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5. The applicant company is a limited liability company incorporated under Moldovan Law. 6. On 24 December 2012 and 21 June 2013 respectively the applicant company initiated two sets of civil proceedings challenging two decisions issued by the State Tax Inspectorate of Străşeni (Inspectoratul Fiscal de Stat Străşeni – “the Inspectorate”) under which it had been fined for non‑compliance with the VAT reporting regulations. On 5 September 2013 these two sets of proceedings were joined. 7. On 26 December 2013 the Străşeni District Court upheld the applicant company’s claims and overturned the impugned decisions. The representative of the Inspectorate was not present when the judgment was delivered, despite having been duly informed of the date and the time of the hearing. 8. On 5 February 2014 the Inspectorate lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Străşeni District Court. No request for an extension of the legal time-limit for lodging an appeal was made. The applicant company objected to the appeal and argued that it had been lodged outside the thirty‑day time-limit and that the Inspectorate had not requested an extension of the legal time-limit for lodging it. 9. In a decision of 3 September 2014 the Chişinău Court of Appeal calculated the applicable time-limit and found that it had expired on 27 January 2014 and, accordingly, that the Inspectorate had been late in lodging its appeal. It therefore decided to strike the appeal out of its list of cases as time-barred. The Inspectorate lodged an appeal on points of law against that decision. It argued that the Chişinău Court of Appeal could not strike out the appeal after having commenced its examination of the merits of the case. 10. On 8 October 2014 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the Chişinău Court of Appeal’s strike-out decision of 3 September 2014. Without contesting the Court of Appeal’s calculation of the time-limit for lodging the appeal, the Supreme Court of Justice accepted the argument put forward by the Inspectorate and found that the Court of Appeal had breached the rules of procedure by adopting a strike-out decision after having started an examination of the merits of the case. Ultimately, the case was referred back to the Chişinău Court of Appeal for re-examination. 11. On 28 January 2015, after rehearing the case, the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld the Inspectorate’s appeal, quashed the judgment of the Străşeni District Court of 26 December 2013 and rendered a new judgment whereby the applicant company’s action was rejected as ill-founded. 12. On 10 June 2015 the Supreme Court of Justice declared an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant company inadmissible.

5. The applicant was born in 1973 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Edirne. 6. On 8 February 2001 a certain İ.Y. and his son M.Y., filed a complaint with the Bursa Public Prosecutor’s office, claiming that they had been threatened by members of a criminal organisation, including the applicant, who had acted under his boss, O.K., and that they had had to give them a substantial amount of money and property as a result. 7. On 20 March 2001 the Public Prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court requested the Bursa Security Directorate to investigate the matter within the context of an investigation concerning a bigger criminal organisation. 8. On 21 March 2001 police officers from the Bursa Security Directorate conducted a search at the applicant’s house, during which they found an unlicensed semi-automatic weapon. The applicant was immediately arrested after the search. 9. Subsequently, he was taken to the Bursa Directorate of Forensic Medicine, where he was examined by a doctor who noted that there were no signs of ill-treatment on his body. He was placed in police custody on the same day. 10. On 23 March 2001, following the extension of his police custody by two days, the applicant underwent another medical examination. The report drawn up after that examination noted the names of several persons who had also been arrested as part of the same investigation and indicated that no injury could be found on any of them. 11. On 24 March 2001 the applicant gave his police statements. He described the course of the events in detail and stated that he and certain people that he worked with had visited İ.Y. and M.Y. at their homes several times in order to obtain money by threatening them. 12. On 25 March 2001 the applicant’s police custody was extended and he was medically examined once again together with twenty-five others. The doctor who conducted the examination simply noted that there were no traces of ill-treatment on any of the persons he had examined. The day after, 26 March 2001, another doctor issued a report in respect of the same people, stating that none of them had any complaints and that he could find no signs of injury on their bodies. 13. On 28 March 2001 the applicant went through a final medical examination before he was detained on remand. This time, a report specific to him was drawn up, stating that he had not put forward any physical or psychological complaints during the examination and that there was no indication of ill-treatment on his body. In his application form, the applicant maintained that the doctor had taken account of his submissions and examined his genitals, but had not been able to find any traces of the electric shocks administered to him. 14. On the same day the applicant gave his statements before the Public Prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court. He reiterated his account of the events, but denied certain parts of his police statements, whereby he had admitted to being a member of a criminal organisation and having threatened İ.Y. He did not indicate anything with regard to his alleged ill‑treatment. 15. On 21 June 2001 the Public Prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court, accusing the applicant of armed robbery, membership of a criminal organisation and illegally carrying weapons. After having explained in detail the composition and acts of a criminal organisation, the Public Prosecutor indicated that the applicant was a member of another organisation, which had threatened and extracted money from İ.Y., a member of the first one. In his recapitulation of the events, the Public Prosecutor mentioned a certain A.V.O., who he claimed to have been involved in the money transactions at issue and to have been threatened by that second criminal organisation. He requested the opening of criminal proceedings against a total of thirty-one people, accusing them of being members of two separate criminal organisations. 16. On 13 September 2001, at the first hearing before the Istanbul State Security Court, İ.Y. stated in the absence of the applicant (who was unrepresented) that he had asked for help from the applicant’s boss, O.K., to sell some of his property in order to pay his debts and that he had paid him a certain amount in return. He claimed that after the transaction, the applicant had threatened him to obtain more money. 17. At the second hearing, held on 6 December 2001, the applicant stated before the court that the indictment had not been served on him and that he had not fully understood the charges against him. After having described the events, he maintained that he and his boss had helped İ.Y. pay his debts and that he had just asked him to pay their share, without making any threats. He further retracted the previous statements he had made before the police and the Public Prosecutor. Finally, he argued that he had been subjected to ill-treatment while in police custody, without giving any details about his allegation. 18. During the same hearing, M.Y. submitted that his father, İ.Y., had been threatened by the applicant. The applicant was not given an opportunity to comment on these submissions. 19. On 9 April 2002 the Public Prosecutor submitted his written opinion to the Istanbul State Security Court. He stated that the telephones of two of the accused had been intercepted and that the conversations between them and with the applicant had revealed that the latter had threatened İ.Y. upon an order from O.K. In describing the events at issue, the Public Prosecutor once again maintained that A.V.O. had been involved in the transactions and had been threatened by fellow members of the applicant’s criminal organisation. He further indicated that the unfolding of the events had been corroborated by the statements of all of the accused, but that they had all denied having threatened İ.Y. and M.Y. Finally, relying on the telephone recordings and the statements of the other accused, the Public Prosecutor proposed that the applicant should be found guilty as charged. 20. Subsequently, the applicant submitted his statements to the court, requesting the examination of two witnesses, A.V.O., who had been mentioned in the Public Prosecutor’s written opinion, and a certain İ.D. 21. At the hearing on 3 September 2002 the Istanbul State Security Court rejected the request, finding that the examination of the witnesses called by the applicant would have no effect on the outcome of the proceedings. After making a summary of all of the defendants’ statements, the court found the applicant guilty as charged, and sentenced him to twenty years and ten months’ imprisonment and a judicial fine. In its reasoning, it stated that the applicant’s guilt had been established on the basis of an overall assessment of the evidence at its disposal, without specifying which particular evidence it relied on. 22. The applicant appealed against the judgment, arguing that the court had failed to hear any witnesses on his behalf and that it had restricted his right to defend himself during the course of the proceedings, in that it had not taken account of any of his submissions. 23. On 12 April 2004 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment after holding a hearing, during which the applicant was not present. 24. The applicant was not represented by a lawyer at any stage of the proceedings, including the appeal proceedings before the Court of Cassation. 25. On 11 October 2004 a committal order concerning the execution of the applicant’s sentence was prepared. It was notified to the applicant by the prison administration on 13 October 2004.

4. The applicant was born in 1978 and is serving a prison sentence in Khabarovsk. 5. On 30 July 2004 the Samara Regional Court sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment. On 20 July 2007 the applicant was placed in Correctional Colony No. IK-56. 6. The Government submitted the following information as regards the personal space afforded to the applicant during his detention in the colony: Cell No. Period of detention Cell measurements (sq. m) Number of inmates 7 From 20 July to 2 August 2007 18 2 No information available. The relevant documents have been destroyed. 10 From 29 October to 26 November 2014 18 2 6 From 26 November 2014 to 2 April 2015 18 2 010 From 2 April 13 December 2015 4 1 6 From 13 to 23 December 2015 18 2 010 From 23 December 2015 to 9 August 2016 4 1 10 From 9 August to 7 September 2016 18 2 010 From 7 September to 26 December 2016 4 1 7 From 26 to 27 December 2016 18 2 10 From 27 December 2016 to 21 July 2017 18 2 3 From 21 July to 3 March 2017 18 2 6 From 3 March 2017 to date 18 2 7. The Government further submitted that from 21 October to 11 November 2009, from 14 to 18 December 2013, and from 5 October to 26 December 2016 the applicant had been detained in Correctional Colony No. IK-55. 8. According to the applicant, the inmates are housed in double or single cells. The double cells measure approximately 18 m² and the single ones approximately 4 m². Since 2007 the applicant has been assigned to different cells, his conditions of detention remaining unchanged. 9. There is no water supply or sewage system on the colony premises. The inmates are given buckets, to compensate for the lack of a toilet, which they have to empty every morning in a cesspool located some two metres away from the recreation area. Each day the inmates receive 10 litres of river water for their personal needs. They are allowed to take a shower once a week. 10. The windows in the cells are covered with three layers of metal bars or screens. The cells are not ventilated. The lighting is dim and inadequate. 11. The food is not fresh, lacks variety and is of poor quality. The milk is often sour, and the fruit juices are diluted with water. 12. The applicant has been housed in single cell no. 10 since 2010. The temperature in the cell does not exceed +120C during the winter. It is damp and stuffy during the summer. He is confined to his cell 22 hours a day and is entitled to one and a half hours’ outdoor exercise per day. 13. The recreation area is divided into exercise yards measuring 7 m². The yards are covered with metal bars and screens. There is no exercise equipment. 14. From July 2007 to December 2016 the applicant was not allowed to grow a beard or to have his hair longer than 0.5 cm. His hair was completely shaved off 2 to 4 times a month, and he had to shave his face 2 to 3 times a week. 15. On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the prosecutor about the compulsory shaving. 16. On 13 December 2013 the prosecutor replied that the compulsory shaving of the head and beard to which the applicant had been subjected had been unlawful, and that the prosecutor’s office had informed the administration of the correctional colony where the applicant was serving his prison sentence. The prosecutor also informed the applicant of his right to appeal either to a higher-ranking prosecutor or a court. It appears that the applicant took no further action.

