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5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Assemini (Italy). 6. By a decision of 4 December 2006 of the Cantonal Prosecutor of the Hercegovina-Neretva Canton (Hercegovačko-neretvanski kanton; one of the ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) the applicant was granted the reimbursement of costs which she had incurred as a witness in the amount of 519 convertible marks (BAM)[1]. 7. On 29 February 2008 the Mostar Municipal Court (“the Municipal Court”) rejected the applicant’s request for the enforcement of this decision, deeming it unenforceable. 8. On 18 September 2008 the Mostar Cantonal Court (“the Cantonal Court”) quashed this decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. 9. On 19 November 2008 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju). 10. On 19 June 2009 the Municipal Court upheld the objection lodged against this decision. 11. On 1 April 2010 the Cantonal Court quashed this decision and again remitted the case to the Municipal Court. 12. On 18 February 2011 the Municipal Court partly accepted the objection against the writ of execution specifically as regards the interest on the main debt calculated from 4 January 2007, and the interest on the total costs of the enforcement proceedings. 13. On 2 December 2011 the Cantonal Court upheld this decision. 14. On 19 September 2013 the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina dismissed the applicant’s request for revision as inadmissible. 15. On 23 December 2013 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina partially accepted the applicant’s appeal and thereby found a violation of her right to a trial within a reasonable time, due to the non-enforcement of the decision of the Municipal Court of 18 February 2011 (see paragraph 12 above). It also ordered the Hercegovina-Neretva Canton to undertake measures in order to enforce the decision within a reasonable time. The Constitutional Court, however, did not award the non-pecuniary damage requested by the applicant. 16. On 21 October 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina confirmed that the final decision in question had not yet been enforced. 17. On 18 December 2014 the said final decision was enforced and the applicant was paid in cash. 18. By a judgment of the Municipal Court of 3 April 2009, which became final on 16 December 2009, a certain P.M. was ordered to pay the applicant the costs of civil proceedings in the amount of BAM 1,959. 19. On 31 October 2010 the applicant submitted to the Municipal Court a request for the enforcement of this judgment. 20. On 14 September 2011, 4 November 2011 and 5 October 2012 the applicant submitted requests for the acceleration of the enforcement proceedings. 21. On 5 December 2012 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution. 22. On 13 June 2013 the Municipal Court dismissed the objection lodged against its decision of 5 December 2012, and P.M. subsequently appealed this decision to the Cantonal Court. 23. On 17 September 2013 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found a violation of the applicant’s right to a trial within a reasonable time, due to the duration of the enforcement proceedings before the Municipal Court. It further ordered the Cantonal Court to urgently rule on the appeal lodged by P.M. The Constitutional Court, however, did not award the non-pecuniary damage requested by the applicant. 24. On 16 October 2013 the Cantonal Court dismissed the appeal lodged by P.M. 25. On 11 June 2015 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution. 26. On 4 August 2016 the said final judgment was enforced and the applicant was paid in cash on her bank account in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It appears that the applicant was still living in Italy at that time.

4. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Pervomayskiy, the Krasnodar Region. 5. In 1967-95 the applicant worked in the Far North of Russia. His family was entitled to assistance in resettlement from the Kamchatka Region pursuant to the Federal Target Program “Construction of housing for persons moving from the Far North Areas”. 6. The program was adopted on 10 July 1995 by the Government of Russia, in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation no. 1122 of 23 September 1992. It provided, inter alia, for construction of housing for persons wishing to resettle from the Far North to various Russian regions. The program was financed by the federal and regional budgets. The client for the entire program was a state scientific and production company S.M. 7. In 1994 S.M. and the State Unitary Enterprise “United Direction for Construction of the Kamchatka Region” (the GUP) concluded a co‑operation agreement. S.M. undertook to build an apartment block in Inzhavino of the Tambov Region, provide assistance with residence registration and compensate 30 per cent of the flats’ price in case they were occupied. The GUP undertook to pay for the housing. 8. At a later stage in 1994 the applicant and the GUP concluded a shared-construction agreement in respect of a flat in the apartment block in Inzhavino. The GUP undertook to provide the applicant with the flat and to transfer it to the applicant’s ownership once it was accepted for exploitation, and the applicant was to pay the price of the flat. He paid the amount due. 9. In 1995 S.M. built the flats and transferred them to the GUP, which was acting for the administration of the Kamchatka Region, to be registered as the administration’s property. The GUP then transferred the flat to the applicant, whose title to the flat was registered. However, expert examinations in respect of the adjacent flats in the same apartment block revealed a number of serious breaches of the sanitary and construction which made the apartment block unsuitable for living. 10. On 2 February 2001 the applicant brought a court action against the GUP for non-compliance with contractual obligations and provision of appropriate housing in accordance with the contract, instead of the flat initially provided to him. 11. On 21 June 2001 he modified the claims asking to dissolve the shared-construction agreement, declare the apartment block to be not in compliance with the construction norms, and pay him damages. On 22 June 2001 the expert examination was ordered by the court, and in December 2001 the expert report was submitted to the court. In the meantime, the case was joined with a number of similar cases against the same defendant. 12. On 13 February 2002 the Inzhavinskiy District Court of the Tambov Region (“the District Court”) rejected the claim. On 25 March 2002, acting on the applicant’s appeal, the Tambov Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) quashed the lower court’s judgment and remitted the case for a new examination, for the court’s failure to establish substantial facts of the case and to examine some items of evidence referred to in the judgment. 13. On 15 July 2002 the District Court again rejected the claim. On 21 August 2002 the Regional Court allowed the applicant’s appeal and found that the lower court had incorrectly applied the domestic law provisions on statutory limitations. It quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case for a new examination. 14. On 11 September 2002 the District Court allowed the claim in part and ordered the defendant to pay the applicant an amount of money. On 23 October 2002 the Regional Court granted the applicant’s appeal and found that the lower court had raised and examined issues falling outside the scope of the applicant’s claims. It annulled the first-instance judgment and sent the case for a fresh consideration by the first-instance court. 15. On 28 January 2003 the District Court allowed the claim in part and awarded the applicant a sum of money which was larger than that pursuant to the judgment of 11 September 2002. On 26 March 2003, on the appeal of the applicant’s counsel, the Regional Court quashed the judgment, in particular, for a failure to address the important circumstances of the case, and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 16. On 20 June 2003 the District Court allowed the claim in part and declared the contract at issue null and void. On 22 July 2003 the District Court supplemented its judgment of 20 June 2003. Both parties appealed. On 20 August 2003 the Regional Court annulled the judgments, having found that the lower court had incorrectly applied the norms of substantive law, and ordered a new examination of the case by the first-instance court. 17. On 1 December 2003 the District Court allowed the claim in full. On 10 March 2004, on the appeal of the defendant, the Regional Court set aside the judgment as it contained an incorrect interpretation of the substantive law, and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 18. The applicant modified his claim, requesting replacement of the flat by a new one of appropriate quality, in line with the consumer protection law. 19. On 5 May 2005 the District Court rejected the claim. The applicant appealed. On 27 July 2005 the Regional Court upheld the District Court’s judgment. The applicant applied for supervisory review proceedings. 20. On 20 April 2006 the Presidium of the Regional Court granted his request, quashed the judgments of 5 May and 27 July 2005 as issued in breach of procedural and substantive law, and ordered that the case be re‑examined by the first-instance court. 21. The applicant modified the scope of the claims. He claimed the dissolution of the shared-construction agreement, as well as pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and court expenses. 22. By a judgment of 17 July 2006 the District Court allowed the claim in part. It established that the flat built for the applicant by the company did not comply with the sanitary and technical requirements. The court ordered the dissolution of the shared-construction agreement between the applicant and the State Unitary Enterprise “United Direction for Construction of the Kamchatka Region” concerning the construction of housing. The court further obliged the respondent enterprise to pay the applicant 644,570 Russian roubles (RUB)[1] in damages, RUB 300,000[2] in penalty and RUB 12,277[3] in costs and expenses. The court further ordered that the flat be transferred in the local administration’s ownership. The applicant appealed. On 20 December 2006 the Regional Court upheld the judgment of 17 July 2006. 23. On 31 January 2007 the writs of execution were sent by the district court to the applicant. 24. According to the Government, on 2 November 2007 the applicant applied to the bailiffs’ service with a request to open the enforcement proceedings and enclosed a copy of the writ of execution. On the same date the enforcement proceedings were opened. 25. Between 28 April and 25 September 2008, by several instalments, the debtor company transferred the amounts due under the writs to the applicant’s known banking account. However, the money returned to the company as the account had been closed in the meantime. 26. On 19 September and 7 November 2008 the bailiffs requested that the applicant updates his banking account information. On 31 October 2008 the bailiffs’ service informed the applicant that the debtor had paid the amount due under the judgment, and re-invited him to submit his banking details. 27. On 6 February 2009 the applicant provided the requested information. On the same date the amount awarded by the domestic court was paid to him in full. 28. The State Unitary Enterprise “United Direction for Construction of the Kamchatka Region” (the GUP) was set up by a decision of the administration of the Kamchatka Region. The company, incorporated as a unitary enterprise at the material time, had “the right of economic control” (право хозяйственного ведения) over the assets allocated to it by the administration in order to carry out its statutory activities. The founder was the owner of the assets. 29. It appears that at the material time the GUP was involved in the construction of socially-important objects in the Kamchatka Region. It used to be a client for construction, major overhaul and reconstruction, represented the regional administration in the respective transactions and was in receipt of the relevant budgetary funds. In particular, in 2002-2005 the company on several occasions became a client and managed funds in respect of construction projects under various Federal Targeted Programs related to housing provision, including resettlement from the Far North, housing for orphans and veterans, and received funds from the regional budget for that purpose. Since August 2004 the company was “a regional State client” (областной государственный заказчик) in respect of the housing subsidies’ allocation for citizens leaving the Far North areas.

5. The first applicant (Ms Muchnik) was born in 1968 and lives in Tomsk. The second applicant (Mr Mordovin) was born in 1956 and lives in Seversk, in the Tomsk Region. 6. At the end of 2014 the Russian Television and Radio Network informed the private regional television company TV-2 that its contract for broadcast services would be cancelled as of 1 January 2015. At the same time, the Federal Service for the Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Роскомнадзор) did not renew the company’s broadcast licence, which was due to expire on 8 February 2015. As a result, TV-2, one of the leading channels in the Tomsk Region which had been reporting on everyday life in the region since 1990, stopped broadcasting at the beginning of 2015. 7. According to the first applicant, between 4 and 14 January 2015 she staged nine solo demonstrations to protest against the authorities’ decision to deprive TV-2 of its ability to broadcast. Some other people also staged solo demonstrations on the same dates and at the same time, keeping a 30‑metre distance from each other. 8. According to the Government, the first applicant, acting together with other persons, held nine “pickets” (пикеты) near two shopping centres in Tomsk between 4 and 14 January 2015, expressing support for TV-2. These “pickets” were held without prior notification being given to local authorities. 9. On 27 February 2015 an administrative-offence record was compiled in respect of the first applicant. She was accused of organising and participating in group public events held without prior notification being given to the local authority, an offence punishable under Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, “the CAO”). It was considered that, while the applicant and other solo demonstrators had complied with the local requirement to keep a 30-metre distance from each other, there had still been a single event amounting to an “assembly” of several people. 10. The administrative case file contained a report and an explanatory note from a high-ranking police officer from Tomsk police department. It was stated, in particular, that F. had initiated a number of public assemblies in support of TV-2 from 4 January 2015 onwards, by posting calls for support via social networks. The first applicant had picked up those involved in the solo demonstrations and transported them to the event venues; she had also handed out leaflets to them for distribution. It was stated that she had organised “picketing” over the course of ten days and had enlisted the help of around eighty people. The report comprised several screenshots of Facebook pages showing calls for people to support TV-2 through protests, including a personal page of the applicant. The administrative case file also contained several reports by police officers who had been present on 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 13 January 2015 at the location where the solo demonstrations had taken place. The police officers pointed out that no breaches of the Public Events Act (hereinafter, “the PEA”) had been detected; the demonstrators had kept the minimum 30-metre distance from each other and had not breached public order. 11. On 3 March 2015 the case against the first applicant was submitted to the Sovetskiy District Court of Tomsk. On the same day, it was assigned to a judge, who set up a hearing for 4.30 p.m. At 1.45 p.m. the judge’s assistant informed the applicant of this by telephone. The judge dismissed an application for the hearing to be adjourned for two days, because such a case had to be examined on the same day it was received by a court. However, the judge gave the applicant an hour to study the file, and when her lawyer appeared some time later he requested only fifteen minutes to study the file. The judge’s assistant later reported that the applicant had not studied the file for the hour which she had been given; instead, she had talked on the phone and chatted with the other people present in the courtroom. The hearing went from 6.09 p.m. to 11.28 p.m., including breaks. 12. By a judgment of 3 March 2015 the first applicant was convicted under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB – about 287 euros (EUR) at the time). The court relied on the administrative-offence record, reports and an explanatory note by police officers, screenshots of Facebook pages, and written statements by different people outlining the applicant’s role in organising the public events. The court dismissed as unreliable the testimony of F. and the applicant’s husband, who had been questioned at her request. 13. The first applicant appealed against the judgment to the Tomsk Regional Court. By a decision of 13 April 2015 the appellate court excluded the reference to the applicant being the organiser of the events, but upheld the remainder of the trial judgment. 14. On 7 September 2015 and 10 February 2016 the Tomsk Regional Court and the Supreme Court of Russia respectively dismissed applications for review lodged by the first applicant. 15. According to the second applicant, on 6 August 2014 from 6 p.m. to 7 p.m. he staged a solo demonstration protesting against the persecution of political activists. The officials present at the venue in question did not make any claims during his solo demonstration or after it (see, however, paragraph 17 below). The applicant was not hindered in any way and completed his demonstration. 16. According to the national authorities and according to the Government’s submissions before the Court, on 6 August 2014 from 6 p.m. to 7 p.m. the second applicant, acting together with (seven) other persons, organised and held a public event in the form of “picket” near Big City, a shopping centre in Tomsk. Using visual aids, the applicant and other protestors expressed their opinion about the participants in the events of 6 May 2012 in Bolotnaya Square in Moscow, without giving prior notification to the authorities. 17. On 15 May 2015 the head of the division for the execution of administrative legislation of the Tomsk police department (ОИАЗ УМВД России по городу Томску) compiled an administrative-offence record in respect of the second applicant and notified him of that record. The latter was accused of an offence under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO for organising and holding a public event without giving prior notification to the competent authority. It was stated that the participants had had posters and T-shirts with slogans expressing their demand that the political activists be released. 18. The administrative case file contained notes written by the police which described a video-recording of the “picket” and comprised screenshots of several social media webpages calling for people to participate in the event of 6 August 2014. It also contained two explanatory notes by police officers from the Tomsk police department’s Centre for Combatting Extremism. The notes described monitoring activities carried out in respect of the applicant and other activists, and three public assemblies held by them on 6 June, 6 July and 6 August 2014. 19. On 15 May 2015 the case file against the applicant was submitted to the Sovetskiy District Court of Tomsk. The applicant, who had not been deprived of his liberty, attended the trial and pleaded not guilty. The trial court heard several witnesses on behalf of the defence. On the same day the district court convicted the second applicant under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB 20,000 (about EUR 306 at the time). The applicant was not represented by a lawyer at the trial. The court considered that the applicant had conspired with others to hold a static demonstration on 6 August 2014; the applicant had been the event organiser, and he had failed to give the authorities prior notification of the event. The court relied on the administrative-offence record drawn up by the police and on various notes and video-recordings produced by the police. In particular, the court noted that the videos showed the applicant and other participants in the event gathering at the venue; it also showed that during the event they had been standing less than 30 metres from each other and talking. The court dismissed the applicant’s argument that he had staged a solo demonstration, an argument which was supported by the testimony of defence witnesses who had also been participants in the event. 20. The second applicant lodged an appeal against the above judgment. On 19 June 2015 the Tomsk Regional Court held an appeal hearing and heard the applicant and his lawyer. The appellate court noted that the available evidence did not confirm that the applicant had been the event organiser; however, he had still been a participant in the public assembly, an assembly of which the authorities had not been given notice. The court therefore reclassified his actions, found him guilty under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO and reduced the fine to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 165 at the time). 21. On 30 November 2015 the acting President of the Tomsk Regional Court rejected a further appeal on points of law by the second applicant.

6. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Munich. He and Mr W. founded the T.AG, a directory enquiries service. The T.AG received, for a fee, the required subscriber information from DTAG. In 2007 and 2008 DTAG was ordered to refund the T.AG part of the fees paid, as they had been excessive. 7. In 2005 the applicant brought an action against DTAG, claiming that as a result of the excessive prices paid by the T.AG, he and Mr W. had had to reduce their shares in the company before its stock market launch. For that reason, as well as on account of a lower valuation of the company on the day of the launch, he had sustained damage. On 28 May 2013 the Regional Court dismissed the claim. 8. The applicant appealed against the Regional Court’s decision. In the reasons for the appeal, he made comments on, inter alia, EU law and the respective interpretation by the CJEU and the Federal Court of Justice. He did not request a referral of a particular question to the CJEU. During an oral hearing before the Court of Appeal the issue of EU law was discussed and the court explained that, in its view, the case-law of the CJEU was clear and that, in contrast to what had been suggested by the applicant, EU law was not applicable to the present case. In the same hearing the applicant called for the proceedings to be suspended and a preliminary ruling from the CJEU to be obtained. In submissions after the hearing he repeated his request and suggested the following wording for a possible preliminary question: “Does Article 86 TEC in the version of the Maastricht Treaty (Article 102 TFEU) preclude the interpretation and application of domestic legislation enacted by a member State which categorically excludes, for legal reasons, the liability of a dominant undertaking that damages a competing joint-stock company through its abusive prices in violation of Article 86 TEC (Article 102 TFEU), thus putting it at risk of bankruptcy, also for damage sustained by the founding shareholders of the damaged joint-stock company resulting from the fact that they take on new shareholders in order to avert bankruptcy, thereby reducing their own shares in the company?” 9. On 2 July 2014 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. In its reasoning the court stated, in particular, that his claim could not be based on EU law, as the applicant was not covered by the protective purpose of any of its provisions. In that regard, the court gave a detailed account of why the applicant’s legal opinion was not supported by the CJEU’s case‑law, to which it referred extensively. It also referred to the relevant case-law of the Federal Court of Justice. As regards the question of whether the applicant should be granted leave to appeal on points of law, the Court of Appeal stated: “There is no reason to grant leave to appeal on points of law pursuant to Article 543 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung). The chamber’s reasoning on the legal question as to who is covered by the protective purpose of Article 86 TEC, Article 82 § 2 EC and Article 102 TFEU and who is consequently eligible for compensation within the meaning of Article 823 § 2 of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) or section 33(1) of the Prevention of Restrictions on Competition Act (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen), have no significance in terms of legal principle (no fundamental significance). There is no need to clarify the legal question raised, since there are no doubts concerning the scope and interpretation of those legal provisions. The plaintiff’s opinion that anyone suffering damage on account of a violation of competition law should be entitled to damages, regardless of the law’s protective purpose, is not shared by anyone in academic writing or case-law.“ 10. The applicant filed a complaint against the refusal of leave to appeal on points of law. In his complaint he repeated his request for a referral to the CJEU and suggested the wording for two questions, one of them being a slightly modified version of the previously suggested question: “Does Article 86 TEC in the version of the Maastricht Treaty (Article 102 TFEU) preclude the interpretation and application of domestic legislation enacted by a member State which categorically excludes, for legal reasons, the liability of a dominant undertaking that damages a competing joint-stock company in violation of Article 86 TEC (Article 102 TFEU), thus putting it at risk of bankruptcy, also for damage sustained by the shareholders of the competing joint-stock company resulting from the fact that they take on new shareholders in order to avert bankruptcy, thereby reducing their own share of the company? ... Does Article 86 TEC (Article 102 TFEU) preclude the interpretation and application of domestic legislation enacted by a member State as laid out in the first question for referral if the damaged shareholders are founding shareholders (investors) who, at the time of the damaging event, have a significant shareholding and, as members of the company’s executive board, decisively shape the company’s competitive conduct?” 11. On 14 April 2015 the Federal Court of Justice rejected the applicant’s complaint: “... because the legal matter [had] not [been] of fundamental significance, because the complaints based on violations of procedural rights [had] failed to convince and because neither the further development of the law nor the interests in ensuring uniform adjudication [had required] a decision to be issued by the court hearing the appeal on points of law (Article 543 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure). More detailed reasoning can be dispensed with pursuant to the second clause of the second sentence of Article 544 § 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 12. The applicant filed a complaint concerning a violation of his right to be heard (Anhörungsrüge) and argued that the Federal Court of Justice had not provided adequate reasoning for the refusal of a referral to the CJEU. On 18 May 2015 the Federal Court of Justice rejected the applicant’s complaint, stating that it had examined his submissions but had not considered them sufficiently convincing and that a decision by a court of last resort had not required more detailed reasoning. 13. On 25 February 2016 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider a constitutional complaint (1 BvR 1410/16) lodged by the applicant, without providing reasons. 14. Article 543 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: “(1) An appeal on points of law may only be lodged if: 2. The court hearing the appeal on points of law has granted leave upon a complaint against the refusal to grant leave to appeal on points of law. (2) An appeal on points of law shall be admitted if: 2. Further development of the law or the interests in ensuring uniform adjudication require a decision to be issued by the court hearing the appeal on points of law. The court hearing the appeal on points of law shall be bound by the admission of the appeal by the appellate court.” 15. The relevant parts of Article 544 of the Code of Civil Procedure read as follows: “(1) Any refusal by the appellate court to grant leave to appeal on points of law may be subject to a complaint (complaint against the refusal of leave to appeal). ... (4) The court hearing the appeal on points of law shall rule on the complaint in a corresponding court order. The reasons on which the order is based shall be summarised briefly; that reasoning may be dispensed with where it would not contribute to clarifying the requirements for granting leave to appeal, or where the court finds for the party filing the complaint. The decision regarding the complaint is to be served upon the parties. ...” 16. According to the established case-law of the Federal Court of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court a legal matter is, amongst other reasons, always of “fundamental significance” if it raises a question that requires a uniform interpretation of EU law, which is relevant for deciding the case, and makes a referral for a preliminary ruling during the appeal proceedings very probable. Therefore, refusal of leave to appeal (on points of law) includes the consideration that a referral to the CJEU is not required in that case (see, for example, Federal Court of Justice, I ZR 130/02, 16 January 2003; Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 557/88, 22 December 1992; 1 BvR 2534/10, 3 March 2014; 1 BvR 1320/14, 8 October 2015). To provide the Federal Constitutional Court with the possibility to review such decisions for arbitrariness, it is necessary that the court establish the reasons for the decision either from the reasoning of the court of last resort or otherwise (see Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 557/88, 22 December 1992; 1 BvR 2534/10, 3 March 2014; 1 BvR 1320/14, 8 October 2015). In case 2 BvR 557/88, the first-instance court had provided detailed reasoning concerning the relevant EU law and why there were no doubts regarding the correct interpretation of those provisions. It had relied on established case-law of the Federal Financial Court. Under these circumstances, the Constitutional Court found it acceptable that the Federal Financial Court had rejected the subsequent complaint against the refusal of leave to appeal without providing reasons. In case 1 BvR 1320/14, however, the Constitutional Court found a violation of the right to a decision by the legally competent court (Recht auf den gesetzlichen Richter) because the Federal Court of Justice had rejected a complaint against the refusal of leave to appeal on points of law and had not provided any reasoning. In that case, the court found that an obligation for a referral to the CJEU during the appeal on points of law proceedings was very likely (lag nahe) and that the Federal Court of Justice had not explained why it had rejected leave to appeal on points of law nevertheless. Even though the lower court had provided brief reasoning, there were no indications that the Federal Court of Justice had embraced it, particularly since the applicant in the proceedings had made extensive submissions in its complaint against the refusal of leave to appeal on points of law, disputing the reasoning of the lower court. 17. Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) provides as follows: “The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the Treaties; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union ...; Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court.” 18. Interpreting this provision, the CJEU held in the case of S.r.l. CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo S.p.a. v. Ministry of Health (C‑283/81, judgment of 6 October 1982, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335, § 21) that: “... a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law is required, where a question of Community law is raised before it, to comply with its obligation to bring the matter before the Court [of Justice], unless it has established that the question raised is irrelevant or that the Community provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court or that the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. The existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of Community law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the Community.” 19. In the case of Kenny Roland Lyckeskog (C-99/00, 4 June 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:329) the CJEU decided, among other things, the question of whether a national court which in practice was the court of last resort in a case, because a declaration of admissibility was needed in order for the case to be reviewed by the country’s supreme court, was a court within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 234 EC (current Article 267 of the TFEU). The court held: “16. Decisions of a national appellate court which can be challenged by the parties before a supreme court are not decisions of a ‘court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law’ within the meaning of Article [267]. The fact that examination of the merits of such appeals is subject to a prior declaration of admissibility by the supreme court does not have the effect of depriving the parties of a judicial remedy. 17. That is so under the Swedish system. The parties always have the right to appeal to the Högsta domstol against the judgment of a hovrätt, which cannot therefore be classified as a court delivering a decision against which there is no judicial remedy. Under Paragraph 10 of Chapter 54 of the Rättegångsbalk, the Högsta domstol may issue a declaration of admissibility if it is important for guidance as to the application of the law that the appeal be examined by that court. Thus, uncertainty as to the interpretation of the law applicable, including Community law, may give rise to review, at last instance, by the supreme court. 18. If a question arises as to the interpretation or validity of a rule of Community law, the supreme court will be under an obligation, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article [267], to refer a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling either at the stage of the examination of admissibility or at a later stage.” 20. This judgment was referred to in a later judgment of the CJEU (Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt, C-210/06, 16 December 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:723), in which it held: “76. The Court has already held that decisions of a national appellate court which can be challenged by the parties before a supreme court are not decisions of ‘a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law’ within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 267. The fact that the examination of the merits of such challenges is conditional upon a preliminary declaration of admissibility by the supreme court does not have the effect of depriving the parties of a judicial remedy (Lyckeskog, paragraph 16). 77. That is true a fortiori in the case of a procedural system such as that under which the case before the referring court must be decided, since that system makes no provision for a preliminary declaration by the supreme court that the appeal is admissible and, instead, merely imposes restrictions with regard, in particular, to the nature of the pleas which may be raised before such a court, which must allege a breach of law.” 21. As regards the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings, the CJEU stated in the case of György Katz v. István Roland Sós (C-404/07, 9 October 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:553): “37. ... It is for the national court, not the parties to the main proceedings, to bring a matter before the Court of Justice. The right to determine the questions to be put to the Court thus devolves on the national court alone and the parties may not change their tenor ...” 22. In its judgment of 9 November 2010 in the case of VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v. Ference Schneider (C-137/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:659), the CJEU stated: “28. ... the system established by Article 267 TFEU with a view to ensuring that European Union law is interpreted uniformly throughout the Member States instituted direct cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts by means of a procedure which is completely independent of any initiative by the parties ...” 23. On 25 November 2016 the CJEU published its (updated) Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (2016/C 439/01). The relevant part reads as follows: “3. The jurisdiction of the Court to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation or validity of EU law is exercised exclusively on the initiative of the national courts and tribunals, whether or not the parties to the main proceedings have expressed the wish that a question be referred to the Court. In so far as it is called upon to assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, it is for the national court or tribunal before which a dispute has been brought – and for that court or tribunal alone – to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of each case, both the need for a request for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court.”

5. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Kyiv. 6. Prior to the events in question, he had been actively involved in Ukrainian politics. From 25 May 2006 to 15 June 2007 and from 23 November 2007 to 23 May 2008 he was a Member of Parliament and from 26 December 2007 to 24 March 2010 he was First Deputy Minister of Justice. His father-in-law was President of the Supreme Court of Ukraine from 2006 to 2011. 7. Between November 2005 and June 2006 and then between June and March 2008 the applicant was one of the equity partners of the law firm Magisters & Partners Ltd (subsequently renamed Magisters Ltd). 8. In December 2008 the State-owned joint-stock company Naftogaz Ukrayiny (hereinafter referred to as “Naftogaz”), which was involved in several serious disputes before the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, decided to extend the legal services agreement which it had concluded with Magisters Ltd in 2002 and which was about to expire. 9. On 23 February 2009 the applicant, acting in his capacity as First Deputy Minister of Justice, sent a letter to Naftogaz, at the latter’s request, informing it of the existence of exceptional conditions, as provided under domestic law, for purchasing legal services from Magisters Ltd without inviting bids from other law firms. It was noted that Magisters Ltd had been providing Naftogaz with legal services for a long time, including in the proceedings before the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. Accordingly, changing the legal services’ provider would be costly and unjustified. 10. The applicant’s letter, which was subsequently submitted to the Economy Ministry, provided the basis for Naftogaz to contract further legal services from Magisters Ltd without pursuing a bidding procedure. 11. On 24 June 2009 the Prosecutor General’s Office (“the PGO”) opened a criminal case under Article 366 § 2 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”; see paragraph 40 below) in respect of alleged forgery of the letter of 23 February 2009 by unspecified officials at the Ministry of Justice. On 14 September 2009 the Kyiv Pecherskyy District Court (“the Pecherskyy Court”) quashed the above ruling after a complaint by the applicant. On 21 October 2009 and 15 July 2010 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld the first-instance court’s decision. 12. On 1 July 2009 the PGO opened another criminal case in respect of the same facts, this time under Article 364 § 2 of the CC (see paragraph 38 below) on suspicion of abuse of office with grave consequences by unspecified Ministry of Justice officials. On 28 December 2009 the Pecherskyy Court quashed that ruling. Its decision was upheld by the appellate court on 10 February 2010. It appears that it was not challenged on points of law. 13. On 5 August 2010 the PGO faxed the applicant “an invitation” to go to its offices at 10 a.m. the following day for questioning about “possible abuse of office and forgery by officials of the Ministry of Justice”. 14. On 6 August 2010 the PGO re-sent the “invitation” to the applicant. This time his questioning was expected at 9.30 a.m. on 9 August 2010. However, he did not appear before the prosecutor. 15. On 20 December 2010 the PGO instructed the Kyiv city police to establish the applicant’s whereabouts and to hand him a summons for questioning at 10 a.m. on 22 December 2010. The letter noted that the applicant had not been present at his address as established by the investigation. 16. Also on 20 December 2010 the PGO enquired with the State Border Service regarding the applicant’s trips abroad in 2009 and 2010. According to the information it received on 21 December 2010, the applicant had left Ukraine more than thirty times during the period in question. 17. On 21 December 2010 an official of the Kyiv city police wrote to the PGO that its information about the applicant’s address was outdated (he had sold the flat in 2003 and had not lived there since). 18. On 22 December 2010 the PGO enquired with the Kyiv city and regional address bureau about the applicant’s registered address and received a reply on 23 December 2010 that he lived in Yagotyn in the Kyiv region. 19. On 22 December 2010 the PGO instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant under Article 365 § 3 of the CC (exceeding of powers by an official leading to grave consequences – see paragraph 39 below). In describing the applicant’s actus reus, the prosecutor found that he had bypassed the registry of the Ministry of Justice when accepting the request from Naftogaz and issuing his letter in reply; that his conclusion about the existence of exceptional conditions for Naftogaz not to pursue a bidding procedure had been in contradiction with the applicable legal provisions; and that he had had no right to put that conclusion on official Ministry of Justice paper. The subsequent extension by Naftogaz of its contract with Magisters Ltd had caused considerable losses to the State budget. 20. Later that day the investigator called the applicant by telephone to summon him for questioning. At the time, he was in hospital with his wife, who was giving birth to their third child. 21. In the afternoon of 22 December 2010, the applicant appeared before the investigator and after being questioned was arrested at 4.50 p.m. under Articles 106 and 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”; see paragraph 41 below). According to the official report, the applicant had been arrested on the grounds that “eyewitnesses, including victims, directly identified [him] as the one who had committed the offence”. His arrest was justified by the necessity to prevent him evading justice or from obstructing the establishment of the truth, and to ensure the execution of an eventual court judgment. The arrest report had the following description of the facts giving rise to the prosecution: “... during the period from 5 to 27 February 2009 [the applicant], exceeding his official powers, issued an expert conclusion with knowingly false information, as a result of which considerable damage, amounting to 1,697,600 [Ukrainian] hryvnias [equal to about 152,000 euros at the time] was caused to [Naftogaz]. In other words, he is suspected of committing a criminal offence under Article 365 § 3 of the [CC].” 22. The procedural rights of arrestees were also listed. The applicant signed it with a remark that he considered his arrest as unlawful given that he had complied with the investigator’s summons in accordance with the CCP and that there was no risk of him hindering the establishment of the truth as he was no longer a civil servant. 23. On 23 December 2010 the applicant was officially charged under Article 365 § 3 of the CC. 24. On 24 December 2010 the applicant challenged his arrest before a court. He claimed that the investigator had failed to refer to any factual circumstances to justify his arrest under Articles 106 and 115 of the CCP. The applicant contended that he had appeared before the investigator upon the latter’s first summons, despite the fact that on that day his wife had been in hospital giving birth. That indicated, in his opinion, that he had had no intention of absconding or hindering the investigation. 25. Also on 24 December 2010 the investigator applied to the court for the applicant to be held in pre-trial detention. The necessity of that preventive measure was explained as follows: “Having regard to [the applicant’s] role in the commission of the offence and his causing serious damage to State interests, his age, state of health, family and financial situation, and other circumstances characterising him, the investigation has grounds to believe that [the applicant] will try to influence the witnesses in this case given his extensive networks in law-enforcement bodies and among judicial authorities. Furthermore, the case file contains sufficient evidence showing that [the applicant] avoided appearing before the investigation authorities, that he travels abroad regularly and that he is absent from his registered address. That being so, if at liberty, he will abscond or hinder the investigation and the implementation of procedural decisions. Therefore, the application of any other preventive measure in respect of the accused ... will not be able to ensure his proper procedural conduct and the fulfilment of procedural decisions...” 26. On the same day the Pecherskyy Court found that the case file did not contain sufficient information about the applicant in order to take a decision on the investigator’s application. In particular, the file did not contain sufficient information about the applicant’s health, family and financial situation or his occupation. The court therefore extended the applicant’s preliminary detention to ten days as a temporary preventive measure. The decision was not subject to appeal. 27. On 30 December 2010 the Pecherskyy Court allowed the investigator’s application (see paragraph 25 above) as well-founded and ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The court further held that that finding rendered it unnecessary to examine alternative preventive measures. It rejected the applicant’s complaint about his arrest as unsubstantiated. 28. On 2 January 2011 the applicant appealed. He reiterated his earlier arguments on the alleged unlawfulness of his arrest by the investigator (see paragraph 24 above). Furthermore, he complained that the Pecherskyy Court had failed to justify the application of what was the most intrusive preventive measure available in his case. He argued that the court had not taken into account the fact that he was the sole breadwinner for his three children and his wife and that their newborn child was still in hospital. Positive character references and his requests for a non-custodial preventive measure had also been disregarded. 29. On 4 January 2011 the President of the Ukrainian Bar Association applied to the Court of Appeal, offering his personal surety for the applicant’s release. In the alternative, he indicated that he was ready to pay bail for the applicant. 30. On 13 January 2011 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the findings and reasoning of the Pecherskyy Court’s decision of 30 December 2010. There was no reference in the ruling to the application by the Bar Association President. 31. On 31 January 2011 the applicant was additionally charged with forging an official document under Article 366 § 2 of the CC (see paragraph 40 below). 32. On the same day the pre-trial investigation was declared completed and the applicant was given access to the case file. 33. On 10 February 2011 the Pecherskyy Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention to three months, finding that there were no grounds to change the preliminary measure to a more lenient one. 34. On 15 February 2011 the investigator released the applicant under an undertaking not to abscond. The change of preventive measure was explained by the fact that the applicant could no longer influence witnesses or impede the investigation. The investigator also made a general reference to the applicant’s age, state of health, family and financial situation, as well as the fact that he had children to care for, permanent employment and positive character references. 35. As known from public available material, some media outlets linked the applicant’s release to a private meeting between his father-in-law as the President of the Supreme Court and the President of Ukraine a day earlier, on 14 February 2011. The applicant publicly denied those rumours. 36. The parties did not inform the Court of any further developments in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. Publicly available material shows that he was amnestied in December 2011.

4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Sofia. He is a journalist and a writer. 5. K.T., a popular figure of Bulgarian politics, has for many years been the leader of a trade union. He has in addition been a member of the managing bodies of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the European Trade Union Confederation. According to information submitted by the Government, the trade union formerly headed by K.T. is the second largest in Bulgaria, with a membership of about 150,000. 6. In 2003 the applicant published a book called “the Shadow of Zion”, dealing with Judaism, Zionism, Freemasonry and their impact on world history. 7. On pp. 69-70 the book contained a paragraph comparing communists and Nazis to Freemasons, stating that, in a Freemason manner, the Nazis had “dreamt to perfect the man”, and also that communists had been “doing that in practice”, including in Bulgaria. The text then continued: “And after the ‘democratic changes’ who became a Freemason? All were communists and people connected with their gloomy secret services.” The names of a number of persons were listed after that, including the “pseudo trade unionist” K.T. The list ended with a reference to a footnote which quoted a 2002 article by another author published in a news magazine. 8. On 28 September 2005 K.T. brought a tort action against the applicant, stating that the allegations contained in the book, namely that he was a Freemason, a communist connected with the former secret services and a “pseudo trade unionist”, were untrue and defamatory. He stated that he was a fervent Christian, which meant that he could not be a Freemason, as the Church had condemned Freemasonry, that he had never been a member of the Bulgarian Communist Party or the youth communist organisation, and that he had not been connected with the communist secret services, but had, on the contrary, all his life fought for human rights and democracy. K.T. argued that the applicant’s allegations had humiliated and defamed him, presenting him as an immoral and unscrupulous person, and that they sought to lower his prestige at the national level and internationally. 9. The applicant objected to the action. He stated that when calling K.T. a Freemason he had relied on earlier publications by other authors, one of which was expressly cited in a footnote to the disputed paragraph. Moreover, K.T. had himself stated in a newspaper interview that he was a member of the Maltese Order. As to the allegation that K.T. had been connected with the communist secret services, the applicant intended to prove this through witness testimony. He pointed out in addition that K.T. had himself bragged about being related to leading figures of the communist regime. The applicant argued that in any event the expressions complained of had not been offensive or defamatory, and that K.T. had not shown that he had indeed suffered non-pecuniary damage as a result. 10. The applicant was legally represented throughout the proceedings that ensued. 11. In a judgment of 10 July 2008 the Sofia City Court (hereinafter “the City Court”) allowed the action and ordered the applicant to pay K.T. 15,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN, the equivalent of 7,670 euros – EUR) in moral damage, plus default interest as of 28 September 2005. 12. The City Court referred to the applicant’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention, but considered that in the case he had overstepped the limits of acceptable criticism. It analysed the allegations made by him and concluded that they had been untrue. As to the applicant describing K.T. as a Freemason, this had been refuted by the fact that K.T. was a fervent Orthodox Christian, whereas the Church was known to reject Freemasonry. As to K.T.’s affiliation with the communist secret services, this allegation had been disproved by the official attestations of the specialised body dealing with those services’ archives, and the witnesses brought by the applicant to prove this point had been unconvincing. Lastly, the expression “pseudo trade unionist” amounted to a gratuitous offence, aimed solely at discrediting K.T. 13. The City Court pointed out further that an insult was a “subjective notion”, which meant that if K.T. felt offended by the applicant’s allegations, that sufficed. In particular, being an Orthodox Christian, it was “logical” for him to feel offended by the Freemasonry allegations. 14. Lastly, justifying the amount of damage to be awarded, the City Court noted that the applicant’s publication had “seriously impinged” upon K.T.’s honour and dignity and had defamed him, both “within the whole trade union community in Bulgaria” and internationally. The distress suffered by K.T. had in addition aggravated his health problems, leading to his hospitalisation. 15. Upon appeal by the applicant, on 23 October 2009, the City Court’s judgment was upheld by the Sofia Court of Appeal. It endorsed the lower court’s reasoning, adding the following: even if K.T. had said that he was a member of the Maltese Order, the applicant had not shown that this was equivalent to Freemasonry; it was irrelevant that the allegations made by the applicant had already been made in earlier publications, as this did not make them “less defamatory or truer”; the fact that K.T. was a public figure justified a higher award of damages such as the one made by the City Court. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In a final decision of 17 August 2010 the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to accept the appeal for examination. In particular, it confirmed that whether or not an allegation was to be considered offensive depended on the manner in which it was perceived by the addressee and his social circle, even if this did not conform “to the common understanding of the facts”. 17. K.T. instituted subsequently enforcement proceedings. In October 2011 a bailiff calculated the total amount due by the applicant, including the principal award of BGN 15,000 (see paragraph 11 above), the default interest accrued by that time and the costs and expenses, at BGN 31,549 (EUR 16,100). The enforcement proceedings were discontinued in 2016 after K.T. abandoned his attempts to obtain payment, with the sum seized from the applicant amounting to merely BGN 4.55 (EUR 2.32). 18. After the communication of the present application, on 23 May 2018 the Government submitted their observations, which were forwarded to the applicant. 19. On 30 June 2018 the applicant published a comment on these observations on his personal blog. As to the Government and the position defended by them, he wrote in particular the following paragraphs: “To be able to understand human rights, including freedom and in particular freedom of expression but also of education, every person has to study, to gather knowledge. Stigmatizing, pointing an accusing finger, uttering insults and putting labels are completely different things. These primitive tricks are far from any erudition, which would have made the respective person think, check, and then judge. Alas, the observations prepared by the governmental Agent ... cannot convince the erudite reader that this has been the case.” “Instead of [commenting on the case], the Governmental Agent discusses many other things. Often she utters lies and employs defamatory and offensive language.” “It is a pity and I have lost much of my time having to deal with so many and such rough and rude lies and perversions. What is sadder is that they come from the Government of a country which is a member of the European Union. Let the shame be for their bosses in Brussels.” 20. The applicant also commented on the Court, calling the former Bulgarian Judge S. Botoucharova “communist” and “Muscovite”, the next Judge Z. Kalaydjieva an agent of the former security services, and the current Bulgarian Judge – a “communist infant”. He also wrote: “You will ask me why I have addressed this court of yours. To walk this road to the end and to drain the bitter cup. And to show convincingly one more time that the world is communist. I do not suppose even for a moment that those bolshevized mass idiots with their washed brains in which they still hear the unfired volleys of the Aurora cruiser, and their imbecile heirs, can ever understand this.”

5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Stavropol. 6. The applicant is the founder, sole owner and director of a limited liability company, Akvilon (общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Аквилон»). Prior to the events described below, the company had been engaged in the grocery retail trade. 7. On 30 November 2001 Akvilon purchased 5 tonnes of granulated sugar in 100 sacks on condition of delayed payment with a view to reselling it to Mr P. and Mr Pr. The two men made an oral agreement with the company to pay 55,000 Russian roubles (RUB – approximately 2,000 euros (EUR)) in cash immediately upon receipt of the sugar. 8. On the same date Mr V., the applicant’s husband and a deputy director of Akvilon, transferred the sugar to Mr P. and Mr Pr., who then left under the pretext that they had to fetch more cash in order to be able to pay. Shortly thereafter, Mr V. complained to the Nevinnomyssk Department of the Interior (Управление внутренних дел г. Невинномысска) of the misappropriation by Mr P. and Mr Pr. of the sugar belonging to Akvilon. 9. On 30 November 2001 criminal proceedings were instituted on suspicion of aggravated fraud in connection with the incident. The case was assigned to an investigator, Mr S., who granted the status of victim of a crime to the Akvilon company. 10. Later that day, the investigator in charge found the five tonnes of sugar in garages belonging to Mr P. and Mr Pr., in the amounts of 1.5 tonnes and 3.5 tonnes respectively. The two men admitted that they had no documents confirming that they had obtained the sugar legitimately, but insisted that they had paid the necessary amount in cash to a certain Ms Ya., who had promised to deliver the money to Akvilon and had then disappeared. The investigator acknowledged Mr P. and Mr Pr. as witnesses in the case and, without formally attaching the sugar, left it with them for safe storage. Both men gave written undertakings to store the sugar until a court decision was given on the matter. 11. On 20 December 2001, following a complaint by Akvilon, the Nevinnomyssk prosecutor’s office ordered the investigator, Mr S., to formally attach the sugar, to seize it from Mr P. and Mr Pr. and to deposit it with a neutral person for safe storage. 12. On 11 January 2002 the investigator ordered the attachment and seizure of the sugar from the garages belonging to Mr P. and Mr Pr., and its transfer to a third party for safe storage. On 15 January 2002 the order was executed and the attached sugar was included in the list of exhibits in the case. 13. By a decision of 22 February 2002 the investigator, Mr S., declared Mr V., who acted as a representative of the Akvilon company, a civil claimant in the criminal case. 14. On 6 August 2002, on the instructions of the prosecutor’s office of the Stavropol Region, the investigating authorities transferred the sugar to the Akvilon company for safe storage. 15. In late 2002 the criminal case was transferred to another investigator. 16. By two decisions of 24 March 2003 the investigator in charge lifted the attachment order on the sugar and ordered that it be excluded from the list of exhibits in the case. The decisions stated that the investigation had established that, despite their written undertakings to store the sugar, Mr P. and Mr Pr. had sold it to third persons in December 2001. They had then, on 8 January 2002, purchased another lot of sugar in the amount of 1.5 and 3.5 tonnes respectively, which had subsequently been attached and included in the list of exhibits by Mr S. The decisions concluded that the sugar in question was not the object of the crime in the present case, and therefore its attachment should be lifted. It is unclear what happened to the sugar thereafter. 17. On 31 March 2003 the Nevinnomyssk Department of the Interior decided not to institute criminal proceedings against Mr P. and Mr Pr. in connection with the fact that they had sold the sugar in breach of their written undertakings given to Mr S. The decision stated that the undertakings had not been legally binding, since when they had been given, the sugar had not been formally attached and included in the list of exhibits, and therefore there had been no legal grounds for Mr P. and Mr Pr. to refrain from selling it. 18. By a decision of 18 April 2003 the investigator in charge ordered the withdrawal of Akvilon’s victim status. The decision stated that it had been established during the investigation that on 30 November 2001 the Akvilon company had dispatched the sugar to the garages belonging to Mr P. and Mr Pr. The two men had then delivered the stipulated amount in cash to a certain Ms Ya., who had negotiated the deal between them and Akvilon and had disappeared once in receipt of the money. The decision concluded that in view of the fact that it was Mr P. and Mr Pr.’s money which had been stolen in the present case, rather than Akvilon’s sugar, it was the former and not the company who were victims of the crime. 19. On 6 March 2007 a deputy prosecutor of the Stavropolskiy Region ordered that Akvilon again be granted the status of victim of a crime. 20. On 29 March 2007 the criminal proceedings instituted in connection with misappropriation of Akvilon’s property were suspended owing to the absence of those responsible. 21. In 2002 Mr P. and Mr Pr. lodged a civil claim against the Akvilon company, seeking to have their title to, respectively, 1.5 and 3.5 tonnes of sugar attached by the investigating authorities acknowledged, the attachment order lifted and the sugar returned to them. 22. By a decision of 17 April 2003 the Nevinnomyssk Town Court (“the Town Court”) discontinued the proceedings in so far as they had been brought by Mr Pr. on the grounds that he was officially registered as a businessman, and that therefore his dispute with Akvilon fell within the competence of a commercial court. It does not appear that this decision was appealed against or that Mr Pr. attempted to pursue the proceedings any further. 23. As regards Mr P.’s claim, after several rounds of proceedings, the Town Court granted it in a judgment of 21 May 2004. The court confirmed Mr P.’s title to 1.5 tonnes of sugar, referring to the fact that he had purchased it on 8 January 2002. The court further established that the sugar belonging to Mr P. had been attached by the investigator, Mr S., and transferred to a third party and then to Akvilon for safe storage and that by the investigating authorities’ decision of 24 March 2003 the attachment order had been lifted. The court thus concluded that Akvilon was under an obligation to return 1.5 tonnes of sugar to Mr P., who was its rightful owner. The judgment was not appealed against, and no enforcement proceedings were ever instituted. 24. Throughout the investigation into the incident of 30 November 2001 the applicant lodged numerous complaints with the supervising prosecutors alleging negligence on the part of the investigator, Mr S. In particular, she complained of his failure timeously to attach the sugar belonging to Akvilon and his decision to transfer it for safe storage to Mr P. and Mr Pr., individuals whom Akvilon had accused of fraud, with the result that the sugar had been lost and Akvilon had suffered pecuniary damage. 25. In letters sent to the applicant in the period of 2002-04, the Nevinnomyssk prosecutor’s office and the main investigating division of the Department of the Interior of the Stavropol Region stated, inter alia, that the investigator, Mr S., had indeed breached certain requirements of the criminal procedure legislation. They went on to say that he had been subjected to disciplinary sanctions in that connection, but that there were no grounds to bring criminal proceedings against him. 26. Between April and July 2004 the Nevinnomyssk prosecutor’s office took a number of similar decisions to dispense with criminal proceedings against Mr S. They stated, in essence, that although formally there were elements of an offence punishable under Article 293 of the Russian Criminal Code (professional negligence) in Mr S.’s actions, that Article provided for criminal liability only if the damage caused by such negligence attained a minimum of RUB 100,000, whereas the pecuniary damage alleged by Akvilon had been lower than that amount. 27. In 2003 Akvilon initiated proceedings before the Commercial Court of the Stavropol Region against the Nevinnomyssk Department of the Interior, the Department of the Interior of the Stavropol Region and the Russian Ministry of the Interior. The company complained that the negligent actions on the part of the investigator, Mr S., during the investigation into the incident of 30 November 2001 had resulted in the loss of five tonnes of sugar belonging to the company. His actions had caused pecuniary damage to the company and had been detrimental to its business reputation, given that it had purchased the sugar on condition of delayed payment, which it had then been unable to fulfil. The company indicated that the pecuniary damage it had suffered to that date amounted to RUB 96,312, taking into account the current price of sugar. It also sought compensation for damage to its business reputation. 28. After several rounds of proceedings, in a judgment of 22 October 2004 the Commercial Court of the Stavropol Region dismissed the company’s claims in their entirety. It noted that it had not been proven that the investigator, Mr S., had been negligent in performing his duties, given that it had been decided to dispense with criminal proceedings against him in that connection, and that therefore there was no causal link between his actions and the pecuniary damage alleged by the claimant company. The court also stated that since Mr S. had not disseminated any defamatory statements concerning Akvilon, there were no grounds to grant its claim for compensation for damage to its business reputation. 29. On 30 November 2004 the Appellate Instance of the Commercial Court of the Stavropol Region quashed the first-instance judgment in so far as the applicant’s claim for pecuniary damage was concerned, stating that the lower court finding as to the absence of a causal link between the pecuniary damage sustained by Akvilon and Mr S.’s actions had been incorrect. The appellate court noted that the first-instance court had not taken into account that criminal proceedings against Mr S. in connection with the negligent performance of his duties had not been instituted only on the formal ground that the pecuniary damage inflicted on the claimant company by his actions had been below the statutory limit established in Article 293 of the Russian Criminal Code. The appellate court further found it established that “it was on account of the unlawful actions of investigator S., who had transferred five tonnes of sugar belonging to the Akvilon company to other persons, that [the company] had been deprived not only of its property but also of the right to claim compensation for damage in the context of the criminal proceedings, as the investigator in charge had withdrawn the status of victim [from the company]”. The appellate court considered it established that the company had proven the circumstances in which it had sustained pecuniary losses in the amount of RUB 96,312, and awarded the company the full amount claimed in respect of pecuniary damage, as well as RUB 8,619.42 for costs and expenses to be recovered from the Russian Ministry of the Interior at the expense of the Federal Treasury. The appellate court further upheld the judgment of 22 October 2004 in so far as it rejected the company’s claim concerning compensation for damage to its business reputation. 30. On 10 March 2005 the Federal Commercial Court of the North‑Caucasus Circuit, acting as a cassation instance, upheld the appeal decision of 30 November 2004. The court, however, reduced the award to RUB 55,000, noting that that sum represented the pecuniary losses sustained by Akvilon in 2001 (see paragraph 7 above). 31. On 19 May 2005 the Supreme Commercial Court of Russia refused leave to apply for a supervisory review of the case. 32. On 15 December 2004, following the decision of the Appellate Instance of the Commercial Court of the Stavropol Region of 30 November 2004, Akvilon was issued with a writ of execution and the enforcement proceedings were commenced. 33. In a decision of 12 July 2005 the Appellate Instance of the Commercial Court of the Stavropol Region noted that on 10 March 2005 the Federal Commercial Court of the North-Caucasus Circuit had reduced the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage from RUB 96,312 to RUB 55,000 and ordered that the recovery of the amount of RUB 41,312 be discontinued. 34. That decision was sent to the Russian Ministry of Finance, which then returned the writ of execution and the decision remained unenforced. 35. On 23 October 2006, at the request of Akvilon, the Commercial Court of the Stavropol Region issued it with another writ of execution for the amount of RUB 55,000 awarded in respect of pecuniary damage and RUB 8,916.42 awarded in respect of costs and expenses. 36. On 25 October 2006 the new writ was sent to the Ministry of Finance for enforcement. 37. On 4 July 2007 the Russian Ministry of Finance transferred the full amount due to Akvilon’s bank account.

5. The applicant is a journalist for DN.no, a Norwegian Internet-based version of the newspaper Dagens Næringsliv (“DN”), published by the company DN Nye Medier AS. 6. On 23 June 2010 Mr X was indicted for market manipulation and insider trading under the 1997 Act on the Trade of Financial Assets (verdipapirhandelloven). He was accused of having requested Mr Y, an attorney, to draft a letter concerning the Norwegian Oil Company (“DNO”), a limited liability company quoted on the stock exchange. The letter, addressed to a trustee company representing the interests of bond holders in DNO (“the bond trustee company”), gave the impression that it had been written on behalf of a number of bond holders who were seriously concerned about the company’s liquidity, finances and future. In fact, it had been written only on Mr X’s behalf. He had owned only one bond, which he had acquired the same day as he had asked attorney Y to draft the letter. 7. Mr X had sent a copy of the above-mentioned letter by fax to the applicant on Friday 24 August 2007, and in this connection he had a telephone conversation with her. The following day, on Saturday 25 August 2007, the applicant wrote an article entitled “Fears of DNO collapse” (“Frykter at DNO rakner”), in which she expressed strong concerns about the content of Attorney Y’s letter, a central feature in the article. 8. The price of DNO stock fell by 4.1% on Monday 27 August 2007, the first trading day after the content of the letter had become known in the press. On the same day, a new article on the topic was published in DN. Other media also reported on the first article, including an online newspaper (Hegnar online) which on 28 August 2007 reported that an analyst had stated that he would not be surprised if the letter had been sent by a person with a short-position or who wanted cheap stocks. The Oslo stock exchange (Oslo børs) suspected market manipulation and, having looked into the matter, forwarded the case to the Financial Supervisory Authority (Kredittilsynet) with suspicions that Mr X had infringed the Act on the Trade of Financial Assets. During subsequent questioning by the Financial Supervisory Authority, Mr X confirmed that he had initiated the letter and been the source of the article in DN. 9. The applicant was questioned by the police on 19 June 2008. They informed her that Mr X had told the police that he had given her the letter. She was handed a signed statement from Mr X in which he confirmed this. The applicant was willing to say that she had received the letter on which the article was based by fax on Friday 24 August 2007, at 5.35 p.m. She also stated that the article had been published on DN.no at 3 a.m. on 25 August 2007. The applicant further explained that she had considered the information in the letter as price-sensitive. She had no particular thoughts as to how many persons were behind the letter, beyond the fact that it had been signed on behalf of several bond holders. The applicant refused to give additional information, referring to the journalistic principles on protection of sources. 10. During the criminal case against Mr X in February 2011 before the Oslo City Court (tingrett), the applicant was summoned as a witness. She refused to answer questions about possible contacts between her and Mr X and other sources, if any, related to the publication by DN.no on 25 August 2007. Relying on Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 10 of the Convention, she argued that she was under no obligation to give evidence on those points. 11. The prosecutor requested that the court impose on the applicant an order to testify. In the court records (“rettsboken”), his arguments in favour of issuing such an order are restated as having included the following: “The prosecutor rose to speak and argued that the witness had an obligation to give testimony about her contact with the defendant in connection with the letter to [the bond trustee company] of 24 August 2007 and asked the court to make a decision on the matter. The prosecutor further justified the obligation of the witness to make a statement and argued that undoubtedly in this case it was desirable to hear her explanation, even if the prosecuting authority found the case adequately disclosed (fullgodt opplyst) without her statement. The press was sometimes abused by investors to take actions liable to affect the share price. The element of abuse should suggest that in a case like this the press would also have an interest in making a statement in order to avoid being abused in this way. Whether or not consent had been given by the source to the witness making her statement had no bearing on the obligation to give evidence. ...” 12. From the same records, it appears that Mr X, through his counsel and co‑counsel, had submitted that he had described his contact with the applicant and that she could contribute nothing further of interest. 13. By a decision of 15 February 2011, the City Court held that the applicant had a duty to give evidence about her contacts with Mr X in relation to the letter of 24 August 2007 from Attorney Y to the bond trustee company. As to the scope of that duty, the City Court held: “The obligation to make a statement is, however, limited to the contact with the defendant as a source and not her communication with possible other unknown sources with whom she has been in contact and who may be protected by the protection of sources.” 14. The prosecutor then stated, according to the hearing protocol, “that he would not ask for postponement of the case as the prosecuting authority considers the case to be sufficiently disclosed (“tilstrekkelig opplyst”) even without the statement of the witness [the applicant]”. It was then clarified that the applicant’s appeal against the order would not be forwarded to the High Court until after the City Court’s judgment in the case against Mr X had been delivered. 15. On 3 March 2011 the City Court convicted Mr X in accordance with the indictment and sentenced him to one year and six months’ imprisonment, of which nine months were suspended for a probationary period of two years. 16. The judgment contains the following passage: “One of the witnesses pleaded, as a journalist, the protection of sources under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and was not willing to explain about her potential contact with the accused. The court held that the witness had an obligation to explain about her contact with the accused since he, as the source of the DN.no article, was known and the court ruled accordingly. An appeal was immediately made against the decision. No motion for extension was made (pending a final decision) as according to the prosecutor the case was sufficiently disclosed (tilstrekkelig opplyst) even without the statement by [the applicant] and this was used as a basis by the court.” 17. On 28 March 2011 Mr X appealed to the Borgarting High Court (lagmannsrett) against the City Court’s assessment of the evidence and application of the law in relation to the issue of guilt, its procedure and the sentence (see paragraphs 34-36 below). 18. The applicant appealed to the Borgarting High Court against the City Court’s order of 15 February 2011. It rejected the appeal by a decision of 28 April 2011, finding it generally decisive whether the source was known. In this case, it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that Mr X had been the applicant’s source. 19. An appeal by the applicant to the Supreme Court was rejected by three votes to two on 30 September 2011 (Norsk Retstidende – Rt. 2011 page 1266). The appeal had been directed at the High Court’s assessment of evidence as well as its application of the law. The disagreement in the Supreme Court concerned primarily the interpretation of the first paragraph of Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, according to which, inter alia, journalists may refuse to answer questions as to who is the source of information confided to them for use in their work (see paragraph 37 below). The two factions of the Supreme Court disagreed, in particular, as to whether this provision was applicable if the source had stepped forward or the identity of the source had otherwise been established. 20. The majority observed that it did not appear from the wording of Article 125 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that it was relevant whether the source had disclosed his or her role or that this role had in other ways become known. However, the wording could not be given decisive weight. It emerged from the preparatory work that the legislature had not, with the chosen formulation, taken a stance on the issue at stake in the present case. There was therefore greater reason to assess whether the rationale underpinning the main rule, namely the right not to answer questions concerning the identity of the source, could also be given significant weight when the person, who had been the source of the information, had given evidence concerning his or her role and had confirmed being the source. It was difficult to see that this should be the case. 21. If the imposition of an obligation on the press to give evidence were limited to cases where the source had come forward, the person who was considering giving information to the press would know that it was up to him or her to determine whether the person who received the information would have an obligation to give evidence. There was thus no cogent reason why such a conditional obligation to give evidence should lead to increased scepticism towards providing information to the press. The same would, to a great extent, be true if the obligation to give evidence also applied when the identity of the source had become known in some other way. While the possibility that the identity of the source might be disclosed could well constitute a deterrent, it would hardly make much difference if information already known was also confirmed by the recipient of the information. 22. An obligation on the press to give evidence in such cases was not thought likely to weaken the public’s general trust that the press would protect its sources. The situation under review did not concern the disclosure of sources but rather whether the person’s role had become known by other means. 23. The majority further disagreed with the applicant’s view that there was no reason to treat a situation, where the informant had identified himself or herself as the source, differently from those cases where the source had consented to being identified. A person who so consented could do so, trusting that the recipient of the information would respect the protection of sources as long as the identity of the source was unknown. Once an informant had confirmed that he was the source, this fact would become known. Should the recipient of the information then refuse to give evidence, this would normally appear futile. In such a situation, an exemption from the obligation to give evidence would in reality not constitute a protection against having to disclose the source, but rather a right to avoid contributing to the elucidation of a criminal case. 24. Interpreting Article 125 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the light of certain statements made in the preparatory work (Ot.prp. nr. 55 (1997-1998), pp. 17 and 18) as followed up in the Supreme Court’s case‑law (Rt. 1995 page 1166 and 2003 page 28), the majority held that this provision did not apply when the source had come forward and had confirmed his or her role. The same ought probably to apply when the identity of the source had been established beyond reasonable doubt by other means. If the state of the evidence was such that confirmation by the journalist of the identity of the source could not be said to assist in identifying the source, it seemed unquestionable to maintain the obligation to testify. 25. As to whether a more wide-reaching protection of journalistic sources followed from Article 10 of the Convention, the majority had regard to the Strasbourg Court’s case-law, including Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (27 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑II), Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom (no. 821/03, 15 December 2009) and the Chamber judgment in Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands (no. 38224/03, 31 March 2009 – noting that the Grand Chamber had decided the latter case on a different ground). They observed that in the two British cases, a violation had been found under the necessity test even though strong countervailing arguments had been present. The majority further noted that there was no decision where the Court had examined the situation where the source had come forward and where in this sense there was no source to protect (“ingen kilde å beskytte”). The principal justification for source protection, as elaborated by the Court in its case-law, was based on the consequences that the disclosure of a source’s identity might have for the free flow of information. However, these considerations did not apply where the source had confirmed his or her participation. 26. Against this background, one could safely assume that no violation of the Convention would arise where a source had come forward and the obligation of the witness to give evidence had been expressly limited so as not to include questions that might lead to other sources being revealed. Also, the charge in this case had been based on the fact that the journalist had allowed herself to be used by the source in his efforts to manipulate the bonds market in a criminal manner. It was a serious criminal case, where it seemed likely that the applicant’s evidence might significantly assist in elucidating the concrete circumstances of the defendant’s contact with her. 27. The minority observed that, should the applicant be ordered to testify concerning her possible contact with Mr X about Attorney Y’s letter of 24 August 2007 to the trustee company, she would have to confirm or deny that Mr X was the source for her article on DN.no on 25 August 2007. By making a statement on this matter, she might also inadvertently reveal other potential sources. The legal question at hand was whether a journalist might rely on source protection if the source, without the journalist having revealed it, could be identified with more or less certainty by other evidence. 28. The wording of Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was absolute and granted members of the press, broadcasting and other media the right to “refuse to answer questions concerning who is ... the source”. The provision made no exception for cases where the identity could be established with more or less certainty in some other way. 29. The protection of sources by journalists was, according to the European Court’s case-law, “one of the basic conditions for press freedom” (Goodwin, cited above, § 39). The purpose was not to protect the source, but rather the public interest in free communication of news and opinions (Rt. 2010 page 1381). If journalists were allowed to protect their sources, they would obtain information enabling them to uncover matters in society that were worthy of criticism more easily than they would otherwise. The fact that it was for the journalist to decide to what extent he or she would rely on such protection reflected that it was not the source who was protected. If the journalist was willing to reveal the source, the source could not prevent it. 30. If it were a precondition for the protection of journalistic sources that no other proof of the source had been presented, such protection would be undermined. This would enable a source to be tracked down, even if a requirement for waiver of source protection was that the source be identified with a criminal standard of proof. If the hearing of evidence on the identity of a source were to be allowed, the media’s working conditions would become considerably more constricted and society’s interest in free communication of information and opinions would suffer. 31. If consent to source disclosure by a potential source should have the effect of removing source protection, the actual source might easily be identified and source protection would be undermined. In the present case Mr X had stated that he was the source. A situation where someone claimed to be the source ought to be considered in the same way as where the source consented to disclosure of his or her identity. A person might incorrectly claim to be the source so that the actual source might be identified by a process of elimination. And even if it were true that this person was the source, it would erode the journalist’s right to source protection should the person who was the source be able to cancel the journalist’s right. In addition, journalists often had several sources. If a journalist could be ordered to describe his or her contact with a person who claimed to be the source, his or her contact with other sources might also be revealed. 32. Equally, a combination of someone claiming to be the source and other evidence confirming this, should not lead to source protection being removed. Effective source protection was necessary in order to ensure free communication of information and opinions. It should not be permissible for press journalists to confirm or deny that a person claiming to be the source was in fact the source, even where there was weighty evidence to this effect. As mentioned above, it was not the source, but society’s interest in free communication of news and opinions, which was to be protected. 33. The prosecutor had argued that Mr X had used the applicant as a tool to commit serious crimes, and this would have constituted a relevant argument, had the case been one concerning a possible individual exception to the right to non-disclosure of sources made under the third paragraph of Article 125. However, the prosecutor had not relied on that paragraph of the provision, and the source’s motive could not render the principle of source protection as such inapplicable. Within the ambit of Article 10 of the Convention, freedom of speech did not protect only information and views that were positively received, but also those which offended, shocked or disturbed the State or parts of the population. Therefore, the fundamental right of journalists to protect their sources could not be dependent on the sources’ motives. 34. Mr X’s appeal against the City Court’s judgment of 3 March 2011 (see paragraph 17 above) was examined by the High Court, which summoned and heard the applicant as a witness on 13 January 2012. She answered certain questions but affirmed that she still would not reply to questions about her contacts with Mr X. The court records contain the following passage: “When heard as a witness [the applicant] stated that she had received Attorney [Y]’s letter by fax on 24 August 2007 at 5.35 p.m. She does not wish to answer questions about who she had received the letter from or on her possible contact with Mr [X] during the period before or after this point in time. The presiding judge pointed out to the witness that after a legally enforceable decision by the Supreme Court she was obliged to give evidence about her contacts with Mr [X]. The presiding judge underlined that an omission to reply to such questions could constitute a ground for the imposition of a fine for an offence against the good order of court proceedings [“rettergangsbot”]. It was emphasised that the duty to reply lay on the witness personally and that a possible fine would be imposed on her personally.” 35. On account of her refusal to comply, the High Court, by a decision of 25 January 2012, ordered the applicant to pay a fine of 30,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK), approximately 3,700 euro (EUR) for an offence against the good order of court proceedings, failing which she would be liable to ten days’ imprisonment. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 36. By a judgment of the same date, the High Court convicted Mr X on the charges and sentenced him to one year and six months’ imprisonment. 37. The relevant articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 22 May 1981 (straffeprosessloven) read as follows: “Article 108. Unless otherwise provided by statute, every person summoned to attend as a witness is bound to do so and to give evidence before the court. Article 125. The editor of a printed publication may refuse to answer questions as to who is the author of an article or report in the publication or the source of any information contained in it. The same applies to questions as to who is the source of other information that has been confided to the editor for use in his work. Other persons who have acquired knowledge of the author or the source through their work for the publishers, editors, press agency or printers in question have the same right as the editor. When important social interests indicate that the information should be given and it is of substantial significance for the clarification of the case, the court may, however, on an overall evaluation, order the witness to reveal the name. If the author or source has revealed matters that it was socially important to disclose, the witness may be ordered to reveal the name only when this is found to be particularly necessary. When an answer is given, the court may decide that it shall only be given to the court and the parties at a sitting in camera and under an order to observe a duty of secrecy. The provisions of this section apply correspondingly to any director or employee of any broadcasting agency.” There is extensive Supreme Court case-law concerning the main rule in Article 125 § 1 about the protection of journalists’ sources and the exception clause in Article 125 § 3 (see, for instance, paragraph 24 above). The Supreme Court interprets the provision in the light of Article 10 of the Convention. 38. Section 205 § 1 of the Act Relating to the Courts of Justice of 13 August 1915 (domstolloven) reads: “Where a witness refuses to give evidence or give affirmation and provides no grounds or provides only those grounds that are dismissed by a legally enforceable ruling, said witness may be penalised by fines and ordered to compensate, in whole or in part, for the costs incurred. A party may also be penalised by fines in cases concerning attachment or garnishment of earnings, where he/she wilfully fails to provide the enforcement authority with the information said party is obligated to provide pursuant to the Enforcement Act, §§ 7-12.” 39. In 2011 the UN Human Rights Committee adopted General Comment no. 34 concerning Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR/C/GC/34), which reads, inter alia, (footnote omitted): “States parties should recognize and respect that element of the right of freedom of expression that embraces the limited journalistic privilege not to disclose information sources.” 40. On 8 September 2015 the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression submitted a report to the UN General Assembly (A/70/361), which stated, inter alia (footnotes omitted): “C. Nature and scope of protection 21. Some authorities refer to a journalistic ‘privilege’ not to disclose a source’s identity, but both reporter and source enjoy rights that may be limited only according to article 19 (3). Revealing or coercing the revelation of the identity of a source creates disincentives for disclosure, dries up further sources to report a story accurately and damages an important tool of accountability. In the light of the importance attached to source confidentiality, any restrictions must be genuinely exceptional and subject to the highest standards, implemented by judicial authorities only. Such situations should be limited to investigations of the most serious crimes or the protection of the life of other individuals. 22. National laws should ensure that protections apply strictly, with extremely limited exceptions. Under Belgian law, journalists and editorial staff may be compelled by a judge to disclose information sources only if they are of a nature to prevent crimes that pose a serious threat to the physical integrity of one or more persons, and upon a finding of the following two cumulative conditions: (a) the information is of crucial importance for preventing such crimes; and (b) the information cannot be obtained by any other means. The same conditions apply to investigative measures, such as searches, seizures and telephone tapping, with respect to journalistic sources.” 41. Other international instruments concerning the protection of journalistic sources include the Resolution on Journalistic Freedoms and Human Rights, adopted at the 4th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy (Prague, 7-8 December 1994), and Recommendation No. R (2000) 7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 8 March 2000. Relevant parts of the Recommendation, with the explanatory report, are quoted in Voskuil v. the Netherlands, no. 64752/01, §§ 43-44, 22 November 2007, inter alia: “Principle 3 (Limits to the right of non-disclosure) a. The right of journalists not to disclose information identifying a source must not be subject to other restrictions than those mentioned in Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Convention. In determining whether a legitimate interest in a disclosure falling within the scope of Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Convention outweighs the public interest in not disclosing information identifying a source, competent authorities of member States shall pay particular regard to the importance of the right of non-disclosure and the pre-eminence given to it in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, and may only order a disclosure if, subject to paragraph b, there exists an overriding requirement in the public interest and if circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature. b. The disclosure of information identifying a source should not be deemed necessary unless it can be convincingly established that: i. reasonable alternative measures to the disclosure do not exist or have been exhausted by the persons or public authorities that seek the disclosure, and ii. the legitimate interest in the disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in the non-disclosure, bearing in mind that: - an overriding requirement of the need for disclosure is proved, - the circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature, - the necessity of the disclosure is identified as responding to a pressing social need, and - member States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing this need, but this margin goes hand in hand with the supervision by the European Court of Human Rights. c. The above requirements should be applied at all stages of any proceedings where the right of non-disclosure might be invoked.” In the present case, the following paragraphs of the explanatory report are also of relevance: “d. Information identifying a source 18. In order to protect the identity of a source adequately, it is necessary to protect all kinds of information which are likely to lead to the identification of a source. The potential to identify a source therefore determines the type of protected information and the range of such protection. As far as its disclosure may lead to an identification of a source, the following information shall be protected by this Recommendation: i. the name of a source and his or her address, telephone and telefax number, employer’s name and other personal data as well as the voice of the source and pictures showing a source; ii. ’the factual circumstances of acquiring this information’, for example the time and place of a meeting with a source, the means of correspondence used or the particularities agreed between a source and a journalist; ...”

5. The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Tunceli. 6. On 5 April 2007 the applicant attended a concert performed by a band called “Grup Yorum” in the Hozat district of Tunceli. 7. On 17 October 2007 the Malatya public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Malatya Assize Court, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of the DHKP/C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front), an illegal armed organisation, under section 7 (2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The public prosecutor noted that the applicant had chanted the following slogans during the concert: “Mahir, Hüseyin, Ulaş; Fight until emancipation”[1] (“Mahir, Hüseyin, Ulaş; Kurtuluşa kadar savaş”); “Martyrs of the revolution are immortal” (“Devrim şehitleri ölümsüzdür”); “Revolutionary prisoners are our honour” (“Devrimci tutsaklar onurumuzdur”); and “Victory on mountains, emancipation at the front; long live victory, long live resistance” (“Dağlarda zafer, cephede kurtuluş; yaşasın zafer, yaşasın direniş”). 8. During the investigation and the proceedings against him, the applicant stated that he had attended the concert in question and chanted the slogans “Music shall not stop, dance shall continue” (“Türküler susmaz , halaylar sürer”) and “We will not be defeated by oppression” (“Baskılar bizi yıldıramaz”). He also noted that he had been on the concert’s organising committee. 9. On 6 March 2008 the Malatya Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment. In its judgment, on the basis of a police report on a police video recording of the concert of 5 April 2007, the indictment, the applicant’s defence submissions, and the public prosecutor’s observations on the merits of the case, the court considered it established that the applicant had chanted the slogans noted in the indictment. The court considered that the concert, for which legal and administrative authorisation had been obtained, had become a propaganda activity in favour of the DHKP/C, and that the applicant had chanted slogans used by that organisation. The Malatya Assize Court concluded that the applicant had committed the offence of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation. 10. The applicant appealed. 11. On 4 July 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance court’s judgment. 12. Between 6 October 2011 and 1 August 2012 the applicant duly served his prison sentence.

5. The United Civil Aviation Trade Union (“the first applicant”) is a trade union registered in Budapest. Mr A. Csorba (“the second applicant”) is a Hungarian national who was born in 1970 and lives in Vecsés. He is the President of the United Civil Aviation Trade Union. 6. On 12 October 2012 the second applicant applied to the Budapest police department for authorisation to hold a demonstration on the road leading to Budapest Ferenc Liszt International Airport. He stated that the demonstration would be held on the hard shoulder of the road, which was not ordinarily used for traffic. The declared objectives of the demonstration were, inter alia, to draw the public’s attention to the precarious financial situation in which the employees of the airport would find themselves if salary cuts envisaged by the company managing the airport were carried out. The event was scheduled to be held between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m. on 17 October 2012. The second applicant also specified that it was expected that about fifty to 100 persons would participate in the event and that it was intended that speeches would be given and that an open letter would be read out. 7. On 14 October 2012 the Budapest police department registered the application and informed the second applicant that, in order to clarify details regarding the programme of the demonstration and the number of police officers that would be required to secure the event, it was necessary to schedule a meeting with the organisers. 8. The second applicant and the Vice-President of the United Civil Aviation Trade Union met with the representatives of the Monor police department on the same day. The representative of the police department suggested that the demonstration be held at another location, since the planned venue would endanger traffic. The second applicant assured the police that the demonstrators would respect traffic rules, would only occupy the part of the road not used for traffic and would distribute flyers to car passengers, and that the organisers would call off or halt the demonstration if it was not in compliance with the relevant legal provisions. 9. On 14 October 2012 the Monor police department forbade the demonstration. It was of the view that the planned demonstration would endanger traffic and would render the airport inaccessible, infringing passengers’ right to leave the country. In any event, the demonstration would breach the traffic code, since those parts of the road not used for traffic were not supposed to be accessed by pedestrians or be used for parking. 10. On 17 October 2012 the applicants requested judicial review of the decision, relying on their right to freedom of expression and to freedom of assembly. They argued that a demonstration could only be forbidden on the grounds of a need to ensure traffic safety if there were no alternative means of access to the airport. In their view the demonstration would not constitute any greater hindrance to traffic than would roadworks. 11. By a decision of 19 October 2012 the Budapest Surroundings High Court (Budapest Környéki Törvényszék) dismissed their complaint, endorsing in essence the police department’s reasoning (see paragraph 9 above).

6. The first applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Turin. The second applicant was born in 1975 and was detained in Turin up to the time of his death on 10 January 2017. 7. In 2004 the applicants were detained in the Asti Correctional Facility. 8. On 10 December 2004 the second applicant intervened in a fight that had broken out between the first applicant and a prison officer. 9. The manner in which the impugned events occurred, as submitted by the applicants and as it emerges from their witness statements during the domestic proceedings, may be summarised as follows. 10. On 10 December 2004, following an altercation with the prison officer, the first applicant was summoned to a meeting with the correctional unit commander (comandante di reparto della polizia penitenziaria). Before he reached the commander’s office, he was stopped by a group of prison officers, who took turns beating him. Following the meeting, he was stripped of his clothes and led to a cell in the solitary confinement wing. 11. The only item of furniture in the cell was a bed with no mattress, bed linen or covers. As to sanitary facilities, the cell had a squat toilet without running water and was not equipped with a sink. The cell window had no window panes and the only source of heating was a small, malfunctioning radiator, which provided little protection against the December weather. For a number of days, although it is unclear for how many exactly, he was left naked. 12. During the first week of his detention in solitary confinement no food was provided and he was given only scant amounts of water. He was subsequently given rationed quantities of food. 13. He was beaten on a daily basis, several times per day. He was repeatedly punched, kicked and hit in the head by prison officers, who assaulted him in groups of varying sizes. 14. He was also subjected to sleep deprivation, as the beatings often took place at night and the prison officers verbally abused him in order to keep him awake. 15. During the detention in solitary confinement the applicant did not receive visits from his lawyer or his family. 16. On 10 December 2004, following the same altercation with the prison officer, the second applicant was stripped of his clothes and led to a cell in the solitary confinement wing of the correctional facility. The bed in the cell had no mattress, sheets or covers, and the cell had no sink. Initially there were no panes in the windows, which were covered with some plastic sheeting after an unspecified number of days. For a number of days, although it is unclear for how many exactly, he was left naked. He was subsequently given some light clothing. 17. The applicant’s food was rationed, and at certain times he was given only bread and water. On some days he received no food at all. 18. The applicant was beaten by prison officers, often more than once per day. He was subjected to various forms of physical violence, including being repeatedly punched, kicked and slapped, at one point with his head being pinned to the ground by one of the prison officers’ boots. The beatings occurred both during the day and at night. The applicant was beaten by four or five officers at a time. One prison officer ripped out a chunk of his hair. 19. On 16 December 2004 he was admitted to the hospital. 20. During the period he spent in solitary confinement he was only allowed outside the cell twice, once to shower and once for some outdoor time. 21. A criminal investigation into the impugned treatment was launched in 2005. It was initiated when it emerged, in the context of covert surveillance in an operation to investigate drug smuggling in the Asti correctional facility, that a number of the prison officers had discussed the ill-treatment inflicted on the applicants. 22. On 7 July 2011 five prison officers, C.B., D.B., M.S., A.D., and G.S., were committed for trial. They were charged with ill-treatment of the applicants under Article 572 of the Italian Criminal Code (“the Criminal Code”), in conjunction with Article 61 § 9 of the Criminal Code, a provision which considers the commission of an offence by a civil servant abusing his or her position to be an aggravating circumstance. 23. On the same date the applicants joined the proceedings as civil parties. 24. The Asti District Court’s judgment was delivered on 30 January 2012. Its findings may be summarised as follows. 25. As to the establishment of the facts concerning the ill-treatment, the court found that the evidence gathered during the investigation and produced at the trial showed that the events had occurred in the manner described by the victims in their submissions during the trial. The Court relied on statements to the effect that the applicants had been subjected to physical and verbal abuse, coupled with the deprivation of food, water, sleep, and clothing, and had been detained in cells without adequate access to sanitation, heating, and bedding. 26. The court further found it to be established beyond reasonable doubt that the applicants had been subjected not merely to isolated acts of harassment and abuse, but to repeated ill-treatment which had been put into practice in a systematic manner. 27. More specifically, the court found it established beyond reasonable doubt that the first and second applicants had been subjected to repeated physical violence from 10 to 29 December 2004 and from 10 to 16 December 2004 respectively. The court found that the beatings occurred regularly at all times of the day, and particularly at night. 28. The court noted that the second applicant had been admitted to the emergency room of the Asti Civil Hospital on 16 December 2004 with traumatic injuries. With regard to the first applicant, the court acknowledged his hospitalisation following the events without citing a date or specific medical documentation to this effect. 29. Moreover, the court found it to be established beyond reasonable doubt that in 2004 and 2005 in the Asti Correctional Facility there had existed what it defined as a “generalised practice of ill-treatment” that had been systematically inflicted on prisoners considered to be problematic. Measures which the court defines as exceeding the bounds of permitted disciplinary or security measures were routinely taken to punish and intimidate problematic detainees and to deter other disorderly behaviour. As part of this practice, a detainee would generally be taken to a cell in the solitary confinement unit where he would be subjected to repeated harassment and abuse by prison officers. The abuse would primarily take the form of physical violence, as detainees would be beaten by groups of prison officers, often during the night. In addition, detainees would be routinely subjected to sleep, food and water deprivation, and would also be denied access to sanitary facilities. 30. The court further found ample evidence that the prison officers operated in a climate of impunity. This was due, in the court’s view, to the acquiescence of high-level prison administrators and the complicity that existed among prison officers. 31. It emerges that the court ordered an inspection of the correctional facility, including the solitary confinement wing, during the course of the trial. The court found that several cells in the solitary confinement wing of the Asti Correctional Facility were unfit for holding detainees. Some did not have bed linen, mattresses, sanitary facilities or heating. Although the windows in some cells had no panes and others had windows covered by metal plates with small perforations, the cells were nonetheless used during the winter months. Some cells were equipped with a bed and a squat toilet but no other furniture or sanitary facilities. 32. Following the establishment of the facts, the court went on to assess responsibility for the established conduct. In this regard, G.S. was acquitted as to his involvement in the ill-treatment, and A.D. and D.B. were acquitted of the charge of ill-treatment under Article 572 of the Criminal Code. The court nonetheless held that the conduct of A.D. and D.B. amounted to infliction of bodily harm contrary to Article 582 of the Criminal Code. However, it ordered that the proceedings against them be discontinued due to the expiry of the applicable time-limit as laid down in the statute of limitations. 33. With respect to C.B. and M.S., the court held that there existed sufficient evidence to conclude that they had been responsible for most, if not all, of the acts of physical, psychological, and “material” abuse at issue. The court then considered that the acts at issue could be classified as torture pursuant to the definition provided by the United Nations (UN) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It went on to observe that Italy had failed to incorporate the offence of torture into national legislation, in breach of its international obligations. It was therefore obliged to conclude that, under Italian law, there existed no legal provision that would allow it to classify the impugned conduct as acts of torture. 34. Having taken note of the above-mentioned considerations, the court proceeded to assess which existing offence was more suitable in respect of the legal classification of C.B. and M.S.’s conduct. When conducting its assessment, the court relied on the conclusion that the primary purpose of the impugned treatment was to punish the applicants, to “maintain order” in the correctional facility, and to convey a clear message to the other detainees. 35. The court considered that the conduct of the two prison officers thus fell most appropriately within the scope of Article 608 of the Criminal Code, which deals with abuse of authority against arrested or detained persons. However, the statutory limitation period for the offence in question had elapsed, as the court had found no procedural action which would have the effect of interrupting it. The court stated that C.B. and M.S. were also responsible for the infliction of bodily harm, but that, as the statute of limitations was applicable to that offence as well, such a finding did not alter the substance of the decision. The court therefore ordered that the proceedings against C.B. and M.S be discontinued because the applicable time-limit as laid down in the statute of limitations had expired. 36. On 22 February 2012 the public prosecutor lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation, arguing that the Asti District Court had erred in the legal classification of the offence with respect to C.B. and M.S. The prosecutor contended that the most appropriate offence for the purposes of classification of the conduct in question would have been aggravated ill‑treatment under Article 572 of the Italian Criminal Code ‒ as initially identified in the bill of indictment ‒ in conjunction with Article 608 of the Criminal Code. 37. By a judgment issued on 21 May 2012, and filed with the court Registry on 27 July 2012, the Court of Cassation declared the public prosecutor’s application inadmissible. The court expressed its agreement with the prosecutor’s contention as a matter of principle but, as the statute of limitations had been likewise applicable to the offence of aggravated ill‑treatment, a decision in favour of the prosecution would have been devoid of any practical effect. 38. On 26 July 2012 C.B. lodged an objection to execution (incidente d’esecuzione) with the Asti District Court, arguing that its decision of 30 January 2012 (see paragraph 24 above) could not be considered as final and binding insofar as he was concerned, as the decision had not been properly served on him. 39. In a decision issued on 31 October the Asti District Court dismissed C.B.’s objection on the grounds that C.B. must have had cognisance of the decision at the moment the public prosecutor lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 36 above) or, at the latest, when his representative filed a defence brief at a hearing before the Court of Cassation in May 2012. 40. On 26 July 2012 C.B. appealed against the decision before the Court of Cassation. 41. In a judgment delivered on 11 July 2013, and filed with the Registry on 1 August 2013, the Court of Cassation granted the appeal. It found that the failure to serve the decision on C.B. could not be remedied by C.B.’s potential knowledge of the decision at a later stage, as argued by the District Court. The Asti District Court judgment of 30 January 2012 could not, accordingly, be considered final and binding insofar as C.B. was concerned. 42. Based on the latter decision, on 10 October 2013 C.B. lodged an appeal against the Asti District Court judgment of 30 January 2012 with the Turin Court of Appeal, seeking an acquittal. 43. No further information has been provided by the parties as to the outcome of the proceedings. 44. In their observations of 31 March 2016, the Government indicated that four prison officers had undergone disciplinary proceedings in connection with the impugned events and by different decisions issued on 29 January 2013 the following disciplinary sanctions had been imposed: – C.B. was dismissed from his functions (destituito dal servizio). He was, however, reinstated on 26 November 2013, following the Court of Cassation judgment of 11 July 2013 which suspended the binding nature of the Asti District Court’s judgment (see paragraph 41 above); – M.S. was dismissed from his functions; – A.D. was suspended from duty for a period of 4 months; – D.B. was suspended from duty for a period of 6 months. 45. According to a document issued by the Staff Director of the Prison Administration Department of the Ministry of Justice on 12 October 2015, and furnished by the Government, the four prison officers were not suspended from duty (sospensione precauzionale dal servizio) during the course of the investigation or the trial. 46. At the Court’s request, the Government submitted extracts from the prison medical record of the second applicant between 26 November 2004 and 5 March 2005 and typed copies of his hospitalisation record of 16 December 2004. 47. The prison medical record indicates that on 13 December 2004 the second applicant was examined visually (whilst still “behind bars”). He complained of pain in the thoracic area and right ear. The reporting physician noted the presence of ecchymoses and haematomas around the patient’s ribcage. He recommended a more thorough medical examination and/or transfer to the infirmary. 48. The record further indicates that another visual examination (also “behind bars”) took place on 15 December 2004. The information in this entry is the same as in the previous entry. Transfer to the infirmary for a medical examination was recommended. 49. On 15 December 2004 the record shows that the applicant underwent a medical examination in the afternoon. The physician reported ecchymoses on the patient’s ribcage and in the retroauricular region. Palpation of the patient revealed diffuse pain. The reporting physician recommended that X‑rays be performed for a suspected fracture. Painkillers were administered. 50. The entry of 16 December 2004 reports the applicant’s transfer to the emergency room of the Asti Civil Hospital as a consequence of traumatic injury. 51. According to the medical record of the Asti Civil Hospital, an X-ray revealed a fractured rib and the medical examination disclosed diffuse bruising in the thoracic and abdominal area and pain on palpation. The record states that the applicant told the doctor his injuries occurred as a consequence of an accidental fall. 52. The prison medical record entry on the applicant’s discharge from the hospital on 16 December 2004 shows that he was prescribed painkillers. 53. As to the first applicant, no copy of the prison medical register had been submitted by the Government, notwithstanding the Court’s request for such information.

5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicant was born in 1967 in the Tajikistan Soviet Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union and came to Russia in 1993. He is an apatride. 7. On 31 July 2014 the applicant was arrested for vagrancy. On 2 August 2014 the Kalininskiy District Court in St Petersburg sentenced him to a fine and administrative removal from Russia. The court also directed that he should be detained until expulsion in the special facility for the detention of aliens in the Leningrad Region (СУВСИГ по СПб и ЛО) in Krasnoye Selo. The decision described the applicant as being “a native (уроженец) of the Tajikistan Republic”. 8. By letters dated 11 August and 18 November 2014, the Federal Migration Service asked the Embassy of Tajikistan in Moscow to issue a laissez-passer document enabling the applicant’s return to Tajikistan. No reply was received. 9. On an unspecified date the applicant was fingerprinted. It was discovered that he had been registered in the police database under a different name. On 11 February 2015 the Federal Migration Service used that name to request a laissez-passer from the Embassy of Tajikistan. It did not receive a response. 10. On 10 September 2015 the Federal Migration Service again attempted to obtain a travel document for the applicant using his original name. The Embassy did not reply. 11. On 28 July 2016 the governor of the detention centre asked the Kalininskiy District Court to discontinue the enforcement of the judgment on the ground that the two-year limitation period in respect of the applicant’s offence had expired. On 29 July 2016 the District Court granted the application. The applicant was released on 13 August 2016. 12. While in detention, the applicant was held in standard six-person cells (Cells 509, 402, 516 and 615) measuring 27.4 square metres which were furnished with three two-tier bunk beds, six bed stands, six chairs and a table. Between October 2014 and February 2015 he was also held in a smaller cell (Cell 514, 13 sq. m, two beds) and a larger cell (Cell 315, 40.2 sq. m, four two-tier bunk beds). 13. Cell 402, in which he stayed from February to September 2015, was a so-called “closed cell”. The steel door with a peephole and a hatch for serving food remained under lock at all times and he was not allowed to leave the cell, except for short and infrequent outdoor exercise. For the first two months, he had been alone in that cell. 14. The applicant complained about dim lighting, poor quality of food, insufficient outdoor exercise in cramped conditions, a lack of medical assistance and a shortage of meaningful activities. The Government disputed the applicant’s allegations and submitted copies of contracts with the catering, cleaning and laundering companies and a copy of visitors’ register from the medical unit.

5. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Yalova. 6. The applicant lived in Turkey between 2001 and 2003, when he met his wife and got married. The applicant and his wife have four children. In 2003 the applicant was deported to Algeria by the Turkish authorities. Between 2003 and 2006 he was imprisoned in Algeria, where he alleges he was subjected to various forms of ill-treatment. 7. The applicant and several other individuals founded the Rachad Movement in Algeria, a political organisation which opposes that country’s government through non-violent means. After the protest movement known as the Arab Spring began in 2010, he was taken into police custody in Algeria and he alleges he was subjected to ill-treatment there. 8. On an unspecified date he fled from Algeria to Syria, where he worked as a teacher. Subsequently, in August 2013, he arrived in Yalova, Turkey, where his wife and children lived. 9. On 3 November 2013 he was taken into police custody as he did not have a passport. On the same day, the applicant was placed in a detention room at the Yalova police headquarters, where he was detained between 3 November 2013 and 7 January 2014. 10. The applicant submitted that the detention room in which he had been kept was in an ordinary police detention facility where arrestees were held for short periods (generally one day). During his detention, many people were detained in the room, at times as many as 10-12 people. The room was around 10 sq. m and there was no heating or ventilation, and no bed. Nor did it receive any natural light. He was confined in that room and was exceptionally allowed to use the other parts of the detention facility. He could use the hall in the centre of the facility only when his family members visited him. The applicant was provided with a mattress and a blanket and he slept on the floor. He was never taken out of the detention facility and did not have access to exercise in the open air. The facility had no shower and he therefore had to wash himself in the toilets. As he suffered from asthma, anaemia and back problems, he needed medical assistance. However, he was taken to hospital on only one occasion. 11. The applicant submitted a number of photographs in support of his submissions. In one of those photographs he is seen sitting on the bench in a small detention room behind bars. 12. In their submissions dated 18 January 2017, the Government submitted that the applicant had been detained in the “custody cell” of the public security branch of the Yalova police headquarters. The custody cell in question was used as a foreigners’ detention centre because there was no separate foreigners’ detention centre in Yalova at that time. The Government stated that the custody facility measured approximately 92 sq. m and consisted of two detention rooms of 12.8 sq. m and 17.6 sq. m, two toilets (3.5 and 5.7 sq. m respectively), a room for the taking of police statements of 13.5 sq. m, a room used for interviews between arrestees and their lawyers of 6 sq. m, and an identification parade room of 6 sq. m. There was also a hall in the centre of the facility, which measured 21 sq. m, onto which the detention rooms opened. The hall had an air conditioner and two windows measuring 70 x 93 cm and 150 x 205 cm which provided natural light for the detention rooms. 13. In their additional observations dated 23 May 2017, the Government submitted that foreign nationals and Turkish nationals detained in the context of criminal investigations were kept separately in two detention rooms in the facility in question. They stated that at the material time the Turkish nationals had been kept locked in one of the detention rooms and that the applicant and other foreign nationals had had access at all times to the hall in the centre of the facility − where there were chairs and a table – and to the toilets. When there were no Turkish national detainees, the foreign nationals also had access to both detention rooms. 14. In support of their submissions the Government submitted a sketch map of the detention facility and a total of thirty-nine photographs. Nine of these photographs were taken outside and show the police station building. Eleven photographs were taken in the toilets, which appeared clean. There is a shower head installed in each of the toilets. Nine other photographs show the room for the taking of police statements, the room used for interviews between arrestees and their lawyers, and the identification parade room. Lastly, nine further photographs show the detention rooms and the hall. It is apparent that the detention rooms are separated from the hall by bars. There are no beds in the detention rooms but along their three walls there are concrete benches topped with a cushion. On the benches there are blankets, apparently used both for covering and as pillows. The detention rooms do not have windows but appear to receive light from the hall. The photographs of the hall show that there are two windows, a table and chairs on which towels were put in that area. 15. The Government also submitted custody registers showing the occupation rates at the detention facility for the period between 4 November 2013 and 7 January 2014. According to those documents, the applicant was detained alone for thirty-one days and for thirty days he was detained together with between one and six foreign nationals. On 26 November 2013 there were seven foreign nationals, including the applicant, detained at the facility. On 27 and 28 November 2013 the applicant was detained together with eleven other foreign nationals. 16. For thirty days between 4 November 2013 and 7 January 2014, there had been no Turkish nationals detained at the facility. In particular, on 26, 27 and 28 November 2013 no Turkish national had been held in custody. During the remaining thirty-five days, a minimum of one and a maximum of five Turkish nationals had been in detention, except for 1 January 2014, when eleven Turkish nationals had been held in police custody. In particular, on 29 November 2013 one Turkish national had been detained at the facility in question. 17. On 27 December 2013 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court. The applicant alleged, inter alia, that the conditions of his detention at the Yalova police headquarters described above had amounted to ill‑treatment (see paragraph 10 above). 18. On 21 January 2015 the Constitutional Court delivered its decision on the admissibility and merits of the applicant’s case. As regards the applicant’s complaint that the conditions of his detention at the Yalova police headquarters had amounted to ill-treatment, the Constitutional Court noted that he had complained that his health had worsened as a result of the conditions in which he had been detained. Since the applicant had been provided with medical assistance when he had fallen ill in detention, the Constitutional Court found that the administrative authorities had taken the necessary measures to protect the applicant’s physical and psychological health. As a result, the court concluded that the treatment of the applicant had not attained the minimum level of severity required to be described as inhuman or degrading treatment. 19. On 24 June 2015 the Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant’s representative. 20. The Standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“the CPT”) concerning the conditions of detention of foreign nationals (see the CPT standards, document no. CPT/Inf(97)10-part) provide, in so far as relevant, as follows: “27. In certain countries, CPT delegations have found immigration detainees held in police stations for prolonged periods (for weeks and, in certain cases, months), subject to mediocre material conditions of detention, deprived of any form of activity and on occasion obliged to share cells with criminal suspects. Such a situation is indefensible. 28. The CPT recognises that, in the very nature of things, immigration detainees may have to spend some time in an ordinary police detention facility. However, conditions in police stations will frequently - if not invariably - be inadequate for prolonged periods of detention. Consequently, the period of time spent by immigration detainees in such establishments should be kept to the absolute minimum. 29. In the view of the CPT, in those cases where it is deemed necessary to deprive persons of their liberty for an extended period under aliens legislation, they should be accommodated in centres specifically designed for that purpose, offering material conditions and a regime appropriate to their legal situation and staffed by suitably-qualified personnel. 30. Obviously, such centres should provide accommodation which is adequately-furnished, clean and in a good state of repair, and which offers sufficient living space for the numbers involved. Further, care should be taken in the design and layout of the premises to avoid as far as possible any impression of a carceral environment. As regards regime activities, they should include outdoor exercise, access to a day room and to radio/television and newspapers/magazines, as well as other appropriate means of recreation (e.g. board games, table tennis). The longer the period for which persons are detained, the more developed should be the activities which are offered to them. ... 79. Conditions of detention for irregular migrants should reflect the nature of their deprivation of liberty, with limited restrictions in place and a varied regime of activities. For example, detained irregular migrants ... should be restricted in their freedom of movement within the detention facility as little as possible.”

4. The applicants were born in 1939 and 1976 respectively and live in Shnogh village. 5. In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (‘Teghout’) was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6. In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper‑molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7. On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the land use category. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8. The plots of land belonging to the applicants were listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9. The applicants, father and son, live in Shnogh village and earn their living from agriculture. They jointly owned six plots of arable land in the village measuring 0.053 ha, 0.448 ha, 0.075 ha, 0.254 ha, 0.212 ha and 0.799 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family, gardening and feeding their livestock. 10. On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicants containing an offer to buy their six plots of land for 19,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 41 euros (EUR)), AMD 213,000 (approximately EUR 463), AMD 26,000 (approximately EUR 57), AMD 87,000 (approximately EUR 190), AMD 73,000 (approximately EUR 160), and AMD 339,000 (approximately EUR 737) respectively plus an additional 15% on each amount offered as required by law, making the final offer AMD 870,550 (approximately EUR 1,893) in total. 11. The applicants did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that they were unable to obtain a valuation of their property by another company. They claim that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of their land. 12. On 12 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicants and their late mother, H., seeking to oblige them to sign the agreement on the taking of their property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on valuation reports prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the reports, the market value of the applicants’ six plots of land was estimated at AMD 757,000 (approximately EUR 1,645) in total. 13. In the proceedings before the Lori Regional Court, the second applicant argued that the market value of their land had been underestimated. 14. In the course of the proceedings, Teghout CJSC submitted other valuation reports in respect of the applicants’ property, stating that Oliver Group LLC had prepared corrected reports according to which the market value of the entire property was AMD 1,038,000 (approximately EUR 2,257). The final amount of compensation, including the additional 15% required by law, would thus be equal to AMD 1,193,700 (approximately EUR 2,595). 15. On 28 November 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC’s claim, awarding H. and the applicants a total of AMD 1,193,700 (approximately EUR 2,595) in compensation. 16. The applicants lodged an appeal, complaining, inter alia, that the first applicant had not been duly notified about the proceedings. They further argued that the Regional Court, although aware that H. had died in 2007, had delivered a judgment that concerned her rights. 17. On 3 April 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal quashed the Regional Court’s judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 18. On 7 October 2009 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC’s claim finding, inter alia, that the valuation reports prepared by Oliver Group LLC should be considered lawful and acceptable evidence to determine the market value of the applicants’ property to be taken for State needs. The Regional Court stated that the first applicant, as H.’s successor, should be awarded her share in the compensation, and awarded the applicants a total of AMD 1,193,700 (approximately EUR 2,595) in equal shares as compensation. 19. The applicants lodged an appeal, claiming, inter alia, that the market value of their land had been seriously underestimated and that the amount of compensation offered to them was not adequate. They argued that the Regional Court had accepted the reports submitted by their opponent as established proof of the market value of their property. They argued in particular that, in order to provide them with a reasonable opportunity to present their case, the Regional Court should have exercised its statutory discretion to order an expert examination, since such a necessity had arisen in the course of the proceedings and they had had no opportunity to provide an alternative valuation themselves. 20. On 3 February 2010 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court’s judgment, stating that the applicants had failed to raise their complaints concerning the alleged inadmissibility of evidence at the first level of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal did not address the issue of whether the Regional Court should have exercised its statutory discretion to order an expert examination to determine the real market value of the applicants’ property, given that there was a dispute on this issue. 21. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. They raised similar complaints to those raised before the Court of Appeal. 22. On 24 March 2010 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants’ cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.

5. The list of applicants is set out in the appended tables. 6. The applicants were employees of a municipal education institution. 7. On 13 June 2001 they brought proceedings before the Kolomna Town Court of the Moscow Region (“the Town Court”) against their employer and the town administration seeking recovery of unpaid wages and taxes to various social funds. 8. On 13 July 2004 the Kolomna Town Court issued a first-instance judgment on the merits of the case. On 22 September 2004 the Moscow Regional Court quashed the judgment on appeal and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 9. On 7 July 2005 the Town Court granted the applicants’ claims awarding each of them a certain amount against their employer (see Appendix I). The judgment was upheld on appeal by the Moscow Regional Court on 28 September 2005. 10. Between 26 June 2001 and 7 July 2005 the court hearings were adjourned twenty-five times due to the respondents’ or one of the respondents’ failure to appear, eighteen times on the claimants’ request and eleven times pursuant the requests by the defendants; four times the first‑instance court adjourned the case as the respondent authorities had been requested to submit additional documents. Moreover, on 11 June 2002 the proceedings were suspended pursuant to a decision by the domestic court on account of the claimants’ alleged failure to appear; on 4 February 2003 that decision was quashed by the appeal court, due to the first-instance court’s failure to notify the applicants of the hearing date. Thus, the period attributable to the authorities amounts to over one year. 11. On an unspecified date in 2005 the employer institution was liquidated. On 18 October 2005 the relevant record was made into the State Register of Legal Entities. 12. According to the Government’s submissions of 19 July 2011, on 30 June 2006 the judgment of 7 July 2005 was partially enforced in respect of certain applicants, as specified in Appendix I.

6. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Reykjavík. 7. The applicant was a member of the Icelandic Parliament (Althingi) during the years 1987 to 2009. He served as Minister of Finance in the years 1998 to 2005, Minister for Foreign Affairs from 2005 to 2006 and Prime Minister from 2006 to 2009. After Parliamentary elections in May 2007 the applicant led the government which was formed by the Independence Party (Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn), of which he was a member, and the Social Democratic Alliance (Samfylkingin). 8. In the beginning of October 2008 the Icelandic banking system collapsed. On 6 October 2008 the applicant proposed a bill to Parliament which, on the same day, was adopted as the Act on the Authority for Treasury Disbursements due to Unusual Financial Market Circumstances etc. (Lög um heimild til fjárveitingar úr ríkissjóði vegna sérstakra aðstæðna á fjármálamarkaði ofl., no. 125/2008). Among other things, it authorised the Financial Supervisory Authority (Fjármálaeftirlitið) to intervene in the operations of financial undertakings. On 7 and 9 October 2008 the authority seized control of Iceland’s three largest banks, Landsbanki Íslands hf., Glitnir banki hf. and Kaupþing banki hf. 9. In December 2008 Parliament established a Special Investigation Commission (Rannsóknarnefnd Alþingis, hereinafter “the SIC”) to investigate and analyse the processes leading to, as well as the causes of, the collapse of the above-mentioned banks. According to section 1 of the Special Investigation Commission Act (Lög um rannsókn á aðdraganda og orsökum falls íslensku bankanna 2008 og tengdra atburða, no. 142/2008; hereinafter “the SIC Act”), one of the Commission’s objectives was to assess whether mistakes or negligence had occurred in the course of implementing laws and rules in respect of financial activities in Iceland and regulatory inspection in that field and, if so, who might be responsible. While its role was not to investigate potential criminal conduct, the SIC should inform the State Prosecutor of any suspicions of criminal activities having taken place as well as any potential breaches of official duty. The SIC made an extensive investigation during which it collected information from individuals, financial institutions and public institutions, conducted formal hearings with 147 individuals and meetings with a further 183 individuals. 10. The applicant testified before the SIC on 2 and 3 July 2009. On 8 February 2010 the SIC informed him that it considered that he had acted negligently and invited him to submit a written statement in reply, which he did on 24 February 2010. 11. On 12 April 2010 the SIC issued its report which contained a detailed description of the causes of the collapse of the Icelandic banks as well as serious criticism of the acts and omissions of a number of public officials and institutions. This included the applicant and two other ministers from his cabinet, the Minister of Finance, Mr Árni M. Mathiesen from the Independence Party, and the Minister of Business Affairs, Mr Björgvin G. Sigurðsson from the Social Democratic Alliance, who were found to have shown negligence by omitting to respond in an appropriate fashion to the impending danger for the Icelandic economy that was caused by the deteriorating situation of the banks. 12. In the meantime, on 26 January 2009, the government led by the applicant resigned and on 1 February 2009 the Social Democratic Alliance and the Left-Green Movement (Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð) formed a government. Those two parties gained a majority of seats in Parliament in the subsequent elections on 25 April 2009. 13. In 2009 Parliament passed an amendment to the SIC Act according to which it was to elect an ad hoc parliamentary review committee (Þingmannanefndin; hereafter “the PRC”) “to address the report of the SIC on the collapse of the banks, and form recommendations as to Parliament’s response to the SIC’s conclusions”. It was also to adopt a position on ministerial accountability and assess whether there were grounds for impeachment proceedings before the Court of Impeachment (Landsdómur) for violations of the Ministerial Accountability Act (Lög um ráðherraábyrgð, no. 4/1963). The PRC was established on 30 December 2009 and was composed of nine members of Parliament representing all the parliamentary party groups. It commenced work on 15 January 2010. 14. The PRC examined the SIC report, held 54 meetings and multiple informal working meetings. It received several expert opinions on ministerial liability from professors as well as the former state prosecutor and Ms Sigríður J. Friðjónsdóttir, then deputy state prosecutor. Ms Friðjónsdóttir attended five meetings of the PRC and expressed her opinions on the potential charges against ministers, the penal provisions that might apply, the evidence that could be relevant and the rules and content pertaining to an indictment. She also submitted a draft text for part of an indictment. The PRC further collected original documents relating to the ministers’ duties which were mentioned in the SIC report, inter alia letters, notes, minutes, emails from the Government Offices and the Central Bank of Iceland and minutes from meetings of the consultative group on financial stability and contingency planning. On 18 May 2010 the PRC sent letters to 16 individuals, including the applicant, who had held office as ministers during the period covered by the SIC report, asking them to submit comments and information regarding the report’s conclusions. The committee received replies from 14 individuals, including the applicant who submitted his reply by letter of 7 June 2010. 15. On 11 September 2010 the PRC submitted a proposal for a parliamentary resolution to commence impeachment proceedings against four cabinet members: the three mentioned above (including the applicant) and Ms Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, who was the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and the head of the Social Democratic Alliance. The proposal listed six points of alleged negligent behaviour, corresponding to the counts in the eventual indictment issued against the applicant (see paragraph 23 below). The applicant was considered to have been negligent in all six respects, whereas the other three ministers were deemed responsible only in respect of five of the points (excluding what was to become count 1.3 in the applicant’s indictment). The proposal was presented as a whole but Parliament decided to vote on each former minister separately. In a resolution of 28 September 2010, by 33 votes to 30, it approved the PRC’s proposal to commence impeachment proceedings against the applicant. With similar small majorities, the votes concerning the other former ministers led to the conclusion that they should not be indicted. All 15 members of the Left-Green Movement and all three members of The Movement (Hreyfingin) voted in favour of impeachment of each of the four former ministers and all 16 members of the Independence Party voted against the proposal. Six of the nine members of the Progressive Party (Framsóknarflokkurinn) voted in favour of impeachment of all the ministers and three members voted against. As regards the members of the Social Democratic Alliance, one of its 20 members voted in favour of impeachment of each of the ministers and 11 members voted against in respect of all of them. The remaining eight Social Democratic members were the only ones that cast differing votes in regard to the four ministers: the applicant – eight in favour of impeachment; Mr Mathiesen – six; Ms Gísladóttir – four; and Mr Sigurðsson – two. 16. On the same day, 28 September 2010, the applicant designated a lawyer for his defence. On 30 September he was formally notified of the result of the voting in Parliament. The Parliament resolution, containing the exact points of indictment, the PRC’s proposal and an explanatory memorandum with the reasons for the proposal, was made available on the website of the Parliament. 17. On 12 October 2010 Parliament appointed Ms Friðjónsdóttir to prosecute the case on its behalf. It also appointed a parliamentary committee to assist her and to monitor the case. 18. The Court of Impeachment constituted to adjudicate the case was composed, in accordance with section 2 of the Court of Impeachment Act (see paragraph 44 below). Thus, five members of the court were judges of the Supreme Court, one was a judge of the District Court (Héraðsdómur) of Reykjavík, and one was a professor at the Law Faculty of the University of Iceland. The latter member was, on 1 September 2011, appointed as justice of the Supreme Court, but continued to sit on the Court of Impeachment in his original capacity. The remaining eight members of the Court of Impeachment were lay judges appointed by Parliament. 19. Following the applicant’s request by letter of 15 November 2010 the Court of Impeachment, on 30 November 2010, appointed the applicant’s lawyer as his defence counsel. The applicant claims that he and his lawyer had made such a request on several earlier occasions. However, no evidence thereof has been submitted in the present case. 20. According to Parliament’s prosecutor (see paragraph 28 below) she invited, by a letter of 9 December 2010, the applicant’s counsel to make comments or request that further information be collected. It appears that counsel did not make any comments or requests in reply. 21. Following decisions of the Court of Impeachment of 22 March 2011 and the District Court of 24 March 2011, the prosecutor was given access to documents and information, including documents from the SIC database, statements given before the SIC as well as correspondence from the applicant’s former work email. She conducted a research into these documents but did not hear the applicant or any witnesses during her investigation. 22. On 11 April 2011 the applicant’s counsel was provided with a USB memory stick containing the documents which the prosecutor had obtained from the SIC database. 23. On 10 May 2011 the applicant was indicted, in accordance with the Parliamentary resolution of 28 September 2010: “1. 1.1 For having shown serious neglect of his duties as Prime Minister in the face of major danger looming over Icelandic financial institutions and the State Treasury, a danger of which he was or ought to have been aware and would have been able to respond to by initiating measures, legislation, general governmental instructions or governmental decisions on the basis of current law, for the purpose of avoiding foreseeable danger to the fortunes of the State. 1.2 For having failed to take initiative, either by taking measures of his own or by proposing measures to other ministers, to the effect that there would be a comprehensive and professional analysis within the administrative system of the financial risk faced by the State because of the risk of financial crisis. 1.3 For having neglected to ensure that the work and emphasis of a consultative group of the Government of financial stability and preparedness, which was established in 2006, were purposeful and produced the desired results. 1.4 For having neglected to take initiative on active measures on behalf of the State to reduce the size of the Icelandic banking system by, for example, advocating that the banks reduce their balance sheets or that some of them move their headquarters out of Iceland. 1.5 For not having followed up and assured himself that active measures were being taken in order to transfer Landsbanki Íslands hf.’s Icesave accounts in Britain to a subsidiary, and then to look for ways to enable this to happen with the active involvement of the State. The above-specified conduct is deemed subject to section 10(b), cf. section 11, of Act no. 4/1963 [on Ministerial Responsibility], and, alternatively, section 141 of the General Penal Code, no. 19/1940. 2. For having, during the above-mentioned period [February 2008 – October 2008] failed to implement what is directed in Article 17 of the Constitution of the Republic on the duty to hold ministerial meetings on important government matters. During this period there was little discussion at ministerial meetings of the imminent danger; there was no formal discussion of it at ministerial meetings, and nothing was recorded about these matters at the meetings. There was nevertheless specific reason to do so, especially after the meeting on 7 February 2008 between him, Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttur, Árni M. Mathiesen and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland; after his and Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir’s meeting on 1 April 2008 with the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland; and following a declaration to the Swedish, Danish and Norwegian Central Banks, which was signed on 15 May 2008. The Prime Minister did not initiate a formal ministerial meeting on the situation nor did he provide the Government with a separate report on the problem of the banks or its possible effect on the Icelandic State. This is deemed to fall under section 8(c), cf. section 11, of Act no. 4/1963, and, alternatively, section 141 of the General Penal Code, no. 19/1940.” 24. Also on 10 May 2011 an amendment to the Court of Impeachment Act (Lög um landsdóm, no. 3/1963) entered into force, according to which the judges “who hold seat on [the court] when Parliament has decided to impeach a minister, and their substitutes, shall complete the case although their term has expired”. According to the bill introducing the amendment, this was to avoid disruption of a judge’s examination of an ongoing case. As a consequence, the six-year term of office of the court’s eight lay judges, who had been appointed by Parliament on 11 May 2005, was extended until the conclusion of the proceedings against the applicant. 25. The case was filed by the prosecution with the Court of Impeachment on 7 June 2011. The prosecution argued, inter alia, in respect of count 2 of the indictment, that the matter of the banking system and the risk of financial crisis had been important government matters and could hardly have been more important. Storm clouds had been gathering since before the beginning of the period to which the indictment related and the applicant had known or ought to have known where things were headed. Thus, this matter should have been discussed at ministerial meetings as prescribed by Article 17 of the Constitution which should be interpreted according to its words (see paragraph 42 below). The prosecution objected to the applicant’s argument that a constitutional custom had developed to the effect that only matters under Article 16 of the Constitution should be discussed in ministerial meetings under Article 17, and even if such custom existed, it could not override a clear provision of the Constitution. Furthermore, a breach against Article 17 had substantive consequences since, if cabinet meetings were not convened on urgent problems, the opportunity to respond clearly would be lessened. It had been apparent that important government matters had not been discussed by the cabinet and the knowledge that the defendant had demonstrably possessed had not been reported to the ministers. The applicant’s violation according to count 2 of the indictment was a conduct offence and punishable irrespective of the consequences or risks attributable to the conduct. 26. The applicant challenged the impartiality and independence of the eight judges appointed by Parliament, mainly on the ground that Parliament had extended their term by having enacted the above-mentioned legislation. By its ruling on 10 June 2011, the Court of Impeachment rejected the petition, finding that the legislator had pursued a legitimate aim and that the measure had been proportionate vis-à-vis the applicant. 27. On 5 September 2011 the applicant lodged a request to have the case dismissed, relying, among other things, on Article 6 of the Convention. He claimed that the investigation in the case had been manifestly defective, inter alia as the investigation conducted by the SIC had not been criminal in nature, the SIC having no such mandate, and as no real investigative measures had been undertaken by the PRC or the prosecutor. He had not been questioned or invited to respond to the accusations, neither before Parliament’s resolution nor before the prosecutor issued her indictment. He also challenged the impartiality of the prosecutor due to her involvement in Parliament’s preparation of the decision to indict him, during which she had been repeatedly consulted by the PRC and had allegedly expressed her opinion on his potential responsibility under the Ministerial Accountability Act. The applicant further maintained that his chance of preparing a proper defence was compromised as the counts of the indictment were undefined and only described in general terms his alleged criminal conduct and the criminal provisions under which that conduct was subsumed were unclear and discretionary. Also the rules governing the impeachment proceedings and the penal provisions of the Ministerial Accountability Act and other invoked legislation were, in his view, so unclear that due process could not be ensured. Finally, he asserted that the decision by Parliament to bring proceedings against him alone had been taken on purely arbitrary and political grounds and thus did not treat him equally with other ministers originally subject to the investigation in the case. 28. The prosecutor contested the applicant’s request, maintaining, inter alia¸ that, in view of the thorough gathering of material by the SIC, there had been no need for an independent collection of evidence by the PRC, which was supposed to base its work on the report of the SIC. Moreover, the applicant’s defence counsel had not asked that the applicant be heard during the investigative stage, although such an opportunity was provided by section 16(2) of the Court of Impeachment Act and the prosecutor had invited him, by a letter of 9 December 2010, to make comments or request further information to be collected. With respect to the applicant’s challenge against her impartiality, the prosecutor objected to the assertion that she had expressed an opinion on the applicant’s potential criminal liability. She further claimed that the counts of the indictment were not unclear or worded in general terms, pointing out that further specifications in regard to several counts were found in the explanatory memorandum accompanying Parliament’s resolution and that, additionally, count 2 of the indictment provided explanatory examples of events that had given reason to discuss the imminent financial crisis at ministerial meetings. The prosecutor also disagreed with the applicant’s contention that the applicable procedural or criminal provisions were unclear. As for the alleged unequal treatment by Parliament when deciding to charge the applicant but not the other ministers, she stated that the majority of its members, bound only by their own conviction, had found that the facts of the case up until that point were likely to lead to a conviction of the applicant but not the others. 29. By a decision of 3 October 2011 the Court of Impeachment upheld the applicant’s motion for dismissal in so far as it concerned counts 1.1 and 1.2 of the indictment, but rejected the remainder of the request. It noted that Parliament held the authority to bring cases against a minister and that its review committee, the PRC, had obtained, inter alia, various evidence referred to in the SIC report and written statements from several ministers, including the applicant, before finding that there was enough evidence for a parliamentary resolution to commence proceedings against the applicant. Parliament’s handling of the matter had been in compliance with relevant legislation and its resolution to commence impeachment proceedings had not prevented the appointed prosecutor from investigating the case further and gathering new evidence. Indeed, the prosecutor had continued the investigation of the case before issuing the indictment against the applicant. Moreover, judgment in a criminal case should be based on evidence presented in court, including the testimonies of witnesses. If there were insufficient support for the charges against the defendant, he would be acquitted of the charges, a more favourable outcome for him than a dismissal, which could lead to possible shortcomings being remedied and a new indictment being issued. As regards the involvement of the prosecutor, the court referred to the general rules of pre-trial investigation under the Criminal Procedure Act (Lög um meðferð sakamála, no. 88/2008), according to which he or she is authorised to take various measures, including the collection of information and the making of decisions affecting the position of a suspect. Such intervention by the prosecutor did not affect his or her eligibility to handle the case later, such as by deciding whether to indict and bring the case to court. In line with this, the advice given to the PRC by the person subsequently appointed prosecutor could not lead to her disqualification in the case, even less so since Parliament held the authority to decide whether to indict and to determine the content of the indictment. With respect to the content of the indictment, the court found that it generally complied with the form and structure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Act and that it did not show such shortcomings that the entire case should be dismissed. As for counts 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 2, the court considered that there was no doubt as to what conduct was the subject of the indictment and how it was deemed punishable by law. However, the conduct imputed to the applicant in counts 1.1 and 1.2 had not been specified with sufficient clarity and these charges were accordingly dismissed. The court went on to find that the procedure in impeachment proceedings was unambiguous and foreseeable, the Court of Impeachment Act containing a few special provisions and the proceedings being, in all other respects, governed by the rules of general application laid down in the Criminal Procedure Act. Furthermore, the penal provisions invoked by the prosecution were worded in such a way that they could be interpreted on the basis of objective criteria and were clear enough to enable a proper defence. Finally, in regard to the fact that Parliament had voted to bring proceedings exclusively against the applicant, the court noted that, under the Constitution, members of Parliament were bound only by their own conviction. Moreover, the resolution adopted by Parliament, as the holder of authority to decide on prosecution in impeachment cases, was not subject to review by the court in such a manner as might lead to the dismissal of the case. 30. Subsequently, the applicant submitted written pleadings to the Court of Impeachment. 31. The public hearing in the case commenced on 5 March 2012. It started with the formal testimony of the applicant, the first statement he gave since the charges had been brought against him. During the hearing, which lasted until 16 March, written evidence was produced and 40 witnesses gave evidence before the court. The applicant attended all sessions. On 13 March the applicant testified for a second time. Oral pleadings by the lawyers for the applicant and the prosecution were made on 15 and 16 March. 32. By a judgment of 23 April 2012 the Court of Impeachment unanimously acquitted the applicant of counts 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 of the indictment, finding that the prosecution had not established that the actions which he was accused of having neglected could or would have averted the danger facing the Icelandic financial institutions and the State treasury or reduced it considerably. As for certain negligence imputed to him by the prosecution, the court considered that it related to actions that were not among his duties. However, by nine votes to six, the majority consisting of five professional judges and four lay judges, the Court of Impeachment found the applicant guilty in respect of count 2. The court considered it established that major danger had been threatening the Icelandic commercial banks and the State Treasury as early as February 2008 and that the applicant had to have been aware of that danger. However, basing itself on the minutes of 52 ministerial meetings held between 1 February and 6 October 2008 and the testimony of the applicant and the witnesses, in particular five ministers who had held a seat in the government in 2008, the court found that this matter had not been discussed during the meetings, apart from the last four meetings, on 30 September and on 3, 5 and 6 October. It therefore concluded that the applicant had failed to comply with the duty set out in Article 17 of the Constitution to hold ministerial meetings on “important government matters”. 33. As to the criminal liability under the Ministerial Accountability Act, the court generally stated: “The accountability provided for in Article 14 of the Constitution and Article 1 of [the Ministerial Accountability Act] represents an addition to the parliamentary and political responsibility borne by a minister towards Parliament in respect of the discharge of his duties of office on the basis of parliamentary rule. Even though parliamentary responsibility places great restraint on a minister, the Constitution assumes that a breach in office on his part may entail criminal liability, as further laid down by law. When comparing these two kinds of responsibility it must be concluded that only serious wrongs on the part of the minister committed in office would lead to his punishment. Accordingly, the sole matter of his conduct being worthy of criticism or blame cannot suffice for invoking the legal accountability in question, so that more grave matters must be in issue. It is then determined by an assessment of all facts whether certain conduct is considered serious enough to be subject to punishment, either pursuant to [the Ministerial Accountability Act] or the general penal code, cf. section 1(2) of the aforementioned Act.” 34. The court went on to make the following remarks about section 8(c) of the Ministerial Accountability Act: “According to section 8(c) of [the Act] it is punishable if a minister, apart from the incidents described in points (a) and (b) of the section, ‘by other means personally implements, orders the implementation or allows the implementation of any measure that contravenes the Constitution of the Republic, or fails to implement any measure prescribed therein, or causes neglect of such implementation’. The latter part of this provision describes an offence of direct omission, which means that the very fact of a minister neglecting to implement any matter ordered by the Constitution or causing the neglect of its implementation will be a punishable offence irrespective of the consequences or risks attributable to such an omission. As noted in the explanatory notes to the bill that became [the Act], section 8(c) of the Act contains a provision of general import which applies to all breaches of the Constitution other than those specifically made punishable in other points of the section. Accordingly, it falls within the conduct description of this provision to fail to comply with the duty, provided for in Article 17 of the Constitution, to hold ministerial meetings ‘to discuss new legislative proposals and important government matters’.” 35. In regard to the applicant’s motion to have the whole case dismissed due to the alleged lack of clarity of section 8(c) of the Ministerial Accountability Act, the Court of Impeachment considered that the words “important government matters” in Article 17 of the Constitution, to which section 8(c) referred, could easily be understood by a reasonable man in the office held by the applicant and that the provisions contained predictable and reasonable criteria regarding the minister’s discharge of official duties. 36. The applicant had also maintained that it was clear from the origin and history of Article 17 of the Constitution that important government matters that should be discussed in ministerial meetings according to that provision were only matters that should have been submitted to the President in the State Council according to Article 16 of the Constitution. The court examined the history of the two constitutional articles, in particular the difference in language between “important government measures” (mikilvægar stjórnarráðstafanir) in Article 16 and “important government matters” (mikilvæg stjórnarmálefni) in Article 17, finding that the latter term was literally more extensive. It concluded as follows: “... These two features, that the constitutional provisions on ministerial meetings has remained substantially unchanged despite the change in Iceland’s constitutional position in 1944 and that a distinction was made between matters to be discussed at ministerial meetings, on the one hand, and those to be submitted to the State Council, on the other, in the first Act on the Government Offices of Iceland, unequivocally support a literal interpretation of the instruction under Article 17 of the Constitution. In accordance with a principle of statutory interpretation it will here be found proper to follow the clear language of the provision, which prior preparatory works cannot refute. Accordingly, the Prime Minister, who heads the cabinet and leads ministerial meetings, has a duty to ensure that important government matters of which he is aware are discussed and, where applicable, addressed in those meetings, as provided for in Article 17 of the Constitution. ...” 37. The court then noted that it was not at the Prime Minister’s sole discretion to determine when a matter was of such nature that it should be raised at a ministerial meeting. Rather, of primary importance was to what extent it concerned the interests of the state and the general population. The court concluded that the danger facing the Icelandic bank system and thus the welfare of the state had been of gigantic and unprecedented proportions and was, due to the great public interest at stake, without a doubt an important government matter within the meaning of Article 17 of the Constitution. 38. The applicant had asserted that cabinet meetings were not a common platform for ministers to discuss matters with other ministers and that Article 17 of the Constitution did not prevent individual ministers from discussing certain matters among themselves without presenting them at the meetings. Furthermore, the minutes of the cabinet meetings did not exhaustively record the discussions, as they contained only a listing of the items placed on the agenda. Frequently, other subjects than those listed had been discussed, inter alia under the item “other issues”. Statements by former ministers before the court had clearly showed that the banking system had been repeatedly discussed at the meetings held during the period to which the indictment referred. In this respect, the court noted that, under the Constitution, cabinet meetings was the forum for political consultation between ministers on important government matters. Whether or not it had been customary to raise comparable issues at ministerial meetings or in informal consultations between the chairmen of governing coalition parties, such practices could not absolve the Prime Minister from the duty laid down in Article 17. 39. As regards the specific conduct imputed to the applicant, the court stated, inter alia, the following: “According to that which has been related above, it is considered proved beyond doubt in the case that the great danger facing the Icelandic banks and thus the welfare of the State was not discussed at cabinet meetings in the period from February 2008 until the end of September the same year. As stated above, it must also be considered a fact in the resolution of the case that various issues that were up for discussion in the consultative group on financial stability and contingency planning, and which there was due reason to discuss in the cabinet, were not dealt with at those meetings. That was all the more urgent as the defendant did not convey important information which he possessed about the affairs of the banks to the Minister for Business Affairs, to whom they pertained. Last but not least it is proven that those two aforesaid documents that were forwarded to foreign authorities [a declaration of 16 May 2008 signed by the defendant, the ministers of foreign affairs and finance and the board of governors of the Central Bank of Iceland to the central banks of Sweden, Denmark and Norway on the completion of currency swap agreements and a letter of 20 August 2008 by the Ministry of Business Affairs to the UK Treasury providing answers to certain questions posed by the latter] and contained, on the one hand, obligations, and, on the other, promises, in the name of the government, were not discussed at its meetings. The defendant and various other persons who have testified before the Court have emphasised that the situation in financial markets was so sensitive during the period related to the case that the slightest rumour that the Icelandic banks might encounter a liquidity crisis could have accelerated and even caused their collapse. For this reason it had been very important to discuss the danger facing the banking system within a small group, in full confidentiality. Although those views may have been fully justified, especially while the difficulties of the banks were still known by few, it is to no avail for the defendant to allege that for this reason he was unable to give an account of the issues in question at cabinet meetings. The framework of those meetings is not least designed so that ministers and supreme holders of executive power can consult one another and discuss important issues confidentially and behind closed doors, with the ministers having a compelling duty ... not to disclose points raised there concerning such confidential matters. The defendant’s conduct of failing to comply with Article 17 of the Constitution where it prescribes that ministerial meetings should be held on important government matters ... not only led to a breach against a procedural rule but also contributed to the fact that a political policy to address the huge problem of which the defendant must have been aware in February 2008 was not formulated at the level of the cabinet of ministers. If such a policy had been formulated and then implemented in an organised manner, including action by the Central Bank of Iceland and the Financial Supervisory Authority, it may be argued that it would have been possible to lessen the harm caused by the collapse of the banks in the beginning of October 2008. It is also likely that the authorities would then have been better prepared for taking a position towards the request of Glitnir Bank hf. for financial assistance at the end of September 2008, so that the problems of that bank might have been resolved in a more deliberate manner than was the case. It may be inferred from the defendant’s testimony before the court that he closely followed the progress of the matters in question. ... [I]t must be regarded as gross carelessness on the part of the defendant to have failed to take up the issues related above for discussion at cabinet meetings, as he was aware or at least should have been aware that they were of such importance, and of such nature, as an integral part of the government’s economic policy, that he had a duty to do so.” 40. The applicant was consequently convicted of a violation of section 8(c) of the Ministerial Accountability Act, for having by gross negligence failed to hold ministerial meetings on important government matters as prescribed in Article 17 of the Constitution. He was not sentenced to any punishment and the Icelandic State was ordered to bear all legal costs, including fees to the applicant’s counsel. Not subject to an appeal, the judgment was final. 41. The minority’s opinion was to acquit the applicant of all charges. In regard to count 2 of the indictment, the minority referred to the requirement of foreseeability and clarity and to the rule of interpretation that a criminal provision should be narrowly construed when there is doubt as to its application. It expressed the following view on the history of Articles 16 and 17 of the Constitution: “According to the interpretation of Article 17 of the Constitution related above, the duty to hold ministerial meetings only extended to meetings on matters to be submitted to the State Council and matters which individual ministers wished to raise, and the actual practice in respect of the functions of ministerial meetings has been in keeping with this ever since. In addition, the witness statements by ministers in the [applicant’s] cabinet have indicated that economic issues and the issues of financial undertakings were frequently discussed in cabinet meetings at the outset of the meeting or under the agenda item of other issues, even though this was not recorded in the minutes. In this case, the interpretation of Article 17 of the Constitution is in issue when assessing whether [the applicant] became guilty of punishable conduct, and viewpoints on good administrative practices which have gained more prominence of late cannot be a determining factor in this context. It should also be noted that a minister will not be held criminally liable under [the Ministerial Accountability Act] unless serious errors have been committed while in office, which cannot apply to the charges according to this count of the indictment, as related above in the course of interpretation of Article 17 of the Constitution. Taking this into consideration, we are of the opinion that the [applicant] should be acquitted of a violation of the [Act].”

4. The applicants complained of a breach of their property rights through the actions of Russian military forces in Chechnya in 2000 and the failure of the competent domestic authorities to provide them with effective remedies in respect of those breaches. 5. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. The application was lodged on 14 March 2008 by Mr Isa Magometkhozhiyev, who was born in 1950 and currently lives in Urus-Martan, Chechnya. He is represented before the Court by Mr D. Itslayev, a lawyer practising in Grozny. (a) Seizure of the applicant’s vehicle 7. The applicant lived at 109 Sovetskaya Street, Urus-Martan. At about 10 a.m. on 10 March 2000 a group of military servicemen arrived at the house. The servicemen drove two armoured personnel carriers (APCs), and an Ural lorry with the registration number M 105 61. The group’s commander introduced himself to the applicant as Major Iv. They seized the applicant’s GAZ-330700 petrol lorry, which was stationed in the courtyard. They did not show any documents or give any explanation in respect of the seizure to the applicant, except to tell him that they had been instructed by their commanders to do so. 8. The applicant followed the servicemen who drove his lorry away. They entered the compound of a military unit known as DON-100, in the south-western outskirts of Urus-Martan. 9. On 11 March 2000 the applicant was allowed by a soldier to enter the compound and he saw his vehicle there. The applicant states that he saw many other vehicles stationed there; some had parts missing. 10. Two weeks later a serviceman told the applicant that his vehicle had been transported to a military unit in Mozdok, North Ossetia. 11. The applicant stated that he had reported the seizure of the vehicle to the authorities immediately, but submitted no documents in this respect. (b) Criminal investigation 12. On 15 March 2001 the applicant informed the military prosecutor of Chechnya of the unlawful seizure of his lorry and asked him to intervene. 13. On 19 June 2001 an investigator of the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office (hereinafter “the district prosecutor’s office”) asked the Ministry of Justice to inform him of the current location of Major Iv., who was no longer stationed in Chechnya. 14. In July and August 2001 the Ministry of Justice replied to the investigator that no Ministry serviceman by the name of Iv. had been serving in Urus-Martan at the time in question. 15. On 20 January 2002 the district prosecutor’s office opened criminal investigation file no. 61001 into the alleged robbery. The decision by which the criminal investigation file was opened stated that in March 2000 a group of unidentified armed persons had, having threatened the applicant with firearms, taken his lorry from his house. 16. After a subsequent exchange of letters between the district prosecutor’s office and the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defence, it proved impossible to identify the military unit in question. On this basis, in April 2003 the military prosecutor’s office refused to take possession of the file. 17. Officials of the North Caucasus Military Circuit denied that the GAZ lorry with the registration and identification numbers indicated by the applicant had been registered with any of their units. This was affirmed by the Chechnya Agency of State property. 18. Certain documents indicated that the servicemen identified by the applicant as belonging to “DON-100” had served in military unit no. 3660 of the internal troops of the Ministry of the Interior, which was permanently based in the Rostov Region. 19. At some point the applicant was granted victim status and information about the vehicle was entered in the national register of missing and stolen vehicles. 20. The applicant on numerous occasions complained to various bodies, including the civilian and military prosecutor’s offices, and the military and civilian authorities both in Chechnya and at the federal level. 21. The investigation was adjourned and reopened on several occasions but failed to identify the perpetrators, to find or question anyone from the military unit in question, or to locate the vehicle. (c) Civil proceedings 22. The applicant lodged a claim for compensation against the State Treasury. On 8 August 2005 the Urus-Martan Town Court refused to consider the claim on the merits. The applicant appealed, and on 30 August 2005 the Supreme Court of Chechnya quashed that decision and remitted it to the District Court for fresh examination. 23. In the meantime, the applicant applied to the Urus-Martan Town Court, requesting that it confirm his ownership of the vehicle in question. The applicant submitted that the vehicle and relevant documents had been taken from him by unidentified servicemen of the Ministry of Justice. The Chechnya traffic police were unable to issue any documents since their archives had burned down in 2000, but a police inspector from Urus-Martan confirmed that the applicant had had the vehicle in his possession. Two witnesses confirmed that the applicant had owned the vehicle. On the strength of the above, on 27 February 2006 the Town Court confirmed the applicant’s ownership of the vehicle in question. 24. By a decision dated 21 September 2006 the Urus-Martan Town Court transferred the applicant’s claim for damages to the Basmanny District Court of Moscow, the city in which the Federal Treasury was situated. The applicant appealed, and on 4 July 2006 the Supreme Court of Chechnya quashed the decision of 21 September 2006 and remitted the case to the Urus-Martan Town Court for fresh consideration. 25. On 21 December 2006 the Urus-Martan Town Court considered the substance of the case and concluded that the evidence submitted by the applicant and adduced during the pending criminal investigation had failed to establish conclusively the implication of State agents in the crime. 26. The applicant appealed, and on 30 January 2007 the Supreme Court of Chechnya quashed the judgment of 21 December 2006 and again remitted the case to the Urus-Martan Town Court for fresh consideration. 27. The applicant lodged a claim seeking compensation for the cost of the lorry (which he estimated at 170,000 Russian roubles (RUB)) and lost income, together with compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 1 August 2007 the Urus-Martan Town Court dismissed the applicant’s claim, referring to the absence of conclusive proof that State servicemen had seized the vehicle. On 18 September 2007 the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld that ruling, referring to the fact that the criminal investigation remained pending. 28. The application was lodged on 6 October 2008 by Mr Ismail Amalayev, who was born in 1960 and currently lives in Kiel, Germany. (a) Destruction of the applicant’s lorry 29. In the evening of 14 October 2000 the applicant, his wife and aunt travelled in the applicant’s KAMAZ 53-20 lorry from the village of Starye Atagi to the Chiri-Yurt district of Grozny, Chechnya. At about 5 p.m. the applicant’s lorry got stuck on the road, not far from a security roadblock. The applicant tried to seek help from the passing drivers, but they were either unable to tow the lorry or didn’t want to stop, in view of the approaching curfew. 30. An armoured personnel carrier (APC), with the hull number 233, belonging to military unit no. 205 was passing by, and the applicant signalled to it by flashing his headlights. The APC stopped within 200-300 metres of the applicant’s lorry. Several servicemen got out but did not approach the lorry. Soon afterwards the applicant’s lorry was shot at from the direction of the APC; the applicant, his wife and his aunt escaped unhurt and ran to Starye Atagi. 31. In the morning on 15 October 2000 the applicant went to the lorry and found it burnt out and looking as though it had suffered from an explosion. The applicant immediately informed the local police, the head of the local administration of Starye Atagi and the local military commander’s office. (b) Criminal investigation 32. On 19 October 2000 the applicant drew up a description of the destroyed lorry, which was co-signed by two traffic police officers from Starye Atagi. The description concluded that the lorry had been “blown up and burned during curfew hours not far from the roadblock manned by the [servicemen of the] 205th motorised rifle regiment”. The applicant submitted a copy of this document to the Court, with some handwritten corrections. 33. On the same day a senior inspector of the state traffic police of the Grozny district department of the interior (ОВД Грозненского района Чеченской Республики) concluded that the applicant’s KAMAZ lorry had been destroyed by fire as a result of being fired at and could not be repaired. 34. In a decision dated 24 October 2000, the Grozny district prosecutor’s office stated that it would not open a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations. It concluded that the applicant had left his lorry on the road and that the car had been destroyed by fire as a result of an electrical short circuit. In 2001-2002 the applicant lodged a number of complaints against that decision. 35. On 25 March 2001 the Grozny District Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations that his KAMAZ lorry had been shot at and been destroyed by fire by unidentified servicemen driving APC no. 233. The investigation was adjourned on several occasions. 36. In March 2006 the applicant, his wife and aunt were granted victim status. The value of the lorry was put by the applicant at RUB 280,000. It does not appear that the investigation progressed beyond the facts communicated by the applicant. 37. On 8 May 2008 the Grozny District Court refused to consider the applicant’s complaint concerning the ineffectiveness of the investigation, since on 1 May 2008 the latest decision to adjourn the investigation had been quashed. On 11 June 2008 the Supreme Court of Chechnya confirmed this decision. 38. On 1 June 2008 the applicant was, once again, informed that the investigation had been adjourned. (c) Civil proceedings 39. The applicant lodged a claim, seeking to recover the cost of the lorry directly from the military unit. On 15 November 2006 the Grozny District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. The applicant appealed, and on 19 December 2006 the Supreme Court of Chechnya quashed the District Court’s decision and remitted the case to the District Court. The Supreme Court pointed out that the case-file material in respect of the pending criminal case, the applicant’s submissions and the evidence produced all pointed to the Ministry of Defence as the possible tortfeasor. It considered that the District Court had failed to elucidate the circumstances of the events in question and to inform the Ministry of Defence of the hearing of 15 November 2006. 40. The case was then transferred to Moscow, where the Ministry of Defence headquarters is located. On 2 March 2007 the Presnensky District Court dismissed the claim. It pointed out that the circumstances of the events in question were the subject of pending criminal proceedings and that “military unit no. 205” did not exist, according to the General Staff of the Ministry of Defence. It is not clear if the applicant appealed. 41. It appears that in March 2013 the applicant left Chechnya and, via Poland, moved to Germany.

4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Gdynia. 5. On 2 January 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed homicide together with other persons. 6. On 5 January 2007 the Gdynia District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded him in custody. The court stressed the need to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings, given that extensive evidence had still to be obtained in the case. It also referred to the fact that the proceedings in question concerned several alleged accomplices. The court further relied on the likelihood that a severe penalty would be imposed on the applicant. 7. On 12 February 2007 the applicant applied for the preventive measure to be lifted or varied. On 15 February the District Prosecutor refused the request, finding that the grounds for the imposition of this measure remained valid. 8. The applicant’s detention was further extended by decisions of the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) of 20 March, 19 June and 21 August 2007. The applicant appealed against all of those decisions. His appeals were dismissed by the Gdańsk Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) on 4 May, 1 August and 19 September 2007 respectively. The courts repeatedly relied in their decisions on the strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question, the likelihood of a severe prison sentence being imposed on him and the need to secure the proper conduct of the investigation, especially the need to obtain further expert evidence. 9. On 17 September 2007 the applicant again applied for release. His application was refused on 21 September 2007 by the Gdynia District Prosecutor. 10. On 27 November 2007 the Gdańsk Regional Court further extended the applicant’s detention until 31 March 2008. The applicant appealed, unsuccessfully. 11. On an unspecified date in late 2007 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Gdańsk Regional Court. The applicant was charged with homicide committed together with two other co-accused. 12. The applicant’s detention was continually extended during the course of the trial. 13. On 4 August 2008 the applicant requested the court to release him on health grounds. On 19 August 2008 the trial court refused his request. It relied on the medical certificate issued by a prison doctor, stating that the applicant could be adequately treated in detention. 14. On 25 September 2008 the Gdańsk Regional Court gave judgment (case no. IV 457/07). The applicant was convicted as charged and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. He lodged an appeal. 15. On 13 May 2009 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal quashed the impugned judgment and remitted the case for retrial (case no. II AKa 45/09). 16. The applicant’s detention was continually extended by the domestic courts, pending his appeal and in the course of the retrial. In particular, on 24 August 2009 the Gdańsk Regional Court extended his detention until 31 December 2009. The applicant appealed against this decision. On 23 September 2009 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal upheld the impugned decision, finding that the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question persisted, despite the fact that the judgment convicting the applicant had been quashed. The Court of Appeal further considered that the Regional Court had correctly relied on the severity of the anticipated penalty as the principal ground for the applicant’s continuing detention and on the risk of the obstruction of the proceedings. 17. On 16 March 2010 the Gdańsk Regional Court gave judgment (case no. XIV K 48/09). The applicant was again convicted as charged and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. The applicant lodged an appeal. 18. On 10 November 2010 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and remitted the case for retrial (case no. II AKa 277/10). 19. On 23 March 2012 the Gdańsk Regional Court further extended the applicant’s detention, reiterating the grounds given in its initial decisions. The applicant appealed unsuccessfully. 20. During the retrial proceedings the Gdańsk Regional Court held fifteen hearings in total. 21. On 12 July 2012 the court gave judgment (case no. XIV K 210/10). The applicant was again convicted and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. He lodged an appeal against that judgment. 22. On 26 October 2012 the Gdańsk Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention until 30 December 2012. On 13 November 2012 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal upheld the impugned decision. It considered that the applicant’s involvement in the offences with which he had been charged had been supported by the non-final judgment of 12 July 2012, in which he had been convicted and had received a severe sentence. The court also held that further detention on remand was the only preventive measure capable of securing the proper course of the proceedings until the delivery of a final judgment. 23. On 6 June 2013 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal partly allowed the applicant’s appeal (case no. II AKa 84/13). The appellate court upheld the conviction but reclassified the offence as involuntary manslaughter (nieumyślne spowodowanie śmierci). The applicant’s sentence was reduced to four years’ imprisonment. The applicant was released on the same day.

5. The applicant was born in 1975. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 6. On 9 July 2002, following proceedings in absentia, the Gjirokastër District Court convicted the applicant of attempted armed robbery, negligent homicide and premeditated murder in relation to another criminal offence, and sentenced him to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. Three other co‑defendants, whose requests for the use of the summary procedure had been granted, were also found guilty. The applicant was represented by a court-appointed lawyer. 7. On 7 October 2002, following an appeal by the three other defendants, the Gjirokastër Court of Appeal upheld the decision in the applicant’s absence. 8. On 10 October 2007, upon the applicant’s extradition to Albania, the District Court accepted his application for leave to appeal out of time. The District Court stated in its reasoning that the postal service had noted that the applicant was living in Italy and that as a consequence he had not been aware of his conviction. 9. On an unspecified date in October 2007 the applicant lodged his appeal. In the first place, he requested that his case be re-examined separately from that of his co-defendants on the grounds that he had not sought the use of the summary procedure. He relied on the Supreme Court’s unifying decision no. 2 of 29 January 2003 (see paragraph 16 below). Secondly, he requested that a fresh examination of the evidence be conducted in his presence and that a number of witnesses be questioned. Thirdly, he maintained that the authorities had failed to inform him about the judicial proceedings before the first-instance court. 10. On 17 December 2007 the Gjirokastër Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction in absentia. The court ruled that the applicant had not put forward new evidence to change the outcome of those proceedings. His request had been directed against the probative value of evidence which had already been examined and decided upon. In upholding the conviction, the court relied on forensic evidence produced in 1997 and 1999 and on witness statements made in 2001 and 2002. The court further stated that the applicant had been duly informed as the authorities had issued a public notice. It finally noted that the summary procedure had been applied equally to all the defendants in accordance with the Supreme Court’s unifying decision of 29 January 2003 (see “Relevant domestic case law below”). Separating the cases could not be considered as the district court had not decided on that issue. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision. He complained of a breach of his right to have witnesses questioned and evidence re-examined. He stressed the fact that in his appeal to the Court of Appeal he had asked for evidence to be obtained, including an identification parade, the questioning of a fourth person who had been present at the events, a face-to face confrontation between himself and the other co-defendants and so on. It had not been possible for him to obtain that evidence himself, only the courts or the prosecutor could have done that. The applicant also maintained the other complaints he had raised in his Court of Appeal case. 12. On 5 March 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that it lacked any grounds of appeal as prescribed by law. 13. On 21 February 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court. 14. On 9 May 2011 the applicant’s lawyer was notified of the Constitutional Court’s decision that his appeal was inadmissible.

5. The applicant was born in 1968 and is detained in Rezina. 6. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment on an unknown date some 10 years prior to the relevant events and is serving his sentence in prison no. 17 in Rezina. On 16 March 2011 the prison administration found a mobile phone in his cell. Since this is an object possession of which is prohibited by prison rules, on 23 March 2011 the prison administration sanctioned him with a reprimand. 7. On 26 July 2011 the prison board decided that the applicant was always to be handcuffed when moving outside his cell. An extract from the decision of the prison board issued to the applicant noted that the prison board had “examined [the applicant]” and had decided to apply handcuffs. No further reasons were given and the length of the period for which the measure was to apply was not specified. It appears from the applicant’s submissions that the measure was revoked at an extraordinary meeting of the prison board five months after it was imposed. 8. On 28 July 2011 the applicant asked the prison administration on what grounds the prison board had decided that he should be handcuffed. On 3 August 2011 he was informed that the sanction had been applied on the basis of order no. 4 of the Prisons Department (see paragraph 17 below). No further details were given. 9. In a letter dated 26 September 2011 the Prisons Department informed the applicant, in response to his request, that the use of handcuffs and other restraints was prescribed by the Regulation Concerning the Serving of Sentences, adopted by Government Decision no. 583 of 26 May 2006 (“the Regulation” – see paragraphs 14 and 16 below). 10. Also on 26 September 2011 the applicant challenged the prison board’s decision before the investigating judge, arguing that he had been sanctioned twice for the same offence, contrary to the express legal requirements, and that he had not been informed of the reasons for the decision to handcuff him. He noted that handcuffing was a sanction and relied on the reply of the Prisons Department (see the preceding paragraph) in arguing that that sanction could only be applied on the basis of the Regulation and not some secret order. None of the circumstances in respect of which the Regulation provided for the use of handcuffs had been cited by the prison board. 11. In their submissions to the court, the prison administration argued that the sanction had been lawfully applied and that the applicant had been properly informed. The prosecutor, who also participated in the hearing, added that the sanction had been necessary in order to prevent the applicant posing any danger to other detainees. 12. On 25 November 2011 the Rezina District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint as unfounded. It found that the measure in question had been applied lawfully and in order to prevent the applicant posing any danger to other detainees. That decision was final. 13. The applicant attempted to have the decision quashed by using an extraordinary remedy, but on 3 October 2012 the Supreme Court of Justice refused his request. 14. Under Article 593 of the Regulation Concerning the Serving of Sentences, adopted by Government Decision no. 583 of 26 May 2006 (“the Regulation”), only one sanction may be applied in respect of a disciplinary offence. 15. Under Article 95 of the Regulation, as modified on 26 September 2008, persons serving life imprisonment shall be handcuffed when moving outside their cells if it is established during the last evaluation that the absence of such a measure will pose an immediate danger to other detainees, prison staff or other persons. Evaluations of this kind shall be carried out at least once every six months. 16. Under Article 219 of the Regulation, a detainee may be handcuffed if (i) he or she physically resists prison staff or “is infuriated” (until he or she calms down), (ii) he or she refuses to move under escort, (iii) there are grounds for believing that there is a risk of the detainee escaping, (iv) he or she attempts suicide or self-mutilation, or attacks other detainees (until the detainee calms down), or (v) during the escorting of a detainee after his or her escape and subsequent apprehension. 17. According to the Government, order no. 4 of the Prisons Department adopted on 13 January 2009 provides, in section 39/1, that the prison board may decide on whether there is any need to handcuff a person sentenced to imprisonment for life or whether to remove handcuffs from such a person, depending on the degree of danger posed by him or her. 18. The European Prison Rules (annex to Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member States of 11 January 2006), in so far relevant, read as follows: “... 68.2 Handcuffs, restraint jackets and other body restraints shall not be used except: a. if necessary, as a precaution against escape during a transfer, provided that they are removed when the prisoner appears before a judicial or administrative authority, unless that authority decides otherwise; or b. by order of the director, if other methods of control fail, in order to protect a prisoner from self-injury [or] injury to others or to prevent serious damage to property, provided that in such instances the director shall immediately inform the medical practitioner and report to the higher prison authority. 68.3 Instruments of restraint shall not be applied for any longer time than is strictly necessary. ...” 19. The relevant parts of the 25th General Report (April 2016) of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT/Inf (2016) 10) provide as follows: “The basic objectives and principles for the treatment of life-sentenced prisoners 74. In the CPT’s view, the objectives and principles for the treatment of life-sentenced prisoners enunciated by the Committee of Ministers in Recommendation Rec (2003) 23 on the management by prison administrations of life sentence and other long-term prisoners remains the most pertinent and comprehensive reference document for this group of prisoners. In summary, these principles are: ... - the normalisation principle: life-sentenced prisoners should, like all prisoners, be subject only to the restrictions that are necessary for their safe and orderly confinement; ... Conclusion 81. The CPT calls upon member states to review their treatment of life-sentenced prisoners to ensure that this is in accordance with their individual risk they present, both in custody and to the outside community, and not simply in response to the sentence which has been imposed on them. In particular, steps should be taken by the member states concerned to abolish the legal obligation of keeping life-sentenced prisoners separate from other (long-term) sentenced prisoners and to put an end to the systematic use of security measures such as handcuffs inside the prison.”

5. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Moscow. 6. The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the public event at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, §§ 7-65, 5 January 2016), and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, §§ 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties’ submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7. On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the “March of Millions” was held in central Moscow to protest against allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square, which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it turned out that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd the police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers. There were numerous clashes between the police and protesters. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered that the meeting finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protestors from the square. 8. On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate suspected acts of mass disorder and violence against the police (Articles 212 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was transferred to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising acts of mass disorder (Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 9. The applicant took part in the demonstration of 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square. He was arrested on the date indicated below and charged with participation in mass disorder. The applicant was detained and tried on those charges but subsequently exempted from liability under the Amnesty Act. 10. The applicant is a political activist and a member of an opposition movement called Levyy Front. On 6 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square to participate in the demonstration and, according to him, did not take part in any disorder or clashes with the police. After the events in question the applicant continued to live at his usual address and pursue his customary activities, including taking part in authorised public events. 11. On 10 June 2012 the applicant was detained on suspicion of participation in acts of mass disorder and committing violent acts against the police on 6 May 2012. On 11 June 2012 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow held a hearing on the investigating authorities’ request to detain the applicant pending the completion of the criminal investigation. In view of the need to provide additional evidence in support of the request, the court adjourned the hearing and authorised the applicant’s detention for seventy‑two hours. 12. On 14 June 2012 the Basmannyy District Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 10 August 2012. It referred to the gravity of the charges and stated that the applicant’s state of health did not preclude his being detained. The District Court concluded that the applicant, faced with the risk of a prison term, might obstruct the proper administration of justice or abscond. 13. On 19 June 2012 charges were brought against the applicant under Article 212 § 2 (participation in mass disorder accompanied by violence) of the Criminal Code. He was accused, in particular, of having thrown an unidentified solid object towards the police. 14. On 11 July 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 14 June 2012. 15. On 8 August 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined a request for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The applicant requested to be released, arguing that all the necessary investigative acts had already been carried out. He presented personal guarantees from two State Duma deputies in support of an undertaking by him to appear before the investigating authorities and the courts for examination of his case. The applicant also requested his release on health grounds and submitted a medical document from 2004 which showed that he had a number of eye conditions. 16. On the same day the District Court granted an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 6 November 2012. It relied on the reasons for and the nature of the crime which had been committed, which gave sufficient grounds to presume that the applicant might reoffend, influence and threaten witnesses and other participants of the criminal proceedings, destroy evidence or otherwise obstruct the proper administration of justice. In addition, the applicant had negative reports related to his place of residence. In particular, he had no permanent employment or family and had been repeatedly brought to administrative responsibility. His state of health was satisfactory and did not warrant his release. Lastly, the court held that in view of the above circumstances the custodial measure could not be replaced by a more lenient preventive measure. 17. On 12 September 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 8 August 2012. 18. On 29 October 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined a new request for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The applicant argued that his detention was detrimental to his health, in particular his eyesight. He referred again to the personal guarantees of two State Duma deputies in support of his request for a milder preventive measure. On the same day the court extended the applicant’s detention until 6 March 2013. The court referred to the gravity of the charges and the nature of the offence imputed to the applicant, along with information about his personality, namely that he had no permanent employment or regular source of income and had negative reports from his place of residence. 19. On 7 November 2012 the charges against the applicant were updated. The classification of the offence remained unchanged. According to the new indictment, between 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. on 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square unidentified persons had called those present to move outside the agreed meeting area and to disobey lawful police orders, leading to mass disorder accompanied by violence against public officials. Between 5 p.m. and 10 p.m. that day the applicant had taken part in acts of mass disorder, in particular, he had repeatedly shouted anti-government slogans. During that period of time the participants of the mass disorder threw pieces of tarmac, stones, sticks and other objects at the police, which hit them on various parts of their body. The applicant, no later than at 8 p.m., found a flagpole and threw it at an unidentified police officer, hitting him in the chest. 20. On 26 November 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 29 October 2012. 21. On 1 March 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted a new extension of the applicant’s detention, until 10 June 2013. It stressed the complexity of the case, reiterated the grounds given in the previous orders and noted that the circumstances that had justified the detention order had not changed. The applicant asked to be released on bail and presented personal guarantees from a well‑known writer and two directors of prominent NGOs, but the court considered that a milder preventive measure could not be applied. The Moscow City Court upheld the extension order on 3 April 2013. 22. On 23 April 2013 the Moscow City Court examined a fresh request to extend the applicant’s detention and set a new term of 6 July 2013 on the same grounds as previously. 23. On 16 May 2013 the Moscow City Court examined an appeal by the applicant against its decision of 23 April 2013 and reversed it on the grounds that the prosecutor’s office would have enough time to bring an indictment by 10 June 2013, adding that after that date the trial court could consider a new extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. 24. On 24 May 2013 the applicant’s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges. 25. On 6 June 2013 that court granted another extension of the applicant’s detention, until 24 November 2013. The decision concerned eleven defendants. Along with the gravity of the charges, the court based its decision on the findings that “the reasons which had initially warranted the detention have not changed” and that “no other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings”. The court also pointed out that the applicant’s state of health was not incompatible with his being kept in custody. The Moscow City Court upheld the extension order on 2 July 2013. 26. On 18 June 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court began the trial in a criminal case against ten participants in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, who were charged with participation in acts of mass disorder and committing acts of violence against police officers. 27. The applicant made an application for release during a court hearing on 6 August 2013 but it was dismissed by the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court on the same day. 28. On 11 September 2013 the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation submitted a complaint to the Presidium of the Moscow City Court about the extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention and requested an alternative preventive measure for him. 29. On 1 November 2013 the Moscow City Court refused the Ombudsman’s request. 30. On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of ten defendants, including the applicant. It ordered their detention until 24 February 2014 on the grounds of the gravity of the charges and the nature of the offences imputable to them. On 17 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld that extension order. 31. On 18 December 2013 the State Duma passed the Amnesty Act which applied, inter alia, to pending criminal proceedings against people suspected and accused of criminal offences under Article 212 §§ 2 and 3 of the Criminal Code. 32. On 19 December 2013 the applicant requested the termination of the criminal proceedings against him by operation of the Amnesty Act. On the same day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted the request and released him from detention. 33. The applicant has moderate myopia, complex myopic astigmatism and a congenital coloboma of the choroid. 34. From 23 June 2012 to 17 September 2012 and from 4 November 2012 to 29 June 2013 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-77/5 in Moscow. Upon his arrival there he was given a medical check which did not reveal any health issues. 35. In IZ-77/5 the applicant was detained in cells 320 (until 29 June 2012), 406 (until 17 September 2012, then from 4 to 30 November 2012), 509 (until 10 December 2012), 506 (until 19 June 2013), and 507 (until 29 June 2013). 36. The cells had the following characteristics: 37. The parties agreed that on most days the number of inmates in the cell did not exceeded the design capacity. They also agreed that the size of the cells and the number of detainees had allowed the applicant four square metres of personal space and that the applicant had had an individual sleeping place in every cell. 38. The parties provided the following accounts of the conditions in the cells. According to the applicant, the cells were inadequately lit and ventilated, were excessively hot in the summer and cold in the winter, they all had a lavatory pan which was separated from the living space by a plastic partition to chin level, which did not provide enough privacy. The applicant alleged that he had been constantly exposed to cigarette smoke and that although the window in the cell could be opened, it overlooked a courtyard used for incinerating rubbish and had let in fumes. There was therefore a constant lack of fresh air in the cell, which the ventilation system could not compensate for. Outdoor exercise was limited to one hour per day. The applicant also stated that the window was too high to give sufficient light for reading or working on documents. Finally, he alleged that the purchase of an electric kettle was a condition for access to drinking water. 39. According to the Government, the cells were equipped with ventilation; the state of the sanitary facilities had been satisfactory; the cells had been cleaned and bedding changed once a week; the applicant had been entitled to one hour of outdoor exercise per day; and the cells had been disinfected and subjected to pest control monthly. They provided measurement tables for the remand prison, which had been created in August 2013. They showed that the level of light in the cells in which the applicant had been detained had ranged between 152 and 264 lux, the standard being 150 lux. The temperature in the cells had measured between 26oC and 28oC and humidity between 41% and 47%, while the permissible level was up to 28oC and 65% respectively. The Government also noted that detainees had access to a gym upon a written request. 40. On 11 July 2012 the applicant’s lawyer requested that the head of the remand prison order a medical examination for the applicant. He alleged that there had been a rapid deterioration of his eyesight. 41. On 16 July 2012 the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited IZ-77/5, and the applicant complained to them about excessive heat in his cell and a deterioration of his eyesight. 42. On 30 July 2012 the applicant requested that the head of the remand prison organise a medical examination owing to his worsening eyesight. 43. On 27 August 2012 the applicant was taken for an outpatient consultation with an ophthalmologist. He was diagnosed with severe myopia, amblyopia, esotropia, and a congenital coloboma of the iris. The doctor noted that the applicant had last been examined in October 2004 and recommended that he have a special examination to determine his disability status (медико-социальная экспертиза). 44. On 8 November 2012 the chief of IZ-77/5 requested another ophthalmologic consultation, repeating the applicant’s complaints about the deterioration of his eyesight. 45. On 23 November 2012 the applicant was taken for another outpatient consultation with an ophthalmologist, who concluded that there were no negative developments in his state of health. The doctor also recommended that he have eye tests once a year. 46. On 13 December 2012 the applicant underwent the special examination for recognition of the status of being disabled, which he was refused. 47. On 29 March and 19 April 2013 the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited IZ-77/5, and the applicant complained to them about the poor quality of his mattress and the deterioration of his eyesight. 48. On 17 September 2012 the applicant was transferred to remand prison IZ-77/1 in Moscow (Матросская тишина), which had a medical wing. The applicant remained there until 4 November 2012 and underwent a series of medical examinations, including blood tests, an echography, a chest photofluorography and an electrocardiogram. 49. According to the applicant, the prison cell measured 4 by 3.5 square metres and housed four inmates, including himself. The window measured 1.75 by 0.5 metres and was too high to give sufficient light for reading or working on documents. The artificial light was dim and flickering and was turned on even at night. There was no mechanical ventilation and the cell was damp, with broken window panes letting in the cold. A shower was allowed once a week and the toilet was only separated from the rest of the cell by a low wall. Outdoor exercise was limited to one hour per day and the purchase of an electric kettle was a condition for getting access to drinking water. 50. According to the certificate issued by the prison governor on 13 November 2013, the applicant was held in cell 707 in IZ-77/1. That cell had measured 16 square metres and had housed four inmates, including the applicant. The cell had one window measuring 115 by 170 cm and the state of the glazing was inspected every day and fixed whenever necessary. The temperature in the cell had been maintained at 18oC. Artificial light was provided by a fluorescent lamp with two 40-watt tubes from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. and by a 40-watt lamp during the night, in line with requirements. The windows had no shutters, only a metal grill with 20-mm metal bars; the size of the mesh was 100 by 200 mm. Inmates had to clean the cell each day with chlorine bleach and detergent provided by the facility. The applicant had been able to shower once a week for fifteen minutes. The cell had been disinfected and subjected to pest control measures regularly. 51. On 16 October 2012 the applicant was examined by a commission of four doctors, including an ophthalmologist. They issued a report which, in so far as relevant, read as follows: “... According to the [the applicant’s] medical documents, dated from 1997 to 2004, [he had been diagnosed with] medium myopia, complex myopic astigmatism, a congenital coloboma of the choroid, and a vascular congenital coloboma of the iris. Partial optic atrophy. According to the results of the medical examination in [IZ-77/1] carried out on 5 October 2012 [he has] high myopia of the right eye. High-degree amblyopia of the left eye, esotropia. A congenital coloboma of the iris [and] of the choroid. ... There have been no negative developments compared with the previous evaluation reports (medical examinations).” 52. On 31 October 2012 the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited IZ-77/1 to check the conditions of the applicant’s detention. Its report read as follows: “[The applicant] is being held in a cell in the remand prison’s medical wing. There are two other detainees in the cell. The cell is one of the worst in the medical wing of [IZ-77/1]. It is cold, the radiator is lukewarm and the glass in the hinged window is broken. The cell has not been renovated for a long time. Dirty, scuffed walls. There is no refrigerator or television, the radio socket is broken. [The applicant] complains that he has not received any treatment in the hospital for three weeks. The medical wing of the remand prison has no ophthalmologist and he was taken for a consultation to the [city hospital] ... According to the chief physician of the medical wing ... [the applicant] had 10% sight in one eye and 20% sight in the other. But the prison doctors could not recommend his release ... because only totally blind detainees are eligible. ... [The applicant’s] detention is detrimental to his health, his eyesight is deteriorating as each day goes by: the light is always on in the cell, day and night. The light is dim; that is bad for his eyesight. ... The members of the [commission] consider that [the applicant’s] detention ... is a way to pressure him into giving the evidence the investigation wants. [He] risks losing his remaining eyesight. It is evident that he has been placed in the worst cell, cold and damp, instead of being treated in the hospital. He has been deprived of the possibility to receive visits from his family and has found himself in an information vacuum, without any television, radio or press. No adequate treatment or medical care.” 53. On 2 November 2012 the applicant was taken for an outpatient consultation with an ophthalmologist, who confirmed the previous diagnoses and identified no change in the applicant’s condition. 54. The discharge summary (выписной эпикриз) issued on 4 November 2012 contained the results of the applicant’s medical examinations carried out in IZ-77/1. The head of the prison’s medical wing concluded that they did not reveal the presence of any of the serious conditions which were listed as being incompatible with custody and there were thus no obstacles to the applicant’s detention. 55. On 30 June 2013 the applicant was placed in remand prison IZ-77/2 in Moscow (Бутырская тюрьма) where he was held until his release on 19 December 2013. 56. In IZ-77/2 the applicant was detained in cells 52 (until 7 July 2013), 01-a (until 12 July 2013), 703 (until 2 September 2013), 332 (until 19 September 2013), and 327 (apparently until his release). 57. The cells had the following characteristics: 58. According to the applicant, the conditions in IZ-77/2 were poor, especially because of a lack of regular outdoor exercise and inadequate sanitary arrangements. In particular, the lavatory pan was only separated from the living space by a chest-high partition which did not provide sufficient privacy. In addition, the applicant did not take a shower after his transfer to IZ-77/2 until at least 30 July 2013, as he indicated in his letter. 59. According to the Government, the conditions in the cells at IZ-77/2 were as follows: the toilet was separated by a solid partition from the rest of the cell, which provided the necessary privacy; the state of the sanitary facilities was satisfactory; the cells were disinfected and subjected to a pest control procedure once every three months or whenever necessary; the applicant had been entitled to one hour of outdoor exercise daily; the cell had been cleaned and the bedding changed weekly; the cells were equipped with forced ventilation and could be aired through a hinged window. Artificial light was provided from a 100-watt bulb by day and a 75-watt bulb by night. The glazing of the windows let in sufficient daylight. 60. On 12 July 2013 the applicant was placed in the medical wing of IZ‑77/2 for an additional examination and adjustment of his treatment. He had been discharged on 18 July 2013 after refusing further treatment. 61. According to a statement of 7 November 2013 issued by IZ-77/2, the applicant’s state of health had been satisfactory and doctors had recommended that he have regular consultations with an ophthalmologist. 62. The applicant’s description of the conditions of detention during his transfer from the remand prison to court and back was identical to that in the case of Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 69-73). 63. On 6 June 2013 court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 and in the end of July moved to hearing room no. 635 at the Moscow City Court. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms. From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued at the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow in hearing room no. 303, which was equipped with metal cages. 64. For a detailed description of the conditions in those hearing rooms see Yaroslav Belousov (ibid., §§ 74-77).

6. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Paola. 7. On 29 January 2002 a hold-up in the applicant’s business premises (a showroom), while he was present, was reported to the Police. The Police suspected that this was not a case of a real hold-up but of fabrication of false evidence. 8. On an unspecified day, shortly after the incident, the applicant gave statements to a court expert. He explained that four individuals had entered the premises, tied him up, and stolen money, amongst other things. 9. A.F., an employee of the company, told the police that he had tied the applicant to a chair with tape and that he had put a suitcase next to the entrance of the showroom, as requested by the applicant. He also stated that he accepted to help the applicant move a photocopier (which had been found overturned on the floor) and that he had seen the applicant put the server of a computer network system under the sofa of a room on the second floor, and the video recorder and the safe-deposit box in other places. 10. Subsequently, on 1 February 2002 at 6.00 pm, the police questioned the applicant in the absence of a lawyer. He was cautioned i.e. he was informed of his right to remain silent and that everything he would say would be put down in writing and could be used as evidence against him. During the interrogation the applicant confirmed to the Police the statement he had given to the expert, noting that something had been done behind his back. In reply to questioning, he stated that another person had the keys to his showroom and that he had not seen a server of a computer network system, neither a video recorder connected to CCTV cameras nor a safe‑deposit box (which had allegedly been stolen on 29 January 2002) and which were found by the police on 1 February 2002. Confronted with A.F.s version of events, the applicant stated that that was A.F.’s allegation. The applicant stated that he had nothing to do with the items mentioned or with what A.F. said they had done together. Thus, it was irrelevant to consider as a coincidence or otherwise the fact that the police had found the things in the places where A.F. had indicated they would be. The applicant repeatedly stated that he had no difficulty reiterating his version of events, if and when it was needed, should they go to court. When invited to repeat his version of events on the spot the applicant requested that his statement be tape‑recorded and his request was acceded to. He confirmed that his statement had been made freely and without threats or promises. The questioning session ended at 6.43 pm. 11. He was then moved to another room at 7.50 pm to record his detailed statement of events (a 38 page transcript). The applicant gave his particulars, was cautioned and recounted in great detail his version of the events of 29 January 2002. Following that, the applicant was asked questions about his business. In particular he noted that he had no reason to make up such a plan and that it would have been foolish of him to throw out (narmih) his business. The applicant was unable to quantify how much profits he was making, questioning which companies were making profits at the time. He avoided replying to a question concerning any losses and insisted that it was irrelevant whether or not he was making profits, as he had saved up the profits he had made in previous years. The applicant could not recall when he last imported products, but he replied that the last time he had exported was ‑ if he remembered well ‑ in December, probably towards Dubai but he could not remember the value of the transaction. On being asked again, he replied that he probably last imported in December, but was unable to give any details. He stated that local business was doing better than exports, but he was unable to quantify his profits. Upon repeated questioning he replied that during the same year he had made a loss. The applicant denied that he was not doing well also on the local market and was hesitant to accept that his business was facing a downfall. The applicant claimed to have had 70,000 United States dollars (USD) in the safe‑deposit box which had been stolen. He admitted that neither on the day of the hold‑up nor earlier that day (1 February 2002) had it been possible to open the safe‑deposit box (found by the police officers). The applicant admitted dealing in thousands of Maltese liras (MTL), but denied that his last import was more than three months before, although he admitted it could have been in November. He admitted that the photocopier which had been found overturned on the floor had not been working for more than two years; adding that it was moved recently to where it was found only because he adjusted its settings and made it work. He admitted that the repairs had been estimated at MTL 280 (approximately 650 euros (EUR)), but it happened that he knew how to operate it. A series of questions ensued concerning the photocopier. The applicant then admitted that the items allegedly stolen (the safe‑deposit box, the server and the CCTV recorder) were found earlier at the premises (on the same day ‑ 1 February 2002) and he insisted that if the police were to watch the CCTV video, they would see the four men. A series of questions concerning the functioning of the CCTV and the movements of A.F., his only employee, ensued, as well as a series of questions concerning the details of the actual robbery, the money stolen, i.e. allegedly USD 70,000 which were in the safe‑deposit box and MTL 34,000 (approximately EUR 79,000) which were in a suitcase and other cash from his wallet. The applicant stated that he could provide some paper invoices in connection with some of the money. The police questioned why he had said the opposite earlier, i.e. that he could not provide proof in the absence of the server which had been stolen. Again questioned about his profits, the applicant was unable to say how much profit or sales he made on a daily basis, admitting that it had been a long time since he had made MTL 100,000 (EUR 233,000) a day. He was also unable to give details about the local sales and admitted that he had problems with the bank. A series of questions and answers concerning A.F., and in particular how he was paid his monthly salary, ensued. At a point A.F. was also brought to the room for questioning in the presence of the applicant. Throughout the questioning the applicant repeatedly reiterated that he was not insured for theft of cash, but in as far as he recalled only for theft of apparatus. On further questioning he could not remember details of his insurance policy. The applicant stated that he had more money than he owed the bank, but did not know how much exactly he owed in payment of rents for various properties he had on the island. In any event he declared that he could pay such rent as the bank had recently reopened his accounts. The questioning ended with a series of factual questioning concerning the events on the day of the alleged robbery. 12. On 2 February 2002 at 10.28 a.m. the applicant made another statement to the police, after being cautioned and in the absence of a lawyer. He confirmed that the police had, on the previous day, seized a video recorder (of the brand GYYR) and a video tape which was in it, and that upon the applicant’s request, the police, the applicant and the court‑appointed expert had viewed the content of the video tape together that same evening. He confirmed that the video recordings showed that it started on 9 October 2000 and ended on 24 October 2000, and that he had requested the viewing of the video for the police to confirm and see the four individuals who had robbed him. However, it had not shown the four persons who robbed him. The applicant explained that he could not confirm that the video recorder was the same one connected to the system, and the second tape inside it was surely not the same type that recorded the events of 29 January 2002. He could not remember how many video recorders of the brand GYYR he possessed noting that the new ones used to be in the stores and others could be in the repair room or in another room. He answered that when the previous day, on site, he had replied to the police that he had no idea where the video recorder would be, he had done so because he had no video recorder except for that attached to the system which had been stolen. When the police pointed out the inconsistency with his previous answer the applicant replied that he had been speaking about the repair room. When he was asked whether the CCTV worked, the applicant had responded that the last time he had needed to check something (at Christmas time), it had been functioning properly. He confirmed that he did not know where the things were located and, in his view, this had been a frame up against him or against his company, by someone close to him or someone who had worked for him, or a competitor. The questioning was concluded at 11.16 am. 13. On the same day i.e. 2 February 2002 the applicant was brought before the Court of Magistrates, as a Court of Criminal Inquiry, together with his employee A.F. They were charged with fabrication of false evidence, simulation of offence, fraud relating to insurance and making a false statement under oath under Articles 110 (1) and (2), 295 and 108 of the Maltese Criminal Code, Chapter 9 of the Laws of Malta. The applicant was also charged with being a recidivist. 14. On an unspecified date, upon a request by the prosecution of 7 October 2002, the case of the applicant was separated from that of his employee A.F. in order for them to be judged separately. On 30 June 2003 A.F. was found guilty of simulation of an offence. On 2 April 2004 the Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed the judgment against A.F. 15. On 19 May 2006 A.F. gave evidence in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. He testified that the applicant, who was his employer, had forced him to tie him (the applicant) to a chair. On the applicant’s insistence he had done so for fear of losing his job. He had tied him to a metal chair brought by the applicant himself. He had left the shop at around 2.30 p.m. and when he returned the applicant had told him what to do and where to call and who to call in a particular sequence. The applicant’s son had arrived at around 3.30 p.m. to help him open the shutter; the applicant pretended to cry and told them to call the police. When A.F. had been asked whether the applicant ever told him why he had wanted to be tied, A.F. replied that the applicant had repeatedly noted that he had to close business, and on the day in question he had said “otherwise I will have to close”. 16. On 23 January 2007, the Court of Magistrates, as a Court of Criminal Judicature, on the basis of the evidence in the case‑file, found the applicant not guilty of all the charges brought against him and acquitted him. It noted that there were two diametrically opposed versions (the applicant’s and A.F.’s), there was therefore a reasonable doubt which had to be resolved in favour of the applicant. 17. On 6 February 2007 the Attorney General (hereinafter the AG) appealed against that judgment. 18. By a judgment of 21 June 2007, the Court of Criminal Appeal varied, in part, the judgment of the Court of Magistrates. 19. It confirmed that there had not been any evidence concerning the charges of fraud relating to insurance and making a false oath, as well as concerning the charge of recidivism. The Court of Criminal Appeal noted that the applicant had consistently repeated during the interrogation that his insurance did not cover theft or money losses, and no proof had been adduced to discredit his statement to that effect. Nor had the applicant lied on oath as he had never made any statement before a judge or magistrate and neither had the prosecution submitted any judgments capable of showing recidivism in terms of law. Similarly, the charge of fabrication of false evidence had also not been proved, since no matter what the applicant had actually done, there had been no proof that he had done so with the intention to put the blame on an innocent third person. 20. However, the Court of Criminal Appeal found the applicant guilty of simulation of an offence under Article 110 (2) of the Criminal Code. It considered that there was direct evidence against the applicant, namely that from his accomplice (A.F.), who testified in the proceedings against the applicant (see paragraph 15 above). As to the testimony of an expert in relation to certain computer programs, found in the applicant’s possession, the Court of Criminal Appeal considered that they had not shed any light on the alleged hold up per se. However, it also noted the witness testimony of the four police officers who had questioned the applicant and carried out investigative work, including searches on the site of the alleged hold‑up. 21. The Court of Criminal Appeal noted that in his first statement the applicant had denied the facts as submitted by A.F. and gave his version of the events of that day. He had stated that he was ready to repeat his version in court and that he had no difficulty to repeat it and to have it recorded on tape, as the applicant had requested. The applicant was then questioned in an interviewing room where he gave his detailed version of the alleged hold‑up, which was transcribed. The applicant was then confronted with A.F., who had said that he acted according to the applicant’s will because he was forced to. A long series of questions ensued, where the police enquired about whether the applicant had been insured for the theft of money, the rent he paid, as well as about where and how certain items had been found, after having previously said that they had been stolen or thrown on the floor. 22. The Court of Criminal Appeal further noted that in his subsequent statement the applicant said that the video he had watched with the police officers had started on 9 October 2000 and ended on 24 October 2000. He could not confirm whether the video recorder was the same one which had been included in the system but he considered that the second tape inside was surely not the one he was recording on, on 29 January 2002. He did not know how many videos of the brand GYYR he had. According to the applicant the new ones used to be in the stores and others could be in the repair room or in another room. The Court of Criminal Appeal noted that the applicant had not mentioned any of this a day earlier, as according to the applicant he had no GYYR video except for the one included in the system. When he had been asked whether the CCTV worked, the applicant had responded that the last time he had needed to check something (at Christmas time), it had been functioning properly. He confirmed that he did not know where the things where and, in his view, this had been a frame up against him or against his company, by someone close to him or someone who had worked for him, or a competitor. 23. The Court of Criminal Appeal noted that the applicant had also testified before the first‑instance court about his local and international projects as well as the events of the day at issue. He had explained as follows: 24. A certain P.M.D. had left the shop at around 1.40 pm and, after that, two people wearing motorcycle helmets came into the shop and demanded money of him. He gave them his wallet which contained more than MTL 1,000 (around EUR 2,300) and they had said that they wanted more. The applicant then gave them a suitcase with money in it, once they opened it they asked for the safe-deposit box while pointing a gun at the applicant’s throat which left him speechless. They went downstairs; the applicant noticed that one of the two men knew his way. The applicant opened the wardrobe in which he kept a small safe-deposit box that he carried with him nearly every day and which weighed around fifteen kilograms. The men asked him to open it but he could not; thus one of the men took it and they then went back upstairs where the two men tied the applicant to a chair they had brought with them. He was tied with tape and could barely breathe. One of the two men went back downstairs and the applicant heard a loud noise. They then went back upstairs by which time there were four of them – the applicant had already noticed the other two men downstairs – and they started to close the curtains and the shutter of the main entrance. From the inside he saw two motorcycles and their drivers wearing helmets as well as a white van. He claimed that all four men had been wearing identical outfits, white crash helmets with tinted visors, green gloves and jeans jackets. 25. In cross-examination, the applicant claimed to have no suspicion about his employee (A.F.) who he did not want to harm. As to the latter’s version, the applicant replied that everyone was entitled to an opinion. A.F. had testified twice although only his last statement had been added to the file. P.M.D. testified that he had been with the applicant and had left early in the afternoon, before the alleged hold-up. 26. The Court of Criminal Appeal considered that since there had been no proof of an insurance policy covering theft of money, there had been no motive. However, it noted that A.F.’s version had been corroborated by, for example, the finding of certain objects in places indicated by A.F., which had been placed by the applicant himself, or by A.F. on orders from the applicant. Thus, according to the Court of Criminal Appeal, A.F.’s testimony was enough to conclude that the applicant was guilty of simulation of offence. It was true that the applicant had repeatedly and categorically denied any wrongdoing; however, he was not reliable in the light of the evasive and hesitant way in which he replied to police questions concerning his business, profitability, rents, and profits of the previous year. The Court of Criminal Appeal also relied on other circumstances such as the fact that the CCTV did not record the events on the day of the alleged hold‑up. Such details raised doubt and made the applicant’s version of events less plausible or acceptable. In the light of all the evidence it considered that the first court had wrongly acquitted the applicant. The Court of Criminal Appeal thus found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment, suspended for four years. 27. On 15 June 2011, the applicant filed an application before the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, complaining about a violation of Article 6 of the Convention on the basis that, inter alia, the Court of Criminal Appeal’s judgment was based on statements given by the applicant to the police without the assistance of a lawyer. 28. By a judgment of 29 October 2012, the court rejected the applicant’s complaints. The court recalled the first-instance judgment in the names of The Police vs Mark Lombardi (Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence, 9 October 2009) where it had been held that the mere fact that a person was not assisted by a lawyer during police interrogation did not violate an applicant’s fundamental rights. It had also held that for there to be a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, one must consider the proceedings as a whole and not the statements in isolation. The court noted, however, that the first‑instance judgment in that case had been overturned by the Constitutional Court which, on 12 April 2011, found a violation of the rights of the individual concerned as the lack of legal assistance deprived objectively the applicant of a fair trial. However, the Constitutional Court in that judgment had also made it clear that the ECtHR’s case‑law should not have retroactive effect and should not be applicable to judgments that had become res judicata – it had not been so in the case of Lombardi since proceedings had still been pending. The situation was different in the present case, which had ended. In conclusion, relying on the Constitutional Court’s position on res judicata in the case of Lombardi, cited above, the court, in the instant case, dismissed the applicant’s claim. 29. On 16 November 2012 the applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court, arguing that the Civil Court (First Hall) was wrong in finding that courts of constitutional competence did not have the function to assess what had happened in criminal proceedings that had become res judicata. 30. By a judgment of 5 April 2013, the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal. 31. The Constitutional Court held that although there may be circumstances where it could provide a remedy if it found that a statement was taken abusively despite the criminal proceedings having come to an end and the judgment having become res judicata, in the present case the applicant had given his statement on 2 February 2002. He had never alleged that the statement was taken abusively. Moreover, he had not even raised this complaint when filing the constitutional application on 15 June 2011. It was only on 23 March 2012, more than eleven years after making the statement, that the applicant requested a correction in the constitutional redress application to add the complaint concerning his statement, possibly because the applicant had become aware of the Court’s judgment in Salduz v. Turkey ([GC], no. 36391/02, ECHR 2008), of 27 November 2008, and realised that it could give him another means of defence. The Constitutional Court held that the fact that the applicant had never raised a complaint before the courts of criminal jurisdiction, when he had every opportunity to do so, was proof that he did not feel that this was of prejudice to him or that his statement was taken abusively. Thus, the applicant could not now, without abusing the judicial process, expect to reopen a closed case which had become res judicata, once he had not raised the issue previously. According to the Constitutional Court, it was also relevant that the Court of Criminal Appeal had not relied solely on the applicant’s statement, but also on other means of corroboration. Consequently, in the Constitutional Court’s view the applicant’s statement was not determinative to the finding of guilt and the first‑instance court had been right not to disturb a judgment which had become res judicata. 32. The relevant domestic law and case‑law concerning constitutional redress proceedings is set out in Brincat and Others v. Malta (nos. 60908/11 and 4 others, §§ 23-26, 24 July 2014) and Dimech v. Malta (no. 34373/13, § 26, 2 April 2015). 33. By Act III of 2002 the Maltese Parliament introduced the right to legal assistance at the pre-trial stage. However, the law only came into force in 2010 by means of Legal Notice 35 of 2010. Prior to this Legal Notice Maltese law did not provide for legal assistance during the pre‑trial investigation and specifically during questioning, whether by the police or by a magistrate in his investigative role. Before questioning, however, suspects would be cautioned, that is, informed of their right to remain silent and that anything they said could be taken down and produced as evidence. At the time no inferences could be drawn by the trial courts from the silence of the accused at this stage. 34. Statements taken by the police could be confirmed on oath before the Court of Magistrates, after arraignment, in which case the person was entitled to be assisted by a lawyer. (a) Cases decided in 2011 - during the pendency of criminal proceedings against the complainants 35. In the wake of the judgment in Salduz, cited above, a number of accused persons raised constitutional complaints during the pendency of the criminal proceedings against them and requested the relevant criminal courts to make a referral to the constitutional jurisdictions. In 2011 three cases were decided by the Constitutional Court (in similar yet never identical formations of three judges), namely The Police vs Alvin Privitera of 11 April 2011, The Police vs Esron Pullicino of 12 April 2011, and The Police vs Mark Lombardi, also of 12 April 2011. In the three cases the Constitutional Court held that the claimants had suffered a breach of their right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention in so far as they had not been legally assisted. The relevant details are as follows: The Police vs Alvin Privitera, Constitutional Court judgment of 11 April 2011, upholding a first-instance judgment following a referral by the Court of Magistrates as a Court of Criminal Judicature 36. The Constitutional Court confirmed that it should apply the Grand Chamber judgment in Salduz and the subsequent line of case-law. In particular it noted that, in order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently “practical and effective”, Article 6 § 1 required that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first questioning of a suspect by the police. Even where compelling reasons might exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction – whatever its justification – must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6. The rights of the defence would in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police questioning without access to a lawyer were used for a conviction. Given that the absence of a lawyer at the investigation stage could irretrievably prejudice the accused’s right, the court considered that where there existed sufficient reasons indicating a violation, it should not wait for the end of the criminal proceedings in order to examine the merits of the case. 37. The Constitutional Court rejected the Government’s plea that the applicant had not raised the issue until the prosecution had finished submitting evidence, noting that in the domestic legal system there was no deadline for raising constitutional claims. It found the Government’s argument that the accused had not been forced to give a statement, and that he had been informed of his right to remain silent, to be irrelevant given the established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and in particular the Salduz judgment. 38. It was not necessary in the case at hand to examine whether there existed any compelling reasons to justify the absence of a lawyer during questioning or whether such restrictions prejudiced the case, in so far as at the relevant time Maltese law had not provided for the right to legal assistance at that stage of the investigation and therefore there had been no need for the accused to request it. There had therefore been a systemic restriction on access to a lawyer under the relevant legal provision in force at the time. It followed that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) in conjunction with Article 6 § 1. 39. The Constitutional Court further noted that in its view the right to be assisted by a lawyer must be granted from the very start of the investigation and before the person being investigated gave a statement, but it did not require that an accused be assisted during questioning. 40. The Constitutional Court did not order the statements to be expunged from the record of the proceedings, but it ordered that the Court of Criminal Judicature be informed of the said judgment so that it could decide accordingly on the validity and admissibility of the statement made. The Police vs Esron Pullicino, judgment of 12 April 2011 upholding a first-instance judgment following a referral by the Court of Magistrates as a Court of Criminal Judicature 41. The Constitutional Court reiterated the same reasoning applied in the case of Alvin Privitera, cited above, stopping short, however, of reiterating the court’s opinion in relation to assistance during the actual questioning. The Police vs Mark Lombardi, judgment of 12 April 2011 upholding a first‑instance judgment following a referral by the Court of Magistrates as a Court of Criminal Judicature 42. The Constitutional Court reiterated the same reasoning applied in the cases of Alvin Privitera and Esron Pullicino, cited above. It further noted case-law subsequent to Salduz in which the Court had found a violation despite the fact that the applicant had remained silent while in police custody (Dayanan v. Turkey, no. 7377/03, 13 October 2009) and despite there being no admission of guilt in the statements given by the applicants (Yeşilkaya v. Turkey, no. 59780/00, 8 December 2009). In Boz v. Turkey (no. 2039/04, 9 February 2010) the Court had stressed that the systemic restriction of access to a lawyer pursuant to the relevant legal provisions breached Article 6. The Constitutional Court further referred to the finding in Cadder v. Her Majesty’s Advocate [2010] UKSC 43, which concerned the same situation in the Scottish legal system and where that court had agreed to follow Salduz to the letter. 43. The Constitutional Court stopped short of reiterating the court’s opinion in Alvin Privitera in relation to assistance during the actual interrogation. It however added that Salduz should not apply retroactively to cases which had become res judicata this was not so in the present case given that the proceedings were still pending. (b) Subsequent cases 44. Following the above‑mentioned judgments of 2011, the Constitutional Court abandoned the above described reasoning (to the effect that a systemic restriction resulted in an automatic breach of Article 6), and started to consider Salduz as an exceptional case and to interpret it to the effect that a number of factors had to be taken into consideration when assessing whether a breach of Article 6 had occurred. By way of example: (i) Cases brought before the constitutional jurisdictions while the criminal proceedings were pending against the complainant Charles Stephen Muscat vs the Attorney General, Constitutional Court judgment of 8 October 2012 45. By a judgment of 10 October 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence, dismissed an objection to the effect that the complaint was premature and found that the fact that the law precluded the accused from being legally assisted sufficed to find a violation. It thus ordered that his statements be expunged from the acts of the criminal proceedings. 46. In reply to the AG’s argument that Mr Muscat had not raised his complaint earlier during the criminal proceedings (which were still pending) the court, relying on the Alvin Privitera case reiterated that the applicant was not subject to any time-limit to bring forward his complaint. 47. On appeal, by a judgment of 8 October 2012 the Constitutional Court reversed the first-instance judgment. 48. It accepted that prima facie it appeared premature to complain about a breach of the right to a fair trial due to a lack of legal assistance, solely on the basis of a statement made without such assistance at a time when a hearing was not yet held and the criminal proceedings were still pending. However, Maltese law (both the Constitution and the European Convention Act) provided for access to the constitutional jurisdictions in respect of fundamental rights complaints also when a breach is likely to occur. Thus, it could not reject the complaint as premature. 49. As to the merits it considered that its role was to determine whether the statement given in the absence of legal assistance amounted to a breach of the applicant’s right given the trial as a whole, and whether there was a risk that the applicant be found guilty when he was in reality innocent. In the absence of such risk no breach would occur. Having examined the ECtHR case law from Imbrioscia v. Switzerland (24 November 1993, Series A no. 275) onwards, it noted, with particular reference to Salduz, that in Maltese law, at the relevant time, no inferences from silence could be made. Mr Muscat had been informed of his right to remain silent. He was a mature adult, who was already expiating a criminal sentence in prison. He had made his statement in 2002 while he had been in detention since 1994. He had had experience with questioning and was not vulnerable. Thus the factor (young age) present in the Pullicino and Privitera cases was missing. 50. The Constitutional Court further noted that Mr Muscat waited until 2010 to bring forward his complaint, and during such time he did not challenge the content of his statement. This signalled that he himself had not felt disadvantaged by the content of his statement. In any event Mr Muscat was still to undergo trial with all the relevant procedural guarantees, and during which the judge could also decide to exclude the statement at issue if it could be shown that it had been given under threat or duress. It followed that the mere taking of the statement could not result in a breach of the right to a fair trial. The Republic of Malta vs Alfred Camilleri Constitutional Court judgment of 12 November 2012 51. In the particular circumstances of the case, the Constitutional Court found a violation of the accused’s fair trial rights, in particular because he had not even been cautioned by the police. However, following a request for retrial which was upheld by a judgment of the Constitutional Court of 31 January 2014, no violation was found because the accused, who had given a statement in the absence of a lawyer, had not been forced to reply to the questions put to him by the police, nor was he particularly vulnerable to the extent that he would have required the assistance of a lawyer. The accused was fifty-five years old and therefore mature. While he had never been to prison or been questioned, he had already been found guilty of minor charges and therefore was acquainted with the law. Lastly, his statement had not been the only evidence, as some police officers had been eyewitnesses to his handling of the drugs in issue. The Police vs Tyron Fenech, Constitutional Court judgment of 22 February 2013 52. By a judgment of 23 January 2012, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence found, inter alia, a violation of the first applicant’s right to a fair trial, as he had not had access to a lawyer before and during the police interrogation which led to his statement of a specific date. The same applied in respect of his other statement under oath before the magistrate, if made while under arrest. It considered that a person had just as much a right to legal assistance before making a statement to a judicial authority as he or she did before making a statement to the police. 53. The Constitutional Court reversed in part the first-instance judgment. Accepting that the case was not premature, and in the light of the criminal courts’ referral pending criminal proceedings against Mr Fenech, it found that the Mr Fenech’s right to a fair trial had been breached only in relation to the statement given to the police, but not the statement given before the magistrate, which could thus be admitted as evidence in the criminal proceedings against him. 54. It considered that a breach of the right to legal assistance during interrogation would occur when a statement was obtained by abuse and not solely because there was no lawyer present. The right to legal assistance was intended to protect persons in particular situations of vulnerability, weakness or fear who as a result of which made statements which led to a finding of guilt despite their innocence. Legal assistance in such cases prevented any such abuse and counteracted the vulnerability of the individual concerned. 55. Mr Fenech was only nineteen years of age at the time and may well have been vulnerable; however, someone other than a lawyer could have provided for such a guarantee, such as a magistrate (independent from the police), before whom the applicant made his second statement in accordance with domestic law. For these reasons the Constitutional Court upheld the Article 6 violation only in respect of the statement the applicant made to the police, which could not therefore be used in the criminal proceedings against him, but not in respect of the statement made before the inquiring magistrate, which could be used in the proceedings. 56. Similar conclusions were reached in The Police vs Amanda Agius, Constitutional Court judgment also of 22 February 2013. The Republic of Malta vs Carmel Camilleri Constitutional Court judgment of 22 February 2013 57. Mr Camilleri raised his constitutional complaint ‑ about lack of assistance when he gave a statement at pre-trail stage - during the criminal proceedings against him, and the matter was referred to the constitutional jurisdictions. 58. By a judgment of 26 June 2012 the first-instance court found a violation of Article 6 in that respect, on the basis of the Salduz judgment, as well as the Constitutional Court judgment in the Privitera case (cited above). 59. On appeal the Constitutional Court reversed the first-instance judgment. It held that the right to a fair trial was violated when a statement was taken abusively and not merely because it was given without legal assistance. This had always been part of the right to a fair trial and had not been created by means of the Salduz judgment. Thus, any finding of a violation to this effect would not constitute a retroactive application of some new right created by jurisprudence. Relying on the Privitera case, it considered that it should not wait for the end of the criminal proceedings in order to examine the merits of the case. Moreover, in the present case, it was precisely the court hearing the criminal proceedings that had referred the matter to the constitutional jurisdictions, and that court had suspended proceedings awaiting this judgment. 60. However, Mr Camilleri did not fall under any category of vulnerability. Furthermore, it could not be said that he had had no access whatsoever to a lawyer, indeed in his first statement he had denied all wrong doing and walked away free. Thus, before he was voluntarily called in for questioning the following days he had all the time necessary to seek the assistance of a lawyer before he appeared voluntarily on three subsequent days where he gave three statements. His statement had also been corroborated by other evidence, there was thus no risk that they were unsafe ‑ in that light it would not be appropriate to expunge such statements. (ii) cases brought before the constitutional jurisdictions after the criminal proceedings had come to an end Simon Xuereb vs the Attorney General, Constitutional Court judgment of 28 June 2012 61. The Constitutional Court considered that the case was different from the three 2011 judgments (mentioned-above) relied upon by the applicant, in so far as those cases had concerned proceedings which were still pending, while the case of Mr Xuereb concerned a judgment which had become final. 62. The Constitutional Court noted that in 2001 Mr Xuereb had been cautioned, that is, informed of his right to remain silent and that anything he said could be taken down and produced as evidence, and yet he chose to make a statement. At the time Maltese law did not provide for the assistance of a lawyer and the Salduz judgment had not yet been delivered. It followed that Mr Xuereb could not complain about that matter. Moreover, the finding of guilt would not have been based solely on his incriminating statement, because there existed various other evidence. Furthermore, he chose to admit to the crimes and settle for a plea bargain. Thus, given his actions during those proceedings he could not now complain of a breach of his rights. It further referred to its established practice based on English case‑law to the effect that the retrospective effect of a judicial decision is excluded from cases that have been finally determined. Joseph Buġeja vs the Attorney General, first-instance judgment of an unspecified date in 2012 confirmed on appeal on 14 January 2013 63. In its judgment the first-instance court of constitutional competence referred to the [then] recent judgments of the Constitutional Court and held that, firstly, the right to legal assistance was not created by recent jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. The right existed already at the time when criminal proceedings against Mr Buġeja were still ongoing and if the latter had not invoked that right at the opportune moment, he could not invoke it almost two years after the final judgment of the Court of Magistrates. The court also noted that after Mr Buġeja released his statement he had had every opportunity to contest it. During the criminal proceedings he had only contested that his statement did not reflect the truth and he testified again to give another version which he claimed was the truth. At no point had he alleged that he had been coerced to sign such statement or that the statement had breached his fundamental human rights. Moreover, he had not even appealed the judgment of the Court of Magistrates. 64. Secondly, the court also considered that the judgment handed down by the Court of Magistrates was not based solely or principally on Mr Buġeja’s statement but on other circumstances which made his involvement in the crime evident. Further, the court referred the Lombardi case decided by the Constitutional Court which held that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR should not be applied retrospectively and affect those judgments which were today res judicata and it referred to the United Kingdom jurisprudence which held that the retrospective effect of a judicial decision was excluded from cases that have been finally determined. Hence, the court rejected the application. 65. On 14 January 2013, the outcome of the judgment was confirmed by the Constitutional Court. The latter held, inter alia, that the fact that the Mr Buġeja had not raised the issue during criminal proceedings (despite the Salduz judgment having been delivered before) did not mean that the applicant could not raise the issue before the constitutional jurisdictions. However, it showed that in the claimant’s own view the matter had had no serious consequences and was simply a formal failing ‑ to the extent that in the Constitutional Court’s view this amounted to abuse of process. Similarly, Mr Buġeja had not appealed the criminal judgment, meaning he had not felt aggrieved. He had only opted to raise the issue after hearing about various judgments of the domestic courts and the ECtHR and thought he could obtain a get-out-of-jail-free card. 66. The Constitutional Court reiterated that the right to legal assistance was not intended to create a formality, which, if not observed, provided the accused with a means to avoid conviction. Before the introduction of Article 355 AT the right to legal assistance was part and parcel of the right to a fair hearing, intended to protect persons who as a result of a particular vulnerability might have given statements as a result of which they could be found to be guilty when in reality they were innocent. In various domestic and ECtHR cases violations had been found in the cases of minors. In the present case, the applicant was neither a minor nor suffering from any other vulnerability, nor had he complained that the statement had been made under duress. Moreover, referring to the Salduz judgment, it recalled that under domestic law as stood at the relevant time, no inferences could be made from silence, thus the applicant could have chosen to remain silent. Furthermore, the applicant had been found guilty not only on the basis of his statement but also on other statements of eye witnesses. George Pace vs Attorney General and Commissioner of Police, Constitutional Court judgment of 31 October 2014 67. By a judgment of 9 April 2014 the Civil Court (First Hall) rejected his complaint, noting that Mr Pace had been questioned fifteen years after the murder, and thus had had plenty of time to seek legal advice. Moreover, he only complained about the matter in 2011, despite him having been questioned in 2004 and the Salduz judgment having been delivered in 2008. 68. By a judgment of 31 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected Mr Pace’s appeal. It noted, inter alia, that it was true that it was still open to the applicant to raise his complaint despite the passage of time. Nevertheless, the court could draw other conclusions as a result, such as those related to credibility. Indeed had the statement been taken under duress the applicant would have raised the matter prior to 2011, it was thus likely that Mr Pace was solely trying to take advantage of the evolution of the ECtHR case-law. It considered that to determine the fairness of the proceedings they had to be taken as a whole, on the facts of the case it did not appear to be so in the present case where Mr Pace did not object to the presentation of his statements to the jurors during the criminal proceedings, to the contrary he noted that he was not challenging the validity of the second statement, which showed that the applicant had not felt prejudiced by his statements, which had been reiterated before the Court of Magistrates. Moreover, his statements had not been the only evidence against him. (iii) Other case-law Gregory Robert Eyre vs the Attorney General, judgment of the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence of 27 June 2012 (final) 69. On 25 August 2005, the Court of Criminal Appeal had found Mr Eyre guilty of committing drug related offences. Subsequently, on 14 October 2011, he filed an application before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence claiming that his case was based on the incriminating statements he had given to the Police at a time when he was not yet being legally assisted. 70. Referring to the Lombardi case, the court reiterated the principle that the retrospective effect of a judicial decision is excluded from cases that had been finally determined. In the light of this principle as well as other principles emanating from the judgments of the Constitutional Court and the ECtHR, the court went on to consider that the finding of guilt was not solely based on Mr Eyre’s statements to the Police at a time when he had no legal assistance. Mr Eyre had also sworn his statement before a Magistrate in the presence of his lawyer and he had admitted his guilt. Moreover on appeal, he asked the Court of Criminal Appeal to confirm his guilty plea, and vary other parts of the judgment. In the light of all those circumstances, the court held that Mr Eyre’s allegations were unfounded and rejected his pleas. 71. There was no appeal from the judgement. Matthew Lanzon vs Commissioner of Police, Constitutional Court judgment of 25 February 2013 72. Mr Lanzon had been charged with trafficking in cannabis in 2001 ‑ at the time he was aged sixteen. Thus, pending his criminal proceedings, he complained before the constitutional jurisdictions about the lack of assistance of a lawyer and by a final judgment of 29 November 2004 his complaint was rejected by the Constitutional Court on the basis that his arrest and questioning were lawful, had lasted a few hours and the applicant had had the right to remain silent. 73. By means of another application lodged in 2011, whilst the criminal proceedings against him were still pending, he once again brought the same complaint before the constitutional jurisdictions. By a judgment of 11 November 2011 the application was rejected as being res judicata, his complaint being identical to that already decided by the Constitutional Court in 2004. It reiterated that jurisprudential change could not have a retroactive application. The judgment was confirmed by the Constitutional Court on 25 February 2013, noting that the Constitutional Court judgment of 2004 had already decided the matter which could not be altered due to the Salduz judgment which was decided four years later.

5. The applicant, who was born in 1948, lives in Corjova, a village under the formal control of Moldovan authorities, but where agents of the self‑proclaimed “Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic” (“MRT”, see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 90, ECHR 2004‑VII for further details) frequently intervened during the events in question, notably by blocking the participation of the local population in elections held in Moldova. 6. On 3 June 2007 local elections were to be held in Moldova, including in Corjova. The applicant, who is an ambulance driver, submitted his candidature for the position of Mayor of Corjova. 7. On 1 June 2007, at 11 p.m., the applicant’s ambulance was stopped by the “MRT” road militia and his documents (Moldovan national identity card and driving licence) were taken away from him without any explanation. 8. On 2 June 2007 the applicant went to the “MRT” militia station located in Dubăsari and asked for the return of his documents. He was then arrested and placed in a detention cell. A few hours later a person came to his cell and, without presenting himself, asked him about his work and his electoral propaganda. The applicant later found out that the visitor had been a judge and that, following that discussion in the cell, the judge adopted a decision, finding him guilty of the administrative offence of unlawful electoral propaganda and sentencing him to 15 days’ administrative detention. 9. The applicant submits that he was not allowed to contact his relatives or to find a lawyer, and was not issued with a copy of the court’s decision, which prevented any possibility of lodging an effective appeal against the decision of 2 June 2007. 10. During his detention the applicant was placed in a cell which, according to him was damp and cold. Food was given once a day. When the applicant’s relatives, alerted by his absence, contacted the local authorities in order to find out about his fate, they were informed of the applicant’s detention. However, their requests to transmit food to him were allegedly rejected. 11. On 17 June 2007 the applicant was released from detention and he was issued with a copy of the decision of 2 June 2007. The time-limit for lodging an appeal had already expired by that time. Upon release, he was allegedly coughing and was diagnosed with chronic acute bronchitis. He also claims that his eyesight worsened considerably. 12. In the meantime, on 6 June 2007, the applicant complained to the Moldovan prosecutor’s office of his unlawful detention. Based on this complaint, a criminal investigation was initiated on 12 June 2007, the applicant and witnesses were subsequently heard. Three high-ranking “MRT” officers were charged and were declared wanted persons. However, on 4 August 2010 the investigation was suspended due to the fact that the three accused were hiding from it in the “MRT”.

4. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Czarnowo. 5. On 29 January 2010 the Szczecin Social Security Board (“the ZUS”) dismissed an application by the applicant for a disability pension on account of a total incapacity to work. The ZUS based its decision on a medical opinion which had found the applicant fit to work. The applicant appealed to a court. 6. On 8 April 2010 the Szczecin Regional Court decided to appoint experts on neurology, orthopaedics and psychiatry and requested that they prepare opinions on the applicant’s state of health. The expert opinions were submitted to the court on 12 July 2010. According to the opinions the applicant was fit to work. 7. On 16 July 2010 the court dismissed an application by the applicant to appoint a legal aid lawyer to represent her. The applicant appointed her husband to represent her in the proceedings. 8. The applicant’s representative submitted comments on the expert’s opinions on 3 August 2010 and, afterwards, several applications for the case to be examined by another court. Some of the representative’s letters to the court contained insulting expressions and he was advised that such expressions could amount to contempt of court. On 28 March 2011 the applicant’s representative also challenged the impartiality of all the judges of the Szczecin Regional Court. 9. On 18 April 2011 the court asked the experts to supplement their opinions but they upheld their earlier conclusions. 10. On 31 May 2011 the court ordered that the applicant be examined by doctors again. Although at first she refused the examination, it did take place. In July 2011 a further expert opinion was prepared. It did not differ in its conclusions from the earlier ones. 11. In August 2011 the court sent the case file to an expert on psychiatry who submitted his supplementary opinion in September 2011. The expert suggested that a further opinion on the applicant’s mental health should be obtained. The court ordered the preparation of such an opinion. It appears that the applicant refused to undergo an examination at a psychiatric hospital. 12. On 19 October 2011 the applicant’s representative was punished for contempt of court in connection with his insulting letter to the court. He was fined 5,000 Polish zlotys (PLN). The applicant’s representative appealed and his appeal was initially rejected for formal reasons but was ultimately admitted for examination on its merits. On 28 November 2012 the Szczecin Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 19 October 2011, finding that insulting remarks contained in a letter to a court should not be regarded as contempt of court. The applicant in the meantime withdrew power of attorney from her husband and started representing herself. She also repeated her application for a legal aid lawyer to be appointed. 13. On 24 June 2013 the court sent the case file to another expert. The opinion was prepared within a month. 14. Subsequently, the court dealt with various applications by the applicant to have a legal aid lawyer appointed, which were ultimately dismissed on 26 March 2015. The applicant lodged several procedural applications with the court, in particular challenging experts. The applicant also challenged the judges again; the presiding judge was changed following a decision of the president of the court on 20 May 2015. 15. On 22 May 2015 the Szczecin Regional Court gave a judgment in which it dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the ZUS decision of 29 January 2010. The applicant appealed. 16. On 27 April 2016 the applicant submitted an application challenging all the judges of the Court of Appeal. In July 2016 the court granted her request for a legal aid lawyer and one was appointed to represent the applicant before the Supreme Court. 17. On 10 January 2017 the Supreme Court dismissed her application challenging all the judges of the Szczecin Court of Appeal. 18. The case file was returned to the Szczecin Court of Appeal for examination. The court ordered further expert opinions on the subjects of psychiatry and occupational medicine. The applicant refused to undergo a medical examination. The expert opinions were finally prepared on 31 August 2017. 19. On 27 February 2018 the Szczecin Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the Regional Court’s judgment. 20. On 25 April 2018 the court granted an application by the applicant for a legal aid lawyer for the purpose of lodging a cassation appeal. 21. A legal aid lawyer was appointed to represent her; however, the applicant requested the appointment of another lawyer. Afterwards she appointed a different lawyer of her choice and revoked power of attorney for her legal aid lawyer. 22. The applicant’s lawyer was asked to remedy some formal shortcomings in her cassation appeal and to pay a fee. 23. On 17 August 2018 the cassation appeal was sent to the Supreme Court. 24. The proceedings are pending. 25. The applicant lodged several complaints under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about breaches of the right to have a case examined, in an investigation conducted or supervised by a prosecutor and in judicial proceedings, without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki - “the 2004 Act”). 26. On 4 January 2013, 17 February 2014 and 29 June 2015 the Szczecin Court of Appeal dismissed her complaints. The court, relying on Convention principles, considered that, taking into account the complexity of the case, the length of the proceedings had not been excessive. In particular, in the second of the above-mentioned decisions, the court agreed that the proceedings in the case had concentrated on the examination of the applicant’s applications for legal aid and her applications challenging the experts and judges. The applicant and her representative had been very active in lodging numerous unfounded applications and appeals, including seeking to appeal after they had been instructed that no further appeal was available under the law. The large number of those applications had made it virtually impossible to deal with the merits of the case. 27. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 17 February 2014, although no such remedy was available under the law. Her appeal and a further request to reopen the proceedings were rejected by the Szczecin Court of Appeal in May 2014. 28. Some other complaints about the length of the proceedings were rejected as they had been lodged less than twelve months following a previous decision under the 2004 Act. On 26 February 2018 the Szczecin Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s most recent complaint about the length of the proceedings before the Court of Appeal as it had not been lodged by a lawyer. 29. A detailed description of the relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for excessive length of judicial proceedings – in particular, the applicable provisions of the 2004 Act – is set out in the Court’s decisions in the cases of Charzyński v.Poland ((dec.), no. 15212/03, §§ 12-23, ECHR 2005-V) and Ratajczyk v. Poland ((dec.), no. 11215/02, ECHR 2005-VIII), and in its judgments in the cases of Krasuski v. Poland (no. 61444/00, §§ 34-46, ECHR 2005-V (extracts)) and Rutkowski and Others v. Poland (nos. 72287/10 and 2 others, §§ 75-107, 7 July 2015).

5. The applicant was born in 1964 and is detained in Gorodyshche in the Rivne region. 6. In the late hours of 11 July 2010 the applicant broke a window in the home of Mr and Mrs Ma. (“the victims”) and threw a jar of petrol with a burning fuse into the room where Mrs Ma. was sleeping. As a result, she was seriously burned. 7. On 19 July 2010 the applicant was arrested. 8. According to the applicant, following his arrest, from 19 to 22 July 2010 police officers ill-treated him in order to force him to confess to attempted murder of the victims. In particular, he alleged that the police officers hit him, put a plastic bag over his head cutting off his air supply, and subjected him to electric shocks. He also alleged that during that period he had been kept without food and water, tightly handcuffed and had not been allowed to use the toilet. 9. On 21 July 2010 the applicant gave a statement to the police confessing that he had thrown a firebomb into the window of the victims’ house because he believed that a person with whom he had had a conflict, Mr Ma., lived there. 10. On 22 July 2010 an arrest report was drawn up documenting the applicant’s arrest on suspicion of attempted murder. O., a legal aid lawyer, was appointed for the applicant. The applicant signed a document that explained his rights as a suspect, including the right to remain silent and to consult a lawyer before his first questioning. 11. Later on the same day the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the presence of lawyer O. He repeated his confession in essentially the same terms. The investigator asked him how he had chosen the window into which to throw his firebomb. He responded that he had chosen the window which had been lit up by light from a computer, indicating that people were living there. At the close of the interview the lawyer asked the applicant whether he was making his statements of his own free will and the applicant responded in the affirmative. 12. On 24 July 2010 the applicant refused the services of lawyer O. and asked that S. be admitted as his lawyer instead. The investigator admitted S. as the applicant’s lawyer on the same day. 13. On 26 July 2010 the applicant’s lawyer asked that the applicant be directed to a forensic medical expert to determine whether he had any injuries and, if so, how they had been inflicted. 14. A report drawn up by a forensic medical expert dated 29 July 2010 stated that, other than bruises on the wrists, which could be explained by handcuffing, the applicant had a hematoma on his back, and red spots on the back of his thighs. The applicant explained the injuries by saying that he had been ill-treated at the police station after his arrest on 19 July 2010: officers had hit him on the torso and back, twisted his arms, put a plastic bag over his head cutting off his air supply, and, using an electroshock device, subjected him to electric shocks on the back and legs. The expert believed that the spots were the result of the healing of bruises which could have been inflicted either by blunt objects or by electric shocks and that all the documented injuries could have been inflicted at the time indicated by the applicant. 15. On 29 July 2010 the applicant was charged with attempted murder and the investigator attempted to question him. He refused to give evidence. 16. On 3 September 2010 the applicant stated, in an interview, that he had intended to set fire to what he thought to be an empty summer cottage, without endangering anyone’s life. 17. On 19 October 2010 the investigator attempted to question the applicant in the presence of his lawyer concerning the origin of his injuries revealed by the forensic medical investigation. He refused to give evidence and stated that he would testify on that point in the course of the trial. 18. Also on 19 October 2010 the investigator, having noted the results of the forensic medical examination, stated that if the applicant’s statements to the expert were confirmed, they would indicate that official misconduct had been committed. Accordingly, he forwarded the results of the examination to the Slovyansk prosecutor, requesting that he conduct an investigation. The prosecutor questioned several police officers, who denied any ill‑treatment. Two officers stated that the applicant had been arrested on 19 July 2010 but had refused to follow the arresting officers to the police station, so he had been handcuffed. He had then been released and had come back to the station voluntarily when summoned on 22 July 2010. 19. On 3 November 2010 an investigator of the prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers in connection with the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment for lack of a corpus delicti in their actions. He referred to the officers’ statements and the applicant’s refusal to give evidence on that point, and stated that the applicant had been handcuffed lawfully and there was no proof that his injuries had been inflicted by the police. 20. In the course of the pre-trial investigation against the applicant witness Mi. was questioned. He testified that on the night of the crime he had taken the applicant to the vicinity of the victims’ house in his car. The applicant had had in his bag a jar of petrol, which he had equipped with a fuse in Mi.’s presence. He had then gone in the direction of the victims’ house and had quickly returned. 21. On 21 October 2010, on completion of the investigation, the applicant and his lawyer studied the file and stated that they had no statements or requests to make. 22. The bill of indictment submitted to the trial court stated, in particular, that although the applicant had pleaded not guilty to the charges, his guilt was corroborated by the evidence, including his own statement made at the early stages of the investigation. 23. At his trial, the applicant testified that he had intended to set on fire what he thought to be an empty summer cottage, without endangering the victims’ lives. Witness Mi. testified that on the night of the crime he had taken the applicant to the victims’ house in his car and that the applicant had had a bag with him. However, contrary to his statement made during the pre-trial investigation, Mi. testified at trial that he had not seen the bag’s contents. He stated that the applicant had gone in the direction of the victims’ house and had quickly returned. When asked about the contradiction in his statements made during the pre-trial investigation and during the trial, Mi. said that he had been subjected to “psychological and physical influence” by the police during the pre-trial investigation. 24. On 23 February 2012 the Slovyansk Court convicted the applicant of attempted murder, intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm and arson which had had grievous consequences. It sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. In convicting the applicant the court relied, in particular, on the applicant’s statements made during the pre-trial investigation, which the trial court interpreted to mean that the applicant had realised that the house he had set on fire had been the victims’ home and that they might have been inside at the time, in particular the applicant’s statement to the effect that he had seen lights on in the house. The trial court also relied on Mi.’s statements made during the pre-trial investigation, finding them more credible than his testimony during the trial, in particular because they had been repeated in the course of confrontations with the applicant. His allegations of pressure had been verified by the prosecutor’s office but no proof had been found to corroborate them. 25. The applicant appealed, arguing, primarily, that he had not intended to murder the victims and had set their house on fire only after attempting to verify that there had been nobody inside. He insisted that he had been ill‑treated in order to extract his confession. 26. On 29 May 2012 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) requested the Slovyansk prosecutor to investigate the applicant’s ill-treatment allegations. 27. On 5 June 2012 the Slovyansk prosecutor quashed the investigator’s decision of 3 November 2010 and conducted a new round of pre‑investigation enquiries. In the course of the enquiries the prosecutor’s office took statements from the applicant, the police officers, lawyer O. and the medical expert who had issued the report of 29 July 2010, and examined the premises of the police station where the alleged ill-treatment had taken place and its entry records. 28. Police officers stated that the applicant had been arrested and handcuffed on 19 July 2012 but had then been released and invited back for a new interview on either 21 or 22 July 2010. Officer F. stated that he could not explain the discrepancy between the date of the applicant’s initial confession, 21 July 2010, and the date of his official arrest, 22 July 2010, insisting that the applicant had been handed over to the investigator, who had put him under arrest immediately following his confession. 29. The record of the interview with the medical expert is one page long. Two questions were put to the expert. First, he was asked on what grounds he had concluded that the applicant’s injuries could have been caused by electric shocks. The expert responded that his conclusion had been based on the applicant’s statements and the results of the examination. Secondly, he was asked whether the injuries noted in the report could have been inflicted by different blunt objects and under different circumstances. The expert responded that they could. 30. Lawyer O. stated that the applicant had not complained to him of any ill-treatment. 31. On 15 July 2012 the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for lack of a corpus delicti in their actions. By way of reasoning, the prosecutor stated, in particular, that the records of the police station where the applicant had allegedly been ill‑treated did not show that he had entered the station during the relevant period. The prosecutor referred to the police officers’, lawyer O.’s and the expert’s statements. The prosecutor considered that the applicant’s account of ill-treatment was not consistent with his injuries. 32. On 12 July 2012 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction. It also noted that according to the findings of the prosecutor’s office, the applicant had been handcuffed on 19 July 2010 and there was no evidence that he had been released afterwards. In view of those findings, the Court of Appeal concluded that the applicant’s allegations that he had been kept in detention from 19 to 22 July 2010 were credible and that that period of detention was to be deducted from his sentence. However, the Court of Appeal did not establish any causal link between that irregular detention and his confession. The Court of Appeal also held that the trial court had not erred in admitting the applicant’s statement given during the pre-trial investigation, since the applicant’s rights had been explained to him prior to questioning, a lawyer had been present and the applicant had not told him of any ill-treatment. 33. The applicant appealed on points of law, raising the same arguments as those raised before the Court of Appeal and also arguing that the discrepancies between his statements made during the pre-trial investigation and the testimony given during the trial were due to the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected. 34. On 19 March 2013 the High Specialised Civil and Criminal Court upheld the judgment of the trial court and the ruling of the Court of Appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Chevelcha. 6. Between October 2003 and November 2004 a number of thefts of cattle from different farms were committed and criminal proceedings were instituted on that account. 7. In the early morning of 2 November 2004 a cow and a bull were stolen from a farm in a village next to the one in which the applicant lived. 8. On 12 November 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted in respect of the theft of 2 November 2004. 9. On 14 November 2004 – at 8.30 a.m. according to the applicant – the applicant was taken by the police from her home to the Orzhytsya police station (“the police station”) to verify her possible involvement in the above-mentioned criminal offences. 10. According to the applicant, at the police station she was subjected to beatings and psychological pressure with a view to extracting her confession to the cattle thefts. The police officers hit her in her face, laid her on the floor with her face dawn, stamped on her legs and twisted her arms back. She was also made to spread her legs as widely as possible while standing and threatened with a beating if she fell down. Her requests for legal assistance were allegedly rejected. 11. The Government maintained that the applicant had not been subjected to any ill-treatment. 12. On the same day, in police custody, the applicant drafted “statements of surrender and confession” (явка з повинною) in which she confessed to several counts of cattle theft and gave “explanations” in which, according to the Government, she submitted that she had committed the criminal offences as a member of a group of persons. No copies of those statements and “explanations” have been made available to the Court. As can be seen from the available complaints lodged by the applicant’s lawyer with the domestic authorities, the applicant drafted a separate document for each of her confessions. 13. At 6.10 p.m. on the same date the investigator of the Orzhytsya police unit dealing with the criminal proceedings concerning the cattle thefts (“the investigator”) drew up a report on the applicant’s detention as a suspect. The applicant signed a record of the explanation of procedural rights to her; in that record she stated that she did not wish to be legally represented at that stage. The investigator therefore issued a decision to conduct the pre-trial investigation into the proceedings concerning the thefts committed in 2003-2004 without the involvement of a defence lawyer. 14. Thereafter, the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the absence of a lawyer. The verbatim record of the questioning suggests that her right to a lawyer and to a meeting with him before the first round of questioning (as well as her right not to incriminate herself) had been explained to the applicant before the start of the questioning. According to the record, the applicant confessed to a number of cattle thefts in 2003 and 2004, committed as a part of a group, and provided some details in this respect. No questions were put or remarks made by the investigator. 15. On 16 November 2004 the applicant’s mother signed a contract for her legal representation with a lawyer, V. On three occasions on the same day and twice on 17 November 2004 (in the morning and afternoon) he attempted to hold a meeting with the applicant but for different reasons was denied access to the police station by duty officers. After each attempt on 17 November 2004, he lodged a complaint with the prosecutor’s office that the police had unlawfully obstructed him from meeting with the applicant, and submitted that all investigative steps taken with the applicant’s participation but in his absence should be considered as having been conducted in breach of her defence rights. 16. On 17 November 2004, apparently during the lunch break, V. managed to see the investigator and requested to be admitted to the proceedings as the applicant’s lawyer on the basis of the agreement concluded with the applicant’s mother. The case-file suggests that on the same date the investigator admitted V. to the proceedings concerning the theft committed on 2 November 2004 and granted him permission to meet with the applicant. 17. On the same date – between 8.15 and 11.30 a.m. according to the official records, and in the afternoon according to the applicant – a reconstruction of the crime was carried out in the presence of the investigator, two attesting witnesses and an expert in criminal law. The relevant record, which was signed by the applicant without any observations, suggests that before the reconstruction commenced, the applicant had been apprised of her constitutional right not to make self-incriminating statements and her right to refuse to participate in the reconstruction or to insist that it be carried out in the presence of a lawyer. The applicant declined (“in the lawyer’s presence”, according to the record) to exercise those rights and expressed her wish for the reconstruction to be carried out without the assistance of a lawyer. 18. During the reconstruction, the applicant provided details as to the theft committed during the early morning of 2 November 2004 and pointed out the place where the stolen animals had been slaughtered by her. The immediate inspection of the place revealed two detached cattle heads and two respective identification tags. 19. From 5 p.m. until 6.15 p.m. on the same date, a court hearing on the application of the preventive measure in respect of the applicant was held, following which the applicant’s detention was extended to ten days. As suggested by the records of the hearing, at the beginning of the hearing the applicant submitted that she wished to be represented by V. and her request was granted by the court. Upon his arrival, the applicant requested a meeting in private with V. Having heard V., who submitted that he was entitled to represent the applicant as of 9 a.m. of 16 November 2004 but since then had been unlawfully obstructed from meeting her, the court announced a break until 6.10 p.m. in order to allow the applicant to meet the lawyer in private. 20. According to the applicant, no such meeting was ever ensured and V. was, in fact, excluded from the hearing. The verbatim record of the hearing refers to no intervention on V.’s part after the break had finished. 21. On 17 November 2004 the applicant was transferred to the Lubny temporary detention facility (ізолятор тимчасового тримання – “the ITT”). The admissions register of the facility suggests that upon her admission the applicant was found to be suffering from abrasions on her chin, left elbow and hip, a bruise on her right hip and a scratch mark on her left knee. It is furthermore stated in the register that the applicant’s injuries had been sustained three days before her admission to the facility and that she raised no complaints before the ITT staff. 22. On 18 November 2004 V. unsuccessfully tried to meet the applicant in the Orzhytsya ITT as he had not been informed of her transfer to the Lubny ITT. On the same date he lodged a complaint with the prosecutor’s office, stating that he had been unable to meet the applicant and had not been informed of her transfer to the Lubny ITT. 23. On 19 November 2004 the deputy head of the Lubny ITT declined to allow V. to meet with the applicant as the investigator’s room was allegedly occupied and there was no other way to allow his request. On the same date V. complained to the prosecutor about this fact. He noted, in particular, that he had waited at the Lubny ITT until the end of the working day and had seen nobody coming out of the premises but the police officers from the Orzhytsya police unit; this, in his opinion, constituted evidence that they had been “working with the applicant” in the lawyer’s absence. 24. On 23 November 2004 V. again complained to the Orzhytsya prosecutor’s office that he was still not able to see the applicant and that no response had been given by the prosecutor to his four earlier complaints about violations of the applicant’s defence rights and his rights as her lawyer. 25. On the same date, from 12.29 until 4.14 p.m., another reconstruction of the crime was carried out in the presence of the investigator, two attesting witnesses and an expert in criminal law. The relevant verbatim record, which was signed by the applicant without observations, suggests that, on being informed of her procedural rights, the applicant declined to be assisted by a lawyer during this investigative step. 26. During the reconstruction, the applicant provided details as to nine episodes of cattle thefts that she had allegedly committed as part of a group in 2003 and 2004 and showed the directions from which her accomplices had brought the stolen animals to her and the places where the cattle had been slaughtered by her. The record of the reconstruction furthermore suggests that once the reconstruction was terminated, the applicant attested that she had given that evidence of her own free will, without any physical and psychological influence being exerted by the police. 27. On 24 November 2004, on being notified of her procedural rights as a suspect, the applicant expressed her wish to be represented by V. On the same date the latter was admitted to the proceedings concerning the thefts committed in 2003-2004. 28. On the same day, in V.’s presence, the applicant was charged with having committed, as a member of a group, the theft on 2 November 2004. She was then questioned as an accused in this respect. The applicant denied her guilt for the theft and submitted that she had given her earlier statements after being told that other persons had incriminated her in the theft and that there was thus no point in her denying her guilt. When asked how it had then happened that she had known and shown the place where the slaughtered animals’ heads had been hidden, she stated that she had been told about the place by the attesting witnesses. 29. On 3 December 2004 a new investigator was appointed to the criminal proceedings concerning the applicant. 30. On 9 December 2004 the Orzhytsya prosecutor ordered the head of the Orzhytsya police unit to cease the violations of the applicant’s defence rights and to ensure that she could meet with her lawyer, V., without any limitations as to the number and duration of such meetings. 31. On 17 December 2004 V. was denied a meeting with the applicant as he had not received any authorisation to do so from the newly appointed investigator to the case. On the same day V. complained about this fact to the prosecutor, referring to the police’s failure to comply with the prosecutor’s order of 9 December 2004 (see paragraph 30 above). 32. On 22 December 2004, on being notified of her procedural rights in the case concerning the theft committed during the early morning of 2 November 2004, the applicant expressed a wish to be represented by V. On the same date, the investigator admitted V. to these proceedings. 33. On 23 December 2004 V. was again denied a meeting with the applicant as “there had been no information proving his admission to the proceedings”. On the following day the applicant lodged a complaint with the prosecutor’s office regarding this refusal to allow her to meet her lawyer. The latter furthermore submitted that on 22 December 2004 his meeting with the applicant had been interrupted and she had been taken out of the meeting room. 34. On the same date, on 23 December 2004, during a court hearing regarding the application of the preventive measure, which was held in the presence of V., from 10 until 12 a.m., the applicant submitted, inter alia, that on the morning of 14 November 2004, at the police station, she had denied having participated in the thefts and had unsuccessfully requested the assistance of a lawyer. She furthermore complained that the police officers had ill-treated her and forced her to draft confessions to a number of thefts, as dictated by them. She provided details of her ill‑treatment on 14 November 2004, as summarised above (see paragraph 10 above), and submitted that she had been afraid of raising any complaint during her examination by a forensic expert on 22 November 2004. 35. On an unspecified date criminal proceedings concerning all instances of theft were joined into a single case. 36. On 19 February 2005, being apprised of her procedural rights as an accused, the applicant stated that she wished to be represented by V. In his presence, she was charged with having organised in 2003 a criminal group and having committed in 2003 and 2004 a number of cattle thefts. 37. On 2 March 2005, when signing a record stating that she had been acquainted with the contents of the case file, the applicant denied her guilt and stated, without giving any details, that all investigative actions had been carried out in breach of her defence rights. V. submitted that there had been no evidence of the applicant’s guilt and requested, accordingly, that the criminal proceedings against the applicant be terminated. On the same day the investigator refused the lawyer’s request as unsubstantiated and having been raised in only general terms. 38. On 22 March 2005 the case against the applicant and her alleged accomplices was sent for trial to the Chornukhinskiy District Court, Poltava Region (“the District Court”). 39. On 19 April 2005 the District Court held a preparatory hearing in the presence of all the defendants and of V. No complaints were raised by them during that hearing. 40. During the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty and claimed, inter alia, that her self-incriminating statements had been obtained by the police by means of ill-treatment and in the absence of a lawyer. Similar statements were made by the applicant’s co-defendants. 41. On 15 September 2005 the District Court found the applicant guilty on a number of counts of theft and sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment. In doing so, it referred mainly to the self-incriminatory statements made by the applicant on 14, 17 and 23 November 2004 (see paragraphs 12, 14, 18 and 26 above) and the confessions given by her accomplices during the pre-trial investigation. When dismissing the applicants’ allegations of ill-treatment by the police, the District Court referred to the statements of attesting witnesses present at the crime reconstructions of 17 and 23 November 2004 (see paragraphs 17 and 25 above); according to those witnesses, the applicant and other defendants had given evidence at those crime reconstructions of their own free will. It furthermore referred to evidence given by the police officers concerned (all of whom had denied all allegations of ill-treatment) and to the fact that no injuries had been found on the applicant’s body during her medical examinations on 22 and 25 November 2004 (see paragraphs 52 and 55 below). The court also stated that during the whole pre-trial investigation the defendants had acknowledged their guilt and had never complained about any ill-treatment, but had retracted their statements only during the trial (which the court considered they had done simply as part of their defence strategy). 42. On appeal of the applicant, on 15 March 2006 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed the above-mentioned judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination. It noted, inter alia, the selective approach taken by the trial court to the assessment of evidence in the case, including the evidence concerning the alleged ill-treatment, and a breach of the applicant’s defence rights. 43. On 20 March 2007 the prosecutor withdrew charges against the applicant on four counts of theft for lack of evidence. 44. On 18 April 2007 the District Court found the applicant and her co‑defendants guilty as charged and sentenced them to different terms of imprisonment. The applicant was given a four-year suspended sentence. The court based the applicant’s conviction on: her voluntary surrender to the police and the self-incriminatory statements that she had made on 14, 17 and on 23 November 2004 (see paragraphs 12, 14, 18 and 26 above); confessions given by her accomplices during the pre-trial investigation; the records of the crime scene examinations; and statements by the victims (that is to say farm owners) and witnesses confirming the fact that animals had been stolen from the farms. 45. The District Court dismissed the defendants’ allegations of ill‑treatment by the police as ill-founded. It noted in this respect that the police officers concerned had denied all allegations of ill-treatment; a surgeon, N., who examined the applicant on 25 November 2004 (see paragraph 55 below) had submitted that he had found no bodily injuries when he had examined her; the forensic expert who had examined the applicant on 22 November 2004 had also attested that no injuries had been found by him on the applicant’s body (see paragraph 52 below); and attesting witnesses who had been present at the crime reconstructions (in which the defendants had participated) had submitted that the applicant and other defendants had given evidence of their own free will. 46. The applicant appealed, submitting that the District Court had failed to comply with the instructions of the Court of Appeal and to duly examine the allegations made by her and her co-defendants of ill-treatment by the police. She stated, inter alia, that the District Court had deliberately ignored evidence proving her bodily injuries. She relied, inter alia, on the relevant data from the admissions register of the Lubny ITT (see paragraph 21 above) and the testimony of a prosecutor who had seen the applicant’s injuries. The applicant furthermore contested the credibility of the statements given by the police officers in the light of the fact that they were direct perpetrators. She also stated that two of the attesting witnesses could not be objective as at the time of the events in question one of them had been undergoing prosecution by the police and the other one was himself a former police officer who had close ties with the police. She furthermore submitted that the District Court had falsified the statement made by N., the surgeon, during the trial regarding the results of the applicant’s examination on 25 November 2004 (see paragraph 55 below). She noted in this respect that N. had in fact confirmed that there had indeed been bodily injuries, which he had recorded in the applicant’s medical file. Lastly, the applicant stated that she had been unlawfully deprived of legal assistance between 14 and 24 November 2004 and that all the evidence on which her conviction had been based, in particular her confessions, had been obtained during that period. She also referred in this regard to the unsuccessful attempts made by her lawyer to hold a meeting with her within the above-mentioned period and to the complaints that he had unsuccessfully lodged with the prosecutor’s office in this respect. 47. On 2 July 2008 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the District Court. In doing so the court referred to (i) the applicant’s voluntary surrender to the police and to the further self-incriminatory statements that she had made during her questioning, which had been corroborated by those made by her alleged accomplices, and (ii) the fact that remains of animals had been found at the place pointed out by the applicant during the reconstruction of the crime. It furthermore stated that the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment had been correctly dismissed by the first-instance court as unsubstantiated, given that the police officers had denied any ill‑treatment and no injuries had been uncovered in the course of the applicant’s medical examinations of 22 and 25 November 2004 or during her further medical examinations in detention in view of the worsening of her chronic health conditions. 48. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal, maintaining, inter alia, her complaints concerning her alleged psychological and physical ill-treatment in police custody and the lack of access to a lawyer between 14 and 24 November 2004. She submitted in this respect that the courts had deliberately ignored evidence proving the fact that she had had bodily injuries shortly after her arrest. 49. On 26 March 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant’s conviction. It noted that her guilt had been proved by her own statements as a suspect in which she had confessed to the thefts and which she had later confirmed during the reconstructions of crimes. The Supreme Court furthermore found that the applicant’s statements had been corroborated by the confessions of her co-defendants. It noted that her complaint of ill‑treatment had been thoroughly examined by the lower courts and had been lawfully rejected as unsubstantiated. It also noted that the applicant’s allegations had been disproved by the testimony of the surgeon, N., and the forensic expert, as well as by that given by the police officers. As regards the alleged violation of the applicant’s defence rights, the Supreme Court noted that during the pre-trial investigation, the applicant had been informed of her right to a lawyer and that the lawyer of her choice had been admitted to the proceedings. The judgment of the Supreme Court was sent to the applicant on 8 April 2009. 50. On a number of occasions between 16 and 21 November 2004 lawyer V. complained to the Orzhytsya prosecutor’s office of the applicant’s ill-treatment in police custody and requested that she be given a medical examination, in his presence, in order to secure evidence of that ill‑treatment. 51. On 18 and 19 November 2004 similar complaints were made by the applicant’s mother. 52. On 22 November 2004 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert. The relevant record suggests that the applicant had had no bodily injuries and had raised no complaints. According to the applicant, she had done so because she had been afraid of further beatings by the police. 53. On 23 November 2004 the Orzhytsya prosecutor’s office declined to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the complaints of the applicant’s lawyer that the applicant had been ill-treated and her defence rights violated. No copy of that decision has been made available to the Court. According to the Government, the decision was based on the results of the applicant’s medical examination of 22 November 2004 (see paragraph 52 above), the police officers denial of ill‑treatment and on the fact that the applicant had not raised any complaint about her ill-treatment during a court hearing on the application of a preventive measure. As regards the defence rights, it was also noted that under the decision of the Orzhytsya District Court of 17 November 2004 lawyer V. had been granted permission to have a meeting with the applicant (see paragraph 19 above). 54. On 25 November 2004 the applicant, through her lawyer, requested a meeting with the prosecutor with a view to making statements regarding “what [had been] done to her at the police station” and “how her voluntarily surrenders [had] appeared”. She also denied her guilt of any criminal offence and asked for a medical examination of her to be conducted in order to identify and treat the injuries that she had been suffering from as a result of her ill-treatment by the police and to protect her from fresh beatings. 55. According to the extracts from the applicant’s medical file, which was provided by the latter to the Court, on the same date, on 25 November 2004, the applicant complained about her poor state of health, including pain in her left elbow. She was examined by N., a surgeon from the local civil hospital who discovered “active yellow marks” (квітучі пятна жовтуватого кольору) from 0.5 to 1 cm in diameter on the applicant’s forearms, hips and right breast. Following the examination, N. found that the applicant’s state of health did not require any medical intervention. 56. On 26 November 2004, after having a meeting with the applicant and being given the results of the aforesaid medical examination, lawyer V. again complained to the prosecutor’s office of the applicant’s ill-treatment by the police and requested, inter alia, that she be given another forensic medical examination in his presence. 57. On 29 November 2004 the applicant was transferred to the Poltava Temporary Detention centre (“the Poltava SIZO”). As can be seen from a certificate issued by the SIZO governor, upon her arrival the applicant underwent a medical examination which uncovered a bruise on her left hip measuring 5 cm by 3 cm and an inflammation on her left forearm. 58. On 17 December 2004 lawyer V. complained to the prosecutor’s office that no response had been made to the applicant’s complaints of ill‑treatment. 59. On the same date the applicant refused to undergo a medical examination unless her lawyer was present. 60. On 21 December 2004 lawyer V. complained to the Poltava prosecutor’s office about the lack of any response to the complaints lodged regarding the applicant’s ill-treatment; the failure to conduct a medical examination of her in the absence of police officers and in the presence of her lawyer; and violations of her defence rights. He furthermore drew the prosecutor’s attention to the allegations of ill-treatment made by the applicant’s alleged accomplices, one of whom had been allegedly hospitalised after being beaten by the police. 61. On 10 January 2005 the Poltava prosecutor’s office quashed the prosecutor’s decision of 23 November 2004 (see paragraph 53 above) as unsubstantiated and ordered an additional investigation in respect of V.’s allegations. It noted, inter alia, that the case file contained no explanations by the officers from the Orzhytsya and the Lubny ITTs and no information regarding whether the applicant had been provided with medical assistance when in the Poltava SIZO and whether she had undergone a medical examination with a view to establishing whether she had bodily injuries. It was furthermore noted that M.M., the applicant’s alleged accomplice, had also lodged a complaint about his physical and psychological ill-treatment by police officers of the Orzhytsya police unit. 62. According to the Government, on 20 January 2005 the Orzhytsya prosecutor’s office had declined to institute criminal proceedings and the applicant had not appealed against that decision. No copy of that decision has been made available to the Court. 63. The applicant furthermore unsuccessfully raised a complaint in respect of her ill-treatment by the police before the domestic courts (see paragraphs 40-49 above).

