 it was found that the bodily injuries had rendered her temporarily unfit for work for over nine days. ... [The applicant] alleges that on the day of the accident she suffered serious bodily injuries, as a result of which she had to undergo surgery. On 6 December 2012 she was subjected to a forensic re-examination, which was concluded on 17 January 2013 ..., it was found that the bodily injuries had rendered her temporarily unfit for work for over nine days. The injuries fall to be examined under the offence of bodily harm prescribed in Article 89 of the Criminal Code. ... On the basis of information obtained during the investigation ..., it appears that from 24 to 27 September 2012, S.N. harassed (e ka shqetësuar) Violeta Pulfer by way of telephone calls, and threatened not to allow her to return to the house she had purchased. In these circumstances, it is suspected that S.N. and E.N. have committed the offence laid down in Article 277 of the Criminal Code, whereas S.N. [is] also [suspected of] the offences laid down in Articles 89 and 275 of the Criminal Code .... On 28 November 2012 [the General Amnesty Act] entered into force. Section 5 provides for the discontinuation of the criminal prosecution of all offences committed until 30 September 2012 in respect of which the Criminal Code prescribed a sentence of up to two years’ imprisonment or a lighter punishment. ... The offences set out in Articles 89, 277 and 275 of the Criminal Code, in respect of which investigations have been opened, have a maximum term of imprisonment of two years, and were committed prior to 30 September 2012. Under these circumstances, there are grounds which mean that the investigation (procedimi penal) cannot continue.” 38. The applicant lodged an appeal against the prosecutor’s decision of 15 February 2013 with the General Prosecutor of Albania. She requested that the investigation be continued by the district prosecutor on account of theft in collusion with others, destruction of property, torture and constraint through threat or violence for the acquisition of property under Articles 134, 150, 86, 109/b of the CC respectively. She also complained of a lack of impartiality of the prosecutor. 39. On 25 April 2013 the applicant was awarded full disability status and was recognised as permanently unfit for work. 40. On 11 July 2014 the General Prosecutor sent the file to the Fier district prosecutor’s office to proceed with the applicant’s complaint concerning the impartiality of the Vlora district prosecutor. 41. On 2 and 3 November 2017, the Government and the applicant, respectively, informed the Court that the applicant had lodged a complaint with the Vlora District Court against the prosecutor’s decision of 15 February 2013 under Article 329 of the CCP. 42. On 18 May 2015 the Vlora District Court had dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It found that the prosecutor had carried out all the necessary investigative steps and that the proceedings had been duly discontinued pursuant to the General Amnesty Act. 43. On 15 September 2015 the Vlora Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant for the same reasons as given by the Vlora District Court. It also noted that the applicant had not claimed before the domestic courts that any investigative actions had been omitted by the prosecutor’s office. 44. On 14 July 2016 the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision of 15 September 2015. 45. On an unspecified date the applicant made another criminal complaint against S.N. and E.N. for the offence of theft under Article 134 of the CC. 46. On 3 November 2017 the applicant informed the Court of the outcome of the third investigation. 47. On 2 November 2012 the prosecutor opened investigation no. 1762 against S.N. and E.N. for the offence of theft under Article 134 of the CC in relation to the event of 30 October 2012. 48. On 6 December 2012 the applicant made another statement before the prosecutor, complaining of, amongst other things, the theft of her belongings that had occurred on 30 October 2012. 49. On 13 March 2013 the prosecutor’s office classified the offence as self-administered justice under Article 277 of the CC. 50. On 10 April 2014 the Vlora District Court discontinued the proceedings on the basis of Article 387 of the CCP since an amnesty had been granted in respect of the offence pursuant to the General Amnesty Act. 51. On 3 November 2017 the applicant also informed the Court that, on an unspecified date in 2014 she had lodged with the Tirana prosecutor another complaint against S.N. for the offences of threat, grievous bodily harm (plagosje e rëndë me dashje) and insult under Articles 84, 88 and 119 of the Criminal Code. The applicant had also complained that the forensic medical report of 17 January 2013 had been based on forged documents and that the offence of grievous bodily harm had in fact been committed. 52. On 30 June 2014 the Tirana prosecutor, after having carried out some investigative actions, decided not to send the case for trial on the grounds that there were no elements of a crime. He reasoned that the magnetic resonance images and the neuropsychiatrist consultation, which the forensic medical report had relied on, were not related to the events of 8 September 2012. 53. On 3 December 2014 the Tirana District Court, following an application by the applicant, decided to quash the prosecutor’s decision and ordered him to continue the investigation. It decided that the prosecutor should examine the evidence as submitted by the applicant and any other evidence or claim related thereto, carrying out a thorough investigation. 54. On 6 October 2015 the Tirana Court of Appeal, following an appeal by the prosecutor, upheld the District Court’s decision of 3 December 2014. 55. In February 2018 the Government informed the Court about the following development. On 6 December 2017, the Tirana prosecutor’s office registered the criminal proceedings on account of falsification of documents. On 11 December 2017 the Tirana prosecutor’s office declared its lack of competence and transferred the case to the Vlora prosecutor’s office, which registered the case no. 9854 on 14 December 2017. It appears that the investigation is still ongoing. However, the Government stated that this set of proceedings had no bearing on the applicant’s complaints.

5. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Kharkiv. 6. On 3 April 2008 the applicant shot a person, causing a serious injury. He was arrested at the scene of the crime. He remained in detention throughout the criminal proceedings against him, primarily at the Kharkiv pre-trial detention centre (SIZO). 7. On 14 April 2009 the Kharkiv Court of Appeal sentenced him to ten years and six months’ imprisonment and the confiscation of all his property. On 29 December 2009 the Supreme Court upheld that judgment. 8. The applicant served his sentence in a number of correctional colonies, including, from 11 May 2010 until 7 April 2011, the Slovyanoserbsk Correctional Colony in the Luhansk Region (hereinafter, “the colony”). 9. On 27 May 2015 the applicant was transferred to a semi-open correctional institution. 10. On 25 December 2015 the applicant was released. 11. On 13 May 2010, the applicant was placed in a single-occupancy cell at his request, as he feared an attack on his life and health by other inmates. Decisions on his placement in isolation from the general prison population were taken in July and August 2010. 12. According to a report by a prison guard dated 10 September 2010, the applicant refused to move from the single-occupancy cell to a dormitory, claiming that he feared violence from other inmates. Similar reports were filed monthly from October 2010 until February 2011. 13. In his application form of 8 November 2010 the applicant described the conditions of his detention in the following fashion: since 13 May 2010 he had been held in an isolation cell, which measured 4.5 sq. m as a whole (including the toilet and the washbasin), with the living space proper measuring 1 sq. m. 14. Following the communication of the application to the respondent Government, the applicant submitted that the average living space per inmate in the dormitory cells of the colony was 2.8 sq. m. He referred in this respect to the report (dated 23 November 2011) of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter, “the CPT”) on its visit to Ukraine from 9 until 21 September 2009 (CPT/Inf (2011) 29), which mentioned overcrowding in respect of most of the colony’s dormitories. 15. The applicant alleged that in the course of his detention all of his correspondence had been systematically monitored by the prison authorities. He submitted in particular that on 22 July and 9 September 2009 the prison administration had handed him two letters from the Court and on 18 December 2010 a letter from the parliamentary secretariat, all of which had been opened by the administration. 16. The applicant submitted copies of registers compiled by prison authorities of his outgoing mail. They show that in the period from 22 July 2009 until December 2010 the applicant sent at least forty-seven letters to various public entities – correspondence which, under domestic law (see paragraph 40 below), was subject to monitoring by the prison authorities – most notably various domestic courts, the High Council of Justice, the Department for the Execution of Sentences (the executive agency in charge of prisons) and Parliament. However, the same register records that the applicant also addressed a number of letters to the Court and a letter to his lawyer, correspondence exempt from such monitoring. The letters to non-exempt addresses are accompanied by brief summaries of their content (for example, in respect of the letter of 18 February 2010 addressed to a domestic court it is noted that it concerned “study of the file, presence at a hearing”) or are marked in the register as “application”, “petition” or “complaint” (“звернення”, “клопотання” or “complaint”, respectively), while letters to the Court and the lawyer are marked as “sealed letter”. 17. According to the applicant, in November 2009, while he was in the Kyiv SIZO, somebody poisoned him; as a result, he developed gastroduodentitis (inflammation of the stomach and duodenum), which became chronic. 18. The applicant’s prison records contain no information in respect of the period from his arrest until 26 January 2010 (see paragraph 46 below). 19. On 26 January 2010 the Kharkiv SIZO medical officer noted that the applicant was suffering from chronic gastroduodentitis that was in unstable remission (хронічний гастродуоденіт у стадії загострення). He prescribed a number of medications. The applicant alleges that he was not actually given those medications. 20. On 18 March 2010 the applicant underwent a radiological examination of his intestinal tract, as a result of which the SIZO general practitioner confirmed the diagnosis of chronic gastroduodentitis. 21. From 6 until 19 April 2010 the applicant was hospitalised in the medical unit of the Kharkiv SIZO and treated for his gastroduodentitis. 22. On 15 February 2011 he was examined by a general practitioner at the colony, who confirmed the diagnosis of chronic gastroduodentitis, which he noted was in a state of exacerbation (хронічний гастродуоденіт у стадії загострення). The general practitioner recommended the applicant’s transfer to the hospital at Luhansk SIZO for examination and treatment. No transfer followed. 23. On 4 October 2011 the applicant was examined at a civilian hospital in Kharkiv. He underwent an ultrasound examination and a biochemical blood test, which included aspartate aminotransferase (AST) and alanine aminotransferase (ALT) markers for liver function. He was diagnosed with acute pancreatitis, congestive duodenopathy, gastric stasis (reduced stomach functioning), inflammation of the oesophagus and chronic hepatitis (with diffuse changes in the liver). A number of medications and a special diet were prescribed. 24. The next day a general practitioner at the correctional colony at which the applicant was being held at the time recommended hospitalisation in the prison hospital at Temnivka, a specialist prison hospital for the Kharkiv region. On 11 October 2011 the applicant was taken there. The applicant refused hospitalisation because he mistrusted the prison doctors and preferred to be treated in a civilian institution. 25. On 17 October 2011 the applicant was examined by a general practitioner, who diagnosed chronic pancreatitis in the acute stage and prescribed treatment. 26. On 1 August 2012 a general practitioner diagnosed biliary dyskinesia (a disorder in which bile has difficulty in moving normally through the biliary tract) and prescribed medication. The applicant alleges that he was not given this medication. 27. From 25 until 31 January 2013 the applicant was treated for hepatitis – specifically, he received antispasmodic and hepatoprotective medicine – as an inpatient in the prison’s medical unit. Upon his discharge it was recommended that he abstain from spicy and fried foods. The applicant alleges that the prison authorities did not comply with this recommendation. 28. Beginning on 15 February 2014 the applicant received medical care in civilian institutions. 29. The applicant had been suffering from osteochondrosis of the lumbar spine since 1998. He was hospitalised and treated for that condition from 28 February until 5 March 2008, prior to his arrest. 30. From 24 April until 4 May 2012 the applicant was treated in the medical unit of the colony in which he was detained at the time for his osteochondrosis and disk protrusion. 31. On 17 May 2012 the applicant underwent an MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) scan of the spine in a civilian hospital. 32. On 31 May 2012 a surgeon examined the applicant and recommended that he undergo examination and treatment in a specialist neurology ward. The applicant alleges that the recommendation was not implemented. 33. From 13 until 23 July 2012 the applicant was hospitalised in the colony’s medical unit and treated for osteochondrosis and multiple Schmorl’s nodes (protrusions of the intervertebral disc). 34. On 20 March 2013 the applicant was examined by a traumatologist. The previous diagnoses were confirmed. The traumatologist prescribed painkillers and anti-inflammatory medication and the use of a back-support device. The applicant alleges that the recommendations were not implemented. 35. From 13 August until 4 September 2015 he was hospitalised in a civilian institution specialising in spinal conditions. On 3 September 2015 the applicant underwent spinal surgery. The doctors explained that surgery was needed in view of the ineffectiveness of the conservative care that he had received and the increase in pain that he was suffering. 36. On 11 November 2015, owing to his back condition, the applicant was recognised as a person suffering from Category 2 disability. The second category is the intermediary one, the first constituting the severest level of disability and the third the least severe. 37. In the course of his detention the applicant also underwent several chest X-rays (which revealed no abnormality), and was diagnosed with bronchitis and a fungal infection of the nails; he was prescribed treatment for that infection. He was also examined by a dentist and an ophtalmologist. 38. Beginning in October 2011 the applicant was also diagnosed with a number of heart-related conditions, notably coronary heart disease. This diagnosis was subsequently confirmed on a number of occasions. No specific treatment was indicated.

5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Sanski Most. 6. By a judgment of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance of 23 May 2005, which became final on 11 September 2007, the Republika Srpska (an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was ordered to pay the applicant 42,767 convertible marks (BAM)[1] on account of pecuniary damage together with default interest calculated from 23 May 2005 until final payment. 7. On 1 February 2010 the applicant submitted a request for the issuance of the writ of execution in his case, which request he amended on 30 August 2010. 8. On 18 October 2010 the applicant submitted a request for the acceleration of the proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of First Instance. 9. On 15 November 2010 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance issued the writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju). 10. On 18 March 2011 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance rejected the objections against its decision of 15 November 2010, as well as the applicant’s request for the payment of the costs of the enforcement proceedings. 11. On 31 May 2011 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance made certain corrections to its decision of 18 March 2011. 12. On 15 December 2011 the Banja Luka Court of Second Instance quashed the decision of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance of 18 March 2011 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 13. On 26 March 2012 the applicant submitted a request for the acceleration of the proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of First Instance. 14. On 12 April 2012 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance partially granted the objection of the Republika Srpska against the writ of execution. 15. On 23 April 2012 the applicant appealed the decision of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance of 12 April 2012. On 11 June, 13 July, and 21 November 2012, and on 15 January 2013 the applicant submitted further requests for the acceleration of the proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of Second Instance. 16. On 21 January 2013 the Banja Luka Court of Second Instance rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of 12 April 2012. 17. On 7 October 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ruled in favour of the applicant that the enforcement proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of First Instance had not been finalised within a reasonable time. It further ordered the Banja Luka Court of First Instance to urgently expedite the enforcement proceedings in the applicant’s case. The Constitutional Court considered this to be sufficient just satisfaction and rejected the applicant’s claim for non-pecuniary damage. 18. On 8 November 2016 the final decision in question was enforced in cash, regarding the principal amount and the statutory default interests. On 5 July 2017 the costs of the enforcement proceedings and related statutory default interests were also fully paid to the applicant.

5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Kocaeli. 6. Following a dispute with a private third party, the applicant initiated compensation proceedings. 7. On 12 March 2009 the Tuzla Civil Court of General Jurisdiction granted the applicant compensation, amounting to 386,464.75 Turkish liras (TRY) (approximately 174,000 euros (EUR)). In the operative part of the judgment, the court indicated that the defendant party had to pay TRY 16,000 (approximately EUR 7,400) for court fees pursuant to the Law on Charges. The court registry accordingly sent a payment order to the defendant party. However, no payment was made. 8. On 18 May 2009 the applicant submitted a petition to the registry of the first instance court, requesting that the judgment be served on her in order to commence enforcement proceedings. On the same day, the court rejected the request on the ground that it was impossible under Section 28(1) (a) of the Law on Charges (Law no. 492) to serve a copy of the judgment unless the court costs that should have been born by the defendant party had been discharged. 9. At the time when the application was introduced, the applicant had therefore been unable to bring enforcement proceedings in order to have the above-mentioned judgment executed unless she herself was willing to pay the court fees that the defendant party had failed to pay. 10. Following the introduction of the present application with the Court, the domestic legislation was amended (see paragraphs 11-13 below), and subsequently the judgment in question was served on the applicant. In the absence of an appeal, the judgment became final on 17 October 2012. On 5 March 2013 the applicant initiated enforcement proceedings against her debtor. On 10 April 2013 the applicant further requested the enforcement office to place a lien on the debtor’s property. According to the documents in the file, as of 14 April 2017 the debt, which is still not enforced, amounts to TRY 812,648.94 (approximately EUR 193,500) including the initial amount of compensation awarded by the domestic court plus interest running at statutory rate.

5. The applicants are Ms Zita Bistieva, who was born in 1976, and her three minor children, who were born in 2006, 2008 and 2013, respectively. The applicants live in Herne, Germany. 6. In 2012 Ms Bistieva’s husband, M.A., and their two elder children arrived in Poland. M.A. applied for asylum for himself and his family. 7. On 6 March 2013 the head of the Aliens Office (Szef Urzędu do Spraw Cudzoziemców) decided not to grant M.A. and his family refugee status and to expel them from Poland (decision no. PU‑420‑37001/SU/2012). That decision was upheld by the Refugee Council on 10 May 2013 (no. RdU-133-1/S/13). No appeal was lodged before the administrative court. 8. Soon afterwards the family fled to Germany, where Ms Bistieva’s third child was born in July 2013. 9. On 28 May 2013 the Polish authorities took over the jurisdiction over the family’s case under Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 (“the Dublin II Regulation”). On 9 January 2014 Ms Bistieva and her three children were sent back to Poland. 10. On 9 January 2014 the Słubice District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered the applicants’ committal until 8 April 2014 to the family wing of a guarded centre for aliens (Strzeżony Ośrodek dla Cudzoziemców) in Kętrzyn. It was held that the applicants should be detained pending their expulsion, which had been ordered by the head of the Aliens Office (Szef Urzędu do Spraw Cudzoziemców) on 6 March 2013 and in view of the risk that they might again flee the country. 11. The information about the guarded centre for aliens in Kętrzyn which is presented in paragraphs 12-16 below, is derived from the reports of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, which resulted from their monitoring visits in 2012 and in January and February of 2014. 12. The Kętrzyn centre was opened in 2008. At the material time, it only hosted families and unaccompanied children. In January and February 2014, 70 migrants were held there. That number included 13 men, 19 women and 38 minors. The majority of migrants in the centre were Russian nationals. The centre was surrounded with a high wall or fence with a single barbed wire on top. Kętrzyn was one of the two guarded centres in Poland which had done away with an additional barbed wire on the fence. Unlike in many other guarded centres, the one in Kętrzyn had outer but no inner bars on the windows and the windows in the day rooms (świetlica) were without any bars. Unlike in all other guarded centres, the bars allowed for windows to be opened sufficiently wide. 13. The overall living conditions in the centre were assessed as good. Each family occupied one room which was equipped with basic furniture. They had, in principle, unlimited access to common areas in the building, which included, a dining room, a number of kitchenettes, laundry rooms and day rooms (equipped with a TV-set, board games, video games and toys, a small gym and a library (containing a large number of publications in Russian and other languages). Migrants in Kętrzyn had also access to outdoor recreational grounds for adults and children. Outdoor time was limited to one hour per day unless, a migrant participated in sport or other type of activities. 14. Adequate medical care, including dental and psychological care, was provided in the Kętrzyn centre. 15. The staff of that establishment had received particularly positive evaluation from its occupants. Many staff members spoke Russian, they were closely supervised by the governor, who regularly talked to the migrants. The security measures were much more relaxed than in other centres for aliens. The premises were clean and adapted to children. 16. Education of migrant children and adults was provided on the centre’s premises by the local authorities and pedagogy students from a nearby university. The classes of Polish, mathematics and geography were run by qualified teachers and the students either received school report cards or certificates of attendance. The classes were organised every day and, in early 2014, lasted from one hour to one hour and a half. In principle, children of all school ages and different language levels were mixed. Individual programmes had, occasionally been offered to those children who had previously studied in a Polish school. A wide range of outdoor and indoor activities, and events were available. They were run by staff members dressed in civilian clothing or visitors from the local school of music. 17. Ms Bistieva appealed, arguing that the administrative detention of herself and her children was unjustified and disregarded the fact that her husband had stayed behind in Germany, having been hospitalised when his family was sent back to Poland. 18. On 27 January 2014 the Warmińsko-Mazurski Governor (Wojewoda) refused to order the expulsion of Ms Bistieva’s youngest child, which was sought by the head of the Świecko Border Guard (Komendant Placówki Straży Granicznej). It was held that the 2013 expulsion decision did not cover the child, who was born later in Germany and whose presence in Poland resulted from a decision of the German authorities. It followed that the child’s presence in Poland, unlike that of the rest of his family, was not illegal. 19. On 28 January 2014 Ms Bistieva applied for refugee status for herself and her three children. She also applied for a stay of the enforcement of the 2013 expulsion decision. 20. On 4 February 2014 the Kętrzyn District Court decided to extend the detention of all the applicants at the guarded centre for aliens until 27 April 2014. The domestic court relied on the fact that the 2013 expulsion decision was enforceable despite Ms Bistieva’s renewed asylum application and that the identification of the family members was being carried out by the Polish authorities. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 21. On 5 February 2014 the Gorzów Wlkp. Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) upheld the decision of 9 January 2014. It was held that the decision to place Ms Bistieva in administrative detention was justified because she was an illegal alien in Poland and she had crossed the German border illegally. The fact that she had minor children could not be considered as a sufficient reason for quashing the impugned decision. The guarded centre for aliens in Kętrzyn provided adequate living conditions and medical care to the family. Any inconvenience suffered by Ms Bistieva’s family was the result not of their placement at the guarded centre but rather of Ms Bistieva’s illegal immigration to Poland. 22. On 19 February 2014 the head of the Aliens Office decided not to grant the application to stay the enforcement of the 2013 expulsion decision. It was noted that the decision covered all the applicants. The authority considered that Ms Bistieva’s new application for asylum was likely to fail as it was based on similar grounds as the one rejected in 2013. The applicant did not appeal. On 11 March 2014 the head of the Aliens Office issued a corrigendum to that decision and removed Ms Bistieva’s youngest child from its scope. 23. It appears that on 20 February 2014 Ms Bistieva’s husband was transferred to Poland and placed in the same guarded centre as the applicants. 24. In view of the 2013 decision, which was enforceable, on 18 April 2014 the head of the Aliens Office discontinued the applicants’ asylum proceedings (decision no. DPU-420-214/SU/2014). That decision was served on Ms Bistieva on 23 April 2014. She did not appeal. 25. On 25 April 2014 the Kętrzyn District Court decided to extend the administrative detention of the applicants until 29 June 2014, given the discontinuation of the latest set of asylum proceedings. 26. Ms Bistieva appealed, arguing that her youngest child was not an illegal alien and, as such, he could not be the subject of administrative detention. She also argued that her own and her other children’s placement in the guarded centre was unjustified. 27. On 22 May 2014 Ms Bistieva lodged a new application for asylum, also asking that the enforcement of the 2013 expulsion decision be put on hold. She argued that her application was justified because on 27 January 2014 the Warmińsko-Mazurski Governor had refused to order the expulsion of her youngest child and because, in a separate set of proceedings, on 25 April 2014 the Refugee Council (Rada do Spraw Uchodźców) had granted refugee status to her father, mother and siblings. 28. On 5 June 2014 the head of the Aliens Office decided to temporarily suspend the enforcement of the 2013 expulsion decision, until the delivery of a new decision, on the grounds that new circumstances had arisen in the case. 29. On 6 June 2014 the Olsztyn Regional Court upheld the decision of 25 April 2014 extending Ms Bistieva’s administrative detention. It was observed that the decision to extend the measure of administrative detention was justified by the need to secure the course of the proceedings concerning the refusal of refugee status and expulsion. It was also noted that the last relevant decision had been delivered by the head of the Aliens Office on 18 April 2014 and served on Ms Bistieva within the statutory time-limit. It followed that her detention was in accordance with the law. The domestic court held that section 107 of the 2003 Aliens Act had not been breached by the fact that the youngest child had been detained along with Ms Bistieva and the rest of the family even though his own expulsion had not been authorised by the Governor. It sufficed that the mother herself was covered by the 2013 expulsion decision and that the child was in her care. Separating Ms Bistieva from any of her children would be contrary to their best interests. Lastly, the court considered, without providing detailed reasons, that the possible alternative measure, namely placing the applicants at the aliens centre in Podkowa Leśna and providing them with social care, was not called for in the circumstances of the case. 30. On 12 June 2014 Ms Bistieva applied to be released from administrative detention. 31. On 29 June 2014 the applicants were released. They started living in Warsaw. Later, on an unspecified date in August 2014 the applicants left for Germany. As submitted by their lawyer, they currently live in Herne. 32. On 28 October 2014 the head of Aliens Office discontinued the applicants’ asylum proceedings on the grounds that they had not appeared for questioning (decision no. DPU-420-1114/SU/2014). 33. The applicants did not bring an action for compensation for unjustified detention in a guarded centre under section 407 of the Aliens Act of 12 December 2013.

5. The applicant company is a bank with its registered office in Vienna. According to the information available to the Court, the applicant company has been in liquidation since November 2016 and the proceedings have not yet been terminated. 6. The applicant company purchased and kept shares in deposit, predominantly shares in the IF company (hereafter – “IF”), for third parties. The applicant company and IF were related to each other; the management board partly consisted of the same persons and staff employed by the applicant company were provided to IF. The A. company, an investment advisor, functioned as an important distribution partner of the applicant company. 7. Due to a significant, successive loss in value of the shares purchased in IF, starting from the second half of 2007, numerous court proceedings were instituted against the applicant company. 8. Following consultations with the A. company, F.M. and H.H. ordered the applicant company, between 2006 and 2008, to purchase and keep IF shares in deposit. 9. In 2009 F.M and H.H. filed a civil action against the applicant company and requested the annulment of their share purchase. IF joined the proceedings as an intervening party (Nebenintervenientin) on the side of the applicant company. 10. On 6 April 2012 the Vienna Commercial Court (Handelsgericht Wien) granted the action and ordered the applicant company to repay F.M. and H.H. the amount invested in exchange for the shares acquired by them. The Commercial Court found that F.M. and H.H. had not been adequately informed about the risks of such a share purchase by the A. company and that the applicant company was to be held accountable for the inadequate information given, having regard to the close professional ties between these two companies. 11. On 20 September 2012 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht Wien) granted the applicant company’s appeal, finding in essence that any inadequate advice given to F.M. and H.H. by employees of the A. company could not be attributed to the applicant company. 12. Thereupon, F.M. and H.H. filed an ordinary appeal on points of law (ordentliche Revision). 13. On 17 June 2013 the Supreme Court (the Second Section), sitting as a five-judge panel, granted the ordinary appeal on points of law and restored the Commercial Court’s judgment of 6 April 2012. It considered that due to the close professional ties, the applicant company had had a significant interest in selling IF shares. For that reason, employees of the A. company had been provided with inadequate information material. The Supreme Court hence found that the applicant company had been liable for the inadequate advice given to F.M. and H.H. 14. On 12 August 2013 the applicant company filed an action for nullity (Nichtigkeitsklage) under section 529 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 25 below). It claimed that Judge N., who had been one of the five judges sitting on the Supreme Court’s panel, had been biased because he had himself purchased shares in IF whose value had dropped, following advice by the A. company. Moreover, Judge N. had previously declared himself biased in comparable cases concerning the purchase of shares in IF. The Supreme Court had accepted Judge N.’s withdrawal from all these cases. According to the respective decisions, Judge N. had even considered filing an action on account of the losses he had suffered due to his acquisition of the shares, with the applicant company being one of the parties against whom such an action might potentially be introduced. He had thus been subjectively and objectively biased, which constituted a reason for challenge under section 19 § 2 of the Act on Exercise of Jurisdiction (Jurisdiktionsnorm) (see paragraph 21 below). As Judge N. had not withdrawn from the case at hand, there had been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 15. The applicant company further explained that it had only learned about the composition of the panel – and thus the involvement of Judge N. in the proceedings at issue – when the Supreme Court’s judgment had been served on the applicant company. It had thus not been possible for the applicant company to challenge Judge N. for bias prior to the delivery of the Supreme Court’s judgment. 16. On 4 September 2013 the Supreme Court (the Seventh Section) excluded Judge N. from taking part in the proceedings concerning the applicant company’s action for nullity. 17. On 27 November 2013 the Supreme Court (the Second Section) decided on the applicant company’s action for nullity. It confirmed that Judge N. had purchased shares in IF prior to their decrease in value. In 2009 Judge N. had offered his shares to a litigation funder (Prozessfinanzierer) in order to introduce possible actions against IF or other persons and entities involved. For this reason Judge N., even though he had not considered himself personally biased, had withdrawn from at least two cases concerning IF shares (see the Supreme Court’s decisions of 14 May 2010, 9 Nc 13/10a, and of 26 November 2012, 9 Nc 38/12f). However, after the litigation funder had terminated the contract with Judge N., the latter had decided not to pursue any claims against IF and had, furthermore, no longer considered it necessary to withdraw from cases dealing with these shares. 18. Following these explanations, the Supreme Court rejected the applicant company’s action for nullity, holding that a decision which had become final could only be contested under section 529 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that a judge who had taken part in the decision had been excluded by law from exercising his or her office (see paragraph 25 below). In contrast, bias of a judge (referring to its decision of 13 November 2013, 7 Nc 19/13y, see paragraph 20 below) did not constitute a ground for nullity. The Supreme Court pointed out that it had recently held, in a case concerning arbitration law, that only in particularly grave cases, where the reason for challenge came close to a reason for exclusion under section 20 of the Act on Exercise of Jurisdiction, could an exception be made (see paragraph 27 below). In the present case, however, no such particularly grave reason had been shown, since the participation of a judge who had in the past considered filing an action against one of the parties to the proceedings was not comparable to a ground enumerated in section 20 of the Act on Exercise of Jurisdiction (see paragraph 21 below). Lastly, the Supreme Court held that no issues arose under Article 6 of the Convention. 19. In other proceedings concerning an action brought against the applicant company (by a different person) in connection with the purchase of shares in IF, the applicant company filed an extraordinary appeal against a judgment of the Court of Appeal of 29 November 2012 with the Supreme Court and subsequently challenged Judge N. for bias in those proceedings. 20. On 13 November 2013 the Supreme Court (the Seventh Section, 7 Nc 19/13y) granted the applicant company’s challenge and declared Judge N. biased, since his impartiality could appear open to doubt. The fact that Judge N. had in the past withdrawn from two comparable cases due to the acquisition of shares in the same company gave rise to doubts as to his impartiality, notwithstanding that he no longer intended to file any civil action in this regard. The fact that he had withdrawn of his own motion from previous cases increased fears as to Judge N.’s impartiality and rendered such doubts objectively justified, even if he did not consider himself personally biased.

5. The applicant was born in Nigeria in 1975 and lives in Zölling. 6. In Nigeria, the applicant completed eleven years of schooling and subsequently held various jobs in Lagos. After leaving the country, he lived in Spain from 1994 to 1997, living at first on social security and later working as a day-labourer on several farms. In 1997 he arrived in Germany, where he applied for asylum under a different identity. His application was finally rejected in July 1998. He left Germany for Italy with a German national with whom he had started a relationship. In January 1999 he moved on to Spain, where he worked as a cook and waiter in various restaurants. 7. In October 2000 the applicant re-entered Germany. On 21 October 2000 his daughter, from his above-mentioned relationship, was born. The applicant’s daughter is a German national. 8. In 2000 and 2001 the applicant and the child’s mother lived together. From the outset they had, and continue to have, joint custody. On 11 December 2000, the Authority of the City of Munich issued the applicant a residence permit based on family ties, valid until 1 December 2001. 9. On 18 July 2001 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed an offence under the Narcotics Act (Betäubungsmittelgesetz). 10. On 28 May 2002 the Munich Regional Court sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment for drug trafficking on a large scale. It observed that the applicant had recruited and instructed the child’s mother as a drugs runner for two separate consignments of cocaine from South America to Europe in summer 1998 and in late 1999/early 2000. It considered, in favour of the applicant, that this was his first criminal conviction, that the first delivery had failed (the drugs did not actually enter the distribution system), and that the applicant had been detained on remand since July 2001. The Regional Court held against the applicant that he had used as drugs runners two young women who were adolescents at the time the offences were committed, and who ran the risk of a lengthy prison sentence in South America; that he had exploited the naivety of his daughter’s mother; that a large amount of cocaine was meant to be smuggled in the first case and that four kilograms of cocaine were smuggled into Europe in the second case; and that the entire undertaking had been handled very professionally. In addition, the Regional Court considered that a conviction for a third case of drug smuggling could not be envisaged for the sole reason that the precise amount of cocaine transported in a suitcase from Peru to Spain could not be determined. 11. The applicant submitted that his daughter and her mother had visited him in prison from 2001 to 2003 and that he had sought a court ruling on contact with his daughter, when the child’s mother discontinued the visits. On 4 July 2006, the applicant and the child’s mother agreed before the Munich Family Court that supervised meetings between him and his daughter would take place as soon as he was released from prison. As of 31 January 2008, the daughter visited the applicant regularly in prison – every four weeks for two hours at a time – in the company of a priest. 12. On 3 July 2009 the applicant was released, after having served his entire sentence. He was placed under supervision of conduct (Führungsaufsicht) until 3 July 2013. 13. After his release, the applicant was granted exceptional leave to remain (Duldung) under Section 60a of the Residence Act – according to the information available to the Court this was granted most recently in January 2017 and would last until July 2017. It meant that enforcement of the expulsion order was temporarily suspended, being impossible to execute as the applicant did not have a valid passport (see paragraphs 28, 29 and 36‑42 below). He began occupational re-training as a management assistant in marketing communication in April 2010, which he successfully completed in June 2012, but was not allowed to engage in gainful employment since his release. 14. The applicant has not lived with his daughter and her mother since his release. Since 2012 they have been living in different cities, with distances between their homes varying between thirty and seventy kilometres and the travelling time varying between forty minutes and one hour. The applicant sees his daughter on a regular basis and maintains close contact with her. It is not disputed between the parties that she spends every other weekend with him. According to a social worker’s statement, he has become an important contact person for her. Both the applicant’s daughter and her mother explicitly wish the applicant’s contact with his child to continue. 15. Since his release, the applicant was convicted of three offences by the Munich District Court, of fraud in 2011 and of theft in 2015 and 2016. He was sentenced to twenty, thirty and ninety day-fines, respectively. By being present on German territory without having a passport, he committed an ongoing offence under the Residence Act. Criminal proceedings in this connection were discontinued by the public prosecutor in November 2013 because the applicant’s guilt was considered to be of a minor nature and because prosecution was not in the public interest. The matter was referred to the administrative authority for treatment as an administrative offence. 16. On 21 March 2003 the Authority of the City of Munich refused to renew the applicant’s residence permit and ordered his expulsion. It held that the applicant’s expulsion was mandatory pursuant to Section 47 § 1 of the Aliens Act (Ausländergesetz; since 2004: Section 53 of the Residence Act) which foresaw the mandatory expulsion of an alien if he or she were sentenced to either at least three years’ imprisonment for a criminal offence, or to any period of imprisonment (not on probation) for an offence under the Narcotics Act. The authority examined whether the applicant enjoyed special protection against expulsion because he was the father of a German child. It found that the applicant had lived with his daughter only for a short time prior to his imprisonment, she had thus experienced separation from the applicant and that, in the light of the applicant’s very serious criminal offences, the State’s interest in removing the applicant prevailed over his interest in enjoying family life with his daughter. He could remain in contact with her by letter or telephone and could apply for permission to enter Germany for specific periods of time (Betretenserlaubnis). It considered that the applicant’s expulsion was in conformity with Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. This decision, which also contained an unlimited re-entry ban and notice that he would be deported to Nigeria if he did not leave Germany voluntarily within four weeks after being released from prison, became final on 26 August 2003. 17. On 15 November 2006, after the applicant had served more than two thirds of his prison sentence, the authorities envisaged his expulsion as of 1 November 2007. 18. On 3 December 2007 the applicant introduced another asylum application (see paragraph 6 above). On 8 February 2008, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees dismissed his application as manifestly ill‑founded under Section 30 § 3 of the Asylum Procedure Act (see paragraph 33 below) and, finding that there were no impediments to his return to his country of origin, ordered his expulsion. The decision again contained notice that he would be deported to Nigeria if he did not leave Germany voluntarily within one week after the decision became final. On 6 March 2008, the Munich Administrative Court granted suspensive effect to the applicant’s appeal in the asylum procedure. On 8 September 2009 it dismissed his appeal in the main procedure, also finding, inter alia, that the applicant’s ties to his daughter could not be taken into account in the asylum procedure. This decision became final on 1 December 2009. 19. On 10 September 2009 the applicant applied for a residence permit based on family ties. 20. On 9 February 2010 the Authority of the City of Munich rejected his application, holding that there was a final expulsion decision (of 21 March 2003) against the applicant, which precluded granting him a residence permit. No impediments arose from the fact that his daughter was a German national. The applicant could maintain contact with her through letters, telephone calls and occasional visits. His daughter was accustomed to a long-distance relationship with him. He was responsible for the renewed separation and the purpose of the expulsion order had not yet been achieved. At the same time, it reduced the re-entry ban to five years and ruled that the applicant could, starting one year after his actual expulsion, apply for permission to enter Germany twice a year for a total of four weeks. 21. On 14 April 2010 the Munich Administrative Court quashed that decision and ordered the administrative authority to issue a residence permit. It noted that the applicant met the requirements for a residence permit based on family ties, but that granting such a permit was precluded by the final expulsion decision. However, the applicant was entitled to a residence permit on humanitarian grounds in accordance with Section 25 § 5 of the Residence Act, with the margin of appreciation inherent in this provision being reduced to zero. Section 11 § 1 of the Residence Act was not applicable to this provision and the applicant’s departure was impossible in law due to his family life with his daughter, which was protected, inter alia, by Article 8 of the Convention. 22. The Administrative Court found that, despite the serious nature of the criminal offences the applicant had committed, there was no public interest that outweighed the child’s best interests and the applicant’s interest in having contact with his daughter. The relationship between the applicant and his daughter had the quality of a “family” and their ties were of benefit to the child. It considered that they could only live together in Germany, as the child could not be expected to relocate to Nigeria; that the applicant had committed the criminal offences prior to the birth of his daughter; that he had made considerable efforts as a father, as was also evidenced by his choice to remain imprisoned in Germany and to have supervised meetings with his daughter as of January 2008 rather than having his sentence suspended and being expelled as of 1 November 2007; that the latter event marked a turning point, which occurred after the expulsion order had become final in 2003 and which had not been taken into account by the administrative authorities; that the child had already been deprived of a relationship with her father for many years during his imprisonment; that the material assessment with a view to the applicant’s expulsion had been conducted on 21 March 2003, years before the developments in the father‑daughter relationship and the moment the expulsion order would be enforced; and that the enforcement of the expulsion order in connection with a re-entry ban would deprive the child of the possibility of a normal father-daughter relationship for the remainder of her childhood. 23. On 27 June 2011 the Bavarian Administrative Court of Appeal overturned that judgment and denied the applicant’s right to a residence permit. It considered that his asylum application had been rejected as manifestly ill-founded under Section 30 § 3 of the Asylum Procedure Act and that, therefore, in accordance with Section 10 § 3, second sentence, of the Residence Act, he could not be granted a residence permit prior to leaving Germany (see paragraph 33 below). The exception to this rule, foreseen in the third sentence of this paragraph, was not applicable because the applicant did not have a claim to a residence permit within the meaning of that provision (see paragraph 34 below). 24. First, a claim to a residence permit based on family ties under Sections 27 et seq. of the Residence Act was precluded by Section 11 of the Residence Act due to the final expulsion order of 21 March 2003 (see paragraph 35 below). Second, a claim to a residence permit on humanitarian grounds under Section 25 § 5 of the Residence Act was proscribed because the applicant did not have a valid passport, which was a general requirement for the granting of a residence permit (see paragraph 32 below). As the decision to waive this requirement in cases concerning residence permits on humanitarian grounds was a discretionary one, the applicant did not have a claim to a residence permit within the meaning of Section 10 § 3, third sentence, of the Residence Act, not even if the margin of appreciation were reduced to zero (see paragraph 34 below). Third, the court found that the applicant could not base a claim to a residence permit on impediments to his return to his country of origin either, referring to the outcome of the asylum proceedings in 2008 and 2009 (see paragraph 18 above). The Court of Appeal concluded that, under these circumstances, it was not decisive whether the ties between the applicant and his daughter were such that the requirements for a residence permit on humanitarian grounds under Section 25 § 5 of the Residence Act were met, if the applicant’s asylum application had not been dismissed, and refrained from elaborating on this aspect. 25. On 12 September 2011 the applicant lodged an action to be granted leave to appeal on points of law, arguing that his case raised a matter of fundamental importance. He submitted that he should be granted a residence permit under Section 25 § 5 of the Residence Act because, as the father of a minor child of German nationality for whom he had joint custody, he did, in principle, have a claim to a residence permit based on family ties. The purpose of Section 10 § 3 of the Residence Act was to sanction abuse of the asylum procedure, but an abusive asylum application should not bear negative consequences where the foreigner had a claim, within the meaning of that provision, to a residence permit. In that regard, it should be decisive whether or not the substantive requirements of the respective provision for a residence permit were met, as in his case with regard to the permit based on family ties, and that the reason for the claim not being realised, in his case the final expulsion order against him, should not be relevant. 26. On 16 February 2012 the Federal Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s action. It noted that, according to the case-law of the domestic courts, the exception foreseen in Section 10 § 3, third sentence, of the Residence Act only applied to claims that followed directly from legislative provisions and in respect of which all requirements, general and specific, were met. A residence permit based on family ties was precluded because of the final expulsion order against the applicant. Under these circumstances, granting a residence permit on humanitarian grounds was to be considered. However, as the applicant did not have a valid passport, which was a general requirement for the granting of a residence permit from which derogations were, in cases concerning Section 25 § 5 of the Residence Act, possible only by way of a discretionary decision, the exception foreseen in Section 10 § 3, third sentence, of the Residence Act was not applicable. The decision was served on the applicant on 22 February 2012. 27. On 22 March 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, alleging that the decisions of the Administrative Court of Appeal and of the Federal Administrative Court violated his right to respect for his family life with his daughter. On 18 July 2012 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to accept the applicant’s constitutional complaint without providing reasons (no. 2 BvR 657/12). 28. After the Authority of the City of Munich, on 12 June 2012, had ordered the applicant to present himself to the Embassy of Nigeria in Germany so that a passport for the upcoming expulsion could be issued, the applicant refused to do so and filed an action against this order with the Munich Administrative Court. During the court hearing on 1 August 2012, the applicant and the immigration authorities agreed to the following: “- The effect of the re-entry ban will be limited to two and a half years after leaving Germany. - The immigration authorities will give their consent for a visa to enter Germany based on family reunion. If the applicant by then still has joint custody with the child’s mother, a residence permit on the grounds of family ties will be issued. If the applicant no longer has joint custody for his daughter, the immigration authority will use its discretion regarding the issue of a residence permit in favour of the applicant. - All of this applies only if the applicant can show that he has not committed further criminal offences and if no other reasons for his expulsion emerge. - A time‑limit for leaving the country is set at 1 November 2012.” In the light of this agreement, the applicant withdrew his action, and the proceedings before the Munich Administrative Court were discontinued. 29. On 25 September 2012 the Embassy of Nigeria in Germany declared that it would not issue a passport to the applicant as long as the proceedings before this Court were pending. On 6 November 2012 the applicant informed the immigration authorities that he would not leave Germany, contrary to his initial plans and to his declaration before the Munich Administrative Court. As a result, the agreement concluded before that court became void.

6. The first applicant was born in 1915 and lived in Vilnius. The second applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Vilnius. The third applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Pagiriai in the Vilnius Region. The fourth applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Vilnius. 7. On various dates in 1991 the applicants or their relatives applied for restoration of their property rights to land which had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. 8. On 8 September 1992 the Vilnius District Court acknowledged that I.B. (the first applicant’s husband and the second applicant’s father) had a right to have his property rights to a plot of land in the village of Kryžiokai, near Vilnius, restored. 9. On 8 July 1993 the same court acknowledged that the fourth applicant had a right to have her property rights to a plot of land in Kryžiokai restored. 10. On 24 April 1996 the Seimas passed a law amending the administrative boundaries of certain municipal areas. Under that law, certain villages around Vilnius, including Kryžiokai and Vaidotai, became part of the Vilnius city municipality. 11. On 21 May 1998 the administrative authorities acknowledged that the third applicant had a right to have her property rights to a plot of land in Vaidotai restored. 12. On 20 December 2002 the Government approved a plan of forests of national importance (valstybinės reikšmės miškai) covering the whole country. It included forests situated in the former villages of Kryžiokai and Vaidotai. 13. On 7 May 2003 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter “the VCA”) restored I.B.’s property rights (see paragraph 8 above) by giving him 5.40 hectares of land in Kryžiokai. As he had died in 1992, the first applicant was issued a certificate of inheritance in respect of the plot on 27 June 2003. On 16 October 2003 she gifted it to the second applicant. 14. On 28 July 2008 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter “the prosecutor”) lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have I.B.’s property rights to 0.25 of the 5.40 hectares given to him annulled (see paragraph 13 above). The prosecutor submitted that, according to the data provided by the State Forest Management Service (Valstybinė miškotvarkos tarnyba), 0.25 hectares of the plot was covered by forest. Since that forest was situated in a city (see paragraph 10 above), it was considered a forest of national importance and could therefore only be owned by the State (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below). The prosecutor noted that the forest had been included in the plan of forests of national importance adopted by the Government in 2002 (see paragraph 12 above), that is before the VCA had adopted its decision to give that land to I.B. In view of the circumstances, the VCA’s decision had to be declared unlawful and its effects annulled. The prosecutor asked that after annulling I.B.’s property rights to that part of the land, the first and second applicants’ property rights to it also be annulled. 15. The applicants disputed the prosecutor’s claim. They submitted that I.B. had acquired property rights in good faith, having lawfully participated in the restitution process carried out by the authorities, and their annulment many years later would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty. The applicants further submitted that Kryžiokai had been a rural area until 1996 (see paragraph 10 above) and the restoration of property rights had complied with the regulations concerning rural areas. They also submitted that, according to the Real Estate Register (Nekilnojamojo turto registras), their land was classified as agricultural and not forest, and the data of that Register had to be considered accurate until proven otherwise. 16. The VCA also disputed the prosecutor’s claim. It submitted that I.B.’s property rights had been restored in accordance with Government regulations adopted in 1998 and 2000 which had set out the rules of land reform in rural areas. The VCA argued that restoration of property rights was a continuous process and thus had to be carried out in accordance with the legislation in force when it began and not that which was adopted later. The VCA also submitted that the decision to restore I.B.’s property rights had been taken in coordination with other authorities, including the Vilnius Forest Authority (Vilniaus miškų urėdija), and they had not presented any objections. 17. The Ministry of Environment, which was a third party in the proceedings, asked the court to allow the prosecutor’s claim. It argued that the VCA’s decision to restore I.B.’s property rights had been contrary to mandatory statutory provisions stating that urban forests could only be owned by the State, and thus had to be annulled. 18. On 17 September 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed the prosecutor’s claim. The court observed that the Constitution and other legislation established that forests of national importance could only be owned by the State (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below). It quoted at length case-law of the Constitutional Court which emphasised the importance of forests to the environment and the obligation of the State to protect them in the public interest (see paragraphs 99-102 below). 19. The Vilnius Regional Court noted that the former village of Kryžiokai had become part of the Vilnius city municipality in 1996 (see paragraph 10 above). Therefore, in line with the Law on Forests, any forest in that area was urban forest (see paragraph 89 below). The court further noted that in 2002 the forest situated on the plot given to I.B. had been included in a Government‑approved list of forests of national importance. Accordingly, when the VCA had adopted the decision to give that plot to I.B. (see paragraph 13 above), the forest situated on it had already been recognised as a forest of national importance. Therefore, the restitution had not been carried out in accordance with the law. The court held that, in such circumstances, I.B.’s and the applicants’ property rights could not take priority over the public interest and had to be annulled. 20. However, the court observed that, according to the Real Estate Register, the area covered by forest on the applicants’ plot amounted to 0.187 hectares and not 0.25 hectares as claimed by the prosecutor, and the data of that Register had to be considered accurate until proven otherwise. It therefore annulled I.B.’s property rights to 0.187 hectares of land, as well as the applicants’ rights to that part of the plot. 21. The prosecutor lodged an appeal against that decision and submitted that when determining the area covered by forest, the court should have relied on the data provided by the State Forest Management Service and not the Real Estate Register. The Ministry of Environment lodged a similar appeal. 22. The applicants and the VCA also lodged appeals. They argued that the VCA’s decision had complied with all the relevant legislation in force when it had been adopted, so it had to be considered lawful. They also submitted that the court had not addressed the argument that in the process of restoration of property rights Kryžiokai had to be regarded as a rural area and not a city. The applicants also submitted that the annulment of their property rights and the requirement for them to return the land to the State would cause them serious difficulties and should therefore not be implemented (see paragraph 95 below). 23. On 25 February 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld the appeals lodged by the prosecutor and the Ministry of Environment and dismissed those lodged by the applicants and the VCA. It reiterated that the Constitution and several laws prohibited the transfer of forests of national importance from the State into private ownership on any basis whatsoever, including restoration of property rights (see paragraphs 86 and 88‑91 below). Accordingly, it was immaterial that, as submitted by the VCA, its decision complied with certain regulations adopted during the restitution process. The Court of Appeal considered that the first-instance court had correctly found that the forest on the plot given to I.B. was urban forest and therefore a forest of national importance, and thus property rights in respect of that part had to be annulled. However, it stated that when determining the area covered by forest the information had to be taken not from the Real Estate Register but from the Register of Forests (Miškų kadastras), which was administered by the State Forest Management Service. According to the latter, the plot given to I.B. included 0.25 hectares of forest. The Court of Appeal therefore partly amended the decision and annulled I.B.’s property rights to 0.25 hectares of land, as well as the applicants’ rights to that part of the plot. It dismissed as unfounded the applicants’ argument that such a decision would cause them serious difficulties. The Court of Appeal ordered the applicants and the VCA to pay the State’s legal costs. 24. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. On 25 May 2010 the Supreme Court refused to accept it for examination on the grounds that it raised no important legal issues. 25. On 1 September 2008 the prosecutor lodged a further claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have I.B.’s property rights to another 1.73 hectares of the 5.40 hectares given to him annulled (see paragraph 13 above), on the grounds that it was covered by a forest of national importance, as well as to have the applicants’ property rights to that part of the plot annulled. The prosecutor presented similar arguments as in the previous proceedings (see paragraph 14 above). The applicants, the VCA and the Ministry of Environment also submitted essentially the same arguments as in the previous proceedings (see paragraphs 15-17 above). 26. On 13 May 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed the prosecutor’s claim. It noted that the presence of forest on the plot of land given to I.B. had been confirmed by the data in the Register of Forests. It also noted that that forest was included in the list of forests of national importance created in 2002 (see paragraph 12 above). The court observed that even though restoration of property rights was a continuous process and included the preparation of various documents, the final decision to restore property rights had to comply with the law in force at the time of the adoption of that decision. It concluded that the VCA’s decision to give the plot to I.B. (see paragraph 13 above) had been contrary to the Constitution and other legislation providing that forests of national importance could only be owned by the State (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below). Accordingly, it annulled I.B.’s property rights to 1.73 hectares of the land, as well as the applicants’ rights to that part of the plot. The court observed that there was no dispute that I.B. had retained the right to restoration of his property rights, and the State was thus under an obligation to restore his rights to 1.73 hectares of land. 27. The applicants and the VCA lodged appeals against that decision. They argued that the VCA’s decision had been based on various administrative and procedural acts according to which the forest on the applicants’ plot had not been considered a forest of national importance, and thus had been lawful. The prosecutor and the Ministry of Environment contested the appeals. 28. On 6 April 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals submitted by the applicants and the VCA and upheld the decision of the first-instance court in its entirety. It stated that the first-instance court had been correct in finding that the forest on the applicants’ plot was a forest of national importance and could thus only belong to the State. 29. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. On 9 July 2010 the Supreme Court refused to accept it for examination on the grounds that it raised no important legal issues. 30. According to the Government, on 11 May 2010 the VCA informed the applicants that there was no possibility of restitution in kind because there was no vacant land in the relevant area. According to the applicants, on 19 October 2010 they sent a letter to the National Land Service (the institution which took over the relevant functions of the VCA after an administrative reform  hereinafter “the NLS”) stating that they were of advanced age and did not “have the energy or state of health to look for vacant land in the Vilnius area”. Copies of the VCA’s and the applicants’ letters have not been submitted to the Court. 31. On 23 February 2012 the applicants received a letter from the NLS confirming that, after the courts had annulled I.B.’s property rights to 1.98 hectares of land, he had retained the right to have those property rights restored. It also stated that there was no more vacant land in the former village of Kryžiokai and that I.B.’s property rights could be restored by: (i) assigning a plot of land or forest equal in value to the land held previously; (ii) providing securities; (iii) discharging liabilities to the State; (iv) transferring, free of charge, a new plot of land equal in value to the land held previously for the construction of an individual home in the city or rural area where the previously held land was situated; or (v) providing monetary compensation (see paragraph 92 below). The applicants, as I.B.’s heirs, were asked to inform the authorities of their choice as to the form of restitution. It is unclear whether the applicants replied to this letter. 32. On 24 July 2012 the applicants received another letter from the NLS which again confirmed that, after the courts had annulled I.B.’s property rights to 1.98 hectares of land, he had retained the right to have those property rights restored. It stated that there was a possibility for the applicants to receive a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in the Vilnius city area but as there were 4,806 other candidates waiting to receive plots in the area, the restitution process would take a long time. The applicants were asked to consider an alternative form of restitution, such as a plot of land in a rural area, a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in a different city, or monetary compensation (see paragraph 92 below). They were also informed that there remained about 0.10 hectares of vacant land in the former village of Kryžiokai, so if they wished to receive a plot in that area, their request would be considered when the land plan was being prepared. 33. On 21 August 2012 the applicants sent a letter to the NLS. They submitted that the annulment of their property rights to 1.98 hectares of land had caused them pecuniary damage in the amount of 331,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL  approximately 95,900 euros (EUR)), according to an assessment of the value of the land carried out in May 2012. In the applicants’ view, being put on the list with 4,806 other candidates and being made to wait for an undetermined period of time for restitution was unacceptable. The applicants asked to be allocated a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in Vilnius in the order of priority, and if that was not possible, to be informed how many plots were available in Vilnius and when they might expect to receive one. They also stated that they would agree to receive a plot of land in Kryžiokai but would first want to know its exact location. The applicants stated that they did not wish to choose any other form of restitution. 34. On 14 December 2012 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius. The applicants were included in that list as candidates to receive 1.98 hectares of land. On 31 December 2012 the NLS held a meeting in which candidates were offered plots in the relevant areas. The second applicant took part in that meeting and chose three plots, measuring a total of 0.3627 hectares. She was offered more plots but refused them because there were electricity installations on them. The minutes of the meeting, approved by the NLS, stated that the next meeting of candidates would be held on 16 April 2013 and those who had not chosen their plots yet, including the second applicant, would be invited to participate. The Court was not provided with any information as to whether that meeting took place, whether the applicants were invited to attend and whether they did so. 35. On 21 August 2014 the NLS adopted a land plan of the aforementioned areas around Vilnius, as well as the list of individuals who would be allocated plots in those areas. The applicants were included in the list and were entitled to receive four plots of land, measuring a total of 0.4035 hectares. 36. On 7 October 2015 the first applicant died. The second applicant was issued a certificate of inheritance on 3 August 2016. 37. On 29 January 2016 the NLS adopted a decision to restore I.B.’s property rights by giving him five plots of agricultural land, measuring a total of 0.7883 hectares. The decision stated that the rights to the remaining 1.1917 hectares would be restored later. 38. On 26 April 2016 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several other areas around Vilnius. I.B. was included in that list as a candidate to receive 1.1917 hectares of land. On 18 May 2016 the NLS held a meeting in which candidates were offered plots in those areas. The second applicant took part in that meeting and chose two plots, measuring a total of 0.18 hectares. It does not appear that she was offered any more plots in that meeting. 39. On 31 August 2017 the NLS adopted a land plan of several areas around Vilnius, as well as the list of individuals who would be allocated plots in those areas. I.B. was included in the list and was entitled to receive two plots of land, amounting to a total of 0.18 hectares. 40. According to the latest information provided to the Court, the first and second applicants’ property rights to 1.1917 hectares of land have still not been restored. 41. On 6 April 2004 the VCA restored the third applicant’s property rights by giving her and another candidate, G.D., joint ownership of 0.52 hectares of agricultural land and 2.12 hectares of forest in Vaidotai. The third applicant’s share of the jointly owned forest was one hectare. 42. On 9 April 2009 the prosecutor lodged a claim with the Vilnius City Second District Court, seeking to have the applicant’s and G.D.’s property rights to the 2.12 hectares of forest annulled (see paragraph 41 above). The prosecutor submitted that the forest was situated in a city (see paragraph 10 above) and was thus considered a forest of national importance which could only be owned by the State (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below). The prosecutor noted that the forest in question had been included in the plan of forests of national importance adopted by the Government in 2002 (see paragraph 12 above), that is before the VCA had adopted its decision to give that forest to the applicant and G.D. Accordingly, the VCA’s decision had to be declared unlawful and its effects annulled. 43. The applicant disputed the prosecutor’s claim. She submitted that the VCA’s decision to give the forest to her and G.D. had been taken in line with the law in force at the material time and in coordination with the relevant authorities, including the Vilnius Forest Authority. The applicant also argued that, in line with the case-law of the Constitutional Court, forests which belonged to private individuals and were subsequently declared to be of national importance did not have to be taken into State ownership, as owners’ rights could be restricted in order to protect the forest. She therefore asked the court to protect her property rights. 44. The VCA also disputed the prosecutor’s claim. It submitted that the restoration of property rights to the land in the former village of Vaidotai had been carried out in line with the regulations applicable to rural areas. It also submitted that the decision to give the forest in question to the applicant and G.D. had been based on several administrative acts adopted in 2000, and so the decision could not be annulled as long as those acts remained in force. 45. The Ministry of Environment, which was a third party in the proceedings, asked the court to allow the prosecutor’s claim. It argued that at the time when the VCA had adopted the decision to give the forest to the applicant and G.D., the forest had officially been urban forest (see paragraph 10 above) and had been included in the list of forests of national importance (see paragraph 12 above). Accordingly, the VCA’s decision had been contrary to mandatory statutory provisions (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below) and had to be annulled. 46. On 4 March 2009 the Vilnius City Second District Court allowed the prosecutor’s claim. It reiterated that, in line with the Constitution and the Law on Forests, urban forests were considered forests of national importance and could only belong to the State (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below). The court also emphasised the importance of forests to the environment and the obligation of the State to protect them in the public interest. It then noted that the former village of Vaidotai had become part of the Vilnius city municipality in 1996 (see paragraph 10 above), so any forests within that area were urban forests. The court also observed that the forest given to the applicant and G.D. had been included in the list of forests of national importance approved by the Government in 2002 (see paragraph 12 above). Accordingly, the VCA’s decision to give that forest to the applicant and G.D. had been adopted after the forest had already become a forest of national importance (see paragraph 41 above). The court held that it was immaterial whether other administrative acts on which the VCA’s decision had been based remained valid (see paragraph 44 above) because property rights had been restored to the applicant and G.D. by that decision and not by any other acts. The court therefore annulled the applicant’s and G.D.’s property rights to the 2.12 hectares of forest. 47. The applicant and the VCA lodged appeals against that decision, raising essentially the same arguments as before (see paragraphs 43 and 44 above). In addition, the applicant submitted that her property rights to the forest in question had been challenged four years after it had been given to her, and thus she had lost the opportunity to have her property rights restored because there was almost no vacant land left in Vilnius or the surrounding area. 48. On 13 August 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the first-instance court’s decision in its entirety. It considered that that court had been correct in finding that the forest in question was a forest of national importance and that the VCA’s decision had thus been contrary to mandatory statutory provisions prohibiting the transfer of such forests into the ownership of private individuals. In response to the applicant’s argument that she had lost the opportunity to have her property rights restored (see paragraph 47 above), the Vilnius Regional Court stated that Lithuanian law provided for partial restitution, and that where it was impossible to restore property rights in natura, it could be done in other ways, including by monetary compensation (see paragraphs 92 and 97 below). Therefore, the court considered that the applicant had retained the right to have her property rights restored in one of the forms provided for by law. 49. The applicant and the VCA lodged appeals on points of law, relying on essentially the same arguments as before (see paragraphs 43, 44 and 47 above). In addition, the applicant submitted that she had acquired the property in good faith and that ordering her to return it to the State would cause her serious difficulties (see paragraph 95 below). She argued that she could no longer receive a plot in the same area because there was no more vacant land there and that she would not receive fair compensation either because property prices had decreased. The applicant submitted that the public interest to protect forests could be achieved in other ways, such as by imposing on her special conditions for use of the forest. 50. On 5 February 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals on points of law and upheld the findings of the lower courts. It observed that restoring property rights to forests in valuable areas had been prohibited since the beginning of the restitution process in Lithuania. Accordingly, individuals could not have a legitimate expectation to acquire property rights to such forests. It also stated that the VCA, as the institution in charge of restoration of property rights, was under an obligation to ensure that its decisions complied with all relevant legislation adopted throughout the entirety of the restitution process. 51. The Supreme Court reiterated that when a transaction was annulled, the parties had to return to one another everything that they had received from that transaction (see paragraph 94 below). It stated that the lower courts had not identified any exceptional circumstances why that rule should not be applied in the present case, nor had the applicant pointed to any such circumstances. The Supreme Court noted that the applicant had retained the right to have her property rights restored in accordance with the law, so her argument that she would experience serious difficulties (see paragraph 49 above) had to be dismissed as unfounded. 52. On 7 April 2010 the applicant sent a letter to the VCA seeking to be given a plot of land in the former village of Vaidotai. On 11 May 2010 the VCA informed the applicant that there was no vacant land in Vaidotai and asked her to choose another form of restitution (see paragraph 92 below). 53. On 29 October 2010 the applicant sent a letter to the NLS stating that she was 78 years old and did not “have the energy or the state of health to participate in the complicated restitution process for a second time”. The applicant stated that she had lost her property because of the unlawful actions of the VCA, therefore the NLS, as the VCA’s successor, had to compensate her for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage which she had sustained. She asked the NLS to provide her with a list of plots of land equal in value in the Vilnius city area to which her property rights could be restored. 54. On 13 December 2010 the NLS informed the applicant that, in accordance with the law, her property rights could be restored by assigning her a plot of land equal in value to the land held previously or by providing securities, but that there was no possibility of her receiving a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in a city. The letter provided the address of a website on which the applicant could find information about vacant plots of land, and she was asked to submit a request to the municipal authorities indicating the area in which she wished to receive a plot equal in value. It was also stated that if she was dissatisfied with the response given, she could lodge a complaint with the director of the NLS. 55. On 16 December 2011 the applicant sent a request to the NLS for compensation in securities. On 1 February 2012 she received a reply informing her that compensation in the form of securities was temporarily unavailable. 56. On 6 March 2012 the applicant submitted a request for a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in the town of Trakai. On 30 May 2012 in a letter to the NLS she reiterated her wish to receive a plot in Trakai and stated that she also wished to receive a plot of land in Vilnius, but did not wish to have her property rights restored by monetary compensation. 57. On 23 July 2012 the NLS sent a letter to the applicant confirming that, after the courts had annulled her property rights to one hectare of land (see paragraph 41 above), she had retained the right to have those property rights restored. She could be given a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in Vilnius or Trakai, but there were many other candidates waiting to receive plots in those areas (4,806 and 94 respectively, and the land plan for Trakai had not been prepared yet), therefore the restitution process would take a long time. She was asked to consider an alternative form of restitution, such as a plot of land in a rural area, a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in a different city or monetary compensation. She was also informed that there remained some vacant land in the former village of Vaidotai, so if she wished to receive a plot in that area, her request would be considered when the land plan was being prepared. It is unclear whether the applicant replied to that letter or submitted any requests concerning the form of restoration of her property rights. 58. On 7 October 2013 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius. The applicant was included in that list as a candidate to receive 1.12 hectares of land. On 9 October 2013 she was sent an invitation to attend a meeting of candidates on 22 October 2013. She did not take part in that meeting. On 24 October 2013 she was sent an invitation to attend a meeting of candidates on 6 November 2013. She did not take part. The applicant submitted to the Court that she had not been informed of those meetings. 59. On 5 April 2016 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several other areas around Vilnius. The applicant was included in that list as a candidate to receive 1.12 hectares of land. On 22 April 2016 the NLS held a meeting of candidates to receive plots of land in those areas. Her representative took part in the meeting but did not provide a form of authority. 60. On 17 May 2016 the NLS held another meeting of candidates to receive plots of land in the aforementioned areas. The applicant participated in that meeting but did not choose any of the plots offered to her. The minutes of the meeting do not indicate the reasons for her refusal. The applicant submitted to the Court that the plots offered to her had had electricity installations on them and had therefore been “worthless”. 61. According to the latest information provided to the Court, the third applicant’s property rights to one hectare of land have still not been restored. 62. On 10 December 2003 the VCA restored the fourth applicant’s property rights by giving her 2.67 hectares of land in the villages of Kryžiokai and Naujaneriai. On 25 April 2005 she sold 1.5 hectares of the land given to her in Kryžiokai to another individual, J.S., for LTL 495,000 (approximately EUR 143,400). The sale agreement was certified by a notary. 63. On 15 December 2008 the prosecutor lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have the applicant’s property rights to 0.15 of the 2.67 hectares given to her annulled (see paragraph 62 above). The prosecutor submitted that, according to the data provided by the State Forest Management Service, the 0.15 hectares were covered by forest. Since it was situated in a city (see paragraph 10 above), it was considered a forest of national importance and could thus only be owned by the State (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below). The prosecutor asked that after annulling the applicant’s property rights, the sale agreement between her and J.S. be annulled in respect of that part of the land. 64. The applicant disputed the prosecutor’s claim. She submitted that there had not been any forest on the land before its nationalisation, and if a forest had grown there afterwards, that should not preclude the restoration of her property rights. She also submitted that she had not acted unlawfully, so the property could not be taken from her. The applicant argued that if authorities or officials had acted unlawfully, the State should have to buy the land from her, and that the public interest should be protected without prejudice to her rights. 65. The VCA also disputed the claim. It argued that the applicant’s property rights had been restored in accordance with the legislation in force at the material time, and that the decision had been taken in coordination with various authorities, including the Ministry of Environment and the Vilnius Forest Authority, which had not presented any objections. 66. The Ministry of Environment, which was a third party in the proceedings, supported the prosecutor’s claim. 67. On 29 March 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed the prosecutor’s claim. It observed that even though the Real Estate Register did not contain information about the presence of forest on the applicant’s land, it had been proven by the data provided by the State Forest Management Service. The court reiterated that forests of national importance could only be owned by the State (see paragraphs 86, 88 and 89 below), and that forests situated in cities were considered forests of national importance, irrespective of whether they had been officially designated as such (see paragraph 102 below). It observed that the former village of Kryžiokai had become part of the Vilnius city municipality in 1996 (see paragraph 10 above). Accordingly, the court held that the VCA’s decision to restore the applicant’s property rights had been unlawful and had to be annulled. 68. Finding that the applicant had not had a right to acquire the 0.15 hectares of land in question, the Vilnius Regional Court held that, consequently, she had had no right to sell the land, and thus the sale agreement between her and J.S. in the relevant part also had to be annulled. In accordance with the Civil Code, J.S. was ordered to return 0.15 hectares of land to the State, and the applicant was ordered to return LTL 49,500 (approximately EUR 14,340) to J.S. (see paragraph 94 below). The court noted that the applicant had retained the right to restoration of her property rights, and that the restitution process had to be “continued at the expense of the VCA or its successor, by finalising (and not starting afresh), in the same order of priority, the restitution process that had already begun”. It accepted the applicant’s argument that she might face financial difficulties as a result of having to return money to J.S. because she no longer had the necessary amount. The court gave the applicant six months from the date on which the decision became final to return the money to J.S. It observed that it had no authority to directly order the VCA to complete the restoration of the applicant’s property rights within that period of time, but that “the activity of the VCA or its successor in the restitution process could constitute grounds for reducing the possible expenses of that institution, if [the applicant and J.S.] were found to have suffered losses as a result of unlawful acts established in the present decision ... and had to be compensated”. 69. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, presenting essentially the same arguments as before (see paragraph 64 above). She also argued that the order to pay the money to J.S. should not have been imposed on her but on the VCA, since it was the latter which had acted unlawfully. 70. On 7 February 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court in its entirety. The court stressed that forests of national importance could not be transferred into private ownership on any basis whatsoever, including restitution of nationalised property (see paragraph 101 below). It stated that the institutions responsible for adopting decisions on restoration of property rights had to verify whether all the conditions for restitution provided by law were complied with and, when deciding to restore property rights in natura, whether the property in question was not a type which could only belong to the State. Accordingly, the VCA, when adopting the decision to restore the applicant’s property rights, had been under an obligation to verify whether that decision complied with the law in force at the time of its adoption. 71. The Court of Appeal held that the finding that the applicant’s property rights had been restored in contravention of the law enabled it to consider that she had acquired those property rights in bad faith (nesąžininga įgijėja). It stated that the applicant and J.S. “could not be considered bona fide acquirers merely because the land in question had become private property as a result of a decision adopted by a public authority”. It also stated that when an individual knew or ought to have known that an administrative decision might be contrary to the law, he or she could not rely on his or her good faith. 72. The Court of Appeal further observed that even though the unlawful restoration of property rights had been the result of a decision adopted by the VCA, under the law it was not possible to order the VCA, and not the applicant, to return the money paid for the plot in question to J.S. (see paragraph 69 above). The court considered that requiring J.S. to return the plot to the State and the applicant to return the money to J.S. would not cause “serious difficulties for the defendants” (see paragraph 95 below). It also reiterated that the applicant had retained the right to restoration of her property rights in one of the forms provided for by law. 73. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. On 29 March 2011 the Supreme Court refused to accept it for examination on the grounds that it raised no important legal issues. 74. On 25 October 2011 the applicant paid LTL 49,500 to J.S. 75. On 23 February 2012 the applicant received a letter from the NLS confirming that she had retained the right to have her property rights to 0.15 hectares of land restored. It stated that there was no more vacant land in Kryžiokai and that her property rights could be restored by: (i) assigning a plot of land or forest equal in value to the land held previously; (ii) providing securities; (iii) discharging liabilities to the State; (iv) transferring, free of charge, a new plot of land equal in value to the land held previously for the construction of an individual home in the city or rural area where the previously held land was situated; or (v) providing monetary compensation (see paragraph 92 below). The applicant was asked to inform the authorities of her choice as to the form of restitution. 76. On 7 March 2012 the applicant sent a letter to the NLS stating that she had suffered pecuniary damage in the amount of LTL 49,500 as a result of the actions of the authorities. The applicant expressed her wish to be given a plot of land of 0.15 hectares, and if the value of that plot was lower than LTL 49,500, that the difference be paid to her as damages. 77. On 24 July 2012 the applicant received another letter from the NLS. It stated that there was a possibility of her receiving a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in the Vilnius city area but as there were 4,806 other candidates waiting to receive plots in that area, the restitution would take a long time. The applicant was asked to consider an alternative form of restitution, such as a plot of land in a rural area, a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in a different city or monetary compensation. She was also informed that there was a possibility for her to receive land in Kryžiokai, so if she wished to receive a plot in that area, her request would be considered when the land plan had been prepared. 78. On 21 August 2012 the applicant sent a letter to the NLS. She reiterated that the annulment of her property rights to 0.15 hectares of land had caused her pecuniary damage in the amount of LTL 49,500. In her view, being put on the list with 4,806 other candidates and being made to wait for an undetermined period of time for restitution was unacceptable. The applicant asked to be allocated a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in Vilnius in the order of priority, and if that was not possible, to be informed how many plots were available in Vilnius and when she might expect to receive one. If she could not be given such a plot, she wished to receive compensation of LTL 49,500. The applicant stated that she did not wish to choose any other form of restitution. 79. On 14 December 2012 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius. The applicant was included in that list as a candidate to receive 0.15 hectares of land. On 31 December 2012 the NLS held a meeting in which candidates were offered plots in the relevant areas. The applicant took part in that meeting. According to the minutes of the meeting approved by the NLS and signed by the applicant, she refused the plot which was offered to her and stated that she wished to wait for the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in her case. 80. On 26 April 2016 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several other areas around Vilnius. The applicant was included in that list as a candidate to receive 0.15 hectares of land. 81. On 27 April 2016 the NLS sent a letter to the applicant inviting her to attend a meeting of candidates on 18 May 2016 in which she would be offered a plot. The applicant did not take part in that meeting. 82. On 18 May 2016 the NLS sent a letter to the applicant inviting her to attend a meeting of candidates on 1 June 2016 in which she would be offered a plot. It is unclear whether the applicant took part in that meeting. 83. According to the latest information provided to the Court, the fourth applicant’s property rights to 0.15 hectares of land have still not been restored.

6. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Dublin, Ireland. 7. In 2004 he married a Slovak national and the couple settled in Ireland. Their two children, born in 2006 and 2008, are both Irish nationals. 8. On 6 January 2011 the mother travelled to Slovakia with the two children and they have not returned to Ireland since. 9. On 31 January 2011 the applicant commenced proceedings in the Slovakian courts for the return of his children to Ireland under the Brussels II bis Regulation and the Hague Convention. 10. On 1 July and 26 October 2011 respectively, the Bratislava I District Court and, following an appeal by the mother, the Bratislava Regional Court, ordered the return of the children to Ireland as their country of habitual residence and issued several ancillary orders. 11. The return order became enforceable on 8 July 2011. 12. On 6 February 2012 the applicant applied for judicial enforcement of the return order since the mother had not complied with it. 13. On 9 February 2012 the Michalovce District Court attempted to have the mother comply voluntarily with the order. In response, she informed the District Court that she had lodged a request with the Prosecutor General for him to exercise his discretionary power to challenge the return order by way of an extraordinary appeal on points of law (mimoriadne dovolanie). 14. On 26 March 2012 the District Court stayed the enforcement proceedings on the return order pending the outcome of the mother’s request to the Prosecutor General. 15. On 14 August 2012 the District Court resumed the enforcement proceedings after the Prosecutor General had found that there were no reasons to lodge an extraordinary appeal on points of law. 16. On 18 October 2012 and 26 June 2013 respectively, the District Court and, following an appeal by the applicant, the Košice Regional Court, found that the return order was not enforceable. They based their conclusions on the following two grounds. Firstly, they concluded that there already existed a previous decision on provisional measures, which had been delivered by the Michalovce District Court on 16 May 2011. That decision had temporarily entrusted the children to the care of the mother and required the applicant to pay child maintenance in the meantime. Those interim custody rights were to be determined later by the competent courts in Ireland. Secondly, the return order had failed to specify that it was directed at the mother or to give a precise time frame for its implementation. Given the fact that the mother had not been identified as the recipient and that the applicant had not been provisionally entrusted with the care of the children, the order could not be enforced. 17. Following the unsuccessful enforcement proceedings, the applicant applied to the same court which had delivered the return order, the Bratislava I District Court. He referred to the shortcomings in the order as identified by the enforcement courts and asked the court to specify to whom the order had been directed and to provide a time frame for the return of the children. The District Court concluded that the applicant’s action was res iudicata and dismissed it on 6 November 2014. 18. In the meantime, on 22 October 2013, the applicant challenged the enforcement courts’ decisions of 18 October 2012 and 26 June 2013 by way of a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended). 19. On 9 July 2014 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint admissible and on 27 May 2015 it found on the merits that the Košice Regional Court had violated the applicant’s rights, as specified below (“the first constitutional judgment”). 20. In particular, it found a violation of the applicant’s rights under Articles 19 § 1 (family life), 41 §§ 1 and 4 (protection of parenthood and children, right to child care), and 46 § 1 (judicial protection) of the Constitution, and under Article 6 § 1 (fairness) and Article 8 (family life) of the Convention. 21. The Constitutional Court found that the Regional Court’s decision had been taken on purely formal grounds and had been arbitrary and in contravention of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Brussels II bis regulation, the Hague Convention and the Constitution. That arbitrary decision had meant that the positive obligations guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention and the applicant’s parental rights had been breached as well. 22. Consequently, the Constitutional Court quashed the contested decision, remitted the applicant’s appeal against the District Court’s decision of 18 October 2012 to the Regional Court for re‑examination and awarded him 3,000 euros (EUR) in compensation for non‑pecuniary damage. In addition, the Constitutional Court awarded the applicant everything he had claimed in legal costs (EUR 276.94). It noted that he had made no claim for costs in respect of his observations in reply to those of the enforcement courts concerned by his complaint and concluded that no award was therefore possible in that regard. 23. The judgment was final and not amenable to appeal. 24. Following the first constitutional judgment, the enforcement proceedings resumed before the Regional Court, which heard the case on 3 August 2015. It acknowledged that it was bound by the Constitutional Court’s judgment. However, having regard to the considerable length of time that had elapsed, it deemed it necessary to assess afresh all the circumstances decisive for the enforcement of the return order, such as the children’s whereabouts, their health and the possibility of their returning to Ireland. It therefore quashed the District Court’s decision under appeal and remitted the matter to it for re-examination. 25. On 15 April 2016 the District Court again declared enforcement of the order impermissible on the basis of newly obtained evidence. It relied on medical reports concerning the children’s health, a psychological report referring to negative consequences for them if they were separated from the mother and an opinion from the court-appointed guardian (the Michalovce office of employment, social affairs and family) about the stable family environment they had while living with their mother. It also took into account the children’s wish to stay with their mother and her new husband, their social ties in Slovakia, where they had been residing since January 2011, and the applicant’s lack of contact with them while in Slovakia. Relying on the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Court’s Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland (no. 41615/07, ECHR 2010), it concluded that their return to Ireland would go against their best interests. 26. Following an appeal by the applicant, the Regional Court upheld the lower court’s decision on 3 August 2016 and it became final and binding on 22 August 2016. 27. In the meantime, the applicant on 22 February 2016 lodged another constitutional complaint aimed at the enforcement proceedings held before the District Court (see paragraph 25 above). He alleged a violation of Articles 6 (length) and 8 (family life) of the Convention and their constitutional equivalents. 28. On 14 December 2016 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s rights under both of those Convention provisions (“the second constitutional judgment”). When dealing with the applicant’s length of proceedings complaint, the Constitutional Court took into account that it was the first time the applicant had raised such a grievance. There had accordingly been no previous constitutional assessment of that matter to prevent it from assessing the impugned enforcement proceedings in their entirety, from when they had been initiated. Having regard to the sensitive nature of the matter and its importance for the applicant’s enjoyment of his parental rights, the Constitutional Court found that the District Court had proceeded with the matter over a long time (for more than four years) and inefficiently (it had stayed the proceedings, delivered an arbitrary enforcement decision on the first occasion, and had taken lengthy procedural steps). Notably, the Constitutional Court emphasised that it was precisely the passage of time which had led the District Court to dismiss enforcement of the return order. It also reproached the District Court for the inadequate way it had dealt with the mother’s procedural requests. It further stressed the particular nature of the enforcement of such return orders and pointed out that they required prompt and efficient decision‑making that was in accordance with international standards. Moreover, the Constitutional Court found that there had been a violation of the applicant’s right to respect for his family life as a consequence of the fact that throughout the enforcement proceedings, whose length had been in breach of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time, he had been unable to assert his parental rights before the competent courts. 29. The Constitutional Court ordered the District Court to reimburse the applicant’s legal costs and to pay him EUR 4,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 30. After the enforcement proceedings had been completed by a final and binding decision and before the second constitutional judgment had been issued, the applicant applied to the Constitutional Court a third time on 14 October 2016. He relied on that occasion on Article 6 (fairness and length) in conjunction with Articles 13 and 8 (family life) of the Convention and challenged the decisions of 15 April and 3 August 2016 (see paragraphs 26 and 27 above) on their merits. That complaint is still ongoing.

5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Omsk. 6. The applicant was deputy head of the Omsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences. 7. On 22 August 2002 the Novosibirsk Regional Court authorised for 180 days the interception and recording of the applicant’s telephone conversations, interception of postal communications and the collection of data from technical channels of communication. The surveillance authorisation read in its entirety as follows: “Operational-search measures carried out with the aim of combatting corruption within State authorities have revealed indications of a systematic bribery scheme operated by certain prison officials in the Omsk region. According to operative information, there are good reasons to suspect [the applicant], deputy head of the Omsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences, of arranging for, and systematically receiving, unlawful payments from confidants of the convicts serving their sentences in Omsk penal institutions in exchange for granting them various privileges (such as a prison leave, improved conditions of detention or transfer to another penal institution within the Omsk region, which was for some reason preferred by the convict in question). Given that [the applicant’s] actions contain elements of criminal offences under Article 290 § 4 of the Criminal Code [bribe-taking], classified as a serious offence, and under Article 285 § 1 of the Criminal Code [abuse of power], it is necessary to perform a combination of operational-search measures (interception and recording of telephone conversations, monitoring of correspondence and collection of data from technical channels of communication) in order to collect evidence of his criminal activities, and to receive information about the bribe‑givers and the payment mechanisms used.” 8. On 18 February 2003 the Novosibirsk Regional Court authorised “audio surveillance” of the applicant’s office for 180 days. The Government did not submit a copy of that decision. 9. Charges of bribe-taking or abuse of power have never been brought against the applicant. 10. In March 2003 the applicant was charged with disclosure of State secrets, an offence under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code, for informing a convict’s relative that the convict was under covert surveillance. 11. When studying the criminal case file, the applicant learnt for the first time that his telephone conversations had been recorded and his other communications monitored. He also learnt that a recording of his telephone conversation with Ms L., a sister of a convict detained in a penal institution under his supervision, formed the basis for the charge of disclosure of State secrets. During the conversation, which had taken place on 17 October 2002, the applicant had warned Ms L. that her relative was under covert surveillance and that there were listening devices hidden in his cell. 12. At the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He claimed, in particular, that the recording of his telephone conversation with Ms L. was inadmissible as evidence as it had been obtained unlawfully. 13. On 16 February 2005 the Omsk Regional Court found the applicant guilty of disclosure of State secrets, an offence under Article 283 § 1 of the Criminal Code. It relied on the recording of the applicant’s telephone conversation with Ms L., among other evidence. It found that the recording was admissible as evidence as it had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. In particular, the interception of the applicant’s telephone conversations had been authorised by a court on the grounds that he was suspected of the serious criminal offence of bribe‑taking. The applicant was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years. 14. In his appeal submissions the applicant complained, in particular, of a violation of his right to respect for his private life. He argued that the interception of his communications had been unlawful and unjustified, and that the recording of his conversation with Ms L. was inadmissible as evidence. 15. On 21 June 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction on appeal. It noted that all the evidence had been collected in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and was admissible.

6. The applicant was born in 1988 and is currently detained in Warsaw Służewiec Remand Centre. 7. On 26 November 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police. 8. On 27 November 2010 the Warsaw Wola District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) charged the applicant with possession of a significant amount of drugs and requested that the Warsaw Wola District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) detain him on remand. 9. On 28 November 2010 the court decided to detain the applicant on remand for a period of three months, in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had been in possession of a significant amount of drugs (III Kp 2159/10). The court applied this measure due to the high probability that the applicant had committed the offence with which he was charged, the severity of the maximum sentence provided by law for such offence (up to at least eight years’ imprisonment) and the fact that the likelihood of such a penalty might induce the applicant to obstruct the proceedings, as well as the fear that the applicant might influence other persons to present a version of events favourable to him. 10. On 21 February 2011 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The court noted that the applicant had also been charged with being a member of an organised, armed criminal gang and pointed out the actions that needed to be taken to conclude the investigation. 11. Between 18 March and 12 April 2011 the applicant partially served a prison sentence ordered in another set of criminal proceedings against him (III K 203/09). 12. On 23 May the Warsaw Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand. The court again relied on the severity of the anticipated sentence and possibly adverse consequences that the applicant’s release could have for the ongoing investigation. 13. On 22 August 2011 the Warsaw Regional Court again extended the applicant’s detention on remand. It listed the charges against the applicant, which included, apart from those mentioned above, battery, making a profit from prostitution of others and destroying property. The court expressly stated that it was not obliged to specify actions aiming to obstruct the investigation, because the sole gravity of charges allowed for the presumption that such actions might be undertaken. It also pointed out that, while at large, the applicant might hinder the investigation concerning other members of the same gang. 14. On 16 September 2011 a bill of indictment against the applicant and fourteen other persons was lodged with the Warsaw Regional Court (XVIII K 297/11). 15. The applicant’s detention on remand was extended by the Warsaw Regional Court on 26 September 2011 until 30 March 2012. 16. Between 24 October 2011 and 24 October 2012 the applicant served the remaining part of the prison sentence ordered in case III K 203/09, and from 24 October 2012 to 23 October 2013 he served a prison sentence ordered in another set of criminal proceedings against him (III K 1027/07). 17. In the meantime, the Warsaw Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand on 13 March, 4 July and 20 September 2012. The two latter decisions were upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) on 31 July and 4 October 2012 respectively. 18. The Warsaw Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention on 4 October 2012, 15 January, 13 June and 28 October 2013, 13 March, 29 July and 30 December 2014, 25 June and 22 October 2015 and on 26 January 2016. The court relied on a high probability that the applicant and other accused had committed the offences with which they had been charged and on the complexity of the case. The court also considered that the persons accused might take actions aiming at obstructing the proper course of the proceedings, because they had known other accused, and the charges against them included being members of an armed and organised criminal gang. The Court of Appeal also considered that there was a high likelihood of a severe sentence being imposed. The relevant decisions were often phrased in general terms and no particular instances of the applicant’s conduct during the investigation or at the judicial stage was provided to substantiate the extension of detention on remand. 19. The applicant’s appeals against those decisions were unsuccessful. His numerous requests for release, including on bail, were dismissed. 20. On 4 March 2016 the Warsaw Regional Court gave judgment. The applicant was convicted of multiple offences and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment and to a fine of 8,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 1,850 euros (EUR)). On the same date the applicant’s detention on remand was lifted. 21. On 12 May 2017 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld that judgment in respect of the applicant.

5. The applicants were born in 1975 and 1976 and live in Cahul and Cetireni respectively. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. The applicants were convicted by Moldovan courts and, at the time of the events, were serving their sentences in prison no. 8 situated in the town of Tighina (Bender), in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova. The town is situated in the security zone under the control of peacekeepers from Moldova, Russia and the self-proclaimed “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” (“MRT”)[1]. Prison no. 8 is under the exclusive control of the Moldovan authorities. By October 2003 some 236 people were detained there; some of them, such as the applicants, were ill with tuberculosis. 8. On 23 September 2002 the Bender local administration, which is subordinated to the “MRT” authorities, disconnected prison no. 8 from the electricity, water and heating supplies. As a result, the detainees were deprived of conditions of basic hygiene, and the food they received did not meet the minimum standards of quality. 9. The prison authorities informed the Moldovan Ministry of Justice, the President’s Office, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Red Cross and the Council of Europe, as well as local human rights organisations, with a view to obtaining assistance in resolving the problem arising from the disconnection from the town’s utilities network. 10. On 12 August 2003 the Bender prosecutor’s office (which forms part of the official Moldovan authorities) informed the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Moldova (“the CHDOM”), for which the applicant’s representative worked, that, as a result of pressure from the OSCE, the Bender authorities had reconnected the prison to the electricity and water supply systems on 23 February 2003. On 10 July 2003 the last of the people who were ill with tuberculosis were transferred to a newly-built hospital wing in Pruncul prison hospital, situated in Moldova. According to the head of prison no. 8, some 236 healthy detainees, including the applicants, remained in the prison after that date. However, also on 10 July 2003, the local authorities disconnected prison no. 8 from the electricity and water supply systems again, without any warning. The “MRT” authorities insisted that the prison needed to be closed down. 11. On 15 September 2004 Mr Pocasovschi (the first applicant) was transferred to another prison. He was released on parole on 14 April 2005. Mr Mihăilă (the second applicant) was transferred to another prison on 1 March 2004 and was released on parole on 28 March 2005. 12. On 21 July 2003 the applicants’ representatives asked the Moldovan Prosecutor General’s Office to initiate criminal proceedings against those responsible for disconnecting prison no. 8 from the utilities systems. On 12 August 2003 the Bender prosecutor’s office replied in general terms, describing the difficult situation with regard to prison no. 8 and the unsuccessful negotiations with the local authorities. 13. On 29 August 2003 the CHDOM asked the Bender District Court (which is part of the Moldovan court system) to order the prosecutor’s office to remedy the human rights violations taking place in prison no. 8. 14. On 7 October 2003 the head of prison no. 8 informed the court that, owing to insufficient access to water and electricity, detainees in his institution could not receive appropriate medical assistance or food of a sufficient standard, or maintain proper hygiene. 15. On 31 October 2003 the Bender District Court ordered the prosecutor’s office to initiate criminal proceedings against those responsible for disconnecting prison no. 8 from the utilities supply. That decision was upheld by the Bender Court of Appeal on 18 December 2003. 16. According to the Moldovan Government, on 18 November 2003 the Bender prosecutor’s office contacted the “MRT” authorities with a view to prosecuting those responsible for disconnecting prison no. 8 from the utilities. It also informed the Joint Control Commission (see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, § 90, ECHR 2004‑VII) of the need to include the subject on its agenda. On 20 December 2003 the “MRT” prosecutor’s office refused to open a criminal investigation on the ground that no crime had been committed. 17. On 19 January 2004 the relatives of two of the detainees made another complaint to the CHDOM regarding the inhuman conditions of detention in prison no. 8. That letter was forwarded to the Moldovan Ministry of Justice, the President of the Republic of Moldova and the Prosecutor General’s Office, along with a request to take all necessary steps to immediately improve the conditions of detention. 18. On 1 March 2004 the CHDOM asked the Bender prosecutor’s office what action had been taken pursuant to the above-mentioned court decisions. On 12 March 2004 the Bender prosecutor’s office replied that all the material was at the Prosecutor General’s Office, which was dealing with the case. 19. On 15 March 2004 the Ministry of Justice informed the CHDOM that the State was making all necessary efforts to ensure acceptable conditions of detention at prison no. 8, and that, at that time, the conditions of detention at that prison did not differ from those at other prisons in the Republic of Moldova. 20. On 20 April 2004 the Prosecutor General’s Office informed the CHDOM that it had lodged an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court of Justice against the decisions of 31 October 2003 and 18 December 2003. On 3 August 2004 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld those decisions. 21. On 1 June 2009 the CHDOM asked the Prosecutor General’s Office what actions had been undertaken after the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 3 August 2004. On 14 July 2009 the Bender Prosecutor’s Office replied that the actions of the “MRT” authorities could not be investigated by the Moldovan authorities as long as the “MRT” authorities de facto controlled the territory of the “MRT”. 22. On 15 March 2004, on behalf of 141 detainees in prison no. 8, including the applicants, the CHDOM lodged a civil action against the Ministry of Justice, asking for the finding of a violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of the Convention. The detainees had authorised the organisation to act on their behalf. The CHDOM also asked for an improvement in the conditions of detention and for the payment of compensation in the amount of 15,000 Moldovan lei (MDL – approximately 1,000 euros (EUR) at the time) for each detainee. 23. On 16 and 22 April 2004 the President of the Bender District Court asked the Supreme Court of Justice to decide whether the case should be examined by another court. On 19 May 2004 the Supreme Court of Justice rejected the request and left the case with the Bender District Court. 24. On 18 June 2004 the Bender District Court decided to transfer the case to the Buiucani District Court in Chişinău, in accordance with territorial competence principles. The claimants (the detainees) and their representatives were not consulted. On 22 June 2004 the CHDOM challenged that decision. On 14 July 2004 the Bender Court of Appeal set aside the decision of 18 June 2004 and ordered the urgent examination of the case by the Bender District Court. 25. On 28 December 2004 the Bender District Court declined to examine the claim because it did not satisfy legal requirements. On 1 February 2005 the Bender Court of Appeal set aside that decision. 26. After February 2005 many of the 141 detainees who were plaintiffs in the above-mentioned civil action were transferred to other prisons in various parts of the country, which made it more difficult for the CHDOM to obtain confirmation of each individual’s power of attorney, as requested by the Bender District Court. In such circumstances, the CHDOM selected nine cases (including those of the applicants in the present case) with which to continue the proceedings. Since the individuals concerned were also detained in separate prisons, the CHDOM made an application for their cases to be examined separately, an application which the Bender District Court refused on 11 November 2005. 27. On 26 April 2006 the Bender District Court rejected the CHDOM’s application to summon as defendants the individuals from the relevant local “MRT” authorities in Bender responsible for violating the detainees’ rights. On an unknown date in June 2006 the Bender Court of Appeal set aside that decision and ordered the summoning as defendants of A.P., A.M. and V.M., the heads of the relevant local “MRT” authorities in Bender. According to the applicants, none of these individuals was summoned by the Bender District Court. 28. On 15 December 2006 the judge who had been examining the case withdrew from it. On 18 May 2007 the judge who had taken over the case also withdrew from it. Subsequently, all other judges of the Bender District Court withdrew, allegedly for fear of persecution by the “MRT” authorities. As a result, the Bender Court of Appeal was asked to decide which other court could examine the case. On 13 November 2007 the Bender Court of Appeal decided that the case should be examined by the Anenii-Noi District Court. 29. On 26 December 2007 the Anenii-Noi District Court declined to examine the claim because it did not fulfil certain legal requirements. It found in particular that there was a lack of valid powers of attorney in favour of the CHDOM. 30. On 6 March 2008 the CHDOM lodged a reformulated court action in accordance with the legal requirements. It also asked for the Russian Government to be summoned as a defendant in the case, as it had de facto control over the territory of the “MRT”. It claimed EUR 10,000 and EUR 7,000 respectively for the breach of the applicants’ rights. On the same date the Anenii-Noi District Court declined to examine the claim because the powers of attorney issued by the detainees in favour of the CHDOM had expired. 31. On 20 May 2008 the Bender Court of Appeal set aside the decision of 6 March 2008, noting that, in the applicants’ cases, the powers of attorney had been renewed. 32. On 18 June 2008 the Anenii-Noi District Court adjourned the hearing because of the absence of a representative of the Ministry of Justice. The same thing occurred on 29 October 2008. The court also informed the CHDOM that, in a letter dated 2 July 2007, the Ministry of Justice had informed the court that a representative of the Russian Federation could only be summoned via the Ministry of Justice. 33. On 30 December 2008 the Anenii-Noi District Court adopted a judgment in which it allowed the applicants’ claims in part. It awarded each of them damages in the amount of EUR 200, to be paid by the Moldovan Ministry of Finance, and EUR 500, to be paid by the Russian Ministry of Finance. 34. On 30 June 2009 the Bender Court of Appeal quashed that judgment in part. It found that, following the prison’s disconnection from the utilities, the prison administration had no longer been able to offer food or medical treatment for tuberculosis which was of an adequate quality; there had been no access to showers, a very poor situation concerning personal hygiene, and only two hours of electricity per day, ensured by a low-power generator. None of the complaints made to the State authorities had resulted in an improvement in the conditions of detention until much later, as established in 2008. The court acknowledged a breach of the applicants’ right not to be held in inhuman conditions of detention, and increased the award in favour of each of them to MDL 20,000 (EUR 1,266 at the time). It also found that the Russian Federation could not be a defendant in Moldovan courts unless it expressly agreed to that, which was not the case here. 35. On 27 April 2010 the Supreme Court of Justice accepted the applicants’ appeal on points of law in part, and amended the judgment of the lower court. It analysed in detail the length of the civil proceedings (between 22 March 2004 and the date of adopting its own judgment on 27 April 2010), the complexity of the case, how the parties and the courts had contributed to the length of the proceedings, as well as the significant interest at stake for the applicants. The court found that, despite the applicants’ representatives’ actions contributing to the overall length of the proceedings (twenty-six out of the sixty-seven months), a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time had taken place, requiring additional compensation which it set at MDL 6,000 (approximately EUR 358 at the time). It did not amend the remainder of the lower court’s judgment. 36. The Moldovan Government submitted a long list of actions concerning their efforts to assert their sovereignty over the “MRT” territory and ensure that human rights were observed in the region. They also submitted copies of documents concerning prison no. 8 in Tighina/Bender specifically, raising in particular the issue of the prison being disconnected from utilities within the framework of the “5+2” negotiations process (between the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the European Union and the USA, in addition to Moldova and the “MRT”) and with various international organisations. II. RELEVANT REPORTS OF INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AND NON‑GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 37. Relevant reports of various inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations concerning the situation in the “MRT” have been summarised in Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC] (no. 11138/10, §§ 61-68, ECHR 2016).

4. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Kharkiv, Ukraine. 5. In 1999 he obtained a Russian passport. 6. On 29 December 2006 the Leninskiy District Court of Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, ordered to arrest and bring the applicant to the court in order to determine the preventive measure during the investigation of his alleged robbery. The applicant’s name was put on the international list of wanted persons. 7. On 26 September 2007 the applicant was arrested in Moscow. As the applicant was a Russian national, he was released. 8. On 14 October 2007 the Ukrainian authorities sought the applicant’s extradition from Russia in relation to the criminal proceedings against him. 9. On 21 December 2007 the Russian Federal Migration Authority concluded that the applicant had fraudulently obtained his Russian passport by falsifying a number of documents. They ordered to seize his passport and put his name on the federal wanted list. The applicant’s subsequent attempts to challenge the Federal Migration Authority’s decision on his Russian passport were unsuccessful. 10. On 13 May 2008 the applicant was arrested. On 15 May 2008 a prosecutor authorised his detention considering that the decision of 29 December 2006 of the Leninskiy District Court of Dnepropetrovsk had authorised the applicant’s “placement into custody”, as mentioned in Article 61 § 1 of the Minsk Convention. 11. On 24 June 2008 a district prosecutor decided that the applicant should be “placed in custody” considering that the decision of the Leninskiy District Court of Dnepropetrovsk of 29 December 2006 authorised “placement into custody”, as required under Article 466 § 2 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”). 12. On several occasions the applicant unsuccessfully complained about his detention to the prosecuting authorities. On 4 September 2008 the Perovskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant’s complaint considering that his arrest and detention in relation to the Ukrainian extradition request had been and remained lawful. On 24 November 2008 the Moscow City Court upheld this decision of 4 September 2008 concluding that “matters relating to lawfulness and reasons for detention should be raised under another procedure prescribed by law”. 13. On 3 October 2008 the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office granted the extradition request. On 18 November 2008 the Moscow City Court confirmed the decision of 3 October 2008. On 29 January 2009 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment of 18 November 2008 on appeal. 14. On 20 May 2009 the applicant was transferred to the Ukrainian authorities in the town of Kharkov. On 26 May 2009 he was transferred to the town of Dnepropetrovsk. On 6 June 2009 a Ukrainian court refused to order the applicant’s detention pending the investigation. The applicant was released.

6. The applicant is currently in Sweden. 7. In 2005 he was granted a temporary residence permit in Sweden which was made permanent in 2007. Both permits were based on the applicant’s family ties, but he was not granted Swedish citizenship. In 2009 he married a non-Swedish national who held a permanent residence permit in Sweden. 8. In March 2016 the Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen) applied to the Migration Agency (Migrationsverket) requesting the applicant’s expulsion. During the Migration Agency’s examination of the request, the applicant applied for asylum, claiming that he was in need of international protection. He further contested the Security Service’s request alleging that, since the Security Service had branded him a terrorist, he would risk torture and at least ten years’ imprisonment in Morocco. He submitted that he would be forced to confess to an act of terrorism that he had not committed. The applicant stated that his parents lived in Morocco and he had visited them a few years earlier. During the visit, police officers had approached him and informed him that they were monitoring him and advised him to “listen to our friends in Sweden or stay away from Morocco forever”. He acknowledged that he had left Morocco legally with his own passport, that he had not been wanted in Morocco, that there were no legal proceedings pending against him and that he had never published anything on, for example, religion or politics. Moreover, to his knowledge, his parents had never been approached by the authorities because of him and the Moroccan authorities had never contacted him in Sweden. However, he claimed that the Swedish Security Service would inform the Moroccan authorities of the reasons for his arrest and expulsion and other Moroccans in Sweden might also submit such information. He was not aware if his situation had been noted in Morocco. The applicant referred to country information about Morocco according to which physical ill-treatment and arbitrary detention occurred, in particular of suspected terrorists. Such persons had been tortured into confession and sentenced to lengthy terms of imprisonment. He also referred to the Court’s case law. 9. On 22 April 2016 the Migration Agency granted the Security Services’ request to expel the applicant and, at the same time, rejected the applicant’s demand for asylum and international protection. It noted that the human rights situation in Morocco had improved significantly. Violence at police stations and prisons had decreased. Imprisonment was common in terror-related cases and persons affiliated with Islamic movements ran a higher risk of being subjected to violence. Older reports contained accounts of torture and ill‑treatment in cases concerning national security and terrorism. However, the Moroccan authorities had publicly stated that the fight against terrorism should not be used as a pretext for depriving people of their rights. Torture was illegal and efforts to curb the use of torture had been successful. In terror-related cases, arrested suspects were examined by doctors before and after interrogation to prevent the use of violence by the interrogators. 10. As concerned the applicant’s situation, the Migration Agency found no reasons to question the Security Service’s assessment of the applicant. In this regard, it found that the applicant lacked credibility since his submissions relating to his background and previous activities were contradicted by the information submitted by the Security Service. Moreover, the Agency considered that he had not made out that the Moroccan authorities had previously showed an interest in him. It took into account that he had lived outside Morocco for about a decade and that, as he said himself, he had lived an inconspicuous life in Sweden without political or religious activities. Furthermore, after his last visit to Morocco, he had left the country legally using his passport. His parents in Morocco had not reported any visits from the authorities enquiring about him and the Moroccan authorities had never contacted him in Sweden. They had never requested his extradition either, or informed him that he was suspected of terrorism or any other kind of criminality. He had never been convicted of any terror‑related crimes in Sweden. The Agency observed that the applicant had submitted that he was not sought in Morocco, that he had not been involved in any legal proceedings there and that the Moroccan authorities had never subjected him to any acts of persecution in the past. As late as towards the end of 2015, the applicant had travelled internationally using his passport, without being stopped. Even though older “country of origin” reports included accounts of ill-treatment, the most recent reports instead spoke of measures taken by the Moroccan authorities aimed at reinforcing the rule of law. 11. As concerned the risk upon return because it was the Security Service which had requested the expulsion, the Migration Agency found that the applicant had not made out that he risked persecution upon return on this ground. It took into account that no objective evidence suggested that the Moroccan authorities were aware of his case and that the legislation had regard to the possible risks of being labelled a terrorist and had been designed to avoid such risks. 12. The Migration Agency concluded that, even taking into account the applicant’s submissions, it shared the Security Service’s assessment and considered that there were grounds to expel the applicant with reference to Section 1, paragraph 2, of the Special Controls of Aliens Act (lagen [1991:572] om särskild utlänningskontroll). It thus rejected his request for asylum and international protection, revoked his permanent residence permit and ordered his expulsion to either Morocco or another specified country. It also decided on a lifelong ban on returning to Sweden. 13. The applicant appealed to the Government, submitting that the Security Service’s assessment had been accepted by the Migration Agency without a careful examination, rendering the proceedings unfair and partial. He maintained his claims and stressed that the use of torture was frequent in Morocco, in particular in relation to suspected terrorists. 14. The Migration Agency forwarded the appeal to the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrationsöverdomstolen) in accordance with Section 3 of the Special Controls of Aliens Act. The Agency maintained its stance and stated, inter alia, that the applicant had not made it probable that he was of interest to the Moroccan authorities and there was no concrete information indicating that they should be aware of what had happened to him in Sweden. The Security Service stated that it was as transparent as possible but, for reasons of confidentiality, could not reveal its working methods and sources. It added that it was continually assessing whether it was possible to enforce the expulsion. If information were to emerge which raised the issue of impediments to the expulsion, the Government would be informed. 15. On 22 June 2016, after having held an oral hearing, the appellate court shared the reasoning of the Migration Agency and decided to recommend that the Government uphold the Agency’s decision. It found, inter alia, that there was nothing to support that the applicant at that point in time was known by the Moroccan authorities and of interest to them. 16. On 8 September 2016 the Government upheld the Migration Agency’s decision in full. The Government noted the Security Service’s submissions concerning the applicant’s background and connections and found that there were no grounds for questioning these submissions. In view of what was known about the applicant’s former activities and other circumstances, the Government concluded that it was reasonable to fear that the applicant would commit or participate in committing a terrorist offence which warranted his expulsion in accordance with the Special Controls of Aliens Act. 17. On 22 September 2016, following the interim measure indicated by the Court, the Government decided to stay the enforcement of the expulsion order until further notice.

5. The first applicant (Ms Makarova) was born in 1989 and lived in Moscow. The second applicant (Ms Astakhova) was born in 1985 and lives in Mytishchi, Moscow Region. The third applicant (Ms Fokht‑Babushkina) was born in 1994 and lives in Moscow. 6. On 14 December 2012 the State Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia, adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited the adoption of children of Russian nationality by citizens of the United States of America. 7. On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading of the draft law was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 8. According to the first applicant, she had read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo demonstrations (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo demonstrations was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 9. All of the applicants decided to hold solo demonstrations on 19 December 2012. According to them, at around 9 a.m. they positioned themselves, holding banners, in the vicinity of the State Duma at some distance from other protesters (see also Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, §§ 206-15, 7 February 2017). 10. According to the first applicant, she was arrested by the police several minutes later and taken to a police van. There were no orders from police officers to stop the demonstration and leave the area. According to the second and third applicants, after their solo demonstrations they left the area, showing their posters to journalists at their request. At that point, they were arrested by the police and taken to the Tverskoy district police station. 11. According to the Government, at 10 a.m. on 19 December 2012 all of the applicants took part in a group “picket” (пикет) held without prior notification of the authorities. The first applicant had a poster reading “I am looking for an American who will adopt me”, the second and the third applicants had posters reading “Orphans are guilty for the death of Mr Magnitskiy? Do not disgrace yourself”. The applicants did not react to the lawful demands of the police to stop participating in the event and continued “picketing”, attracting the attention of passers-by. At 10.30 a.m. they were arrested and taken to the Tverskoy district police station for the purpose of compiling an administrative-offence record. At 1.20 p.m. on that day the applicants were released. 12. At the police station the applicants were charged with participating in a group public event held without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, “the CAO”). The administrative-offence record in respect of the first applicant and the police officers’ reports in respect of all the applicants indicated that the offence had been committed at 10 a.m. It was also stated that they had taken part in a non-notified group public event and had refused to end it when requested to do so by the police. 13. On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of circuit no. 369 of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced her to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB; about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The court found it established, on the basis of the administrative-offence record, the police officers’ reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicant that the latter had taken part in a public event (“picket”) which had involved fifty people and had been held without prior notification of the authorities. On 14 February 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgment on appeal. The applicant did not attend the appeal hearing, even though she had been duly summoned to it. 14. On 31 January 2013 in two separate proceedings the same justice of the peace convicted the second and the third applicants under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced each of them to fines of RUB 20,000. The court relied on the administrative offence records, the police officers’ reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicants. On 21 February and 21 March 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgments in respect of the third and second applicants respectively. Both applicants were absent from the appeal hearings, though the third applicant’s lawyer did participate. In the third applicant’s case the appellate court examined some documents and interviewed a police officer in a detailed manner before affording the defence counsel an opportunity to cross-examine him; the appeal judge then asked a number of follow-up questions. In its appeal decision the appellate court considered that the third applicant’s guilt had been proved by the adverse evidence, such as the administrative-offence record, the escort procedure record and testimonies. 15. On 1 and 5 July 2013 the Moscow City Court examined supervisory review complaints lodged by the second and third applicants. The court reclassified the charges against the applicants as falling under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO, namely breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant. Their fines were reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 232 at the time) each.

4. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Adana. 5. At the time of the events giving rise to the application, the applicant was a member of the Socialist Democracy Party (Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi). 6. On 21 March 2007 the applicant attended the Newroz (Kurdish New Year) celebrations in Adana, where he made a speech on behalf of his political party. According to a report prepared on the same day by the police, in his speech the applicant stated that the military forces should comply with the ceasefire declared by the PKK and that a general amnesty should be declared. He contended that people were being detained for referring to Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, as “Sayın (Esteemed) Öcalan” whereas the Prime Minister also referred to him as “Sayın Öcalan”. The applicant further stated that Abdullah Öcalan should not be kept in isolation in prison and that independent doctors should visit him. He lastly made the following statement: “Do not fire but talk for resolving the Kurdish issue”. 7. The police report of 21 March 2007 further stated that subsequent to the applicant’s speech, songs with Kurdish lyrics were played and some demonstrators waved PKK flags. 8. On 6 April 2007 the Adana public prosecutor asked two experts to prepare a report on the police video recordings of the celebrations of 21 March 2007. According to the report dated 16 April 2007 prepared by two persons, the demonstrators chanted certain slogans and waved flags and posters of Abdullah Öcalan from time to time during the celebrations. 9. On 18 April 2007 the Adana public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Adana Assize Court charging the applicant with membership of the PKK[1] under Articles 220 § 7 and 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code on account of his participation in the demonstration of 21 March 2007 and of the content of his speech. He relied on the police report of 21 March 2007, the police video recordings of the Newroz celebrations and the expert report dated 16 April 2007. 10. On an unspecified date the Adana public prosecutor amended the charges against the applicant and asked the Adana Assize Court to convict him of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). 11. On 24 March 2008 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicant under the aforementioned provision and sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment. The court considered, on the basis of the police report of 21 March 2007 and the expert report of 16 April 2007, that the applicant’s statements had constituted propaganda in favour of the PKK and that the crowd had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK after having listened the applicant’s speech. 12. On 19 July 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 24 March 2008. 13. On 11 January 2012 the applicant started serving his prison sentence. On 29 May 2012 the Adana Assize Court granted the applicant early conditional release starting from 3 June 2012.

5. The applicant was born in 1965 and is currently detained in Czarne Prison in Poland. 6. The applicant was placed in detention on remand at Nicosia Central Prisons on 14 September 2010 pending criminal proceedings against him before the Limassol District Court (case no. 25536/10). 7. On 11 January 2011 the applicant was convicted of a number of offences (including burglary, theft, various road traffic offences and unlawful residence). On 24 January 2011 the court imposed four sentences ranging from six months’ to two years’ imprisonment, to run concurrently from 5 September 2010. 8. The applicant was released on 18 May 2012 following the suspension of his sentence by virtue of a decree issued by the President of the Republic concerning a number of prisoners. 9. In his application form the applicant, without specifying the exact period of his detention, submitted that he had been held in overcrowded cells at Nicosia Central Prisons, where there was only 0.5 to 1.7 sq. m of personal space for each detainee. He stated that the cells were cold and lacked adequate light. Furthermore, there were no toilets in the cells. He sometimes had to wait two to three hours to use the toilet, and, when the cells were locked, he had to urinate into a bottle and defecate into a waste bag. 10. The Government submitted that the applicant had been detained from 14 September 2010 until his release on 18 May 2012 in three different parts of Nicosia Central Prisons. Between 14 September 2010 and 24 January 2011 he had been detained in Block 5, which accommodated remand prisoners. Following his conviction and sentence he had been transferred to Block 2B, where he had been detained between 24 January 2011 and 5 October 2011. On the latter date he had been placed in Block 2A, where he had been detained until his release on 18 May 2012. Both Block 2B and 2A accommodated sentenced prisoners. The Government provided copies of Nicosia Central Prisons’ daily occupancy records (ημερήσιες χωρητικότητες των κεντρικών φυλακών) indicating the number of prisoners in each block per day. However, they submitted that no records were kept in relation to occupancy of particular cells in the blocks. (a) Block 5: 14 September 2010-24 January 2011 11. Block 5 could accommodate up to sixty-eight remand prisoners; it had thirty-four double occupancy cells measuring 6.21 sq. m, eight toilets and eight showers. Block 5 included Block 5A, which had twenty-three double occupancy cells of the same size as Block 5, accommodating forty-three remand prisoners. It was almost certain that during his detention in Block 5 the applicant had shared a cell with another inmate and that therefore he had had 3.10 sq. m of personal space. (b) Block 2B: 24 January 2011-5 October 2011 12. At the time the applicant had been detained there Block 2B had not yet been renovated. It had twenty-six double occupancy cells measuring 9.98 sq. m; two large cells measuring 19.55 sq. m, which accommodated five to seven detainees, and a common room which had been made into a dormitory for between twenty and fifty inmates. The dormitory measured 90 sq. m and had nineteen windows. Prisoners with short-term sentences had been kept in the dormitory. Block 2B had six toilets and six showers. 13. Based on the daily occupancy records for the relevant period, the number of inmates in the block varied from 80 to 124 per day. The Government stated that it was possible that the applicant had spent time in all the different types of cells in this block during his detention. In the double occupancy cell the applicant would have had 4.99 sq. m of personal space; in the larger cell he would have had from approximately 2.8 to 3.9 sq. m, depending on whether he had shared the cell with five, six or seven inmates; and, lastly, in the dormitory he would have had from 1.8 sq. m to 4.5 sq. m of personal space, depending on the number of inmates detained there with him. If the applicant had been held in the dormitory in early spring or during the winter (see paragraph 49 below), he would have disposed of between 2.04 and 3.2 sq. m of personal space as the daily occupancy records indicated that the block had accommodated between 94 and 110 inmates per day during those periods. (c) Block 2A: 5 October 2011-18 May 2012 14. On 5 October 2011 the applicant was transferred to Block 2A, which had been renovated. The block had forty-one double occupancy cells, accommodating eighty-two prisoners. The cells measured 9.80 sq. m and thus the applicant had had 4.9 sq. m of personal space at his disposal. There were six toilets, six showers and three urinals. (d) Additional information regarding the general conditions in the blocks 15. The various parts of the prison were equipped with a central heating system which covered all the blocks and cells. The central air conditioning system which functioned in the summer months was in the corridors and there were individual electrical fans in the cells. All the cells had properly insulated windows, which provided natural light and ventilation. The dimensions of the windows varied. Detainees were free to move outside their cells in the closed prison, including the yard, workshops, kitchen and school from 6 a.m. to 5 p.m. (winter time) or to 6 p.m. (summer time). After that, the detainees could move freely within their blocks until 9 p.m. on weekdays and 10 p.m. on weekends and public holidays. 16. Following the 2012 report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (“CPT”) on its visit to Cyprus from 12 to 19 May 2008, the prison administration discontinued the practice of switching off cell bells during the night, hence detainees had access to the toilets during those hours (see paragraphs 26-27 and 30 below). The administration of the prison had issued order no. 32/2008 concerning prisoners having access to the toilet facilities whenever necessary. The order had also directed prison staff to check and ensure that the call panel in the warden’s room was active at all times, especially during the evening, so that prisoners could be assisted and emergencies prevented. A violation of the order constituted a disciplinary offence. According to a letter by the prison director dated 27 February 2014, records were not kept of when cells were opened for toilet visits during the night, that is between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. However, a detainee could leave his cell for up to three toilet visits during that period.

5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Ankara. At the relevant time he was a professor of translation in the Faculty of Science and Literature of the University of Mersin (“the faculty”). He specialised in the German language. 6. On an unspecified date the applicant was invited to Istanbul to take part in a television programme that was due to be broadcast live on a public channel on Saturday 31 March 2001. The programme consisted of a debate on the topic of “The cultural structure of the European Union and the traditional structure of Turkey – Comparing identities and modes of behaviour – Likely problems and suggested solutions”. 7. On 27 March 2001 the applicant informed the director of the translation course that he had been invited to take part in the above-mentioned programme. 8. On the same day the course director wrote to the dean of the faculty informing him that the applicant had been invited to take part in a television programme. In his letter he also expressed doubts as to whether there was a link between the applicant’s specialist field and the subject of the programme and whether the applicant’s invitation to take part in a personal capacity was in keeping with the university’s principles. 9. On 30 March 2001 the dean of the faculty informed the director of the translation course that it had been decided that the applicant’s participation in the programme in question was not appropriate. The applicant was informed of the dean’s decision the same day. 10. On 31 March 2001 the applicant nevertheless took part in the programme in Istanbul. 11. In letters dated 2 and 5 April 2001 to the dean of the faculty, the applicant asked why his participation in the broadcast of 31 March 2001 had not been considered appropriate in spite of his past work on the subject covered by the programme. He added that it would have harmed his professional standing and reputation for reliability if he had withdrawn from the programme at short notice when he had already agreed to take part. He also maintained that he had been entitled to take part in the event, citing his academic freedom in that regard. 12. In a letter to the applicant dated 9 April 2001 the dean of the faculty replied that the applicant had not been entitled to take part in the event without the authorities’ permission. He added that the director of the translation course had expressed misgivings as to whether the applicant was sufficiently familiar with the topic of the programme of 31 March 2001, and that the view of the course director had been taken into account in the decision to refuse authorisation. 13. On Saturday 14 April 2001 the applicant took part in another programme in the same series, following an international conference held in Istanbul from 11 to 13 April 2001 which the dean of the faculty had authorised him to attend. 14. On 27 April 2001 a disciplinary inquiry was opened concerning the applicant on the grounds that he had twice taken part in the programme in Istanbul without the university’s authorisation. 15. On 26 June 2001 the commission of inquiry published its report. It noted at the outset that the applicant had been authorised to take part in events outside his city of residence on twelve occasions during the 2000/01 academic year, but that his request for authorisation concerning the programme of 31 March 2001 had been refused in view of the opinion of the course director, who considered that the topic of the programme was not directly linked to the applicant’s specialist field. As to the applicant’s participation in the broadcast of 14 April 2001, the commission noted that the dean of the faculty had authorised the applicant to attend an academic gathering to be held from 11 to 13 April 2001 in Istanbul, and that this authorisation had not covered 14 April 2001. The commission considered in that regard that not even research professors should take part in programmes of this type without supervision or authorisation, and that universities had to uphold academic ethics. It went on to find that the applicant’s participation in two television programmes in Istanbul on 31 March and 14 April 2001, without authorisation from his university, amounted to leaving his city of residence without authorisation, an offence punishable under regulation 8(g) of the disciplinary regulations for managers, lecturers and officials in higher education institutions (“the disciplinary regulations”). It therefore proposed, by way of a penalty, that the applicant’s salary be reduced by one-eighth, under regulation 4(d) of the above-mentioned regulations. 16. On 2 July 2001 the dean of the faculty decided to reduce the applicant’s salary by one-eighth for leaving his city of residence without authorisation, an offence punishable under regulation 8(g) of the disciplinary regulations. 17. On 20 July 2001 the applicant applied to the University Vice‑Chancellor for reconsideration of that decision and requested that the sanction be lifted. 18. On 8 August 2001 the Vice-Chancellor decided to lift the sanction of a reduction in salary and to impose a less severe penalty on the applicant, in the form of a reprimand under regulation 16 of the disciplinary regulations. 19. On 25 October 2001 the applicant applied for judicial review of that decision. He referred to his academic freedom, which he claimed was provided for in the Constitution, as justification for his participation in the television programme in question, pointing out that the programme had been broadcast on a public-service channel. He also argued that regulation 8(g) of the disciplinary regulations was liable to be wrongfully applied by managers and that the perimeter of a city no longer had the same significance in view of modern means of transport and communication. Lastly, he argued that the programme of 14 April 2001 had been a follow-up to the conference of 11 to 13 April 2001, which he had been authorised to attend, and that the people invited to appear on the programme had been participants in the conference. 20. On 29 May 2002 the Adana Administrative Court (“the Administrative Court”) dismissed the applicant’s application, finding that the decision to penalise him had not been unlawful. The court noted in that regard that it was beyond dispute that, on 31 March 2001, the applicant had left his city of residence despite the refusal of his request to take part in the television programme in question. The court considered that the applicant’s remaining arguments gave no reason to suppose that the decision to impose a sanction had been defective. 21. On 8 August 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He complained, in particular, that the Administrative Court’s examination of his claims had been inadequate. 22. On 31 October 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Administrative Court’s judgment. It found that the reasoning of the decision had been in conformity with the procedure and the law and that there were no grounds for quashing the decision.