4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Jrvezh. 5. On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia, which was followed by daily protest rallies held at Yerevan’s Freedom Square from 20 February onwards by the supporters of the main opposition candidate. On 1 March 2008 the assembly at Freedom Square was dispersed by the police. The applicant, who was present at Freedom Square at that time, was arrested and later charged under Article 316 § 1 of the Criminal Code (CC) with assaulting police officers. 6. On 4 March 2008 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention for a period of two months, namely until 1 May 2008, on the ground that the applicant, if at large, might abscond and obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on the persons involved in the criminal proceedings. 7. On 10 March 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that there was no evidence to substantiate the need for his detention. He was a former high-ranking police officer and a law-abiding citizen who enjoyed trust and respect in society. 8. On 21 March 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fact that the applicant was accused of a grave offence punishable by up to ten years’ imprisonment increased the probability of his evading criminal liability and punishment and was sufficient to conclude that the applicant, if at large, might commit a new offence. As to the applicant’s good character, mentioned by him in his appeal, this was not sufficient for lifting the detention order. 9. On 29 April 2008 the indictment was finalised and the applicant’s case was sent to court for trial. The applicant remained in detention by virtue of Article 138 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). 10. On 13 May 2008 the District Court decided to set the case down for trial, ruling in the same decision that the applicant’s detention was to remain unchanged. That decision was not subject to appeal. 11. On 11 June 2008 the District Court found the applicant guilty under Article 316 § 1 of the CC of assaulting police officers and sentenced him to a suspended term of one and a half years’ imprisonment.

5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Palaio Faliro. 6. She has worked as a kindergarten teacher for the Greek Ministry of Education since 1983. On 23 August 2005, following her participation in a selection procedure, she was appointed educational coordinator of the Hellenic Republic at the General Consulate of Greece in Chicago for a period of two years. On 14 August 2007 the Ministers of Education and Foreign Affairs issued a decision informing all educational coordinators abroad of the end of their term of service. On the same date, the Minister of Education issued a decision informing the educational coordinators that they were to remain in their posts until the completion of the next selection procedure. The applicant’s name was omitted from the second ministerial decision and the post of educational coordinator in Chicago remained vacant. She applied to have the decision annulled, which the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal agreed to do as the applicant had been omitted from the decision without any specific reasoning (decision no. 1363/2008). The applicant was therefore allowed to occupy the position until the successful completion of the next selection procedure. 7. In the meantime, a call for applications for educational coordinators for the next two-year period was published on 27 November 2007. The applicant submitted an application. On 23 July 2008 the coordinators selection committee published a ranking of candidates in which the applicant, having received 48.00 points, was placed 13th among those who had chosen French as their foreign language. On 22 August 2008 the Official Gazette (Εφημερίδα της Κυβερνήσεως) published a decision by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Education to appoint the candidates who had been selected. The applicant was not included. That decision was revoked and replaced with a ministerial decision dated 29 August 2008 including the same content. 8. On 24 September 2008 the applicant lodged an application for annulment of the ministerial decisions of 22 and 29 August 2008 on appointing the selected educational coordinators with the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal in so far as she had been omitted. The applicant complained that the ranking had not been published in the Official Gazette, as required by law, and that she had been erroneously awarded fewer points than she should have had. 9. On 16 July 2009 the applicant’s legal representative requested that the court accelerate proceedings, arguing that an educational coordinator’s term of appointment lasted two years and that the contested administrative act would soon expire. The hearing was scheduled to take place on 13 November 2009, but was adjourned to 5 March 2010. 10. On 3 February 2010 the applicant submitted additional grounds of annulment. The 5 March 2010 hearing was adjourned to 4 June 2010 as the Ministry had not provided the court with its submissions regarding the additional grounds for annulment. On 27 May 2010 the applicant sent a memorandum to the Court, requesting that the case be heard speedily, adding that an eventual discontinuation of the trial would violate her rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the hearing was again adjourned owing to the Ministry’s failure to provide submissions. Adjournments took place on 4 June, 17 September and on 8 October 2010. On 26 October 2010, the Ministry sent its observations to the court, and a hearing took place on 10 December 2010, when the two-year term for educational coordinators and the contested ministerial decision had already expired. 11. On 13 December 2010 the applicant submitted a memorandum requesting that the examination of her application for annulment be continued despite the expiry of the administrative act, arguing that she had special locus standi to continue to pursue the annulment process. In particular, she argued that if the contested act was annulled she would be credited with two more years of experience, which would improve her chances of being selected as a deputy coordinator of education in a future selection procedure. 12. On 16 March 2011 the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal published decision no. 508/2011 rejecting the applicant’s arguments. As regards her first reason for continuing the proceedings, it held that she had already been awarded the maximum number of points allowed by law for experience abroad. As regards her chances of being selected as a deputy coordinator of education in a future selection procedure, the domestic court held that that was not a lawful reason to continue the procedure in court, because it concerned an uncertain, future administrative procedure. Based on the above and on domestic law, the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal held that there was no need to adjudicate, on the grounds that the contested act was no longer in force (decision). As regards the applicant’s arguments that the eventual rejection of her application would violate Article 20 of the Constitution and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the domestic court held that the provision of Article 32 § 2 of Presidential decree no. 18/1989 served the legal aim of avoiding any unnecessary trials. The individual who had lodged the application was no longer in need of judicial protection as the contested act no longer had any unfavourable consequences. Having also regard to the possibility provided for by law to continue the trial if the individual could prove that he or she still suffered from unfavourable consequences that could be removed only by the annulment of the contested act, the right to judicial protection remained intact.

5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Opaci. 6. On 29 July 2009, the applicant was celebrating his birthday with a group of friends by a lake when they were attacked by S. who was intoxicated and carrying a hunting rifle. S. was angry because the applicant and his friends had allegedly ill-treated his uncle earlier. During the conflict, S. hit one of the applicant’s friends with the barrel of his gun and fired four gunshots at the group’s cars parked nearby. The applicant attempted to prevent S. from continuing shooting but was shot from a distance of some five metres into his right calf. The applicant’s repeated attempts to disarm S. resulted in his receiving two more gunshots from a very short distance into his already wounded leg. 7. As a result of the attack the applicant sustained serious injuries to his right leg which led to amputation of his leg above the knee. 8. On 31 July 2009 criminal proceedings were instituted against S. on charges of hooliganism with the use of a firearm resulting in the causing of severe harm to the applicant’s health. 9. Between 1 and 10 August 2009 twenty-five witnesses were questioned and by 12 September 2009 most of the investigative measures were completed. 10. On 12 August 2009 S. was declared a suspect in the criminal proceedings and on 29 December 2009 he was indicted. 11. On 12 January 2010 S. was heard as an accused. He acknowledged his guilt, but refused to make any declarations. 12. On 23 February 2010 the criminal case-file was remitted for examination from the Căușeni Police Station to the Anenii Noi Police Station. 13. Between March and December 2010 the Anenii Noi police conducted a new investigation into the circumstances of the case and carried out again all the investigative measures. 14. On 14 December 2010 the case-file was transmitted to the Anenii Noi prosecutor’s office with the proposal to be remitted to a court for consideration. 15. On 20 December 2010 both the applicant and his representative were notified of the completion of the criminal investigation. 16. On 30 December 2010 the prosecutor’s office decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings against S. The prosecutor’s office found that according to Article 63(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a person’s status as suspect cannot be maintained longer than three months. Since S. was indicted on 29 December 2009, that is four months and seventeen days later, the indictment was unlawful. Therefore, all charges against S. were dropped and the proceedings discontinued. 17. On 18 February 2011 at the request of the applicant’s representative, the prosecutor general’s office decided to annul its previous decision of 30 December 2010, and to resume the criminal investigation on the ground that new facts had been discovered. 18. On 31 March 2011 the Rascani District Court upheld S.’s objection against the prosecutor’s decision of 18 February 2011, ordering its annulment. The applicant and his representative were not summoned or informed about the proceedings.

4. On 28 February 1996 the applicants and the debtor (JSP “Tara” Cetinje) reached a court approved settlement before the Cetinje Municipal Court, whereby the debtor undertook to pay the applicants specified amounts in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 5. The settlement became final on the same date. 6. The debtor ultimately paid part of the amounts determined in the settlement. 7. On 26 May 1997 the Podgorica Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings against the debtor. 8. On 19 August 1997 the applicants submitted their respective claims based on the settlement. 9. In the course of the insolvency proceedings the Podgorica Commercial Court acknowledged the applicants’ claims. 10. On 23 December 2009 the Podgorica Commercial Court terminated (zaključio) the insolvency proceedings against the debtor, but continued the proceedings against the debtor’s estate. This decision was upheld by the Appellate Court on 9 April 2010. 11. The proceedings are still pending. 12. On 14 October 2010 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ constitutional appeal on procedural grounds. 13. The court settlement in question remains partly unenforced to the present day. 14. It transpires from the case file that at the time the court settlement was concluded and became final (see paragraphs 4 and 5 above) the debtor was a company predominantly comprised of State‑controlled capital. The Government neither contested this nor provided any evidence to the contrary.