5. The applicants were born in 1979 and 1984. They are currently serving life sentences imposed in the impugned proceedings described below. 6. On 18 May 2006 at 11.45 p.m. several persons arrived by car in front of an Internet café in Skopje and opened fire with machine guns. According to an expert report admitted in the ensuing proceedings, around 70 bullets were fired towards the café. In the incident three children were killed and six people were seriously injured (“the victims”). 7. Following a criminal complaint for murder lodged against unknown perpetrators, on 3 August 2006 the public prosecutor requested that an investigating judge question the victims and a certain B.H. who had allegedly been present at the scene at the time of the shooting. 8. Between 6 and 19 December 2006 the investigating judge heard oral evidence from the victims and other witnesses. None of them identified the applicants as the perpetrators. Some victims, as well as other witnesses who had arrived at the scene immediately after the shooting, stated that there had been no street lighting and that visibility had been considerably impaired. The investigating judge also heard oral evidence from M.M., who had sold the car used in the incident to two people whom he didn’t know and “would not recognise if I (he) were to see them now”. He stated that a certain F. had introduced him to the buyers. 9. During the investigation, there were several unsuccessful attempts by the investigating judge to summons B.H. Assistance from the police was also sought. Having been alerted to the summons and the police inquiry, B.H. appeared in court to testify before the investigating judge. On 27 February and 23 March 2007 he confirmed that he had been present at the scene at the time of the incident and that he had been shot in the upper leg. He had fainted and had spent time recovering in a private hospital outside the respondent State. He stated that there had been four people in the car and that all had fired on the café. He identified a certain Dz. as the driver of the car. He also alleged that he himself had been the most likely target of the attack owing to his alleged involvement in the killing of the applicants’ brother, which had happened at the beginning of 2006. In that context, he had received threats that he would be killed. 10. On 4 May 2007 two people who had been eye-witnesses to the incident gave oral evidence in the presence of the investigating judge and the public prosecutor. They testified as anonymous witnesses (сведок со прикриен идентитет) under the pseudonyms “Korab” and “Vodno”. The latter asked not to have his identity revealed for the following reasons: “the people who committed the crime are violent and have a criminal record and that’s why I’m afraid of their threats; they are armed, convicted, I fear for my life and the life of my family, I fear reprisals.” 11. On photographs shown in evidence, both witnesses identified one of the applicants as having fired on the café and Dz. as the driver of the car. “Vodno” also identified the other applicant as having fired on the café. He stated that three people (including the applicants) had fired weapons in the incident of 18 May 2006. 12. On 11 May 2007 another individual was examined before the investigating judge and the public prosecutor under the pseudonym “Vardar” for the same reasons as the witness “Vodno”. He confirmed that Mr Ramiz Asani (the applicant) had bought the car used in the accident from M.M. He also stated that after the incident Mr Ramiz Asani had told him the following: “what you’ve seen and heard on television about the incident with M.M.’s car – I did it in revenge for the killing of my brother ...” 13. On the same date, the investigating judge opened an investigation against the applicants and Dz. on reasonable suspicion of murder. The applicants, who had in the meantime been arrested, were remanded in prison custody. On a later date the investigating judge suspended the investigation in respect of Dz. as he had proved to be untraceable. 14. In an indictment of 13 August 2007, the public prosecutor accused the applicants − who had no previous record, but had criminal proceedings in relation to other charges pending against them − of having fired machine guns at the Internet café with the intention of killing B.H. The prosecutor requested that the trial judge examine the victims and several witnesses − including B.H. and M.M., and the anonymous witnesses − and to admit other material evidence in evidence, including post-mortem reports and other expert reports. 15. At the trial, the applicants, represented by two lawyers, unsuccessfully requested that evidence produced by the anonymous witnesses be rejected and that the written transcripts of their depositions be excluded from the case file. The trial judge, however, granted their request for witnesses “Korab” and “Vodno” to be questioned at the trial. The examination was carried out at a hearing of 21 January 2008 in the presence of only the trial judge and the public prosecutor, as provided for in the Criminal Procedure Act in force at the time (see paragraph 24 below). Both witnesses repeated the statements they had given before the investigating judge and reiterated their fear of negative repercussions. Their statements were read out at the trial in the presence of the applicants. A written transcript of their depositions was communicated to the applicants who, at their request, obtained a ten-day grace period in which to prepare written questions to be put to these witnesses by the court. The applicants formulated seven questions to be put to each witness. Both witnesses replied, again in the presence of only the trial judge and the public prosecutor. “Korab” stated that only one person had fired, while according to “Vodno” three people had fired at the café. Both witnesses submitted that, despite the impaired visibility, there had been sufficient light to see the applicants. A transcript of their replies was communicated to the applicants. 16. The trial judge further examined M.M., who did not recognise Mr Ramiz Asani as the buyer of the car used in the incident. He also heard oral evidence from three of 25 witnesses proposed by the applicants regarding their whereabouts at the time when the crime was committed. All three witnesses corroborated the applicants’ version of events, namely that they had been in another local café at that time. 17. Since the identity of witness “Vardar” had been disclosed in the proceedings (F.S.), the trial judge granted the applicants’ request for him to be questioned again. At a hearing held on 1 April 2008 in the presence of the applicants, F.S. denied that he had testified as an anonymous witness. He denied that the applicants had bought the car from M.M. He alleged that he had been beaten by the police in order to tell the investigating judge that the applicants had bought the car (see paragraph 12 above). 18. At the same hearing, the trial judge read out B.H.’s pre-trial statement (see paragraph 9 above). The judge did so after having tried on several occasions to secure his attendance at the trial and having inquired with the police about his whereabouts. It was noted that, according to official notes in the case file, B.H. was untraceable. The record of the hearing did not specify that the applicants objected to the reading of the statement. 19. During the proceedings, the trial judge granted the applicants’ request for a face-to-confrontation with the experts who had carried out the ballistic examination. He did not, however, allow an additional ballistic examination and refused to admit further evidence regarding the intensity of the street lighting at the scene at the relevant time (the applicants alleged that the street light had been too low to allow the anonymous witnesses to see the assailants). In their concluding remarks, the applicants claimed that B.H. was in the respondent State and had been involved in incidents relating to the parliamentary elections of 1 June 2008. 20. On 23 June 2008 the trial court delivered a judgment in which it found the applicants guilty of murder and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The applicants’ presence at the scene when the incident happened, as well as the development and dynamics of events, was established on the basis of the testimony of the anonymous witnesses “Korab” and “Vodno”, which the court regarded as credible and consistent despite “small differences which were due to the intensity of the shooting and fear for their lives”. The court also gave weight to the statement given by F.S. in the pre-trial proceedings under the pseudonym “Vardar”. It disregarded his statement of 1 April 2008 (see paragraph 17 above), finding that it had been given under duress and the threat that he or his family would be killed. In this connection it referred to a police report of 24 January 2008 according to which F.S. had been visited several times by unknown people who had threatened him and his family about the testimony given in the pre-trial proceedings. The motive for the crime was established on the basis of the statement given by B.H. in the pre-trial proceedings. That witness had not been examined at the trial since he had been untraceable. In that context, the trial court referred to an official note by the police of 9 January 2008 informing the court that B.H. had fled the respondent State and that an arrest warrant (потерница) had been issued against him. The court did not say anything regarding the applicants’ allegations that B.H. had in fact been in the respondent State and could have been located (see paragraph 19 above). In the court’s view, the evidence produced by the defence witnesses was unreliable and aimed at enabling the accused to avoid criminal responsibility. For this reason it considered it irrelevant to examine the remaining witnesses proposed by the defence. The applicants’ defence that they had been at another location at the relevant time was found to be self‑serving. 21. In public hearings held on 10 October 2008 and 25 September 2009 (latter judgment served on the applicant on 5 January 2010) respectively, the Skopje Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court upheld the applicants’ conviction and the sentence imposed on them. They dismissed appeals lodged by the applicants in which they complained inter alia that the trial court had failed to admit evidence proposed by the defence, that their conviction could not be based solely on the statements of the anonymous witnesses, which had been unlawfully obtained, and that the trial court had not examined B.H. notwithstanding their claims that he would have been available for examination. In this connection they argued that it had been an issue of public record that in the election incidents of 1 June 2008 B.H. had been wounded and hospitalised and later detained by the police. 22. The courts held that the evidence produced by the anonymous witnesses had been lawfully obtained and that the applicants’ opportunity to put written questions to them had secured their defence rights. The fact that the witnesses had only produced evidence a year after the incident had been due to their fear. Furthermore, they stated that the applicants’ conviction had not been based solely on the evidence produced by those witnesses. In this connection they found that the trial court had admitted other evidence, both documentary and verbal. As regards the evidence produced by B.H., the courts held that the trial court had tried to secure his attendance at the trial, but he had been unavailable for examination, as described in the police note. The higher courts also endorsed the trial court’s finding regarding the applicants’ motive for committing the crime, as established on the basis of the evidence produced by B.H. That had been confirmed by the pre-trial statement of witness F.S. given under pseudonym “Vardar” (see paragraph 12 above). 23. On 2 December 2010 Dz. was found and detained. In subsequent criminal proceedings, he was convicted of murder and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment.

5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Senica. 6. On 3 October 2006 the applicant and three others were charged with extorting money from P. P. 7. On 6 October 2006 the Senica District Court (okresný súd) remanded the applicant and two of his alleged accomplices in custody from 3 October 2006 onwards. The court held that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence with which he was charged, that the offence had been committed in an organised way, and that therefore there was a risk that he could put pressure on witnesses, contact other perpetrators and tamper with evidence. The court relied on the testimony of P.P., who allegedly had been warned by one of the applicant’s accomplices about instructions from the applicant not to cooperate with the police. On 24 October 2006 the Trnava Regional Court (krajský súd) dismissed an interlocutory appeal (sťažnosť) by the applicant. 8. On 6 December 2006 a police investigator charged the applicant and fifteen other people with establishing, masterminding and supporting a criminal group. The applicant was also charged with aggravated coercion, extortion, and causing bodily harm. 9. On 22 December 2006 the Pezinok Special Court (špeciálny súd, hereafter “the Special Court”), where the case had been transferred in the meantime owing to the organised nature of the crimes, dismissed an application by the applicant for release. It relied on the particularly serious and organised nature of the offences he was charged with, and held that there was a real danger that he might influence witnesses and contact other perpetrators in order to tamper with evidence. On 17 January 2007 the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 10. On 16 March 2007 the Special Court extended the applicant’s detention until 3 October 2007. In addition to the reasons mentioned above, it relied on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant was the leader of a criminal group which had been operating for several years, and that not all of the members of that criminal group had been identified. The court pointed out that the criminal investigation was particularly complex. On 28 March 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 11. On 17 April 2007 the police investigator charged the applicant with another count of extortion. 12. On 11 June 2007 the Special Court dismissed another application by the applicant for release. It relied on the testimony of several witnesses who were afraid to testify against him. The court took into account the complexity of the criminal investigation, finding that there had been no undue delays. On 22 June 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 13. On 14 September 2007 the applicant was charged with two other counts of extortion. 14. On 18 September 2007 the Special Court extended the applicant’s detention until 3 April 2008, and extended the grounds for his detention by including the risk of his reoffending. It held that it was reasonable to suspect that, if released, the applicant would continue his criminal activities, taking into account: the motives for such activities and their duration and extent; the methods of intimidation and violence used by the criminal group; the hierarchical and organised nature of the group; and the fact that not all of the members of the group had been identified. On 26 September 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 15. On 17 March 2008 the applicant’s detention was extended until 7 July 2008. The Special Court added that his detention assisted the investigation, since the victims were willing to testify, but still not all of the members of the criminal group had been identified. On 26 March 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 16. The applicant was indicted before the Special Court on 13 June 2008. The bill of indictment concerned sixteen criminal acts, eighteen defendants and fourteen victims. The applicant was charged with establishing, masterminding and supporting a criminal group, aggravated coercion, causing bodily harm, and ten acts of extortion. All the crimes were qualified as particularly serious crimes. The sums extorted ranged from 10,000 to 33,000 euros (EUR). 17. On 25 June 2008 the Special Court examined the grounds for the applicant’s detention and ruled that he should remain in detention. It pointed out that, according to the indictment, he was allegedly the leader of a criminal group, a group which had been conducting criminal activities for six years against people who were victims and witnesses in the trial, by means of threats and the use of physical and psychological violence. On 4 July 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 18. On 6 October 2008, when conducting a preliminary examination of the bill of indictment, the Special Court again reviewed the grounds for the applicant’s detention and ruled that he should remain in detention. On 15 October 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 19. On 16 July 2009 the Special Court dismissed another application by the applicant for release. It held that several witnesses were afraid to testify against him in his presence and had thus been heard in his absence. In particular, one witness had been contacted and threatened by unknown persons in an attempt to get him to change his testimony. The court also took into account that not all the witnesses had been heard by the trial court. On 19 August 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 20. On 27 May 2010 the Special Court extended the applicant’s detention until 13 December 2010. The court limited the grounds for his detention to the risk of his reoffending, because the trial court had already heard all witnesses. It stated that there was substantial evidence suggesting that the applicant was the leader of a criminal group which had operated systematically for several years, and therefore it was reasonable to assume that, if at liberty, he might continue with the criminal activities. The court further held that it was essential to protect victims and witnesses who had expressed a fear of the applicant when testifying at the trial. 21. On 10 June 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. 22. On 23 June 2010 the applicant was convicted by the Special Court of establishing, masterminding and supporting a criminal group, four acts of extortion, three acts of aggravated coercion and fraud and was sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. He remained in detention pending the outcome of an appeal. 23. On 13 September 2010 a request for release lodged by the applicant was dismissed by the Special Court. The Supreme Court dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant on 6 October 2010. 24. On 22 November 2010 the Supreme Court extended the applicant’s detention until 3 April 2011. 25. On 11 February 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against his conviction, which thereby became final. The applicant started to serve a prison sentence, and the time spent in detention was taken into account when calculating his prison term. 26. On 10 August 2010 the applicant filed a constitutional complaint (ústavná sťažnosť) against the Supreme Court’s decision of 10 June 2010 to dismiss his interlocutory appeal (see paragraph 21 above). Among other things, he complained that his detention was no longer justified, that it had lasted an excessively long time, and that the Supreme Court had not answered all the arguments raised in his interlocutory appeal (“the first constitutional complaint”). He complained under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and under their constitutional equivalents. 27. On 17 December 2010 he filed another constitutional complaint, alleging a lack of speediness in relation to the judicial review of his detention by the decisions of the Special Court of 13 September 2010 and the Supreme Court of 6 October 2010 (“the second constitutional complaint” – see paragraph 23 above). 28. On 27 October 2010 the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) accepted a part of the applicant’s first constitutional complaint for further examination, including the complaint regarding the length of his detention. It held that the formal requirements under sections 20 and 50 of the Constitutional Court Act had been satisfied. At the same time, it dismissed the rest of the complaint as manifestly ill-founded. 29. On 18 January 2011 the Constitutional Court accepted the second constitutional complaint for further examination, and joined the proceedings relating to the first and the second constitutional complaint. 30. On 8 December 2011 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. It held that the Supreme Court, in its decision of 10 June 2010, had failed to respond to all of the applicant’s arguments. Although the Supreme Court had examined in detail the applicant’s arguments regarding the grounds for his detention, it had failed to respond to his other arguments, such as one about the impartiality and independence of the tribunal reviewing his detention, and another about alleged shortcomings in his representation during the judicial review, and thus the court had breached Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. The Constitutional Court further held that the judicial review of the applicant’s detention between 13 September and 6 October 2010 had not been sufficiently speedy, and found another violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention on this account. It quashed the Supreme Court’s decision of 10 June 2010 and awarded the applicant EUR 4,500 as just satisfaction. It did not order his release, since the applicant had been convicted in the meantime and had started to serve a prison term. The Constitutional Court considered it unnecessary to examine the rest of the applicant’s complaints, including the one under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention regarding the length of his detention. 31. Between the applicant’s arrest and the completion of the pre-trial investigation, the authorities conducted interviews with eighteen defendants, interviewed fifteen victims and twenty‑three witnesses, commissioned five expert opinions, analysed telecommunication recordings, conducted home searches and identity parades, and gathered a large amount of documentary evidence. 32. Between the lodging of the indictment with the trial court and the applicant’s conviction by the court of first instance, the trial court held hearings over the course of fifty-one days. The hearings were scheduled on a monthly or near monthly basis. 33. On 18 September 2008 the presiding judge of the Special Court appointed a substitute defence lawyer for the applicant to prevent the obstruction of court hearings. 34. On 15 December 2008 the presiding judge of the Special Court fined two of the applicant’s defence lawyers: one for failing to appear at three court hearings, and the other for obstructing justice.

4. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Sovetskaya Gavan, Khabarovsk Region. 5. On 22 October 2009 the applicant was arrested and brought to the Khabarovsk Administrative Detention Centre where he stayed until 27 November 2009. 6. Since 22 October 2009 he had been detained with more than 12 inmates in the cell no. 9 designed for 12 persons and had to take turns to sleep. A month after he had been transferred to another cell with the area of 6 square meters which he had shared with another inmate. 7. The detention centre had no shower facilities or a place for outdoor walks. The applicant’s cell was cold and damp, iron banks were not covered by mattresses. Toilets were not separated from the living area, and the persons using them were in full view of others. Food supply was inadequate, the applicant was served meals only once a day and had no drinking water from within the cell. 8. The Government submitted that the Khabarovsk Administrative Detention Centre comprised two cells: no. 5 with the area of 14.6 square meters for 3 inmates and no. 6 with the area of 18 square meters for 4 inmates. There was no overcrowding; the toilet had been separate by a shoulder length fence. The detainees may take a shower once a week. The temperature was 23oC, there were kettles with boiled water in the cells. 9. On 26 October 2009 the applicant’s wife, Mrs Liu, sought to visit the applicant but was refused. 10. On 6 and 10 November 2009 the applicant’s wife filed complaints with the Khabarovsk Prosecutor’s Office stating that she had not been allowed to see the applicant. 11. In August 2010 the applicant brought a civil claim for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage, stating that the conditions of his detention had been inhuman and degrading, and that the prohibition on family visits was unlawful. 12. On 9 February 2011 the Industrialnyy District Court of Khabarovsk dismissed his claim. Relying on the statements of a representative of the detention centre, the court held that the Internal Rules of the Administrative Detention Centres approved by the Decree of the Ministry of Defence of Russia of 6 June 2000 no. 605 dsp (“the Rules”) did not make provision for family visits, and that the applicant’s right to family life had not been breached as he had met his wife during court hearings. 13. On 18 May 2011 the Khabarovsk Regional Court upheld the above decision on appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Budenovsk, the Stavropol Region of the Russian Federation. He is a former military officer. 6. On an unspecified date the applicant sued his former employer military unit. 7. On 3 May 2001 the Military Court of the Pyatigorsk Garrison (“the military court”) ordered, inter alia, the head of the respondent military unit to re-calculate the period of the applicant’s service, applying the favourable terms of such calculation for the time when the applicant had participated in a military operation. The military court obliged the head of the military unit to issue the relevant orders, to calculate and to pay the applicant some additional payments and field allowance for the periods specified in the judgment. The judgment contained information on the indexes and other parameters that should be applied for the awarded amounts to be calculated. 8. On 14 May 2001 the judgment came into force. 9. In March 2002 the applicant obtained the writ of execution and submitted it to the Department of the Federal Treasury in Budenovsk. 10. On 19 March 2002 the Department of the Federal Treasury returned the writ of execution to the applicant on the ground that the military unit did not have an account there, and the judgment contained no specific amounts awarded to the applicant. 11. On 21 March 2002 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs’ service. On the same day the enforcement proceedings were initiated. 12. On 19 February 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ was returned to the applicant without enforcement following his request to withdraw the writ. 13. In 2004-2005 the applicant applied to the domestic courts for clarification of the initial judgment with the view to establish the specific amounts due to him. The applicant’s requests were dismissed as being lodged out of time. The courts noted that, in any case, the matter concerning the awarded amounts should have been resolved by way of an additional decision rather than clarification of a final judgment, and informed that an application for an additional decision should have been lodged before the entry into force of the main judgment. 14. It is not disputed between the parties that the judgment of 3 May 2001 remained unenforced in the part concerning the payment to the applicant of the second salary and the field allowances for the periods specified in the judgment. 15. On 24 March 2016, after communication of the present case, the Ministry of Finance of Russia calculated the amount due to the applicant under the judgment of 3 May 2001. According to this calculation, the main debt amounted to 80,220.74 Russian roubles.

5. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Batelov. 6. In 1965 he had a sexual relationship with a woman who gave birth to a daughter, Z., on 2 March 1966. 7. As the applicant denied that he was the father, Z.’s legal guardian brought proceedings on her behalf in the Jihlava District Court (okresní soud) for a declaration of paternity. 8. After giving birth to Z., but before initiating the aforementioned proceedings, the mother married another man. 9. On 23 April 1970 the District Court found that the applicant was Z.’s father and ordered him to contribute to her maintenance. 10. The court reached its finding after hearing evidence from several witnesses. It also had regard to documentary evidence and took into consideration the results of a blood test known as a “bio-hereditary test” (dědicko-biologická zkouška). In addition, it established that the applicant had had intercourse with the mother sometime between 300 and 180 days before Z.’s birth. In such cases, a presumption of paternity arose under Article 54 of the Family Code, unless there were clear grounds to rebut the presumption. Another man had also had intercourse with the mother at the crucial time, however, the blood test established that he was not the father. 11. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Brno Regional Court (krajský soud) and requested another expert opinion. The Regional Court denied the request because the facts had been proved to a sufficient degree. It eventually upheld the judgment of the District Court on 2 June 1970, which became final on 10 June 1970. 12. In 2011 the applicant requested that the Prosecutor General (Nejvyšší státní zástupce) challenge his paternity in court. By a letter of 21 June 2011 he was informed that the requirements of Article 62 of the Family Code to initiate such proceedings had not been met. Z., by that time an adult, did not want to challenge paternity, it was not in her interests and the applicant had not produced any expert evidence credibly disproving it. 13. On 29 February 2012 the applicant and Z. underwent a DNA examination. The resulting report of 19 April 2012 unequivocally confirmed that the applicant was not Z.’s father. 14. On 9 May 2012 the applicant submitted a new request to the Prosecutor General to challenge his paternity in court. 15. On 12 September 2012 the Prosecutor General informed the applicant that the determination of his paternity had been decided by the Jihlava District Court under Article 54 of the Family Code and that therefore the prosecution service could not initiate proceedings under Article 62 and 62a of the Family Code. The Prosecutor General only had that specific competence as regards statutory presumptions of paternity under Articles 51 § 1 and 52 of the Family Code. When paternity had been established by a judicial declaration under Article 54 of that Code and the judgment had come into legal force, as in the applicant’s case, the law did not provide for any possibility to challenge it. 16. Relying on his rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint (ústavní stížnost) against the Prosecutor General’s decision of 12 September 2012. He maintained that he had proved that he was not Z.’s biological father and requested that the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) order the Prosecutor General to initiate proceedings and challenge his paternity. He also argued that Articles 61 § 1 and 62 § 1 of the Family Code were unconstitutional. 17. On 13 December 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It noted that his paternity had been established by a judicial decision which had come into legal force and stated, inter alia, that the competence of the Prosecutor General could only apply if all the legal requirements had been fulfilled, which was not, however, the applicant’s case.

5. In 2006 the applicant moved to Norway after marrying C, an Iraqi national who had come to Norway in 1999. The couple’s first daughter, A, was born in February 2008. Their second daughter, B, was born in June 2010. 6. On 7 April 2009 the emergency unit at the child welfare authorities in F. municipality received a request to assist the police with an incident in which the applicant and C were having a heated argument in the presence of their child. A few days later, on 10 April, the police were called again. The applicant then said that C had hit her and tried to strangle her and A on the same day. C was arrested and placed in custody. The applicant and A were taken to a crisis centre. 7. The next day, on 11 April, the applicant was admitted to hospital with pain and bleeding. She then consented to A being placed in an emergency foster home while she was in hospital. The applicant asked the hospital for protection during her stay, because she was afraid that C’s family would come to the hospital to kill her. 8. The applicant was discharged from hospital on 12 April 2009. She withdrew her consent to the emergency placement of A and they moved into a crisis centre. The child welfare authorities made a decision on assistance measures on 14 April 2009 and informed the applicant that they would be concerned about A’s welfare if the applicant were to move back in with C. The applicant then stated that she did not wish to move back in with him. She wanted to have a domestic abuse alarm device if she moved back. 9. On 16 April 2009 the applicant moved back home with A. She did not want to give evidence in the criminal proceedings against C, A’s father, and refused to release her doctor from the duty of confidentiality. On 24 April 2009 C was released from custody and moved back home. A restraining order that had been imposed on him in relation to the applicant was lifted at her request. 10. Taking into account that C had tried to strangle the applicant and A with an electrical cord (see paragraph 6 above), the child welfare authorities gave the applicant a choice between moving into a crisis centre with A or having her forcibly taken into care. On 29 April 2009 the applicant moved back into the crisis centre in F. with A. 11. While at the crisis centre the applicant had a lot of contact with C by telephone. She expressed a wish to move back in with him with A, but also stated that he should not be at home at the same time as them. After she let C into the crisis centre on 6 May 2009, the centre no more wanted her to stay there. As the applicant expressed a wish to move back home to C, the child welfare authorities decided on 7 May 2009 to place A in an emergency foster home for the second time because they were of the opinion that the mother was unable to protect A from violence from her father. 12. In a consultation at the emergency clinic that day, the mother denied that C represented a risk to her or the child and that he had previously hurt them. 13. On 18 May 2009 the applicant moved into a crisis centre in O. This crisis centre was of the opinion that A should be returned to her. The child welfare authorities disagreed, and cooperation between the crisis centre and the authorities became difficult. In the end, A was returned to the applicant on 24 June 2009 and they then stayed together at the crisis centre. 14. On 17 July 2009 the applicant and A moved back in with C. The child welfare authorities closed the case, but reopened it after the applicant’s lawyer raised concerns (“bekymringsmelding”) and stated that mother and child still had great need of the authorities’ help. On 29 July 2009 the authorities initiated assistance measures, including parenting guidance, couple therapy, a Norwegian language course for the applicant, and aggression management therapy for C. An application was also submitted for a kindergarten place for A. After a while the kindergarten raised concerns owing to A’s high absence rate and the fact that many verbal expressions of anger were being directed at the staff by C. 15. On 15 October 2009 the police raised additional concerns with the child welfare authorities after they had been called out to the hospital in F. The mother had been admitted the day before with a suspected ectopic pregnancy. C had taken A to the hospital and the police had regarded his behaviour as so aggressive and threatening towards the hospital staff that they had thought it appropriate to notify the child welfare authorities. C had influenced the applicant to discharge herself from hospital against medical advice. However, she had suffered heavy bleeding and had been readmitted. C had been banned from visiting her at the hospital. He was at home with A, about whom the police were concerned, as the father was aggressive and threatening towards the applicant and their daughter. 16. On the following day, 16 October 2009, the child welfare emergency unit visited the family. C was very upset and angry, as he claimed that he had not consented to such a visit. 17. In May 2010 the applicant attended an appointment at a crisis centre in O. According to the child welfare authorities’ records, C had been “aggressive and out of control” because of this meeting. 18. In June 2010 the couple’s second daughter, B, was born. 19. On 2 September 2010 the City Court (tingrett) gave a judgment in which C was acquitted of violating Article 219 of the Penal Code on the maltreatment of family members, but convicted of some other offences. The counts in the indictment under Article 219 concerned the incidents in April 2009 (see paragraph 6 above). In the course of the criminal case, the applicant had withdrawn her previous statements concerning violence by C. 20. On 17 November 2010 the child welfare authorities received a call from a crisis centre in S. informing them that the applicant and her two children had arrived there after C had been violent towards them and had threatened to kill the applicant. C had been arrested, but had then been released. The applicant had withdrawn her statement about his acts of violence and was preparing to go home. Based on this and previous incidents, the authorities decided to issue an emergency care order that day to place the children in an emergency foster home at a secret address. This was A’s third emergency placement (see paragraphs 7 and 11 above). The order was approved by the County Social Welfare Board (fylkesnemnda for barnevern og sosiale saker – hereinafter also “the Board”) the following day. 21. On the same day, 18 November 2010, the applicant went to the crisis centre in O. At a meeting held there on 23 November 2010 she stated that she never wanted to return to C. The child welfare authorities emphasised that she could not have any contact with him once the children were returned to her. Initially, the authorities’ intention was to return the children to the applicant at the crisis centre in S., where they would all stay. The specialist team in S. expressed concern about this solution, and the authorities decided that the children could not be returned until the applicant was settled in her own flat. They thought it would be unfortunate to return the children only to put them through another emergency placement if the mother moved back to C. 22. On 25 November 2010 a restraining order was imposed on C in relation to the applicant. 23. The parents appealed against the emergency care order of 17 November 2010 to the Board, which granted the appeal in part in a decision of 15 December 2010. The decision regarding the emergency placement was upheld, but the amount of contact with the children was increased and the decision not to inform the parents of the children’s whereabouts was set aside. 24. On 21 December 2010 the applicant moved from the crisis centre in O. to the crisis centre in S. She subsequently stayed at a crisis centre in G. from 5 January to 29 May 2011. 25. An application for the children to be taken into care was first submitted to the Board by F. municipality on 23 December 2010. The municipality wanted consideration of the case to be postponed so that an expert assessment could be prepared, but the parents were opposed to this. The Board considered the case at a meeting from 8 to 10 March 2011. On 18 March 2011 the Board nevertheless decided to adjourn the case in order to appoint experts to carry out an assessment of it. The appointed experts were a specialist in educational and psychological counselling, L.M., and a specialist in clinical psychology, B.S. The experts’ joint statement was submitted on 31 May 2011. 26. The child welfare authorities wanted the contact sessions to be supervised and engaged trained personnel from a company to do so. The supervisers started their work on 8 April 2011 and submitted a report on 3 June 2011. 27. C was dissatisfied with the work of the appointed experts (see paragraph 25 above), and therefore hired G.H., a specialist in child and adolescent psychology, as a private expert to observe contact sessions between the applicant and the children. G.H. submitted his report on 11 June 2011. 28. The care order case was considered by the Board on 14 and 15 June 2011. 29. The applicant stayed at the crisis centre in G. again from 14 to 30 June 2011, after which time she moved into her own flat in G. 30. Before the Board reached a decision, the two children were abducted from a contact session with the applicant. The incident took place on 21 June 2011 at G. Volunteer Centre (“frivillighetssentral”) in B. Two people wearing balaclavas and sunglasses forced their way in during the contact session, used an electroshock weapon on the applicant and abducted the children. The contact session was being supervised by a member of the company’s staff (see paragraph 26 above). The staff member managed to escape through the veranda door and summon help. The applicant was injured and unconscious and was taken away to hospital by air ambulance. The children were found in a flat in H. the next day. C later admitted that he had been behind the abduction and that he had been in the vicinity when it had happened. 31. The Board found out about the abduction before it made its decision, and it was therefore decided that there should be no contact between the children and the parents. The operative part of the Board’s decision of 24 June 2011 read as follows: “1. F. municipality, represented by the child welfare authorities, shall take A, born ... February 2008, into care. 3. A and B shall be placed in separate foster homes at secret addresses. A shall be placed in enhanced foster care [where foster parents have extensive support from the child welfare authorities]. 4. No minimum level of contact between the mother and the girls is set out. If contact sessions are to take place, the child welfare authorities are authorised to supervise them. 5. No minimum level of contact between the father and the girls is set out. If contact sessions are to take place, the child welfare authorities are authorised to supervise them.” 32. The decision was brought before the City Court (tingrett). When the hearing started, on 9 November 2011, the applicant was not present. Her counsel was there and argued that the case should be postponed. After the City Court had decided not to do so, the applicant’s counsel left as he was of the opinion that he could not attend to the interests of his client. However, C informed the court that he was in touch with the applicant. She arrived later the same day at the court and stated that she had spoken to her counsel. She also argued that the case should be adjourned. When told that it had already been decided to continue the hearing, the applicant left the court. 33. On 21 November 2011 the City Court upheld the Board’s decision. As to the applicant and her counsel leaving the hearing, the court noted that it found it difficult to view this as anything but an attempt to force the court into postponing the case, although it did not find it clear why they wanted the case to be postponed. Based on the evidence presented to it, the City Court found it highly likely that C would attempt to abduct the children. Moreover, it was found to be the case that C was in control of the applicant and that she followed his orders. Among other things, the City Court referred to the fact that the applicant under the hearing had made herself unavailable to her counsel, but not to C. The City Court stated that the abduction risk might possibly be regarded differently when the criminal case against C had been heard by the court. At present, however, it took account of how C had declared that the abduction had been in the children’s best interests and concluded that there should be no visiting rights. 34. Instructed by the applicant’s lawyer on 5 December 2011, a specialist psychologist, J.W., submitted an expert report in the case on 16 December 2011. 35. The parents appealed to the High Court (lagmannsrett) against the City Court’s judgment. 36. On 8 March 2012 the applicant submitted an official complaint to the police against C in relation to rape, deprivation of liberty, and threats made in her flat. The applicant went to the crisis centre in G., but moved back to her own flat a few days later. C also contacted the applicant in G. later in March. A restraining order was imposed on him, and the applicant was moved to a secret address. 37. The High Court appointed the clinical psychologist B.S. as expert (see paragraph 25 above). He submitted his report on 12 August 2012. The High Court then heard the case from 25 to 27 September 2012. The parents were present together with their counsel and gave evidence. Eight witnesses were heard, including two expert witnesses. B.S., the court-appointed expert, gave testimony. 38. On 22 October 2012 the High Court rejected the appeal. It noted that a care order presupposed serious deficits in the applicant’s caring abilities and though the applicant, if viewed in isolation, would have sufficient capacity to take care of the children with assistance of the child welfare authorities, the question was whether the children would be sufficiently protected from C. The applicant did not want further dealings with him. C’s behaviour showed, however, that he was unwilling to respect her wish. As to contact rights, the High Court did not take a stance on whether a secure regime for visits could be established. At that time, there was in any event an obvious risk that C would again try to kidnap the children. 39. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett) was denied by the Supreme Court’s Committee on Leave to Appeal (Høyesteretts ankeutvalg) on 19 December 2012. 40. During the summer of 2013, the applicant was subject to threats from her half-brother, on paid assignment from C, in order to make her move back to Iraq. On 12 August 2013 she was granted divorce. The hearing of the criminal charges against C took place in September 2013. 41. On 1 October 2013 the child welfare authorities applied to the Board for an order that the applicant and C have their parental responsibility in respect of A and B removed; parental responsibility would then be transferred to the authorities. The authorities also applied for the Board’s authorisation of the foster parents’ adoption of the children. The applicant applied to the Board for an order that A and B’s placement in care be discontinued. 42. On 3 October 2013 the District Court convicted C of abducting the children (see paragraph 30 above) and sentenced him to one year and seven months’ imprisonment, of which six months were suspended. C appealed against the judgment. 43. On 29 November 2013 the Board appointed B.S., the psychologist, as its expert. He submitted a report on 31 January 2014 (see paragraph 53 below). 44. The case was heard on 10 and 11 February 2014. The Board sat with a chairperson who was qualified to act as a professional judge, a psychologist and a layperson, in accordance with the first paragraphs of sections 7-2 and 7-5 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 114 below). The applicant was present with her legal aid counsel and gave evidence. C was in Iraq, but testified by telephone as a party to the case and was represented by his counsel. The appointed expert attended the proceedings and testified. One other witness was heard. 45. In its decision of 25 February 2014, the Board noted that the previous care order case had been considered as directed against the applicant, as C had accepted that she had day-to-day care and control of the children. This situation had not changed, and C now supported the applicant’s claim for revocation of the care order. 46. The Board first reiterated the following from the High Court’s judgment of 22 October 2012 concerning the children’s placement in care (see paragraph 38 above): “In the High Court’s opinion, seen in isolation, the mother will be capable of providing adequate care for the children, provided that adequate assistance measures are offered. The High Court understands that this opinion is shared – although to a varying extent – by all the experts who have appeared before [it].” 47. There was limited updated information about the applicant’s situation at the time of the Board’s decision, but it was clear that she had been granted a divorce from C. She had also passed a Norwegian language course and established a small social network in G. Seen in isolation, her ability to provide care thus appeared to have improved somewhat since the High Court hearing. 48. On the other hand, the High Court had concluded that there were serious deficiencies in the applicant’s ability to provide care because of the threat that C represented to her and the children. The Board made reference to the following passages from High Court’s judgment: “... the question at issue in this case is whether the children will be sufficiently protected against violence from their father if they are returned. It is very important to the father that the children grow up in accordance with their Kurdish background, and he is clearly willing to go to great lengths to achieve this, possibly also by using violent methods. He has stated that the purpose of the abduction was to take them to Iraq. ... After the presentation of the evidence, the High Court is in no doubt that the father is violent and represents a threat to the mother. ... Based on the facts described above, the High Court finds that there is a strong preponderance of likelihood of the father having committed violent acts against the mother, and that it is probable that he, or someone acting on his behalf, will be violent to the mother again. Among other things, [the court] points out that the expert witness J.W., who has assessed the violence described in the case in a cultural context, believes that the mother’s ‘life probably was [or] is in serious danger’. The mother and father are divorced, and the mother wants no further contact with the father. His behaviour as recently as in March this year in G. shows that he is not willing to respect the mother’s wish to break off contact [with him]. In the High Court’s opinion, there can be little doubt that the father’s further contact with the mother will be harmful to the children and constitute a significant deficiency in relation to the children’s safety if the care order is revoked.” 49. However, the High Court had stated in its judgment that the question of contact for the applicant could be seen in a different light if C were expelled from the country. This was because the security concerns described in the judgment would then not apply to the same extent. 50. The expert appointed by the Board, B.S., had not carried out a new assessment of the applicant’s ability to provide care in his report of 31 January 2014 (see paragraph 43 above). In a statement dated 11 February 2014 from the Child Welfare Expert’s Commission (barnesakkyndig kommisjon), one of the two commission members had remarked that it would have been preferable for the mother to have been given an opportunity to comment on such a serious matter. It was also stated that it was expected that this would form part of the Board’s consideration of the case. 51. In his testimony before the Board, psychologist B.S. upheld his assessment given in the report of 31 January 2014 that, seen in isolation, the applicant’s ability to provide care was sufficient for her to have care and control of the children with assistance measures in place. The Board agreed, and also made reference to the High Court’s assessment of this issue (see paragraphs 38 and 46 above). Nothing in the case indicated that the applicant’s ability to provide care had deteriorated since the High Court’s hearing in 2012. If anything, it had to be deemed to have slightly improved. The applicant had testified before the Board and the Board considered that the issue had been adequately clarified. 52. The children’s father had been in Iraq for months, and had stated in his testimony as a party to the case that he was building a house and was engaged to be married to a new woman. He had no plans to return to Norway, and he planned to settle permanently in Iraq. The father had last been in Norway during the criminal proceedings against him in September 2013. His counsel stated that the conviction had not been formally served on C, but he had nonetheless appealed against it, and he added that he expected C to sign the letter accompanying the appeal soon, so that the High Court could consider it. 53. In his expert report of 31 January 2014 to the Board, B.S. had given the following assessment of the situation: “According to information received, the father is currently in Iraq. If he returns to [Norway], he must expect to be arrested to serve the prison term he was sentenced to for the abduction. [I do] not know if he would then be expelled from the country. The present situation resembles the situation that the High Court deemed to be associated with less risk for the children [(see paragraph 49 above)]. [I do] not necessarily agree with the High Court’s assessment. This is a complex issue, and to the extent that the question of risk can be clarified with a sufficient degree of certainty, that would require extensive investigation which would also involve the parents’ relatives and other networks in countries other than Norway. That is far beyond the remit of the expert examination. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some general reflections based partly on knowledge about what is common in the parents’ culture, and partly on information provided by the parents themselves. The children belong to the father’s family. Not just to the father, but to his family. The mother has main responsibility for bringing up the children as long as they are regarded as children. It is therefore unproblematic for the father to accept that the children be returned to the mother to grow up with her. Once they are grown up, however, they will still belong to their father’s family. They will be considered ‘adult’ long before the Norwegian age of majority; age of sexual maturity is a more relevant criterion than chronological age. For a family that is concerned with the honour code, the actions of an adult daughter have a bearing on the whole family’s honour. If she leads a life in conflict with the family’s norms, particularly as regards her sexual life, this affects the whole family, which will lose all prestige in the eyes of the surrounding world. In extreme cases, the family may feel forced to track down the woman and kill her to restore the family’s honour and prestige. This does not necessarily diminish with time and distance. Nor does this only apply in conservative religious families; it is more a question of culture than of religion. There are several examples of relatives tracking down women living in Western countries and committing so-called honour killings despite the family having lived in the West for many years and appearing to be modern and well-integrated. If such mechanisms are at play in the father’s family, the father’s whereabouts are less important in relation to the risk. Nor will the risk diminish with time. The opposite may even be true. A and B are young children, and children are not in a position to disgrace their family. As they become older, keeping them under control may become much more important for the family than it is today. Preferably, they should be ‘saved’ before they have the opportunity to do anything wrong. The family could achieve this by organising another abduction and taking them to Iraq. If the children were nevertheless to bring dishonour on the family, or if the family assumed that to be the case because they lived outside the family’s control, there is a possibility that A and B would risk being hunted for years and maybe even killed if their family found them. On the basis of the above, [I am] of the opinion that the risk associated with disclosing A and B’s whereabouts has not decreased, even though the father is abroad. This means that returning them to their mother would still entail a serious threat to their care situation, even if the mother, seen in isolation, may be able to provide proper care. Based on what is known about the mother from before, [I am] highly uncertain whether the mother would keep her and her children’s identities secret from the father’s family in the event that she was given a new identity and a secret address. In order for such an arrangement to be safe, the mother would probably have to break off all contact with her own family as well. It is neither realistic nor ethically justifiable to make this a condition.” 54. In the Child Welfare Expert’s Commission’s statement of 11 February 2014 (see paragraph 50 above), one of the two commission members had pointed out that the expert’s conclusions as quoted above were not based on concrete knowledge about the situation in this family. The member had also stated that, when so much time was devoted to considerations on the family and situation in Iraq, this could easily give a wrong impression, even if doubts were also included in the report. This could easily lead to incorrect or false premises being established for the assessment of the risk associated with the mother’s contact with the children in a situation where their biological father was not in the country. The other commission member had had no comments on the expert’s report. 55. The Board agreed that assessing the risk with a sufficient degree of certainty would require extensive investigation. This had not been done in this case, and the Board had no option but to base its assessment on the known facts. Based on the presentation of evidence, the Board agreed with the expert that his concerns regarding the risk had not been assuaged during the hearing before the Board. 56. Firstly, the police still considered the children to be at high risk of being kidnapped. The police had not testified about this before the Board, but the Board had no reason to doubt the police’s assessment. The Board had been informed that the foster families had to clear all visits outside the municipality with the police. At a time when the police’s use of resources was under continuous evaluation, the Board saw no reason to believe that the level of protection was seen as excessive. 57. Secondly, C had tracked down and raped the applicant in March 2012, and had also approached her later that month. In the summer of 2013 the applicant had received death threats from her half-brother, among other things, and she herself had stated that the threats had been made because C had paid her half-brother to do this. The applicant had informed the Board that she had been kept under surveillance for a prolonged period by her half-brother, who had come to Norway under an alias. She had reported this to the police, and the police had allegedly told her that her brother might possibly be expelled from Norway. However, she did not know his whereabouts. Since C had on two occasions and until quite recently used accomplices to put the applicant and/or the children in great danger, the Board considered C’s actual location of less importance. There was also good reason to question whether he would stay away from Norway, given that he had appealed against the District Court’s judgment in the criminal case (see paragraph 42 above). An appeal on the question of his guilt would be dismissed if he did not appear. 58. Thirdly, C’s mother in Iraq had stated that she would come to Norway if the children were not returned to the applicant. She had also said that her husband, A and B’s paternal grandfather, was very ill and had been hospitalised as a result of the stress of the children being taken away from the family. These statements showed that the stress on the family as a result of the case did not seem to have diminished, but in fact still seemed to have a strong presence. The paternal grandmother’s statement gave the impression that the children’s fate was the family’s responsibility, and not a matter that just concerned C. 59. Fourthly, the Board considered it unlikely (“lite sannsynlig”) that the applicant would be able to protect the children from their father if they were returned to her. When the children were younger, the applicant had repeatedly demonstrated that she was unable to protect herself and the children from C. She had moved back to C several times, despite having reported him to the police for violence against both herself and the children. He could not be prosecuted for these offences because the applicant either withdrew her previous statements or refused to make statements to the police. Since the abduction in 2011, C had contacted the applicant several times, and he had also been violent again. Despite knowing that C was behind the death threats and surveillance of her in the summer of 2013, she now believed that he did not represent a risk. It was difficult to say whether this was what the applicant actually believed or whether it had to do with her wish for the children to be returned to her. In any case, the applicant’s statement indicated that she failed to realise how serious the situation was. 60. The expert’s assessment was that if the applicant were to have care and control of the children then she would probably have to break off all contact with her own family. The Board concurred with the expert’s view. The applicant and C had reportedly grown up in the same neighbourhood, and the families knew each other. At least one member of the applicant’s family had demonstrated that he was willing to carry out unlawful acts on behalf of C. The applicant’s contact with her own family would therefore entail a significant risk of her and the children’s whereabouts becoming known to C. The applicant had stated that she would be willing to break off all contact with her family if the children were returned to her. However, when at the same time she said that C was no longer a threat, it was difficult for the Board to envisage that she would be sufficiently motivated to make such a sacrifice. In the Board’s assessment, C represented such a significant threat that the children would probably be at risk, even if the applicant managed to break off contact with her family. The Board referred to how C had over a period of several years demonstrated that he had both the means and the will to carry out his wishes. His rape of the applicant in March 2012, and the surveillance and death threats against her via an accomplice in the summer of 2013 showed that he had learnt nothing from the abduction in 2011. On the basis of the factors set out above, the Board assumed that, for the foreseeable future, C appeared to be prepared to use unlawful means to gain control over the applicant and the children. 61. It had been argued before the Board, particularly by C’s counsel, that the risk to the children would be lesser if they were with their applicant rather than placed in a foster family. The reasons given for this were that C and his family wanted the children to be returned to the applicant, and they would then be satisfied with the situation. The Board did not rule out the possibility that C and his family would be satisfied for a while and thus not represent any immediate threat if the children were returned. However, this had to be regarded as highly uncertain, and it would in any case depend entirely on how the applicant chose to live her life with the children. If she were to deviate from what was expected of her regarding how the children were raised, the children would again be at risk. Reference was made to the comment in the expert report that the children in a Kurdish family belonged to the father’s family, and that, for example, the actions of an adult or sexually mature daughter would have a bearing on the whole family’s honour. 62. Overall, the Board found that it had been substantiated that the risk of the children and/or the applicant being subjected to criminal offences by C had remained virtually unchanged since the High Court had considered this issue in October 2012 (see paragraph 38 above). This meant that the risk associated with disclosing A and B’s whereabouts had not decreased, even if C was currently in Iraq. The parents had argued that no attempts to abduct the children had been made since 2011, and this showed that the risk was significantly reduced. The Board did not share this view. According to the Board’s assessment, this was because the children’s whereabouts had not been disclosed and there had been a comprehensive security regime in place since July 2011. 63. On the basis of the above, the Board concluded that the applicant had to be deemed permanently unable to provide the children with proper care, and falling within the scope of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 114 below). This assessment also meant that her application for revocation of the care order pursuant to section 4-21 could not be granted. 64. Since the Board concluded that the applicant was unable to provide proper care, it was not necessary to discuss whether the attachment criterion in section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 114 below) was also satisfied. Considering how serious the case was and its profound importance to the parties involved, the Board nevertheless found grounds to discuss this issue, and started its assessment by seeking to clarify the children’s functioning and care needs. 65. The Board noted that A, the oldest daughter, had shown a lot of anger and had acted out during her initial period in foster care. She had been insecure, had not wanted her foster parents to leave her, and had slept next to her foster mother at night. She had wanted constant reassurance that she was to live in the foster home forever. This had improved considerably from approximately March 2013. Most of the anxiety had now gone, and the foster home interpreted this to mean that A now felt certain that she would not have to leave the foster home. A disliked events involving big crowds, such as end-of-term events. She had taken part in a leisure activity, but had stopped because she preferred to stay at home. The appointed psychologist, B.S., had stated before the Board that A had spontaneously told him during his visits that thieves had tried to steal her. The foster parents had told him later that A had not talked about this for a long time, and that they never talked about the abduction with A. The expert’s interpretation was that A still appeared to have memories of her abduction. He also assumed that she had memories of her parents’ turbulent marriage, since she was nearly three years old at the time of her emergency placement. 66. Furthermore, the Board took into account that A had had several temporary placements, and psychologist B.S. had found her to be highly vulnerable with regard to new broken relationships. In his opinion, losing her foster parents would be a traumatic experience for A. 67. The other daughter, B, had been six months old when placed in emergency care. She had arrived in the foster home when she was about a year old. The foster parents described her as a timid girl who only wanted to sit on her foster mother’s lap. She would not let anyone get close to her except her foster mother, who could never leave a room without B following her. Gradually, the foster father had been allowed to get closer to her, first by sitting next to them while B sat on her foster mother’s lap. Even at the time of the Board’s decision, B had an extreme fear of losing her foster parents. In the autumn of 2013 the foster parents had gone away for the weekend. B had been to stay with an aunt who had children of the same age and whom B knew well and was fond of. The foster parents had prepared her thoroughly, telling her that they were going away for a few days, but that they would come back. When they had come to collect her, B had reacted with hysterical laughter that had turned into sobbing and crying. She had clung to her foster mother and repeated over and over again that they must never leave her again. Even now, four months later, B was still back at the stage where both the foster parents could not leave the room at once. She woke up two or three times during the night and said “mummy”, quietly at first. If she did not get a response immediately, she would stand up and shout “mummy” in a frightened voice. 68. In his report, B.S. had concluded that A and B basically had normal abilities and were resourceful children who had developed well cognitively, socially and in terms of their motor skills. However, the children’s previous experiences of their violent father, their dramatic abduction and broken relationships had made them particularly vulnerable with regard to new broken relationships. 69. The expert had described to the Board a strong, secure and good attachment between the children and their foster parents. B had been living in the foster home since she was one year old, and she saw the foster parents as her mother and father. The same applied to A, even though she was three years old when placed in the foster home. She knew that she had another mother who loved her, but her strong attachment was to her foster home. The Board concurred with the expert’s assessment, and found that the children had become strongly attached to the people with whom they were living and the environment in which they were living. In the Board’s view, removing the children from their foster homes would constitute a serious trauma with the potential to do great harm. Both alternative conditions in the third paragraph of section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act (see paragraph 114 below) were thus deemed to be fulfilled. 70. As to adoption, the Board initially observed that the central question in the case was whether adoption would be in the children’s best interests. Adoption was a highly invasive measure and, pursuant to case-law, particularly compelling reasons were required for consent to adoption to be granted against the biological parents’ wishes. The decision had to be based on a concrete assessment, but also on general experience, as set out by the Supreme Court in a judgment reported in Norsk Retstidende (Rt.) 2007 page 561 (later brought before the Court, see Aune v. Norway, no. 52502/07, 28 October 2010 and paragraph 117 below): “In my opinion, a clear distinction cannot be drawn between general experience and individual considerations; general experience can be expressed with varying degrees of nuance, for example, based on the child’s age when it was placed in the foster home and how long the placement has lasted and will last. The expert witness in this case has stated that, in his general experience, a foster home relationship is not the preferable option for the long-term placement of children who go to the foster home before forming an attachment to a biological parent; in such cases, adoption is in the child’s best interests. In my opinion, considerable importance must be attached to such general, but nuanced experience. However, individual circumstances – which could weigh for or against adoption – must also be assessed in relation to general experience.” 71. The Board found the strict conditions set out by the Supreme Court fulfilled in this case. 72. Research showed that adoption would generally give a stronger sense of security and belonging in a family situation than a foster placement. An adoption removed all doubts about where a child would grow up, and normally strengthened the attachment between the child and the adoptive parents. It was the Board’s assessment that this general experience also applied in the present case. 73. It was normally beneficial for children to have contact with their parents, even in cases where children had to live outside the home for various reasons. In principle, an adoption broke all legal ties between a child and his or her parents, and any continued contact with the biological family would normally be dependent on the adoptive parents’ ability and wish to maintain such contact. 74. Since the abduction, and following the Board’s decision of 24 June 2011 (see paragraph 31 above), there had been no contact sessions between A and B and their parents for nearly three years at the time of the Board’s decision of 25 February 2014. The Board therefore found that it had to be deemed that there was little attachment between the applicant and the children. This was particularly so in B’s case, who was only six months old at the time of her placement in care on an emergency basis. After the emergency placement, B had had contact sessions with the applicant for about six months, but they had ended following the abduction. Therefore, no attachment could be said to exist between the applicant and B in a psychological sense. A, who had lived with the applicant for nearly three years, would probably have an attachment to her. However, this attachment also had to be deemed considerably weakened as a result of the prolonged interruption of contact. In addition, the attachment between the applicant and A probably had to be deemed tinged by a certain amount of insecurity as a result of the family situation with the violent father. 75. In addition to the significantly weakened attachment, authorities that had previously considered the case had concluded that the high risk involved meant that contact between the children and their parents was not an option. The Board concurred with this assessment and found that it still applied. Stopping contact would therefore not have any major immediate consequences for the children, and such consequences, seen in isolation, did not constitute a strong argument against adoption. The security situation meant that the children’s cultural background could not be maintained without a risk of their identities being exposed, and therefore cultural considerations could not be a strong argument against adoption either. 76. The Board also found that the general arguments in favour of adoption applied to both A and B. In the Board’s opinion, the extraordinary circumstances of their placement and the security situation gave added weight to these arguments. Adoption had clear advantages with regard to security. The children would be able to use their new names, which would mean that the risk of their identities being exposed would be significantly reduced. The foster families currently lived under a fairly strict security regime under which, for example, they could not leave the municipality without informing the police. The police’s assessment was that the risk of another kidnapping remained high, and it was unavoidable that this would have a big impact on A and B’s lives. Although adoption would not remove the risk entirely, the reduced risk of the children’s identities being exposed would be highly beneficial. 77. Based on the above factors, the Board found that adoption would be in A and B’s best interests and that consent for adoption should be granted. 78. The foster parents’ identities were not known to the Board, and owing to security concerns they had not testified before it. This was largely why the Board had appointed expert B.S. to assess the foster parents’ suitability. 79. The foster parents had had daily care and control of A and B for nearly three years, which had to be considered a sufficient period in terms of assessing their suitability. 80. B.S., the psychologist, had spoken very highly of the way the foster parents cared for A and B. He had described both foster homes of the two daughters as characterised by warmth, generosity and sensitivity to the children’s needs. A’s foster parents’ counsellor had told B.S. that she considered the foster parents well suited as adoptive parents. Both children had developed a strong and secure attachment to their foster parents. They received the daily care, personal contact and security that they needed. The foster parents’ suitability for the task had not been contested either – either by the applicant or by C. The Board saw no reason to doubt that the foster parents would also continue to take good care of A and B in the future, and that they were fit to bring up the children as their own. Owing to the children’s age and development, obtaining their opinion was not an option. 81. Based on the above, the Board found that the conditions set out in the Child Welfare Act were satisfied. 82. In order to grant consent to the children’s adoption, the Board also had to make a formal decision to remove the parents’ parental responsibility. The Board endorsed the municipal child welfare authorities’ proposal on this point, since removal of parental responsibility was necessary and in the children’s best interests. On this basis, the Board consented to adoption in the parents’ stead. 83. The Board observed that the child welfare authorities had not proposed that there be an order on contact visits following the children’s adoption, because of the security situation, and the applicant had argued that failing to ask the foster parents whether they would consent to her having contact constituted a procedural error. 84. However, the Board found that even if the foster parents had given their consent for contact visits, that would be irrelevant, because such contact would entail too great a security risk. It had been clearly substantiated that there was a risk that C would try to find the children if there was provision for contact visits. Even if the applicant was prepared not to disclose information, the children could easily disclose information that would reveal their whereabouts and new names during contact with the mother. In the Board’s opinion, the applicant would be at great risk of violence and threats from the father, in order for her to disclose such information. Contact visits could therefore not be considered in the children’s best interests. 85. Both parents requested that the case be reviewed by the City Court. 86. The City Court reappointed B.S. as an expert. He delivered an updated report on 14 August 2014. Composed of one professional judge, one psychologist and one layperson, in accordance with section 36-4 of the Dispute Act (see paragraph 121 below), the City Court heard the case on 26 and 27 August 2014. The applicant attended with her legal aid counsel and testified. C’s counsel attended, whilst C gave evidence by telephone from Iraq. The court-appointed expert was present on the second day of the hearing, and gave evidence. 87. In its judgment of 9 September 2014, the City Court stated that removal of parental responsibility and adoption against the parents’ wishes under section 4-20 of the Child Welfare Act were very serious and invasive measures that required compelling reasons. The best interests of the children were the most important aspect, and the decision had to take account of this. 88. The City Court agreed with the Board that removal of parental responsibility and adoption was nevertheless necessary in this case, and referred to the thorough grounds given by the Board for its decision. 89. In addition, the City Court noted that the applicant’s situation had improved since the Board’s hearing. She had shown steady positive development and established an independent life for herself after the final breakdown of her relationship with C. The applicant was taking Norwegian language classes and undergoing training in order to improve her employment prospects. There was general agreement that, with assistance measures, she had the ability to care for children, but not two children with so traumatic a background as A and B. 90. The girls had had many traumatic experiences. There was no doubt that C had committed serious violence against the applicant in the presence of the girls on a number of occasions. They had had to flee to different crisis centres together with the applicant. They had also moved back to a violent father with her. This had clearly been frightening for them and they were both marked by the experience, even today. 91. The girls had been abducted by masked men during a contact session with the applicant. The men had injured the applicant, who had been hospitalised. The abduction had been planned by C, and the girls had been found with him in a flat in H. The plan had been to take the girls to Iraq. The abduction that their own father had put them through must have been a very frightening experience for them, one whose after-effects they were still struggling with. 92. The abduction had resulted in broken relationships with their emergency foster parents when the girls had been placed in new emergency foster homes. That had necessarily been followed by another rupture when they had been placed in foster homes. As a result of their background, both girls had suffered from separation anxiety but had now become strongly attached to their foster parents. They clung to them and were afraid of losing their foster parents. 93. The City Court reiterated the following from B.S.’s report of 14 August 2014: “The ability to provide care must always be assessed in relation to the children’s care needs. A and B have a history and display behaviour that means that they can no longer be assumed to just have the same ordinary care needs as other children their age. If the mother were to have care and control of the children, she would have to deal with the extensive additional challenges that returning them [to her] would entail. The mother’s ability to reflect on the children’s history and special needs seems to be limited. The expert has strong doubts as to whether the mother’s ability to provide care is sufficient to meet A and B’s needs in the short and long term. Returning them [to her] is therefore not assumed to be a realistic alternative if consideration for the children’s best interests is to be the deciding factor.” 94. Before the City Court, expert B.S. upheld the recommendations he had made to the Board in his report of 31 January 2014 (see paragraphs 43 and 53 above). 95. After visiting the children in their foster homes in January 2014, he had made the following statement in that respect about the children’s attachment to their foster parents: “When [I] last visited the foster homes, the children had started to form an attachment to their foster parents. This process has now progressed much further. [My] observations, the foster parents’ statements and the foster home counsellor’s assessments all point in the same direction: A and B have established strong attachments to their foster parents and perceive them as their psychological parents [(“sine psykologiske foreldre”)]. The interaction between A and her foster parents was characterised by a calm, warm and intimate atmosphere. [She] related to the foster parents in the way you would expect of a child with a secure attachment to her parents. The foster parents were attentive and responded to her input, but were also clear about their expectations of her. B primarily related to the foster mother as her secure base for exploration. She was verbally active and spoke well, using varied language. She gave clear signals of what she wanted. The atmosphere in B’s home and the interaction between her and her foster parents were the same as for A: calm, pleasant and characterised by warmth and closeness. The children basically have normal abilities and are resourceful children who have developed well cognitively, linguistically, socially and with regard to their motor skills. At the same time, they have had experiences of an unusually frightening nature. They have experienced violence committed by the father against the mother, which is today considered to be as harmful to children as their being victims of violence themselves. The children may also have suffered violence at the hands of their father. Then came the broken relationship when they were taken into care, the dramatic abduction, the emergency foster home placement, and finally the foster home placement. Although the children do not have memories of these events that enable them to tell a coherent story, many observations show that they both have fragmentary memories. A’s story about thieves who wanted to steal her in the other country and B’s fear of a bad man can be assumed to be rooted in such memories. These experiences have left the children particularly vulnerable to new broken relationships. They both display intense separation anxiety and cling to their foster parents. A has begun to relax more and seems to have achieved a sense of security that “mummy” and “daddy” will always be there. B is in a new clingy period, triggered by the foster parents being away from her for a few nights some months ago. In [my] opinion, there is no doubt that the children have a strong attachment to the people with whom they are living and the environment in which they are living. Being removed from them would constitute a serious trauma with the potential to do great harm, not least because of the vulnerability they have developed as a result of their experiences before the placement.” 96. The City Court deemed it out of the question to expose the children to the risk that returning them to the applicant would entail, and found that the conditions for this were not satisfied. They had not had any contact with their mother since the abduction on 21 June 2011. At the time of the court’s examination, they had no attachment to her. The City Court had no doubt that the children had such an attachment to their foster parents that it would be harmful to them to be removed. 97. Agreeing with the court-appointed expert, the City Court found it completely improbable (“helt usannsynlig”) that the parents would at any point in the future be in a position to make use of or exercise their parental responsibility. The situation was permanent, and it was in the children’s best interests that the foster parents be given parental responsibility for them. 98. It was sufficient for the removal of parental responsibility that the alternative requirement regarding attachment (as referred to in section 4-21 of the Child Welfare Act, see paragraph 114 below) was satisfied. The City Court nevertheless commented that there was still a risk with respect to C and his family. C had stated that the children meant everything to him, and the City Court did not rule out the possibility that he might make another attempt to take them to the Kurdistan-area if he found out about their whereabouts. The risk of this would increase significantly if the applicant were granted contact with her daughters again. 99. The police had carried out a new threat assessment before the main hearing in August 2014. The following was stated in their report: “There is little doubt that the mother in particular, but possibly also the father, will continue to fight for parental responsibility in respect of their children. However, the police consider it improbable that they will find out where the children are under the current circumstances. The children are young and cannot make contact with the mother or father themselves. However, one should not underestimate the will the father has demonstrated to get his children back. The abduction on 21 June 2011 probably required a lot of planning, and he put considerable resources into executing the plan. In addition, the abduction showed a willingness to use violent means to achieve his goals. The father himself stated to the police that he hired people to carry out the abduction. It is unclear what role the mother played in this, but given that she brought a large sum of money and a lot of clothes and other equipment to the meeting on 21 June 2011, it is not inconceivable that she might have known more than she told the police.” 100. The police had concluded that the threat level was moderate at that time because the parents did not know the children’s whereabouts, but that this could change. The following had been stated in the conclusion: “When applications are lodged for contact with the children, the threat situation could change significantly. The children have now reached an age where they could easily reveal the names of their foster parents and where they live. This applies regardless of where and how contact sessions are held. In addition, it is highly probable that the father, if he finds out that the mother has been granted contact with the children, may become active again. It is known that, in certain cultures, the father has a ‘right’ to the children when a marriage breaks down or similar situations arise. It was also an issue that he wanted to send the children back to his home country.” 101. The City Court found that it had been proved that a threat still existed which made it imperative to protect the children. It did not trust the applicant to be able to protect them against C if he were to become aware that she had contact with them. Nor did it trust C to accept that the children should remain in their foster homes. He had previously used accomplices and could do so again. Members of his own family could help him to take the children to the Kurdistan-area. In return for payment from C, the applicant’s half-brother had also tried to threaten her into returning to their home country. 102. The children could not be subjected to the risk of being abducted and taken to Iraq by people who were strangers to them. The City Court therefore also agreed to their identities remaining secret. This meant that there could be no contact with the applicant for fear that someone could reveal where they were living. If contact sessions were to take place, it would not be difficult to follow them home, regardless of what security measures were put in place. 103. The City Court also agreed with the child welfare authorities that adoption offered many advantages compared with placement in a permanent foster home (see paragraph 76 above). Adoption provided a higher degree of stability (“trygghet”), both for the foster parents and for the children. This was true in general, but it was particularly important to A and B, considering their history (“bakgrunn”). In this connection, it also had to be taken into consideration that the strict security measures that had been put in place to prevent another abduction had to be maintained. The children had changed their names and lived at secret addresses. 104. The foster parents had a strong wish to adopt the girls. According to the court-appointed psychologist, B.S., both girls had been particularly lucky with their foster home placements. 105. Both parents appealed to the High Court against the City Court’s judgment. The applicant’s appeal was not directed against the decision not to discontinue public care. In her declaration of appeal, she stated that she accepted that it had been a long time since her two children had been placed in their foster homes and that, having regard to their attachment at the time, she would not maintain the claim that they be returned to her. She appealed against the decision to remove her parental authority and authorise the children’s adoption, and requested that the High Court grant her visiting rights. 106. In a decision of 8 December 2014, the High Court unanimously refused to give the parents leave to appeal. 107. The High Court noted that the reasons given for the City Court’s judgment were relatively brief, but this was because that court had concurred with the reasons given by the Board. When looking at the Board’s decision and the City Court’s judgment jointly, there was no doubt (“utvilsomt”) that the children’s best interests had been considered in a satisfactory and adequate manner. 108. On the basis of the concrete circumstances of the case, the High Court considered that the decision was not flawed because the significance of the children’s cultural background and identity had not been considered separately in the decision regarding what would be in their best interests. The same went for the question of sibling identity. The High Court found it clear that deciding to remove the parents’ parental responsibility and granting consent to the children’s adoption in this case was not in breach of Article 8 of the Convention or Articles 3 and 9 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. 109. As regards the assessment of the children’s future situation with regard to security, the outcome was not central to the question of removal of parental responsibility and consent to adoption. As stated by the City Court, it was sufficient for the alternative requirement regarding attachment to be satisfied (see paragraph 98 above). This was not considered to be in dispute. Reference was made to the fact that before the High Court the applicant was no longer applying for the care order to be revoked, in view of the children’s attachment to their foster homes. 110. In any event, the High Court was of the view that there were no serious flaws in the City Court’s assessment of the security situation. It did not constitute a procedural error that this question had not been examined further and that no expert witnesses with particular expertise in the foreign culture aspects of the case had been appointed. 111. Based on the concrete circumstances of the case, in particular the fact that the children had been violently abducted in 2011 and the applicant had been subjected to serious threats initiated by C as recently as 2013, there was, in the High Court’s opinion, nothing to indicate that a further examination of the children’s security situation would have led to a different conclusion. The City Court had based its assessment on the police’s assessment that the level of threat against the children was currently moderate, since the parents did not know their whereabouts, but that the situation could change. The City Court had then carried out a concrete assessment of whether contact with the applicant could entail a risk of C initiating an abduction. In the High Court’s view, this assessment had not been flawed, either in terms of the assessment of the evidence or the application of the law. 112. The applicant appealed against the High Court’s refusal to grant her leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. 113. On 5 February 2015 the Supreme Court’s Committee on Leave to Appeal, composed of three Supreme Court Justices, rejected the appeal, unanimously finding that it had no prospects of success.

4. The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Adıyaman. 5. On 21 March 2007 the applicant participated in the Newroz (Kurdish New Year) celebrations held in Malatya. 6. On an unspecified date the Malatya public prosecutor filed an indictment charging the applicant and twenty other people with disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). The public prosecutor claimed that the applicant had waved a green, yellow and red flag symbolising the PKK. 7. On 6 March 2008 the Malatya Assize Court convicted all of the accused as charged, including the applicant. On the basis of evidence in the case file, the court found it established that one of the accused, Ms N.K., had made a press statement, and the other accused, including the applicant, had chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and its leader. The court also noted that the accused had waved the so-called flag of the PKK. The applicant was sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment. 8. On 31 May 2011 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 6 March 2008. 9. On 21 December 2011 the applicant started serving his prison sentence. 10. On 12 July 2012 the Malatya Assize Court ordered the applicant’s release from prison in accordance with Law no. 6352, which had entered into force on 5 July 2012 and had amended certain provisions of Law no. 3713. 11. On 12 December 2012 the Malatya Assize Court decided to suspend the execution of the applicant’s prison sentence in accordance with provisional section 1 of Law no. 6352. The suspension was for a period of three years, on the condition that he did not commit a terrorism-related offence during that period.

5. The applicant was born in 1992 and is currently serving a prison sentence. 6. The applicant was a student at the Azerbaijan State University of Economics at the time of the events. He was also a civil society activist and was one of the founders of Free Youth, a non‑governmental organisation established in 2011. 7. Following a number of deaths of soldiers in the Azerbaijani army in non-combat situations, from January until March 2013 a number of demonstrations were held in Baku in protest against the deaths of soldiers in the army. The demonstrations received wide media coverage and drew the public’s attention to the deaths of soldiers in the army for which the government were harshly criticised. The demonstrations were organised through social media and the information about them was disseminated through social media and the press. The applicant actively participated in those demonstrations and in their organisation. The NIDA civic movement, a non-governmental organisation established by a group of young people, played a key role in the organisation and conduct of the above-mentioned demonstrations. Although the demonstrations were peaceful, the police dispersed those who had gathered and a number of demonstrators were arrested (see, for example among many other cases, Mehtiyev and others v. Azerbaijan, nos. 20589/13 and 7 others, 6 April 2017; Bayramov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 19150/13 and 52022/13, 6 April 2017; and Hajili and others v. Azerbaijan, nos. 44699/13 and 2 others, 29 June 2017). 8. At the time of the events the “Harlem Shake” dance became popular in Azerbaijan. A number of video performances of a “Harlem Shake” dance by different groups of people were prepared in Azerbaijan and uploaded to the YouTube video-hosting website. On 1 March 2013 the applicant together with a group of his acquaintances, went to the seaside park in the city centre of Baku, where his acquaintances performed a “Harlem Shake” dance; a video recording of their dance was made. The applicant did not dance and just observed those who were dancing. On an unspecified date the video recording of the dance was uploaded to YouTube. There is no document in the case file indicating that the video recording in question was uploaded to YouTube by the applicant. The video which is still available at the time of the judgment on YouTube lasts around one minute. It represents seven individuals dancing together in a park. In the back of the scene, one person is dancing in a close proximity to a bronze statue, making sexually suggestive movements. On an unspecified date, after the uploading of the video recording to YouTube, a television programme concerning that video was broadcast on a private television channel. The narrated section of the broadcast referred to the people dancing in the video as drug addicts and anarchist members of NIDA, criticising the demonstrations organised in protest against the deaths of soldiers in the army. 9. In March 2013 criminal proceedings were instituted against some members of NIDA who had actively participated in the organisation of the above-mentioned demonstrations, for illegal possession of explosive substances and devices and illegal possession of narcotic substances (see Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, nos. 48653/13 and 3 others, §§ 5-16, 7 June 2018). The applicant was questioned twice as a witness within the framework of those criminal proceedings prior to his arrest. 10. Since 2013 various criminal proceedings have been instituted against members of NIDA who have been arrested and detained within the framework of those criminal proceedings. The domestic proceedings concerning the arrest and pre-trial detention of various members of NIDA are the subject of other applications pending before the Court (see for example applications nos. 65583/13, 70106/13, 41105/14, 54846/14, 63571/16, 74143/16 and 14307/17). 11. On 30 April 2013 the applicant was arrested by the police because of his participation in a gathering in front of the Azerbaijani State Oil Academy. On the same day the Nasimi District Court found the applicant guilty under Article 298.2 (violation of the rule regulating the organisation and holding of gatherings) of the Code of Administrative Offences and sentenced him to fifteen days’ administrative arrest. The domestic proceedings concerning the applicant’s arrest on 30 April 2013 and subsequent administrative conviction have already been the subject of the judgment in the case of Mirzayev and others v. Azerbaijan (nos. 12854/13, 28750/13 and 76329/13, 20 July 2017). In that case, the Court found violations of Articles 11 and 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention in relation to the applicant. 12. Following his release, on 17 May 2013 the applicant was again arrested and charged under Articles 221.2.1 (hooliganism committed by a group of individuals) and 221.2.2 (hooliganism committed by resisting a public official) of the Criminal Code. The description of the charges consisted of a single sentence half a page long. The relevant part of the decision stated: “... Ilkin Bakir oglu Rustamzade has been charged on the basis of sufficient ... evidence that he engaged in hooliganism by expressing manifest disrespect towards society because on 1 March 2013 in Baku, with a group of individuals, including B.G. and others, with whom he had close ties, at around 3 p.m. in the seaside park, [he] blatantly breached public order by making a video recording of continued and repetitive immoral actions ... in respect of a bronze statue of an old man ... and of intentionally chaotic hand and foot movements (qərəzli xaotik əl-qol hərəkətləri) carried out after having stripped to the waist, and [he] manifestly failed to comply with lawful requests [made by] public officials, ... [namely] the security officers of the seaside park department and police officers [and others] that he desist from the above‑mentioned actions, [which breached public order; [he] resisted by [insolently refusing] to cease his actions (müstəsna həyasızlıqla öz hərəkətlərini dayandırmaması ilə müqavimət göstərərək); [he] prepared video footage amounting to 6.16 megabytes from a video recording depicting actions against the ethical principles of the society in which he lives and on 1 March 2013 widely disseminated it by uploading it to the YouTube website under the title of “Harlem Shake – Park Bulvar” ... Through these actions, Ilkin Bakir oglu Rustamzade committed criminal offences under Articles 221.2.1 and 221.2.2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan. ...” It appears from the documents in the case file that apart from the applicant only one other person (B.G.) dancing in the impugned video was charged with the criminal offence of hooliganism under Article 221 of the Criminal Code. No criminal proceedings were instituted against other individuals performing in the impugned “Harlem Shake” dance video. 13. On the same day the prosecutor lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court seeking the applicant’s detention pending trial. The prosecutor justified his request by citing the gravity of the charges against the applicant and the fact that there was a risk of his absconding and obstructing the investigation’s functioning by influencing other participants in the criminal proceedings. 14. On 17 May 2013 the Nasimi District Court, relying on the official charges brought against the applicant and the prosecutor’s request, ordered the applicant’s detention pending trial for a period of two months. The court cited the risk of his absconding and reoffending, together with the nature of the criminal act, and justified its decision as follows: “Having examined the request with the [aid of the] material in the case file and having heard the submissions of those who have been present at this court hearing, and taking into account the fact that there is a likelihood that the accused, Ilkin Bakir oglu Rustamzade, will abscond from the investigation and reoffend, as well as the nature of the criminal act attributed to him, the court considers that he should be remanded in custody.” 15. On 20 May 2013 the applicant appealed against that decision, submitting that there had been no justification for the application of the preventive measure of detention pending trial. In particular, he submitted that he had already complied twice with the investigation’s requests within the framework of other criminal proceedings and that there was no evidence that he would abscond or reoffend. He also submitted that there was no evidence that he had committed any criminal offence. In that regard, he noted that the court had ordered his detention pending trial without examining any evidence, as even the video recording of the dance had not been available in the case file. 16. On 24 May 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the first-instance court’s decision had been justified. The appellate court made no mention of the applicant’s above-mentioned specific complaints. 17. On 27 June 2013 the applicant lodged a request with the Nasimi District Court, asking to be put under house arrest instead of being held in pre-trial detention. He claimed, in particular, that his pre-trial detention was not justified and that there was no reason for it to continue. 18. On 28 June 2013 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the request, finding it unfounded. 19. On 4 July 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s decision. 20. On 12 July 2013 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal case lodged a request with the court asking for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention for a period of two months, submitting that more time was needed to complete the investigation. 21. On 15 July 2013 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant’s detention pending trial until 17 September 2013. The court substantiated the need for the extension by citing the likelihood that, if released, the applicant might abscond or obstruct the investigation by influencing those participating in the criminal proceedings. 22. On 18 July 2013 the applicant appealed against that decision, claiming that the first-instance court had failed to justify the extension of his detention pending trial. He also reiterated that there was no evidence that he had committed any criminal offence and that the court, in deciding to extend his pre-trial detention, had not examined any evidence proving that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence. 23. On 22 July 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the Nasimi District Court’s decision of 15 July 2013. The appellate court’s reasoning reiterated that provided by the first-instance court. 24. Following a request dated 10 September 2013 by the prosecutor in charge of the case for an extension of the period of the applicant’s pre-trial detention, on 11 September 2013 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant’s detention pending trial by two months, until 17 November 2013. The court justified its decision by citing the need for additional time in which to carry out further investigative measures and the fact that the grounds for the applicant’s pre-trial detention had not changed. 25. On 16 September 2013 the applicant appealed against that decision, reiterating his previous complaints. 26. On 19 September 2013 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the Nasimi District Court’s decision of 16 September 2013. The appellate court reiterated the reasoning provided by the first‑instance court. 27. No further extension decisions were included in the case file. 28. It appears from the documents before the Court that on an unspecified date in September 2013 the applicant was additionally charged with new criminal offences under Articles 28 (preparation of a crime), 220.1 (mass disorder) and 228.3 (illegal acquisition, transfer, sale, storage, transportation and carrying of arm, its accessories, supplies, explosive substances and devices by an organised group) of the Criminal Code. The investigator’s decision in this respect was not made available to the Court. 29. On 6 May 2014 the Baku Court of Serious Crimes found the applicant guilty on all counts and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment. 30. On 16 December 2014 the Baku Court of Appeal and on 15 October 2015 the Supreme Court upheld that judgment in respect of the applicant. 31. A separate application (see application no. 22323/16) concerning the fairness of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, in which various complaints under Articles 6, 7, 10 and 18 of the Convention were raised, is pending before the Court.

7. The applicant was born in 1969 and is serving a sentence of imprisonment in Tavda, Sverdlovsk Region. 8. On 22 September 2000 criminal proceedings were instituted in connection with a murder and a robbery committed in March 1999. 9. On 2 October 2000 investigator B. of the Dzerzhinskiy District Prosecutor’s Office of Nizhniy Tagil (“the District Prosecutor’s Office”) took a decision to summon the applicant to the proceedings as a defendant and to remand him in custody. Regard was had to the gravity of the charges and the risk that the applicant might obstruct the establishment of the truth. The detention order, approved by the prosecutor, did not indicate a specific time-limit, but contained a reference to Article 97 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, which provided that the initial period of detention during a criminal investigation was not to exceed two months (see paragraph 73 below). 10. On the same day the applicant’s name was put on the list of wanted persons, as his whereabouts could not be established. 11. During the night of 18-19 March 2006 the applicant was arrested. 12. On 19 March 2006 he was taken to a police station, where he was informed that he was on the wanted list as a suspect in connection with a murder committed in Nizhniy Tagil. 13. On 27 April 2006 the investigator informed the applicant of the decision of 2 October 2000 and appointed legal-aid counsel N. to secure his defence. Under questioning the same day the applicant confirmed that he understood the charges against him. 14. Meanwhile, on 25 April 2006 the applicant brought a complaint against the investigator under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation (which provides for judicial review of decisions of investigators that might infringe the constitutional rights of participants in the proceedings or prevent a person’s access to court) challenging the lawfulness of his arrest, which had not been based on a judicial decision, and the investigator’s failure to bring charges against him within the required time-limit. 15. On 23 May 2006 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Nizhniy Tagil (“the District Court”) rejected the applicant’s complaint. The court found that the applicant had been arrested in accordance with the law and had been informed of the charges against him as soon as he had been brought before the investigator on 27 April 2006. 16. On 7 July 2006 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) discontinued the appeal proceedings in respect of the decision of 23 May 2006. The Regional Court held that Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation did not allow for judicial review of issues related to arrest or detention. 17. In the meantime, on 18 May 2006 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 18 July 2006. The District Court found that the grounds for the applicant’s detention persisted and that there existed a risk that the applicant might abscond during the investigation or trial, as he had been on the wanted list for several years prior to his arrest. 18. On 16 June 2006 the Regional Court upheld the order on an appeal by the applicant. 19. On 17 July 2006 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 24 August 2006 on the same grounds. 20. On 16 August 2006 the Regional Court upheld the above extension order, noting that it was of no importance that the initial detention order had been issued by the investigator in 2000. It referred to the fact that before the entry into force of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation in July 2002, it had been lawful for a prosecutor to issue detention orders in a criminal case. 21. On 24 August 2006 the District Court further extended the applicant’s detention until 18 September 2006. The District Court considered that the grounds for detention were still valid. 22. Meanwhile, on 4 August 2006 the revised charges were brought against the applicant. Under questioning on the same day the applicant confirmed that the substance of the charges was clear to him. 23. On 31 August 2006 the applicant studied the case file, which comprised three volumes. 24. On 5 September 2006 the applicant was served with a bill of indictment and the case was submitted to the Regional Court for trial. 25. On 2 November 2006 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of robbery and murder and sentenced him to twenty years’ imprisonment. 26. On 16 April 2007 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the conviction on appeal. 27. On 18 March 2006 the applicant’s partner T. told the police that the applicant had been on the wanted list since 2000, and informed them of the latter’s whereabouts. She gave them the keys to the applicant’s flat and warned that he usually carried a knife and a razor blade on him. 28. On the same day officers of the special police force of the Chief Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior of Russia for Perm Region (“the OMON”) and investigators from the Department of the Interior of the Sverdlovskiy District of Perm planned the applicant’s arrest. 29. At 11.30 p.m. officers and investigators (nine officers in total) entered the applicant’s flat in order to arrest him. According to them, when they shouted that they were the police the applicant tried to reach for a bag containing a razor blade. The officers forced him to the floor and handcuffed him. According to the applicant, when the officers entered the room where he was sleeping they immediately dragged him on to the floor and started kicking and beating him with their gun stocks. 30. On 19 March 2006 the applicant was taken to the police station and from there to Perm remand prison no. 59/1 (“Perm SIZO-1”). The record of the applicant’s medical examination in the remand prison indicates that the applicant complained of severe pain in the left side of his chest area. He was observed to have small abrasions and haematomas up to four cm in diameter in the area of his face, on his head, chest, back, and hips, and morbidity on palpation of the left ribs. A preliminary diagnosis of broken ribs was given. 31. At 4.25 a.m. on the same day the applicant was examined by doctors at the first-aid station of the Perm City Hospital No. 1 and was found to have an injured chest and a broken rib on his left side. The first-aid station report sent to the police on the same date read that the applicant had sustained the injuries at the hands of the police during his arrest. The applicant was referred to the Perm Regional Hospital. 32. At 5.10 a.m. on the same day the applicant was taken to the Perm Regional Hospital, where an X-ray was carried out which revealed fractures to his eighth and ninth ribs on the left side. The applicant explained at the hospital that he had received those injuries on 18 March 2006 when he fell on the street. The fractures were bound and the applicant was found fit for detention. 33. On 20 March 2006 the applicant was transferred to SIZO-3 in Nizhniy Tagil via Yekaterinburg remand prison no. 66/1 (“Yekaterinburg SIZO-1”). 34. Between 19 March and 4 April 2006 the OMON conducted an internal check in respect of the incident. The use of force and special means (handcuffs) on the applicant was found lawful. 35. On 21 March 2006, during his medical examination at Yekaterinburg SIZO-1, the applicant was diagnosed with fractures to the eighth and ninth ribs on his left side. He made a written submission to the head of SIZO-1 to the effect that those injuries had been inflicted by police officers during his arrest in Perm. 36. On 29 March 2006 the applicant complained to a prosecutor in Nizhniy Tagil that he had been ill-treated during his arrest. On 31 March 2006 his complaint was forwarded to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Sverdlovskiy District of Perm (“the District Prosecutor’s Office”). 37. On 17 April 2006 an investigator of the District Prosecutor’s Office refused to open a criminal case against the officers who had participated in the applicant’s arrest, stating that the existence of constituent elements of a crime in their actions had not been made out. The investigator relied mainly on the statements made by those officers. He concluded that the officers’ conduct during the arrest had been lawful. The investigator referred in this respect to sections 13 and 14 of the Federal Law on the Militia, which provided that police officers could apply physical force when arresting a person who had committed an offence and resisted the lawful demands of the police. The text of this decision contained the applicant’s submission to the effect that after his arrest he had been taken to the police station on 19 March 2006, where he had been informed that he was on the wanted list on suspicion of a murder committed in Nizhniy Tagil. 38. Following the communication of the complaint of ill-treatment to the Government (see paragraph 4 above), on 5 December 2012 the acting prosecutor of the Perm Region quashed the decision of 17 April 2006, finding that the pre-investigation inquiry had been incomplete. 39. On 12 December 2012 an investigator of the Sverdlovskiy District Investigation Department of the Investigation Committee in Perm instituted criminal proceedings into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment during his arrest. 40. On 12 February 2013 the applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. He was questioned the following day. 41. The investigators identified and questioned witnesses, including the applicant’s neighbours in Perm and the doctors involved in his medical examination on 19 March 2006 at the Perm Regional Hospital. The police officers insisted that they had not beaten the applicant. They suggested that he could have hurt himself when he tried to get hold of a razor blade during the arrest. Two doctors of the Perm Regional Hospital submitted that during the applicant’s examination he explained that his injuries had been the result of a fall the day before the arrest. A forensic medical examination was ordered. 42. In their report of 15 February 2013 the medical experts concluded that on the basis of the available documents they could not determine the time when the applicant’s ribs had been broken. 43. Witness T. (one of the police officers) further submitted that during the arrest the applicant did not obey the lawful demands of the police and tried instead to get hold of the razor blade in his bag. T. then had used a foot sweep to put the applicant on to the floor. As he fell, the applicant hit his left side on a chair. When the applicant fell on to the floor he landed on his left side and started using foul language. At that moment the officers pressed him on to the floor and rolled him on to his abdomen. 44. The additional expert report dated 30 April 2013 also stated that the time when the injuries had been inflicted could not be established. The applicant’s ribs could have been fractured either as a result of the impact of a hard blunt object or objects or in the circumstances indicated by T. 45. On 12 June 2013 the investigator discontinued the criminal proceedings for lack of constituent elements of a crime in the actions of police officers. The investigator concluded that the applicant could have been injured either by the police during his arrest or under other circumstances prior to the arrest. He noted, in particular, that at the regional hospital the applicant had explained that he had received his injuries when he had fallen in the street on 18 March 2006. The investigator relied on the findings of the medical experts that the time of the injuries could not be established. The investigator further found that the use of force and special means against the applicant had been lawful and justified: the applicant was known to have a knife and a razor blade on him and, when told to surrender, had tried to reach for the bag containing them. Therefore, if the applicant had received his injuries at the moment of his arrest, there would have been no constituent elements of the crime in the actions of the police officers. 46. On 26 June 2013 a senior supervisor at the Department for Investigation of High-Priority Cases at the Investigation Committee for Perm Region found the decision of 12 June 2013 lawful and justified. He concluded that the applicant’s injuries had most probably been inflicted on the applicant by the police officers during the arrest. However, as the applicant had shown resistance to the officers and they had had information that he had a knife and a razor blade on him, the use of force (a foot-sweep wrestling move) and handcuffs by the police had been lawful, and there were no constituent elements of a crime in the acts of the officers. 47. According to the applicant, he found out about the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings from the Government’s observations. On 6 July 2016 he wrote to the Perm Region Prosecutor asking for the criminal investigation to be resumed. In August 2016 his request was dismissed. 48. On 23 March 2006 the applicant was taken by train from Perm SIZO-1 to Yekaterinburg SIZO-1. 49. According to the applicant, while he was later being transferred, from Yekaterinburg SIZO-1 to Nizhniy Tagil SIZO-3 on 27 March 2006, he was beaten up by two convoy officers, which led him to attempt suicide by cutting his right wrist with a razor blade. 50. After his arrival in Nizhniy Tagil on 28 March 2006, the applicant was taken to medical facility LIU-51. A medical certificate issued by LIU‑51 on the same day indicates that the applicant had a cut on the right forearm, haematomas on the chest and left hip, and fractures of the eighth and ninth ribs, all received on 19 March 2006. 51. On 31 March 2006 an investigator in Nizhniy Tagil issued a decision to refuse to institute criminal proceedings. During the pre-investigation inquiry the applicant explained that he had attempted to cut the veins on his right wrist to protest against his brutal arrest, and that he had no complaints against the officers accompanying him on the train. On the basis of that statement and the explanation by the officers and other arrested persons, the investigator concluded that there was no indication of ill-treatment. 52. On 5 April 2006 the applicant was transferred to Nizhniy Tagil SIZO-3. 53. According to the applicant, on numerous occasions between 14 April and 6 September 2006 he was taken from SIZO-3 to the Dzerzhinskiy police station in Nizhniy Tagil, where he was threatened in order to make him cooperate with the investigating authority. 54. On 5 June 2006 the applicant was transferred to the medical unit of SIZO-3 because of chronic bronchitis. He was discharged from the medical unit on 25 September 2006. 55. According to the applicant, while he was in the medical unit of SIZO-3, on 11 July, 15 and 23 August 2006 he was exposed to some kind of nerve gas, which was intended to extract a confession. The applicant alleges that as a result of gas exposure, his bronchial asthma had been aggravated to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. 56. From 2007 to 2012 the applicant received regular treatment in detention for chronic bronchitis and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. 57. On 25 February 2009 the applicant complained to the Prosecutor General’s Office that he had been ill-treated between 14 April and 6 September 2006. 58. On 18 April 2009 an investigator from the Dzerzhinskiy District investigative division of Nizhniy Tagil of the Investigation Department of the Investigation Committee at the Russian Federation’s Prosecutor’s Office for the Sverdlovsk Region (“the Dzerzhinskiy District investigation division”) refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of investigator B. in charge of the applicant’s criminal case. It had not been established that investigator B. intimidated the applicant or used any other illegal means to extract his confession. 59. On 29 November 2012, following the communication of the complaint to the Government, the Head of the Investigation Department of the Investigation Committee at the Russian Federation’s Prosecutor’s Office for the Sverdlovsk Region quashed the decision of 18 April 2009 as premature. An additional pre-investigation inquiry was ordered. 60. On 9 January 2013 a chief investigator of the Dzerzhinskiy District investigation division took a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings. On the basis of the available documents and testimonies, the investigator concluded that throughout his stay at Nizhniy Tagil SIZO-3 the applicant had had access to medical assistance and had received treatment for his bronchial asthma. Apart from complaints of a cough and shortness of breath no other complaints were raised by the applicant. 61. On 4 February 2013 the Head of the Investigation Department of the Investigation Committee at the Russian Federation’s Prosecutor’s Office for the Sverdlovsk Region set aside the above decision and ordered an additional pre-investigation inquiry. 62. On 6 March 2013 a chief investigator of the Dzerzhinskiy District investigation division again took a decision to refuse to institute criminal proceedings. The investigator noted that there had been no evidence of ill‑treatment, and that the applicant had never mentioned the alleged ill‑treatment during the criminal proceedings against him. 63. On 15 April 2015 a chief investigator of the Dzerzhinskiy District investigation division rejected another request for a criminal investigation in respect of B., on account of alleged ill-treatment of the applicant during detention. 64. On 10 March 2016 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint in connection with the above decision not to open a criminal case. The court found that the decision of 15 April 2015 was well reasoned. 65. On 24 June 2016 the Regional Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 66. On 17 June 2013 the Court sent the applicant a letter containing the Government’s comments on the applicant’s claims for just satisfaction and their further observations on the case. It was sent to the applicant for information purposes, and he was asked not to reply. 67. According to the applicant he received that letter only on 30 August 2013, despite the fact that it was delivered to the local post office on 17 August 2013. The envelope was already open and certain pages were missing.

4. The first applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Žagarė and the second applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Šiauliai. 5. In December 2010 the first applicant bought a house at an auction organised by the State and registered his property rights in the State Property Register. At the time, the former owners of the house, Z.B. and his wife G.B., were living there. The auction was organised as a result of a debt of Z.B. 6. In January 2011 the first applicant lodged a claim with the court, asking to evict Z.B. and G.B. and for an award in respect of pecuniary damage. 7. On 21 December 2011 the Šiauliai District Court held that the first applicant was the lawful owner of the house and that Z.B. and G.B. were unlawfully occupying the premises. The court held that Z.B. and G.B. had to be evicted and decided to award the applicant 1,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 289 euros (EUR)) for every month from 28 December 2010 until the eviction of Z.B. and G.B. from the house. It appears that by May 2017 EUR 5,013 had been recovered from Z.B. and G.B. and paid to the first and the second applicants, the remaining amount to be paid being EUR 5,070. 8. On 4 April 2012 the Šiauliai District Court issued a writ of execution and on 5 April 2012 it was received by the bailiff’s office. 9. On 6 April 2012 the bailiff sent a letter to Z.B. and G.B. and asked them to vacate the house, the letter was received by Z.B. on 13 April 2012. 10. In May 2012 G.B. lodged a complaint against the bailiff but on 6 June 2012 the Šiauliai District Court dismissed it. G.B. then lodged a separate complaint which was also dismissed by the Šiauliai Regional Court on 24 September 2012. 11. In October 2012 the first applicant asked the bailiff to ensure that the police were present during the forced eviction; to ensure that the access to the house was not impeded by the dog; the first applicant also asked the bailiff to get the information from the Children’s Rights Protection Service because Z.B. claimed that his minor granddaughter had been living in the house. The first applicant also asked the police to oblige the residents of the house to terminate their unlawful actions; to oblige them to remove their dog from the area; to warn the unlawful residents of the house of their responsibility for material damage and to fine them. 12. In October 2012 the bailiff asked the authorities about the permanent place of residence of Z.B.’s granddaughter. The authorities stated that Z.B.’s daughter and granddaughter were living together in Vilnius. This was later confirmed by Z.B.’s daughter herself. 13. On 13 November 2012 the bailiff informed Z.B. and G.B. that the eviction would take place on 23 November 2012. On 15 November 2012 Z.B. asked the bailiff to suspend the eviction because G.B. was ill. At first the bailiff refused to suspend the enforcement action but on 22 November 2012, after having received medical documents about G.B.’s state of health, he postponed the eviction until 14 December 2012. 14. On 20 November 2012 Z.B. lodged a complaint against the bailiff, also asking the court to apply interim measures – to suspend the eviction proceedings owing to G.B.’s illness and the presence of his minor granddaughter in the house. On 22 November 2012 the Šiauliai District Court decided to apply interim measures and to suspend the eviction proceedings until the complaint against the bailiff was examined. 15. The complaint against the bailiff was examined on 19 December 2012 by the Šiauliai District Court, which decided to dismiss Z.B.’s complaint. The court held that the writ of execution had been issued on 4 April 2012 (see paragraph 8 above) and that the bailiff had urged Z.B. and G.B. to vacate the house before 15 May 2012; thus he had given them thirty-nine days. The court further held that Z.B. had complained about the bailiff’s eviction notice about the forced eviction but had also asked that the execution proceedings be suspended and the eviction postponed. The court held that Z.B. had already asked the bailiff to suspend the eviction but the bailiff had refused to satisfy this request. The court also stated that Z.B. had complained about the bailiff’s eviction notice of 13 November 2012 (see paragraph 13 above). The bailiff had informed the animal shelter, the police and the Children’s Rights Protection Service; he had thus acted in accordance with domestic law. The court decided to annul the interim measures applied by the decision of the Šiauliai District Court (see paragraph 14 above). 16. Z.B. submitted a separate complaint against the decision of the Šiauliai District Court (see paragraph 15 above), complaining that the court had made a purely formalistic assessment of his minor granddaughter’s living arrangements in the house and that it had not commented on the fact that the bailiff had ignored his wife’s illness. On 28 March 2013 the Šiauliai Regional Court held that the illness of G.B. had not come on suddenly, that there were no minors living in the house and that there were no grounds to suspend the execution of the eviction order. 17. The bailiff submitted a separate complaint against the decision of the Šiauliai District Court (see paragraph 14 above). On 25 January 2013 the Šiauliai Regional Court dismissed the bailiff’s complaint holding that G.B.’s illness had been grounds to suspend the eviction proceedings. 18. On 3 April 2013 the bailiff informed Z.B. and G.B. that the eviction would take place on 16 April 2013. On that day Z.B. stated that his mother was living in the house and, because she was not on the list of persons who could be evicted, the eviction could not take place. The bailiff decided to suspend the eviction. 19. On 16 April 2013 Z.B. lodged a complaint with the court, stating that the bailiff’s actions had been arbitrary and asking to remove him from the case. This complaint was dismissed by the Šiauliai District Court on 23 April 2013. 20. On 22 April 2013 the first applicant complained to the bailiff about the latter’s inactivity on 16 April 2013 (see paragraph 18 above). The first applicant claimed that the bailiff had to enter the house and evict Z.B. and G.B. by force and that Z.B.’s mother had to be taken care of by the police or other relevant authorities. 21. On 2 May 2013 the bailiff decided not to satisfy the first applicant’s complaint. The bailiff held that he could only evict those persons that were listed on the writ of execution, and Z.B.’s mother was not one of them. The bailiff agreed with the first applicant that Z.B. had been avoiding the eviction but stated that he had tried to defend the first applicant’s interests by suggesting to the latter to apply to the Šiauliai District Court so that it broadened the list of persons to be evicted. 22. The first applicant then lodged a complaint before the Šiauliai District Court, complaining about the bailiff’s inactivity. 23. On 14 June 2013 the first applicant sold the house to the second applicant. 24. Consequently, on 19 June 2013 the Šiauliai District Court replaced the first applicant with the second applicant in the proceedings (see paragraph 22 above). 25. On 16 August 2013 the Šiauliai District Court satisfied the second applicant’s complaint. The court held that when the execution actions had been protracted, the interests of a creditor had been breached, and thus the main role in the execution proceedings had been played by the bailiff. Only the persons listed on the writ of execution could be evicted, and any other persons were considered to be only temporarily present and had to immediately leave the premises. Only the court and not the bailiff could postpone the eviction. The court held that the bailiff had failed to perform the execution of the eviction properly and that he had had no grounds to suspend or postpone the execution. The court thus annulled the bailiff’s order of 16 April 2013 to suspend the eviction and the order of 2 May 2013 by which the bailiff dismissed the first applicant’s complaint (see paragraphs 18 and 21 above). 26. Z.B. submitted a separate complaint. On 31 October 2013 the Šiauliai Regional Court dismissed it. 27. On 7 November 2013 the bailiff issued an order for forced eviction. 28. On 18 November 2013 the forced eviction took place, with the participation of the bailiff, the locksmith and two police officers. However, Z.B. and G.B. did not participate in it and when the second applicant entered the house, all their furniture and other belongings were still there. The next day, the bailiff drew up a document by which the second applicant was assigned as the property manager of the goods that had been left in the house and that had been seized. 29. In December 2013 Z.B. lodged a complaint against the bailiff regarding the forced eviction. On 3 January 2014 the Šiauliai District Court held that the eviction had been lawful and that the bailiff had acted in accordance with domestic law. 30. Z.B. submitted a separate complaint, which was dismissed by the Šiauliai Regional Court on 27 March 2014. 31. The Government submitted that on 11 February 2014 the bailiff ordered Z.B. and G.B. to collect their goods that had not been seized (see paragraph 28 above) from the house on 17 February 2014 at the latest. As this order had not been executed, on 26 March 2014 the bailiff issued a property-seizure order with the aim of selling the goods off. 32. Z.B. and G.B. lodged a complaint in respect of the bailiff’s decision to issue the property-seizure order (see paragraph 31 above). On 26 May 2014 the Šiauliai District Court dismissed their complaint, holding that in accordance with domestic law the evicted person had to take his or her property. If he or she failed to collect the property within three months from the date when it had been transferred to the property manager, it could be sold and the income given to the debtor. In the present case, the second applicant had become the property manager on 18 November 2013 (see paragraph 28 above), the property seizure act had been drawn up on 19 November 2013, and the property had to be taken by Z.B. and G.B. before 17 February 2014. After this date the sale of the property would become lawful. 33. On 30 and 31 October 2014 the bailiff announced a public auction concerning the movable property of Z.B. and G.B. It was also suggested to the debtors’ representative that they could approach the second applicant and take back their property that had not been seized. 34. Z.B. applied to the Šiauliai District Court to have interim measures applied to prevent the bailiff from selling their movable property. Z.B. explained that he wanted either to lodge a complaint against the bailiff in accordance with the out-of-court settlement procedure or to lodge a claim with the court. Z.B.’s application was accepted by the Šiauliai District Court on 3 December 2014. Z.B. was also instructed to lodge any such complaint against the bailiff under the out-of-court settlement procedure or a claim with the court before the deadline of 17 December 2014 and to pay the applicable court fees. According to the Government, Z.B. failed to pay the court fees, and the interim measures were therefore annulled on 9 June 2015. 35. On 17 June 2015 the Šiauliai District Court rejected another complaint lodged by Z.B. against the bailiff, the second applicant and third parties regarding the annulment of the negative consequences caused by the unlawful actions of the bailiff and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The court stated that Z.B. had asked it to rule that some personal belongings could not be sold at auction. The court held that Z.B. and G.B. had not taken advantage of the opportunity to name buyers who might have had an interest in taking part in the auction that had been subsequently carried out. Z.B. had failed to explain why he had not taken his belongings within the three‑month time-limit; moreover, he had not even provided a description of his alleged personal belongings. The court therefore dismissed Z.B.’s complaint. 36. On 8 April 2013 G.B. lodged an application for interim measures, asking to prohibit the use of the house and other buildings in the garden and complaining of the result of the auction – the first applicant purchasing the house (see paragraph 5 above) – and asking for the result of the auction and the purchase agreement to be annulled. 37. On 16 May 2013 this application was dismissed by the Panevėžys Regional Court and on 5 September 2013 by the Court of Appeal. 38. G.B. lodged another application for interim measures, complaining of the results of the auction. Her application for interim measures was dismissed by the Panevėžys Regional Court on 10 September 2013 and her complaint about the result of the auction was dismissed by the Panevėžys Regional Court on 9 December 2013.

4. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Glendale, California, the United States of America. 5. The applicant worked in the British Council’s Armenia office (hereinafter “the British Council”) as a project manager on a full-time, permanent contract starting from 25 November 2002. 6. In the course of her employment the applicant had two children, born on 27 March 2008 and 7 May 2010. The applicant spent her maternity leave in the United States and regularly sent requests to extend that leave every six months for the duration of her absence. In particular, she sent such requests in March and September 2009 as regards her first child and then in April and September 2010 as regards her second child. It appears that the applicant’s maternity leave was extended, based on those requests. In March 2011 her leave was further extended until 1 September 2011. 7. According to the applicant, on 19 August 2011 she requested another extension of her maternity leave. She handed an envelope with her written request to that effect to her friend H.K., who was to return to Armenia on 17 August 2011 after a visit to the United States. Upon arrival, H.K. gave the envelope to R.O., a driver, who then handed it to A.K., a security guard at the British Council. 8. On 30 September 2011 the applicant received notice of termination of her employment contract prior to its term. The notice referred to the change in volume and conditions of work at the British Council, as well as the need to reduce the number of staff. In addition, the notice stated the following: “... [your] employment contract shall be terminated based on [the relevant provisions] of the Labour Code of the Republic of Armenia. We also inform you that your employment contract shall be terminated ... considering the fact that you did not return to work after the completion of your unpaid maternity leave, which was to end on 1 September 2011, as indicated in your letter sent to us by fax on 17 March 2011. The employment contract shall be considered terminated as of 1 December 2011.” 9. It appears that the applicant sent emails to the management of the British Council in relation to the early termination of her employment. 10. On 30 November 2011 Ar.M., a lawyer and a representative of Prudence, a law firm which provided legal services to the British Council, replied to the applicant on behalf of that body. In particular, the email stated that the termination of the applicant’s employment had been in full compliance with domestic law and the terms and conditions of the British Council. 11. By an order of 1 December 2011, issued by the director of the British Council, the applicant’s employment contract was terminated. 12. On 30 December 2011 the applicant brought a claim against the British Council before the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, contesting the order of 1 December 2011 and seeking reinstatement. 13. By a decision of 11 January 2012, Judge A.M. of the District Court took over the examination of the applicant’s case and scheduled the preparatory hearing. 14. According to a power of attorney executed by a notary public in London on 12 January 2012, the British Council authorised, inter alia, Ar.M. and K.B., another lawyer with Prudence, to represent jointly or separately its interests before courts of all instances in Armenia. 15. On 16 January 2012 the British Council was notified by the District Court of its taking over of the examination of the case and the judge appointed. 16. On 31 January 2012 K.B. applied to the District Court to represent the British Council before the said court, also asking the court to postpone the hearings. On 1 February 2012 Ar.M. informed the District Court that he would not be representing the interests of the British Council in the instant case. It appears that during the whole trial before the District Court, K.B. alone represented the British Council. 17. On 14 February 2012, in its reply to the applicant’s claim signed by K.B., the British Council denied that the applicant had submitted a request to extend her maternity leave for another six months as of 1 September 2011. 18. On 9 July 2012 Judge A.M. rejected the applicant’s claim, finding that her dismissal had been lawful. 19. After the proceedings before the District Court, it was discovered that Judge A.M. and the lawyer Ar.M. were twin brothers. Furthermore, the law firm Prudence, of which Ar.M. and K.P. were senior associates, had been founded by D.M., A.M.’s and Ar.M.’s elder sister, and was managed by her husband, E.M. 20. On 6 August 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal arguing, inter alia, that Judge A.M. had lacked impartiality when deciding her case owing to his close family ties to the legal representatives of her opponent in the proceedings. The Government claimed that no such issue had been raised, nor had any evidence to support such a claim been provided. 21. On 28 September 2012 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the District Court’s judgment. In doing so, the Court of Appeal did not address the applicant’s arguments regarding the alleged lack of impartiality of Judge A.M. in the proceedings before the District Court. 22. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those submitted in her previous appeal. 23. On 28 November 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.

4. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Belgium. At the time of the events, he was studying at a university in Constanţa, where he had been since October 2006. 5. On 3 April 2008 the Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT) attached to the Tulcea County prosecutor’s office opened a criminal investigation against O.D.A., a student at the same university as the applicant, on suspicion of drug trafficking. 6. At around 1.30 p.m. on 18 April 2008 O.D.A. was caught trying to send by bus a package containing twelve LSD tabs in an undercover operation set up by DIICOT. The drugs were destined to reach an undercover agent who had previously contacted O.D.A. asking to buy drugs from him. O.D.A. was immediately taken to the Tulcea County police station, where he gave a written statement saying that he had “had” the drugs from the applicant. He also said in his statement that he had been informed that he was entitled to a lawyer but had waived this right. 7. On the same date the case prosecutor submitted to the Tulcea County Court a request to search the residences of O.D.A. and the applicant. In the request the prosecutor stated that, by a decision issued on 18 April 2008, the criminal investigation opened against O.D.A. had been extended to the applicant on suspicion of drug trafficking. The search was authorized by a judge. 8. During the search, which took place on the evening of 18 April 2008, 4.12 grams of cannabis and fifty-one LSD tabs were found in the applicant’s room. After the search, at around 10 p.m., the applicant was first taken to hospital for a toxicology test and then to the Tulcea County police station (in the city of Tulcea, 125 km from Constanţa), where a police officer asked him to give a statement. 9. The applicant handwrote a statement (in English) in which he explained as follows: “... my brother and I travel frequently ... to Belgium.... While in [Belgium], my brother and I travelled to the Netherlands numerous times to smoke THC ... The first and only time that I brought drugs into Romania was 2 months ago. I bought these drugs from a friend of a friend of mine ... He offered me a deal from someone he knew. I gave my friend the money, 450 euros, and he returned a day later with 200 grams of hashish and 60 LSD which was meant as a gift... After smoking about 40 grams of it, my brother and I wrapped the hashish and LSD in a black plastic bag and put it in a pocket of some trousers and packed it in a suitcase amongst other clothes. ...” He further stated that since he did not use LSD and had needed money he had decided to sell nine LSD tabs to O.D.A. Lastly, he said that he had never sold any drugs before, that he was not a drug trafficker and that he was sorry for his actions, which he would never repeat. At the upper bottom of the front page the statement was signed and dated 18 April 2008 by a police officer. Besides the applicant’s signature, the statement bore an additional signature which resembled that of the lawyer appointed on his behalf and, at the foot of the page, the date of 19 April 2008. 10. The applicant was then taken to the headquarters of DIICOT where, at 2.15 p.m. on 19 April 2008, the prosecutor informed him of the accusations against him, namely unlawful possession of, importing and trafficking drugs. At the same time the applicant was informed of his right to an interpreter and a lawyer of his own choosing and to remain silent. Then the accusations were read to him in the presence of a lawyer and an English language interpreter – both appointed on his behalf by the authorities – who also assisted him during his subsequent questioning by the prosecutor. All the above information were included in a minutes drafted on 19 April 2008 at 14:15 p.m. and signed by the prosecutor, the applicant as well as by his appointed lawyer and interpreter. After the applicant’s initial statement given to the police had been translated into Romanian by the interpreter, the prosecutor took a new statement from him. In this statement, which was in Romanian and signed by the applicant, the lawyer, the interpreter and the prosecutor, the applicant reiterated the previous statement given to the police (see paragraph 9 above) but this time stated that he had not known about the LSD in his luggage until he had unpacked at the dormitory. The applicant also said: “I have no complaints against the police authorities or the prosecutor”. After the charges were formally brought against him, at 3.45 p.m. in the presence of the lawyer and the interpreter, the applicant said that he “maintained his previous statements”. 11. The same day a request by the prosecutor to remand the applicant and O.D.A. in custody was rejected by the Tulcea County Court because the two men did not have a criminal record, were students and had been willingly cooperating with the investigative authorities. Later that evening the applicant was allowed to leave the prosecutor’s office. 12. On 3 June 2008 the applicant and O.D.A were sent to trial for unlawful possession of, importing and trafficking drugs. 13. The Tulcea County Court considered the criminal case between September and October 2008. 14. The applicant, who was assisted by two lawyers of his choice and did not contest the charges brought against him, raised numerous complaints before the court regarding procedural irregularities during the investigation. He stated, among other things, that after the search on the evening of 18 April 2008, he had been detained by the police from 10 p.m. until the next day, when the prosecutor’s request to remand him in custody had been rejected by the court. He argued that his initial statement given to the police during his detention (see paragraph 9 above) should not be taken into consideration because it had been taken in the absence of a lawyer and an interpreter and, as a result, he had not understood his rights. 15. On 24 October 2008 the Tulcea County Court convicted the applicant of unlawful possession of, importing and trafficking drugs and gave him a three-year suspended sentence. He was fined 1,000 Romanian Lei ((ROL) – approximately 270 euros (EUR)). 16. Drawing on the evidence gathered during the investigation and at the trial, the court established the facts as follows. In February 2008 the applicant and his brother had travelled to Belgium to visit their father and from there to Amsterdam, in order to smoke THC. On their return, the applicant had hidden in his luggage and brought into Romania 200 grams of hashish and 60 tabs of LSD, drugs that he had obtained from a friend studying in Belgium. The applicant alleged that he had not known at the time about the LSD, which had been a present from his friend, and that he had only discovered it when he had unpacked at the dormitory. The court however held that the applicant could not claim that he had not been aware of the contents of his luggage since in his first statement (see paragraph 9 above) he had declared that he had personally packed the LSD in a black bag in his suitcase. The court further held that O.D.A., who had used to smoke together with the applicant, had responded to a request for drugs from other students because he had needed money. According to his statements, he had bought approximately 40 grams of cannabis from the applicant on several occasions, and twelve LSD tabs that he had sold at a higher price. On 18 April 2008 O.D.A. had been caught trying to sell the twelve LSD tabs. 17. The court stated that it had based its decision on the following: a technical report on the drugs, toxicology reports, the statements given by the defendants and witness statements. As regards the applicant’s request to disregard his initial statement it stated: “As regards the defendant [K.C.], not only did he refuse to testify before this court, but he tried – personally and through his lawyers – to exclude from the case the statements he gave before the prosecutor, claiming that he had not been made aware of his rights and that he had not been satisfied with the services of the interpreter. After verification of these allegations, the court finds that the defendants were informed of the charges and of their right to remain silent and to be represented by a lawyer of their choice. The defendant K.C. was informed of his rights on 19 April 2008, at [2.15 p.m.], in the presence of his interpreter and lawyer, [and was] questioned afterwards. As regards the services of the interpreter, the defendant could have complained to the prosecutor if he was not satisfied, which he failed to do.” 18. The applicant appealed against that judgment, reiterating his previous arguments. 19. On 3 April 2009 the Constanţa Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal as ill-founded. In reply to his arguments, it noted that he had been represented by a lawyer and had benefited from the services of an interpreter throughout the entire criminal proceedings, in compliance with the guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention. The court further held that: “The nature of the case and the people involved, in a special location – a university campus – required urgent investigative measures, therefore it cannot be claimed that the presumption of innocence had been breached or that the defendants had been deprived of their right to defence.” 20. The applicant filed an appeal on points of law (recurs). He argued, among other things, that he had been held at the police station and at the prosecutor’s office without legal justification for an unreasonable length of time (twenty-two hours); he also stressed that his initial confession had been taken while he had been detained at the police station without an interpreter, in the absence of a lawyer and following threats by the police officer guarding him. He further submitted that the most serious charges against him had been based only on this initial confession and on O.D.A.’s statement – also taken in the absence of a lawyer – as well as on the findings of the search that, in his opinion, had not been carried out in compliance with the legal procedural requirements. The applicant added that his right to be informed promptly in a language which he understood and in detail of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, as provided for by Article 6 § 3 of the Convention, had been breached. 21. On 21 January 2010 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law with final effect. 22. The court undertook a fresh analysis of the evidence in the file and decided that the guarantees of a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention had been respected as regards both defendants since they had been provided with legal assistance and had benefited from adversarial proceedings in which all their arguments had been examined and replied to. In conclusion, the court considered that the proceedings, taken as a whole, had been fair. 23. As regards the applicant’s specific complaint about his initial statement given to the police, the court held as follows: “ ... the statements given by the applicant and O.D.A. ... were in compliance with the legal requirements ... for the respective stages of the investigation, they reflected their wishes at the relevant time, both defendants having the capacity to understand the rights presented to them, being students and even in the absence of legal studies, they could have understood the extent of their rights and obligations.” 24. The court further observed that O.D.A. had specifically waived his right to legal assistance (see paragraph 6 above) while the applicant, who had also been informed of his right to an interpreter, had expressed a wish to be assigned one. It also noted that the file included the prosecutor’s decision appointing an English language interpreter in the case and minutes signed by the applicant and the interpreter attesting that the applicant had been informed of his right to be represented by a lawyer of his choice and of the right to remain silent (see paragraph 10 above). The court concluded that, in any event, the applicant had not at any point been detained and therefore legal assistance had not been mandatory in his situation. 25. The remaining arguments raised by the applicant were dismissed by the court as not proved. 26. Throughout the entire trial the applicant was represented by two lawyers of his choice and assisted by a court provided English language interpreter.

5. The applicants are: (1) Ms Umidat Mukhtarova, who was born in 1942, (2) Ms Manash Mukhtarova, who was born in 1965, (3) Ms Mariya Umarova, who was born in 1950, (4) Mr Lechi Umarov, who was born in 1942, (5) Ms Zara Umarova, who was born in 1977. The second applicant lives in Grozny. The other four applicants live in the village of Kharsenoy, Chechnya. 6. The first and second applicants are the mother and the sister of Mr Sharpudi (also spelled as Sharpuddi and Sharpudin) Mukhtarov, who was born in 1975. The third and fourth applicants are the parents of Mr Zaurbek (also spelled as Zovrbek) Umarov, who was born in 1975 (in the documents submitted the year was also stated as 1981). The fifth applicant is his sister. 7. The circumstances of the case can be summarised as follows. 8. At the relevant time Mr Sharpudi Mukhtarov lived with his family in the camp for refugees from Chechnya in the village of Nesterovskaya, Ingushetia. At about 3.30 p.m. on 1 November 2003 he and his friend Mr Zaurbek Umarov were on the outskirts of the village when a group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived in a military UAZ and VAZ‑2106 vehicles without registration numbers. The servicemen were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian; some of them were wearing balaclavas. They put Mr Mukhtarov and Mr Umarov on the ground threatening them with weapons, then forced them into the vehicles and drove off in the direction of Ordzhonikidzevskaya village. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 9. On 16 May 2008 an interview with Mr Umarov appeared in a television programme broadcast by the Russian television news channel NTV (НТВ). The second applicant provided this information to the investigators (see below). 10. The whereabouts of Mr Sharpudi Mukhtarov and Mr Zaurbek Umarov have been unknown since the date of their abduction. 11. Immediately after the abduction the first applicant informed the authorities thereof and requested that criminal proceedings be opened. 12. On 18 November 2003 the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor’s office in Ingushetia opened criminal case no. 23600076 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code concerning the abduction of Mr Mukhtarov. The decision stated that it was taken following the first applicant’s complaint. 13. On 8 December 2003 Mr M.M., the father of Mr Sharpudi Mukhtarov, was granted victim status and questioned. 14. On 6 January 2004 the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor gave instructions to the investigators. He indicated, in particular, that Mr Zaurbek Umarov, who had been abducted together with Mr Mukhtarov, was wanted by law-enforcement authorities on account of his participation as a member of an illegal armed group in a shootout with the authorities in October 2003 in Troitskaya village. 15. On 13 January 2004 the investigators requested an extension of the investigation’s time frame, stating, amongst other reasons, that there were grounds to suspect that the abduction of Mr Sharpudi Mukhtarov was linked to his friendship with Mr Zaurbek Umarov. 16. On 18 March 2004 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The investigators’ decision stated that Mr Mukhtarov and Mr Umarov had been abducted together. Mr M.M. was informed about this decision by a letter of 20 March 2004. 17. On 14 August 2008 the investigation was resumed. 18. On 15 August 2008 the first applicant was granted victim status upon her request (see paragraph 34 below). 19. On 19 August 2008 the investigation was suspended again. 20. On 24 November 2008 the investigation was resumed following the second applicant’s submissions to the investigators about the TV interview with Mr Umarov (see paragraph 35 below). 21. On 29 November 2008 Ms. E.E., Mr Zaurbek Umarov’s wife, was granted victim status. The investigators’ decision stated that her husband Mr Zaurbek Umarov had been abducted together with Mr Mukhtarov. 22. On 24 December 2008 the investigation was suspended and then resumed on 30 March 2009. 23. On 1 April 2009 the Sunzhenskiy District Court of Ingushetia granted the investigators’ request and allowed the seizure of the video containing the interview with Mr Umarov from the NTV channel. 24. On 30 April 2009 the investigators sent a request to the NTV channel. In reply NTV informed them that the video recording of the programme had already been destroyed owing to the expiry of the conservation period. 25. On the same date the investigation was suspended. The whereabouts of both Mr Sharpudi Mukhtarov and Mr Zaurbek Umarov remain unknown. 26. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 27. On 15 January 2004 the investigators questioned the first applicant, who denied that Mr Mukhtarov had been involved in illegal armed groups. 28. On 22 January 2004 the investigators questioned Ms Z.I., the Mukhtarov family’s neighbour, who had witnessed the abduction. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above and stated that the abductors had been wearing military uniforms and had looked a lot like law-enforcement officers. 29. On 4 February 2004 the investigators questioned a police officer from the Sunzhenskiy district department of the interior (police station), Mr M.R. He confirmed that Mr Zaurbek Umarov was among those who had offered armed resistance to law-enforcement officers in October 2003 in Troitskaya village. 30. Between 5 and 20 February 2004 the investigators questioned Mr A.I., Ms D.M. and Ms Z.Kh., who had also witnessed the abduction. They confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 31. On 15 August 2008 the first applicant was questioned again. Her statements were similar to the account of events submitted to the Court. 32. On 19 November 2008 the investigators questioned Ms E.E. She stated that she had learnt about the circumstances of Mr Umarov’s abduction from her mother-in-law (the third applicant) and that she had not lodged any complaints in that connection. On 16 May 2008 around 8.30 p.m. she had seen an interview with her husband, whom she had identified with certainty in a television programme, lasting about five minutes. She had not informed the investigators of this fact. 33. On an unknown date the investigators questioned Ms Z.E., who was the mother of Ms E.E. She confirmed that she had also seen the interview with Mr Umarov in the TV programme. She had identified Mr Umarov by facial features and a scar on his face. Ms Z.E. learnt from the programme that he had been sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. 34. On 4 August 2008 the first applicant informed the investigators about the death of her husband, Mr M.M., and asked to be granted victim status in the criminal case. 35. On 12 November 2008 the second applicant informed the investigators of the television programme in which Mr Zaurbek Umarov had appeared (see paragraph 9 above). She stated that she had learnt about it from some acquaintances and asked the investigators to obtain a copy of the programme. 36. On 3 March 2009 the second applicant’s lawyer asked the investigators to be allowed to read the investigation file and make copies of the documents. It is unclear whether any reply was given to this request. 37. On 29 April 2009 the first applicant asked the investigators to provide her with copies of documents from the investigation file. It is unclear whether any reply was given to this request. 38. On several occasions between 2003 and 2009 the first applicant complained to various law-enforcement authorities about the abduction and requested assistance in the search for her son. Her complaints were forwarded to the investigators. In reply she received letters stating that the law-enforcement agencies were taking measures to establish her son’s whereabouts. 39. On 27 August 2011 the second applicant requested information about any progress in the proceedings. She also asked to be granted victim status in the criminal case. The outcome of this request is unknown. 40. According to the fifth applicant’s submissions to the Court, Mr Umarov’s relatives had learnt about his abduction from Mr Mukhtarov’s relatives on 1 November 2003. They complained about the incident to the local police and Sunzhenskiy district police station. Despite their complaints, the criminal case was opened only on 18 December 2003. The third, fourth and fifth applicants had received no news about the whereabouts of Mr Umarov since then. The fifth applicant also stated that she had seen the interview with her brother on television in May 2008. 41. On 7 September 2005 the NGO Memorial, acting on behalf of Ms Z.U., Mr Umarov’s sister, asked the public prosecutor of Ingushetia whether any criminal case had been instituted into Mr Umarov’s disappearance. 42. On 3 October 2005 the prosecutor’s office of Ingushetia informed Ms Z.U. and the NGO Memorial that the criminal case into the abduction of Mr Mukhtarov and Mr Umarov had been opened on 18 November 2003, and that the investigation had been suspended.

6. The applicant was born in Peqin in 1977. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 7. In 1998 the applicant was implicated in the commission of the criminal offence of setting up and being a member of an armed gang and of other criminal offences. 8. On 4 February 1999 the prosecutor charged him with the offences of membership of an armed gang, attempted intentional murder and other crimes. The notification of the prosecutor’s charges was acknowledged by the applicant’s officially appointed lawyer. 9. It appears that throughout the investigation proceedings the applicant was represented by an officially appointed lawyer. 10. On 12 February 1999 the Elbasan District Court ordered the applicant’s arrest. However, the order could not be enforced as the applicant could not be traced. 11. On 19 February 1999 the Elbasan District Court declared the applicant a fugitive from justice after unsuccessful attempts to locate him. The decision stated that it was impossible to find him as it appeared that he had escaped to an unknown destination (këto kërkime nuk kanë bërë të mundur kapjen e të pandehurit pasi ai rezulton të ketë ikur në drejtim të paditur). 12. On an unspecified date the prosecutor decided to commit the applicant for trial. 13. On 28 May 1999 the Supreme Court transferred the case for examination to the Durrës District Court. 14. On 2 June 1999 the applicant’s father appointed a lawyer to represent the applicant before the domestic courts. 15. The trial proceedings against the applicant were conducted in absentia and he was represented by a lawyer appointed by his family in accordance with Article 48 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”). 16. On 15 February 2000 the Durrës District Court convicted the applicant in absentia of establishing and participating in an armed gang and attempted intentional murder. He was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The decision was based on evidence from documents and witness testimony. 17. The applicant’s family-appointed lawyer and the other co-accused appealed against the conviction to the Durrës Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”). On 19 April 2000 the Court of Appeal declined to examine the applicant’s appeal on the grounds that the applicant’s family had not given any express authority to the lawyer for such a procedure. However, the Court of Appeal examined the applicant’s case as part of its overall examination, having regard to the appeals of the other defendants. It convicted the applicant of the same offences as before and sentenced him to thirteen years’ imprisonment. 18. On 7 December 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed appeals by the applicant and other co-accused against the Court of Appeal’s decision of 19 April 2000. 19. On 16 September 2005 the applicant was arrested by the Czech authorities on the basis of an arrest warrant issued by Albania. 20. On 25 January 2006 the applicant was extradited to Albania. 21. On 1 March 2006 the applicant was officially informed of his conviction in absentia. 22. On 13 September 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the conviction in absentia. 23. On 24 October 2007 the Constitutional Court, sitting in camera, declared the appeal time-barred as the two-year time-limit had started to run on 7 December 2000. The Constitutional Court’s reasoning stated that throughout the proceedings the applicant had been represented by a court‑appointed lawyer or a family-appointed lawyer and that accordingly he had had the opportunity to become acquainted with the proceedings brought against him.

4. The applicant was born in 1963 and is currently serving a prison sentence. 5. On 14 August 2008 the applicant was arrested in Orel on suspicion of assault and rape. According to the applicant, during his time in police custody police officers from the Severnyy district police department in Orel and the operational search division of the Orel regional police department (ОВД по Северному району г. Орла и ОРЧ УВД по Орловской области) subjected him to ill-treatment to force him to confess to the crimes. The police officers allegedly handcuffed the applicant and physically assaulted him, punching and kicking him multiple times in the face, legs and body. 6. On 15 August 2008 the Orel inter-district investigation unit of the investigative committee for the Orel region (“the investigative committee”) ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant. It began on 15 August 2008 and was completed on 29 August 2008. According to the report (no. 2378/5a), the applicant had the following injuries: (i) three scratches on his right cheek; (ii) two bruises on his neck; (iii) two bruises on his chest; (iv) two bruises on his back; (v) eleven bruises and an abrasion on his right upper limb; (vi) nine bruises and an abrasion on his left upper limb; (vii) an abrasion on his right lower leg; (viii) an abrasion on his left hip; and (ix) an abrasion on his left buttock. 7. According to the expert, the applicant’s injuries had been caused by blunt objects with a limited surface area one to three days before the examination and had not caused any actual bodily harm to the applicant. 8. The expert did not exclude the possibility that the applicant’s bruises on his wrists could have been caused by handcuffs, and also concluded that the applicant had had thirty-four points on his body where force had been used, and had sustained no less than twenty-three blows. 9. In reply to an investigator’s question whether the injuries could have been self-inflicted, the expert stated that the injuries were within the reach of the applicant’s hands, except for the injuries on the back, which could have been received as a result of the applicant being struck by or striking himself against a blunt object with a limited striking surface (the expert’s “explanations” of 26 June 2009). 10. According to the IVS (temporary detention centre) medical records, the applicant complained about headache and pain in the back when he was placed in the IVS on 16 August 2008, after being examined at the traumatology centre of the Orel town hospital and diagnosed with contusion to the soft tissues of the head and closed craniocerebral injury (with a question mark). When he was taken out of the IVS at 12.45 p.m. on 18 August 2009 he complained about pain in the area of the wrists and dumb fingers, dizziness and nausea. When he was brought back at 9 p.m. that day (after being examined at the Orel regional hospital where he was diagnosed with contusions to the soft tissues of the head and abrasions to the face) he complained about headache and had abrasions on the forehead and on the back, explaining that he had received them at the Severnyy district police station. On 19 August 2008 he complained about headache and dizziness, and had abrasions on the face, forehead, wrists and left elbow, which – according to him – he had received at the Severnyy district police station the day before. 11. According to pre-trial detention facility IZ-57/1, on 20 August 2008 the applicant had abrasions above the left eyebrow, on the left cheek, the wrists and the right elbow. 12. On 18 August 2008 the applicant lodged complaints with the Severnyy district prosecutor’s office of Orel and the investigative committee against the police officers, requesting that they be prosecuted. 13. On 19 August 2008 the investigative committee received material in relation to the applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment. 14. On the dates specified below, and in accordance with Article 24 § 1 (1) or (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, officials at the investigative committee issued refusals to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers under Article 286 § 3 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers) for no case to answer. Those refusals were systematically overruled by the higher authority within the investigative committee as premature, unsubstantiated and based on incomplete inquiries, and the investigation authorities were ordered to carry out additional inquiries. The refusals were issued and overruled on the following dates: Refusal No. Issued on: Overruled on: (i) 19 December 2008 18 February 2009 (ii) 27 February 2009 12 May 2009 (iii) 26 June 2009 date unknown (iv) 21 August 2009 6 May 2010 (v) 16 May 2010 19 October 2010 (vi) 29 October 2010 15. The investigative committee based its decision on the police officers’ explanations denying the applicant’s ill-treatment. They stated that they had arrested the applicant in the night time on suspicion of having committed the crimes, that in the course of the arrest they had tripped the applicant up, twisted his hand behind his back and handcuffed him since he had tried to escape, and that they had interviewed him at the Severnyy district police department before the arrival of an investigator next morning to draw up an official record of his arrest. They also interviewed the applicant on 18 August 2008 about his complaint of ill-treatment at the Severnyy district police, which had been communicated to the police on 16 August 2008 by the traumatology centre of the town hospital. According to the police officers, the applicant had fallen before his arrest (being drunk) and at the IVS detention centre, and had inflicted injuries on himself at the police station. According to the applicant’s explanations, he had not resisted his arrest, he had been beaten up at the time of his arrest and also during the night at the Severnyy district police station and when brought there for investigative activities thereafter. As a reaction to his ill‑treatment and false accusations of crimes he had tried to bang his head against the desk and, on 18 August 2008, to jump out of the window of the Severnyy district police station, but had been stopped. Police officer R.D. had thrown him to the floor and stepped on his face. The applicant denied the police officers’ allegations of self-inflicted injuries and stated that he had signed the explanation about allegedly falling before the arrest under the threats of continued ill‑treatment from police officers S.D. and I.B., who had beaten him up before. According to statements by the applicant’s girlfriend, she heard the applicant screaming from being allegedly beaten up during his arrest and at the police station; several days later at the police station he had complained to her that police officers had beaten him up; he had had abrasions on the face; and he had lost consciousness during a confrontation between them and the ambulance had been called. 16. The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers of 29 October 2010 maintained the findings made in the previous refusals (for example, the refusal of 26 June 2009) that the police had lawfully applied force during the applicant’s arrest, that the applicant had attempted to inflict injuries on himself, which was coherent with the forensic medical expert’s conclusion that the injuries, except for the injuries on the back, had been within the reach of his hands. By alleging the police ill‑treatment the applicant had tried to escape prosecution and to blacken the police officers’ honour and dignity. 17. On 16 April 2009 the Zavodskiy District Court of Orel convicted the applicant of physical assaults and rapes involving three women victims, and sentenced him to thirteen years and five months’ imprisonment. 18. At trial, the applicant denied his guilt and complained about the police ill-treatment. The trial court acknowledged the appearance of injuries on him as they had been recorded by the expert, but noted that that could not serve as evidence of his innocence in relation to the crimes which had been committed. The trial court also noted that the pre-investigation inquiry had been pending with respect to his alleged ill-treatment, and that an examination of that issue fell outside the scope of the applicant’s criminal case. 19. On 9 June 2009 the Orel Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the trial court’s conclusions.

7. The first applicant, Mr Aleksandr Viktorovich Ivanov, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1956. He is currently serving a life sentence in Zhytomyr prison no. 8 (“Zhytomyr prison”). 8. On 17 March 1996 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder and other crimes. On 23 March 1996 he was placed in the Odessa pre-trial detention centre (“SIZO”). 9. On 19 February 1997 the Odessa Regional Court convicted the applicant of aggravated murder and other crimes, and sentenced him to the death penalty. On 10 July 1997 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld that judgment and it became final. 10. Following a declaration that the death penalty was unconstitutional by a decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in December 1999 and amendments to the Criminal Code in February 2000, on 4 October 2000 the Odessa Regional Court commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment. 11. On 29 May 1999 the applicant was transferred to Zhytomyr prison. 12. On 27 March 1996 while detained in the Odessa SIZO, the applicant was found to have HIV antibodies. According to his medical file, that result was confirmed following further tests on 29 March and 1 April 1996. The applicant was recommended to undergo a clinical immunology examination. 13. According to the applicant, no further examination or medical treatment was carried out following the above-mentioned test. 14. The applicant’s medical file contains a note by a dermato-venereologist on 19 April 1996 with indication that he was HIV-infected. Another note was made on 31 August 1998 indicating that he received medical advice “on the issues of HIV infection”. Later on, in October 2008 a note was made in his medical file indicating that the applicant had been suffering from HIV for ten years and had had hepatitis B. 15. According to the Government, on 20 February, 27 March, 17 April, 3 June, 11 June, 9 September and 5 November 1997, and on 23 January, 5 March, 17 March, 4 June, 7 July, 19 September and 10 December 1998, the applicant underwent regular medical examinations at the SIZO. In the course of those examinations he did not raise any health complaints. An HIV test of 11 January 1999 did not indicate HIV infection in the applicant’s blood. The case file contains a medical certificate of 14 January 1999 indicating that following the HIV test, the applicant was found to have HIV antibodies. He was recommended to undergo an in-depth clinical immunology examination. There is no information in the case file as to whether that recommendation was followed up. 16. On 31 May 1999, following the applicant’s transfer to Zhytomyr prison, he underwent a medical examination by a panel of doctors at the prison medical unit. The examination revealed that he was apparently in good health. 17. On 25 December 2007 following a blood test, the applicant was revealed viral hepatitis C antibodies. 18. On 6 May 2008 the applicant underwent a CD-4 (white blood-cell) test, the result of which was 175 cells per mm3. 19. On 25 June 2008, following a regular medical examination by a specialist in infectious diseases, the applicant was diagnosed with stage 2 HIV infection (the CD-4 count was 176 cells). He was prescribed a course of antiretroviral therapy(“the ART”). 20. On 13 July 2008 the applicant underwent another CD-4 test, the result of which was 296 cells per mm3. 21. According to the applicant’s medical file provided by the Government, in November 2008 he was examined by a doctor from the Zhytomyr regional centre for Aids prevention and control (“the anti-Aids centre”). The applicant was diagnosed with HIV infection (second clinical stage) and hepatitis C in the remission stage. 22. According to the Government, on 1 March 2009 the prison received the relevant medication from the penal authorities, and the applicant started the ART course. 23. On 7 October 2009 the applicant was examined by a medical commission and diagnosed with HIV infection (second clinical stage), chronic hepatitis (the type of disease was not indicated), chronic gastritis, cholecystitis, ischemic heart disease and second-degree hypertension. 24. On 27 August 2010 the applicant underwent a regular examination by a specialist in infectious diseases, who diagnosed him with HIV infection (second clinical stage) and chronic hepatitis C with minimal activity. 25. On 19 December 2011 the applicant underwent a regular quarterly examination by doctors from the anti-Aids centre. He was diagnosed with HIV infection (second clinical stage with a CD-4 count of 437 cells) and chronic hepatitis C with minimal activity. It was recommended that he continue receiving the ART by hepatoprotectors twice a year for twenty days. 26. The parties did not inform the Court about the treatment the applicant was provided with after December 2011. 27. The second applicant, Mr Vladimir Mikhaylovich Kashuba, was a Ukrainian national who was born in 1958. At the time of his death (8 January 2018 – see paragraph 6 above), he was serving a life sentence in Ladyzhynka Colony no. 39 (“the Ladyzhynka Colony”). 28. On 7 September 2000 the second applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated robbery and murder. On 14 September 2000 he was placed in the Lutsk SIZO. 29. On 4 January 2001 the Volyn Regional Court found the applicant guilty of aggravated robbery and murder and convicted him to life imprisonment. By the same judgment he was found to be exceptionally dangerous to society. An appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 24 May 2002. 30. On 8 September 2001 the applicant was transferred to the Vinnytsya SIZO. 31. On 22 February 2007 he was transferred to the Ladyzhynka Colony. 32. Upon arrival at the Lutsk SIZO in September 2000, the second applicant was examined by the SIZO medical personnel and placed under monitoring as a person who had suffered tuberculosis (TB). 33. Upon arrival at the Vinnytsya SIZO in September 2001, the applicant was examined by the SIZO medical personnel and placed under monitoring as a person who had suffered TB. 34. According to the applicant, in March 2003 he underwent a medical check and was diagnosed with TB. 35. The applicant submitted that, in May 2003 he had received some medication for his TB. From June to August 2003 he did not receive any treatment. In September 2003 his treatment was resumed and a special diet was prescribed for him. The parties did not specify the nature of that treatment. 36. On 18 November 2003 the applicant was examined by a tuberculosis specialist and was diagnosed with clinically cured TB (клінічно вилікуваний туберкульоз). On 30 March 2004 he was examined by another tuberculosis specialist and was diagnosed with spontaneously cured TB (спонтанно вилікуваний туберкульоз), and tuberculoma of the upper part of the left lung. The parties did not specify whether the applicant had been prescribed and had received any treatment during the above-mentioned period of time. 37. According to the applicant, between March 2004 and November 2006 he was examined eight times by the tuberculotherapist. During that period he was diagnosed with tuberculoma of the upper part of the left lung and later with post-TB residual changes in the upper part of the left lung (category 5.1). He was prescribed some treatment, the nature of which was not specified by the parties. 38. Upon arrival at the Ladyzhynka Colony on 22 February 2007, the applicant was examined by the colony’s medical personnel and placed under monitoring as a person with residual changes in the upper part of the left lung in the form of dense focal lung lesions (щільні вогнищеві тіні), category 5.1. 39. According to the applicant, since 27 February 2007 he has been provided with medical treatment and a special diet for his TB. The parties did not specify the nature and duration of that treatment. 40. On 3 September 2007, 29 February and 1 September 2008, 1 March and 1 September 2009, and 26 February 2010 the applicant was prescribed a season’s course of anti-relapse treatment and a special diet. The parties did not specify the nature of that treatment. 41. According to the Government, between April 2008 and April 2014 the applicant was examined by a prison doctor more than fifty times regarding his TB. He was diagnosed with TB residual changes in the upper part of the left lung in the form of dense focal lung lesions (category 5.1), and chronic bronchitis in the unstable remission stage. Medical treatment was prescribed. The parties did not specify the nature of that treatment. 42. The second applicant submitted that he was forced to remain in a bent position with his arms handcuffed behind his back during regular searches of his cell, for outside walks, and on the way to take showers. He provided the following description of the above-mentioned events. 43. Before the cell doors were opened, the applicant was asked to bend down, put his arms behind his back and insert them through a small window in the cell door to have them handcuffed. The guards then opened the cell door, took the prisoners out of the cell and performed a search of the inmates and the cell. During the search, the applicant and the rest of the inmates were kept in a bent position. Upon completion of the search, the applicant was taken back to the cell, the handcuffs were removed and he was allowed to stand up straight once the cell door had been closed. 44. In order to take outside walks, the applicant was taken out of the cell in a bent position with his arms handcuffed behind his back. He and the other inmates were forced to assume that position on the way to the exercise yard and back. The inmates were escorted by a group of prison guards and dogs. Sometimes that procedure was followed with beatings with rubber truncheons. 45. According to the prison schedule, the applicant was allowed a shower once a week. On the way to the shower facilities and back, he was forced to assume a bent position with his arms handcuffed behind his back. The water in the shower was sometimes cold and the shower itself lasted five minutes. The shower room was dark; it was equipped only with a small window, and there was no electric light inside. There was no heating in the shower room and in winter the temperature there was approximately 7-8oC. 46. The applicant was provided with 100 grams of soap per month for his hygiene needs. He received the rest of the hygiene products he needed from his mother. 47. The applicant had to wash and dry his clothes in the cell which, as a result, was damp. It was not possible to open the window and ventilate the cell in winter as the heating was too low and the cell got cold at once.

5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Katowice. 6. The applicant is a former activist of an anti-communist opposition group, who was interned in 1982. 7. He observed the trial against three high-ranking members of the communist-era Military Council of National Salvation who had ordered the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. 8. The trial in question, which lasted from 2007 until 2015, attracted a lot of public attention in Poland. 9. On 12 January 2012 the main defendant, General C.K. was convicted and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. This penalty was reduced by half under the Amnesty Act and its execution was suspended for five years in view of the defendant’s old age and poor health. Another defendant was acquitted and another had her case discontinued. On 15 June 2015 the appellate court upheld the first-instance judgment. 10. The applicant was in the courtroom when on 12 January 2012 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) was to deliver its judgment in the case described above. 11. At 1.30 p.m., after the judges had arrived in the courtroom, the applicant jumped behind the judge’s table and shouted: “This is a mockery of justice!” (Tutaj trwa kpina z wymiaru sprawiedliwości). 12. The judges left the courtroom. 13. Some other members of the audience shouted “Disgrace!” and “Court before the court!” (Hańba and Sąd pod sąd). They were all holding up photos of victims of the communist regime. 14. The applicant was forcibly removed from the courtroom. 15. Shortly afterwards, he returned and continued shouting out similar statements joint by other members of the audience. In view of the audience’s refusal to leave the courtroom, the judge who was presiding over the trial decided to announce the judgment from a different room. 16. At 3 p.m. the trial was resumed in a new room, with the public comprising only journalists. Here, in the applicant’s absence, the Warsaw Regional Court imposed on him a disciplinary custodial penalty of fourteen days for contempt of court (“for the breach of the solemn nature, serenity and the course of court proceedings, to the degree making the announcement of the judgment impossible”). 17. On 12 January 2012 a written decision, in the form of an extract from the court minutes as described in the preceding paragraph, was issued to that effect. 18. The applicant submitted that he had not been served with that decision or informed of it. 19. On the day of the trial in question, that is 12 January 2012, a warrant was issued ordering the applicant’s placement in a penal facility with a view to his serving the penalty. On 13 January 2012 a warrant to this effect was sent to Katowice police station together with a copy of the court’s decision imposing the disciplinary punishment. 20. On 19 January 2012 the applicant was served with a warrant and then arrested so that he could be committed to Warsaw Remand Centre to serve the penalty in a closed regime. 21. On 22 January 2012 the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against the decision imposing the custodial penalty. He argued that his one-minute statement had not disturbed the court to such an extent as to make it impossible to announce the judgment. He also submitted that if the presiding judge had told him to return to his seat, he would have complied. Since only a copy of the first page of the applicant’s appeal has been submitted to the Court, it is unclear whether the applicant had also raised the argument of the lack of impartiality of the judges who had punished him for contempt of court. 22. On 30 January 2012 this appeal was registered with the Registry of the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny). 23. On 31 January 2012 the applicant’s appeal was transferred to the Warsaw Regional Court for comment. 24. On 1 February 2012 the appeal together with the Regional Court’s comments was received by the Warsaw Court of Appeal. The appellate hearing was scheduled for 23 February 2012. 25. On 2 February 2012 – the fourteenth day of the applicant’s detention – the Prison Board of the Warsaw Remand Centre decided that the applicant should be detained under a semi-open regime (with the possibility to leave his cell during the day). 26. Following that decision, the applicant was transferred for several hours to a remand centre with a semi-open regime. 27. He was released later that day. 28. On an unspecified date, the appellate hearing was rescheduled because of the judge’s illness for 22 March 2012. 29. On 22 March 2012 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s interlocutory appeal, finding that the applicant’s disrespectful behaviour had interfered with the solemn nature of court proceedings and with the court’s dignity, and had disrupted the proceedings. His action had provoked the audience to shout similar slogans. It had been premeditated as the applicant had known that the announcement of the judgment had been scheduled for live media broadcast. The court also considered that the applicant’s behaviour could not be explained by an emotional disagreement with the court’s ruling because at the time of the incident the applicant had been unaware of the outcome of the trial. The applicant had wished to disturb the order of the proceedings irrespective of their result. In the domestic court’s view, imposing a more lenient penalty would have sanctioned unaccountability and would have lacked a deterrent effect.

5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Diyarbakır. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. 7. According to an incident report prepared by eight police officers on 28 May 2004, the authorities had obtained intelligence which suggested that at 3 p.m. on 28 May 2004 two members of the PKK (Workers’ Party of Kurdistan, an armed illegal organisation) would go to Adana, a big city in southern Turkey, on a motorbike in order to carry out terror attacks in shopping malls, the police headquarters and the courthouse. According to the intelligence, the code names of the two persons were “Küçük Şiyar” and “Botan”, and before carrying out the attacks they would meet outside a mosque in Adana. 8. Police officers, who had started taking security measures to stop and apprehend the two persons outside the mosque in question, received information at around 2.30 p.m. on 28 May 2004 that a red motorbike with two persons on it had been observed and was on its way towards the mosque. However, on their arrival outside the mosque the persons on the motorbike noticed the police presence in the area and drove on without stopping. The police officers gave chase in police cars and “Küçük Şiyar”, who was sitting on the back of the motorbike, drew his pistol and pointed it at a police car. The police car then hit the motorbike and the two persons fell to the ground. “Küçük Şiyar” stood up and fired at the police officers. The police officers returned fire and “Küçük Şiyar” fell to the ground. When the police officers realised that he was injured, they called an ambulance and sent him to hospital. The driver of the motorbike managed to flee the scene after falling from the motorbike. 9. The second suspect, “Botan”, was arrested outside the mosque by a number of different police officers while he was waiting for “Küçük Şiyar”. He was subsequently identified as M.G.A. 10. It appears from another report prepared by different police officers that at 3 p.m. on the same day a police chief and three police officers arrived at the scene of the incident after “Küçük Şiyar” had been shot but before he was taken to hospital. The four police officers noticed a pistol of 9 mm calibre with five bullets inside lying some 1.5 to 2 metres away from “Küçük Şiyar.” When the four police officers searched a bag they noticed on the motorbike they found a hand grenade. According to the report, the pistol, the hand grenade and the motorbike were then taken away by the four officers in order not to hinder the flow of traffic and to prevent panic among the public, as the incident had occurred on a busy street. 11. “Küçük Şiyar” was admitted to the hospital at 3 p.m. The doctors noted a bullet entry wound on his back and considered his condition to be life-threatening. He was taken into the operating theatre. Police officers at the hospital carried out a search of the pockets of the clothes worn by “Küçük Şiyar” and found 900 United States dollars and a handwritten note containing the scribbled words “800 g. potassium chloride” and “susceptible to friction and impact”. Neither his name nor his code name was written in any of the hospital records as they were not known to the hospital personnel at the time. 12. Crime-scene investigators arrived at the scene of the incident at 3.10 p.m. on the same day and conducted a search. According to a report prepared by the crime-scene investigators at 6.45 p.m. the same day, the motorbike was still at the scene of the incident on their arrival. During their search the crime-scene investigators found two 9 mm spent bullet cases and secured them as evidence. It was stated in the report that there were no other items of evidence such as “a bullet, blood[stains], [or] bullet marks”. It was also stated in the same report that swab samples had been taken from the hands of the injured person after his operation at the hospital. 13. According to a police report, on the same evening the driver of the motorbike, who was subsequently identified as M.N.B., was arrested by police officers. Moreover, on the same evening a certain M.K., who was suspected of having provided logistical support to the two men, was also arrested. M.K., who was shown a photograph of “Küçük Şiyar” that had been taken at the hospital, identified him as a person who had stayed at his house together with M.N.B. on the evening of 27 May 2004. 14. The pistol found next to “Küçük Şiyar” was examined by the forensic authorities and it was established that it had been used in another armed attack in Adana on 18 March 2004. The two spent bullet cases found at the scene (see paragraph 12 above) were also examined and it was established that they had been discharged from that pistol. 15. On 30 May 2004 “Küçük Şiyar” died at the hospital. His body was transferred to the Forensic Medicine Institute in order that a post-mortem examination could be carried out. 16. At 6.45 p.m. on 31 May 2004 M.N.B. was questioned at a police station. He told police officers that on 28 May 2004 “Küçük Şiyar” had asked him to give him a lift to Sabancı Mosque and that he had complied with that request. On their way to the mosque, “Küçük Şiyar” had asked him to take him to the courthouse instead, and shortly afterwards their motorbike had been hit by a car from behind and he had fled the scene. 17. On 1 June 2004 the prosecutor sent a letter to the hospital and asked for “the clothes of the as yet unidentified person who [had] died at the hospital on 30 May 2004” to be sent to him so that they could be forwarded to the forensic authorities for examination. On the same day the hospital informed the prosecutor that the clothes had been given to the police officers at the hospital when the injured person had been taken into the operating theatre. On the same day the prosecutor wrote to the police headquarters, asking them to return those clothes to his office urgently. In their reply of 3 June 2004 the police informed the prosecutor that the clothes had not been “handed over to the police headquarters”. 18. The police forensic laboratories prepared a report on 2 June 2004 pertaining to the examination of swab samples which had apparently been taken from the hands of M.N.B., M.K., M.G.A and a certain İ.T. and which had been sent to the laboratory “in an envelope”. It was established in the report that there were gunpowder residues on the swab samples taken from the hands of M.N.B. and İ.T. No gunpowder residues had been found on the swab samples taken from the hands of M.K. or M.G.A. 19. On 3 June 2004 the applicant went to the hospital, where he was shown the body of “Küçük Şiyar” which he identified as that of his son, Şiyar Perinçek, born in 1979. The applicant stated that his son had been studying at a university in Ankara and that he and his family had not heard from him in six years. The applicant added that he had been informed by an anonymous telephone caller the previous day that his son had been killed in Adana. The body of his son was released to the applicant the same day. 20. On the same day the police informed the prosecutor that the person who had initially been considered to be İ.T. and had been referred to as İ.T. in the Police Laboratory’s report of 2 June 2004 (see paragraph 18 above) was in fact the applicant’s son, Şiyar Perinçek. 21. Also on the same day, the Adana Branch of the Human Rights Association, a non-governmental organisation, submitted a petition to the prosecutor’s office. It was alleged in the petition that the shooting incident had taken place outside its offices and been witnessed by a number of people. According to those eyewitnesses, an unmarked car following a motorbike had drawn up next to the motorbike and the car’s door had opened, causing the two passengers on the motorbike to fall to the ground. One of the persons had stood up and started to run away and a person who had come out of the unmarked vehicle had put his knee in the small of the back of the person on the ground and fired two bullets into his back. That person had then collected the two spent bullet cases discharged from his pistol and put them in his coat pocket. Afterwards, according to the Human Rights Association, instead of taking the injured person to hospital, they had hauled him into a car and taken him to a number of locations. The other person on the motorbike, M.N.B., had tried to flee the scene but had been apprehended by the police and taken to a police station, where he had been subjected to serious ill-treatment. The petitioners requested the prosecutor to carry out an in-depth investigation into their allegations and to ensure that a detailed post-mortem examination would be conducted on the body. 22. On 16 June 2004 the prosecutor asked the Adana police headquarters to provide the names of the police officers who had been involved in the shooting incident on 28 May 2004 and to ensure their attendance in his office for questioning. The prosecutor also asked to be provided with copies of the forensic reports pertaining to the examinations conducted on the weapons used during the incident. The prosecutor was subsequently provided with the forensic reports summarised above (see paragraphs 14 and 18). The police also informed the prosecutor that the pistol used by the police officer in the shooting had not been forensically examined. 23. On 6 July 2004 the prosecutor questioned T.S., one of the police officers who had been at the hospital when the applicant’s son had been taken there. T.S. told the prosecutor that, although he had secured as evidence the money and the other items found in the pockets of Şiyar Perinçek, he had not taken away his clothes. 24. K.K., also a police officer, who was questioned the following day, told the prosecutor that Şiyar Perinçek’s clothes had been removed before Şiyar Perinçek had been taken into the operating theatre and that they had then been taken away by a plainclothes police officer, D.A.Y., in a black plastic bag. K.K. also gave the prosecutor a copy of the hospital ledgers, according to which the clothes had been handed over to a police officer. The prosecutor was subsequently informed on the same day that D.A.Y. had left for his annual leave for a month and could not therefore be questioned. 25. On 7 July 2004 the police headquarters forwarded to the prosecutor the names of the eight officers who had taken part in the incident of 28 May 2004 and who had also prepared the incident report on the same day (see paragraphs 7‑8 above). 26. On 9 July 2004 seven of the eight police officers mentioned in the preceding paragraph were questioned by the prosecutor as witnesses, while the eighth officer, D.Ö. – a police chief – was questioned as a suspect. D.Ö. told the prosecutor that the police had received intelligence on the day in question that two terrorists would carry out bomb attacks in Adana and that they had therefore taken the necessary precautionary measures around a mosque, where the two terrorists were to meet. When a motorbike with two persons on it fitting the description given to the police had arrived outside the mosque, the persons on the motorbike had noticed the police presence and driven on without stopping. D.Ö. and his seven colleagues in two unmarked police cars and a police motorbike had then given chase. As the person sitting on the back of the motorbike had drawn his pistol and aimed it at the officers riding on the police motorbike and in the other police car, D.Ö. had asked the driver of the vehicle in which he was travelling to approach the motorbike from its side and to hit it. The driver had complied and the two persons on the motorbike had fallen to the ground. D.Ö. had then got out of the car and told the two persons to surrender. The driver of the motorbike had managed to run away and the second person on the motorbike had fired two rounds towards D.Ö. D.Ö. had then fired towards him and at that moment one of the other police officers had jumped on the person and apprehended him. No other police officer had fired a weapon during the incident. Upon realising that the person had been injured, he and his colleagues had called an ambulance and transferred that person to hospital. D.Ö. denied the allegation that he had put his knee in the small of the back of the person on the ground and fired two bullets into his back (see paragraph 21 above), and told the prosecutor that if he had not shot the person, the person would have shot him. He had therefore acted within the statutory limits regulating the use of force and had not intended to kill the person. 27. The remaining seven officers made similar statements and denied the allegation that M.N.B. had been arrested at the place of the incident or that he had been ill-treated. 28. On 13 July 2004 the applicant joined the criminal investigation as an intervener. 29. A security guard who had been on duty at the hospital on 28 May 2004 told the prosecutor on 14 July 2004 that the applicant’s son had been taken into the operating theatre with his clothes on and that shortly afterwards the personnel in the operating theatre had removed those clothes and given them to plainclothes police officers from the anti-terrorism department waiting at the hospital. Although the contents of the applicant’s son’s pockets had been listed in an official document (see paragraph 11 above) and then handed over to the police officers, the clothes had not been listed in the document. 30. On 16 July 2004 the prosecutor filed an indictment with the Adana Assize Court (hereinafter “the trial court”) and charged the police chief, D.Ö. (see paragraph 26 above), with the offence of manslaughter on account of the killing of the applicant’s son. In the same indictment the prosecutor charged two other police chiefs with the offence of ill-treatment in respect of M.N.B.’s allegations (see paragraph 21 above). The applicant joined the criminal proceedings as an intervener. 31. On 27 August 2004 Amnesty International urged the national judicial authorities to carry out an effective investigation and to establish the full circumstances of the incident. The United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions also requested the Turkish Government to be provided with information concerning the killing. 32. During the hearing held on 21 December 2004 the applicant, with the assistance of the lawyers representing him, submitted his written observations to the trial court. The applicant argued that the version of the events concerning the shooting proffered by the defendant police officer did not represent the truth. He maintained that his son had been unarmed at the time of the shooting and alleged that the police officers had shot him at close range. He alleged that the police officers had been covering their tracks by destroying the evidence and that the clothes his son had been wearing at the time of his shooting had been taken away and lost by the police officers. The applicant also argued that, before the crime-scene officers had arrived at the scene of the incident, important evidence had been removed by another group of police officers (see paragraph 10 above). Moreover, although according to the report prepared by those police officers both pistols, the hand grenades and the motorbike had been taken away by them before the arrival of the crime-scene officers, according to the crime‑scene officers’ report the motorbike had still been at the scene on their arrival (see paragraph 12 above). 33. The applicant also criticised the method by which swab samples had been taken from the hands of his son. He argued in that connection that swab samples taken from the hands of a number of persons had been put in the same envelope (see paragraph 18 above) as that containing his son’s swab samples, which had caused the various swab samples to contaminate each other. Moreover, the forensic report pertaining to the examination of the swab samples allegedly taken from the hands of his son had not mentioned his son’s name but the name of İ.T. It was not possible, therefore, to accept that the swab samples with gunpowder residue had been taken from the hands of his son. The applicant informed the trial court that İ.T. had been on trial for terrorism-related offences and that it would not have been logical for his son to carry a wanted person’s identity card. The applicant also informed the trial court that İ.T. had been killed by the security forces on 29 June 2004. 34. The applicant argued that inconsistencies and irregularities such as the foregoing cast doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the investigation and showed that the police officers had manipulated the evidence. In this connection the applicant argued that it was highly suspicious that the bullet and the spent bullet case discharged from the defendant police chief’s pistol had not been recovered; in fact, there was no mention in any of the crime scene reports that the forensic authorities had even searched for that bullet or the spent bullet case. Similarly, the defendant police officer’s pistol had not been subjected to any forensic examinations after the incident. 35. During the trial M.N.B. maintained that on the day in question he had been about to go to Adana city centre on his motorbike when the applicant’s son had asked him for a lift. While riding the motorbike towards the city, he had stopped at a set of traffic lights and at that moment a car had hit them and they had fallen to the ground. At the time he had thought that they were about to be robbed and had panicked. Then he had heard gunfire and seen Şiyar Perinçek falling to the ground. A number of men had then apprehended both him and Şiyar. M.N.B. denied that Şiyar Perinçek had been armed or that he had fired at the police officers or that he had been carrying a bag on the motorbike (see paragraph 10 above). 36. On 3 December 2004 the report pertaining to the post-mortem examination conducted on the body of the applicant’s son on 30 May 2004 was forwarded to the trial court. According to the report, there was a bullet entry hole under his left armpit and a bullet exit hole in the right scapula. The doctors considered that death had been caused by the destruction of the internal organs and the ensuing medical complications. It was also stated in the post-mortem report that the applicant’s son had been shot through his clothes and that the distance from which he had been shot could not therefore be calculated, since the clothes worn by the deceased at the time of his shooting would have to be examined in order establish that distance. 37. During one of the hearings K.K. – the police officer who had told the prosecutor on 7 July 2004 that Şiyar Perinçek’s clothes had been taken away from the hospital by his colleague, D.A.Y. (see paragraph 24 above) – was examined by the trial court. This time K.K. told the trial court that Şiyar Perinçek had gone into the operating theatre with his clothes on and that his clothes had never been handed over to a police officer afterwards. The lawyers representing the applicant argued, in response, that the information in K.K.’s statement of 7 July 2004 had been unambiguous and alleged that K.K. had changed his story to protect his fellow colleagues. They stated that they would lodge a formal complaint against K.K. and his colleagues for obstructing the course of justice. 38. Subsequently the applicant’s lawyers informed the trial court that at their instigation an investigation had been opened into their allegations against the police officers and that a number of people working at the hospital at the time of the events had been questioned by a prosecutor. During the questioning the hospital personnel had told the prosecutor that Şiyar Perinçek’s clothes had been removed in the operating theatre and handed over to the police officers, who had been very anxious to take them away. The lawyers argued that the insistence of the police officers on taking the clothes away and their subsequently losing them proved that there had not been a shootout between Şiyar Perinçek and the police officers but that the police officers had shot Şiyar Perinçek at close range. 39. The defendant police officer, D.Ö., submitted his final written defence arguments to the trial court and maintained that the lack of burn marks around the bullet entry hole showed that he had not shot Şiyar Perinçek at close range. Şiyar Perinçek had not heeded his warnings to surrender and had instead opened fire on him. Thus, by shooting back he had acted in self-defence. 40. In his submissions to the trial court the prosecutor also argued that the defendant police officer had acted in self-defence. 41. On 6 March 2007 the applicant submitted his final arguments to the trial court. He repeated his earlier arguments and complaints and alleged that his son had been shot at close range. He invited the trial court to examine the autopsy report in detail with a view to establishing the distance from which his son had been shot. He submitted that the clothes his son had been wearing had been taken away by police officers with a view to hiding the fact that they had shot his son at close range. He argued that in the absence of the clothes, the sizes of the bullet entry and exit holes could help to ascertain the distance from which his son had been shot. The applicant also informed the trial court that the police officers working at the hospital had since been indicted and put on trial for neglecting their duties by losing his son’s clothes. 42. In its judgment of 6 March 2007 the trial court acquitted the defendant police officer, as it considered that the police officer had acted in self‑defence and had used proportionate force. The trial court concluded that the applicant’s son had been a member of a terrorist organisation and had come to Adana to carry out terrorist attacks. When the police officers had given chase to the motorbike, he had fired two rounds towards the police officers. The defendant police officer had then fired one round and injured the applicant’s son, and he had subsequently died in hospital. After the incident the police officers had found explosives in a bag on the motorbike. The pistol used by the applicant’s son and two spent cartridges had also been recovered at the site of the incident. The clothes worn by the applicant’s son at the time of the shooting had got lost during “the commotion at the hospital” and it had not therefore been possible to establish the distance from which he had been shot. However, as there had been no burns or gunpowder on and around the injury, it was apparent that he had not been shot at close range. 43. The applicant appealed against the judgment and repeated his earlier arguments. He complained that his arguments concerning defects in the investigation had not been taken into account by the trial court. Given that there was a large amount of evidence in the file showing that the clothes had been taken away from the hospital by the police officers, the conclusion reached by the trial court, namely that the clothes had got lost during “the commotion at the hospital”, was clearly wrong. The applicant also criticised the trial court’s conclusion that the shooting had not been carried out at close range because there had been no burn marks around the injury, and argued that no such conclusion could be reached in the absence of the clothes. 44. The appeal lodged by applicant against the judgment was rejected by the Court of Cassation on 5 March 2009. In its one-page decision the Court of Cassation stated that the applicant’s arguments that there had been failures in the investigation were not convincing. The decision was returned to the registry of the Adana Assize Court on 15 April 2009. 45. In the meantime, the criminal proceedings which had been brought against three police officers and a private security guard for having neglected their duties by losing Şiyar Perinçek’s clothes ended in their acquittal on 7 February 2007. The applicant appealed against their acquittal on 8 February 2007. On 6 June 2011 the Court of Cassation declined to examine the appeal as the offence in question had become statute-barred, and discontinued the criminal proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Yerevan. 6. On 11 March 2010 two individuals, S.T. and H.O., were arrested by the Georgian law-enforcement authorities in Tbilisi when they tried to sell 15 g of enriched uranium which they had transported from Armenia by train on the same day. 7. In April 2010 the National Security Service of Armenia received information from the Georgian authorities that S.T. and H.O. had received the radioactive substance from the applicant. On 22 April 2010 the National Security Service instituted criminal proceedings in relation to the matter. 8. On the same date the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having aided and abetted S.T. and H.O. in the offence. He was believed to have acquired the enriched uranium which he had then sold to H.O. in Yerevan. Thereafter, S.T. and H.O. had smuggled the radioactive substance to Tbilisi, where they had been arrested. 9. On 23 April 2010 the applicant was charged with aiding and abetting S.T. and H.O. in the offence. 10. The applicant denied the charges. His case was that H.O., whom he had known for about ten years, had owed him money for a long time. In February 2010 he had been robbed in Ukraine, and afterwards he had somehow reached Moscow to find a job but had then been obliged to return to Yerevan. However, since his money had been stolen, he had decided to ask H.O. (as the person who owed him money) to send him some money for his journey. After his return he had met H.O. in Yerevan several times in order to discuss financial matters relating to the payment of the rest of the debt. 11. On 28 April 2010 H.O. was questioned as a witness at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. He stated that, inter alia, the applicant had given him 1 g of a radioactive substance in either 2002 or 2003. At the beginning of March 2010 he and S.T. had asked the applicant, who had been in Russia at the time, whether he would be able to obtain radioactive substances. During the conversation the applicant had enquired about the price per gram that had been offered for such a substance. The next day he had called H.O. and offered to bring the requested radioactive substance to Armenia. Since the applicant had had no means to travel, they had transferred money to him. The applicant had arrived in Armenia several days later and given the radioactive substance to H.O. They had agreed that H.O. would pay the applicant after the deal. When asked whether he owed any money to the applicant, H.O. denied ever having borrowed from him. 12. On 29 April 2010 S.T. was also questioned as a witness at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. He stated, inter alia, that when he had been in Georgia, some people had offered to buy uranium from him. He had then gone to Armenia and asked H.O. to find the applicant so that he could provide them with uranium. S.T. further stated that H.O. had been in contact with the applicant, who had agreed to come to Armenia and give him uranium. Thereafter they had sent travel money to the applicant by bank transfer. He had then met H.O. at the railway station. H.O. had brought the radioactive substance back to Georgia and stated that he had taken it from the applicant. 13. On 8 December 2010 the bill of indictment was finalised and the case was transferred to the Tavush Regional Court for trial. The following evidence was relied on in the bill of indictment: the witness statements made by S.T. and H.O. in Georgia; other witness statements, in particular those of K.O. and V.G., made in Armenia; the conclusion of a forensic examination conducted in Georgia, according to which the substance seized from S.T. contained enriched uranium; regular telephone correspondence between the applicant and H.O. in the period between 1 September 2009 and 30 March 2010, and in particular two telephone calls made on 10 March 2010; and the relevant exit and entry stamps in the applicant’s passport proving that he had arrived in Yerevan from Moscow on 10 March 2010. 14. At one of the hearings before the Regional Court, relying, inter alia, on the Strasbourg Convention of 1959 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the applicant requested the temporary transfer of S.T. and H.O. from the prison in Georgia so that they could be examined at the trial. 15. His request was granted. Thus, on 27 January 2011 the presiding judge ordered S.T.’s and H.O’s temporary transfer to Armenia. 16. By a letter of 29 April 2011, the Ministry of Justice of Georgia, refused to grant the request by referring to Article 11 § 1(b) of the Strasbourg Convention, which states that a request for assistance may be refused if “his or her presence is necessary at criminal proceedings pending in the territory of the requested Party”. The Ministry of Justice added that S.T.’s and H.O.’s had been convicted by a judgment of the Tbilisi Court of Appeal of 30 March 2011, but that the judgment was still open to an appeal on points of law. 17. On 6 May 2011 the applicant’s representative allowed the Regional Court to continue with the examination of the case even if S.T. and H.O. could not be transferred to Armenia, since the applicant was ill. However, he asked the court not to rely in its judgment on the testimony given in Georgia by those absent witnesses. 18. At a hearing of 24 May 2011 the presiding judge informed the parties of the reply received from the Ministry of Justice of Georgia. 19. At the same hearing the applicant asked to summon S.G. – the conductor of the train who had been questioned during the investigation – as a witness, on the grounds that some of his statements were in contradiction with the statements of S.T. and H.O. The trial court rejected that application, considering it unfounded. 20. On 25 May 2011 the Regional Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment, and ordered the confiscation of his property. In doing so, the Regional Court relied on the statements of S.T. and H.O. made during the questioning in Georgia; the statements of the witnesses V.D. and K.O. – the applicant’s friend and H.O.’s daughter respectively; the results of forensic examinations carried out in Georgia and Armenia confirming that the substance discovered contained enriched uranium; the evidence of telephone correspondence between the applicant and H.O.; and the existence of exit and entry stamps in the applicant’s passport proving that he had arrived in Yerevan from Moscow on 10 March 2010. 21. The applicant lodged an appeal, complaining, inter alia, about the lack of opportunity to cross-examine S.T. and H.O. at trial and about the trial court’s refusal to summon S.G. 22. On 13 July 2011 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction. The judgment did not address the applicant’s arguments regarding the fact that S.T. and H.O. could not be examined and the refusal to examine witness S.G. 23. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those put forward in the previous appeal. 24. By a decision of 17 September 2011 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.

5. The first applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Dnipro, Ukraine. The applicant bank was a commercial joint-stock bank based in Ukraine with its registered office in Zaporizhzhya. Its banking licence was revoked on 11 January 2001 (see paragraph 12 below). Subsequently, the applicant bank was liquidated (see paragraph 19 below). 6. The first applicant was the vice-president, founder and majority shareholder of the applicant bank. 7. In February and March 2000 the domestic authorities instituted two sets of criminal proceedings for tax evasion and abuse of office by the management of the applicant bank. 8. In March 2000 the first applicant was arrested as part of the criminal proceedings (for more details see Feldman v. Ukraine, nos. 76556/01 and 38779/04, 8 April 2010). In April 2000 the Ukrainian news agency UNIAN reported on a session of the Coordination Committee on Combating Corruption and Organised Crime. The relevant extract reads: “‘It is a matter of honour for the General Prosecutor’s Office and the State Tax Administration to bring the story of Slovyanskyy Bank to its logical conclusion,’ said the President of Ukraine during his speech at the session ... He stated that the chairs of the bank had turned it into a source of uncontrolled personal income. ‘Such money‑makers have powerful patrons, and there is great pressure on the investigation,’ stated the President.” 9. On 29 June 2000 the National Bank of Ukraine (“the NBU”) suspended the applicant bank’s licence for some of its operations, considering that its financial position had deteriorated sharply and that it had been performing risky operations which threatened its solvency. 10. In July 2000 an investigator from the tax police of the State Tax Administration, acting in the course of the criminal proceedings, ordered an attachment of the applicant bank’s securities. 11. On 18 September 2000 the NBU put the applicant bank under temporary administration, which involved suspending the functions of some of the bank’s managers. 12. On 11 January 2001 the NBU issued a resolution “On the Liquidation of Slovyanskyy Commercial Joint-Stock Bank” by which, among other things, (1) the applicant bank’s operating licence was revoked in full; (2) the powers of the board, the council and the general shareholders’ meetings were terminated; and (3) the applicant bank was ordered to be liquidated. By the same resolution the NBU approved the composition of a liquidation commission for the bank, consisting of eleven officials from the regional departments of the NBU and two members of staff from the local tax office. 13. On 5 March 2001 the first applicant, who was in detention at the time, brought a claim under the rules of Chapter 31-A of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1963 with the Pechersky District Court of Kyiv, challenging the NBU’s decision. He maintained that the impugned resolution was unlawful and that the NBU had decided to liquidate the applicant bank owing to its failure to fulfil its financial obligations, whereas that failure had been caused by the NBU itself and the tax authorities. The first applicant emphasised that after the resolution had been adopted, the applicant bank had not been able to protect its rights and interests on its own. He added that the resolution had been detrimental to the interests of the applicant bank’s shareholders, including himself. 14. On 26 June 2001 the court found that the first applicant could bring a claim, however, it had to be dismissed. The court held that the NBU had been competent to adopt the impugned resolution, that the measures taken had been lawful and that they had been made necessary by gross violations of banking legislation by the applicant bank and its difficult financial position. 15. The first applicant appealed against that decision. 16. On 5 July 2002 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 26 June 2001 in part, but changed its reasoning. It held that the NBU’s resolution of 11 January 2001 had not concerned the first applicant and it had not been established during the determination of the claim that his rights and freedoms had been violated. For those reasons the court of appeal dismissed the claim. 17. The first applicant appealed on points of law. 18. On 21 April 2005 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed the decisions of 26 June 2001 and 5 July 2002 and terminated the proceedings, considering that the claim was inadmissible. It found as follows: “... The first and second-instance courts have established that Mr B.M. Feldman brought a claim as a shareholder of Slovyanskyy Bank, however he did not request the protection of his own rights and freedoms but, in fact, acted in the interests of Slovyanskyy Bank, without being duly authorised [bold text in the original]. According to Articles 1 and 12 of the Code of Commercial Proceedings, disputes between a subject of entrepreneurial activities and enterprises, institutions and organisations concerning the protection of their rights and freedoms, and their disputes concerning the declaration of legal acts as invalid, should be examined by the commercial courts. Given that a shareholder is not entitled to apply to a court for the examination of such a dispute and that this case is not to be examined in accordance with civil procedure, the decisions adopted in this case should be quashed and the proceedings should be terminated, in accordance with Article 136 § 2 (1) and Article 227 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure ...” 19. The liquidation process of the applicant bank was completed on 30 November 2012. The bank was removed from the legal entities official database on 4 August 2014.

6. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Pskov. 7. At about 2 a.m. on 17 August 2005 the applicant was travelling in a car with B. – who was driving – M. and T. Their car was stopped by the police. Police Officers F. and K. asked for their ID cards. The applicant, who did not have his ID card on him, was taken to Zavelichenskiy police station in Pskov. 8. The applicant described events at the police station as follows. F. and K. had demanded that he stand facing a wall, hands raised, and had searched him. They had allegedly insulted him verbally and physically. In particular, they had punched him repeatedly in the face and the lumbar region and had tried to knock him down. 9. They then took him to the Pskov regional addiction-treatment clinic. When coming out of the police station they were approached by B., M., T. and I., the applicant’s brother. According to statements by B. and I., the applicant was depressed, his sweater was dirty and the bridge of his nose was red. I. also saw injuries on the applicant’s torso when he asked the applicant to lift his sweater. 10. At 2.56 a.m. a doctor at the addiction-treatment clinic carried out a breath test and tested his coordination. She stated in a record of “medical examination for establishment of alcohol consumption and state of inebriation” that the applicant’s examination had been initiated by Officer K. in connection with an administrative offence, and that the applicant had consumed alcohol but had revealed no signs of inebriation. She noted in the part of the record concerning the tested person’s “appearance” that the applicant had no injuries, and in the part concerning “vegetative-vascular reactions” that his face was “hyperemic”. 11. According to the applicant, the doctor did not ask him to undress and did not examine his body. Nor was he asked to sign the record of his examination or given its copy. 12. After the test the applicant was taken back to the police station. At the request of a police officer he signed a statement that at about 1 a.m. on 17 August 2005, when passing by a bus stop in B.’s car, he had called out through an open window to girls at the bus stop inviting them for a drive in the car. After that a police car had followed them and B. had stopped the car. The police officers had ordered him to proceed with them to the police station “for the reason that he had used foul language”. 13. At about 5 a.m. he was released. 14. At 10 a.m. the applicant was examined at his request by a forensic-medical expert at the Pskov Regional Forensic-Medical Bureau. The applicant explained that he had been punched and kicked by two police officers at about 2 a.m. that day. According to the medical report, the applicant had the following injuries: (i) an abrasion measuring 1.2 by 0.2 cm on the bridge of the nose, (ii) a bruise measuring 2 cm by 2 cm in the area of the right cheekbone, (iii) a bruise measuring 2.5 by 1 cm on a finger of the left hand, and (iv) a bruise measuring 2.5 by 2 cm on the left side of the lumbar region. The expert concluded that the injuries, which were not considered harmful to the applicant’s health, could have been caused on that day by hard blunt objects, for example by fists or feet. 15. On the same day Officer K. lodged a criminal complaint that at 2.10 a.m. on 17 August 2005 the applicant had sworn at him through an open car window when passing by. In the course of enquiries into the police officer’s allegations the applicant denied swearing or any other misbehaviour on his part. The Pskov police found no elements of criminal offences such as hooliganism (Article 213 § 1 of the Criminal Code) or insult of a public official (Article 319 of the Criminal Code) in the applicant’s actions and refused to institute criminal proceedings against him (decision of 24 August 2005). 16. On 22 August 2005 the applicant complained to the Pskov town prosecutor’s office about the unlawful actions of the police officers, indicating their service identification numbers. 17. Investigators of the Pskov town prosecutor’s office carried out a pre‑investigation inquiry and refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant’s complaint. Their two decisions of 7 October and 2 December 2005 were annulled by their superiors, who considered that the decisions had been based on an incomplete inquiry. 18. In the most recent refusal of 23 December 2005 to institute criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in the actions of the police officers, the investigator established the facts as follows, relying on the police officers’ statements. At 2 a.m. on 17 August 2005 the applicant had addressed F. and K. with foul language from the window of his car, which had stopped near their police car. After that, the car with the applicant had started driving away. F. and K. had pursued the car and stopped it. They had taken the applicant to the police station. K. had explained to the applicant that he had been arrested for having committed a criminal offence under Article 319 of the Criminal Code (insult of a public official). On their way to the police station the applicant had behaved provocatively and threatened the police officers that they would have problems at work and would be dismissed. During the applicant’s escorting to the police station the police officers had not used physical force or any means of restraint. F. and K. had taken the applicant from the police station to an addiction-treatment clinic for a medical examination because he had been drunk. Before leaving for the clinic they had been approached by the applicant’s brother, who had enquired about the reasons for the applicant’s detention and a further procedure. The applicant’s brother had suggested that the applicant should have simulated concussion and complained that he had been beaten up by the police officers. 19. The investigator further noted that the drug-clinic doctor had not recorded any injuries on the applicant; and that in his statement signed at the police station the applicant had not denied using foul language and had not complained of any use of force or means of restraint against him. The investigator dismissed statements by I., M. and T. in support of the applicant’s allegations as unreliable and held that the applicant’s allegations had not been confirmed. 20. On 31 January 2006 the Pskov Town Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the investigator’s decision of 23 December 2005. It noted that F. and K. had “categorically” denied that they had beaten up the applicant. It held that there was no evidence of the applicant’s ill‑treatment at the police station and that his injuries could have been received in “other circumstances”. On 22 March 2006 the Pskov Regional Court upheld the Town Court’s decision on the applicant’s appeal. It stressed that there had been no eyewitnesses to the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment, and that the applicant had not complained of any ill-treatment to the drug-clinic doctor. Referring to the “categorical” denial of any ill-treatment by F. and K., the Regional Court held that the applicant had failed to prove his ill-treatment and that he could have received his injuries in “other circumstances” on 17 August 2005, in a time span between his examination at the addiction‑treatment clinic and his examination by the forensic-medical expert. 21. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Novyy Toryal in the Mariy-El Republic. 22. At about 1 a.m. on 31 March 2007 a car without a licence plate, in which the applicant and other young men were going home after a party, was stopped by the traffic police officer. Soon another police car arrived with four or five police officers who, according to the applicant, pushed him and the other young men to the ground, and punched and kicked them. The applicant identified the police officers as M., O., S., V. and Zh. 23. The applicant and the other three men were taken to the police station in Novyy Toryal, where they arrived at 1.45 a.m. 24. According to the applicant, the events at the police station were as follows. Police Officers M., O. and S. interviewed him, asking who had been driving the car and whether the car had been stolen. The applicant denied that he had been driving the car and stated that the driver had run away and that he did not know him. The police officers repeatedly punched and kicked him in the head and on other parts of his body. 25. At 3.20 a.m. the applicant and the others were released. The applicant’s mother met them at the police station and called the ambulance. All four men were taken to the emergency unit of Novyy Toryal Central District Hospital, where they were recorded as having injuries. 26. The applicant was examined at 3.26 a.m. and admitted to the hospital surgical unit in a condition of “medium seriousness” at 4.20 a.m. His right ear was swollen and bleeding. He had a swelling on the back of the head measuring 7 by 4 cm, numerous bruises on the face and temples, and numerous abrasions on the back, neck, shoulders, the right side of the torso and one of his fingers. He had no alcohol on his breath. He was diagnosed with closed craniocerebral injury, brain contusion, traumatic perforation of the right eardrum and numerous contusions to the head and the lumbar region. He was exempted from attending school until 22 April 2007 due to his temporary disability on account of the closed craniocerebral injury and concussion. The hospital communicated information about the applicant’s hospitalisation with injuries allegedly received as a result of his ill‑treatment by police officers to the Novyy Toryal police. 27. On 31 March 2007 the Novyy Toryal police officers reported to their superior that they had pursued a car which had had no licence plates and had not stopped at their initial order. When the car had eventually stopped, several young men, seemingly drunk, had sworn at them, refused to get into the police car and tried to run away. The police officers had used force to overcome their resistance, managing to restrain them on the ground and search them, and had then taken them to the police station. 28. On the same day the applicant’s mother complained to the Novyy Toryal district prosecutor’s office about the unlawful actions of the police officers. An investigator of the Novyy Toryal district prosecutor’s office carried out a pre-investigation inquiry into her complaint. 29. On 4 April 2007 the applicant was examined by a forensic-medical expert from the Novyy Toryal division of the Mariy-El Republic Forensic‑Medical Bureau. The applicant had bruises around both eyes and an abrasion measuring 4 by 2 cm on the back of the head. Having examined the applicant’s hospital records, the expert concluded in a report of 13 April 2007 that the applicant’s injuries, notably brain contusion, traumatic perforation of the right eardrum, bruises on the face, abrasions on the head, torso and limbs and swelling in the lumbar region, could have been sustained on 31 March 2007 by impacts from hard, blunt objects. The injuries had resulted in short-term health issues for the applicant including a temporary incapacity for work lasting up to three weeks, that is to say minor harm to his health. 30. On 8 May 2007 the Novyy Toryal police brought administrative proceedings against the applicant, issuing administrative-offence records and a decision which stated that at 1 a.m. on 31 March 2007 the applicant had driven a car without a licence plate and without a driving licence and had not stopped the car on a police officer’s repeated order. A fine was imposed on the applicant. 31. On 9 May 2007 a deputy prosecutor of the Novyy Toryal district prosecutor’s office decided that material concerning the applicant’s unlawful driving on 31 March 2007 should be examined separately from the material concerning the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment. 32. On 20 May 2007 the Novyy Toryal police decided that no criminal proceedings should be brought against the applicant, whose actions disclosed no elements of a crime under Article 166 § 1 of the Criminal Code (carjacking). It found that it had been the applicant who had been driving the car with no licence plates before being stopped by the police on 31 March 2007. The applicant had bought it from a third person. However, he had not paid the full price and the previous owner had not given him the documents necessary for re‑registering the car in his name and obtaining licence plates. 33. Investigators of the Novyy Toryal district prosecutor’s office thrice refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment for lack of the elements of a crime in the police officers’ actions. The refusals were annulled by their superiors, who considered that the inquiry was incomplete. 34. In the most recent decision of 22 June 2007 the investigator, relying on the police officers’ statements, established the facts as follows. During the night of 30-31 March 2007 the applicant, who had been driving a car without a licence plate, had disobeyed a traffic policeman’s order to stop and had tried to escape, thereby violating the traffic rules and committing administrative offences. However, administrative proceedings had not been brought against him in accordance with the law as a result of negligence on the part of the police officers responsible for drawing up administrative-offence records. The police had acted lawfully in apprehending the applicant and taking him to the police station. Officers O., M., S., V., S.K. and N.K. had lawfully used physical force in the course of the applicant’s apprehension, as a result of which he had sustained the injuries described in the forensic-medical expert’s report. 35. That decision was declared lawful and well-founded by the Novyy Toryal district deputy prosecutor (report of 24 June 2007) and by the Novyy Toryal District Court (decision of 14 August 2007, upheld by the Mariy‑El Supreme Court on 26 September 2007). 36. On 25 February 2013 the Mariy-El Republic deputy prosecutor annulled the decision of 22 June 2007 as unlawful and unfounded and ordered a fresh pre-investigation inquiry. 37. The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Diveyevo in Nizhniy Novgorod Region. 38. At about 11 p.m. on 24 March 2007 the applicant was attending a discotheque at the Diveyevo Cultural Centre when he was approached by Police Officer K., who led him to the police car and took him to the Diveyevo district police station. According to the applicant, Police Officer K. twisted his arms behind his back when leading him to the car. 39. According to the applicant the events at the police station were as follows. He was requested to stand facing the wall. K., who wore army-type boots, kicked him at least ten times on the legs. Then he was placed in an administrative-detention cell, where he stayed until his release at about noon on 26 March 2007. 40. In reports to their superiors dated 24 March 2007 Officer K. and two police trainees stated that at 11.30 p.m. on 24 March 2007 at the Diveyevo Cultural Centre the applicant, who had been drunk, had used foul language in their presence, ignoring their orders to stop. 41. N., a police officer on duty at the Diveyevo police station, drew up an administrative-detention record, in which he stated that the applicant, who had committed petty hooliganism, had been subjected to administrative detention for the purpose of the averting the offence. No injuries on the applicant were mentioned in the part of the record concerning the routine procedure of inspection of detainees for injuries. The time of the record was drawn up was indicated as 11.30 p.m. on 24 March 2007. 42. Officer T. drew up an administrative-offence record, in which he stated that at 11.30 p.m. on 24 March 2007 at the Diveyevo Cultural Centre the applicant, who was drunk, had used foul language and ignored police officers’ orders to stop. He had thereby committed an administrative offence of petty hooliganism. The time of the drawing-up the record was indicated as 11.40 p.m. on 24 March 2007. The acting head of the Diveyevo district police issued the applicant a fine of 1,000 Russian roubles (RUB). The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 43. After his release from the police station, at 3.20 p.m. on 26 March 2007 the applicant was examined by a doctor at Diveyevo Hospital, who recorded bruises on the interior of the left calf (in the upper and middle parts), an abrasion on the front of the left shin, a bruise on the left ankle, a bruise on the right knee, a bruise on the left elbow, and an abrasion on the left hand. The applicant was diagnosed with contusions of the left shin, left ankle, right knee and left elbow, and abrasions of the left shin and left hand. 44. The hospital passed on information about the applicant’s injuries, allegedly inflicted by the police, to the Diveyevo district prosecutor’s office. On the same day the applicant lodged a criminal complaint seeking K.’s prosecution. An investigator of the prosecutor’s office carried out a pre‑investigation inquiry. 45. On 27 March 2007 the applicant was examined by a forensic‑medical expert from the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Forensic‑Medical Bureau. The applicant had two bruises on the interior of the left calf (in the upper and middle parts) measuring 7 by 3 cm and 10 by 5 cm, a 1.5 by 0.5 cm bruise on the front of the left shin, a 2 by 1 cm bruise on the left ankle, and a 3 by 1.5 cm bruise on the left elbow. He also had an abrasion on the front of the left shin measuring 1.5 by 0.8 cm, an abrasion on the right ankle measuring 1 by 0.4 cm and an abrasion on the left hand measuring 3 by 2 cm. The areas of the back of the left shoulder in the middle part, the left knee, the left shin and the left ankle were painful at palpation. The expert concluded that the injuries, which had not resulted in harm to the applicant’s health, had been caused by hard blunt objects two or three days before the examination, as a result of at least five traumatic impacts (report of 27 March 2007). In reply to the investigator’s additional question as to whether the applicant could have received the injuries when getting into the police car, the expert stated that such a possibility could not be excluded. 46. The Diveyevo district police carried out an internal inquiry into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment, in the course of which K., other police officers and witnesses gave statements about the events in question. On 28 April 2007 the head of the Diveyevo district police approved a report on the inquiry in which the facts were established as follows. After 10 p.m. on 24 March 2007 K. and two police trainees had approached the applicant and rebuked him for using foul language; he had ignored their commands and continued swearing; K. had ordered that he go with them to the police station but he had refused; K. took him by the sleeve and led him to the police car; they took the applicant to the police station. It was established that no physical force had been used against the applicant. A number of other internal inquiries into the same events were carried out later, with the most recent one (report of 4 March 2013 approved by an acting head of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional police force) finding no disciplinary misconduct in K.’s actions. There was no mention in the report of the applicant receiving injuries when getting into the police car. Nor did K. mention it in his statements given in the course of the internal inquiry on 30 November 2007. K. stated that no physical force or means of restraint had been used against the applicant for lack of resistance on his part. 47. Investigators refused to institute criminal proceedings against Police Officer K. Their refusal was annulled five times by their superiors, who considered that their inquiry was incomplete. 48. The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in K.’s actions was taken on 2 September 2008 by an investigator from the Sarov investigative committee of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor’s office. Relying on statements by K. and other police officers, who had denied any violence against the applicant, the investigator held that the applicant could have received the injuries when getting into the police car before being taken to the police station on 24 March 2007. The investigator’s decision was declared lawful and well‑founded in the Sarov Town Court’s decision of 16 January 2009, upheld by the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court on 13 March 2009. 49. In May 2013 the applicant was examined by a psychiatrist. He complained of a sleep disorder on account of his ill-treatment in police custody on 24 March 2007. He was diagnosed with sleep disorder related to the legs injuries sustained on that day and recommended a consultation and treatment by a neurologist and a trauma specialist. 50. The applicant was born in 1969 and lived in Cheboksary. 51. At about 12.30 a.m. on 29 June 2006 the applicant’s car was stopped by Officers V. and Z. of the traffic police. According to the applicant, they knocked him to the ground and kicked him repeatedly. The police officers then drew up records, stating that he was drunk. He disagreed, requesting that he be taken for a medical examination which would confirm that he was not. The police officers took him to the Kaliniskiy district police station instead. 52. According to records drawn up by V. between 12.30 a.m. and 1.50 a.m.: (i) the applicant was suspended from driving because he had signs of alcohol intoxication (alcohol on his breath, red eyes and slurred speech); (ii) he had been ordered to undergo a medical examination to determine whether he had been in a state of alcohol intoxication, but he had refused to do so; (iii) his car had been impounded; and (iv) the applicant had been found to have committed an administrative offence by refusing to undergo a medical examination at the request of the police. 53. At the police station V. and Z. reported to their superior that the applicant had disobeyed their order to stop his car; that they had pursued him until he had eventually stopped; that he had resisted arrest; and that in order to apprehend him they had twisted his arm behind his back, as a result of which he had fallen. 54. At about 5 a.m. the applicant was released from the Kaliniskiy district police station. 55. On the same day both the applicant and Officer Z. lodged criminal complaints with the Kalininskiy district prosecutor’s office, Cheboksary. The applicant complained that he had been beaten up by V. and Z. The latter complained that in the course of the applicant’s apprehension he had hurt his hand when they both had fallen. 56. On 30 June 2006 an investigator ordered the applicant’s forensic‑medical examination, which was carried out on 3 July 2006. A forensic-medical expert from the Chuvashia Republic Forensic-Medical Bureau recorded ten abrasions measuring from 0.2 by 0.1 cm to 10 by 5 cm on the upper and middle parts of the lower right arm, on the right wrist and on both knees. The applicant also had four bruises on the middle part of the right upper arm and on the upper and middle parts of the left upper arm, measuring 1.6 by 1.2 cm, 1.7 by 1.3 cm, 0.9 by 0.3 cm and 0.2 by 0.2 cm. The expert concluded that all injuries, which had not resulted in harm to the applicant’s health, could have been caused by hard blunt objects. 57. On 3 August 2006 the Justice of the Peace of Court Circuit no. 7 of the Kalininskiy District of Cheboksary held a hearing in the administrative proceedings against the applicant. The applicant contested the police officers’ versions of events on 29 June 2006 and stated that he had not been drunk and had demanded to undergo a medical examination that would have confirmed that fact; however, the police officers had not let him be examined. His statements were supported by a witness. The court found the applicant guilty of disobedience of a police officer’s lawful order to undergo a medical examination to detect alcohol intoxication, and sentenced him to the seizure of his driving licence for a year and a half. On 31 August 2006 the Kalininskiy District Court, following a prior appeal by the applicant, upheld the judgment. 58. Investigators refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant’s alleged ill‑treatment by the police officers. Their refusals were annulled by their superiors more than twenty times on the grounds that they had been based on an incomplete inquiry. On several occasions the Kalininskiy District Court of Cheboksary rejected the applicant’s appeals on the grounds that the investigators’ decisions had already been annulled. On two occasions the District Court granted the applicant’s appeals and found the decisions unlawful and unfounded. 59. The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in the police officers’ actions was issued on 28 September 2009 by an investigator from the Cheboksary inter-district investigative committee. Relying on the reports by Officers V. and Z. and similar statements given by them later, the investigator held that the applicant’s injuries had been the result of the lawful use of force by the police officers during his arrest. The investigator’s decision was declared lawful and well‑founded in the Kalininskiy District Court’s decision of 12 November 2009, and was upheld by the Chuvashia Supreme Court on 17 December 2009. 60. In the same decision of 28 September 2009 the investigator dismissed the criminal complaint lodged by Z., finding no fault on the part of the applicant as Z. had fallen and hurt his hand when arresting him. 61. The applicant brought civil proceedings, seeking to have the investigating authority’s failure to carry out an effective investigation declared unlawful and claiming compensation. On 26 May 2008 the Leninskiy District Court dismissed his application, finding that he had failed to prove that the investigating authority had acted unlawfully, that he had been harmed as a result of its actions or inaction, that there had been a causal connection between specific unlawful behaviour and any harm, and that there had been evidence of an alleged tortfeasor’s liability. It held that domestic law did not provide for compensation of non‑pecuniary damage in a case of a delayed decision in reply to a criminal complaint or in a case of the annulment of such a decision. On 30 June 2008, following an appeal by the applicant, the Chuvashia Supreme Court upheld the judgment. 62. The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Novocheboksarsk. 63. At about 6 a.m. on 8 February 2008 the applicant and other young men, who were sitting in his parked car, were approached by traffic-police officers and taken to Novocheboksarsk police station following a complaint from a certain P. that they had broken a window in her car and tried to steal a child seat. The applicant was handcuffed. 64. The applicant described events at the police station as follows. One of the police officers had grabbed him by the neck with one hand and by his head with the other and hit his face against a wall. The applicant’s two front teeth had fallen out and he had felt unwell. Later, he had asked to have the handcuffs removed as they had been causing him pain. Instead, a police officer lifted his hands shackled behind him, inflicting more pain. 65. According to the records drawn up by Officer B. between 6.50 a.m. and 9.20 a.m. on 8 February 2008: (i) the applicant was suspended from driving because he had signs of alcohol intoxication (alcohol on his breath, red eyes and trembling fingers); (ii) he was ordered to undergo a medical examination for detecting alcohol intoxication, but refused to do so; (iii) his car was impounded; and (iv) the applicant was found to have committed an administrative offence by refusing to undergo a medical examination at the request of the police. The applicant was subsequently found guilty of disobeying a police officer’s lawful order to undergo a medical examination for detecting alcohol intoxication, and sentenced to the seizure of his driving licence for a year and a half (judgment of the Justice of the Peace of Court Circuit no. 5 of Novocheboksarsk of 14 March 2008, and was upheld by the Novocheboksarsk Town Court on 19 May 2008). 66. In a report to his superior, Officer M. stated that the applicant had behaved aggressively at the police station and that he himself had hit his head against a wall and had broken his tooth. 67. No criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant in relation to P.’s complaint in respect of the attempted theft of a child seat (Novocheboksarsk town police decision of 18 February 2008). 68. After his release at about 6 p.m. on 8 February 2008 the applicant was examined by a doctor at the traumatology unit of the Novocheboksarsk town hospital. The applicant had abrasions on the right side of his face, his lip, the left side of his neck and the wrists, and the crowns of two upper teeth on the right side were broken. On the same day he was examined by a dentist who recorded that the upper front tooth on the right was missing, the crown of the next tooth to the right was broken, and that the two lower front teeth were loose as a result of a traumatic subluxation. 69. On 12 February 2008 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint that he had been ill-treated at the police station. The Novocheboksarsk investigative committee at the Chuvashiya Republic prosecutor’s office carried out a pre-investigation inquiry. 70. An investigator obtained an opinion of a forensic-medical expert from the Novocheboksarsk division of the Chuvashia Republic Forensic-Medical Bureau, who considered that the applicant’s injuries could have been received within twenty-four hours of the applicant’s medical examination on 8 February 2008, as a result of an impact from a hard blunt object, for example as a result of hitting a wall as regards the injuries to the front teeth, lip and face. The injuries had resulted in short-term health problems lasting up to three weeks, that is to say minor harm to the applicant’s health. 71. Investigators of the Novocheboksarsk investigative committee refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant’s alleged ill‑treatment by the police. Their refusal was annulled fourteen times by their superiors, who considered that it had been based on an incomplete inquiry, and a fresh pre‑investigation inquiry was ordered. 72. The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in the police officers’ actions was taken by an investigator on 5 November 2009. He cited the police officers’ statements that the applicant had tried to run away, they had therefore handcuffed him in order to take him to the police station, where the applicant himself had struck his face against a wall. Relying on the police officers’ statements, the investigator concluded that the applicant had inflicted the injuries on himself by striking his face against a wall at the police station, and that the abrasions on his neck and wrists had been a result of the lawful use of force by the police officers in the course of his arrest. The investigator’s decision was declared lawful and well-founded by the Novocheboksarsk Town Court’s decision of 23 April 2010, and was upheld by the Chuvashia Supreme Court on 25 May 2010. 73. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Moscow. 74. At about 5.20 a.m. on 28 May 2008 the applicant was arrested by Police Officers P. and V. in a twenty-four-hour shop and taken to the Mitino district police station of the Moscow North-Western administrative circuit. According to the applicant, in the police car he was slapped in the face several times, and at the police station the police officers repeatedly punched him in the head and other parts of the body and kicked him in the chest. 75. In their reports concerning the incident the police officers did not mention that the applicant had had any injuries. 76. In a record of the applicant’s administrative detention at 5.30 a.m. on 28 May 2008, drawn up at 5.32 a.m. that day, an officer on duty at the police station noted the applicant’s complaint that the police officers had inflicted injuries on him. The record further stated that the applicant’s examination had revealed no injuries on him. 77. At 6 a.m. the applicant was examined by a doctor at an addiction‑treatment hospital and was found to be in a state of alcohol intoxication. The doctor noted that the applicant was handcuffed and had abrasions on his face. 78. According to an administrative-offence record drawn up on 28 May 2008 by the officer on duty, at 5.20 a.m. on 28 May 2008 the applicant had breached public order by using foul language in a public place and ignoring police officers’ requests to stop. On the same day the Justice of the Peace of the Mitino District Court Circuit no. 175 found that the applicant had committed petty hooliganism and imposed a RUB 500 fine on him. The applicant, who pleaded guilty, did not appeal against the judgment. He was released after the hearing. 79. On the same day he was examined by a doctor at polyclinic no. 229 who recorded bruising to the area of both eyes and the nose, bleeding of the sclera of both eyes, a fractured nose and a possible concussion. On 3 June 2008 the applicant was examined at town hospital no. 71 and diagnosed with acute right‑side perforated post-traumatic otitis and bruising of the soft tissue of the head, in particular in the area of the left eye and the cheek bones. On 9 June 2008 he was examined at polyclinic no. 2 and diagnosed with hearing difficulties on both sides and acute right‑side perforated post‑traumatic otitis. 80. Following the applicant’s criminal complaint of 2 July 2008, the Tushinskiy district investigative committee at the Moscow prosecutor’s office carried out a pre‑investigation inquiry. 81. The applicant’s medical records were examined by a forensic‑medical expert from the Moscow City Forensic-Medical Bureau. The expert concluded that the bruising and fracture of the nose (which had resulted in short-term health problems lasting up to three weeks, that is to say minor harm to the applicant’s health), the bruising in the area of both eyes and the cheek bones and the bleeding to the sclera of both eyes could have been sustained on 28 May 2008 as a result of impacts from hard blunt objects. As no injuries had been recorded in the area of the external right ear, the expert doubted that the perforated otitis had been a result of trauma or its connection to the alleged police ill-treatment (the expert’s report of 9 October 2009). 82. Investigators refused to institute criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in the police officers’ actions. Their three refusals issued between July 2008 and October 2009 were annulled because they were based on an incomplete inquiry. 83. In the most recent refusal to open a criminal case of 28 January 2010 an investigator held that the applicant, who had been drunk, could have fallen and injured himself. It relied, inter alia, on Officer P.’s report dated 7 July 2008 that the applicant had been brought to the police station with “visible injuries”. That decision was declared lawful and well-founded in the Tushinskiy District Court’s decision of 19 March 2010, and later upheld by the Moscow City Court on 17 May 2010.

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Chișinău. 6. At the time of the events the applicant was the owner of a company, incorporated in Moldova, which ran an erotic video-chat business in Chișinău. It employed young female models who provided erotic shows via webcam to customers outside Moldova in exchange for payment. 7. On 3 March 2015 the applicant was arrested and accused of pimping (proxenetism). 8. On 7 March 2015, at the request of a public prosecutor, the Centru District Court ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody for a period of thirty days. The applicant appealed against the order and argued that his detention had not been based on a reasonable suspicion that he had committed an offence. He submitted that he could not be accused of pimping, in that the female models employed by him had not been engaged in prostitution. He argued that the prosecutor and the court which had ordered his detention had applied an extensive interpretation of the provisions of the Criminal Code concerning the offence of pimping. He also argued that the existing case-law of the domestic courts did not contain anything which would enable erotic video-chat activity to be assimilated with prostitution and pimping. The applicant also contended that there were no relevant and sufficient reasons for remanding him in custody. 9. On 16 March 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and held that there had been grounds to believe that he might abscond or interfere with the investigation. The court did not respond to the applicant’s argument about a lack of reasonable suspicion and the allegation of extensive interpretation of the criminal law. 10. On 31 March 2015 the Centru District Court upheld a request by the Public Prosecutor and prolonged the applicant’s detention for another thirty days. The applicant appealed on the same grounds as on the first occasion. However, his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 7 April 2015. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a habeas corpus request, which was upheld by the Centru District Court on 27 April 2015; the applicant was released from detention. 12. During the proceedings the applicant explained that, prior to starting the video-chat business, he had consulted a lawyer to make sure that the activity was legal in Moldova, and he had been assured that it was not illegal. He also submitted that he had seen numerous similar businesses in Chișinău, which had strengthened his belief that the activity was not unlawful. 13. On 30 December 2016 the Centru District Court found the applicant guilty as charged but ordered that the criminal proceedings against him be terminated on the basis of an amnesty law. One of the conditions for applying the amnesty law was for the applicant to admit his guilt and express remorse. The applicant did not appeal against this decision. 14. In deciding the case, the court sought an opinion from the State Agency for the Protection of Morality as to whether the acts committed by the female models employed by the applicant could be qualified as prostitution and, thus, whether the applicant’s activity could be qualified as pimping. The opinion of 21 October 2015, which was the key element in convicting the applicant and was subsequently used in other similar cases, stated that the actions of the female models employed by the applicant could be considered acts of prostitution, in that their clients could obtain sexual gratification as a result of the models’ performance and because the models were paid for those acts. Thus, the fact that the applicant obtained revenue from the above activity could be considered pimping.

6. The applicant was born in 1980 and is detained in Pravieniškės Correctional Facility. 7. On 11 May 2009 the State criminal police bureau started a pre‑trial investigation into allegations that an armed criminal organisation was active in Vilnius Region. It was suspected that the said organisation was armed with firearms and possessed and distributed large amounts of narcotic and psychotropic substances (for the general factual background, see Lisovskij v. Lithuania, no. 36249/14, § 6, 2 May 2017). 8. In the context of that investigation, on 15 December 2009 some of the members of the organisation were arrested and in the course of imposing coercive measures on them it was established that the applicant also possibly belonged to the organisation. 9. On 23 February 2010 the applicant was arrested and officially notified that he was suspected of participating in a criminal organisation armed with firearms. 10. On 24 February 2010 the Vilnius District Court authorised the applicant’s detention on remand for two months. The court considered that the available evidence was sufficient to hold that the applicant may have committed the crimes of which he was suspected. It held that the applicant might commit new crimes because he: was suspected of having committed a very serious crime that could lead to a long period of imprisonment; had no strong social ties; was unemployed and not enrolled in an educational institution; was not married; had been convicted two times before for crimes concerning the illegal possession of narcotic and psychotropic substances (which constituted a negative character trait); and acknowledged that he had been using narcotic and psychotropic substances. Moreover, there was a risk that the applicant might try to abscond, given that he had relations abroad. The court also found that the applicant might interfere with the criminal investigation because he was living with another suspect in the case, was buying narcotic and psychotropic substances from other persons, his role in the criminal organisation was quite active and there was a risk that he might try to influence other witnesses or suspects or that those persons might try to influence him. The court also stated that the case was extremely complex and a number of procedural actions had to be performed. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against this decision. 11. On 22 April 2010 the Vilnius Region District Court extended the applicant’s detention for a further three months. It relied on the same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 10 above). In addition, the court noted that the case against the applicant was complex and of a large scale, and that a number of investigative actions had to be carried out, including the determination of the applicant’s role in the criminal organisation and his relationship with other suspects. The court also observed that although during the applicant’s detention no investigative actions had been carried out with regard to the applicant, the records of the pre-trial investigation showed that various investigative actions had been performed in order to establish grounds for the suspicion in respect of the applicant (vehicles had been inspected, a chemical analysis of the substances found during the search of the applicant’s flat had been performed, expert conclusions had been received, and other suspects – who had given testimony about the applicant – had been questioned). It appears that the applicant did not appeal against this decision. 12. On 20 July 2010 the Vilnius Region District Court extended the applicant’s detention for a further month. It relied on the same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). In addition, the court noted that intensive investigative actions had been undertaken, without limiting the pre-trial investigation to the actions solely against the applicant. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against this decision. 13. On 20 August 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention for a further three months. It relied on essentially the same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 10 above). However, the court held that there was no indication that the applicant might try to interfere with the criminal investigation, so it decided to strike it out from the list of grounds on which the applicant had been detained. Nevertheless, the grounds for detention listed in domestic law were alternatives – that is to say the existence of only one was enough for detention on remand to be imposed. The court also noted that in the course of the past three months, numerous procedural actions had been carried out: a number of suspects had been questioned, eyewitnesses had been identified, additional questioning of suspects had taken place, verification of testimony given at the crime scene had taken place, items significant for the pre-trial investigation had been examined, additional tasks (including the investigation of certain objects) had been scheduled, descriptions of the suspects had been collected. The court was convinced that sufficient grounds to prolong the applicant’s detention on remand existed. 14. The applicant appealed against that decision and applied for the imposition of a different restrictive measure. He argued that before his arrest he had had a permanent place of residence with his father and a permanent income because he had been working as a long-distance driver, and that he had strong social ties and had not known any of the other suspects. He also claimed that the investigation was inactive and that there were no grounds to further detain him. However, on 16 September 2010 the applicant’s appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. The court stated that when ordering detention on remand, a court was not establishing the applicant’s guilt, and that the standard of evidence required for detaining him was thus lower. The court considered that there was enough information to believe that the applicant had committed the crimes he had been accused of. The court also agreed that the applicant might abscond or commit new crimes. Moreover, the court stated that it could not impose a more lenient restrictive measure because it could only uphold or quash the first-instance decision. The court also observed that, under domestic law, detention on remand could last longer than six months only when the case was especially complex or of a large scale. It found that in the applicant’s case those conditions had been met: the investigation concerned a criminal offence committed by a criminal organisation, there were more than fifty suspects, and it was necessary to carry out numerous investigative actions. 15. On 23 November 2010 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on the same grounds as those given in its previous decisions and noted that the procedural action that had been taken had been the same as that listed in its previous decision (see paragraph 13 above). 16. The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for a different restrictive measure to be imposed. He claimed that he was not guilty and that in the nine months of his detention the officers had not presented any proof of his guilt. He also denied the risk of his absconding because it was in his interests that the court examine his case on the merits and acquit him. The applicant denied that he would commit new crimes just because he was unemployed. It was the applicant’s view that if that were so then every unemployed person could be detained. He also claimed that his previous conviction should not have been taken into account when prolonging his detention on remand because he had been paying a fine imposed on him in that case and no one could be punished for the same offence twice. He also had a father and a brother, which showed his strong social ties. Finally, he had only been questioned twice in the nine months he had been detained. 17. On 17 December 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It reiterated the previous findings (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above) but also noted that the applicant’s criminal activities had lasted for a long time and that he had been making money from them. The court also noted that the applicant had been additionally questioned on 15 and 17 November 2010, that another suspect had been questioned twice as well, and that DNA and dactyloscopy examinations had been scheduled. 18. On 23 February 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on the same grounds as those given in its previous decisions (see paragraphs 10 and 13 above). In addition, the court held that there were over forty suspects in the case; numerous investigative actions had been performed: suspects had been arrested and questioned; witnesses had been questioned; eyewitnesses had been identified; items relevant for the investigation had been examined; characteristics of the suspects had been collected; and material gathered in the pre-trial investigation had been divided into two parts (and the material gathered in the first part had already been transferred to a court for examination on the merits). 19. The applicant appealed against that decision and asked that a different restrictive measure be imposed. On 31 March 2011 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Court of 23 February 2011. It relied on essentially the same grounds as those given before (see paragraph 17 above). The court also stated that the applicant’s argument that he had only been questioned twice during the pre-trial investigation could not be assessed in the light of a delay in the proceedings caused by the extreme complexity of the case and the intensity of the pre-trial investigation. Moreover, the offences committed by the applicant had not been incidental; rather, they had been committed over a long period of time. The applicant’s argument that he had a father and a brother with whom he had strong social ties could not be deemed to outweigh the public interest in his remaining in detention. 20. On 19 May 2011 the applicant was officially notified that he was suspected of participating in a criminal organisation armed with firearms and of possession of a very large amount of narcotic and psychotropic substances with the intention to distribute them. 21. On 20 May 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on the same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 18 above). In addition, the court held that there were fifty-eight suspects, of whom twenty were granted the status of a suspect, and that numerous procedural actions had been performed. 22. The applicant appealed against that decision and asked that it be quashed. On 16 June 2011 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Court of 20 May 2011. 23. On 1 August 2011 the prosecutor referred the bill of indictment and the case to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits. 24. On 18 August 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 21 above). It added that the applicant had been working as a long-distance driver for eight years and had been travelling to Russia constantly; there was thus a danger that he could abscond. Moreover, the court held that the applicant might try to interfere with the proceedings and that thirty-three persons stood accused. 25. The applicant appealed against that decision and asked that it be quashed. On 14 September 2011 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Court of 18 August 2011. The court, however, decided that the first-instance court had wrongly concluded that the applicant might interfere with the proceedings and removed this ground from the list of grounds for extending the applicant’s detention. The court furthermore held that there were no grounds to believe that the case was being delayed and it also observed that the criminal case had already been referred to the court for examination on the merits. 26. On 21 November 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 24 above). It added that there were thirty-three co-accused in the criminal case against the applicant and that the case was complex. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against this decision. 27. On 23 February 2012 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 26 above). In addition, it stated that the case file comprised ninety-six volumes of material; the standpoints of the co-accused were not clear because all of the co-accused had stated that they would give their testimony at the end of the proceedings; and the hearings were planned in advance and their schedule was extremely intense. It appears that the applicant did not appeal against this decision. 28. On 17 May 2012 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 27 above). 29. The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for it to be quashed. He claimed that he had been detained for twenty-seven months and had not been questioned once. The applicant furthermore submitted that the searches of his home had not revealed any trace of narcotic or psychotropic substances, the identity of persons to whom he had allegedly sold the substances had not been established, other co-accused had not recognised him as a person whom they knew and the whole accusation against him had been based on the testimony of a drug addict. The applicant also stated that he had a father and could live with him. 30. On 14 June 2012 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Court of 17 May 2012. The court held that it could not conclude that the proceedings had been protracted because the case had been transferred to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits and because of that, in the course of criminal proceedings the duration of the applicant’s detention on remand had not been limited. 31. On 22 August 2012 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on the same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 28 above). 32. The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for it to be quashed. On 11 September 2012 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The court stated that the case was being examined before the first-instance court on the merits and that the evidence had been examined; the applicant’s allegations that no investigative actions had been performed in respect of him were thus unfounded. 33. On 22 November 2012 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on the same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 31 above). In addition, the court noted that the case file comprised 104 volumes, there were thirty-three co-accused and the hearings had been taking place in accordance with the schedule. 34. The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for it to be quashed. On 21 December 2012 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s findings that the applicant might abscond, that the criminal case was complex (it had 106 volumes and thirty‑three co-accused), and that it was not possible to achieve the purpose of Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 35. On 15 February 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 33 above). In addition, the court noted that the criminal case had 107 volumes and thirty‑two co-accused, and that the hearings had been taking place in accordance with the very intense schedule. 36. The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for it to be quashed. On 5 March 2013 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s findings. 37. On 14 May 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 35 above). In addition, the court noted that the case filed contained 114 volumes and thirty-two co-accused and that the hearings had been taking place in accordance with the schedule. 38. The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for it to be quashed. On 28 May 2013 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s findings. 39. On 21 August 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 37 above). In addition, the court stated that the case file comprised 116 volumes, and that the case involved thirty-two co-accused and was extremely complex. 40. The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for a less restrictive measure to be imposed. On 5 September 2013 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s findings. 41. On 15 November 2013 the Vilnius Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand for a further three months. It relied on same grounds as those given in its previous decision (see paragraph 39 above). In addition, the court stated that the case file comprised 118 volumes and that the case was extremely complex. Moreover, the criminal case was at the end of its examination before the first-instance court and the closing arguments had begun. 42. The applicant appealed against that decision and asked for the imposition of a less restrictive measure. On 6 December 2013 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s findings. 43. On 17 February 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court decided not to extend the applicant’s detention on remand and instead imposed house arrest. The court held that his previous convictions had been for non-violent crimes and that although he was not married, he had a family and relatives who had taken care of him even during his detention (by means of calls and visits), which showed that he had strong social ties. Although the applicant had been born in Russia and worked as a long-distance driver, his father lived in Vilnius, so the risk of his absconding was low. The court also stated that over the four years of the pre-trial investigation the relevant data had been collected and the final speeches were already taking place in the criminal case. The court thus decided to impose house arrest for six months and obliged the applicant to stay at his place of residence between 11 p.m. and 9 a.m. and not to communicate with certain people. 44. Between the applicant’s arrest on 23 February 2010 until the completion of the pre-trial investigation on 1 August 2011 (see paragraphs 9 and 23 above) the authorities conducted six interviews with the applicant, seized and examined his car and other belongings, and ordered a forensic examination of various items seized from the applicant. Moreover, the authorities received fifty expert reports; there were fifty examinations of the objects found in the course of the pre-trial investigation; twenty searches were performed, thirty restrictive measures were imposed, the suspects were questioned 194 times, eight persons were arrested, forty-four witnesses were questioned, the authorities conducted 196 eyewitness identifications, various witnesses and suspects visited the crime scene twenty-four times to give testimony, a search warrant was issued in respect of one suspect and a request for extradition was sent to Israel regarding another suspect. 45. Between the transfer of the case to the Vilnius Regional Court for examination on the merits on 1 August 2011 and the decision on 17 February 2014 to impose house arrest on the applicant, a total of sixty‑five hearings were coordinated in advance and scheduled, and nineteen of those hearings were either cancelled or adjourned: (a) From 1 August 2011 until 26 June 2012 twenty-two hearings were scheduled (one each month from October 2011 until January 2012, three in February 2012, three in March 2012, four in April 2012, three in May 2012 and five in June 2012); four of them were adjourned (one in February 2012, two in April 2012 and one in June 2012) and one was cancelled (in May 2012); (b) From 12 September 2012 until 7 June 2013 thirty-three hearings were scheduled (three each month from September 2012 to March 2013, six in April 2013, three in May 2013 and three in June 2013); seven of them were adjourned (one in December 2012, one in February 2013, three in March 2013 and two in April 2013), and three of them were cancelled (one in February 2013 and two in April 2013); (c) From 13 September 2013 until 17 February 2014 ten hearings were scheduled (two each month from September 2013 until November 2013, one in January 2014, and two in February 2014); three of them were adjourned (one in September 2013, one in October 2013, and one in February 2014) and one of them was cancelled (in October 2013). 46. The main reasons for the adjournment or cancellation of hearings were illnesses of members of the court, lawyers or co-accused or the failure of some of the co-accused to appear; on one occasion one of the co-accused did not have a lawyer, on one occasion one of the members of the court had to attend a funeral, and on several occasions lawyers for the co-accused were unable to attend (for various reasons). During the forty-six hearings which were held, the court heard testimony from the co-accused, witnesses and victims, played audio and video recordings, and read out case material. 47. On 22 May 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court convicted the applicant of participation in a criminal organisation armed with firearms and of possession of narcotic and psychotropic substances with the intention to distribute them (Articles 249 § 2 and 260 § 1 of the Criminal Code, respectively). The applicant was sentenced to eight years of imprisonment and he was ordered to pay a fine of 4,443 euros (EUR). It was decided to continue his house arrest until the start of the execution of the judgment. 48. The applicant appealed against his conviction, and so did the prosecutors. The prosecutors asked the court to re-categorise the applicant’s offence and to hold that he had participated in a criminal organisation armed with firearms and that he had possessed a very large amount of narcotic and psychotropic substances with the intention to distribute them, and to increase the length of the imposed prison sentence to thirteen years. The applicant complained that the first-instance judgment had been unlawful and unfounded and that it had been based on controversial, inaccurate, illogical testimony given by one person. He also complained that the first-instance court had not identified the indications that he had belonged to a criminal organisation, the relationships between the members of that criminal organisation, and the specific actions they had performed. Lastly, the mere fact that some narcotic and psychotropic substances had been found in his room during the search did not mean that he had had the intention of distributing them. 49. On 24 April 2017 the Court of Appeal held that although during the search of the applicant’s room the amounts of narcotic and psychotropic substances found had not been large, he had known that a certain D.J. had stored large amounts of narcotic and psychotropic substances in the same flat. Moreover, testimony of witnesses confirmed that the applicant had been distributing the narcotic and psychotropic substances. The court thus decided to re-categorise the applicant’s offence under Article 260 § 3 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to twelve years of imprisonment and ordered him to pay a fine of EUR 4,443. 50. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He claimed that there was no evidence that he had committed the offences at issue, that the lower courts had failed to examine all the relevant circumstances of the case, that their judgments had been based on incorrect assumptions, and that he had not known about any arms used by the criminal organisation or about narcotic and psychotropic substances being kept in the flat that he had been living in. He also complained about the length of the criminal proceedings, given that the offences he had been convicted of had been committed before 2010, and yet the criminal proceedings were still on-going. 51. On 9 January 2018 the Supreme Court examined the applicant’s appeal on points of law and allowed it in part. The court held that the lower courts had drawn the right conclusions about the applicant’s criminal activities. However, the Supreme Court assessed the sentence imposed in the light of the applicant’s complaint about the length of criminal proceedings against him. The court held that the proceedings in respect of the applicant had lasted from 23 February 2010, when he had been arrested, until the adoption of the present judgment – that is to say seven years, eleven months and fourteen days, which was an extremely long period of time and could only be justified by exceptional circumstances. The court noted that the case had been extremely complex because there had been thirty-two co-accused, the case file had comprised 138 volumes, the first‑instance judgment had amounted to 480 pages and the judgment of the appellate court had amounted to 197 pages. In such a case the length of proceedings could be justified, but only if the relevant authorities reacted to the complexity of the case appropriately and undertook all relevant measures without undue delays. The court held that in the instant case the process followed by the Court of Appeal had not been effective. The first‑instance judgment had been delivered on 22 May 2014, and the case had been received at the Court of Appeal on 10 November 2014. However, at the first hearing on 19 February 2015 the Court of Appeal had decided to adjourn the case until 7 October 2015. During the hearing on 6 November 2015 the Court of Appeal had decided to apply to the relevant German authorities to be allowed to question one witness in Germany, and the next hearing was scheduled for April 2016. The reply from Germany had been received by the Court of Appeal on 10 February 2016; however, during the hearing on 7 April 2016 the next six scheduled hearings had been cancelled owing to the fact that the lawyers of eleven of the co-accused had been involved in other cases. The Court of Appeal had delivered its judgment on 24 April 2017. The length of the criminal proceedings in the present case was extremely important because the applicant had been detained on remand for almost four years. The Supreme Court held that in accordance with the case-law of the Court, the fact that the applicant had been held in detention on remand for such a long period of time, required particular diligence on the part of the authorities dealing with the case to administer justice expeditiously. The Supreme Court made references to the case‑law of the Court (Matoń v. Poland [Committee], no. 30279/07, § 29, 9 June 2009; Paskal v. Ukraine, no. 24652/04, § 58, 15 September 2011; Pawlak v. Poland [Committee], no. 28237/10, § 46, 13 January 2015; and Tomczyk v. Poland, no. 7708/12, § 41, 13 January 2015). The Supreme Court thus held that the unjustifiable length of criminal proceedings constituted grounds to impose a more lenient sentence on the applicant and ordered the applicant’s imprisonment for eleven years and six months and ordered him to pay a fine of EUR 4,443. 52. The applicant lodged a claim with the domestic courts for 100,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately EUR 28,962) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of his detention in allegedly inadequate conditions in Lukiškės Remand Prison. He alleged overcrowding. 53. On 23 September 2013 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that for 1,159 days the applicant had been held in overcrowded cells and awarded him LTL 5,795 (approximately EUR 1,678) in compensation. 54. The applicant appealed and on 18 August 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court increased the amount of compensation to LTL 11,700 (approximately EUR 3,389). 55. The applicant lodged a claim before the domestic courts and asked that he be awarded LTL 50,000 (approximately EUR 14,481) in non‑pecuniary damages for detention in inadequate conditions from 24 February 2010 until 17 February 2014 in Lukiškės Remand Prison. He alleged that the cells had been overcrowded, and cold and humid in winter and hot in summer; he also alleged that the cells had suffered from dampness and mould. 56. On 9 January 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant had already received compensation for the period from 24 February 2010 until 13 May 2013, and decided to terminate the case in respect of this period. As regards the remaining period of time, the court considered that for 248 days the applicant had been held in overcrowded cells and awarded him approximately EUR 1,437 in compensation. The domestic courts dismissed the applicant’s complaint regarding other sanitary conditions as unfounded. 57. The applicant appealed and on 6 October 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court of 9 January 2015.

5. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Seville. 6. The applicant was a member of an activist group which occupied the Casas Viejas Social Centre in Seville. 7. The owners of the building initiated judicial proceedings before the Seville First Instance Court no. 24 (hereinafter the “First-Instance Court”) to recover possession of their property. The First-Instance Court ultimately ordered the eviction of all the occupants and set 29 November 2007 as the date for their removal. 8. On that date, the applicant, along with other occupiers, participated in a protest against their eviction from the building. 9. Once the Judicial Committee of the Notices and Seizures Department (Comisión Judicial del Servicio Común de Notificaciones y Embargos), together with the legal representative of the building owners and the police, entered into the building, they discovered that the occupants had dug an underground tunnel of about 4.5 m deep which ended in a small space. They had placed some rudimentary reinforcing in order to prevent the collapse of the structure. Furthermore the occupants had positioned several “PVC” and iron tubes in the walls and the floor of the small room. 10. As part of the protest against the eviction, the applicant and another protester, R.D.P., claimed that they had attached themselves to the floor of the room in such a way that they were not able to release themselves. Indeed they had introduced one of their arms inside one of the tubes and enchained their wrist to an iron stick which was fixed inside the tube. Since the fixation system was not visible it was impossible for the authorities to know whether this was true or not. 11. Negotiations were held throughout the whole day, yet they were unsuccessful. The police, together with the fire service, considered digging them out. This idea was dismissed as there was risk of collapse. 12. In order to verify whether the applicant and R.D.P. were attached to the floor, the police officers fixed a rope to their waist and wrist, respectively, and tried to pull them out of the tube to which they were fixed, to no avail. The fire service informed the applicant and R.D.P. that the building might collapse if heavy machinery were used to release them. 13. On 30 November 2007, in view of the time which had elapsed and the applicant’s threat to kick down some unstable wooden posts that had been installed by the fire fighters as a preventive measure, two police officers immobilised them with ropes. 14. At around 7 p.m. on 30 November 2007, owing to the severe suffering caused by the fixation technique, R.D.P. informed the police officers and fire fighters of his intention to voluntarily release himself and asked them to untie him. At around 8.30 p.m. the applicant also decided to end his protest. 15. The applicant and R.D.P. were immediately arrested and brought before a judge. They were also taken to a public health centre where they underwent a forensic examination. As regards the applicant, the forensic report stated the following: “Patient history and examination He refers to having had his right hand tied, reporting local pain, local redness. Joint movement. No vascular disorders. X rays: 0[1] Presumptive diagnosis: Contusion of the right wrist. Treatment: Avoid strain. [illegible drug name] 1/d if pain” 16. That same report also stated the following: “Visual inspection, palpation and manipulation of limbs and other body areas rule out the possibility of physical injuries compatible with trauma or exogenous violence. No haematomata, abrasions or injuries on different explored areas. He reports discomfort in both wrists but no visible haematological signs are at present detectable. Interview and patient history rule out any decrease of his cognitive or volitional abilities, [patient thus] fit to give statement at this very moment.” 17. On 1 December 2007 the applicant participated in a press conference during which he commented on the eviction and the techniques the police and fire fighters had used during the confinement. He referred to the events in the following terms: “The torture was physical and psychological. The physical torture was undertaken only by national police officers and was insanely observed by the fire fighters. That is to say, fire fighters, whose specific names I am going to give because they treated us very badly – the most senior fireman was L., and [there was also] firemen M. and J – were taking photographs while we were tortured, taking photographs next to us as if we were their prizes, mocking. The physical torture that I am going to describe ... was very subtle so that it did not leave marks, but it caused intense pain ... and the other torture, well, it left marks ... above all the first one on my colleague ... The first act of torture was carried out by national police officers, as I say, as soon as they came ... they grabbed my colleague’s arm, the free one, and they fixed a rope to his wrist quite tightly and they took the rope out of the tunnel and three national police officers ... pulled him to try to get him out ... with the purpose of causing him pain, frightening him, you know. The wrist inside the tube started to swell ... he was not able to open the padlock for a full day ... [T]o me, instead of fixing the rope to my free wrist, they fixed it to my waist and they repeated what they had done to R.D.P.: they took the rope out of the tunnel and three national police officers ... pulled me with the same purpose ... the second act of torture was already physical and was perpetrated by national police officers. It was conducted at the end of the protest action, that is to say, the physical torture forced us to [release ourselves] from the tubes ... [T]he blood supply was cut off at the top, we could not move our fingers since the pain was very intense, we were like this for an hour, that is when fire fighters took the photograph because they did nothing else to us. This act of torture was also undertaken by two national police officers who appeared in some press pictures in ‘Emasesa’ white overalls: I am not sure that if [people] have realised that both police officers with the ‘Emasesa’ overalls appear [in the press pictures], well, these are the ones who carried out the torture[;] then they finished tying us up and left the place and right away some fire fighters arrived and then the firemen J., M. and L. took photographs as a prize ... at this point, and owing to suffering and the pain in his wrist, R.D.P. ... decided to leave the protest action and release himself ... I said to them as a proposal: ‘Look, I am not going to release myself, but I will cooperate with everything that is necessary to allow the underpinning of the structure ... [T]hey then tied me in the same position and, well, that is then when I decided to put an end to the protest action. Well this was physical torture ... Psychological torture was repeated eh, well it was continuous ... psychological torture was repeated several times and it was mainly perpetrated by fire fighters and consisted of brief psychological mistreatment ... they told us that it was impossible to take us out alive ..., that we would be killed by rubble because there was a bulldozer working right above us, [and] we were listening to the bulldozer ... [T]hey used the famous ‘oxygen measuring device’ which indicated that we were about to pass out ... They told us that the police were going to inject us with a sleep serum ... [T]hey told us that the police were going to introduce gas through the ventilation system, they did not specify which type of gas ... [T]hey also told us that they would release rats inside the tunnel ...” 18. A female journalist asked the applicant whether the medical report had revealed any kind of physical or psychological damage, to which the applicant answered “not psychological” yet “physical”. The applicant further stated that he had already said that “physical torture [was] very subtle and undertaken by elite police officers, that hardly left marks but ... caused intense pain”. 19. As a result of the statements, on 21 December 2007 the delegation of the Government of Andalusia lodged a complaint with the public prosecutor, requesting the initiation of a criminal investigation before the Seville investigating judge no. 17. This judge ordered the opening of an investigation, as a result of which the applicant was charged with slander and defamation. 20. On 6 July 2011 Seville criminal judge no. 13 (hereinafter “the criminal judge”) convicted the applicant of slander, sentencing him to twenty month fine with a daily amount of 10 euros (EUR). In addition, he was ordered to pay compensation to the two police officers for damage in a total amount of EUR 1,200, with one day’s imprisonment for every two day fines unpaid in default. Furthermore, the applicant was ordered to publish the judgment in the media which had participated in the press conference at his own expense. 21. The criminal judge stated that authorities had acted in a proportionate manner. The criminal judge considered that the first action carried out by the police (that is to say fixing a rope to their waist and wrist, respectively, and using force in an attempt to pull them out) had been a proportionate technique with the purpose of verifying whether the applicant and R.D.P. were in fact attached to the concrete floor. He further observed that the methods used by the police, such as threatening them with the use of gas or with prosecution for committing a crime against a person in authority, had just been measures aimed at pressuring the applicant and R.D.P. to release themselves. According to the criminal judge the fire fighters also intimidated the applicant and R.D.P. by telling them that the walls could collapse if the authorities opted to use machinery to release them. The purpose behind this was to make them release themselves voluntarily. Additionally, the criminal judge observed that the authorities had then taken the decision to tie the applicant’s right hand to his ankle in order to immobilise him, in view of the risk of the walls collapsing and the applicant’s threat to kick down the unstable wooden posts that had been installed by the fire fighters as a preventive measure. 22. In view of the statement of facts as determined by the judge, it was considered that the applicant’s remarks constituted a direct accusation of the commission of a crime – namely torture – which was untrue. 23. The criminal judge then considered that the right to freedom of speech was “a fundamental right but it [was] not unlimited either in its abstract concept or in its practical execution” since it had to be “respectful of other people and one [could not] avail oneself of it in order to use abusive or offensive words”. In this case “the applicant [had] exceeded the bounds of his right to freedom of speech ... by violating other people’s rights.” 24. The criminal judge noted that the behaviour of the police officers did not disclose all the elements under the legal classification of torture within the meaning of Article 174 of the Spanish Criminal Code, which clearly defined torture as follows: “Torture is committed by a public authority or official who, in abuse of office, and in order to obtain a confession or information from a person, or to punish him or her for any act he or she may have committed, or is suspected of having committed, or for any reason based on any kind of discrimination, subjects that person to conditions or procedures that, owing to their nature, duration or other circumstances, cause him or her physical or mental suffering, suppression of or decrease in his or her powers of cognisance, discernment or decision-making, or that in any other way attack his or her honour”. 25. The criminal judge thus considered that the applicant’s declaration included a specific accusation of torture, which meant that a police officer or official had specific intent to obtain a confession or information from a person, or to punish them for an act they may have committed, or were suspected of having committed. 26. The judge additionally found that the descriptions given by the applicant, in combination with the pictures that had been published by the press, could lead to the identification of the police officers in question. They would then be linked to accusations of torture, which, according to the criminal judge, had not taken place. 27. In reply to the argument that the word “torture” had been used colloquially, the judge considered the following: “[T]he applicant’s repetition of the word torture reveals that it was not an occasional and exceptional use of such word in place, but it was exposed and expressed in full awareness and repeatedly in order to get the message across to listeners, i.e., that the applicant had been subject to torture by police officers and fire fighters.” 28. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Seville Audiencia Provincial, which on 28 June 2013 partially ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the fine to be reduced to twelve month fine with a daily amount of EUR 10. The Audiencia Provincial upheld the remaining elements of the first-instance judgment. In particular, the Seville Audiencia Provincial indicated that the remarks made by the applicant had constituted a direct accusation of the crime of torture and that the applicant’s statements were a “deliberate way to personally and professionally discredit the police officers”. According to the Audiencia Provincial, the applicant was aware of the fact that what he was publicly saying was false. Additionally, it stated that the applicant’s statement could not be described as an act of public criticism of the intervention carried out by the police, nor had the applicant’s intent been to provide the public with information. On the contrary, the applicant had “simply claimed that he [had been] tortured by two police officers ..., something that [had been] false ... with the sole intent of attacking the honour of the police officers by maintaining that they had committed a crime”. The applicant’s statements had been a “conscious, disproportionate, unnecessary and unjustified act of accusing someone of having committed a crime which [had gone] beyond the legitimate criticism of a police action ...”. 29. On 29 July 2013 the applicant lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court. In particular, the applicant relied on paragraphs a) and d) of Article 20 of the Spanish Constitution. The applicant stated that the narrated facts at the press conference had been true, as had been recognised by the domestic courts in the framework of the criminal proceedings, yet the only thing that had differed had been the intention attributable to the police officers. The applicant had used the term “torture” in a colloquial manner. This type of expression could not be limited by strict criminal-legal definitions. The applicant further stated that the term “torture” contained several meanings apart from the strictly criminal one. According to the Royal Academy of the Spanish Language (Real Academia Española ‑ hereinafter “the Academy”), the word torture meant “serious physical or psychological pain inflicted on somebody, with various methods and tools, with the purpose of obtaining a confession or as a means to punish”. However, according to this same institution, the word torture also meant “serious pain or suffering, or the thing that produces it”. The applicant further stressed that the word “torture” was in daily used to refer to any kind of mistreatment. Ultimately, the applicant argued that restricting the use of the word “torture” to those scenarios where all the criminal elements of the crime were present was an excessive restriction on the right to freedom of expression and, in particular, on a social debate which concerns the methods used by public powers in order to pursue a legitimate aim. 30. On 21 October 2013 the Constitutional Court declared the amparo appeal inadmissible on the grounds that the applicant had not complied with the obligation to prove that his appeal was one of “special constitutional relevance”.

5. The present case concerns criminal proceedings against the applicant, who was Minister of Defence in the period between July 2000 and May 2001, and three other defendants (K.Gj., V.T. and Lj.P.). The applicant and K.Gj., who was undersecretary (подсекретар) in the Ministry of Defence (“the Ministry”) at the time, were convicted of abuse of office (злоупотреба на службена положба и овластување) in relation to two procurement contracts (for food and construction services) concluded in December 2000 between the Ministry and HS (“the company”) that had been owned at the time by Z.S. and his wife, M.S. In February 2001, the company was bought by Lj.P. and V.T. – the applicant’s father-in-law and brother-in-law respectively. The latter contract concerned construction of army housing in a military base (касарна) in Skopje. 6. In spring 2001 an armed conflict broke out in the respondent State. 7. On an unspecified date in 2001, an investigating judge of the Skopje Court of First Instance (Основен суд Скопје – “the trial court”) opened an investigation in respect of the applicant, K.Gj., Lj.P. and V.T., because of a reasonable suspicion of abuse of office. Several witnesses were examined and a forensic accounting report was commissioned. 8. On 11 June 2001 the investigating judge heard evidence from K.K., a Ministry official. He stated that K.Gj. had asked him to meet with Lj.P. to sign the construction contract and told him that the applicant had insisted on having the contract urgently signed. He had met with Lj.P., but an issue had arisen when, erroneously, a certain company called M. had been indicated as the supplier. At that point Lj.P. had called the applicant and told him “this [had] not [been] our company, ours [had been the company HS]”. 9. On 18 June 2001 the investigating judge heard evidence from the applicant, who denied the charges against him. 10. On 26 October 2001 the investigating judge heard evidence from Z.S. solely in the presence of the public prosecutor. He denied any personal acquaintance with the applicant and stated that Lj.P. had asked him to make a bid to supply food to the Ministry. He further affirmed that V.T. had signed the contracts on behalf of the company, although he had not authorised him to represent the company. After Z.S. had found out about the bank transfers from the Ministry, Lj.P. and V.T. had threatened that he would sell the company to them. 11. On 23 November 2001 the public prosecutor lodged a bill of indictment with the trial court against the four defendants. The applicant and K.Gj. were indicted on charges of abuse of office and Lj.P. and V.T. were charged with inciting them to commit the offence. The applicant was also charged with ordering K.Gj. to conclude the two public-procurement contracts on behalf of the Ministry with the company, contrary to the procedure provided by the Public Procurement Act (Закон за јавни набавки, Official Gazette no.26/98). The prosecutor proposed that certain evidence be admitted at trial, and requested that the court summon witnesses, including Z.S. 12. On 11 March 2002 a three-judge panel of the trial court confirmed the indictment dismissing the defendants’ objections as unfounded. 13. All four defendants gave oral statements at the trial. The applicant gave his statement at the trial hearing held on 13 June 2003. Throughout these proceedings he maintained his innocence. The applicant denied any involvement in the procurement process regarding the two contracts and challenged K.Gj.’s allegations as untrue (see paragraph 14 below). He maintained that the procurement process had been conducted through the Ministry’s administration (стручни служби) and the undersecretary, that he had not been informed of the details of individual contracts and that the two contracts had been lawfully concluded. He insisted that had been unaware that his relatives had owned the company. 14. His co-defendant, K.Gj., asserted that he had informed the applicant of the public-procurement decisions and acted on his orders. He affirmed that on the applicant’s orders the construction contract that had been initially signed with the company M. had been invalidated and a new contract had been signed with company HS. Throughout the proceedings, K.Gj. maintained that the two contracts had been concluded in accordance with the law as they had been exempt from the regular process under the Public Procurement Act for the following reasons: the food contract had concerned urgent procurement; and the construction contract had concerned issues of security and defence. 15. The other two co-defendants, V.T. and Lj.P., maintained that the takeover of the company had been mutually agreed. V.T. asserted that he had signed the two contracts on Z.S.’s instructions and with proper authorisation. Lj.P. claimed that he had intended to fulfil all contractual obligations, but the construction had been stalled owing to the breakout of armed conflict. 16. At a hearing held on 11 September 2003 the trial court, despite the objections of the defence, read out Z.S.’s pre-trial statement (see paragraph 10 above) since police enquiries had confirmed that he had left the country for the United States. At the same hearing, the court heard evidence from other witnesses, including M.S., who maintained that neither she, nor her husband had authorised V.T. to sign contracts on behalf of the company. She confirmed that her husband had asked her to sign the documents for the takeover of the company and that he had been scared. V.M. (M.’s owner) also testified, confirming that the Ministry had withdrawn from the construction contract that had been initially signed with his company. 17. On 3 November 2003 the trial court convicted the defendants as charged, except Lj.P., the proceedings against whom had been separated. On 2 March 2004 this judgment had been quashed by the Skopje Court of Appeal (Апелационен суд Скопје – “the Court of Appeal”) which gave detailed instructions to the trial court. It noted that the trial court had not made sufficient efforts to hear evidence from Z.S., whose testimony was considered as key evidence (клучен доказ). His examination was considered relevant in the context of V.T.’s role in the case and the use of the funds transferred by the Ministry to the company. The trial court also needed to examine those Ministry officials that had participated in the procurement procedure regarding the contracts in order to establish whether the defence arguments regarding the lawfulness of the contracts were valid. Lastly, all relevant facts needed to be established regarding the execution of the two contracts, including the existence of any objective difficulties in this regard. 18. In the re-trial proceedings, the trial court commissioned an addendum to the forensic accounting report and an additional expert report regarding the construction contract. The first hearing in the re-trial proceedings was held on 13 September 2005. In the course of the proceedings, the trial court held numerous hearings, examined a number of witnesses and admitted other documents and expert evidence (see paragraph 20 below). It joined the case against Lj.P. to the applicant’s case. The court heard evidence from the Ministry officials who had participated in the construction services and food procurement and examined K.K., who maintained his earlier statements (see paragraph 8 above). Several hearings were postponed on account of health reasons in respect of some of the defendants. 19. At the hearing held on 27 April 2006 the trial court admitted the written record of Z.S.’s pre-trial statement as evidence on basis of section 351(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act (see paragraph 29 below) since securing his attendance at the trial would have been extremely difficult and might have prolonged the proceedings, given that repeated police enquiries had confirmed his residence in the United States. Moreover, sufficient evidence had been adduced regarding the facts that needed to be established from his testimony. The defence objected to his statement and argued that his presence was required in order to establish all relevant facts, particularly regarding V.T.’s authorisation to represent the company and Z.S.’s alleged use of company funds. They argued that Z.S.’s address abroad had been known and the trial court could have summoned him through diplomatic channels. 20. At the same hearing, the court admitted documentary evidence, including: financial and other documents related to the company; official documents from the Ministry related to the procurement process and the two contracts; and several letters from the Ministry sent in reply to enquiries made by the trial court. The defence challenged the veracity of the letters and applied to have the signatories examined at the trial. They proposed that further documentary evidence be taken into evidence, including the full case file from the Ministry regarding the contracts. These proposals were rejected as the trial court found no reason to doubt the veracity of the letters and considered that all relevant documents had already been submitted and any further requests were aimed only at prolonging the trial. 21. At the hearings held on 10 and 17 November 2006 the defence reiterated their request to examine the signatories of the letters (see paragraph 20 above) and some other witnesses and proposed as evidence written material (including army reports and documents, government transcripts and media articles related to the armed conflict) in order that the court establish the relevant facts in respect of the circumstances related to the procurement process, the execution of the contracts, the influence of the deteriorating security situation and Z.S.’s role in the company’s affairs. The trial court refused to admit the request, finding that sufficient evidence had already been adduced regarding the relevant facts that were to be established from the proposed evidence. 22. On 29 December 2006 the trial court convicted the defendants as charged and ordered them to compensate jointly the Ministry for the damage caused. The applicant was sentenced to three years and six months’ imprisonment. Relying on a considerable amount of evidence, including the testimony of Ministry officials who had participated in the two contracts and other witnesses, written material related to the procurement, two expert reports and the statements of the two experts at the trial, the trial court concluded the two contracts had not been awarded in a process compliant with the rules of public procurement. It was established that the food contract could not be considered as urgent procurement. As to the construction contract, the court found that there had been neither a legal framework governing the construction of military housing on the site of the base, nor a clear decision or plan for the particular location, which suggested that the defendants’ choice of location had been aimed at circumventing the public-procurement rules. The company had not been officially registered for construction activity at the time of award of the contracts, only subsequently. The trial court also found that any reasons related to the inability to execute the contracts had been irrelevant. 23. The trial court dismissed the applicant’s defence, relying on the statements of K.Gj. and K.K., who confirmed his involvement with the impugned contracts (see paragraphs 8 and 14 above). A written order signed by the applicant requiring that all procurement was to be executed according to the plan and that he should be notified of the process was considered as a further confirmation of his involvement. Referring to Z.S.’s statement, the trial court dismissed V.T. and Lj.P.’s defence, holding that his and M.S.’s statements had proven that these two defendants had taken over the company with threats, as part of their plan to obtain unlawful pecuniary gain (see paragraphs 10 and 16 above). 24. As to the refused evidence, it reiterated the reasons given at the trial hearings (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above). Z.S.’s statement had been admitted into evidence because it would be difficult to secure his presence at the trial as he resided at an address in California in the United States of America. 25. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court had dismissed all his applications to introduce evidence (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above) which aimed to prove: (i) that the deteriorating security situation had justified the urgent food procurement and impeded the execution of the construction contract; (ii) that any construction in the military base had fallen under the “security” exception of the public-procurement rules. The trial court had also failed to secure the presence of Z.S. at the trial, despite the Court of Appeal’s instructions, and had refused evidence to disprove his testimony. 26. On 18 and 19 September 2007 the Court of Appeal held a public hearing at which it dismissed the defendants’ appeals. It found that all relevant facts had been correctly established and that the trial court had complied with its instructions. It considered that the refused evidence, which had mostly concerned the inability to execute the construction contract, had been irrelevant for the case. The court referred to the statements of Z.S. and M.S. in the context of the use of their company in the impugned procurement process by V.T. and Lj.P., without commenting on Z.S.’s absence from the trial. 27. The applicant lodged an application for extraordinary review of the final judgment (барање за вонредно преиспитување на правосилна пресуда) reiterating his complaints (see paragraph 25 above). 28. On 20 May 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ judgments and their findings regarding the lawfulness of the contracts. It found, inter alia, that the deteriorating security situation had not affected to the events in question. It further found that the trial court had admitted into the file evidence proposed by both the prosecution and the defence that had been necessary for establishing the relevant facts. The refusal to admit further evidence had not violated the defendants’ right to defence, nor had it affected the lawful and correct adjudication of the case.

5. The first applicant company, B. Tagliaferro & Sons Limited, is a company registered in Malta in 1966 and is situated in Valletta. The second applicant company, Coleiro Brothers Limited, is also a company registered in Malta in 1966 and it is situated in Marsa. 6. In 1993 each applicant company was the owner of a one third undivided share of three corner properties, namely nos. 124 and 125 in Strait Street and no. 109 Archbishop Street, Valletta (hereinafter “the properties”). 7. According to a court-appointed expert the properties nos. 124 and 125 were valued at the equivalent of 35,000 euros (EUR) each in 1993 and EUR 58,000 and EUR 60,000 respectively in 2012, while property no. 109 was valued at the equivalent of EUR 93,000 in 1993 and EUR 140,000 in 2012. The same architect estimated that the rental value from 1993 to 1998 would be the equivalent of EUR 233, EUR 250 and EUR 600 respectively, to be augmented by 10 % every five years thereafter. 8. By a President’s declaration of 23 February 1993 the Government declared its intention of acquiring by title of absolute purchase the three properties for public purposes. No Notice to Treat (offering an amount of compensation) was issued by the Commissioner of Lands (‘CoL’) at the time (see below). The public purpose later transpired to be that of using the properties, together with other properties also expropriated (together referred to as “the premises” hereinafter), as government offices ‑ in particular, as the Office of the Attorney General. 9. On 2 June 1993 and 12 October 1993 the Government had lodged planning applications, which were later withdrawn. Another development application was submitted in 1996 and approved in the same year. However, since parts of the premises expropriated (including other adjacent property not owned by the applicant companies) were occupied by squatters and by other persons having legal title (of lease or similar ‑ inkwilini ‑ hereinafter referred to as “lessees”), the Government was unable to take over the premises. The applicant companies insisted that at the time of the declaration, the properties owned by them were vacant. 10. Between 1996 and 2007 the Attorney General repeatedly requested the Lands Department to take steps to vacate the premises. In turn the latter department wrote to the Housing Authority requesting it to provide alternative accommodation to the lessees and the squatters. Given that not all the occupiers had applied for alternative accommodation, as expected by the authorities, the relocation process was delayed. Thus, the construction permit in relation to the planned project issued in 1996 expired. On 18 September 2000 another application was submitted to the Malta Environment and Planning Authority for approval. By the end of 2015 no approval had yet been issued due to various obstacles from the various committees of the Planning Authority. 11. In the meantime in April 2000 the issue was brought to the attention of the Justice Minister and in January 2001 eviction orders were issued to evict the occupiers of the premises. 12. In 2003 the applicant companies wrote to the CoL requesting him to pay compensation for the taking. The latter did not reply. 13. In 2007 the premises were vacated and the Government took over their possession. 14. By means of a judicial protest of 20 July 2008 the applicant companies requested the return of the properties owned by them as well as compensation for the taking until its effective release. The CoL did not reply to the protest. 15. On 24 June 2009 the Government issued a new declaration for the expropriation of the properties. They offered the following amount of compensation which was deposited via the courts in an interest bearing account: EUR 8,968 for property no. 124 (for a plot of land measuring 23.10 sq.m.); EUR 8,316 for property no. 125 (no measurement provided); and EUR 21,733 for property no. 109 (for a plot of land measuring 87.08 sq.m), in line with estimates made by architect FHV. 16. The Government thus became the owner of the properties in accordance with the Land Acquisition (Public Purposes) Ordinance, Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta, hereinafter “the Ordinance”, as amended. The applicant companies were not served with this declaration as required by law (see paragraph 37 below). 17. On unspecified dates the two applicant companies instituted separate constitutional redress proceedings complaining that the taking had not been in the public interest, that there had been a delay in the payment of compensation and that they had had no access to an impartial and independent tribunal in the meantime. 18. The two applications were heard and determined concurrently by the domestic courts. 19. By two separate judgments of 12 October 2012 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional jurisdiction, upheld the applicant companies’ claims in part. 20. It rejected their claim concerning the lack of public interest of the expropriation, having considered that the purpose of the taking was one in the general interest of citizens, given the role of the Attorney General who performed constitutional duties in the interest of the State. The Attorney General’s Office was to be moved to a more appropriate location, allowing it to expand. Whether the Government had other alternative property for this project was not a matter to be examined by the court, such choices falling within the Government’s discretion, which in the present case had not been applied unreasonably, and the decision had been intra vires. While it was true that a certain delay had occurred in the development of the initial plan, the court considered that the public interest still existed as the plan was still in force and had recently started progressing more rapidly. Moreover, the property was still earmarked for the same purpose, which purpose had never been abandoned by the authorities. 21. The court, however, found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in connection with the delay resulting from the expropriation proceedings, highlighting the slowness of the authorities in taking steps to vacate the premises and in offering the applicant companies compensation. 22. It further found a violation of Article 6 in so far as the applicant companies had not had access to court between 1993 and 2009, given that access to the Land Arbitration Board (LAB) was limited solely to the CoL. 23. Moreover, until 2009 the LAB did not fulfil the requirements of an independent and impartial tribunal given its composition according to the law as it stood before the 2009 amendments. The constitutional jurisdictions had already held (in previous domestic‑case law) that the LAB did not fulfil the requirement of independence and impartiality because of the method of appointment of its technical members before the 2009 amendments. Nevertheless, the latter amendments provided that the technical members, who assisted the chairperson in his decision, would now be appointed by the chairperson. Moreover, the latter’s decision was subject to appeal before the Court of Appeal. It followed that the same issues did not arise post 2009, thus the applicant companies had suffered a violation of their right to have their claims determined by an independent and impartial tribunal solely until 2009. 24. Furthermore, in the court’s view, the applicant companies were also still suffering a violation of their right to a fair trial within a reasonable time in connection with the proceedings which were at the time in their preliminary phase, in so far as the CoL had not yet officially notified the owners (or curators on their behalf) allowing them to challenge the compensation. 25. The court further noted that while according to the law the obligation to act was upon the CoL and owners should not be required to take judicial steps to impose a term for him to act, the fact that the applicant companies had not undertaken such judicial steps could affect the compensation awarded. 26. The court rejected the applicant companies’ claims for material damage without prejudice to proceedings which they could bring before the LAB which could now be considered independent and impartial – it being chaired by a judge or magistrate who fulfilled the relevant guarantee - and whose decisions could also be appealed. It awarded each applicant company EUR 10,000 in non‑pecuniary damage (known in the domestic system as moral damage) bearing in mind that they each were owners of a third undivided share of the properties. The court also ordered the applicant companies to pay half the costs of the proceedings, that is to say EUR 3,546.97. 27. Both parties appealed. 28. By two separate judgments of 31 May 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected the defendants’ appeal and upheld the applicant companies’ appeal in part. It confirmed the first‑instance judgment, extending the scope of certain violations and increasing the amount of compensation awarded. 29. The Constitutional Court confirmed the violations of Article 6 (access to court and length of proceedings) and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in so far as in the absence of a Notice to Treat issued by the CoL the applicant companies had had no access to court from 1993 to 2009. However, these violations persisted further, in so far as even after the declaration of 2009 and the CoL’s deposit in court of the offer made to the applicant companies, he had failed to notify the owners as required by law [Article 9 (2) of the Ordinance] with the consequence that proceedings had stagnated and no access to court by the applicant companies was possible as a result of his inaction. Indeed, the authorities had slacked all throughout the process. Similarly, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the applicant companies’ failure to bring judicial proceedings to oblige the CoL to act could only have a bearing on the award of compensation but not on the substance of the claim. 30. It further confirmed the public interest of the taking, which persisted to date since, despite the delay, the Government was still pursuing the aim it had originally intended for the property. 31. The Constitutional Court also confirmed the lack of independence and impartiality of the LAB, however not only until 2009. The Constitutional Court considered that, even following those amendments the law remained deficient given the lack of security of tenure of the technical members of the board, on whose technical advice the chairperson had to base his or her decision. While it confirmed the first‑instance court’s findings concerning the role of the chairperson, it observed that the technical members were still subject to reappointment (by the President of Malta, on the advice of the executive, which was always a party to the proceedings before such board). Although the role of the technical members was subordinate to that of the chairperson (who following the amendments was not bound to follow the experts’ unanimous report), in practice it was decisive in so far as the chairperson (a legal person without the necessary technical knowledge) was undoubtedly influenced by the decision of the technical members when considering technical matters. As stated in previous domestic case-law, at least in the mind of an objective observer, the possibility of the technical experts being reappointed could be an incentive for such members to determine low values for expropriated property in order to remain in the good books of the executive who had the power to keep them in office. Thus, such a body did not fulfil the guarantees of independence and impartiality. In the specific circumstances, those failings could not be cured by the Court of Appeal, which was not in a position to interfere with the conclusions of the technical members of the board. 32. However, the Constitutional Court considered that material damage had to be awarded by the LAB in separate proceedings; it thus only awarded non-pecuniary damage in the amount of EUR 15,000 to each applicant company. It ordered the applicant companies to pay a third of the costs of the appeal proceedings (that is, EUR 1,109.41) and confirmed the costs as ordered at first-instance for those proceedings. It further directed that the judgment be served upon the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 33. In 2018 the applicant companies submitted that no use had yet been made of their property, the value of which was increasing in line with the value of property in general in Malta. They also noted that the Government had done restoration works in the area, particularly to a part of Palazzo Verdelin, which was a historic building described in newspapers as an early example of baroque architecture in Malta, but not to the part owned by the applicant companies which was left to deteriorate in the absence of maintenance works. 34. At the same time, the Government informed the Court that due to the urgency of vacating and transferring the Office of the Attorney General, another building in Valletta which was previously a museum was identified for use as the Office of the Attorney General. It was now being refurbished and modified for such purpose. However, the applicant companies’ property remained designated for public use. They noted that the applicant companies’ property could not be refurbished as it needed extensive structural works unlike Palazzo Verdelin which required only restoring the facade.

5. The applicants, Tiramavia S.R.L., Valan International Cargo Charter S.R.L. and Grixona S.R.L. are companies specialising in air transportation. 6. Each of the companies had a valid air operator certificate (an “AOC”)[1] issued by the Moldovan Civil Aviation State Authority (the “CASA”). 7. On 1 June 2007 the CASA issued an order banning all flights of aircraft registered in Moldova to Iraq and Afghanistan, with effect from 15 July 2007. 8. Between 4 and 8 June 2007, all Moldovan aviation companies were subjected to a check by the European Union Safety Committee. As a result, some irregularities concerning compliance with the European norms in the field of aviation safety were detected. The European Union Safety Committee also found that some aviation companies did not comply with the rule according to which the companies have to have their principal place of business in the state of registration. One of the conclusions set down in the visit report drawn up by the European Union Safety Committee was that the CASA failed to demonstrate the ability adequately to enforce and implement the relevant safety standards. According to the report, the CASA had undertaken to remedy the situation within three months. 9. In a letter addressed to the CASA by the European Commission on 8 June 2007, the former was asked to require all the companies concerned to present their response to the findings in the report by 22 June 2007 at the latest. The CASA was also informed that the companies concerned would have the possibility of presenting their views orally during the Air Safety Committee meeting of 25 June 2007 in Brussels, at which a decision was to be taken on whether or not to ban those companies from entering European Union airspace. 10. On 14 June 2007 the CASA sent the applicant companies the EU Safety Committee’s report and informed them that they had until 22 June 2007 to present their comments. 11. On 18 June 2007 the CASA sent the applicant companies aviation instruction no. 2584 and asked them to present by 21 June 2007 a plan for remedying the irregularities found by the EU Safety Committee. The corresponding plan was sent by the applicant companies to the CASA on 21 June 2007. 12. Also on 18 June 2007 the CASA sent the applicant companies aviation instruction no. 2585 requesting them to undertake measures with a view to remedying some of the irregularities before 20 July 2007 and other irregularities before 20 September 2007. 13. On 21 June 2007 the CASA issued order no. 102/GEN withdrawing the applicant companies’ AOCs, and thereby terminating their activity. 14. In respect of the first applicant company and three other companies which are not applicants in the present case, the reason relied upon by the CASA was that the airport authorities of several European countries had discovered irregularities with their aircraft, some of which had a recurring nature, and that those irregularities had a negative impact on flight security. The CASA did not specify which irregularities it referred to. 15. As to the second and third companies, the CASA relied on the fact that they flew to destinations such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Congo, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, New Zealand and United Arab Emirates. The CASA argued that those destinations involved security risks and that it had no resources to ensure flight security in those territories. 16. On 22 June 2007 the applicant companies wrote to the CASA and asked it to reverse its decision on the grounds that it had not explained exactly what irregularities formed the basis for the withdrawal of the AOCs and that the CASA had not afforded them enough time to remedy the alleged irregularities. 17. The CASA refused to reverse its decision, and on 28 June 2007 the applicant companies challenged it in the Chişinău Court of Appeal. The applicants submitted, inter alia, that according to section 23 of the Law on Civil Aviation, the CASA was entitled to suspend or withdraw the AOCs only if the companies failed to remedy the irregularities found by the CASA within the prescribed time-limit. They also made reference to section RAC‑AOC 0170 from the Regulations in the Field of Civil Aviation according to which an AOC could be revoked only after being initially suspended. Since the CASA had not observed those legal provisions, its actions were unlawful. 18. On 3 December 2008 the Chişinău Court of Appeal rejected the applicant companies’ action, finding that the CASA had been entitled to withdraw the applicant companies’ AOCs because serious irregularities threatening the safety of the flights had been found in respect of the first applicant company and three other companies, which are not applicants in the present case, and because those companies had failed to remedy those irregularities. The Court of Appeal did not indicate the irregularities to which it referred. The court also found that the other companies had failed to comply with the CASA’s order of 1 June 2007 prohibiting flights to Iraq and Afghanistan as of 15 July 2007. The court did not give an answer to the applicants’ argument concerning the CASA’s failure to observe the provisions of section 23 the Law on Civil Aviation and those of the Regulations in the Field of Civil Aviation. It only stated that the legal basis for the CASA’s decision was section 5 of the Law on Civil Aviation and paragraph (c) of RAC-AOC 0170 from the Regulations in the Field of Civil Aviation. The applicant companies challenged the decision before the Supreme Court of Justice, reiterating inter alia their position concerning the unlawfulness of the challenged decision. 19. On 29 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant companies’ appeal and upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal after finding that the CASA was entitled to revoke the AOCs since the second and third applicant companies had failed to comply with its instructions concerning the ban on all flights of aircraft registered in Moldova to Iraq and Afghanistan, with effect from 15 July 2007. As to the first applicant company, the Supreme Court confirmed the finding of the inferior court that serious irregularities threatening the safety of the flights had been found in respect of it and other companies which are not applicants in the present case and that they had failed to remedy those irregularities. The Supreme Court did not specify which irregularities it referred to and did not address the issue of the unlawfulness of the CASA’s decision.

4. The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Bukhara, Uzbekistan. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicant was born in Uzbekistan. In 2003 his father, mother, brother and sister moved to Vladivostok in Russia and subsequently acquired Russian nationality, while he continued to live with his grandfather in Bukhara, visiting them in the summer months. After his grandfather had died and the applicant had finished the secondary school, in June 2011 he joined his family in Russia. 7. The applicant took a mandatory blood test with a view to obtaining a health certificate to support his application for a temporary residence permit. He was found to be HIV-positive. 8. On 23 September 2011 the Consumer Protection Authority declared the applicant’s presence in Russian undesirable (the “exclusion order”) on the ground that he was HIV-positive. 9. By judgment of 19 December 2011, the Sovetskiy District Court in Vladivostok rejected the applicant’s challenge to the exclusion order, finding that it was issued in full compliance with Russian law. 10. On 13 February 2012 the Primorskiy Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 11. On 22 February 2012 the applicant left Russia to comply with the exclusion order.

4. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Kyustendil. 5. In a judgment of 15 August 2004 the Sofia District Court awarded the applicant BGN 2,120.28 (about 1,100 euros (EUR)) in damages, plus the legal interest for the period starting on 11 February 2003 until full payment, and BGN 200 in costs and expenses, against the National Centre for Recreation, Rehabilitation and Sport (“the Centre”). The Centre was a State body subsidised by the Ministry of Education. It exercised certain functions entrusted by the Ministry. The damages were awarded for loss of salary following the applicant’s unlawful dismissal from work. The judgment became final on 11 February 2008. 6. In the meantime, on 25 May 2005 the Minister of Education ordered that the Centre be closed down and its remaining property be managed by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry then established a State-owned joint-stock company with part of the Centre’s property. 7. On 26 November 2008 the applicant was issued with a writ of enforcement for the amount awarded against the Centre in the final judgment of 11 February 2008 (see paragraph 5 above). On 18 March 2009 he filed a request with the Minister for Education for payment of that amount. 8. The Ministry of Education replied in May 2009 that neither the Ministry, nor the State-owned joint-stock company, was the successor of the Centre and that the amount claimed was not due by them. 9. As of 23 March 2015, the date of the applicant’s last communication to the Court, no change in the above circumstances had been recorded.

6. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Diyarbakır. 7. At the time of the events giving rise to the application, the applicant was the head of the district branch of the Democratic People’s Party (Demokratik Halklar Partisi – DEHAP) in the Ergani district of Diyarbakır. 8. On 15 February 2005, on the anniversary of the arrest and transfer of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK[1], to Turkey, the Ergani district branch of DEHAP organised a gathering in front of the district branch office in order to read out a press statement. The applicant read the statement in question. 9. On 31 May 2005 the Ergani public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Ergani Criminal Court against twenty-six persons, including the applicant, charging them with breach of the Marches and Demonstrations Act (Law no. 2911) on account of their participation in the above-mentioned event. They were accused of participating in the gathering and carrying banners with slogans such as “The solution is in İmralı[2]” (“Çözüm İmralı’da”), “Solitary confinement is a crime against humanity” (“Tecrit insanlık suçudur”), “Not EU, not US, Öcalan has the solution” (“Ne AB ne ABD, Çözüm Öcalan’da”) , “The youth is Öcalan’s fedai”[3] (“Gençlik Apo’nun Fedaisidir”), and “Freedom to Öcalan” (“Öcalan’a özgürlük”), as well as posters of Abdullah Öcalan. They were also accused of chanting slogans such as “To the sun, to freedom” (Güneşe güneşe, özgürleşmeye”), “Long live the brotherhood of peoples” (“Yaşasın halkların kardeşliği”), “May those hands which aim to damage peace be broken” (“Barışa uzanan eller kırılsın”), “A tooth for a tooth, blood for blood, we are with you” (“Dişe diş kana kan, seninleyiz”) and “AKP, be careful, do not abuse our patience” (“AKP şaşırma, sabrımızı taşırma”). 10. On 5 October 2006 the Ergani Criminal Court decided that it lacked jurisdiction to examine the case. It held that the impugned acts constituted the offence proscribed by section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713 and that the accused should therefore be tried by the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 11. On an unspecified date the Diyarbakır Assize Court remitted the case file to the Ergani Criminal Court. 12. On 19 March 2007 the Ergani Criminal Court once again decided that the Diyarbakır Assize Court had jurisdiction over the case. 13. On 10 August 2007 the Sixth Chamber of the Diyarbakır Assize Court began the trial in the case. 14. On 15 April 2010 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor submitted to the first-instance court his observations on the merits of the case. According to those submissions, the public prosecutor considered that the applicant should be convicted under section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713, as the press statement read out by him had referred to Abdullah Öcalan as the “honourable Kurdish people’s leader”. 15. On the same day the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7 (2) of Law no. 3713. The court based its judgment, among others, on a police report regarding the reading out of the press statement dated 15 February 2005 and a police report dated 23 February 2005 on the examination of a police video recording of the event of 15 February 2005. The court judgment read as follows: “... it has been decided that Ahmet Kınık and R.A. committed the offence proscribed by section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, as they participated in the reading out of a press statement organised by the DEHAP in Ergani on 15 February 2005 on the anniversary of the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, and chanted slogans such as ‘The solution is in İmralı’, ‘Solitary confinement is a crime against humanity’, ‘Not EU, not US, Öcalan has the solution’, and ‘The youth is Öcalan’s fedai’. They marched and chanted these slogans without obtaining prior permission.” 16. The Sixth Chamber of the Diyarbakır Assize Court sentenced the applicant to ten months’ imprisonment but decided to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment (hükmün açıklanmasının geri bırakılması) for a period of five years, under Article 231 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 17. On 5 July 2010 the applicant objected to the decision of the Assize Court to suspend the pronouncement of the judgment. 18. On 22 November 2010 the Fourth Chamber of the Diyarbakır Assize Court dismissed the applicant’s objection.

6. The applicants were born in 1947 and 1971 and live in Skopje. The first applicant is the father of the second applicant. 7. The first applicant was arrested on 23 December 2010. The second applicant was arrested on the next day. 8. On 24 December 2010 the applicants were brought before an investigating judge of the Skopje Court of First Instance (Основен суд Скопје, “the trial court”). On the same day the investigating judge opened an investigation in respect of twenty people, including the applicants, on suspicion of criminal conspiracy (злосторничко здружување) and tax evasion (даночно затајување). It was alleged that the first applicant had conspired to create an organised group for the commission of various criminal offences through a network of companies founded and owned by the suspects. 9. At the same time the investigating judge ordered that nineteen of the suspects, including the applicants, be held in pre-trial detention for thirty days. The order also applied to five suspects who were still at large, including H.R., the son of the first applicant and brother of the second applicant. The order was based on all three grounds specified in section 199(1) of the Criminal Proceedings Act (Закон за кривичната постапка, Official Gazette no. 15/2005 – “the Act”), namely a risk of the suspects absconding, reoffending and interfering with the investigation. As to the risk of absconding, the judge took into account the statements of the suspects, including the fact that some of them had decided to remain silent, the gravity of the charges and the severity of the anticipated penalty, and concluded that there was a risk of the suspects absconding if they were released. Detaining the suspects on the grounds of the risk of their reoffending was justified by the fact that most of them held managerial posts in companies implicated in the criminal proceedings and had authority to sign business accounts and other financial documents. The judge further held that special circumstances (особени околности) suggested that if released, the suspects might interfere with the investigation by influencing prosecution witnesses who were to be examined by the investigating judge. The preparation of a financial expert report was also ordered. 10. On 21 January 2011 a three-judge panel of the trial court set up under section 22(6) of the Act (see paragraph 33 below) ordered a thirty-day extension of the pre-trial detention of the applicants and twelve other suspects on all three grounds specified under the Act. As to the risk of their absconding, the panel reasoned as follows: “The material and verbal evidence adduced so far corroborates the reasonable suspicion that the defendants have committed the crimes of which they are suspected. Having regard to the nature, character and type of offences that are being investigated, as well as the gravity of the charges, the level of criminal responsibility, the anticipated penalty ... the panel considers that there is a real risk of flight if the defendants are released ... The risk of flight is further reinforced by the financial circumstances of the defendants, given the fact that most of them do not have immovable property in their name ... The panel has taken into consideration the fact that most of the defendants have families and that they are parents, as well as that [some of the defendants, including Ms E. Ramkovska] have immovable property in their name, but these circumstances do not eliminate the risk of the defendants absconding and are insufficient to secure their attendance at the pre-trial proceedings.” 11. The panel also considered that, if released, the suspects might interfere with the investigation. In this connection, it took note of the fact that the examination of prosecution witnesses had been scheduled for 21, 25 and 31 January 2011. The fact that some of the suspects (but not the applicants) had decided to remain silent was considered by the panel as a factor that heightened the risk of interference with the investigation. 12. As regards the risk of reoffending, the panel took into account that the applicants were suspected of being part of an organised group that had been operating over a prolonged period of time, with assigned roles in business structures of already existing companies or companies which the suspects aimed to establish with a view to making unlawful gains. The fact that the suspects still held the same posts in the companies implicated in the criminal proceedings implied a risk of reoffending, if they were released. 13. On 26 January 2011 the applicants lodged appeals complaining that the three-judge panel had not given concrete reasons to justify their pre-trial detention. They argued that the panel had not provided sufficient reasons to justify detaining them on grounds of the risk of their reoffending, and that the risk of interference with the investigation had not been substantiated since nearly all the evidence had already been gathered. The fact that some of the other suspects had decided to remain silent could not serve as basis for extending their pre-trial detention. The applicants also submitted that they did not have a previous criminal record; they had not resisted arrest and had behaved in an exemplary manner during their detention. Both of them had families and possessions in the respondent State. The second applicant was a mother of three minor children. They sought release and replacement of the detention order with a more lenient measure, such as house arrest. 14. On 4 February 2011 the Skopje Court of Appeal (Апелационен суд Скопје, “the Court of Appeal”) dismissed the appeals of the applicants and the other suspects and upheld the court order. As regards the risk of interference with the investigation, the Court of Appeal held that the investigation had not yet been completed and the examination of the witnesses was ongoing. The court relied on the gravity of the charges and the severity of the penalty to justify detaining them on the grounds of the risk of their absconding. As to the risk of reoffending, the Court of Appeal reiterated the panel’s finding that the suspects were being investigated for acting as an organised group over a prolonged period of time, through a network of companies founded at home and abroad, with a view to making unlawful gains. 15. On 21 February 2011 a three-judge panel of the trial court ordered another thirty-day extension of the pre-trial detention of the applicants and nine other suspects. The panel used identical wording to justify detaining them on the grounds of the risk of the suspects absconding, reoffending and interfering with the investigation. Additionally, the panel took into consideration the fact that the investigation had been extended to include additional criminal offences. Thus additional evidence, including the examination of two witnesses – M.N. and R.D. as representatives of certain companies – was yet to be secured. 16. On 4 March 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed appeals lodged by the applicants and the other suspects. It upheld the panel’s decision and its reasoning justifying further extension of the applicants’ pre-trial detention. 17. On 22 March 2011 the applicants and the other suspects were indicted before the trial court. Both applicants were charged with money laundering, criminal conspiracy and tax evasion. The first applicant was further charged with abuse of office. 18. On the same day a three-judge panel of the trial court ordered another thirty-day extension of the pre-trial detention of the applicants and other accused. The extension was ordered on grounds of the risk of the accused absconding and reoffending. The panel provided the following reasoning: “The material and verbal evidence adduced so far corroborates the high degree of reasonable suspicion that the accused have committed the crimes with which they are charged. Having regard to the nature, character and type of offences with which the accused are charged under the indictment; given that the accused committed the criminal offences as a well-organised and compact group consisting of organisers and members with assigned roles in taking the incriminated actions they are suspected of; having regard to the degree of danger for society and criminal responsibility; having regard to the type and severity of the anticipated penalty for the type of offences of which the accused are suspected, including the possibility of an effective prison sentence, the panel considers that there is a real risk of flight if the accused are released ... The risk of flight is increased if the behaviour of H.R., N.R., R.I. and R.C [other accused] is taken into consideration given that they remain unavailable to the law-enforcement authorities ... In the assessment of the risk of reoffending as a ground warranting further extension of the pre-trial detention, the panel took into account the nature and type of the offences with which the accused were charged ... and the fact that the defendants are accused of acting as a well-organised group, consisting of organisers and members, with assigned roles in the business structures of several companies, that acted over a prolonged period of time. The risk of reoffending is reinforced due to the circumstance that some of the criminal offences were committed as continuous crimes, which underlines the nature and character [of the accused], as well as their susceptibility to carry out criminal activities of this type over a prolonged period of time. The fact that the majority of the accused still occupy the same posts in the companies involved in the criminal proceedings, from which they took the incriminated actions of which they are accused in the criminal proceedings at hand, generates a risk of reoffending if the accused are released ...” 19. On 28 March 2011 the applicants lodged appeals complaining that the court order violated their rights under Article 5 of the Convention, in that it did not provide concrete reasons for their detention. They argued that the panel had essentially issued a collective detention order, using identical wording and standardised phrases without specifying any particular reason concerning the applicants’ personal character that would justify their pre-trial detention. They also argued that the wording used by the panel was in violation of the principle of presumption of innocence guaranteed under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. 20. On 11 April 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of the applicants and the other accused. It relied on the gravity of the charges and the severity of the anticipated penalty as circumstances warranting further extension of the pre-trial detention of the applicants and the other accused. With regard to the risk of reoffending, the Court of Appeal took note of the fact that the defendants were accused of acting as an organised group over a prolonged period of time, with pre-defined roles, using the established business structure of companies in the respondent State and abroad. 21. On 21 April 2011 a three-judge panel of the trial court ordered another thirty-day extension of the pre-trial detention of the applicants and other accused on the grounds that they might abscond and reoffend. It provided the same reasons as before. 22. On 29 April 2011 the applicants appealed against the panel’s decision before the Court of Appeal. 23. On 10 May 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of the applicants and the other accused, providing the same reasoning as before. 24. On 13 May 2011 that decision was served on the first applicant in prison. On the same day the applicants’ lawyer inspected the case file in the trial court. 25. In the meantime, the applicants unsuccessfully applied for release on several occasions. On 10 May 2011 a three-judge panel of the trial court dismissed an application for release submitted by the second applicant. It also removed the risk of reoffending from the list of grounds justifying the second applicant’s pre-trial detention. 26. In the course of the proceedings the applicants’ pre-trial detention was continuously extended until their conviction by the trial court. The first applicant’s detention was extended on the grounds that he might abscond and reoffend. After 10 May 2011 the second applicant’s detention was extended solely on grounds that she might abscond. 27. On 14 March 2012 the trial court convicted the applicants as charged. The court further decided that they would remain in custody until the judgment became final. 28. On 25 February 2013 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicants’ conviction. The applicants have started to serve their prison sentences. 29. In their observations the Government informed the Court about an article published on 19 November 2014 on an internet portal called Prizma-Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) entitled “The Government offered settlement – Ramkovski declined, he will wait for Strasbourg” (“Владата понудила спогодба – Рамковски ја одбил, ќе го чека Стразбур”). In the article the journalist wrote about the factual background of the case, the complaints communicated to the Government and the questions asked by the Court. It included a link to the statement of facts and the Court’s questions sent to the parties. 30. The caption under the title of the article read as follows: “The State offered a settlement to Velija Ramkovski – compensation for the long pre-trial detention and violation of the presumption of innocence in the ‘spider web’ affair, in relation to which he has complained before the European Court [of Human Rights] – but he refused. Faced with the fact that the State will lose the case, the Government will change the legal provisions concerning pre-trial detention.” 31. The last part of the article was entitled “Ramkovski refuses settlement, the Government changes the law” (“Рамковски одбива спогодба, Владата го менува законот”). The article went on to say: “After the Court asked the questions, the State offered a settlement, Velija Ramkovski’s defence team confirmed for BIRN. A settlement between the parties for payment of compensation is allowed by the statute of the Court. However it was not acceptable to Ramkovski. - I met with Velija Ramkovski in prison, I gave him the message from the State about a settlement, but he refused. He has decided to wait for the Court in Strasbourg to find violations in his case with a judgment – confirmed for BIRN a member of Ramkovski’s legal defence team who is representing him before the domestic courts. The State confirmed that they have been contacted by the Court in Strasbourg and also confirmed the credibility of the documents in BIRN’s possession. - The Government agent and the Bureau for representation of the State before the Court in Strasbourg are preparing the observations to be sent to the Court by the end of November – said the Government agent, Kostadin Bogdanov. He says that in the meantime they have contacted the parties by telephone and have offered them a settlement. However, they have received no response yet and they are required to submit their observations to the Court within several days. ...” 32. After it had been published on the Prizma-BIRN internet portal, information about the settlement offer had appeared on several other internet portals.

5. The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Siġġiewi. 6. The applicant is the owner of 14 Kirkop Square, Kirkop, a two‑storey tenement with a surface area of around 175 sq.m. (hereinafter “the property”). In 1975, 1979, and 1987, following the death of their father, mother and uncle respectively, the applicant and her three brothers inherited an estate which included the property. By a deed of partition of 11 November 1998 the property was assigned to the applicant and she became its sole owner. 7. The property was requisitioned in 1955 by means of a requisition order. The premises were then allocated to the San Leonard Band Club in Kirkop (hereinafter “the band club”). The owners of the property never recognised the tenant or accepted any rent from the club. According to a judgment of 1 February 1958 of the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction, the owners were entitled to do so because the tenement had not been leased as a dwelling, and thus greater risks were involved. 8. In the years that followed rent was paid to the owners by the competent authority (then the Director of Social Housing, today the Housing Authority). The annual rent payable amounted to 30 Maltese Lira (MTL – approximately 70 euros (EUR)), less than EUR 6 per month. According to an architect’s valuation from 2007 submitted by the applicant, the rental value of the tenement at the time was MTL 750 (approximately EUR 1,747) per month. The Government challenged this estimate, as the valuation had contained no explanation as to the basis for the calculations, or whether the property was considered residential or commercial, or vacant or occupied. They relied on a valuation in an architect’s report concerning a property (3 Kirkop Square) requisitioned in 1955 for the purposes of the band club – which stated that the rental value in 2015 was EUR 12,250 per year, which meant EUR 1,021 per month. The Government did not refer to the different address, arguing as though the valuation referred to the property at issue in the present case. 9. Over the years the band club carried out extensive structural alterations, without obtaining the consent of the owners or the relevant permits from the competent authorities. According to an architect’s report, there had been a total change and the alteration effected had effaced what had once been the traditional layout of important buildings in old Maltese towns. According to the applicant, this deprived her of the valuable quality and historical and architectural importance of the property, thus devaluing it. The Government argued that the applicant had not availed herself of any ordinary remedy in this regard and had thus failed to substantiate the loss in value. Moreover, in their view the property was in a good state of repair and the alterations had increased its value. 10. According to the applicant, the band club also repeatedly breached the tenancy agreement which it had signed, by manufacturing fireworks on the premises and conducting commercial activities (such as running a bar and letting the premises out as a wedding venue despite not having the requisite authorisation). The Government submitted that these were unsubstantiated allegations, which had not been proved before the domestic courts. 11. As from 2008, in the light of constitutional proceedings (see below), the band club started depositing the annual rent in court. 12. The applicant and her brothers also owned a property (18 St. John’s Alley, Kirkop) adjacent to the tenement above, which was requisitioned in 1986 and also assigned to the band club. 13. In 1987 the owners of the tenement instituted civil proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction against the Housing Secretary and the band club. They requested that the requisition order of 30 December 1986 be declared null and void as being contrary to the 1949 Housing Act, and sought to regain possession of the tenement. They also requested compensation for the damage allegedly sustained. 14. In a judgment of 9 October 1991 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction rejected the plaintiffs’ claim. The owners appealed against that decision. 15. In a judgment of 30 December 1993 the Court of Appeal declared the requisition order null and void and ordered that the appellants be given possession of the premises within six months. It held that the requisition for the purposes of assigning the property to the band club could not be considered to be in the public interest. It sent the case back to the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction for it to award the appellants compensation. 16. In a judgment of 31 May 2005 the Court of Appeal rejected a request for a new trial submitted by the band club. 17. In a judgment of 16 October 2006 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction found the Housing Secretary and the band club liable for the damage suffered by the owners in connection with the structural alterations to the property. This judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 27 February 2009. 18. By a judgment of 6 May 2009 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction awarded the owners EUR 72,000 in damages, covering EUR 16,000 for missing objects, EUR 40,000 to rectify the structural changes made and EUR 16,000 for the loss of use of the property for twenty years. This judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 2 October 2012. 19. In 2007 the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings in relation to the property requisitioned in 1955, asking the court to declare that, as a result of the requisition order and the continued occupation of the premises, she had suffered a breach of her rights under Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. She asked the court to award her compensation for the taking of possession of the property and for the violations suffered, and to order any other measure capable of preventing the continuation of the violation, including the release of the property. 20. The defendants, the Director of Social Accommodation, the Attorney General and the band club, argued that no such violations had occurred. 21. By a judgment of 11 October 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction upheld the applicant’s claims. It considered that the requisition order had been issued for the property to be enjoyed by a private entity and therefore the measure had not been in the public interest. In this connection, it referred to a judgment of 30 December 1993 by the Court of Appeal concerning what it considered to be the same property (see above). Moreover, the measure had not been proportionate. The rent had been derisory, causing the applicant to suffer a disproportionate and excessive burden. She had therefore suffered a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. According to the court, the applicant had also suffered a violation of Article 14, as only her property had been requisitioned for the use of the band club. In determining the amount of compensation, the court did not take into account the fact that the applicant or her ancestors had received rent, given that the amount was derisory. Bearing in mind the values established by the applicant’s expert as to the rental value and sale value of the property, which was MTL 180,000 (approximately EUR 420,000) (pg.12 of the judgment), as well as the length of time the requisition was and remained in place, the court awarded the applicant EUR 60,000 in compensation (kumpens) for the requisition of the premises and the violations found, noting it was not awarding civil damages (danni ċivili) in this context. Three quarters of the amount was to be paid by the Director of Social Housing and one quarter by the band club. It further ordered the band club to vacate the premises within three months of the date of judgment and to return the premises to the applicant. 22. The band club appealed, arguing that it could not be held responsible for breaches of human rights and that, in any event, the measure had been in the public interest. It further contested the order to vacate the property. The Attorney General and the Director of Social Accommodation also appealed, in particular in relation to the findings of a lack of public interest, a violation of Article 14 and the redress awarded. The applicant cross‑appealed, arguing that the compensation awarded was too low and did not reflect the losses she had incurred over the years. 23. By a judgment of 25 May 2012 the Constitutional Court upheld the first-instance judgment in part. It reiterated the finding of a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far as the requisition had been disproportionate. It found, however, that it had been in the public interest – the court considered that jurisprudence had shifted since the time of the judgment of 30 December 1993 of the Court of Appeal on which the first-instance court had based its assessment. In the present case the requisition had served a social and cultural purpose for the generality of citizens and could not be said to have served solely private interests. 24. It further found that there had been no violation of Article 14. 25. As to the redress, the Constitutional Court revoked the order for the club to vacate the premises. Considering that the violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was a consequence of the lack of a fair balance between the interests of the landlord and those of the tenant, and given that the validity of the lease was not at issue in the present case, it did not seem appropriate for it to evict the tenant; it sufficed that that unfair balance be redressed. 26. The Constitutional Court confirmed the amount of compensation awarded by the first-instance court, including the way in which it had to be shared. It considered that the band club had benefited from the situation and had never attempted to fix it, despite the fact that it had not been recognised as a tenant. In relation to the amount of compensation, it considered that the disproportionality of the measure had not persisted since the start of the requisition in 1955, but had started to be so only after the 1980s. Furthermore, the applicant had received the rent paid by the department and had only instituted constitutional proceedings in 2007 (while never contesting the validity of the requisition), thus it was legitimate and in line with local case-law to reduce her compensation. It also held that the property had been taken in the public interest and therefore the compensation needed not reflect market values. It followed that the compensation had to be reduced, however, given that the property was not to be vacated, it was appropriate to retain the amount awarded by the first‑instance court. Lastly, the court held that the claim for damages for the depreciation of the property as a result of structural works did not fall within the ambit of a constitutional complaint, and it was thus not its place to award such damages. 27. The Constitutional Court ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the cross-appeal and half the judicial costs of the proceedings before the two levels of jurisdiction.

5. The applicants were born in 1976 and 1983 respectively. 6. The first applicant, Aleksey Navalnyy, is a political activist, opposition leader, anti-corruption campaigner and popular blogger. He lives in Moscow. The second applicant, Oleg Navalnyy, is the first applicant’s brother; he is an entrepreneur and a former employee of the Federal State unitary enterprise Russian Post. He is currently serving a three-and-a-half year sentence in a correctional colony in the Oryol Region. 7. From 2005 the second applicant worked at the Main Centre for Long Distance Mail, a subsidiary of Russian Post. On 1 December 2007 he became head of its Internal Mail department and then worked in other managerial posts in various departments and divisions of Russian Post. 8. On 17 October 2006 Russian Post concluded a contract with the limited liability company Multidisciplinary Processing (OOO Многопрофильная процессинговая компания – hereinafter “MPK”) and the telecommunications company Rostelekom, whereby MPK undertook to print Rostelekom’s telephone bills and deliver them through Russian Post to Rostelekom’s customers. 9. On 1 February 2007, under a separate contract, Russian Post leased electronic equipment from MPK. On 10 April 2007 MPK subcontracted the sorting, packing and the transfer of the equipment leased to Russian Post to a private joint-stock company, the Interregional Mail Centre (OAO Межрегиональный специализированный почтовый центр – hereinafter “MSPT”). 10. On 3 December 2007 the applicants and their parents acquired the limited liability company Alortag Management Limited, incorporated in Cyprus. 11. On 7 May 2008 MPK subcontracted the printing of the Rostelekom telephone bills to the limited liability company IPS M-City (OOO ИПС М‑Сити – hereinafter “M‑City”). 12. On 19 May 2008 Alortag Management Limited set up a Russian limited liability company, Chief Subscription Agency (ООО Главное подписное агентство – hereinafter “GPA”). Neither of the applicants held formal positions in GPA, but it appears that the second applicant was actively involved in its functioning. 13. On 16 July 2008 the chief of Russian Post’s Mail Service Directorate informed its client, the Russian subsidiary of French company Yves Rocher, the limited liability company Yves Rocher Vostok (OOO Ив Роше Восток), that from 1 October 2008 it would terminate the practice of collecting the client’s parcels from a specific distribution centre and that this service would henceforth be subject to a separate contract. Subsequently, Ms B., a manager at Yves Rocher Vostok, asked the second applicant for advice on handling the transfer of parcels from the distribution centre and he suggested that she use a private contractor, GPA. 14. On 2 August 2008 the financial director of Yves Rocher Vostok, Mr K.M., signed a freight forwarding agreement with GPA for the collection and transfer of parcels from the distribution centre at 23,600 Russian roubles (RUB) per shipment. On 10 August 2008 GPA subcontracted the freight forwarding services under that agreement to two specialist courier companies. GPA paid the couriers RUB 14,000 per shipment. GPA and its contractors provided those services to Yves Rocher Vostok until the end of 2012. 15. On 7 November 2008 the general director of MPK, Mr Sh., signed an agreement with GPA whereby the latter undertook to provide overall logistical services to MPK related to the printing, sorting, packing and distribution of telephone bills as well as the sorting, packing and transfer of electronic equipment to Russian Post. Subsequently, GPA subcontracted those services to seventeen specialist companies, including M-City. GPA and its contractors rendered the services to MPK until March 2013. 16. In the same period, the first applicant ran an increasingly public anti-corruption campaign targeting high-ranking public officials (see Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia, nos. 46632/13 and 28671/14, § 15, 23 February 2016). In 2011-2012 he organised and led a number of rallies, including an assembly at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow on 6 May 2012 (see, among other sources, Frumkin v. Russia, no. 74568/12, §§ 7-65, ECHR 2016 (extracts)). 17. At the beginning of 2012 the first applicant investigated the off-duty activities of the chief of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (“the Investigative Committee”), Mr Bastrykin. On 25 April 2012 the Investigative Committee, at the direct order of Mr Bastrykin, instituted criminal proceedings in embezzlement case against the first applicant (see Navalnyy and Ofitserov, cited above, hereinafter “the Kirovles case”). On 5 July 2012 Mr Bastrykin made a public statement expressing his determination to have the first applicant prosecuted. On 26 July 2012 the first applicant published an article about Mr Bastrykin, alleging in particular that his business activities and residence status were incompatible with the office he held (ibid., §§ 30-31 and 118). 18. On 4 December 2012 the general director of Yves Rocher Vostok, Mr B.L., lodged a complaint with the Investigative Committee, alleging that in 2008 unidentified persons had misled his company’s employees and had persuaded them to conclude a contract with GPA, thus depriving the company of a free choice of contractor. He stated that it was possible that the company had suffered significant damage as a result. 19. On 10 December 2012 the first applicant made a public plea for people to participate in the Freedom March, an opposition rally at Lubyanskaya Square on 15 December 2012, in defiance of a ban by the Moscow authorities. 20. On the same day the Investigative Committee decided to open a criminal file on the basis of material severed from the Kirovles case. The new file concerned suspicions of fraud by the applicants against Yves Rocher Vostok and the laundering of the proceeds of illegal transactions, offences set out in Articles 159.4 and 174.1 § 2 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code. 21. On 20 December 2012 charges of fraud and money laundering were brought against the applicants under Articles 159.4 and 174.1 § 2 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code in connection with acts allegedly committed against MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok. 22. On 13 February 2013 the second applicant requested that five Yves Rocher Vostok employees be questioned as witnesses, including the general director Mr B.L. and the manager Ms B., but the investigator rejected the request on 18 February 2013. It appears that the witnesses were questioned during the investigation, but the applicants were not informed of that fact or given the opportunity to have a formal face‑to-face confrontation with them. 23. On 18 July 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Kirov found the first applicant guilty of organising large-scale embezzlement in the Kirovles case and gave him a suspended prison sentence of five years. The Court subsequently found that those proceedings had been conducted in violation of Article 6 of the Convention (see Navalnyy and Ofitserov, cited above, §§ 102-21). 24. On 11 February 2013 the financial director of Yves Rocher Vostok, Mr K.M., submitted an internal audit report to the investigator stating that the company had not sustained any damage or loss of profits due to its agreement with GPA; it had been established by the auditors that GPA had charged the market price for its services. 25. On 28 February 2014 the Basmannyy District Court ordered that the first applicant be placed under house arrest. This preventive measure was maintained until 5 January 2015. 26. On 14 August 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court began hearing the applicants’ criminal case. 27. On 14 November 2014 the applicants requested that the court call and examine the general director of Yves Rocher Vostok, Mr B.L., the manager, Ms B. and several employees of Russian Post as witnesses. They also asked the court to obtain certain internal documents relating to the structure and functioning of Russian Post. The court dismissed those requests. 28. On 9 December 2014 the applicants asked the court to summon six witnesses, again including Mr B.L. and Ms B. 29. On 15 December 2014 the court, at the request of the prosecutor, issued a warrant compelling Mr B.L. to appear, however, it was not executed. The court subsequently allowed statements that he and Ms B. had given during the investigation to be read out. 30. On 19 December 2014 the court concluded the trial and said it would deliver a judgment on 15 January 2015. 31. At about 4 p.m. on 29 December 2014 the applicants and their defence counsel were summoned by telephone to appear in court at 9 a.m. on 30 December 2014 for delivery of the judgment, which had been brought forward from 15 January 2015 for unknown reasons. 32. On 30 December 2014 the court delivered the introductory and operative parts of the judgment. The applicants were found guilty of money laundering and of defrauding MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok and were convicted under Articles 159.4 §§ 2 and 3 and 174.1 § 2 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code. The first applicant received a suspended sentence of three and a half years and the second applicant a prison sentence of the same duration, to be served in a correctional colony. They were also fined RUB 500,000 each and had to pay jointly RUB 4,498,546 in damages to MPK. The court ordered that the first applicant should remain under house arrest and that the second applicant be placed in “pre-trial detention”, with his term of imprisonment running from that day. Delivery of the judgment in full was adjourned until 12 January 2015. 33. The second applicant appealed against his detention the same day. 34. The first applicant appealed against the extension of his house arrest on 31 December 2014. 35. On 12 January 2015 the applicants appealed against the judgment of 30 December 2014 on the merits. They received the full text of the judgment on the same day, which included the reasons for finding the applicants guilty of fraud. The court found that the applicants had set up a “fake company”, GPA, with the intention to use it as an intermediary to offer services to two clients of Russian Post, MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok. It held that the second applicant had taken advantage of insider information that Russian Post had ceased to provide the companies with certain services for lack of operational capacity and had convinced those clients to use GPA as a substitute; that he had misled the clients about GPA’s pricing policy and its relationship with Russian Post, thus depriving them of the freedom of choice of service providers; that he had promoted his company’s services while knowing that it would have to subcontract the work to other companies; and that GPA had retained the difference in price between what MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok paid for its services and what GPA paid to its subcontractors. The court concluded that the latter margin had been stolen from MPK and Yves Rocher Vostok by the applicants through GPA. The court further established that the amounts in question constituted the proceeds of crime, and that using that money to pay GPA’s office rent, legal services, dividends to the applicants and for transfers to affiliated companies had constituted money laundering. 36. On 19 January 2015 the Moscow City Prosecutor’s Office appealed against the first-instance judgment on the grounds that the sentence given to both applicants had been too lenient. 37. On 28 January 2015 the applicants challenged the accuracy of the verbatim records of the first-instance hearing. Only a few of their corrections were accepted. 38. On 11 February 2015 the applicants lodged additional points of appeal and a request that six witnesses be called and examined, including Mr B.L. and Ms B. 39. On 17 February 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the first‑instance judgment, except for the part imposing a fine and awarding damages to MPK, which was reversed. 40. On 27 April 2015 the applicants lodged a cassation appeal. 41. On 26 June 2015 the Moscow City Court refused leave to lodge a cassation appeal.

4. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Podgorica. 5. Between 3 December 2002 and 15 September 2003 the daily newspaper Dan published several articles about a human trafficking case in Montenegro, in which the applicant’s name was mentioned in various contexts. 6. On 22 October 2004 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the publisher of the said newspaper, seeking compensation for non‑pecuniary damage due to violation of his honour and reputation caused by the publishing of untrue information about him. 7. On 4 June 2010, following a remittal, the Podgorica First Instance Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant, ordering the publisher to pay the applicant 8,000 euros (EUR) in non-pecuniary damages and to publish the judgment in Dan, the daily newspaper in question. 8. On 22 October 2010 the Podgorica High Court amended this judgment by awarding the applicant EUR 4,000 as compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered, which judgment was served on the applicant on 29 November 2010. 9. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal on 14 January 2011. 10. On 7 April 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. This decision was served on the applicant on 19 May 2011.

4. The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, lived in the Chechen Republic or Ingushetia. Their personal details are set out in the appended table. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after allegedly being unlawfully detained by servicemen during special operations. The events concerned took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have not seen their missing relatives since the alleged arrests. Their whereabouts remain unknown. 5. The applicants reported the abductions to law‑enforcement bodies, and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have remained pending for several years without any tangible results being achieved. The applicants lodged requests with the investigating authorities and various law-enforcement bodies for information and assistance in the search for their relatives. Their requests received either only formal responses or none at all. The perpetrators have not been established by the investigating bodies. It appears that all of the investigations are still pending. 6. Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or other witnesses to both the Court and the domestic investigative authorities. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases, as presented by the applicants, but questioned the involvement of servicemen in the events. 7. The applicant is the mother of Mr Aslan Abubakarov, who was born in 1979. 8. At the material time the applicant and her family lived in the village of Achkhoy-Martan in the vicinity of the Achkhoy-Martan district department of the interior (“the Achkhoy-Martan ROVD”) and the Achkhoy‑Martan district department of the Federal Security Service (“the Achkhoy-Martan FSB”). 9. At about 3 a.m. on 14 October 2004 a large group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicant’s house in two armoured personnel carriers (“APCs”) and two Ural lorries without registration plates. The servicemen were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. Some of them were equipped with helmets, metal shields and portable radio devices. A group of around six servicemen broke into the house, searched the premises and checked the identity documents of the residents. Then they forced Mr Aslan Abubakarov into one of the Ural lorries and drove him off in the direction of the Achkhoy-Martan FSB. 10. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. The applicant submitted written statements by three neighbours, Ms B.A., Mr Sh.S. and Ms S.S., who had seen a group of servicemen arriving at her house in military vehicles, including APCs. 11. Shortly thereafter the applicant’s husband, together with his son and two neighbours, Mr Sh.S., and Mr T.A., went to the checkpoint on the outskirts of Achkhoy-Martan in search of Mr Aslan Abubakarov. Servicemen manning the checkpoint told them that a convoy of military vehicles had passed through unrestricted earlier that night. 12. On 14 October 2004 the father of Mr Aslan Abubakarov contacted the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor seeking to have a criminal investigation opened into the abduction of his son. 13. Two days later the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. On the same day the investigators questioned the applicant and her husband. Their submissions were similar to the applicant’s submissions before the Court. 14. On 1 November 2004 the prosecutor opened criminal case no. 38050 under Article 126 of the Russian Criminal Code (“the CC”) (abduction). 15. Between November and December 2004 the investigators questioned the applicant’s neighbours, who had heard about the abduction. They noted that Mr Aslan Abubakarov had not participated in illegal armed groups. 16. In the meantime the investigators requested various law-enforcement authorities, including the FSB, and detention facilities to provide them with information about the possible arrest and detention of Mr Aslan Abubakarov. The authorities replied that they did not have any information on the matter. 17. On 29 December 2004 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 18. On 19 January 2005 the investigators questioned the applicant’s neighbour Mr Sh.S., an eyewitness to the abduction, who said that Mr Aslan Abubakarov had been abducted by men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas who had arrived at the applicant’s house in APCs. 19. On 1 March 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 20. On 29 April 2005 the above decision was overruled as ill-founded and the investigation was resumed. 21. Having questioned several hearsay witnesses, the investigators suspended the investigation on 6 June 2005. 22. On 14 November 2006 Mr Aslan Abubakarov’s father contacted the Russian Prosecutor General, complaining of the ineffectiveness of the investigation into his son’s abduction. On 22 January 2007 the complaint was forwarded to the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor, who overruled the decision of 6 June 2005 as unlawful and ordered the resumption of the investigation on 14 February 2007. 23. Subsequently the investigation was suspended on 14 March and 30 November 2007 and 11 July 2008 and then resumed on 31 October 2007, 11 June 2008 and 13 September 2011 respectively, before being suspended again on 14 September 2011. 24. In the meantime, on 4 September 2008 and 14 April 2009, Mr Aslan Abubakarov’s parents contacted the Russian Ministry of the Interior and the Chechen Parliament’s committee for the search for missing persons respectively, asking for their assistance in the search for their son. Their requests were forwarded to the investigators. By letters of 5 December 2008 and 6 June 2009 the investigators replied that the investigation had been suspended, but that operational search activities were ongoing. 25. There is no information about any further developments in the proceedings. 26. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Said-Emin Magaziyev, who was born in 1979. The first and second applicants are his parents, the third and fourth applicants are his sisters, and the fifth applicant is his son. 27. On 10 September 2002 Mr Said-Emin Magaziyev was taken to the Achkhoy-Martan ROVD and questioned by a police investigator, M.K., and an FSB officer, V.K., on suspicion of having been involved in a truck crane theft. On the same day he was released under an obligation to appear before the FSB officer for subsequent questioning on 16 September 2002. However, he failed to do so. 28. At 3 a.m. on 18 September 2002 seven or eight servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas armed with automatic weapons arrived at the applicant’s house in the village of Zakan-Yurt, Chechnya, in several APCs. They broke into the house, searched the premises, bound Mr Said‑Emin Magaziyev, put him in one of the APCs and drove off towards the village of Samashki. 29. The abduction took place in the presence of several neighbours who had been woken up by the noise of military vehicles passing by. The applicants submitted written statements by three of them, Mr I.A., Mr A.M. and Mr B.M. They confirmed that on the night of 18 September 2002 military vehicles, including an APC, had parked near the applicants’ house. Several minutes later they had driven off in the direction of Samashki. As soon as the vehicles had left, the first and second applicants went to see the neighbours, complaining about their son’s abduction. 30. Immediately thereafter the first applicant and several neighbours followed the abductors. Having reached Samashki, they spoke with villagers, who told them that several APCs had entered the premises of the Samashki military commander’s headquarters. 31. In the morning the first applicant went to the headquarters. The personnel manning the headquarters told him that Mr Said-Emin Magaziyev had been detained and brought to the headquarters at 4 a.m. on 18 September 2002. A few hours later a UAZ minivan had taken him away to an unknown destination. 32. On an unspecified date the applicants informed the authorities of Mr Said-Emin Magaziyev’s abduction. 33. On 28 September 2002 the Achkhoy-Martan district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 63072 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 34. The Government did not provide the Court with a copy of the investigation file. From the applicants’ submissions it appears that the investigation proceeded as follows. 35. On 27 December 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 36. On an unspecified date in 2002 or 2003 the investigators suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. 37. On 8 August 2003 they resumed the investigation, and at some point later they suspended it again. 38. On 3 December 2004 the applicants contacted the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, seeking its assistance in the search for Mr Said-Emin Magaziyev. The outcome of the request is unknown. 39. In early 2007 the first applicant complained to the Russian Prosecutor General of the ineffectiveness of the investigation into his son’s abduction. 40. On 9 March 2007 the investigators resumed the investigation. 41. On 16 March 2007 the applicant’s complaint concerning the ineffectiveness of the investigation was forwarded to the investigators. By a letter of 3 April 2007 they replied that the investigation had already been resumed. Four days later, on 7 April 2007, the investigation was suspended. 42. On an unspecified date in 2008 the investigation was resumed. Subsequently it was suspended on 10 June 2008 and 16 February 2009 and then resumed on 16 January and 23 March 2009 respectively, before being suspended again on 23 April 2009. 43. In the meantime, on 20 January 2009 the fourth applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. 44. On 14 May 2009 the third applicant requested that the investigators grant her permission to review the criminal case file. The outcome of the request is unknown. 45. On 21 June 2011 the fourth applicant complained to the investigators of the lack of information about the course of the proceedings. The next day she was informed that the proceedings had been suspended on 23 April 2009, but that extensive operational search activities were ongoing. 46. There is no information about any further developments in the case. 47. The first applicant is the wife of Mr Ruslanbek Boltiyev, who was born in 1962. The second, third and fourth applicants are his children. 48. The fifth applicant is the wife of Mr Shamkhan Zibikov, who was born in 1964. The sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth applicants are his children. 49. The tenth applicant is the wife of Mr Sayd-Ali (also spelled as Said‑Ali) Sharshuyev, who was born in 1954. 50. At 7 a.m. on 20 July 2003 three armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the first applicant’s house in the village of Avtury, Chechnya, and ordered the first applicant and her family members to show their identity documents. They checked Mr Ruslanbek Boltiyev’s passport and left. 51. About ten minutes later the first applicant heard several gunshots outside. Then two armed servicemen of Chechen and Slavic appearance entered the house. The Chechen serviceman ordered Mr Ruslanbek Boltiyev to follow them. They put him in a grey UAZ vehicle without registration plates and drove away. 52. Immediately after that, the first applicant went to see Mr Ruslanbek Boltiyev’s brother, who lived nearby, and followed the UAZ in a car with him. They caught up with the UAZ in the village centre. The first applicant was allowed to pass socks and medication on to her husband. Then three other UAZ vehicles arrived and the convoy drove off in the direction of the village of Shali. The first applicant attempted to follow the convoy, but was not allowed to cross the checkpoint between Shali and Avtury. (b) Abduction of Mr Shamkhan Zibikov 53. At about 7 a.m. on 20 July 2003 two armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the fifth applicants’ house in Avtury, Chechnya, and checked the identity documents of the family members. At the time Mr Shamkhan Zibikov was in the courtyard and the fifth applicant did not see what was happening to him. When she went outside, she saw about fifteen military UAZ and VAZ vehicles. The servicemen ordered her to go back inside the house. A few minutes later all the vehicles, except for three, left. She did not see in which vehicle her husband was put. (c) Abduction of Mr Sayd-Ali Sharshuyev 54. At about 7.30 a.m. on 20 July 2003 several armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms, some of whom were in balaclavas, arrived in VAZ‑21099 and UAZ vehicles at the tenth applicant’s house in Avtury, Chechnya, searched the premises and took Mr Sayd-Ali Sharshuyev away. 55. On 20 July 2003 the head of the Avtury municipal administration informed the Shali district department of the interior (“the Shali ROVD”) about the abduction of Mr Ruslanbek Boltiyev, Mr Shamkhan Zibikov and Mr Sayd-Ali Sharshuyev. On the same day investigators from the Shali ROVD examined the applicants’ houses. No evidence was collected. 56. On 24 July 2003 the case was transferred to the Shali district prosecutor. 57. On 30 July 2003 he opened criminal case no. 22111 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 58. On 31 July 2003 the investigators questioned the tenth applicant, who described the circumstances of her husband’s abduction, and her neighbour, Mr A.A. The latter stated that he had seen the abduction of Mr Sayd-Ali Sharshuyev by servicemen in camouflage uniforms, who had arrived in VAZ and UAZ vehicles without registration plates. 59. In early August 2003 the investigators questioned relatives of Mr Ruslanbek Boltiyev and Mr Shamkhan Zibikov, eyewitnesses to their abductions. Their description was consistent with the applicants’ account of the events. 60. On 13 September 2003 the investigators contacted various military and law-enforcement authorities to check whether the abducted persons had been arrested and taken into custody. The respondent authorities replied that they had no information about their arrests or detention. 61. On 18 and 19 August 2003 the first, fifth and tenth applicants were granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 62. On 18 August 2003 the brother of Mr Sayd-Ali Sharshuyev informed the investigators that he had identified one of the persons who had arrested Mr Sayd-Ali Sharshuyev. It was Mr A., from the village of Tsotsin-Yurt, who worked in the Chechen President’s security service. Mr A. had told him that the security service had detained Mr Sayd-Ali Sharshuyev for two days and then had transferred him to the FSB. 63. On an unspecified date (apparently in August 2003) one of the investigators spoke with the head of the Chechen President’s security service, Mr S. He stated that on 20 July 2003 the security service had conducted a special operation in Avtury. As a result of that operation four persons had been arrested. One of them had been released afterwards, whereas three others had been taken to the town of Gudermes to take part in “operational activities”. Mr S. refused to give a formal statement. 64. On 30 September 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was then resumed on 3 July 2004 and suspended on 9 August 2004. 65. On 22 September 2004 the investigators resumed the investigation. 66. On 12 October 2004 the investigators questioned Mr S., who denied the involvement of the security service in the abduction. 67. On 22 October 2004 the investigation was suspended. It was then resumed on 6 September 2005, 12 April 2006, 12 January 2010 and 9 August 2011, and then suspended on 14 November 2005, 14 May 2006, 12 February 2010 and 19 August 2011 respectively. 68. In the meantime, on 8 June 2006 and 22 May 2007 the first and tenth applicants respectively contacted the Chechen Parliament seeking assistance in the search for their missing husbands. It appears that their letters were forwarded to the investigators. It is not clear whether any replies followed. 69. On an unspecified date in 2009 the tenth applicant asked the Chechen Parliament’s relevant committee to help her to find her husband. Her request was forwarded to the investigators, who replied on 23 April 2009 that the investigation had been suspended, but that operational search activities in the case were ongoing. 70. On 22 January 2010 the investigators questioned Mr A. According to his statements, on 20 July 2003 he had been working in the Kurchaloiy district department of the interior and had participated in a “mopping-up” operation carried out by FSB officers from the “SSG-1” unit in Avtury. The operation had been headed by an officer with the call sign “Terek”. Four or five people had been arrested during that operation on suspicion of having participated in an illegal armed group. 71. On 6 February 2010 the investigators requested the FSB in Chechnya to provide them with a list of persons who had participated in the “mopping-up operation”. By a letter of 5 March 2010 the FSB replied that the relevant archive documents had been destroyed, and that in any event the information requested was classified. 72. There is no information about any further developments in the case. 73. On an unspecified date in 2011 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court, challenging the effectiveness of the investigation and seeking to have the criminal proceedings resumed. 74. On 10 August 2011 the Shali Town Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the investigation had already been resumed a day before, on 9 August 2011. 75. The applicant is the sister of Mr Khamit Dzhambulatov, who was born in 1957. 76. At 8 p.m. on 28 August 2002 a group of fifteen to twenty armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas broke into the courtyard of the applicant’s house in Grozny. Some of them remained in the courtyard, while the others entered the house. The servicemen spoke unaccented Russian. They searched the premises and left. 77. At 8 p.m. on 7 September 2002 several armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived at the applicant’s house in an APC. They broke into the house and searched the premises. Thereafter the servicemen took Mr Khamit Dzhambulatov outside. A couple of minutes later the applicant went outside. She did not find her brother, but saw the APC driving away. Her neighbours told her that Mr Khamit Dzhambulatov had been forced into the vehicle by the servicemen. 78. On 9 and 12 September 2002 the applicant contacted the head of the Staropromyslovskiy district municipal administration in Grozny and the Grozny town prosecutor, complaining about her brother’s abduction. 79. A month later, on 12 October 2002 the prosecutor opened criminal case no. 54087 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 80. The Government did not provide the Court with a copy of the investigation file. From the applicant’s submissions it appears that the investigation proceeded as follows. 81. On 12 December 2002 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators, and on 12 October 2004 it was resumed again. 82. On 2 December 2004 the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 83. Ten days later, on 12 December 2004, the investigation was suspended. 84. According to the applicant, she and her mother contacted the local authorities, the investigative committee and the Red Cross, seeking their assistance in the search for their missing relative, but to no avail. 85. On 17 June 2009 the applicant asked the investigators to grant her victim status in the criminal proceedings. 86. On 11 June 2010 she requested the investigators to resume the investigation and to allow her to review the case file. 87. It appears that no responses were forthcoming in reply to those two requests. 88. On 26 September 2011 the investigators resumed the investigation. 89. On the next day they granted the applicant victim status and questioned her. Her statements were similar to the account of the events described above. 90. Subsequently, the investigation was suspended on 26 October 2011, 27 January and 23 March 2012 and 18 December 2013, and then resumed on 27 December 2011, 13 March 2012, and on an unspecified date in 2013 respectively. 91. In the meantime, on 3 and 27 February 2012 the applicant requested the investigators to allow her to review the case file. Several months later her lawyer obtained access to the documents in the case file. 92. There is no information about the further progress of the investigation. 93. The applicant is Ms Ayzan Golbatsova, who was born in 1953. She is the mother of Mr Alikhan Golbatsov, who was born in 1979. 94. The applicant died on 17 August 2013. Her daughter, Ms Elina Golbatsova, the sister of Mr Golbatsov, expressed her wish to pursue the proceedings before the Court in her mother’s stead. 95. At about 9 p.m. on 25 November 2004 Mr Alikhan Golbatsov and his acquaintance Mr S.K. were driving a Zaporozhets car in the village of Avtury in the direction of its centre, when a group of armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms stopped them. The servicemen were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. They were in two UAZ minivans and three Ural lorries. Having forced Mr Golbatsov and Mr S.K. into one of the minivans, the servicemen drove off to an unknown destination. 96. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. The applicant submitted written statements by several of them. Her neighbour, Ms D.A., had seen Mr Alikhan Golbatsov’s car being stopped by armed servicemen in a white UAZ minivan. The servicemen had surrounded the car and argued in unaccented Russian. Other witnesses, Mr L.Z. and Ms E.A., made similar statements. The aforementioned three witnesses were not questioned by the investigators. 97. Immediately after the abduction the applicant informed the authorities and requested that criminal proceedings be opened. 98. On 23 December 2004 investigators from the Shali district department of the interior examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. On the same day they questioned Mr Alikhan Golbatsov’s relatives. They submitted that on 25 November 2004 he had not returned home. 99. On 24 December 2004 the case was transferred to the Shali district prosecutor. 100. On 10 January 2005 he opened criminal case no. 46002 under Article 105 of the CC (murder). 101. In January 2005, apparently following allegations made by relatives of Mr Alikhan Golbatsov or Mr S.K. that the two men had been abducted by State agents, the investigators contacted various authorities, including the Shali district FSB and remand prisons, to check whether Mr Alikhan Golbatsov had been arrested and taken into custody. The authorities replied that they had no information on the matter. 102. On 11 January 2005 the head of the Avtury municipal authority informed the investigators that the remains of Mr Alikhan Golbatsov’s car bearing signs of an explosion had been found near a road between the villages of Avtury and Niki-Khita in the Kurchaloiy district, Chehcnya. 103. On 1 February 2005 the applicant, the mother of Mr Alikhan Golbatsov, was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 104. On 23 February 2005 the investigators asked the Kurchaloiy district military commander whether a special operation had been conducted on 25 November 2004. The military commander replied in the negative. 105. On 17 March 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was then resumed on 17 June 2005, and suspended again on 17 July 2005. 106. On 22 January 2007, apparently after the investigation had been resumed one more time, the wife of Mr S.K. was granted victim status. 107. On 2 October 2007 the applicant contacted the Chechen Ombudsman, seeking his assistance in the search for her son. She submitted that on 25 November 2004 Mr Alikhan Golbatsov had been arrested in the centre of Avtury by a group of servicemen in camouflage uniforms. On 8 October 2007 the Ombudsman requested the investigators to inform him about the progress of the case. 108. On 12 November 2007 the investigators resumed the investigation and asked the applicant to tell them the names of the village residents who had seen the abduction of her son. Owing to the time that had elapsed, she could not recall the names. 109. On 11 December 2007 the investigation was suspended. 110. On unspecified dates in early 2008 and 2009 the applicant asked the Chechen President and the Chechen Parliament’s committee for the search for missing persons to assist in the search for her son. Her requests were forwarded to the investigators. By a letter dated 18 June 2009 they informed her that the investigation had been suspended, but that operational search measures were ongoing. 111. On 28 March 2011 the applicant requested that the investigators inform her about the progress of the investigation and allow her to review the criminal case file. Her request was granted. 112. On 14 June 2012 the investigation was transferred to the Kurchaloiy district prosecutor. There is no information about any further developments in the case. 113. The applicant is the mother of Mr Ruslan Pareulidze (also spelled as Paraulidze), who was born in 1982. 114. At the material time Mr Ruslan Pareulidze was visiting his aunt, Ms M.M., in the Nesterovskaya settlement, Ingushetia. 115. At about 5 p.m. on 7 October 2003 Mr Pareulidze was in the courtyard of his aunt’s house when a group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived in a military UAZ car, a Niva car and a Gazel minivan with the registration plates O 182 MM 06. The servicemen spoke unaccented Russian and were of Slavic appearance. They forced Mr Ruslan Pareulidze into the minivan and drove off to an unknown destination. 116. About five days later a group of about 200 servicemen arrived at Ms M.M.’s house in APCs, Ural lorries and UAZ minivans. They brought a man, presumably Mr Ruslan Pareulidze, whose upper body and head were covered with a sack. The servicemen searched the house and then drove off again with the man. 117. On 8 October 2003 Ms M.M. informed the authorities of the abduction and requested that criminal proceedings be opened. 118. Two days later the investigators questioned Ms M.M., her son, and two neighbours who had witnessed the abduction. Their submissions were similar to the account of the events set out above. 119. On 20 October 2003 the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 23600067 (in the documents submitted the number was also referred to as 036600067) under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 120. On 25 October 2003 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. On the same day the investigators questioned her and several neighbours. They repeated the statements given before, adding that several days after the abduction Ms M.M.’s house had been searched by persons in uniforms, accompanied by a neighbourhood police officer. Some of the witnesses said that according to rumours, Mr Ruslan Pareulidze had been in the custody of the FSB. 121. On 16 October 2003 the road traffic police, further to a request from the investigators, informed them that the registration number O 182 MM 06 belonged to a Niva car owned by the FSB in Ingushetia. 122. On 20 February 2004 the investigators questioned the neighbourhood police officer who had participated in the search which followed the abduction. He submitted that on 7 October 2004 he had accompanied a group of the FSB officers who intended to check the registration documents of two families, including that of Ms M.M. When they had arrived at the latter’s address he had remained outside. The FSB officers had entered the house and left it shortly thereafter. Then they had moved to another address and found a large secret store of weapons. According to rumours, the location of that store had been disclosed by Mr Ruslan Pareulidze, who had been in the custody of the FSB. 123. In the meantime, on various dates in 2003 and 2004 the investigators requested a number of law-enforcement authorities, including the FSB, to provide them with any information about Mr Ruslan Pareulidze’s arrest or detention. The authorities replied that they had no information on the matter. 124. On 20 March 2004 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 125. On 16 December 2004 the applicant contacted the FSB in Ingushetia, seeking its assistance in the search for her son. The FSB forwarded her letter to the investigators, who replied that the investigation had been suspended, but that operational search activities were still ongoing. 126. On 28 March 2005 the applicant requested the update on the course of the proceedings. Three days later the investigators informed her that there had been no new developments in the case. 127. On 12 March 2008 the applicant requested the investigators to provide her with copies of some documents from the investigation file. Her request was granted on 15 March 2008. 128. On 24 November 2010 the investigators resumed the investigation and on 30 December 2010 they suspended it again. 129. On 27 August 2011 and 26 June 2012 the applicant contacted the investigators, requesting information about new developments in the case. On 9 July 2012 the investigators replied that the proceedings had been suspended, but that recently they had ordered that operational search measures in the case be intensified. 130. There is no information about the further progress of the investigation. 131. The first applicant is the wife of Mr Lema (also spelled as Lemma) Khamzatov, who was born in 1964. The second, third and fourth applicants are his children. The application form was also lodged on behalf of Mr Lema Khamzatov’s father, Mr Saydamagomed Khamzatov. However, on 8 July 2016 the applicants informed the Court that he had died in 2011, that is to say before the application was submitted. Therefore he cannot be treated as one of the applicants. 132. At about 3 a.m. on 4 May 2003 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 5 May 2003) Mr Lema Khamzatov was at home in the Noviye Aldy settlement, Chechnya (in the documents submitted the address was also referred to as Grozny) when a group of about thirty armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at his house in APCs and UAZ minivans. The servicemen spoke unaccented Russian. Having broken into the house, they checked the identity documents of the residents, including the applicants, and then forced Mr Khamzatov outside, handcuffed him, put him into one of the APCs and drove off to an unknown destination. 133. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the applicants and their neighbours. The applicants submitted written statements by four neighbours, Ms R.S., Mr R.D., Ms M.A. and Mr L.Kh, who had seen the abduction from their houses. They confirmed the account of the events as described above. 134. Immediately after the abduction the applicants attempted to search for Mr Khamzatov on their own, but in vain. On 6 May 2003 Mr Lema Khamzatov’s father lodged an official complaint asking the authorities to assist in the search for his son. 135. On 15 May 2003 the Zavodskoy district prosecutor in Grozny opened criminal case no. 30069 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 136. On an unspecified date the investigators examined the crime scene and collected cartridge cases and bullets, allegedly left by the perpetrators near a neighbouring house. 137. On 29 May 2003 the investigators ordered an expert ballistics examination of the evidence collected, as well as a fingerprint analysis. The experts concluded that the cartridge cases and bullets belonged to a special sniper rifle (Винтовка Снайперская Специальная), a “Val” special automatic rifle (Автомат Специальный “Вал”), and an Army Sniper Complex-94 rifle (Войсковой Снайперский Комплекс-94). No fingerprints were found. 138. On 6 June 2003 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings and questioned. A copy of the records of questioning submitted by the Government is illegible. 139. On 11 June 2003 the investigators questioned the father of Mr Lema Khamzatov. His description of the events was similar to the applicants’ submissions before the Court. 140. On 15 July 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 141. On 25 August and 1 and 11 September 2003 Mr Lema Khamzatov’s father contacted the Russian Prosecutor General, the head of the Russian Parliament and the head of the Chechen Parliament respectively, seeking their assistance in the investigation. The requests were forwarded to the investigators, who did not reply. 142. On 5 April 2004 the applicant asked the investigators to resume the investigation. On the next day, 6 April 2004 the investigation was resumed. It was then suspended on 9 May 2004. 143. On 21 August 2004 the aforementioned decision was overruled by the deputy prosecutor of Chechnya. He noted the investigators’ failure to identify all of the eyewitnesses to the abduction, to question the police officers who had manned the road checkpoints at the material time, and to take other basic investigative steps. The investigation was resumed and then suspended on 25 September 2004. It does not appear that the persons mentioned by the deputy prosecutor were questioned, in spite of his direct orders to that end. 144. Subsequently the investigation was resumed on 25 April 2006 and 1 March 2010, and then suspended on 25 May 2006 and 2 March 2010 respectively. In the meantime, on 4 February 2010 the father of Mr Lema Khamzatov requested the investigators to provide him with information about new developments in the case and to grant him victim status. On 1 March 2010 his request was granted. 145. The Government did not submit a copy of the investigation file concerning further developments in the case. From the documents presented by the applicants it appears that on 8 July 2010 the NGO SRJI/ASTREYA, on behalf of Mr Lema Khamzatov’s father, requested an update about the progress of the case and access to the documents in the case file. No reply was forthcoming. 146. On 14 December 2012 the applicant’s relatives father repeated the request, but to no avail. 147. The applicants are the parents of Mr Islam Reshidov and Mr Usam (also spelled as Usama) Reshidov, who were born in 1986 and 1989 respectively. 148. At about 2.30 p.m. on 7 December 2004 Mr Usam Reshidov was at the crossroads of Zavodskaya and A. Sheripova Streets in the town of Argun, Chechnya, when a group of armed servicemen in military camouflage uniforms arrived in an APC, a UAZ vehicle and a Niva car. The servicemen apprehended Mr Usam Reshidov and took him away to an unknown destination. 149. At about 7 p.m. on the same date, presumably the same group of servicemen in military vehicles (among which were APCs, a UAZ car and a Niva car) surrounded a block of flats on Sakhzavodskaya Street in Argun, broke into a flat, where Mr Islam Reshidov was with his friends Mr A.Kh. and Ms I.D., apprehended them and then took them to the Argun military commander’s headquarters. Subsequently Ms I.D. was released from detention. 150. Immediately after the abductions the applicants complained to the police, asking for assistance in the search for their sons. 151. On 21 December 2004 the first applicant lodged an abduction complaint with the Chechnya prosecutor. She stated that Mr Usam Reshidov had left home on 7 December 2004 and had not come back, and that Mr Islam Reshidov had been abducted on the same date from his friend’s flat in Argun by military servicemen in APCs. 152. On 30 December 2004 she contacted the Argun district department of the interior (“Argun ROVD”). She submitted that on 7 December 2004 her sons had left home and had not returned. On 6 January 2005 the Argun ROVD refused to open a criminal investigation into the incidents. 153. On 27 January 2005, at the request of Mr A.Kh.’s father, the Argun prosecutor opened criminal case no. 58003 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 154. On 7 February 2005 the Argun deputy prosecutor overruled the refusal to open a criminal case dated 6 January 2005. The investigation into the abduction of the Reshidov brothers was joined to the investigation in criminal case no. 58003. 155. Two days later, on 9 February 2005 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings and questioned. She told the investigators that after the abduction she and Ms I.D.’s mother had gone to the Argun military commander’s headquarters in search of their relatives. At the headquarters she had met officer R. From her conversation with him she had understood that both of her sons had been detained on the headquarters’ premises. 156. Between February and April 2005 the investigators requested a number of law-enforcement agencies to inform them whether they had conducted any special operations on 7 December 2004 in Argun and whether they had arrested or detained the Reshidov brothers. No reply in the affirmative was received. 157. Between February and August 2005, and again in February 2006, the investigators questioned residents of the block of flats from which Mr Islam Reshidov had been abducted. Some of them had heard gunshots and sounds produced by heavy military vehicles outside their flats on the evening of 7 December 2004; others had directly witnessed the special operation conducted by the law-enforcement agencies. 158. On 17 February 2005 the investigators questioned officer A.Kh. from the Argun ROVD. According to him, on 8 December 2004 he had heard from Argun ROVD officers and officers from the temporary operative group of the Ministry of the Interior (Временная оперативная группировка органов и подразделений Министерства Внутренних Дел) (“the VOGOP”) that a special operation aimed at arresting Mr A.Kh. had taken place on 7 December 2004, but that the arrest had failed. 159. 14 March 2005 the investigators questioned Ms I.D. Her statement concerning the circumstances of the abduction was similar to the applicants’ account of the events submitted to the Court. According to her, the abductors had placed her in a police station detention unit, where she had been detained for nine days and then released. 160. On 27 April 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was then resumed on 15 May 2005. 161. At some point the investigators established that the VOGOP had been manned by officers from the Chelyabinsk regional department of the police, and asked them to submit information about the special operation carried out on 7 December 2004. 162. By a letter of 22 July 2005 the Chelyabinsk regional department of the police replied that at the investigator’s request they had questioned several officers who had worked in Argun at the time of the abduction. Those officers had submitted that in 2004 the authorities had obtained information that Mr A.Kh. and Mr Islam Reshidov had planted a bomb in the building of the Argun municipal administration. On 7 December 2004 servicemen from the Argun municipal administration’s security service and the FSB had carried out a special operation to arrest the men. The police had arrived at a block of flats on Sakhzavodskaya Street in Argun and broken into the flat where Mr A.Kh. and Mr Islam Reshidov resided. Mr Usam Reshidov and Ms I.D. had also been in the flat. An exchange of fire had followed and Mr A.Kh. had managed to escape. The Reshidov brothers and Ms I.D. had been apprehended and taken to the headquarters of the Argun municipal administration’s security service. Their fate remains unknown. The allegation that an explosive device had been planted in the municipal administration building had proved to be false. 163. On 30 June 2005 the investigation was suspended. It was then resumed on several occasions: on 19 January and 16 May 2006, 1 April 2008, 17 May and 3 July 2013 and 23 December 2014 and then suspended on 21 February and 23 June 2006, 7 May 2008, 21 May and 13 July 2013 and 30 December 2014 respectively. 164. In the meantime, on 7 June 2006 the investigators questioned Mr I.N., the Argun acting prosecutor at the time of the events. He submitted that in December 2004 a special operation had been conducted on account of the alleged involvement of the Reshidov brothers, Ms I.D. and Mr A.Kh. in the preparation of a terrorist attack in Argun. 165. On 21 June 2006 similar information was obtained from the Argun ROVD officer Mr Sh.D., who stated that the Reshidov brothers, Ms I.D. and Mr A.Kh. had been arrested by military servicemen in the course of a special operation. 166. On 14 May 2013 the second applicant requested that he be granted victim status in the case. His request was granted on 4 July 2013. 167. On 29 December 2014 the investigators ordered a DNA sample to be taken from the second applicant to compare it with those stored in the DNA database of unidentified bodies. 168. There is no information about any further developments in the case. 169. On 3 April 2006 the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Shali Town Court, challenging her lack of access to the criminal case file and the investigators’ failure to take basic steps. 170. On 1 June 2006 the court allowed the applicant’s complaint in part and ordered the investigators to allow her to review the case file. 171. On 26 June 2013 the applicants lodged a similar complaint with the court, challenging their lack of access to the criminal case file and the investigators’ inaction. 172. On 29 July 2013 the court rejected the complaint, finding that the investigators had already resumed the investigation. 173. The first and second applicants are the parents of Mr Magomed Mezhiyev, who was born in 1977. The third, fourth and fifth applicants are his wife and children. The sixth, seventh and eighth applicants are his sister and brothers. 174. On 22 October 2016 the applicants informed the Court of the death of the first applicant on 5 November 2015. 175. On 27 April 2017 the third applicant informed the Court that she had changed her surname from Mezhiyeva to Muguyeva. 176. At about 12 noon (in the documents submitted the time was also referred to as 2 p.m.) on 24 July 2005 Mr Magomed Mezhiyev, who was an officer of the Chechen Ministry of the Interior, and his acquaintance, Mr A.M. (in the documents submitted also referred to as Mr A.Kh.), were driving on Pobedy Avenue in Grozny when a group of armed men in camouflage trousers and black T-shirts forced them out of their car. The men apprehended Mr Magomed Mezhiyev and put him into the boot of a car which was parked nearby. Shortly afterwards several VAZ 2107 cars without registration plates arrived at the scene. The men forced Mr A.M. into one of those cars and drove off in the direction of Minutka Square, Grozny. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 177. According to the applicants, several days after the abduction an unidentified armed man in a black uniform contacted them and offered to sell them for 1,000 United States dollars (USD) a video recording depicting Mr Magomed Mezhiyev and Mr A.M. being detained on the premises of the Grozny district department of the interior (“the Grozny ROVD”). The applicants paid the sum requested for the recording and then submitted it to the investigators (see paragraph 183 below). 178. On 24 July 2005 the applicants contacted the Zavodskoiy district department of the interior requesting that a criminal case into the incident be opened. On the same day the first applicant was questioned. His allegations were similar to the applicants’ account of the events. 179. On 24 July 2005 the investigators questioned Mr A.Sh., who had seen the abduction. The description he provided was consistent with the applicants’ version of the events. 180. At some point later the case was transferred to the Zavodskoy district prosecutor in Grozny. 181. On 2 August 2005 the prosecutor opened criminal case no. 41082 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 182. On 8 August 2005 the first applicant was granted victim status in the case and questioned again. Referring to hearsay evidence, he submitted that after they had forced his son into their vehicle, the abductors had told the eyewitnesses that they were FSB officers conducting a special operation. One of the witnesses had followed their car and seen it entering the premises of the Grozny ROVD. 183. On 19 September 2005 the first applicant told the investigators that he had obtained a video recording showing his son and his acquaintance Mr A.M. on the ground in the Grozny ROVD. The first applicant stated that he had recognised the appearance and the voice of his son, the Grozny ROVD building and the car belonging to the head of the Grozny ROVD. According to the first applicant, he had bought the recording from an armed serviceman in camouflage uniform who had arrived at his house and offered it in exchange for USD 1,000. 184. On the same date the investigators seized the aforementioned recording as evidence. 185. On 28 October 2005 the investigators questioned the head of the Grozny ROVD. He denied that Mr Magomed Mezhiyev had been arrested. 186. On 2 December 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. Subsequently, it was resumed on 9 December 2005, 3 March and 28 September 2006, 22 February 2007, 27 March, 2 June 2008 and 11 August 2008, 28 March and 8 September 2011, 28 May 2012, 14 November 2013, 12 March 2014 and 13 July 2016 and then suspended on 9 January, 11 April and 6 November 2006, 14 April 2007, 4 May, 9 July 2008 and 25 September 2008, 28 April and 28 September 2011, 14 June 2012, 14 December 2013, 17 March 2014 and 13 August 2016 respectively. 187. In the meantime, on 27 October 2006 the investigators attempted to examine the premises of the Grozny ROVD to verify whether it had been depicted on the video, but they were not let in owing to the lack of special authorisation. 188. At some point the video recording submitted by the first applicant to the investigators was lost and the investigators requested the applicants to provide them with a new copy. The applicants did so on 3 September 2008. 189. On an unspecified date in 2010 the third applicant requested the investigators to provide her with an update about the progress of the proceedings. On 18 June 2010 she was informed that the investigation had been suspended. 190. On 21 November 2013 the investigators obtained the first applicant’s DNA sample to compare it with those stored in a database of unidentified bodies. The outcome of the expert examination is unknown. 191. There is no information about any further developments in the proceedings. 192. On 15 May 2012 and 26 February 2014 the first applicant complained to the Zavodskoy District Court in Grozny, challenging the respective decisions of 28 April 2011 and 14 December 2013 to suspend the investigation and the investigators’ failure to take basic steps. 193. On 30 May 2012 and 13 March 2014 respectively the court rejected the complaints, finding that the investigators had already resumed the investigation. On 15 April 2014 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld the latter decision on appeal. 194. The applicant is the wife of Mr Bekmagomed (also spelled as Bek‑Magamed) Daniyev, who was born in 1975. 195. On 17 October 2014 the applicant’s representative lodged an application form with the Court signed by him on behalf of the applicant. The power of attorney enclosed had not been signed by the applicant. 196. On 4 April 2016 the Registry of the Court instructed the applicant to submit a signed power of attorney as soon as possible. 197. On 10 May 2016 the applicant signed the power of attorney and sent it to the Court. 198. On 6 January 2005 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 28 January 2005) the applicant and Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev were at home in their flat in the town of Argun when at about 6 a.m. a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived at their block of flats in three cars, including a UAZ and white Gazel minivan. The men spoke unaccented Chechen and Russian; some of them were in balaclavas. Some of those who were not wearing balaclavas were of Slavic appearance. The men broke into the applicant’s flat, forced Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev outside, put him in one of their vehicles and drove off to an unknown destination. 199. The white Gazel minivan was subsequently seen exiting the premises of the Argun military commander’s headquarters. 200. On 24 January 2005 the applicant informed the authorities of the abduction and asked for assistance in the search for her husband. 201. On the same day investigators from the Argun ROVD examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. The investigators also questioned several relatives of Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev, including the applicant. Their statements were similar to the applicant’s submissions before the Court. Among other details the applicant noted that the abductors had presented themselves as police officers from the Argun ROVD. 202. On 28 January 2005 the case was transferred from the Argun ROVD to the Argun prosecutor. 203. Between 1 and 15 February 2005 the Argun prosecutor requested that a number of law-enforcement agencies provide information on whether they had conducted any special operation on 6 January 2005 or detained Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev, and whether any information existed on the latter’s suspected involvement in illegal armed groups. The Argun prosecutor’s office also asked those law-enforcement agencies whether they had ever used a white Gazel minivan. No reply in the affirmative was received. 204. On 7 February 2005 the Argun prosecutor opened criminal case no. 58005 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 205. On 8 February 2005 the investigators decided to pursue four main theories, namely that Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev had been abducted: by servicemen of either federal or local law‑enforcement agencies because of his suspected terrorist activities, by members of illegal armed groups, or for the purpose of obtaining a ransom. 206. On the same day the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 207. On an unspecified date between March and April 2005 the Argun deputy prosecutor examined the investigation file and concluded that the most probable version of the events was that Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev had been abducted by officers from the Chechen President’s security service on suspicion of having participated in an illegal armed group. 208. On 7 May 2005 the investigation in the case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. On 3 August 2007 that decision was quashed by the supervising authorities and the investigation was resumed. 209. On 21 August 2007 the deputy head of the Argun ROVD informed the investigators that according to “operative information”, Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev had aided an illegal armed group. 210. On 3 September 2007 the investigation was suspended. 211. On 4 December 2008 the applicant complained to the investigators’ supervisors that the investigation was ineffective and requested that the proceedings be resumed. The outcome of the request is unknown. 212. On 7 April 2009 the mother of Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev complained to the Chechen Ombudsman about the abduction. On 23 April 2009 the Ombudsman asked the investigators to take measures to establish Mr Bekmagomed Daniyev’s whereabouts. 213. On 18 August 2011 the applicant again requested the investigators to resume the criminal investigation. Her request was rejected on 9 September 2011. 214. On 10 May 2012 the applicant requested permission to inspect the investigation file. The next day her request was granted. 215. There is no information about any further developments in the case. 216. On 12 October 2012 the applicant lodged a claim with the Presnenskiy District Court in Moscow seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the alleged abduction of her husband by law‑enforcement agencies. 217. On 22 April 2013 the court dismissed her claim as unfounded. On 22 April 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld that ruling on appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Giresun. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 8 February 2006 the applicant, a caretaker employed at the Public Education Centre (Halk Eğitim Merkezi) in Giresun, was taken into police custody on suspicion of child molestation, after being caught in an allegedly indecent position with X., a 9-year-old pupil at the primary school located in the same building as the Public Education Centre. 8. On 8 March 2006 the Espiye Public Prosecutor lodged an indictment with the Espiye Criminal Court of First Instance, charging the applicant with the sexual abuse, sexual assault and unlawful detention of a minor, pursuant to Articles 103 § 1 (a), 109 § 3 (f) (5) and 102 §§ 1 and 3 (a) of the Turkish Criminal Code. 9. During the ensuing criminal proceedings, the Espiye Criminal Court of First Instance heard statements from the applicant, the parents of X., the psychiatrist who had interviewed the girl after the incident, and the teachers and personnel at the Public Education Centre and the neighbouring primary school, including the teacher E.U., who was the sole eyewitness to the incident. Denying the allegations against him, the applicant stated that on the morning in question, he had entered one of the classrooms in the building for cleaning purposes, where the alleged victim was already present with another pupil. While he was busy cleaning, X. had asked for a simit (a type of bread roll) and had attempted to hug him, as a result of which gesture he had lost his balance and fallen onto a desk with X. It was at that point that the teacher E.U. had entered the classroom. 10. E.U., on the other hand, testified before the trial court that as she opened the door of the classroom in question, she saw the applicant sitting on a desk in the dark with his legs apart, hugging X. who was sitting on his lap, facing the blackboard. Within a matter of seconds, upon seeing her, the applicant threw X. away in panic. E.U. stated that while she had never witnessed similar behaviour by the applicant before, the scene she had seen on the day in question looked suspicious. She also confirmed that there was another pupil in the classroom at the time. 11. S.P., who worked in the same primary school and was also the uncle of X.’s mother, asserted before the court that although he had never witnessed any suspicious behaviour on the part of the applicant, he had heard a colleague, İ.K., say that the applicant had engaged in indecent behaviour towards some pupils at the school where he had worked previously. However, İ.K., who was the deputy principal at the applicant’s previous school, denied giving S.P. any such information concerning the applicant or hearing any adverse rumours or complaints about him for that matter. 12. X.’s father alleged that according to the information he had received from M.Ö. and M.K. ‒ respectively an employee and the manager at the Public Education Centre ‒ the applicant had been dismissed from his previous job for similar behaviour. M.Ö. denied this allegation, but M.K. confirmed that the above-mentioned S.P. had given him this information, although he himself had never witnessed any indecent behaviour by the applicant. 13. Another witness, B.A., confirmed that the applicant had apologised to him following the incident. There is no information in the case-file as to the exact content of this apology. 14. The psychiatrist who interviewed X. after the incident reported that the latter lacked the mental capacity to comprehend and recount what might have taken place on the relevant day and, for that reason, it would be futile, and possibly harmful for her well-being, for the trial court to question her. 15. On the basis of all the evidence before it, on 18 December 2008 the Espiye Criminal Court of First Instance ordered the applicant’s acquittal, holding that it was not possible to establish beyond all reasonable doubt that he had committed the sexual acts forming the basis of the charge. The court observed that the statements of the sole eyewitness were contradictory in parts and that they included her personal interpretation of what had actually taken place on the relevant morning. It added that, despite E.U.’s allegation that the applicant had thrown X. to one side upon her entry in the room, no wounds or bruises had been detected on the girl’s body. 16. On 13 January 2009 the acquittal judgment became final in the absence of any appeal. 17. Parallel to the criminal proceedings pending before the Espiye Criminal Court of First Instance, a disciplinary investigation was conducted against the applicant in relation to allegations of harassment. 18. The disciplinary investigation was carried out by two inspectors who took statements from X.’s father, from M.K., the manager of the Public Education Centre, from B.A., a teacher at the primary school, from A.T., the principal of the primary school, and from the applicant, who was being held in detention in relation to the criminal proceedings at the time. The inspectors also took two separate statements from the sole eyewitness, the teacher E.U., under oath and took into account a report from the guidance counsellors of the primary school regarding the psychological and physical development of the minor X. That report, dated 7 January 2003, described the physical and social developmental attributes of the girl as weak and very timid, respectively. The medical diagnosis was stated as autism. 19. The investigation report which was issued at the end of the disciplinary investigation on 3 April 2006 found the allegations of harassment against the applicant to be well-founded and recommended the dismissal of the applicant from the civil service on the grounds that his conduct constituted “shameful and disgraceful conduct incompatible with the civil service” as provided under section 125 § E (g) of Law no. 657. In coming to this conclusion, the inspectors noted the following: “...The eyewitness, E.U., reported having seen the applicant in a position which made her suspect that he had been in the course of sexually harassing the student, [X.] She explained that the following facts ‒ in particular, the room being dark as a result of the lights having been turned off, the applicant sitting at the desk right next to the door with his legs open with the minor on his lap and the desk in front having been pushed further away, coupled with the fact that he had been caressing the body of the minor and holding her tight around her waist ‒ had led her to conclude that [the applicant] had been attempting to harass her. [She stated that] what she witnessed did not look like a regular display of affection and when she had entered the room, he had thrown the child off him in panic. In his statement, [the applicant] stated that the minor had attempted to hug him while he was cleaning the floor and that, as a result of that gesture he had lost his balance and the minor had sat on his lap. He added that when E.U. entered the room, he was trying to get the minor off him. [The applicant’s] statement that he had fallen onto a desk with the minor as a result of the latter trying to hug him corroborates E.U.’s version of the events. However, the part about him having lost his balance as a result of the minor’s attempt to hug him would be quite unusual given the physical attributes of the minor in question. Moreover, the consistent statements of E.U., taken under oath, who as a mother and an educator seems to have suffered a great deal of emotional distress from these events, give the impression that the allegations against the applicant are well-founded. [...] The event has shocked and distressed the town community as well as the school... The severity of this event is further exacerbated by the fact that the student in question is a mentally disabled child, ... unable to express or defend herself...This is a disgraceful thing for a civil servant. [The event] has also given rise to a criminal investigation instigated by the Espiye Public Prosecutor’s office where [the applicant], is accused of sexually abusing a minor who was born on [...] February 1993 and who was unable to defend herself due to her mental incapacity, and to the remanding in custody of [the applicant]. ...we are of the opinion that [the applicant] has harassed [X.] and that this conduct, which is proven, falls under situations provided for in section 125 § E (g) of law no. 657, that is to say, “shameful and disgraceful conduct that is incompatible with the civil service”. 20. On 25 May 2006 the applicant submitted his written defence to the Supreme Disciplinary Council of the Ministry of Education (“the Supreme Disciplinary Council”). He requested at the outset that the investigation be postponed until the criminal proceedings against him on the same allegations had been finalised. Furthermore, denying all accusations, he challenged E.U.’s statements as being wholly subjective and distorting the facts, bearing particularly in mind that the whole incident had taken place within a matter of seconds, as she too had acknowledged, which did not realistically allow her to make the detailed observations that she had recounted to the authorities. He added that it was not logical that he would have committed the alleged act in the presence of another pupil in the classroom right before the start of the classes. 21. On 5 July 2006 the Supreme Disciplinary Council issued the following decision in relation to the applicant, in so far as relevant: “Upon examination of the file ... and of the defence statement duly taken [from the applicant], the following has been decided: On the basis of the information and documents in the file, the veracity of the act [harassment of X.] attributed to the applicant has been conclusively established... For this reason, it has been decided unanimously to accept the proposal to dismiss the applicant from the civil service in accordance with section 125 § E (g) of the Law no. 657 [on Civil Servants], ...” 22. On 30 October 2006 the applicant objected to the Supreme Disciplinary Council’s decision before the Ordu Administrative Court. The applicant argued that his dismissal on the basis of a finding that he had committed the act of sexual harassment of a minor, which is a criminal act, while criminal proceedings were still pending in respect of that self-same allegation violated his right to the presumption of innocence. 23. On 3 July 2007 the Ordu Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s objection on the following grounds: “The case concerns the dismissal of the [applicant,], who worked as a caretaker, on the basis of the allegations that he harassed [X.] on the premises of the primary school. Section 125 E-g of Law no. 657 provides that shameful and disgraceful conduct that is incompatible with the civil service requires dismissal from the civil service. Section 131 of the same Law also provides that the commencement of criminal proceedings against a civil servant shall not suspend disciplinary proceedings arising out of the same facts and that acquittal or conviction in the criminal proceedings shall not prevent the execution of disciplinary sanctions.” [...] Although it has been argued that the sole eyewitness’s version of the events cannot be taken as a conclusive basis on which to deem that the applicant committed the act imputed to him, on the basis of the evidence in the case-file and in consideration of the position in which the applicant was found in the classroom, as well as the fact that the classroom’s door had been shut and the lights had been turned off and the room was therefore dark as it was also very early in the morning and it was raining [...], having further regard to the statement by the principal of the neighbouring primary school, A.T., during the criminal proceedings acknowledging that the applicant had apologised to him after the incident and that he had also heard rumours about the applicant’s similar indecent behaviour in other schools where he had previously worked, the applicant’s argument has not been found to be credible. 24. This statement by A.T., referred to in the Ordu Administrative Court judgment, is not mentioned in the judgment of the Espiye Criminal Court of First Instance. 25. On 28 July 2007 the applicant appealed against the decision of the Ordu Administrative Court, which he considered to be based on groundless accusations. He argued firstly that, in circumstances where the act forming the basis of criminal and disciplinary investigations was one and the same, the criminal proceedings would be better placed to shed light on the circumstances and to arrive at an accurate conclusion regarding the facts than would be those of the disciplinary bodies, whose findings would be at best hypothetical. He pointed out that the administrative court had ignored the presence of another pupil in the classroom at the time of the incident, as well as his explanation that the door had been shut as a result of the draught from the open window. The administrative court had similarly overlooked his service record (sicil dosyası) and the fact that it made no mention of any allegations of misconduct in his previous post, which would be unimaginable if he had really been dismissed from that post for indecent behaviour. He also referred in this connection to the statements of İ.K., the deputy principal at the previous school, denying any such allegations of indecent behaviour. 26. On 17 November 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, endorsing the first-instance court’s reasoning and not mentioning the acquittal judgment which had been delivered by the Espiye Criminal Court of First Instance in the meantime. 27. On 7 July 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s rectification request. 28. On 27 May 2013, that is to say after lodging his complaint with the Court, the applicant brought proceedings against the Ministry of Education and requested the reopening of the proceedings concerning his dismissal from the civil service. The applicant relied on the Espiye Criminal Court of First Instance’s final judgment of 18 December 2008, which acquitted him of the charges of sexual abuse, sexual assault and the unlawful detention of a minor, and argued before the Ordu Administrative Court that his right to the presumption of innocence had been violated in the course of the dismissal proceedings because he had been dismissed on the basis of allegations that he had committed offences in respect of which the criminal proceedings had not yet become final. On 24 October 2013, the Ordu Administrative Court dismissed the case, holding that the arguments put forward by the applicant for reopening proceedings did not fall within the exhaustive list of permissible grounds for this extraordinary remedy. 29. In their observations on 14 March 2014, the Government informed the Court that appeal proceedings were pending before the Supreme Administrative Court.