5. The first applicant was born in 1988, the second applicant was born in 1994 and the remaining applicants were born in 2010-2016. According to the last letter sent by their representative to the Court on 20 May 2018, they currently reside in Poland, where their asylum applications are under consideration. 6. The applicants used to live in the Chechen Republic. As submitted by them, the events leading to their departure were as follows. 7. In 2005-2006 the first applicant started having problems with the Russian security services. He believed that that was happening because his relatives had participated in the Second Chechen War. Officers from the district police came to his home and questioned him at a police station, and his home was raided by armed people wearing masks. In 2009 he decided to leave Chechnya and applied for international protection in Poland, and later moved to Austria. However, in 2010 he had to return to Chechnya. There, he started working in the State security system, where he participated in counter-terrorism operations and provided security to the highest officials of Chechnya. He quit that job in October 2015, but before that he and his mother were asked if he was planning to join illegal armed groups in Syria. In February 2017 he was taken to the headquarters of the department at which he worked and asked to become an informer; he refused. In March 2017 two police officers came to his home and forcefully took him to a police station, where he was again asked to become an informer and again he refused. Afterwards he was tortured – he was given electric shocks and beaten on the kidneys, head and other parts of his body. After that he agreed to become an informer and was released after five days of detention. Following the beating, the first applicant started suffering from health problems, such as pain in the kidneys and problems with his memory. 8. In April 2017 the applicants left Chechnya and went to Belarus with the aim of crossing into Poland. They submitted that they had attempted to lodge asylum applications several times on the Polish border, but each time the border guards had refused to accept their applications and returned them to Belarus (see M.A. and Others v. Poland, no. 42902/17, Statement of Facts and Questions to the Parties; see also paragraphs 22-26 below for further events and the applicants’ eventual acceptance into Poland). 9. On 16 April 2017, around noon, the applicants arrived at the Medininkai checkpoint on the border between Lithuania and Belarus. They submitted to the Court that they had told the border guards in Russian that they were seeking asylum, but asylum proceedings had not been initiated. 10. The State Border Guard Service (hereinafter “the SBGS”) issued decisions on refusal of entry in respect of all seven applicants. The decisions indicated that the applicants had been refused entry on the grounds that they did not have valid visas or residence permits. It was also indicated that the decisions could be appealed against before a regional administrative court within fourteen days. The decisions were written in Lithuanian and English. 11. The applicants were asked to sign the decisions. In the space for a signature on each of the seven decisions, the first and second applicants wrote “azul’” in Cyrillic (азуль) – they submitted to the Court that that word was often used by Chechen asylum seekers to mean “asylum”. 12. The border officer who was on duty at the Medininkai checkpoint that day submitted the following official report to a senior officer: “I hereby inform you that on 16 April 2017, at 12.15 p.m., at the Medininkai border checkpoint ... a Russian national [M.A.] ... who had arrived on foot ... was refused entry into Lithuania. The reason for refusal of entry – absence of a valid visa or residence permit. At 12.45 p.m. the alien was returned to Belarus. His documents were checked by a senior border officer [A.B.].” Reports with similar wording were drawn up with respect to each of the applicants. 13. The applicants were returned to Belarus on that same day. They did not appeal against the decisions refusing them entry into Lithuania. 14. On 11 May 2017, around noon, the applicants arrived at the Kena checkpoint on the border between Lithuania and Belarus. They submitted to the Court that they had told the border guards that they were seeking international protection and asylum and that the first applicant had been tortured in Chechnya. However, asylum proceedings were not initiated. 15. The SBGS issued decisions on refusal of entry in respect of all seven applicants, with the same content as before (see paragraph 10 above). The decisions were written in Lithuanian. The first and second applicants signed all seven decisions and wrote that the decisions had been translated into Russian. 16. The border officer who was on duty at the Kena checkpoint that day submitted the following official report to a senior officer: “I hereby inform you that on 11 May 2017 ... when I was examining the train [from Moscow to Kaliningrad], at around 12:00 p.m., the following Russian nationals [the applicants] submitted their documents for inspection. None of them had valid visas or residence permits, and therefore they were refused entry into the Republic of Lithuania. Seven refusal of entry decisions were issued in respect of these individuals ... At 3.10 p.m. the individuals were transferred to border officers of Belarus via the Medininkai border checkpoint.” 17. The applicants were detained at the border checkpoint for several hours and then they were returned to Belarus. They did not appeal against the decisions to refuse them entry into Lithuania. 18. On 22 May 2017, at around 10.20 p.m., the applicants arrived at the railway border checkpoint in Vilnius. They submitted to the Court that they had had with them a written asylum application in Russian, prepared by a Belarussian human rights organisation, and they had given that application to the Lithuanian border guards. They provided the Court with a copy of that application and a photograph of the application, together with their train tickets, taken on what they claimed to be the premises of the border checkpoint. However, asylum proceedings were not initiated. 19. The SBGS issued decisions on refusal of entry in respect of all seven applicants, with the same content as before (see paragraphs 10 and 15 above). The first and second applicants signed the decisions concerning them, but those concerning the children (the remaining applicants) were not signed. The decisions were written in Lithuanian and it was not indicated on them whether they had been translated into Russian. 20. The border officer who was on duty at the Vilnius railway checkpoint that day submitted the following official report to a senior officer: “I hereby inform you that on 22 May 2017 I was on duty at the Vilnius railway border checkpoint. At around 10.50 p.m. ..., upon the arrival of a passenger train [from Minsk to Vilnius], it was detected that nationals of the Russian Federation did not have valid Schengen visas or residence permits ... ... The above-mentioned individuals were returned via the Medininkai border checkpoint on 23 May 2017, at 4.24 a.m.” The report mentioned the names of the second applicant and three of the children. The Court has not been informed if a similar report was drawn up with regard to the first applicant and the other two children. 21. The applicants were detained at the border checkpoint overnight, and in the morning of 23 May 2017 they were returned to Belarus. They did not appeal against the decisions refusing them entry into Lithuania. 22. Subsequently, the applicants again attempted to submit asylum applications in Poland, without success, and they lodged an application against Poland before this Court. On 16 June 2017 the Court decided to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, indicating to the Polish Government that the applicants should not be removed to Belarus. However, it appears that they were removed (see M.A. and Others v. Poland, Statement of Facts and Questions to the Parties cited above). 23. The applicants’ stay in Belarus was legal until 10 July 2017. 24. Between October and December 2017 the first applicant’s relatives in Chechnya received several summonses, addressed to him, obliging him to appear before the police. In December 2017 a summons was delivered to the first applicant in Belarus. He went to a police station there and was told that all the applicants had to leave Belarus. They returned to Russia at the end of December 2017. Soon afterwards the first applicant was detained. The second applicant had not been informed about the exact location of the first applicant’s detention. 25. In January 2018 the second applicant and the remaining applicants went to Belarus again and managed to submit asylum applications on the Polish border. They were admitted to a refugee reception centre in Poland to await the decision on their asylum applications. 26. In February 2018 the first applicant was released from detention in Russia. He submitted that he had not known where he had been held and that he had been beaten up by the staff at the detention facility. He provided the Court with photographs of bruises on his body which he claimed to have sustained in detention. In March 2018 the first applicant travelled to Belarus and managed to submit an asylum application on the Polish border. He joined the second applicant and the remaining applicants at a refugee reception centre in Poland to await the decision on his asylum application.

4. The first applicant, Mr Tamašauskas, was born in 1971. The second applicant, Mr Radzevičius, was born in 1977. They are both detained in Vilnius. 5. The first applicant was detained in Šiauliai Remand Prison from 28 September 2012 until 4 September 2014. 6. On an unspecified date he lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he had been detained in overcrowded and unsanitary cells. He claimed 48,493 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 7. On 9 January 2015 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant’s claim. It found that during the period under consideration the applicant had spent 629 days in Šiauliai Remand Prison and that during the remaining periods he had been transported outside of that prison. During those 629 days, he had between 1.72 and 16.96 sq. m of personal space. The court noted that the documents provided to it by the administration of the prison did not indicate the exact amount of personal space available to the applicant in each cell. It therefore gave the applicant the benefit of the doubt and held that during the entire period of 629 days his right to adequate personal space (3.6 sq. m, under the domestic law applicable to prison cells) might have been breached. The court also noted that parts of the cells had been occupied by furniture and that the space in which the applicant had been able to move had thus been even smaller. 8. However, the court dismissed the applicant’s allegations that the conditions in the cells had been unsanitary on the basis of reports submitted by domestic public healthcare authorities. It also held that the applicant had not proved that his health had deteriorated as a result of the conditions in which he had been detained. 9. The applicant was awarded EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 10. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, but on 6 October 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the lower court’s decision in its entirety. 11. The second applicant was detained in Alytus Correctional Facility from 22 November 2012 until 17 September 2014. 12. On an unspecified date he lodged a civil claim against the State, alleging that he had been detained in overcrowded and unsanitary dormitory-type rooms. He claimed EUR 16,611 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 13. On 12 October 2015 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court allowed in part the applicant’s claim. It found that from 22 November 2012 until 11 April 2013 the applicant had had 2.96 sq. m of personal space, and that from 11 April 2013 to 13 August 2014 he had had 3.03 sq. m of personal space, in violation of the domestic requirement of 3.1 sq. m, applicable to dormitory-type rooms. During the remainder of his detention the personal space available to the applicant had complied with the domestic requirements. 14. On the basis of reports submitted by the domestic public healthcare authorities, the court held that the temperature, ventilation and humidity in the rooms had complied with the relevant domestic requirements, and dismissed the applicant’s complaints in that regard. However, it observed that the administration of the correctional facility had not submitted any documents refuting the applicant’s allegation that the natural light in the rooms had been insufficient, and found in the applicant’s favour. The court also noted that during the relevant period the applicant had sought medical help for back pain, headaches, mood swings and insomnia; the court considered that those ailments might have been related to the unsuitable conditions of his detention. 15. However, the court considered that the reduction in the minimum personal space available to the applicant had been minor and that it had been compensated for by his ability to move freely around the correctional facility and by the various leisure activities available there. It therefore held that the finding of a violation was sufficient, and dismissed the applicant’s claim for non-pecuniary damages. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, but on 14 October 2016 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the lower court’s decision in its entirety.

5. The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Ajdovščina. She is the mother of Branko Štefančič, born in 1961. Mr Štefančič suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and depression and had been admitted to the Idrija Psychiatric Hospital on several occasions. In 2007 he lodged an extensive criminal complaint, alleging that he had suffered various injustices at the hands of his work colleagues, acquaintances, the police and other organisations. Upon examining the complaint, the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor’s Office decided not to pursue it. In June 2008 Mr Štefančič started to telephone the Prosecutor’s Office and go there in person on an almost daily basis. He made various delusional accusations regarding murders that had gone unpunished “since the age of Christ”. 6. On 19 June 2008 Mr Štefančič appeared at the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor’s Office, and was told by the receptionist that the office was closed that day. He replied that he would come back the next day, armed, and that nobody would be able to hide from him. Having been told about Mr Štefančič’s threats, the Head of the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor’s Office, B.O., telephoned the Idrija Psychiatric Hospital and told the staff what had happened. She was told that Mr Štefančič was mentally ill and had already been treated in the hospital several times. She was further advised to contact the Ajdovščina Community Health Centre and suggest that a referral be made for Mr Štefančič’s involuntary confinement. In addition, B.O. was warned by Mr Štefančič’s consulting psychiatrist that over the past few weeks his patient had threatened to kill several people, including his doctor, mother and sisters. In view of this, the psychiatrist had assessed that Mr Štefančič was dangerous and in need of treatment, and added that he should be taken seriously due to his physical strength. B.O. also called the Nova Gorica police and told them about Mr Štefančič’s visits to the Prosecutor’s Office. 7. At 5.30 p.m. a doctor from the health centre telephoned the Ajdovščina police station to request police assistance with Mr Štefančič’s involuntary confinement on the grounds that he could become aggressive. She later took the request for his police-assisted transport and the order for his confinement to the police station in person. 8. At 5.55 p.m. the duty officer submitted the request to the commander of the police station, who granted it immediately. 9. At 6 p.m. officer J.T. from the Ajdovščina police station set off to the applicant’s house and found her son, who was living there, at home. He informed officers at the Nova Gorica police communications centre, and they informed the health centre staff that they could proceed with the involuntary confinement. Police officer J.T. remained at the scene until health centre medical staff consisting of B.A., the doctor on duty, and S.M. and I.P., medical technicians, arrived. Also sent to the scene were D.K., a second officer from the Ajdovščina police station, police officer dog handler J.K., and two traffic officers of the Nova Gorica traffic police. 10. According to the police report of 31 July 2008 based on the statements made by the police officers and medical staff, upon their arrival at around 8 p.m. the police officers and medical technicians first talked to the applicant, who was sitting on a bench at the back of her house. They asked her whether her son was in the house and whether he was armed. She replied that her son was indeed in the house and was on the telephone. She further explained that she was not aware of him possessing any firearms. The medical team informed the applicant why they were there and then entered the house, while the police officers remained at the front door. 11. Dr B.A. informed Mr Štefančič that they were going to take him to a psychiatric hospital, but he refused to go with them. The medical team attempted to persuade him, but he became agitated and verbally aggressive. The police officers warned him that he would be taken to the hospital by force if he refused to go of his own free will. 12. The medical technicians attempted to take hold of Mr Štefančič’s arms, but he pushed them off and started to scream. Dr B.A. then instructed the police officers to handcuff him, but when J.T. and D.K. attempted to restrain him, he resisted forcefully and pushed them off. In response, the police officers used physical force in order to push him to the ground, and J.K. ordered a muzzled dog on a leash to jump at him. As Mr Štefančič did not seem to react to the dog jumping at his chest, J.K. took it back to the police car. J.T. and D.K. meanwhile continued to use physical force and managed to wrestle Mr Štefančič to the ground onto his back. 13. The two police officers were then joined by dog handler J.K., who used the “rear chokehold” technique on Mr Štefančič. Together they managed to put him into the recovery position and medical technician S.M. injected Haldol (an antipsychotic drug with tranquilising effects) into his buttocks. As Mr Štefančič continued to resist, they could not administer the full dose of medication to him. The police officers then turned him onto his stomach, and J.T. handcuffed his hands behind his back. Medical technician I.P. injected him with Akineton, medication used on psychiatric patients to reduce the tremors caused by antipsychotic drugs. 14. Mr Štefančič calmed down as soon as he received the second dose of medication. A few moments later, the police officers and medical technicians noticed that there was a brown palm-sized pool of liquid under his head. They alerted Dr B.A., who established that Mr Štefančič had vomited and assessed that it could have been attributed to exertion. However, when one of the medical technicians checked Mr Štefančič again, he detected an irregular heartbeat, and again called out to the doctor. The medical team began to resuscitate him at 8.10 p.m. The police officers attempted to unlock his handcuffs, but only managed to free one of his hands, before the key broke. 15. The applicant, who was waiting outside during the intervention, was heading to the front of the house when she heard loud noises and a dog barking. When she approached the front door, she saw Dr B.A. massaging her son’s chest. She asked the police officers what was going on, to which one of them replied that they were resuscitating her son. Another ambulance arrived at the scene at 8.42 p.m., and an electrocardiogram was performed on Mr Štefančič, but to no avail. At 8.45 p.m. Dr B.A. pronounced him dead. He attributed the death to a heart attack or stroke. 16. Immediately after Mr Štefančič’s death, the officers from the Ajdovščina police station notified the Nova Gorica police communications centre of the incident and secured the area. The duty State prosecutor and the duty investigating judge of the Nova Gorica District Court were also notified of the death. The investigating judge attended the scene and ordered a forensic examination of the body. The medical file and equipment used in his resuscitation were also seized. 17. On 20 June 2008 police officers D.K., J.T. and J.K. made records of the methods of restraint they had used on Mr Štefančič (physical force, handcuffs and the police dog), which were confirmed by their superior officers to have been lawful. 18. In the days after the incident, an officer of the Nova Gorica police took statements from the police officers and medical staff involved in the incident, as well as from the applicant. 19. The applicant stated that on the evening of 19 June 2008 several police cars and an ambulance drove to the house and an officer asked her whether her son was keeping firearms. She replied that he was not, as far as she was aware. The applicant remained outside during the intervention and could not remember exactly how the events unfolded. She heard screaming, but was afraid to go inside. Sometime later she looked into the hallway and saw her son lying on the floor, surrounded by Dr B.A. and the medical technicians. She asked them what was going on, and they replied that they were resuscitating her son. She noticed that he had vomited. 20. D.K. and J.T., police officers, stated that upon entering the house, Mr Štefančič, who appeared to be talking on the telephone, told the medical technicians that he would not go with them, and D.K. and J.T. then warned him that they would use force if necessary. Dr B.A. also tried to convince him to go with them without success and he then instructed the officers to handcuff him. D.K. and J.T. took him by the arms to lead him to the ambulance but he resisted strongly. Dog handler J.K. attempted to calm him down by ordering the police dog to jump at him but Mr Štefančič did not react to the dog’s attack. The officers struggled to wrestle him to the ground and eventually succeeded in pushing him to the ground on his back; they then turned him onto his stomach, but he continued to resist forcefully. Dog handler J.K. then used the so-called “rear chokehold” technique on him, and together they managed to turn him onto his side. One of the medical technicians then administered the first dose of medication to him, whereupon he was again turned onto his stomach and handcuffed with his hands behind his back. The second dose of medication was then administered to him and he calmed down. 21. After Mr Štefančič received the second dose of medication, D.K. noticed a brown palm-sized pool of liquid under his head. Somebody mentioned that it was vomit and D.K. then asked if that was right. Dr B.A. was on the telephone arranging for Mr Štefančič’s transport to the psychiatric hospital but upon hearing D.K.’s question checked Mr Štefančič and said that the vomiting was due to exertion. J.T. confirmed that Dr B.A. initially said that Mr Štefančič was okay and vomited from exertion but added that the doctor did not check Mr Štefančič’s pupils or pulse. Then one of the medical technicians looked at Mr Štefančič again and checked his pulse. He called out to the doctor, saying that something was not right as he was breathing irregularly. Officer J.T. then attempted to unlock the handcuffs, and managed to get the one on his right hand off before the key broke. The medical staff started to resuscitate him. The whole incident, from the beginning of the police intervention until the beginning of the resuscitation procedure, only lasted a few minutes, five at the most. 22. J.K., a police dog handler, confirmed that he had first joined the intervention by ordering the police dog, which was muzzled, to jump at Mr Štefančič, who, however, made no attempt to shake the dog off or to withdraw from the attack. Therefore J.K. took the dog back to his car and then returned to the house, where officers D.K. and J.T. were not able to turn Mr Štefančič onto his stomach. J.K. helped them by holding him in a rear chokehold and together they managed to turn him onto his stomach and handcuff him. As this was going on, one of the medical technicians injected medication into his buttocks. J.K. also confirmed his colleagues’ accounts as to how the resuscitation of Mr Štefančič proceeded after it was discovered that he had vomited. 23. I.P., a medical technician, stated that on his arrival, he first asked the applicant a few questions and then entered her house with his colleague S.M. According to both medical technicians, Mr Štefančič pretended to be speaking on the telephone. I.P. explained to him that he was being taken to the psychiatric hospital to see a psychiatrist. Mr Štefančič refused to go and Dr B.A. ordered him to be handcuffed. As regards the events that ensued concerning the use of force by the police officers, I.P.’s statement matched the statements of police officers D.K., J.T. and J.K. (see paragraphs 20‑22 above), while S.M. did not pay much attention to the police operation, as he was preparing a syringe of Haldol. 24. As soon as the police officers managed to wrestle Mr Štefančič to the ground and turn him onto his side, S.M. injected him with Haldol. S.M. added that because Mr Štefančič forcefully resisted, he could not administer the full dose of medication to him. He then left the house. While the police officers turned Mr Štefančič onto his stomach, I.P. administered the second injection into his buttocks and he calmed down. I.P. then noticed that he was not breathing or was struggling to breathe. As far as he could remember, he called out that Mr Štefančič was not breathing. Dr B.A. approached him and saw him take a breath, concluding that he was breathing. S.M., standing outside, stated that he had not seen when and how Mr Štefančič had started to vomit, but heard the exchange between his colleague and Dr B.A. The doctor then left the house and started to arrange Mr Štefančič’s transport to the hospital. I.P. checked Mr Štefančič again and exclaimed that he was not breathing. Together with the police officers they turned Mr Štefančič onto his back and I.P. noticed that he was cyanotic. He also noticed traces of vomit on Mr Štefančič’s face, so he first protected his airways. The police officers had by then removed the handcuffs from him. His colleague S.M., who confirmed that Mr Štefančič looked grey and had traces of vomit on his face, fetched the resuscitation kit from the ambulance. Together with Dr B.A. they had intubated him; however, even at the beginning of resuscitation, his pupils were dilated, which was also a bad sign. I.P. also stated that the whole incident, from the use of physical force on Mr Štefančič until the beginning of the resuscitation procedure, only lasted a few minutes, five at the most. I.P.’s account was confirmed in substance by traffic officer M.D., who together with his colleague A.K. guarded the back entrance to the applicant’s house and thus only heard part of the incident. 25. Medical technician S.M. expressed the view that the police officers might have used excessive force in dealing with Mr Štefančič. He added that though Mr Štefančič had refused to go to the psychiatric hospital, he had not been particularly aggressive, and above all, had not physically attacked anyone. 26. Dr B.A., a general practitioner, stated that Mr Štefančič’s psychiatrist expected that he might behave aggressively so he received instructions to give him an injection of two ampoules of Haldol and one ampoule of Akineton. Although in the beginning of the intervention Mr Štefančič appeared agitated, but not aggressive, he started to resist forcefully when the police officers attempted to handcuff him. 27. According to Dr B.A., after Mr Štefančič was handcuffed and calmed down, he came out of the applicant’s house and started to arrange his transport. One of the police officers then called out to him that something was not right, that Mr Štefančič had vomited and was having trouble breathing. He was immediately turned onto his back. Dr B.A. noticed that Mr Štefančič had turned blue in the face and that he was wheezing. The medical team then started the resuscitation procedure, massaging his heart and intubating him, as well as administering 1 mg of adrenaline and 3 mg of atropine to him. However, as they did not have an electrocardiogram monitor or a defibrillator, another ambulance was called. By the time the second ambulance arrived at 8.42 p.m., they could only establish that Mr Štefančič had died. 28. On 21 July 2008 a criminal investigations officer of the Nova Gorica police obtained an oral preliminary report from the forensic pathologist who had performed the autopsy of Mr Štefančič. According to him, the deceased had most likely died of asphyxiation from inhaling gastric contents (choking on his own vomit). With regard to the question of potential liability for Mr Štefančič’s death, he took the view that the asphyxiation occurred during the police intervention, and that the presence of a doctor could not have altered the course of events. He added that the doctor could only be accused of negligence if the death had occurred during the resuscitation, which in his opinion had not been the case. 29. On 31 July 2008 the head of the Nova Gorica police criminal investigations unit submitted a report of the incident to the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor’s Office. Based on a statement provided by the forensic pathologist who conducted the forensic examination, the report stated asphyxiation from inhaling gastric contents as the cause of Mr Štefančič’s death. As to the events leading to the death, the police report summarised the statements given by the intervention team and stated that Mr Štefančič had resisted the police officers who had tried to take him to the psychiatric hospital, whereupon physical force had been used on him. After Mr Štefančič had been restrained and had calmed down, the police officers and medical technicians had noticed that he had vomited. After Dr B.A. had initially assessed that this could be attributed to exertion, he had been found to have an irregular heartbeat and the medical team had tried to resuscitate him, but to no avail. As regards the question of potential liability for Mr Štefančič’s death, the police report followed the forensic pathologist’s opinion that he had died during the police intervention and that his death could not have been prevented by any medical assistance. The report concluded by saying that no facts had been established giving rise to a suspicion that a criminal offence had been committed in connection with the death of Mr Štefančič which warranted criminal prosecution. 30. On 10 September 2008 the completed forensic report was submitted to the investigating judge of the District Court, confirming asphyxiation from inhaling gastric contents as the immediate cause of Mr Štefančič’s death. In addition to the trauma consistent with the cause of death, the examination revealed a number of blunt injuries to various parts of his body. 31. These included contusions on the outer edge of the shoulder blade, the left of the back and the back of the right thigh, swelling on the right of the hairline and the squamous part of the temporal bone, contusions on the inside of the upper right arm and left forearm and on the front of the left thigh. Several haematomas were recorded around the left shoulder blade, on the outer edge of the right shoulder blade, on the right of the thorax and on the scalp, as well as a pulmonary oedema, an oblique fracture of the fifth rib, bruising around the lumbar spine, and brain swelling. 32. According to the report, these injuries had either been caused by Mr Štefančič’s body being struck by an object, by part of his body being pressed against something, by him falling, or by his body being pressed between two hard surfaces. As regards the injuries to the back of his body, hairline and front left thigh, the forensic pathologist concluded that they had most likely occurred by him falling or falling after being struck, and that the bruises were caused by the body being pulled to the ground. 33. The toxicology report revealed a low concentration of haloperidol (an antipsychotic drug with strong calming effects) in Mr Štefančič’s blood. The forensic report concluded that the substance had been consumed either as a prescription medicine or administered during the intervention in order to calm him down, but could not be linked to his death or identified as the cause of his vomiting. 34. No particularities or disease-related changes had been found in Mr Štefančič’s system which could have directly contributed to his death. 35. With regard to enquiries made by the investigating judge as to whether Mr Štefančič’s death could have been prevented by prompt and adequate medical assistance, the forensic report stated: “Disregarding the particular circumstances surrounding the incident, this question could be answered in the affirmative; however, one cannot neglect the exceptional circumstances in which the incident occurred. Prompt and adequate medical assistance could have saved the life of [Mr Štefančič], even in the event that no ambulance with resuscitation equipment was immediately available. It is likely that [Mr Štefančič] was thrown or pushed to the ground where, prior to being handcuffed, his body was pushed down by applying body weight or some other pressure. [Being struck or pushed in] the stomach most likely induced the vomiting. In so far as the medical staff or the officers assisting them in the involuntary confinement had noticed in due course that [Mr Štefančič] began to vomit, they could have prevented him from inhaling gastric contents either by lifting his body into a vertical position or by turning him onto his side and mechanically clearing his oral cavity by using their fingers or an aspirator (if an aspirator was at the disposal of the medical staff). However, it was not possible to apply any of these measures to an aggressive patient resisting hospitalisation; it is only possible to apply such measures after the patient has calmed down or lost consciousness as a result of disruption in the exchange of gases following the aspiration of gastric contents. Having regard to the agitation and aggressiveness of the patient, as well as the circumstances of the incident, such measures almost certainly could not have been applied. The deceased only lost consciousness when his breathing was disrupted by inhaling massive amounts of gastric contents. Only then was it possible to apply more aggressive medical intervention (mechanical clearing of the oral cavity, suction of gastric contents from the oral cavity and respiratory tract, removal of potentially larger foreign objects and insertion of a tube with a balloon to prevent continuing aspiration of gastric contents, ventilation of the patient), which could not be performed on a conscious person, in particular on an aggressive person, due to the unpleasant feelings such an intervention induces. In the present case, the aspiration of gastric contents was particularly massive and aggressive, which is indicated by the pieces of food found by the histological analysis to be present even in the alveoli, the final branching of the respiratory system. In the present case it was not possible, once the deceased lost consciousness, to apply those methods and to suck the gastric contents from the respiratory passages and alveoli; considering the quantity and force of the aspiration of gastric contents, medical assistance probably would not have saved the life of [Mr Štefančič].” 36. On 18 September 2008 the investigating judge of the Nova Gorica District Court sent the statements of the persons involved in the incident, a record of the examination of the scene, the order for a forensic examination of Mr Štefančič’s body and the forensic report to the State Prosecutor’s Office. 37. On 23 September 2008 the Head of the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor’s Office, B.O., informed the District Court that the conditions had not been met for the institution of criminal proceedings, and that the case file had been archived. 38. On 20 January 2009 the applicant, through her representative, lodged a criminal complaint against police officers J.T., D.K. and J.K., whereby she stated that her son had been strangled and had died as a result of an unnecessary and unprofessional police intervention. The applicant also stated that the forensic report was misleading and there were doubts as to its accuracy. In addition, an anonymous criminal complaint was lodged against E.G., the head of the Nova Gorica uniformed police unit. The complainant alleged that E.G. had abused his position by giving a statement at a press conference in which he had covered up the actual cause of Mr Štefančič’s death in order to prevent criminal prosecution of Dr B.A. 39. After having reviewed the Nova Gorica State Prosecutor’s Office’s case file, on 2 June 2009 a State prosecutor from the Group of State Prosecutors for Special Matters (Skupina državnih tožilcev za posebne zadeve – hereinafter “the Special Matters Group”), which had exclusive jurisdiction over the prosecution of criminal offences committed by police officers, rejected both criminal complaints on the basis of the police and forensic reports and the media reports from the press conference on Mr Štefančič’s death. 40. The decision to reject the criminal complaints summarised the information included in the police and forensic reports, as well as the statements given to the police by Dr B.A. and medical technicians S.M. and I.P. 41. The State prosecutor, relying on the forensic report, concluded that Mr Štefančič’s death could have been prevented if someone had been noticed in time that he had started to vomit. However, in the case in question Mr Štefančič had been aggressive and resisted hospitalisation, and no assistance could be provided until he had calmed down. Therefore, in the State prosecutor’s opinion there was no is reasonable suspicion that the actions of J.T., D.K. and J.K., the three police officers who had restrained Mr Štefančič, constituted a criminal offence. Moreover, as regards the anonymous criminal complaint, the State prosecutor established that, according to the reports in the media, the head of the Nova Gorica uniformed police unit had stated neither that Mr Štefančič had died as a result of being administered sedatives, nor that the medical team had immediately begun resuscitation after his condition had deteriorated. Therefore, no reasonable suspicion existed that E.G. had committed a criminal offence liable to prosecution ex officio. 42. No appeal was available to the applicant against the decision to reject her criminal complaint. However, she could take over the conduct of criminal proceedings as a “subsidiary prosecutor”.

5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Murmansk. 6. On 23 December 2003 the Murmansk regional prosecutor’s office initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant, who was suspected of leadership of a criminal armed gang. According to the authorities, the applicant, as the leader of the gang, had planned and committed several offences, namely aggravated kidnapping, assault, aggravated robbery and extortion, in Murmansk and Moscow. 7. On 23 December 2003 the Murmansk Regional Court authorised the interception and recording of the applicant’s telephone communications on his mobile telephone, number ...-15. The surveillance authorisation read in its entirety as follows: “[The police] are investigating [a case] against a criminal gang involved in robberies and the extortion of money and personal belongings from citizens in Murmansk and other Russian regions. [The applicant] is the leader of the gang. [M.] and [Z.] are members of that gang. According to intelligence information, these people are planning to commit aggravated extortion from Murmansk businessmen. Operational-search measures have revealed that [the applicant] uses mobile phone number ...-15, registered as belonging to [M.]. In view of the above and given that it seems impossible to obtain the information necessary to expose [the applicant’s] unlawful activities by overt investigation, the court, on the basis of Article 23 of the Russian Constitution and Article 186 § 2 of [the Code of Criminal Procedure] decides to authorise for 180 days the interception of [the applicant’s] telephone communications on his mobile telephone number ...-15.” 8. On 24 and 25 December 2003 the police intercepted the applicant’s conversations with an accomplice, M. 9. On 25 December 2003 two of the applicant’s accomplices, M. and S., were arrested. The applicant went into hiding. 10. On the same day, 25 December 2003, at the applicant’s request his brother retained G. as the applicant’s legal representative. The legal services agreement stated that G. was to consult and defend the applicant while his name was on the police’s wanted persons list in connection with charges that were not yet known to him. If the applicant were to be arrested by the police, an additional agreement would be signed between G. and the applicant. There is no evidence that the police or the investigator were informed about that agreement. 11. On 26 December 2003 the Murmansk Regional Court authorised the interception and recording of the applicant’s telephone communications on his mobile telephone number ...-49. The surveillance authorisation read in its entirety as follows: “[The police] have intelligence information about a criminal gang involved in robberies and the extortion of money and personal belongings from citizens in Murmansk and other Russian regions. [The applicant] is the leader of the gang. Operational-search measures have revealed that [the applicant] uses mobile phone number ...-49. In view of the above and given that it seems impossible to obtain the information necessary to expose [the applicant’s] unlawful activities by overt investigation, the court, on the basis of Article 23 of the Russian Constitution and Article 186 § 2 of [the Code of Criminal Procedure] decides to authorise for 180 days the interception of [the applicant’s] telephone communications on his mobile telephone number ...-49.” 12. On 26 and 27 December 2003 the police intercepted conversations between the applicant and G. 13. On 27 December 2003 the applicant was arrested. 14. On 28 December 2003 G. informed the investigator that he was the applicant’s defence counsel by virtue of instruction no. 1062 of the Murmansk Regional Bar Association (“the Bar Association”). He was formally admitted (допущен) as counsel for the applicant. 15. On 5 January 2004 the applicant was charged with aggravated robbery, assault, kidnapping and extortion, committed by an organised criminal group. S. and M. were also charged with the same criminal offences. 16. At the beginning of August 2004 the investigator informed G. that his presence was required during investigative procedures involving the applicant. On 23 August 2004 the investigator was informed by the Bar Association that G. was on annual leave until 4 October 2004. 17. On 24 August 2004 the investigator appointed legal aid counsel for the applicant, noting that he had refused to choose replacement counsel and had insisted on being represented by G. 18. On 30 August 2004 the investigator decided to remove G. as counsel for the applicant, finding that it was necessary to question him about his telephone conversations with the applicant on 26 and 27 December 2003. He noted that at the time, G. had not yet been the applicant’s counsel. However, well aware that the applicant had committed serious criminal offences, G. had advised him what to do. In particular, he had told the applicant that money was needed, which could possibly mean that G. had intended to bribe a police official. He had also informed him about the course of the criminal proceedings, which had become known to him as at the time he had been representing the applicant’s accomplices, S. and M. When the police had tried to force the applicant’s door, the applicant had summoned G., who had said that he could not come and offered to send another lawyer. He had then advised the applicant to try to avoid arrest and, if that was not possible, to destroy his telephone and the SIM card, and to remain silent when questioned. In the investigator’s opinion, by giving such advice, G. had been trying to hide his connections with the applicant and his knowledge of the criminal offences committed by him. Given that at the material time G. had not been formally admitted as the applicant’s counsel, he should be considered as having advised him in his capacity as a simple citizen. He should therefore be called as a witness in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 19. On 11 October 2004 the criminal case against the applicant and his accomplices was transferred to the Murmansk Regional Court for trial. The criminal case file comprised twelve volumes; five criminal cases were joined into one criminal case against the applicant and his accomplices. 20. A preliminary hearing was held on 21 and 22 October 2004. 21. The trial started on 3 November 2004. The applicant asked the court for permission for his brother, a civil lawyer working at a company which sold car spare parts, to act as his defence counsel. The court rejected his request, stating that the applicant’s brother was not qualified to participate as defence counsel in criminal proceedings, that he did not have the relevant practical experience, and that the applicant was already represented by legal aid counsel. 22. On 4 November 2004 the applicant requested that legal aid counsel assigned to his case be removed for failure to provide adequate legal assistance. The court rejected his request. The applicant then requested that AM. be admitted as his defence counsel instead of the legal aid lawyer. The judge granted that request and AM. represented the applicant throughout the remainder of the criminal proceedings. The trial was adjourned until 15 November 2004 to let AM. study the case file. 23. On 15 November 2004 the hearing was again postponed, until 22 November 2004, owing to the failure of one of the co-accused to appear due to illness. 24. Further hearings were held between 22 November and 9 December 2004. 25. On 22 November 2004 the applicant challenged the admissibility as evidence of transcripts of his telephone conversations with G. on 26 and 27 December 2003. He argued that G. had been his counsel as from 25 December 2003, as confirmed by the legal services agreement of that date and by relevant payment invoices. The conversations in question were therefore protected by legal professional privilege and their transcripts could not be used in evidence in criminal proceedings. 26. On 30 November 2004 the Murmansk Regional Court found that the legal services agreement of 25 December 2003 stated that G. was to provide the applicant with legal assistance in the framework of criminal proceedings, without clearly identifying the criminal proceedings to which it related. The investigator had not been informed about that agreement. G. had not been formally admitted as the applicant’s counsel in the present criminal proceedings until 28 December 2003 when he had shown the investigator the relevant instruction by the Bar Association. The Regional Court found it relevant that during the conversations intercepted by the police, G. had advised the applicant to remain in hiding and to destroy the evidence. Moreover, having been present, as their counsel, at S.’s and M.’s questioning after their arrest, G. had informed the applicant about their statements to the investigator. When summoned by the applicant to assist him at the time of his arrest, he had refused to come and had offered to send another lawyer. That gave reasons to doubt that G. had been representing the applicant at the time in the present criminal proceedings. The investigator had subsequently removed G. as counsel for the applicant. G. had not, however, been called to testify against the applicant in breach of legal professional privilege. Given that the applicant’s conversations with G. intercepted by the police contained information about the applicant’s criminal activities, they were not subject to legal professional privilege and their transcripts were admissible as evidence. 27. On 9 December 2004 the court ordered a graphological expert report and for that reason adjourned the trial until 5 April 2005. 28. On 4 April 2005 the applicant lodged an action before the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Murmansk, challenging the investigator’s decision of 30 August 2004 to remove G. as his counsel. On 6 June 2005 the Oktyabrskiy District Court dismissed that complaint as inadmissible, finding that it could not be examined once the investigation had been completed. The applicant could raise the complaint before the trial court. 29. Meanwhile, further hearings were held on 5, 25 and 27 April and 5 and 12 May 2005. 30. On 19 May 2005 the court ordered a complex psychological expert examination of one of the co-accused and adjourned the trial pending the expert examination report. A further complex psychological examination was ordered on 4 July 2005 and the trial was again adjourned until 7 October 2005. 31. On 7 October 2005 the trial was adjourned because the court ordered that two prosecution witnesses who had testified against S. and who were detained in Moscow be transported to Murmansk for a cross‑examination. 32. The trial remained adjourned between 7 October 2005 and 6 March 2006 while awaiting the transfer of the prosecution witnesses, who at the time were on trial in a criminal case in Moscow. They were transferred to Murmansk on 3 March 2006, after their conviction of 7 October 2005 had been upheld on appeal on 26 December 2005. 33. On 29 December 2005 the applicant challenged the admissibility as evidence of the transcripts of his telephone conversations with M. on 24 and 25 December 2003 and with G. on 26 and 27 December 2003. He claimed, in particular, that the transcripts had been obtained unlawfully. 34. The trial was resumed on 6 March 2006. Hearings were held on 16 March, 6, 7, 13 and 20 April 2006. 35. During the trial the court examined numerous pieces of evidence, including three expert reports and the statements of six victims and twenty‑four witnesses from Murmansk and Moscow. 36. On 12 May 2006 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to thirteen years’ imprisonment. It relied on the transcripts of the applicant’s telephone conversations with G. and M., among other evidence, observing that the interception of the applicant’s telephone communications had been authorised by a court. Having analysed the transcripts of the applicant’s telephone conversations with G., it held as follows: “The lawyer had not been formally admitted to provide legal assistance to [the applicant] at the time [when the interception had taken place]. His actions were considered by the investigator to be unlawful and served as a basis for the decision to remove [G.] as counsel for [the applicant] and for considering the question of opening criminal proceedings [against G.]. The court does not have any reason to believe that the information obtained as a result of [intercepting the applicant’s] telephone communications with [G.] cannot be used as evidence, given that the information in question has not become known to [G.] as a result of providing legal assistance to [the applicant].” 37. The applicant appealed against the conviction, claiming that the Regional Court had erred in its assessment of the evidence, that the transcripts of his telephone conversations with his co-defendant M. and counsel G. had been unlawfully used as evidence in the criminal proceedings, that G. had been unlawfully removed as counsel from his case, and that the authorities had refused to allow his brother to act as his legal representative. 38. On 18 December 2006 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction. It held, in particular, that the transcripts of the applicant’s telephone conversations with M. and G. had been correctly admitted as evidence. It further observed that the applicant’s allegations of violations of his right to defence during the preliminary investigation had been examined by the first-instance court and had been rejected as unsubstantiated. 39. The applicant was arrested on 27 December 2003. 40. On 29 December 2003 the Murmansk Regional Court remanded the applicant in custody. It held that he was suspected of particularly serious offences, did not have a permanent job, and that his assertions that he owned a family business were unconvincing. There were therefore sufficient reasons to believe that he might abscond, obstruct the course of justice, and continue his criminal activities. 41. On 24 February and 18 June 2004 the Regional Court ordered extensions of the applicant’s detention, citing the need for further investigation, the gravity of the charges and the risks of the applicant absconding, putting pressure on witnesses and obstructing the course of justice. There were no factors relating to the applicant’s character, state of health, family or other circumstances which would warrant release. The applicant did not appeal against those extension orders. 42. On 11 October 2004 the criminal case file was transferred to the Regional Court for trial. On 22 October 2004 the Regional Court ordered the applicant’s and his co-defendants’ detention during trial, referring to the gravity of the charges and the lack of permanent employment “at the time of the commission of the crimes”. It considered that the grounds which had served as the basis for the preventive measure remained valid. The applicant did not appeal. 43. On 5 April, 4 July, 7 October and 29 December 2005 and 7 April 2006 the Regional Court extended the applicant’s and his co‑defendants’ detention, finding that the grounds which had served as the basis for the preventive measure remained valid and that there were therefore no reasons to change it. The trial could not proceed for objective reasons as it was necessary to wait for the results of a psychological expert examination of S. and for the transfer for questioning of two prosecution witnesses against S. 44. The applicant appealed against the above extension orders to the Supreme Court. He submitted that he had been permanently residing in Murmansk, that he had been working in the family business, that he had no previous convictions and that he had no intention of absconding from the authorities. The authorities had failed to substantiate their allegations that he might abscond or continue with his criminal activity. As regards the risk that he might put pressure on witnesses, it was no longer relevant as all the witnesses had already been questioned by the trial court. According to the applicant, the extension of his detention had been based solely on the gravity of the charges against him. The trial had been adjourned for reasons which were not related to his personal situation, but in order to carry out expert psychological examinations of one of the co-accused and to ensure the transfer from Moscow of two prosecution witnesses who were to give evidence against that same co-accused. He asked to be released on bail or on his father’s personal guarantee. 45. On 11 August, 9 November and 15 December 2005 and 30 March 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the above extension orders on appeal, referring to the gravity of the charges and the risks of the applicant absconding or putting pressure on witnesses. The fact that the witnesses had already been questioned was irrelevant because the applicant might still put pressure on them or otherwise obstruct the trial. 46. The applicant was held as follows: in remand prison no. IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk from 30 December 2003 to 21 May 2006; in correctional facility no. IK-16 in Murmashi, Murmansk Region, in a special wing with the material conditions of detention of a remand prison (ПФРСИ – помещение, функционирующее в режиме следственного изолятора) from 21 May to 9 October 2006; in remand prison no. IZ-35/2 in Vologda from 12 to 17 October 2006; and in remand prison no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow from 18 October 2006 to 24 January 2007. 47. The Government submitted that it was impossible to provide original documentation concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention in remand prison no. IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk because all the official records had been destroyed after the expiry of the statutory period for their storage. In respect of that detention facility they submitted only statements and reports prepared by the prison authorities in 2010. They also submitted copies of the prison population register for the entire periods of the applicant’s detention in correctional facility no. IK-16 in Murmashi and in remand prison no. IZ-35/2 in Vologda, and selected pages from the prison population register for the period of detention in remand prison no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow. 48. The Government submitted the following information about the applicant’s detention, which was based on the above-mentioned documents: Detention facility Cell No. Period of detention Surface area (in square metres) Number of inmates Number of beds remand prison IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk 331 30 December 2003 to 5 January 2004 49. The Government asserted that in all the cells where the applicant had been detained between 2003 and 2007, the number of inmates had not exceeded the number of beds and that at all times while in detention the applicant had been provided with an individual sleeping place. At the same time, the Government submitted as follows: “... during the applicant’s detention the sanitary norm for space per inmate was not always complied with. However, it happened only occasionally ... and the prosecutor’s office demanded that these infractions be eliminated ...” 50. Relying on the statements and reports prepared by the prison authorities in 2010, the Government further submitted that the applicant had been provided with bed sheets and cutlery. The cells were cleaned daily by the inmates and the administration of the penal institutions carried out a sanitary treatment of the premises every month. 51. All cells were equipped with wash basins supplying cold water; hot water was available for personal and household needs. In addition, the inmates were allowed to use their own kettles and water heaters. 52. At all times in all the remand prisons, the applicant and the other inmates were allowed to take a fifteen-minute shower once a week; their linen was changed weekly. 53. The applicant and other inmates were allowed to take one hour’s daily exercise in specially equipped yards. 54. According to the applicant, remand prison no. IZ-51/1 (SIZO-1) in Murmansk had been severely overcrowded and the space available to him had been below the domestic standards. The applicant contested the accuracy of the data submitted by the Government about the designated number of bunk beds within the cells. For instance, in cell no. 423 the actual number of bunk beds had been eight and not three as submitted by the Government, as could be seen from the photographs he had submitted to the Court. Cell no. 406 had seven sleeping bunks and housed up to nine inmates. 55. In reply to the applicant’s complaints about poor conditions of detention, the Murmansk regional prosecutor’s office stated, on 14 November 2005, as follows: “... the applicant’s complaints ... that the conditions of detention in SIZO-1 were not fully compatible with the sanitary regulations prescribed by the Federal Law on pre‑trial detention ... that the minimum individual space prescribed by the Law (4 sq. m per person) was not always complied with, that the premises needed repair, that the walls in some of the cells were stained with mould and crumbling, that the plumbing was often out of order, that not all the cells were equipped with a sufficient number of shelves and TV sets, that broken glass in the windows was not replaced promptly and that there were no refrigerators – [all these complaints] reflect the reality. These deficiencies were noted by the prosecutor’s office during their inspection of SIZO-1.” 56. On 25 April 2006 the Murmansk regional prosecutor’s office stated: “... in 2005-06 the number of detainees in SIZO-1 frequently exceeded the prescribed limits. For these reasons it was not always possible to comply with the sanitary regulations (4 sq. m per inmate). For the same reasons the requirements concerning the separate detention of different categories of detainees were sometimes not complied with ...” 57. As regards correctional facility no. IK-16 in Murmashi, the applicant stated that during his stay there he had been detained in inadequate conditions. The cells had been overcrowded. The space available to him throughout the detention period had been below the domestic standards. In particular, he had shared a cell measuring 20 sq. m with five other detainees. 58. On 28 September 2006 the applicant complained to the Murmansk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences of inadequate conditions of detention in IK-16. In particular, he complained of poor nutrition, overcrowding, a lack of newspapers and television sets, and of the authorities’ refusal to make copies of documents at inmates’ requests. He received no reply. 59. Furthermore, as regards remand prison no. IZ-35/2 in Vologda, the applicant stated that the quality of the food in the prison had been extremely poor. He had been detained with thirty-six other detainees in a cell measuring 50 sq. m. The cell had been infested with cockroaches, bedbugs and rats. The detainees had slept on bunk beds. 60. Lastly, as regards remand prison no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow, according to the applicant, he had been held in cell 434, which measured 13 sq. m, with seven other detainees. The inmates had slept on bunk beds. There had been a table measuring 1 m by 0.3 m but no benches or chairs to sit on. The cell had been swarming with insects. The inmates had been allowed to take exercise only in groups. 61. From 9 to 12 October 2006 the applicant was transferred by train from Murmansk to Vologda. He was given no food. He received his first meal on 13 October 2006. 62. On 17 and 18 October 2006 the applicant was transferred by train from Vologda to Moscow. 63. From 24 January to 9 February 2007, on the way from Moscow to Murmansk, between St Petersburg and Murmansk, the applicant was transported in cramped conditions in a compartment with up to sixteen other inmates, some of whom were suffering from tuberculosis. 64. As regards the conditions of the applicant’s transportation between Murmansk and Vologda from 9 to 12 October 2006, the applicant was transported in a compartment with other inmates, none of whom were suffering from tuberculosis. He was transferred from Vologda railway station to the local remand prison IZ‑35/2 in a special vehicle separately from other inmates. 65. When the applicant was transferred from Vologda railway station to Moscow on 17 and 18 October 2006, he was not transported with inmates who were suffering from tuberculosis. 66. When the applicant was transferred from Moscow to Murmansk between 24 January and 9 February 2007, he was transported first alone in the railway compartment, then from St Petersburg onwards he was transported with other inmates, none of whom were suffering from tuberculosis. 67. During the transfers the applicant was duly provided with dry food rations; he was given permission to use hot water and the toilet. 68. The applicant did not lodge any complaints about the conditions of his transportation between Murmansk and Moscow. He did not apply for medical assistance, nor did he complain about the state of his health. 69. In their submission the Government neither specified the number of inmates transported with the applicant, nor the size of the compartments in which they had travelled. Nor did they submit any copies of documents regarding that part of the applicant’s complaints, including the distribution of dry rations for the trip.

5. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Glyka Nera. He is the executive director of the non-governmental organisation “Greek Helsinki Monitor”. 6. On 26 January 2007, 11 February 2007 and 7 March 2007, Greek Helsinki Monitor published on its website some press releases, in which, inter alia, it welcomed the concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) for Greece and criticised the domestic authorities’ responses to them. 7. On 4 March 2007, E.T., in her capacity as General Secretary for Gender Equality of the Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, gave an interview which was published in a magazine included with a Sunday newspaper. In that interview the following statement was put to her: “Greek Helsinki Monitor accuses you of withholding information and lying before the UN about the position of Roma women, minority women, and whether polygamy is practiced in Greece.” E.T. gave the following answer: “What they claim is extremely unfair. They lay the country open to criticism (εκθέτουν τη χώρα) – because what they claim is false. No other NGO shares the Monitor’s position. We, in our report, may not have fully documented everything, but no one can claim that Greece is an entirely patriarchic country and that nothing has been done all these years.” 8. On 1 April 2007 the same newspaper published a reply sent by the applicant, as executive director of Greek Helsinki Monitor, to E.T.’s comments, in which he asked E.T. to document her statements. On 1 June 2007 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the public prosecutor at the Athens First-Instance Court. He submitted that E.T. in the above-mentioned interview had made false statements about Greek Helsinki Monitor which amounted to slander committed through the press. The applicant expressed his wish to join the proceedings as civil party, initially for the amount of 100,000 euros (EUR), which he later reduced to EUR 44. 9. Following an urgent preliminary inquiry, to which E.T. was requested to provide a statement as a suspect in the case, on 10 January 2008 the public prosecutor at the Athens Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant’s criminal complaint and filed (αρχειοθέτησε) it away, in accordance with Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In particular, the prosecutor considered that the above-mentioned statements made within the context of the interview, did not constitute facts but value judgments and in any event, they did not overcome the necessary threshold of similar exchanges between various bodies. The prosecutor also added that Greek Helsinki Monitor had used the same expression, that is to say it had described statements included in reports prepared by the Greek Government as “false”, in various press releases, in a much more heated tone. 10. On 6 February 2008, following an appeal by the applicant against the order by which his criminal complaint was filed away, the public prosecutor at the Athens Court of Appeal ordered E.T.’s criminal prosecution for slander made through the press, considering that the above-mentioned statements were susceptible of harming the applicant’s honour and reputation, not only individually, but also as representative of Greek Helsinki Monitor. 11. On the basis of the above, E.T. was indicted and 25 June 2008 was set as the hearing date before the three-member Athens Magistrates’ Court. On 26 May 2008 E.T. appealed against her indictment. On 17 June 2008 her appeal was dismissed by the Athens Council of Magistrate Judges. 12. The new hearing date before the three-member Athens Magistrates’ Court was set for 18 September 2008. On that date, at the beginning of the hearing of the case, E.T. raised for the first time an objection concerning lack of competence of the trial court, arguing that her status as a lawyer meant she could not have her case heard by a three-member magistrates’ court. By judgment no. 53833/08 published on the same date, the said court declared itself not to have competence and referred the case to the three-member Athens Court of Appeal for misdemeanours (hereafter the “Court of Appeal”). On 28 November 2008 the operative part of the judgment was corrected and on 6 April 2009, the case file was transmitted to the prosecution service at the Athens Court of Appeal, marked as extremely urgent. 13. The new hearing date was set for 13 May 2009. On that date, the applicant’s lawyer sent a letter to the court, requesting that the hearing be postponed as he could not attend it owing to other professional obligations. Additionally, K.D., a journalist who had interviewed E.T., had not been present and the applicant submitted that he considered her testimony essential. As a result, the Court of Appeal by its judgment no. 4044/09 postponed the hearing until 5 October 2009, citing a material witness’s absence as the reason. On 5 October 2009 the case was not heard because the courts had not been sitting owing to the parliamentary elections that had taken place the previous day. 14. The case was again set for hearing on 17 February 2010. On that date, E.T.’s lawyer submitted certificate no. 2063/2010 of the Greek Parliament, according to which E.T. had been elected as a deputy in the parliamentary elections of 4 October 2009. On that basis, he applied to the court to have the proceedings suspended in accordance with Article 62 of the Constitution in order for Parliament to give permission. The applicant objected to the suspension and filed written submissions in which he argued, inter alia, that it was not necessary for Parliament to grant leave for the criminal proceedings against E.T. as the acts for which she was accused had not taken place in the course of her parliamentary activities. He cited in that connection the Court’s cases Tsalkitzis v. Greece (no. 11801/04, 16 November 2006) and Syngelidis v. Greece (no. 24895/07, 11 February 2010). He further stressed that the impugned acts would become time‑barred on 4 September 2010 and requested that the court proceed with examination on the merits of the case. 15. The Court of Appeal, after having held deliberations in camera, published judgment no. 1656/2010 by which it suspended the criminal proceedings against E.T. until the Greek Parliament had granted leave and, if such leave were not granted or if no action were taken in the three‑month period from the submission of the prosecutor’s request to the Greek Parliament, until her status as a parliamentarian ended. In respect of Article 62 of the Constitution and the applicant’s objection, the domestic court held the following: “... In addition, since Parliament has not granted leave, the prosecution is declared inadmissible if it concerns an offence committed when the defendant was a member of parliament. If, however, criminal proceedings were initiated prior to that, when the defendant was not a member of parliament, then they are suspended until the said leave is granted or until the defendant’s status as a parliamentarian ends ... It should be noted that in the present case no matter arises concerning the interpretation of Articles 61, 62 and 20 § 1 of the Constitution ... and of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, so as for the court to rule that Parliament’s leave is not required to conduct this trial because the above-mentioned act did not take place, according to the civil claimant’s allegations, in the context of her parliamentary duties. That is because the prosecutable offence (slander for an interview that the defendant gave to a newspaper in her capacity as General Secretary for Gender Equality of the Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation) clearly does not concern a private dispute; it should be examined if it relates and is linked to the political activity of the defendant-deputy and in general to the exercise of her parliamentary duties. However, examination of this matter and, eventually, any conclusion thereof can only be carried out by the competent authority, the Greek Parliament ...” 16. The decision was published on the date of the hearing, that is to say 17 February 2010, and was finalised (i.e. entered in a special book at the registry of the criminal court) on 10 August 2010. On 13 August 2010 the applicant lodged an application with the public prosecutor of the Court of Cassation requesting an examination of points of law of the said judgment. His request was rejected on the grounds that the Court of Appeal had rightly suspended the proceedings so that Parliament could grant leave, in accordance with Article 62 of the Constitution. On 19 August 2010 the case file was transferred to the public prosecutor of the Court of Cassation, who the next day sent it to the Minister of Justice. On 23 August 2010 the Minister of Justice transferred the case file to the Greek Parliament. 17. On 24 October 2010 the Special Permanent Committee of Parliamentary Ethics of the Greek Parliament, having taken a deposition from E.T., ruled unanimously that the requirements of Article 83 § 3 had been met and thus E.T.’s immunity should not be lifted. On 12 January 2011 the Plenary of the Greek Parliament dismissed the request for leave to continue the criminal proceedings. On 1 March 2011 the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation notified the public prosecutor at the Court of Appeal of the outcome of Parliament’s vote on granting leave. 18. On 16 July 2012 the head of the General Directorate of Human Resources of the Greek Parliament notified the Ministry of Justice that E.T. had ceased to be member of parliament since 11 April 2012. On 26 October 2012 the Court of Appeal published judgment no. 8658/2012 in which it considered that the offence of which E.T. was accused had become time‑barred as more than forty-two months had passed since its alleged commission. It consequently ended the criminal prosecution. The judgment was finalised on 21 March 2013.

4. The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Beiuş. 5. The applicant was married to I.T. and had a daughter with him, born in 2011. In May 2013 the applicant left the marital home and the child remained with I.T. On 21 May and 5 June 2013 respectively I.T. and the applicant filed for divorce and each sought sole custody of the child. 6. On 10 December 2013 the Beiuş District Court granted the couple’s divorce and joint custody of the child, and decided that the child should remain with her father. In a final decision of 17 June 2014 the Bihor County Court quashed the above decision in part and decided that the child should live with the applicant. I.T. refused to hand over the child. 7. On 4 July 2014 the applicant applied to the bailiff’s office for enforcement of the decision of 17 June 2014. On 5 August and 25 September 2014 I.T. went to the bailiff’s office alone and told the bailiff that the child refused to live with her mother. A representative of the Bihor Directorate General for Social Welfare and Child Protection (“the child‑protection authority”) was also present at these meetings. 8. On 3 October 2014 the bailiff and the applicant lodged an action with the Oradea District Court, seeking an order that I.T. pay her 1,000 Romanian lei (RON – approximately 225 euros (EUR)) for each day of non-enforcement of the custody order. On 11 May 2015 the court dismissed the action on the grounds that I.T. had not opposed the enforcement and that it had been the child who had refused to go with her mother. It appears that neither the applicant nor the bailiff appealed against this decision. 9. On 6 October 2014 the bailiff lodged a criminal complaint against I.T. for non-compliance with a court order, but on 23 January 2015 the prosecutor’s office attached to the Oradea District Court decided not to charge I.T. It considered that the reports drafted by the bailiff after each encounter with I.T. showed that it had not been I.T., but the child who had opposed the enforcement. 10. On 4 November 2014 the bailiff, accompanied by a social worker from the child protection authority and the police, went to I.T.’s home. They asked to see the child to verify if she wanted to go with her mother. Initially I.T. refused, but eventually he brought the child out. The bailiff noted as follows: “After [the mother] talked with the minor, I asked the minor if she wanted to leave with her mother, and she gave me a non-committal answer. However, I should note that, although the minor did not show an aversion towards her mother, she did not wish to leave with her mother. The social worker reached the same conclusion.” 11. The social worker who was also present at the meeting noted as follows: “The father refused to bring out the child, became uncooperative but eventually agreed that [the child] sit near her mother. The atmosphere was tense, the parents made reproaches to each other in front of the child and they spoke to each other in a raised voice. When the mother tried to hold the child in her arms, the child started crying and held the hand of her father’s current wife tightly. After the child sat for a while with the mother, [the bailiff] asked the child if she wished to leave with her mother. Although the child did not show an aversion towards her mother, she refused to leave with her.” 12. On 13 November 2014 the applicant complained to the child protection authority that the social worker who had accompanied her and the bailiff on 4 November 2014 had been unfamiliar with the case, had questioned her motives in front of the child and had not known how to facilitate their reunion. It appears that she received no reply to her complaint. 13. On 8 December 2014, at the bailiff’s request and based on the report of the visit of 4 November 2014, the child protection authority applied for mandatory counselling under Article 912 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with a view to re-establishing a relationship between the applicant and the child. On 20 January 2015 the Beiuş District Court allowed the request and ordered that the child should follow a three-month psychological counselling programme. 14. The objectives of the counselling programme were to assist both parents in establishing positive contact with the child, and to help rebuild the mother-child relationship. 15. Several meetings were organised between 4 February and 4 May 2015. The psychologist met the parents separately and together and met the child. I.T. refused to allow the applicant to participate in the counselling sessions together with the child. He also asked the applicant to agree to postpone the enforcement of the custody decision for a year if she wanted to see her daughter during counselling. As the applicant did not accede to his request, he refused any contact between the mother and daughter during that period. 16. On 16 June 2015 the psychologist submitted her report to the court and to the child protection authority. She noted that the child was well‑integrated into her father’s family, was emotionally attached to her father, stepmother and stepbrother, and was afraid that the applicant would come and take her away during the counselling meetings. She also noted that the father was not facilitating the relationship between the applicant and their child. 17. At the end of the counselling programme I.T. agreed to allow the applicant to speak with the child on the telephone. The psychologist observed that the counselling had failed to diminish the child’s high levels of separation anxiety and ambivalent attitude towards her biological mother and had failed to reach the objectives set at the beginning. 18. On 21 May and 22 October 2015 and 16 April 2016 the applicant asked the bailiff to continue the enforcement proceedings. There is no indication that he did so. On 22 October 2015 and 25 May 2016 the bailiff sought payment of the costs of the enforcement proceedings from I.T. 19. On 8 July 2015 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against I.T. for refusing to comply with a court order and for alleged acts of violence against the child when the applicant had wanted to take her home. On 30 September 2016 the prosecutor decided not to charge I.T. The applicant did not complain about that decision. 20. Meanwhile, on 2 June 2015 I.T. had lodged an application with the Beiuş District Court, seeking an order that the child live with him. At the same time he lodged an interim request with the same objective. On 30 June 2015 the District Court dismissed the interim request on the grounds that the child was already living with him. The court noted that the applicant had already suffered harm because she could not take her child home despite the court decision of 17 June 2014 (see paragraph 6 above). I.T. appealed, but on 27 August 2015 the Bihor County Court upheld the previous decision. 21. On 17 February 2016 the Beiuş District Court also dismissed the main action lodged by I.T. concerning the child’s residence. The parents, I.T.’s new wife and the child were interviewed by a court-appointed psychologist who was tasked with assessing the family relations between the parties. She concluded that the child needed time to rebuild her relationship with her mother and recommended that a contact schedule be drawn up between them. She also recommended parental counselling. The court considered that there were no serious reasons to prompt a change in the child’s legal residence and that it was in the child’s interests to remain with her mother. 22. I.T. appealed, but in a final decision of 29 September 2016 the Bihor County Court upheld the previous decision. The relevant parts read as follows: “The minor must have a normal relationship with both parents, which presupposes that the current situation, where she is distanced from her mother, is overcome, because otherwise it will be almost impossible for her to re-establish a normal relationship with her mother, and this does not serve the child’s best interests. The court does not deny the importance of a stable environment for the minor, including her home and the people who are part of her daily life; it considers, however, that at the present time preserving continuity does not serve the child’s interests to develop a normal relationship with both parents. The parties must understand ... that the minor must be supported in order to adapt to her new environment... The court is not bound by the wish expressed by the minor to remain with her father, because she is of a young age and because the father has persuaded the minor not to go to her mother’s home. ... To hold that the child’s opinion is binding without exception would mean that the proceedings, including the hearing of evidence, are useless and that the court’s sole role is to take note of the child’s preference and decide accordingly.” 23. According to the applicant, on 21 March 2018, the date of her latest communication to the Court, she had still not been reunited with her daughter.