5. A list of the applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 6. The applicants spent a certain number of hours (see the Appendix) in police custody before their arrests were recorded. Their subsequent complaints to the national authorities were dismissed. 7. At about 10 p.m. on 18 July 2005 the applicant was arrested and taken to a police station, where he was subjected to a body search and questioned. 8. At 5.10 a.m. on 19 July 2005 a criminal case was opened against the applicant on suspicion of drugs possession. At 7.10 a.m. an arrest record was drawn up, following which the applicant was questioned as a suspect. 9. On 20 July 2005 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of St Petersburg (“the District Court”) ordered that the applicant should be remanded in custody. 10. The applicant challenged the lawfulness of the above-mentioned decision, claiming that in violation of domestic law, the record of his arrest had been drawn up nine hours after he had been brought to the police station instead of three hours. In the applicant’s opinion, this rendered his subsequent remand in custody unlawful. 11. On 9 August 2005 the St Petersburg City Court (“the City Court”) found the above-mentioned decision lawful. The appellate court held that the custodial measure had been applied in accordance with domestic law and that the belated drawing up of the arrest record as such could not serve as grounds for releasing the applicant from custody. 12. On 15 September 2005 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 31 October 2005. 13. On 22 November 2005 the City Court upheld that decision on appeal. The court acknowledged the fact that the record of the applicant’s arrest had been drawn up after the expiry of the three hours permitted by domestic law. It held, however, that that violation could not automatically lead to the refusal of the investigator’s requests for the application of a custodial measure and its further extension. 14. On 28 June 2007 the applicant threatened a taxi driver with a knife. When the car stopped, two acquaintances of the taxi driver seized the applicant and held him until the arrival of the police. Police officers handcuffed the applicant and took him to a police station at about 4 a.m. 15. At about 7 a.m. an investigator opened a criminal investigation into robberies carried out against taxi drivers. At around 9.30 a.m. a police officer talked to the applicant, who allegedly confessed to having committed those robberies. As the applicant was in a state of alcohol-induced intoxication, it was allegedly suggested to him that he wait for the investigator in the hall of the police station while he sobered up. In the meantime the investigator interviewed the victims. At 6 p.m. the investigator drew up an arrest record and questioned the applicant as a suspect. 16. On 30 June 2007 the Norilsk District Court of the Krasnoyarsk Region (“the District Court”) ordered the applicant’s detention. 17. From October 2007 the prosecutor’s office repeatedly terminated the criminal investigation following complaints of unlawful detention lodged by the applicant. The latest relevant decision was taken on 28 April 2008. On 30 June 2008 the District Court examined an appeal lodged by the applicant against the decision of 28 April 2008. The court established that the applicant had been taken to the police station at about 4 a.m. on 28 June 2007 and that the arrest record had been drawn up at 6 p.m. the same day. On the basis of the testimonies given by the applicant and police officers, the court found that the applicant had spent a considerable time in the hallway of the police station without attempting to leave it. The District Court concluded as follows: “It follows from the [rules of criminal procedure] that detention should be understood as the restriction of movement of a person placed in a special room under the constant control of law-enforcement personnel. Such restrictions were not applied in respect of [the applicant]. He became a suspect in a criminal investigation only after the investigator Ch. drew up his arrest record at 6 p.m. on 28 June 2007. Regard being had to the above and on the basis of the inquiry conducted, the investigator K. has rightfully concluded that [the applicant] when present at [the police station] had not been restricted in movement and that he had been able to leave the premises. However, he had not done so, which should be interpreted as his staying at [the police station] of his own free will.” 18. On 23 September 2004 the applicant was arrested and taken to a police station. On 24 September 2004 he was questioned as a witness in a murder investigation. 19. It appears that on 24 September 2004 the applicant was charged with the administrative offence of disorderly conduct, but administrative proceedings were not pursued. 20. At 9.55 p.m. on 27 September 2004 an arrest record was drawn up in which it was noted that the applicant was suspected of a criminal offence. On 28 September 2004 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Omsk (“the District Court”) ordered the applicant’s detention. 21. On 1 November 2006 the Omsk Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) convicted the applicant of theft, robbery and murder, and sentenced him to twenty years’ imprisonment, running from 23 September 2007, the date of his actual arrest. On 19 December 2007 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the conviction on appeal. 22. On 27 June 2005 the applicant had sought the criminal prosecution of the police for unlawful detention, alleging ill-treatment from 23 to 27 September 2004. His request had been refused on 7 July 2005 and the applicant had challenged the refusal before a court. On 28 January and 22 April 2010 the District Court and the Regional Court respectively dismissed his court action. Both courts considered the police officers’ actions as lawful and the allegations of ill-treatment as unsubstantiated. 23. The applicant sought damages for his unlawful detention. On 24 February and 27 July 2011 the Pervomayskiy District Court of Omsk and the Regional Court acting on appeal respectively dismissed his claims. The courts found no evidence of unlawful actions against the applicant. 24. On 10 April 2007 an unidentified person broke into the flat of Mr I.K., a police officer, threatened him with a scalpel, took a few valuables and absconded. On the same date a criminal investigation was initiated into the matter. 25. At about 5.50 a.m. on 11 April 2007 two police officers took the applicant from his flat to a police station. He was questioned about his whereabouts the previous day. At 11.40 a.m. the applicant participated in an identification parade as a result of which he was identified by the victim, Mr I.K. 26. At 2.05 p.m. the police drew up an arrest record, according to which the applicant had been detained at 2 p.m. on 11 April 2007 on suspicion of armed robbery. According to the applicant, he was only then informed of the reasons for his arrest. 27. On 12 April 2007 the Avtozavodskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod ordered that the applicant should be remanded in custody. 28. On 11 October 2007 the applicant was found guilty of armed robbery and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. He appealed against his sentence, pointing out, in particular, that he had been unlawfully detained at the police station for eight hours on 11 April 2007 and had not been promptly informed of the charges against him. 29. On 1 February 2008 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the sentence on appeal, stating, amongst other things, that “... no violations of criminal procedure took place during the applicant’s arrest”. 30. At 7.25 p.m. on 16 March 2007 the applicant was arrested during a test purchase of drugs. At 11.30 p.m. on 18 March 2007 an arrest record was drawn up. 31. On 10 January 2008 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Orenburg convicted the applicant and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment running from 16 March 2007. The applicant appealed against the judgment, complaining of, among other things, his unrecorded detention for two days, ill-treatment by police officers during those two days and the inadmissibility of evidence collected during those days. On 21 February 2008 the Orenburg Regional Court dismissed those complaints as unsubstantiated and upheld the judgment of 10 January 2008. 32. The police arrested the applicant at about 12 noon on 8 July 2011. His arrest record was drawn up at 9.25 p.m. 33. On 10 July 2011 the Zasviyazhskiy District Court of the Ulyanovsk Region (“the District Court”) ordered the applicant’s detention. The District Court rejected the argument about the actual time of arrest on the grounds that at 12 noon the applicant had been “conveyed” to a police station rather than arrested. On 14 July 2011 the Ulyanovsk Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 34. The applicant was arrested at about 5.10 p.m. on 11 October 2010. An arrest record was drawn up at 2.25 a.m. on 12 October 2010. On 13 October 2010 a justice of the peace found the applicant guilty of taking drugs without a medical prescription and sentenced him to one day’s administrative detention, running from 2.40 a.m. on 12 October 2010. 35. On 13 October 2010 the Volzhskiy District Court of the Volgograd Region (“the District Court”) ordered the applicant’s detention. The District Court relied on the fact that the applicant was suspected of a serious drug-related crime, was a drug addict, and might obstruct the investigation and reoffend. The applicant did not appeal against the detention order. 36. On 6 December 2010 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention. It reiterated that the applicant had been charged with a particularly serious offence and had no official sources of income. The District Court also rejected the applicant’s request for release on bail using his mother’s flat as a caution because he had not produced documents proving the kinship between the applicant and his mother, nor had he proved that she owned the flat or that she was prepared for it to be used as a guarantee. On 17 December 2010 the Volgograd Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld the court order on appeal. The Regional Court found that the fact that the applicant had no criminal record, had a permanent residence, employment, positive references and an under-age child, had formerly participated in military service and was undergoing hospital treatment were insufficient to warrant his release in view of the severity of the charges against him. 37. On 1 March 2011 the District Court further extended the applicant’s detention on the grounds that he might reoffend and obstruct the investigation. On 5 March 2011 the Regional Court upheld the court order on appeal. 38. On 7 April 2011 the District Court ordered a further extension of the applicant’s detention. 39. On 31 May 2011 the District Court convicted the applicant. The applicant appealed against the judgment, complaining of, among other things, his unrecorded detention. On 26 July 2011 the Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 40. On 20 May 2015 the Presidium of the Volgograd Regional Court (“the Presidium”) quashed the judgment of 31 May 2011 and the appeal decision of 26 July 2011 on the grounds that the trial judge had earlier adjudicated the case of his co-accused. The Presidium remitted the applicant’s case for re-trial and ordered his detention. On 1 December 2015 the District Court convicted the applicant of drug dealing. On 16 February 2016 the Regional Court upheld that judgment on appeal. 41. The applicant was arrested by the police at about 6 p.m. on 7 September 2011. An arrest record was drawn up at 5.25 p.m. on 8 September 2011. It indicated the time of the actual arrest as 4.35 p.m. on 8 September 2011. 42. On 10 September 2011 the Sverdlovskiy District Court of Krasnoyarsk ordered the applicant’s detention. On 27 September 2011 the Krasnoyarsk Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. The national courts found that the applicant had been arrested in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. 43. On 26 November 2010 police officers took the applicant to a police station. On 28 November 2010 the applicant was questioned as a witness in respect of the murder of three people. On 29 November 2010 the applicant made a “statement of surrender and confession” (явка с повинной) in which he confessed to the three murders. On 30 November 2010 a record of the applicant’s arrest was drawn up. 44. On 5 May 2011 the prosecuting authorities rejected a request by the applicant to open a criminal case against the police for, inter alia, his unacknowledged detention. On 8 June 2011 the Leninskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk (“the District Court”) dismissed a complaint by the applicant about the refusal of 5 May 2011 to open a case. The District Court found that on 26 November 2010 the applicant had been taken to the police station and questioned, along with many others, as a witness. It further established that at 11 p.m. on 29 November 2010 he had made a statement of surrender and confession, and that only after that had he been arrested and questioned as a suspect in the presence of a lawyer. The District Court therefore held that no criminal procedure rules had been broken. On 4 August 2011 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld that judgment on appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the District Court. 45. On 18 October 2011 the Regional Court found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment starting from 27 November 2010. The trial court considered that despite the arrest record of 30 November 2010, the applicant had actually been arrested on 27 November 2010. On 27 March 2012 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment on appeal. 46. On 15 January 2010 Ms A. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant. At 4.20 p.m. on the same date the applicant was taken to a police station and questioned. An official arrest record was drawn up on 16 January 2010. 47. On 30 April 2010 the Usinsk District Court of the Komi Republic (“the District Court”) convicted the applicant as charged. On 13 July 2010 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic (“the Supreme Court”) upheld the conviction on appeal. 48. The applicant asked that 15 January 2010 be recognised as the date of his actual arrest and that the prison term start running from that date. On 13 May 2013 the District Court rejected his claims as unfounded. It accepted that the police had indeed taken the applicant to the police station on 15 January 2010, but considered that he had been questioned as a witness on that date and had not been actually detained until his arrest record had been drawn up the following day. On 23 August 2013 the Supreme Court upheld that decision. 49. At 8.05 p.m. on 28 December 2012 the police arrested the applicant on a train going to Moscow and placed him in custody. An arrest record was drawn up at 11.25 p.m. the same day. On 30 and 31 December 2012 two police officers accompanied the applicant by train to the town of Tyumen. On 1 January 2013 a new arrest record was drawn up, indicating 6.50 a.m. as the time of the applicant’s arrest. According to the applicant, the initial arrest record of 28 December 2012 had disappeared from his case file. On 2 January 2013 the Kalininskiy District Court of Tyumen ordered the applicant’s detention. The court omitted to examine the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention prior to 1 January 2013. On 24 January 2013 the Tyumen Regional Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant against the detention order, having found that his arrest and detention had been lawful. 50. At about 4 p.m. on 12 November 2013 the applicant was arrested by the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”). It appears that he spent the following thirty-four hours handcuffed, first in the FSB officers’ car and then on police premises. He was allegedly denied access to any means of communication or to legal assistance. At 1 a.m. on 14 November 2013 a criminal case was opened against him on charges of fraud. At 2.30 a.m. on 14 November 2013 an arrest record was drawn up. Later that day, at 5.30 p.m. according to the applicant, the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”) ordered his detention. The District Court rejected a complaint lodged by the applicant of unrecorded detention. On 27 November 2013 the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) upheld the detention order on appeal. The City Court noted that during the thirty-four hours between the applicant’s actual arrest and his formal arrest as a suspect, he had been “conveyed” to the investigator. 51. At about 11 p.m. on 21 September 2014 the police arrested the applicant and took him to a police station. According to the applicant, the police established his identity and place of residence, questioned him, photographed him and took fingerprints. He had not been informed about his rights or the reasons for his arrest. He was released at 6 a.m. on 22 September 2014. 52. At 5 a.m. on 23 September 2014 the police took the applicant from his house to a police station for identification by the victim and questioning. The applicant was not provided with legal assistance. At 9 p.m. an investigator drew up a record of the applicant’s arrest for the criminal offence of disorderly conduct. At 9.30 p.m. the applicant was questioned as a suspect without legal assistance. It appears that a lawyer hired by the applicant’s family was not allowed to see his client. 53. On 25 September 2014 the Troitskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant’s detention in view of the gravity of the charges against him, his permanent residence outside of Moscow, and the fact that he was unemployed and had no dependants. The applicant appealed against the court order, complaining, in particular, that the police had failed to inform him about his rights and to provide him with legal assistance. On 31 October 2014 the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) upheld the detention order on appeal. 54. On 1 October 2014 an investigator charged the applicant with murder and questioned him in the absence of the lawyer hired by his family. 55. On 21 November 2014 the Dorogomilovskiy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”) extended the detention of the applicant and his co-defendants. The applicant appealed, complaining that the extension order had been based on the same reasons as before and had been issued in respect of all co‑defendants without examining their particular situations. On 16 December 2014 the City Court upheld the extension order, endorsing the District Court’s reasoning. On 20 January 2015 the District Court further extended the applicant’s detention on the same grounds. It appears that an appeal lodged by the applicant against that detention extension order was dismissed.

5. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Moscow. 6. On 24 January 2011 a bomb attack at the Domodedovo airport killed 37 people and injured more than 160. It was later established that the explosion was caused by a suicide bomber and organised by a militant group operating in the North Caucasus. The applicant, who was present at the airport at the time of explosion, sustained multiple injuries to her body (wounds, contusions and fractures) which provoked further complications (cerebral oedema, coma, respiratory and cardiac insufficiency and a traumatic shock). The applicant’s injuries were life-threatening and caused serious harm to her health. 7. Within the framework of the criminal investigation into the bombing, the investigative authorities arrested four persons. On 11 November 2013 the Moscow Regional Court found them guilty of multiple charges, including commission of an act of terror, organisation of a criminal gang and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. Three defendants received life sentence and the fourth one was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. 8. On 25 November 2014 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of 11 November 2013 in substance on appeal. 9. According to the Government, the applicant was granted a victim status. She did not bring a civil action for damages against the convicted persons. 10. On 25 January 2011 the Russian authorities opened criminal investigation on the charges of negligence against the airport managers and employees and the policemen deployed at the airport. On 22 March 2011 the applicant was granted a victim status in the proceedings. On 5 March 2012 the investigator decided to recall it. On 26 March 2012 the investigator discontinued the proceedings. 11. On 22 May 2012 the Deputy President of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation quashed the decision of 26 March 2012 and re-opened the case. The proceedings are pending to date. 12. On 3 June 2013 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the decision of 5 March 2012. 13. On an unspecified date the applicant brought a civil claim against the airport seeking damages resulting from the failure of the airport security to prevent the bombing. 14. On 27 August 2013 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant’s claims for damages. On 16 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 27 August 2013 on appeal. The City Court dismissed, inter alia, as unsubstantiated the applicant’s allegation that the suicide bomber had been able to enter the airport owing to the lack of a metal detector at one of the airport entrances noting that such fact should have been established in the course of the relevant criminal investigation.