4. The first applicant lives in Sarajevo. He is the grandfather of the second applicant. The second applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Sarajevo. 5. On 10 November 2005 the second applicant initiated administrative proceedings in order to obtain recognition of the veteran status of his late father. His request was rejected on 12 December 2005. The second applicant appealed on an unknown date in December 2005 or January 2006. 6. On 26 January 2006 the competent Ministry upheld the first-instance decision. 7. On 21 January 2008 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court quashed the decisions of 12 December 2005 and 26 January 2006, and remitted the case to the first-instance body. In the new proceedings, the second applicant’s request was again rejected. The last decision was given by the Sarajevo Cantonal Court on 25 September 2012. It was served on the second applicant on 23 October 2012. 8. In the meantime, on 10 October 2012, the Constitutional Court found a breach of the second applicant’s right to a trial within a reasonable time. It did not award any damages.

4. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Chisinau. 5. At the material time, the applicant was a student and was undertaking an unpaid internship at a law firm. 6. On 23 October 2008 criminal proceedings were initiated against T., a lawyer with whom the applicant worked, on charges of trading in influence. In particular, T. was accused of receiving 10,500 euros (EUR) from D. to pass on to the judges examining a criminal case against a relative of D.’s in order to obtain his acquittal or a more lenient sentence. The applicant had no procedural standing in those proceedings. 7. On 30 October 2008 the police lodged with an investigating judge a request for a warrant to search the applicant’s apartment. The request was granted; the decision to issue the warrant read as follows: “The criminal investigation against T. was initiated on 23 October 2008 ... In the course of the investigation it has been established that from March until September 2008, T. extorted and received from D. in several instalments the amount of EUR 10,500, [to be given to] the judges who examined D.’s relative’s case, in order to obtain his acquittal or a more lenient sentence. On 24 October 2008 T. was caught in flagrante receiving 3,800 US dollars (USD) from D., allegedly for influencing the prosecutor not to appeal against the [subsequent] judgment [acquitting the accused]. The evidence in the file and the material obtained through the operational investigation allow the well-founded assumption that at [the applicant’s] home, situated at [address], can be found EUR 10,500 received from D. and relevant documents, Decides To order a search of [the applicant’s] residence, situated at [address], with the aim of finding and seizing EUR 10,500 received from D. and documents concerning the criminal case.” 8. On the same day, a prosecutor lodged a request with the Buiucani District Court for a warrant to be issued for the search of the applicant’s apartment. His request took the form of a verbatim copy of the police decision. Also on the same day the Buiucani district investigating judge issued a decision authorising the search. The decision read as follows: “The present criminal proceedings were initiated on 23 October 2008 ... against T. After hearing the prosecutor and examining the material, and taking in consideration the fact that that material had been obtained in [a manner] in compliance with the law, the court finds that the request for the authorisation of the search is well founded and should be upheld. On the basis of Articles 41, 125, 301, 305 and 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court: ... 9. On 10 December 2008 the police searched the applicant’s apartment in the presence of her elderly mother [but not the applicant]. They did not find anything. 10. On 21 August 2009 the applicant lodged a request for access to the evidence which had been presented to the judge to justify the search. On 3 September 2009 the Buiucani district investigating judge replied that the case file was held at the [premises of] the investigating authority and that access could only be granted pursuant to the law. 11. It appears from the material in the case file that the criminal proceedings against T. ended with the latter’s acquittal.

5. The first applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Cetinje. The second applicant was founded in Cetinje in 1990. The first applicant is the founder, the sole owner, and the executive director of the second applicant. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 1 July 2013 an insolvency creditor X (stečajni povjerilac) requested the Commercial Court (Privredni sud) in Podgorica to open insolvency proceedings (stečajni postupak) in respect of the second applicant. In the proceedings before the Commercial Court the second applicant was represented by the first applicant and a lawyer duly authorised by the latter. On 27 December 2013 the Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the second applicant and, inter alia, appointed an insolvency administrator (stečajni upravnik). 7. On 23 January 2014 the second applicant, through the lawyer, lodged an appeal against the Commercial Court decision. 8. On 18 March 2014 the Court of Appeals (Apelacioni sud) in Podgorica rejected the appeal (žalba se odbacuje) as having been submitted by an unauthorised person, given that the lawyer had not been appointed by the insolvency administrator. The court relied on sections 75 and 76 of the Insolvency Act (see paragraphs 17-18 below). This decision was served on the applicants on 17 April 2014. 9. On 12 May 2014 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal. 10. On 13 May 2014 the applicants’ representative filed an initiative with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud) seeking the assessment of the constitutionality of section 76 of the Insolvency Act in force at the time. There is nothing in the case-file as to the outcome of that initiative. 11. On 23 July 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants’ constitutional appeal for “not having been lodged by a party to the domestic proceedings or by a person authorised to appeal on behalf of the person whose rights and freedoms were violated”. This decision was served on the applicants on 15 October 2014.

5. The applicant was born in 1987 and is detained in Drogobych. 6. On 6 September 2007 the B. family’s house in the village of Side was burgled by a masked gang. On unspecified dates, a number of other robberies were committed in a similar way in the region. 7. At the end of October 2007 M., a relative of the B. family, confessed to them that he had participated in the burglary, having been forced to do so by K. and Ya., who had also taken part in the crime. He submitted that the other participants had not been known to him. 8. On 4 December 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted in respect of the burglary. 9. On unspecified dates K. and Ya. – and, subsequently, three other persons – were arrested as suspects in the case. Before being arrested on criminal charges, all of them had been placed in administrative detention for alleged resistance to the police, in the course of which they confessed to the burglary. One of the detainees, Sh., allegedly named the applicant as an accomplice. 10. On 6 February 2008, in order to verify the applicant’s possible involvement in the aforementioned crime, police officers approached him when he was in the backyard of his house and ordered him to accompany them to a police station. The applicant refused and, according to the police record, attempted to flee. Accompanied by his father, he was taken to the Sambir police station and spent the following night in detention. His father was sent home. 11. At about 10 a.m. on 7 February 2008, the applicant was taken to Drogobych police station where the police drew up a report stating that he had committed an administrative offence, having manifested wilful disobedience to a lawful order given by police officers. They also drew up a report on the applicant’s administrative arrest, which suggested that no physical injuries had been found on him during his apprehension. The applicant refused to sign both reports. Thereafter, he was brought before the Drogobych District Court, which sentenced him to twelve days’ administrative detention for manifest disobedience to the lawful demands of the police. 12. On the same day at the Sambir police station, according to the relevant record the applicant made a “statement of surrender and confession” (явкa з каяттям) in which he confessed to two counts of burglary, including that of the B. family. According to this statement, the applicant had participated in the crime because he had been under constant threats from K., the alleged organiser of the burglary, to whom he had owed money, and from K.’s friend, P., who had also participated in the burglary. He also stated that he had no complaints against the police and that no physical or psychological coercion had been applied to him. On the same date, according to the relevant record, “explanations” were obtained from the applicant in which he confirmed his participation in the burglary and provided further details as to the circumstances of the crime. 13. According to the applicant, the police ill-treated him with a view to extracting confessions from him. In particular, after the hearing at the Drogobych District Court on 7 February 2008 (see paragraph 11 above), he was taken back to Drogobych police station. At about 3 p.m., police officers of that station, in the presence of their colleagues from Sambir police station, handcuffed his hands behind his back, kicked him and hit him with the back of a chair; when he requested a lawyer, police officer Y. came in holding a white stool leg. He placed the applicant face down on a table, stuffed a knitted hat in his mouth and beat him with the stool leg on his bare heels, causing him a fractured foot. To stop the beating the applicant agreed to confess and signed the statement of surrender to the police. Thereafter, he was taken to the investigator in charge of the investigation of the burglary for questioning. He once again confirmed his confessions, being afraid of further ill-treatment by the police. Prior to being taken to the investigator, the applicant was transferred back to Sambir police station in the late evening on 7 February 2008. There he was taken to the Sambir Temporary Detention Centre (“the Sambir ITT”) where he drafted a statement that he had not been beaten by the police and that his foot pain had been caused by accidently twisting his foot on the stairs. According to the applicant, he was forced to make such a statement by the head of the police station. He further submitted that no medical assistance had been administered to him for the following five days, despite his complaints of severe pain in the foot. 14. According to the Government, the applicant had not suffered any ill‑treatment and had confessed to the burglary of the B. family’s home of his own free will. 15. In the early morning of 8 February 2008, according to the applicant, he was made to write another document, referred to as “explanations”, as dictated by police officers. In this document he confirmed his confession to the burglary. 16. On 12 February 2008 the applicant was taken to Sambir Town Hospital, where he was diagnosed with a fractured right foot and received the necessary medical assistance. 17. On the same date, once he had been discharged from the Sambir ITT, the applicant submitted in writing that he had no complaints against the police officers of Sambir police station in connection with his detention in that facility. 18. On a number of occasions during the applicant’s administrative detention, namely on 9, 11 and 12 February 2008, a lawyer, Ms I., appointed by the applicant’s family on 7 February 2008, unsuccessfully attempted to hold a meeting with the applicant. She managed to “briefly meet” him for the first time in the late evening of 12 February 2008. 19. On 18 February 2008, when the term of the applicant’s administrative detention expired, criminal proceedings were instituted against him in connection with the burglary of the B. family’s home and, without leaving the police premises, he was re-arrested as a suspect in the case. According to the arrest report, the applicant was arrested on the grounds that he had been identified by an eyewitness. The relevant entry in the arrest record suggests that the applicant expressed his wish to be assisted by a lawyer before the first questioning. 20. According to the Government’s submissions, on the same date the applicant was questioned as a suspect. He admitted his guilt in respect of the burglary and provided the relevant details. Before the questioning, he had been apprised of his procedural rights and waived his right to legal assistance. Copies of the interview record, as well as of the waiver and the note on acquaintance with procedural rights, submitted to the Court by the Government, bear a visible handwritten correction of their dates: from an illegible pre-typed to a handwritten “18” February 2008. 21. The applicant submitted that he had not been questioned on 18 February 2008 and had never waived his right to legal assistance. He alleged that the authorities had forged the documents and that the recorded interview they referred to had in fact taken place in the investigator’s room on 7 February 2018, during his administrative detention (see paragraph 13 above). 22. On 19 February 2008, at the applicant’s request, Ms I. was admitted to the proceedings as his defence counsel. Thereafter, the applicant was assisted throughout the proceedings either by her or by another lawyer, Mr M., appointed by the applicant’s father. 23. On 20 and 25 February 2008 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer. He denied his guilt in respect of the burglary and refused to make any further statement in that respect. 24. On 21 February 2008 the Sambir Town Court remanded the applicant in custody as a preventive measure pending trial. 25. On the same day an expert from the Sambir Town Forensic Examination Bureau examined the applicant on the investigator’s instruction with a view to establishing whether he had any injuries and, if so, their location and nature, and whether they could have been caused by a free fall from one’s height or by falling onto some objects. The applicant told the expert that he had been beaten at Drogobych police station on 7 February 2008, including with a stool leg. The examination report was completed on 4 March 2008. It documented inflammation at the base of the first finger on both hands (осадження шкіри в ділянках основи перших пальців на обох руках), which could have been caused by blunt hard objects, possibly on the date and in the circumstances as described by the applicant. The injury was assessed as a minor one and not typical of a free fall from a man’s height. In addition, the expert noted that the applicant’s right foot was in a plaster cast during the examination and that on 4 March 2008 a radiologist from the Lviv Regional Diagnostic Centre had examined an X-ray image of 12 February 2008 and found “no signs of traumatic injuries” on the bones of the right foot. 26. On 31 March 2008 the applicant retracted his earlier confessions and submitted that he had incriminated himself as a result of ill-treatment by the police and that he had not committed the crime in question. 27. On 24 April 2008, during an identification parade, the victim B. pointed to the applicant as having participated in the burglary of her home. She alleged that she recognised him by his hands and provided the relevant details. 28. On 4 June 2008 the applicant again denied his participation in the burglary. 29. On 6 June 2008 the pre-trial investigation was completed and the case against the applicant and his five alleged accomplices was sent to the Sambir District Court of Lviv Region (“the Sambir District Court”) for trial. During the trial, the applicant and his alleged accomplices pleaded not guilty and submitted that their confessions to the burglary had been extracted from them by the police by means of ill-treatment. They relied on the bodily injuries which had been discovered on them shortly after their arrest and on the pending criminal proceedings against the police officers. 30. On 28 December 2010 the Sambir District Court found the applicant, along with his five co-defendants, guilty of aggravated burglary and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment, with confiscation of all his personal property. The court relied on, among other things, the confessions the applicant had made during the pre-trial investigation – in particular, on 7 February 2008 and “during his questioning as a suspect” – even though he had retracted them at the investigation stage and during the trial. The court rejected the applicant’s argument that his statement of voluntary surrender and confession to the police had been extracted from him by means of ill‑treatment. It noted that in accordance with the applicant’s submissions, after his arrest on 6 February 2008 he had been taken first to Sambir police station and then, on 7 February 2008, to Drogobych police station where his alleged ill-treatment had taken place. The court thus concluded that “the applicant had made his confessions to the police on 7 February 2008 at Sambir police station before the physical injuries had been inflicted on him.” The allegations of the applicant’s co-defendants as to their ill‑treatment by the police were also dismissed by the trial court. The term of the applicant’s sentence was to be calculated from 6 February 2008. 31. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal of Lviv Region (“the Lviv Regional Court”). He submitted, among other things, that his conviction had been based mainly on confessions obtained from him by coercion, as well as on the statements made in a similar way by his co‑defendants. 32. On 23 November 2011 the Lviv Regional Court upheld the first‑instance court’s judgment. As regards the applicant’s allegation of ill‑treatment and his objection to the use of his self-incriminating statements obtained under duress, the court found that the first-instance court had established that the applicant had made his confession at Sambir police station before being taken to Drogobych police station where the alleged ill‑treatment had taken place. It further relied on the Sambir prosecutor’s findings set out in his decision of 7 March 2008, which had not been appealed against by the applicant, according to which on 7 and 12 February 2008 the applicant himself submitted that he had had twisted his foot on the stairs and that he had had no complaints against the officers of Sambir police station (see paragraph 37 below). 33. The applicant, both in person and through his lawyer, M., appealed on points of law. In his appeal, the applicant mainly maintained the arguments advanced in his earlier appeal. He emphasised in this connection that the Lviv Regional Court had relied on the results of the investigation of his ill‑treatment allegations conducted by the Sambir prosecutor’s office as the final and conclusive ones, whereas the criminal proceedings in respect of his ill-treatment complaint had been still pending. Lawyer M. mainly challenged the allegedly selective approach to the assessment of evidence and the establishment of the facts. 34. On 22 January 2013 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters (“the HSC”) upheld the judgments of the lower courts. It concluded that the applicant’s guilt had been sufficiently proved by the evidence, including his own confessions. In so far as his allegation of ill‑treatment was concerned, the HSC relied on the reasoning given by the Lviv Regional Court and found that it had correctly dismissed the allegation as unsubstantiated. The complaints of the applicant’s co-defendants about their ill-treatment in police custody with a view to extracting their confessions to the burglary of the B. family were likewise dismissed by the HSC. 35. On 14 February 2008 lawyer I., acting upon the instructions of the applicant’s relatives, lodged a criminal complaint with the Sambir district prosecutor’s office about the applicant’s ill-treatment and requested that he be given a forensic medical examination. She also complained that the head of Sambir police station had unlawfully obstructed her from meeting with the applicant on 9, 11 and 12 February 2008 and had provided false information as to the applicant’s whereabouts. 36. On 27 February and 20 March 2008 the applicant’s mother and father respectively complained to the Sambir district prosecutor’s office and the Prosecutor General of the applicant’s ill-treatment in police custody and the police’s failure to provide the applicant with timely medical assistance for his foot injury. The father requested that the applicant be given a forensic medical examination. 37. On 7 March 2008, in response to the complaints of lawyer I. and the applicant’s mother, the deputy prosecutor of Sambir refused to institute criminal proceedings against the heads of Sambir police station and of the Sambir ITT and a police officer, K., on the grounds that there was no evidence that they had committed any crime. He relied on the applicant’s statements made on 7 and 12 February 2008, according to which nobody had ill-treated him and his foot injury had been caused by accidentally twisting it on the stairs (see paragraphs 13 and 17 above). He noted that the applicant had not complained to him of any ill-treatment shortly after his arrest. The prosecutor forwarded the ill-treatment allegations to the Drogobych prosecutor’s office for further examination. By the same decision, the prosecutor rejected as unsubstantiated the complaints concerning the lack of medical assistance in respect of the applicant’s foot injury and the allegations that his relatives and lawyer had not been allowed to see him. 38. On 26 March, 9 April and 4 June 2008 the prosecutors refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the complaints of the applicant’s ill-treatment. They questioned the applicant, who maintained that he had been ill-treated by the police and submitted a detailed account of the events of 7 February 2008 as outlined in paragraph 13 above, and the police officers, all of whom denied any use of physical force or psychological pressure against the applicant. The prosecutors then relied on the testimony of the officers and on the statements the applicant had made on 7 and 12 February 2008. They also noted the fact that the applicant had remained silent during a court hearing on the application of a preventive measure in respect of him. 39. On 1 April 2008, 10 May and 10 July 2008 the above-mentioned prosecutors’ decisions of 26 March, 9 April and 4 June 2008 respectively were annulled by supervising prosecutors as unfounded and premature. The prosecutors found the inquiries that had been conducted incomprehensive and of a low professional level and ordered additional investigative steps to be taken. 40. On 7 and 23 April 2008 at the request of the applicant’s father the applicant underwent another X-ray examination of his right foot. It confirmed that the applicant had a fracture of the fifth metatarsus bone of his right foot. 41. Between July 2008 and August 2010, in the context of unspecified criminal proceedings against officers of Sambir police station, a number of investigative steps were taken to verify the applicant’s allegations of ill‑treatment. In particular, the applicant and the police officers identified by him were questioned on a number of occasions; reconstructions of the crime scene were conducted (on 29 July and 16 August 2008) and identification parades were carried out (on 16 August and 17 September 2008). The applicant repeated in detail his account of the events and pointed out the persons who had allegedly ill-treated him. On 17, 18 and 30 September 2008 confrontation interviews between the applicant and the police officers were carried out. The officers denied any ill-treatment. 42. On 12 August 2008, a traumatologist who had examined the applicant on 12 February 2008 was questioned. He confirmed that the applicant had had a fractured foot when he had been admitted to the hospital, and submitted that the applicant had not replied when asked about the origin of his trauma. 43. On an unspecified date another witness submitted that he had seen police officers holding the applicant under his arms because he had a foot injury. When the witness had asked the applicant what had happened to his foot, the applicant had allegedly replied: “I don’t know”. 44. On 17 September 2008, following an order given by the prosecutor, comparative X-ray images of the applicant’s feet were made. 45. On 21 October 2008 the prosecutor ordered a forensic medical examination by a panel of experts from Lviv Regional Forensic Examination Bureau aimed at answering the following questions. Did the applicant sustain traumatic injuries to his right foot and, if so, how serious were the injuries and could they have been inflicted in the circumstances indicated by the applicant during his questioning as a witness and during the reconstruction of the crime scene with his participation? Could the injuries have been sustained in the circumstances indicated in the applicant’s written statement of 7 February 2008, namely that he had twisted his foot on the stairs? Could the injuries have been self-inflicted (intentionally or accidently), without the application of external force, for example by twisting the foot while walking or running? What were the features of the object which could have been used to cause the injuries and could this have been a wooden stool leg, as suggested by the applicant? Could those injuries have been inflicted on 7 February 2008 (between 6 and 12 February 2008) and, if so, what was the precise date of their infliction? Lastly, was it possible to establish how many blows had been inflicted on the applicant and in which order? 46. On 28 October 2008 the experts’ report answered those questions as follows: the applicant did sustain a fracture of the fifth metatarsus bone of his right foot; the injury could have been caused at the beginning of February 2008, as suggested by the applicant, but it was not possible to state with precision the particular date of infliction; the injury originated from a blunt object and could be classified as “light” in terms of severity; such a fracture would normally be caused by a direct impact on the bone either by inflicting a blow with a blunt object or by falling on the foot from a height, but in the applicant’s case it most likely originated from a blow to his foot with a blunt object such as a wooden stool leg or a wooden bar; the particularities of the applicant’s injury which could be observed on the X‑ray images were not typical of an accidental twisting of the foot; and the last question could not be answered. 47. On 3 August 2010 the Drogobych interdistrict prosecutor’s office instituted separate criminal proceedings against the officers of Drogobych police station identified by the applicant for abuse of powers in connection with the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant. On 24 December 2010, following questioning of the applicant and the police officers, the criminal investigation was discontinued for lack of evidence of a crime in the police officers’ actions. 48. On 19 January 2011 the Lviv regional prosecutor’s office quashed the decision of 24 December 2010, having noted that there remained a number of investigative steps yet to be taken in order to establish the truth in the case. 49. On 21 March 2011 the investigator ordered another medical examination by a panel of experts to answer the same questions as those which had been answered by the forensic experts on 28 October 2008 (see paragraph 45 above). In the prosecutor’s opinion, the experts’ conclusions of 4 March 2008 and 28 October 2008 raised doubts as to their correctness and contradicted the material in the case file. 50. On 23 January 2012 an additional forensic medical report was delivered by a panel of experts from the Main Forensic Examination Bureau of the Ministry of Health. According to the report, the applicant had a fracture of the fifth metatarsus bone of his right foot which, given the absence of external injuries in the area of the fracture, could have been sustained without the application of external force to the applicant, for example by twisting the foot while walking or running. The experts found that the injury could not have been sustained in the circumstances described by the applicant or by falling from a height. They further noted that the abrasions on both his hands had been caused by a blunt object, but that there was insufficient information in the file to identify the object. The experts concluded that both injuries could have been sustained between 6 and 12 February 2008 and stated that it was not possible to establish the date more precisely. Likewise, it was impossible to establish “the number of blows and ... in which order” they had been administered. 51. On 20 March 2012 the Drogobych interdistrict prosecutor closed the criminal proceedings against the police officers of Drogobych police station. He relied on the police officers’ denial of any ill-treatment, supported by statements by their colleagues, the applicant’s statement made on 7 February 2008 that he had accidently twisted his foot on the stairs and the results of the forensic medical examination of 23 January 2012, which the prosecutor regarded as the only reliable one. That decision was not appealed against by the applicant. Instead, he complained of ill-treatment in the course of the trial in the criminal case against him (see paragraph 29 above).

3. According to a medical report issued on 29 June 2004 by the Gaziantep university hospital, the applicant’s state of health required him to follow one diet for his diabetes and another one for his coronary disease, and to live in a well-ventilated environment free of tobacco smoke. 4. On 30 April 2008 the applicant was placed in the Erzurum H-type prison, where he remained until 6 March 2009, serving a term for terrorist offences. 5. On 17 July 2008 the applicant was taken to the cardiology department of the Atatürk university hospital in Erzurum (“Erzurum hospital”) for blood tests and an echocardiogram. 6. A report drawn up on 24 July 2008 by the Erzurum hospital’s health board pointed out that owing to his cardiac issues the applicant had to adhere to a special anti-cholesterol diet with high poultry meat and vegetable content and low levels of beef and saturated fats. The report mentioned that if the prison in which the applicant had been placed offered a wide choice of daily menus it would be unnecessary to transfer the applicant to another prison providing such facilities. It added that on the other hand, if the prison only offered one standard menu, the Erzurum hospital’s health board would hold a further meeting in order to decide whether the applicant should be transferred to another prison, after ascertaining the view of a dietician on the cholesterol content of the standard menu. 7. On an unspecified date the applicant, arguing that the meal served in prison was incompatible with his medically prescribed diet, asked the prison authorities to send samples to the Ministry of Justice and the Human Rights Commission of the Grande National Assembly of Turkey. 8. On 24 October 2008 the prison disciplinary board rejected his request on the grounds that the foodstuffs would spoil very quickly, before reaching their destination. That board pointed out that the applicant could lodge a complaint by mail with the aforementioned institutions in order to inform them of his grievances concerning the meals served in prison. 9. The applicant appealed against that decision. On 7 November 2008 the Erzurum judge responsible for the execution of sentences (“the judge responsible for the execution of sentences”) dismissed the appeal. On 5 December 2008 the Erzurum Assize Court (“the Assize Court”) upheld the dismissal decision given by the judge responsible for the execution of sentences. 10. Meanwhile, on 24 November 2008, the applicant had been taken to the emergency department of Erzurum hospital complaining of chest pains. On 5 December 2008 he underwent an exercise electrocardiogram. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the judge responsible for the execution of sentences about the refusal by the prison authorities, despite his many requests, to provide him with meals compatible with his medically prescribed diet, which he said formed an integral part of his medical treatment. He also complained about his difficulties in obtaining medication. The applicant stated the following, inter alia: “... my state of health [is poor]; the prison authorities informed me that I would be provided with meals compatible with my diet, but that has not happened; this can be noted from surveillance camera footage; I was not provided with the menu list when I wanted to submit it to the Ministry for examination.” 12. On 2 January 2009 the judge responsible for the execution of sentences allowed the applicant’s request. That judge referred in his decision to a document which the prison authorities had drawn up for the attention of the Erzurum public prosecutor’s office, stating the following: “... medically prescribed diets cannot be prepared in [our] prison’s kitchen; we can only cook unsalted and unspiced versions of the meals prepared for the other [prisoners]. Extra potatoes, boiled eggs and tomatoes are sometimes provided.” 13. The judge responsible for the execution of sentences pointed out that the prison had not indicated in that document whether or not the meals contained fats, which made it impossible to assess their cholesterol content. In view of the impossibility of ascertaining whether meals prepared in that manner were compatible with the medical prescriptions in question, he ordered that the standard menu should be examined by a dietician and, if that menu proved incompatible with the applicant’s diet, that the applicant should be provided with an appropriate menu. 14. On 5 January 2009 the Erzurum public prosecutor (“the prosecutor”) appealed against the decision of 2 January 2009. On 8 January 2009 the judge responsible for the execution of sentences dismissed that appeal. 15. On the same day the prosecutor lodged a fresh appeal against the decision of 8 January 2009, this time with the Assize Court. He argued as follows: the meals were prepared in the prison kitchen; the daily allowance per prisoner, which totalled three Turkish liras (TRY – about 1.40 euro at the material time), was only sufficient to prepare one type of meal per day, which meant that the prisoners could not be offered several types of menus; menus could not be prepared for the medically prescribed diets for a total of thirty-eight individuals detained in the same prison, and only an unsalted, fat-free and unspiced version of the standard menu was on offer. According to the prosecutor, the prison would only be able to improve its service in that respect if the amount of the daily allowance were increased. 16. On 9 January 2009 the Assize Court followed the prosecutor’s reasoning and quashed the decisions given by the judge responsible for the execution of sentences on 2 and 8 January 2009. 17. Furthermore, according to the weekly lists of standard menus for the weeks of 24 February 2009 and 3 March 2009, the meals served to prisoners in the Erzurum Prison had mainly consisted of beef, fried food and starches: poultry meat had only been served once a week and the menus had comprised minimal fresh vegetables.

7. The applicant companies have their registered offices respectively in Bari (G.I.E.M. S.r.l.), Rome (Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l. and R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l.), and Pellaro (Reggio di Calabria) (Falgest S.r.l.). Mr F. Gironda was born in December 1959 and lives in Pellaro. 8. The applicant company owned a plot of land in Bari on the coast at Punta Perotti, with a total area of 10,365 sq. m, adjacent to land belonging at the time to a limited liability company Sud Fondi S.r.l. The land was classified as suitable for building in the general land-use plan (piano regolatore generale) in respect of two plots, the rest being earmarked for use by small businesses according to the plan’s specifications. 9. In By-Law no. 1042 of 11 May 1992 the Bari municipal council approved a site division and development plan (piano di lottizzazione ‑ hereinafter “site development plan”) submitted by Sud Fondi S.r.l. The plan provided for the construction of a multi-purpose complex, comprising housing, offices and shops. According to the applicant company, its land was automatically incorporated into the development plan by the municipal council. 10. On 27 October 1992 the Bari municipal authority asked the applicant company if it wished to be party to a site development agreement in order to be able to build on the land. If its response was negative, the authority would have to expropriate the land under Law no. 6 (1979) of the Apulia Region. 11. On 28 October 1992 the applicant company informed the Bari municipal authority that it wished to participate in a site development agreement. The authority did not reply. 12. On 19 October 1995 the Bari municipal authority issued a building permit to Sud Fondi S.r.l. 13. On 14 February 1996 Sud Fondi S.r.l. began the building work, which had mostly been completed by 17 March 1997. 14. On 27 April 1996, following the publication of a newspaper article about the building work carried out near the sea at Punta Perotti, the public prosecutor of Bari opened a criminal investigation. 15. On 17 March 1997 the public prosecutor ordered a temporary measure restraining disposal of property in respect of all the buildings in question. He also added the names of certain individuals to the register of persons prosecuted, including those of the authorised representative of Sud Fondi S.r.l. and the managers and foremen responsible for the building work. In his decision the public prosecutor expressed the view that the locality known as Punta Perotti was a protected natural site and that the building of the complex was therefore illegal. 16. The representatives of Sud Fondi S.r.l. challenged the temporary restraining measure before the Court of Cassation. In a decision of 17 November 1997 that court declared the measure null and void and ordered the return of all the buildings to their owners, on the ground that it was not prohibited to build on the site according to the land-use plan. 17. In a judgment of 10 February 1999 the Bari District Court acknowledged the illegality of the buildings erected at Punta Perotti as they had been built in breach of Law no. 431 of 8 August 1985 (“Law no. 431/1985”), which prohibited the granting of planning permission in respect of sites of natural interest, including coastal areas. However, since in the present case the local authority had issued the building permits, and in view of the lack of coordination between Law no. 431/1985 and the regional legislation, which was incomplete, the court found that no negligence or criminal intent could be imputed to the defendants. All the defendants were thus acquitted on the ground that the mental element of the offence had not been made out (“perché il fatto non costituisce reato”). 18. In the same judgment, finding that the development plans were materially in breach of Law no. 47/1985 and illegal, the Bari District Court ordered, in accordance with section 19 of that Law, the confiscation of all the developed land at Punta Perotti, including that belonging to the applicant company, together with the buildings thereon, and the incorporation of the property, without compensation, into the estate of the municipal authority of Bari. 19. In an order of 30 June 1999 the Heritage Minister (Ministro dei beni culturali) prohibited any building in the coastal area near the city of Bari, including at Punta Perotti, on the ground that it was a site of significant natural interest. That measure was declared null and void by the Regional Administrative Court the following year. 20. The public prosecutor appealed against the judgment of the Bari District Court, calling for the defendants to be convicted. 21. In a judgment of 5 June 2000 the Bari Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the court below. It found that the granting of planning permission had been legal, in the absence of any ban on building at Punta Perotti, and there having been no appearance of illegality in the procedure for the adoption and approval of the site development agreements. 22. The Court of Appeal thus acquitted the defendants on the ground that no material element of an offence had been made out (“perché il fatto non sussiste”) and revoked the confiscation measure in respect of all the buildings and land. On 27 October 2000 the public prosecutor appealed on points of law. 23. In a judgment of 29 January 2001 the Court of Cassation quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision without remitting it. It acknowledged the material illegality of the site development plans on the ground that the land in question was subject to an absolute ban on building and to a landscape protection measure, both provided for by law. In that connection, the court noted that at the time the development plans had been adopted (20 March 1990), Regional Law no. 30/1990 on landscape protection had not yet entered into force. Consequently, the applicable provisions in the present case were those of Regional Law no. 56 of 1980 (on land use and development) and National Law no. 431/1985 (on landscape protection). 24. The Court of Cassation observed that Law no. 56/1980 in fact imposed a prohibition on building within the meaning of section 51(F), from which the circumstances of the case allowed no derogation, because the site development plans concerned plots of land that were not situated within the city limits. The court added that, at the time when the site development agreements were adopted, the land in question was included in an implementation plan (piano di attuazione) for the general land-use plan which post-dated the entry into force of Regional Law no. 56/1980. 25. The Court of Cassation noted that in March 1990 (see paragraph 23 above), at the time when the site development plans had been approved, no implementation scheme (programma di attuazione) had been in force. In that connection the court referred to its case-law to the effect that an implementation scheme had to be in force at the time of the approval of site development plans (Court of Cassation, Section 3, 21 January 1997, Volpe; 9 June 1997, Varvara; 24 March 1998, Lucifero). The reason for this was ‑ again according to the case-law – that once an implementation scheme had expired, a building ban which had been discontinued by the scheme would become effective once again. Consequently, it was necessary to find that the land in question had been subject to a building ban at the time of the approval of the site development plans. 26. The Court of Cassation further referred to the existence of a landscape protection measure, under section 1 of National Law no. 431/1985. In the present case, as the competent authorities had not issued a notice of conformity with the requirements of landscape protection (that is, neither the nulla osta approval issued by the national authorities attesting to such conformity – under section 28 of Law no. 150/1942 – nor the prior approval of the regional authorities under sections 21 and 27 of Law no. 150/1942, nor the approval of the Regional Planning Committee under sections 21 and 27 of Regional Law no. 56/1980). 27. Lastly, the Court of Cassation noted that the site development plans concerned only 41,885 sq. m, whereas, according to the specifications of the general land-use plan for the city of Bari, the minimum area was set at 50,000 sq. m. 28. In the light of those considerations, the Court of Cassation thus found that the site development plans and building permits had been illegal. It acquitted the defendants on the grounds that they could not be found to have negligently or intentionally committed offences and that they had made an “unavoidable and excusable mistake” in the interpretation of the regional legislation, which was “obscure and poorly worded” and interfered with the national law. The Court of Cassation also took into account the conduct of the administrative authorities, and in particular the following facts: on obtaining the building permits, the defendants had been reassured by the director of the relevant municipal office; the site-protection prohibitions with which the construction project was at odds did not appear in the land-use plan; and the competent national authority had not intervened. Lastly, the Court of Cassation found that in the absence of any investigation concerning the reasons for the conduct of the public bodies, it was not possible to speculate on those reasons. 29. In the same judgment the Court of Cassation ordered the confiscation of all the buildings and plots of land, on the ground that, in accordance with its case-law, the application of section 19 of Law no. 47 of 1985 was mandatory in the case of illegal site development, even where the property developers had not been convicted. 30. The judgment was deposited in the court Registry on 26 March 2001. 31. In the meantime, on 1 February 2001 the applicant company had again asked the Bari municipal authority for permission to enter into a site development agreement. 32. On 15 February 2001 the Bari municipal authority informed the applicant company that, following the judgment of the Court of Cassation of 29 January 2001, the ownership of the land at Punta Perotti, including that belonging to the applicant company, had been transferred to the municipality. 33. The criminal proceedings described above gave rise to another application to the Court (see Sud Fondi S.r.l. and Others v. Italy, no. 75909/01, 20 January 2009). 34. On 3 May 2001 the applicant company applied to the Court of Appeal of Bari seeking the return of its land. It alleged that, in line with case-law of the Court of Cassation, the confiscation of property belonging to a third party in relation to criminal proceedings could be ordered only to the extent that the latter had participated in the commission of the offence, in terms of either material or mental elements. 35. In a decision of 27 July 2001 the Court of Appeal upheld the applicant company’s appeal. 36. The public prosecutor appealed on points of law. 37. In a judgment of 9 April 2002 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the Bari Court of Appeal and remitted the case to the Bari District Court. 38. The applicant company lodged an interlocutory application for review of the enforcement order, seeking the return of its land. 39. In a decision deposited in the court’s Registry on 18 March 2004, the Bari preliminary investigations judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari) dismissed the applicant company’s application. He first observed that the company’s grievances concerned neither the existence nor the formal lawfulness of the impugned measure, which was a mandatory administrative sanction that the criminal court was also entitled to impose in respect of the property of third parties which had not taken part in the commission of the offence of unlawful site development offence. The judge found that the public imperative of protecting land had to prevail over the individual interests. 40. The applicant company appealed on points of law. It emphasised that no construction work had actually been carried out on its land, which had not been the subject of a building permit. By its very nature, it argued, a confiscation measure should be directed solely against land upon which unlawful construction had taken place. 41. In a judgment of 22 June 2005, deposited in the court’s Registry on 18 January 2006, the Court of Cassation, finding that the Bari preliminary investigations judge had addressed all the points in dispute giving logical and correct reasons, dismissed the applicant company’s appeal on points of law. The court noted that the confiscation of the applicant company’s land had been compliant with its settled case-law whereby the measure provided for in section 19 of Law no. 47 of 1985 was a mandatory administrative sanction imposed by the criminal court on the basis of the incompatibility of the situation of the property in question with the legislation on unlawful site development, even where the defendants had been acquitted. Property owners who were not parties to the criminal proceedings and who claimed to have acted in good faith would be entitled to seek redress before the civil courts. 42. According to the information provided by the parties, in October 2012 the Bari municipal authority, having regard to the principles set out and the violations found by the Court in its Sud Fondi S.r.l. and Others judgments (merits and just satisfaction, no. 75909/01, 10 May 2012), asked the Bari District Court to return the confiscated land to the applicant company. In a decision of 12 March 2013 the preliminary investigations judge of that court revoked the confiscation measure and ordered the return of the land on account of the fact that, first, the Court had found a violation of Article 7 of the Convention in Sud Fondi S.r.l. and Others and, secondly, that the company was to be regarded as a bona fide third party because none of its directors had been found liable for the offence of unlawful site development. The judge’s decision was entered in the land register on 14 June 2013 and the applicant company was thus able to recover its property on 2 December 2013. 43. On 7 April 2005 the applicant company had applied to the Bari District Court, seeking compensation for the damage it had sustained as a result of the conduct of the Bari municipal authority and the consequences for the company’s assets. It reproached the municipal authority for: (1) failing to adopt an alternative to the land-use plan; (2) failing to clarify the existence of the constraints arising as to the authorised use of the areas concerned by the site development at issue; and (3) approving site development procedures which had apparently been lawful but had led to the confiscation of the land and had caused a significant economic loss. According to the information provided by the parties, the proceedings were still pending, as the expert’s report evaluating the damage, estimated at 52 million euros by the applicant company, had not yet been filed. 44. The applicant company R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. was the owner of land suitable for building with an area of 33 hectares at Golfo Aranci. 45. Under the municipal development scheme (programma comunale di fabbricazione) for Golfo Aranci, approved on 21 December 1981, the land in question belonged to zone F – classified as a tourist zone – and was suitable for building within a given volume. It was possible to exceed that volume in the context of hotel or hotel-type development. 46. Wishing to build a hotel-type residential complex for tourists with a number of accommodation units (produttiva alberghiera), R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. submitted a site development plan (piano di lottizzazione) to the competent authorities. 47. On 27 March 1991, under section 13 of Regional Law no. 45 of 1989, the Sardinia Region issued its nulla osta approval for building at a minimum distance of 150 metres from the sea, provided that once erected the buildings would actually be used for tourist accommodation. That obligation had to be recorded in the land register. 48. On 29 November 1991 the Sardinia Region granted the landscape transformation permit, under Law no. 431/1985 and section 7 of Law no. 1497/1939, to R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. (see paragraphs 93-96 below). 49. The municipality of Golfo Aranci approved the site development plan with final effect on 17 December 1991. 50. On 22 April 1992, subject to the regional approval, the municipality of Golfo Aranci authorised the mayor to issue a derogating building permit allowing a greater construction volume than that provided for by its municipal development scheme, for the purposes of a hotel-type structure (opere alberghiere ricettive). The file shows that the site development plan concerned an area of 330,026 sq. m. 51. On 17 July 1992 the Sardinia Region issued its final approval of the plan. 52. In the meantime, on 22 June 1992, Regional Law no. 11/1992 had entered into force. It removed the possibility of derogating from the prohibition on building near the sea and fixed the minimum distance at 2 kilometres for dwellings and 500 metres for hotels. As regards buildings intended for hotel-type use, such as the hotel-type residential complexes for tourists in the present case, they were to be treated as dwellings. Under the same law, the minimum distance of 2 kilometres thus had to be maintained, except in the cases where, before 17 November 1989, a site development agreement had already been signed and the infrastructure work had already begun. 53. On 17 July 1992 the Sardinia Region authorised the mayor to grant a building permit to R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. by way of derogation from the municipal land-use plan. 54. On 13 August 1992 the mayor of Golfo Aranci and R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. entered into a site development agreement. Under Article 10 thereof the buildings erected on the site would continue to be used for tourist-hotel purposes and could not be sold off in separate units for a period of twenty years. The agreement stipulated that the development plan was compliant with section 13 of Regional Law no. 45/1989 and with the other planning regulations; it certified that the applicant company had paid a deposit of an amount equivalent to the total cost of the amenities. That work was to be paid for by the applicant company, which would also be required to assign 30% of the land free of charge to the municipality for the primary infrastructure (urbanizzazione primaria). 55. On 31 August 1992 the municipality of Golfo Aranci issued a permit for the primary infrastructure. On 23 November 1992 the municipality issued the building permit for the construction work. 56. On 19 February 1993, following the entry into force on 22 June 1992 (see paragraph 52 above) of Regional Law no. 11/1992, amending Regional Law no. 45/1989, the regional authority revoked certain permits that had been granted under the previous legislation. The applicant company was not affected. 57. The work began in 1993. In 1997 eighty-eight housing units, less than one third of the total number, had been built. A number of them had been sold to individuals, subject to a clause stipulating that the property had to remain assigned, for a number of years, for tourist-hotel use. 58. On 28 January 1995 R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l., which was seeking new partners to optimise the project and share the risks, asked the municipal authority whether the sale of the buildings to third parties was compatible with the development agreement. On 14 February 1995 the municipal authority stated that the agreement had been drafted clearly enough; it therefore did not need clarification. It gave a favourable opinion as to the possibility of selling the buildings, but not in single units and provided the intended use of the properties remained unchanged. 59. On 11 March 1996 the municipal authority, again approached by the applicant company, confirmed the opinion issued on 14 February 1995. 60. At an unknown date, R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. entered into a preliminary contract of sale with Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l. concerning part of the land covered by the development agreement and certain buildings erected in the meantime. In addition, on 15 January 1996, Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l. entered into an agreement (contratto di appalto) with R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. under which the latter undertook to carry out construction work on the land forming the object of the preliminary contract of sale. 61. With a view to becoming the owner of the land and buildings, on 26 February 1997 Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l. also signed agreements with a travel agent for the purpose of renting out units on a weekly basis. 62. On 22 October 1997 R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. sold to Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l. 36,859 sq. m of land and the buildings known as “C2”, namely sixteen units for residential-tourist use. In addition to the buildings R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. assigned the construction rights to Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l. The price of the transaction was fixed at 7,200,000,000 Italian lire (ITL), equivalent to 3,718,489.67 euros (EUR). 63. In November 1997 R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. was the owner of sixteen housing units and the plots of land covered by the site development plan, with the exception of plot no. 644 and those previously sold to Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l., which was the owner of the land it had purchased and of sixteen units. 64. On 26 March 1998 the municipal authority approved the transfer (voltura) of the building permit concerning the land and buildings purchased by Hotel Promotion Bureau S.r.l. 65. On 3 April 2006, further to a request by R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. for a planning certificate in respect of the relevant property for the period 1990‑1997, the municipal authority stated that the development agreement signed with R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. and the permits granted were compatible with the planning regulations in force at the material time, and in particular with Regional Law no. 45/1989, and it therefore considered that the offence of unlawful site development was not made out in the circumstances. 66. In 1997 the public prosecutor of Olbia opened a criminal investigation in respect of Mr M.C. and Mr L.C., the legal representatives of the applicant companies. They were suspected of a number of offences, including that of unlawful site development within the meaning of section 20 of Law no. 47/1985 for building too close to the sea and without planning permission, together with fraud for changing the intended use of the properties in breach of the development agreement. 67. On 20 November 1997 a court order restraining disposal of property was imposed on the land and buildings. 68. In a decision of 17 January 2000 the Sassari District Court returned the land and buildings to their rightful owners. 69. In a judgment of 31 March 2003 the Olbia District Court acquitted M.C. and L.C. on the merits in respect of all the offences, with the exception of that of unlawful site development, the prosecution of which was declared statute-barred. 70. Having regard to the entry into force of Regional Law no. 11 of 1992 (see paragraph 52 above) and the new minimum distance from the sea introduced therein, the District Court took the view that the municipality of Golfo Aranci should never have issued the building permits and that the previously issued authorisations could not legitimise the situation. The building permits were thus in breach of the law or, at least, ineffective (inefficaci). Although erected in accordance with the permits issued by the municipal authority, the constructions were thus incompatible with the statutory provisions and their existence thus constituted unlawful site development. In addition, the sale of the housing units to individuals cast doubt on their continued use for tourist-hotel purposes and this change of purpose also placed the buildings in breach of the law. In conclusion, the District Court ordered the confiscation of the property previously placed under a restraining order and the transfer of ownership to the municipality of Golfo Aranci within the meaning of section 19 of Law no. 47/1985. 71. As regards, in particular, the charge of fraud, the court took the view that the offence was not made out because there had been no financial loss to the municipality, since the cost of the infrastructure work remained the same even if the intended use changed. In addition, the mental element, that is to say the existence of intent to defraud the municipality, had not been proved in view of the fact that the sale had been carried out as a result of the financial difficulties of R.I.T.A. Sarda S.r.l. Moreover, the court pointed out that the municipal authority had issued the company with a favourable opinion as regards the sale of the buildings. 72. In a judgment of 11 October 2004 the Cagliari Court of Appeal upheld the Olbia District Court’s finding of dismissal (non doversi procedere) in respect of the offence which was statute-barred and reiterated that the municipality of Golfo Aranci should not have issued the building permits, which were illegal and in any event ineffective. The constructions erected were de facto incompatible with the regional legislation prohibiting them. In addition, between March 1995 and November 1997 most of the housing units had been sold off, thus changing their intended use. As to the charge of fraud, the Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal of the applicant companies’ legal representatives on the basis of the same considerations, on this point, as those of the District Court. It confirmed the confiscation order. 73. Mr M.C. and Mr L.C. appealed on points of law but their appeal was dismissed by the Court of Cassation in a judgment of 15 February 2007. 74. According to the information provided by the Government, on 29 July 2015 the individual purchasers of the confiscated property still retained full possession. Shortly before that, on 21 May 2015, a resolution of the municipality of Golfo Aranci had acknowledged the genuine interest of the community in keeping the confiscated complex, referring in particular to the possibility of using the housing to cope with situations of urgency in the event that the local authorities should decide to assign the use of the property, directly or indirectly, for rent by persons with low income. 75. The company Falgest S.r.l. and Mr Filippo Gironda were the co‑owners, each with a 50% interest, of a plot of land at Testa di Cane and Fiumarella di Pellaro (Reggio di Calabria) with a total surface area of 11,870 sq. m. The land-use plan provided solely for the possibility of building hotel-type residential complexes for tourists on that land. 76. On 12 October 1994 the applicants applied for a building permit to erect a tourist residential complex consisting of forty-two houses and sports facilities. 77. On 15 September 1997 the municipality of Reggio di Calabria issued the building permit. 78. After verification by the municipality, a number of variations from the plan were noted. The municipality ordered the suspension of the work on 26 January 1998. 79. On 29 January 1998 the applicants filed an amended plan (variante in corso d’opera), which provided for fewer houses (forty instead of forty‑two) and restricted the construction area. This amended plan sought to regularise the work as already carried out, within the meaning of Law no. 47/1985. 80. On 10 February 1998 the mayor of Reggio di Calabria cancelled the order suspending the work on the ground that the discrepancies in relation to the initial construction project could be regularised by means of the amended plan submitted in respect of ongoing work under section 15 of Law no. 47/1985. 81. On 1 October 1998 the inspector of the municipality of Reggio di Calabria noted that the work was in conformity with the amended plan. The work was pursued. 82. In 2002 the public prosecutor of Reggio di Calabria opened an investigation in respect of Mr Gironda, in his capacity as co-owner of the property, and five others: a director of the company, two signatories to the development project and two foremen. They were all suspected of committing a number of offences, in particular that of unlawful site development within the meaning of section 20 of Law no. 47/1985. 83. In a judgment of 22 January 2007 the Reggio di Calabria District Court acquitted all the defendants on the merits (perché il fatto non sussiste) in respect of all the charges, except for the offence of unlawful site development, the prosecution of which it declared statute-barred. The court noted that the project had provided for the construction of residences for hotel-type tourist accommodation. However, the structural specifications of the buildings (caratteristiche strutturali) and the evidence suggested that the real purpose of the project was the sale of houses to individuals, thus casting doubt on the intended hotel-type tourist use. This change of purpose rendered the site development unlawful. In conclusion, the court ordered the confiscation of the land and buildings and the transfer of the property to the municipality of Reggio di Calabria under section 19 of Law no. 47 of 1985. 84. In a judgment of 28 April 2009 the Reggio di Calabria Court of Appeal acquitted the applicants on the merits (perché il fatto non sussiste) in respect of all the charges, including that of unlawful site development. It revoked the confiscation of the property and ordered its return to the owners. 85. The Court of Appeal took the view, in particular, that the approved project was compatible with the land-use plan and the planning regulations. Given that there had been no preliminary or final contract of sale, there was no evidence of any change in the purpose of the constructions and therefore no unlawful development. 86. In a judgment of 22 April 2010, deposited in the Registry on 27 September 2010, the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Court of Appeal without remitting it, finding that the change in purpose of the constructions was proved by statements made by third parties and by documents in the file. For the Court of Cassation, the offence of unlawful site development (the prosecution of which was statute-barred, entailing the dismissal of the case) had thus indeed been knowingly committed by the defendants. Consequently, the property in question again became subject to the confiscation order made at first instance by the Reggio di Calabria District Court. The acquittals were maintained. 87. According to an expert’s report of 5 May 2015, the expert having been appointed by the applicants, the complex confiscated from the latter was in an advanced state of abandonment and neglect. In the applicants’ submission, the municipal authority, which was the owner of the property, had not carried out any work to keep the open spaces maintained.

6. The applicant company, a limited liability company based in Vienna, owns and publishes the daily newspaper Der Standard and the online news portal derstandard.at. 7. The Carinthian Regional Hospital Operating Company (Landeskrankenanstalten-Betriebsgesellschaft – hereinafter “the KABEG”) is a public-law institution (Anstalt öffentlichen Rechts) which operates five hospitals in Carinthia previously owned by the Region of Carinthia (Land Kärnten). 8. The KABEG is governed and represented by the board of management (Vorstand) which consists of at least one person and is appointed and supervised by the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). The supervisory board consists of three members of the Regional Government, one person who is appointed by the Regional Government and two representatives of the employees of the KABEG. The chairperson of the supervisory board is appointed by the Regional Government. 9. In 2011 I.M. was the member of the board of management in charge of human resources. K.S. was the chairperson of the supervisory board and leader of the parliamentary group (Fraktionsführer) of the Freedom Party of Carinthia (Freiheitliche Partei in Kärnten) in the Carinthian Regional Parliament (Landtag). His brother, U.S., was Deputy Governor of the Region of Carinthia. 10. Because of financial problems, rehiring (Wiedereinstellung) of high‑level managers and accusations of tortious interference on the part of politicians in the recruitment process, management errors and corruption within the KABEG, a public debate arose in 2010. On 28 October 2010 the medical director of Klagenfurt Regional Hospital (Landeskrankenhaus), who was in charge at that time, criticised I.M. in a confidential employees’ meeting of the medical doctors of the hospital. Only a few hours later the medical director was dismissed without notice. 11. On 25 November 2011 on the internet news portal derstandard.at and on 26 November 2011 in the daily newspaper Der Standard the following article was published: “Spying accusation against KABEG board of management ... The [KABEG] board of management ..., [I.M.], is under heavy pressure. According to the minutes of a meeting disclosed on Friday, she is supposed to have ordered the spying on a confidential employees’ meeting [Betriebsversammlung] for doctors of Klagenfurt Regional Hospital herself. These minutes were drafted after the employees’ meeting on 28 October 2010 in the course of a subsequent meeting in the office of the board of management and they state: ‘[I.M.] explains that she has, as a precaution, sent an informant, who wrote up a transcript [Wortprotokoll].’ ‘Stasi methods’ Prominent victim of this informant was the medical director, [M.A.], who had accused the KABEG management of using ‘Stasi methods’ against insubordinate doctors. M.A. was dismissed without notice immediately after the employees’ meeting. The informant was a trainee lawyer under [I.M.]’s lawyer. [I.M] always claimed that she had not been aware of this operation, that the KABEG lawyer had acted on his own volition. [He] took the blame and therefore had to explain himself before the bar association. K.S. ([Freedom Party of Carinthia]), chairperson of the supervisory board, who also put pressure on journalists in respect of critical reports on the KABEG, is supposed to be the spiritus rector of the spying operation. The now disclosed minutes (which are at the disposal of Der Standard) cast doubts on [I.M.]’s version ...” 12. On 10 January 2012 K.S., referring to the statement, that he was supposed to be the spiritus rector of the spying operation, initiated private prosecution proceedings for defamation under the Media Act (Mediengesetz) against the applicant company. He claimed compensation and demanded publication of the judgment, arguing that the statement had been a statement of fact, lacked any factual basis and was untrue. 13. The applicant company argued that the statement was a critical but permissible value judgment and had had a factual basis: K.S. had cultivated a friendship with I.M. and had supported her in the ongoing public debate; moreover, he had been associated with other spying accusations and had even announced in public that he would investigate and spy on politically unpopular individuals in order to get information to discredit them in public. The article did not allege that K.S. had personally initiated or ordered that a spy be sent to the employees’ meeting; however, by regularly applying and publicly announcing such practices he had created a climate and environment where such unfair methods were anticipated as “normal” and commonplace. 14. On 21 March 2012 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht für Strafsachen) rejected K.S.’s claims under the Media Act as inadmissible, reasoning that the term spiritus rector was neither defamatory nor mocking, nor did it allege specific conduct. Being called a spiritus rector meant being seen as a spiritual or ideological guide (geistiger oder weltanschaulicher Führer), which, especially for politicians, could not be seen as a negative quality and only suggested that others felt inspired by this person. 15. On 18 April 2012, following a prior complaint lodged by K.S., the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) quashed the Regional Criminal Court’s decision of 21 March 2012 and ordered it to initiate proceedings under the Media Act against the applicant company. It held that, taking into account the contents of the whole article, the statement suggested that K.S. had been the “spin doctor” (Ideengeber) of the spying operation. Based on this interpretation, the article would qualify as defamatory and originate a claim under the Media Act. It was thus required to examine the factual basis of the article. 16. In the subsequent proceedings before the Regional Criminal Court the applicant company explicitly declared that it would not provide evidence as to the truth (Wahrheitsbeweis) of K.S. having acted as a spin doctor or the like. It maintained its position that the statement was a value judgment. 17. On 15 May 2012 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court ordered the applicant company, under Section 6 of the Media Act, to pay 3,000 euros (EUR) (EUR 1,500 for each publication of the article) in compensation to K.S. on account of defamation, and to publish the judgment. Assuming that the statement was to be understood in the way set out in the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 18 April 2012, and noting that the applicant company had not provided evidence as to the truth of the allegation, it found that the article and statement qualified as defamation within the meaning of Article 111 § 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch). 18. On 26 September 2012 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant company’s appeal against this decision. It held that describing someone as the spiritus rector of a negatively connoted spying operation had left no doubt for the readers addressed that the suggestion had been that this person had been the initiator and spin doctor of this operation. The statement implied a “specific and sufficiently concrete” (spezifisch und hinreichend konkretisiert) accusation of conduct and thus qualified as a statement of fact, as to the truth of which the applicant company had failed to provide evidence. As regards the applicant company’s complaint about the amount of compensation granted, the Court of Appeal held that it did not even amount to 10% of the maximum compensation permitted by law, and was not excessive in relation to the circulation of the newspaper and the online news portal. 19. That decision was served on the applicant company’s counsel on 24 October 2012. 20. The applicant company subsequently lodged an application for renewal of the criminal proceedings (Erneuerung des Strafverfahrens) under Article 363a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung) with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof), complaining under Article 10 of the Convention of a violation of its right to freedom of expression. 21. On 26 June 2013 the Supreme Court rejected the application. It stated that the Court of Appeal’s considerations as to the qualification of the statement as a statement of fact did not raise concerns, and held that such statements of fact, which had not been proven to be true and were thus defamatory, were not protected by Article 10. It concluded that the interference with the applicant company’s right to freedom of expression had been prescribed by law, had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of others and had been necessary in the circumstances of the case, in particular taking into account the low amount of compensation granted. 22. On 10 January 2012 K.S. also lodged an injunction suit under Article 1330 of the Civil Code (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) against the applicant company, requesting that the latter be ordered to refrain from alleging or disseminating that K.S. had been or was supposed to have been the spiritus rector of a spying operation on a confidential employees’ meeting for doctors of Klagenfurt Regional Hospital. 23. On 5 March 2012 the applicant company requested that the proceedings be suspended until the termination of the proceedings under the Media Act (see paragraphs 12 et seq. above), arguing that the assessment of the factual elements in those proceedings, which would presumably lead to a rejection of K.S.’s application, would have a binding effect on the civil proceedings. 24. On 19 March 2012, during a hearing, the Vienna Commercial Court (Handelsgericht) suspended the proceedings until the termination of the proceedings under the Media Act, holding that they should only be continued at one party’s request. 25. At K.S.’s request of 1 October 2012, the Commercial Court resumed the proceedings on an unspecified date. 26. On 19 November 2012 the Commercial Court granted the injunction, finding that the criminal conviction in the proceedings under the Media Act had binding effect on the injunction proceedings. 27. On 29 June 2013 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant company’s appeal against that decision. It confirmed that, in line with the Supreme Court’s case-law, the conviction in the proceedings under the Media Act was binding, both in relation to the established elements of facts and the legal assessment. In particular, a final conviction under section 6 of the Media Act establishing that a particular media content fulfilled the objective elements of defamation would determine – in a way that was binding and not revisable in the civil proceedings – that the audience understood the media content as defamatory. Referring to the Supreme Court’s case-law on the issue, the Court of Appeal did not grant leave to lodge an ordinary appeal on points of law (ordentliche Revision) with the Supreme Court. 28. The applicant company did not lodge an extraordinary appeal on points of law (außerordentliche Revision) with the Supreme Court.

4. The applicants are Russian nationals who, at the material time, lived in the Chechen Republic. Their personal details are set out in the appended table. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared after allegedly being unlawfully detained by servicemen during special operations. The events concerned took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have not seen their missing relatives since the alleged arrests. Their whereabouts remain unknown. 5. The applicants reported the abductions to law‑enforcement bodies, and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have been ongoing for several years without any tangible results being achieved. The applicants lodged requests for information and assistance in the search for their relatives with the investigating authorities and various law-enforcement bodies. Their requests received either only formalistic responses or none at all. The perpetrators have not been identified by the investigating bodies. It appears that all of the investigations are still ongoing. 6. Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours to both the Court and the domestic investigating authorities. The Government did not dispute the principal facts of the cases as presented by the applicants, but questioned the involvement of servicemen in the events. 7. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Ismail Makhmudov, who was born in 1976. The first applicant is his mother, the third applicant is his wife, the fourth applicant is his daughter, and the fifth and sixth applicants are his brothers. The second applicant was Mr Ismail Makhmudov’s father. He died on 12 July 2010. 8. At about 7 p.m. on 4 January 2003 a grey UAZ minivan (tabletka) allegedly belonging to the Gudermes district department of the interior (“the Gudermes ROVD”) parked near the applicants’ house in Oiyskhar settlement, Chechnya. At 8 p.m. Mr Ismail Makhmudov left his house and when he was passing the minivan ten armed men in camouflage uniforms, some of them in balaclavas, jumped out of the minivan, surrounded him, forced him into the vehicle, and drove off to an unknown destination. 9. The applicants submitted written statements by three witnesses to the incident. Ms L.Ya saw a UAZ minivan parking some 300 metres from her house, and a group of men in camouflage uniforms speaking unaccented Russian nearby; Ms T.A. saw the abduction of Mr Ismail Makhmudov from her window; and Mr A.T. witnessed the UAZ minivan with the men in camouflage uniforms driving by in the direction of the highway. 10. On 5 January 2003 day the first applicant went to the Gudermes ROVD, where she met a police officer, Officer L.Kh., who told her that they had already taken Mr Ismail Makhmudov home. 11. On 6 January 2003 the second applicant, Mr Ismail Makhmudov’s father, complained of the abduction to the Gudermes ROVD. Three days later the Gudermes ROVD refused to open a criminal case into the incident, stating that “there were no grounds to believe that [Mr Ismail Makhmudov] had been the victim of a criminal offence”. 12. On 21 January 2003 the Gudermes district prosecutor in Chechnya overruled the above refusal and opened criminal case no. 32004 under Article 126 of the Russian Criminal Code (“the CC”) (abduction). 13. On 20 March 2003 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 14. Having questioned several witnesses who did not have any information about Mr Ismail Makhmudov’s whereabouts, on 21 March 2003 the investigators suspended the proceedings for failure to identify the perpetrators. 15. On 1 March 2004 the first applicant asked the investigators to grant her access to the case file documents. On 18 March 2004 her request was refused. 16. On unspecified dates between April and June 2004 the first applicant contacted the Chechen Ministry of the Interior, the Chechen President and other authorities, seeking their assistance in the search for her son. She was informed in reply that the criminal proceedings were ongoing. 17. In early 2005 the first applicant sent similar requests to the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”) in Chechnya, the Chechnya prosecutor and the Chechen Ministry of the Interior. Her enquiries were forwarded to the investigators in charge of the case. 18. On 28 April 2005 the deputy Gudermes district prosecutor overruled the decision of 21 March 2003 and resumed the proceedings to question Mr Ismail Makhmudov’s neighbours and check if he had been apprehended during a special operation. 19. It appears that in May 2005 the investigators questioned Mr Ismail Makhmudov’s neighbours. The copies of their interview records submitted by the Government were illegible. 20. On 28 May 2005 the proceedings were suspended. The applicants were not informed about that. 21. On 16 November 2005 the first applicant asked the Gudermes district prosecutor to inform her about the progress of the case and to investigate the abduction more thoroughly, alleging that it had been perpetrated by State agents. No response followed. 22. On 15 February 2006 the NGO Russian Justice Initiative contacted the investigators on behalf of the first applicant, seeking an update on the progress of the investigation. Again, no response followed. 23. On 7 April 2008 the proceedings were resumed. Several days later the investigators contacted various law-enforcement bodies and detention facilities to establish whether Mr Ismail Makhmudov had been placed in custody. The respondent authorities had no information about his arrest or detention. 24. On 15 May 2008 the first applicant was questioned. She provided the investigators with the names of several fellow villagers who had seen a grey UAZ minivan parked near her son’s house at the time of the abduction. 25. On 19 May 2008 the investigation was suspended again. Later, it was resumed on 15 December 2008, 30 January 2009 and 21 August 2012, and then suspended on 19 January and 12 March 2009 and 21 September 2012 respectively. 26. On 15 January 2009 the investigators granted victim status to the second applicant and questioned him. He made statements similar to those of his wife, the second applicant. He also mentioned that the former head of the local police, Mr U., had told him that at about 8 p.m. on 4 January 2003 he had seen a UAZ minivan and several persons in military uniforms and balaclavas near the applicants’ house. The men had stated that they had problems with electricity, but had refused to accept his help. 27. On 10 March 2009 the investigators questioned Mr Sh.B., who submitted that he had seen a grey UAZ minivan in the vicinity of Mr Ismail Makhmudov’s house. 28. On 4 February 2015 the first applicant enquired about the course of the proceedings. On 13 February 2015 she was informed that they were still ongoing. There is no information about further developments in the case. 29. On 20 March 2010 the first applicant lodged a court claim with the Gudermes Town Court in Chechnya, seeking that the proceedings suspended on 19 May 2008 be resumed. She also alleged that the investigation had not been thorough. 30. On 8 June 2010 the court dismissed her claim on the grounds that the proceedings had already been resumed on 2 June 2010. 31. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Ismail Dashtayev, who was born in 1975. The second applicant is his sister. 32. On 30 January 2002 Mr Ismail Dashtayev and his fellow villager Mr L.‑A.Ch. were going by taxi from the town of Nazran, Ingushetiya, to the village of Novyye Atagi, Chechnya. Just before the entrance to Novyye Atagi, they were stopped by servicemen who had blocked the road with two armoured personnel carriers (“APCs”). The servicemen were in camouflage uniforms without identifying insignia, except for one, who had the shoulder straps of a colonel. Speaking unaccented Russian, they asked Mr Ismail Dashtayev and Mr L.‑A.Ch. for their identity documents. A few minutes later, two grey UAZ minivans without registration plates arrived. Suddenly, one of the servicemen pointed his gun at Mr Ismail Dashtayev’s head, while another searched his pockets. They then put Mr Ismail Dashtayev in one of the UAZ minivans and drove off towards the town of Shali. When Mr L.‑A.Ch. asked the servicemen where Mr Ismail Dashtayev had been taken, the servicemen shouted at him, asking whether he wanted to join him. Thereafter, the servicemen searched Mr L.-A.Ch., put a black plastic bag over his head, forced him into the other UAZ minivan, drove him to Shali, and then released him in front of the central district hospital. 33. On 7 February 2002 the first applicant complained of the abduction of her son to the Shali district prosecutor in Chechnya. 34. On 31 May 2002 the district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 59116 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 35. On 1 July 2002 the investigators questioned the first applicant. She described her attempts to find her missing son. Firstly, she had contacted Mr L.-A.Ch.’s mother, who had told her that Mr Ismail Dashtayev had been apprehended together with Mr L.-A.Ch. Then she had spoken with the head of Novyye Atagi’s local authorities, who had stated that Mr Ismail Dashtayev had been detained on the premises of the Shali district department of the interior (“the Shali ROVD”). 36. The next day the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 37. On 31 July 2002, having sent requests concerning Mr Ismail Dashtayev’s whereabouts to various authorities, including the Shali ROVD, the investigators suspended the criminal proceedings for failure to identify the perpetrators. 38. At some point later the authorities replied that they did not have any information about Mr Ismail Dashtayev’s whereabouts. 39. On 21 January 2003 the proceedings were resumed and then on 28 February 2003 suspended again. 40. On 5 March 2004 and 22 February 2008 the first applicant asked the head of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences and the Chechnya Ombudsman to assist her in her search for her son. 41. On 14 March 2008 the investigators resumed the proceedings. 42. On 28 March 2008 the investigators questioned Mr L.-A.Ch for the first time. His statement was similar to those submitted to the Court by the applicants. 43. On 19 April 2008 the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were not informed of that. 44. On 10 February 2010 the applicants’ representative contacted a number of domestic authorities, asking for their assistance in establishing the whereabouts of the applicants’ missing relative. In reply, he was informed that the criminal investigation into Mr Ismail Dashtayev’s abduction was ongoing. 45. On 20 January 2011 the investigation was resumed. Several days later the investigators questioned various officials who had assisted the investigation in establishing the circumstances of the abduction. All of them explained that they had failed to find out which authority had blocked the road and apprehended Mr Ismail Dashtayev. 46. On 14 February the investigators ordered a DNA test to be performed, to compare the DNA of the first applicant to that stored in a database of DNA from unidentified bodies. No matches were found. 47. On 21 February the investigation was suspended again. There is no information about further developments in the proceedings. 48. On 27 December 2010 the applicants complained to the Shali Town Court of the decision of 19 April 2008 to suspend the proceedings and of the investigators’ failure to take all necessary investigative steps. 49. On 24 January 2011 the court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the investigation had already been resumed on 20 January 2011. 50. On 28 January 2011 the applicants appealed. They complained that the investigators’ failure to act in a timely manner had not been examined by the district court, and that the court hearing had been held in their absence. 51. On 6 April 2011 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic quashed the decision of 24 January 2011 for technical reasons and then terminated the examination of the appeal. 52. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Vakha Nauzov, who was born in 1974. The first applicant is his mother, the second applicant is his wife, and the third, fourth and fifth applicants are his children. 53. On 6 June 2003 the Russian Parliament announced amnesty for illegal combatants involved in the armed conflict in Chechnya who voluntarily stopped their activities and surrendered their weapons. 54. At the beginning of June 2003 Mr Vakha Nauzov and Mr U.M. surrendered their weapons to the Gudermes department of the FSB and were pardoned. A few days later both men were hired by the security service of the Head of Administration of the Chechen President. They worked in the village of Novoe Gordali, Chechnya. 55. On 20 June 2003 Mr Vakha Nauzov and Mr U.M. drove to work in a silver-blue VAZ-2106 car with registration plate no. 173-05. At 11 a.m. they were stopped at checkpoint no. 75 on a highway near the village of Druzhba. Fellow villagers who were passing the checkpoint in a minibus at the time, including Ms A.E. and Ms D.Kh., saw that several servicemen had surrounded Mr Vakha Nauzov and Mr U.M., while others were searching their car. Some of the witnesses, whose identities the applicants did not disclose before the Court, heard Mr Vakha Nauzov shouting that his boss should be informed that they were being taken away. 56. On 22 June and then again on 6 August 2003 the applicants complained of the abduction to the Gudermes prosecutor and the Gudermes ROVD in Chechnya. In the complaint to the prosecutor, the applicants alleged that Mr Vakha Nauzov had been apprehended at a checkpoint in the eastern part of Gudermes. 57. On an unspecified date police officers from the Gudermes ROVD questioned the servicemen who had been manning checkpoint no. 75. They denied arresting Mr Vakha Nauzov. 58. On 6 August 2003 the Gudermes ROVD refused to institute an investigation into the abduction, for lack of evidence of a criminal offence. 59. On 19 July 2004 the Gudermes prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that the Gudermes ROVD had opened search case no. 063043 to establish their relative’s whereabouts. 60. On 15 July 2005 the Gudermes prosecutor’s office overruled the refusal to open a criminal case of 6 August 2003 and ordered the Gudermes ROVD to carry out further examination of the abduction complaint. 61. On 4 August 2005 the Gudermes ROVD again refused to open a criminal case. On 31 October the Gudermes prosecutor overruled the refusal and ordered the ROVD to examine the complaint once again. 62. On 31 November 2005 the Gudermes prosecutor opened criminal case no. 45129 under Article 105 of the CC (murder) in respect of the abduction of Mr Vakha Nauzov and Mr U.M. 63. On 31 December 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 64. On 18 September 2007 the first applicant asked the investigators to provide her with a copy of their decision to grant her victim status. It appears that no response followed. 65. On 24 October 2007 the first applicant requested that the investigators resume the proceedings and grant her victim status. 66. On 19 November 2007 the proceedings were resumed and on 13 December 2007 the first applicant was granted victim status. Six days later the proceedings were suspended again. 67. On 2 July 2008 and 13 April 2009 the applicants contacted the Chechen President and the head of the Chechen Parliament’s committee for the search for missing persons respectively, asking for their assistance in the search for their missing relative. Their requests were forwarded to the investigating authorities, which informed the applicants that the criminal proceedings were still ongoing. 68. On 21 April 2010 the second applicant requested that the investigators grant her victim status. The next day her request was granted. It appears that the investigation was not formally resumed at that time. 69. On 12 January 2011 the first applicant asked the Chechen prosecutor to establish her son’s whereabouts and find the culprits. On 31 January 2011 she was informed that her request had been forwarded to the Gudermes prosecutor. 70. On 14 February 2011 the first applicant asked to be updated on the progress of the investigation and to be allowed to access the criminal case file. Four days later she was given access to a few documents from the file. 71. On 11 June 2011 the first applicant again requested access to the case file. On 30 June 2011 the investigators dismissed the request on the grounds that the same request had already been granted. 72. Subsequently, the proceedings were resumed on 31 October 2011 and on 6 July 2012, and then suspended on 30 November 2011 and 6 August 2012 respectively. No tangible results have been achieved in the meantime. There is no information about further developments in the case. 73. The first applicant was the mother of Mr Supyan (also spelled as Supiyan) Mukayev, who was born in 1982. She died on 30 November 2013. The second applicant is the father of Mr Supyan Mukayev. The third applicant is the latter’s brother. 74. At about 3 p.m. on 15 March 2005 Mr Supyan Mukayev and his acquaintance Mr M.Kh. were standing on Groznenskaya Street, across from the Bass petrol station in the village of Shali, when a group of about ten armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms approached them and ordered them to put their hands up. They then forced Mr Supyan Mukayevwas and Mr M.Kh into two separate vehicles, a VAZ-2199 car and a UAZ minivan, parked nearby and drove them off in the direction of Grozny, passing freely through military checkpoints on their way. The abduction was witnessed by several persons. 75. Shortly thereafter the street was cordoned off by the Vostok-2 battalion of the Russian Defence Ministry. Military vehicles such as APCs and UAZs patrolled the town, while servicemen searched the premises of the local telecommunication agency. 76. The first applicant, together with other town residents, approached the Shali military commander and asked him for an explanation as to what had happened to Mr Supyan Mukayev and Mr M.Kh. In reply, the officer told her that her son was an informant for illegal armed groups operating in Chechnya. 77. On the next day, 16 March 2005, the servicemen took Mr M.Kh. to the town of Gudermes and released him there. 78. At some point after the abduction, the first applicant went to the Shali local administration and spoke to its deputy head, who told her that her son had been arrested by servicemen from the Vostok-2 battalion and had then been detained in Gudermes. 79. Immediately after the abduction the applicants informed the authorities of what had happened and requested that a criminal case be opened. 80. On 7 July 2005 the Shali district prosecutor in Chechnya opened criminal case no. 46073 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 81. On the same day the prosecutor contacted various law-enforcement authorities in order to check if Mr Supyan Mukayev had been arrested and placed in custody. The respondent authorities stated that they had no information in that regard. 82. The next day, 8 July 2005, the first applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. Subsequently, the second applicant was granted victim status on 27 April 2011. 83. On an unspecified date in September 2005 the investigators obtained a copy of a report of 16 March 2005 prepared by the Shali district military commander and addressed to the Chechnya military commander. According to that document, there had been activity aimed at cordoning off the local telecommunication agency in Shali on 15 March 2005. During that operation two village residents, Mr Supyan Mukayev and Mr M.Kh had been arrested. Mr Supyan Mukayev had been arrested on suspicion of having been a messenger for Mr P.Ch. After that, servicemen of the Vostok battalion had taken him in the direction of Mesker-Yurt village. Another village resident, Mr M.Kh., had been released following an inquiry. 84. On 13 September 2005 the investigators questioned Mr M.Kh. He explained that he had been apprehended in Shali and released a day later in Gudermes. He had been blindfolded and therefore unable to see the abductors or the place where he had been detained. During subsequent questioning, on 2 February 2007 he stated that the perpetrators had been State agents. 85. On 7 October 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. Subsequently, it was resumed on 15 March and 17 July 2006, 16 January and 14 March 2007, 25 April 2011, and 9 July 2012, and then suspended on 15 April and 27 August 2006, 27 February and 15 April 2007, and 9 August 2012 respectively. 86. In the meantime, on 10 April 2006 the investigators had questioned the deputy head of the Shali local administration. He confirmed that he had spoken with the first applicant about Mr Supyan Mukayev’s abduction, but denied making any references to the Vostok-2 battalion. According to him, at that time he had had only some unverified information that Mr Supyan Mukayev had been apprehended by servicemen. 87. In February 2007 the investigators questioned several persons who worked at the Bass petrol station and had witnessed the abduction. Their statements were similar to the applicants’ account of the events. 88. On 14 January 2009 the first applicant asked the Chechen Parliament’s committee for the search for missing persons to assist in the search for her son. Her request was forwarded to the investigators, who replied on 1 June 2009 that the proceedings had been suspended, but the search was still under way. 89. In May or June 2011 the investigators obtained a DNA sample from the second applicant and then compared it to those stored in the database of DNA from unidentified bodies. No matches were found. 90. There is no information about further developments in the proceedings. 91. The first and second applicants are the parents of Mr Rustam Gaysumov, who was born in 1980. The third applicant is his wife and the fourth and fifth applicants are his children. The sixth and seventh applicants are the parents of Mr Khuseyn Elderkhanov, who was born in 1980. 92. On 8 November 2006 the police conducted a special operation in Druzhby Narodov Square in Grozny. The area was intensively patrolled by a large number of armed servicemen in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms. 93. On the same date, in the morning, Mr Rustam Gaysumov and Mr Khuseyn Elderkhanov, both of whom were former members of illegal armed groups in Chechnya, went to Grozny on business. At about 1 p.m. the police stopped their car for an identity check in Druzhby Narodov Square, then arrested them and took them away to an unknown destination. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 94. The applicants submitted written statements from Ms M.E., who worked at a kiosk located in Druzhby Narodov Square, and Ms Sh.N. Both were eyewitnesses to the abduction. Ms M.E. submitted that on 8 November 2006 she had seen servicemen in uniforms and balaclavas armed with automatic weapons. They had conducted a special operation. At around 2 p.m. they had stopped a car with two persons, allegedly Mr Rustam Gaysumov and Mr Khuseyn Elderkhanov. Shortly thereafter, one of them had gone to Ms M.E.’s kiosk to buy a blank authorisation form for driving a car and had told her that he was from the Achkhoy-Martan District. Then he had returned to his car. Immediately after that the servicemen had forced Mr Gaysumov and Mr Elderkhanov into a Niva car and driven off. Ms Sh.N. gave a similar statement. She added that there had been forty to fifty servicemen in the square and the Niva car had been followed by two to three UAZ vehicles. 95. On 10 November 2006 some of the applicants informed the Leninskiy district prosecutor in Grozny of the abduction and requested assistance in the search for their relatives. Between November and January 2007 the applicants forwarded similar requests to a number of other law-enforcement agencies. 96. The Zavodskoy district prosecutor in Grozny carried out a preliminary inquiry into the incident. In particular, he obtained “operative information” that Mr Gaysumov and Mr Elderkhanov had been apprehended by “unidentified staff members of the Chechen law‑enforcement agencies” and had been released later. Apparently, keeping this in mind, on 28 December 2006 the prosecutor refused to open a criminal case. 97. It appears that at some point later that decision was overruled and on 27 January 2007 the Zavodskoy district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 11006 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 98. On 31 January and 3 March 2007 the first and seventh applicants respectively were granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 99. On 13 March 2007 the investigators questioned Ms M.E., the lady who worked at the kiosk in Druzhby Narodov Square. She stated that on 8 November 2006 when servicemen had been conducting a special operation in the square, one of them had come to her kiosk to buy a blank authorisation form for driving a car. She had had a limited view from the kiosk’s window, and therefore could not see what had happened thereafter. According to the applicants, Ms M.E. was afraid to tell the investigators about the abduction she had witnessed. 100. On 27 March 2007 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 101. On 26 June 2007 the proceedings were resumed and on 17 August 2007 suspended again. 102. In 2008 the applicants contacted various authorities, including the Chechen Government and the Chechen President, seeking their assistance in the search for their missing relatives. Their enquiries were forwarded to the investigators, who informed them that the proceedings had been suspended. 103. On 22 November 2010 the investigators resumed the proceedings and questioned relatives of Mr Gaysumov and Mr Elderkhanov. 104. On 2 December 2010 the first applicant asked the investigators about progress and applied for victim status in the proceedings. Ten days later he was informed that on 12 December 2010 the proceedings had been suspended. 105. On 3 March 2011 the seventh applicant also requested information about the investigation’s progress and access to the case file. The outcome of that request is unknown. 106. Subsequently, the proceedings were resumed on 17 May and 16 November 2011 and 28 February 2014, and were then suspended on 6 June and 21 December 2011 and 19 March 2014 respectively. There is no information about further developments in the proceedings. 107. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Alikhan Satuyev, who was born in 1975. The first, third and fourth applicants are his siblings and the second applicant is his mother. 108. At 4 a.m. on 14 June 2003 twelve to fifteen armed servicemen in balaclavas and camouflage uniforms arrived in a white Niva car and armoured UAZ vehicles without registration plates at Mr Alikhan Satuyev’s flat in Grozny. Some of them surrounded the block of flats, while others broke into the flat, handcuffed Mr Satuyev and took him away to an unknown location. 109. Mr S. Kham., the uncle of Mr Alikhan Satuyev, who was working as a judge at the time, found out that Alikhan Satuyev had been taken to the Oktyabrskiy temporary district department of the interior (“the Oktyabrskiy VOVD”) by the head of its criminal search department. In a private conversation with the latter, he was told that Alikhan Stauyev had been released on the same day, shortly after his arrest. 110. On 14 June 2003 the wife of Mr Alikhan Satuyev, Ms L.U., complained of the abduction to the Zavodskoy district department of the interior in Grozny (“the ROVD”). On the same day the investigators questioned Mr A.D., Mr Satuyev’s neighbour. His submission was similar to those made by the applicants before the Court. Two days later, Ms L.U.’s abduction complaint was forwarded to the Zavodskoy district prosecutor. On 24 June 2003 the latter opened criminal case no. 30097 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 111. On 2 July 2003 the investigators questioned Mr M.B., who stated that on the night of 12-13 June 2003 police officers from the Oktyabrskiy VOVD had apprehended him and taken him to the police station, where they had asked him about Mr Alikhan Satuyev. The police officers had then taken him to the centre of Grozny, where he had shown them where Mr Satuyev’s flat was located. 112. Later in July 2003 the investigators questioned several officials from the Oktyabrskiy VOVD. The copies of their statements as submitted by the Government were illegible. As far as could be seen from one of them, Mr A.T., the head of the Oktyabrskiy VOVD, spoke with Mr Satuyev’s uncle, Judge S. Kham., and then with Officer N.S. following the judge’s enquiry into the fate of his nephew. The officer informed him that Mr Satuyev had been arrested and apparently released afterwards. 113. In the period August-September 2003 the investigators attempted to question Officer N.S., but failed to locate him. 114. On 24 September 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 115. On 22 January 2004 the proceedings were resumed. By 20 February 2004 the investigators had obtained the names or nicknames of five officers from the Oktyabrskiy VOVD who had allegedly been involved in the events of 14 June 2003. They asked the Oktyabrskiy VOVD to inform them about the officers’ whereabouts. 116. On 28 February 2004 the investigators initiated the search for Officer N.S. and suspended the criminal proceedings into the abduction. 117. On 26 March 2004 the proceedings were resumed. 118. On 28 April 2004 the Oktyabrskiy VOVD informed the investigators that certain persons from the list of alleged perpetrators had left the police owing to the expiration of their employment contracts. The Oktyabrskiy VOVD did not have information about the identity of the officers whose nicknames had been specified by the investigators in their request. 119. On 14 April 2004 the investigators questioned Officer M.A., who confirmed that on 14 June 2003 he had participated in a special operation under Officer N.S.’s command. In particular, he had cordoned off the area near a block of flats where the arrested person had lived. Officer M.A. did not know that person’s name. 120. On 26 May 2004 the investigators suspended the proceedings. 121. On 26 January 2005 the above decision was overruled by the Chechnya deputy prosecutor, who ordered that the proceedings be resumed. 122. On 16 February 2005 Ms L.U. was granted victim status in the proceedings. 123. On 8 March 2005 the proceedings were suspended. They were subsequently resumed on 10 January 2006, 20 April 2007, 20 September 2011, and then suspended on 14 January and 23 May 2007 and 20 October 2011 respectively. In the meantime, the applicants contacted various authorities, seeking their assistance in the search for their missing relative. 124. On 15 May 2009 the second applicant enquired about the progress of the investigation. On 15 May 2009 the investigators replied to her, stating that the proceedings had been suspended, but operative search measures were ongoing. 125. On 5 October 2011 the second applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. There is no information about further progress in the case. 126. On 12 August 2011 the second applicant complained to the Zavodskoy District Court in Grozny about the investigators’ decision to suspend the criminal proceedings. On 20 September 2011 the court dismissed the complaint, as the investigation had already been resumed. 127. On 8 January 2013 the second applicant lodged a civil claim with the Leninskiy District Court in Grozny, seeking compensation in the amount of 3,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB – approximately 75,100 euros (EUR)) for non-pecuniary damage caused by the abduction of her son. 128. On 21 March 2013 the Leninskiy District Court granted the claim in part, awarding the second applicant RUB 500,000 (approximately EUR 12,500). 129. On 2 July 2003 the Chechen Supreme Court quashed the above judgment on appeal and dismissed the second applicant’s claim in full, on the grounds of lack of evidence of State agents’ involvement in the abduction. 130. The first applicant is the wife of Mr Vakhab Abubakarov, who was born in 1957. The second and third applicants are his children. 131. At about 4 a.m. on 26 November 2002 several servicemen in camouflage uniforms broke into the applicants’ house in Argun, Chechnya. Speaking unaccented Russian, they asked the members of the applicants’ family to show their identity documents. They then searched the house, took Mr Vakhab Abubakarov outside, and locked the applicants in the house. The applicants’ neighbours heard an APC moving around in the vicinity of their house. 132. On 26 November 2002 the first applicant complained to the local police of Vakhab Abubakarov’s abduction. 133. On 28 November 2002 the Argun prosecutor opened criminal case no. 78101 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 134. In November 2002 the investigators contacted various civilian and military authorities to check if Mr Vakhab Abubakarov had been apprehended in the course of a special operation and placed in custody. The respondent authorities had no information about his arrest or detention. 135. On 4 December 2002 the investigators questioned the members of Mr Abubakarov’s family who had been in the house at the time of his abduction. Their statements were similar to those which they made before the Court. On the same date the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 136. On 28 January 2003 the investigators suspended the proceedings for failure to identify the perpetrators. 137. On 4 September 2004 the proceedings were resumed. Two days later the investigators examined the crime scene. 138. On 4 October 2004 they suspended the proceedings again. 139. On 22 November 2004 the Shali Town Court declared Mr Vakhab Abubakarov a missing person. 140. On 4 May 2006 the NGO Memorial enquired about progress in the proceedings on the first applicant’s behalf. By a letter dated 2 June 2006, they were informed that the proceedings had been suspended, but operative search measures were being implemented. 141. On an unspecified date in early 2009 the first applicant asked the investigators to allow her to access the case file. On 6 March 2009 the request was granted. 142. On 25 May 2009 the first applicant contacted the Chechen Parliament’s committee for the search for missing persons, seeking its assistance in the search for her husband. Her request was then forwarded to the investigators, who informed her on 21 June 2009 that the criminal proceedings into the events of 26 November 2002 had been suspended. 143. On 5 March 2010 the first applicant requested that the investigation be resumed and that she be granted access to the investigation file. On an unspecified date the investigators replied that the case file had been sent to the Investigative Committee for examination. 144. On 28 June 2010 the investigation was resumed. It was subsequently suspended on 28 July 2010, then resumed again on 18 August 2010, and suspended one more time on 18 September 2010. 145. On various dates in July 2010 the investigators questioned several neighbours of the applicants who had heard about the abduction, but had not witnessed it. On 23 July 2010 the investigators obtained a DNA sample from the first applicant. They compared it to the ones in the database of DNA from unidentified bodies, but did not find any matches. 146. In late 2010 the NGO Materi Chechni asked a member of the Russian Parliament to assist in search for Mr Abubakarov. The first applicant’s inquiry was forwarded to the investigators, who replied on 3 November 2010 that the proceedings had been suspended on 18 September 2010. 147. There is no information about further progress in the investigation. 148. On 10 June 2010 the applicants complained to the Shali District Court of the investigators’ failure to investigate the case thoroughly and about their decision to suspend the proceedings on 4 October 2004. 149. On 29 June 2010 the applicants’ complaint was dismissed on account of the investigation being resumed on 28 June 2010. 150. The applicants appealed, but to no avail. The Chechen Supreme Court dismissed their appeal on 15 September 2010. 151. The applicant is the mother of Mr Lema (also known as Lom-Ali and also spelled as Lyoma in the documents submitted) Magomadov, who was born in 1981. 152. On the night of 13-14 November 2002 the applicant and her son, Mr Magomadov, were at home in Grozny when about a hundred armed men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived at the entrance of their house. They had automatic weapons, helmets and portable radio sets. Shortly thereafter a group of the intruders forced the door and broke into the house. Having searched its premises, they beat Mr Magomadov and then dragged him away, barefoot and undressed. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses, including the neighbours. 153. On the morning of 14 November 2002 the applicant’s neighbours examined the area. Along with numerous shoeprints left on the ground, they found prints left by bare feet, presumably those of Mr Magomadov, who had been taken away on foot. Having followed the trail, the neighbours arrived at a checkpoint, where they discovered tyre tracks left by an APC. The neighbours learnt from officers who had been manning the checkpoint on the night of the abduction that an APC had indeed parked at the checkpoint during the night, and at some point a group of military servicemen had arrived with a young man, barefoot and undressed, had put him into the APC and had driven off. 154. On 14 November 2002 the applicant informed the authorities of the abduction and requested their assistance in the search for her son. 155. The next day the Grozny town prosecutor opened criminal case no. 48212 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 156. On the same day, 15 November 2002, the investigators examined the crime scene at the applicant’s house. No evidence was collected. 157. On 7 January 2003 the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings and questioned. Her statement was similar to the account of the events submitted to the Court. 158. On 15 January 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was then resumed on 26 May 2004 to question the applicant’s neighbours and “intensify operative search measures”. 159. In early June 2004 the investigators questioned several neighbours who had not seen the abduction, but had heard about it from the applicant and other village residents. 160. On 25 June 2004 the investigation was suspended. 161. On 16 and 25 June 2005, 15 September 2008 and 20 April 2009 the applicant contacted the Grozny town prosecutor, the Chechen Parliament, the Russian Investigative Committee and the head of the Chechen Parliament, seeking their assistance in the search for her son. The authorities forwarded her letters to the investigators, who informed her by letters of 18 August 2005, 14 October 2008 and 23 May 2009 that the proceedings had been suspended, but operative search measures were being implemented. 162. Between May and June 2004 and again in July 2007 the investigators asked a number of authorities to provide them with any information about Mr Magomadov’s whereabouts. They also enquired whether a special operation had been conducted in Grozny on the night of his abduction. No reply in the affirmative followed. 163. On 4 June 2010 the investigators resumed the proceedings. Several days later they questioned the applicant again. She confirmed her previous statement. A month later, on 4 July 2010 the proceedings were suspended. 164. On 27 August 2011 the applicant asked the investigators about developments in the case and asked them to allow her to access the case file documents. On 15 September 2011 her application was granted. She was also informed that the proceedings had been suspended, but operative search measures were being implemented. 165. There is no information about further developments in the case. 166. On an unspecified date in 2010 the applicant complained to the Leninskiy District Court in Grozny of the investigators’ failure to take basic steps to find her son. 167. On 11 February 2010 the court dismissed her complaint as ill‑founded. 168. The applicant is the mother of Mr Zelimkhan Dutayev, who was born in 1980. 169. At the material time, Mr Zelimkhan Dutayev was staying in Grozny on business. He was residing in a flat belonging to his acquaintances, Ilyas and Isa Yansuyev. 170. At about 4 or 5 a.m. on 13 February 2003 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas arrived at the Yansuyevs’ block of flats in two APCs, apprehended Mr Zelimkhan Dutayev, Mr Ilyas Yansuyev and Mr Isa Yansuyev, and drove them off to an unknown destination. 171. The circumstances of the abduction are described in detail in the application lodged by relatives of the Yansuyev brothers: Sasita Israilova and Others v. Russia, no. 35079/04, §§ 9-15, 28 October 2010. 172. On 13 February 2003 the applicant complained of the abduction to the Leninskiy District military commander. The family of Mr Ilyas Yansuyev and Mr Isa Yansuyev joined the complaint. 173. The next day investigators from the Leninskiy district department of the interior examined the crime scene. They found a bloodstain and collected a sample from it. 174. On 17 May 2003 the Grozny town prosecutor opened criminal case no. 20039 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 175. The course of the investigation, from its beginning until 14 April 2009, is described in Sasita Israilova, cited above, §§ 20-78. 176. On 14 April 2009 the criminal proceedings were resumed. On various dates in April and May the investigators questioned relatives of the abducted persons and their neighbours, all of whom repeated their statements which they had given to the investigators before. On 18 May 2009 an expert examined the blood sample collected on 14 February 2003 and concluded that it had rotted owing to the wrong packaging being used and was not usable. Three days later the proceedings were suspended. 177. On 22 February 2012 the NGO Materi Chechni contacted the head of the Chechen Parliament’s committee for the search for missing persons on the applicant’s behalf, seeking assistance in the search for Mr Zelimkhan Dutayev. The head of the committee asked the investigators to inform him about the course of the proceedings. On 14 April 2012 the investigators replied that the proceedings had been stayed, but operative search activity was under way. 178. On 5 April 2012 the applicant asked the investigators to inform her of the progress made and to allow her to access the case file. On 17 April 2012 the request was granted. 179. On 17 July 2014 the investigators resumed the proceedings and five days later obtained the applicant’s DNA sample to compare it to the ones in the database of DNA from unidentified bodies. No matches were found. 180. On 6 August 2014 the proceedings were suspended again. There is no information about further developments. 181. The first applicant is the wife of Mr Islam Asukhanov, who was born in 1968. The second, third and fourth applicants are his children. 182. At about 3 a.m. on 30 May 2003 several armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas broke into the applicants’ house in the village of Goyty, Chechnya, searched it, and took Mr Islam Asukhanov to an unknown destination. 183. On 30 May 2003 the applicants complained of the abduction to the Urus‑Martan district department of the interior (“the Urus‑Martan ROVD”). On the same day the investigators examined the crime scene and collected some fingerprints. 184. The next day the first applicant lodged an abduction complaint with the Chechnya prosecutor. She stated that Mr Islam Asukhanov had been abducted by a group of fifteen persons in camouflage uniforms. Some of them had cordoned off the house, while others had climbed over the fence and entered the premises. They had forced her husband into a white VAZ car and driven off to an unknown destination. After the abduction she had contacted servicemen who were manning the checkpoint at the entrance of Goyty. The servicemen had told her that two APCs and two cars had driven into Goyty at around 2 a.m. and had left the village thirty minutes later. They had headed to the village of Atagy. 185. On an unspecified date the first applicant’s complaints were forwarded to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor. On 6 June 2003 the latter sent several requests to law-enforcement authorities, military authorities and the FSB in the Urus-Martan district to check if Mr Islam Asukhanov had been apprehended during a special operation. The replies received were all in the negative. 186. On 14 June 2003 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor opened criminal case no. 34064 under Article 126 of the CC (abduction). 187. On 14 August 2003 the investigators suspended the proceedings for failure to identify the perpetrators. 188. On 13 June 2006 the above decision was overruled as premature and the proceedings were resumed. 189. On 10 July 2006 the investigators questioned the applicant’s neighbour, Ms R.U. She stated that on the night of 30 May 2003 she had seen a white VAZ vehicle on the street. The next morning the first applicant had told her that her husband, Mr Islam Asukhanov, had been abducted. 190. On 12 July 2006 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She stated, among other things, that the abductors had spoken unaccented Russian and had been armed with automatic weapons. 191. The next day the investigation was suspended. 192. On 5 August 2009 the first applicant requested that the investigation be resumed and that she be allowed to access the case file. Six days later she was allowed to access some of the case file documents. The remainder of her request was dismissed. 193. On 23 June 2011 the first applicant asked the investigators to resume the proceedings and question several witnesses to the abduction. 194. On 27 June 2011 the investigators resumed the proceedings to question the witnesses mentioned by the first applicant. However, the investigators questioned none of them and on 1 July 2011 they suspended the proceedings again. 195. On 13 April 2012 the first applicant asked the investigators to provide an update about new developments in the proceedings. On 24 April 2012 she was informed that the proceedings in the case had been suspended. 196. Subsequently, the proceedings were resumed on 12 June and 18 September 2012, 30 May and 1 August 2014, and then suspended on 22 June and 28 September 2012, 6 July 2014 and 7 August 2014 respectively. 197. On 20 June 2014 the investigators questioned several neighbours of the applicants, none of whom had seen the abduction, but had heard about it from the applicant. 198. There is no information about further developments in the proceedings. 199. On 16 September 2010 the first applicant complained to the Achkhoy-Martan District Court, challenging the investigators’ refusal of 5 August 2009 to provide her with access to the entire case file and resume the proceedings. The complaint was allowed on 27 September 2010. 200. In June 2012, in two separate sets of proceedings, the first applicant challenged the investigators’ decisions of 1 July 2011 and 22 June 2012 to suspend the investigation before the Urus‑Martan Town Court. 201. On 15 June and 21 September 2012 respectively the court dismissed the challenges on the grounds that the proceedings had already been resumed. 202. On 28 September 2012 the first applicant appealed to the Chechnya Supreme Court against the second decision, and on 17 October 2012 the court upheld it.

6. The applicants were born in 1973 and 1970 respectively, and live in Odessa. They are a married couple. 7. At the time of the events the first applicant was an accountant in a private food-processing company (“company Y.”). Her mother, N., was its director and owner. The second applicant was a private entrepreneur supplying company Y. with raw materials in exchange for processed foodstuffs. 8. On 23 July 2001 the Odessa Prymorskyy district prosecutor’s office (“the Prymorskyy prosecutor’s office”) opened a criminal case against the officials of company Y. on suspicion of forgery of quality certificates for the company’s goods. 9. On the following day the police conducted a search on the company’s premises, as a result of which they seized a considerable volume of foodstuffs belonging to the second applicant. 10. There was an altercation between the first applicant and the police: she attempted to leave, but several officers stopped her when she was already in her car, dragged her out and handcuffed her (see paragraphs 16, 31, 35 and 38 below for additional factual details). As the first applicant lost control of her vehicle, it collided with a car parked nearby, which belonged to a private person, G. 11. On 24 May 2002 the Odessa Prymorskyy District Court (“the Prymorskyy Court”) quashed the prosecutor’s decision of 23 July 2001 (see paragraph 8 above) as unlawful. 12. On 24 July 2001 N. (the first applicant’s mother and the director of company Y. – see paragraph 7 above) complained to the Prymorskyy prosecutor’s office about the events of 24 July 2001. She submitted in particular that the first applicant had been beaten by the police. 13. On the following day N. sent a similar complaint to the city and regional prosecuting authorities, as well as the Prosecutor General’s Office. 14. On 30 July 2001 the first applicant complained to the Prymorskyy Court about her alleged ill-treatment on 24 July 2001 at the time of her arrest. She asked the court to declare the officers’ actions unlawful and to oblige them to make a public apology to her. 15. On 6 December 2001 the Prymorskyy Court forwarded the above complaint to the Odessa Suvorivskyy district prosecutor’s office (“the Suvorivskyy prosecutor’s office”) for investigation. 16. On 20 December 2001 the Suvorivskyy prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers for lack of the constituent elements of a criminal offence in their actions. The prosecutor gave the following reasons for that decision. The first applicant had arrived at company Y. during the police search and had tried to leave the premises before the search had been completed. She had “deliberately inflicted minor bodily injuries on [two police officers] who had tried to stop her illegal actions”. Furthermore, a medical examination of the first applicant of 25 July 2001 had documented in particular an abrasion below her right eye, a bruise on her chest and a bruise on her left thigh. However, “she had sustained those injuries in circumstances which [she was] concealing”. The first applicant had also had bruises on her wrists and arms. Those had resulted from her forceful removal from the car and her subsequent handcuffing, both of which were deemed to be legitimate restraint measures. The prosecutor observed that the first applicant’s arrest by the police and the events thereafter had been video recorded, and that the videotape confirmed the police officers’ account. 17. On 26 December 2001 the first applicant received a copy of the above ruling. 18. She challenged the ruling before the Odessa Suvorivskyy District Court (“the Suvorivskyy Court”). As confirmed by a postal receipt, the first applicant sent the above complaint on 3 January 2002 and the court received it on 4 January 2002. 19. On 10 January 2002 the Suvorivskyy Court dismissed the first applicant’s complaint without examining it on the grounds that it had been introduced out of time. According to the court’s ruling, she had lodged it on 9 January 2002[1], whereas she had had to do so within seven days of 26 December 2001. 20. On 21 January 2002 the first applicant appealed against the above ruling to the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal. She submitted that the correct date on which she had lodged her complaint was 3 January 2002[2] and she had not missed the seven-day time-limit, given that there had been official holidays during which neither the post office nor the court had been open. 21. On 27 February 2004 the first applicant enquired with the Suvorivskyy Court about the progress of her appeal. In accordance with the relevant procedure, she had submitted the appeal via the court’s registry and the registry had been responsible for forwarding it to the appellate court. 22. On 1 April 2004 the President of the Suvorivskyy Court replied to the first applicant that her appeal had indeed been received on 21 January 2002. However, the clerk who had registered it had been dismissed in February 2003. At the time of writing, there were no records of the first applicant’s appeal in the court’s information system. 23. On 7 July 2004 the first applicant asked the Suvorivskyy Court to restore the proceedings concerning her appeal of 21 January 2002 which had apparently been mislaid. She received the reply that such an action was impossible, given that there was no appeal before the court. 24. On 26 April 2005 the first applicant again challenged the prosecutor’s ruling of 20 December 2001 before the Suvorivskyy Court. 25. The case file does not contain any further information in that regard. 26. On 19 September 2001 criminal proceedings were instituted against the first applicant on suspicion of having inflicted minor bodily injuries on the police officers. 27. On 3 December 2001 an obligation not to leave her town of residence was imposed on the first applicant as a preventive measure pending her trial. 28. On 7 March 2002 the investigator rejected a request by the first applicant for a forensic medical examination to establish the seriousness of her injuries sustained on 24 July 2001. The reason for the rejection was that on 20 December 2001 the prosecutor had refused to institute criminal proceedings regarding the matter (see paragraph 16 above). 29. On 11 March 2002 the pre-trial investigation was completed and the case was referred to court for trial. 30. The Suvorivskyy Court adjourned hearings on several occasions owing to the absence of the first applicant and the absence of the victims and witnesses. One of the adjournments, which lasted almost eight months, was at the first applicant’s request, because she was pregnant. 31. On 17 September 2004 the Suvorivskyy Court found the first applicant guilty of deliberately inflicting minor bodily injuries on law‑enforcement officials and sentenced her to one year’s imprisonment, suspended for one year. The court relied in particular on the videotape of the events of 24 July 2001, as well as reports on the officers’ medical examination of 25 July 2001 which documented the injuries which they had possibly sustained a day earlier. One of them had a bite wound on his right wrist possibly originating from a human bite, and an abrasion on his right hand that might have resulted from scratching by handcuffs. Another officer had abrasions on his face and right arm possibly resulting from being scratched with fingernails. The preventive measure in respect of the first applicant – the obligation not to leave town – remained the same. 32. The first applicant appealed. She submitted in particular that the trial court had failed to examine her own allegation of ill-treatment by the police. She noted in that regard that, as shown on the videotape, at 2.30 p.m. she had had no visible injuries, whereas at 4.10 p.m. on that day there had been a bruise below her eye. 33. On 23 September 2004 the President of the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal acknowledged the excessive length of the criminal proceedings against the first applicant in a letter sent to her following her complaints in that regard. The letter stated that the judge of the first-instance court who was dealing with her case had been disciplined in that regard. 34. On 25 November 2004 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 17 September 2004 (see paragraph 31 above) and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination. 35. On 28 July 2005 the Suvorivskyy Court acquitted the first applicant. It held that, as indicated by the case-file material, the search conducted on company Y.’s premises on 24 July 2001 had been unlawful (see paragraph 11 above). Furthermore, the police officers involved had been wearing plain clothes. Accordingly, the first applicant’s actions had been legitimate and had aimed to protect her property and reputation. The court also lifted the preventive measure in respect of the first applicant. 36. On 13 December 2005 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the prosecutor and quashed the judgment of 28 July 2005, remitting the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination. 37. On 18 January 2006 the Suvorivskyy Court started a retrial. 38. On 10 October 2008 the Suvorivskyy Court acquitted the first applicant once again and lifted her obligation not to leave town. The Suvorivskyy Court’s reasoning was similar to that in its decision of 28 July 2005. It further stated that the police officers had had no order to prevent anybody from leaving the company’s premises and that their violence towards the first applicant had been unlawful and arbitrary. 39. On the same day the Suvorivskyy Court also delivered a separate ruling stating that there had been a number of violations of the domestic legislation and the Convention in the criminal proceedings against the first applicant. The case file before the Court does not contain a copy of that ruling. 40. On 10 February 2009 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 10 October 2008 and the separate ruling. 41. On 19 January 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions in the retrial proceedings. 42. On 4 September 2001 G., with whose car the first applicant’s car had collided on 24 July 2001 (see paragraph 10 above), lodged a civil claim for damages against the first applicant. 43. On three occasions the appellate court remitted the case to the first‑instance court for fresh examination. In the fourth round of the proceedings, on 2 December 2008, the Suvorivskyy Court allowed G.’s claim in part, awarding her an amount corresponding to 420 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and about EUR 50 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be paid by the first applicant. 44. On 24 February and 7 May 2009 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court respectively upheld that judgment. 45. After the seizure of the foodstuffs on 24 July 2001, the prosecuting authorities transferred them to a private company, D. (“company D.”), for storage purposes. 46. Following several unsuccessful complaints to the prosecuting authorities in respect of the search and seizure, on an unspecified date the second applicant brought a commercial claim against company D., seeking the return of his property, as well as compensation for lost profit. 47. On 18 January 2002 the Odessa Regional Commercial Court allowed his claim in part and ordered company D., which did not dispute having received the foodstuffs, to return the second applicant’s property to him. However, as the bailiff was unable to find any such property at the premises of company D., on 14 February 2002 the same court changed the mode of enforcement in respect of its judgment and ordered the company to pay the second applicant 102,535 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – about EUR 22,000 at the time). 48. On 15 April 2002 the Odessa Commercial Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the defendant in part and deleted certain foodstuffs from a list referred to in the judgment of 18 January 2002. Apparently, the appellate court was not aware of the ruling of 14 February 2002. 49. On 29 May 2002 the Higher Commercial Court quashed the lower courts’ decisions and rejected the second applicant’s claim. 50. On 18 June 2002 the second applicant applied to the Higher Commercial Court for a review of its ruling of 29 May 2002 on the basis of newly discovered circumstances, namely the Prymorskyy Court’s decision of 24 May 2002 recognising that the criminal investigation against the company Y. officials had been unlawful (see paragraph 11 above). The Higher Commercial Court referred that application to the Odessa Commercial Court of Appeal for examination. 51. On 25 November 2002 the Odessa Commercial Court of Appeal quashed the Higher Commercial Court’s ruling of 29 May 2002. It held that the impugned seizure had taken place within the criminal proceedings, whose institution had been recognised as unlawful. Furthermore, the police had had no procedural documents authorising them to seize the goods in question. It had also been established that the withheld property had never been used as material evidence in criminal proceedings; nor had the assets been frozen or transferred to company D. to secure a civil claim. Lastly, the court stated that company D. had had no legal basis to sell those goods. 52. On 3 April 2003 the bailiff’s service transferred to the second applicant UAH 4,404 which it had recovered from company D. in relation to the enforcement of the ruling of 14 February 2002. 53. On 23 March 2004 the bailiff’s service returned the writ of enforcement to the court, as it was impossible to implement it, owing to the absence of any funds or property at company D. 54. On 2 April 2002 the second applicant complained to the Odessa Regional Commercial Court of the bailiff’s inactivity as regards enforcing the ruling of 14 February 2002 (see paragraph 47 above). 55. On 9 June 2003 the Odessa Regional Commercial Court found that there had indeed been an unlawful omission on the part of the bailiff’s service: the service had not taken any steps to ensure the enforcement. 56. On 13 December 2004 the applicants brought a claim against the bailiff’s service, seeking compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 57. On 26 December 2005 the Odessa Kyivskyy District Court ordered the bailiff’s service to pay the second applicant UAH 98,131 in respect of pecuniary damage (the unenforced part of the ruling of 14 February 2002 – see paragraphs 47 and 52 above). The court also ordered the defendant to pay both applicants UAH 30,000 (about EUR 5,000) jointly in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and rejected the first applicant’s claim for pecuniary damages. 58. On 21 June 2006 the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal quashed the Odessa Kyivskyy District Court’s decision of 26 December 2005. It rejected the first applicant’s claim and discontinued the proceedings brought by the second applicant, holding that his claim fell to be examined by commercial courts. 59. The applicants appealed on points of law to the Higher Administrative Court, which started the proceedings on 24 March 2008. 60. According to the applicants’ submissions of 7 September 2017, they did not receive any information from the Higher Administrative Court about further developments in those proceedings.