4. The applicant was born in 1953 and lived in Martin. In 2006 she was recognised as “severely disabled” with 60% “functional impairment” pursuant to the relevant national laws. Her monthly disabled person’s allowance payments in 2010, 2011 and 2012 were 325.40 euros (EUR), EUR 336.20 and EUR 346.30, respectively. 5. Prior to the above, in 2004, the applicant had lodged a claim with the Martin District Land Office (Obvodný pozemkový úrad) for restitution of a suite of real property consisting of several plots which came under special legislation provisions on restitution. 6. On 20 December 2011 she lodged an action against the Land Office with the Žilina Regional Court, sitting as an administrative tribunal, seeking an order for acceleration of the restitution proceedings. 7. This type of action required mandatory legal representation. Accordingly, the action was submitted through a lawyer. The applicant also sought an order for costs. The latter claim was calculated under the applicable national rules as pertaining to two “acts of legal assistance” (úkon právnej služby), in particular a first consultation with a lawyer, and the formulation of the action. EUR 130 was claimed in respect of one such act along with an associated lump sum for overheads; the whole claim came to some EUR 260. 8. On 2 January, 29 February and 23 March 2012 the applicant made further submissions. In the former two, she proactively informed the court that the Land Office had taken decisions in respect of her restitution claim on 23 December 2011 and 12 January 2012 and contended that these decisions did not determine her claim in relation to all the plots concerned and that they had been taken with the aim of creating a false impression that there had been no unjustified delays in the proceedings. The latter submission was made in response to a request by the court to specify the plots in respect of which the applicant’s restitution claim was still outstanding. 9. In the submission of 23 March 2012 the applicant reiterated her claim in respect of legal costs, amending its scope as pertaining to five acts of legal assistance, including the three submissions mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 10. On 10 April 2012 the Regional Court granted the action and made an order for costs. As to the latter ruling, it summarised the applicant’s claim as pertaining to three acts of legal assistance (the first consultation with a lawyer, the formulation of the action, and the formulation of the submission of 2 January 2012). It found that the applicant had correctly calculated the value of the act of legal assistance and that the undertaking by her lawyer of those acts had been justified. Accordingly, it allowed the claim in respect of those three acts of legal assistance. There is no reference in the Regional Court’s decision to the remaining two acts of legal assistance in the summary of the applicant’s claim, in the courts’ reasoning, or in the operative part of its decision. The Regional Court’s decision was not amenable to appeal. 11. On 18 May 2012 the applicant challenged the ruling on costs before the Constitutional Court. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, she complained that the Regional Court had failed to provide any reasons for not allowing her claim for costs with respect to the remaining two acts of legal assistance. As she had been fully successful in the case, she normally should have been compensated in respect of the costs of all justified acts of legal assistance received. A reduction of the award could only have been based on exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Article 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, in determining the issue of legal costs, the Regional Court had made no use of that provision and, in any event, no such circumstances pertained, in particular because the case concerned unjustified delays in proceedings before a public authority lasting more than seven years; her efforts to ensure an out-of-court solution had been futile and had left her with no alternative to asserting her rights in the Regional Court; legal representation before that court was mandatory, the applicant was disabled, and she was living on the allowance specified above. 12. On 14 June 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It noted that it was essentially aimed at the fact that the Regional Court had provided no explanation for deciding on and granting compensation in respect of three acts of legal assistance only. It observed that, as such, the complaint concerned a decision on costs rather than on the merits of the applicant’s action. It referred to its established case-law to the effect that decisions on costs could violate fundamental rights and freedoms only exceptionally, in particular if there were an extremely serious interference with such rights and freedoms. It was true that the decision contested in the applicants’ case was “challengeable under the criteria of lawfulness”. However, it was necessary to take into account that the value of the remaining two acts of legal assistance was only some EUR 270. This was less than three times the statutory minimum wage, the limit that was otherwise applicable to admissibility of appeals on points of law. If the amount at stake was this negligible, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court could only be engaged in very exceptional circumstances and no such circumstances had been established in the applicant’s case. Accordingly, her complaint was rejected as manifestly ill-founded. The decision was served on 3 August 2012 and no appeal lay against it.

5. The applicant was born in 1960. 6. On 11 August 2006 the applicant, who suffered from schizophrenia, was arrested in his parents’ flat following an argument with his relatives. 7. The Court, in connection with that incident, in its judgment of V.D. v. Croatia (no. 15526/10, 8 November 2011) found that the investigation into the applicant’s arguable claim of ill-treatment by the police during the arrest had not been effective, contrary to the requirements of the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention. It also found that the Government had not furnished any convincing or credible arguments which would provide a basis to explain the manner in which the applicant had sustained his injuries during the arrest. The Court thus concluded that the applicant had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by the police, in breach of the substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention. 8. On 16 August 2012, in the context of the procedure for the execution of the Court’s judgment, the Government submitted an action plan indicating that the applicant had sought the reopening of the case against the police officers implicated in the incident (S.P., V.B., D.K. and T.S.) before the relevant criminal courts. To date, the Committee of Ministers has not concluded its supervision of the execution of the judgment under Article 46 § 2 of the Convention. 9. On 8 March 2013 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) ordered the reopening of the proceedings against the police officers, S.P. and V.B. That decision was upheld by the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 16 January 2014. 10. On 4 October 2013 the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court (Općinski kazneni sud u Zagrebu) ordered that the proceedings against D.K. and T.S., the other two police officers involved in the applicant’s arrest, be reopened. That decision became final on 5 November 2013. 11. Following the court orders for the reopening of the proceedings against the police officers, the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu; hereinafter: “the State Attorney’s Office”) assumed responsibility for conducting the investigation. 12. On 13 June 2014 the State Attorney’s Office informed the applicant that it had opened an investigation in respect of the police officers concerning his allegations of ill-treatment during his arrest on 11 August 2006. The applicant was also served with the decision on the opening of the investigation, which indicated that in the further course of the proceedings it would be necessary to question him, his parents and his common-law wife, Ms T.V., as well as the relevant police officers, and that a forensic expert report concerning the injuries which the applicant had sustained in the incident would be ordered. In addition, the applicant was served with a list of his rights as a victim in the proceedings, which included, in particular, the right to be represented by a lawyer, to lodge a civil claim, to propose that certain facts be established and evidence obtained in the proceedings, and to have access to the file. 13. On the same day, the State Attorney’s Office received a letter from the applicant’s lawyer (dated 12 June 2014) asking whether further proceedings would be conducted and whether the applicant would be able to propose that certain evidence be obtained in the proceedings. 14. In the meantime, the suspect police officers challenged the decision to reopen the investigation. On 10 July 2014 the Zagreb County Court dismissed their appeals. The decision thereby became final. 15. On 24 September 2014 the State Attorney’s Office summoned the applicant for questioning. The applicant was again provided with a list of his rights as a victim in the proceedings. A summons was served on the applicant’s father, who informed the State Attorney’s Office that the applicant was living abroad and that he was unable to appear for questioning. The applicant also sent a letter to the State Attorney’s Office providing the same justification for his absence. The applicant was then summoned to appear on 30 October 2014. 16. During his questioning on 30 October 2014, the applicant stated that on the day of the incident he had been at his parent’s flat in Zagreb together with his common-law wife, Ms T.V., and their son. As they had had a dispute, somebody had called the police, who had intervened at the scene. He had first spoken to the police officers but when they had asked him to accompany them to the police station, he had refused. They had then thrown him to the ground face down and had started beating him. At one point they had also handcuffed him and tied his legs. He had managed to bite one of the police officers and as he had been in agony from the beating, he had also bitten his own tongue. The applicant also stated that there had been two paramedics present at the scene. 17. On 5 November 2014 the applicant’s lawyer asked the State Attorney’s Office to send her a copy of the record of the applicant’s questioning. On 28 November 2014 a copy of the record was sent to her. 18. In the further course of the investigation, the State Attorney’s Office questioned the applicant’s parents and two other relatives (D.D. and M.D.) who had witnessed the incident, as well as the relevant police officers. 19. During the questioning, D.D. stated that she had only seen the applicant being taken out of the flat by the police officers. M.D. stated that he had seen the applicant and the police officers talking in the flat and that at one point the applicant had tried to punch one of the police officers, after which the police officers had engaged in suppressing his resistance. However, at that point M.D. had left the room where that had been happening. The applicant’s mother stated that she had left the room after the police officers had handcuffed the applicant and tied his legs. She had then heard screams, and on re-entering the room she had seen a lot of blood and the police officers standing around the applicant. Oral evidence to the same effect was given by the applicant’s father. 20. The police officers denied ill-treating the applicant. They all provided evidence to the extent that when they had intervened at the scene they had immediately realised that they were facing an individual with a mental disorder. He had threatened to kill them, although he had said that he would spare one of them because he had blue eyes. When they had approached him, the applicant had started to resist so they had decided to handcuff him. At that point, he had bitten the hand of police officer S.P. A commotion had then ensued, in the course of which the applicant had fallen on the ground. He had also started kicking, so the police officers had tied his legs. The applicant had also bitten his tongue and had hit his head against the floor, so the police officers had decided to hold his head and to put him on his side. Afterwards, a medical team had intervened at the scene and the applicant had been taken to hospital. 21. On 24 November 2014 the State Attorney’s Office ordered a report from a forensic expert, D.M., concerning the injuries which the applicant had sustained following his arrest. 22. On 27 November 2014 the State Attorney’s Office asked the Zagreb emergency service to provide the names of the members of the medical team who had intervened at the scene during the applicant’s arrest. The next day, the emergency service replied that they could not find the requested information in their records. 23. However, on the basis of a statement given by one of the suspects, V.B., the State Attorney’s Office established the identity of one of the paramedics who had intervened at the scene. As that person had in the meantime moved out of Zagreb, on 28 November 2014 he was interviewed by telephone. In his interview with the prosecutor he denied having seen any ill-treatment of the applicant during the arrest. However, he stated that the applicant had been very agitated and that he had seen him attacking and biting a police officer. 24. Meanwhile, on 27 November 2014 the expert, D.M., issued his report. The expert report indicated that the injuries which the applicant had sustained to his face had been caused by two blows, probably by a fist. The further injuries on his arms, legs and body had been caused either by several blows or possibly also by a fall, as well as by handcuffing. Some of the injuries appeared to have been caused by the body being scratched with an object or dragged across the floor while lying face down. There was also damage to the applicant’s tongue as a result of a bite, but it had been impossible to establish exactly how that injury had been caused. 25. The State Attorney’s Office found that the forensic expert, D.M., needed to be questioned concerning his report and that he should be presented with some further evidence obtained during the investigation, namely photographs of the crime scene and the individuals concerned taken immediately after the incident, the statements of the relevant police officers and the statement given by the paramedic. 26. On 28 November 2014 the State Attorney’s Office questioned D.M. The latter stated that the injuries to the applicant’s face could not have been caused when the police officers had attempted to prevent the applicant from self-harming by holding his face, but that it was possible that he had banged his head against the stretcher while being transported by the paramedics. D.M. stressed that, likewise, the tongue laceration which the applicant had sustained could have been caused by his fall and by him banging his head against the stretcher. D.M. also explained that, having seen the photographs of the applicant taken after the incident, he did not believe that the injuries he had sustained had been caused by beating, but were likely to have been caused by the commotion during the arrest. 27. On 9 December 2014 the State Attorney’s Office, by a reasoned decision analysing all the evidence obtained and the facts established during the investigation, terminated the investigation on grounds of lack of evidence of any ill-treatment or any other excessive use of force by the police during the applicant’s arrest. 28. The decision to discontinue the investigation was served on the applicant on 15 December 2014. It was served on his lawyer the next day. The applicant was informed that he could take over the proceedings as a subsidiary prosecutor. 29. The applicant challenged the decision of the State Attorney’s Office before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). On 19 February 2015 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s complaints inadmissible on the grounds that the impugned decision did not concern any of his civil rights or obligations, or any criminal charge against him. 30. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant’s representative on 5 March 2015. 31. On 6 December 2007 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the State in the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu), seeking damages for the injuries sustained during his arrest. 32. In the course of the proceedings, the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court obtained evidence from several expert witnesses concerning the injuries which the applicant had sustained. One of the experts, V.P., concluded that the injuries on the applicant’s body could have been caused by blows or by the body being dragged across the floor, and that the injuries to his hands and legs could have been caused by impact against a hard surface. The injuries on his face had not been properly documented but such injuries were usually caused by punches delivered with lesser intensity. She also found that there had been an injury to the applicant’s tongue. Another expert, S.D., found that it was impossible to draw any firm conclusion as to how the tongue injury had been caused. 33. On 31 March 2014 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court ruled in the applicant’s favour. On appeal, the Zagreb County Court increased the amount of compensation for damage, awarding the applicant 17,400 Croatian kunas (HRK). On 20 April 2016 the State paid the applicant in total HRK 66,716.88 (approximately 8,850 euros (EUR)) in compensation for damage, costs and expenses incurred for the proceedings, and interest. 34. Following intervention by the police and the medical service, the applicant was placed in a psychiatric hospital, where he died on 16 November 2017. An autopsy report indicated that the cause of death was heart failure. An investigation into the event is pending before the relevant State Attorney’s Office.

5. The applicant company was ordered to pay EUR 10,000 in damages to a person referred to as a presumed member of the mafia on one page of a book published by it. The domestic court considered that the applicant company, which had based the impugned passage of the book on, inter alia, an internal report of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigations (Bundeskriminalamt), had not complied with its duty to carry out thorough research and had seriously interfered with the personality rights of the person referred to. 6. The applicant company is a prominent German book-publishing house with its registered office in Munich. In 2015 it was ranked among the ten publishing firms generating the highest turnover in the German publishing sector. 7. In September 2008 the applicant company published a book entitled “Mafia” written by Petra Reski, an author internationally renowned for her anti-Mafia publications. The book was reprinted in several editions and also published in Italy. It deals, in its 352 pages, with the Mafia’s ties to Germany, its inner structures and its various branches. The book also recounts an event which took place in 2007 in Duisburg where six people of Italian nationality were killed by fifty-six bullets in front of the Italian restaurant “Da Bruno”. The killings were supposed to be the culmination of a vendetta between two ‘Ndrangheta families which had started in 1991 in Italy. The incident received national and international media attention. 8. On pages 157 and 158 the book referred, by his full name, to a person called S.P., an Italian national residing in Germany. The relevant part reads as follows (translated, names abbreviated and emphasises added by the Court): “... The public prosecutor’s office of Stuttgart investigated the Calabrian [L] for drug dealing and money laundering – he is said to have contributed to financing the electoral campaign of [O] with his funds. This was not to remain the sole link existing between a presumed member of the ʽNdrangheta and a German politician: in the city of Erfurt, the Calabrian [S.P.], who had been mentioned already in 2000 in a report prepared by the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation, gained notoriety. [S.P.] runs the restaurant ‘[Pa]’ in Erfurt: a restaurant seating 400 guests, not a bad rise for someone like [S.P.], who, according to statements of the investigators, had started out as a pizza baker in the pizza restaurant ‘Da Bruno’. After all, having contacts can be very helpful, even if, following the massacre of Duisburg, the pizza restaurant ‘Da Bruno’ no longer serves as that great a reference. In any case, [S.P.] continued to maintain his network of relationships in Erfurt by generously sponsoring the local golf club. When the police performed a search of the restaurant ‘[Pa]’ because of [S.P.]’s alleged involvement in a murder, it ran into the then Prime Minister of Thuringia, [B.V.], and his Secretary of the Interior, [R.D.] – both of whom had been dining there purely as a matter of chance, as [S.P.] asserted. He, by the way, had excellent relations with the police: when a further search was performed, the police found an identity card in his premises, which had been issued to him in his purported capacity as interpreter for the Uzbek delegation at an Interpol conference in Rome. The identity card, it was stated, had been issued by the Secretary of the Interior of the Saarland. ...” 9. As regards S.P.’s presumed membership of the ‘Ndrangheta, the applicant company relied on, inter alia, reports by the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation of 2000 and 2008. Neither report had been made public. 10. The relevant passage in the report of 2000 reads: “If one takes account of the enormous reputation that [S.P.] has and the esteem in which he is held by the Italian community, one forms the opinion that [S.P.] is a de‑facto fully-fledged member of the ‘Ndrangheta clan.” 11. The relevant parts of the report of 2008 read: “According to Italian colleagues from Calabria and Bianco, this connection could have contributed to [S.P.] becoming a member of the Romeo alias ‘Staccu’ clan. Owing to the prestigious reputation [S.P.] enjoys in the ‘Italian milieu’, he has to be a full member of the ‘Ndrangheta. ... Direct relatives of the clan live in Germany and run pizza restaurants. Their main bases are in the cities of Duisburg, Erfurt, and Leipzig. These bases are led by [A.M.], [D.G.] and [S.P.], with [D.G.] taking the role of the so-called ‘capo locale’. ... [D.G.] and [S.P.] could be in charge of investing the proceeds of drug trafficking. This theory is corroborated by the high number of good restaurants and statements from various sources that [S.P.] is said to have invested in several restaurants and acquired real estate in Dresden and the surrounding areas.” 12. In 1997 S.P. had already been mentioned by name in the context of organised crime. He had been interviewed in a television report regarding the ‘Ndrangheta in Thuringia and had denied any membership of or connection to the ‘Ndrangheta. 13. After publication of the book, S.P. applied to a court for an injunction against the dissemination of the passages highlighted in the above excerpt of the book (see paragraph 8 above). On 13 November 2008, the Munich Regional Court issued the injunction and confirmed it on 15 December 2008 after hearing both parties. It held that even though there was a public interest in reporting about organised crime, the author had acted in breach of her journalistic duties. The internal reports of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation constituted an insufficient source for the allegations made in the book, since the reports were not intended for publication. The investigating authorities themselves had not come to the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence of an offence having been committed by the plaintiff. Moreover, the Regional Court stated, a report on a suspicion also had to include the circumstances exonerating the party affected. Accordingly, the book should have stated that the investigating authorities had not obtained any indications which would have served as a basis for filing an indictment, much less a sentence, and that in fact the investigations pursued against the plaintiff had not resulted in any such bringing of charges or in any sentencing. In addition, the court held, the publication had not made it clear that the pizza restaurant “Da Bruno”, in which the murders had been perpetrated, was not identical to the pizza restaurant of the same name in which the plaintiff had worked as a pizza baker many years prior to those deeds. Lastly, the court continued, the book had been published unlawfully because the plaintiff had not been given any opportunity to make a statement regarding the suspicion prior to publication. 14. On 7 April 2009 the Munich Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant company’s appeal against the Regional Court’s judgment of 15 December 2008. It held that the book expressed a serious allegation that the plaintiff was a member of a criminal organisation and therefore seriously interfered with his personality rights. The section of the book dealing with the plaintiff did not allow an average reader to infer that the plaintiff’s membership of the criminal organisation ‘Ndrangheta could only be assumed vaguely. Rather, the court continued, the interplay of the many individual statements in the book created the impression that there was a very strong suspicion that the plaintiff was a member of the ‘Ndrangheta. The evidentiary facts researched by the author and published by the applicant company did not constitute sufficient proof of the exceptionally grave suspicion raised in the book. The court established that even the internal report by the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation only mentioned a number of vague suspicious circumstances, for the most part without providing any details or naming any specific sources. For example, it said that because of the high respect in which the plaintiff was held in the “Italian milieu”, he must be a fully fledged member of the ‘Ndrangheta. The internal reports only showed that owing to certain information compiled in them, some of which had not been corroborated by evidence, assumptions had been made as to the existence of certain connections. This did not seem to be a sufficient basis for publicly branding the plaintiff as a presumed ʽNdranghetista. Moreover, the court continued, certain statements in the book were incorrect, such as the region in which the plaintiff had been born. Other statements were fragmentary, as the investigation during which the plaintiff’s restaurant was searched by the police had been discontinued. In that regard, the court held that the book had failed to report exonerating circumstances. Even though authors did not have to await the outcome of an investigation before reporting on a corresponding suspicion, if the reporting on a suspicion was reliant on investigations that had been carried out six or seven years previously, the author could not ignore the fact that the investigation proceedings had come to an end without any charges having been brought. 15. In the main proceedings, in addition to his request that the injunction be upheld, S.P. applied for damages in the amount of EUR 20,000. 16. On 22 June 2011, the Munich Regional Court upheld the injunction, but dismissed the plaintiff’s application for damages. The Regional Court reiterated the reasoning it had given in the judgment of 15 December 2008 and that given by the Court of Appeal in its judgment of 7 April 2009 (see paragraphs 13-14 above). The court further reiterated that the author had not sufficiently researched the basis for the allegation that S.P. was a member of the ʽNdrangheta, since all the sources only indicated vague suspicious circumstances pointing at S.P. Secondly, the author had not complied with the “absolute requirement” of presenting exonerating circumstances. Lastly, the court held that the publication was unlawful as the author had not given the plaintiff the possibility to comment on the allegation prior to publication. 17. The Regional Court dismissed the plaintiff’s application for damages as being ill-founded. It held that even though the applicant company had breached the permissible boundaries of reporting on suspicions as well as its journalistic diligence, it had not done so in a serious manner. Accordingly, it sufficed to stop the dissemination of the impugned statements but did not require a payment of damages. 18. During the proceedings before the Regional Court the applicant company offered to furnish certain evidence supporting the suspicion published in the book. In particular, it offered to provide the names of witnesses who could allegedly confirm the statements made in the internal report of the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation and the suspicion published in the book. The Regional Court refused to hear the witnesses as it found that they would be unable to give evidence regarding the alleged membership and that the applicant company had failed to identify the specific issues on which the witnesses could testify. 19. The applicant company did not appeal against the judgment of the Regional Court. The plaintiff, however, appealed against the dismissal of his claim for damages. Consequently, in so far as the judgment ordered the injunction, it became final. 20. On 29 November 2011, the Munich Court of Appeal, in addition to the injunction, sentenced the applicant company to pay damages in the amount of EUR 10,000 and dismissed the plaintiff’s further claim for damages. The court stated that the prerequisite for any entitlement to pecuniary compensation was a serious violation of personality rights which could not be compensated in any other way. It found that that prerequisite had been met in the plaintiff’s case. As far as the violation of the plaintiff’s personality right was concerned, the Court of Appeal endorsed the reasoning of the Regional Court. It expressly conceded to the applicant company that there was great public interest in obtaining information about criminal organisations and “that the motivation of the author and of the defendant [in the instant case: applicant company] for informing the public on the activities pursued by the ‘Ndrangheta in Germany was commendable and honest”. However, the Court of Appeal continued, the applicant company had acted culpably to a significant extent. It had been grossly negligent on the part of the applicant company to disseminate an allegation based on a suspicion which seriously interfered with the plaintiff’s personality right in spite of the fact that the plaintiff had obviously not been given an opportunity to be heard and that the allegation had been disseminated without including the necessary information that the murder investigation addressed by the book subsequently had been discontinued. This charge of gross negligence could not be put aside because the author had tackled a subject of strong public interest. The applicant company should have realised that the information compiled about the plaintiff was not corroborated by evidence and that there were insufficient evidentiary facts to support the allegation reported in the book. The applicant company could not argue that it had not acted culpably, as it had based its publication on information obtained from a governmental authority. That principle, the court held, had been developed by the courts in adjudicating for official press releases issued by German authorities. However, the author had relied solely on internal analyses prepared by the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation as well as evaluation reports and documents generated in the course of intra-agency communications between Italian government authorities. 21. The Court of Appeal further reasoned that the injunction was not sufficient redress for the plaintiff, as it was not an adequate means of reaching the readers of a book that had already been published. Consequently, it found that the payment of damages was required. The court held that compensation in the amount of EUR 10,000, instead of the EUR 20,000 claimed by the plaintiff, was both sufficient and adequate. 22. On 28 March 2012 the Munich Court of Appeal dismissed as ill‑founded a complaint lodged by the applicant company that it had been denied the right to be heard. 23. On 19 November 2013, the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a constitutional complaint (1 BvR 82/12) lodged by the applicant company, without providing reasons.

5. The first applicant (Mr Grigoryev) was born in 1984 and lives in Svetlogorsk. The second applicant (Ms Igamberdiyeva) was born in 1989 and lives in Kaliningrad. 6. On an unknown date the second applicant notified the Kaliningrad authorities of her intention to hold a group public event on 12 December 2010 in Pobeda Square. The authorities replied that preparations for the New Year celebrations were planned on that day; they did not suggest an alternative venue. The second applicant did not challenge the authority’s reply before the domestic courts. Both applicants decided to stage solo demonstrations near the monument to “Mother Russia” instead; this did not require prior notification. 7. According to the applicants, on 12 December 2010 the first applicant staged a solo demonstration holding a banner saying “Freedom for Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev! We plead for a lawful judgment”. After he had completed his demonstration and placed himself at a distance of some twenty metres, the second applicant held her own solo demonstration. She was wearing a T-shirt saying “Freedom for Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev!” She completed her demonstration in five minutes. Then the first applicant returned to the venue with his banner and remained there for about two minutes, until police officers took him to a police van. He was then taken to a police station and held there for over three hours. 8. According to the Government, at 4 p.m. on 12 December 2010 the applicants participated in a group public event in the form of a “picket” (пикетирование) using visual props, namely a banner and a T-shirt. At 4 p.m. the first applicant was taken to the Leninskiy district police station. Between 5.15 p.m. and 6.30 p.m. a duty officer drew up an administrative offence record in respect of the first applicant. He was accused of taking part in a group public event held without authorisation, an offence under Article 20.2 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter “the CAO”). On 14 December 2012 the second applicant was called to the Leninskiy district police station, where she was accused of a similar offence, although it was classified under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO. 9. The cases against the applicants were submitted to a justice of the peace of court circuit no. 2 of the Leninskiy District of Kaliningrad. The court ordered the police to submit a video recording showing the events of 12 December 2010. By two judgments of 3 March 2011 the justice of the peace found that the applicants had held solo demonstrations and had not breached the Public Events Act (hereinafter “the PEA”), including its prior notification requirement applicable to group events. The court relied, inter alia, on the video recording submitted by the police. The administrative cases against the applicants were discontinued for lack of the elements of the offences under Article 20.2 §§ 1 and 2 of the CAO. 10. The police lodged an appeal. On 16 May 2011 the Leninskiy District Court of Kaliningrad upheld the judgments. The appellate court also considered that it had not been confirmed that the applicants had in fact taken part in a group “picket”. 11. The applicants sought compensation of 100,000 roubles (RUB)[1] each for unlawful deprivation of liberty and violation of their right to freedom of expression by way of solo demonstration. By a judgment of 15 July 2011 the Tsentralniy District Court of Kaliningrad found that taking the first applicant to the police station had been unlawful, and awarded him RUB 10,000 (equivalent to 250 euros (EUR) at the time) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On 25 July 2011 the same court also granted the claims by the second applicant, having found that preventing her from staging a solo demonstration and consequently prosecuting her had been unlawful. The court also awarded the second applicant RUB 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. 12. The first applicant appealed against the judgment of 15 July 2011, complaining, inter alia, about the amount of the compensation and the first‑instance court’s failure to make specific findings in relation to the violation of his freedom of expression on account of the police intervention in his solo demonstration. On 7 September 2011 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld the judgment. Relying on Article 27.1 § 2 of the CAO and Article 1070 § 2 of the Civil Code, it ruled that it followed from the discontinuation of the CAO case that placing the first applicant under administrative escort and arrest had been unlawful under Russian law as well as “unjustified” (необоснованные). The appellate court also considered that the interference with freedom of expression had been acknowledged by the declaration that taking the first applicant to the police station had been unlawful. 13. The second applicant also appealed. On 21 September 2011 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld the judgment of 25 July 2011.

4. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Zagreb. 5. On 28 April 2008 the daily newspaper B. published an article under the headline “Mob Lawyer joins the Supervisory Board”, describing the applicant as an extortionist. 6. On 27 May 2008 the applicant’s representative asked the publisher to publish a correction of that information. The publisher neither replied nor published a correction of the disputed information. 7. On 9 July 2008, after the expiry of the deadline envisaged in the relevant provisions of the Media Act (Zakon o medijima) to publish a correction, the applicant brought a civil action against the publisher in the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu), claiming non-pecuniary damage. 8. On 10 July 2009 the publisher replied stating in particular that the applicant had failed to submit a power of attorney with his request. 9. At a hearing held on 31 January 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court heard evidence from the applicant who said that he had authorised his representative to act on his behalf vis-à-vis the publisher. 10. On 31 January 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court, relying on sections 22(2) and 40(3) of the Media Act, declared the applicant’s claim inadmissible. The first-instance court held that the request for the publication of a correction of the disputed information had not been signed by a duly authorised person because the applicant had not proved that his representative had actually submitted a power of attorney with the request. The relevant part of the decision reads: “In his testimony, the [applicant] stated that he had given power of attorney to his counsel, [Lj.P], authorising her to institute both criminal and civil proceedings for defamation ... He was present during the preparation of a draft of the request for the correction of the disputed information ... ... This court does not accept the [applicant]’s evidence because the [applicant] has no direct knowledge of what was ultimately sent to the defendant ... On the other hand, the [applicant’s] statement concerning the granting of a power of attorney is of no relevance for the solution to the specific legal issue ... ... Given that the request for the publication of a correction of the disputed information was not signed by the [applicant], but by his counsel, [Lj.P.], and that it was not accompanied with a power of attorney, the [applicant] has not proved that he had properly requested the publication of a correction of the disputed information ... an action which is, pursuant to section 22(2) of the Media Act, a procedural requirement for bringing a civil action for non-pecuniary damage against the publisher ...” 11. On 19 November 2012 the Šibenik County Court (Županijski sud u Šibeniku) dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance decision. 12. On 14 March 2013 the Constitutional Court declared a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant inadmissible on the grounds that there was “no constitutional issue” to be examined.

5. A was born in 2011 and is the daughter of the applicant and Y. Both the mother and father had just turned 19 when the child was born. They had been engaged to be married, but the relationship had ended, and the applicant did not name Y as the child’s father. At the father’s initiative, paternity was established by a court on 18 April 2012. The applicant and the child’s father later agreed on joint parental responsibility. 6. When the child was born, the applicant was living at home with her parents, who are Norwegian Roma. Shortly afterwards, she and A were thrown out by the applicant’s father – the child’s maternal grandfather – and the applicant, assisted by the social security authorities, decided that she and the child would stay at R. family centre – a parent-child institution. They moved back home after just under three weeks, but returned to the family centre three weeks later because the maternal grandfather had been violent to the applicant. 7. While the applicant was staying at R. family centre, on 1 December 2011 the grandfather stabbed a neighbouring married couple who were the parents of one of the applicant’s friends. The background to this was that he believed that they had helped the applicant to move to the family centre. The applicant was equipped with a panic alarm (voldsalarm). 8. The applicant and A stayed at R. family centre for three and a half months, until 16 February 2012. They then moved back in with the applicant’s family. Shortly thereafter, the Child Welfare Service applied for a care order pursuant to section 4-12(a) of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 67 below). 9. On 14 June 2012 the Child Welfare Service issued an emergency care order to place A in an emergency foster home at a secret address, in accordance with the second paragraph of section 4-6 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 67 below). The decision stated that the Child Welfare Service had known the family network for many years and that the family, including the applicant, evaded measures of assistance. The County Social Welfare Board (fylkesnemnda for barnevern og sosiale saker – “the Board”) approved the emergency placement the following day. On 18 June 2012 A was moved to the emergency foster home, and on 21 June 2012 it was decided that the applicant would have one hour of supervised contact per week. The reason given for the supervision was the risk that the child might be abducted. 10. On 25 June 2012 the Board reviewed the emergency care order. It noted that the Child Welfare Service had been informed by the staff at R. family centre that there were considerable deficiencies in the applicant’s ability to care for herself and the child, but that she would not accept assistance. Moreover, the Board observed, inter alia, that the applicant had repeatedly moved back from the family centre to her parent’s home, where she herself had been the victim of violence numerous times as well as witness to violence against other family members and neighbours, even after A had been born. A witness from R. family centre had testified that the mother would not take advice, had herself had a troubled childhood and was under the dominance of her father. The witness mentioned that the applicant’s father took decisions for the applicant and controlled her finances. He had also taken her to the social security authorities and presented her as having intellectual disability (psykisk utviklingshemmet) in order to obtain an apartment for himself. The Board added that even when the applicant had lived in a secure environment at R. family centre, she had followed her father’s order to return home. 11. On 23 August 2012 Oslo City Court (tingrett) reviewed and upheld the emergency care order. It noted, inter alia, that there was an obvious (nærliggende) risk that the applicant’s father would influence her to prevent the Child Welfare Service from involving itself any further. It took account of how her father had prevented her from going to school, which meant that she still could not read or write and did not have the necessary knowledge for day-to-day life. Further, the City Court found that the applicant was obviously still under strong influence of her father, as had been lately illustrated by how she had two times left the family centre (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above) without notice, because her father had asked her to do so. For this reason, the City Court did not attach weight to the applicant’s statements before that court to the effect that she was now willing to accept assistance measures. Moreover, the applicant had stated that she was now living with a friend, but had been unable to give the address. A’s father, Y, supported the emergency care order before the City Court. 12. After three months, on 26 September 2012, A was moved from the emergency foster home to her current foster home. The background to this move was that the emergency foster mother had discovered a car following her after a contact session at the child welfare centre two days before, on 24 September. She had reported this to the centre’s emergency foster care department, which had found out that the car belonged to the applicant’s maternal grandfather. The car had been driven by a young man who was alone in the car. Because of the abduction risk, the Child Welfare Service made an emergency order that the applicant would have supervised contact with A one hour per month in suitable premises and with police assistance. A similar decision was made in relation to Y the next day, on 27 September. 13. On 5 October 2012 Y initiated custody proceedings against the applicant and requested an order that A live in his care. The appointed expert in that case, A.G.H., concluded that neither parent should have care and control of or contact with A. 14. On 18 October 2012 the Board reviewed the orders on contact rights of 26 and 27 September 2012 (see paragraph 12 above). It found, inter alia, that the incident on 24 September, viewed in conjunction with the other information about the behaviour of the mother’s family and network, showed that the applicant and Y could both be subject to threats or pressure, which again implied a risk that A might be kidnapped. The Board noted that it would be demanding to carry out any contact sessions without A’s identity being revealed to the applicant’s family and network, but the risk would be reduced with fewer visits. The Board also attached weight to A being a vulnerable child who had experienced considerable instability and disorder in her first year. She had recently been moved again and had a particular need for calm and stability. 15. On 19 December 2012 the Board, composed of a chairperson qualified to act as a professional judge, a psychologist and a layperson, in accordance with the first paragraphs of sections 7-2 and 7-5 of the Child Welfare Act, issued a care order pursuant to section 4-12(a) of that act (see paragraph 67 below). Before the Board, A’s father, Y, supported the care order and requested visiting rights. 16. On the issue of daily care, the Board considered that A was a vulnerable girl who had already experienced several broken relationships. Referring to case documents and testimony, it assessed A as insecure in her attachment to care persons. The Board further noted that A scored as “delayed” and otherwise obtained low scores on tests relating to motor skills, communication and social functioning. It appeared clear that she had been under-stimulated until she was placed in the emergency foster home. She had therefore, in the Board’s view, a particular need for stable and predictable surroundings and a care that could further her development (utviklingsfremmende omsorg). The Board found it clearly proved that there were serious deficiencies in terms of the personal contact and security needed by A in light of her age and development. This could be related to the applicant’s own growing up not having been secure and adequate (trygg og god), including that she had been kept away from, or had chosen not to avail herself of, assistance measures from child welfare and health authorities. 17. The Board remarked that the child welfare authorities should consider offering the applicant treatment of her mental health, and further assessed that she would not be able to benefit from child welfare assistance measures without her first obtaining help with her mental health. In addition, the Board noted that the material conditions had considerable deficiencies: the applicant had been assisted to get her own apartment, but had not paid rent or managed to obtain documents in order to have the rent covered by the social security authorities. She had stated that her father had received all the money she had been granted as financial support, to which she had only had limited access. The Board considered that she, in short time, could end up in a situation where she could not offer the child a place to live and food. The Board examined the issue of A’s Roma heritage in light of the United Nation’s 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 69 below) and the Council of Europe’s 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (see paragraph 72 below) and concluded that these did not prevent that a care order be issued. 18. As to the question of contact, the Board stated that this had to be determined in light of the proportionality requirement set out in Article 8 of the Convention as well as the United Nation’s 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 69 below). According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, the clear starting point was that a care order should be a temporary measure to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit. Reference was also made to Johansen v. Norway, 7 August 1996, §§ 78 and 83, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑III, according to which the authorities had a “normal obligation under Article 8 of the Convention to take measures with a view to reuniting them if the mother were to become able to provide the daughter with a satisfactory upbringing”. At the same time, contact which did not further the child’s development could be limited, and even denied. The Board further noted that according to case-law of the Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights, special and compelling reasons were required in order to justify contact to such limited extent that it had to be considered as a breaking off of contact. 19. The Board went on to examine the instant case in view of the fact that, in its opinion, it would be a long-term placement. This meant that the purpose of contact was for A to get to know her biological origins with a view to potential future attachment. Before the Board, the child welfare authorities had submitted that contact should be denied altogether, because of the risk that A would otherwise be abducted. The Board found it substantiated that it was a member of the applicant’s family who had followed the emergency foster mother on 24 September 2012 (see paragraph 12 above) to find out where A had been placed. However, the Board agreed with the parents that there was quite a leap between following someone in order to find out an address and carrying out an abduction. The Board was therefore of the opinion that there was a “certain risk” of A being kidnapped and kept hidden, but that there was not, at the time it made its decision, a sufficiently present and obvious (aktuell og nærliggende) risk. Two contact sessions had taken place since A had been moved from the emergency foster home into her ordinary foster home following the “car incident”, without anyone attempting to find out her address. Nor had any information about where A had been placed emerged during contact sessions, since she was too young to communicate that information. She would probably be unable to do so for another year. 20. The Board had not found any other circumstances relating to the contact between the parents and A to indicate that special and compelling reasons for denying contact existed, and gave both parents supervised contact of one hour, four times a year. Neither of them was entitled to know A’s whereabouts. 21. Both the applicant and Y accepted the care order, but the applicant applied to the City Court for contact to be increased, with the frequency to be decided by the court. The father became a party to the case. He first applied for the Board’s decision to be upheld. He subsequently applied for unsupervised contact. The municipality asked the court to deny both parents contact because of the risk of abduction. 22. The City Court heard the case from 18 to 19 June 2013. The court’s bench was comprised of one professional judge, one lay judge and one psychologist (see paragraph 68 below). The parties attended with counsel and gave evidence. Eight witnesses were heard. 23. On 5 July 2013 the City Court gave judgment and ordered that the applicant and Y were not entitled to have contact with A. 24. The City Court found that the applicant’s father had not altered his need to control the applicant and her child. The court referred to statements the applicant had made to the police, to the extent that her father wanted to take over the care of the child and planned to take the applicant and her daughter abroad, kill the applicant and then take over the care of A. He had allegedly said this only a few hours before he had stabbed the parents of the applicant’s friend (see paragraph 7 above). It was also, to the City Court, unlikely that the applicant had cut off contact with her father. In addition, it was likely to have been the applicant’s family who had followed the emergency foster mother (see paragraph 12 above). There was thus a present and obvious (aktuell og nærliggende) risk of kidnapping. At the age of two, A had already had to change care persons several times, and it could be considerably harmful if she lost her foster parents because of kidnapping or a risk of such. In addition, the applicant’s father could not in any way be expected to be a serious care person for A. Viewed in connection with the contact sessions that had taken place, which had led to the child having negative reactions and challenged the calm and stability in the foster home, this supported the conclusion that the court should not allow any contact. Weighing the different interests, the City Court concluded that a decision to the effect that the applicant would not be entitled to have contact with A, pertained to her best interests. 25. As to A’s cultural background on her mother’s – the applicant’s – side, the City Court concluded that the Council of Europe’s 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (see paragraph 72 below) could not lead it to reach a different conclusion as to what was in A’s best interests. It added that it would be limited how much the applicant could teach A about the Roma during four contact sessions yearly, and that A would be given information about her background by the foster parents. 26. The applicant and Y both appealed to the High Court (lagmannsrett) which heard the case, including testimony from the applicant and the child’s father – who both attended with counsel – and eight witnesses, three of which were experts. It gave judgment on 5 May 2014, dismissing the appeals. 27. The High Court noted that it was circumstances relating to the applicant’s family that had led it to decide not to allow any contact. It mentioned that the applicant’s father had, over the years, been convicted of possession and use of drugs, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (promillekjøring, kjøring i påvirket tilstand), thefts and a stabbing. He had been suspected of violent crimes and charged with attempted murder with the use of a firearm, but the charges had been dropped. The applicant’s mother had been fined and sentenced to imprisonment for violent crimes. Moreover, the High Court noted, the applicant’s father had thrown the applicant out of her home when she had had care of the child, then only newborn. The applicant had explained that she had been subject to violence from her father and abuse from her mother and brother. The High Court noted that the applicant’s father was violent and appeared unpredictable. In addition, there had been the incident with the emergency foster mother being followed (see paragraph 12 above). There was, in conclusion, a risk that the child would be abducted and hidden from the Child Welfare Service. The child had already been a victim of neglect when living with the applicant and the applicant’s parents and there were reasons to fear that she would again be subject to neglect if someone in the applicant’s extended family (storfamilie) kidnapped her. Breaking off A’s relationship to her foster parents, to whom she was developing attachment, at that time, would also in itself be serious. 28. The High Court also referred to the fact that a psychologist at an outpatient clinic, K.G.F., had reported that A was marked by neglect in her early life. The psychologist recommended that A, because of her socio-emotional difficulties, be referred to the Children’s and Young People’s Psychiatric Out-Patient Clinic (Barne- og ungdomspsykiatrisk poliklinkk). Furthermore, the psychologist recommended that A, because of her somewhat scarce use of language, attention difficulties and early development delay, in time be examined by educational and psychological services (praktisk-pedagogisk tjeneste) for at least one year prior to starting school. The psychologist had reported that A needed that her needs to develop in a completely secure and predictable environment be given priority, which also implied a need for a continued arrangement in which she did not have contact with the applicant. The High Court noted, in addition, that another psychologist, A.G.H., who had been appointed as expert in the proceedings between the parents concerning custody and parental authority (see paragraph 13 above) had already in 2012 recommended that none of the parents should have contact with A, primarily because of the abduction risk. 29. The High Court disagreed with the Board’s consideration to the effect that, while there was a certain risk of abduction, it could not qualify as present and obvious (aktuell og nærliggende), and special and compelling reasons could therefore not be present. In the High Court’s view, an overall assessment had to be made, in which not only the probability of an abduction would weigh in, but also factors such as the consequences of a possible abduction, the child’s robustness and other consequences that contact would entail for the child. Although the main reason for refusing contact lay in the abduction risk, that risk was not the only argument for denying contact. One unfortunate consequence of the abduction risk was that contact sessions would necessarily have to take place without the foster parents – A’s primary caregivers and those she felt most secure with – present. This could also harm the child’s confidence in the foster parents. In addition, A had had negative reactions to the sessions that had taken place. The foster parents had stated that she, following the sessions, could cry for a week, be sad, wake up during nights as if she had bad dreams and had developed a rash that looked like eczema which the health visitor had said had been stress-related. The problems associated with the contact sessions had to be seen in view of the fact that A was a vulnerable child. 30. In the view of the High Court, it was not possible for A’s father, Y, to have contact with A either. He had repeatedly been threatened by the applicant’s father, brother and cousin. The court was of the opinion that he could be pressured into disclosing information about A’s whereabouts should it come to his knowledge. 31. The applicant and Y appealed to the Supreme Court, regarding the application of the law and assessment of the evidence. Written declarations were presented to the court by A.N., a secondary education teacher at a municipal Roma Initiative (Romtiltaket) – an advice centre that gave help and guidance; H., a case officer with the Child Welfare Service, and the psychologist K.G.F. (see paragraph 28 above). They had also given evidence before the City Court and the High Court (see paragraphs 22 and 26 above). Since the High Court had given judgment, the maternal grandfather had started serving a four and a half year sentence in connection with the stabbing in December 2011 (see paragraph 7 above). The Supreme Court had also been informed that the applicant was pregnant and living with the father-to-be (see paragraph 38 below). 32. In its judgment of 23 October 2014 (Norsk Retstidende (Rt.) 2014 page 976) the Supreme Court first set out the general principles with respect to contact rights, based on the Child Welfare Act, its preparatory works and related Supreme Court case-law, Article 9(3) of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 69 below) and Article 8 of the Convention on the right to respect for family life as this provision had been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights in cases such as Johansen v. Norway, cited above; R. and H. v. the United Kingdom (no. 35348/06, § 73, 31 May 2011); and Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC] (no. 41615/07, § 136, ECHR 2010). The Supreme Court additionally observed that the relevant legal standard that could be inferred from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights – that a child’s ties with its family can only be broken “in very special circumstances” – was also in line with Article 102 and Article 104 viewed in conjunction with Article 92 of the Norwegian Constitution (see paragraph 66 below). 33. On the topic of A’s Roma identity, the Supreme Court examined, inter alia, Article 30 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 69 below), Article 27 of the international Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (see paragraph 71 below), General Comment No. 11 from 2009, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 70 below), and Article 5 of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (see paragraph 72 below). 34. The Supreme Court considered it somewhat unclear whether the High Court had been of the opinion that the risk of abduction alone was sufficiently high to justify denial of contact. Studying the High Court’s reasons, it found that these could be understood to mean that, in the overall assessment, even a small (“certain”) risk of abduction would be a sufficient basis for denying contact if an abduction would have a strong harmful effect on the child, if the child was vulnerable, and if the child reacted negatively to contact sessions. If this had been the High Court’s point of departure for its assessment, it had not been pertinent. If the risk of abduction could not be said to be real and present (reell og aktuell), contact could not be denied because an abduction would have a severely harmful effect. This also had to apply if the child showed such negative reactions to contact sessions as in the present case, since contact was considered to be in the child’s best interests from a long-term perspective. The Supreme Court also interpreted the municipality to mean that the negative reactions were not in themselves a sufficient basis for denying contact. 35. When turning to the facts of the instant case, the Supreme Court took into account that there had been no direct presentation of evidence before it, nor had any expert witnesses been appointed, which would normally imply that it would be reluctant to depart from the High Court’s assessment of the facts. In the instant case there were, however, some unclear or new aspects of the case that needed further examination by the High Court. This included A’s maternal grandfather having started serving a four and a half year sentence (see paragraphs 7 and 31 above); two years had passed since the incident in which the emergency foster mother had been followed (see paragraph 12 above) and nothing had happened since to indicate that the applicant’s family was trying to locate A or planning to abduct her; the applicant had grown older and was anew pregnant, now with a father to-be from a different environment; the applicant had gone to school and undergone a work placement. The Supreme Court wanted an assessment of what the foregoing meant in relation to the possibility of the applicant resisting any pressure exerted by her family and also a more thorough assessment concerning Y. 36. The Supreme Court assumed, as had the High Court, that an abduction would be traumatic for A. She would be torn away from her care situation, and it was unlikely that she would receive satisfactory care if she were hidden from the authorities by someone acting on behalf of her maternal grandfather. The case had still not been sufficiently elucidated before it for it to be satisfied that a real and present (reell og aktuell) risk of abduction existed. 37. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that the High Court’s judgment be set aside so that the case could be reheard by the High Court. 38. On 15 October 2014 the applicant had given birth to a son, B, whose father is of half Chilean and half Peruvian descent. 39. On 3 November 2014, after the case was returned to the High Court from the Supreme Court, the applicant requested that an expert witness be appointed in order to assess her caring skills in respect of B. On 13 January 2015 the court turned the request down. It stated that the key issue was whether a real risk of abduction existed and that an expert assessment of the applicant’s competence to care for her newborn child was not particularly relevant. As to the applicant’s relationship to her own family, and the significance of this with respect to her ability and will to protect A from persons in the family who might pose an abduction risk, it considered that an expert witness would not be particularly qualified to draw a conclusion regarding these circumstances. Insights into these issues could rather be obtained through conversations between the Child Welfare Service and the applicant, and by the applicant’s appearance before the High Court. 40. The applicant and Y also requested an interim measure to the effect that contact be reestablished in line with the Board’s decision. On 12 December 2014 the High Court turned the request down. It noted that while the Supreme Court under the relevant procedural law had been formally competent to decide on the merits of the case, it had chosen to quash the High Court’s former judgment because the case had been insufficiently elucidated. A meeting with the parties had since been held on 8 December 2014, and the court had then been informed of the child welfare authorities having requested the police to make a report on the abduction risk. The report would be finalised by January-February 2015 and the appeal hearing had been scheduled at 12 March. A new, full hearing, would thus take place in three months’ time and in examining the request for interim measure, the High Court had no further basis on which to assess the abduction risk than that which the Supreme Court had had some one and a half months earlier. 41. During the appeal hearing from 12 to 13 March 2015 in the contact proceedings, the High Court’s bench was comprised of three professional judges, a lay judge and a psychologist (see paragraph 68 below). The applicant and Y attended with their counsel and gave statements. An officer with the Child Welfare Service attended together with the municipality’s counsel. Seven witnesses were heard, including the child welfare officer. 43. In its reasoning, the court commenced by noting that it would review all aspects of the case as far as it was elucidated at the time judgment was given. 44. As a rule, children and parents were entitled to have contact with each other after a child had been taken into care under the first paragraph of section 4-19 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 67 below). When applying this provision, decisive importance had to be attached to finding measures that were in the child’s best interests. This included attaching importance to giving the child stable and good contact with adults and continuity of care. Reference was made to section 4-1 of the Child Welfare Act (ibid.). 45. Moreover, the Child Welfare Act had to be interpreted and applied in accordance with Norway’s obligations under various conventions. In the present case, the relevant provisions were found in Article 9(3) of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child on the child’s right to regular and direct contact with both parents (see paragraph 69 below) and Article 8 of the Convention on the right to respect for family life. Since the child belonged to a national minority, Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the right of minority children to live in keeping with their own culture and use their own language also applied (ibid.). In addition, it followed from Articles 5(1), 10(1) and 14(1) of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of 1 February 1995 (see paragraph 72 below) that the State had a duty to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, allow the minority to learn their minority language and use it freely and without interference. The Supreme Court had based several decisions on the understanding that the provisions had to be interpreted in such a way that special and compelling reasons were required to deny contact. The High Court assumed that the same requirement applied to the provision in the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention. 46. The special and compelling reasons relevant to this case were whether there was a real risk of abduction if contact sessions took place and whether there were concrete circumstances that substantiated this fear. The risk also had to be present, but no “preponderance of probability” could be required. The latter had been clarified by the Supreme Court’s judgment in the instant case (see paragraphs 32-37 above). 47. In the High Court’s opinion, the risk of abduction was still real and present (reell og aktuell). This risk was related to the applicant’s father in particular, but also generally to other people in the community to which he and his family belonged. In this respect, the High Court agreed with the parents’ counsels that the parents had to be assessed as individuals and not on the basis of what group they belonged to. Knowledge about the mother’s environment could nevertheless have a bearing as background information. According to information provided by the police, the Roma community was statistically overrepresented in child abduction cases. This was also consistent with the impression of a psychologist, F. This overrepresentation could be due to the fact that many members of the community did not adhere to the Norwegian model for law enforcement and conflict resolution, and the possibility of keeping children away from the Norwegian authorities provided by family ties abroad. 48. The applicant had previously found it difficult to break contact with her family and the community. When she had been given a place at R. family centre in September 2011, she had moved back in with her parents a few weeks later (see paragraph 6 above). On 1 November of the same year, she had been placed in the same institution again, but had moved back in with her family again in February 2012, despite the fact that her father had previously been violent to her (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above). 49. One of the witnesses – A.N., the teacher from the municipal Roma Initiative (see paragraph 31 above) – had given a positive assessment of the applicant’s recent development. She was now described as resourceful and eager to learn, she had her own flat, and she had recently had her second child. According to the witness, she could serve as a role model for other Roma women. 50. The High Court did not disagree that there were positive elements in the applicant’s development, but there was also information to indicate that the development had not been as stable as the applicant and A.N. claimed. In May 2013 the applicant had been evicted from her flat after several complaints from neighbours of domestic disputes. She was in receipt of social security benefits because she had no other income with which to support herself and her second child, B. It had also been reported that her work training and school attendance had been somewhat unstable. In the summer of 2013 the police had been called because of an argument between the applicant and her father. Shortly after B’s birth in October 2014 (see paragraph 38 above) social services had raised concerns because the applicant had been at risk of losing her home for being behind on her rent. B’s father had previous convictions for drug crime, among other things, and, according to the applicant, he had been violent to her during her pregnancy. Considering the circumstances, the High Court considered it natural to assume that the applicant might feel the need for her family’s help and protection. 51. If the applicant were to come under her father’s influence again, it was unlikely that she would cooperate with the Child Welfare Service to prevent A from being abducted in connection with a contact session. During the investigation of her father in connection with the stabbing (see paragraph 7 above), she had stated that her father wanted to take over the care of A. The applicant had been told that her father planned to take her to another country, kill her and take her child. She had then asked for a domestic abuse alarm device. 52. It was the High Court’s opinion that, if the applicant’s father wanted to take over the care of A, there was little doubt that he would threaten or persuade the applicant to use contact sessions for these purposes if he considered it expedient. He had previously displayed controlling and threatening behaviour in relation to his daughter. He had taken her out of school when she was eight years old. She had been physically abused by him and he had been against her moving out. The High Court’s judgment of 11 October 2013, in the criminal case against him, showed that he did not hesitate to carry out aggravated acts of violence when he thought the family’s interests were being threatened. According to the judgment, he had visited a neighbouring married couple who had allegedly been involved in the applicant’s moving out of her parents’ flat into the family centre (see paragraph 6 above). The father’s message had been that the couple was not to interfere in what was an internal family matter. The confrontation had ended with him stabbing the couple and inflicting life-threatening injuries on them both (see paragraph 7 above). He had been sentenced to four and a half years’ imprisonment for this offence (see paragraph 35 above). His criminal record also contained many other serious offences (see, inter alia, paragraph 27 above). 53. After a contact session on 24 September 2012, the emergency foster mother had noticed a car following her (see paragraph 12 above). She had stated that she had decided not to drive straight home, and instead had driven around for a while until her pursuer had lost her by a set of traffic lights. The car had been driven by a young man, and had later been found to be registered to the applicant’s maternal grandfather. The episode had been reported to the police, but had not been investigated further. However, the fact that the emergency foster mother had been followed after a contact session by a car belonging to a member of the applicant’s family could not be a coincidence. In the court’s opinion, this episode confirmed the risk of abduction, although nothing more specific could be said about it. 54. The fact that there had been no subsequent episodes to indicate that anyone was trying to locate the child or plan to abduct her did not, in the High Court’s opinion, reduce the risk of abduction to any significant extent. It could just as well be due to a lack of opportunity as a change in attitude. The applicant’s father had been serving a prison sentence during this entire period, and the foster parents’ identity and address were not known to the applicant’s family. 55. The High Court considered that there would also be a real and present (reell og aktuell) danger of abduction in relation to Y if he were to have contact sessions. It was unlikely that he himself would abduct the child, but he might be pressured or tricked into aiding an abduction, for example by being threatened or tricked into disclosing information about A that could help to identify the foster home and foster parents. Y had previously stated that he had received such threats. He had told the police that the applicant’s cousin and younger brother had threatened to kill him, and that this had allegedly taken place on 15 December 2010. His lawyer had written in a letter to the Child Welfare Service dated 8 November 2011 that Y had repeatedly received death threats from the applicant’s father, brother and cousin when he had asked for a paternity test. In the summer of 2012 Y had told the Child Welfare Service that he had reported the applicant’s family to the police twice. One of the official complaints concerned the applicant’s brother and cousin, who he had reported for threatening to shoot him. The second concerned threats from the applicant’s father and uncle. The complaints had been withdrawn because the parties had reached an agreement. He had raised concerns before the Board that the child might be kidnapped. The High Court did not attach decisive weight to the fact that Y, according to his testimony, no longer had any contact with the applicant or her family, and that he no longer shared the Child Welfare Service’s concerns about an abduction. 56. An abduction would clearly be harmful to A, who would in such a case be torn away from the care of her foster parents. A psychologist, F., had testified before the City Court that the child showed signs of having suffered neglect at an early age. She was still a vulnerable child with attachment problems. She needed a calm life, extra security and therapy. She would probably be subjected to more neglect if she were abducted. 57. Other than the general assumption that it was a good thing for a child to get to know its culture and background, there was little to indicate that contact sessions would be beneficial if they were to take place. Contact would be quite limited and the possibility for the child to get to know her background and Roma culture would thus in any case be significantly reduced. In addition, the foster parents had stated that A had shown strong reactions to the contact sessions that had actually taken place. She was a child with special needs. According to the foster parents, the contact sessions had caused her sleep and digestive problems. If contact were to be resumed, psychologist F. feared that it could cause a significant feeling of insecurity and a reaction against the foster parents for allowing this insecurity, particularly as A had suffered significant neglect in her biological family. Both the foster parents and the Child Welfare Service still considered A to be suffering from separation anxiety, which could be exacerbated by contact. The contact sessions could also be stressful for her. The Child Welfare Service had stated that it had to consider the risk of abduction and make the contact sessions supervised and subject to police protection, regardless of the High Court’s conclusion. The High Court had to assume that this would further impair the quality of the contact sessions. 58. The effects that contact would have on the foster parents also had to be taken into consideration. Contact with the biological parents could create insecurity that could in turn have a negative impact on the conditions in the foster home. The incident in which a car had followed the emergency foster mother could be taken into account in this context. The episode had not been investigated, and not much was known for certain about it. In any case, it had to have been an unpleasant experience, and was likely to have created a sense of fear in the foster parents. 59. Neither the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention nor the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention could lead to any other conclusion. The High Court did not interpret any of these conventions to mean that parents had an unconditional right to contact if it was contrary to the child’s best interest. Under Article 9(3) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the right of contact could be exercised except if it was contrary to the child’s best interests (see paragraph 69 below). The right to family life was also not unconditional, in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Convention. These exceptions had to be considered as expressions of a general principle in family law (barneretten) to consider the best interests of the child, a principle that had also to be applied when interpreting Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (ibid.) and the relevant provisions in the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention (see paragraph 72 below). These provisions also had to allow for contact to be denied in cases, such as this one, where special and compelling reasons so indicated. 60. The State’s obligation to protect its citizens could not lead to any other conclusion either. The risk of abduction not only applied in connection with contact sessions. It was also related to the possibility of the applicant’s family discovering the foster family’s identity and address. If that were to happen, the measures required to protect the child from abduction would be so extensive as to be unrealistic. In the High Court’s view, denial of contact was sufficient to fulfil the State’s obligation to protect A from being abducted. 62. Both parents appealed to the Supreme Court. The applicant maintained, among other things, that security measures in connection with contact sessions were not unusual, and that contact sessions had taken place also after the “car incident” (see paragraph 12 above) without abductions having been attempted. In its response at this point, the child welfare authorities submitted, inter alia, that the fact that some contact sessions had been carried out subsequent to the County Social Welfare Board’s decision (see paragraphs 15-19 above) without abduction having been attempted, could not be decisive. It argued that these sessions, which had taken place with police assistance, had occurred at a time when A had not yet started to talk and did not understand much of the situation. 63. On 7 July 2015 the Supreme Court’s Appeals Leave Committee (Høyesteretts ankeutvalg) – composed of three Supreme Court Justices – refused leave to appeal. 64. The Committee remarked that during the High Court proceedings, the child’s foster mother had testified by telephone without her identity being revealed to the appellants. This was a procedural error. However, it was clear to the Committee that it could not have had a bearing on the substance of the decision, and there was therefore no reason to refer the appeal on this matter for consideration by the Supreme Court. 65. The High Court’s reasons had clearly been sufficient. As to the appellants’ attack on the substance of the High Court’s judgment, the Committee found that neither the decision’s significance beyond the scope of the current case nor any other circumstances indicated that the case should be heard by the Supreme Court. The decision to refuse leave to appeal was unanimous.