5. The applicants are a married couple of Roma origin. They were born in 1986 and live in Hurbanovo. 6. On 16 June 2012, around 9 a.m., Mr J., a municipal police officer who was off duty that day, took an illegally purchased gun with two full magazines and some extra ammunition and drove in his private car to the town of Hurbanovo, where around a thousand Roma people live. 7. Around 10 a.m. he stopped in front of the applicants’ family house, entered the property and, without saying a word, started firing bullets at the family members who happened to be in the yard. He stopped shooting when the cartridge of the gun was empty. Three members of the applicants’ family, namely the second applicant’s father, brother, and brother-in-law, were shot dead. The first applicant was seriously injured in the hips and thighs and the second applicant in the liver, lower appendix, stomach, and elbow. 8. After the shooting, Mr J. returned to the car. On his way, he met two other Roma men, members of the applicants’ family, and threatened to kill them. Then he got into his car and drove away. Eventually, he arrived at the house of the mayor of Hurbanovo, in front of which he was arrested. 9. Mr J. was charged on 17 June 2012 with premeditated first-degree murder, partly accomplished and partly attempted (zločin úkladnej vraždy, sčasti dokonaný a sčasti v štádiu pokusu), in connection with the offences of prohibited acquisition and possession of a firearm and forcible entry into a dwelling. (a) Questioning of Mr J. 10. During his pre-trial questioning on 16 and 17 June and 12 July 2012 Mr J. provided several statements concerning his recollection of the above events, confessed to the charges on all counts, and expressed remorse. 11. His first statement of 16 June 2012 reads as follows: “... I woke up at around 8.30-9.00 a.m. and I don’t know what came into my mind but I told myself that I must do something with those Roma people, it was nothing specific ... I put on my boiler suit and slippers, took a gun – a pistol which I had in my wardrobe ... this morning I loaded the gun, ... got into my car and went to deal with everything, including the Roma ... Afterwards, I wanted to shoot myself; somehow it weighed heavily [on my mind] ... I went down to Hurbanovo, where I arrived at around 9.20 a.m. ... I went across the city of Hurbanovo and I came to the houses at the end of the city, where Roma live. I slowed down nearby one house [and] looked into the yard, but there was only one girl, so I drove further to another house. ... By the next house ... I saw a gate opened and Roma in the yard, I pulled up, got out of the car and entered the yard ... I had the gun already in my hand as I was getting out of the car ... they were sitting and I started to fire shots at them ... I wanted to kill them. ...” The investigator further asked why Mr J. had entered that particular yard and started shooting. Mr J. answered: “... I did not care which yard I entered, if there had been more Roma in that first yard where only one girl had been, I would have entered there and opened fire in that first yard.” 12. During a second interview on 17 June 2012, Mr J. stated, inter alia, that he was not able to explain the reasons for his actions, that he did not remember most of the events, and that he had wanted to commit suicide shortly after the shooting. He had just fired at some people – not at a specific person – and could not remember how many times he had fired. He also declared that he did not know the applicants’ family personally, only by sight, having had dealings with them as a municipal police officer. He had often gone to Hurbanovo to deal with problems of public order and remembered meeting some members of the applicants’ family – in particular, the late brother of the second applicant, since he had once slapped him because of his aggressive behaviour after he had been caught stealing. In particular, his statement reads as follows: “The investigator: What brought you to the decision to go and shoot at those people? Mr J.: This I don’t know ... maybe because I have been working as a policeman for twenty years and there were always problems with Roma, but I have never been aggressive towards them. ... Investigator: Why did you enter that particular yard and start shooting? Mr J.: Because there were people; if there had been people in the first yard, I would have maybe gone in there. The investigator: Did you care about the nationality, age, ethnicity of those people in the yard? Mr J.: I did not think about that. ...” 13. At a third interview conducted on 12 July 2012, Mr J. confirmed his previous statements and further stated: “... these thoughts that I had about dealing with the Roma in Hurbanovo – that is to say to do something with them – had been crossing my mind. When I was loading the gun with bullets I might have been thinking also about a radical solution, as eventually happened ... I had been thinking about my work, how to resolve the public‑order issue in the town. I felt that I had been dealing with this for a long time without any success, that there had been some kind of a failure or ineffectiveness ... I could have been nervous because of all this; I could have been tense and all this resulted in my actions.” (b) Statements of witnesses 14. On 16 June 2012 several witnesses were interviewed, including the applicants’ relatives. In general, they did not know of any particular racially motivated behaviour on the part of Mr J. against Roma. However, one of the witnesses, Mr D.L., stated that Mr J. was harsher on Roma than on other people. Other witnesses – including Mr J’s daughters, the mayor of Hurbanovo and Mr J.’s direct supervisor – stated that he had not shown any anti-Roma sentiment. 15. The police conducted further interviews on 19 June and 20 June 2012. The witnesses, including colleagues of Mr J., stated that he had not expressed any anti-Roma opinions or comments. 16. On 3 July 2012 the police interviewed other witnesses; they also again interviewed Mr D.L., who stated that approximately a week or two before the incident Mr J. had had a conflict with his nephew, M. who had been shot dead during the attack. M. had been caught stealing in a scrap yard with two other Roma boys. Mr J. had allegedly tried to kick one of them, slapped M. and told them that they were lucky that it was not him who had caught them. (c) Expert opinion 17. On 16 July 2012 the investigator requested expert examinations of Mr J. by two experts in psychiatry and one expert in clinical psychology. They drafted a joint expert opinion. 18. The experts were asked questions, inter alia, about Mr J.’s mental state and possible illness or disorder, his ability to recognise the lawfulness of his actions, his ability to control his own behaviour, a possible motive for his actions from a psychological point of view, his ability to fully comprehend the course of events, and his credibility. 19. The report concluded that Mr J. did not remember clearly what had happened. However, he was able to credibly reconstruct some events and acknowledge that he had fired at someone. During the examination, he had also mentioned some incidents that he and his colleagues had experienced involving people of Roma origin, his worries, his fear of them, and his despair at his inability to deal with them. In particular, he had also stated: “This family has paid for all of them ...” 20. The report further concluded that Mr J. had been suffering mounting emotional tension for a long time, which had been released by “the escalation effect” and had possibly been affected by the alcohol he had consumed the night before. He was suffering from a temporary mental disorder, known as “abnormal short-term reaction failure with the clinical result of the escalation effect” (abnormná skratová reakcia s klinickým priebehom vystupňovaného afektu), which had resulted in his becoming of unsound mind at the critical moment. Therefore, while he had been committing the crime in question he had had a significantly reduced ability to recognise the unlawfulness of his actions and to control them. 21. Furthermore, the clinical psychologist concluded that Mr J. was not suffering from any mental illness such as psychosis, or from any dependency. Rather, he had been developing a paranoid personality connected to an intense fear of the aggressive behaviour of some “Roma fellow citizens” towards him or people close to him. This had triggered a perceived need to protect himself, born of paranoia. The psychologist considered that Mr J. had: “... the paradoxically altruistic motive of [finding] a radical solution to public order issues in the town, in particular towards that part of it which contained the non‑adaptable and problematic Roma people. [Mr J.’s] ambition to personally deal with the public order issues in the town, in particular as regards the Roma minority, is evidently overdesigned [predimenzovaná] [and] is beyond the actual capabilities of one person ... it can be stated that [Mr J.] had been developing burnout syndrome as another of the possible motivating factors.” 22. In his conclusion, the psychologist found that an important motive determining his behaviour before and during the crime could have been his continual frustration about his own work and the fact that he had been unable to resolve the public-order issues in the town – in particular, the problems concerning the Roma part of the population. He had been developing burnout syndrome as well. However, the immediate motive for his behaviour at the critical moment was unclear. 23. On 23 November 2012 the investigator interviewed the psychologist, who further confirmed that Mr J.’s aggression had manifested itself shortly before the attack against the Roma boys who had been caught stealing and that this aggression had been internally intensified by a growing feeling of helplessness and fear of danger from the Roma. Furthermore, the expert noted that Mr J. had believed that he could solve the “Roma question” and that his action was in the interest of society. He also stated that: “... the anger, rage and hatred of the accused concerned those from the Roma ethnic minority, who had been repeatedly subject to his interventions ...” 24. The expert concluded that he could not confirm unequivocally a racial motive. (d) The indictment 25. On 11 December 2012 the special prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Specialised Criminal Court (Špecializovaný trestný súd) (hereinafter “the SCC”), charging Mr J. with (i) premeditated first-degree murder under Article 144 § 1 and § 2 (c) of the Criminal Code, with reference to Article 138 (j) of the Criminal Code, partly accomplished and partly attempted (zločin úkladnej vraždy, sčasti dokonaný a sčasti v štádiu pokusu), and (ii) the offence of carrying a concealed weapon under Article 294 § 1 and § 2 of the Criminal Code, in concurrence with the offence of illegal entry into a dwelling under Article 194 § 1 and § 2 (a) of the Criminal Code, with reference to Article 138 (a) of the Criminal Code. 26. The special prosecutor referred to, inter alia, the testimony of Mr J., of the applicants, and of other witnesses, as well as the expert reports and the statements given by the experts when they had been interviewed, including the psychologist’s statements concerning the earlier violent confrontation between Mr J. and Roma children, and Mr J’s growing feelings of helplessness, his fear of the Roma, and his belief that in acting as he had he had believed that he was solving an issue with the Roma. 27. As regards the legal classification of the offence of murder, the bill of indictment reads, in the relevant part, as follows: “it is necessary to classify ... the action of the accused, as far as it concerns the shooting [and killing] of the five members of the Lakatoš family ... as ... the offence of first-degree murder within the meaning of Article 144 §§ 1 and 2 (c) of the Criminal Code ... In the present case, there was no accidental behaviour (murdering) caused by the arising of a situation (for example, an argument or ... outburst at the place in question); rather, the murder was premeditated (that is to say a motive had been considered in advance). ... [T]he term “in advance” is not confined to a particular time and ... the motive could have been formed ... over years, months, hours, or several minutes ... In the case of the accused, he had committed himself to the decision to kill ... when he ... decided to drag out a weapon from its hiding place ... and left the house. ... [M]oreover, the experts also identified a longer and continuing internal feeling of dissatisfaction with the state of affairs ... which resulted exactly in the decision to go and shoot with an intention to kill and which had also manifested itself for several moments externally; for example, by the earlier obtaining of an illegal weapon.” The special prosecutor furthermore argued that the intention to kill was obvious from the manner in which the accused had acted. The special prosecutor identified one aggravating factor in the offence under Article 144 § 2 (c) of the Criminal Code – namely, that Mr J.’s attack had been directed simultaneously against five persons. The ethnicities of the victims or racial motives were not mentioned and addressed. 28. Between 25 and 28 March 2013 a public hearing took place, during which Mr J. gave no evidence, stated that he did not deny the charges, and responded affirmatively to the presiding judge’s questions as to whether he understood the facts of the crime, whether his defence rights had been properly granted, whether he comprehended the legal status of the offence, whether he had been informed of the penalties under the law for the criminal offences in question, and whether he had confessed to the crime voluntarily. 29. The applicants, together with six other members of the family, joined the criminal proceedings as civil parties. Their lawyer claimed compensation for damage on their behalf. 30. On 26 March 2013 two of the experts testified and referred to the conclusions of their report. To the applicants’ representative’s questions, the expert in psychiatry stated that it was not within their remit to assess the issue of racism. Later, the representative also attempted to question the clinical psychologist regarding Mr J.’s aggression towards Roma. However, since a civil party could raise only issues concerning a claim for damages (see paragraph 53 below), the court did not allow him to ask those questions. In his final remarks, the applicants’ representative expressed doubts about the objectivity and accuracy of the expert opinion, and in relation to the Mr J.’s motive stated that: “... the assessment of the motivational foreground is, in my opinion, inadequate. The experts ... underestimated or misjudged the racial motive of the offender’s actions.” The applicants’ representative proposed that a second expert opinion be ordered. This was rejected by the court. The court reasoned that the issue of the accused’s motive for the purposes of the claim for damages was of a legal nature and could thus not be assessed by such experts. 31. On 27 March 2013 the SCC delivered a simplified version of the judgment. Owing to the fact that Mr J., his lawyer, and the prosecutor had all waived their right to appeal, the judgment contained only a brief description of the criminal act in question and the sentencing part, pursuant to Article 172 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The judgment did not contain any legal reasoning. 32. The SCC found Mr J. guilty of a serious criminal offence as charged, killing three people and injuring two. The court established that: “[The accused] ... after he woke up at around 9 a.m. ... with a view to definitively resolving the problem with the unintegrated [neprispôsobiví] citizens of Hurbanovo by causing their deaths, took a weapon [and] loaded it with two full magazines; in addition ... he took twelve pieces of single 7.62 x 25 mm ammunition and ... drove himself to the front of the family house ... in Hurbanovo, where at around 10.10 a.m. he left the vehicle, unlawfully entered the yard ... and without a word ... aimed and shot eight times at persons at the yard ...” 33. Mr J. was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. The sentence was exceptionally reduced owing to Mr J.’s diminished soundness of mind, pursuant to Article 39 § 2 (c) of the Criminal Code. His gun was forfeited and protective psychological treatment in an institution was ordered for him, together with protective supervision amounting to three years. 34. The applicants’ claim for damages was referred to the civil courts. 35. As can be seen from the file, on 19 April 2013 two appeals were lodged. The first appeal was lodged by Ms I.L. She argued, inter alia, that the court had failed to consider the possibility of a racial motive. The second appeal was lodged (through their representative) by all members of the family, including the applicants and Ms I.L. In their appeal, they cited procedural errors, including the lack of any reasoning for the impugned judgment. 36. On 18 September 2013 the applicants’ appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd). It concluded that the applicants, as civil parties, did not have the right to challenge the judgment in respect of the guilt of and sentence imposed on Mr J. and that their appeal could only have been directed against the ruling on compensation for damage. However, since the applicants had been referred to civil courts to claim such compensation, and having regard to the fact that those proceedings were ongoing at the material time, the Supreme Court considered their appeal premature in this part. 37. On 26 June 2013 and 4 March 2014 the applicants, together with other injured parties, sought leave from the Minister of Justice to lodge an extraordinary appeal on points of law. Such leave was refused by the Minister of Justice on 17 September 2013 and 3 April 2014, respectively. 38. On 24 May 2013 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint (ústavná sťažnosť) against the judgment delivered by the SCC. They alleged a violation of Articles 2, 6, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention and the corresponding provisions under the Constitution. In sum, they claimed that the SCC had erroneously concluded that Mr J. had had diminished soundness of mind at the time that the crime had been committed, and that as a consequence the SCC had imposed an inappropriately low sentence, which could not serve to discourage the future occurrence of the behaviour in question. 39. They furthermore complained of the ineffectiveness of the criminal prosecution owing to the questionable quality of the expert report and the alleged bias of its authors, the court’s refusal to order a second expert opinion, the fact that it had been impossible for their lawyer to ask questions and cross-examine the expert witnesses, the absence of any reasoning in the final judgment, and the lack of any assessment of the racial overtones of the crime. They also alleged a lack of reasoning in the SCC’s judgment and that they had had no opportunity to challenge the conviction in their position as civil parties in the criminal proceedings, apart from the part concerning compensation for damage. 40. On 27 May 2015 the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) dismissed the applicants’ complaint. It held that the impugned judgment had been delivered in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. It furthermore held that even if it had found the lack of reasoning incorrect it could not have found any violation of the applicants’ constitutional rights on the basis of that conclusion. The court noted that: “... the sole fact that the impugned judgment ... is not reasoned complicates the assessment of its constitutionality. The Constitutional Court can assess other applicants’ complaints only generally on the basis of other documents from the [respective] case file (in particular, the expert opinion and minutes from the main hearing).” 41. In so far as the applicants complained of the failure of the criminal justice authorities to address the racial motive of the attack, as well as their inability to challenge the conviction and the sentence, the Constitutional Court considered that these complaints were directed against provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the position of an injured party under Slovak criminal law. However, the court observed that the applicants could not challenge the compatibility of the law with the Constitution and the Constitutional Court had no competence to address their grievances. 42. In addition, the court scrutinised the adequacy of the sentence and summarised that the accused had been diagnosed with diminished soundness of mind at the time of the commission of the crime. This was the conclusion reached by a lawfully obtained expert report, which had also examined the motive of the accused and provided a comprehensive explanation in that regard. The criminal court had had discretion to impose such a reduced sentence, as long as it was done in accordance with the law. As to the applicants’ complaint about the lack of a decision on their claim for damages in the criminal proceedings and the lack of any reasoning given by the court in respect of their claim for damages, the Constitutional Court referred to the Supreme Court’s reasoning and rejected this part of the complaint. 43. On 10 October 2012 the family of the applicants’ late relatives lodged a civil claim for damages with the Komárno District Court (okresný súd). After the SCC referred the applicants to the civil courts with their claim for damages, on 30 May 2013 they requested to be allowed to join the pending proceedings. 44. By a decision of 22 October 2013, the District Court dismissed the applicants’ request. Following an appeal by the applicants, the Nitra Regional Court (krajský súd) quashed that decision on 31 January 2014 and allowed the applicants to join the pending proceedings in respect of damages. 45. On 22 November 2016, at the hearing before the District Court, the applicants withdrew their claims and the court discontinued the proceedings. 46. On 18 June 2013 the Ministry of Justice awarded the first applicant the sum of 2,358 euros (EUR) and the second applicant EUR 7,545.60, in accordance with Act no. 215/2006 Coll. on compensation for victims of violent crimes. Furthermore, the second applicant received EUR 4,090 in respect of his father’s death. 47. On 9 March 2015 the District Prosecutor’s Office dismissed a criminal complaint lodged by the applicants against Mr J., which was based on the suspicion that he had committed a criminal offence by disposing of property in order to defraud creditors (poškodzovanie veriteľa) by transferring the title to his house to his daughter and giving EUR 5,000 to his wife as a gift.

4. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Ulyanovsk. 5. At around 8.10 p.m. on 16 June 2007 the applicant and K. were arrested on suspicion of robbery. They were taken to the criminal investigation unit of the Kotlovka district police department for the South‑West Administrative Circuit of Moscow (ОУР ОВД по району Котловка ЮЗАО г. Москвы). 6. The applicant’s account of subsequent events at the police station is the following. During the night of 16 June 2007 the applicant was insulted and beaten up by police officers A.A. and M., who requested that he confess to the robbery. He lost consciousness several times. The applicant continued to be physically assaulted in the presence of investigator A.I. from the South‑West Administrative Circuit police, who threatened him with imprisonment. The applicant refused to sign any confession statements. The police officers coerced K. to confess to the robbery, physically assaulting him and making him see the applicant’s beatings. The applicant was threatened with physical retaliation if he complained about their conduct. 7. At 7.20 a.m. on 17 June 2007 investigator A.I. drew up a record of the applicant’s arrest for robbery, which was signed by the applicant in the absence of a lawyer. The record indicates that the applicant was arrested at 7.20 a.m. that day. 8. At 11.05 a.m. the applicant was placed in a South‑West Administrative Circuit temporary detention facility (IVS). 9. On 18 June 2007 the Gagarinskiy District Court of Moscow remanded the applicant in custody. 10. On 21 June 2007 the applicant was placed in a Moscow pre‑trial detention facility (IZ-77/2). 11. On 17 June 2007 the applicant was examined by a doctor of Moscow Town Hospital no. 33 at the request of the on-duty officer of the Kotlovka district police station. According to the hospital records, the applicant had (i) bluish bruises on his face, chest, back and both legs measuring between 6 x 6 cm and 3 x 6 cm; and (ii) an abrasion on his back measuring 1.5 x 6 cm. He was diagnosed with multiple contusions and abrasions on his head, chest and upper limbs. 12. According to records from the IVS and IZ-77/2, of 17 and 21 June 2007, respectively, the applicant had multiple contusions and abrasions on his head, chest and upper limbs. 13. On 13 August 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the internal security department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Moscow, allegedly as soon as he had stopped fearing for his life. 14. During the two years which followed, investigators of the Zyuzinskiy district investigation unit of the investigative committee for Moscow carried out a pre-investigation inquiry and issued refusals to open a criminal case (dated 14 September 2007, 24 February 2008 and 2 May 2009) pursuant to Article 24 § 1 (1) or (2) of the CCrP, either because there was no evidence that a crime had been committed or because none of the elements of a crime under Article 286 § 3 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers with use of violence) were present in respect of the actions of police officers A.A. and M. In doing so they relied on the police officers’ and investigator A.I.’s explanations denying any wrongdoing. They did not interview the applicant. 15. According to explanations by the police officers received during the pre‑investigation inquiry, on 16 June 2007 they took the applicant – who according to operative information had committed a robbery – to the police station, where an “explanation” was received from him concerning the crime, without any physical or psychological pressure being exerted on him. 16. The investigators’ decisions refusing to open a criminal case, except for the most recent decision of 2 May 2009, were overruled by the investigators’ superiors and an additional inquiry was carried out. On 15 January 2008 the investigator’s refusal of 14 September 2007 was overruled on the grounds that it had been premature and based on an incomplete inquiry, as it did not contain an explanation of the applicant’s injuries. On 23 April 2009 the investigator’s refusal of 24 February 2008 was overruled as premature. 17. The investigator’s conclusions in the most recent refusal to open a criminal case dated 2 May 2009 were generally similar to the previous decisions. It also stated that the applicant had been convicted of several crimes and had been sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment, and that the police officers had acted in accordance with their duties. 18. The applicant appealed against the investigator’s decisions of 24 February 2008 and 2 May 2009. His appeal against the former decision was not examined by domestic courts, which terminated the proceedings in view of the annulment of the decision by the investigating authority (decision of 24 April 2009 of the Gagarinskiy District Court of Moscow, as upheld on 28 October 2009 by the Moscow City Court). On 24 November 2010 the Gagarinskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant’s second appeal, holding that the decision of 2 May 2009 was lawful and well‑grounded. In particular, the court noted that the applicant’s arguments concerning his alleged ill-treatment by police officers A.A. and M. had been examined during his criminal trial and dismissed as unconfirmed. On 6 June 2011 the Moscow City Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and fully endorsed the first‑instance court’s decision. 19. On 11 December 2007 the Zyuzinskiy District Court of Moscow convicted the applicant of robbery and banditry, and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment. 20. At trial, the applicant pleaded not guilty. He stated that on 16 June 2007 he had been arrested, driven to a police station and physically assaulted by police officers. The trial court dismissed the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment by the police. It relied mainly on the investigator’s refusal to open a criminal case against the police officers of 14 September 2007 (subsequently overruled), noting there was no objective information showing that physical violence had been used against the applicant. 21. The applicant’s co-accused, K., did not confirm his confession statements at the preliminary investigation, explaining that he had given them because police officers had physically assaulted him and had made him see the applicant’s beatings. The trial court dismissed his arguments and based its judgment on K.’s confession statements given at the preliminary investigation and other evidence. 22. On 27 February 2008 the Moscow City Court upheld that judgment on appeal, holding that the applicant’s allegations that unlawful investigative techniques had been used had not been confirmed. 23. The Government submitted statements collected by lieutenant colonel S. from the internal security department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Moscow on 17 November 2016 from police officer M. and investigator A.I., in which both M., presently a senior operational police officer of the Criminal Search Department for the South-West Administrative Circuit of Moscow, and A.I., presently an investigator of the Department for the Fight against Organised Crime for the South-West Administrative Circuit of Moscow, denied any unlawful conduct and ill‑treatment in respect of the applicant after the applicant’s arrest in 2007.

4. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Mersin. 5. The applicant is a teacher in primary school and at the material time she was a member and secretary of the local branch of the trade union of Education and Science Workers (Eğitim ve Bilim Emekçileri Sendikası). 6. On 28 November 2008 the applicant participated in a demonstration organised by the above mentioned trade union on the theme “No to violence against women”. 7. On 29 June 2009 the District Directorate of National Education imposed a disciplinary sanction in the form of a reprimand on the applicant for her participation in the aforementioned demonstration under Article 125 of the Law no. 657 on Civil Servants. 8. On 10 July 2009 the applicant objected to this decision and requested its annulment. 9. On 29 July 2009 the Disciplinary Board of the Yenişehir district governor dismissed the applicant’s objection considering that the contested decision was in accordance with law and there were no grounds for its annulment.

6. The applicant was born in Qesarat, Tepelenë, in 1977. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 7. On 14 January and 10 November 2005, following proceedings in absentia, the Gjirokastër District Court and the Court of Appeal, respectively, convicted the applicant of attempted theft resulting in death in collusion with others and sentenced him to seventeen years’ imprisonment. That decision became final on 9 February 2007 after the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant’s lawyer. It appears that the applicant was represented by a lawyer appointed by his family throughout the court proceedings. 8. It appears that on 30 March 2007 the applicant was extradited from Greece to Albania. 9. On 3 May 2007 the Gjirokastër District Court allowed a request by the applicant to appeal out of time and he lodged an appeal against his conviction in absentia. 10. On 12 November 2007 the Gjirokaster Court of Appeal while requalifying the charges against the applicant on the basis of the evidence obtained during the proceedings in absentia, upheld the applicant’s conviction, ruling that it had become res judicata. 11. By a final decision of 7 October 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant’s conviction as decided in the Gjirokastër District Court’s decision of 2005, ruling that it had become res judicata and that the facts and law in the case had been examined previously. It further noted that leave to appeal out of time should not have been granted as the case had become res judicata. 12. On 21 February 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court against the Supreme Court’s decision, complaining, inter alia, about the fact that the domestic courts had not given him the possibility of a fresh factual and legal determination of the criminal charge. 13. On 9 May 2011 the applicant’s lawyer was notified of the Constitutional Court’s decision to dismiss his appeal.