6. The applicant was born in 1960. He currently lives in Belgium, but at the material time lived in Podgorica, Montenegro. 7. The applicant is a Roma and a Muslim. On an unspecified date in 2006 the applicant and his family moved into an apartment in a building constructed for socially disadvantaged families. According to the applicant, because of constant attacks in which his car and the apartment were damaged, the perpetrators of which were never found, he installed a camera outside his apartment. 8. On 26 May 2009 the applicant’s next-door neighbour, Y, was watching a kickboxing match between a Montenegrin and a Bosnian contestant on television. The applicant overheard the next-door conversation as the doors of both his and Y’s (adjacent) terraces were open. When the Bosnian kickboxer appeared with his coaches, all of whom were Muslim, Y allegedly said that he would slaughter one of them, and X, another neighbour, made a disparaging reference to the Bosnian kickboxer’s Turkish descent. According to the applicant, X left Y’s apartment at a certain point and went to his car, from which he took a gun. Y said “turn it to the left”, which was the direction of the applicant’s terrace. This was followed by nine to ten gunshots, and Y’s calling out insulting references to the applicant’s “Turkish mother”. X, Y and Y’s family picked up the spent cartridges from the ground afterwards. 9. On 9 September 2009 three neighbours, V (Y’s wife), S and B, were talking on the next-door terrace. As he was on his terrace, the applicant overheard the conversation. V said that she was fighting “cockroaches, frogs, nits and lice, and all sorts of other things”, which had been brought by “those dirty gipsies” (“od ovija gabeljčina”). V continued by saying that B and S “[could] use a hammer and a pruning knife (kosijer), and [she] would use an axe”. S replied that “her [people] carried swords”. V said that the axe could serve just as well. S answered “no, no, he is a Muslim, I have a sword”. B said “all is fine, whatever is more readily available” (“valja što god prije stigne”). V said loudly “An axe, an axe, a sledgehammer, like the one used on pigs”. 10. On 15 September 2009 Y was having an argument with M, another neighbour, when X joined and said, among other things, that if he “saw red”, he would “kill both you and your brother here like a dog” (“e ću te ubit ka psa i tebe i brata ođe”), apparently pointing at the applicant’s apartment, adding “dirty gypsy” (“cigane glibavi”) and “trash” (“ovo smeće”). This was witnessed by M’s brother, D. It is unclear from the case‑file if the applicant was present during the argument or if he learned about it in some other manner. 11. On 22 September 2009, the day of Ramadan Bayram, a religious holiday celebrated by the applicant and his family, a large cross was drawn on the applicant’s apartment door, and a large message was written on the wall next to it saying “move out or you’ll bitterly regret it” (“seli se, usko će ti bit”). The applicant called the police, who came and took photographs of the cross and the message. The same day the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the police against the families of X, Y, S and B, and one more family living in the building. 12. Between 19 and 22 October 2009 the police interviewed X, Y, V, B, M, D, and three other neighbours. 13. X, Y, V, and B denied the applicant’s allegations. X and Y also denied that they had watched the match together, and Y submitted that everything he had said had been addressed to the Bosnian kickboxer. Both X and Y confirmed that they had heard the shots but said they did not know who had fired them. Y and his children had indeed picked up the spent cartridges from the ground, not in order to hide anything, but because the children found the spent cartridges interesting to play with. Neither X nor Y knew who was responsible for the incident of 22 September 2009, but they suspected the applicant himself. 14. V submitted that the discussion of 9 September 2009 had referred to another person sought by the police at the time in relation to various attacks, and they had been discussing how they would defend themselves in the event of an attack. B denied that she had been in V’s apartment on that occasion. 15. M confirmed that during the argument with Y, X had come and said that if he “saw red” he would “kill them, as well as this gypsy” (“napraviću dženaze i vama, a i ovom ciganinu”), pointing in the direction of the applicant’s flat. M had assumed that he had meant the applicant. D confirmed M’s statement. 16. The other two neighbours were not aware of any conflicts amongst the neighbours, or that anybody ill-treated or insulted the applicant on the basis of his national origin. They had no idea who could be responsible for the incident of 22 September 2009. The third neighbour, N.L., confirmed the applicant’s submissions in relation to another incident (see paragraph 30 (b) below). 17. On 26 October 2009 the case file was transmitted to the State prosecutor’s office (Osnovno državno tužilaštvo) in order to assess whether there were any elements of the criminal offence of jeopardising someone’s security (ugrožavanje sigurnosti). 18. On 18 November 2009 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the higher State prosecutor’s office (Više državno tužilaštvo) in Podgorica in relation to the above events. He filed the complaint against X, Y, V, S and B for incitement to ethnic, racial and religious hatred, discontent and intolerance (izazivanje nacionalne, rasne i vjerske mržnje, razdora i netrpeljivosti, hereinafter “hate crime”) in connection with discrimination, racial and otherwise (see paragraphs 38-39 below). He also enclosed relevant video material. 19. On 24 November 2009 the higher State prosecutor’s office rejected the complaint on the grounds that there were no elements of any hate crime or other criminal offence within its competence. The applicant was notified that he could take over the prosecution as a subsidiary prosecutor and that the case file had already been forwarded to the State prosecution service on 26 October 2009 (see paragraph 17 above). 20. On 25 November 2009 the State prosecution service issued an official report (službena zabilješka) finding that the impugned words of 26 May, as well as those of 9 September 2009, which referred to the use of swords and axes, had not been addressed to either the applicant or anybody close to him, and that the incident of 15 September 2009 could not be considered a threat. It was concluded that none of those three events had involved an element of jeopardising someone’s security, or any other criminal offence subject to public prosecution. The incident of 22 September 2009, however, could be considered as jeopardising security. On 27 November 2009 the State prosecution service asked the police to undertake measures in order to find the perpetrator. At the same time the police were informed that the applicant’s criminal complaint in this regard would be kept until the perpetrator was found, or until 22 September 2012, when the prosecution of that criminal offence would become time-barred. On 31 December 2009 the State prosecutor informed the applicant of this, as well as of the fact that he could file a criminal complaint against a specific person with appropriate evidence (uz valjane dokaze). 21. On 14 December 2009 the applicant filed an application for an investigation (zahtjev za sprovođenje istrage) with the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica. He enclosed the relevant videos, and proposed that the court hear a number of neighbours, including those he suspected. 22. On 17 March 2010 the High Court dismissed that application for lack of evidence. In particular, the submitted video material was considered to be inadmissible, having been obtained without a prior court order, and the court observed that the suspected neighbours had denied that what they had said related to the applicant. It was further held that the applicant had not submitted any evidence in relation to the incident of 22 September 2009, nor had he called the police at the time to come to the scene and “collect the necessary material for further analysis” in order to verify his suspicions. 23. On 26 March 2010 the applicant appealed against that decision. He submitted, in particular, that on 22 September 2009 he had actually called the police, who had only taken photographs of the scene. The fact that they had failed to do what they should have done was in no way his fault, as it was not up to him to tell the police what to do, but only to lodge a criminal complaint, which he had done. 24. On 31 May 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal for lack of evidence, in substance endorsing the reasoning of the High Court. In doing so, the court held that the applicant’s objections as to the gathering of evidence by the police “could not be the subject of [that] court’s assessment”. 25. On 19 July 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He maintained, inter alia, that because of the failure of the domestic authorities to protect him and his family, they had had to move out of the apartment (see paragraph 35 below). He relied on the right to private life, the right to an effective domestic remedy, and the prohibition of discrimination. 26. On 25 March 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional appeal. It considered that it should be examined under Articles 6 and 14 of the Convention and corresponding Articles of the Montenegrin Constitution, and found there had been no violation of any of them. 27. On 7 April 2016, as regards the incident of 22 September 2009, the police informed the State prosecutor’s office that “[they] had acted on [the applicant’s] criminal complaint and undertaken measures in accordance with their authority, having dedicated a significant amount of time [to the complaint]. While carrying out those official actions [they] had not found material evidence which would undoubtedly indicate the perpetrator of this criminal offence”. 28. The Government submitted information from the applicant’s criminal record reflecting convictions for minor offences in 1981, 1990 and 2002. For each of these offences he had received a suspended sentence. 29. On 20 December 2007 the applicant was celebrating Bayram. X and Y claimed before the domestic bodies that the applicant had celebrated inappropriately by playing loud music from very early in the morning, shooting in the air and calling Turks and Wahhabi (vehabije) to jihad. He had apparently also tried to hit X with a flagpole (koplje od zastave). The applicant submitted that X and W (the husband of X’s niece) had been insulting him and his family, while X had also spat on him, shouted obscenities and thrown stones at him, causing him minor physical injuries. On 30 September 2008 the applicant was found guilty in misdemeanour proceedings of disturbing public order and peace (narušavanje javnog reda i mira) by shooting several shots in the air from his starting pistol on 20 December 2007. He was sentenced to a ten-day period of imprisonment and the pistol was confiscated. The decision was upheld by a second‑instance body on 23 December 2008. In relation to the same incident, on 29 July 2008 X and W were charged with violent behaviour against the applicant. In the course of the proceedings, a medical expert witness submitted that the applicant had a contusion (nagnječenje) on the left part of the back of his head, which would have been classified as a minor physical injury at the time it had been inflicted. The medical expert submitted that the injury had been caused by a blunt object, possibly a “larger stone”, and that it could not have been caused by sand or “stones the size of beans”. On 24 May 2011, after the case had been remitted, the Court of First Instance acquitted X and W, considering that it had not been proved that they had committed the offence. 30. The applicant reported the following events to the police, but to no avail: (a) on 6 October 2008 an unknown person had thrown a brick and broken one of the windows of his apartment; (b) on 11 September 2009 S and her husband, Z, had tried to hit the applicant’s parked car with their own car; this was confirmed by another neighbour, N.L., who witnessed this event and was interviewed by the police in October 2009 (see paragraph 16 above); (c) on 16 October 2009 S had asked Y aloud if he was going to “slaughter” somebody, and he had answered that he was, both of them looking at the applicant; S had said that he would “make [his] car dirty with that man”; (d) on 19 December 2009 an unknown person had fired several shots in front of the applicant’s apartment, below the children’s bedroom; the applicant gave the police eight bullet shells that he had found on the ground; (e) on 1 January 2010, shortly after midnight, X had thrown firecrackers at the applicant’s car and broken its windscreen; he had also thrown a glass bottle at the applicant and a metal bar at his son, swearing profusely and threatening to slaughter them all; this had been followed by gunshots. 31. On 21 October, 23 October and 30 October 2009 X, V and M.Ć. respectively lodged criminal complaints against the applicant for insulting and provoking them, and for playing loud music and calling Turks and Wahhabi to jihad. On 25 December 2009 those complaints were rejected by the State prosecutor. 32. On 24 April 2010 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica found the applicant guilty of recording Y without authorisation and eavesdropping (prisluškivanje) on him, and sentenced him to 40 days’ imprisonment, suspended for a period of one year. That judgment was upheld by the High Court on 15 October 2010. On 26 December 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional appeal by the applicant in this regard. 33. On 7 May 2010 the applicant was fined 800 euros (EUR) in minor offence proceedings (prekršajni postupak) for threatening (izazivanje osjećaja ugroženosti) V, a decision which was upheld on 7 July 2010. 34. On 26 May 2010 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against X with the State prosecution service, alleging that in August and September 2009 he had threatened to “cut [the applicant’s] gypsy head off and impale it on a pike” (nabiti na kolac). On 27 July 2010 the deputy State prosecutor rejected the criminal complaint. On 12 August 2010 the applicant filed a private criminal action (optužni predlog) against X, who was acquitted by the Court of First Instance on 7 June 2011. The court found that X had indeed said the impugned words in front of a witness, and that the words could have made the applicant feel frightened and insecure, but the court could not accept “that [the applicant] had taken those words seriously, especially since the witness, who was the only one who had heard the words, had not taken them seriously, which was why he had informed the applicant about them only two months later”. That decision was upheld by the High Court on 7 March 2012. 35. On 6 July 2010 X threatened the applicant’s daughter by saying that he would kill and slaughter them all, with his hands stretched towards her neck. The girl apparently fainted and was admitted to hospital unconscious. The same day the applicant and his family moved out of their apartment. They were allegedly on a hunger strike for the next twenty-four days, seeking help from various State institutions.

6. The applicants, who were born in 1980 and 1977, respectively, live in Slobozia and Parcani, in the self-proclaimed “Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria” (“MRT”). In view of the fact that, in the applicants’ submission, it was impossible for them to apply to the Court directly, the application was lodged by their mothers. 7. On 2 March 2005 the applicants were arrested by the “MRT” authorities and placed in detention on remand on suspicion of murder. On 1 June 2009 they were convicted by an “MRT” court and sentenced to terms of fourteen years and a half, and fourteen years’ imprisonment, respectively. On 4 August 2009 the Supreme Court of the “MRT” upheld the above judgment, but reduced the sentence of the first applicant to fourteen years’ imprisonment. 8. It does not appear from the material in the case file and from the parties’ submissions that the applicants informed the authorities of the Republic of Moldova about the proceedings against them and the conviction and detention in the “MRT”. 9. In December 2014 the applicants challenged their conviction by way of an extraordinary appeal before the Supreme Court of the Republic of Moldova which, on 14 February 2015, upheld their appeal and quashed the judgments of the “MRT” courts on the ground that they had been issued by unconstitutional tribunals. 10. The applicants were released from detention on 20 July and 20 August 2015, respectively, for reasons which were not related to the Supreme Court of Moldova’s decision of 14 February 2015.

5. The applicant was born in 1972 and is currently serving a life sentence in Ladyzhynska colony no. 39 (“the colony”). 6. On 25 November 2004 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of several crimes and sentenced him to life imprisonment and ordered confiscation of all his property. On 23 February 2006 the Supreme Court upheld that judgment with certain changes. 7. Since 26 August 2003 the applicant has been detained in various detention facilities, initially pending the criminal investigation against him and his trial, and subsequently after sentencing. 8. On 26 August 2003 the applicant was placed in a temporary detention facility in Donetsk (SIZO No. 5) for the duration of the criminal proceedings against him. On 25 January 2007 he was diagnosed with tuberculosis. The case file contains other evidence to indicate that 1 February 2007 was the date of the tuberculosis diagnosis. 9. Upon completion of the criminal proceedings, on 16 March 2007 the applicant was transferred to the Ladyzhynska colony. 10. On 20 March 2007 a preliminary examination of the applicant was conducted, together with laboratory tests and an X-ray. He was put under medical supervision owing to the residual effects of his tuberculosis. 11. According to the Government, the applicant was under medical supervision and received the appropriate medical care for his tuberculosis. In particular, he had been examined on a regular basis by the colony doctors between 20 March 2007 and 26 February 2018 and prescribed treatment. As a result of each course of treatment his health had improved. The Government did not specify the frequency of the applicant’s regular examination and treatment during that time. 12. In December 2011 a blood test revealed that the applicant had contracted hepatitis C. According to the applicant, he was denied access to copies of the test results. 13. According to the Government, on 28 February 2012 the applicant was examined by a colony doctor who diagnosed him with chronic persistent hepatitis in remission. The applicant was prescribed treatment. 14. On 16 May 2012 doctors from the Vinnytsya Regional Centre of Control and Prevention of HIV-Aids diagnosed the applicant with hepatitis C in remission without hepatic impairment. According to the Government, the applicant was prescribed with symptomatic treatment and as a result of the treatment his health improved. The Government did not specify the nature of that treatment. 15. According to the Government, the applicant was supervised by the colony doctors and was prescribed with all necessary medicine and a special diet. The Government did not specify the frequency of the treatment or the nature of the diet provided to the applicant. 16. The Government further submitted that from 23 February to 20 March 2015 the applicant had been under medical treatment in a multi-disciplinary hospital in Stryzhavska correctional colony no. 81. As a result of the treatment his health had improved. The nature of that treatment was not specified. 17. They also added that as of 26 February 2018 the applicant remained under the ongoing supervision of the colony doctors, and his state of health was satisfactory. 18. According to the applicant, during his detention he submitted numerous applications to the domestic authorities, including the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”), seeking to obtain copies of various documents to be submitted to the Court in substantiation of his application. 19. He added that between August and November 2006 he requested that the Court of Appeal provide him with a copy of his indictment. His requests were refused on 8 August and 6 September 2006 on the grounds that he had already been provided with a copy of that document in the course of the criminal proceedings against him and that there was no legal requirement to meet his requests. Eventually, on 21 July 2008 a copy of that document was sent to the applicant. 20. Between April and August 2009 the applicant requested that the Court of Appeal send him copies of several court records from his criminal case file as well as from that of his accomplice. Those requests were initially refused as not having a basis in law. According to the Government, on 10 September 2009 the applicant lodged another application with the Court of Appeal in which he requested copies of court hearing records, the cassation appeal and other documents from his criminal proceedings case file. On 2 October 2009 the Court of Appeal sent the requested copies to the applicant, but excluded copies of the court hearing records, on the ground that their transmission was not covered by the legislation that was applicable at that time. On 21 April 2011 the Office of the Government Agent before the European Court of Human Rights sent copies of the court hearing records to the applicant. 21. By letters dated 12 and 17 January 2017, the Court of Appeal refused the applicant’s applications for a copy of his request for an extension of the time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal against his conviction of 25 November 2004 and a copy of a court ruling of 26 October 2016 dismissing that request. The Court of Appeal specified that the applicant’s criminal case file had been sent to the Higher Specialised Court of Ukraine for Civil and Criminal Matters upon the latter court’s request. The applicant has not been provided with a copy of the requested documents.

4. The first applicant was born in 1966 and is serving a prison sentence in correctional facility IK-8 in the Khabarovsk region. The second applicant was born in 1967 and is serving a prison sentence in correctional facility IK‑10 in the Sverdlovsk region. 5. The applicants were arrested at 6 a.m. (the first applicant) and 7 a.m. (the second applicant) on 19 March 2007 on suspicion of having committed murder and taken to the Department for Combating Organised Crime at the Voronezh regional police department (управление по борьбе с организованной преступностью при ГУВД Воронежской области, the “UBOP”). Their arrest records were drawn up at 8.40 a.m. and 9 a.m., respectively. 6. According to the applicants, S., G. and other police officers from the UBOP (according to the second applicant, in the presence of investigator M.) subjected them to violence in different offices at the UBOP premises in order to make them confess to various crimes. The applicants described being administered electric shocks through wires attached to various parts of their bodies, including ears and genitals, while gas masks were put over their heads, their hands were shackled behind their backs and several police officers restrained them on the floor in order not to let them throw the wires off. The police officers pushed on the handcuffs. The first applicant also described being punched and kicked. The applicants did not give any self‑incriminating statements. 7. At around 10 p.m. the applicants were taken to a temporary detention facility at the Voronezh regional police department (the “IVS”). 8. The IVS duty officer in the presence of police officer S. recorded the following injuries on the first applicant: bruises on the bridge of the nose, under both eyes, on the left shoulder blade, right shoulder and stomach, abrasions on the wrists, and an abrasion and a bruise on the buttocks. An ambulance was called. The ambulance medical assistant recorded an abrasion and bruising to the applicant’s right wrist and directed the applicant to an emergency hospital where he was diagnosed with contusion to the soft tissues of the right wrist. It was noted that he had abrasions and bruising to the right wrist, which was swallowed and hot. 9. On 22 March 2007 the first applicant was transferred to pre-trial detention facility SIZO-1 in Voronezh, where the following injuries were recorded on him: bruises on both forearms, abrasions on both wrist joints, and small abrasions under thin scabs below the skin level on the left wrist, the right hip and shank. According to SIZO-1, the second applicant had no visible injuries on his arrival there on 23 March 2007. 10. On 23 March 2007 an investigator of the Voronezh regional prosecutor’s office ordered the applicants’ forensic medical examination with a view to establishing the presence of injuries, stating that the applicants had been arrested on 19 March 2007 and asking whether injuries, if any, could have been self-inflicted or caused as a result of a fall. 11. On the same day the second applicant was examined at the Voronezh Regional Forensic Medical Examination Bureau. Expert Sh. recorded the following injuries on him: a bruise in the area around each wrist joint measuring 13 to 0.4-0.5 centimetres; a bruise on the right shank measuring 3.5 to 2.5 centimetres; a stripe-shaped abrasion on the left forearm measuring 2.2 centimetres with uneven edges and a firm reddish-brown surface at the skin level; and small abrasions on each wrist measuring 0.2 to 0.4 centimetres and on the left shank measuring 0.3 to 0.7 centimetres of an irregular‑oval shape with uneven edges and firm reddish surface at or below the skin level. 12. The expert concluded that “the injuries had been inflicted by a hard blunt object, as confirmed by bruises and abrasions”, not earlier than three‑five days before the examination (three days as regards the injuries on the wrist joints); that it was unlikely that they could have originated from a fall and that self-harm was not excluded. 13. According to the expert’s report of 23 March 2007, the second applicant’s examination was conducted in the presence of police officer S. and the applicant stated that police officers had not inflicted any injuries on him. According to the second applicant, his examination was conducted in the presence of S. and other police officers who had subjected him to violence and he feared for his safety; he was not able to fully undress himself for the examination; and the expert did not ask him any questions. 14. On 27 March 2007 the first applicant was examined at the Voronezh Regional Forensic Medical Examination Bureau by the same expert who recorded the following injuries on him: a wound on the right wrist joint measuring 1.4 to 0.4 centimetres, of an irregular-oval shape, with uneven edges and rounded ends, under firm brownish scab rising over the skin level; an abrasion on the left wrist joint measuring 1.4 to 0.8 centimetres, of an irregular-oval shape, under firm brownish scab entirely coming off here and there; stripe-shaped abrasions on the wrists under firm brownish scabs entirely coming off here and there, measuring 3.5 to 0.4 centimetres (on the front side of the right wrist joint), 5.5 to 0.4 centimetres (on the back side of the right wrist joint) and 3.7 to 0.4 centimetres (on the back side of the left wrist joint). 15. The expert concluded that the injuries had been inflicted by a hard blunt object, as confirmed by their nature, shortly before the examination, possibly at the time as indicated in the investigator’s decision ordering the examination. The expert excluded a fall as the origin of the injuries, while not ruling out self‑harm. 16. According to the expert’s report of 27 March 2007, the first applicant’s examination was conducted in the presence of police officer S. and the applicant stated that on 19 March 2007 after his arrest police officers had punched him in the area of the stomach and the arms, had handcuffed him and tortured him with electric current. 17. Following the investigator’s decision of 30 March 2007, expert Sh. issued an additional report of 26 April 2007, prepared without the first applicant’s examination, in which she stated that the first applicant’s wrist injuries could have been caused by handcuffs with further squeezing, approximately 7-11 days before the applicant’s examination on 27 March 2007. 18. On 24 February 2011 a new report by the forensic medical expert was issued, on the basis of the two previous reports and the first applicant’s medical records from the IVS and SIZO-1. The expert concluded that the injuries to the first applicant’s wrists could have been inflicted on 19 March 2007. Their infliction on 16‑18 March 2007 could not also be excluded. The lack of details in the description of the injuries recorded at the IVS made it impossible to determine the time of their infliction. As regards the injuries recorded at SIZO-1, they could have been inflicted on 19 March 2007 and very unlikely prior to that date. The injuries had been inflicted by a hard blunt object. The expert did not find it possible to give an opinion as to whether the injures could have been inflicted by electric current. The applicant had received at least one traumatic impact to his face and no less than three traumatic impacts to his torso. The expert found it difficult to determine the number of traumatic impacts to the applicant’s upper and lower limbs in view of the multiplicity of the injuries. The injuries were located within the reach of the first applicant’s own hand (except for the bruise on the left shoulder blade) and could have therefore been self‑inflicted. They could not have originated from a fall. 19. On 25 and 30 March 2007 the first applicant complained about the violence he had allegedly suffered at the hands of the police officers at the UBOP to the Voronezh regional prosecutor’s office. On 9 April 2007 his complaint was received by the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office of Voronezh. Similar complaints were lodged by his wife with the Voronezh regional police department and prosecutor’s office and the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. 20. No criminal case was opened into his alleged ill-treatment. Investigators from the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office of Voronezh, and later from the investigative committee unit for the Leninskiy district of Voronezh, conducted pre‑investigation inquiries and issued seven refusals to bring criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of crimes under Articles 286 § 3 (abuse of powers with use of violence) and 302 (coercion to give statements) of the Criminal Code in the actions of police officers S. and G., pursuant to Article 24 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCrP”). All refusals were annulled by the investigators’ superiors because they were based on incomplete inquiries and additional inquiries were ordered: - refusal of 20 April 2007, annulled on 19 September 2007; - refusal of 29 September 2007, annulled on 2 October 2007; - refusal of 12 October 2007, annulled on 28 November 2007; - refusal of 10 December 2007, annulled on 15 January 2008; - refusal of 25 January 2008, annulled on 11 February 2011; - refusal of 24 February 2011, annulled on 15 April 2011; - refusal of 28 April 2011, annulled on 6 July 2011; and - refusal of 8 July 2011 (on the grounds that the injuries could have been inflicted before the first applicant’s arrest and that the applicant had no injuries which could have been inflicted by electric current), annulled on 28 August 2015 (because the investigator failed, inter alia, to identify all police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant). 21. The following explanations were received by the investigators in the course of the pre-investigation inquiries. Witness B. stated to have seen that a blow “in the area of the ribs” had been delivered to the first applicant at the UBOP premises and to have heard the first applicant screaming in one of the UBOP offices. According to the first applicant’s wife who witnessed the applicant’s arrest at their home, the first applicant had no injuries before his arrest and he had injuries – he was limping and had a bruise under the right eye, an abrasion on the bridge of the nose and swallowed hands – next day when she saw him at the court hearing concerning his detention on remand. Police officers S. and G. stated that after arresting the applicant they had taken him to the UBOP premises where investigator M. had drawn up the record of his arrest. Then they had taken the first applicant to the IVS. At the IVS the first applicant had complained that handcuffs (used when taking him to the IVS) had chafed his hands and they had taken him to an emergency hospital where a doctor had disinfected a scratch on his wrist. They denied, as did investigator M., the first applicant’ ill-treatment. 22. The first applicant’s appeals under Article 125 of the CCrP against the refusals to bring criminal proceedings of 20 April 2007, 12 October 2007, 10 December 2007, 24 February 2011, 28 April 2011 and 8 July 2011 were not examined by the Leninskiy District Court of Voronezh on the grounds that the impugned decisions had been annulled by the investigative authorities (after court appeals had been lodged). The applicant’s appeal against the refusal to initiate criminal proceedings of 25 January 2008 was examined and dismissed on the grounds that the refusal was reasoned and lawful (the District Court’s decision of 18 March 2008, upheld by the Voronezh Regional Court on 15 May 2008). 23. On 14 August 2007 the second applicant complained about his alleged ill‑treatment by the UBOP police officers to the Voronezh regional prosecutor’s office. When describing tortures by electric current he noted, in particular, that in order to keep the wires attached to his body the police officers had put them under the gas mask, under the elastics of the socks, and had tied them to the penis. No criminal case was opened into his alleged ill‑treatment. Investigators from the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office of Voronezh, and later from the investigative committee unit for the Leninskiy district of Voronezh, issued four refusals to bring criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime under Article 286 (abuse of powers) of the Criminal Code in the actions of police officers S. and G. and investigator M., pursuant to Article 24 § 1 (2) of CCrP. All refusals were annulled by the investigators’ superiors because they were based on incomplete inquiries and additional inquiries were ordered: - refusal of 1 October 2007, revoked on 24 October 2007; - refusal of 6 November 2007, revoked on 16 November 2007; - refusal of 26 November 2007, revoked on 27 November 2007; and - refusal of 7 December 2007, revoked on 28 August 2015 (on the grounds, inter alia, that the information about the lack of injuries on the second applicant on his arrival to SIZO-1 on 23 March 2007 had not been supported by medical and other relevant documents). 24. The refusals to institute criminal proceedings were based on explanations by police officers S. and G. and investigator M. denying the second applicant’s ill-treatment, and explanations allegedly received over phone from expert Sh. that the second applicant’s injuries could not have been inflicted by electric current. The investigating authorities concluded that the second applicant’s allegations were unfounded. 25. On 14 February 2008 the District Court rejected the second applicant’s appeal under Article 125 of the CCrP against the decision of 7 December 2007. On 1 April 2008 the Voronezh Regional Court upheld the District Court’s decision. 26. On 20 March 2007 the Leninskiy District Court of Voronezh examined in different proceedings an investigator’s request that the applicants be detained on remand on the grounds of the gravity of the crime of which they were suspected (murder) and resultant risks of their absconding, re-offending, threatening witnesses, victims and other participants to the proceedings, destroying evidence and otherwise hindering the criminal proceedings. The applicants and their lawyers objected, referring to the applicants’ permanent places of residence, the hypothetical nature of the investigator’s arguments and, in the first applicant’s case, to his employment and family ties. The court ordered the applicants’ detention, being satisfied that the applicants – suspected of the particularly grave crime punishable by long terms of deprivation of liberty – might re-offend, exert pressure on their potential accomplices and abscond, if at large. 27. On 28 March 2007 the applicants were accused of robbery committed in September 2001 and theft. They were also suspected of having committed a number of other robberies and thefts as part of an organised group. The investigator advanced reasons for the extension of the applicants’ detention on remand similar to those in his initial request. In its decisions of 17 May 2007 (concerning both applicants, upheld on appeal by the Voronezh Regional Court on 5 June 2007), 8 June 2007 (concerning the second applicant, upheld on appeal on 3 July 2007), 9 June 2007 (concerning the first applicant, upheld on appeal on 26 June 2007) and 6 September and 12 December 2007 (concerning the second applicant, the latter decision upheld on appeal on 17 January 2008) the District Court, after hearing the applicants and their lawyers who maintained their objections, granted the investigator’s requests and extended the applicants’ detention, stating that they were accused of the grave crimes and the grounds for the court’s initial decision to remand them in custody had not changed. 28. Essentially the same reasoning can be found in the court’s decision of 14 September 2007 (concerning the first applicant) which was taken in the presence of the investigator and prosecutor and in the first applicant’s absence due to his “health condition”. In his appeal against that decision the first applicant’s lawyer stated that on 14 September 2007 the first applicant had been taken to the hearing from his detention facility, he had felt unwell in the courthouse and an ambulance had been called. According to the ambulance records, the applicant had pain in the stomach, was diagnosed with rupture, was provided with medical assistance and required hospitalisation, which was refused. According to the lawyer, hospitalisation had been refused by the investigator who had ordered that the applicant be taken back to the detention facility. Despite the lawyer’s objections to holding the hearing in the applicant’s absence, the court had decided to proceed with the hearing. The lawyer had allegedly left the courtroom in protest. 29. On 11 October 2007 the Regional Court, after hearing the applicant’s lawyer and the prosecutor, upheld the decision of 14 September 2007, holding that the District Court had taken into account the gravity of the offences incriminated to the applicant, his personality and the lack of grounds for the change of the preventive measure. It noted that according to the District Court’s records of the hearing the applicant’s lawyer had been present. 30. On 12 December 2007 the District Court, having heard the applicants and their lawyers, extended the applicants’ detention until 16 March 2008. In addition to the gravity of crimes and the alleged corresponding risks of the applicants absconding, re-offending and influencing victims and witnesses, it noted that the investigator had to finalise important investigative measures, such as the additional questioning of victims, psychological expert examinations of the accused and bringing final charges against the applicants and their co‑accused. On 17 January 2008 the Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal. 31. In its decisions for extension of the applicants’ detention of 6 March (concerning both applicants), 17 March 2008 (concerning the first applicant, upheld by the Supreme Court of Russia on 20 May 2008) and 18 March 2008 (concerning the second applicant, upheld on appeal on 20 May 2008) the Voronezh Regional Court relied on the gravity of multiple crimes of which the applicants stood accused (including banditry according to final charges), the risk of their re‑offending and the need to finalise investigative activities involving 36 victims and eight accused and their lawyers. It also noted complaints by the applicants’ co‑accused V.Z. and A.S. that the first applicant had allegedly threatened them with physical retaliation. In his appeal against those decisions the first applicant’s lawyer noted that the complaints by V.Z. and A.S. had not been read out and examined at the hearing, that they appeared to be meaningless in view of the fact that V.Z. and A.S. had themselves been detained pending trial and that the first applicant had lodged a counter-complaint with the police that they had slandered him. According to the first applicant, V.Z. and A.S. had not confirmed their complaints in the course of the relevant inquiry. In upholding the Regional Court’s decisions the Supreme Court did not address the arguments concerning the complaints by V.Z. and A.S. The Regional Court further issued detention extension orders similar to the previous orders on 11 June 2008 (concerning the first applicant, upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 11 September 2008) and 16 June 2008 (concerning the second applicant). 32. On 16 September 2008 the Regional Court held a preliminary hearing in the case against the applicants and others. In a grouped decision the court ordered that the applicants and other defendants should remain in custody pending trial, stating in general that it had no reasons to consider that the previous grounds for their detention were no longer valid or that a change in preventive measures was warranted. On 27 January 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 16 September 2008 on appeal. Essentially the same reasons were relied on in extending the applicants’ detention in the Regional Court’s decision of 25 February 2009, upheld on 10 June 2009 by the Supreme Court, which noted, without providing any details, that some victims in the case had expressed fears for their safety and that some defendants had abused their rights delaying the proceedings. 33. The applicants’ detention was further extended pending trial for essentially the same reasons by the Regional Court’s decisions of 22 May 2009, 25 August 2009, 23 November 2009 (upheld by the Supreme Court on 25 February 2010) and 19 February 2010 (upheld on 27 July 2010). The reasoning in these grouped decisions concerning several defendants comprised (without indicating whom of the defendants it concerned) a reference to victims Kh., S. and Z. who had objected to the defendants’ release fearing for their and their families’ safety (the Government also referred to victims A.G., V.G. and M.; the first applicant noted that those victims, not mentioned in the courts’ decisions, had acknowledged at the trial that they had actually not received any threats from the defendants), the first applicant’s criminal records, the defendants’ abuse of their rights by submitting multiple requests the majority of which had been rejected and the resultant protraction of the proceedings and the risk of the defendants exerting pressure on jurors. It was noted that identification parades at the preliminary investigation had been conducted in a way that the visualisation of some victims by the accused had been excluded, in order to ensure the victims’ safety. According to the first applicant, it was not shown that this had been requested by the victims. The Regional Court also referred to alleged pressure on a co‑accused and witnesses by the first applicant by way of written instructions as to what statements to give at the trial. The first applicant disputed those allegations and unsuccessfully requested an expert opinion as to whether the instructions had been written by him. 34. The applicants’ case was examined in a jury trial. At the preliminary hearing the Voronezh Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ and their co‑defendants’ complaints that they had been subjected to violence by the UBOP officers. The trial court heard, among others, witness R.D. who stated to have been subjected to violence, including electric shocks, by police officers S. and G. in the presence of investigator M. Witness B. stated that he had been taken to one of the UBOP offices where the first applicant was lying on the floor face down. Police officers had threatened B. to do the same to his son (the applicants’ co-accused) if B. would not write statements under their instructions. B. had seen that they had pushed on the shackles on the first applicant’s hands. According to written statements by one of the applicants’ co-defendants, V.Z., of 8 April 2008, and by a detainee in SIZO‑1, V.A.Z., of 7 April 2008 (submitted to the Court by the second applicant), V.Z. and V.A.Z. had allegedly been subjected to violence, including electric shocks, by the UBOP officers in 2007. 35. Following a jury verdict of 1 December 2010, the Regional Court in a judgment of 29 December 2010 convicted the applicants of banditry (Article 209 of the Criminal Code), several accounts of theft and robbery, murder and illegal use of weapons, and sentenced the first applicant to twenty-four years’ imprisonment and a fine and the second applicant to twenty-two years’ imprisonment and a fine. 36. On 23 August 2011 the Supreme Court of Russia quashed the judgment in respect of the first applicant and remitted his case to the trial court for a fresh examination from the moment following the jury verdict, extending his detention on remand until 23 November 2011. It upheld the judgment in respect of the second applicant. 37. On 17 October 2011 the Regional Court convicted the first applicant of banditry (Article 209 of the Criminal Code), several accounts of theft and robbery, murder and illegal use of weapons, and sentenced him to twenty‑five years’ imprisonment and a fine. On 29 March 2012 the Supreme Court amended the judgment of 17 October 2011 by, inter alia, reducing the first applicant’s sentence to twenty-four years’ imprisonment and a fine and upheld the judgment in the remaining part. 38. According to a certificate of 27 August 2015 of SIZO-3 in the Voronezh region of the Russian Federal Penal Authority («Федеральная служба исполнения наказаний», “the FSIN”) submitted by the Government, the first applicant was held in SIZO-3 alone in cell no. 26 from 20 May 2009 to 29 November 2010, and alone in cell no. 3 from 29 November 2010 to 20 May 2012. The first applicant’s detention in SIZO‑3 in the Voronezh region from 20 May 2009 to 20 May 2012 is also confirmed by a certificate of 28 August 2015 of medical unit no. 10 of medical-sanitary department no. 36 of the FSIN. 39. According to a certificate of 8 September 2015 of SIZO-3 and logs of dates of “individual consultations and psycho‑correctional work” submitted by the Government, the first applicant received such consultations on the following dates: 16 June 2009; 28 April, and 2 and 9 December in 2010; 4 February, 11 March, 21 April, 29 September and 23 December in 2011; and 29 March and 5 May in 2012. According to the first applicant, he did not receive such consultations. On some of the dates indicated in the records submitted by the Government he participated in court hearings in his case or had access to the case‑file at the courthouse, and some records indicated cell no. 28 as the place of his detention while he was never held there. 40. According to a certificate of 14 October 2015 from medical unit no. 5 of medical-sanitary department no. 27 of IK-8 (in the Khabarovsk region) addressed to the applicant’s lawyer, the first applicant’s examination to determine his fitness for solitary confinement was not carried out. 41. The first applicant had family visits on the following dates: 21 August, 11 and 25 September, and 6 November in 2009; 15 January, 5 February, 19 March, 16 April, 7 May, 4 June, 9 July, 16 August, 14 September, 17 November, and 3 and 28 December in 2010; 31 January, 21 March, 20 April, 16 May, 11 October, 8 November and 16 December in 2011; and 11 January and 16 May in 2012. 42. On 15 June 2011 a deputy head of the FSIN Voronezh regional unit issued a report for determining a further place for the first applicant’s detention. He stated that during his detention in SIZO-3 in Voronezh the first applicant had not committed disciplinary offences, had not entered into conflicts with the administration of the detention facility, and had been polite and tactful. However, he had shown himself as an adherent to the thieves’ customs. That report was approved by the head of the operational department of the FSIN for the Voronezh region and by the head of the FSIN for the Voronezh region. 43. On 30 June 2011 the head of the FSIN ordered that the first applicant further serve his sentence in the Khabarovsk region. 44. On 19 March 2012 the first applicant requested the Head of the FSIN that he be allowed to serve his sentence in the Voronezh region where his family resided. On 27 April 2012 his request was refused pursuant to Article 73 § 4 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences. 45. In July 2012 the first applicant arrived at correctional facility IK-8 located in the Khabarovsk region. 46. On 13 July 2012 the Sovetskiy District Court of Voronezh dismissed the applicant’s mother’s appeal against the FSIN’s decision, relying on Article 73 § 4 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences. 47. On 7 November 2012 the Kominternovskiy District Court of Voronezh dismissed the applicant’s wife’s similar appeal on the same ground. 48. On 11 January 2013 the first applicant again requested the FSIN that he be transferred to the Voronezh region for serving his sentence. On 25 February 2013 his request was refused. In April 2013 the first applicant challenged the FSIN’s refusal before the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow. He complained, in particular, that his transfer to the remote correctional facility had made it impossible for him to have visits from his wife, two children and elderly disabled mother. On 19 July 2013 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint on the grounds that his transfer to the remote correctional facility did not contradict domestic law and that the hindrance of his family members’ visits could not serve as a ground for transferring him to a similar correctional facility in his region. The applicant appealed against that decision. On 22 September 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court’s decision on the same grounds, noting that the three‑month time‑limit to appeal against the FSIN’s order had expired.

4. On 30 November 2004 the applicant company signed a contract (“the contract”) with the Ministry of Finance (“the Ministry”) for an investment loan, expressed in the equivalent of the national currency, with the repayments calculated in euros (во денарска противвредност пресметана во евра). Clause 11 of the contract stipulated that a statutory default interest rate (затезна камата по стапка yтврдена со закон) was to be paid on all overdue repayments, which, according to an annex forming part of the contract, were expressed in euros. 5. On 4 September 2012 a bailiff issued an enforcement order under the terms of the contract. The applicant company’s protest and appeal against the enforcement order were dismissed by both the President of the Ohrid Court of First Instance (Основен суд Охрид) and by the Bitola Court of Appeal (Апелационен суд Битола), with the final decision being dated 3 April 2013. 6. On 17 May 2013 the applicant company lodged a civil claim against the Ministry seeking an annulment of clause 11 of the contract, claiming that, in accordance with domestic law, interest on the repayment of loans in foreign currencies should be calculated on the basis of that foreign currency’s domestic rate (домицилна камата) instead of the statutory default interest rate. In that respect it relied on a judgment by the Supreme Court in which the same provision, contained in an identical contract regarding a State-granted loan to another person, had been annulled (Рев1. бр. 74/2012). 7. The applicant company’s claim was dismissed by the Ohrid Court of First Instance and the Bitola Court of Appeal on 7 October and 13 January 2014 respectively, each holding that the loan had been approved in the national currency and therefore the statutory default interest rate applied. Neither court commented as to the Supreme Court’s case-law. The final judgment was served on the applicant company’s representative on 31 March 2014. 8. On 27 May 2015 insolvency proceedings were opened in respect of the applicant company. 9. In judgments Рев.1 бр. 168/2011 of 8 February 2012, Рев.1 бр.74/2012 of 6 December 2012 and Рев. бр. 202/2012 of 24 October 2013, the Supreme Court held that interest on State-granted loans which were to be repaid in amounts expressed in a foreign currency should be calculated on the basis of that currency’s domestic interest rate. The Supreme Court took the stance that the loan repayment instalments were the determinative factor in the cases, and since, in those cases, the instalments had been expressed in a foreign currency, the statutory default interest rate was not applicable. The same stance was taken in two appeal court judgments (ТСЖ бр. 828/08 of 21 May 2008 and ТСЖ 1527/09 of 11 November 2009).

5. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Vsesvyatskaya. 6. At the material time the applicant was a journalist at a Lithuanian weekly publication. 7. He was also a civil activist. As was later established by the domestic courts, since approximately the summer of 1998 the applicant had identified himself as a member of an informal liberal democratic movement, Revolyutsionnoye Kontaktnoye Obyedineniye (“the Revolutionary Contact Union” – hereinafter “the RKO”). Also, in the period from 2000 until 2004 the applicant was the founder, owner, publisher and editor-in-chief of a monthly newsletter entitled Radikalnaya Politika (“Radical Politics”). He determined the contents of the newsletter and published his own articles in it, as well as articles by people with similar views and excerpts from official and non-official sources of information and the mass media. He, himself, prepared each issue of the newsletter at his home address by typing it up on his personal computer, and then had it printed out and reproduced in multiple copies. The exact number of copies of each issue is unknown. The applicant then distributed the newsletter in person or through other unidentified individuals by selling it or giving it out for free at various places in Moscow. The articles touched, to a great extent, on the events in the Chechen Republic. 8. An article headlined “From the interview given by M. Udugov[1] to the Kavkaz Center press agency” (“Из интервью М. Удугова агенству Кавказ Центр”) mentioned the large-scale hostage-taking at the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow in October 2002[2] referring to it as “the action of Movsar Barayev’s heroic Chechen rebels in Moscow” (“акция героических чеченских повстанцев Мовсара Бараева в Москве”). It stated, in particular: “Russia has clearly demonstrated that it is at war and permanently in danger of being hit by retaliatory blows, because its rulers have perpetrated a despicable attack on a sovereign State and are killing innocent civilians there. Even the western community is compelled to admit that Putin’s Russia is waging a war aimed at the physical extermination of Chechens as an ethnic group.” 9. An article entitled “Insanity [defence] of Budanov[3] [is] a guarantee of victory for Basayev[4]” (“Невменяемость Буданова – залог победы Басаевa”) commented on the case of a high-ranking Russian officer who was standing trial on charges of torture and murder for the strangulation of an 18-year-old Chechen woman and, in particular, on the judgment of the first-instance court by which the defendant had been found not guilty by reason of temporary insanity. The article, of which the applicant was one of the authors, stated, in particular: “... The whole of Chechnya is filled now with the same Budanovs – maniacs, bloodthirsty sadists, murderers and degenerates in epaulettes. Russia’s whole occupying army consists of those Budanovs.” 10. It also stated that: “... The fact that a [someone who posed a] danger [to] society, an insane maniac was in command of a regiment ... sets a new task before the revolutionary-democratic forces of Russia. From now on we should require immediate compulsory psychiatric examination of all commanders of the military and naval forces, service personnel of the Ministry of the Interior, the border guard, the police and the FSB, starting from a captain and finishing with the Commander-in-Chief – V.V.Putin.” 11. It also appealed: “Let dozens of Chechen snipers take up their positions in the hills and the city ruins and hundreds and thousands of aggressors perish from their holy bullets! No mercy! Death to the Russian invaders!” 12. An article headlined “Accomplices to the murderers of the Chechen people” (“О соучастниках убийства чеченского народа”), authored by a third person, commented on the hostage-taking at the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow in October 2002 and contained the following paragraph: “I, as a national of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya (CRI), who is daily suffering from the Russian State Terror, can understand the reasons which pushed Chechen patriots to this extraordinary act. It had been brought about by the continuing attacks by Russia on the Chechen State and [the Chechen] people. There are no documents condemning the mass murder of nationals of the CRI, to say nothing of Russia’s aggression against the Chechen State ... Chechen patriots, reduced to a state of despair by Russia’s Terror, were compelled to commit this guerrilla act in Moscow, the capital of Russia. In so doing they pursued their sole goal, namely to alert the international community to the total genocide of the Chechen people being cynically committed by the Russian invaders”. 13. The same article mentioned the “national liberation struggle of the Chechen people against the colonial expansion of Russia”. 14. In an article headlined “The Chechen resistance is alive! Maskhadov has visited Dzhokhar and Argun” expressions such as “President Maskhadov”, “President of the CRI”, “Commander-In-Chief of the CRI Maskhadov”, “the capital of the CRI, Dzhokhar” were used. 15. In an article headlined “In memoriam, Salman Raduyev[5]” (“Памяти Салмана Радуева”) the applicant wrote: “Chechen heroes are leaving ... Dudayev, Atteriyev, Khattab and today – Raduyev. As if they would be devoured by a scary black noisome abyss. And the name of this abyss is Russia.” 16. In the same article the applicant stated: “... Salman Raduyev fought against Russia to his last breath, without making compromises with the murderers of his people. His life was an example of how one should fight against Russia. His death has become an example, amongst a million of such examples, of the immeasurable scoundrelism and perfidy of Russia, the pathological falsity and criminality of Russia as a State, as a civilisation, as a subject of history. ... Salman Raduyev is the brightest page [in the history] of the heroic Chechen Resistance movement. He was a hero of an entire generation, not only in Chechnya, but also in Russia. His life and death are a guarantee that damned imperial Russia will be destroyed and the Chechens and all other peoples oppressed by it will finally obtain freedom. We will avenge you, Salman!” 17. In an article entitled “A new joke by Vova” (“Новая шутка Вовы”) the applicant stated: “Lawful convictions issued by the Sharia court of the CRI against national traitors are being executed rigorously.” 18. In the same issue of the newsletter the applicant reproduced information from the website regions.ru regarding a police operation by a unit of the regional Department of the Interior aimed at setting free Uzbek nationals who had been held in slavery by Russian nationals. The applicant headlined that article with the words “Russians have slaves and dare to squawk something about Chechens” (“Русские держат рабов и еще смеют что-то вякать в адрес чеченцев”). 19. In the same issue the applicant published an article headlined “Orthodox [believers] went completely nuts” (“Православные совсем охренели”) in which information had been given about some unidentified “Orthodox theologians” who, in a booklet called “Foundations of the Orthodox Faith” had allegedly claimed that “Jesus Christ [had been] crucified not by Jews but by Chechens”. 20. In an article headlined “‘Chechen syndrome’ inside out” (“Чеченский синдром навыворот”), the applicant wrote: “... Most importantly, we realised with our hearts and skin that Freedom is, indeed, the most precious thing that a man has, the most precious treasure, the only thing worth dying for. And if [an individual is] lucky[, he or she will] take with [him or her]self to the other world at least some enemies, as selfless Chechen women do when they put on their ‘shaheed belts’. The life of a human is in any event brief and fragile and is only worth living if you are free. Otherwise it is better to die at once. As these Chechen women die.” 21. He went on as follows: “... In supporting Chechnya at war, demonstrating our solidarity with Basayev, openly supporting Movsar Barayev in Moscow on the days of the ‘Nord-Ost’ [theatre siege], we crossed a line, a certain border, past which all connections to our past and the environment and people among which we had been born and grown up and lived broke down; we had trustingly considered ourselves to be part of them, until we read on a foreign, enemy website, and saw with our own eyes, all the awful details of the atrocities committed by [our] people in a tiny neighbouring mountain country. Hence, the Rubicon has been crossed, the choice has been made and there is no room to back off – we no longer have any other family than all peoples oppressed by ‘our’ Empire, than partisans fighting to be freed from its yoke, than famous warlords like Basayev and political parties which claim monetary compensation [from Russia] for their occupation and return of the territories Russia has annexed ...” 22. In the same article the applicant stated: “... It is the bloody cannibalistic atrocity of this State towards a tiny and helpless mountain people that first brought this thought into our conscience: Russia must be destroyed forever, a State doing similar things to an entire nation should not exist at all!” 23. An article headlined “Chechnya shielded the Caucasus” (“Чечня заслонила собою Кавказ”), authored by a third person, stated: “... Maskhadov, Basayev, Khattab[6] and other heroes of the Chechen resistance courageously and firmly got in the way of Russia’s aggression and, in fact, saved not only the independence of Chechnya but also its very existence, as well as the existence of other States in the Caucasus ...” 24. In an article entitled “No comments” the applicant stated: “... Putin’s cheap propaganda can jabber as long as it wishes that Maskhadov is a bandit and that he is responsible for the ‘Nord-Ost’ [theatre siege] and the recent explosions in Tushino[7]. Anyone who shows at least some interest in contemporary Chechnya knows that it is Maskhadov who is the legitimate President of Chechnya. And until he is re-elected in accordance with the constitution of the CRI, and not the Russian constitution, any other ‘presidents of Chechnya’ are out of the question. Lawful elections of the president of the CRI under the constitution of the CRI of 1992 will only be possible when the CRI army, headed by Commander-in-Chief Maskhadov, defeats occupying Russia’s illegal armed groups of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Security Service, and chucks them out of the territory of independent Ichkeriya ...” 25. In an article headlined “Retribution-2” (“Возмездие-2”) the applicant stated: “... Retribution for genocide will take place sooner or later. If we live up to it, we will be its witnesses and it would be good to become its punishing sword. Until then we are only capable of organising lamentably small candlelight vigils to commemorate all those killed and tortured in Chechnya, Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland – from the White (Baltic) to the Black Seas – by our State which has become frenzied because of blood. It is impossible to live with this heavy burden in the soul, as the terrible knowledge of Russia’s history requires retribution from all those who remain conscious. It is possible that the hands which hold a commemoration candle today will hold a gun tomorrow – it is hard to believe that but Lord help us to live in the happy time when this happens. For the time being we don’t have any other weapons, except for the alarm bell of our words. ... We remember and grieve for all those killed and tortured by ‘our’ Empire, hated by us. However, a better gift to all Chechens being exterminated will be not [to have] yet another meeting with candles to commemorate their genocide, but each blow struck – even though they are still weak, for now – against the criminal State which is killing them and depriving us of our freedom, mutilating our souls, striving to turn us into butchers and binding us with blood. ‘Less words and more action’ – this is the slogan of slogans of the day! Particularly given that there is much to be done for the radical anti-imperial opposition in the country!” 26. The article also read: “... let Russia spit blood for yesterday’s and today’s genocide of the Chechen people – it serves it right, it deserved it. Let our commemoration candles at the meetings of 23 February turn into flaming torches, in whose purgatorial flames this rotten block, lying in the way of humankind, will burn!” 27. In the same article the applicant wrote: “... As to the writing of inscriptions on the walls of buildings, fences and bus stops, one cannot overestimate the importance of those acts. From today on and until 14 [March 2004[8]] we have to strike persistently at one point: slaves, become free for at least a moment, do not participate in fake ‘elections’! We need not campaign among the limited circle of revolutionaries, human-rights activists, extremists, and members of radical and marginal social groups – they already know everything. Each direct and open appeal to ... the people other than politicised consumers of ... TV cud [тележвачки] is an open and powerful blow to the regime and will hasten its end ...” 28. In the same article the applicant also issued the following call: “... We have to accumulate, hate and keep record of their crimes – the endless list of all those ‘sweep operations’, ‘identity checks’, ‘counter-terrorist operations’, gagging laws, unlawful searches and politically motivated criminal prosecutions. It would also be good to make lists of all those who carried out a particular ‘sweep operation’ in a particular village, who instituted criminal proceedings, on whose information and on which date. It is known from the historical perspective that those people are most of all afraid of personal responsibility, which they would not be able to shift on to their commanders who had given illegal orders. One day executioners in uniforms and narks without uniforms in Moscow, as well as in Chechnya, will be held accountable to us for everything ...” 29. An article headlined “Kremlin looters” (“Кремлевские мародеры”), authored by a third person, criticised the actions of the Russian Army in the Chechen Republic and, in particular, accused them of a large-scale extra‑judicial executions of civilians during a “sweep” operation in a Chechen village in 1995. It also stated: “In Chechnya the Russian Army stopped existing as a military force of the State, having, once and for all, turned itself into a frenzied gang of looters and murderers; a herd intoxicated with drugs.” 30. In his “editorial note” to the “Declaration of the Committee ‘2008: a free choice’” the applicant stated: “We, [the RKO] and Radikalnaya Politika, are united with the Committee and prepared to cooperate with them. Obviously, we are much more radical than them. We consider that we should not wait until 2008[9] and be worried about the Constitution but call on the people to overthrow and liquidate Putin’s regime as soon as possible. We also don’t consider it possible to preserve the contemporary Russian Federation as an integral State. However, we are for a common ground with all our allies, even those who are much more moderate.” 31. On the front page the following statement was published on behalf of the “editorial team”: “Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev[10] died a hero and he will remain [a hero] in the memory of humankind, historians and grateful future generations. He fought the bloody Rusnya[11] as long as he could”. 32. In an article headlined “The price to be paid for genocide” (“Расплата за геноцид”) the applicant wrote: “The explosion in the Moscow metro[12] is justified, natural and lawful ... Chechens have a moral right to blow up everything they want in Russia, after what Russia and Russians have done to them; no objections regarding humanism or love for humankind can be accepted.” 33. In the same article the applicant stated: “It has been ten years since the Russian Federation and its people [began] a totally destructive genocidal war against the Chechen people, who before the war numbered only one million people”. 34. In an article headlined “Will Russia be allowed to participate in the Summer Olympics in Athens?” (“Пустят ли Россию на летнюю олимпиаду в Афинах?”) the applicant wrote: “Russia’s bloody attack on the CRI led to, among millions of other similar bloody consequences, Russia’s security forces’ killing of the ex-President of the CRI, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, who had helped his people to repel this attack.” 35. In eight issues of the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter, in a column entitled “The Good News” (“Благие вести”), the applicant published information which he had copied from various news agencies’ websites, such as Interfax, or websites like strana.ru and KMNews.ru. The information mostly concerned events such as deaths of federal servicemen or law-enforcement officers in the Chechen Republic; violent attacks and assaults on public officials or police officers in various regions of Russia; and so forth. 36. On 23 February 2004 the applicant took part at an unauthorised meeting, where he displayed banners with slogans condemning the current political regime, such as: “Zakayev is not a terrorist, unlike Putin and Co.” (Закаев не террорист, в отличие от Путина и К), “Europe! Do not betray the Chechen resistance!” (Европа! Не предай Чеченское сопротивление!), “Russian invaders – get out of Chechnya” (Русские оккупанты – вон из Чечни!), “When will the Chechen people be freed and rehabilitated?” (Когда будет освобожден и реабилитирован чеченский народ?) and also a flag with the words “Radical Party”. 37. On 10 March 2004, while participating in a meeting at Pushkin Square in Moscow, the applicant, personally and with the participation of an unidentified person, disseminated issues nos. 2 (40) and 3 (41) of the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter and informed people interested in it about the forthcoming issues, how to subscribe and other ways to financially support the newsletter, of which he was the editor-in-chief. 38. On 18 December 2003 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion that the views expressed in the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter amounted to appeals to extremist activities and incitement to racial, national, social and other hatred. 39. A psychological-linguistic expert examination of the texts published by the applicant was carried out. In a report of 13 April 2004 the expert stated, in particular, that the impugned texts contained negative emotional assessments of Russia’s servicemen; of people of Russian ethnicity; and of Orthodox believers. The report further mentioned that, by criticising Russia’s actions in the Chechen Republic, the texts gave negative assessments of Russia, as a State; of the existing political regime; of Russia’s army as a part of the machinery of the State. The report also pointed out numerous expressly negative words and expressions used by the applicants when describing Russia. It also mentioned that the impugned texts positively assessed and justified the actions and activities of a number of Chechen separatist leaders and fighters; terrorist attacks, including explosions, within the territory of Russia. 40. On 26 April 2004 the applicant was formally charged with the above-mentioned offences and on an unspecified date the case was transferred to the Butyrskiy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”) for trial. 41. At the trial, the applicant pleaded not guilty. He confirmed that he had been the editor-in-chief and publisher of the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter but argued that he had printed the newsletter only for himself and had not distributed it. He further argued that he had merely expressed his opinion regarding various political events in Russia, and, in particular, his civic position regarding the ongoing armed conflict in the Chechen Republic. In his words, he had never called for extremist activities or violent overthrow of the existing political regime in Russia; he had only called for a change of the leadership in the country. 42. The District Court called and examined a number of witnesses, who submitted that they had bought the applicant’s newsletter or seen him distribute it for free in public. It also examined the expert who had drawn up the report of 13 April 2004. The expert confirmed his conclusions made in the report. A number of witnesses on the applicant’s behalf were also called and examined. 43. The trial court further examined other pieces of evidence, including the expert report of 13 April 2004; written complaints from eight private individuals in which they had stated that the applicant’s articles had aimed at inciting hatred and had contained insulting language in respect of Russians, Orthodox believers and law-enforcement officers; reports of seizure of issues of the applicant’s newsletter; reports of a search of the applicant’s flat and seizure of his computer; a report on the applicant’s forensic psychiatric examination, which confirmed that he was fully able to understand the meaning of his actions and to control them. 44. The District Court examined the applicant’s arguments and those raised by his defence counsel and dismissed them as untenable on the facts of the case, with reference to the witness statements and other pieces of evidence. (b) Judgment of 20 November 2006 45. In a judgment of 20 November 2006 the District Court found the applicant guilty of “having publicly appealed to extremist activities through the mass media” (Article 280 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code) and of having committed “actions aimed at inciting hatred and enmity as well as at humiliating the dignity of an individual or group of individuals on the grounds of ethnicity, origin, attitude towards religion and membership of a social group, through the mass media” (Article 282 § 1 of the Russian Criminal Code). 46. The trial court established the circumstances of the case, as summarised in paragraphs 6-7 above, and referred to the texts mentioned in the expert report of 13 April 2004 (see paragraph 39 above). It considered that the impugned texts had had a clear extremist leaning and incited actions prohibited by the Suppression of Extremism Act (see paragraph 69 below). In particular, in those texts the applicant had called for extremist acts, such as a forcible overthrow of the constitutional order and the President of Russia; had called for a breach of the territorial integrity of Russia; had justified and glorified terrorist acts; had called for violence against the Russian people and abased their dignity; and had incited religious discord by arguing that the Orthodox faith had been inferior and by insulting its followers. In those texts the applicant had used insulting language in respect of Russia as a State, the political regime in the country, and servicemen of Russia’s armed and security forces. 47. More specifically, the District Court observed that in various issues of his newsletter the applicant had represented the conflict in the Chechen Republic as a war between two States – Chechnya and Russia; had approved of terrorist attacks carried out in Russia, and of the actions of criminals and terrorists aimed at the extermination of the Russian people as a nation. In this respect, the District Court referred to the applicant’s relevant texts in issue no. 1 (27) (see paragraph 16 above) and in issue no. 9 (35) (see paragraphs 21 and 23 above), stating that in those texts, while “mentioning a number of persons implicated in terrorist and extremist activities”, the applicant had used words and expressions aimed at creating positive public opinion about those persons and their criminal acts. 48. The District Court also pointed out that “the texts of the applicant’s articles contain[ed] positive assessment of the bombings in Russia perpetrated by Chechen terrorists as well as the acts of Chechen snipers from illegal armed groups who kill[ed] Russia’s servicemen in Chechnya”. In this respect, it quoted an extract from issue no. 1 (27) (see paragraph 11 above) and extracts from issue no. 3 (41) (see paragraphs 31-32 above). 49. The trial court went on to note that the applicant had qualified Russia’s actions in the Chechen Republic as aggression and had considered the Russian Army to be an occupying force. Accordingly, he “[had] negatively assessed Russia’s actions and those of Russia’s armed forces; similarly negatively [the applicant had] assessed Russia as a State, the Russian Army as a part of the machinery of the State and Russia’s servicemen as a social group”. The District Court continued to state that, on the other hand, the applicant “[had] represented the events in the Chechen Republic as a war waged by Russia against the Chechen people (the Chechen ethnic group) and as genocide against the Chechen people”. The court corroborated these findings with reference to relevant texts published in issue no. 1 (27) (see paragraphs 8 and 12 above) and in issue no. 3 (41) (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above). 50. The District Court also observed that the applicant had justified and positively assessed the acts of Chechen rebel fighters, and that he had regarded the Chechen Republic as an independent State with its own President (A. Maskhadov), capital (Dzhokhar), constitution, armed forces and Commander-in-Chief, courts (Sharia courts) and legislation. In particular, in issue no. 1 (27), the applicant had interpreted the events in the Chechen Republic as “a national liberation struggle of the Chechen people against the colonial expansion of Russia” (see paragraph 13 above), referred to “lawful convictions of the Sharia court of the CRI” (see paragraph 17 above), and mentioned “President Maskhadov”, “President of the CRI”, “Commander-In-Chief of the CRI Maskhadov”, “the capital of the CRI, Dzhokhar” (see paragraph 14 above). Also, in issue no. 3 (41) the applicant published a “decree by President Maskhadov” and in the article “No comments” he praised “President Maskhadov” as “the legitimate President of Chechnya” (see paragraph 24 above). 51. The District Court further referred to the texts in eight issues of the applicant’s newsletter published in the column entitled “Good news” (see paragraph 35 above). It pointed out that the applicant had represented bad events in a positive way, that is to say as actions approved by the authors and by the applicant himself and as an example to be followed. The court pointed out that another example to be followed, according to the applicant, had been actions of Chechen women putting on “shaheed belts”; in the latter respect, the court quoted a relevant extract from the article “‘Chechen syndrome’ inside out” (see paragraph 20 above). 52. The District Court went on to observe that “in all issues of his newsletter ... [the applicant had] wilfully made use of insulting characteristics, negative emotional assessments and attitudes towards ethnic, racial, national, religious and social groups”. In particular, in respect of Russia as a State he had employed such negative emotional references as metaphors “scary noisome abyss”, “bloody cannibalistic atrocity”, “rotten block”; humiliating characteristics “immeasurable scoundrelism, perfidy, pathological falsity” and negative attitudes aimed at destruction (the metaphor “to spit blood”), which, according to the trial court, was a clear indication of an attitude aimed at inciting bloodshed. The court corroborated these findings with reference to relevant extracts from issue no. 1 (27) (see paragraph 15 above), issue no. 9 (35) (see paragraph 22 above) and issue no. 2 (40) (see paragraph 26 above). 53. The District Court also considered that in the article headlined “Insanity of Budanov, a guarantee of victory for Basayev”, “the applicant [had] insult[ed ...] servicemen of the Russian Army and law-enforcement officers by launching an appeal to act criminally against them”. In particular, the court stated that “in that article [the applicant gave] an emotional and negative description of the servicemen of the Russian Army as a social group” (see paragraph 9 above) and “[made] an appeal for actions against [army] servicemen ..., such as requiring an immediate compulsory psychiatric examination of its commanders” (see paragraph 10 above). In support of its relevant findings, the District Court also relied on an extract published in issue 2 (40) (see paragraph 29 above). 54. It went on to state that “by publishing and disseminating the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter [the applicant had] wilfully acted with a view to stirring up enmity and conflict, including armed conflict, on national, racial and religious grounds between citizens living in the European and Asian parts of the country and people living in the Caucasus”. In this respect, the trial court referred to the applicant’s “editorial note” published in issue no. 2 (40) (see paragraph 30 above), observing that in that publication the applicant had “demonstrated a negative attitude towards the existing political system and Russia as a State”. The trial court pointed out that “the stance taken by [the applicant] concerning the liquidation of the existing State regime (“Putin’s regime”) presuppose[ed] not only actions in conformity with the constitution but also the possibility of deviating from it (“to overthrow the regime, without really caring about the Constitution”)”. 55. The court further noted that in the article “Retribution-2” the applicant had referred to “the following acts aimed against the State and the existing political regime in Russia: organisation of meetings concerning events in the Chechen Republic, participation in those meetings, writing inscriptions on the walls of buildings, fences and bus stops” with the contents reflected in the relevant extracts of that article (see paragraph 25 above). The court also stated that “the applicant [had] also suggested carrying out other unlawful acts against the State and the political regime in the texts of his newsletters but [had] failed to specify which”. 56. The District Court then observed that in various issues of his newsletter the applicant had “intentionally appealed for records to be kept of such acts as ‘sweep operations’, ‘identity checks’, ‘counter-terrorist operations’, ‘unlawful searches and politically motivated criminal prosecutions’, which he [had] qualified as ‘crimes’ and the persons who [had] carried them out as ‘executioners in uniforms’ and ‘narks without uniforms’”. The court referred, in particular, to the applicant’s appeal made in the relevant extract from the article “Retribution-2” (see paragraph 28 above). 57. The trial court went on to note that in the article “Orthodox [believers] went completely nuts” (see paragraph 19 above) the applicant had made use of a heading carrying a negative and emotional assessment of the followers of the Orthodox denomination (“went nuts”). However, in the court’s words, “the content of the article [did] not correspond to its title, because it concern[ed] an isolated case (a statement that “Jesus Christ was crucified not by Jews but by Chechens”, contained in a booklet called “Foundations of the Orthodox Faith”); this isolated case [was] generalised from and represented as a typical situation of Orthodox believers by virtue of using the impugned heading”. In the same vein, the District Court pointed out that in issue no. 1 (27) the applicant had reproduced information concerning certain Uzbek nationals held in slavery by certain Russian citizens (see paragraph 18 above). The court noted that the applicant had entitled that article “Russians have slaves and dare squawk something about Chechens” and had represented an isolated fact to the readers as typical and characteristic of all Russians, whereby he had “made a negative and emotional assessment (‘to squawk’) in respect of Russian citizens as a nation”. 58. Moreover, in issues nos. 1 (27) and 9 (35) the applicant had argued that “Orthodox people [православный народ] had been inferior by using insulting characteristics and negative emotional assessments of believers, discriminatory expressions in respect of the Orthodox denomination as a religion and stating that this religion, practised by Russians, should be abolished, thereby abasing the national dignity of the people practising [it]”. According to the trial court, statements regarding the inferiority of the Orthodox faith had been made by the applicant in an attempt to stir up inter‑ethnic and racial conflicts in society so as to cause indignation in society and eventually to call for a change of the existing political regime. The court did not specify which particular articles in the above-mentioned issues contained those characteristics and assessments. 59. Lastly, the court referred to the fact that “at an unauthorised meeting on 23 February 2004 the applicant [had] called on individuals to support his movement by openly displaying banners with slogans condemning the regime” (see paragraph 36 above) and during the meeting of 10 March 2004, “to continue to commit crimes aimed at incitement to hatred and enmity among the population, abasement of dignity of an individual or group of individuals on the grounds of gender, nationality, language, origin or religious beliefs and membership of a social group, the applicant, personally and with a participation of an unidetified person, had distributed issues nos. 2 (40) and 3 (41) of the Radikalnaya Politika newsletter and had informed the persons interested in it about the forthcoming issues, how to subscribe and other ways to financially support the newsletter, of which he had been the editor-in-chief”. In the trial court’s view the applicant thus had called for extremist activities to be supported by way of their financing on a charitable basis. 60. The District Court rejected the applicant’s argument that in the relevant articles he had made no appeals to extremist activities, and, in particular, that he had not called for the overthrow of the constitutional order nor stirred up inter-ethnic discord; and that he supported the constitutional order, the Russian Constitution and the Chechen people’s right to self-determination and had merely availed himself of the right to freedom of expression. The trial court noted, with reference to the expert report of 13 April 2004, that the language used by the applicant in the impugned texts enabled the court to conclude that the applicant’s actions had constituted criminal offences and that he had clearly abused his right to freedom of expression secured by the Russian Constitution. 61. The District Court furthermore dismissed the applicant’s argument that he had been the author of only some of the articles held against him whereas the others had been written by other individuals. The court observed in this connection that the applicant had been the editor-in-chief of the newsletter and, in this capacity, had had the power to shape its editorial direction and he had been responsible for its content. 62. As regards the punishment to be imposed on the applicant, the District Court had regard to the state of his health and the fact that he had no criminal record, had positive references and had a dependant mother. At the same time it stressed the “high social danger” posed by the applicant’s offences and his personality and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. The court also prohibited the applicant from practising journalism for three years to run concurrently. 63. The applicant appealed, referring, among other things, to Article 10 of the Convention and stating that as the editor-in-chief of the impugned newsletter he had expressed in it his personal views concerning political events in Russia and his attitude, as a citizen of that country, to the war in the Chechen Republic. He had not made any appeals for extremist activities and had not declared the superiority of any one religion over another. Nor had he called for the overthrow of the constitutional order, but he had expressed the view that the Government should be changed. The applicant further pointed out that the number of copies of the newsletter in question had been so miniscule that the statements published therein had presented no public danger. He also argued that the measure of punishment imposed on him was excessively severe, given, in particular, the fact that he had no criminal record and had positive references from the place where he lived. 64. On 23 May 2007 the Moscow City Court upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. It stated, in particular, that the applicant’s newsletter had been a mass medium despite the low number of copies produced. It also considered that the first-instance court had correctly established the facts and assessed the adduced evidence and that the punishment imposed on the applicant had been justified in the circumstances of the case. 65. The applicant was released on 21 March 2011 after he had served the prison sentence in full. In his submission, numerous requests by him for release on parole had been refused.

4. The applicant was born in 1976 and is serving a sentence of life imprisonment. 5. In December 2005 violent robberies were committed at two scrap metal collection points in Odesa. One employee was shot dead. In the course of the investigation, the police organised an ambush, which led to the applicant and his acquaintance, Mr D., being arrested. As established by the domestic courts, before his arrest the applicant had pointed a gun at a police officer, who had knocked it out of his hands using a martial arts technique. The gun had been loaded and had had its safety catch released. 6. On an unspecified date the applicant had free legal counsel appointed for him for the pre-trial investigation and the proceedings before the first‑instance court. 7. On 4 September 2006 the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal, sitting as a court of first instance, found the applicant guilty of the illegal handling of arms, robbery with violence, intentional murder for profit and an attempt on the life of a law-enforcement officer. It relied, inter alia, on the statements of several eyewitnesses who had recognised the applicant. Having regard to the fact that the applicant had previously been convicted of the intentional infliction of fatal injuries and that he had committed the crimes at issue while on probation following release in October 2005, the court sentenced him to life imprisonment. 8. The applicant, who was no longer legally represented, appealed in cassation. He complained, in particular, about the absence of free legal assistance at that stage of the proceedings. The applicant contended that the first-instance court had erred in its assessment of the facts of the case and their legal classification. 9. On 30 January 2007, following a hearing with the participation of Mr D. (the other defendant) and his lawyer, as well as the prosecutor, but without the applicant or any representative from his side, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 4 September 2006. 10. On 11 June 2007 the applicant, who was not aware of the above ruling, requested that the Supreme Court ensure his presence at its hearing. 11. On 17 August 2007 a copy of the Supreme Court’s ruling of 30 January 2007 was sent to the applicant.

4. The applicants live in Shnogh village. 5. In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (‘Teghout’) was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6. In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper‑molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7. On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8. The plots of land belonging to the applicants were listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9. The applicants, a family of four, live in Shnogh village and earn their living from agriculture and apiculture. They jointly owned two plots of arable land in the village measuring 0.373 ha and 0.448 ha. They also owned a beekeeper’s house measuring 69.4 square metres situated on the second plot of land. The land was used for growing crops for the family, feeding their livestock and beekeeping. 10. On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicants containing an offer to buy their plots of land. Compensation of 183,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 398 euros (EUR)) and AMD 304,000 (approximately EUR 661) was offered for the two plots of land respectively, plus an additional 15% as required by law. 11. The applicants did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that they tried to obtain an alternative valuation of their property by another company, but did not succeed. They claim that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of their land. 12. On 12 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicants seeking to oblige them to sign an agreement on the taking of their property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on the valuations prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the reports, the market value of the applicants’ plots of land was estimated at AMD 183,000 (approximately EUR 398) and AMD 304,000 (approximately EUR 661) respectively. 13. In the proceedings before the Lori Regional Court the applicants argued that the market value of their land had been underestimated. They further submitted that the valuation of their property had not been carried out correctly, since no account had been taken of the number of trees, the beekeeper’s house situated on the second plot of land, and a number of other factors that should have affected the calculation of the amount of compensation. 14. In the course of the proceedings, Teghout CJSC submitted new valuations of the applicants’ property, also prepared by Oliver Group LLC. The representative of Teghout CJSC stated that a new valuation of the applicant’s second plot of land had been conducted in order to include the building situated on it. According to the new valuations, the market value of the applicants’ second plot of land including the building was estimated to be AMD 1,728,000 (approximately EUR 3,760). As to the first plot of land, it was stated that Oliver Group LLC had prepared a corrected report according to which the market value of the property was AMD 189,000 (approximately EUR 410). The final amounts of compensation for the two plots of land, including the additional 15% required by law, would thus be equal to AMD 217,350 (approximately EUR 473) and AMD 1,987,200 (approximately EUR 4,320) respectively. 15. On 28 November 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC’s claim, awarding the applicants compensation of AMD 217,350 for the first plot of land and AMD 1,987,200 for the second plot of land. 16. The applicants lodged an appeal. Relying, inter alia, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, they complained that the Regional Court had deprived them of their property. 17. On 18 June 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court’s judgment finding, inter alia, that the latter had struck a fair balance between the applicants’ interests and the legitimate aim pursued, and that the market value of the property had been properly determined, on the basis of the corrected valuation reports prepared by Oliver Group CJSC. 18. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those submitted in the previous appeal. 19. On 12 August 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicants’ cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.

5. The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Mardin. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, the applicant was a student at the Philosophy Department of the Faculty of Arts and Science at Dicle University. 6. On 28 March 2006 a funeral of four militants of the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party), an illegal armed organisation, took place in Diyarbakır. 7. An incident report regarding events that took place between 28 March and 1 April 2006 was prepared on 3 April 2006 by the police and was signed by more than 220 officers. It stated that on 24 March 2006 fourteen PKK militants had been killed by the security forces and that the remains of four of the militants were released to their families in order to be buried in Diyarbakır. On 28 March 2006 at around 7 a.m., the remains were taken to a mosque where around 1,500‑2,000 people had gathered. The crowd blocked the traffic as they carried the coffins, chanted separatist, hostile slogans in Turkish and Kurdish in support of the organisation and Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, and waved PKK posters and banners. The crowd then walked to a cemetery for the burial of the deceased. The security forces did not intervene as there were relatives of the deceased, including children and old people, in the crowd. The police report stated that after the burial ceremony had been completed, a group of about 1,000 people continued to march. They were warned by the police that they were not allowed to chant illegal slogans, disseminate propaganda in support of the organisation or wave illegal flags. However, the crowd became agitated and started throwing stones at the police officers on duty, injuring a number of them and causing extensive damage to State buildings and vehicles, banks, shops and other vehicles belonging to private individuals. According to the police report, more people later joined the illegal demonstration, which continued on 29, 30 and 31 March and 1 April. The report further stated that prior to those events some media organs controlled by the PKK had called for mass protests. 8. On 5 March 2007 a demonstration was held on the campus of Dicle University to protest about the conditions of Abdullah Öcalan’s detention, and in particular about his alleged poisoning by the Turkish authorities. A group of forty people entered the university building and asked the students to leave. They held a press conference on the premises of the university and chanted slogans in favour of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan. 9. On 9 March 2007 the applicant was arrested. 10. On 10 March 2007 he was questioned at the anti-terror branch of the Diyarbakır police headquarters where he denied taking part in both the demonstration of 5 March 2007 and the funeral of 28 March 2006 and the subsequent events. 11. On the same day, the applicant made a statement to the Diyarbakır public prosecutor. He was shown photographs that had been taken of him on 28 March 2006 and 5 March 2007 during the funeral and the demonstration at the university. The applicant accepted that he had participated in the funeral of one of the PKK militants. He stated that the militant had been a relative of a friend of his, that he had attended the funeral as a religious duty, but that he had not attacked the police with stones. The applicant also stated that on 5 March 2007 he had stood in front of the university building with other students for a short while and that his photograph must have been taken then. He stated that he had not chanted slogans with the demonstrators. 12. The applicant was brought before a judge of the Diyarbakır Assize Court later that day. He maintained that his statements to the public prosecutor had reflected the truth. The judge remanded the applicant in custody on the basis of a strong suspicion that he had committed the offence of disseminating propaganda in support of a terrorist organisation or its purposes. 13. On 8 May 2007 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicant with the Diyarbakır Assize Court. The applicant was charged with disseminating propaganda in support of the PKK and with membership of an illegal organisation under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) and Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 5237), on the basis of Articles 220 § 6 and 314 § 3 of the same Code. The public prosecutor noted that on 28 March 2006 the applicant had participated in an illegal demonstration held under the pretext of a funeral; had chanted a slogan; and had covered his face with the hood of his coat during the demonstration. The public prosecutor also noted that the applicant had supported the chanting of slogans in favour of the PKK by applauding during the demonstration of 5 March 2007. The public prosecutor further claimed that the applicant had regularly, willingly and knowingly participated in illegal demonstrations organised by political parties, associations and persons who supported the PKK and that therefore he should be punished for membership of an illegal organisation. 14. In support of the indictment, the public prosecutor submitted police video recordings of the funeral held on 28 March 2006 and the demonstration at Dicle University of 5 March 2007 to the court. In the first recording, the applicant was seen in a crowd next to a coffin making a “V” sign. In the second recording the applicant was again seen in a crowd with the hood of his coat on his head. In the third recording, the applicant was seen applauding with other students. 15. On 19 June 2007 the Diyarbakır Assize Court held the first hearing during which the applicant made defence submissions. He stated that he had attended the funeral on 28 March 2006 and that he had briefly participated in the gathering at the university on 5 March 2007. He accepted that he was the person in the photographs. He denied the accuracy of the allegation that he had chanted slogans during the funeral and the demonstration. He noted that he did not remember that he had made a “V” sign, but that he might have done so, along with the rest of the crowd. A witness was also heard by the trial court, and confirmed the applicant’s version of events of 5 March 2007. At the end of the hearing the court ordered the applicant’s continued detention on remand. 16. On 30 November 2007, at the end of the fourth hearing, the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant of membership of an illegal organisation, the PKK, pursuant to Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code, on the basis of Articles 220 § 6 and 314 § 3 of the same Code, and sentenced him to six years and three months’ imprisonment. The applicant was also convicted of two counts of disseminating propaganda in support of the PKK under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, for which he received a sentence of a total of one year and eight months’ imprisonment. 17. The court first gave a summary of the applicant’s defence submissions, the public prosecutor’s observations on the merits of the case and the evidence in the case file. That evidence was the applicant’s statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the judge, dated 10 March 2007; a photograph relating to the funeral of 28 March 2006; printed versions of news articles published by various media in support of the PKK which had been downloaded from the Internet; the arrest and incident reports; reports on the video recordings; a copy of the leaflet distributed at Dicle University on 5 March 2007; reports by experts on the examination of the video recordings; the applicant’s identity documents; and a document showing that he had no previous criminal record. 18. In its judgment, the Assize Court observed, on the basis of the police video recordings and the photographs extracted from those recordings, that the applicant had attended the funeral of four PKK militants on 28 March 2006; that he had walked in front of one of the coffins during the funeral; and that he had made a “V” sign. Noting that the funeral had subsequently turned into propaganda for the PKK-KONGRA/GEL, thus an illegal demonstration, and considering that the applicant had walked close to the coffins, the court considered that the applicant had played an active role in the illegal demonstration. The court noted that it was not established that the applicant had chanted slogans during the funeral. As to the demonstration held on 5 March 2007 at Dicle University, the trial court noted that the applicant had applauded while other demonstrators had chanted slogans in support of Abdullah Öcalan. 19. The Assize Court noted that the funeral of the PKK militants and the demonstration of 5 March 2007 had both been held in line with calls and instructions issued by the PKK. They had subsequently turned into propaganda events in favour of the PKK and had become illegal demonstrations. Hence, the court found it established that the applicant had acted with the intention of supporting the deceased on 28 March 2006 and had acted together with illegal demonstrators on 5 March 2007, thereby committing the offence of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK and its leader. 20. The Diyarbakır Assize Court further referred to a decision dated 22 March 2007 (case no. 2006/9165, decision no. 2007/2432) of the Ninth Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation, in which the latter had considered that the acts of the accused demonstrators (participation in the demonstration of 28 March 2006 after calls for a demonstration had been made by the PKK, in accordance with the latter’s aims; the chanting of slogans in support of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan; singing the PKK’s youth march song; burning tyres and blocking traffic; carrying PKK flags and banners and Öcalan posters; attacking public buildings, as well as police and civilian vehicles with stones and Molotov cocktails; carrying the bodies of the PKK militants who had been killed by the security forces) should be considered as offences committed on behalf of that organisation. The Court of Cassation found therefore that the accused should be punished for those offences and also be convicted of membership of an illegal organisation. Noting that the applicant had acted together with the aforementioned demonstrators on 28 March 2006, the Diyarbakır Assize Court considered that the applicant’s participation in the funeral and demonstration and his conduct at that time had also occurred as a result of instructions and calls by the PKK. The court considered that the applicant had acted on behalf of the organisation, in line with the goals and activities of the PKK, and that therefore he should be punished for not only disseminating propaganda, but also for membership of an illegal organisation. 21. One of the three judges sitting on the bench of the assize court dissented. In his dissenting opinion, the judge stated that neither Article 220 § 6 of the Criminal Code nor the explanatory memorandum on Article 220 § 6 explained the concept of committing an offence on behalf of an illegal organisation. The dissenting judge noted that such an offence should be capable of producing a result for a terrorist organisation and its aims, such as the offences of aggravated injury, kidnapping, deprivation of liberty, murder or bombing. He also noted that such an offence should have devastating repercussions for society when the way of committing the offence, the time of the offence and its effects were taken into consideration. He finally opined that in order to conclude that non-members of an illegal organisation had committed an offence on behalf of that illegal organisation, there should be a decision to commit an offence on behalf of that organisation and an intention to join the organisation in question. The judge therefore concluded that the applicant should only have been convicted under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 22. The applicant appealed. 23. On 29 January 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 30 November 2007 in so far as it related to the applicant’s conviction under Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code, on the basis of Articles 220 § 6 and 314 § 3 of the same Code, for membership of an illegal organisation. The higher court, however, quashed the applicant’s conviction under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 on procedural grounds. 24. On 23 March 2009 the Court of Cassation’s decision of 29 January 2009 was deposited with the registry of the first-instance court. 25. On 28 April 2009 the Diyarbakır Assize Court once again convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 26. On 17 October 2012 the Court of Cassation quashed the applicant’s conviction under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713. 27. On 14 December 2012 the Diyarbakır Assize Court decided to suspend the criminal proceedings against the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, pursuant to Law no. 6352, which had entered into force on 5 July 2012. The suspension was for a period of three years, on the condition that he did not commit an offence when expressing ideas and opinions through the medium of the press or other media, or by any other method. 28. In the meantime, on 25 October 2010 the applicant was expelled from Dicle University by the administrative board of the Faculty of Arts and Science because he had failed to complete his degree within the maximum period of seven years for an undergraduate programme. The case lodged by the applicant against that decision was dismissed by the Diyarbakır Administrative Court on 5 June 2012. The court considered that the fact that the applicant had been serving a prison sentence did not justify his non‑attendance at classes and examinations. 29. After serving four years and eight months of his sentence, the applicant was released from prison on 15 November 2011.

5. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Köthel. 6. In 2004 the applicant began a relationship with X, a married woman who continued to live with her husband, with whom she had six children. In early 2006, X became pregnant and disclosed this to the applicant. In October 2006, she gave birth to a girl. Shortly after, the relationship with the applicant ended. 7. X and her husband, the girl’s legal father, refused the applicant’s subsequent initiatives to have contact with the child. They disputed that the applicant was the biological father but refused to consent to paternity testing. 8. The applicant initiated various proceedings to establish his legal paternity, to have biological paternity testing conducted and to obtain joint custody. His requests were to no avail. 9. On 21 December 2010 the applicant applied to Obernburg Family Court to obtain regular contact with the child, referring to the Court’s judgment in the case of Anayo v. Germany (no. 20578/07, 21 December 2010) delivered on the same day. He claimed to be the child’s biological father and offered to prove this claim by means of an expert’s report. In addition, he made a sworn declaration that he had had sexual intercourse with X around the time of conception. 10. On 9 May 2011 the Family Court dismissed the applicant’s request. It held that the applicant’s paternity had not been established and that, consequently, he could not be granted contact. 11. On 14 June 2011 the applicant appealed. On 16 November 2011 he supplemented his appeal, mainly relying on the Court’s judgment in the case Schneider v. Germany (no. 17080/07, 15 September 2011) and requested contact with the child at least once a month, initially under supervision. 12. On 1 December 2011, the Court of Appeal orally heard the applicant and the child’s legal father. The latter declared that he knew about the relationship between his wife and the applicant and also assumed that there had been sexual contact. In October 2005 the mother had told him and the children that her relationship with the applicant was terminated although he could not rule out, and indeed considered it likely, that she had continued the relationship without his knowledge. He had learned of his wife’s pregnancy in February 2006 and concluded that he was the father. In December 2006 the applicant had told him on the telephone that he was the child’s father. At that moment, the mother had felt relieved that the time of secrets was over. This moment had been a breakthrough for them as a couple and their relationship had improved subsequently. The child had been desired by both. Even assuming that the applicant were the child’s father, he would not agree to any contact because the applicant had caused them much suffering and had to bear the consequences of his behaviour. The proceedings the applicant had instituted were a burden for the couple but did not have a negative impact on the relationship with his wife, but had rather consolidated it. Everyone in the family but the child knew that the applicant believed that he was the child’s father. 13. On 9 February 2012 the Court of Appeal orally heard the child’s mother. At the end of the hearing it informed the parties that it considered contact with the applicant not to be in the child’s best interest for the time being and suggested that the applicant withdraw his appeal. 14. On 21 June 2012 the child’s appointed guardian ad litem (Verfahrenspfleger), a psychologist, furnished a detailed written statement concluding that contact with the applicant would be detrimental to the child’s well‑being at this age. 15. On 17 August 2012 the applicant requested the Court of Appeal to mandate an expert opinion on the question of whether contact would be detrimental to the child or would at least serve her best interest; to hold an oral hearing where the guardian ad litem should explain her written statement; to conduct a paternity test and to hear the child. 16. On 28 September 2012, the Court of Appeal informed the parties that it considered it necessary to hear the child. The child’s guardian ad litem opposed this. She submitted, inter alia, that the child had no knowledge of the applicant’s claims, that the latter could not prove his fatherhood in the absence of a legal basis and that the child’s legal parents had not submitted any proof of their allegations that the mother’s husband was also the child’s biological father. 17. On 29 October 2012 the Court of Appeal heard the six‑year‑old child in the presence of her guardian ad litem only. According to the minutes, the child was aware - without knowing the real reasons - that her parents were in dispute with the applicant, who wanted to visit her or wanted her to visit him, but that neither her parents nor herself agreed to this. 18. On 19 November 2012 the guardian ad litem submitted that the child’s hearing confirmed her written statement of June 2012. 19. On 21 November 2012 the applicant commented on the child’s hearing, submitted a private expert opinion and requested the Court of Appeal to mandate an expert opinion regarding contact rights and to appoint a new guardian ad litem. He further asked the Court of Appeal to inform the child about his application during a new hearing. He added that in the event that his appeal were to be denied, he should receive a written report on the child’s development and two recent photographs every six months. (b) The decision of the Court of Appeal 20. On 13 December 2012 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s requests. It observed, at the outset, that the applicant could not rely on Article 1684 § 1 of the Civil Code as he was not the child’s legal father. He could not rely on Article 1685 § 2 of the Civil Code either, because he had never borne any actual responsibility for the child. The Court of Appeal then addressed the question of whether Article 1685 § 2 of the Civil Code could be interpreted, in the light of the Court’s judgments Anayo and Schneider (cited above), as assuming that a father who was able to prove that he had seriously tried to bear actual responsibility but failed to do so because of the mother’s or legal parent’s resistance, could be considered as having borne actual responsibility within the meaning of this Article. 21. This question could, however, be left open because contact had in any event to serve the child’s best interest. In this respect the Court of Appeal held that it was already contrary to the child’s best interest to address the preliminary question of whether the applicant was the child’s biological father. The child was living in a well-organised and emotionally stable family unit consisting of a father, a mother and other children. The Court of Appeal pointed out that it was convinced that this family union would be destroyed if the applicant’s paternity were established and contact rights ordered. The hearing of the child and the legal parents had shown that in the child’s perception of the world, there was only one father, the mother’s husband. There were no indications that the latter did not assume his role as a father towards the child or assumed it differently than towards his other children. The child was well-integrated in the family, where she felt protected and secure. This assessment was also consistent with the conclusions of the child’s curator ad litem. 22. The Court of Appeal feared that clarifying the question of paternity bore the risk that the family unit would break up, which would have considerable negative consequences on the child because she would lose her essential attachment figures. As it had indicated after the hearing, it held it to be more likely that the applicant was the child’s biological father. This question could, however, ultimately only be determined by a paternity test, to which the child’s legal parents were opposed. The mother affirmed that her husband was the biological father of her daughter and both stood firm against the applicant. According to the Court of Appeal it resulted from the hearing that the legal father trusted, in principle, his wife’s assertions but at the same time had doubts as to his paternity, although he had not explicitly expressed them. In spite of these doubts, and the long-lasting court proceedings, he did not put in question his wife’s statements. The Court of Appeal received the impression that the spouses had barricaded themselves against the applicant as if they were in a corral, as had shown the legal father’s declaration that the legal proceedings did not have a negative impact on the relationship with his wife but had rather consolidated it. The Court of Appeal concluded that the legal father could live with this uncertainty, and that his attitude had no consequences for the child. If, however, the applicant’s biological paternity were to be established, the legal father would realise that his long-standing trust in his wife was not justified. It was not possible to predict the legal father’s reaction, but the manifest risk that the spouses’ marriage would break up could not be dismissed in view of the couple’s past difficulties. The couple’s separation would amount to the breaking-up of the child’s family unit and the loss of her relationships, which would endanger her well-being. 23. The Court of Appeal pointed out that it was aware that, in view of the importance of the child’s well-being, it could be a long time before the preliminary question of paternity could be clarified and years before contact rights could be granted. This might evolve once the child started to ask questions, but for now it was not in her best interest to be confronted with the paternity issue. It was therefore not advisable to tell her about the applicant’s allegations or to substitute the child’s guardian ad litem. 24. The Court of Appeal went on to say that, even assuming that the applicant was the child’s biological father, contact with the applicant was not in the child’s best interest. Due to the highly emotional conflicts between the legal parents and the applicant, and the fact that the applicant had not ruled out that he might tell the child that he was her biological father if he saw her, contact would jeopardise the child’s well-being. Therefore it was not advisable to order an expert opinion regarding the question of whether and how the child would deal with two fathers or whether it was in general advisable to grant children contact with their biological fathers at an early stage. These issues had to be assessed in the light of the extremely tense relations between the applicant and the child’s legal parents, and in view of the predictable consequences for the child if contact were granted. The Court of Appeal added that it could decide on these questions on its own after having orally heard the persons involved, and based on the written statements of the guardian ad litem, an experienced psychologist well-known from other proceedings. 25. As regards the applicant’s request for information the Court of Appeal held as follows: “The applicant’s request for information, claimed in the alternative in his lawyer’s submissions of 21 November 2012, does not exist. Such claim cannot be based on Article 1686, 1st sentence, of the Civil Code because the applicant is not, as required by this provision, the child’s legal father. Whether the provision can be interpreted in the light of the above mentioned decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, as assuming that a biological father can also claim a right for information, can be left open: that would require addressing the preliminary issue of whether the applicant was the child’s biological father. It has already been shown that clarifying this question by ordering a paternity test would be contrary to the child’s well-being.” 26. On 11 February 2013, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s objection alleging a violation of the right to be heard. 27. Previously, on 28 January 2013, the applicant had lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court (no. 1 BvR 844/13). 28. On 18 July 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court informed the applicant that on 13 July 2013, the Law for the strengthening of the rights of biological but not legal fathers had entered into force which, pursuant to Article 1686a of the Civil Code, provided a new possibility for biological fathers to be granted contact and information rights even if they had no social and family relationship with the child (see paragraph 32 below). It added that in court proceedings concerning the enforcement of such rights, the determination of the preliminary question of paternity could be necessary, pursuant to Article 167a § 2 of the Family Matters Act (see paragraph 33 below). It enquired of the applicant whether, under these circumstances, he would withdraw his constitutional complaint. 29. On 13 August 2013 the applicant replied that he would maintain his complaint because, even under the new law, he would not have obtained a more favourable decision. He pointed out that the Court of Appeal had rejected his request for contact rights, even assuming that he was the child’s biological father, since contact did not serve the child’s well-being. The Court of Appeal had thus already decided in the light of the new Article 1686a of the Civil Code. The applicant added that the same reasoning applied to his request for information. Given that, in its view, the determination of paternity would endanger the family unit, the Court of Appeal would refrain from ordering a measure of examination because the legal parents could not reasonably be expected to undergo any examination, under Section 167a § 2 of the Family Matters Act. 30. On 21 September 2014 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint without providing reasons.

5. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Tbilisi. 6. On 23 January 1998 he was arrested on suspicion of manslaughter. 7. On 24 October 2000 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. 8. Subsequently, the applicant was further convicted, by virtue of the judgment of the Krtsanisi-Mtatsminda District Court of 24 December 2004, of refusal to comply with an order of a prison officer at the prison where he was serving his murder sentence. His initial term of imprisonment was consequently extended by one year. 9. On 6 January 2006 the applicant was placed in Tbilisi prison no. 7(“prison no. 7”) to serve the sentences referred to in paragraphs 7-8 above. 10. On 8 August 2006, at approximately 7.30 p.m., prison officers entered the applicant’s cell (no. 2) to conduct a surprise search. All the inmates, including the applicant, were ordered to vacate the cell and wait in the adjacent corridor for the search to finish. 11. The search was filmed by a cameraman from the Prison Service (“the video recording”). Upon completion of the search, a prison officer drew up a written report, according to which a penknife had been discovered “under the mattress on a bed in the cell”; the knife was seized as evidence. It later became apparent that the bed in question belonged to the applicant. The applicant was never presented with the written record on the discovery of the knife and thus did not sign the document. 12. On 11 August 2006 the applicant was charged with possessing an item prohibited under the prison regulations (the offence proscribed by Article 378 § 2 of the Criminal Code), and on 4 September 2006 the prosecutor sent the case to the Tbilisi City Court for trial. 13. The trial started on 12 February 2007. The prison officers who had conducted the search on 8 August 2006 were summonsed by the trial court as witnesses for the prosecution. 14. On the same day, 12 February 2007, the applicant applied to have the Tbilisi City Court examine the seven inmates who had been sharing cell no. 2 with him at the material time. He explained that the cellmates could describe the exact circumstances in which the search of the cell had been conducted. That information was essential for the purposes of assessing whether or not the search had been conducted in a manner involving an abuse of his rights. He brought the court’s attention to the fact that the charge against him was based only on the statements of the prison officers who had conducted the search in question, and who had already been summonsed as witnesses for the prosecution, and that the cellmates had never been interviewed at the pre-trial stage. The applicant referred in that regard to the principle of the equality of arms and his right to have witnesses on his behalf give testimony under the same conditions as those against him, within the meaning of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention. He also cited Article 18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, pursuant to which the trial court was obliged to take all necessary procedural measures aimed at the establishment of the relevant circumstances of the case in a comprehensive and objective manner. 15. In reply to the applicant’s application, the prosecutor argued that examining the cellmates would not be justified, given that all of them were serving criminal sentences. However, the prosecutor reaffirmed the importance of examining the prison officers who had conducted the search of the cell on 8 August 2006. 16. Having heard the parties’ pleadings, the Tbilisi City Court decided by its ruling of 12 February 2007 to refuse the applicant’s application for the cellmates to be examined as unsubstantiated. The court stated that the accused had not sufficiently demonstrated the necessity for summonsing those witnesses who, it should be noted, were not trustworthy people as they had criminal convictions. 17. As is apparent from the transcript of the trial, when questioned in the period between 12 and 21 February 2007 by the trial court as witnesses for the prosecution, the prison officers gave statements concerning the exact circumstances in which the knife had been discovered that were somewhat different. In particular, one of the officers submitted that the knife had been found “in the bed, between the mattress and the blanket, closer to the footboard” while another stated that it had been hidden “in [the applicant’s] bed, between the mattress and the sheet, closer to the headboard, near the pillow”; yet another officer stated that “the knife fell onto the floor the moment we took the mattress off the bed”. That inconsistency was seized upon by the applicant before the trial court. The prison officers also submitted that, in so far as the door of the cell had been left open during the search, the cellmates could have observed the process from the adjacent corridor (see paragraph 10 above). 18. The video recording was shown during the trial on 23 February 2007. The applicant objected that the recording did not necessarily establish that the knife had fallen from his mattress (the recording is described in more detail in paragraphs 25-26 below). As is apparent from the transcript of the trial, the public prosecutor conceded that the video recording of the search did not establish with certainty where exactly the knife had been found. However, the prosecutor argued again that the prison officers’ statements before the trial court confirmed that the knife had been discovered in the applicant’s possession. 19. The applicant further complained during his last pleading before the trial court on 23 February 2007 of the inability to have the witnesses on his behalf, the seven cellmates, examined under the same conditions as those for the prosecution. Notably, he argued that, even assuming that the knife had indeed been found in his bed by the prison officers, that fact did not necessarily mean that he had owned it; the prohibited item could have been discreetly planted in his bed by a cellmate or cellmates the moment the prison officers entered the cell with the intention of conducting a search. Therefore, in order for the trial court to obtain the fullest possible picture of the situation, it was essential to examine all of his cellmates. He also reiterated that his cellmates might have been a source of information about any possible abuses committed by the prison officers during the search. 20. By a judgment of 1 March 2007 the Tbilisi City Court convicted the applicant of possessing a prohibited item in prison (the offence proscribed by Article 378 § 2 of the Criminal Code). He was sentenced to three years in prison. The court confirmed that the prison officers’ statements, the video recording and the written record of the search of the cell and the seizure of the knife constituted the incriminating evidence. 21. On 30 March 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment of 1 March 2007, reiterating all the arguments that he had made during the trial. In particular, in his complaint about the lower court’s refusal to examine his cellmates, he asked the Tbilisi Court of Appeal to do so. Reiterating his previous arguments as to why he considered the cellmates to be important witnesses (see paragraph 19 above), he argued that, without examining them, it would not be possible for the appellate court to establish objectively the real circumstances surrounding the search of 8 August 2006. The applicant also requested that the video recording be reviewed by the appellate court as it did not necessarily establish that the knife had been found in his bed. 22. The public prosecutor’s office also appealed against the sentence imposed by the judgment of 1 March 2007, requesting that, given the applicant’s previous criminal record, a more severe punishment be imposed. 23. By a judgment of 3 October 2007 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld that of the public prosecutor. As regards the applicant’s procedural application for summonsing his cellmates as witnesses, the appellate court rejected it as unsubstantiated. It further confirmed that the criminal case file contained sufficient incriminating evidence against him. The court, informed by the consideration of the applicant’s previous criminal record, decided to increase the sentence from three to four years. 24. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, reiterating all his above-mentioned complaints and arguments, was rejected as inadmissible by the Supreme Court of Georgia on 11 February 2008. The cassation court dispensed with an oral hearing and delivered its final decision on the basis of the written procedure only. 25. The recording showed how several plain-clothes individuals, identifiable as prison officers by their manner, conducted a search of a prison cell. 26. In one of the scenes, the officers took the mattress, whose cover seemed to be intact, from the metal bed frame in the cell. Holding it approximately 1 metre above the floor, the officers started examining the mattress with their hands and a metal detector. Suddenly, there was a sound of metal hitting the floor, and an officer picked up an object, which resembled a small penknife. It was not clear from the recording whether or not that object had fallen from the mattress. 27. According to the medical documents available in the case file, on 7 November 2007 the applicant complained for the first time to the prison administration of a high fever and a dry cough. On 10 November he was transferred to the prison hospital. 28. Between 10 and 13 November 2007 the applicant was subjected to a number of laboratory tests, including a full biochemical analysis of his blood samples, and consultations with various medical specialists. The resulting opinion, dated 13 November 2007, diagnosed the applicant with pulmonary tuberculosis (TB), with the upper part of his left lung already seriously affected by the disease (in an advanced stage of disaggregation). The applicant was occasionally coughing up blood. The opinion further diagnosed the applicant with viral hepatitis C (HCV), with the disease in its early stage at that time. 29. Having regard to the medical opinion of 13 November 2007, a panel of doctors of the prison hospital elaborated a treatment plan for the applicant’s TB and HCV. Notably, given the stages of the two diseases at that time and the known side-effects of the anti-TB and anti-HCV drugs, the doctors recommended that the applicant firstly be provided with anti-TB medication under the DOTS programme (Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course – the treatment strategy for detection and cure of TB recommended by the World Health Organisation). He was prescribed daily doses of conventional antibiotics such as isoniazid (300 mg), ethambutol (1,100 mg), rifampicin, pyrazinamide (1,600 mg) and streptomycin (1,000 mg). Only upon completion of the anti-TB treatment, could the applicant start receiving, in the doctors’ view, antiviral drugs for his HCV, such as interferon alpha-2b and ribavirin; the exact dosage of the intake of the latter drugs were to be determined in due course. 30. According to his medical file, the applicant started receiving the anti-TB medication under the DOTS programme from 13 November 2007. During the intensive period of the treatment, which lasted three months, the applicant was kept in the prison hospital under the close supervision of medical personnel with the appropriate training. Upon completion of the intensive phase of the treatment, the applicant was transferred on 12 February 2008 back to prison no. 7, where he continued his course of antibiotics under the supervision of a doctor of that prison for an additional five months. 31. Throughout his treatment, both at the prison hospital and in prison no. 7, the Prison Service arranged regular tests of the applicant’s sputum culture and bacterial sensitivity to be carried out by the National Centre for Tubercular and Lung Diseases. The results of those tests showed that the sputum culture was already negative and also established that the applicant’s TB bacteria were still sensitive to the administered antibiotic drugs, which confirmed the suitability of the ongoing treatment. 32. Upon completion of the DOTS programme on 13 January 2008, the applicant’s sputum culture was subjected to another set of comprehensive laboratory tests, the results of which confirmed that TB bacilli were no longer present in the applicant’s organism. The results of an X-ray examination of the applicant’s thorax further confirmed that there were no new tubercular signs in the applicant’s lungs. 33. Subsequently, on 5 December 2008 and 11 February 2010, the applicant repeatedly underwent additional medical check-ups, which included the relevant laboratory tests and X-ray examinations, the results of which excluded any signs of a recurrence of the tuberculosis. 34. In May 2010, in line with the medical opinion of 13 November 2007 (see paragraph 28 above), the Prison Service arranged for a full biochemical analysis of the applicant’s blood for the purpose of elaboration of a specific treatment plan for his HCV. The results of the blood analysis, dated 17 May 2007, showed that the viral activity in the applicant’s organism was low. 35. Based on the above-mentioned blood test, an infectologist and a hepatologist called in by the Prison Service from civilian hospitals prescribed the applicant on 2 June 2010 a specific dosage of the relevant anti-HCV drugs. He was extensively informed by the doctors of the possible strong neurological side-effects of the prescribed drugs. Having regard to those side-effects, as well as the fact that the viral activity of the HCV was still low at that time, the applicant decided to postpone the treatment. He wrote a note to that effect, which was dated 2 June 2010. 36. The case file does not contain any other information on the applicant’s state of health as of June 2010.

4. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Co. Roscommon. 5. In November 1999 the applicant purchased a newly-built house, which has been her dwelling place since then. The sale took the form of two agreements. The first was an agreement to purchase the land from the owners, Mr and Mrs F, for the sum of 5,000 Irish pounds (IEP) (approximately 6,350 euros). The second was a building agreement under which she paid IEP 80,000 (approximately 101,600 euros) to a building company called T and C Developments Ltd. The company was owned by Mr and Mrs F, who were the only shareholders. The house was covered by a guarantee provided by a company known as Homebond. 6. From the time she moved into the house in March 2000, the applicant noted major structural defects in the property. She reported this to Homebond in September 2001. The company carried out an inspection of the house and, in September 2002, offered to make certain repairs to it in accordance with the terms of the guarantee. According to the applicant, Homebond refused to issue an Engineer’s certificate/guarantee upon the completion of the works, which would have been required if the applicant were to sell the house afterwards. 7. In February 2003 the applicant instituted proceedings in the High Court against the parties mentioned above, i.e. Mr and Mrs F (first and second defendants), T and C Developments (third defendant), and Homebond (fourth defendant). A fifth defendant was included in the action, a Mr Q, who, as an engineer, had certified that the house was in compliance with the relevant building regulations. In March 2003, Mr Q’s company was named as the sixth defendant. The applicant filed her statement of claim in May 2003. 8. Over the following months, she wrote several times to the solicitors for the first three defendants requesting that they deliver their defence, on each occasion offering some additional time for this purpose. By December 2003 these defendants had not yet delivered their defence, at which point the applicant applied to the High Court for a judgment in default of defence against them. 9. The statement of claim was not served on the fourth defendant until December 2003, an oversight that the applicant attributed to her solicitors. The fourth defendant entered its defence to the plaintiff’s claims in May 2004. 10. In January 2004 the High Court ordered the first three defendants to deliver their defence within three weeks. In March 2004, the applicant agreed to allow an additional 21 days for them to file their defence. 11. In July 2004 the applicant again applied to the High Court for a default judgment against the first three defendants, in light of their failure to enter their defence to the action. The defence was filed in September 2004. While it was presented as the defence of the first and second defendants, it was clarified at a later stage in the proceedings (in mid-2009), that it also concerned the third defendant. 12. On 20 December 2004, at the request of the applicant, the High Court gave a default judgment against the fifth and sixth defendants (Mr Q and his company), holding them liable to the applicant in damages and for costs. According to the judgment, these sums were to be assessed at a future date. The judgment was never enforced. The applicant explained that she received legal advice to the effect that the practice was to hold over such judgments until the case had been heard and damages assessed. She added that at a later stage in the proceedings (2009/2010) she received legal advice that the default judgment had by then expired. 13. According to the applicant, in the years 2005-2008 her solicitors considered it more effective to engage principally with the fourth defendant, Homebond, in light of the guarantee on the house. Homebond made a proposal to the applicant in June 2006 to carry out remedial work on the house. Her solicitor sought clarification of the proposal, writing several times between December 2006 and February 2008 when Homebond replied. The applicant indicated her readiness to accept the proposal. However, when subsequently requested to assign her rights to Homebond she sought clarification of the matter from the company, writing in April 2008 and again in April 2009. 14. On 20 April 2009 the High court granted a motion brought by the applicant’s solicitor to cease to represent her. From that point onwards, she acted as a lay litigant. 15. On 22 April 2009 the applicant gave notice of intention to proceed with her case to all of the defendants, a necessary step under domestic law where proceedings have been dormant for more than one year (Order 122 r. 11 of the Rules of the Superior Courts). 16. On 20 July 2009 the High Court struck out the applicant’s motion for a judgment in default of defence. The applicant sought to appeal this ruling to the Supreme Court, requesting additional time for this purpose in September 2009, which the Supreme Court refused to allow on 16 October 2009. 17. On 13 October 2010 the applicant again gave notice of her intention to proceed. The following month, she was informed by solicitors for Homebond that the offer made in 2002 was still valid. 18. On 12 September 2011 the applicant once more issued notice of her intention to proceed. In November 2011 she sought a trial date and was informed that a hearing would take place in March 2012, later moved to April 2012. At that point it was suggested by a High Court judge that the parties could attempt to resolve the dispute by mediation. The applicant explored this option but did not pursue it when it became clear, by June 2012, that some of the defendants were not interested. By this stage she had been informed that the sixth defendant had gone into voluntary liquidation. In July 2012 the applicant was informed that the case would be heard in early 2013. 19. The case was not heard as a single action. Only the fourth and fifth defendants appeared (the latter only briefly) at the hearing that commenced on 29 January 2013. The first three defendants, although given notice of the hearing, were not represented at it. The High Court’s ruling, given on 20 March 2013, therefore only considered the claims against Homebond and Mr Q. The judge ruled that Homebond was liable to the applicant under the terms of the guarantee. Although the guarantee set an upper limit of IEP 30,000 (approximately 38,100 euros), the judge considered that in the circumstances of the case it was justified to award the full amount of the estimate for repairs, approximately 51,000 euros. The judge dismissed the case against Mr Q, and observed that the real fault lay with the builder. 20. On 10 April 2013 the High Court issued an order against the fourth defendant for the amount awarded to the applicant. 21. On 15 May 2013 the same judge dealt with the case against the first three defendants. She held them jointly and severally liable to the applicant in damages for 94,082 euros. 22. Homebond sought to appeal the judgment and order against it. For this it was required to serve the notice of appeal personally on the applicant within twenty-one days. According to the elements in the case-file, the company’s solicitors tried unsuccessfully to arrange service on the applicant. They subsequently applied to the Supreme Court for additional time to appeal, which was granted on 14 June 2013. 23. The applicant brought a cross appeal, claiming that the High Court had wrongly failed to award her legal costs. 24. In October 2014 the applicant sought to have the appeal struck out for lack of prosecution by Homebond. This was not granted. Instead, ruling on 10 October 2014 the Supreme Court granted her two weeks to make her submissions on the question of costs. The applicant filed her submissions the following week. 25. On 28 October 2014 many pending appeals were transferred from the Supreme Court to the new Court of Appeal, including the Homebond appeal. 26. In November 2014, the Court of Appeal directed the parties to file their respective submissions within two weeks, granting a short extension of this deadline the following month. On 19 December 2014 it set a hearing date of 23 February 2015. On the latter date it allowed Homebond’s appeal and dismissed the applicant’s cross appeal. 27. On 10 June 2013 the first and second defendants filed a notice of appeal against the judgment of the High Court. 28. On 8 July 2013 the High Court made a garnishee order attaching monies owed by a commercial bank to the first and second defendants in the amount of the damages awarded to the applicant. 29. On 26 July 2013 the Supreme Court granted to the defendants a stay on the award of damages, on condition that they pay into court the sum of 45,000 euros within a period of three months, failing which the stay would lapse. The payment was not made. An application by the defendants to put forward property deeds in lieu of money was refused by the Supreme Court on 22 November 2013. 30. The applicant obtained a judgment mortgage against the defendants on 29 October 2013. 31. On 24 January 2014 the Supreme Court again refused an application from the defendants to stay the judgment of the High Court. It also refused to lift the garnishee order and to vacate the judgment mortgage obtained by the applicant. 32. On 11 July 2014 the Supreme Court refused an application from the applicant to strike the appeal out for lack of prosecution. It directed the defendants to file their books of appeal within ten weeks, failing which the appeal would be dismissed. 33. The appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeal, which indicated on 19 November 2014 that it would first consider the issue of the liability of the first and second defendants, and set a short deadline for the parties’ submissions on this. 34. The hearing took place on 9 March 2015. The Court of Appeal set aside the judgment of the High Court, holding that as a matter of law Mr and Mrs F were not liable to the applicant for the defects in the house since they had simply sold her the land and were not themselves party to the building agreement. There could only be a remedy against the third defendant, T and C Developments Ltd., with whom the applicant had concluded the agreement in 1999. 35. The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against this judgment. On 29 July 2015 the Supreme Court refused to grant leave.