8. The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Ceira (Portugal). 9. The facts of the case, as established by the domestic courts and submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 10. The applicant’s son, A.J., was born on 29 May 1964. 11. A.J. suffered from several mental illnesses, with a number of possible diagnoses being considered over the years such as schizophrenia and major depression. He also had a pathological addiction to alcohol and prescription drugs (medicamentos) and was sometimes violent towards his mother and sister. According to the expert medical opinion obtained after his death and during the domestic proceedings (see paragraph 33 below), A.J. may also have suffered from borderline personality disorder. 12. A.J. was hospitalised in the Sobral Cid Psychiatric Hospital (Hospital Psiquiátrico Sobral Cid, hereinafter “the HSC”) in Coimbra on eight occasions on a voluntary basis from: 4. 10 to 18 January 1993, after being accompanied to the HSC by the police who had been called to his home following a family dispute. He was released at his request, having filled out a release form; 6. 1 to 3 September 1999, when he was urgently admitted to hospital on 1 September (diagnosed with chronic alcoholism), and signed his own release form on 3 September 1999 against medical advice; 7. 12 December 1999 to 14 January 2000, when he was hospitalised after a delirious episode, and referred to the HSC by the emergency department. At the beginning of his stay he was forbidden to leave the pavilion building where he was confined; 13. The medical files show that his degree of dependence on medical assistance (grau de dependência) varied during these stays between being a patient in need of partial assistance and a patient requiring intensive or full assistance. At other times the degree of dependence was not noted, as was the case for his last stay in 2000. Between some of these stays he saw a doctor at the HSC as an outpatient but on an infrequent basis. 14. According to the Government, these stays followed emergencies or bouts of alcoholic intoxication, and only the last stay followed a suicide attempt. 15. During some of the periods he spent in hospital, A.J. was authorised to spend weekends at home with his family – three weekends during the period from 12 December 1999 to 14 January 2000, and two weekends during the period from 2 to 27 April 2000. 16. In March 2000 A.J. went to Lisbon to try to renew his driving licence for heavy vehicles. However, he was unsuccessful. On 1 April 2000 he attempted to commit suicide by taking an overdose of prescription drugs. He was taken to the emergency department of Coimbra University Hospital. 17. On 2 April 2000 A.J. was voluntarily admitted to the HSC from the emergency department (this was the last of his stays at the HSC (see paragraph 12 above). He was treated by Dr A.A., who had been his psychiatric doctor since December 1999. According to the clinical records dated 2 April 2000 and the witness statement of Dr A.A., the suicide attempt may have been the result of his failure to renew his driving licence. According to her, he had become depressed and thought his life no longer had any value, he felt marginalised and also powerless to achieve any aim in life. 18. For the first week of his stay at the HSC, he was placed under a restrictive regime, even though he was a voluntary inpatient (see paragraph 54 below). He was confined - in his pyjamas - to pavilion 8, where the Male General Psychiatric Clinic (Hospitalisation of Acute Cases) was located, and was not allowed to leave the pavilion. However, the clinical records show that on 3 April 2000 he left the pavilion after lunch and went home. He was brought back to the HSC by his brother-in-law at around 1.30 p.m. In the second and third week of that stay at the HSC, given an improvement in A.J.’s condition, the restrictive regime was lifted and he was allowed to circulate outside the pavilion and within the HSC grounds. This regime remained unchanged up until his death on 27 April 2000 (see paragraph 28 below). During that period he was allowed to spend two weekends at home. 19. During the second weekend A.J. was allowed to go home to spend Easter with the applicant and other members of his family. He left the HSC at 10 a.m. on Friday 21 April 2000 after his breakfast, and was due to return on Wednesday 26 April 2000 after breakfast. Dr A.A. was on holiday over that period (she had left on 19 April 2000) and was replaced by Dr E.R. Dr E.R. saw A.J. twice before the latter spent the Easter weekend at home. 20. At around 10.30 p.m. on Tuesday 25 April 2000, the applicant took A.J. to the emergency department of the Coimbra University Hospital because he had drunk a large amount of alcohol. The observation record completed by the emergency department at around midnight on 25 April 2000 read as follows: “patient hospitalised in HSC, being seen by doctor A.A; he spent the weekend outside and must have behaved recklessly because he got drunk. History of mental weakness, depressive episodes and recurrent suicide attempts, those characteristics were not observed during the weekend. Sent back to the HSC where he is hospitalised.” He was prescribed medication in case of emergency, and it appears from his clinical records that he was given emergency medication at around 2 a.m. on 26 April 2000 at the HSC. 21. The clinical record from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. on 26 April 2000 shows that A.J. stayed in bed and only got up to eat. He received phone calls and a visit from his sister. There is no clinical record for the shift from 4 p.m. to midnight and for the shift from midnight to 8 a.m. the next day. The domestic courts accepted that the applicant’s son had been medicated for the whole day, whereas the applicant contested that fact on the basis of the lack of any clinical record. 22. The clinical record resumes at 8 a.m. on 27 April 2000. The nurse noted that between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. A.J.’s behaviour had been calm and he had been walking around outside pavilion 8. According to the oral statement of one nurse and the clinical record, he had eaten well, including his afternoon snack at around 4.45 p.m. 23. The clinical records do not mention that A.J. was seen by the doctor on call on returning to the HSC. Dr E.R. stated in his oral evidence that he had assumed that A.J. was fine since the nurses had not requested any assessment (see paragraph 35 below). 24. At around 4 p.m. the applicant called the hospital. She was told to call back later, during the afternoon snack, as her son was not inside the building at that time. She was assured that some minutes earlier he had been standing at the door and he looked fine. 25. At around 7 p.m. it was noticed that A.J. had not appeared for dinner. The coordinating nurse was informed of his absence. The hospital staff then started searching the areas where patients were allowed to walk about freely, such as the cafeteria and the park. 26. At some time between 7 p.m. and 8 p.m. the coordinating nurse reported the disappearance to Dr M.J.P., who was on call that day (but not at the HSC at that time), and contacted the National Republican Guard. 27. At around 8 p.m. the coordinating nurse spoke on the telephone to the applicant and told her that A.J. had not appeared for dinner. 28. It is not known at what precise time A.J. left the pavilion and the hospital grounds after he had taken his afternoon snack and thereafter followed a footpath towards the applicant’s house. At 5.37 p.m., dressed in his pyjamas, A.J. jumped in front of a train running between Lousã and Coimbra. 29. On 17 March 2003 the applicant lodged a civil action with the Coimbra Administrative Court (Tribunal Administrativo do Círculo de Coimbra) against the HSC under the State Liability Act (Legislative Decree no. 48051 of 21 November 1967) seeking pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages of 100,403 euros (EUR). 30. The applicant claimed that her son had been treated at the HSC for mental disorders on several occasions. He had been admitted to the hospital as a voluntary inpatient on 2 April 2000 because he had attempted to commit suicide. She alleged that he had made another attempt over the Easter weekend when he was at home with her. The fact that her son had been able to leave the hospital grounds on 27 April 2000 had led the applicant to conclude that the hospital staff had acted negligently in the performance of their duties. Because of his suicide attempts and mental condition, her son should have been under medical supervision and the hospital staff should have prevented him from leaving the hospital grounds. She maintained that her son’s suicide had been caused by the poor organisation of the hospital services. The poor organisation was reflected in three aspects: a) the lack of fencing around the boundaries of the hospital, which allowed inpatients to leave the hospital easily without any supervision, b) the lack of a mechanism for checking the presence of inpatients which would allow the hospital staff to notice an absence immediately, and c) the lack of an emergency procedure capable of detecting an inpatient’s absence, which would allow the hospital staff to adopt the effective measures required to ensure that the inpatient was returned safely without endangering the lives of others or his own life. The applicant relied on the specific background leading to A.J.’s hospitalisation since the beginning of April as well as details from his clinical record, notably his repeated excessive consumption of alcohol, his mental illness, and his earlier suicide attempt. She maintained that on account of all those circumstances, the monitoring measures should have been enhanced in order to prevent him from leaving. 31. On 29 October 2003 the court gave a preliminary decision (despacho saneador) specifying the facts considered to be established and those which remained to be established. 32. On 5 July 2005 the court ordered that an expert report be drawn up on A.J.’s clinical condition and the supervision measures required as a result of that condition. 33. On 27 September 2006 a psychiatrist appointed by the Medical Association (Ordem dos Médicos) submitted his report, which was based on an analysis of photocopies from the clinical files of the HSC. The relevant parts of the report read as follows: “... Although alcohol dependence was the predominant diagnosis, several other diagnoses were considered. In particular, dependent personality (personalidade dependente); delirious outbreaks (surto delirante); schizophrenia; manic-depressive psychosis (psicose maníaco-depressiva)... A.J.’s clinical history enables us to consider him an ill person with recurring relapses into excessive alcohol consumption ... but also another kind of symptomatology... He was an individual who was “very violent and aggressive when he was drunk, and even in those moments when he had not been drinking he was a conflictual young man, easily irritable”... ... There is no detailed reference in his clinical records to his psychopathological condition on 26 April 2000 (after the alcohol intoxication episode which led him to the emergency services on 25 April 2000), 27 or 28? April 2000... ... The [plaintiff’s] son suffered from disturbances which caused depressive behaviour with a significant inclination to suicide. Taking into account the clinical documents, his clinical condition may have led to another attempt to commit suicide, which turned out to be fatal. In addition, the polymorphism of the patient’s psychiatric condition should be emphasised. A psychopathological condition such as the patient’s has a bad prognosis and suicide is frequently preceded by an attempt (or attempts) to commit suicide. ... Indeed, it must be clarified that ... he may have been suffering from a borderline personality disorder [perturbação de personalidade borderline]... ... There is reference to a multiplicity of diagnoses, all of them capable of enhancing the risk of the patient’s suicide (and also of suicidal behaviour). ... The clinical history and psychopathological framework [quadro psicopatológico], for the reasons already mentioned, would predict future suicidal behaviour; thus the occurrence of suicide is not surprising. With regard to prevention, containment and surveillance measures must without a doubt be adopted. But with a patient like this one, these measures are difficult to adopt (see for example his requests to be discharged despite the doctor’s opinion, which is substantiated) and never sufficient because of the high potential for suicide. ... We can assume or assert the increased suicide potential of an individual when he is suffering from a psychopathological framework such as schizophrenia, major depression, chronic alcoholism; all these pathologies are mentioned in the patient’s clinical records. This potential is also increased if the patient is suffering from Borderline Personality Disorder, as we mentioned; an illness which cannot be excluded with regard to this patient. The prevalence of suicide is significant among patients suffering from these pathologies. Therefore, what happened is not unusual. The fact that the patient had been on antidepressant treatment for more than two weeks, had wandered around the hospital without ever endangering his life, and the fact that there is nothing in the medical records on suicidal thoughts, does not mean that the probability of that event (suicide) was negligible. However, it was hardly avoidable. [Fully effective] Prevention of suicide in these patients is an impossible task. In a patient who wanders around the hospital and whose symptomatology is not suggestive of imminent suicide, where that probability (of suicide) is higher but is not so increased at that moment (considering the background and the characteristics of the patient), prevention is much more difficult.” 34. The first hearing took place on 8 October 2008. The applicant and the psychiatrist who had issued the above medical opinion gave evidence at the hearing. 35. At five hearings (namely on 8 and 9 October 2008, on 14 January 2009, and on 9 and 13 February 2009) the court heard evidence from different witnesses, including: the applicant’s daughter (A.J.’s sister); nurses, doctors and medical auxiliaries who had worked for or were still working for the HSC, some of whom had started their shift at 4 p.m. on 27 April 2000; a social worker employed by the HSC since 1995, who had had contact with A.J.; and the train driver. Dr A.A., who had been A.J’s psychiatric doctor at the HSC, gave evidence that his treatment consisted of taking the prescribed medication, ensuring that he received the treatment voluntarily, and establishing a relationship of trust with him in order for him to receive therapy. She confirmed that voluntary inpatients could have their freedom of movement restricted if it was thought necessary. In these circumstances inpatients would be forbidden from leaving the pavilion and would remain in their pyjamas. Dr E.R. (who had been replacing Dr A.A. at the relevant time) confirmed that on 27 April 2000 there had been no mention on the information board in pavilion 8 of any restrictive measures in respect of A.J. In other words, he had been free to leave the pavilion, although to leave the grounds of the HSC he would have needed medical permission. Dr M.J.P., who had been the emergency doctor on call on 27 April 2000, explained that had the nurses in the pavilion seen a problem with A.J.’s behaviour on that day they would have called her, which they had not done. The court also analysed several documents attached to A.J.’s clinical file from the HSC. 36. On 9 March 2009 the court conducted an on-site inspection (see paragraph 48 below). 37. On 7 January 2010 the court held a hearing at which it adopted a decision concerning the facts. The court considered, inter alia, that it should not explicitly define A.J.’s pathology. Regarding the episode on 25 April 2000, the court decided to view it simply as an abuse of alcohol, taking into account his underlying chronic alcoholism and the fact that the drinking had taken place in the afternoon and mainly at a café. 38. On 25 April 2011 the Coimbra Administrative Court delivered a judgment in which it ruled against the applicant. With regard to the applicant’s argument that the hospital should have erected fences or other barriers around the hospital grounds, the court pointed out that the current approach in the treatment of mentally ill patients was to encourage social interaction. The existence of fencing would lead to the stigmatisation and isolation of mentally disabled inpatients. In this regard it held that the lack of security fences or walls was: “in line with modern theories of psychiatric science according to which the treatment of patients suffering from mental disorders must take place in an atmosphere of trust and mobility of movements, in physical conditions which promote the freedom and autonomy of movements, and which favours the interaction and the conviviality between patients and the staff in order to encourage [the patient’s] reintegration; monitoring of these patients must be conducted in a discreet way”. 39. As to the applicant’s complaint regarding the lack of a mechanism capable of checking the presence of inpatients, the court found that the HSC had a surveillance procedure in place which consisted of verifying the inpatients’ presence at meal and medication times; this was in compliance with recent psychiatric science and respected the inpatients’ right to privacy and dignity. Additionally, the court found that the inpatients in respect of whom a specific restrictive regime of hospitalisation was adopted were given more attention by the nursing team and the medical assistants, who verified their presence inside the building where they were hospitalised or in the areas surrounding the building’s entrance, as the case may be. With regard to the applicant’s argument that no emergency procedure existed, the Coimbra Administrative Court noted that it consisted of alerting the police and the inpatient’s family in the event of absence. It found this procedure to be appropriate. 40. As regards the applicant’s complaint that her son had committed suicide as a result of the absence of permanent monitoring, the court held that his suicide had not been foreseeable. It was true that her son had been suffering from a mental illness which had never been properly diagnosed, either because the symptoms were complex or because he had been addicted to alcohol and prescription drugs. In this regard, the court pointed out that over the years the applicant’s son had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and major depression. However, it was only after his death and as a consequence of an expert opinion requested from the Medical Association during the proceedings (see paragraph 33 above) that a probable diagnosis of borderline personality disorder had been made. The court established that A.J. had last been admitted as an inpatient after a suicide attempt. However, it considered that despite the possibility that inpatients diagnosed with mental diseases such as those of the applicant’s son might commit suicide, during the last days before his death he had not shown any behaviour or mood which could have led the hospital staff to suspect that 27 April 2000 would be different to the preceding days. According to the Coimbra Administrative Court, the fact that he had been admitted to the emergency department of the Coimbra University Hospital because he had consumed a large amount of alcohol had not been the result of a suicide attempt but of reckless behaviour. The Coimbra Administrative Court found that, having returned to the HSC, he had been kept under medical supervision the whole day, was medicated and accompanied by the medical staff, and that his health had improved. The court thus concluded that there were no circumstances that would have made it possible to predict the tragic outcome that had occurred. It was not possible to affirm that his suicide had been predictable, nor was there anything in the case file that could have justified the adoption of the involuntary treatment procedure in the days preceding the tragedy, since it was not foreseeable that he would commit suicide. According to the court, A.J.’s behaviour had been “absolutely unexpected and unforeseeable”, given the concrete circumstances of the case. 41. On 12 May 2011 the applicant appealed to the Administrative Supreme Court, claiming that the first-instance court had wrongly assessed the evidence, that its findings of fact had been incorrect, and that it had wrongly interpreted the law. 42. On 26 September 2012 the Deputy Attorney-General attached to the Administrative Supreme Court was asked to provide an opinion on the appeal. He recommended that the first-instance judgment should be reversed. The opinion focused on the failure to put in place a surveillance framework specifically adapted to A.J.’s mental health problems and risk of suicide, as well as the alleged failure of the HSC to comply with its obligation to prevent suicide. It stated that: “.... with regard to patients with a tendency to commit suicide only the prescription and application of enhanced monitoring (vigilância acrescida) could be considered adequate. In A.J.’s medical report there are references to suicide attempts; the last one occurred on 1 April 2000, some days before 26 April 2000 when he went back to HSC after being treated at [Coimbra University Hospital] due to the consumption of a large amount of alcohol; the possibility of a suicide attempt was thus a “probable risk” or, among the possible risks, one which could be anticipated in so far as it could be expected by a prudent assessor (avaliador prudente). Therefore, in our opinion, the impugned judgment has erred in considering for the purpose of assessing the level of monitoring required from the defendant, that A.J.’s suicide was an absolutely unexpected and unforeseen fact and by holding that there were no grounds to increase the monitoring in the particular case. The [HSC] never prescribed or put in place a regime to reinforce the monitoring of A.J. – a regime which could be suited to preventing any possible exit from the hospital, ... This enhanced surveillance, which aims at protecting the patient, is part of the therapeutic obligation of the hospital and it does not conflict with the open-door regime as a treatment method applied to patients in the circumstances in which it is considered suitable.” 43. Regarding the facts which the applicant had relied on concerning several HSC inpatients who had left without permission and the resulting tragic consequences, the opinion noted that those elements should not be taken into consideration. According to the opinion: “the degree of surveillance that ought to be established must take into consideration “all the probable risks” and all those “which can fall within the expectations of a prudent assessor”. A.J.’s medical report, alone, already had references to suicide attempts, one of which had occurred twenty-five days earlier. Thus it was possible to predict a repetition of those. It is therefore possible to conclude that the defendant did not establish or put in place any monitoring measure which could be considered adequate to the status of a psychiatric hospital and to A.J.’s characteristics as a patient – it could and should have done so.” 44. On 29 May 2014 the Administrative Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal by two votes to one, upholding the legal and factual findings of the Coimbra Administrative Court. The Administrative Supreme Court found that the facts relied on by the applicant before the lower court concerning similar cases of inpatients who had left the HSC without permission were irrelevant to the decision in the instant case. The court rejected the applicant’s argument that A.J. had exhibited depressive behaviour with a “strong” tendency towards suicide, which he had attempted on different occasions. It upheld the finding of the lower court which had established only one suicide attempt on 1 April 2000. 45. The Administrative Supreme Court considered that the practice of counting of inpatients at meal and medication times was sufficient and had allowed the hospital staff to verify A.J.’s attendance during lunch and the afternoon snack on 27 April 2000. It rejected the applicant’s argument that counting the inpatients when they were given their meal trays with their meals was “deeply amateurish”. As to the foreseeability of the suicide, the Administrative Supreme Court held that the HSC had not breached any duty of care, as there had been no indication which could have led the hospital staff to suspect that the applicant’s son would try to commit suicide that day, namely by leaving the hospital grounds. The Administrative Supreme Court took into account that during previous periods of hospitalisation the applicant’s son had also left the hospital grounds, and that no link had been established between that behaviour and a particular risk of suicide in so far as they had only been able to establish the existence of a single suicide attempt, namely on 1 April 2000. 46. In a dissenting opinion, one of the judges stated that the hospital should have secured the grounds in some way in order to fulfil its duties of care and supervision. By not doing so, it had allowed inpatients to leave easily without being discharged, thus breaching those duties. That omission had been the cause of the “escape” and suicide of the applicant’s son. 47. The HSC is a psychiatric hospital located outside Coimbra on seventeen hectares of land. It is part of the Coimbra University Hospital and is State-run. 48. According to an on-site inspection made by the Coimbra Administrative Court on 9 March 2009 in the course of the proceedings against the hospital, the HSC had eighteen buildings (one for each hospital department). On the basis of information before the Court it appears that different types of patients were hospitalised in these different buildings depending on their gender and the type and extent of their illness. The grounds of the HSC were not bordered by security fences or walls of any other kind. The buildings were surrounded by green areas with trees and other vegetation, and the different buildings were accessed by means of roadways and paths, which were also surrounded by trees and other vegetation. The main entrance to the HSC had a barrier and a security guard. One of the possible exits from the hospital grounds led to a shortcut towards a railway station platform. This shortcut was accessed by taking the road behind building no. 9. The station platform was around a fifteen to twenty-minute walk from that part of the HSC’s grounds. 49. In accordance with the guidelines prepared by the HSC, meals were taken in the hospital cafeteria and inpatients had to remain there until the end of the meal. There was a User’s Guide intended for inpatients which set out the rules governing their hospitalisation. Inpatients were not allowed to leave the pavilion without informing the relevant nurse in advance. Inpatients were also forbidden to leave the hospital grounds without the authorisation of a specialist. If an inpatient wished to leave the hospital before authorisation had been given, a discharge form had to be signed. 50. The following schedule was in place during A.J.’s stay in April 2000: i. Wake-up time: between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m.; ii. Bedtime: flexible, from 10 p.m. the inpatient must remain silent and with the lights out; iii. Meals: 51. A mechanism was in place, as recognised by the domestic courts, for checking an inpatient’s presence, by counting the inpatients at each meal time (five times a day) and at medication time. In addition to this, an inpatient’s presence was checked at bedtime. Inpatients under a restrictive hospitalisation regime were monitored more closely by the nursing team. 52. An emergency procedure was triggered when the absence of a patient was noticed. This procedure consisted of alerting the police, the doctor on call and the inpatient’s closest relatives. 53. During hospitalisation an inpatient was accompanied by a therapeutic team made up of a doctor, a nurse, a social worker, and a medical auxiliary. 54. A distinction was made between voluntary and involuntary hospitalisation (see paragraph 58 below). Under voluntary hospitalisation, an inpatient could abandon treatment at any moment. However, according to the doctors who testified in the domestic proceedings and the Government’s observations, there were two types of regime for voluntary inpatients: a restrictive regime, according to which inpatients were not allowed to leave the pavilion, and a general regime, allowing inpatients to leave the building after informing the duty nurse, although they were still not allowed to leave the grounds of the HSC without permission. Inpatients under the restrictive regime were generally dressed in pyjamas and a dressing gown, while inpatients under the general regime seem to have had a free choice as to what they wore. It appeared that inpatients were often kept on the restrictive regime at the beginning of a hospital stay, even if they were admitted on a voluntary basis. There was an isolation room for inpatients who were very agitated and aggressive and this room could also be used for voluntary inpatients. 55. The applicant submitted news articles to the Court referring to inpatients who had apparently managed to leave the HSC’s grounds. The first five articles below had already been submitted to the domestic authorities (see paragraph 44 above where the Administrative Supreme Court found the information contained therein to be irrelevant to the decision in the instant case): (i) on 9 March 2008 the body of an inpatient who had escaped two weeks earlier was found close to the hospital grounds (in Diário de Coimbra); (ii) on 29 October 2008 a man escaped from the HSC and was hit by a car after jumping in front of it (in Diário das Beiras); (iii) on 31 July 2008 the body of an inpatient who had escaped from the hospital the previous month was found in a river (in Diário de Coimbra); (iv) on 14 August 2008 a patient who had been involuntarily hospitalised in the HSC escaped (in Diário de Coimbra); (v) in early March 2010 three different inpatients escaped from the hospital; one of them was located by the police after stealing a car and another was found dead in a nearby river (in Bombeirospontopt); (vi) on 16 October 2011 an inpatient escaped from the HSC’s grounds and attacked two police officers with a hoe (in Correio da Manhã); (vii) on 1 March 2015 two inpatients escaped from the HSC and stole a car (in Tvi24).

5. The first applicant, Habibe İncin, is the wife of Kerim İncin; the second to seventh applicants are his children; the eighth applicant is his mother and the remaining seven applicants are the siblings of Kerim İncin. 6. On 22 March 2005 the applicants Halima İncin and Hazım İncin, with the assistance of their lawyer, submitted a petition to the Hakkari prosecutor. In their petition the two applicants alleged that after severe military clashes had taken place in the vicinity of their village, in 1994 they and their family members had left Turkey and moved to live with their relatives in Iraq. In June 1995 Kerim İncin had gone back to their village in Turkey to collect a sum of money he was owed. While he was having dinner in the village headman’s house, village guards had arrived and taken him to the nearby Geçimli military station. While at the military station Kerim İncin had been questioned and subjected to ill-treatment. After having detained him at the station for a week, the soldiers had taken him back to the village, where they had shot him and buried him. 7. In the petition the lawyer representing the applicants stated that the applicant Hazım İncin had recently returned to Turkey from Iraq and wanted to lodge an official complaint concerning the killing of his father. In their petition the two applicants also gave the prosecutor the names of a number of people who they alleged had witnessed the incident in question. They asked the prosecutor to carry out an investigation, to identify and question all the eyewitnesses, to exhume the body of Kerim İncin and to find and punish those responsible for the killing. 8. The prosecutor started an investigation into the applicants’ allegations immediately. In the course of the investigation, between 2005 and 2006 the prosecutor questioned the applicants and other members of their family. During the same period the prosecutor also identified, summoned and questioned a large number of witnesses and members of the military who had lived or worked in the region at the time of the events but who, in the years that had elapsed since the killing, had moved to different parts of the country. A number of witnesses told the prosecutor that they had seen Kerim İncin being taken away from the village by the soldiers and added that shortly afterwards a large-scale military operation had been conducted in the area and they had heard that Kerim İncin had been killed in the course of that operation. 9. Some members of the military forces told the prosecutor during their questioning that they had no recollection of the events while others stated that no such incident had taken place. 10. As a result of the questioning the prosecutor found it established that Kerim İncin had indeed been killed and that his body had been buried in Taşbaşı village cemetery. 11. On 26 May 2006 the prosecutor asked the Hakkari Gendarmerie Command whether there would be any security concerns if he were to visit that cemetery with a view to exhuming a body. The prosecutor was informed in reply that it was not a good idea to do so because the security forces conducted spontaneous operations in the area during the summer months. 12. The prosecutor continued to request security updates from the military until 2009 and sent approximately twenty letters requesting that the military inform him as soon as it was possible to visit the village. In respect of the requests made during winter months the military informed the prosecutor that it would not be safe to go to the area because of adverse weather conditions. In their replies during spring, summer and autumn months, the soldiers informed the prosecutor that it was not a good idea to go to the area in question because a military operation could be conducted there at any time. 13. Finally, on 11 June 2009 the prosecutor informed the military of his intention to go to the cemetery on 18 June 2009 and instructed the military to take the necessary security measures for his planned visit. 14. On 18 June 2009 the prosecutor went to the cemetery in question and a body was exhumed from a grave in his presence. It was subsequently established by DNA analysis that it was the body of Kerim İncin. Forensic examinations showed that there were ten holes in the clothes in which Kerim İncin had been buried and that the cause of death had been numerous firearms injuries inflicted on his body and skull. 15. On 25 March 2010 the prosecutor took a decision not to prosecute ten of the suspects who had been working as members of the military at the time of the events, for lack of evidence. The following day the prosecutor prepared an indictment and charged Y.K. − who had been the commander of the Geçimli military station where Kerim İncin had allegedly been taken at the time of the events − with the offence of murder. 16. The trial before the Hakkari Assize Court started on 12 April 2010. The two applicants who had introduced the complaint with the prosecutor on 22 March 2005 (see paragraph 6 above), namely Halima İncin and Hazım İncin, joined the criminal proceedings as interveners. In the course of the trial a total of twenty hearings were held. On 27 November 2014 the Hakkari Assize Court acquitted Y.K. for lack of evidence. The same day the applicants appealed against the judgment acquitting Y.K. and the proceedings before the Court of Cassation are still pending. 17. At the request of the Court, the Government stated that, in accordance with the applicable statute of limitations, the criminal proceedings against Y.K. would not become time-barred until 2025.

6. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Gyál. 7. On 26 February 2011 the Pest Central District Court remanded the applicant in custody under Article 129 § 2 (b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on suspicion of aggravated murder within the meaning of Article 166 § 1 of the Criminal Code. It summarised the suspicions against him, referred to police reports, an autopsy report, the victim’s medical documents, examinations of various exhibits and witness testimonies, and concluded that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had poisoned the victim on 8 April 2010. The court found it established that there was a need for the applicant’s detention, because otherwise he would tamper with evidence by exerting pressure on the witnesses, as evidenced by his previous conduct whereby he had threatened them. It dismissed an argument by the applicant that he had committed the criminal offence more than a year before, thus the prosecutor’s office had erred in stating that he could tamper with evidence or influence witnesses. The court also held that the applicant’s “unclear” financial situation and the severity of the possible punishment demonstrated that there was a risk of his absconding. The court gave no consideration to an application by the applicant’s lawyer for the applicant to be placed under house arrest. 8. An appeal against that decision was dismissed on 3 March 2011. 9. On 21 March 2011 the Buda Central District Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 26 May 2011. It noted again that because of the severity of the possible punishment and the fact that the applicant had neither a permanent address nor a regular income, there were grounds to believe that he would abscond. The court held that there was a risk of his interfering with the investigation if he were to threaten the witnesses or destroy physical evidence. 10. The applicant appealed, arguing that the conditions for pre-trial detention had not been fulfilled because there was no risk of his absconding or influencing witnesses. He argued that his well-established personal circumstances – the fact that he lived with his common-law wife and two children, his parents, and his brother’s family – and the fact that he had no criminal record excluded the risk of his absconding. He further submitted that he had cooperated with the investigating authorities. Alternatively, the applicant requested that he be released and placed under house arrest. 11. The first-instance decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Regional Court on 15 April 2011, and the court’s reasoning was that the public interest in the applicant being detained was more important than his interest in his right to liberty being respected. 12. On 23 May 2011 the Buda Central District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 26 August 2011. The court maintained its previous reasons justifying the need for his detention. It emphasised that there was a risk of his absconding, owing to the severity of the possible punishment and the fact that he had no declared employment and had previously not been reachable at his permanent address. It added that, if released, the applicant might influence the witnesses or destroy evidence. 13. On 22 June 2011 the Budapest Regional Court upheld that decision. 14. On 24 August 2011 the Buda Central District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 26 November 2011 under Article 129 § 2 (b) (risk of absconding) and (c) (risk of collusion) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As regards the risk of absconding, the court found that although the applicant had previously not been reachable at his permanent address and had only had temporary jobs, his temporary residence had been known and he had no criminal record. However, given the seriousness of the potential punishment and his “unstable” financial circumstances, his presence at the proceedings could only be ensured through the most restrictive measure. As regards the risk of collusion, the court dismissed an argument by the applicant’s lawyer that the prosecution authorities should have questioned all the witnesses by that stage of the proceedings. It held that although the majority of the witnesses had been heard, further questioning could still be necessary. 15. On 26 August 2011 the Budapest Regional Court upheld the lower court’s decision under Article 129 § 2 (b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 16. Subsequently, the applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended on a number of occasions. In particular, on 23 November 2011 the Buda Central District Court extended his detention until 26 February 2012. The court found that he had failed to attach a “hosting declaration” (befogadó nyilatkozat) and a declaration of his host’s financial capacity to his application to be placed under house arrest. According to the court, although the investigation was about to conclude, based on previous witness testimonies, there was a risk that the applicant would intimidate witnesses. It also held that this last reason could justify the applicant being detained until the closure of the investigation. That decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Regional Court on 1 December 2011. Although by that time the applicant had submitted a hosting declaration, the appeal court objected to his release for the reason that he had not provided a declaration of his host’s financial capacity. 17. Furthermore, on 24 February 2012 the Budapest High Court held that the unclarified financial situation of the applicant and the seriousness of the crime substantiated the risk of his absconding. It also found, without giving further reasoning, that there were still grounds to believe that at that stage of the proceedings the applicant would influence the witnesses. In an appeal, the applicant argued that the investigating authorities had implemented no procedural measures, the proceedings had been unreasonably lengthy, and previously he had always been reachable at his temporary residence. As regards the risk of his influencing witnesses, the applicant submitted that no such risk could be established two years after the alleged criminal offence. On 8 March 2012 the Budapest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, stating that the investigation was being conducted in a timely manner and witness testimonies had previously evidenced that the applicant had tried to exert pressure on the witnesses. 18. On 25 April 2012 the applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended by the Budapest High Court until 26 June 2012. The court maintained that, under Article 129 § 2 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, his detention was still necessary because of the risk of his absconding. It considered that the applicant had no “financial or essential” ties counterbalancing the risk of him escaping an eventual serious punishment. Although he had family ties, a child who was a minor, and a relative willing to give assurances to provide for him if he were released, given the seriousness of the charges, the gravity of the possible punishment and his unstable financial circumstances, there was a real risk that he would abscond. However, the court did not find that the risk of collusion (Article 129 § 2 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure) was substantiated, since there was no way to influence any of the investigative measures which the prosecution had relied on. In particular, the witness who the investigating authorities still intended to hear was unlikely to testify, given the fact that he was ill and unreachable. The court also considered that although it was likely that the applicant’s acquaintances and relatives had tried to influence witnesses in the two years following the commission of the crime, there was no reliable information that this had actually taken place, and a hypothetical risk of further attempts to do so could not substantiate the risk of collusion. 19. That decision was upheld on appeal on 7 May 2012. 20. On 22 June 2012 the applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended until 26 August 2012. The court agreed with the applicant’s argument that his unsettled personal circumstances could not be relied on to justify his detention after the passing of a lengthy period of time following his arrest. It nonetheless held that, in the absence of any financial ties, his family ties could not counterbalance the risk of his absconding, also having regard to the severity to the potential punishment. 21. That decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Court of Appeal on 28 June 2012, and an appeal by the applicant to the effect that less restrictive measures could be applied in his case was dismissed. 22. The Budapest High Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention on 21 August 2012, reiterating the same arguments as before. It dismissed the applicant’s arguments that no investigative measure had been implemented for a considerable period of time. It also found that the hosting declaration of the applicant’s family member, the fact that he was raising a child who was a minor, and the fact that his legal residence had also been clarified were irrelevant, and did not diminish the risk of his absconding. The second-instance court upheld the decision on 24 August 2012. 23. On 24 October 2012 the applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended again for a month under Article 129 § 2 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the Budapest High Court expressed doubts as to whether there was enough evidence to conclude that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the crime. It dismissed an argument by the prosecutor’s office that the applicant would hinder the investigation. It considered that, irrespective of the seriousness of the charges, it appeared that there was less risk of his absconding, since he was raising two children who were minors and he had no criminal record. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment but extended the applicant’s detention by two months. 24. On 21 December 2012 the applicant’s detention was extended; the Budapest High Court again referred to the fact that, at the time of his arrest, the applicant had been unreachable at his permanent address and had been earning a living from temporary jobs, which, taken together with the severity of the potential punishment, substantiated the risk of his absconding. The decision was upheld on appeal on 10 January 2013. 25. On 22 February 2013 the Budapest High Court released the applicant from pre-trial detention and placed him on bail under house arrest. According to that decision, besides the suspicion against the applicant, the only grounds for restricting his liberty were the risk of his absconding, given the gravity of the offence, and this in itself could not justify his continued pre-trial detention. On appeal, the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed the first-instance decision and placed the applicant in detention on 28 March 2013. It noted that, given the seriousness of the offence, there was a danger of his absconding, irrespective of his family ties. 26. On 23 April 2013 the Budapest High Court released the applicant from detention upon his giving an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. Relying on the Court’s case-law, the High Court found that pre‑trial detention could only serve as a measure of last resort, and the applicant’s continued detention would only serve as an anticipated punishment. The decision was overturned by the Budapest Court of Appeal on 26 April 2016, and the applicant was placed in detention for the same reasons as those given before. 27. On 17 June 2013 the Budapest Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office preferred a bill of indictment. 28. On 25 June 2013 the Budapest High Court extended the applicant’s detention until the date of the first-instance court’s judgment, under Article 129 § 2 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of absconding), for essentially the same reasons as those given before. 29. On 28 January the applicant applied for release, but the application was dismissed on 18 February by the Budapest High Court on the grounds that, given the gravity of the offence and the complexity of the case, pre‑trial detention did not constitute an anticipated punishment. That decision was upheld on appeal by the Budapest Court of Appeal on 18 February 2014. A further application by the applicant of 18 April 2014 was dismissed on 8 April 2014 (the dismissal was upheld by the second-instance court on 24 April 2014) on the grounds that the applicant had not relied on new circumstances warranting his release. 30. The applicant’s detention was reviewed on 16 July 2014 by the Budapest Court of Appeal. It held that the gravity of the offence, the applicant’s lack of financial resources and essential ties, and the fact that he had only notified the authorities of his place of residence once he had been placed in detention substantiated the risk of his absconding. 31. On appeal, that decision was upheld by the Kúria on 24 September 2014, which endorsed the reasons given by the lower court. The Kúria also found that the applicant’s pre-trial detention was both necessary and proportionate, and no less restrictive measure would be sufficient to ensure the purpose of the criminal proceedings. 32. On 29 October 2014 the applicant was found guilty of aggravated murder and sentenced to eighteen years’ imprisonment by the Budapest High Court.

6. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Sofia. 7. The applicant’s grandfather owned part of a real estate. He donated his part to the applicant’s cousins in 1997. The applicant’s grandfather died on 16 January 2003. 8. On 13 February 2004 the applicant brought proceedings under section 30 of the Inheritance Act 1949 before the Sofia District Court. She claimed that, by donating his part in the immovable property in 1997, her grandfather had infringed her right to a “reserved share” in his inheritance, given that the immovable property in question represented his entire estate. In a decision of 2 March 2005 the court upheld her claim by diminishing the part of the estate donated to the applicant’s cousins and restoring the applicant’s “reserved share” in her grandfather’s inheritance. 9. Following an appeal by the other party, on 20 September 2007 the Sofia City Court quashed the first instance court’s judgment and rejected the applicant’s claim for restoration of her “reserved share” in her grandfather’s estate. In particular, referring to Interpretative Decision No. 1 of 4 February 2005 by the Supreme Court of Cassation (“SCC”), the court found that the applicant had not complied with the statutory requirements for claiming her reserved share. The court held that, given that her cousins to whom the real estate had been donated could not be considered “heirs-at-law”, the applicant should have claimed the reserved share of the inheritance by means of an “inventory”. 10. Following a cassation appeal brought by the applicant, on 24 March 2009 the SCC upheld the Sofia City Court’s findings in full in a final decision.

5. The first applicant (Ms Belan) was born in 1961. The second applicant (Ms Sviderskaya) was born in 1949. They both live in Rostov-on-Don. 6. On 3 September 2012 the second applicant and Ms T. notified the local authority of their intention to hold a public assembly from 4 to 5 p.m. on 15 September 2012 in Sovetov Square in Rostov-on-Don. They indicated that the assembly would otherwise be held in front of the Lenin monument at the entrance to Gorkiy Park. The first applicant intended to take part in the public event. 7. On 5 September 2012 the authority suggested that the event should instead be held from 9.30 to 10.30 a.m. in the square in front of the City Library. On 6 September 2012 the event organisers dismissed the suggestion as unsuitable for the purposes of their assembly. On 12 September 2012 the authority insisted on their suggestion and refused to make another one because large-scale festive events were due to take place in the town on the proposed date. Ms T. withdrew her request to hold the planned event. 8. According to the first applicant, she decided to stage on 15 September 2012 a solo “picket” (одиночный пикет) from 2 to 3 p.m. at the entrance to Gorkiy Park. She chose the format of a solo “picket” because it did not require her to give prior notification to the authorities. At around 2.10 p.m., shortly after she had started, she was approached by police officers who ordered her to stop the “picket” and issued her with a formal warning for a violation of public order. One of the officers asked a passer-by, Mr Z., to hold her banner so that she could sign the warning. The events were recorded on video. At around 2.20 p.m. the applicant and Mr Z. were arrested and taken to a police station. The applicant remained there from 2.30 to 6 p.m. She was then allowed to leave. 9. According to the second applicant, from 1.30 to 2.45 p.m. on 15 September 2012 she staged a solo demonstration on a street corner opposite Gorkiy Park to protest against construction laws. On her way back home she walked through the park and at around 3 p.m. saw a man holding a banner. She approached him to read the banner, which read “I will not give up my freedom of choice, which is granted by God and the Constitution!”. She was immediately approached by a police officer, who ordered her to show her own banner but she refused. At 3.05 p.m. she was taken to a police station, where she saw the first applicant. According to the second applicant, she spent five hours at the police station (including two hours waiting outside for a copy of the record). 10. According to the relevant records, the first and second applicants were taken to the police station at 5.20 p.m. and 4.45 p.m. respectively for the purpose of compiling an administrative-offence record. The police station logbook indicated that the first applicant had been brought there at 4.20 p.m. and released at 6.30 p.m., and that the second applicant had been brought there at 4.45 p.m. and released at 6.45 p.m. 11. At the police station both applicants were accused of organising and holding a public event without giving prior notification to the authorities, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter “the CAO”). The administrative-offence records indicated that the first applicant had held a public event at 3.45 p.m. and the second applicant at 3.10 p.m., and that both offences had been committed near the Lenin monument at the entrance to Gorkiy Park. The administrative case files contained handwritten reports by the two police officers who had arrested the applicants. Both reports contained descriptions of the applicants’ acts substantially similar to those contained in the administrative-offence records. 12. On an unspecified date the case was transferred to a justice of the peace of Circuit no. 2 of the Leninskiy District of Rostov-on-Don. The trial court held several hearings. The applicant attended and was assisted by a representative, though it is unclear whether that person was a lawyer. 13. On 25 September 2012 the trial court held a hearing and heard various witnesses. Ms O. stated that she had seen the applicant standing in front of the entrance to Gorkiy Park with a banner and that a man and a woman had also been “standing on that square” with banners. Mr P. testified that he had wanted “to join the picket” at Gorkiy Park. Mr Z. stated that he had happened to be standing close to the first applicant and had taken her banner at the request of the police so that she could sign some papers. 14. At the same hearing the trial court dismissed an application by the defence seeking to admit two photographs and a video-recording (apparently showing the events of 15 September 2012) into evidence. The judge stated that it was unclear who had captured the footage and that they contained no indication of when and where they had been taken. However, at the defence’s request, the judge ordered the city police department to release the footage of two street cameras. 15. On 4 October 2012 the deputy chief of the city police department replied that the footage from one camera had been “saved” and invited the judge to provide an electronic storage device onto which it could be copied. However, on 18 October 2012 the acting head of the duty unit of the city police department informed the judge that the street camera footage could not be released because it had not been archived owing to a failure of the archiving system and “because those city cameras had not been working”. 16. The trial court summoned police officer A., who had arrested the first applicant, for questioning. At a hearing on 7 November 2012 A. stated that after receiving information from Sh., the chief of police station no. 4 (see paragraph 28 below), he had arrived at Gorkiy Park where he had seen a group of people, including Z., in possession of banners, without having given any prior notification of their public event, and that he also remembered arresting Ms Belan, though he could not remember her face. A. also stated that on 15 September 2012 officers from the regional bureau of forensic examinations (“forensic bureau”) within the regional police department had taken photographs of what appeared to be a public assembly. 17. On 7 November 2012 the trial court also allowed the examination of videos submitted by officers of police station no. 4 containing two clips relating to the events on 15 September 2012. One showed the applicant with a banner, while the other showed her reading a piece of paper and Mr Z. standing close to her and holding a banner above his head. The trial court later declared those clips inadmissible evidence. The trial court also granted a request by the defence for the forensic bureau to provide the photographs taken on 15 September 2012. The hearing was then adjourned. 18. On 12 November 2012 the chief of the city police department replied to that request, indicating that no photographs or video recordings had been taken on 15 September 2012 in front of the entrance to Gorkiy Park. It is unclear whether the forensic bureau was within that official’s purview. 19. In the meantime, on 9 November 2012 the same justice of the peace convicted the second applicant in separate proceedings dealing with the same events (see paragraph 28 below). 20. On 13 November 2012 the trial court convicted the applicant under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and issued him with a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB – about 497 euros (EUR) at the time). The court based its findings on the statements of the witnesses O., P. and Z. and officer A.’s testimony. The court found it established that on 15 September 2012 a group of people with banners had held a public event in front of the entrance to Gorkiy Park, without having given prior notification to the authorities, and that the applicant had participated in that event. 21. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Leninskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don, arguing that the Public Events Act (hereinafter “the PEA”) conferred on the regional authorities the power to determine the minimum distance between solo demonstrations. As no such specification had been made in the Rostov region, there was no legal justification for not treating people standing at even a short distance from each other as solo demonstrators or, by implication, for treating them as a public assembly. 22. It appears that the appellate court heard further evidence from the witness O., who stated that around 3 p.m. on 15 September 2012 she had approached the Lenin monument with the intention of expressing her views on the situation in the country; she had seen the applicant standing alone with a banner close to the monument. O. had positioned herself at a distance, closer to the city administration building. The applicant had then been approached by two police officers and had handed over her banner to a passer-by while signing a document, before being taken away. O. had also seen two other people standing with banners at a distance. 23. It also appears that the appellate court watched a video-recording at the applicant’s request, although its origin is unclear. It is also unclear whether this was one of the videos sought to be admitted into evidence at the trial. 24. On 3 December 2012 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It dismissed O.’s testimony as unconvincing and complicit, noting that she had participated in the same event and was an acquaintance of the applicant. With regard to the above-mentioned video-recording, the court observed as follows: “As regards the video examined at the hearing ... it shows [the applicant] holding a banner. It also shows different people. The video-recording was done without zoom so it is not possible to conclude whether [the applicant] was holding a demonstration alone or whether there were other participants. In any event, earlier other people were convicted of the same offence at the same time and place. This refutes [the applicant’s] argument about her solo demonstration.” 25. On 4 December 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Rostov regional prosecutor’s office, seeking the institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers under Articles 149 and 286 of the Criminal Code (unlawful impediment to a public assembly and abuse of powers). She alleged that the termination of her solo demonstration and her arrest by the police had been unlawful. By a letter of 9 January 2013 the regional prosecutor’s office replied that the decisions of 13 November and 3 December 2012 were not amenable to appeal. 26. On 28 December 2012 the justice of the peace granted permission to the applicant to pay the administrative fine of RUB 20,000 in three instalments. 27. On 6 March and 20 May 2013 the deputy president of the Rostov Regional Court upheld the decisions of 13 November and 3 December 2012. The applicant did not apply for a further review of those court decisions before the Supreme Court of Russia. 28. On 9 November 2012 the same justice of the peace convicted the second applicant under Article 20.2 of the CAO for holding a public assembly without giving prior notice to the authorities. The court heard several witnesses, including two defence witnesses and the two police officers who had arrested her. Officer Sh. stated (see paragraph 16 above) that there had initially been four solo demonstrators but they had later started to gather together. The applicant had been walking amongst them and had put down her banner when she had been told by the police that she was conducting herself in an unlawful manner; subsequently, the four demonstrators had positioned themselves in pairs. 29. The justice of the peace found that the applicant had held a group public event together with three other participants and concluded that in the circumstances of the case it was appropriate to issue her with the minimum statutory fine of RUB 20,000. 30. The applicant appealed. On 6 December 2012 the Leninskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don examined her appeal and upheld the earlier judgment. 31. On 10 December 2012 the second applicant lodged a complaint with the Rostov regional prosecutor’s office, similar to that lodged by the first applicant (see paragraph 25 above). The second applicant alleged that she had been placed under administrative arrest, which had been unlawful because no written record of it had been made by the police. On 9 January 2013 the regional prosecutor’s office replied that the decisions of 9 November and 6 December 2012 were not amenable to appeal. 32. By a decision of 26 December 2012 the justice of the peace allowed the applicant to pay the administrative fine in three monthly instalments (two instalments of RUB 7,000 and one of RUB 6,000). This was the best possible solution under Article 31.5 of the CAO. The court took note of the fact that the applicant received an old-age pension of RUB 5,561 (EUR 138 at the time) per month. It was not specified whether she had any other income. 33. In the meantime, the second applicant applied for a supervisory review of the decisions of 9 November and 6 December 2012, arguing, inter alia, that she was in a precarious financial situation. She asked for the fine to be reduced to below the statutory minimum, in accordance with a ruling of the Russian Constitutional Court made on 14 February 2013. On 6 March and 29 May 2013 the deputy president of the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgments, stating, in particular, that the amount of fine was “within the scope of the statutory requirement”. On 10 January 2014 the Supreme Court of Russia also upheld the judgments.

4. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 5. The applicants complained that they had been unfairly convicted of drug offences following entrapment by State agents. In application no. 48523/15, the applicant also raised other complaints under the provisions of the Convention. As regards application no. 3436/15, on 31 October 2013 the Levokumskiy District Court of the Stavropol Region found the applicant guilty of three counts of an attempted drug sale “committed with the same intent” on 10 and 17 May and 19 June 2013, as well as declared him guilty of unlawful purchase and storage without an intent to sell of a large quantity of drugs, seized from him on 19 June 2013. The applicant was sentenced to ten years and a month of imprisonment. The conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal by the Stavropol Regional Court on 23 January 2014. In May 2015 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Stavropol Region asked the Presidium of the Regional Court to amend the conviction by excluding episodes of 17 May and 19 June 2013 “in view of the lack of a criminal conduct [in the applicant’s actions]” and to uphold the conviction in respect of the episode on 10 May 2013. The Deputy Prosecutor argued, in particular, that the “operative experiment” in the course of which the applicant had sold drugs on 10 May 2013 had been properly authorised by the acting head of the district police department and had been recorded, and thus there was no need to perform subsequent “operative experiments” in the form of the test purchase on 17 May and 19 June 2013. On 30 June 2015 the Presidium of the Stavropol Regional Court accepted the Deputy Prosecutor’s request for the revision of the final conviction by virtue of Article 401 of the Russian Criminal Code, annulled the conviction in respect of the two episodes of drug sale on 17 May and 19 June 2013, declared the applicant guilty of an attempted drug sale on 10 May 2013 and sentenced him to eight years and one month of imprisonment. The Presidium noted that having conducted “the operative experiment” on 10 May 2013 the police had already established and recorded the applicant’s criminal activity. However, the police officers had not prevented the applicant’s subsequent criminal activities and “had again, on 17 May and 19 June 2013 performed similar operative measures”. The Presidium concluded that the applicant’s conviction of episodes of 17 May and 19 June 2013 had therefore been based on unlawfully obtained evidence and thus should be voided. As regards the episode on 10 May 2013, it observed a video recording of the “test purchase” and noted that the applicant had talked about future drug sales. It then read out a statement by a witness M. who had testified that “the buyer had not incited anyone to sell drugs” when they were in the “company drinking alcohol”. The Presidium concluded that there was no indication of the police entrapment on 10 May 2013. DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE 6. Title 3, Section XIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure (here and after – the CCrP) of 2002 (“Procedure for review at second instance”) (Часть 3, Раздел XIII “Производство в суде второй инстанции”) stipulates in Article 390 § 2 that the decisions taken by the second-instance courts on appeal acquire binding force immediately. 7. On 29 December 2010 Federal Law no. 433-FZ, which entered into force on 1 January 2013, amended the Code by introducing a new Chapter 47.1 (“Cassation procedure”) (“Производство в суде кассационной инстанции”). 8. Article 401.2 (“Right to lodge a cassation appeal”) of the Code prescribed a list of persons who were entitled to lodge a cassation appeal against any judicial act. Paragraph 3 of the same Article introduced a one‑year time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal against a judicial act which had become final and provided for a possibility to reset that time‑limit on certain grounds. 9. The new Article 401.6 provided safeguards against cassation revision of final judgments and decisions where revision could aggravate the situation of a convicted person, an acquitted person, or a person in respect of whom a criminal prosecution had been terminated. First, such revision was possible only within one year after these judgments or decisions had become final. Second, the cassation appeals were further restricted by the substantive criterion allowing a review only if a judgment breached the law “to an extent which distorted the essence and meaning of a judicial decision as an act of administration of justice”. 10. On 19 December 2014 the State Duma adopted Federal Law no. 518-FZ, approved by the Council of the Federation on 25 December 2014, and signed by the President on 31 December 2014. The Law amended Article 401.2 of the Code by removing any time bars for lodging cassation appeals. The provisions of Article 401.6 remained in force. 11. The CCrP provides for a possibility to reopen proceedings in a criminal case when a violation of a Convention right has been found by this Court. The relevant provisions read as follows: Article 413. Grounds for reopening of proceedings in a criminal case due to new or newly discovered circumstances “1. Final judgments ... may be annulled and the proceedings in a criminal case reopened due to new or newly discovered circumstances ... ... 4. New circumstances are ... ... 2) A finding by the European Court of Human Rights of a violation of [Convention provisions] during consideration of a criminal case by a Russian court ...” Article 415. Initiation of [revision] proceedings “5. The Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation revises ... [judgments] under circumstances listed in subparagraphs 1 and 2 of Article 413 of the Code upon application by the President of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation within one month. Having considered the [above] application, the Presidium ... annuls or alters the judicial decisions in a criminal case in line with ... the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights ...” Article 419. Proceedings in a criminal case after annulment of judicial decisions “Judicial proceedings in a criminal case after annulment of judicial decisions due to new or newly discovered circumstances and the lodging of appeals against new judicial decisions follow the general rules [established by the Code].” 12. In 2016 the Russian Supreme Court published an extensive report summarising the legal positions of the European Court of Human Rights in cases where a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention has been found in view of the applicants’ conviction as a result of the police entrapment. It has since issued a number of similar interpretative summaries of the Court’s case-law on this subject. In addition, relying on Article 415 § 5 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Court has regularly authorised the re-opening of criminal proceedings in view of the fact that the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention following the Russian courts’ failure to effectively conduct the review of the defendants’ arguments that the criminal offence had been committed as a result of the police entrapment (see for example the Presidium’s decision no. 28-P17 issued on 12 April 2017 in response to the Court’s decision in the case of Ulyanov and Others v. Russia [Committeee], nos. 22486/05 and 10 others, 9 February 2016).

5. The first applicant is a French national who was born in 1970 and lives in Mouroux. He is the brother of the victim, M.B. born in 1968. The second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants, who were born in 1977, 1973, 1972, 1939 and 1951 respectively, are the victim’s sister, widow, brother, father and mother. They live in Mouroux, Massy, Valentigney and Thulay respectively. 6. On 12 November 2009, at about 4.30 p.m., M.B., who was 1 m 80 tall and weighed about 100 kilos, went into a pharmacy in Valentigney. He was known to the staff there, where he habitually went to collect the medicine prescribed for his psychiatric disorders. 7. M.B. asked to exchange some medicine dispensed without a prescription, saying he was not satisfied with it. A pharmacist’s assistant, Ms R., and the owner of the shop, Mr F., explained to him that the effects of the medicine had diminished because he had become addicted to it. M.B. started to become angry, throwing the medicine boxes on the floor, raised his voice and started speaking incoherently: “I’m fed up with your night visits, with your assistant and with you!” 8. M.B. told Mr F. that he intended to file a complaint against him. Mr F asked Ms R. to call the police. M.B. sat down on one of the chairs for customers at the pharmacy. 9. At 4.53 p.m. four police officers arrived on the scene after receiving a call from the incident room instructing them to intervene in an incident involving an individual with psychiatric disorders. 10. Deputy police sergeant L. and police constable M. asked M.B. several times to accompany them out of the pharmacy. When he vehemently refused, sergeant L. and constable D. seized him by the arm in order to remove him from the pharmacy. Constable M. seized M.B. by his right leg. M.B. struggled and called for help. 11. At the doorstep up to the pharmacy M.B. found himself on the ground. Constable M. attempted to handcuff him behind his back while he continued to struggle and appeal to the police for help. Constable M. punched M.B. twice in the solar plexus but still did not succeed in handcuffing him. 12. M.B. was then turned onto his right side and constable D. was able to handcuff him in the front with two pairs of interlinking handcuffs. 13. Deputy police sergeant P. went to get the police vehicle to move it closer to the pharmacy. Two police officers seized M.B. by the arm in order to put him in the van. Despite putting up resistance, M.B. was forced inside the police van. 14. M.B. continued struggling and shouting in the police van and pushed one police officer against the luggage holder above and another against a shelf before falling face downwards. Deputy police sergeant L. positioned himself above his shoulders in order to fasten another pair of handcuffs attaching M.B. to the fixed part of the back seat in the van. Constables D. and M. positioned themselves on top of him, on his legs and on his buttocks. 15. At 4.58 p.m., that is, exactly five minutes after they had arrived, the three police officers present in the vehicle contacted their headquarters requesting assistance from the fire brigade and the mobile emergency medical service (SAMU). 16. According to the incident room’s telephone log, at 5.07 p.m. the fire brigade asked the police to transfer M.B. to their vehicle. Deputy police sergeant L. refused to do so on grounds of M.B.’s extremely agitated state. 17. The firemen then drew up a record of M.B.’s condition. He had calmed down, but his heart rate could not be measured with the pulse oximeter because the sensors were not working. One of the firemen constantly monitored his breathing, which stopped at one point. A fireman noted the absence of blood circulation. 18. The team of firemen brought M.B. inside the pharmacy. One of them alerted the ambulance service by radio. The firemen inserted a semi-automatic defibrillator and started carrying out cardiac massage. 19. An emergency doctor from the mobile emergency and intensive care service (SMUR), called out by the firemen, administered specialist cardiopulmonary resuscitation. He recorded M.B.’s death at 6.02 p.m. 20. An investigation into the cause of M.B.’s death was commenced immediately. 21. Of the three pharmacists who gave a statement that day, on 12 November 2009, two were present when the police officers had asked M.B. to leave the premises. They confirmed that when M.B. had refused to comply, the police officers had approached him and seized him. They said that M.B. had begun shouting and struggling at that point and had continued shouting and struggling when he had got into the police van, handcuffed. None of the three witnesses had seen what had happened in the police van. 22. One of them stressed the fact that M.B. had been a customer at the pharmacy for a year and a half and had always been very pleasant during his monthly visits to collect his neuroleptics prescription. 23. On the same day Mr S., a volunteer firefighter, was also questioned. He stated that on his arrival M.B. had still been in a highly agitated state, lying face down in the van, with the police officers restraining him: one either sitting or kneeling on the victim’s buttocks, and the other holding his legs; his hands were outstretched and fastened by several handcuffs to the back seat of the van; the victim’s head was on the driver’s side, and his right cheek face down on the floor. He explained that he had requested medical reinforcements and that then, when they observed that his heart had stopped beating, the firemen had decided to take him back into the pharmacy to continue carrying out cardiac massage. 24. On 13 November 2009 one of the pharmacists was questioned a second time. He stated that M.B. had been a regular customer at the pharmacy. He said that the police officers had not hit M.B. 25. Constable M. was questioned the same day. He stated that deputy sergeant L. had introduced himself to M.B. and had asked him to come outside “to explain the problem, as in this type of intervention the aim is to separate the parties”. He explained that M.B. had refused to leave the pharmacy several times despite repeated requests by the police, who had finally dragged hm towards the door. He said that he had then seized M.B.’s right leg and that, just in front of the entrance to the pharmacy, M.B., who had lost his balance, had fallen down. He added that the police officers had then attempted to handcuff him and that when he had resisted attempts to put him in the police van constable D. had pulled his legs, which had unbalanced him and caused both of them and deputy police sergeant L. to fall over in the police van. He said that L. had managed “I don’t know how to pin him back down on the ground”. He also said that in order to finish handcuffing him deputy sergeant L. had squatted down on M.B.’s shoulders while constable D. remained at leg level; as M.B. had continued struggling, he himself had stood on his buttocks. He stated that they had remained “like that for a while, but I cannot tell you how long, it felt like a long time, with me on his buttocks, my colleague on his shoulders and the third officer on his feet, assisted by P., who had crossed his legs to stop him moving. It was then that the fire brigade arrived”. 26. Deputy sergeant L. was also questioned on 13 November 2009. He stated that he had received instructions from his headquarters to go to a pharmacy and had been informed that M.B. “suffered from psychiatric disorders”. He confirmed that M.B. had put up a violent struggle before letting himself slide to the ground in front of the entrance to the pharmacy. He explained that constable M. had administered two punches to the abdomen, using a technique known as “diversionary blows”. As regards the rest, he confirmed the above-mentioned conditions in which M.B. had been handcuffed in the police van. 27. An autopsy was carried out on 13 November 2009. The forensic doctor described and explained the traumatic injuries observed: the injury to the left eyebrow and the associated swelling did not suggest injuries following a blow but were related to an impact by that part of his face on a ridged surface. The other facial injuries suggested close contact on a rough surface. The injuries to the wrists were characteristic of handcuffing. Those to the lower part of the chest and in the abdominal cavity could have been incurred as a result of two violent blows to that area. The forensic doctor specifed that the injuries had caused neither internal bleeding nor fractures. He mainly noted marks on the lungs and 70% stenosis on a heart artery. Dr H.’s report, drawn up on 16 November 2009, contained the following conclusions: “Death in all likelihood occurred as a result of heart failure. An atheromatous attack observed on an artery of the heart exposed him to a severe risk of cardiac rhythm disorders and sudden death. The state of stress and agitation presented by the victim on his arrest may have contributed to heart failure. Restriction of chest expansion may have occurred when the victim was restrained, but it cannot be affirmed that mechanical asphyxiation was the cause of death. ... Recent traumatic injuries consistent with action by third parties were observed. In any event, the various injuries did not directly contribute to the death; nor is there any injury consistent with blows to the face.” 28. On 14 and 23 November 2009 Ms S., a shopkeeper, was questioned and stated that she had heard shouts from her shop opposite the pharmacy. She said that she had seen four police officers with a man lying face down with his arms behind his back being punched and kicked. Through a side window of the police van she stated that she had seen a female and a male police officer trampling on the spot while hanging on to the roof of the van, one administering three punches in a downwards movement and lifting his knee up very high before bringing it down in one sharp movement. 29. On 23 November 2009 the shopkeeper’s minor son was questioned and stated that he had seen two police officers trampling on M.B. in the road and that a female police officer had hit him several times with a truncheon in the stomach, back and face. 30. On 3 December 2009 a judicial investigation for manslaughter was opened in respect of a person or persons unknown and assigned to two investigating judges. 31. On an unknown date the applicants applied to join the proceedings as civil parties. 32. On 7 January 2010 Ms C., a neighbour next to the pharmacy, stated that she had seen M.B. struggling, face downwards, outside the pharmacy. She said that the police officers had “thrown him into the van” and that she had left after the doors were closed. She stated that the police officers had not hit M.B. 33. On 21 January 2010 chief brigadier M. D., an instructor in defence and arrest techniques and in the psychological and behavioural aspects of police intervention, was heard as a witness. He stated that in the event of a dispute between people, “the opposing parties should in so far as possible be separated”: the police officers, in attempting to induce the M.B. to leave the pharmacy, had sought to avoid a fight in the shop. He said that the blows administered by constable M. and described as “two punches to the suspect’s abdominal area with the aim of distracting and and securely handcuffing him [were] among the priority areas for attempting to weaken the resistance of the person concerned. They [the police officers] had not been over zealous and had completed the handcuffing in the front. The officers had also acted in an emergency situation. The technique used by constable M. appear[ed] the most appropriate in the context of the intervention”. He added that all the techniques taught were designed to weaken resistance to arrest. He specified that, with regard to the immobilisation of M.B. in the van, standing on a person’s buttocks was not among the techniques taught and that positioning oneself across M.B.’s shoulders, as sergeant L. had done, was one of the procedures taught. That technique enabled the officer to prevent the suspect from moving while avoiding postural asphyxiation. He concluded that the intervening officers, having regard to the context of the intervention, had acted with pragmatism and discernment. 34. Reports were produced by several experts appointed by one of the investigating judges. On 23 June 2010 Dr L., professor of forensic medicine, and Dr R., lecturer in forensic medicine, provided a forensic medical report after examining M.B.’s body on 18 December 2009. They stated that their examinations had revealed “a series of cutaneous lesions that could not have contributed to the death”. They did not indicate evidence of any “factor suggesting death by chest compression”. There was thus no evidence of “petechial subconjunctival injuries or of facial petechial injuries”. They stated as follows: “our examination of the sealed evidence has not revealed any elements indicating the cause of death of [M.B.]. The sealed evidence shows that he was receiving psychiatric treatment for psychosis with several episodes of hallucination requiring the regular ingestion of antipsychotic medicines. ... At the levels measured, the ingestion of psychoactive drugs revealed by the toxicological investigations does not appear capable of explaining the victim’s death by a process of direct toxicity. ... In conclusion, the death of [M.B.] ... is in all likelihood the result of myocardial failure. The death is due to natural causes.” 35. On 10 December 2010 Dr T. and Dr F. produced their anatomopathological expert report after examining a copy of the autopsy report of 16 November 2009, a copy of the interviews with the members of the police patrol team who had arrested M.B., a copy of the record of examination of two witnesses, various sealed samples collected both by Dr H. and by Professor L. and Dr R.: “[M.B] died suddenly of cardiac rhythm disorders owing to a coronary spasm triggered by a context of intense and prolonged emotional and physical stress. ... In conclusion, the intense and prolonged emotional stress, and the prolonged and severe agitation, which started in the pharmacy and contined during the arrest explain the series of physiopathological phenomena which caused the death: (1) intense stimulation of the sympathetic nervous system (adrenergic neuro-hormonal system), (2) coronary-ischemic spasm, (3) fatal cardiac rhythm disorders.” 36. On 14 and 16 December 2010 and 19 January 2011 the four police officers appeared for the first time as assisted witnesses. 37. On 8 April 2011 a reconstruction was organised, by the two investigating judges in charge of the case, in the presence of the civil parties’ lawyers and the assisted witnesses. During the visit to the scene the forensic doctor stated that he had not noted any traumatic injury consistent with the violence described by the witness Ms S, the only injuries suggesting direct action by a third party being those corresponding to the punches administered to the stomach. 38. On 5 July 2011 Dr C., university professor, neurologist and psychiatrist, and head of a forensic medical department, examined M.B.’s medical file at his psychiatrist’s surgery, his medical file at the casualty department of Montbéliard Hospital, and the medical file kept by M.B.’s general practioner. He stated that M.B., who had been receiving psychiatric care for many years, had been admitted to a hospital psychiatric unit several times and presented a psychotic disorder characterised by delusional notions of a betwitching, persecutory and interpretative type During his most recent hospital consultation he had been diagnosed with paranoid psychosis, which is related to schizophrenia. Dr C. concluded his report as follows: “[M.B.] presented a serious psychiatric disorder, namely, delusional psychosis, which explains the initial altercation with the pharmacist and his subsequent state of extreme agitation when the police officers attempted to induce him to leave the pharmacy. It is also possible that the intervention by the police was interpreted in a delusional manner. When the SMUR [mobile emergency and intensive care service] intervened the criterion of seriousness was ... the fact that [M.B.] had been suffering from heart failure for approximately twenty minutes. The superficial injuries observed, during the autopsy, to the right-hand side of the face and the front of the knees [appear to him] compatible with immobilisation on the floor of the van and the petechial injuries to the upper abdomen and the left abdominal region are compatible with punches administered as described in the autopsy report.” 39. On 25 November 2011 the Ombudsman, an institution independent of the State, having the task, inter alia, of ensuring compliance by the police with their code of professional ethics, to whom a member of parliament had submitted the case, produced a report. He found that whilst the police officers had been very quick to seek the assistance of the fire brigade and the emergency medical service, it was regrettable that the situation had been inaccurately described by the incident room to the firemen prior to their intervention (the latter had been informed of M.B.’s “withdrawal symptoms”). He considered that there had been no imminent danger to people or property in the pharmacy and thus no urgent need to remove M.B. as soon as possible. He stated that the immobilisation and compression procedures carried out in the van had been dangerous and disproportionate. He described as “amouting to a serious infringement of human dignity and to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3” the techniques used by constables D. and M. to pin M.B. to the floor of the police van. The Ombudsman also noted conflicting statements by the police officers regarding whethere there had been physical violence other than the two diversionary blows and pointed out that no witnesses had been present throughout the entire incident. The Ombudsman concluded that the precipitation with which the police had acted had led them to make an erroneous assessment of M.B.’s situation and to react in a stereotypical manner rather than adjust their conduct during the intervention, despite the fact that they knew that M.B. was receiving treatment for psychiatric disorders and that they had been able to observe abnormal behaviour on his part. He recommended reinforcing the initial and continuous training of police officers with regard to dealing with persons suffering from a mental disorder. Lastly, he recommended that disciplinary proceedings be brought against the four police officers who had arrested M.B. for “disproportionate use of force or failing to cease using such force”. 40. On 18 January 2012 Dr T. and Dr F. supplemented their expert report of 10 December 2010. They confirmed the conclusion of their earlier report and ruled out mechanical asphyxia: “M.B. died suddenly of cardiac rhythm disorders, with no occurrence of mechanical asphyxia.” They reiterated the part played by extreme stress in the death, stating that “the adrenergic stimulation was related to the extreme and prolonged emotional and physical stress. The stress lasted approximately one hour and thirty minutes, starting in the pharmacy and continuing throughout the arrest”. 41. On 26 March 2012 the four police officers who had arrested M.B. were charged with manslaughter as a result of the manifestly wilful violation of a legal or statutory duty of caution and security. 42. On 5 November 2012 the the public prosecutor at the Montbéliard tribunal de grande instance filed submissions recommending that the charges be dropped. 43. On 21 December 2012 the investigating judges ruled that there was no case to answer. They found that whilst it was true that M.B. had been in a relatively calm state, the pharmacist had nonetheless considered his behaviour sufficiently disturbing to inform the police of the presence in his establishment of a person in an agitated state and suffering from psychiatric disorders. They observed that the police officers had not immediately used force and that, on being informed of M.B.’s pyschiatric pathology, they had called the emergency medical service. The judges found that the evidence given by Ms S. had been invalidated by the observations made during the reconstruction, the statements made by the pharmacists and the conclusions of the forensic doctor. The investigating judges observed as follows: “ ... pinning [M.B.] to the ground was not identified by the medical experts as the direct cause of the death. Whilst the intervention by the police inevitably generated stress, the victim had already been stressed well before their intervention. As the police did not know about [M.B.’s] heart disease, of which he himself was unaware, they could not foresee that the combination of these two factors [stress and heart disease] could create a risk for the victim.” 44. The judges considered that the force used by the police officers had been necessary and proportionate “even if being pinned down in the van, by L. and P. and M.’s position – standing on [M.B.’s] legs – may appear objectionable in absolute terms”. 45. The applicants appealed against that ruling. On 16 October 2013 the Investigation Division of the Besançon Court of Appeal upheld the decision finding no case to answer on the following grounds: “[M.B.’s death was due] according to the forensic doctor who carried out the initial autopsy ... to heart failure in circumstances of stress and effort acting on a predisposed heart condition; the second forensic report supported the finding of cutaneous injuries that could not have been a contributory cause of death and ruled out death due to chest compression; the experts indicated that the death of [M.B.] was, in all likelihood, the result of myocardial failure and natural causes; the anatomopathological report ... [led] the experts to conclude that [M.B.] had died suddenly of cardiac rhythm disorders owing to a coronary spasm triggered by a context of intense and prolonged emotional and physical stress, and formally ruled out mechanical asphyxia; lastly, the forensic and psychiatric expert ... concluded that [M.B.] presented a serious psychiatric disorder ... which explained the initial altercation with the pharmacist and the ensuing state of extreme agitation when the police officers attempted to induce him to leave the pharmacy, as their intervention could have been interpreted in a delusional manner”. 46. With regard to the conditions of arrest, the Investigation Division found that the agitated state and the “recalcitrant, not to say violent, behaviour of [M.B.] had obliged the police officers to use force and intervention techniques, which they had been taught, to restrain him”, including the two punches administered by constable M. “who explained that he had used a technique taught to police officers to assist in handcuffing suspects by creating a surprise effect, that explanation being confirmed by his colleagues and instructor”. The Investigation Division found that M.B. had been pinned to the floor of the van in conditions that had been “admittedly unusual, or even objectionable”, but that these had preserved the respiratory capacity and ventilation of a person who “was continuing to oppose strong resistance to the police officers”. It concluded that “no inadvertence, lack of care, inattention, negligence or breach of a statutory or legal duty of protection or care, or gross negligence [could] be attributed [to the police officers] in the death of [M.B.]”. 47. The applicants appealed on points of law. On 18 November 2014 the Court of Cassation dismissed their appeal on the following grounds: “ ... the Court of Cassation is satisfied on the basis of the grounds of the judgment being appealed that in upholding the decision finding no case to answer the Investigation Division, after analysing all the facts referred to it and addressing the main grounds in the statement of appeal, gave sufficient and coherent reasons for their finding that the investigation had been thorough and that there was insufficient evidence on which to convict the persons charged with of manslaughter or any other offence ...” ...