6. The first and second applicants are Ilinden’s chairman and deputy chairman. The remaining seven applicants are members of Ilinden’s board of management. 7. The background to the refusal to register Ilinden at issue in this case has been set out in detail in the judgments in the following cases: Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, ECHR 2001-IX; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria, no. 44079/98, 20 October 2005; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59489/00, 20 October 2005; Ivanov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 46336/99, 24 November 2005; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59491/00, 19 January 2006; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 37586/04, 18 October 2011; United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 34960/04, 18 October 2011; Singartiyski and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 48284/07, 18 October 2011; and United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), nos. 41561/07 and 20972/08, 18 October 2011. 8. On 19 September 2010 ninety-eight members of Ilinden held a founding meeting at which they resolved to form the organisation and apply to register it, adopted articles of association, and elected individuals to the organisation’s constituent bodies. 9. On 27 September 2010 Ilinden’s managing council applied to the Blagoevgrad Regional Court for it to be registered as an association. 10. In the course of the proceedings, the court several times asked the applicants to rectify deficiencies in the registration papers. 11. In a decision of 3 February 2012 (реш. № 15 от 03.02.2012 г., по ф. д. № 85/2010 г., БОС), the Blagoevgrad Regional Court refused to register Ilinden. It noted that it had on several occasions instructed the applicants to rectify deficiencies in the registration papers, the latest such instruction having been given on 29 November 2011. The applicants’ subsequent filing of papers on 5 January 2012 had, however, failed to deal satisfactorily with the court’s concerns. The applicants had not clearly set out the competences of the association’s constituent bodies and had not made it clear which of the several copies of the articles of association filed with the court, in which differences appeared, had been the ones adopted at the founding meeting. Also, Ilinden’s aims, as defined in its articles of association, contravened Article 44 of the Constitution (see paragraph 22 below). It was true that Ilinden intended to use peaceful means to attain those aims. But the aims were themselves contrary to the State’s security and sought to stir up national hatred. Ilinden asked that Bulgaria “stop carrying out its policy of assimilating Macedonians”, “stop supporting nationalist propaganda that [has] sow[n] discrimination, hostility and threats against Macedonians”, “stop preventing Macedonians from holding peaceful rallies”, and “not [to] discriminate against Macedonians”. Those aims were directed against the security of the rest of the citizens and would lead to hostile relations between allegedly “discriminated Macedonians” and other Bulgarian citizens. They were therefore unlawful and precluded Ilinden’s registration. 12. The applicants appealed. They submitted that the court had misconstrued Ilinden’s articles of association and that it was not seeking to stir up hatred or hostility. The real reason for the refusal to register it had been that it had advocated opinions which were at odds with official opinion. The registration papers met all the required formalities. 13. In a decision of 23 April 2012 (реш. № 634 от 23.04.2012 г. по ф. д. № 1002/2012 г., САС, ГК), the Sofia Court of Appeal upheld the refusal to register Ilinden. It held that its aims, as set out in its articles of association, were political, which was not permissible for an association seeking registration under the Non-Profit Legal Persons Act 2000 (see paragraphs 19-21 and 23 below). For instance, in clause 2 of its articles of association, Ilinden proclaimed itself as successor to “the national liberation struggle of the Macedonian nation”, and in clause 3 stated that it would “express and protect the civic, political, national, social and economic rights of Macedonians living in Bulgaria”. Clause 4 spoke of the protection of Macedonians subjected to racial and ethnic assimilation by the Bulgarian State’s nationalistic policies and demanded that Pirin Macedonia be given cultural autonomy, that the assimilation of Macedonians be stopped, and that Macedonian identity, religion, language, traditions and heritage, allegedly being subjected to ethnocide by the Bulgarian authorities, be protected. Clause 5 said that Ilinden would strive to free Macedonians from the sense of fear engendered by the Bulgarian State’s policy of discrimination and assimilation and to outlaw Bulgarian racism against Macedonians. According to the Sofia Court of Appeal, the lower court had been correct to find these aims contrary to the unity of the nation. They overtly pitted one group of citizens against another and engendered national and ethnic hatred, contrary to Article 44 § 2 of the Constitution (see paragraph 22 below) 14. At the end of its decision, the Sofia Court of Appeal said that it was amenable to appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court of Cassation. 15. On 4 June 2012 the applicants lodged such an appeal, reiterating their earlier arguments and submitting that the refusal to register Ilinden had been in breach of their right to freedom of conscience and association and that it had penalised them for advocating views contrary to those held by the majority of the population. 16. In a decision of 30 April 2013 (опр № 133 от 30.04.2013 г. по т. д. № 510/2012 г., ВКС, I т. о.) a three-member panel of the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to accept the appeal on points of law. It held that under the applicable provisions of the 1952 Code of Civil Procedure, as construed in a binding interpretative decision in 2001 (see paragraph 24 below), appellate decisions upholding refusals to register a non-governmental organisation had been amenable to appeal on points of law. However, that was not the case under the 2007 Code of Civil Procedure, which had come into effect on 1 March 2008. The court analysed in detail the relevant provisions of the new Code and found that, when properly construed in the light of its overall scheme and the provisions governing similar registration proceedings, the rules governing the manner of appealing against a refusal to register a non-governmental organisation were to be construed as permitting an appeal to a court of appeal against a first-instance decision refusing registration but precluding an appeal on points of law against the court of appeal’s decision. 17. On 14 May 2013 the applicants lodged a procedural appeal against that decision under Article 274 §§ 1 (1) and 2 of the 2007 Code. They contested the way in which the three-member panel had construed the relevant provisions of the new Code. 18. In a final decision of 15 July 2013 (опр. № 508 от 15.07.2013 г. по ч. т. д. № 2571/2013 г., ВКС, II т. о.), another three-member panel of the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the first panel’s decision. It noted that the appeal had been lodged within the applicable one-week time-limit under Article 275 § 1 of the 2007 Code, which ran from the date of serving of the decision. However, it went on to hold that the appeal was unfounded, and that no appeal on points of law lay against the Sofia Court of Appeal’s decision. Analysing in detail the applicable provisions of the new Code, it confirmed the manner in which the first three-member panel had interpreted them.

5. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Vilnius. 6. On 30 October 1991 the applicant’s sister applied for the restoration of her property rights to her late father’s land, which was located in Pylimėliai village, city of Vilnius. She indicated that the applicant was also a successor to the same plot of land. 7. It appears that the applicant’s father had owned some land in Pylimėliai village. According to the most recent information available to the Court, the exact plot of land he had owned was 6.0961 hectares. It appears that the applicant’s restitution process took two directions: at first she agreed to receive part of the land in the Vilnius region and then she asked to receive another 0.32 hectares in the Vilnius region, and she wanted to receive some land in the city of Vilnius (see paragraphs 8-22 below). 8. On 26 May 2000 the applicant asked the authorities to restore her property rights to her father’s land by giving her plots of land of equivalent value in the Vilnius region. 9. By a decision of 6 April 2001, the applicant’s property rights were restored in respect of 0.2420 hectares of her father’s land by attributing to the applicant a plot measuring 0.5124 hectares in the Vilnius region. 10. On 19 May 2006 the authorities established that the applicant had a right to restore her title to 0.32 hectares of her father’s land. It appears that they did so following an application lodged by the applicant to have her right to a plot of land of 0.32 hectares transferred from Vilnius to the Vilnius region. 11. On 17 November 2014 the applicant was informed that she could have her property rights restored to her father’s land by receiving a plot of forest in a rural area. She had to apply before 1 March 2015. On 27 February 2015 the applicant informed the authorities that she wanted her property rights restored by receiving a plot of forest in Didžioji Riešė. 12. On 30 July 2015 the National Land Service (“the NLS”) decided to restore the applicant’s property rights to 0.0315 hectares of her father’s land by transferring her right to a plot of land of 0.1599 hectares. It was indicated in the decision that her rights to the remaining 0.2884 hectares would be restored later. 13. On 30 August 2016 the NLS held a meeting to consider the location where the applicant had chosen two plots of land. 14. On 26 February 2018 the NLS held a meeting to consider the location where the applicant had chosen four plots of land. It appears that no decision as to the restoration of the remaining land was adopted. 15. It appears that at the date of the latest information available to the Court (17 September 2018), the applicant’s property rights to 0.2884 hectares of her father’s land had not yet been restored. 16. On 27 December 2001 the applicant applied for the restoration of her property rights to her father’s land by returning to her 0.2 hectares of land in Vilnius, either in the former Pylimėliai village or in Antakalnis. It appears that this request was the change of her initial wish as regards the form of restitution (see paragraph 8 above). 17. On 20 March 2003 the applicant asked the authorities to return to her in kind the remaining part of her father’s land in Pylimėliai, Vilnius. It appears that this request was another change of her wish as regards the form of restitution (see paragraph 16 above). 18. On 27 June 2005 the Vilnius County Administration (“the VCA”) restored the applicant’s property rights to 0.0973 hectares of her father’s land by transferring to her a plot of land in Vilnius for the construction of an individual house. On 10 February 2006 the VCA restored the applicant’s property rights to 0.0544 hectares of her father’s land by transferring to her eleven plots of land in the former Pylimėliai village. 19. On 2 May 2012 the applicant informed the authorities that she would not accept monetary compensation as a form of restitution and that she wanted to restore her property rights to her father’s land in natura. She also asked what actions she had to take in order to receive the land. 20. On 23 April 2013 the NLS restored the applicant’s property rights to 0.0005 hectares of her father’s land. 21. On 19 July 2016 the NLS restored the applicant’s property rights to 0.0042 hectares of land by returning to her in natura four plots of land measuring 0.0042 hectares in total. 22. On 5 January 2018 the NLS restored the applicant’s rights to 0.0078 hectares of land by returning to her in natura two plots of land measuring 0.0078 hectares in total. It was indicated that the applicant’s property rights to the remaining 0.2898 hectares would be restored later. It appears that at the date of the latest information available to the Court (17 September 2018), the applicant had not yet received those 0.2898 hectares of land. 23. On 4 November 2004 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court examined a claim lodged by the applicant that the VCA had been protracting the adoption of a decision on the restoration of her property rights in Vilnius. The court found that the authorities had asked the applicant to provide a document which she had in fact already provided and held that the authorities had failed to act in due time in the process of restoring her property rights. The court ordered the authorities to act in accordance with domestic law and to proceed with the restitution process. 24. On 3 June 2005 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court examined another claim lodged by the applicant that the VCA had been protracting the adoption of a decision on the restoration of her property rights. She asked the court to oblige the VCA to return to her 0.7730 hectares of land. The court held that the authorities had been inactive and ordered them to issue a decision restoring the applicant’s property rights within three months of the date on which the aforementioned court decision had become final (see paragraph 36 below). 25. The VCA appealed against that decision. On 11 October 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. 26. On 10 April 2009 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court examined a third complaint lodged by the applicant regarding the inactivity of the authorities in the process of restoration of her property rights. The applicant asked the court to oblige the VCA to restore her property rights to 0.3013 hectares of land in Vilnius and to 1.72 hectares in the Vilnius region, as well as to award her 10,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 2,896 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The court held that the applicant had submitted several requests in 2006 asking the VCA to proceed with the restoration of her property rights; however, the latter had refused to act. Moreover, the authorities’ decision of 19 May 2006 (see paragraph 10 above) had remained unenforced. It was explained to the applicant that several measures had yet to be carried out in order to proceed. The court held that the applicant had to be included on the list of citizens wishing to receive land in Didžioji Riešė, but that due to the authorities’ inactivity, she had not been included on the list. The court also found that she still had a right to the restoration of her title to 0.6223 hectares of land and that the restitution process in her case had been going on for more than eighteen years. The court ordered the VCA to issue a decision restoring the applicant’s property rights to 0.6223 hectares of land within three months of the date on which the aforementioned court decision became final. As regards compensation, the court awarded the applicant EUR 579 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 27. The authorities appealed. On 14 June 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court found that the first-instance court had made some mistakes in calculating the time-limits for submission of a claim, and remitted the case for fresh examination. 28. On 8 December 2011 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court carried out a fresh examination of the applicant’s complaint (see paragraph 26 above). The court stated that 5.44 ares of land had been returned to the applicant in natura in total and that the applicant’s property rights to 0.6223 hectares of her father’s land had not been restored. The court held that it could not order the VCA to transfer her rights to a plot of land measuring 0.3013 hectares in Vilnius because the largest plot that could be transferred in Vilnius was 0.12 hectares. Nor could it order the VCA to transfer 1.72 hectares of land in the Vilnius region because the plot of land the applicant had indicated belonged to someone else. The court awarded the applicant EUR 869 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 29. The applicant and the NLS appealed. On 16 April 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeals. The court held that the decision regarding the applicant’s right to the restitution of 0.32 hectares of land had not yet been adopted and that the applicant had been offered the option of monetary compensation. 30. In 2014 the applicant instituted court proceedings seeking compensation amounting to EUR 133,848 in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 28,962 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. She claimed that the authorities had failed to issue decisions restoring her property rights in due time and that her property rights had not yet been restored. She also claimed that she had lost the right to the restoration of her title to 0.2 hectares of land in the city of Vilnius because ‒ after a change in the domestic regulations ‒ the maximum plot size that could be restored for the construction of an individual house was now fixed at 0.12 hectares (see paragraphs 28 above and 37 below). However, she had received a plot of land measuring 0.0973 hectares. 31. On 26 May 2014 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s compensation claim. It held that in 2000 she had applied to the authorities for the restitution of 2 hectares of her father’s land in the Vilnius region instead of the original plot her father had owned in Vilnius County (see paragraph 8 above). She had received 0.5124 hectares in 2001 (see paragraph 9 above). In 2001 she had applied for the restoration of her property rights to 0.2 hectares of land in Vilnius (see paragraph 16 above), and in 2003 she had asked for the remaining land to be returned in kind (see paragraph 17 above). In 2005 and 2006 the applicant’s property rights to 0.0973 and 0.0544 hectares of land had been restored (see paragraph 18 above). In 2012 the applicant had informed the authorities that she would not accept monetary compensation and still wanted to receive the remaining land in natura (see paragraph 19 above). In 2013 her property rights had been restored to 0.0005 hectares of land (see paragraph 20 above). The court also indicated that before 1 April 2003 the applicant had changed her mind as to the form of restitution and had claimed that she wanted to receive the land in natura. The court noted that the process of restoration of the applicant’s property rights had been carried out in several stages: in 2005 she had received a plot of 0.0937 hectares in Pašilaičiai, Vilnius (see paragraph 18 above); in 2006 a document confirming that she had a right to receive 0.32 hectares of State redeemable land had been drawn up; and in 2006 and 2013 her property rights had been restored to 0.0544 hectares and 0.0005 hectares respectively (see paragraphs 18 and 20 above). As regards the plot for the construction of an individual house, the court held that a decision to restore the applicant’s property rights to 0.0937 hectares of land had been issued in 2005 and had not been challenged. The court also ruled that the restitution process was not over and would be continued. In the court’s opinion, the authorities had not acted unlawfully and there were no grounds for awarding the applicant compensation. 32. The applicant appealed against the first-instance decision and on 7 April 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court decided to reopen the case for examination on the merits in order to receive some additional documents. 33. On 19 June 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first‑instance decision. It held that although the applicant claimed that the authorities had failed to execute the decisions of the courts to restore her property rights, she had never challenged the authorities’ decisions to restore her property rights to certain plots of land. The court also held that the restitution process had been carried out and suspended for objective reasons. The authorities had confirmed that the process would recommence as soon as the municipality had delineated the plots of land.