5. The applicants were born in 1988, 1982, 1984 and 1987 respectively. At the material time all four of them were serving their respective prison sentences in Rustavi Prison no. 1. 6. At about 1 p.m. on 30 March 2009 the applicants were arrested in a yard behind the prison during an alleged attempt to flee. The applicants and the Government have submitted different accounts of the circumstances surrounding their arrest. 7. According to the applicants, they left the confinement area through an open door. Then they climbed up a two-metre high wall with the assistance of scaffolding attached to it at the time and jumped down into the back yard. There, they were attacked by prison officers who severely beat them with wooden sticks and iron pipes. The second and third applicants, together with another prisoner, R.G., hid in a truck parked nearby to avoid the beatings, while the first and fourth applicants surrendered immediately. After the arrest the applicants were placed in a punishment cell where their beating continued. 8. The Government admitted that the applicants had been injured on the day of the incident, but submitted that they had sustained all the injuries either as a result of falling from a prison wall that was under construction at the time or as a result of the necessary physical force to which the prison officers had had to have recourse in order to effect their arrest. The Government further submitted that whereas the second and third applicants had resisted the prison officers during their arrest, the first and fourth applicants had immediately surrendered. 9. On the day of the incident the Investigation Department of the then Ministry of Corrections and Legal Aid (“the Ministry of Prisons”) opened a criminal investigation into the circumstances of the applicants’ attempted escape. The investigator in charge of the case questioned the applicants, who blamed all their injuries on a fall from a prison wall. On the same date, the investigator commissioned an expert from the National Forensic Bureau who visually examined all those injured and issued reports in respect of the first, second and third applicants as well as the prison officers on 7 April 2009 and in respect of the fourth applicant on 16 April 2009. The examinations of the applicants were conducted in the presence of the investigator. 10. The medical expert concluded, in respect of all the applicants, that the injuries could have been caused by blows with a hard blunt object(s) inflicted at the time of the escape attempt. He further concluded that the injuries concerned were of minor severity and had not caused the third and fourth applicants long-lasting effects on their health. The extent and nature of the injuries sustained by each of the applicants, as recorded by the expert, were as follows: 11. It was observed that the first applicant had multiple abrasions on his chest, nose, forehead, cheeks, right ear, upper left arm, right shoulder and on both knees. His nose was bleeding and swollen. His lower left eyelid was bruised and swollen and he had a cut which was slightly bleeding on his tibia. The forensic expert further noted that during the examination, the applicant had complained of pain in the chest. 12. It was observed that the second applicant had multiple haematomas from his shoulders to his back and on his right cheek; abrasions on the right shoulder and on the back of his right hand; multiple scratches on the right side of his neck; and a deep scratch on the left thigh, covered with scabbing. 13. It was observed that the third applicant had multiple abrasions on the right forearm; an abrasion on the back of the fifth finger of his left hand; and cuts which were slightly bleeding on his head, on the left temple and crown. 14. It was observed that the fourth applicant had multiple haematomas on the chest, right elbow, and below the left eye; abrasions on the forehead and knee; a scratch on the right thigh; and a laceration which was slightly bleeding on the crown of the head. 15. According to the forensic expert reports issued on 7 April 2009 (as cited in the Court of Appeal judgment of 25 March 2010 against the applicants), it was observed that prison officer Z.Ch. had an abrasion on his forehead; V.M. had a haematoma on his face; and O.T. had multiple abrasions on his feet and hands. 16. In October and November 2009 when the applicants were allowed to testify before the court in the criminal proceedings against them, they stated that they had been ill-treated during their arrest. All of them withdrew the statements they had given during the pre-trial investigation. The first and second applicants claimed in that connection that pre-typed texts of statements had been given to them by the investigator and that they had been forced to sign those statements without reading them. 17. On 29 December 2009 the Rustavi City Court convicted all the applicants of attempted escape from prison (an offence under Article 379 of the Criminal Code of Georgia). The second and third applicants were also found guilty of resisting prison officers in the exercise of their duties (an offence under Article 378 of the Criminal Code of Georgia). Their conviction was upheld by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal on 25 March 2010. Before the courts of first and second instances, the applicants maintained their ill-treatment allegations, which were not, however, addressed by the courts. By a decision of 26 July 2010 the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected as inadmissible an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicants. 18. On 10 November 2009 all the applicants, except for the fourth one, complained to the Chief Prosecutor of Georgia of ill-treatment on 30 March 2009 and requested the initiation of criminal proceedings in line with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. On 11 November 2009, the prosecutor forwarded the applicants’ complaint to the judge examining the case against the applicants, considering it relevant for the on-going trial proceedings. 19. On 1 February 2010 the applicants enquired about the progress of the investigation, complaining that none of them had been questioned in connection with their allegations of ill-treatment. 20. On 19 February 2010 a panel of independent forensic experts called by the second and third applicants issued forensic reports concluding that the two applicants suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder which could have been derived from the applicants’ ill-treatment. Based on the forensic reports issued by the National Bureau of Forensics on 7 April 2009 (see paragraph 9 above), the panel further concluded that the applicants concerned could have sustained the injuries described in those documents as a result of ill-treatment. The two applicants provided the Office of the Chief Prosecutor with the forensic reports in relation to their complaints. 21. On 3 March 2010 the fourth applicant also lodged a criminal complaint of ill-treatment with the Office of the Chief Prosecutor. 22. On 8 July 2010 the applicants, acting through the Office of the Public Defender of Georgia (“the PDO”), lodged yet another complaint. By a letter of 30 July 2010 they were informed that a preliminary enquiry had been opened on 22 July 2010 under Article 123 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (causing severe or minor injuries by use of excessive force). 23. On 15 December 2010 and 13 January 2011 all four applicants, acting through their lawyer, wrote again to the Office of the Chief Prosecutor enquiring about the progress of their case. In their letter of 13 January 2011, they also denounced the fact that their ill-treatment allegations against the prison authorities were being investigated by the very same authorities – the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Prisons. On 31 March 2011 the applicants’ letter was forwarded to the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Prisons, but was left unanswered. 24. In April 2011 the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Prisons conducted the first investigative interviews in connection with the applicants’ alleged ill-treatment. Throughout the subsequent months an investigator from the Ministry of Prisons interviewed the prison governor and four prison officers who had been involved in the incident, including those who had arrested the applicants. They all denied having beaten the applicants. Two of them claimed that all of the applicants had sustained their injuries by falling from the wall while they had been fleeing from the prison. One of the officers (O.G.) stated that the first and fourth applicants had surrendered without resistance or complications. The three prison officers who had been injured during the incident (V.M., O.T. and Z.Ch.) admitted that they had had recourse to physical force in order to arrest the second and third applicants, but they denied that the applicants had sustained any injury therefrom. Rather, they attributed all the applicants’ injuries to their alleged fall from the wall. 25. As regards the details of the arrest of the second and third applicants, Z.Ch., V.M. and O.T. stated that the two, together with another prisoner, R.G., had attempted to escape in a truck that had been parked in the back yard of the prison. After driving a short distance, the truck had stopped all of a sudden. The prison officers had then approached them and ordered them to surrender. The three prisoners had resisted arrest while they had been in the truck cabin. According to O.T., R.G. had been trying to restart the vehicle. The officers had managed to capture the applicants only after receiving help from additional prison staff. 26. The investigator also interviewed the four applicants, who confirmed the allegations of ill-treatment they had made in their criminal complaints. In particular, they stated that they had been severely beaten with wooden sticks and iron pipes immediately after their arrest and as a result, the first, second and fourth applicants had passed out several times. When they had regained consciousness, the beatings had resumed. The applicants also named those prison officers who had been involved in the beating. They denied that they had sustained their injuries as a result of falling from the wall. Only the fourth applicant admitted that he had slightly injured his leg when he had jumped from the wall, but said that he had received the remaining injuries from the beating. 27. The second and third applicants further claimed that on the day of the incident pre-typed texts of statements had been given to them by the investigator and that they had been forced to sign these statements without reading them. The fourth applicant stated that he had felt sick after the ill‑treatment, so he had been unable to adequately judge reality and had signed the interview record without scrutinising it. He further stated that the next day after the incident he had been transferred to Ksani Prison no. 15, where, upon his arrival, he had been beaten by the Governor of the prison. Subsequently, he had been regularly threatened and warned not to lodge a complaint about his ill-treatment. The second and third applicants also claimed that D.Ch., head of the Prison Service of the Ministry of Prisons and other senior officials of the agency had promised them leniency in respect of their escape attempt in return for remaining silent about their ill‑treatment. 28. The investigator also interviewed R.G., who was arrested together with the applicants while fleeing. He essentially confirmed the applicants’ account of the events and further claimed that the prison governor, D.S., while physically and verbally abusing the applicants, had called a guard to shoot them, but the latter had not complied with the order. 29. The forensic medical examination reports of April 2009 obtained as part of the investigation conducted against the applicants in the prison escape case were included in the investigation file concerning the applicants’ alleged ill‑treatment. 30. On 17 September 2011 in response to a complaint lodged by the applicants about the ineffectiveness of the investigation, the prosecutor informed them that they were just witnesses in the matter and had no standing to lodge a complaint. 31. On 13 March 2012, the PDO, acting on behalf of the applicants, requested the Office of the Chief Prosecutor information about the status of the investigation. The PDO was notified that several witnesses had been interviewed and that the investigation was on-going. 32. On 20 August 2012 the prosecutor decided to discontinue the proceedings for lack of evidence of a crime. The prosecutor fully accepted the version of events put forward by the prison officers, concluding that the applicants could have been injured when they had jumped down from a wall whilst fleeing from the prison. The prosecutor also noted that the prison officers had been forced to use physical force against the applicants to effect their arrest, but made no conclusion as to whether the applicants had sustained their injuries therefrom. The applicants were not informed about the decision. 33. On 21 October 2013 the applicants wrote yet another letter to the Office of the Chief Prosecutor enquiring about the status of the investigation, but received no reply. Hence, on 19 June 2014 the applicants’ lawyer sent an additional complaint. 34. By a letter of 21 July 2014, the applicants were informed that a decision had been taken on 20 August 2012 to discontinue the relevant proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Weinheim. He is a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website (babycaust.de). At the time of the proceedings outlined below, the website included, among other things, the following content. 6. On the starting page a picture of graves was shown and the text underneath read “then: Holocaust”. Upon clicking on the picture, the user was directed to a page titled: “Abortion – the new Holocaust?” on which the Holocaust was compared to abortions. On the left margin of the starting page, there were several links, of which one was called “Life or death?”. Upon clicking on it, the user was directed to a page with the headline “Prayer requests for Germany”. From that page, the reader was directed to a location-based alphabetical list mentioning the names and practice addresses of doctors who performed abortions in Germany, and to a request for prayers for those doctors. At the very bottom of the same page, under the highlighted text “German contemporary history in brief”, a sentence read: “Perverted doctors murder unborn children at the request of the mothers” (Pervertierte Ärzte ermorden im Auftrag der Mütter die ungeborenen Kinder) On the same page, clicking on the button “close page” forwarded the user to a page where it was stated: “Pray, if possible regularly, for the doctors ... who personally undertake the AGGRAVATED MURDER of abortion killing” (Beten Sie – wenn möglich regelmäßig – für die Mediziner ..., welche den MORD der Abtreibungstötung selbst vornehmen ...) (Emphasis in original). Somewhat farther down on the same page, it was stated that counselling centres that issued certifications: “... are enabling and facilitating the unpunished aggravated murder of children in their mother’s womb.” (... ermöglichen und begünstigen einen straffreien Kindermord im Mutterschoβ.) 7. One of the doctors listed on the applicant’s website, Dr Q., sought a civil injunction ordering the applicant to remove his name and address from the website. 8. On 23 May 2006 the Mannheim Regional Court rejected Dr Q.’s application on the grounds that it was a fact that Dr Q. performed abortions and that the remainder of the website’s content was covered by the applicant’s freedom of expression. It observed, in particular, that the present case was not comparable to similar cases which had concerned an interference with personality rights by the distribution of personalised leaflets. The publishing of a doctor’s name on a list of abortion performing doctors had no comparable “pillory effect”. 9. Subsequently Dr Q. appealed and – during the appeal proceedings – modified his application, seeking a civil injunction ordering the applicant to desist from labelling abortions, such as those performed by Dr Q., “aggravated murder”. 10. On 28 February 2007 the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal granted the sought injunction. The court held that the applicant’s website led it to be understood that abortions performed by Dr Q. constituted “aggravated murder”. While the term “aggravated murder” did not have to be understood in a merely legal sense but could also be understood as a moral judgment, the overall presentation of the website at the very least did not exclude a reading that Dr Q. had perpetrated the criminal offence of aggravated murder. Even though the applicant had pointed out that abortions were exempt from punishment, he had not referred to section 218a of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 14 below), which exempted abortions as performed by Dr Q., from criminal liability. In addition, the applicant had emphasised the term “aggravated murder” in the relevant parts of the website and had compared abortions with the Holocaust. In sum, the statements of the website could be understood as a personalised accusation against Dr Q. of perpetrating aggravated murder. 11. On 29 May 2007 the Federal Court of Justice refused a request by the applicant for legal aid on the grounds that the applicant’s intended appeal on points of law lacked sufficient prospect of success. 12. On 2 July 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit a complaint by the applicant for adjudication for being inadmissible, without providing reasons (no. 1 BvR 1663/07).

5. The applicants purchased licences for gambling operations for the periods indicated in the Appendix. They (except the third applicant; see paragraphs 43-47 below) operated gambling businesses. The licences were prepaid for the entire period for which they were issued. The applicants each paid the amount in Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) equivalent to 150,000 euros (EUR) for the licences (see paragraph 63 below). The licences were revoked by operation of law on 25 June 2009 (see paragraph 15 below). 6. On 23 December 2008 the Cabinet of Ministers introduced a bill in Parliament on regulation of gambling operations. The bill proposed detailed rules for comprehensive regulation of commercial gambling operations, such as a new licensing system and a number of regulatory requirements (see paragraph 78 below). The bill envisaged that the resulting law would come into force thirty days after enactment and that the entities holding gambling licences under the old system would have a year from that day to comply with the new set of requirements; their licences would remain in effect for the periods for which they were issued. On 26 December 2008 Parliament adopted the bill at its first reading. 7. On 18 March 2009 the relevant parliamentary committee approved its amended text for the second reading. 8. On 26 March 2009 two members of parliament introduced a bill which proposed a total prohibition on gambling, to come into force on 1 January 2010. In an explanatory note the authors stated that gambling was developing rapidly, leading to a rise in crime, and that an increasing number of children and young people were being drawn into it (see paragraph 147 below). 9. On 7 May 2009 a fire occurred at a gambling establishment in the city of Dnipro, leaving nine people dead and eleven injured. The incident attracted considerable public attention. 10. On the same day the Cabinet of Ministers issued an instruction (розпорядження) entitled “Measures to Increase the Safety of Citizens”, which envisaged a number of measures in response to the disaster, including: (i) directing the Ministry of Finance and local executive authorities to take action to revoke the licences of the entities which had operated the establishment where the fire had taken place; and (ii) directing the Ministry of Finance to suspend (зупитини) all gambling licences for one month. 11. On 8 May 2009 the Ministry of Finance issued an order by which it suspended all gambling licences until 7 June 2009 with immediate effect. 12. On 15 May 2009 Parliament passed into law the bill introduced on 26 March 2009 (see paragraph 8 above) prohibiting all gambling operations in Ukraine (hereinafter “the Prohibition Law”), with some limited exceptions – notably in respect of lotteries. The law did not contain any provisions regarding compensation for licence holders (see paragraphs 66 and 67 below). 13. The President vetoed the Prohibition Law. He pointed out, in particular, that: (i) the Licensing Law did not provide for such grounds for the revocation of licences as the banning of a particular activity; (ii) the proposed law was contrary to the constitutional provisions protecting property (see paragraph 58 below); (iii) the proposed law was silent regarding the matter of expenses already committed by businesses for the acquisition of licences and for rent; and (iv) businesses would sue the State for the funds they had paid for licences and permits and for any other damage they would incur if the bill became law. 14. On 11 June 2009 Parliament overrode the veto. 15. On 25 June 2009 the law entered into force and as of that date the applicants’ licences were deemed to have been revoked by operation of law. 16. The applicants lodged claims for compensation with the domestic courts, but those claims were dismissed. 17. Prior to the prohibition, the applicant company operated at least fifteen gambling establishments and points in Kharkiv. 18. On 26 September 2009 the applicant company lodged a claim for damages against the Ministry of Finance and the State Treasury Administration. It claimed 11,461,690 Ukrainian hryvnias ((UAH – about 905,426 euros (EUR) at the time) in damages, representing: part of the licence fees corresponding to the period from the Prohibition Law’s entry into force to the date on which the applicant company’s licence was supposed to expire (25 April 2011); and various losses it had suffered in respect of the purchase of gambling-related equipment and special tax-control software, the refurbishment of gambling premises and lost profit. Subsequently, it increased those claims to the equivalent of EUR 3,219,900. It relied on various provisions of domestic law. Its first argument was that, by selling a licence for five years priced “per year”, the State had given it a guarantee that it would be able to engage in the licensed activity for the duration of the licence, provided that it complied with the licence terms. The Licensing Law, which was a lex specialis, did not provide for the collective revocation of licences, which was only possible on a case-by-case basis on the grounds provided in that law. The applicant company also relied on the following provisions of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 68-71 below): (i) Article 1166 concerning the general obligation to compensate for tort damage; (ii) Article 1170 concerning the obligation of the State to compensate for damage caused by the enactment of laws terminating property rights (hereinafter also referred to as “the Legislative Takings Clause”); and (iii) Article 1173 concerning the obligation of public authorities to compensate for damage caused by their unlawful decisions and actions. 19. On 10 December 2009 the Kyiv City Commercial Court dismissed the claim. The court cited the part of Article 1166 of the Civil Code requiring intent or negligence for tort liability. Article 1173 required a finding that the acts of the authorities were unlawful. Parliament had the constitutional power to enact laws, which it had done in enacting the Prohibition Law. That law had not been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, there was no indication of unlawful action on the part of the State. For the same reason, Article 1175 of the Civil Code, providing for liability in the event of damage caused by legislative documents that had been declared unlawful (see paragraph 72 below), was equally inapplicable. Neither the Prohibition Law nor the budget provided for any compensation. There was thus no basis for the claim for damages. 20. The applicant company appealed. It raised essentially the same arguments. It also argued that the first-instance court had failed to apply the Legislative Takings Clause, which was the applicable provision in the case since the Prohibition Law had terminated the applicant company’s property rights in respect of the licence, cash registers and gambling equipment. That provision of the Civil Code required compensation specifically for lawful action, in this case the enactment of the Prohibition Law. This also followed from the provision of the Constitution requiring full compensation for the taking of private property (see paragraph 58 below). In addition, the applicant company cited Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and stated that the notions of “possessions” and “property” used in that provision were autonomous and broad. In that context the applicant company stated that in Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden (7 July 1989, § 53, Series A no. 159) the Court had recognised that a licence to sell alcoholic beverages constituted a “possession” for those purposes. The applicant company referred to the domestic provisions incorporating the Convention and the Court’s case-law (see paragraphs 74-76 below) and submitted that the first-instance court had failed to comply with its obligation to apply Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and the Court’s case-law. In the concluding part of its appeal the applicant company stated that Article 41 of the Convention provided for payment of just satisfaction. 21. On 6 April 2010 the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s judgment. It cited the Civil Code provisions concerning tort liability in general and tort liability for unlawful action by public authorities (see paragraphs 37 below and 68-71 below) and endorsed the first-instance court’s reasoning. It did not comment on the applicant company’s arguments concerning the Legislative Takings Clause, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 or the Court’s case-law. 22. The applicant company lodged an appeal on points of law. It argued that the lower courts’ finding that there was only an obligation to compensate for unlawful acts was wrong and that the Legislative Takings Clause provided for compensation in the event of the lawful termination of property rights. It repeated the other arguments it had raised in the first appeal. 23. On 22 September 2010 the High Commercial Court rejected the applicant company’s appeal and upheld the lower courts’ decisions. It stated that the Prohibition Law did not provide for the termination of property rights within the meaning of the Legislative Takings Clause, or for payment of any compensation to licence holders. The law in question had not been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, the lower courts had correctly found that the applicant company had failed to show that there had been either any unlawful conduct on the part of the defendants or a causal connection between the defendants’ actions and its losses, both of which were required elements in a claim for damages. 24. The applicant lodged several claims with the domestic courts. They are set out below in the order in which they were completed domestically and the applicant submitted her corresponding application forms with the Court. (a) First set of proceedings: reimbursement of licence fees 25. In the first set of proceedings (application form submitted on 25 September 2012) the applicant claimed UAH 360,349.59 (about EUR 30,160 at the time) from the State Treasury Administration and the Ministry of Finance, corresponding to the licence fees for the unused part of her licence, in respect of the period from the Prohibition Law’s entry into force to the date on which her licence was supposed to expire (16 May 2011). She relied on various provisions of domestic law, most notably the Legislative Takings Clause (see paragraph 70 below). In that context she pointed out that, in accordance with the Court’s judgment in Tre Traktörer AB (cited above), licences constituted “possessions” for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. She relied on the provisions of domestic law incorporating the Convention and the Court’s case-law and the primacy of the former (see paragraphs 74 and 76 below) and argued that the Prohibition Law, by revoking her licence, had terminated her property rights within the meaning of the Legislative Takings Clause. 26. On 15 December 2011 the Kyiv Commercial Court rejected her claim on the grounds that the Prohibition Law did not provide for the reimbursement of the licence fees paid for licences revoked by operation of that law. 27. The applicant appealed, relying in particular on the same provisions of the Civil Code, the Convention, the Court’s case-law and the incorporating provisions of domestic law. She also pointed to the provisions of the Code of Commercial Procedure prohibiting the courts from refusing to give judgment in the absence of legislation governing an issue (see paragraph 76 below). 28. On 1 February 2012 the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s judgment. It cited domestic provisions concerning the obligations of the public authorities to compensate for damage caused by their unlawful conduct (see, in particular, paragraph 71 below), and stated that Parliament’s constitutional role was to enact laws, that it had acted within those powers in adopting the Prohibition Law and that that law did not provide for the payment of any compensation to former licence holders. 29. The applicant, reiterating essentially the same arguments, lodged an appeal on points of law with the High Commercial Court. 30. On 21 May 2012 the High Commercial Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions, holding that there was no indication of an error of law in them. (b) Second set of proceedings: challenge against the Cabinet of Ministers’ instruction to suspend all gambling licences 31. In the second set of proceedings (application form submitted on 4 November 2013), the applicant sought to have the acts of the Cabinet of Ministers and of the Ministry of Finance regarding the one-month suspension of her licence declared unlawful and quashed (see paragraph 11 above). She argued that no law conferred power on the Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministry of Finance to suspend a licence. The Licensing Law itself only provided for the revocation of licences in certain cases but not for the “suspension” of licences (see paragraph 64 above). 32. The Kyiv Circuit Administrative Court returned the applicant’s claim in so far as it was directed against the Ministry, holding that the administrative courts at the place of her registration as a businessperson were competent. This resulted in the third set of proceedings instituted by her (see paragraph 37 below). It proceeded to examine the remainder of the claim against the Cabinet of Ministers. Similar claims lodged by three other companies were joined to the proceedings. 33. On 27 September 2011 the first-instance court agreed with the applicant’s arguments, allowed the claim and declared unlawful the relevant part of the Cabinet of Ministers’ instruction (see paragraph 10 above). 34. On 31 May 2012 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal allowed appeals by the Cabinet of Ministers and the Ministry of Finance and quashed the first-instance court’s judgment. It referred to the constitutional rules defining the Cabinet of Ministers as the highest executive authority having the power to issue instructions to ministries (see paragraphs 60 and 62 below). The Ministry of Finance was required to follow the Cabinet’s instructions. Accordingly, the Cabinet of Ministers had had the power to issue the instruction in question. 35. One of the other claimant companies lodged an appeal on points of law, which the applicant joined. The appeal presented essentially the same arguments as in the applicant’s claim (see paragraph 31 above). 36. On 28 May 2013 the High Administrative Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision, having largely repeated its reasoning. (c) Third set of proceedings: challenge against the Ministry of Finance order suspending all gambling licences 37. In the third set of proceedings (application form submitted on 19 July 2016) the applicant submitted a separate claim seeking to have the order of the Ministry of Finance which had suspended her licence declared unlawful and quashed. Her main argument was that the Ministry had acted ultra vires (see paragraph 31 above). The applicant also stated that, in addition to breaching domestic law, the order had also breached Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which she quoted. She referred to the the Court’s judgment in Tre Traktörer to the effect that a licence constituted a “possession”. The applicant also invoked Article 17 of the Convention. 38. On 2 July 2013 the Zakarpattya Circuit Administrative Court rejected her claim, holding that, because the Cabinet of Ministers had powers to give instructions to ministries (see paragraph 62 below) and the ministries had the power to issue their own orders, the Ministry, in issuing the impugned order which complied with the Cabinet of Ministers’ instructions, had acted within its powers. 39. The applicant appealed. She reiterated the same arguments, insisting that the order was contrary to higher-level norms than the Cabinet of Ministers’ instruction, namely the Licensing Law and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 40. On 2 December 2015 the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s judgment, essentially repeating its reasoning. 41. On 20 January 2016 a judge of the High Administrative Court denied the applicant’s company leave to appeal on points of law, stating that there was no appearance of any error of law in the lower courts’ decisions. 42. The third applicant, a single-shareholder company, was established in September 2008. 43. On 10 November 2008 the applicant company paid the full price for a five-year licence to the State Treasury and on 14 November 2008 it obtained its licence, valid from 28 October 2008 to 27 October 2013. 44. According to the applicant company, it invested in preparation for the opening of a gambling business, acquired permits, cash registers and gambling equipment, rented premises and recruited staff, but never launched the business because of the prohibition of gambling. 45. In July 2009 the applicant company asked the Ministry of Finance for a refund of the licence fees but was told that no refund was forthcoming. 46. In November 2010 the applicant company asked an authority responsible for licensing for a certificate, which it intended to submit to the State Treasury Department to obtain reimbursement of the funds paid for the licence, under the procedure established for the reimbursement of erroneous and excess payments to the Treasury (see paragraph 77 below). 47. Having received no response, the applicant company lodged a claim against the licensing authority, the State Treasury Administration and the Ministry of Finance, seeking reimbursement of the amount it had paid for the licence. It relied on the provisions concerning reimbursement of erroneous or excess payments to the Treasury and the provisions of the Code of Administrative Justice that required the courts to give judgment even in the absence of relevant legislation (see paragraphs 76 and 77 below). 48. On 4 May 2011 the Lviv Circuit Administrative Court allowed the applicant company’s claim in part and ordered the State Treasury to return UAH 963,030.15 (about EUR 80,600 at the time), corresponding to the part of the licence fees for the period from the Prohibition Law’s entry into force to the date on which the applicant company’s licence was supposed to expire (27 October 2013). The court stated, in particular, that the defendants’ main argument was that there was no established mechanism for the reimbursement of funds paid for revoked gambling licences. However, the court rejected that argument, relying on the provision of the Code of Administrative Justice that required the courts to give judgment even in the absence of relevant legislation (see paragraphs 76 below). The key consideration for the court was that, under the Licensing Law, a licence was a document which granted the right to operate a particular business for a certain period of time. The applicant company had paid and obtained the licence for the totality of that period. Given that it was prevented from actually using the licence, a portion of the fees had to be reimbursed. 49. The defendants appealed. Copies of their appeals have not been provided to the Court. 50. The applicant company responded. In addition to its other arguments, it relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court’s judgment in Tre Traktörer AB (cited above) and the provision of the Code of Administrative Justice requiring administrative courts to apply the Court’s case-law (see paragraph 76 below). It argued that, because the Prohibition Law had revoked its licence in the absence of any grounds for doing so under the Licensing Law and, indeed, in the absence of any wrongdoing on its part, the domestic law did not meet the requirement of “foreseeability” under the Convention. It also pointed out that the transitional provisions of the Prohibition Law required the Cabinet of Ministers to enact new regulations as required for the implementation of the Prohibition Law (see paragraph 67 below). The applicant company argued that those regulations had to include the mechanism for compensation but that the Cabinet’s failure to enact them could not disadvantage the former licence holders. 51. On 21 July 2014 the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance court’s decision, holding that the Prohibition Law did not provide for any mechanism for reimbursement and that the procedures established for erroneous or excess payments to the Treasury were inapplicable. 52. The applicant company appealed, arguing that the first-instance court’s judgment had been correct. It reiterated its arguments. Developing its argument in respect of the alleged lack of foreseeability of the domestic law, it also quoted certain passages from Sierpiński v. Poland (no. 38016/07, §§ 72, 79 and 80, 3 November 2009) concerning uncertainty in respect of compensation as applicable to its own case. 53. On 15 March 2016 the High Administrative Court upheld the appeal court’s decision. It stated that the lower courts’ conclusion that the procedures established for erroneous or excess payments were inapplicable had been correct. 54. Article 8 of the Constitution provides that the provisions of the Constitution have direct effect and guarantees the right to apply to the courts relying directly on the Constitution. 55. Article 9 provides that international treaties ratified by Parliament are part of domestic law. 56. Article 13 § 4 requires the State to ensure the protection of property. 57. Article 19 establishes the principle of legality and the principle that any action by the public authorities must be based on powers granted by the Constitution or laws passed by Parliament. 58. Article 41 guarantees the right to property. It provides, in particular: “... No one shall be unlawfully deprived of the right of property. The right of private property is inviolable. The expropriation of objects covered by the right of private property may be carried out only in exceptional cases for reasons of social necessity, on the grounds of and by the procedure established by law, and on condition of full compensation for their value in advance. The expropriation of such objects with full compensation for their value at a subsequent stage is permitted only under conditions of martial law or a state of emergency. Confiscation of property may take place only pursuant to a court decision, in the cases, to the extent and by the procedure established by law. ...” 59. Article 42 provides that everyone has the right to engage in entrepreneurial activity that is not prohibited by law. 60. Article 133 defines the Cabinet of Ministers as the highest body in the executive branch of government. 61. Article 150 authorises the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of laws enacted by Parliament on applications from the President, forty-five members of parliament, the Supreme Court, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights and the legislature of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. At the relevant time, no right to apply for individual constitutional review was recognised. 62. Section 1 of the Law provided that the Cabinet of Ministers exercised executive power directly, as well as through ministries and other executive agencies which it had the power to direct, coordinate and control. 63. Section 15 of the Law, as worded at the material time, provided that payment for a licence had to be made at the time that the licence was issued. The fee for the issuance of a licence for gambling operations was EUR 30,000 per year, and licences were issued for a five-year term. 64. Section 21 of the Law contained an exhaustive list of situations in which a licence could be revoked (анулювання), such as in the event of a repeated breach of the terms of the licence or misrepresentation in the licence application. The Law did not contain any provisions on the revocation of licences in the event of the prohibition of a previously lawful licensed activity. Neither did it provide for any temporary “suspension” (зупинення) of licences. 65. The Laws regulating fire and workplace safety and public-health supervision provide for the right of the relevant inspectors to conduct checks of various establishments and suspend their operations if they present a risk of fire, workplace accidents or health hazards. 66. Section 2 of the Law on the Prohibition of Gambling in Ukraine of 15 May 2009 contains a general prohibition on gambling in Ukraine with some limited exceptions – notably in respect of lotteries. 67. Section 4 of the Law contains transitional provisions. Pursuant to section 4(1), the Law came into effect on the date of its official publication, which occurred on 25 June 2009; it was to remain in effect until a law was passed authorising gambling in specially designated areas (no such law has been passed to date). Section 4(2) provides that gambling licences issued prior to the date of the Law’s entry into force are deemed to have been revoked and that no new licences will be issued. Section 4(4) directed the Cabinet of Ministers to take the following action, within three months: (i) submit to Parliament a bill providing for gambling in specially designated areas; (ii) submit to Parliament draft amendments to other laws flowing from the Prohibition Law; (iii) amend its own regulations in line with the Prohibition Law and ensure that executive agencies did the same at their level; and (iv) adopt new regulations as required for the implementation of the Law. 68. Article 1166 of the Code, which sets out general grounds for tort liability, provides that a person who causes damage can be released from liability where the damage did not result from intent or negligence on his or her part. It also provides that a person can be held liable for lawful acts where the Code and other laws so provide. 69. Subsequent Articles of the Code set out alternative grounds for possible claims for damages in tort. 70. Article 1170 of the Code provides that, in the event of the enactment of a law which terminates property rights in respect of certain assets (у разі прийняття закону, що припиняє право власності на певне майно), the State is to compensate the owner for the loss in its entirety. This provision is also referred to as the “Legislative Takings Clause” (see paragraph 18 above). 71. Article 1173 of the Code requires the public authorities to compensate for damage caused by unlawful decisions, actions or inaction of such authorities. There is no need to show that the authority acted with intent or negligence. 72. Article 1175 of the Code provides for compensation for the adoption of a legislative document (нормативно-правового акта) if that document is subsequently declared unlawful and rescinded. There is no need to show intent or negligence. 73. As a general rule, the statute of limitations for tort claims is three years (Article 257 of the Code). 74. Section 17 of the Law on the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights of 2006 provides that the courts, when deciding cases, are to apply the Convention and Protocols and the Court’s case-law of as a source of law. 75. Section 19 of the International Treaties Law of 2004 provides that international treaties are deemed part of domestic law and prevail over conflicting provisions of domestic legislation. 76. Article 8 §§ 1 and 2 of the 2005 Code of Administrative Justice, as worded at the relevant time, provided that the courts were guided (керується) by the principle of the rule of law and that they had to apply this principle taking into account the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. Paragraph 3 provided that claimants could invoke the Constitution directly. Under paragraph 4 of the same Article, the courts could not refuse to give judgment if there was no legislation governing matters before them or if the relevant legislation was incomplete, unclear or contradictory. A similar provision could be found in Article 4 of the 1991 Code of Commercial Procedure. Article 9 § 4 of the Code of Administrative Justice provided that in the event of a contradiction between a legislative act and the Constitution, an international treaty or a legislative instrument which was higher in the hierarchy of norms and one which was lower, the court was to apply the former. Paragraph 6 provided that in the event of a conflict between a binding international treaty and a law enacted by Parliament, the court had to apply the treaty. A similar provision could be found in Article 4 of the Code of Commercial Procedure. 77. The State Committee for Entrepreneurship, the State agency responsible for certain licensing matters at the time, established (order no. 88 of 7 May 2009) a procedure for reimbursement of funds paid erroneously or excess payments for licences and permits. Under the procedure, on a licensee’s application a regional department of the Committee had to issue a reimbursement certificate, to be submitted to the State Treasury Administration. The State Treasury Administration also approved a procedure for reimbursement of taxes and payments made to the Treasury in error or in excess of what was due (помилково або надмірно зарахованих). 78. The system of gambling regulation proposed by the Cabinet of Ministers in its bill no. 3535 of 23 December 2008 contained the following elements: (i) a licensing system with five-year licences, provisions for revocation and temporary suspension of licences; (ii) a requirement for gambling operators to own rather than rent all gambling equipment and to comply with certain minimum capital levels, from EUR 200,000 to EUR 1,000,000 depending on the type of operations; (iii) restriction of the locations where gambling establishments could operate, barring them from such places as schools and public transport, and minimum requirements for the size of gambling establishments (500 sq. m for casinos and 250 sq. m for others); (iv) special certification for gambling equipment and software. The text proposed for the second reading tightened certain regulatory requirements, such as raising the minimum age for entry to gambling establishments from eighteen to twenty-one years and adding certain additional places, such a cultural heritage sites, to the list of places where gambling would be prohibited.

5. The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in the Ventspils district. 6. On 6 December 2001 the applicant was convicted of kidnapping, aggravated murder and aggravated extortion and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. This judgment was upheld at two levels of appeal and took effect in 2002. 7. In accordance with section 504(1) of the Sentence Enforcement Code (Latvijas Sodu izpildes kodekss), the applicant was placed at the maximum‑security level in a closed prison. 8. On an unspecified date the applicant was transferred to the medium‑security level of that closed prison. 9. According to the applicant, in 2008 he realised that there was a difference in the respective treatment of male and female inmates with regard to the execution of custodial sentences. Male inmates who had been convicted of serious crimes started serving their sentences in closed prisons, while female inmates who had been convicted of the same crimes started serving their sentence in partly-closed prisons. As the applicant considered that this had a notable impact on restrictions of various prisoners’ rights, he lodged complaints about this issue with several State institutions. 10. On 30 September 2008 the applicant was informed that his father had died. On 2 October 2008 he requested permission to leave prison in order to attend his father’s funeral. On the same day the prison director replied that he had no authority to allow the request, as the applicant was serving his sentence at the medium-security level of a closed prison. Under the Sentence Enforcement Code only prisoners serving their sentence at the medium- or minimum- security level in partly-closed prisons were eligible for such leave. 11. In the years 2012-2015 the applicant was granted one prison‑leave day per year. The case file contains no information as to the type of prison and security level in which the applicant served his sentence during this time. 12. On 11 September 2015 the applicant was conditionally released. 13. On 1 July 2008 the Ministry of Justice examined the applicant’s complaint about the difference in treatment between convicted men and women. It referred to sections 504(1) and 505(1) of the Sentence Enforcement Code and observed that the legislature had chosen to create different legal frameworks in respect of sentence execution for men and women. The Ministry of Justice concluded that there was no discrimination on the grounds of sex because the rights of both male and female inmates were restricted, and both sexes were deprived of their liberty. 14. On 25 October 2010 the Ombudsperson concluded the examination of the applicant’s complaint about the refusal to allow him to attend his father’s funeral. He observed that closed prisons hosted male convicts who had been sentenced to deprivation of liberty for having committed serious or especially serious crimes, as well as convicts who had been moved from partly-closed prisons for grave or systematic breaches of the regime under which they had been held. In closed prisons convicts were subjected to tightened security and maximum surveillance. It followed that the persons placed in those prisons were particularly dangerous to the society. Hence, the restriction imposed on the applicant was proportionate and necessary in a democratic society. 15. On 9 July 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, arguing that section 504(1) of the Sentence Enforcement Code was discriminatory on the grounds of sex, in breach of Article 91 of the Constitution. As women convicted of the same crimes started serving their sentence in partly-closed prisons, they were entitled to more and longer visits, more phone calls and could progress to more lenient security levels more rapidly. In addition, women could be granted leave from prison for up to seven days per year, whereas no such right was provided for men. 16. On 29 July 2008 the Constitutional Court, relying on section 20(6) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, declined to institute proceedings. It stated that the legal reasoning included in the complaint was evidently insufficient for the claim to be allowed (acīmredzami nepietiekams prasījuma apmierināšanai). In particular, the applicant had failed to specify why the difference in treatment between men and women should not be acceptable. 17. On 7 August 2008 the applicant lodged a second constitutional complaint, adding that men and women who were convicted of serious and especially serious crimes were in the same circumstances in that they were both imprisoned. Yet, despite the prohibition of discrimination requiring men and women to be treated equally, their rights were restricted to a different extent. The applicant also pointed out that within the context of discrimination the burden of proof was shifted – namely, after a person had demonstrated a difference in treatment, it fell for the respondent to show that this difference had not amounted to discrimination. 18. On 5 September 2008 the Constitutional Court again declined to institute proceedings. With respect to the first sentence of Article 91 of the Constitution, which addressed the principle of equality, the Constitutional Court pointed out that the following criteria had to be examined – the existence of comparable groups, a difference in treatment between those groups, and a lack of objective and reasonable justification for that difference in treatment. As the legal reasoning advanced by the applicant was based on the assumption that men and women who had committed similarly grave crimes were in comparable situations, the Constitutional Court considered this reasoning evidently insufficient for the claim to be allowed. With respect to the prohibition of discrimination enshrined in the second sentence of Article 91 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court pointed out that the applicant had failed to specify the human right in conjunction with which the discrimination complaint had been made. Thus, in relation to this part of the application, legal reasoning had not been provided (nav sniegts juridiskais pamatojums) and the formal requirements of a constitutional complaint had not been met. In so far as relevant, the Constitutional Court relied on sections 20(5)(3) and 20(6) of the Law on the Constitutional Court. 19. In a third constitutional complaint of 20 October 2008, the applicant added that on 2 October 2008 he had been refused permission to leave prison to attend his father’s funeral. He had thereby been discriminated against on the basis of sex, as women in his situation would have been able to attend the funeral. In support of his discrimination-related complaint the applicant referred to the right to private life, right to family life, and freedom of expression. 20. On 21 November 2008 the Constitutional Court declined to institute proceedings, invoking section 20(6) of the Law on the Constitutional Court. It noted that the application contained no reasoning as to why men and women who had been convicted of serious and especially serious crimes and given prison sentences would need to be subjected to the same rules of sentence enforcement – namely, how men and women were in comparable situations. On those grounds, the legal reasoning included in the constitutional complaint was held to be evidently insufficient for the claim to be allowed.

7. The applicants are shareholders of two savings banks, namely Kinizsi Bank Zrt. (“Kinizsi Bank”) and Mohácsi Takarék Bank Zrt. (“Mohácsi Bank”), and of one savings cooperative, Pátria Takarékszövetkezet (“Pátria Cooperative”). A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix, which also indicates the financial institution in which they hold shares and any changes to their situation following the lodging of the application. 8. At the time the application was lodged, the applicants held shares with an aggregate par value of 2,043,342,000 Hungarian forints (HUF), approximately 6,310,000 euros (EUR), representing 98.28% of the total registered capital of Kinizsi Bank and shares with an aggregate par value of HUF 1,833,300,000, approximately EUR 5,662,000, representing 87.65% of the total registered capital of Mohácsi Bank, and shares with an aggregate par value of HUF 8,100,000, approximately EUR 25,000, representing 5.61% of the total share capital of Pátria Cooperative. 9. On 18 December 2014 and 15 April 2015 respectively two of the applicants, Ms László Jánosné Boris (no. 18) and Ms. Endréné Csoltkó (no. 28), the only shareholders of Pátria Cooperative amongst the applicants, withdrew their complaints before the Court. Therefore, the facts of the case below do not contain any further information relating specifically to Pátria Cooperative. 10. Kinizsi Bank and Mohácsi Bank were established in 1958 and used to operate as savings cooperatives. Their clientele was mostly from the local community. 11. In 1993 a voluntary and restricted integration took place involving 235 savings cooperatives, including the predecessors of Kinizsi Bank and Mohácsi Bank. The purpose of the integration was to enhance the cooperatives’ market position and financial security. With the active support of the Hungarian State and the PHARE Program of the European Union, they entered into an integration agreement. The key institutions of the integration were the National Association of Savings Cooperatives (Országos Takarékszövetkezeti Szövetség – “OTSZ”), the Savings Bank (Takarékbank Zrt.) and the National Fund for the Institutional Protection of Savings Cooperatives (Országos Takarékszövetkezeti Intézményvédelmi Alap – “OTIVA”), which was created as part of the integration. OTIVA, on the one hand, improved the security of deposits placed with the savings cooperatives by supplementing the National Deposit Insurance Fund (Országos Betétbiztosítási Alap – “OBA”), and, on the other hand, served to prevent crisis situations and improved the stability of savings cooperatives. Until changes were introduced by the Integration Act, the shareholding of the savings cooperatives and certain saving banks (together referred to as “cooperative credit institutions”) in the Savings Bank exceeded 60%. 12. In 2006 and 2008 respectively Kinizsi Bank and Mohácsi Bank transformed into the companies limited by shares and received their licences for banking operations. They however remained members of OTIVA and part of the above-mentioned integration. 13. According to Risk Report 2013/I issued by the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (hereafter “the Supervisory Authority”) in June 2013, the cooperative credit institution sector remained profitable throughout the economic crisis. However, in 2011 and 2012 respectively the operating licences of two saving cooperatives were revoked by the Supervisory Authority, which resulted in the deposit holders obtaining indemnification from OBA. 14. Following an audit carried out with respect to 121 cooperative credit institutions, further to the entry into force of the Integration Act (see paragraph 16 below), a certain number of them had their operating licences withdrawn. Furthermore, ninety-one cooperative credit institutions were obliged to commit reserves, in eight cases a serious crisis situation was established and some required a capital injection from the Integration Organisation (see paragraph 18 below). 15. According to the Government, basing its findings on the data collected after the Integration Act came into force, considering the capital/loan ratio, thirty-nine cooperative credit institutions would not have been in a position to ensure profitable operations without the new measures. The above-mentioned audit also revealed that thirteen cooperative credit institutions had a capital adequacy ratio below 8%, five of which had a negative ratio value. 16. On 13 July 2013 Act no. CXXXV of 2013 on the Integration of Cooperative Credit Institutions and the Amendment of Certain Laws Regarding Economic Matters (“the Integration Act”) entered into force. It was then amended in several aspects, including by Act no. CXCVI of 2013 on the Amendment of Certain Laws Regarding the Integration of Cooperative Credit Institutions (“the Integration (Amendment) Act”) with effect from 30 November 2013. 17. The Integration Act concerned cooperative credit institutions, that is most savings cooperatives operating as a cooperative and the banks operating as companies limited by shares who on 1 January 2013 had been members of OTIVA. Its scope therefore extended to Kinizsi Bank and Mohácsi Bank. It made the cooperative credit institutions ipso jure members of the Integration Organisation and shareholders of the Savings Bank. 18. The Integration Act abolished the integration of cooperatives organised on a voluntary basis, with voluntary membership, and terminated OTIVA. Instead, it introduced a mandatory integration headed by, inter alia, the Integration Organisation of Cooperative Credit Institutions (Szövetkezeti Hitelintézetek Integrációs Szervezete  “the Integration Organisation”), which had been newly created as a legal successor of OTIVA and other voluntary institutional protection funds, and the Savings Bank, which continued to be the central bank of the integration, now having more extensive powers. The Integration Act also created a financial risk pool, encompassing the whole of the cooperative credit institutions sector. 19. The Savings Bank supervises the operations of the cooperative credit institutions and is authorised to issue instructions in order to ensure compliance with the law and the regulations issued by the Integration Organisation and the Savings Bank. Apart from the cooperative credit institutions, the Savings Bank and the Hungarian Development Bank (Magyar Fejlesztési Bank Zrt. – “the MFB”) became members of the Integration Organisation by virtue of law. Due to the changes in the ownership of the Savings Bank pursuant to the Integration Act (see in particular, sections 13 and 20, cited in paragraph 39 below) the shareholding of Kinizsi Bank and Mohácsi Bank in the Savings Bank changed. While the two banks previously possessed 0.15% and 2.27% respectively in the Savings Bank, they had a 0.12% and 1.83% stake respectively following the implementation of the Integration Act. 20. The Integration Organisation’s assets are included in the consolidated own funds of the Savings Bank and the cooperative credit institutions. The solvency capital of the cooperative credit institutions is determined collectively, including the property of the Savings Bank and the Integration Organisation. 21. Under section 17 of the Integration Act, the cooperative credit institutions which did not comply with the relevant requirements of the Integration Act were excluded from integration and their operating licences withdrawn. In such cases, and if they decided to exit, their shares in the Savings Bank could be bought by the MFB, who had a call option (section 20(10) of the Integration Act). 22. In July 2013 banks could leave the integration if they were each able to provide an additional HUF 2 billion, approximately EUR 6 million, as for the creation of a new bank. Moreover, following the amendment of the Integration Act, the cooperative credit institutions were obliged to deposit an amount equivalent to the value of the share capital they had had at the time of the establishment of their membership in the Integration Organisation to a separate account at the Savings Bank for 730 days (sections 11(7) and (8), and 20/A(12) and (13) of the Integration Act; see also paragraph 43 below). At least one bank, to which the Integration Act applied, decided to exit the system and this decision was accepted by the Supervisory Authority. 23. In 2012 the Hungarian State emerged as an indirect owner of the Savings Bank, when the MFB (see paragraph 19 above), which is owned by the State, purchased a stake in Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank AG, representing 38.5% of the Savings Bank’s shares. Following the entry into force of the Integration Act, the Savings Bank’s capital was increased by HUF 654,986,000 to HUF 3,389,704,000 (approximately EUR 10 million) from the previous amount of HUF 2,735,038,000. Out of this capital increase, the State-owned Hungary Post (Magyar Posta) exercised its statutory subscription rights and acquired ordinary shares with an aggregate par value of HUF 654,666,000 (approximately EUR 2 million), almost 20% of the Savings Bank’s shares (see section 20 of the Integration Act, cited in paragraph 39 below). 24. Apart from the capital increase, the State has directly paid HUF 136 billion, approximately EUR 420 million, to the Integration Organisation through the Joint Capital Coverage Fund of Cooperative Credit Institutions (hereinafter referred to as “the Fund”). 25. It was envisaged that the State’s ownership in the integration would only be of a temporary nature. In 2014 its stake in the Savings Bank was sold, through a bidding process, to one company. According to the Government, the majority of the buyer company is owned by savings cooperatives and private individuals and, as a result of this transaction, the direct and indirect shareholding of cooperative credit institutions in the Savings Bank increased to 76.96%. 26. Following the entry into force of the Integration Act, the cooperative credit institutions were obliged to approve a new memorandum of association conforming to the model established by the Integration Organisation. They continue to be bound by any amendments to the model introduced by the Integration Organisation (sections 17/H and 19(3) of the Integration Act, see also paragraph 46 below). 27. For a resolution by the board of directors and supervisory board of the cooperative credit institutions to be valid, an invitation to the relevant meeting of the board of directors or supervisory board, together with all related material, must be simultaneously sent to the Savings Bank (section 15/A of the Integration Act). Minutes of the general meetings and meetings of the board of directors of the cooperative credit institutions must always be submitted to the Savings Bank, and minutes of the supervisory board meetings must be sent to the Savings Bank in certain cases. The cooperative credit institutions are also required to inform, inter alia, the Integration Organisation and the Savings Bank of any legal proceedings in which they are involved (section 15/C of the Integration Act). 28. The shareholders of the cooperative credit institutions may take, inter alia, the following resolutions subject to consent/approval of the Savings Bank: - the adoption of the annual financial report of the company (section 15(11) and 17/J(2) of the Integration Act); - the issuing of bonds (section 17/K(1) of the Integration Act); - decreases or increases of capital (ibid.); - any payment to the shareholders under any legal title (e.g. dividends, reduction of capital) in connection with their status as shareholders (see section 17/Q(3) and (4) of the Integration Act, cited in paragraph 39 below); - the conversion, merger or demerger of the company (section 17/S(3) of the Integration Act); and - acquisition of own shares (section 17/Q(6) of the Integration Act). 29. The consent of the Savings Bank is required for the appointment of executive officers of the cooperative credit institutions (section 15(12) of the Integration Act). The Savings Bank is authorised to suspend their mandate; it may appoint a managing official for an interim period if the cooperative credit institutions do not comply with the instructions or their operations are not in compliance with the law or regulations, or if they are in a so-called crisis situation (section 15(4), (7) and (12) of the Integration Act). 30. The Integration Organisation is entitled to suspend the voting rights of the shareholders of the cooperative credit institution for one year if they threaten the reliable and secure operation of the cooperative credit institutions (see section 17/C(5), cited in paragraph 39 below). 31. The Integration Organisation is authorised to define the level of the cooperative credit institutions’ solvency capital on an individual case‑by‑case (not consolidated) basis (section 17/C(1); if they do not reach the level defined, the Integration Organisation is authorised to increase the capital of the cooperative credit institutions, or take certain other measures (see section 17/C(2), cited in paragraph 39 below). 32. As to the actual application of the measures provided for by the Integration Act, the Government submitted the following information: (i) There have been altogether 151 cases in which cooperative credit institutions sought the consent of the Integration Organisation for the appointment of board members; in ten cases the consent was refused, affecting seven cooperative credit institutions. These cases did not concern Kinizsi Bank or Mohácsi Bank. (ii) Executive officers of cooperative credit institutions were removed in nine cases; four of these affected cooperative credit institutions where the capital adequacy ratio was largely insufficient, which led to a capital injection by the Integration Organisation in three cases and a merger with another cooperative credit institution in the fourth case; in the remaining five cases, executive officers were removed for breaches of the relevant legislation. These cases did not concern Kinizsi Bank or Mohácsi Bank. (iii) In eight cases the Savings Bank refused to consent to the payment of dividends; the reasons were: (a) non-compliance with the relevant legislation (two cases, including Kinizsi Bank (see paragraph 35 below)), (b) the risk of not fulfilling the business plan (four cases), (c) the risk of not fulfilling the business plan but allowing for the payment of a limited amount of dividends (two cases, including Mohácsi Bank (see paragraph 35 below)). (iv) In three cases the increase in capital was provided by the Integration Organisation in order to achieve the 8% capital adequacy ratio; none of them concerned Kinizsi Bank or Mohácsi Bank. (v) The voting rights of shareholders of cooperative credit institutions have never been suspended by the Integration Organisation. (vi) In two cases, not concerning Kinizsi Bank and Mohácsi Bank, the Savings Bank refused to consent to the payment of the shares’ value in a cooperative credit institution for members who had exited the institution, finding that the payment would have jeopardised the fulfillment of the capital adequacy ratio requirements. 33. Kinizsi Bank and Mohácsi Bank had to adopt a memorandum of association in line with the model provided by the Integration Organisation following the entry into force of the Integration Act. However, the shareholders of the two banks who disagreed with the resolution adopting the aforementioned memorandum challenged it in court. On 12 March 2015 the Pécs High Court found for the plaintiffs in the case brought by the Mohacsi Bank’s shareholders. The court held that the model memorandum of association issued by the Savings Bank and the Integration Organisation could not in any way deviate from the mandatory provisions of the Companies Act. On 30 March 2015 a similar judgment was given by the Veszprém High Court in a case brought by the shareholders of Kinizsi Bank. In both cases, the decision adopting the impugned memorandum at the general meetings of the bank was annulled. 34. It would appear that the required solvency capital of Kinizsi Bank and Mohácsi Bank was at some point raised. However, both banks were able to comply with the new requirement. 35. In the case of Kinizsi Bank, the Savings Bank refused to approve the annual report for 2014 as the bank had not provided data to the auditor to complete the financial audit. The applicants submitted that the required data had been submitted in due time. In the case of Mohácsi Bank, the Savings Bank approved the annual financial report for 2014 but prohibited the actual payment of dividends amounting to 25% (see paragraph 32 above). 36. The Government averred that several further sets of proceedings were pending before Hungarian courts in which Kinizsi Bank or Mohácsi Bank or their shareholders had sought a remedy against certain decisions of the Savings Bank or the Integration Organisation.

4. The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in the town of Snizhne, Donetsk region. 5. On 14 January 2004 the applicant’s son, born in 1967, was found dead in the applicant’s barn. On the same day police officers inspected the scene and reported that the man had committed suicide by hanging. 6. On 24 January 2004 the investigator of the Snizhne Prosecutor’s Office, following the pre-investigation inquiries, refused to initiate criminal proceedings on the grounds that no elements of a crime had been established in relation to the death of the applicant’s son. 7. On 11 February 2004, following a forensic medical examination, an expert concluded that the applicant’s son’s death had been caused by strangulation by a loop of rope, possibly as a result of the applicant’s son’s body weight pulling against the rope. The body displayed no other injuries. 8. On 5 April 2005 the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office quashed the decision of 24 January 2004 (see paragraph 6 above) as premature and unfounded, finding that further pre-investigation inquiries were necessary given that the possible reasons for suicide had not been examined, and other relatives as well as acquaintances of the deceased had not been questioned either. Numerous investigating instructions were given. 9. In the course of further pre-investigation inquiries, between 2005 and 2012, the investigators took measures to establish the circumstances of the applicant’s son’s death. They questioned various persons, and ordered numerous additional medical examinations of the corpse of the deceased. At a certain point medical experts noted that the applicant’s son’s body had numerous fractures. The experts opined that all those fractures had been inflicted after the applicant’s son’s death, possibly during the exhumation of the body. The applicant’s husband informed the authorities that when he had seen his dead son in the barn, the corpse of his son had been in a sitting position and the rope loop had not been tightened. The applicant argued that it had not been suicide but a violent murder. She advanced different theories, suspecting notably: police security guards who had allegedly taken the applicant’s son from a local bar, following which he had been found dead; a local police officer who had engaged in a dispute with the applicant’s son; a woman who had been employed by the applicant’s son in his textile business and her husband; the applicant’s son’s brothers-in-law; a business partner of the applicant’s son; and people from a local gambling club (the applicant’s son had been engaged in transporting money from the club to another town). 10. On 25 April 2005, 26 March 2006, 20 August 2008, 17 February and 12 December 2011, 15 February 2012 and 17 September 2012, following the pre-investigation inquiries, the investigators refused to initiate criminal proceedings on the grounds that no elements of a crime had been established. Those decisions were quashed as unsubstantiated by the supervising authorities, which found that further investigative measures were necessary. Numerous investigating instructions were given. 11. On 7 December 2012 the applicant, relying on the new Code of Criminal Procedure of 2012, requested that an investigation be opened in respect of the alleged murder of her son. On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted. 12. On 24 December 2012, 22 July and 30 September 2013 the criminal proceedings were terminated because no elements of a crime could be established. Those decisions were quashed by the supervising authorities as unsubstantiated and further investigations were ordered. In particular, on 5 December 2013 the Snizhne Town Court quashed the decision of 30 September 2013 after finding that the investigation had not been thorough and comprehensive. The court noted the theory of the possible involvement of the local police had not been properly examined, the role of the applicant’s son’s brother-in-law had not been clarified even though he might have been the first to find the dead body, the applicant had not been questioned on all the issues which were relevant to the case, and the evidence relating to the applicant’s son’s suicidal tendencies had not been assessed. 13. On 1 April 2014 the criminal proceedings were closed one more time on the ground that no elements of a crime could be established.

5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Belgrade. 6. On 15 June 2004 the applicant was injured in a traffic accident. He suffered severe serious injuries. An investigation into this incident was initiated in November 2004 and terminated in May 2005, with no criminal charges being brought. 7. On 10 June 2005 the applicant lodged a civil claim for non-pecuniary damages with the Second Municipal Court in Belgrade against the Belgrade City’s Transportation Company (Gradsko saobraċajno preduzeċe Beograd). 8. On 27 December 2007 the Second Municipal Court ruled in the applicant’s favour. On 3 July 2008 the District Court quashed the decision and remitted the case to the first instance. 9. On 23 October 2009 the Second Municipal Court adopted a partial decision (delimičnu presudu) against which the applicant and the defendant appealed on 7 December 2009 and 10 December 2009, respectively. 10. On 30 September 2010 the Court of Appeals in Belgrade quashed the decision and remitted the case to the Court of First Instance for a re-trial. 11. In the meantime, on 22 December 2009, the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court complaining under Article 32 of the Constitution (a provision which corresponds to Article 6 of the Convention) about the overall fairness of domestic proceedings and their length. The Constitutional Court’s decision was rendered on 4 November 2010. No violation in respect of the applicant’s complaints was found. 12. Due to applicant’s change to the value of the dispute (vrednost spora), on 31 October 2010 the Court of First Instance ruled that it had no further jurisdiction to examine the applicant’s complaint. The case was then sent to the High Court in Belgrade. 13. On 20 June 2013 the High Court adopted a partial judgment against which the applicant and the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals in Belgrade. 14. On 6 June 2014 the Court of Appeals partly quashed the impugned judgment. 15. It would appear that the case is still pending before the High Court. 16. Additionally, on 28 October 2014 the applicant lodged a new submission with the Constitutionals Court concerning, inter alia, the length of the impugned proceedings. It would appear from the facts of the case that the Constitutional Court has not yet responded.

6. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Überherrn. He had worked as a prison officer in the prison of Saarbrücken. 7. In April 2007 the prison authorities discovered that a mobile phone had been smuggled into the prison in December 2006. In May 2007 an investigation was opened against the applicant and in October 2007 several investigative measures against the applicant, including telephone surveillance, were ordered. On 14 January 2008 the applicant was summoned for questioning and on 16 January 2008 he was interviewed by the police. On 13 May 2008 the public prosecutor’s office filed a bill of indictment on charges of taking a bribe. He was accused of having accepted a bribe in the amount of 200 euros (EUR), of having smuggled a mobile phone into the prison and of having provided it to an inmate. Charges were also brought against seven other accused. 8. Subsequently, the District Court appointed defence counsel for all accused, and provided them in turn with access to the case files, including the recordings of the telephone surveillance. The refusal to appoint counsel for one co-accused was appealed against before the Regional Court, which decided on that matter in April 2009. 9. On 8 January 2010 the main proceedings were instituted before the District Court, and on 12 January 2010 the court scheduled the trial hearings. It subsequently enquired with counsel for the defence as to which dates might be suitable for further hearings for oral argument in the months of June and July 2010 and on which days in April 2010 it would be possible to hold a preparatory meeting. 10. The first hearing of the main proceedings took place on 3 May 2010 and after fourteen hearings the District Court convicted the applicant for having taken a bribe and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of one year and four months, suspended on probation. On 23 September 2010 the written judgment was filed by the court. In October 2010 the applicant was preliminarily suspended from his duties and his salary was reduced by approximately 25 %. 11. The applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment. In addition, the four co-accused and the public prosecutor appealed against the respective judgments. 12. In September 2011 the applicant changed his defence counsel; new counsel was provided with access to the case file. 13. The appeal proceedings commenced on 25 October 2011 and ended after seven hearings on 18 November 2011. The Regional Court acquitted the applicant as well as his co-defendants. It provided the judgment in writing on 23 December 2011. 14. On the day on which the judgment was pronounced, 18 November 2011, the public prosecutor lodged an appeal on points of law and submitted the reasoning on 16 January 2012. Responses to the appeal were submitted by the accused, and the Court of Appeal scheduled a hearing for 21 January 2013. 15. On 21 January 2013 the Court of Appeal set the judgment of the Regional Court aside and remitted the matter to the Regional Court. 16. New appeal proceedings commenced on 11 February 2015 and ended on 2 April 2015. The Regional Court convicted the applicant for having taken a bribe and sentenced him to eight months’ imprisonment. It suspended the execution of the prison sentence on probation and declared three of the eight months as having been served. 17. In its reasoning concerning sentencing the court held, inter alia, that it had to be taken into consideration in favour of the applicant that the deed had been committed already in 2006, that more than eight years had elapsed since then and that he had been subjected for many years, since 2007, to a criminal investigation and court proceedings that had been pursued against him. The court had also taken into account that the applicant had been suspended from service as soon as he had been convicted by the court of first instance and as a consequence had been receiving only a reduced salary since then. 18. Lastly, the court declared three months of the prison sentence as having been served in order to compensate for the excessively long proceedings. These had resulted from the fact that the presiding judge had only been able to schedule hearings on the matter from 11 February 2015 onwards after the matter had been remitted by the Court of Appeal on 29 January 2013. A discontinuation of the proceedings sought by the applicant based on the unreasonable length of the proceedings had, however, not been appropriate. This was only an option in extreme cases, where the weight of the disadvantage to be compensated for was greater than the weight of the punishment to be executed, to which such compensation was to apply. This standard, the court held, had not been met in the applicant’s case. 19. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of the Regional Court on 2 April 2015 and submitted his writ of appeal on points of law on 8 April 2015. 20. On 29 April 2016 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as being manifestly ill-founded. His subsequent complaint of a violation of his right to be heard was to no avail either. The appellate judgment of the Regional Court thus became final on 12 May 2016. 21. On 2 June 2016 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. On 4 July 2016 the Federal Constitutional Court decided not to admit it for adjudication (2 BvR 1140/16). 22. As a consequence of the conviction becoming final, the applicant lost his status as a civil servant pursuant to the Status of Civil Servants Act (Beamtenstatusgesetz). A statement to that effect by the authorities was not required, nor did a formal notification have to be sent to the applicant. 23. The applicant then applied to the Administrative Court seeking an interim injunction, under which he would retain his status as a civil servant for the time being, and the Land of Saarland would be instructed to continue paying his basic salary. By a decision of 12 July 2016 the Administrative Court dismissed his application, holding, inter alia, that it was contrary to the Status of Civil Servants Act (see paragraph 34 below). The court also stated that the fact that, in the event that the suspension of his prison sentence was revoked, only five months would have to be served, did not change the fact that he had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least six months. 24. On 6 October 2016 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant against the decision of the Administrative Court of 12 July 2016.

4. The second applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Prilep. 5. On 8 November 2008 seven persons, including the second applicant, founded the applicant association. The founding members adopted several documents concerning the applicant association, including its Charter, the relevant parts of which read as follows: Article 1 “The Church of Real Orthodox Christians of Macedonia [hereinafter “the Church”] is a voluntary association of individuals, who exercise, through their religious beliefs and doctrinal sources, the freedom of religion ... through preaching; prayer; religious rituals; and other forms of expression.” Article 3 “The seat of the [applicant association] is [the street name].” Article 8 “The aims of the Church are the following: ... - to promote, stimulate and educate the members about the spiritual life and development; - to hold and organise religious education; educative religious discussions and lectures; public religious debates; visits to monasteries ... to hold preaching sessions; prayer meetings ... and other orthodox rituals; - to organise humanitarian funds and actions for the well-being and support of people; - to take care and support all who are in a need of help ...; ... - to inform the orthodox followers about religious holidays and culture; - to publish bulletins, material, publications, books and advertising material with orthodox content; - to organise and hold joint meetings, rituals and other religious activities with other orthodox churches in the State and abroad with whom the Church is in union.” ...” Article 9 “As part of its activity, the Church will publish literature with orthodox content and establish funds, in particular, for: - publication of bulletins and periodicals ...; - publication of chronicles concerning the work of the members; - publication of books; - creation of funds for financial aid.” Article 11 “The publication and humanitarian activity of the Church, as well as the funds that it will establish, shall be financed by: - sponsors; - donations; - contributions; - funds gained by its own economic activities.” Article 27 “The Church will be financed by: - economic activities; - sponsorship; - donations; - voluntary contributions and funds, and so forth.” 6. On 26 November 2008 the Ministry of Justice granted permission to the applicant association to use the word “Macedonia” in the name. 7. On 3 December 2008 the second applicant, acting as an authorised representative of the applicant association, submitted an application for its registration as a religious association. As stated in the application, it appended, inter alia, evidence that its founding members were Macedonian nationals. By a letter of 19 December 2008, the Skopje Court of First Instance (“the Registration Court”) acknowledged receipt of all appended documents and requested that the applicants complete the application by specifying the organisational form under which the applicant association sought registration. On 5 January 2009 the applicants replied that the applicant association sought registration as a church. 8. On 6 March 2009 the Registration Court rejected the application as incomplete. Whereas it confirmed that nationality documentation was in the file, the court held that it was unable to establish whether the application for registration had been submitted in good time. That decision was quashed on appeal by the Skopje Court of Appeal, which found no reasons why the Registration Court had not sought that the applicants complete the application in that respect by its request of 19 December 2008. 9. On 10 May 2010 the Registration Court dismissed “the application of the applicant association” for registration, finding that it had requested registration as a religious entity under the Legal Status of Churches, Religious Communities and Religious Groups Act (“the 2007 Act”) only for formal reasons, while in practice it would operate as an association of citizens to which the Association of Citizens and Foundations Act applied. In this connection, the court held that: (a) the text of Article 1 of the Charter was not identical to the text of section 2 of the 2007 Act; (b) Articles 9 and 10 of the Charter specified that the applicant association would publish literature with religious content and would create funds, which, according to the court, was contrary to the aims specified in section 2 of the 2007 Act. In this connection it was noted that Articles 11 and 27 of the Charter specified that the applicant association would be financed, inter alia, by economic activities (стопанска дејност), which was contrary to sections 30-33 of the 2007 Act; (c) there was no evidence that the founding members and the second applicant were Macedonian nationals; and (d) despite the fact that the founding members had adopted the required documents for registration of the applicant association, they had not discussed the issues specified in section 13(1)(2-6) of the 2007 Act. 10. Referring to sections 7 and 8 of the 2007 Act, the court also found that: “The registration of the voluntary association of physical persons under the name ‘Church of Real Orthodox Christians of Macedonia’ ... would violate the freedom of religion ... of all physical persons-believers who exercise the[ir] freedom of religion through already registered religious communities and, in particular, the lawful legal status of other registered voluntary associations of physical persons ... and their managing bodies; hierarchy; their competence; titles; religious activity and everything that is regulated by their rules ... ... the free manifestation of religion cannot endanger ... human rights and freedoms of others ...” 11. The second applicant lodged an appeal with the Skopje Court of Appeal in which he complained on behalf of the applicant association that the reasons given by the Registration Court were unclear and contradictory. In this connection he argued, inter alia, that he had submitted copies of nationality documentation for the founding members; that section 31 of the 2007 Act provided that religious entities could publish relevant literature; that the sources of income provided for in the Charter corresponded to those set forth in the 2007 Act; and that the Registration Court had not explained how and why the registration of the applicant association would affect the religious beliefs and managing bodies of other registered religious communities. 12. On 16 December 2010 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision, finding that the reasoning contained therein was clear and consistent. It held that Article 11 of the Charter provided that the applicant association would be financed from funds obtained from economic activities, which implied that it would be for-profit, contrary to section 33(2) of the 2007 Act. Furthermore, the permission granted by the Ministry of Justice of 26 November 2008 (see paragraph 6 above) concerned “the Church of Real Orthodox Christians” and not “the Church of Real Orthodox Christians of Macedonia”. Lastly, it established that there was no evidence in the case file regarding the nationality of the founding members and the second applicant. The court did not address the remaining complaints.

5. The applicant company is a legal entity registered in Mažeikiai. 6. In 2004 the Competition Council (Konkurencijos taryba) opened an investigation into the applicant company’s alleged abuse of its dominant position on the fuel market. The investigation covered the applicant company’s activities between 2002 and 2004. According to the applicant company, the last action that fell within the scope of the investigation was undertaken on 31 December 2004. 7. On 7 March 2005 the Competition Council decided to broaden the scope of the investigation and to find out whether the applicant company’s activities had affected trade between the European Union member States, as defined in Article 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (“the TEC”) – now Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“the TFEU” – see paragraph 43 below). 8. On 22 December 2005 the Competition Council found that the applicant company had abused its dominant position on the fuel market, and fined it 32,000,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 9,267,841 euros (EUR)). 9. The applicant company appealed against the decision of the Competition Council of 22 December 2005 (see paragraph 8 above). It argued that the Competition Council had committed procedural violations and that it had also made mistakes in defining the scope of the market and the scope of the geographical market, and that its ruling that the applicant company had abused its dominant position on the fuel market had thus been unjustified. The applicant company also described as unjustified the Competition Council’s ruling that its pricing had been discriminatory and that the applicant company had obliged other economic entities to sign loyalty and non-competition agreements (see paragraph 16 below), and that it had discriminated against other economic entities. The applicant company also described as unfounded the Competition Council’s ruling that it had sold diesel fuel for differing prices to different economic entities and had thus discriminated against them and that it had sold arctic diesel fuel to one economic entity for a better price than that which it had offered to others. The applicant company was also dissatisfied with the level of the fine and was of the view that that it had been disproportionate. 10. On 28 June 2008 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court stated the following. The court held that the Competition Council had a right to investigate whether actions of economic entities had been in accordance with Article 82 of the TEC. The court emphasised that the Law on Competition enabled the Competition Council to initiate an investigation upon its own initiative if it gave sufficient reasons for doing so. In the present case, the Competition Council had given sufficient reasons for broadening the investigation to cover Article 82 of the TEC. The court found that the Competition Council had committed some procedural violations and decided to annul parts of its decision. The court also examined the case on the merits. It held that the Competition Council had defined the scope of the market and the geographical market incorrectly, and that that had had a major impact on its decision. It followed that further conclusions reached by the Competition Council regarding the applicant company’s dominant position, its abuse of that dominant position and compliance with Article 82 of the TEC could not have been just because they had been based on incorrect data. 11. The Competition Council appealed. On 8 December 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court delivered its decision, stating that it disagreed with the first-instance court regarding a number of procedural violations but holding that the Competition Council had not extensively explained why it had ignored the applicant company’s arguments regarding the scope of the market. In order to establish the scope of the market, it was necessary to investigate further. The court thus decided to return the case to the Competition Council for additional investigation (grąžinti bylą Konkurencijos tarybai atlikti papildomą tyrimą). 12. On 15 January 2009 the Competition Council decided that the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision (see paragraph 11 above) obliged it to undertake additional investigative measures into the applicant company’s activities and decided to reopen the investigation (atnaujinti tyrimą) with regard to the applicant company. 13. On an unspecified date, the applicant company appealed against the decision of the Competition Council to recommence the investigation. It submitted that the investigation of the applicant company’s activities had covered the period between 2002 and 2004. Although the initial investigation had not mentioned the end date of the actions examined, it could be presumed that the last investigated action had been undertaken on 31 December 2004. Domestic law provided that economic entities could only be held liable for breaches of the Law on Competition up to three years after the date of the violation in question or, if the violation was continuous, three years after the date of the last action that had been contrary to the Law on Competition (see paragraph 27 below). The applicant company stated that the last such action had been undertaken by it on 31 December 2004 and that the limitation period had ended on 31 December 2007; it could thus not be held responsible for breaches of the Law on Competition. 14. On 25 May 2009 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company’s complaint. The court held that final court decisions had to be executed, and that in view of the fact that the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of 8 December 2008 had become final (see paragraph 11 above), the Competition Council had an obligation to reopen the investigation into the applicant company’s activities. 15. The applicant company lodged an appeal, which was dismissed by the Supreme Administrative Court on 13 May 2010. The court provided its reasoning in five short paragraphs, holding that by its impugned decision the Competition Council had merely restarted the previous investigation (rather than opening a new one) (skundžiamu nutarimu yra tik atnaujinamas anksčiau vykdytas tyrimas vykdant Lietuvos vyriausiojo administracinio teismo įpareigojimą, o ne pradedamas naujas tyrimas), and that the provision of the domestic law regarding the limitation period was only applicable in respect of new investigations. 16. In order to comply with the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of 8 December 2008 (see paragraph 11 above), on 16 December 2010 the Competition Council carried out an additional investigation into the applicant company’s activities. The Competition Council clarified the definition of the geographical scope of the market, narrowing it to the territory of Lithuania. The Competition Council found that the applicant company had undertaken actions that had restricted competition – namely, it had abused its dominant position by applying discriminatory pricing, by imposing yearly loyalty requirements on other economic entities (that is to say by requiring them to agree to purchase a certain amount of fuel per year from the applicant company) and by restricting parallel imports and the onward sale by its clients of cheap fuel. The applicant company raised an issue regarding the limitation period, claiming that it had expired and that the Competition Council therefore had to terminate the investigation. The Competition Council was of the view that a limitation period had to be calculated from the time at which the economic entity in question had ceased engaging in unlawful activity. One of the breaches committed by the applicant company had started in 2002; one had started in 2003; and the rest had started in 2004. There was no information that the applicant company had ended its unlawful activities (except for one of them). Thus, the three‑year limitation period had not even started to run. Moreover, there was no information that the applicant company had changed its behaviour on the relevant markets in such a way that it no longer undertook actions contrary to the Law on Competition and the TFEU; therefore, the violation had been continuous, and it could not be held that the limitation period had expired. Even if the limitation period had started running before the Competition Council’s issuance of its decision of 22 December 2005, the calculation of it would nevertheless have ceased to run on the day that the Competition Council adopted its decision. The time‑limit for holding the applicant company liable should have started running on 8 December 2008 – the date of the Supreme Administrative Court’s partial annulment of the decision of the Competition Council. Otherwise, it would have been impossible for the Competition Council to rectify the shortcomings in its decision owing to the length of the court proceedings. Such a situation would have been contrary to the principles of justice and reasonableness because the harmful actions in question could have continued and there would have been no opportunities to require the applicant company to terminate them. Moreover, it would have been impossible to enforce the execution of the court’s decisions. The calculation of the limitation period provided by the applicant company was favourable to other economic entities that had breached the Law on Competition. Such economic entities would only have to behave in such a manner as to ensure that the court proceedings in respect of their own behaviour lasted for a long time. The Competition Council also drew attention to the provisions of the Code of Administrative Offences, wherein it was stated that if a court annulled a decision to impose a sanction on an economic entity or to terminate the procedure regarding the imposition of a sanction (or if that first‑instance decision was annulled by an appellate court), the time-limits would start to run again from the date on which the court’s or appellate court’s decision became final (see paragraph 31 below). The Supreme Administrative Court held that responsibility for violations of the Law on Competition was an administrative responsibility in the broad sense and that the principles of administrative responsibility could also be applied to violations of the Law on Competition (see paragraph 38 below). The Competition Council decided that the provisions of the Code of Administrative Offences had to be applied in the applicant company’s case and that – irrespective of the rules of the Law on Competition – the time-limit had to be calculated from the day on which the Supreme Administrative Court had adopted its decision. The provisions of European Union law also provided that the limitation period for imposing fines had to be suspended when the European Commission’s decision was reviewed by the European Union Court of Justice (see paragraph 47 below). The Competition Council was of the view that the national competition authority could not be more limited than the European Commission in its ability to suspend the limitation period. The Competition Council also relied on the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of 13 May 2010, whereby the court held that the Competition Council had been obliged to reopen the investigation and not to start a new one (see paragraph 15 above). The Competition Council found that the applicant company had breached the Law on Competition and the TFEU and fined it LTL 8,231,000 (approximately EUR 2,383,862). 17. The applicant company lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court and asked it to annul the order of the Competition Council of 16 December 2010 (see paragraph 16 above). The applicant company’s arguments were based, inter alia, on the fact that the limitation period for imposing the fine had been missed and that the applicant company could not be held responsible for violations of the Law on Competition and of the TFEU. The applicant company argued, inter alia, that the Law on Competition set the most serious economic sanctions of all those provided under the Lithuanian legal system and that such high fines threatened the continuity of the activities of economic entities and that because of that it was logical that the law provided that the limitation period could not be suspended or renewed. 18. On 15 April 2011 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant company’s complaint. As regards the limitation period and its calculation, the court held that the investigation into the applicant company’s activities had been started on 15 July 2004. The Competition Council was of the view that the limitation period had not started running before 22 December 2005 and that even if it had, it must have stopped when the Competition Council had adopted its decision (see paragraph 8 above). When the Supreme Administrative Court had annulled part of the Competition Council’s decision (see paragraph 11 above), the time-limit for responsibility for violations of competition law had had to be reset. The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court decided that the investigation had merely been reopened and that no new investigation had been initiated (nagrinėjamu atveju tyrimas tiesiog buvo atnaujintas, o ne pradėtas naujas) and that the applicant company’s arguments regarding the limitation period had been unfounded. 19. The applicant company appealed, raising the issue of the limitation period. On 21 January 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the arguments of the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court (see paragraph 18 above). It added that there was disagreement between the parties about the dates on which the applicant company had committed violations. Because the Competition Council had investigated the applicant company’s activities between 2002 and 2004, the court held that the last violation had been committed by the applicant company on 31 December 2004. The court also observed that the Competition Council had not proved that the violation had continued after 31 December 2004, and did not accept its arguments that the applicant company’s violation had been continuous or that the limitation period had not started running at all. The court then emphasised the importance of the principle of res judicata – that is to say the factual and legal aspects had been examined in another decision of the court and had to be accepted, and that a party to the proceedings or another person who had participated in the case (where the parties to the proceedings were the same) could rely on that court’s decision without having to prove the same circumstances again. In addition, one of the most important elements of the principle of the rule of law was the principle of legal certainty, which required that the principle of res judicata be respected. Accordingly, when the courts resolved a case, their decisions should not be questioned or left unexecuted, because courts’ decisions (together with legal norms) were a guarantee of the stability of public life and the certainty of social relations. Having regard to that, the Supreme Administrative Court was of the view that on 13 May 2010 it had already examined the Competition Council’s right to reopen the investigation into the applicant company’s activities (see paragraph 15 above). As a result, the legality of the reopening of the investigation had the power of res judicata and could not be questioned again. The Supreme Administrative Court also referred to another one of its cases, decided by different composition with an exception of one judge, on 21 June 2012, which had concerned the sale of dairy products (“the dairy products case”). In that case it had examined the relevant provisions of the Law on Competition – namely their application when a case concerning a violation of competition law was transferred for examination to a court, which then annulled the decision of the Competition Council and returned the case to it for further investigation (see paragraph 40 below). However, the court held: “In the opinion of the extended composition of the court, the reasoning provided in the dairy products case is not applicable to the present case firstly, because of the abovementioned arguments regarding the influence of the decision of 13 May 2010 and the principle of res judicata. Moreover, the circumstances of the instant case and the one in which the decision of 21 June 2012 has been adopted, are not the same or so similar that they could be examined similarly. In the administrative case no. A520‑2136/2012 the court has examined the legality of the decision of the Competition Council whereby the economic entity was suspected of a breach of the provisions of the Law on Competition and in the instant case the applicant company is suspected of breaching both the Law on Competition and the TFEU. In the opinion of the extended composition of the court, this circumstance also determined the conclusion that the two cases are substantively different and the decision, taken in one of them, cannot be a precedent in determining the other one.” The court thus decided that the Competition Council’s ruling that (i) the limitation period had not expired and (ii) the applicant company could be held liable for the breaches of the Law on Competition had been lawful. The court did however lower the fine to LTL 7,819,450 (approximately EUR 2,264,669).

6. The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Vienna. He is of Bulgarian origin. 7. On 23 July 2009 a letter signed by the applicant was sent to the Sofia Municipality. In that letter the applicant complained of construction works undertaken by his nephew, A.K., which had significantly altered the house which had been owned by his parents and where he had been born. The applicant had become aware of that during his stay in Sofia in May 2009. He expressed his indignation about the works undertaken, as well as doubts as to their legality, and requested to be sent copies of all documents concerning them, stating that he intended to bring the matter to court. He stated in addition that A.K. held, for the property in question, an “illegal notarial deed ... acquired on the basis of a forged notarial deed”. These allegations concerned the notarial deeds of 1995 and 1996, described in paragraph 12 below; A.K. had been the beneficiary under both of them. The applicant indicated an intention to challenge these deeds in court. 8. In December 2009 A.K. initiated a private criminal prosecution of the applicant. In his complaint he stated that he had become aware of the applicant’s letter “by chance”, and claimed that the applicant had defamed him, in particular by stating that he had an “illegal notarial deed ... acquired on the basis of a forged notarial deed”. This implied that A.K. had committed a criminal offence, namely using a forged document. In the same proceedings A.K. also brought a tort action against the applicant, claiming 10,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN – the equivalent of 5,114 euros (EUR)) in non‑pecuniary damage. 9. The applicant objected to the complaint against him, contending that what he had stated was true and that he had never claimed that A.K. had actually used the forged documents. 10. In a decision of the Sofia District Court of 18 October 2012, the criminal prosecution of the applicant was discontinued as time-barred, and the examination of the case continued only as regards A.K.’s tort action. 11. That action was allowed in a judgment of the Sofia District Court of 30 January 2014. The domestic court stated expressly in that judgment that it did not have to establish the elements of the criminal offence of defamation. It had to establish, in accordance with section 45(1) of the Obligations and Contracts Act (see paragraph 20 below), whether the applicant’s behaviour amounted to a tortious act and whether A.K. had suffered any damage as a result. 12. As to the facts of the case, the Sofia District Court established that A.K. had become the owner of part of the property at issue after his mother had donated to him a share in 1983 and he had purchased another share from a co-owner in 1995. Both transactions had been attested in notarial deeds. In a further notarial deed of 1996 A.K. had been recognised as the owner of part of the property. In 2006 he had obtained a permit to enlarge the existing house. The construction works had been carried out in 2006 and 2007. A representative of the building control authorities had visited the site on 2 July 2009 and had established breaches of the relevant rules, but no administrative sanction had been ordered against A.K. An additional check had been carried out on 26 November 2009, after one of the co-owners of the property (not the applicant) had complained. That check had showed that part of the construction works undertaken by A.K. did not correspond to the construction permit. It appears however that A.K. had not been ordered to demolish the unlawfully constructed parts. Further complaints by the co‑owners concerning the construction undertaken by A.K. had been sent to the municipality on 13 May 2010. 13. The Sofia District Court heard in addition witnesses who said that, following the applicant’s allegations against him, A.K. had become nervous and had had unspecified problems with the authorities. 14. The Sofia District Court found that it had never been shown that the notarial deeds in A.K.’s favour had been flawed, meaning that they had to be considered valid. The applicant’s allegations that one of these deeds had been “illegal” and another one “forged” could have affected A.K.’s good name in society, as they suggested that A.K. had profited from using unlawful means. Those allegations had also damaged A.K.’s professional reputation, since he was working in construction. This was so even bearing in mind that the municipal authorities had taken no particular action against A.K., and that checks on the construction site had been incited by other co‑owners of the property. The above considerations were valid regardless of whether the applicant had committed the criminal offence of defamation, since this was not the subject of the proceedings. The applicant had had resort to his constitutional right to petition the authorities, but the exercise of that right did not have to involve causing damage to others. 15. The Sofia District Court ordered the applicant to pay A.K. BGN 5,000 (the equivalent of EUR 2,557) in non-pecuniary damage, plus default interest. It considered such an award to be just, pointing out that A.K. had enjoyed a good name in society, that the applicant’s allegations had also affected A.K.’s professional reputation, and that the allegations had been made before a municipal body and not in private correspondence. 16. Upon an appeal by the applicant, in a final judgment of 21 August 2015, the Sofia City Court upheld the District Court’s judgment, endorsing its reasoning. 17. The applicant has not submitted documents showing that he actually paid the amount awarded to A.K., nor has he claimed to have made any such payment.

5. The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Turkey. 6. On 22 August 2004 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party). The following day, on 23 August 2004, he was questioned by the gendarmerie, at which time he was reminded of his rights, including the right to benefit from legal assistance. He refused the assistance of a lawyer and gave a statement of forty-nine pages in length in which he admitted his membership of the PKK and gave detailed information about the organisation and its members. According to transcripts of that statement, the applicant read its content and signed every page of it. 7. On 26 August 2004 the applicant was brought before the Tunceli public prosecutor and he was again reminded of his right to benefit from legal assistance. He indicated that he did not wish to be assigned a lawyer and that he would make a statement without assistance. He confirmed his membership of the PKK and his support for that illegal organisation, however maintaining that he had never been involved in an armed operation. The applicant was placed in detention pending trial on the same day. 8. On 3 December 2004 the Malatya public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Malatya Assize Court, charging the applicant under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code with seeking to destroy the constitutional order and unity of the Turkish State and to remove part of the country from the State’s control. The public prosecutor claimed that the applicant: - had exploded a remote-controlled land mine in Ovacık province in November 2003 that had caused the injury of one soldier, - had exploded a time bomb in Ovacık province on 28 October 2003 that had caused the injury of two soldiers. In its assessment report (tensip zaptı) dated 10 December 2004 the Malatya Assize Court ordered a copy of the police statements of D.T., M.A., A.Ç., S.G., H.B. and V.D. The trial court further ordered that the whereabouts of D.T. be ascertained. 9. M.A. was tried in another set of criminal proceedings concerning the same organisation. On 17 February 2004 M.A. lodged an application to benefit from the Reintegration of Offenders into Society Act (Law no. 4959), which had come into force on 6 August 2003. 10. On 30 December 2004, at the first hearing, the applicant gave evidence in the presence of his lawyer and accepted the contents of his police statement. In other words, the applicant once again admitted his membership of the PKK while insisting that he had not been involved in any armed activity. He further stated that his statement had not been read back to him by the police and asked the trial court not to take it into consideration in case it had any incriminatory remarks in respect of himself or third persons in so far as they concerned participation in armed activities. When asked about his statement before the public prosecutor, the applicant essentially confirmed it, whilst insisting that he had not given any statement concerning the attacks in Tunceli, a city in the east of Turkey, and adding that he had signed it without reading it. Lastly, the applicant stated that he had received training in bomb-making and that he had been planning to carry out bomb attacks in major cities in accordance with the instructions of the PKK. His lawyer submitted that he had nothing to add to the applicant’s statements. 11. During the same hearing the trial court questioned several witnesses, namely A.Ç., M.A. and K.A. A.Ç. testified that he knew the applicant but that they had not carried out any armed attack together. M.A. stated that he had not known the applicant’s real name, but he had known him as “Hamza”. M.A. further testified that he had no knowledge of the applicant’s position and activities within the illegal organisation. K.A. testified that he did not know the applicant. 12. At a hearing on 25 November 2005 the trial court noted that D.T. was in Kırklareli Prison and it issued a letter of request to the Kırklareli Assize Court, requesting that the latter obtain his statements. 13. On 14 December 2005 D.T.’s statement was taken by the Kırklareli Assize Court, pursuant to the letter of request by the trial court. According to the transcript of the hearing at the Kırklareli Assize Court, D.T. was detained in Kırklareli E-type Prison at the time his statement was taken. D.T. stated that he had known the applicant as “Zafer” and that he had knowledge of the attack in Ovacık province, adding that he had heard such information from the member with the code name “Serhildan”. 14. On 15 March 2006 the applicant asked the trial court to hear evidence from D.T. in person. The trial court rejected this request on the basis that hearing D.T.’s testimony in person would not contribute to its assessment since his statement given before another court had been considered sufficient for a conviction. 15. On 10 May 2006 the Malatya Assize Court found the applicant guilty pursuant to Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The court took account of the variety of evidence and witness statements, including those of D.T., which had been taken by the Kırklareli Assize Court at the trial court’s request. The relevant parts of the trial court’s reasoned judgment read as follows: “... EVIDENCE, EXAMINATION OF EVIDENCE AND REASONING ... a) Evidence H.B., who is being tried for the offence of membership of an illegal armed organisation, stated on page 18 of his police statement that N.I. [the co-accused] had been involved in the killings of two soldiers in May 2003 around the River Hiran in Tunceli. ... Witness A.Ç. stated on page 52 of his police statement that the members of the [illegal] organisation [PKK] with the code names ‘Zana’ and ‘Fırat’, who had been acting under the leadership of a member with the code name ‘Dilhas’, had infiltrated the security forces’ cordon in May 2003 around the Ziyaret river at Güleç village in Malazgirt. ... Witness M.A. stated on page forty-four of his statement that the attack on the public-order commando unit at the location known as Göktepe in Malazgirt province in May 2003, that resulted in two soldiers being killed, had been carried out by the members of the [illegal] organisation [PKK] with the code names ‘Zana’ and ‘Fırat’, who were acting under the leadership of ... ‘Dilhas’. On page forty-four [of his statement], he stated that the bomb had been planted at the road checkpoint at the location known as Efkartepe in Ovacık province on 28 October 2003 by ... ‘Hamza’ and that he was an expert in explosives and was from a unit whose leader was the member with the code name ‘Diyar’. ... Witness V.D. stated on page 20 of his police statement that ... ‘Dilhas’ had placed the explosives on the highway between Tunceli and Pülümür and that ... he had heard this from ‘Dilhas’. D.T., who was being tried for the offence of membership of an illegal armed organisation, stated on page 15 of his police statement that the decision to attack the military unit had been taken in October or November 2003 and that the mines had been placed and set off ... by Suat Daştan [the applicant], who had the code name ‘Zafer’. D.T., who gave evidence as a witness before the Kırklareli Assize Court, acting on letters of request, stated that his pre-trial statements had been correct and that he had knowledge concerning [the applicant]’s actions [under the code name “Zafer”] in Ovacık province and at the guard post and that he had received that information from ... ‘Serhildan’. Witness A.Ç., in his statement before the [trial] court, stated that his pre-trial statements had not been correct and that the member with the code name ‘Nurhak’ mentioned by the applicant had been himself [A.Ç.] and that they had not committed any attacks together. Witness M.A., in his statement before the [trial] court, stated that he had known the applicant’s code name as ‘Hamza’ and that he had no knowledge concerning the applicant’s illegal activities within the organisation [the PKK]. ... b) Examination of evidence, admission of our court and reasons ... Although it was stated in the indictment that the applicant had been responsible for the attacks of 28 October and November 2003 in Ovacık province, it was understood that the attack which was mentioned by the witness D.T. was the one of 28 October 2003 and that the two attacks mentioned in the indictment were one and the same. And although [the applicant’s] code name was revealed as ‘Zafer’, it came to light as a result of the confrontation [between the applicant and the witness M.A.] conducted during the trial that ... ‘Hamza’, who had been mentioned by the witness M.A. on page forty-four of his [police] statement as the perpetrator of the attack on 28 October 2003 and who had received special training in explosives, had [in fact] been [the applicant]. ... Although the accused [the applicant] denied any involvement in any armed activity throughout the proceedings, the statements of S.G., A.Ç., H.B., V.D., M.A. and D.T. as well as the evidence given by M.A. and D.T. during the trial and the fact that M.A. had identified the applicant as ... ‘Hamza’ were consistent with each other and the admitted witness statements [showed] that ... the applicant, who was known as ‘Hamza’ by the witness M.A., had sprung the trap and had placed the mines on 28 October 2003. ...” 16. On 6 February 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.

4. The applicant was born in 1991 and lives in Mersin. 5. On 30 December 2011 the applicant was taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation and of making propaganda for that organisation. 6. On the same day, the applicant was brought before the investigating judge who ordered his detention on remand taking into account the nature of the offences, and the strong suspicion that he had committed the alleged offences, and the risk of absconding. 7. On 28 March 2012 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an objection against the decision dated 30 December 2011 ordering the applicant’s detention and requested his release. On 29 March 2012 the Mersin Magistrates’ Court dismissed the objection on the basis of the case file, without holding a hearing. On 16 April 2012 the applicant’s lawyer filed a further objection against that decision. On 17 April 2012 the Mersin Criminal Court with General Jurisdiction dismissed the objection on the basis of the case file, without holding a hearing. 8. On 5 September 2012 the applicant was released from detention on remand. 9. On 10 September 2012 the Adana Public Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicant, accusing him of being a member of a terrorist organisation and of making propaganda in its favour. 10. According to the latest information in the case file, the proceedings against the applicant are still pending before an assize court.

5. The applicant is a media company with its registered office in Ankara. 6. On 5 November 1998 Kamoy Araştırma Siyasi Danışmanlık ve Yayıncılık A.Ş. (hereinafter “Kamoy Araştırma”), a company affiliated with the applicant company, applied to the Turkish Patent Institute (Türk Patent Enstitüsü) for registration of the trademark “Özlenen Gazete Vatan, Günlük Siyasi Gazete” (Homeland: The newspaper we longed for). On 5 November 1998 the trademark was registered in the name of the company for a period of ten years. 7. In February and March 1999 Kamoy Araştırma published a newspaper entitled Özlenen Gazete Vatan. In March 1999 it halted the publication of the newspaper owing to financial reasons. 8. On 4 September 2002, Bağımsız Gazetecilik Yayıncılık A.Ş. (hereinafter “Bağımsız Gazetecilik”), another company operating in the media sector, began publishing a newspaper called Vatan. 9. On 22 October 2002, Kamoy Araştırma brought a case against Bağımsız Gazetecilik before the Istanbul Intellectual Property Court, requesting the suspension of the latter’s use of its registered trademark, which according to it constituted unfair competition. It argued, inter alia, that the other party was using the same name for the same product, namely a newspaper, without having obtained any prior permission, despite the fact that it had the rights to the registered trademark which needed to be protected pursuant to Legislative Decree no. 556 on the Protection of Trademarks. 10. During the course of the proceedings the trademark was transferred to the applicant company, which subsequently became a party to the proceedings. 11. On 18 August 2003 an expert report assessing both parties’ rights as regards the name at issue was submitted to the court. It noted that while the applicant company had indeed registered the name “Vatan”, which was common to both newspapers, Bağımsız Gazetecilik had the “declaration of intention to publish a periodical” (mevkute beyannamesi – hereinafter “declaration of a periodical”) dated 1974, which allowed it to publish with that name. The report pointed out that the newspaper Vatan had been published since 1975 and that the name had become recognisable long before the applicant company had applied for registration. In that connection, the report noted that in view of the last paragraph of Article 7 of Legislative Decree no. 556, which made reference to the recognisability of a trademark, it should be accepted that it was Bağımsız Gazetecilik that had actually made the name a recognised brand. It concluded accordingly that the Patent Institute should have refused the applicant company’s request for registration pursuant to Article 7 of Legislative Decree no. 556. 12. On 27 January 2004 the Istanbul Intellectual Property Court dismissed the applicant company’s claim. The court noted that the newspaper Vatan, the rights to which had been transferred to Bağımsız Gazetecilik in 2002, had been published since 1975. In line with the findings of the expert report, it held that the name “Vatan” had become well-known as a newspaper prior to the applicant company’s application for its registration as a trademark and that the applicant company, whose application should actually have been rejected by the Patent Institute, could not be considered to have brought the case in good faith. The court furthermore stated that in any event the use of the name by the defendant party was protected by section 31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act (Law no. 5000 on the Establishment and Duties of the Turkish Patent Institute), which had come into force on 6 November 2003 during the course of the proceedings and set forth that those who publish periodicals could not be prevented from doing so on the basis of Legislative Decree no. 556. 13. The applicant company appealed against the judgment. It argued that the “declaration of a periodical” mentioned in the expert report was simply an official recognition of an application to publish a periodical and did not have any priority over a registered trademark. Noting that its rights to the trademark at issue were still valid, it argued that Turkish law provided for the absolute protection of a registered trademark. The applicant company also challenged the application of section 31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act to its case, stating that the said regulation had entered into force after it had lodged its case. It argued that the provision did not have a legitimate aim and paved the way for everyone to publish newspapers with the same name. 14. On 6 May 2005 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment on the basis of the second reasoning relied on by the Intellectual Property Court. The appellate court pointed out that according to the additional paragraph of Article 7 of Legislative Decree no. 556, the application for the registration of a trademark which had previously been recognisable – in this case, the application for registration lodged by the defendant party (see paragraphs 18-23 below) – could not be rejected. It found that despite that provision, since the applicant company had already registered the trademark, it would have priority over an unregistered trademark, albeit a recognisable one. Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that the first reasoning of the court, which gave priority to the unregistered trademark, could not be accepted. It noted, however, that the case should in any event be dismissed pursuant to section 31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act. 15. The applicant company applied for rectification of that judgment, arguing that the retrospective application of section 31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act put the other party in a privileged position. In that connection, it maintained that had the Intellectual Property Court ruled on its case within one year of it having been lodged, it would have been able to prevent the unlawful use of its trademark. 16. On 28 October 2005 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant’s rectification application. 17. On 31 January 2008, in examining the matter in relation to a separate case, the Turkish Constitutional Court annulled section 31(2) of the Turkish Patent Institute Act, finding that it did not comply with Article 35 of the Constitution, which guaranteed the right to property. After having established that a trademark constituted a possession, the Constitutional Court stated that Legislative Decree no. 556 was aimed at protecting registered trademarks from unlawful interferences and that the provision at issue made it impossible to exercise that protection as regards unlawful interferences which had already started by its entry into force. It concluded accordingly that such a restriction of trademark rights, which resulted in the protection of unlawful acts, was not in the public interest. 18. On 24 September 2002 Bağımsız Gazetecilik applied for the registration of the name “Vatan” as a trademark. The Patent Institute rejected the application on account of the already existing registration in the applicant company’s name. 19. On an unspecified date Bağımsız Gazetecilik objected to the decision of the Patent Institute. 20. On 8 December 2003 the Patent Institute imposed a provisional measure on the trademark, restricting its transfer to third parties. 21. On 7 February 2005 the Patent Institute accepted the objection of Bağımsız Gazetecilik and decided to register the name “Vatan” in its name for publishing services. 22. In the meantime, on 2 April 2004 Bağımsız Gazetecilik had initiated proceedings against the applicant company for the annulment of the latter’s registered trademark. 23. On 17 February 2005 the Ankara Intellectual Property Court ruled that the registration in the name of the applicant company be declared void, finding that Vatan had become well-known as a newspaper before the applicant company’s registration. The court also held that the applicant company had not used the trademark for a period of five years, which was a reason for annulment of a trademark under Article 14 of Legislative Decree no. 556. That judgment became final by a decision of the Court of Cassation on 12 June 2006. 24. On 11 August 2006 the trademark for the name “Vatan” was registered in the name of Bağımsız Gazetecilik. 25. On 9 November 2006 the applicant company’s trademark registration was removed from the register of the Patent Institute.

5. The applicants were born in 1963, 1960 and 1959 respectively. The first applicant lives in Balzan, the second applicant in Naxxar and the third applicant in Sliema. 6. The applicants are owners of apartment no. 3 situated at 94, Melita Street, Valletta. This apartment was inherited by the applicants from their father, who died in September 2006. 7. Initially, the apartment belonged to the applicants’ late father and his brothers. On 4 August 1981, the late father of the applicants and his brothers entered into a contract granting a temporary emphyteusis for seventeen years to couple S. The seventeen year temporary emphyteusis was to commence on 12 August 1981 and the ground rent to be paid was set at 120 Maltese liri (MTL) (around 280 euros (EUR)) annually. 8. In 1988, one of the co‑owners had taken legal action to collect arrears of ground rent for eleven years and to evict couple S. By a judgment of the Court of Appeal (civil jurisdiction) of 27 May 1992, couple S. was ordered to pay the arrears; however, the court did not order their eviction. 9. According to the applicants, in 1992, their late father had entered into negotiations with couple S., in order to reach a new lease agreement and increase the rent. Couple S. did not accept the terms of the new lease and did not pay outstanding arrears. 10. On 17 October 1994, a deed of partition was signed by the siblings and the apartment in question was assigned in its entirety to the late father of the applicants. 11. On 11 August 1998 the temporary emphyteusis came to an end. Nevertheless, couple S. continued to occupy the apartment by title of lease since the law (Article 12(2)(b)(i) of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance as amended by Act XXII of 1979 – see Relevant domestic law below) provided for the conversion of a temporary emphyteusis into a lease, irrespective of the owners’ consent. As a result, couple S. could in practice reside indefinitely in the applicants’ premises. 12. The rent established at the time, calculated in accordance with the law, was MTL 170.70 (around EUR 397.62) annually and was to be revised every fifteen years (according to Articles 12 and 13 of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance). The next revision of the rent was scheduled for 2013 and the rent then would be EUR 568.06. 13. Neither the applicants, nor their late father ever accepted any rent paid by couple S. on the following grounds: the rent due as calculated according to the law was far less than the rental market value of the apartment; the law in question (Article 12 of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance) was in breach of their rights as stipulated in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention; the conditions imposed by Article 12 of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance were disproportionate and did not pursue a legitimate aim; the owners were being denied enjoyment of their own property; and structural changes had been made to the premises without the applicants’ late father’s permission (or of any of his brothers). 14. According to a report of an ex-parte architect drawn up on 25 January 2011, the market value of the apartment at the time was that of EUR 125,000. Constitutional Redress Proceedings (a) First-instance 15. On 18 October 2012, the applicants filed proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction. They alleged that their predecessors had no alternative but to enter into a contract of temporary emphyteusis in order to prevent the apartment from being requisitioned, and once that contract of temporary emphyteusis had been converted into an indefinite lease, by imposition of the law and against their will, the applicants had lost the property for an indefinite period and had no means of recovering it. The applicants argued that had the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance not been amended by Act XXII of 1979, the temporary emphyteusis on their apartment would have simply come to an end and they would have recovered their property. However, due to the change in law (brought about by Act XXII of 1979), couple S. had remained therein rendering it impossible for the applicants to regain possession of their apartment. Furthermore the rent due to them, as established by the law, failed to strike a fair balance between the rights of the owners and the rights of couple S. They also argued that they needed the apartment for their own use. The applicants requested that the court provide them with the necessary compensation for the damage they had suffered. 16. On 29 January 2014, the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, found against the applicants, dismissed their claims and ordered them to pay the expenses of the proceedings. 17. Relying on Zammit v. Malta (no. 16766/90, Commission decision of 12 January 1991, Decision and Reports 68) the court held that state intervention in socio economic matters such as housing is often necessary in securing social justice and public benefit. In this area the margin of appreciation available to a legislature in implementing social and economic policies was necessarily a wide one, both with regard to the existence of a problem of public concern warranting a measure of control and as to the choice of the rules for the implementation of such a measure. Recognizing that a balance between the right of owners, the state, and the person occupying the apartment needed to be struck, and that according to the European Court of Human Rights such balance had not been struck in the case of Amato Gauci v. Malta (no. 47045/06, 15 September 2009 in connection with the laws pertinent to this case), the court noted that neither the Convention nor the Constitution established an absolute right of property. 18. The court held that Article 12 of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance did not deprive the applicants of their property, but it impacted the ability of the applicants to use the apartment. Furthermore, the rent payable to the applicants did not reflect the value of the property in question ‑ the court‑appointed expert had established that the rental value of the apartment in 2014 was EUR 3,000 annually, and that the rental value of the apartment in 1998 had been EUR 2,000 annually. However, in the court’s view the applicants could not validly argue that Article 12 of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance, as amended by Act XXII of 1979, had infringed their rights since the temporary emphyteusis had been entered into in 1981, when the amendments to the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance by Act XXII had already been introduced. At the time, the consequences of the law as amended by Act XXII were clear and foreseeable; nevertheless, the applicants still chose to enter into such an agreement, and did so freely. (b) Appeal 19. On 31 January 2014, the applicants appealed the above decision. 20. On 6 February 2015, the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal and upheld the decision of the first‑instance court. The Constitutional Court ordered the applicants to pay for the costs of the appeal proceedings. It found that the inflation rate was established by the Principal Government Statistician, as required by Article 13(2) of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance. Having no proof to the contrary, it had to be assumed that the inflation rate established was correct and objective. The calculation of the rent due for the lease (upon conversion of the temporary emphyteusis to a lease), did not only depend on the inflation rate but also on the ground rent that had been payable at the time of the temporary emphyteusis. Thus, the rent was low not as a consequence of the inflation rate, but as a result of the ground rent, established voluntarily by the applicants’ predecessors, which was lower than it should have been at the time. The Constitutional Court considered that the ground rent payable at the time of the temporary emphyteusis for the property at issue should have been EUR 1,476.27 a year (based on the inflation index for 1981 as being 408.16, and in the light of the fact that the inflation index for 1998 was 580.61 ‑ time when the court expert had estimated the rental value of the apartment for that year at EUR 2,100) and not MTL 120 (around EUR 280) as the parties had agreed. The Constitutional Court observed that when the temporary emphyteusis agreement was entered into, two architects had been present alongside the applicants’ predecessors (then owners of the apartment). Therefore, the applicants could not argue that their predecessors had not known the value of the apartment. 21. The Constitutional Court therefore concluded that the owners of the apartment (which had now been inherited by the applicants) knew that: i) they were agreeing on a ground rent that was relatively low in amount; ii) when the temporary emphyteusis ended it would be converted into a lease that could be inherited and renewed (because Article 12 of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance as amended by Act XXII was already in effect at the time the temporary emphyteusis agreement was entered into); and iii) that the value of the rent would be worked out on the basis of the ground rent that was being paid, in proportion to the rise in living standards. In consequence they were aware that the rent would remain relatively low, like the ground rent had been. 22. The Constitutional Court also found that the applicants’ need for the apartment, namely to place their mother who was herself living in a rented apartment paid for by the applicants (at EUR 400 a month), was not a good reason to have the property back. 23. Lastly, the Constitutional Court did not deny that the applicants’ predecessors were faced with a possibility that the apartment would be requisitioned, since the apartment was empty (and empty properties could be requisitioned). However, entering into a temporary emphyteusis agreement was not the only choice they had: the applicants’ predecessors could have sold the apartment or rented it for commercial purposes. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court argued that the owners could have requested a higher ground rent. Nevertheless, they didn’t and they had entered the contractual relationship voluntarily fully aware of the consequences that would ensue.

4. The applicant was born in 1929 and lives in St Petersburg. 5. On 17 February 2000 the applicant lodged a claim with the Yakutskiy Town Court of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) (“the Town Court”) against the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) for providing him with a housing subsidy and for a compensation of non-pecuniary damage. 6. On 2 February 2001 the Town Court dismissed the claims. 7. On 23 April 2001 this decision was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) (“the Supreme Court”). 8. On 7 April 2005, following the applicant’s supervisory review appeal, the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 23 April 2001. The Supreme Court remitted the case for a new examination by the court of cassation instance for the applicant had not been duly summoned to the hearing of 23 April 2001. 9. On 11 May 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal and upheld the judgment of 2 February 2001. 10. On 26 January 2006, upon the applicant’s supervisory review appeal, the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 2 February 2001 and the decision of 11 May 2005 as it found that the lower courts misjudged the facts of the case and erred in application of the national law. 11. On 17 May 2006 the Town Court again dismissed the applicant’s claims. 12. On 21 August 2006 the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of 17 May 2006 on appeal and remitted the case for a new examination, as the lower court had misapplied the national law. 13. On 18 December 2006 the Town Court ordered the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) to pay the applicant 683,619 Russian roubles (RUB) from the federal budget funds allocated for providing the housing subsidies for persons leaving the high north regions. 14. On 12 February 2007 the Supreme Court found the decision of 18 December 2006 to award the applicant money unlawful and unreasoned, quashed the decision and yet again remitted the case for a new examination. 15. Twice, on 26 April 2007 and 7 September 2007, the Town Court dismissed the applicant’s claims. 16. Each time, on 18 July 2007 and 19 May 2008, respectively, the judgment of the Town Court was set aside on appeal, and the case was remitted for a new examination. In the first set of the proceedings, the appellate court found the judgment unlawful, and requested to bring into the proceedings the municipality “Nizhnekolymskiy rayon”. In the second set of the proceedings, the appellate court found that the applicant had not been duly summoned to the hearing, and that the municipality should have been joined to the proceedings as a defendant rather than a third party. 17. On 23 September 2008 the Town Court granted the applicant’s claims in part. It ordered the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) to pay the applicant RUB 1,812,838.10 from the federal budget funds allocated for the housing subsidies for persons leaving the high north regions. 18. On 17 November 2008 the judgment of 23 September 2008 was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court. 19. On 25 November 2010 the applicant requested the writ of execution in respect of the judgment of the Town Court of 23 September 2008. 20. On 10 February 2010 a writ of execution was issued. 21. On unspecified dates, the applicant submitted the writ of execution, first, to the Department of the Federal Treasury and, second, to the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya). 22. On 13 April and 8 June 2011 respectively the writ of execution was returned to the applicant as the debtor had no accounts at these bodies. 23. On 29 July 2011 the Department of the Federal Bailiffs’ Service for the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) (“the Bailiffs’ Service) received the writ of execution and opened the enforcement proceedings. 24. On 24 August 2011 the Head of the Bailiffs’ Service ordered to set aside the above decision to open the enforcement proceedings. 25. On 30 August 2011 the decision of 29 July 2011 was set aside and the Bailiffs’ Service refused institution of enforcement proceedings with the reasoning that as the enforcement document required recovery of public budgetary funds, it could not be enforced by the Bailiffs’ Service. 26. On 8 February 2012 the District Court clarified the judgment of 23 September 2008. It explained that the debt had to be recovered from the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) represented by the Federal Treasury of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) from the federal budget sources allocated for the housing subsidies for persons leaving the high north regions. 27. On an unspecified date the applicant on one more occasion sent the writ of execution to the Department of the Federal Treasury. On 26 April 2012 the writ was returned to him for the debtor had no account at the Treasury. 28. On 10 July 2012 the Bailiffs’ Service received the writ of execution and opened the enforcement proceedings. 29. On 10 September 2012 the enforcement proceedings were terminated for the debtor had no property that the debt could be recovered from. 30. On the same date the bailiff responsible for the execution of the judgment issued an act establishing that there were grounds for returning the writ of execution to the creditor. According to this document, the debtor, the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya), was a collective executive body, without the status of a legal entity or any property on their balance sheet. 31. The judgment of 23 September 2008 remained unenforced. 32. On 29 November 2010 the applicant lodged a claim under the Compensation Act (see the Domestic Law part below). He complained that the civil proceedings in his case against the Government of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) had been unreasonably long, and asked for a compensation in that respect. 33. On 20 December 2010 a judge of the Supreme Court of Russia ordered that the application should be returned to the applicant with the reasoning that the proceedings complained of ended on 17 November 2008, i.e. before the entry into force of the Compensation Act. 34. On 15 March 2011 the applicant’s special appeal against the above decision was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Russia. The court agreed with the judge that had passed the decision of 20 December 2010 that the end date of the proceedings was the date of the decision of 17 November 2008 to uphold the judgment of 23 September 2008 on appeal, while the subsequent period when the applicant applied for supervisory review of that decisions should not be included in the overall length of the proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in San Jose, the United States of America. 6. On 6 September 2005 the applicant brought proceedings against the private company X and a third party, seeking the recovery of property rights pertaining to land, both on his own behalf and on behalf of six other plaintiffs who were allegedly co-owners of the property. 7. Between 11 October 2005 and 24 March 2008 the Ploieşti District Court (hereinafter referred to as “the District Court”) held more than fifteen hearings in the case in order to allow the parties to add evidence to the file. 8. On 21 December 2005 the District Court ordered the applicant to inform it by 31 January 2006 of the home addresses of the other six plaintiffs on whose behalf he had brought the proceedings. The applicant complied with the court’s order. 9. On 29 November 2006 the applicant informed the District Court on behalf of himself and the other six plaintiffs of the cancellation of the legal representation contract they had signed with their initial legal representative. 10. On 24 March and 21 April 2008 the District Court adjourned the proceedings on procedural grounds and in order to allow the applicant to add to the file the relevant documents proving that he and the other six plaintiffs were entitled to claim the land in question and that the applicant was authorised by the other plaintiffs to represent them. The court also noted that the proceedings would be suspended in accordance with the relevant civil procedure rules if the applicant failed to comply with the court’s request to add the requisite documents. 11. On 16 June 2008 the District Court suspended the proceedings in accordance with Article 242 § 1(2) of the former Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the “CCP” – see paragraph 25 below) on the grounds that none of the parties had attended the hearing scheduled for that date. 12. On 26 January 2009 the District Court amended of its own motion the decision of 16 June 2008. It held that some of the parties had in fact attended the hearing of 16 June 2008. However, the proceedings had had to be suspended on the grounds that, according to the available evidence, four of the other six plaintiffs had died prior to 2005 and the applicant had taken no steps to identify the heirs of the deceased parties in order to enable the court to summon them as parties to the proceedings. 13. The applicant appealed on points of fact and points of law against both the decision of 16 June 2008 and that of 26 January 2009 (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above). 14. On 8 October and 3 December 2009 the Prahova County Court (hereinafter referred to as the “the County Court”) adjourned the aforementioned appeal proceedings brought by the applicant in order to allow the private company X to prepare its defence and the applicant to submit proof of the steps he had taken to identify the home addresses of the other six plaintiffs, and to serve a summons on the six plaintiffs by publishing it in a national newspaper. 15. On 11 February 2010 the County Court allowed the applicant’s aforementioned appeal against the District Court’s decisions and ordered the reopening of the proceedings. It held that there was no evidence in the file that four of the other plaintiffs had died or that the first-instance court had adjourned the proceedings in order to allow the applicant to submit proof of those deaths. Also, the decision of 26 January 2009 to amend the decision of 16 June 2008 (see paragraph 12 above) had been unlawful. 16. On 2 July 2010 the applicant asked the President of the District Court to order that court to start the re-examination of the case. He complained that even though the County Court had ordered the reopening of the proceedings in the case in February 2010, the District Court had still not resumed the examination thereof. 17. On 14 October and 9 December 2010 and 3 March 2011 the District Court adjourned the proceedings on procedural grounds to allow the plaintiffs’ legal representative to add documents to the file and to prepare his defence, and for the court to deliberate. In addition, it ordered the applicant to clarify whether the other six plaintiffs were still alive and, if not, to establish who were their heirs. The court further noted that the proceedings would be suspended according to the civil procedure rules if the applicant failed to comply with the court’s request. 18. On 8 March 2011 the District Court suspended the proceedings on the grounds that the applicant had failed to clarify whether the other six plaintiffs were still alive and if not who were their heirs. It noted that the applicant had made some attempts to obtain the requested information from the relevant domestic authorities, but he had failed to provide relevant information about the plaintiffs which would have enabled the authorities to identify them. Moreover, the summonses sent by the court to the known foreign addresses of the other six plaintiffs provided by the applicant had either not been received by the recipients or had been returned because the intended recipients had been unknown at those addresses. The applicant appealed on points of fact and points of law against the decision. 19. On 18 January and on 14 and 21 March 2012 the County Court adjourned the appeal proceedings in order to allow the six other plaintiffs to be publicly summonsed, and for the parties to make written submissions. 20. On 28 March 2012 the County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of fact and points of law against the District Court’s decision of 8 March 2011 (see paragraph 18 above). It held, amongst other things, that the applicant had acted as the other six plaintiffs’ representative without being able to prove that they were still alive or to identify their heirs, if such heirs existed. Since he was the one who had brought the proceedings, he had a duty to produce evidence in respect of the persons he was representing and was solely responsible for the way he had chosen to formulate his action before the court. The court was bound by the procedural framework set by the applicant. Since he had chosen to sign the application to the court both on his own behalf and on that of other persons, he should have been aware that he would be responsible for proving his status and his right to act as a representative. 21. On 29 November 2012 the County Court dismissed the extraordinary appeal for a review of proceedings instituted by the applicant against the final judgment of 28 March 2012 as having been lodged out of time. 22. On 11 March 2013 the County Court dismissed the extraordinary appeal for the annulment of the proceedings instituted by the applicant against the final judgment of 28 March 2012 as ill-founded. 23. On 23 May 2013 the District Court of its own motion declared the proceedings brought by the applicant on 6 September 2005 (see paragraph 6 above) to be barred by limitation on account of his inaction. It held that for more than a year the applicant had failed to make any request for the proceedings to be reopened. The applicant appealed on points of fact and points of law against the decision. 24. By a final judgment of 27 March 2014 the County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of fact and points of law against the District Court’s decision of 23 May 2013 (see paragraph 23 above). It reiterated the reasons provided by the first-instance court. It also held that the extraordinary appeals lodged by the applicant against the judgment of 28 March 2012 (see paragraph 20 above) had not put a stop to the bar by limitation, because they could not be considered as procedural acts aimed at reopening the proceedings.