4. The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, were living in the Chechen Republic. Their personal details are set out in the appended table. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after allegedly being unlawfully detained by servicemen during special operations. The events took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have not seen their missing relatives alive since the alleged arrests. 5. The applicants reported the abductions to law‑enforcement bodies, and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have remained pending for several years without any tangible results being achieved. The applicants lodged requests for information and assistance in their search for their relatives with the investigating authorities and various law-enforcement bodies. Their requests received either only formal responses or none at all. The perpetrators have not been identified by the investigating bodies. 6. Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided to both the Court and the domestic investigating authorities by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases, as presented by the applicants, but questioned the allegation that servicemen had been involved in the events. 7. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Turpal-Ali Yandayev, who was born in 1982. The second applicant is the father of Mr Said-Ali Khamayev, who was born in 1984. 8. On the afternoon of 19 June 2003 Mr Turpal-Ali Yandayev, Mr Said‑Ali Khamayev and Mr Z.I. were on their way from the village of Tsa-Vedeno to the village of Serzhen-Yurt, Chechnya, when military servicemen stopped their Gazel vehicle at a checkpoint known as “SSG-4”, which was situated at the crossroads on the outskirts of the village of Elistanzhi. The servicemen ordered the men to get out of their car and then searched the vehicle. The search took place in the presence of numerous witnesses, who were passing through the checkpoint at the time. It is unclear what happened after the search. The whereabouts of Mr Yandayev, Mr Khamayev and Mr Z.I. have remained unknown ever since. 9. On the next day, 20 June 2003, the burnt-out wreck of the car of Mr Yandayev, Mr Khamayev and Mr Z.I. was found about 200 metres from the Benoy checkpoint, on the outskirts of Serzhen-Yurt. The checkpoint logbook had an entry which recorded the passage of the car through the checkpoint at 8 p.m. on 19 June 2003. Subsequently, the time was changed to 7 p.m. Servicemen manning the checkpoint told the applicants that at about 9 p.m. on 19 June 2003 they had seen something burning not far from the checkpoint. 10. On an unspecified date after the abduction, the second applicant learned from Colonel B., an officer at the Grozny remand prison, that Mr Yandayev, Mr Khamayev and Mr Z.I. had allegedly been detained at the main military base of the federal forces in Khankala, Chechnya for about six months, and then transferred to the Mozdok district of Chechnya. It is unclear whether the applicants submitted this information to the investigators. 11. On 23 June 2003 the Shali district prosecutor in Chechnya opened criminal case no. 22096 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”) (abduction) into the events of 19 June 2003. 12. It appears that on the same day the investigators found and examined the burned-out remains of the Gazel vehicle. A plastic bottle containing a combustible mixture was found nearby. That evidence was not collected or added to the case-file. 13. On 24 June 2003 the investigators questioned Mr U.I., who stated that between 5 and 6 p.m. on 19 June 2003, as he had been passing a checkpoint on the Serzhen-Yurt road, he had seen a Gazel vehicle parked nearby. One man had been in the car and another had been speaking with a serviceman. 14. On various dates at the end of June 2003 the investigators questioned several traffic police officers who had been on duty at the Benoy checkpoint on the day of the incident. The copies of the records of their questioning submitted to the Court are illegible. 15. On 10 July 2003 the applicants were granted victim status in the criminal case. 16. On 23 August 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. Shortly thereafter the applicants lodged a request for the proceedings to be resumed, but on 28 August 2003 their request was refused. 17. On 1 September 2003 the investigators asked the Federal Security Service (“FSB”) whether the abducted persons had been detained by FSB officers. On 4 September 2003 the FSB replied in the negative. 18. On 7 June 2004 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision of 23 August 2003 to suspend the investigation, noting various shortcomings in the investigation. He pointed out that the bottle containing a combustible mixture found near the burned car had not been collected and that the investigators had not identified a military unit stationed in the vicinity of Serzhen-Yurt that might have had information about the abducted persons. 19. On 10 July 2004 the investigators established that military unit no. 62372 had been stationed near Serzhen-Yurt at the relevant time. However, since 2003 the personnel making up that unit had been changed four times. Therefore, according to the investigators, it was impossible to find persons who could shed light on the circumstances of the abduction. 20. On 22 July 2004 the investigation was suspended. 21. On 5 May 2005 the first applicant asked the Shali district prosecutor to resume the proceedings. 22. On 16 December 2005 the prosecutor informed the first applicant that the investigation would be resumed “in the nearest future”. 23. On 28 March 2006 the Russian Justice Initiative, an NGO based in Moscow, on behalf of the first applicant, enquired about the progress of the investigation. The reply from the investigators of 21 April 2006 stated that operational-search activity was ongoing. 24. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 25. The first applicant is the son of Mr Sultan Saynaroyev, who was born in 1925. The second applicant was the wife of Mr Sultan Saynaroyev. According to a letter addressed to the Court dated 4 July 2018 from the first applicant, the second applicant has died. 26. At the material time, Mr Sultan Saynaroyev lived in the village of Galashki, Ingushetia. 27. He was engaged in bee keeping and ran an apiary in a small area, known as “Berezhki”, located between the two neighbouring villages of Arshty and Galashki. 28. On the afternoon of 22 October 2002 Mr Sultan Saynaroyev left the apiary and was heading home to Galashki on foot when a group of forty-five to fifty armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived in four armoured infantry carriers (“AICs”) without registration numbers. One of the vehicles carried a large label reading “Rossiya” (Россия). Speaking unaccented Russian, the servicemen stopped Mr Suleyman Saynaroyev and ordered him to go with them to a neighbouring apiary belonging to Mr M.O. The latter and his family members were in that apiary. The servicemen checked the identity documents of all those present and searched the premises. One of the servicemen, who was apparently in charge of the group, introduced himself as Sergey and said that he was from a military unit stationed in Arshty. After the search, the servicemen ordered Mr Sultan Saynaroyev to proceed with them to their headquarters for a further check, having assured him that the decision to apprehend him had been approved by the Arshty municipal administration. They put Mr Sultan Saynaroyev into one of the AICs and drove off in the direction of Chechnya. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 29. In the evening the first applicant spoke to the head of the Arshty police department, Mr A.Ts., who told him that a special sweeping-up operation was in progress in the village and that for that reason a large number of military servicemen were present in the village. 30. On 24 October 2002 the first applicant spoke to Mr A.M, deputy head of the Ingushetia Government. The latter said that he had had a telephone conversation with the military commander of the headquarters of the federal forces at the military base in Khankala, Chechnya, who had informed him that Mr Sultan Saynaroyev had been brought to the Khankala military base on 23 October 2002 and that he would soon be released. 31. The whereabouts of Mr Sultan Saynaroyev have remained unknown ever since. 32. On 23 October 2002 the applicants lodged a complaint about the abduction with the authorities and asked that a criminal case be opened. 33. On 14 November 2002 the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor in Ingushetia opened criminal case no. 22600057 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 34. The Government did not provide the Court with a copy of the investigation file. From the applicant’s submissions it appears that the investigation proceeded as follows. 35. On 20 November 2002 the Ingushetia Minister of the Interior informed the deputy head of the Ingushetia Government that the operational search activities conducted into the disappearance of Mr Sultan Saynaroyev showed that the latter had been abducted by unidentified military servicemen, who had taken him in a military vehicle in the direction of the Chechen Republic. 36. On an unspecified date the criminal case was forwarded to the military prosecutor’s office for further investigation. 37. On 29 November 2002 Colonel S.I., the commander of military unit no. 74814, reported, in particular, that Mr Sultan Saynaroyev had been detained on 22 October 2002 by servicemen of the Regional Operative Headquarters of the FSB in the North Caucasus (Региональный Оперативный Штаб ФСБ России по Северо‑Кавказскому региону). 38. On 25 December 2002 the military prosecutor’s office, referring to its lack of jurisdiction over the investigation, forwarded the criminal case to the Ingushetia prosecutor. 39. On 29 December 2002 the Ingushetia FSB informed the investigators that it had no information concerning Mr Sultan Saynaroyev’s whereabouts. 40. On 10 January 2003 the acting head of the criminal investigation department of the Ingushetia Ministry of the Interior reported to the investigators that on 29 November 2002 the United Group Alignment had confirmed that Mr Sultan Saynaroyev had been detained by servicemen of the FSB, but that the FSB in a letter of 3 January 2003 had denied any involvement in the incident. 41. On 14 March 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 42. On 23 April 2003 the Deputy Minister of the Interior of Ingushetia informed the applicants that operational search activities had indicated that FSB servicemen had been involved in the abduction of Mr Sultan Saynaroyev. 43. On 4 September 2003 and again on 21 November 2003 the investigators informed the applicants that the proceedings in the criminal case had been resumed. 44. On 18 January 2006 the first applicant asked the investigators to inform him about the progress of the proceedings. A week later the investigators replied that the investigation had been suspended. 45. On 21 April 2006 and again on 27 September 2006 the first applicant enquired about the progress of the proceedings again. Apparently no reply was given to these two enquiries. 46. On numerous occasions between 2002 and 2007 the applicants complained to various State authorities and law-enforcement agencies about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for their relative. In reply they received letters stating that their requests had been forwarded to yet another State agency or that the law-enforcement authorities had no information concerning their relative’s whereabouts. 47. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 48. On 27 February 2006 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Sunzhenskiy District Court in Ingushetia challenging the investigators’ failure to take basic steps. On 13 March 2006 the court allowed the complaint and ordered that the investigation be resumed and a number of procedural steps taken. 49. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Usman Magomadov, who was born in 1957. The first and the third applicants are his brothers, the fourth applicant is his wife, and the fifth, sixth and seventh applicants are his children. 50. The second applicant was Mr Usman Magomadov’s brother. He died on 2 December 2010. His widow, Ms Zakhra Magomadova, subsequently expressed her wish to pursue the application. 51. On 28 March 2002 Mr Usman Magomadov left his home in the village of Mesker-Yurt and was driving to work in the town of Argun in his white Zhiguli car when a group of about four armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas stopped him at checkpoint no. 136 on outskirts of Argun. They pulled Mr Usman Magomadov out of his car, forced him into one of the two APCs waiting nearby and drove off in the direction of the town. 52. The abduction was witnessed by several bystanders, including the fourth applicant and her relative, Ms E.D. 53. Ms E.D. asked one of the servicemen at the checkpoint where Mr Usman Magomadov was being taken. The serviceman replied that he was being taken to the Argun military commander’s office. She immediately took a taxi and followed the APCs until they reached the premises of the military commander’s office. Then the military vehicles turned in the direction of Khankala, where the main base of the Russian forces in Chechnya was located. Somewhere on the road the vehicles stopped. Ms E.D. got out of the taxi and was approaching them on foot when a Niva car pulled over. A serviceman, who appeared to be a military colonel, got out of the car and asked her what was happening. She explained the situation and he promised to help. Then he approached the APCs and spoke to the servicemen. After finishing the conversation, the colonel and the servicemen drove off to Khankala. 54. Several days later the driver of the Niva car informed Ms E.D. that Mr Usman Magomadov was detained in the Grozny department of the FSB. 55. The whereabouts of Mr Usman Magomadov remain unknown. 56. Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities thereof and asked that a criminal case be opened. 57. On 30 April 2002 the Argun inter-district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 78051 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 58. The Government did not submit copies of the documents from the relevant criminal case file. Instead they submitted copies of documents from an unrelated case file. 59. According to the documents submitted by the applicants, the investigation proceeded as follows. 60. On 5 May 2002 the fourth applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 61. On 14 June 2002 Mr V.S., a police officer who had been manning the checkpoint on the day of the abduction, was questioned. He stated, in particular, that during the morning on that date thirty-five to forty military servicemen had arrived at the checkpoint in four APCs. From their conversation with each other he had understood that they had been looking for certain men in a white Zhiguli vehicle who had allegedly committed an armed attack on federal forces the day before. 62. On 20 June 2002 the crime scene was examined. The investigators did not find or collect any evidence. 63. On the same day they questioned Mr V.B., another police officer who had been manning the checkpoint on the day of the abduction. He had not witnessed the moment of the abduction; however, he confirmed the presence of armed military servicemen and four APCs at the checkpoint at the time of the events in question. 64. On 19 June 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. Subsequently, it was resumed several times – each time on the orders of (and following criticism by) the supervisors, and then suspended again. Specifically, the investigation was resumed on 25 December 2003, on unspecified dates in April and September 2004, and on 6 February and 5 June 2007. It was suspended on 5 February, 9 May and 9 October 2004 and 6 March and 10 July 2007. 65. In the meantime, on 19 May 2004, the fourth applicant requested the Chechen Governmental Committee for the Protection of the Constitutional Rights of Russian Citizens Living in the Chechen Republic (Комитет Правительства Чеченской Республике по обеспечению конституционных прав граждан Российской Федерации проживающих на территории Чеченской Республики) to assist in the search for Mr Usman Magomadov. His request was forwarded to the investigators. 66. On 10 April 2006 the first applicant asked the Argun prosecutor to expedite the investigation into Usman Magomadov’s abduction. It appears that the requests were forwarded to the investigators and that the proceedings are still ongoing. 67. On 1 December 2006 and 7 May and 22 November 2007 the fourth applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali District Court regarding her lack of access to the case file and the investigators’ failure to take basic steps. 68. On 8 February 2007 and 8 June and 14 December 2007 respectively the court allowed the complaint in part, ordering that access to the case file be granted. 69. The applicant is the wife of Mr Alash Mugadiyev, who was born in 1956. 70. On 1 February 2003 the Vostok special battalion conducted a special military operation in the village of Ersenoy, Chechnya. The servicemen cordoned off the settlement and ran identity checks in respect of all of its residents. 71. At about 8 a.m. on that date the applicant, Mr Alash Mugadiyev, their daughter, and their son-in-law were in their house in Ersenoy when a group of ten armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms entered their household. The servicemen were unmasked, were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. They checked the identity papers of all the family members and informed them that they were going to detain Mr Alash Mugadiyev for three hours. The servicemen then took him to the outskirts of the village, where a convoy of military vehicles was waiting. 72. The applicant and her relative, Ms S.M, followed the servicemen and saw Mr Alash Mugadiyev being put into an UAZ (tabletka) minivan. The vehicle’s registration plate contained the figures 386 кх. On the same day two other residents of the village, Mr S.A. and Mr A.B., were detained by servicemen. Mr S.A. was put into the same vehicle as Mr Alash Mugadiyev. 73. At about midnight the special operation was completed and the servicemen left Ersenoy and drove to the settlement of Vedeno; they travelled in a large group of military vehicles, including several APCs, Ural military lorries and the UAZ minivan containing Mr Alash Mugadiyev and Mr S.A. 74. The applicant followed the servicemen to the settlement, where she met the commander of the Vostok special battalion, Mr Y.D., who confirmed that her husband and several other residents of Ersenoy had been detained by his battalion’s servicemen. 75. Mr S.A. and Mr A.B. were released later. Mr S.A. stated that following their detention on 1 February 2003, he and Mr Alash Mugadiyev had been taken to the Vedeno district military commander’s headquarters and had there been separated. 76. The whereabouts of Mr Alash Mugadiyev remain unknown. 77. Immediately after the above-described events the applicant asked the authorities to open a criminal investigation into the abduction of her husband. 78. On 3 March 2003 the Vedeno district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 24018 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). The applicant was granted victim status in the case and questioned. 79. On 3 July 2003 the investigation in respect of the case was suspended, and then, on 18 November 2003, resumed again. 80. A week later the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 81. On 2 December 2003 the investigators asked the head of the Khankala military base whether a special operation had been carried out in the region between 29 January and 3 February 2003. It appears that no reply was given. 82. On 29 December 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 83. On 19 February 2007 the applicant asked the head of the Chechen Parliament to assist in the search for her husband and to expedite the investigation. On 1 March 2007 the request was forwarded to the investigators, who resumed the proceedings on 31 March 2007. 84. On 10 April 2007 the investigators reported that one of the witnesses, Mr Y.D., had died in March 2003, and that he therefore could not be questioned. 85. On 14 April 2007 the applicant was questioned again. Her statements were similar to those submitted to the Court. 86. On 22 and 23 April 2007 the investigators questioned two relatives of Mr A.B. They submitted that he had been detained separately from Mr Alash Mugadiyev and had not met him. 87. On 30 April 2007 the investigation was suspended. 88. On 5 May 2007 the investigators questioned Mr V.T., who had been the military commander of the Vedeno District at the time of the abduction. He stated that owing to the amount of time that had elapsed he could not recall the events of early 2003. 89. On the same day the investigators established that the Vedeno district department of the interior had not had a vehicle with a registration plate containing the figures 386 кх. 90. On 25 February 2009 the applicant requested the investigators to transfer the criminal case for further investigation to a military investigations department. The request was refused on 20 March 2009. 91. It appears that the criminal proceedings are currently pending. 92. The applicant is the mother of Mr Rasul Tutayev, who was born in 1981. 93. At about 8.40 p.m. on 22 October 2004 the applicant, Mr Rasul Tutayev, his wife (Ms R.A.), and three other family members were at home when two Gazel minivans arrived at their block of flats in Grozny. A group of about fifteen armed men in military uniforms broke into the applicant’s flat. All of the men, except two, were in balaclavas. The two men not wearing balaclavas were of Asian appearance. All of the men spoke unaccented Russian and had special military equipment, such as aiming lasers, blast shields and helmets. 94. After threatening the applicant and her family members with firearms, the men forced Mr Rasul Tatuyev outside, put him into one of the two minivans with the registration number 798ax95rus, and drove off. 95. The applicant, Ms R.A. and two of their neighbours, Ms Z.Ts. and Ms R.M., witnessed the men forcing Mr Rasul Tatuyev into the minivan and driving away. Ms R.A. ran after them and saw the vehicles enter the premises of one of the State authorities’ buildings in Grozny. 96. Mr Rasul Tutayev has not been seen since. 97. On 23 October 2004 the applicant went to the Leninskiy district commander’s office in Grozny. The military commander, D., confirmed that Mr Rasul Tutayev was detained on those premises. 98. Immediately after the abduction the applicant complained to the authorities about her son’s detention and requested assistance in the search for her son. 99. Shortly thereafter the Leninskiy district prosecutor in Grozny asked the FSB and the police task force unit (OMON) about Mr Rasul Tutayev’s arrest. In late October 2004 the FSB and OMON replied that they had not detained him. 100. On 19 November 2004 the Leninskiy district prosecutor in Grozny opened criminal case no. 30136 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 101. Three days later the applicant was granted victim status in the case. 102. On 19 February 2005 the investigators suspended the proceedings for failure to identify the perpetrators. 103. On 30 March 2005 the investigation was resumed and joined with criminal case no. 40025, which had been opened in respect of the abduction on 26 January 2005 of Mr A.A. and which had allegedly been perpetrated by the same persons. A month later the investigators suspended the proceedings. 104. On 18 August 2006 the supervising prosecutor ordered that that the investigation be resumed. 105. On an unspecified date in September 2006, the investigators questioned Mr Rasul Tutayev’s wife. Her statements were similar to those submitted by the applicant to the Court. 106. On 7 September 2006 Mr Rasul Tutayev’s brother was granted victim status in the criminal case. 107. On 18 September 2006 the investigators suspended the proceedings. 108. On 11 July 2009 the applicant wrote to the Chechen President, asking him to ensure that there would be an effective investigation into the abduction of her son. 109. On various dates in 2010 the applicant contacted the Investigative Committee of Russia and the FSB, seeking their assistance in the search for her son. On 9 July 2010 the Russia Investigative Committee forwarded her complaint to the Chechnya Investigative Committee. On 2 September 2010 the FSB informed her that the whereabouts of Mr Rasul Tutayev were unknown to it. 110. On 3 December 2012 the applicant wrote to the Leninskiy district prosecutor in Grozny enquiring about the recent developments in the investigation. 111. On 22 May 2013, following the applicant’s repeated requests, the proceedings were resumed. Having sent several requests to various State bodies for information, the investigators suspended the proceedings on 24 June 2013. On 13 November 2013 that decision was declared unlawful by a higher investigating authority and ill-founded on account of the investigators’ failure to establish the identity of the owner of the vehicle with the registration number 798ax95rus. Six days later the investigation was resumed. It was again suspended on 19 December 2013, then resumed on 19 August 2014, and again suspended on 19 September 2014. 112. It appears that the proceedings are still pending. 113. The first applicant is the sister of Mr Askhab Konchiyev, who was born in 1973. The third applicant is his brother. 114. The second applicant was also a brother of Mr Askhab Konchiyev. He died on 16 January 2016, after lodging the application with the Court. 115. On 18 July 2002 Russian military forces in Chechnya conducted a special sweeping-up operation in the village of Serzhen-Yurt. The servicemen cordoned off the settlement and ran identity checks on all the residents. 116. At around 12 a.m. on that day (in the documents submitted the time was also given as 9 a.m.) a group of armed servicemen in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicants’ house in Serzhen-Yurt in four APCs and one UAZ vehicle with no registration numbers. The servicemen broke into the house and searched the premises. They then forced Mr Askhab Konchiyev into one of the APCs and took him to an unknown destination. 117. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. 118. On various dates between July 2002 and February 2003 the first applicant lodged a complaint regarding the abduction with the South Federal Circuit prosecutor. On 6 February 2003 her complaint was forwarded to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office, and then to the Shali district prosecutor. On 27 February 2003 the latter opened criminal case no. 22042 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction) and granted the first applicant victim status in that case. 119. On 27 April 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It is not clear whether the applicants were informed of the suspension. 120. On 15 June 2006 the first applicant asked the deputy head of the Chechen Parliament to assist in the search for her brother. 121. On 26 July 2006 the investigators resumed the proceedings and sent a number of requests to various authorities, including the federal military forces, for it to be established whether Mr Askhab Konchiyev had been arrested and placed in custody. The replies were all in the negative, none of the authorities had any information about his detention. 122. On 10 August 2006 the investigators questioned the first applicant, who confirmed the account of the events described above, and who also stated that an acquaintance of hers had seen footage of Mr Askhab Konchiyev’s arrest broadcast on a federal television channel in November 2005. 123. On 26 August 2006 the investigators suspended the proceedings. 124. On 5 May 2010 the first applicant requested the investigators to provide her with access to the investigation file. Her request was refused on 14 May 2010. 125. On 9 June 2010 the first applicant requested the investigators to resume the proceedings and to ensure that there would be a thorough investigation into the abduction. Her request was refused on 21 June 2010; nevertheless, on 2 September 2010 the proceedings were resumed. 126. On 29 September 2010 the investigators questioned a person from the village, who stated that in summer 2003 the federal forces had conducted a special sweeping-up operation in Serzhen-Yurt. The servicemen had not had any distinctive features on their uniforms, and some of them had been in balaclavas. He had not seen the arrest of Mr Askhab Konchiyev, but had heard about it from other residents of the village. 127. On 2 October 2010 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 128. On 18 July 2011 the first applicant enquired about the progress of the investigation. In September 2011 she was informed that the proceedings had been suspended. 129. On 28 September 2011 the investigators resumed the proceedings. In October 2011 they questioned Mr Askhab Konchiyev’s nephew, who had witnessed the abduction and who gave statements similar to those given by the applicants. 130. On 28 October 2011 the investigators ordered that a DNA test be performed in order to verify whether Mr Askhab Konchiyev’s body was among unidentified remains found in the region. The outcome of the expert examination is unknown. 131. It appears that the proceedings in the case are still pending. 132. On 20 August 2010 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court challenging the investigators’ failure to take basic investigative steps. 133. On 7 September 2010 the court rejected her complaint, having found that on 2 September 2010 the investigation had been resumed. On 22 December 2010 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the decision on appeal. 134. The first applicant is the wife of Mr Yusup Mezhiyev, who was born in 1973. The second applicant is his son and the third applicant is his brother. 135. On the morning of 23 June 2002 Mr Yusup Mezhiyev and his acquaintances, Mr K.A., Mr B.A., Ms B.A. and Ms A.A., left their homes in the village of Staryye Atagi and went to work in Grozny. At about 8.30 a.m. a group of military servicemen stopped their car at checkpoint no. 33 in the Oktyabrskiy district in Grozny. Having checked their identity documents, the servicemen handcuffed and blindfolded Mr Yusup Mezhiyev. Then they forced him into an UAZ minivan parked nearby and drove off in the direction of the Oktyabrskiy district temporary police department in Grozny (ВОВД Октябрьского района г. Грозный). The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 136. The whereabouts of Mr Yusup Mezhiyev remain unknown. 137. Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities thereof and requested that criminal proceedings be initiated. 138. On the same day investigators from the Grozny town prosecutor’s office arrived at checkpoint no. 33. There they met FSB officers, who declined to provide any information concerning Mr Yusup Mezhiyev’s detention. The FSB officers noted that they were involved in a special operation, and that they were not subordinates of the prosecutor’s office. 139. On 5 July 2002 the Grozny town prosecutor opened criminal case no. 52075 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 140. On 20 July, and again on 7 and 9 August 2002 the investigators questioned several police officers who had been manning checkpoint no. 33 at the time of the events in question. They stated that on 22 June 2002 the FSB officers had arrived at the checkpoint in order to undertake a special operation. On the morning of 23 June 2002 they searched cars passing through the checkpoint. None of the officers questioned had information about the abduction. The checkpoint had also been manned by OMON officers. Several of them were also questioned by the investigators, but none of them had witnessed the arrest of Mr Yusup Mezhiyev. 141. On 24 July 2002 the third applicant was granted victim status. 142. On 20 August 2002 the investigators questioned Ms A.A. Her account of the events was similar to the applicants’ submission before the Court. 143. On 5 September 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. Following criticism by the supervisors it was subsequently resumed on 22 May 2003. 144. On 14 August 2003 Mr B.A was questioned. His statement was similar to those of the applicants and Ms A.A. He also stated that immediately after Mr Yusup Mezhiyev’s detention he had asked a police officer at the checkpoint about the people who had carried out the arrest. He had been told that Mr Yusup Mezhiyev had been arrested by the FSB officers. 145. On 25 August 2003 the FSB replied to an enquiry lodged by the investigators, stating that Mr Yusup Mezhiyev had never been detained by its agents. 146. Subsequently, the proceedings were suspended on 30 August and 28 November 2003, 21 November 2004, 7 August 2005, and 7 February and 28 May 2011, and resumed on 28 October 2003, 21 October 2004, 7 July 2005, and 26 January and 18 May 2011 respectively. 147. In the meantime, in November 2003 the investigators questioned the officers who had visited the checkpoint on the date of the abduction. They stated that the FSB officers at the checkpoint had refused to answer any questions. All of them, except one, had been in balaclavas. They had arrived at the checkpoint in an UAZ minivan. 148. A year later, in November 2004, several other police officers from the checkpoint were questioned. All of them confirmed the presence of the FSB officers at the crime scene, but none of them could say whether Mr Yusup Mezhiyev had been detained. Their duty station had been located too far from the FSB officers for them to be able to make out the details of what had happened. 149. On various dates between 2006 and 2010 the applicants lodged several requests for information with the investigators, asking them to expedite the proceedings. On 20 April 2010 the first applicant requested that she be granted victim status in the criminal case in order for her to be able to access the case file. 150. On 25 May 2010 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned by the investigators. It is not clear whether she obtained permission to access the case file. 151. On 11 July 2005 the investigators asked the head of the OMON forces to provide them with a list of the officers who had been manning checkpoint no. 33 at the time of the incident, but to no avail – the OMON head refused the request on 27 July 2005, citing the confidentiality of the information sought. 152. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 153. On 28 December 2010 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Oktyabrskiy District Court in Grozny challenging the investigators’ failure to take basic steps. 154. On an unspecified day in late January 2011 (the date is illegible) the court rejected the complaint on the grounds that on 26 January 2011 the criminal investigation had been resumed. 155. The applicants are the parents of Mr Lom-Ali Akhilgov, who was born in 1986. 156. At the material time the “Zapad” unit of the United Military Alignment (“the UGA”) was stationed in the town of Urus-Martan, about one kilometre from the applicants’ house, situated in the vicinity of a bridge. The area was under curfew; checkpoints had been erected on all roads leading to and from the town. 157. On 8 January 2003 the applicants and their sons, Lom-Ali and Magomed, were at home. At about 3 a.m. a group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived in the neighbourhood in several vehicles, including an APC, an Ural lorry and an UAZ minivan. Some of them were in balaclavas. The soldiers, who spoke unaccented Russian, broke into the applicants’ house, pointed their guns at the first applicant and took Mr Lom‑Ali outside. They told the second applicant that she would find her son on the following day at the Zavodskoy district department of the interior in Grozny (“the Zavodskoy ROVD”). Then they walked out onto the street with the applicant’s son and headed in the direction of the UGA headquarters; they dragged him over the bridge and then put him in the UAZ minivan. According to the applicants’ neighbours, another group of soldiers, numbering about twenty, was waiting for the first group at a point about 300 metres from the applicants’ house. 158. The whereabouts of Mr Lom-Ali Akhilgov remain unknown. 159. On the morning of 8 January 2003 the applicants went to the Zavodskoy ROVD, looking for their son. The police denied that he had been arrested or detained on their premises. On 10 January 2003 the applicants complained about the abduction to the Urus‑Martan district prosecutor. 160. On 13 January 2012 investigators from the prosecutor’s office questioned Mr Lom-Ali Akhilgov’s brother, an eyewitness to the abduction, who confirmed the account of the events given by the applicants. 161. On 30 January 2003 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 34009 (in the documents submitted also referred as no. 63044) under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 162. On 30 March 2003 the investigation in respect of the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It appears that the applicants were not informed thereof. Between 2005 and 2006 they requested information about the progress of the proceedings, but to no avail. 163. On 12 June 2007 the investigators questioned the applicants. They gave statements similar to those that they had submitted to the Court. 164. On 9 July 2009 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor, alleging that the investigation of his son’s abduction by federal servicemen had been ineffective and requesting that the authorities grant him victim status in the criminal case and inform him about progress in the proceedings. On 20 July 2009 the investigators replied that the investigation had been resumed for failure to take basic steps, such as questioning the witnesses to the abduction and undertaking an examination of the crime scene. 165. On 28 July 2009 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 166. On 7 August 2009 the investigators questioned Mr S.A., the applicants’ neighbour. He had seen the abduction from his house. According to him, the abduction had followed the scenario typically followed by the federal forces, who usually left their military vehicles at some distance, detained a person and then returned to their vehicles. 167. Several days later the investigators sent requests to various authorities for them to establish Mr Lom-Ali Akhilgov’s whereabouts. It appears that no positive answers were received. 168. On 20 August 2009 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 169. On 3 September 2009 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the head of the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district investigations department, stating that the investigation had been ineffective and asking to be allowed to review the case file. 170. On 15 September 2009 the investigators replied to the applicant, stating that he had the right to access only those documents which related to the investigative steps taken with his participation. 171. Subsequently, the investigation was resumed on 19 May and 29 June 2011, and then suspended on 29 May and 29 July 2011 respectively. 172. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 173. On 18 November 2009 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Achkhoy-Martan District Court alleging that the investigation had been ineffective and requesting the court to order the investigators to resume the proceedings and allow him to review the case file. On 11 December 2009 the court allowed the complaint, stating that for more than six years the investigation had been unlawfully suspended and that the applicant was entitled to review the entire contents of the case file. 174. On 11 November 2010 the first applicant again lodged a complaint with the Achkhoy-Martan District Court stating that the investigation had been ineffective. On 20 May 2011 the court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, stating that the investigation had been resumed on 19 May 2011. On 15 June 2011 this decision was upheld on appeal by the Chechnya Supreme Court. 175. The first and fourth applicants are the adoptive parents of Mr Isa Zilbukharov, who was born in 1975. 176. The second and third applicants are, respectively, the grandmother and the mother of Mr Ruslan Zilbukharov, who was born in 1979. 177. The fifth, sixth and seventh applicants are, respectively, the daughter, the son and the wife of Mr Aslan Tsurayev, who was born in 1972 (in the documents submitted the year of birth was also referred to as 1970). On 10 July 2018 the applicants informed the Court that the fifth applicant, Ms Amina Tsurayeva, changed her surname to Bogatyreva on 22 August 2016. 178. The eighth, ninth and tenth applicants are the children of Mr Cha‑Borz (also spelled as Chaborz) Ibragimov, who was born in 1975. The thirteenth applicant is his brother. 179. The eleventh and twelfth applicants are, respectively, the son and the wife of Mr Sharpuddi Altamirov, who was born in 1964. 180. On 3 November 2003 a temporary military checkpoint was set up at a crossroads on the highway between the villages of Shalazhi and Gekhi‑Chu. Military servicemen conducted checks of passing vehicles and passengers. 181. At about 6 p.m. (in the documents submitted the time was also given as 8 p.m.) on 3 November 2003 Mr Ruslan Zilbukharov, Mr Isa Zilbukharov, Mr Aslan Tsurayev and Mr A.D. were driving in a car through the checkpoint, when a group of twenty to twenty-five armed military servicemen stopped them for an identity check. The servicemen were wearing camouflage uniforms and spoke unaccented Russian. Having checked the documents, the servicemen forced Mr Ruslan Zilbukharov, Mr Isa Zilbukharov and Mr Aslan Tsurayev into a GAZ-66 vehicle parked nearby. 182. Mr A.D., who witnessed the events, asked one of the servicemen where the three men were being taken. The serviceman replied that they were taken to a police station. 183. Meanwhile, Mr Sharpuddi Altamirov and Mr Cha-Borz Ibragimov were passing through the same checkpoint. The servicemen also stopped them for an identity check. They forced them into the GAZ-66 vehicle into which Mr Ruslan Zilbukharov, Mr Isa Zilbukharov and Mr Aslan Tsurayev had already been put, and drove off in the direction of Gekhi-Chu. 184. The whereabouts of the applicants’ relatives remain unknown. 185. Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities thereof and asked that a criminal case be opened. 186. On 20 November 2003 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 34118 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 187. The Government provided the Court with a copy of criminal case file no. 34118, which was opened on 21 December 2004 in respect of the finding of three corpses on a road leading to the village of Zebir-Yurt, Chechnya. Apparently that case is unrelated to the investigation into the abduction of the applicants’ relatives. 188. On 5 December and 19 December 2003, 9 January 2004, 25 July 2005 and 15 June 2010 the seventh, eighth, twelfth, fourth and third applicants, respectively, were granted victim status and questioned. 189. The investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions, including 23 May 2008, 2 March 2009 and 16 June 2010, when it was each time suspended. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed thereof. 190. On 27 October 2008 the twelfth applicant asked the investigators to grant her permission to access the contents of the investigation file and to resume the investigation. Her request was refused. 191. On an unspecified date in April 2011 (the exact date is illegible) the investigators informed the fourth applicant that proceedings in the case had been suspended and that operational search activities were underway in order to establish the whereabouts of his missing relative. 192. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 193. On 12 November 2008 the twelfth applicant lodged a complaint with the Achkhoy-Martan District Court challenging her lack of access to the investigation file and the investigators’ failure to take basic steps. 194. On 13 January 2009 the court allowed her complaint in part and ordered that the investigation in respect of the case be resumed. However, it ruled lawful her lack of access to the investigation file. 195. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Abdul-Malik Dishnayev, who was born in 1970, and his brother, Mr Abdul Dishnayev, who was born in 1974. The second and third applicants are their sisters. The fourth applicant is the father of Mr Timerlan Akhmadov, who was born in 1980. 196. On 9 March 2003 Mr Abdul-Malik Dishnayev, Mr Abdul Dishnayev and their acquaintance, Mr Timerlan Akhmadov, arrived in Grozny and stayed at the second and third applicants’ house. 197. At about 2 a.m. on 10 March 2003 a large group of 120 to 130 armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicants’ house in an APC, Ural lorries and UAZ-452 vehicles. A group of ten servicemen broke into the house and searched the premises. They spoke unaccented Russian and were of Slavic appearance; some of them were equipped with portable radio devices. The servicemen forced the Dishnayev brothers and Mr Timerlan Akhmadov outside, put them into the vehicles and drove off to an unknown destination. 198. The whereabouts of the applicants’ relatives remain unknown. 199. On 10 March 2003 the second applicant complained to the authorities about the abduction. 200. Three days later the Leninskiy district prosecutor in Grozny opened criminal case no. 20050 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 201. On 30 April 2003 the third applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. On the same date she and the second applicant were questioned as witnesses; they confirmed the circumstances of the abduction, as described above. 202. On 17 and 27 May 2003 the investigators questioned Mr Kh.G., the applicants’ neighbour, and Mr B.Kh., a police officer who worked at a checkpoint in the vicinity of the applicants’ village. Mr Kh.G. stated that on the night of the abduction he had heard military vehicles passing by and the next morning had learned of the abduction of village residents. Mr B.Kh. confirmed that at that time a motorcade of military vehicles had passed through the checkpoint. The next morning three women from the village had come to the checkpoint, asking for assistance in the search for three abducted relatives. Mr B.Kh. had advised them to contact the police. 203. On 13 June 2003 the investigation in respect of the case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 204. In 2004 the investigators sent a number of requests to the domestic authorities, including military units and detention facilities, in an effort to establish the whereabouts of the Dishnayev brothers and Mr Timerlan Akhmadov, but to no avail – no replies in the positive were received. 205. On 5 May 2005 the first applicant lodged an application with the Chechen Governmental Committee for the Protection of Constitutional rights of Russian Citizens Residing in the Chechen Republic, asking it to provide her with assistance in her search for her sons. On 20 May 2005 she was informed that the proceedings had been suspended. 206. In early 2006 the first and the fourth applicants wrote to the head of the Chechnya Parliament, asking him to assist in the search for their abducted relatives. Their letters were forwarded to the Chechnya Ministry of the Interior. On 21 June 2006 the applicants were informed that criminal proceedings were pending. 207. On 25 July 2006 the investigation was resumed and the applicants’ were informed thereof. 208. On 1 September 2006 the investigators suspended the proceedings again, but on 7 December 2006 that decision was overruled as unfounded. The supervising authorities instructed the investigators to question witnesses to the abduction. 209. On 19 and 20 December 2006 the investigators questioned several relatives of the abducted persons. Their statements were similar to the account submitted by the applicants to the Court. 210. On 30 December 2006 the proceedings were suspended. 211. On an unspecified date, apparently in 2008, the first, second and third applicants complained to Chechnya prosecutor’s office about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for their relatives. On 10 October 2008 the proceedings were resumed. 212. On 10 November 2008 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. Two days later the proceedings were suspended again. 213. On 19 March and 16 April 2010 the applicants were informed that the criminal case had been transferred to the special cases department of the investigations committee at the Chechnya prosecutor’s office (отдел по рассмотрению особо важных дел Следственного Управления Следственного Комитета при прокуратуре РФ по Чеченской Республике) for further investigation and that operational search activities were in progress. 214. It appears that the investigation is still pending.

4. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Romny. 5. In September 2009 criminal proceedings in respect of fraud and bribery were instituted against the applicant. 6. On 12 January 2010 the Romny Court convicted the applicant of both charges and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment. By the same decision the court remanded him in custody pending the execution of its judgment. 7. On 23 March 2010, upon an appeal by the applicant, the Sumy Regional Court of Appeal (“the Regional Court”) quashed the judgment of 12 January 2010 and remitted the case for retrial. By the same decision it also ordered his continued pre-trial detention, without providing any reasons or indicating a time-limit for it. 8. On 27 April 2010 the applicant asked the Romny Court to order his release from custody, subject to an undertaking not to abscond. He noted, in particular, that his conviction having been quashed, an undertaking not to abscond would constitute a sufficient measure for ensuring the proper conduct of proceedings. In that regard he submitted that he had no prior criminal record and that the crimes imputed to him were not serious. In addition, he had a permanent residence and had obtained positive character references. He also needed to support a family, including a child, and was suffering from several chronic illnesses which required regular medical supervision and which might deteriorate if he remained in detention. The applicant also submitted that, having been bound by an undertaking not to abscond throughout the first round of the proceedings, he had never attempted to abscond or to obstruct the investigation and had dutifully complied with all his procedural obligations. 9. On an unknown date in May 2010 the Romny Court refused the applicant’s request for release, having found that the crimes imputed to him were sufficiently serious as to potentially warrant a prison sentence of three years or more. It also ruled, without providing any details, that there was sufficient evidence that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings if he were to be released. 10. On several further occasions (in particular, on 13 July, 29 September and 7 December 2010) the applicant lodged similar requests for release; the court rejected each such application on the date on which it was lodged, referring to the seriousness of the offences imputed to the applicant and to the lack of any valid reasons justifying his release. 11. On 10 February 2011 the applicant again asked to be released from custody pending the proceedings against him, reiterating his previous arguments and emphasising that it was very difficult while in detention to keep to his special diet and secure the necessary medical supervision for his chronic medical conditions. 12. On 23 February 2011 the Romny Court allowed that request and released the applicant, subject to an undertaking not to abscond. Referring to Article 5 of the Convention, the court noted that, regard being had to the applicant’s character (in particular, his age, health, family and social status, the absence of a prior criminal record and his positive character references), there was no reason to consider that he would abscond, obstruct the investigation or engage in criminal activity if released pending trial. 13. Subsequently, the case was remitted to the prosecutor’s office for further investigation. The charge of bribery was dropped by the prosecutor’s office, and the applicant was committed to stand trial on the charge of fraud alone. 14. On 23 November 2012 the Romny Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to a fine. However, it released him from any liability to pay the fine levied for the crime for which he had been tried as the time-limit for implementing that sanction had expired. Accordingly, the court also terminated the proceedings as time-barred. The applicant did not appeal against this ruling and it became final.

5. The first applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Sofia. The second applicant was registered in 1992 and has its registered place of business in Sofia. 6. At the time of the events in question the first applicant was registered as a sole trader. At that time the main commercial activity of the two applicants was trade in medicaments. 7. In February and March 2006 the first applicant sold medicaments to a company called K., for which she was paid 22,043.23 Bulgarian levs (BGN), the equivalent of 11,275 euros (EUR), in total. 8. Between December 2005 and April 2006 the second applicant also sold medicaments to K., receiving a total of BGN 33,344.05 (the equivalent of EUR 17,055) by way of payment. 9. In September 2006 other companies which were creditors of K., including E., applied for the commencement of insolvency proceedings against K. Their request was allowed in a judgment of 17 November 2006 of the Plovdiv Regional Court (hereinafter “the Regional Court”), which declared company K. insolvent, opened insolvency proceedings and appointed a trustee. It noted that K. had ceased its payments to E. and other creditors in October 2005, and held that the initial date of the company’s insolvency was therefore 30 October 2005. 10. In January 2007 the trustee prepared the first list of K.’s creditors, which included company E. 11. In May 2007 company E. brought proceedings against the first applicant under section 646(2) of the Commerce Act, as in force at the time (see paragraph 25 below), seeking to have the payments K. had made to her during the so-called “suspect period” – the period between the initial date of insolvency as declared by the Plovdiv Regional Court and the commencement of the insolvency proceedings (the payments described in paragraph 7 above) − declared null and void and the sum received by her returned to the insolvency estate. 12. The action was allowed in a judgment of the Regional Court of 31 October 2007. Observing that it was undisputed that K. had paid the first applicant BGN 22,043.23 during the “suspect period”, and without analysing the matter any further, it ordered her to pay back this sum to the insolvency estate, plus default interest. 13. That judgment was upheld on 12 March 2008 by the Plovdiv Court of Appeal (hereinafter “the Court of Appeal”). 14. The Court of Appeal’s judgment was enforceable and, at the request of K.’s trustee, a bailiff opened enforcement proceedings against the first applicant for the sums due to the insolvency estate. In December 2008 the applicant settled that debt, which also included interest and costs and expenses related to the enforcement proceedings. 15. In the judicial proceedings against the first applicant, in a final decision of 21 January 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to accept for examination an appeal on points of law lodged by her. 16. In April 2007 company E. brought proceedings against the second applicant under section 646(2) of the Commerce Act, as in force at the time (see paragraph 25 below), seeking to have the payments K. had made to it during the “suspect period” between 30 October 2005 and 17 November 2006 (payments described in paragraph 8 above) declared null and void and the sum received by the applicant returned to the insolvency estate. 17. The action was allowed in a judgment of 23 January 2008 of the Regional Court. While it acknowledged that the transactions between the second applicant and K. had not damaged the latter’s interests, because K. had received equivalent goods in exchange for its payments to the applicant, the Regional Court added that the Commerce Act “did not take account” of such considerations. It thus ordered the second applicant to pay back to the insolvency estate the sum of BGN 33,344.05, plus default interest. 18. Upon appeal by the second applicant, on 10 June 2008 that judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal, which stated once again that section 646(2) of the Commerce Act did not require any proof that the contested payment had damaged the interests of K.’s remaining creditors; such damage, as well as the knowledge about it, were to be considered “presumed”. 19. Since the Court of Appeal’s judgment was enforceable, a bailiff opened enforcement proceedings against the second applicant for the sums owed by it to the insolvency estate. The second applicant settled that debt, which included interest and costs and expenses related to the enforcement proceedings, in October 2008. 20. In the main judicial proceedings against the second applicant, in a final decision of 29 July 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to accept for examination an appeal on points of law lodged by it. 21. In the insolvency proceedings against K., the majority of its assets were distributed among its creditors between November 2007 and October 2008. In two decisions delivered in November and December 2008 the trustee in bankruptcy added the State to the list of creditors, with claims exceeding BGN 5,000,000. As the State was a privileged creditor, almost all payments from the insolvency estate after that were made to it, but a substantial proportion of the debts owed to it by K. nonetheless remained unpaid. 22. The applicants did not make use of the possibility afforded to them by section 648 of the Commerce Act (see paragraph 29 below) to join the insolvency proceedings as creditors of K. Two other companies in a similar situation – they had also been obliged to return sums to the insolvency estate on the basis of section 646(2) of the Commerce Act – did join the insolvency proceedings, but received no part of the sums owed to them. 23. The insolvency proceedings continued until 2014, when company K. was wound up.

6. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Adana. 7. On 11 July 2000 the Adana Magistrate’s Court ordered the detention of the applicant in absentia. 8. On 20 July 2000 the applicant was questioned by the gendarmerie in the absence of his lawyer. In his statement, the applicant gave a detailed description about his involvement in an illegal organisation and the activities in which he had taken part. Subsequently, he was brought before the public prosecutor at the Adana State Security Court. During the interview, the applicant stated, again in the absence of a lawyer, that his statements made to the gendarmerie had been correct. 9. On 15 September 2000 the investigating judge at the Mardin Magistrate’s Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention, again in the absence of a lawyer. 10. On 24 October 2000 the public prosecutor lodged an indictment before the Adana State Security Court, charging the applicant under Section 125 of the former Criminal Code with carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. 11. On 25 October 2005 the Adana Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged. 12. On 26 April 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the conviction. 13. On 6 November 2007 the Adana Assize Court found that, inter alia, on the basis of the applicant’s statements to the gendarmerie and the public prosecutor, the applicant had committed the offence under Section 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 14. On 12 November 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the conviction.

6. The applicants in application no. 11308/16 (Tlapak) are a mother and father. Their son J. was born on 15 January 2012. The applicants in application no. 11344/16 (Pingen) are also a mother and father. Their two daughters A. and B. were born on 7 October 2009 and their son G. was born on 23 May 2013. All the applicants are members of the Twelve Tribes Church (Zwölf Stämme) who lived in a community of around twenty members of the church in Wörnitz, Germany. A second community with around 100 members was located in the nearby village of Klosterzimmern. 7. In 2012 the press reported about the Twelve Tribes Church and its position on the right of parents to apply corporal punishment, especially caning. Furthermore, statements by a former member of the community were published, confirming that children had been punished with rods. 8. In 2012 and 2013 the local youth offices (Jugendamt) visited both communities and its spokespersons were invited to a meeting at the Bavarian Ministry of Education. Corporal punishment and the issue of compulsory schooling were discussed at the meeting. 9. On 16 August 2013 the Klosterzimmern youth office and the Nördlingen Family Court received video footage from a television reporter showing ten different instances of corporal punishment in the community in Klosterzimmern. The footage, filmed with a hidden camera, showed the caning of various children between the ages of three and twelve. According to the television reporter, the person who carried out the punishment was not, in most cases, a parent of the child being punished. 10. On 3 September 2013 the Ansbach Family Court, upon an application by the competent youth office, made an interlocutory order regarding all children in the Twelve Tribes community in Wörnitz, including the applicants’ children. The court withdrew the applicants’ rights to decide where their children should live (Aufenthaltsbestimmungsrecht), and to take decisions regarding their health (Gesundheitsfürsorge), schooling and professional training, and transferred those rights to the youth office. The court based its decision on the above-mentioned video footage and the testimony of the television reporter and six former members of the Twelve Tribes community. It concluded that there was a reasonable likelihood that the children would be subjected to corporal punishment in the form of caning and so-called “restraining”, involving holding a child’s limbs tight and pressing his or her head down until the child had no strength left to cry and struggle. 11. On 5 September 2013 the youth office took the community’s children into care. They were supported by around thirty police officers, who, at the same time, searched the community’s premises and found a wooden rod. 12. The applicants’ children were subsequently examined but no physical signs of abuse or beating were revealed. 13. J. Tlapak was subsequently placed in a foster family. As he was still being breastfed, his mother was permitted daily visits to give him milk. 14. A. and B. Pingen were also placed in a foster family. Their aunt’s family was approved as fosterers and they were then placed with them. 15. Since G. Pingen was then only one year and four months old and was also still being breastfed, he and his mother were placed together in a foster family. 16. On 13 September 2013 the Ansbach Family Court heard the applicants and on 23 September 2013 it upheld its order of 3 September 2013 in an interim decision. 17. On 2 December 2013 the Nuremberg Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicants against the interim decision of the Family Court in essence, but set the decision aside to the extent it concerned the parental right to decide on schooling matters. Given the son’s age, the court held that there was no need to decide on that issue in the interim proceedings. 18. In 2015 the applicants moved – without their son J. – to the Czech Republic, where they have been living since. 19. The Ansbach Family Court heard the applicants on 13 September 2013 and the applicants’ daughters on 18 September 2013 in the foster family’s home. The daughters reported that their parents had hit them on the hand with a rod as a form of corporal punishment. On 23 September 2013 the Family Court upheld its order of 3 September 2013. 20. On 2 December 2013, upon an appeal by the applicants, the Nuremberg Court of Appeal reversed the decision to withdraw the right to decide where G. Pingen should live. The earlier decision on the daughters was upheld, with the proviso that the parents were to retain the right to take decisions on school matters and on their daughters’ choice of education or training and career. 21. The son was subsequently returned to the applicants, who moved first to Belgium and later to the Czech Republic, where they have been living since. The applicants’ daughters are still in the care of the foster family (see paragraph 14 above). 22. Upon an application made by the applicants on 9 September 2013 the Family Court initiated the main proceedings and, on 24 September 2013, it commissioned an expert opinion. 23. After interviewing the applicants and observing a meeting between them and their son, the expert submitted a written opinion on 19 December 2013. He found that even though the applicants had a loving attitude towards their son, they considered corporal punishment with objects as an appropriate and necessary parenting method. Owing to their willingness to apply that method to their son, there was a likelihood bordering on certainty that if he remained with them, they would apply corporal punishment. This, the expert concluded, would significantly jeopardise the son’s development and result in psychological problems. Overall, it was in the child’s best interests to place him away from his parents to protect him from the applicants’ parenting methods, which were dangerous for the child. Since their parenting was based on religious convictions, they were unwilling to abandon the parenting method of corporal punishment and lacked the will to cooperate with the authorities or accept help. Consequently, less intrusive measures could not be considered sufficient. 24. Subsequently the applicants submitted a privately commissioned expert opinion, in which the court-appointed expert’s approach and methodology was criticised. In addition, the applicants retrospectively withdrew their consent to being assessed by the court-appointed expert and to an assessment of their son. 25. In separate proceedings the Family Court, on 1 August 2014, issued an interim decision in which it withdrew the applicants’ parental right to decide on the son’s assessment by the court-appointed expert and consented to such a measure. 26. On 4 August 2014, the Family Court forwarded the privately commissioned expert opinion to the court-appointed expert, who responded to the criticism and gave details of his methodology in a letter of 15 August 2014. 27. In a hearing on 19 September 2014 the court proposed an agreement between the applicants and the youth office, with the aim of returning their son to them. However, the applicants and the youth office did not agree on a settlement owing in particular to a disagreement about the son attending a state school and play therapy. Moreover, there were concerns about the parents attending a development course and assisting with medical measures. The youth office considered those aspects as essential and declined the partial settlement proposed by the applicants. 28. After hearing the applicants’ son in the home of the foster family where he had been placed on 21 October 2014, the Family Court decided on 22 October 2014 to withdraw the applicants’ right to decide where their son should live and to take decisions regarding his health and schooling, and transferred those rights to the youth office, which had been appointed as supplementary guardian. 29. The Family Court stated that it would be very detrimental to the best interests of the child if the son continued to live with the applicants owing to their parenting methods. Based, in particular, on the court‑commissioned expert opinion and the statements by the applicants during the court proceedings, the court concluded that there was a high, concrete probability that the son would be subjected to corporal punishment using physical objects over the course of several years. According to the expert, this would give rise to an expectation that the applicants’ son would suffer from psychological issues. Even though separating the parents and the child constituted a severe interference with their right to a family under Article 6 of the Basic Law (see paragraph 53 below) and may possibly have negative consequences for the child, that interference was justified in the case at hand. Corporal punishment of the kind at issue was particularly degrading for a child. It was not only banned by Article 1631 § 2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 54 below) but also constituted an interference with a child’s human dignity, protected under Article 1 of the Basic Law (see paragraph 50 below), and a child’s right to physical integrity, protected under Article 2 of the Basic Law (see paragraph 51 below). 30. The court also held that the risk to the child could not be averted using less drastic measures. Throughout the course of the proceedings the applicants had unreservedly advocated their parenting style and had refused to accept the opinion that the type of corporal punishment they endorsed was covered by the ban on violence under Article 1631 of the Civil Code. The physical effects of such punishment were only short-lived, which was why it would only be possible for the youth office to observe any such effects if it made unannounced visits and the child had – by chance – been punished immediately prior to such a visit. According to the expert’s explanations, the psychological consequences could, by contrast, only be determined after a longer period of time and they were difficult to discern at first glance. Although the applicants had most recently indicated to the court that they were ready to refrain from corporal punishment in the future, the court regarded such statements as not being compelling since they had not provided any grounds. The Family Court, nonetheless, pointed out that the applicants were free to reach an out-of-court settlement with the youth office concerning the conditions under which the son could be returned after the proceedings had been concluded. However, the previous settlement proposal had been refused because the applicants had not been willing to agree to have their son take part in play therapy and attend a state school. 31. In regard to the fact that the applicants had withdrawn their consent to being examined by the court-appointed expert after the expert opinion had already been submitted, both for themselves and their child, the court held that this did not render the expert’s report unusable in the proceedings. While the court had given its own consent in place of the parents’ as far as it concerned the son, the parents’ actions on that point could not, in light of the state’s obligation to protect children under constitutional law, hinder the use of the expert opinion in the proceedings. Allowing parents to reject expert opinions they disagreed with by retrospectively withdrawing consent to an examination would prevent any effective protection of children in family court proceedings. 32. The applicants subsequently appealed against the decision of the Family Court. The Court of Appeal, after hearing the applicants, their son, the son’s guardian ad litem, a representative of the youth office, the court‑appointed expert and the expert commissioned by the applicants, dismissed the applicants’ appeal on 26 May 2015. 33. In a decision of thirty-nine pages, the Court of Appeal considered in detail the applicants’ statements concerning corporal punishment, publications by the Twelve Tribes Church, the expert’s opinion and the criticism of the report by the privately commissioned expert. Overall it confirmed the decision and reasoning of the Family Court of 22 October 2014. The court emphasised that not all individual violations of the right to a non-violent upbringing under Article 1631 § 2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 54 below) could justify a withdrawal of parental authority. However, there was a fear in the applicants’ case that systematic caning with a rod would be the reaction whenever the child was deemed to have broken a rule. There was moreover already a threat to the child’s best interests as he would live in constant fear of suffering physical pain and experiencing the resulting humiliation as psychological suffering. Beatings as such, the court held, constituted child abuse and misuse of parental authority. It was of no relevance whether or not lasting physical injuries occurred. 34. The court further held that on account of their religious beliefs, the applicants were convinced that their child-rearing methods were legitimate. Accordingly, they were neither willing nor able to avert the danger to their child and the recent contradictory statements they had made could not be considered as credible. 35. On 16 August 2015 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a constitutional complaint by the applicants (1 BvR 1467/15), without providing reasons. 36. The Family Court, upon an application by the applicants dated 9 September 2013, initiated the main proceedings and on 24 September 2013 commissioned an expert opinion. 37. After interviewing the applicants, their two daughters and the children’s foster parents, and observing a meeting between the applicants and their children, the expert submitted a written opinion on 23 December 2013. He stated that the applicants and their daughters had confirmed that the parents had used a rod as corporal punishment on the daughters and that even though the applicants had a loving attitude towards their children, they considered corporal punishment using physical objects as an appropriate and necessary parenting method. Given the past incidents of corporal punishment and the applicants’ general willingness to use that method on their children, it was virtually certain that they would subject them to corporal punishment again. The expert concluded that the applicants’ rigid, authoritarian parenting style and their conviction that children should be raised to obey their parents by means of corporal punishment using physical objects from the age of three conflicted significantly with the best interests of the children and was also detrimental to the unimpaired development of their personality. He expected that such methods would likely result in psychological issues. Overall, it was in the best interests of the children to place them away from their parents. Since the applicants’ parenting style was based on religious convictions, they were unwilling to abandon the parenting method of corporal punishment and were not fully prepared to cooperate with the authorities and accept help. Consequently, measures that infringed on their rights to a lesser degree could not be considered sufficient. 38. Subsequently, the applicants submitted a privately commissioned expert opinion, in which the court-appointed expert’s approach and methodology was criticised. In addition, the applicants retrospectively withdrew their consent to being assessed by the court-appointed expert and to the assessment of their three children. 39. In separate proceedings the Family Court, on 1 September 2014, issued an interim decision in which it withdrew the applicants’ parental right to decide on the children being assessed by the court-appointed expert and consented to the psychological examination. It also forwarded the privately commissioned expert opinion to the court-appointed expert, who responded to the criticism in it and gave details of his methodology in a letter of 1 October 2014. 40. In a hearing of 29 September 2014 the parties discussed an agreement between the applicants and the youth office, with the aim of returning the daughters to the applicants and protecting all three children. However, the applicants and the youth office could not agree on a settlement as there was disagreement in particular on the children attending a state school and therapy. Moreover, the applicants were unwilling to remain in Germany under the supervision of the youth office for an extended period of time. 41. After hearing the applicants and their daughters several times, including in parallel proceedings, the Family Court decided on 21 October 2014 to withdraw the applicants’ right to decide where all three children should live and to take decisions regarding the children’s health and schooling, and transferred those rights to the youth office, which had been appointed as supplementary guardian. Additionally, the court ordered the applicants’ son to be handed over to the youth office. 42. In its reasoning, which was similar to that in application no. 11308/14 (see paragraphs 29-31 above), the Family Court held that the applicants’ parenting methods meant that it would be very detrimental to the best interests of all three children to continue to live with their parents. The court emphasised that the aim of Article 1666 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 55 below) was not to penalise past child abuse or views on parenting that were in contradiction to Article 1631 § 2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 54 below), but to prevent imminent threats to the best interests of children. Based, in particular, on the opinion by the court‑appointed expert and the statements by the applicants and their children, the court concluded that there was a high, concrete probability that the children would be subjected to systematic corporal punishment using physical objects, which would in turn be detrimental to the best interests of the children in physical and psychological terms. The severe interference with the applicants’ right to a family under Article 6 of the Basic Law (see paragraph 53 below) by separating them from their children was nonetheless not only justified but also proportionate since the risk to the children could not be averted using milder means. Besides the problem of detecting corporal punishment through unannounced visits by the youth office (see paragraph 30 above), the court also pointed out that the applicants had consistently, over the course of the proceedings, shown a lack of willingness to cooperate with the youth office and had refused to accept state schools, both of which the court found necessary to prevent degrading corporal punishment and ensure the children’s autonomous development. Furthermore, the court held that it could be expected that the applicants would leave Germany if their children were returned to them and thereby elude any orderly monitoring and supervision by the competent youth office. Lastly, the court concluded that the withdrawal of the consent to being examined by the court-appointed expert did not hinder the use of the expert opinion in the proceedings (see paragraph 31 above). 43. The applicants subsequently appealed against the decision of the Family Court and applied for an interim measure to suspend the order to hand their son over to the youth office. 44. On 15 December 2014 the Court of Appeal provisionally suspended enforcement of the Family Court’s order on the son. The court held that given his age, one year and six months, and the fact that he was still being breastfed, enforcement would constitute an especially serious interference with the applicants’ rights. In addition, the son’s young age meant there was no imminent and sufficient risk of him being subjected to corporal punishment. 45. During the appeal proceedings the applicants proposed a settlement to the Court of Appeal. The applicants would temporarily return to Germany and for two months they would gradually be reunited with their two daughters under the supervision of the youth office. At the end of that period, if the family reunification had been successful, the Family Court’s decision would be set aside and the whole family would move to the Czech Republic. 46. On 26 March 2015 the Court of Appeal conducted an oral hearing during which it heard, inter alia, the applicants, their daughters, the court‑appointed expert, the expert commissioned by the applicants and the children’s guardian ad litem. The applicants’ daughters stated that, even though they would like to see their parents more often, they would prefer living with their foster parents. Moreover, a representative of the youth office indicated during the hearing that the applicants had not distanced themselves from their previous parenting methods in a credible way and that therefore the youth office was not able to agree to the settlement they had proposed. 47. On 10 June 2015 the Court of Appeal, in a detailed decision of forty‑five pages, rejected the applicants’ appeal and confirmed the reasoning of the Family Court. The court held that corporal punishment with a rod, prohibited by Article 1631 § 2 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 54 below), constituted the physical abuse of children and if applied regularly and repeatedly the competent authorities were obliged under Article 1666 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 55 below) to intervene and take the necessary measures in the best interests of the children. The applicants’ daughters had consistently stated during the proceedings that they had been caned on a daily basis and the applicants themselves had confirmed that they had “disciplined” their daughters with a rod. The court was convinced that the applicants would continue to use corporal punishment on their children in the future since that parenting method was already firmly established and was based on religious beliefs from which the applicants had not fundamentally distanced themselves. Their statements had shown that they, in essence, continued to approve of corporal punishment and considered it an appropriate parenting method. The fact that the applicants had recently acknowledged that their children had a right to a non-violent upbringing did not mean they had changed their attitudes to parenting in a permanent way; rather, that had only served a procedural purpose, namely to have their daughters returned to them as soon as possible. In the court’s opinion, the applicants were only prepared to refrain temporarily from corporal punishment. The court was therefore unable to find that the applicants had changed their way of parenting and distanced themselves from corporal punishment in a manner which the court could regard as credible. Consequently, there was an imminent danger of systematic corporal punishment if the two daughters were returned to their parents. The danger also existed for the applicants’ son as there was no fixed age when the applicants started “disciplining” their children as they rather considered it a tool to enforce their parental authority. As the two-year-old son was expected to start his “phase of defiance” soon, it also had to be expected that the applicants would respond with caning. 48. The Court of Appeal also confirmed that the applicants’ withdrawal of their consent to being assessed did not prevent the courts from using the expert opinion as evidence and that there were no less severe measures available to avert the imminent detriment to the best interests of the children resulting from their parents’ use of corporal punishment. In that regard, the court, inter alia, pointed to the fact that the applicants had already left Germany with their son and refused to return to live there permanently. The competent authorities would therefore from the very outset be unable to provide sufficient support to the family or effectively monitor the applicants’ parenting methods. 49. On 16 August 2015 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a constitutional complaint by the applicants (1 BvR 1589/15), without providing reasons.

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Ivanovo. 6. At the relevant time the applicant was a member of the Ivanovo Region electoral commission. 7. On 23 October 2003 a deputy head of the Ivanovo Region Department of Internal Affairs ordered audio-visual “surveillance” (“наблюдение”) of the applicant’s office. The parties did not submit a copy of that decision. 8. The surveillance was carried out from 27 October to 5 November 2003 by means of a hidden camera. 9. The applicant was subsequently charged with abuse of power, an offence under Article 285 of the Criminal Code. While studying the criminal case file he discovered that it contained video recordings of him talking on the telephone in his office. 10. At the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He claimed, in particular, that the video recordings were inadmissible as evidence as they had been obtained unlawfully without prior judicial authorisation. He also challenged the authenticity of the recordings. 11. On 27 September 2004 the Leninskiy District Court of Ivanovo convicted the applicant of abuse of power and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years. The court relied on statements by several witnesses, physical evidence, expert reports and the video recordings of the applicant’s telephone conversations. It found that the video recordings were authentic and that they had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. 12. The applicant appealed. He reiterated, in particular, his argument that the video recordings were inadmissible as evidence. 13. On 12 November 2004 the Ivanovo Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal. The court held that the District Court had correctly declared the video recordings admissible as evidence because they had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

5. The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Mārupe. At the material time the applicant held a pilot licence and was undergoing aviation training. 6. In 2008 the applicant used the services of a company, KD.C. (the name of this company was subsequently changed, but it will be referred to hereinafter as “KD.C.” or “the company”). D.K. held 100% of the shares in the company (he was its sole owner) and he was also its sole board member. The company provided private flights and organised private pilot training courses. The Civil Aviation Agency had issued the company with a registration certificate for the provision of private pilot training courses. 7. The company did not provide commercial flights, therefore it fell outside the scope of the Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers on Procedures Regarding the Issuing of an Air Operator’s Certificate for Aerial Work (8 May 2007), and was not certified by the Civil Aviation Agency. 8. On 16 August 2008 KD.C. organised a private flight from Riga to Tukums using a multi-engine aircraft, a Piper PA-31 with a maximum allowed mass of 2,900 kg. The applicant and six other people boarded the aircraft as passengers. The applicant occupied the front seat of the aircraft, next to the pilot, G.V., and maintained radio communication with the air traffic control service. 9. At around 10 a.m. the pilot, G.V., lost control of the aircraft and it crashed (see paragraph 12 below). As a result, the pilot died and all passengers sustained serious injuries. 10. According to a forensic medical examination, the applicant suffered serious, life-threatening injuries. He permanently lost the vision in his right eye and sustained other permanent damage to his health. He underwent treatment in Latvia and abroad. After rehabilitation, the applicant was able to continue working as an aviation specialist, but under certain limitations. He was not permitted to operate an aircraft independently and was required to undergo medical checks more often than other aviation specialists. 11. Following the accident on 16 August 2008 officials from the Transport Accident and Incident Investigation Bureau (Transporta nelaimes gadījumu un incidentu izmeklēšanas birojs, hereinafter “the TAIIB”), whose main task was to establish the circumstances of an accident, went to the scene of the accident and carried out an investigation. 12. According to the TAIIB’s final report of 27 June 2009, on the day of the accident, when operating in cloudy weather, G.V., the pilot, made a series of chaotic manoeuvres, as a result of which the aircraft, which was about 30-50 m from the ground, lost altitude. The attempts to stabilise it were unsuccessful. As a consequence of hitting the ground and damaging its tank, the aircraft caught fire. 13. The investigation concluded that the primary cause of the accident was “human error” (cilvēka faktors), namely G.V. having insufficient skills and experience to independently operate a multi-engine aircraft in accordance with instrumental flight rules and, in particular, to operate a Piper PA-31 aircraft. The pilot had not obtained authorisation from the Civil Aviation Agency to fly that particular type of aircraft. In particular, G.V. had started the “differences training programme” for the Piper PA‑31 aircraft on 1 August 2008, but had not finished it. Nevertheless, on 16 August 2008 he had flown without sufficient qualifications. 14. The final report indicated several aspects which had contributed to the accident, such as unfavourable weather conditions with poor visibility, and the “unsafe supervision” (nedroša uzraudzība) carried out by the Civil Aviation Agency “[to ensure] that the aviation legislation and visual flight rules were complied with”. 15. With regard to KD.C., the company which owned the aircraft, the investigation concluded that it had not followed up on the pilot’s differences training programme and its outcome. On the day of the accident the company had not checked whether the pilot’s documents complied with the requirements of the legislation, and it had unjustifiably (nepamatoti) handed over the aircraft to him and verbally authorised him to fly. 16. The above report, inter alia, addressed to the Civil Aviation Agency eight recommendations concerning flight safety. The second recommendation advised the Civil Aviation Agency to impose a duty on aircraft owners to set up a procedure for aircraft handovers which would prevent pilots from operating a flight without a licence and would contain confirmation of an appropriate qualification certificate issued by the Civil Aviation Agency. 17. On 16 August 2008 a criminal investigation was opened into the aircraft accident. In the course of the investigation the police gathered evidence, ordered that forensic examinations be carried out, and interviewed numerous witnesses, including various aviation specialists. 18. Questioned as a witness, D.K. stated that he himself had no experience of operating aircrafts, and that G.V. had been the company’s de facto associate, although legally he had had no contractual relationship with the company; D.K. also stated that he had had no doubts that G.V. had had sufficient qualifications, because he had undergone the necessary training and obtaining a certificate had only been a formality. It had been supposed that G.V. would at all times be accompanied by a more experienced instructor during the training flights. On the day of the accident D.K. had a telephone conversation with G.V. and the latter informed him that he had finished his “instruction” and would soon be starting a flight. Only afterwards did D.K. find out that another aeroplane had returned to the same airport owing to bad weather conditions. 19. The investigation revealed that G.V. had undertaken to fly the aircraft even though he lacked the requisite skills, which had caused the accident in question. On 14 January 2010 the proceedings with regard to G.V. were terminated due to his death. 20. The material in the criminal case contained a letter from the TAIIB dated 20 October 2009 which stated, inter alia, that at the material time the legislative acts regulating aviation safety in Latvia had not provided for a procedure setting out how to hand over an aircraft for a general aviation flight. 21. This was further confirmed in a statement given by a TAIIB official during the investigation, that in general aviation, unlike in commercial aviation, there were no established (nebija sakārtots) regulations regarding an aircraft owner’s responsibility in relation to a specific flight and a pilot’s skills. Therefore the recommendations of the TAIIB were adopted to address that issue within the existing system (see paragraph 16 above). During the investigation, an official of the Civil Aviation Agency testified that in commercial aviation, the question of an operator’s responsibility with regard to the qualifications and rights of a pilot was sufficiently regulated, however this regulation did not apply to general aviation flights. 22. On 24 May 2011 the prosecution indicted D.K. for negligence in the performance of his professional duties (section 197 of the Criminal Law) and violation of air traffic safety or operation regulations (section 257(2) of the Criminal Law). The prosecution alleged that D.K. had handed over the aircraft to G.V. knowing that the latter lacked the requisite permit and skills to operate it. On 8 June 2011 the prosecution referred the case for trial. 23. On 22 October 2012 the Tukums District Court found D.K. guilty on both counts. It established that D.K. had not applied any measures to verify G.V.’s qualifications. He had given the aircraft to the pilot knowing that the latter lacked the appropriate authorisation and had permitted him to fly. D.K. was given a suspended prison sentence of five years. He was also ordered to pay the applicant 20,000 Latvian lati (around 29,000 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 24. On 15 May 2013 the Zemgale Regional Court, acting as an appellate court, quashed the above judgment and acquitted D.K. In the appeal proceedings, D.K. testified that in his telephone conversation with G.V. on 16 August 2008 they had agreed that G.V. would not fly, owing to the bad weather conditions. He explained the inconsistency in relation to his pre‑trial testimony (see paragraph 18 above) as follows. Firstly, he had been a witness at that stage. Secondly, he had been interviewed in Latvian, which was not his mother tongue, and he had not been as fluent as was necessary. He had no doubt that G.V. was responsible for the accident, and he could not envisage also being charged in criminal proceedings. 25. With regard to negligence in the performance of his professional duties (see paragraph 44 below), the court deemed that neither the indictment nor the first-instance judgment had shown what professional duties in particular D.K. had neglected. Also, not being an aviation specialist, he could not have been regarded as a “special subject” for the purposes of this section of the Criminal Law (an organisation’s responsible employee). 26. Concerning the alleged violation of air traffic safety or operation regulations (see paragraph 45 below), the appellate court concluded that it had not been established precisely what regulations D.K. had violated and by what conduct in particular. Besides, section 257 of the Criminal Law required that the prohibited conduct be committed by a transport employee, which D.K. was not. 27. The appellate court indicated that, even though D.K. could not be held criminally liable, KD.C. had an obligation to provide compensation for the damage sustained by the victim, and therefore the applicant had rights to seek damages in civil proceedings. 28. Both the applicant and the prosecutor submitted appeals against the appellate court’s judgment. 29. On 9 December 2013 the Senate of the Supreme Court endorsed the appeal court’s findings that it had not been shown that D.K. had committed the requisite actus reus. The Senate confirmed that D.K.’s actions did not contain the necessary elements of a crime under sections 197 and 257(2) of the Criminal Law. 30. The Senate stated that the prosecution should not have relied on certain provisions of the Commercial Law, the Civil Law, the Law on Aviation and the Convention on International Civil Aviation (hereinafter “the Chicago Convention”). Those provisions were applicable when determining the civil and not criminal liability of an aircraft owner. In accordance with section 34 of the Law on Aviation, a pilot was prohibited from performing his functions in the event that he had not acquired the appropriate qualifications. The above provision had been binding upon the pilot and not D.K. The Senate also stated that only on 18 November 2010 had Part II of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention, Seventh Edition, come into force, making provision for the liability of an aircraft owner and a pilot; before that date the Chicago Convention provided the responsibility only of the pilot (see also paragraph 58 et seq. below). 31. Furthermore, at the material time, no legislation had provided for a procedure for handing over an aircraft to a pilot, designating a person responsible for verifying pilots’ training, or checking flight planning and implementation. Only subsequent to the accident in question had recommendations been issued to the Civil Aviation Agency on the preparation of statutes relevant to flight safety. As of 24 April 2013, section 91 of the Law on Aviation had provided that an aircraft owner or operator was not allowed to hand over an aircraft to a person lacking the appropriate qualifications and insurance cover (see paragraph 55 below). 32. On 13 August 2010 the applicant lodged a claim for damages against KD.C. (the company which owned the aircraft), D.K. (the sole owner and board member of the company), and the insurance company. In the claim, inter alia, the applicant relied on sections 1782, 2347 and 2349 of the Civil Law (see paragraphs 42-43 below). In the meantime, by a final decision of the Riga Regional Court of 8 November 2010, KD.C. was declared bankrupt (maksātnespējīgs) upon application by one of its creditors and respective proceedings were started with retrospective effect from 31 December 2008. 33. On 14 May 2013 the Riga Regional Court, acting as a court of first instance, dismissed the claim in full on the grounds that the defendants had not committed unlawful actions (prettiesiska darbība). There was no dispute that D.K. had agreed to the pilot starting a “differences training programme” for the Piper PA-31 aircraft with a flight instructor, O.G. However, there was no evidence that on 16 August 2008 D.K. had allowed the pilot to operate this aircraft carrying seven passengers. On the contrary, the instructor and another witness (J.Z.) had testified that it had been planned that the pilot would operate the aircraft with the flight instructor, who had not arrived at the airport to take the flight on that date because of the bad weather conditions. The pilot had been informed of the bad weather conditions and the fact that the flight instructor would not arrive for the flight. By referring to the investigation carried out by the TAIIB, the Riga Regional Court noted that the primary reason for the accident was “human error” on the part of the pilot, and that the lack of sufficient procedure in relation to handing over an aircraft had contributed to the accident, but was not the sole cause of it. Moreover, the applicant had occupied the front seat of the aircraft, next to the pilot, and had maintained radio communication. Taking into account that he was a pilot himself and that he had received information about the unfavourable weather conditions, he could have avoided any damage by choosing not to fly in such circumstances. By referring to the second recommendation (see paragraph 16 above), the court concluded that, at the material time, there had been no obligation for aircraft owners to verify the qualifications and health of pilots. 34. On 24 September 2015 the Civil Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court, acting as an appellate court, dismissed the applicant’s claim in full on the following grounds. 35. With regard to KD.C., the civil proceedings were terminated because the company had ceased to exist (on 26 May 2015 it had been excluded from the Companies Register) and there was no legal successor. 36. Next, the appellate court found that D.K. could not be held liable under sections 1779 and 1635 of the Civil Law for the damage sustained by the applicant. By referring to the investigation carried out by the TAIIB, the appellate court also noted that the primary cause of the accident had been “human error” on the part of the pilot. While the lack of a sufficient procedure in relation to handing over the aircraft had contributed to the accident, there was no causal link between the accident and the actions of D.K., who managed the company. The appellate court also referred to the conclusions made in the criminal proceedings to the effect that D.K. was not liable for the flight operated by the pilot, and the fact that he had been acquitted. Moreover, the appellate court referred to evidence given to the first-instance court and concluded that on 16 August 2008 D.K. had not allowed the pilot to operate the aircraft independently and that the pilot’s course of action (to operate the aircraft independently) had been arbitrary and unlawful. It had been planned that the pilot would operate the aircraft with the flight instructor (see paragraph 33 above). In the light of sections 97 and 98 of the Law on Aviation, the owner of the aircraft was the company and not D.K. Thus, the latter could not be held responsible under the Law on Aviation. In so far as the applicant referred to the Chicago Convention, this was inapplicable, because it only provided for the responsibility of a pilot-in-command and, from 18 November 2010 onwards, the responsibility of an owner; D.K. was neither a pilot nor an owner. Neither could D.K. be held liable under section 1782 of the Civil Law (see paragraph 43 below) because the pilot had not been an employee of the company. Nor could he be held liable under sections 2347 and 2349 of the Civil Law (see paragraph 42 below). Referring to the conclusions made in the criminal proceedings, the appellate court held that D.K. had not engaged in any unlawful (prettiesiska) or liable (vainojama) activity. Therefore, he could not be required to pay damages to the applicant. There was no doubt that the aircraft was a source of dangerous activity, but D.K. was not its owner. Instead, KD.C. was the owner of the aircraft, therefore it was liable for loss caused by the source of dangerous activity. 37. The appellate court also refused to hold D.K. liable as a board member of the company. It concluded that, under the relevant provisions of the Commercial Law, board members were liable for damage caused to a company. In the present case, the company had not incurred any losses because it had not provided compensation for any damage sustained by the applicant. 38. Lastly, the appellate court dismissed the claim against the insurance company. In the judgment, it stated that the aircraft accident fell outside the terms of the aircraft’s insurance, which provided that compensation was not awarded if an accident was caused by a pilot who had no right to operate an aircraft. In the present case, the pilot had not had a permit to operate the aircraft in question. 39. In a preparatory meeting on 5 May 2016 the Senate of the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant in the case against KD.C., D.K. and the insurance company. 40. In a letter dated 12 May 2015 addressed to the Government regarding the accident in question, the Civil Aviation Agency stated: “As regards the responsibility of the aircraft owner, we note that the legislative acts [at the material time] provided that the owner of an aircraft was responsible for ensuring the maintenance of the aircraft’s airworthiness, but not its safe operation during a flight, which was the pilot’s responsibility. In particular, in accordance with Commission Regulation (EC) No 2042/2003 of 20 November 2003 on the continuing airworthiness of aircraft and aeronautical products, parts and appliances, and on the approval of organisations and personnel involved in these tasks, under Annex I (Part M) M.A. 201 (a), the owner is responsible for the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft and shall ensure that no flight takes place unless: the aircraft is maintained in an airworthy condition; and any operational and emergency equipment fitted is correctly installed and serviceable or clearly identified as unserviceable; and the airworthiness certificate remains valid; and the maintenance of the aircraft is performed in accordance with the approved maintenance programme.” 41. Article 92 of the Constitution (Satversme) provides, inter alia, that “any person whose rights are violated without justification has a right to commensurate compensation”. Domestic legal provisions pertaining to compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage under the Civil Law (Civillikums) are quoted in full in Zavoloka v. Latvia (no. 58447/00, §§ 17‑19, 7 July 2009). Sections 1635 and 1779 are also explained in the case of Holodenko v. Latvia (no. 17215/07, § 45, 2 July 2013). 42. Under section 2347 of the Civil Law, if a person is responsible for causing another person bodily injury through an illegal action, the person responsible shall compensate the victim for medical expenses and the loss of future income (paragraph one). A person engaging in activities, which are dangerous for others (transport, enterprise, construction, dangerous substances, etc.), shall compensate for loss caused by the source of dangerous activity, unless he or she proves that it was incurred owing to force majeure, or through the victim’s own intentional act or gross negligence (paragraph two). Under section 2349 of the Civil Law, the domestic courts shall award compensation for bodily injuries causing mutilation and disfigurement. 43. Section 1782 provides that a person who fails to exercise due care in choosing agents or other employees, and who fails to satisfy himself or herself as to their abilities and suitability to perform duties as may be imposed on them, shall be liable for losses the agents or employees cause a third party. 44. Section 197 criminalises negligence by an organisation’s employee in the performance of his or her professional duties where substantial harm is caused to the organisation or to the lawful rights and interests of another person. 45. Section 257(2) criminalises, inter alia, violation by a transport employee of air traffic safety or operation regulations if there are serious consequences (smagas sekas). 46. Section 5 provided that the Ministry of Transport and the Civil Aviation Agency implemented the State policy and administration in the area of the use of the Republic of Latvia’s airspace and civil aviation operations. 47. Section 6 defined the powers of the Civil Aviation Agency. These powers comprised, inter alia: carrying out State supervision of the use of the Republic of Latvia’s airspace and civil aviation operations; prohibiting activities related to the use of airspace or the operation of aircrafts in breach of legislative acts; coming up with measures to guarantee aircraft flight safety; and drawing up legislative acts regulating the safety of civil aviation operations. Together with other authorities, the Civil Aviation Agency was also tasked with supervising the training, retraining and raising of the level of qualifications of civil aviation personnel (section 31). 48. Section 33 provided that aviation specialists should carry out their functions pursuant to the domestic and European Union law and the international agreements which were binding upon the Republic of Latvia. 49. The relevant parts of section 34 read as follows: “An aviation specialist is prohibited from performing his or her functions if he or she: 1) is unable to present a licence with an appropriate qualification stamp allowing the performance of such functions, or if the specialist’s [possession of] the appropriate qualification has not been verified within the time-limit prescribed; ...” 50. Section 36 provided that the work of a civil aircraft flight crew should be managed by a pilot-in-command. If a civil aircraft flight crew included only one pilot, he or she was also the pilot-in-command. 51. Section 37 set out the duties of the pilot of an aircraft, such as: managing the work of a flight crew so that aircraft flight safety was ensured and the provisions of this Law and other laws of the Republic of Latvia were respected, as well as the requirements of by-laws, instructions and other laws and regulations; implementing measures to prevent danger threatening the aircraft which he or she controlled; rescuing passengers, injured crew members, the aircraft, and its documentation and property on board; and providing medical assistance to those who were injured if the aircraft had an aviation accident. 52. Section 38 set out the rights of the pilot of an aircraft, such as: taking the final decision on an aircraft taking off, continuing with a flight or landing at an intended flight destination or an alternate aerodrome; or temporarily suspending the departure of an aircraft. 53. Section 96 provided as follows: “An aircraft owner or operator, if the aircraft has been operated by another person, shall be liable for any harm caused by the death or damage to health of a member of the flight crew which occurs during the performance of his or her official duties. The performance of duties shall commence with a flight crew member’s preparation for a flight and shall conclude after the flight at the moment when he or she has fulfilled all of the functions set out in the rules regarding the operation of the aircraft and other regulations.” 54. Section 97 provided as follows: “An aircraft owner or operator, if the aircraft is operated by another person, shall be liable for any harm caused to a third party in the territory of the Republic of Latvia by an aircraft in flight or an object that has become separated from that aircraft [where this harm] manifests [itself] in either the death of the third party or damage caused to his or her health, or harm caused to his or her property, if the aircraft owner or operator, in accordance with the procedures laid down in legal acts of the Republic of Latvia, does not prove that the harm occurred according to the fault of the victim himself or herself. The Cabinet [of Ministers] shall determine the procedures by which compensation for harm to a third party or [that third party’s] property shall be provided, if [such harm] is caused by a military or civil aircraft (or an object that has become separated from that aircraft) of the Republic of Latvia which the National Armed Forces of Latvia use for military purposes. For the purposes of this section, an aircraft shall be deemed to be an aircraft in flight from the moment the engines of the aircraft are started before take-off until the moment when the aircraft has finished taxiing after its landing.” 55. On 21 March 2013 the Law on Aviation was supplemented by section 91. This was to have effect from 24 April 2013 onwards and was worded in the following manner: “An aircraft owner and operator is prohibited from handing over an aircraft which is to be flown to a person who does not have a civil aircraft flight crew member licence with an appropriate qualification stamp and who is not insured in accordance with section 111 of this law.” 56. In a judgment of 24 November 2010 in case no. SKC-233/2010, the Civil Cases Chamber of the Senate of the Supreme Court held that there was no specific legal regulation for compensation with regard to actions taken by a domestic court, save for regulation concerning unjustified conviction and administrative arrest. However, such an absence could not be an obstacle to lodging a respective claim, because the third sentence of Article 92 of the Constitution, which provided for the right to receive compensation, was directly applicable. The Administrative Cases Chamber of the Senate of the Supreme Court, in a decision of 24 July 2012 in case SKA-726/2012, held that, in order for a person to seek compensation for an infringement of his or her rights caused by a legal provision adopted by Parliament, he or she could file a civil claim with a court of general jurisdiction, directly referring to the third sentence of Article 92 of the Constitution. Such a claim would be brought against the Republic of Latvia, which would be represented by its Parliament (pret Latvijas Republiku Saeimas personā). 57. The claimant in civil case no. 04255508, relying on Article 92 of the Constitution and Article 1635 of the Civil Law, alleged liability on the part of the State and requested an award of compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of a failure to ensure the safety of soldiers’ skydiving classes and their compliance with legal provisions, which had resulted in the death of the claimant’s son. These skydiving classes had been organised by the National Armed Forces, and the domestic courts established negligence on the part of State officials (they had failed to comply with various provisions of domestic law and internal instructions), as well as a causal connection between that negligence and the death of the soldier. In its judgment of 6 March 2013, the Senate of the Supreme Court, sitting in an extended composition, referring to, inter alia, the State’s positive obligations enshrined in Article 2 of the Convention, ruled that an acquittal in criminal proceedings did not exclude the State’s liability for an accident. Consequently, the victim’s relatives had a right to seek compensation for non-pecuniary damage. In its judgment of 31 October 2014 in civil case no. C33137808, the Senate of the Supreme Court, sitting in an extended composition, noted that the State police’s conclusion reached in the course of criminal proceedings as to the absence of pecuniary damage was not binding on a court adjudicating a civil claim, and did not absolve parties to civil proceedings from the obligation to prove the non-existence of pecuniary damage in the course of those proceedings. In another decision of 3 February 2015 in case no. C322451I I, the Civil Cases Division of the Supreme Court upheld a lower court’s ruling awarding compensation for non-pecuniary damage to a victim’s relatives, notwithstanding the fact that criminal proceedings were ongoing in respect of the same events. 58. The Chicago Convention provides that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory (Article 1). No scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State without that State’s special permission (Article 6). Latvia acceded to the Convention on 13 July 1992, and it entered into force in respect of Latvia on 12 August 1992. The Sixth Edition of Annex 6 (“Operation of Aircraft”) to the Chicago Convention contains International Standards and Recommended Practices that were applicable on 1 July 2008. It contains three parts: international commercial air transport – aeroplanes (Part I), international general aviation – aeroplanes (Part II) and international operations – helicopters (Part III). 59. Part II reads as follows: FOREWORD Historical background “... Level of safety. The Annex should ensure an acceptable level of safety to passengers and third parties (third parties meaning persons on the ground and persons in the air and in other aircraft). Also, as some international general aviation operations (typically under 5,700 kg) would be performed by crews less experienced and less skilled, with less reliable equipment, to less rigorous standards and with greater freedom of action than in commercial air transport operations, it was therefore, accepted that the passenger in international general aviation aircraft would not necessarily enjoy the same level of safety as the fare-paying passenger in commercial air transport. However, it was recognised that in ensuring an acceptable degree of safety for third parties, an acceptable level of safety for flight crews and passengers would be achieved. Freedom of action. The maximum freedom of action consistent with maintaining an acceptable level of safety should be granted to international general aviation. Responsibility. The responsibility that devolves under the operator in Annex 6, Part I, should, in Part II of the Annex, fall under the owner and pilot-in-command. ...” Applicability “The Standards and Recommended Practices of Annex 6, Part II, are applicable to international general aviation operations with aeroplanes. The Standards and Recommended Practices represent minimum provisions and, together with those of Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft, Part I – International Commercial Air Transport – Aeroplanes, now cover the operation of all aeroplanes in international civil aviation, except in aerial work operations. It will be noted that the Standards and Recommended Practices contained in Annex 6, Part II, when applied to the operation of large aeroplanes, are less stringent than those in Annex 6, Part I, applicable to the same or similar aeroplanes when used in commercial air transport operations. Nevertheless, it is considered that, in conjunction with existing provisions in Annexes 1 and 8, Annex 6, Part II, ensures an adequate level of safety for the operations envisaged for the large aeroplanes in question. In this connection attention is drawn to the point that the entire performance Standards of Annex 8 are applicable to all aeroplanes of over 5,700 kg mass intended for the carriage of passengers or cargo or mail international air navigation, of which the prototype was submitted for certification on or after 13 December 1964. Moreover, by virtue of Annex 1 the pilot of an aircraft certificated for operation with a minimum crew of at least two pilots must hold a type rating for that aircraft type.” SECTION 2 – GENERAL AVIATION OPERATIONS CHAPTER 2.1 GENERAL 2.1.1 Compliance with laws, regulations and procedures “2.1.1.1 The pilot-in-command shall comply with the laws, regulations and procedures of those States in which operations are conducted. ... 2.1.1.2 The pilot-in-command shall be familiar with the laws, regulations and procedures, pertinent to the performance of his or her duties, prescribed for the areas to be traversed, the aerodromes to be used and the air navigation facilities relating thereto. The pilot-in-command shall ensure that other members of the flight crew are familiar with such of these laws, regulations and procedures as are pertinent to the performance of their respective duties in the operation of the aeroplane. 2.1.1.3 The pilot-in-command shall have responsibility of the operational control. ...” CHAPTER 2.2 FLIGHT OPERATIONS 2.2.1 Operating facilities “The pilot-in-command shall ensure that a flight will not be commended unless it has been ascertained by every reasonable means available that the ground and/or water facilities including communication facilities and navigation aids available and directly required on such flights, for the safe operation of the aeroplane, are adequate for the type of operation under which the flight is to be conducted ...” 2.2.2.1 Operating instructions – general “An aeroplane shall not be taxied on the movement area of an aerodrome unless the person at the controls is an appropriately qualified pilot or: a) has been authorised by the owner ...; b) is fully competent to taxi the aeroplane; c) is qualified to use the radio if radio communications are required; and d) has received instruction from a competent person in respect of aerodrome layout, and where appropriate, information on routes, signs, marking, lights, ATC signals and instructions, phraseology and procedures, and is able to conform to the operational standards required for safe aeroplane movement at the aerodrome.” 2.2.5 Duties of pilot-in-command “2.2.5.1 The pilot-in-command shall be responsible for the operation, safety and security of the aeroplane and the safety of all crew members, passengers and cargo on board. ...” CHAPTER 2.6 AEROPLANE MAINTENANCE 2.6.1 Owner’s maintenance responsibilities “2.6.1.1 The owner of an aeroplane, or in case where it is leased, the lessee, shall ensure that, in accordance with procedures acceptable to the State of Registry [the State on whose register the aircraft is entered]: a) the aeroplane is maintained in an airworthy condition; b) the operational and emergency equipment necessary for an intended flight is serviceable; and c) the certificate of airworthiness of the aeroplane remains valid. 2.6.1.2 The owner or the lessee shall not operate the aeroplane unless it is maintained and released to service under a system acceptable to the State of Registry. ...” CHAPTER 2.7 AEROPLANE FLIGHT CREW 2.7.2 Qualifications “2.7.2.1 The pilot-in-command shall: a) ensure that each flight crew member holds a valid licence issued by the State of Registry...; b) ensure that flight crew members are properly rated; and c) be satisfied that flight crew members have maintained competency. ...” CHAPTER 2.9 SECURITY 2.9.1 Security of aircraft “The pilot-in-command shall be responsible for the security of the aircraft during its operation.” 60. Section 3 of Part II, providing for the responsibility of an operator of a flight, is not relevant to the present case, because it applies to international general aviation operations with aeroplanes with a maximum certificated take-off mass exceeding 5,700 kg, or aeroplanes equipped with one or more turbojet engines.

5. The applicants, two brothers, were born in 1970 and 1975 and are currently serving prison sentences in Sol-Iletsk, Orenburg Region. 6. On 5 December 2001 the Volgograd Regional Court found the applicants guilty of several murders. 7. On 23 July 2002 the Supreme Court of Russia quashed that judgment on appeal and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 8. In September 2002 the criminal case was resubmitted to the Volgograd Regional Court for trial by a professional judge assisted by two lay judges. 9. On 13 September 2002 the Regional Court extended the applicants’ pre-trial detention, indicating that the measure of restraint should remain unchanged. 10. According to the second applicant, on 23 September 2002 he lodged two appeals against the extension order of 13 September 2002. The first one, recorded under reference number 35/13/2-218-z, was sent to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the second one, recorded under reference number 35/13/2-217-z, was sent to the Volgograd Regional Court. 11. On 5 December 2002 the composition of the court was changed and the case was referred to a trial judge and two new lay judges, Mr D. and Ms Mot. 12. On 17 January 2003 the Regional Court found the applicants guilty of several counts of murder and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 13. On an unspecified date the second applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment of 17 January 2003. 14. On 8 July 2003 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the applicants’ conviction on appeal. According to the second applicant, on that date he also learnt that his appeal of 23 September 2002 had not been included in the case file and that it would not be considered. 15. On 21 December 2005 the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 8 July 2003 by way of a supervisory review and remitted the case to the appellate court for fresh consideration. 16. By a letter of April 2007 the Deputy President of the Volgograd Regional Court informed Judge V. of the Supreme Court that Mr D. had acted as a lay judge in five criminal trials on 6, 13 and 21 February, 18 March and 11 September 2002, and that Ms Mot. had been a lay judge in three criminal trials on 8 October, 21 November and 30 December 2002. 17. On 22 May 2007 the Supreme Court upheld, in substance, the applicants’ conviction on appeal. The appellate court held, inter alia, that the participation of the lay judges in more than one criminal trial per year could not undermine the “legitimacy” of the tribunal in the applicants’ case. 18. On 28 August 2007 the second applicant requested that the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the decision of 13 September 2002 be restored due to the disappearance of the hard copy of his original complaint. 19. On 21 September 2007 the trial court refused the second applicant’s request, noting that it was no longer possible to establish whether he had lodged the appeal in question in due time or at all. 20. On 7 May 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the refusal, adding that the second applicant’s complaint of unlawful detention after 13 September 2002 was ill-founded. С. Alleged censorship of the second applicant’s letters by the administration of the correctional colony and interference with his right of individual petition 21. According to the second applicant, on 26 March 2009 he sent an application to the Court via the administration of the correctional colony. The application was not received by the Court. 22. On 11 December 2009 the Registry of the Court received the initial letter sent by the second applicant through the administration of the correctional colony on 19 November 2009. 23. On 14 August 2010 the second applicant received a parcel from his representative. It had been opened by the administration of the correctional colony for the purpose of censoring. The parcel contained documents from the Court, sheets of blank paper and two crossword puzzles. The second applicant received the documents and blank paper. The crossword puzzles were transferred for censorship. One day later the second applicant received the crossword puzzles. 24. Between July and September 2011 the Court received letters from, and sent letters to, the second applicant’s representative. 25. On 8 December 2011 the second applicant’s complaints were forwarded to the Government for further observations. By that time, the second applicant had sent sixteen letters to the Registry of the Court through his relatives, his representative and the administration of the correctional colony. 26. Between 31 July 2007, the date on which the application with the Court was lodged, and 8 December 2011, the date on which the complaints were forwarded to the Government, the Registry of the Court sent nineteen letters to the second applicant either acknowledging receipt of letters or requesting documents. 27. On 15 May 2006 and 27 December 2007, while undergoing a personal inspection, the applicant had altercations with the guards. 28. On 15 May 2006 the deputy head of the administration decided to terminate an inquiry into a complaint of ill-treatment lodged by the second applicant. The decision stated as follows: “At 6.40 a.m. on 15 May 2006 [the second applicant], while being inspected by the guards of the correctional colony, resisted, pushed back one of the guards, Mr Mar., and tried to kick him. [The second applicant] was urged to stop his resistance; however he continued. Therefore [a rubber truncheon] was used. Eyewitnesses, prison guards Mr Mar. and Mr S., confirmed the above-mentioned facts. According to forensic medical examinations conducted on the same day, the [second applicant] had bruises measuring 8 by 2.7 cm and 10 by 2.7 cm on his hips. The experts concluded that the applicant did not need any medical treatment. In view of the circumstances of the case and [applicable laws], the measures [of restraint] taken against [the applicant] were lawful”. 29. On 27 December 2007 a forensic medical examination concluded that the first applicant had sustained bruises measuring between 3 by 10 cm and 3 by 15 cm on his hips. 30. On 28 December 2007 the deputy head of the administration decided to terminate yet another inquiry into the second applicant’s alleged ill‑treatment of 27 December 2007. He dismissed the applicant’s allegations, reiterating verbatim the text of the decision of 15 May 2006. 31. On 27 January 2008 the regional assistant prosecutor, repeating virtually the same facts and findings as those in the decision of 28 December 2007, acknowledged the lawfulness of the measures taken by the guards of the correctional facility on 27 December 2007. 32. On 16 November 2010 the second applicant sought to institute criminal proceedings in respect of his alleged ill-treatment on 15 May 2006 and 27 December 2007. 33. On 17 November 2010, after a pre-investigation inquiry, an investigator of the regional investigative committee, I., refused to institute criminal proceedings due to the absence of corpus delicti. In his decision the investigator relied on the statements made by the second applicant and several guards of the correctional colony. He referred to the facts established by the decisions of 15 May 2006 and 28 December 2007 (see paragraphs 28 and 30 above). The investigator’s decision further reads as follows: “The authorities conducting the preliminary inquiry are sceptical about [the second applicant’s] allegations, since he tries to conceal his discontent with the regime of the correctional colony and complains about the measures taken by the administration of the colony as being unlawful. According to the statements of Mr. Kan., an employee of correctional colony IK-6, [the second applicant] is a liar and has a tendency to commit crime. Special measures have been taken against him due to his failure to comply with the regime of the correctional colony. All measures taken were lawful. ... Other employees of the correctional colony stated that no unjustified or unlawful measures had been taken in respect of [the second applicant].” 34. On 17 December 2010 the head of the investigative committee quashed that decision and remitted all the material for fresh consideration. 35. On 27 December 2010 the investigator again dismissed the second applicant’s complaint due to the absence of corpus delicti. 36. On 14 June 2011 the regional prosecutor quashed the decision of 27 December 2010 and remitted the material for fresh consideration. The parties did not inform the Court about the outcome of the proceedings. 37. According to the second applicant, on 10 August 2009 and in September 2009 he was blindfolded, suspended by his arms and subjected to electric shocks by the guards of the correctional colony. He was unable to identify them. It appears that the second applicant did not bring any proceedings in respect of those events. 38. According to the second applicant, on 12 May 2010 he was called to the office of the head of the correctional colony and after being threatened to withdraw his application to the Court, he was beaten up by several guards.

6. A list of applicants is set out in the Appendix. 7. The applicants are joint owners of the property at number 204, High Street, Mosta, Malta (hereinafter referred to as “Property A”) having a ground floor footprint of 505 sq.m. and a first floor of a little more than 100 sq.m., with roof terraces, located in the primary town centre. Property A is located adjacent to another property that is also jointly owned by the applicants, namely Villa Grech‑Mifsud, High Street, Mosta (hereinafter referred to as “Property B”). The applicants became owners either through inheritance or donation from their parents on various dates between 1991 and 2011. 8. In 1923, the applicants’ ascendants entered into a rent agreement with Nicolò Isouard Band Club Association (hereinafter referred to as the “Band Club”), whereby they willingly rented Property A to the Band Club for twenty pounds sterling annually (approximately 23.84 euros (EUR)). In 1947 the rent was increased to twenty‑four pounds sterling annually (around EUR 28.62). 9. In 1970, L.G., one of the applicants’ ascendants, filed an application before the Rent Regulation Board (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”), on behalf of all the joint owners at the time, whereby he requested that the annual rent be raised. On 15 December 1970 the Board upheld the request and increased the rent to sixty pounds sterling annually (approximately EUR 71.60), to be paid six months in advance. 10. On 14 August 1978 the applicants’ ascendants entered into a new lease agreement with the Band Club, whereby they willingly rented Property A and part of the garden of Property B (hereinafter, jointly referred to as “the rented property”) to the Band Club for 120 Maltese liras annually ((MTL) – approximately EUR 279.52), to be paid six months in advance. 11. L.G., who died during the constitutional redress proceedings (see hereunder), gave evidence before the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, to the effect that the annual rent due to the applicants was that of MTL 136 (approximately EUR 316), and that the Band Club was actually paying MTL 130 annually (approximately EUR 302). These amounts did not correspond to those agreed upon within the rent agreement of 14 August 1978. In the mentioned proceedings the court concluded that, on an unspecified date, the applicants and the Band Club had entered into a verbal agreement, whereby the annual rent due was increased because the Band Club had requested the use of a further part of the garden of Property B. 12. On 28 October 1980 and again on 10 January 1983 L.G. complained with the Band Club about its use of the rented property as a discotheque and as a restaurant. 13. In 2004 and 2005 the Band Club had requested that it be able to rent a further part of the garden of Property B and for it to purchase the part of the property that was being utilized as the seat of the club. The applicants refused. 14. On 8 August 2009 the applicants appointed an architect who estimated that the rented property ought to at least attract a rental income of EUR 36,700 yearly. 15. On 12 February 2010 the applicants or their ascendants (as owners, hereinafter referred to as “the owners”) filed an application before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence. They claimed, inter alia, that their right to peaceful enjoyment of their property, as protected under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, had been violated. They referred to Article 4 in conjunction with Article 3 of the Reletting of Urban Property (Regulation) Ordinance (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Ordinance’), which precluded them from increasing the rent to reflect the market value of the rented property. 16. On 15 July 2015 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, inter alia, found that the owners had suffered a violation of their rights as protected under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and awarded them the sum of EUR 50,000 in compensation. 17. The court noted the Attorney General’s arguments against the owners whereby he contended that: the owners’ ascendants had not been forced to enter into the rental agreement with the Band Club ‑ they had willingly entered into the agreement which at the time they deemed just; when the owners’ ascendants had entered into the agreement the special legal dispositions regulating the renting of a property as a club (introduced through the enactment of the Reletting of Urban Property (regulation) Ordinance) were already in place and therefore the owners’ ascendants had entered into the agreement with full knowledge of the consequences it would lead to; therefore they had brought the situation upon themselves and could not allege a violation of their rights, nor should the owners be resorting to the courts to alter their situation. 18. The court noted that, in 1923, when the owners had entered into the first rental agreement with the Band Club, the laws enacting the special dispositions concerning renting a property as a club had not yet come into force. The special dispositions came into play between the first rental agreement (1923) and the second rental agreement (1978). The court considered that the rental agreement of 14 August 1978 was an extension of the first rental agreement - the first agreement having been entered into before the special dispositions had come into force. Therefore, the court rejected the Attorney General’s arguments. 19. The court accepted that clubs play a social role in Maltese society, even to date. With this social interest the State was permitted a level of interference. The legality of such interference had not been contested. However, when comparing the circumstances in which the rent agreement had originally been entered into, to the present day circumstances, the element of proportionality had not been respected and thus the applicant’s rights had been breached. 20. As to the owners’ request for the court to establish a raise in the rent payable to them, the court considered that it was not its role to take on functions that the Constitution granted to another organ of the state, just as much as it could not “erase” (tħassar) laws unless it found that they had “no effect” (ma jiswewx). Thus, it was not competent to give the remedy requested by the applicants. This decision was reinforced by the introduction of the new laws in 2014 which updated the rents payable. 21. The court considered that the estimate provided by the ex parte architect did not suffice due to the criteria used and the approximate manner in which the calculations had been done. However, some form of compensation was due. Taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, the evidence presented before it and the applicable laws, the court awarded compensation in the sum of EUR 50,000. 22. On 26 June 2015 the Constitutional Court, upheld the Attorney General’s appeal and concluded that the owners had not suffered a violation of their rights as protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and therefore no compensation was due. The costs of proceedings at both instances were to be paid by the owners. 23. The Constitutional Court observed that the complaint concerned two rental agreements that were entered into in 1923 and 1978 respectively, between which special legal dispositions concerning properties rented as clubs were introduced. Unlike the first-instance court, the Constitutional Court concluded that the agreement of 14 August 1978 amounted to novation (see relevant domestic law). It was a new rent agreement concerning a larger property and a higher annual rent payable. The intentions of the parties in the original agreement were set aside, and were now regulated by means of a new agreement. The court considered that on 14 August 1978 Articles 3 and 4 of the Ordinance were already in force. Thus, the parties had willingly entered into the agreement with full knowledge of the consequences it would lead to. Therefore the owners could not allege a violation of their rights. The principle volenti non fit injuria applied. The court concluded that the case of the owners did not concern the renunciation of a human right, but rather the exercise on the part of the owners to dispose of their property as they desired. From the evidence presented before it, the Constitutional Court concluded that the agreement of 14 August 1978 established clearly that the owners wanted to enter into a rental agreement for a larger property, with a higher rent to be paid by the Band Club, and had done so. Therefore the owners had not suffered a violation of their property rights. 24. The relevant domestic law concerning leases of band clubs is set out in Bradshaw and Others v. Malta (no. 37121/15, §§ 21-24, 23 October 2018). 25. In so far as relevant Article 1179 of the Civil Code, Chapter 16 of the Laws of Malta, reads as follows: “Novation takes place - (a) when the debtor contracts towards his creditor a new debt, and this is substituted for the old one which is extinguished;”

9. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Bijela (Montenegro). 10. On 29 September 1992, the applicant’s father-in-law, Vu.Z., represented by his wife K.Z., concluded a contract with F.O. and H.A. for the exchange of his house in Dubrovnik for a house in Trebinje (Bosnia and Herzegovina). 11. Vu.Z. died on an unknown date between 2001 and 2002. 12. On 14 August 2002 the applicant’s husband M.Z., who was a son of Vu.Z., represented by a certain M.Č. from Herceg Novi (Montenegro), brought a civil action in the Dubrovnik Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Dubrovniku) against F.O.’s heirs and H.A., seeking to have the contract for the exchange of the houses declared null and void and to obtain the possession of the house in Dubrovnik. M.Č. was a practising lawyer in Montenegro. 13. M.Z. claimed that the contract had contained incorrect information with regard to the legal status of the house in Trebinje and that K.Z. had not had the necessary authorisation to sign such a contract. He further alleged that the contract had been signed under duress because of circumstances arising from the war in Croatia. He also submitted that the difference in the values of the properties exchanged had been disproportionate in that the house in Dubrovnik was worth about 250,000-300,000 euros (EUR) and the house in Trebinje some EUR 80,000-90,000. Lastly, he stressed that it had been impossible for him to regularise his ownership of the house in Trebinje due to the irregularities in the contract. 14. In his action, M.Z. indicated the value of the subject matter of the dispute (vrijednost predmeta spora) at 10,000 Croatian kunas (HRK) (approximately EUR 1,300 at the time). 15. On 16 August 2002 the Dubrovnik Municipal Court (hereafter: “the Municipal Court”) invited M.Z. to clarify the circumstances relating to his legal representation, in particular by providing a valid power of attorney, and to provide some further documents concerning his claim. 16. A first hearing in the case was held on 3 March 2003. At that hearing, the Dubrovnik Municipal Court instructed M.Z. to provide documents attesting to his standing as heir of Vu.Z. 17. Further to this hearing, the parties exchanged pleadings and documentary evidence requested by the Municipal Court. 18. At a hearing on 13 December 2004 the respondents insisted that the issue of M.Z.’s representation by M.Č. needed to be clarified. The latter stated that he would no longer represent M.Z., who would instruct a lawyer in Croatia to represent him. 19. A further hearing was held on 1 February 2005. M.Z. was represented by I.B., a lawyer practising in Dubrovnik (who is also representing the applicant in the current proceedings before the Court). At the hearing, the lawyer I.B. corrected some clerical omissions in the civil action and reiterated the arguments for declaring the contract null and void as set forth in the civil action, namely that the contract had been signed under duress, that the legal status and ownership of the house in Trebinje had not been properly stated and that there had been a disproportionate difference in the value of the properties. In reply to a question by the trial judge concerning the validity of the power of attorney issued by Vu.Z. to his wife K.Z. (see paragraphs 10 and 13 above), I.B. stressed that he did not consider that power of attorney to be invalid as an original had been deposited in the relevant register. The respondents challenged the arguments advanced on behalf of M.Z. on the basis that there were no grounds for declaring the contract null and void. 20. At a hearing on 6 April 2005 the lawyer I.B. explained that following the termination of the hearing he would no longer represent M.Z., who would in future be represented by the applicant (his wife). At the same hearing, I.B. submitted two documents. In the first he requested that the validity of the power of attorney issued by Vu.Z. to his wife K.Z. (see paragraphs 10, 13 and 19 above) be examined on the grounds that there were doubts as to its authenticity. In the same document he asked that a preliminary measure (injunction) be issued preventing any disposal of the property in dispute. In the second document he explained that the value of the subject matter of the dispute had been set too low, and indicated the new value of the subject matter of the dispute at HRK 105,000 (approximately EUR 14,160 at the time). 21. At the same hearing, the respondents contested the suggestion that there was any issue with the validity of the power of attorney, pointing out that at a hearing held on 1 February 2005 I.B. had not challenged that validity. The respondents also opposed the request for an injunction. Finally, they objected to the change of the value of the subject matter of the dispute, arguing that it had been increased only in order to enable the claimant to lodge an appeal on points of law. 22. After hearing the parties’ pleas, the Municipal Court questioned the respondents as witnesses. Following their questioning, at M.Z.’s request the Dubrovnik Municipal Court adjourned the hearing in order to obtain the original of the impugned power of attorney and reserved its decision on the request for an injunction. No decision was adopted with regard to the change of the value of the subject matter of the dispute. 23. On 25 April 2005 the Municipal Court ordered M.Z. to pay court fees of HRK 1,400 (approximately EUR 190 at the time) for bringing the civil action. It assessed the fees by reference to a value of the dispute set at HRK 105,000. 24. At a hearing on 13 September 2005 the Municipal Court examined the materials available in the file, following which it concluded the hearing. 25. By a judgment of 27 September 2005 the Municipal Court dismissed M.Z.’s claim and the request for an injunction. It found that despite repeated attempts to summon M.Z. to the hearing, he had failed to appear without providing any valid reasons. Also, in the light of the parties’ arguments, including on the issues regarding the power of attorney on the basis of which the contract had been concluded, it found no grounds to doubt the validity of the contract. The Municipal Court ordered that M.Z. was to bear all the litigation costs, including the expenses of the opposing parties, in the amount of HRK 25,931.10 (approximately EUR 3,480 at the time). It assessed the costs of the proceedings by reference to the value of the subject matter of the dispute indicated at the hearing on 6 April 2005, namely HRK 105,000. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows: “... [T]he costs of the proceedings were awarded to the respondents [and assessed] according to ... the value of the dispute indicated by the claimant (HRK 105,000 ‑ (page 58 [of the case-file]) which this court accepted.” 26. On 12 December 2005 the first-instance court ordered M.Z. to pay court fees of HRK 1,400 for the judgment. It also assessed these fees by reference to a value of HRK 105,000 for the dispute. 27. By judgment of 1 October 2009 the Dubrovnik County Court (Županijski sud u Dubrovniku; hereafter: “the County Court”) dismissed an appeal by M.Z. and upheld the first-instance judgment. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows: “In view of the fact that the [first-instance judgment] is challenged in its entirety, thus including also the decision on the costs of the proceedings, and although the appeal is not specified in that respect, [it is to be noted that] the decision on the costs of the proceedings is based on the relevant law and adequate reasons are provided.” 28. On 24 May 2010 M.Z. lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court challenging the findings of the lower courts. 29. On 7 October 2010 M.Z. died. The proceedings were taken over by his wife Vesna Zubac, the applicant, as his heir. 30. By a decision of 30 March 2011 the Supreme Court declared the appeal on points of law inadmissible ratione valoris, finding that the value of the subject matter of the dispute was below the statutory threshold of HRK 100,000 (approximately EUR 13,500 at the time). It held that the applicable value of the subject matter of the dispute was that set out in the claimant’s statement of claim in the civil action. The relevant part of that decision reads as follows: “With regard to section 40 (3) of the Civil Procedure Act if, in a situation referred to in subsection 2, it is obvious that the value of the subject matter of the dispute indicated by the claimant is too high or too low, so that an issue arises concerning jurisdiction over the subject matter, the composition of the court, the type of proceedings, the right to lodge an appeal on points of law, the authorisation for representation or the costs of proceedings, the court shall, ex officio or upon the objection of the respondent, by the latest at the preparatory hearing or, if no preparatory hearing has been held, at the first session of the main hearing before the respondent has begun litigation on the merits of the case, quickly and in an appropriate manner verify the accuracy of the value specified and, by a decision against which no separate appeal is allowed, determine the value of the subject matter of the dispute. It follows that when an action does not concern a sum of money the claimant is obliged to indicate the relevant value of the subject matter of the dispute in the civil action, after which the claimant is not allowed to change the [indicated] value of the dispute. Only a court may set the value of the subject matter of the dispute, ex officio or if an objection is raised by the respondent, if it establishes that the value indicated in the civil action is too high or too low, by the latest at the preparatory hearing or, if no preparatory hearing has been held, at the main hearing before the examination of the merits. In the present case the value of the subject matter of the dispute indicated in the statement of claim is 10,000 Croatian kunas. Later on, at the hearing of 6 April 2005, the claimant’s representative indicated the value of the subject matter of the dispute at 105,000 Croatian kunas considering that it had been indicated too low in the civil action. However, the claimant did not amend the claim at the same time. The first-instance court did not adopt a decision on a new value for the dispute because the procedural requirements under section 40 (3) of the CPA [Civil Procedure Act] were not met. It follows that the relevant value of the subject matter of the dispute is the one indicated by the claimant in the civil action, namely 10,000 Croatian kunas, because the claimant was not allowed to change the indicated value if he did not amend his claim at the same time.” 31. By a decision of 10 November 2011 the Constitutional Court summarily declared a constitutional complaint by the applicant, complaining, inter alia, of a lack of access to the Supreme Court, inadmissible on the grounds that the case raised no constitutional issues. On 30 November 2011 it served its decision on the applicant’s representative.

4. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Batumi. 5. On 2 September 2008 at 10.05 a.m. the applicant was arrested (together with his friend Z.B.) in Batumi on suspicion of possession of illegal drugs, by members of the Special Operations Unit (სოდის სამმართველო) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (“the MIA”). According to the report of his detention and personal search, he physically resisted the arrest. As a result he sustained injuries to his face and both legs when being forced out of his car and on to the ground. The applicant signed this report without making any written comments. 6. At 5:35 p.m. on the same day the applicant underwent an external visual examination at the Batumi no. 1 temporary detention centre. A report drawn up thereafter recorded multiple injuries on the applicant’s body, including bruises and abrasions on his face and head, both legs, and the waist area, and black and swollen eyes. A note was made to the effect that the applicant could not remember in what circumstances he had sustained those injuries and that he had no complaints about the arresting officers. 7. Soon afterwards an ambulance was called for the applicant. He was pre-diagnosed as suffering from possible concussion and was recommended for a transfer to a medical establishment. An hour later an ambulance was called again. After the applicant had been examined, he was diagnosed with a closed head injury and concussion; bruises were noted on his chest and waist area and it was recommended that he undergo inpatient treatment in a hospital neurosurgery department. 8. At 10.10 p.m. the applicant was taken to Batumi hospital. After a brain tomography examination and other medical check-ups the diagnosis of a head injury was not confirmed. He was diagnosed instead with a fracture of the maxillary sinus on the right side, multiple bruises, and excoriations on his face and body. He was then taken back to the temporary detention centre. 9. On the same night the applicant’s lawyer called the hotline of the office of the Prosecutor General of Georgia, complaining that the applicant had been ill-treated. On 4 September 2008 criminal proceedings were initiated under Article 118 § 2 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (causing less serious bodily injury). On the same date the investigator dealing with the case ordered a forensic examination of the applicant. Having visually examined the applicant, the medical expert concluded on 10 September 2008 that the applicant had multiple scratches and bruises all over his body and face, as well as black eyes and a fracture of the right maxillary sinus. He noted that the injuries could have been sustained on 2 September 2008 by the impact of a hard blunt object, and cumulatively belonged to the category of less serious bodily injuries causing long-lasting damage to health. 10. On 4 September 2008 the applicant was questioned in connection with the circumstances of his arrest. He maintained his allegations of ill treatment, claiming that he had been beaten during the arrest as well as after he was transferred to the Special Operations Unit at the MIA. He further dismissed the accusation that he had resisted arrest as untrue. On 6 September 2008 the investigator questioned two employees of the Batumi no. 1 temporary detention centre. They both confirmed that the applicant had had multiple injuries when he had arrived at the detention centre, and that in reply to their question he had claimed that he had sustained those injuries during the arrest. He had not provided any additional details, and had not made any complaints against the arresting police officers. 11. On 17 November 2008 the investigator decided to continue the investigation under Article 333 § 1 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (abuse of power). In the meantime, on 15 November 2008, the applicant’s lawyer lodged a complaint with the General Prosecutor’s Office denouncing the investigation as ineffective. He complained about the fact that no identification parade had been carried out: this would have allowed the applicant to identify the police officers who had ill-treated him during the arrest. Nor was this done in respect of the time after he was transferred to the Special Operations Unit, where he had stayed for about seven hours. He also noted that he had requested footage from the video surveillance cameras in the street where the arrest operation had taken place, but that his request had received no response. By a letter of 15 January 2009 the prosecutor dealing with the case informed the applicant’s lawyer that the investigation was still pending, and that in view of the conflicting evidence it was impossible to establish whether the force used against the applicant during the arrest had been proportionate or not. The applicant’s lawyer was also informed that the surveillance cameras in question had not been working on the day of the applicant’s arrest, so no video recording could have been obtained. 12. According to the Government, at the time they submitted their observations the investigation of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment was still pending. 13. According to the bill of indictment, the applicant was charged with various drug offences under Article 260 § 3 (a) and Article 273 of the Criminal Code. On 18 March 2009 the Batumi City Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to fourteen years and three months’ imprisonment and a fine. His conviction was confirmed by the Kutaisi Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Georgia on 23 September and 18 November 2009 respectively.

7. The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Varna. 8. As is apparent from the documents in the file, the applicant moved from Turkmenistan to Bulgaria in late 2001 together with her parents. In the summer of 2002 she obtained temporary residency status. Before the move, the applicant’s father had been the deputy chair of the Central Bank of Turkmenistan and later a member of a political movement which was critical of the domestic political regime. It appears that, because of her father’s political activity, members of her family were subjected to persecution in Turkmenistan and that in 2006 the applicant’s aunt was tortured and murdered in prison. 9. The applicant started studying at a secondary school with an intensive foreign languages curriculum in the autumn of 2002. Her father opened his own construction business in Bulgaria. 10. On 22 October 2002 the Turkmen authorities charged both of the applicant’s parents with aggravated embezzlement of public funds amounting to 40,000,000 United States dollars, allegedly committed between 25 July 2002 and 3 September 2002. The Turkmen prosecutor ordered their detention in relation to those charges and filed a request for their extradition with the Bulgarian authorities. 11. The following circumstances are undisputed between the parties. 12. On 4 December 2002 the applicant, aged fourteen at the time, was alone at home. At around 11 a.m. about ten police officers arrived at the family apartment. On entering the apartment the officers informed the applicant that they had come to arrest her parents. She called her parents on the telephone. It appears from the documents before the domestic courts that at that time, the parents were out shopping accompanied by their legal representative, who returned home with them. This took some time because of heavy traffic. In the meantime the officers prohibited the applicant from moving around the apartment and interrogated her in the absence of a social worker and a psychologist, despite having seen her identity document, which indicated her age. 13. The applicant’s parents were arrested as soon as they arrived home. The record of a court hearing in the domestic proceedings for damages (see paragraphs 27-41 below) indicates that the parents’ legal representative was present during the arrest. The lawyer stated that the police officers had not allowed the parents to collect personal belongings from the flat but that, as far as he could recall, they had allowed the applicant to hand them some personal items from the flat. He did not know where the police officers had taken the applicant’s parents but said that he thought that they had been taken to the Regional Investigation Office. In any event, he had visited them the following day but could not remember exactly where. The legal representative also stated that during the next few days his task had been to circulate between the two different prisons where the applicant’s parents were detained in order to organise their defence. He stated that he could not describe the state of the applicant at the time of the arrest, his task having been to defend her parents. He did not know what had happened to the applicant and had not seen her after her parents’ arrest. 14. An order for the applicant’s parents’ detention for twenty-four hours was issued by the police on 4 December 2002 and they were placed in police custody for that period. Upon their application for judicial review of that detention order, the Varna Regional Court set it aside the following day, finding it flawed as it did not indicate any legal grounds for the detention. Immediately upon their release from police custody the applicant’s parents were served with a prosecutor’s order for their detention for seventy-two hours in connection with the extradition request (see paragraph 10 above). They were detained on the spot. 15. On 6 December 2002, at two separate hearings, the Varna Regional Court extended their detention for a period of thirty days. The applicant’s father was taken to Varna Prison and her mother to Sliven Prison. 16. During and after the court hearings on 6 December 2002 the applicant’s parents were represented by the same lawyer who had been present during their arrest and was a friend and neighbour of the family. 17. The parties dispute what took place at the hearing when the judge enquired about the care measures in place in relation to the applicant. According to the latter, when her mother was asked by the judge through an interpreter whether there was anyone who could take care of her child, her mother replied by shaking her head. In Bulgaria nodding one’s head signifies “no” and shaking it means “yes”. According to the applicant, the judge, having interpreted the mother’s response as “yes”, noted in the record of the hearing: “The child has someone to take care of her”. 18. The Government, in contrast, pointed to the record of the hearing, which indicated that the applicant’s mother had replied that there was someone who could take care of her child. In their view, this was evidence of the mother’s reply. In addition, they cited an excerpt of the court’s record where the applicant’s mother had addressed the court in the following terms: “I am very surprised as I have worked as an associate professor, with a doctorate in science, for ten years, and for some reason, they want to accuse me of something that happened out there, and I’ve been living here for a whole year. We came here so that my children could study in Varna, in a democratic country, because Turkmenistan is a dictatorship; a fascist regime has begun. There is someone to take care of my child.” According to the court record of the hearing, the mother’s statement had been preceded by an intervention by the prosecutor, who had indicated that it was necessary to comply with the requirements of Article 152 § 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so that if the family had no relatives or friends to care for the child, the municipality had to be informed with a view to placing her in a child-care centre, kindergarten or boarding facility (интернат). 19. On an appeal by the applicant’s parents, the Varna Court of Appeal lifted the detention orders in two separate decisions on 17 December 2002. The applicant’s parents were released on bail and returned home to the applicant the same day. 20. The request for their extradition to Turkmenistan was ultimately refused on 22 May 2003 by the Varna Regional Court. During those proceedings they were represented by the same lawyer. The refusal became final on 30 May 2003 as it had not been appealed against. The court found that the criminal proceedings against the applicants’ parents were connected to the father’s political activities and that the extradition request had been made with the aim of persecuting and punishing him for his political beliefs. 21. It is alleged that the applicant’s parents were arrested so rapidly that they did not manage to leave any money for her, or to give her any instructions as to whom to turn to or how to go about caring for herself. The officers did not tell the applicant for how long they were taking her parents away, where they would be taken or for what reason. According to the applicant, they indicated that they would either lock her parents in prison or deport them to Turkmenistan. Both prospects caused the applicant anguish as she had heard that prisons were horrible both in Turkmenistan and in Bulgaria. She also feared that her parents might be subject to the same treatment in Bulgaria that members of her family had endured in Turkmenistan. 22. According to the applicant, no one took care of her after her parents’ arrest. She only found 15 levs (about 7 euros (EUR)) in the apartment, which she used for bus tickets to go to school and for food. The money ran out fast and during the last days of her parents’ absence she did not have anything to eat. She suffered insomnia and, when she could sleep, had nightmares. Before her parents’ arrest, her mother had been the one to wake her up in the morning. 23. She permanently dreaded being herself sent back to Turkmenistan, where her relatives were in prison and her grandparents had been made homeless for having opposed the regime. 24. She alleged that she had gone several times to the police’s office for foreigners, looking for her parents. She had also tried to telephone people in Turkmenistan to ask for help. Both steps proved unsuccessful. 25. The applicant had to ask people in the street how to reach her school as, before the arrest, her father had always taken her there. At some stage during her parents’ detention a stray dog bit the applicant on the leg. She did not know what to do or how to seek help. Her mother took her to hospital on 18 December 2002, the day after she was released from detention, fearing that the wound might have become infected. 26. The Government alleged that it had not been proven that the applicant had been left alone, without an adult carer, during the period in question. The Government stressed that the applicant’s parents had been represented throughout by the same legal representative, who was, moreover, a neighbour and friend. When questioned in the context of the domestic proceedings in the applicant’s case about the exchanges in court on 6 December 2002, the lawyer indicated that he had no recollection of them (see paragraph 35 below). 27. On 7 March 2006 the applicant, with her parents’ agreement, brought proceedings for damages under section 45 of the Contracts and Obligations Act before the Varna Regional Court. She directed her claim against the Varna regional office of the Ministry of the Interior, the Prosecution Service, the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Judicial Council, and sought to establish the responsibility of the authorities that had left her unattended during her parents’ detention in December 2002, in breach of the Child Protection Act. 28. In a decision of 27 March 2006 the court invited her to specify the grounds of her claim and to indicate the specific actions, the particular respondent and the type of damage caused to her. She specified that she was seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage stemming from the authorities’ failure to organise support and care for her during her parents’ detention. 29. On 10 April 2006 the court reclassified her claim under section 49 of the Contracts and Obligations Act. It further invited her to specify the names of the officials against whom she had directed her claim, and to show that she had paid the court fees of about EUR 10,000, corresponding to 4% of the total amount of damages sought. The applicant lowered the value of her claim on 9 May 2006, paid the corresponding court fees in the amount of about EUR 6,135 and submitted additional proof to the court. 30. On 15 May 2006 the Varna Regional Court terminated the proceedings as it found that the applicant had failed to correct the irregularities in her claim as directed by the court on 10 April 2006. 31. The applicant appealed on 12 May 2006 to the Varna Court of Appeal, submitting that the respondents were the legal entities specified in her legal claim of 7 March 2006 as amended, given that they had been represented by different individuals at different points in time. The appellate court upheld the lower court’s decision on 4 October 2006. 32. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, submitting that her claim was directed against the different institutions as legal persons, as she could not know the names of the individual officials who had failed to provide her with care. She also described her condition after her parents’ detention. On 14 February 2007 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the lower court’s decision, finding that it had wrongly instructed the applicant to specify individual respondents. It remitted the case to the first-instance court, the Varna Regional Court, for a fresh examination. 33. On 25 October 2007 the applicant further specified her claim before the Varna Regional Court, in particular describing her circumstances in the immediate aftermath of her parents’ arrest and the continuing psychological trauma which she had suffered as a result. She submitted that during the hearing on 6 December 2002 on the extension of her parents’ detention, the judge had wrongly interpreted her mother’s response to the question posed regarding her care. 34. A psychiatric and psychological report was prepared in the context of the court proceedings in 2008. The report established that the applicant was depressed and at times aggressive. This was attributed to the shock she had experienced in relation to her parents’ detention and the ensuing uncertainty. She showed signs of accumulated tension, fear, worries, disappointment and anger towards the officials who had abandoned her to her own devices following her parents’ arrest. She had no interest in her daily life or in the future and had become withdrawn as a result of her loss of confidence in the justice system. Two additional medical expert reports were prepared in 2008. They found that the applicant was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, which was probably the result of what she had gone through after her parents’ arrest. The doctors stated in court that no improvement was likely in her case and that her condition was expected to become chronic. Another medical report ordered by the court in 2009 confirmed that the applicant was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and that, while she had been a healthy and energetic child prior to her parents’ arrest, she had experienced frequent bouts of depression thereafter and had succumbed to overwhelming feelings of self-pity, insecurity and futility of effort and engagement. 35. The applicant’s parents’ lawyer, who had attended the hearings relating to their detention in 2002, testified on 22 February 2008 that he did not know what had happened to the applicant during her parents’ arrest; nor could he remember anything about the circumstances relating to the question and answer in court on 6 December 2002 concerning her care. On 24 October 2008, during the same proceedings, the applicant’s teacher testified that she could not remember the applicant being absent from or having gone hungry at school. The girl had not complained to her about anything at the time. 36. The Varna Regional Court rejected the applicant’s claim on 27 July 2009, finding that it had not been proven that she had been left alone while her parents had been detained in December 2002. The court also held that, in the three days following the court hearing on 6 December 2002, the applicant’s mother had not sought to have the record of the hearing rectified, even though it was legally possible to do so. 37. Furthermore, the court held that on 6 December 2002 the Varna Regional Court had accepted that the mother had replied in the affirmative to the judge’s question regarding whether there had been anyone to care for the applicant. That question had been transmitted to the applicant’s mother with the assistance of an interpreter. Consequently, the court concluded that it had not been incumbent on the criminal justice system to act in any other way in order to protect the applicant. 38. The court further accepted fully the conclusions of the psychological reports on the applicant’s state of chronic post-traumatic stress disorder after the December 2002 events. However, it found that the only evidence supporting the applicant’s claim that she had been left alone in December 2002 was her parents’ testimony and that there were no other pieces of evidence in support of this assertion. Given that the mother had stated during the hearing on her detention that someone had been taking care of the child, the conditions set out in Article 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had not been met and, therefore, the institutions involved in the criminal proceedings had not been obliged to pursue steps towards taking the applicant into care. 39. The applicant appealed to the Varna Court of Appeal. She again challenged the findings of the lower court about her mother’s reply during the court hearing on 6 December 2002. She also submitted that her mother had not been in a position to see the record of the hearing, given that she had been taken back immediately to the remand prison. She further asserted that the authorities had been under an obligation to verify at the time of the arrest on 4 December 2002 and immediately afterwards whether care had been available to her, and that in any event they should not have waited two days to enquire about her situation for the first time during the court hearing. She submitted that her current state of health was the direct result of the shock and stress she had endured in connection with the arrest and the lack of provision of care. She paid about EUR 3,000 in court fees. 40. The appellate court confirmed the lower court’s decision on 10 December 2010. It found that, even if the applicant had been left alone after the arrest, responsibility for that could not be attributed to the police, the prosecuting authorities or the court, given that her mother had stated that there had been someone to take care of her. In addition, the post-traumatic stress disorder from which it had been established that she suffered could have been the result of additional factors not directly related to her parents’ arrest. 41. The Supreme Court of Cassation rejected an appeal on points of law by the applicant in a final decision of 18 January 2012, finding no grounds for allowing the appeal to be pursued. 42. The applicant was granted humanitarian status on 10 March 2004 and refugee status on 15 September 2007. II. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL TEXTS United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 43. This treaty (hereinafter “the UN Convention”), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 1989, has binding force under international law on the Contracting States, including all of the member States of the Council of Europe. Article 3(i) of the UN Convention states: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”

6. The applicants were born in 1985, 1988 and 1985, respectively. They live in Serbia. 7. On 26 and 27 March 2008 a brandy still, a kettle, two pieces of ham, a piece of bacon, a wheel and 10 litres of motor oil were stolen from the home of L.M. near Subotica. On 27 March 2008 L.M. reported that crime to the police. During the night of 27 to 28 March 2008 L.M. was brutally beaten up. The following items were stolen from his home that night: a combine-harvester radiator, a portable water hose, a tamburitza (a string instrument popular in Southern Europe), a Cardan joint, 60 euros (EUR) and a small amount of Serbian dinars (RSD). 8. On 28 March 2008 at about 1 a.m., following a tip-off from L.F., a patrol from Palić police station found an abandoned car about 5 km from L.M.’s home. Not far from the car, they found two pieces of ham, a piece of bacon, a combine-harvester radiator, a portable water hose and a tamburitza. They took those items to Palić police station. L.F. told the police that his neighbours, J.M. and Š.K., had seen four or five Roma men leaving the car. No further steps were taken at that stage since they were not aware that those items had been stolen from L.M. the day before. 9. On 28 March 2008 at about 2 p.m. the police found L.M. at his home. He was half-conscious. An investigating judge arrived at about 3 p.m. A police detective, at the request of the investigating judge, collected DNA evidence from a water jug on the kitchen table. Soon thereafter, he collected DNA evidence from the car mentioned above. He then went to Palić police station to photograph the items found near that car the previous night. 10. On 31 March 2008 the first applicant made a statement to the police. He stated that on the night of 27 to 28 March 2008 the second and third applicants and R.K. had beaten up L.M. and stolen from him a combine-harvester radiator, a portable water hose, a tamburitza and EUR 60. He also stated that he had stayed in the car because he had refused to participate in the robbery. He added that the car had broken down shortly after that and that they had been obliged to leave it and continue on foot. 11. On the same day, the police arrested R.K. In the presence of his counsel, V. Juhas Đurić, he denied any involvement in that robbery. 12. On 2 April 2008 R.K was taken to the investigating judge. In the presence of his counsel, he again denied any involvement in the crime in question. 13. On 3 April 2008 the public prosecutor requested that an investigation be opened into the robbery of L.M. against R.K., and against the second and third applicants, whose whereabouts were unknown at that time. 14. On 4 April 2008 R.K. was taken to the investigating judge again. In the presence of his counsel, he reiterated that he had not taken part in the robbery. This time, however, he incriminated the applicants. He stated that the three applicants in the present case had told him on 29 March 2008 that they had robbed L.M. They allegedly told him also that they had been obliged to abandon their car and some stolen items not far from L.M.’s home because of an accident. His counsel, V. Juhas Đurić, then withdrew from legally representing him owing to a conflict of interest (he intended to defend the second and third applicants if and when they were arrested). 15. Later that day, the investigating judge opened an investigation into the robbery of L.M. against R.K and against the second and third applicants. 16. On 7 April 2008 the third applicant was arrested. The next day he was taken to the investigating judge. In the presence of his counsel, he denied any involvement and added that R.K. had lied in his statement of 4 April 2008. 17. On 18 April 2008 a number of witnesses, including the first applicant, were questioned by the investigating judge. The first applicant retracted his statement of 31 March 2008, maintaining that it had been extracted under threats of violence from police officers. He further stated that R.K. had lied in his statement of 4 April 2008. 18. On 22 April 2008 the public prosecutor requested that the investigation into the robbery of L.M. be extended so as to include also the first applicant. 19. On 12 May 2008 the second applicant was arrested. On 20 May 2008 he was taken to the investigating judge. In the presence of his counsel, he denied the charges. Since he was not fluent in Serbian, he made his statement in Hungarian. 20. On 20 May 2008 L.M. gave evidence to the investigating judge. He said, inter alia, that on 27 March 2008 he had seen a group of Roma men in front of his home running away with a wheel he owned; one of them had had black hair with blonde highlights, had been short and around 30 years old (it would appear from a subsequent statement of L.M. that this was in fact R.K. – see paragraph 27 below). 21. On 26 May 2008 R.K. gave evidence to the investigating judge again. He retracted his statement of 4 April 2008, claiming that he had lied. 22. On 11 June 2008 the investigating judge extended the investigation into the robbery of L.M. so as to also include the first applicant. 23. On 8 July 2008 experts established that the DNA evidence collected from the water jug found in L.M.’s kitchen matched the DNA profile of L.M. and that the DNA evidence collected from the car found in the vicinity of L.M.’s home matched the DNA profile of the third applicant. 24. On 10 July 2008 the public prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicants and R.K. for robbery allegedly committed on the night of 27 to 28 March 2008 (count 1) and for burglary allegedly committed on 26 and 27 March 2008 (count 2). 25. On 5 September 2008 R.K. was transferred to the Special Prison Hospital in Belgrade. On 15 October 2008 he was diagnosed with advanced stomach cancer. One week later he was operated on and put on morphine. In the meantime, the start of the trial had had to be adjourned. 26. On 28 October 2008, in order to prevent further delays in the case against the other accused, the public prosecutor requested that R.K.’s case be severed and that he be tried separately. She amended the indictment accordingly. 27. The trial against the applicants started on 17 November 2008. They pleaded not guilty to both charges. The trial court then heard the victim, L.M., who said that on the night of 27 to 28 March 2008 four Roma men had attacked him at his home. He could not remember their faces. Having been shown a photo of R.K., L.M. stated that this was most likely the man with blonde highlights who had stolen his wheel on 27 March 2008 (see paragraph 20 above). He added that the tamburitza, the combine-harvester radiator and the portable water hose, which had been found by the police on 28 March 2008 at about 1 a.m., had belonged to him. 28. On 21 November 2008 the trial court held that R.K. was not able to effectively participate in the criminal proceedings due to his health. It therefore ordered his immediate release. 29. On 2 December 2008 the first applicant applied to the trial court to present evidence as soon as possible because he had some important information concerning it. However, at the next hearing, held on 23 January 2009, he invoked his right to remain silent. 30. On 23 January 2009 the trial court heard evidence from seven witnesses. 31. D.R., the police detective in charge of this case, said that he had collected DNA evidence from a water jug on the kitchen table in L.M’s home and from an abandoned car found not far from there. He had tried to take also fingerprints from the crime scene, but this had been impossible. 32. U.Đ. confirmed his earlier statement according to which in March 2008 he had heard two young men on a local bus plotting to steal a violin from the home of a musician that same night. They had spoken Serbian without an accent. One man had got off at Aurometal and the other on Dubrovačka Street in Palić. The witness decided to follow the latter until an abandoned house in Marka Oreškovića Street in Palić, which had been occupied by Roma people. He later went to the police and reported the incident. The witness stated at the hearing that he was 50-60% certain that the second applicant had been the one who had got off the bus at Aurometal (the witness had been able to observe him from the bus for about thirty seconds); the third applicant could have been the other one, but the witness was not sure because he had seen him only from behind. 33. M.P., a police officer, stated that on 14 March 2008, following the tip-off from U.Đ., he had gone to the house in Marka Oreškovića Street and found the applicants, R.K. and some other Roma people there. On 28 March 2008 at about 1 p.m. he had decided to visit L.M. to inform him that some of the items stolen from him the day before had actually been found. L.M. had been injured, but had managed to tell the witness that three or four Roma men had attacked him during the night and had stolen from him a tamburitza, among other things. The witness had instantly remembered the incident of 14 March 2008 concerning a plot to steal a musical instrument. He had then gone to check the car found not far from there the previous night. He had established that the car had belonged to either the second or third applicant. Lastly, the witness added that all three accused had been known to the police. 34. O.S., one of the experts who examined the DNA evidence collected from L.M.’s home and from the car found in the vicinity of L.M.’s home, explained his report of 8 July 2008 according to which the material matched the DNA profiles of L.M. and the third applicant (see paragraph 23 above). 35. P.E. stated that he had helped Officer M.P. to find L.M.’s home the day after L.M. had been beaten up and robbed. 36. J.M. and Š.K. confirmed their earlier statements according to which they had seen four or five Roma men leaving a car beside the road during the night of 27 to 28 March 2008. J.M. and his neighbour, L.F., had then found two pieces of ham, a piece of bacon, a tamburitza, a combine-harvester radiator and a water hose about 50 m from the car. They had called the police. 37. On 23 January 2009 the public prosecutor applied to the court to have the statements that R.K. had made to the investigating judge read out at the trial. The defence objected, arguing that R.K. could only be heard as a witness as his case had been severed. The trial court dismissed the application. On 26 January 2009 the defence applied to have two social workers give evidence so as to confirm that the second applicant did not speak Serbian without an accent (unlike the person whom U.Đ. had heard plotting to steal a violin (see paragraph 32 above)). The trial court also dismissed that application. 38. On 19 February 2009 R.K. died. 39. On 30 March 2009 the following additional documents were read out at the trial: the criminal file no. 119/08 concerning the severed case of R.K.; judicial records according to which the first applicant had three prior convictions, the second applicant had no prior convictions, the third applicant had two prior convictions, and, lastly, R.K. had nine prior convictions; and a police report of 14 March 2008 (see, in this regard, the witness statements of U.Đ. and M.P. in paragraphs 32 and 33 above) stating that the persons seen by U.Đ. earlier that day had been probably the first and the third applicants (rather than the second and the third applicants, as stated by U.Đ. on 23 January 2009). The trial court declared inadmissible the statements of the first applicant made before the opening of an investigation against him. In his closing argument, defence counsel argued that the statement of R.K. of 4 April 2008 was not reliable as it had not been made under oath and had been retracted on 26 May 2008. 40. On the same day, the trial court rendered a judgment. On the basis of the statement of R.K. made on 4 April 2008 and the other evidence set out above, it convicted the applicants of burglary and robbery. The first and third applicants were sentenced to eight and a half years’ imprisonment. In view of the fact that he had no prior convictions, the second applicant was sentenced to five and a half years’ imprisonment. 41. In their appeal, the applicants argued, inter alia, that the statement of R.K. of 4 April 2008 ought not to have been admitted because they had not been able to test that evidence by means of cross-examination. 42. On 9 March 2010 the Novi Sad Court of Appeal (Apelacioni sud) upheld the judgment of 30 March 2009. It acknowledged that the statement of R.K. made on 4 April 2008 had been the sole evidence against the first applicant and that the only corroborative evidence against the second and third applicants had been the statement of U.Đ. made at the trial on 23 January 2009 and the DNA evidence belonging to the third applicant found in a car abandoned in the vicinity of the crime scene. The court held that its admission was still lawful. It relied, in this regard, on Article 337 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as well as the fact that R.K. had made the statement in question in the presence of his counsel, V. Juhas Đurić, who had shortly thereafter become counsel for the applicants. 43. In their constitutional appeal, the applicants invoked, inter alia, the right to a fair trial. In this connection, they submitted that the statement of R.K. of 4 April 2008 ought not to have been admitted as they had not been able to test that evidence by means of a cross-examination. They added that it was irrelevant that V. Juhas Đurić, their then counsel, had been present when R.K. had made the impugned statement because he had become their counsel only after that date. In their opinion, it had been crucial that they had not been able to examine or have examined R.K. either on 4 April 2008 or later. They relied in this connection on Lucà v. Italy (no. 33354/96, ECHR 2001‑II). 44. On 29 September 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the case. It relied, like the second-instance court, on the relevant domestic provision in accordance with which statements made by co-accused to an investigating judge could be admitted as evidence if they had died in the meantime. It concluded that the applicants’ complaint about the fairness of their trial was, in substance, of a fourth-instance nature and therefore inadmissible. 45. The applicants have served their prison sentences.

6. The applicant was born in 1961 and is detained at the Corradino Correctional Facility, Paola. 7. On 25 June 2004 the police searched the applicant’s residence and found a quantity of cannabis plants, a canopy, foil and two electric lamps on the roof. 8. The police informed the applicant that he was being charged by the Attorney General, before the Criminal Court, with (i) cultivation and (ii) aggravated possession (not for his exclusive use) of cannabis. 9. A court-appointed expert found that the weight of the dried cannabis leaves found amounted to 3,416.20 grams, from which 6,832 cannabis ‘reefers’ could be made or 11,382 ‘sticks of cannabis’. 10. During the trial by jury the applicant, who suffered from chronic depression and severe back pain, admitted the first charge. 11. By a judgment of 5 March 2008 the applicant was found guilty of both charges (the verdict was unanimous in relation to the first charge, and seven votes to two in relation to the second charge) and was sentenced to a term of twelve years’ imprisonment and a fine of 25,000 euros (EUR) by the Criminal Court. The fine was to be converted into a further eighteen months’ imprisonment if it remained unpaid. In determining the punishment, the Criminal Court noted that, according to the law, if, having considered the age of an accused, his previous conduct, the quantity and quality of the drug in question, as well as all other circumstances, or if the jury’s verdict was not unanimous, it considered that the punishment of life imprisonment would not be adequate, it could sentence the accused to a term of imprisonment of between four and thirty years and a fine of between approximately EUR 3,330 and EUR 116,500. In the present case, it considered the conduct of the applicant, the fact that there was agreement that the second charge would be absorbed by the first charge for the purposes of punishment, and the punishments handed down in similar cases. 12. By a judgment of 12 March 2009 the Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed the first-instance judgment. 13. On 9 November 2010, the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings, complaining under Article 6 § 1 about, inter alia, the discretion of the Attorney General as public prosecutor to decide in which court to try an accused. 14. On 10 October 2012 the case was adjourned for judgment. On 11 February 2013 (following the judgment of the Court in Camilleri v. Malta, no. 42931/10, 22 January 2013) the applicant asked to add a complaint under Article 7 in connection with the discretion of the Attorney General. 15. By a decree of 12 February 2013 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, rejected the request to suspend the determination of the case and to allow the applicant to add a complaint under Article 7 of the Convention, given that the stage of collection of evidence and pleadings (dibattiment) had come to an end. 16. By a judgment of 21 March 2013, the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, rejected the applicant’s claims. Having rejected all other complaints by the applicant, it considered that it was not necessary to determine the complaint concerning the discretion of the Attorney General (under Article 6). 17. By a judgment of 9 December 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected an appeal by the applicant and confirmed the first‑instance judgment. As to the complaint about the Attorney General’s discretion, the Constitutional Court considered that the Court had found a violation of Article 7 in that connection (giving no remedy), but had not determined the matter under Article 6. In the Constitutional Court’s view, such a finding which related to the lack of foreseeability of the law could not cast doubt on the fairness of the proceedings in general which would paralyse the entire judicial system. Furthermore, local case‑law had previously established that such a discretion did not breach an applicant’s fair trial rights. The Constitutional Court also noted that there was no reason to alter the first-instance court’s discretion regarding not allowing the addition of the complaint under Article 7, at a time when the collection of evidence had closed.

4. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Cork. 5. She has been receiving treatment for a pituitary brain tumour since 1982. In that year, she underwent surgery to remove as much of the tumour as possible. In the following years she received a variety of treatments for her condition. In 1995 she became the patient of Dr B, a consultant endocrinologist. He referred her for an MRI scan of the tumour, performed that same year, and monitored her condition in the following years. In August 2000, at the request of Dr B, the applicant underwent another MRI scan. This indicated that there had in fact been no significant change since 1995, but the tumour remained large. The applicant also underwent two types of test to determine her level of growth hormone. 6. Dr B received the result of the first test on 5 September 2000. He spoke by phone with the applicant, telling her that the tumour was very unsatisfactory. Prior to that conversation, the applicant was under the belief that the operation in 1982 had removed almost the entire tumour. She therefore understood the information given to her by Dr B about the tumour to mean that it was growing rapidly, gravely endangering her health. 7. The applicant was prescribed a newly-available drug to treat her condition, to be injected by her general practitioner on a monthly basis from September 2000. As the drug led to severe gastrointestinal side effects within a short time, Dr B reduced the dosage by half. It appears there were no side effects following the injections of October and November 2000. At the end of the year the applicant was unwell, and was hospitalised in early January 2001 suffering from vomiting, diarrhoea, severe exhaustion, headaches, cramps and muscular spasms in her arms and legs. A blood test indicated that she was also severely hypothyroid. It was later established that this was a side-effect of the drug, not known at the time. 8. The applicant had further discussions with Dr B about her condition and treatment. Dr B proposed to defer the next injection until the following month. The applicant received two more injections, in February and March 2001. From February 2001 she became the patient of another endocrinologist. 9. In May 2004 the applicant commenced civil proceedings in the High Court against Dr B and the hospital. Her case in negligence was that Dr B had failed in his duty of care towards her in the prescribing of the drug and the monitoring of its administration to her. She further argued that her consent to the treatment was vitiated for lack of sufficient information, or for misinformation, about her condition and the appropriateness of the medication proposed to her. 10. The applicant’s statement of claim was served on the defendants in October 2004. Dr B entered his defence in February 2005, seeking further and better particulars from the applicant, which the applicant’s solicitor provided in June 2005. The hospital entered its defence in June 2005, and also sought further and better particulars. 11. According to the Government, between February 2005 and September 2008 eleven motions seeking various forms of interim relief were brought before the High Court and decided in relation to the case. 12. In October 2009, the case was included in a procedure before a judge of the High Court known as a “positive callover”. The purpose of this was to assign hearing dates to cases that had already been waiting for a considerable period of time. A hearing date in April 2010 was set for the case. 13. In January 2010 the applicant’s solicitor replied to the request for further and better particulars made by the second defendant in June 2005. The hearing commenced on 13 April 2010 and took place over twelve days. Two expert witnesses appeared for the applicant and two for the defence. The hearing concluded on 7 May 2010. Judgment was given on 20 May 2010. 14. The High Court ruled against the applicant on all grounds. The judge preferred the evidence given by the witnesses appearing on behalf of the defence, deeming their qualifications to be more relevant to this specialised area than those of the experts retained by the applicant. He found that Dr B had complied with the therapeutic indications on the data sheet of the drug. The doctor’s decision to place the applicant directly on the long-acting form of the drug was supported by the expert opinion given on his behalf. The judge did not accept that Dr B had failed to monitor adequately the effects of the drug on the applicant during the months that she received it. Likewise, he rejected the claim that the doctor had failed in his duty of care in the manner in which he had explained the proposed course of treatment to the applicant and the possible side effects. 15. On the question of consent, the judge considered that while the applicant had misunderstood the exact state of her tumour, this was not to be blamed upon Dr B, who had fulfilled his legal duty by giving her accurate and appropriate information about her condition. The applicant’s mistaken impression was neither caused nor contributed to by the doctor’s explanations. He found that Dr B had not been aware of the applicant’s misunderstanding and could not be blamed for the deficiencies in her knowledge of her condition. Moreover, he had given sufficient warning to the applicant regarding the gastro-intestinal side effects of the drug. Other potential side-effects (gallstones, hepatic dysfunction) had not been raised, but as they had not in fact materialised there were no grounds for complaint. The judge concluded that the applicant had given her valid, informed consent to the treatment. 16. The applicant appealed against the judgment, advancing numerous grounds. The appeal was filed on 1 July 2010. It remained pending before the Supreme Court until it was transferred to the newly-established Court of Appeal on 29 October 2014. The hearing of the appeal took place on 30 July 2015. 17. In a judgment of 17 November 2015 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The Court of Appeal addressed two issues. First, regarding the treatment of the applicant with the particular drug, it saw no basis to criticise the findings of the trial judge. His preference for the evidence of the defendants’ experts was rationally grounded, and his rejection of the applicant’s criticisms of Dr B was based on careful consideration of the evidence. 18. Second, on the issue of consent, the Court of Appeal reviewed the evidence about what Dr B knew of the applicant’s understanding of her condition. It rejected her claim that the High Court had made a clear error on this point. It considered that Dr B’s actions had been in keeping with the relevant domestic legal principles. It noted that Dr B’s opinion at the time was that the applicant had a serious condition that required treatment. As surgery was not possible, the only alternative was medication. It was, the Court of Appeal held, reasonably open to him to hold that view. He had explained to the applicant the expected benefits of the drug prescribed, as well as the unpleasant side effects. As for the argument that the doctor should have also presented a “do nothing” option, the Court of Appeal described this as “somewhat unreal”. Where a person seeks referral from a general practitioner to a specialist, it could be reasonably assumed that they wished to receive treatment, and that they had excluded the non-treatment option. 19. The applicant sought leave to appeal. On 8 March 2016 the Supreme Court refused.

5. The applicant was born in 1959. He is currently detained at Săpoca Psychiatric Hospital, in a section of the hospital located in the municipality of Ojasca (Buzău County). 6. The applicant has been in receipt of a second-degree disability allowance since 1993. 7. On 29 January 2001, following the publication of an article in the national press and a programme broadcast on a national television channel, the police operating at Bucharest police station no. 20 initiated a criminal prosecution against the applicant. He was charged with incest and sexual corruption of his two under-age daughters, aged 15 and 16. He was alleged to have had sexual intercourse with his elder daughter and forced both his daughters to be present while he was having sexual intercourse with his wife. 8. On the same day the applicant was questioned by the police in the presence of an officially appointed lawyer regarding the charges against him, before being placed in police custody for twenty-four hours. 9. On 30 April 2001 the applicant, assisted by an officially appointed lawyer, was questioned by a prosecutor concerning the same charges. 10. On the same day the prosecution, with reference to Article 114 §§ 1 and 2 of the Penal Code (CP), ordered the applicant’s provisional detention in a psychiatric hospital with a view to conducting a medical examination to assess his capacity for discernment. The prosecution noted in that regard that a paranoid affective psychosis diagnostic had been posited on several occasions between 1994 and 1999. It stated the following: “... in the present case there is sufficient circumstantial evidence of the precarious state of health of the accused, who represents an extremely serious danger to society given that he is liable to commit further such antisocial acts.” 11. On the same day the applicant was admitted to the Alexandru Obregia Psychiatric Hospital in Bucharest. He underwent psychiatric examinations which found, inter alia, paranoid impulsive tendencies with high conflict potential. Furthermore, the applicant’s state was described as comprising irritability, suspicion, interpretative tendencies and potential aggression. 12. A forensic medical report was drawn up on 2 November 2001 establishing that the applicant suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and lack of discernment. It recommended putting in place the compulsory medical treatment provided for by Article 113 CP. 13. A preliminary investigation was also instigated against the applicant for the rape of his wife. 14. The prosecution heard the applicant’s wife and two daughters. 15. By decision of 27 February 2002 the prosecution, in the absence of a medical certificate and since the applicant’s daughter had not confirmed the sexual relations with her father, ordered the closure of the criminal proceedings against the applicant for incest. Drawing on the statements of his two daughters, it also concluded that the applicant had forced them to be present while he was having sexual intercourse with his wife, thus committing offences of sexual corruption of minors, but decided to close the proceedings on that count owing to the applicant’s lack of discernment, as found in the forensic medical report of 2 November 2001 (see paragraph 12 above). The prosecution further dropped the rape charge on the grounds that the applicant’s wife had not lodged a criminal complaint against him. Lastly, it referred the case file to the competent court for confirmation of the preventive measure of medical detention. 16. By decision of 22 April 2002 Bucharest District Court 6 upheld the medical detention order. Listing the criminal charges against the applicant, the court stated the following: “In the light of the findings of the psychiatric forensic medical report that N. suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and lacks discernment as regards the offences he committed, and having regard to the recommendations of the [reporting] committee that the preventive detention measure should be imposed on the accused, the court accedes to the [prosecution’s] request and, pursuant to Article 114 CP, confirms the provisional medical detention order and informs the Bucharest Health Department of the implementation of that order.” 17. The applicant did not attend the hearing, nor was he represented by a lawyer in court. 18. The decision was posted on the door to the applicant’s home and in the town hall of Bucharest District 6, where the applicant’s home was located. 19. From 30 January 2001 to 20 January 2003 the applicant was detained in the Alexandru Obregia Psychiatric Hospital. On 21 January 2003 he was transferred to the Poiana Mare Psychiatric Hospital, where he remained until 29 January 2006. The applicant was provided with a neuroleptic- and tranquilliser-based treatment. ... 32. In March 2007, after the entry into force of the amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure (CPP) requiring periodic and automatic judicial review of the detention (see paragraph 90 below), the judge of Buzău District Court (“the delegated judge”) ordered a psychiatric forensic medical report. 33. In July 2007 the competent medical board drew up a report based on the results of an examination of the applicant, the medical documentation transmitted by the psychiatric hospital, the report by his GP, a social welfare inquiry concerning the applicant conducted on 3 May 2006, the 22 April 2002 decision of Bucharest District Court 6 and the forensic medical report of 2 November 2001. The board found that during his detention the applicant had expressed delusions of grandeur with transient psychotic relapses, had endeavoured to conceal his symptoms, had behaved in a calm, composed manner, had accepted his treatment, had refrained from stirring up trouble with the other patients and had shown little hostility during the treatment. It pointed out, however, that he had been hostile during the examination and had expressed delusional ideas of injustice and his intention to remedy the latter. It concluded that the applicant was suffering from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and that, having regard to the medical documentation, to the evolution in the patient’s condition during his detention and to the psychiatric examination in issue, the detention measure should remain in place. 34. On 15 August 2007 the delegated judge invited Buzău District Court to replace the detention measure provided for in Article 114 CP with the compulsory medical treatment measure provided for in Article 113 CP. 35. On 11 September 2007 the applicant, assisted by an officially appointed lawyer, was heard by the court. He requested his release, seconded by his lawyer. 36. By decision of the same day, Buzău District Court decided to order the applicant’s continued psychiatric detention. It reasoned as follows: “By Criminal Decision No. 588 of 22 April 2002, Bucharest District Court 6 ordered N.’s medical detention on the grounds that he had been charged with having committed the offence of incest, consisting of sexual relations with his 16-year-old daughter, in 2000, and the offence of sexual corruption on the grounds that on 21 January 2001 he had sexual intercourse with his wife in the presence of his two daughters. The psychiatric forensic medical report [of July 2007] shows that the patient suffers from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and points to the advisability of maintaining the preventive detention measure laid down in Article 114 CP. Having regard to the foregoing, the court ... decides to maintain the medical detention measure (Article 114 CP) imposed on patient N.” 37. The applicant took cognisance of that decision in summer 2008, when he underwent a further forensic medical examination. He appealed. 38. By final decision of 19 December 2008 Buzău County Court, referring to the reasoning of the Court of First Instance, dismissed the appeal as manifestly ill-founded after having heard the applicant, assisted by an officially appointed lawyer. 39. The applicant’s detention measure was made subject to several judicial reviews by Buzău District Court and Buzău County Court. It transpires from the decisions adopted, of which the Court has copies, that the applicant was heard by both courts during the different sets of proceedings. 40. He was assisted by various officially appointed lawyers, who, in the proceedings completed before 2016, had confined themselves to referring to the findings of the forensic medical assessments carried out, and had either left it to the discretion of the courts whether or not to maintain the measure or objected to the lifting thereof. 41. Apart from the decisions adopted after 2015, the case file does not indicate whether the prior decisions had been served on the applicant. 42. According to the forensic medical reports drawn up after each review, the applicant, who had not fully acknowledged the fact of his mental illness, had been calm, had not refused his treatment and had refrained from causing trouble with the other patients. On the other hand, the reports stated that he had vehemently denied having committed the criminal offences with which he had been charged, claiming that his former wife had been plotting against him. 43. By decision of 13 October 2008 Buzău District Court maintained the detention measure in respect of the applicant. The court referred to the 22 April 2002 decision and to a forensic medical report drawn up following an examination of the applicant in May 2008, which had recommended maintaining the measure. On 9 January 2009, on appeal from the applicant, Buzău County Court upheld that decision. 44. By decision of 18 February 2010 Buzău District Court dismissed a request submitted by the applicant for the lifting of the detention measure. The court referred to a forensic medical report drawn up after an examination of the applicant the same month, which had recommended maintaining the measure and described the applicant’s delusional ideas concerning the setting up of a new State, his lack of feasible future plans and the fact that he had not fully accepted his drug therapy. 45. By decision of 1 April 2010 Buzău District Court maintained the detention measure in respect of the applicant. It referred to the decision of 22 April 2002 to a forensic medical report drawn up after an examination of the applicant in December 2009, insofar as it recommended maintaining the measure and described the applicant’s delusional ideas concerning the setting up of a new State and his lack of realistic future plans. 46. Furthermore, although this aspect was not mentioned by the court, it transpires from that report that the applicant’s GP had noted an erotomaniac obsession with his former wife, which had indicated a total incapacity for social reintegration and would most likely have triggered conflicts or unforeseeable, potentially dangerous situations had he returned to the apartment where he had lived with his family. The report further noted that the applicant’s friend, who had attended most of the medical boards’ meetings, had come down emphatically in favour of the applicant’s release, claiming that he would accommodate him indefinitely in the apartment which he shared with his mother. However, the assessment board doubted the reality of such support proffered by someone who was himself suffering from psychiatric problems. On the other hand, the report mentioned that the applicant had been plainly rejected by his daughters and his former wife, and that despite the rejection by his former wife and the fact that he himself considered that his detention was the result of scheming on her part, he intended to get back together with her if he was released. 47. By decision of 22 April 2010 the Buzău Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant’s second application for release on the grounds that its decision of 18 February 2010 had meanwhile become final and was therefore res judicata. During the proceedings a forensic medical report had been drawn up on 9 March 2010, reaching conclusions similar to the findings of the report submitted in December 2009 (see paragraph 45 above). 48. In November 2010, May and November 2011 and April 2012 the delegated judge requested the Buzău Institute of Forensic Medicine to carry out psychiatric assessments with a view to periodic reviews of the need to maintain the applicant’s psychiatric detention. 49. The Institute of Forensic Medicine examined the applicant on the aforementioned dates but did not draw up or forward its reports until November 2013. The reports confirmed the diagnosis of the applicant’s condition and proposed maintaining the detention measure. 50. By four separate decisions adopted on 17 and 19 December 2013, the Court of First Instance, citing the case-law of the Court in matters of detention of persons suffering from mental disorders, maintained the detention measure. It referred to the findings of the above-mentioned forensic medical reports. In its decision of 17 December 2013 the court further had regard to a forensic medical report drawn up following an examination of the applicant carried out a few days previously, in December 2013. Furthermore, it referred, broadly, to the “aim of the preventive measures, which was to put an end to a situation of danger and prevent the perpetration of acts punishable under criminal law”, and concluded that the criteria set out in Article 434 § 1 CPP had been satisfied. 51. By three separate decisions adopted on 4 February 2014, Buzău District Court maintained the applicant’s detention measure on the basis of three psychiatric forensic medical reports drawn up following examinations of the applicant in November 2012, May 2013 and November 2013. The Court has not received copies of those reports and decisions. 52. On 1 July 2014 Săpoca Psychiatric Hospital applied to the courts to declare the applicant incapable and place him under guardianship (see paragraph 77 et seq. below for the conduct of the related proceedings). 53. By decision of 19 February 2015, citing the Court’s case-law in matters of detention of persons suffering from mental disorders, Buzău District Court maintained the detention measure in respect of the applicant. It referred to a forensic medical report drawn up after an examination of the applicant in September 2014, which recommended maintaining the measure and referred to the “aim of the preventive measures, which was to put an end to a situation of danger and prevent the perpetration of acts punishable under criminal law”. 55. In April 2015 the applicant appealed to the Judicial Inspection Board of the Higher Council of the Judiciary against the alleged practice of Buzău District Court of conducting retrospective reviews of the need to maintain the detention measure. By decision of 15 June 2015 the Judicial Inspection Board dropped the applicant’s complaint. It confirmed the existence of the practice criticised by the applicant, but pointed out that it had been caused by the medical authorities’ delay in forwarding their expert reports and not in any breach by the judges of their attributions. 56. On 3 September 2015 the delegated judge requested the Buzău Institute of Forensic Medicine to conduct a further psychiatric expert assessment with a view to periodically reviewing the need to maintain the applicant’s psychiatric detention. The applicant filed a separate action seeking the replacement of the detention measure with a compulsory medical treatment measure. 57. On 23 September 2015 the Forensic Medical Board also examined the applicant. The applicant’s lawyer representing him in the present application before the Court sent a reasoned letter to the Board strongly advocating the replacement of the measure implemented in respect of his client. 58. On 1 October 2015 the Board drew up its forensic medical report recommending the replacement of the detention measure with a compulsory medical treatment measure. It emphasised that the persistence of the applicant’s delusional ideas concerning the setting up of a “new State” and his lack of social and family support, a factor conducive to social reintegration, supervision of his medical treatment and the management of the applicant’s daily needs relating to the purported “new State”, had justified maintaining the detention up until then. It noted that the applicant had not been aggressive to others or to himself during his detention. In that context, it welcomed the steps taken by Săpoca Hospital to place the applicant under guardianship, which it considered appropriate in the perspective of his release, given that the applicant had been rejected by his family (his brother, sister, former wife and daughters). Finally, the Board recommended that the social welfare services of the applicant’s district of residence should be informed that they had to take the necessary action with a view to releasing him. 59. On 22 October 2015 Buzău District Court, which was responsible for the review, ordered a fresh forensic medical report from the National Institute of Forensic Medicine (IFM) in Bucharest. 61. On 12 April 2016 the IFM submitted its expert report, which stated, in particular, that: – the applicant was suffering from chronic delusional disorder with no prospect of improvement, but rather with future aggravation of the illness due to aging; – the illness as manifested in the applicant did not point to any risk of a danger to society, but the lack of feasible plans for the future foreshadowed future conflicts, a risk of advanced social deterioration and the impossibility of monitoring the evolution of his illness; – the applicant lacked any social support from his family or other persons of trust. Under those conditions, the forensic medical board pointed out that the case presented a genuine psychiatric and deontological dilemma. Indeed, it considered that although, from the psychiatric point of view, the applicant could be released subject to compulsory medical treatment on the basis of Article 109 CP, that measure was inconceivable in the absence of social support. Consequently, it proposed provisionally maintaining the detention until the social welfare services could transfer the applicant to a specialised institution capable of providing him with appropriate living conditions and treatment. 62. By decision of 27 May 2016 the Buzău Court of First Instance, referring to the findings of the 12 April 2016 forensic medical rapport (see paragraph 61 above), ordered the maintenance of the detention measure. 63. The applicant appealed to Buzău District Court against that decision. He was represented by an officially appointed lawyer, who argued that the applicant’s wishes should be complied with. Questioned by the court, the applicant stated that he would live with his former wife and one of his daughters in their apartment. He added that he had a retirement pension. 64. By judgment of 29 August 2016 Buzău County Court upheld the 27 May 2016 decision. It held as follows: “Given the absence of improvement in the patient’s state of health and the fact that the members of his family cannot monitor his continued medical treatment, and having regard to the nature of the charges against him which had resulted in his medical detention, family members against whom [the applicant] has committed antisocial acts cannot be expected to cohabit with him. Nevertheless, the director of the establishment [where the applicant is detained] must inform the social welfare services responsible for transferring [the applicant] to a specialised institution capable of providing proper living conditions and treatment.” (b) Measures taken by the national administrative and hospital authorities 65. On 6 September 2016 the Director of Săpoca Hospital invited the Directorate General of Social Assistance and Child Welfare (“DGASPC”) in Bucharest District 6 to adopt welfare measures in respect of the applicant pursuant to the instructions set out in the forensic medical report of 12 April 2016. 66. By letter of 29 September 2016 the DGASPC replied that the applicant’s former wife had informed it that she did not intend to be involved in any way in the process leading up to the applicant’s release. Furthermore, the DGASPC pointed out that it had contacted the social welfare services in the county of residence of the applicant’s sister with an eye to his possible placement with her. It also stated that the only centre in Bucharest District 6 which took in persons suffering from neuropsychiatric disorders could not admit the applicant owing to a lack of available places. Finally, it explained that it had also unsuccessfully attempted to contact other specialised and residential centres. 67. On 15 November 2016 the Director of Săpoca Hospital contacted the municipality of Unguriu, which had meanwhile been assigned the guardianship of the applicant .... The Director informed the municipal authorities the implementation of the preventive detention measure was temporary, and that they were required to act in the interests of the applicant, particularly with a view to his possible placement in a specialised institution after his release. 68. On 21 November 2016 Unguriu municipality replied that the guardianship order was not yet final and that it therefore could not act in respect of the applicant. 70. The forensic medical report drawn up on 25 January 2017 recommended replacing the detention measure with a compulsory medical treatment order in view of the applicant’s “low level of dangerousness (while on treatment), compliance with the rules, absence of incidents, [and] the lengthy period of supervision”. The report mentioned in particular: – the existence of a single, strange and systematic delusionary theme concerning the creation of a “united Somali State”, which delusion did not however alter his compliance with hospital rules; – lack of conflict situations and of incidents pointing to potentially aggressive behaviour; – proper therapeutic cooperation during detention, despite his purely formal acquiescence in the reality of his illness and need for treatment; – absence of antisocial precedents – apart from the acts noted during his placement in detention – or consumption of psychoactive substances (drugs, alcohol); – negative effect of the extension of detention for social reasons on the development of the applicant’s illness and physiological state, and – the guardianship order. The report nevertheless emphasised the risk of decompensation of the illness, involving possible negative social consequences should the aftercare provided to the applicant by the body assigned guardianship prove inadequate. 71. On 21 February 2017 the applicant was heard by Buzău District Court. He was represented by an officially appointed lawyer, who advocated replacing the detention measure. 72. By final decision given on the same day, Buzău District Court ordered the replacement of the detention measure with a compulsory treatment order until the applicant had made a full recovery. It referred to the forensic medical report of 25 January 2017 (see paragraph 70 above) and to the “aim of the preventive measures, which was to put an end to a situation of danger and prevent the perpetration of acts punishable under criminal law”. b) Measures taken by the national administrative and hospital authorities 74. On 8 March 2017 the lawyer representing the applicant before the Court sent a letter to Săpoca Hospital recommending, in the framework of enforcement of the decision of 21 February 2017, the applicant’s ultimate reintegration into society rather than his placement in a residential centre. He emphasised that releasing the applicant without adequate support would condemn him to vagrancy, destitution and the deterioration of his physical and mental health. Lastly, he requested the setting up of an interdisciplinary commission responsible for identifying the action to be taken on the applicant, on the model of the efforts expended in other countries to deinstitutionalise persons in medical detention. 75. On 9 March 2017 the applicant was transferred to another section of the same hospital for persons suffering from chronic illnesses. 76. On 14 March 2017 the Director of Săpoca Hospital invited la DGASPC to implement assistance measures in respect of the applicant pursuant to the final decision ordering the replacement of the detention measure. It also attempted, unsuccessfully, to contact two foundations in Bucharest for the same purpose. ...

4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Baku. 5. The applicant’s son, Urkhan Mammadov (U.M.), was born in 1989. On 7 July 2010 he was drafted into the army for his compulsory military service. 6. At the request of the military authorities, before joining the army, on 21 May 2010 U.M. underwent a medical examination in Narimanov District Polyclinic no. 8, where it was established that he was suffering from rheumatism. In May and June 2010 U.M. underwent further medical examinations at the Central Oil Workers’ Hospital and the Research Institute of Cardiology. During these examinations, no heart disease or any other disease was revealed which might prevent him from performing his military service. 7. On 6 July 2010 U.M. underwent a medical examination at the Narimanov District Military Commissariat (the army recruitment office) which declared him partially fit for military service (məhdudiyyətlə hərbi xidmətə yararlı) in accordance with Articles 49 (ç) (nasal cavity illness) and 66 (ç) (spine illness) of the “Table of Diseases” (“Xəstəliklər cədvəli”). 8. On 7 July 2010 U.M. joined a military unit in Barda region and on an unspecified date he was transferred to a military unit located in Shaki region. 9. On 13 July 2010 U.M. called his family by telephone, asking them to provide him with some belongings. During the conversation he did not complain about his state of health. 10. At around 10 a.m. on 14 July 2010 the applicant was invited to the Narimanov District Military Commissariat, where he was informed of the death of his son. 11. It appears from the case file that at around 5 a.m. on 14 July 2010 at reveille in the dormitory of the military barracks U.M. did not wake up. At that moment the soldiers realised that U.M. was wheezing. They took U.M. out of the military barracks and tried to give him artificial respiration. However, as U.M. did not respond, he was immediately taken to the Shaki Central Hospital, where he was pronounced dead. 12. On 14 July 2010 a record of an inspection of the scene of the incident (hadisə yerinə baxış protokolu) was drawn up and signed by an investigator at the Zagatala Military Prosecutor’s Office. It was further signed by two attesting witnesses (hal şahidi), S.R. and A.F., who were serving in the same military unit, as well as, by a participant (iştirakçı), M.M., who was also serving in the same military unit. The record states that the inspection began at 9 a.m. and ended at noon. According to the record, no object relevant to the investigation was identified. The investigator also noted that U.M.’s bed had been made by other soldiers after U.M.’s transfer to the hospital and the floor of the dormitory had been cleaned with chlorine and kerosene in the morning before the beginning of the inspection. 13. On 14 July 2010 the Zagatala Military Deputy Prosecutor examined U.M.’s body and drew up a record of this inspection (meyitə baxış keçirilməsi haqqında protokol) in the presence of two experts. It appears from the record that various injuries were found on U.M.’s body. In particular, the following injuries were mentioned in the record: a blue-violet bruise (qançır) of an elongated shape, measuring 8 x 3 cm, on the right side of his lower back; a scratch (cızıq), measuring 0.8 x 0.1 cm, on the left side of his back; a subcutaneous haemorrhage (dəridaxili qansızma), measuring 5.5 x 1 cm, on his upper right hip; and two abrasions (sıyrıq), measuring 0.3 x 0.1 cm and 0.5 x 0.2 cm on the fingers of his left hand. Blood and cell samples were taken from the body and sent for biological and histological forensic examinations. Eighteen photographs of the body were taken during the inspection and were added to the record. The Government provided the Court with a copy of that record, together with black and white versions of these photographs, in which no sign of injury to the body can be seen. The applicant provided the Court with a copy of a colour version of photograph no. 5 added to the record. It appears from this photograph that there was a bruise on the left side of his neck between the ear and the shoulder and a bruise around the left eye. However, there was no mention of such injuries in the record of 14 July 2010. 14. On 12 August 2010 the two experts who had examined U.M.’s body on 14 July 2010 issued report (akt) no. 21 on the forensic medical examination (meyitin məhkəmə-tibbi müayinəsi) of the body, which was considered as an annex to the record of 14 July 2010. The report was based on the examination of the body on 14 July 2014, as well as on the results of the biological and histological forensic examinations of the samples taken from the body and the opinions of two other specialists. The experts concluded that, taking into consideration that there was no injury which might have caused the death, U.M.’s death had probably resulted from a severe dysfunction of the respiratory system (kəskin tənəffüs çatışmazlığı) caused by swelling of the thymus gland and the development of a brain tumour. As for the injuries found on the body, the experts concluded that they were not related to U.M.’s death. They further found that those injuries had been caused by a hard blunt object, that the abrasions, bruise and haemorrhage were likely to have been inflicted one to three days before the death, and the scratch not more than one week before the death. 15. It appears from the documents in the case file that on various dates the investigator in charge of the case questioned a number of soldiers of the military unit in which U.M. had served. The soldiers stated that they had never witnessed any case of ill-treatment during their military service. 16. On 25 August 2010 the investigator ordered a forensic examination. The investigator asked the experts conducting that examination to answer various questions concerning the cause of U.M.’s death and the existence of any relationship between U.M.’s previous health problems and his death. The investigator also asked the experts to establish whether the injuries on U.M.’s body could have been sustained when he had performed physical exercises during his military service or when the soldiers had tried to resuscitate him. 17. On 24 September 2010 the experts issued forensic report no. k/82, which mainly reiterated the findings of the report of 12 August 2010. The experts concluded that U.M.’s death had probably resulted from severe dysfunction of the respiratory system caused by swelling of the thymus gland and the development of a brain tumour, because there was no potentially lethal injury on his body. They further noted that U.M. had probably been suffering from this disease before joining the army, but it had not been possible to reveal it during the medical examinations. As regards the investigator’s question concerning the origin of the injuries, the experts noted that as they had not examined the body they could not give a clear answer to that question. However, they pointed out that, taking into consideration the morphological characteristics of the injuries, it was possible from the medical forensic point of view that they could have been sustained when U.M. had been performing physical exercises during his military service or when the soldiers had tried to resuscitate him. 18. On 16 October 2010 an investigator from the Zagatala Military Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with U.M.’s death. Relying on the forensic medical reports, the investigator concluded that the death had probably resulted from severe dysfunction of the respiratory system caused by swelling of the thymus gland and the development of a brain tumour. He further held that, as U.M. had not complained about his state of health and had had no clear symptoms, it had not been possible to establish the existence of this health problem during the medical examinations that U.M. had undergone before joining the army. As regards the injuries on U.M.’s body, the investigator noted that U.M. had never been ill-treated during his military service and that these injuries could have been sustained when U.M. had been performing physical exercises or when the soldiers had tried to resuscitate him. 19. On 12 November 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Ganja Military Court against the investigator’s decision of 16 October 2010, complaining of the ineffectiveness of the criminal investigation. He disputed the investigator’s conclusions relating to the cause of his son’s death, arguing that U.M. had not been suffering from any disease. In particular, he argued that, if U.M. had really died of the swelling of the thymus gland and a brain tumour, there would have been prior medical symptoms. The applicant further disputed the investigator’s explanation as regards the origin of the injuries found on U.M.’s body. In that connection, he submitted that, although the experts concluded that the injuries were likely to have been inflicted one to three days before the death, the investigator held that the injuries could have been sustained when the soldiers tried to resuscitate U.M. on 14 July 2010. 20. On 24 November 2010 the Ganja Military Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The court reiterated the investigator’s findings as regards the cause of the death and the origin of the injuries found on U.M.’s body. 21. On 7 December 2010 the applicant appealed against that decision, reiterating his previous complaints. He complained, in particular, that the criminal investigation had failed to establish clearly the cause of his son’s death and the origin of the injuries found on U.M.’s body. 22. On 24 December 2010 the Shaki Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.