4. The applicants are a family. The first applicant, Mr Omer Akçay (also spelt Emer and Emir Akchay), who was born in 1960, is a Turkish national. The second and third applicants are his wife, Ms Svetlana Akchay, who was born in 1975, and his son, Mr Deniz Akchay, who was born in 2000. Both of them are Russian nationals. The first applicant’s surname is spelt as it would be in Turkish. The second and third applicants’ surname is the same as that of the first applicant, but it has been transliterated into Russian and has a different spelling. Background information 5. The first applicant has been residing in Turkey since April 2016. Prior to that, from 1999 to 2016, he resided with his family in Syktyvkar, in the Komi Republic, Russia. The second and third applicants still reside there. 6. At some point prior to December 1999 the first applicant moved from Turkey to Russia and started living with the second applicant in Syktyvkar. He resided in Russia on the basis of regularly extended residence permits. 7. In January 2000 the third applicant was born and the first applicant was registered on his birth certificate as his father. The third applicant goes to school in Syktyvkar. 8. In 2007 the first applicant was officially registered as a business owner; he had a cattle farm, where he employed five Russian nationals. 9. On 27 January 2015 the Komi Department of the Federal Migration Service (“the Komi FMS”) granted the first applicant yet another renewal of his five-year residence permit, valid until 3 February 2020. 10. On 2 December 2015 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 27 November and 4 December 2015) the Komi Department of the Federal Security Service (“the Komi FSB”) issued a letter requesting that the FMS annul (revoke) the first applicant’s residence permit. The text of the document stated as follows: “... on 13 October 2005 the Komi FMS issued Mr E. Akchay – a Turkish national who was born on 1 January 1960 in Malazgirt, Turkey – with residence permit 82 no. 0013753 (by FMS decision no. 015777 of 13 October 2005). According to the department’s information, this person’s actions mean that he poses a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation, which, in accordance with section 9(1)(1) of the Foreign Nationals Act, provides grounds for annulling a foreigner’s residence permit in the Russian Federation. Given the above, we ask you to annul the residence permit of the Turkish national Mr Emer Akchay, in accordance with the Russian legislation.” 11. The above request by the Komi FSB specified neither the grounds for the measure nor the nature of the alleged threat. 12. On 8 December 2015 the Komi FMS annulled the first applicant’s residence permit with reference to section 9(1)(1) of the Foreign Nationals Act, which provided for the revocation of the residence permits of foreign nationals who posed a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation or its citizens. 13. On 29 December 2015 the first applicant was invited to the Komi FMS, where he was made aware of the annulment decision and his residence permit was confiscated. He was warned that he was supposed to leave Russia within two weeks, or he would be deported. The first applicant was not informed of the grounds for the annulment. 14. On 26 January 2016 the applicants’ farm was inspected by the Russian Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance, which fined the first applicant 3,000 Russian roubles (RUB) for failing to comply with a number of relevant regulations – for example, for not having pet passports for three of the farm dogs and for piling up manure within less than sixty metres of the cattle barn. 15. On 17 February 2016 the Komi FMS issued a decision ordering the first applicant to leave Russia within five days of receiving the decision, under the threat of deportation, and banning his re-entry into the Russian Federation until 19 September 2018. The first applicant was informed of that decision on 7 April 2016. 16. On an unspecified date in April 2016 the first applicant was again invited to the Komi FSB and reminded to leave Russia on his own initiative, as otherwise he would be detained and then deported. He was given an exit visa valid until 20 April 2016. 17. On 20 April 2016 the first applicant left Russia. The second and third applicants remained in Syktyvkar to take care of the farm and continue attending school. 18. On 13 July 2016 (in the documents submitted, the date was also referred to as 21 June 2016) the first and second applicants officially registered their marriage in Turkey. 19. On 31 December 2015 the first applicant appealed to the Syktyvkar Town Court (“the Town Court”) against the annulment of his residence permit, stating that the Komi FSB’s request of 2 December 2015 to annul his residence permit had been made on national security grounds which were unknown to him, and that the subsequent decision of the Komi FMS complying with that request and annulling his residence permit was unlawful and disproportionate. He stated that he had a family in Russia, was a business owner, had no criminal record or record of administrative offences, and that the annulment of his residence permit would deprive him of grounds for staying in Russia and disrupt his family and private life. 20. On 24 February 2016 the Town Court examined the first applicant’s appeal. At the hearing, representatives of the Komi FSB informed the court that the first applicant had received eleven (in the documents submitted the number was also referred to as twelve) administrative fines for speeding, for which six tickets had been issued in 2015, three tickets in 2014 and two tickets in 2013. In addition, in 2015 the first applicant had been fined for other traffic violations, such as driving a vehicle with a defect, on three occasions. He had also received two administrative fines for violating the terms of foreigners’ residence in Russia (failing to register within the prescribed time-limit, in 2013 and then in 2015). In addition, on one occasion in January 2016 he had been fined for failing to comply with veterinary regulations at the cattle farm. 21. The first applicant’s representative stated at the hearing that the first applicant had a farm in Russia, diligently paid taxes, employed several Russian nationals, and had a wife and a fourteen-year-old son. After the Russian military aircraft had been brought down in Turkey, the traffic police had started stopping the first applicant “at every turn”. When the first applicant’s representative asked the Komi FSB’s representative why, despite all of the alleged administrative infractions, the first applicant’s permanent residence permit had been extended yet again in February 2015 without any problems, the Komi FSB’s representative replied as follows: “the international situation is complicated, therefore the attitude in Russia towards violations by foreign nationals has become stricter”. The first applicant’s representative invited the applicants’ neighbour, Ms Ch., to the hearing, who testified that she had known the first applicant for twenty years, that he was a well-respected man who helped local orphans, that he worked for the good of the local community, and that he had a wife and son and was the breadwinner of the family. 22. At the hearing the first applicant also asserted that he had not been made aware of the detailed information concerning his administrative infractions which had been presented to the court by the Komi FSB prior to the hearing. He stressed that he was still unaware of the nature of the threat he allegedly posed to Russia’s national security, and that he had family in Russia, including a son who was a minor. He also had a farm which required constant attention. He admitted that he had had speeding tickets, but stressed that such infractions were very common and were of a minor nature, and that throughout the time he had been living in Russia he had never had a traffic accident. In his opinion, the impugned decision to exclude him from Russia had been taken in view of the strained relations between Russia and Turkey after the incident with the Russian military aircraft. 23. On the same date, 24 February 2016, the Town Court upheld the annulment of the first applicant’s residence permit. In its decision, the court referred to his record of administrative violations as submitted by the Komi FSB at the hearing. The court did not make any references to the nature of the threat posed by the first applicant to national security, other than stating that his record of administrative offences for the last three years had provided the necessary basis for the Komi FSB’s request to annul his residence permit. The Komi FSB did not provide any other documents substantiating its request for the first applicant to be excluded on national security grounds. The court did not examine the first applicant’s complaints concerning the disruptive effect of the exclusion on his family life. 24. On 17 March 2016 the first applicant appealed to the Komi Supreme Court against the judgment of 24 February 2016, stating, amongst other things, that he had been residing in Russia since 1999, and that since 2005 he had been living there on the basis of regularly extended five-year residence permits. The last extension had been granted in February 2015, which demonstrated that he was a long-term migrant of good standing who complied with the relevant regulations. The first applicant further stated that he had always paid the taxes relating to his farm business and that he provided jobs for five Russian nationals. Referring to Article 8 of the Convention, he submitted that the annulment violated his and his family members’ right to respect for their family life, and that it was a disproportionate measure that did not pursue a legitimate aim. Lastly, the first applicant stressed that he was still unaware of the nature of the threat he allegedly posed to the national security of the Russian Federation. 25. On 15 and 28 April 2016 the Komi FSB lodged its objections to the first applicant’s appeal with the Komi Supreme Court, demanding that the court find against him. Amongst other things, its submissions of 15 April 2016 stated the following: “... State security bodies, in particular the Federal Security Service, have the right to evaluate the activities of foreign citizens and stateless persons as [people] representing a threat to defence, the security of the State, public order or health, and the court has no right to interfere with that authority. The use of those preventive measures in respect of national security is left to the discretion of the Federal Security Service. Issues relating to national security are specific, and their evaluation is carried out by designated bodies on the basis of information obtained from sources, including those outside of judicial control. Therefore, the Federal Security Service is not supposed to provide the court with documents substantiating the grounds for its decisions concerning the undesirability of the residence of a foreign citizen in the Russian Federation, as such documents contain State secrets, and the court does not have authority to request those documents ...” 26. Amongst other things, the FSB’s further submissions to the court of 15 April 2016 stated the following: “... the information concerning the annulment of the residence permit was provided to the Federal Migration Service by the Federal Security Service on the basis of classified decision no. 18577c of 27 November 2015 concerning the applicant’s actions posing a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation and its citizens, [actions] which serve as the basis for the annulment of the residence permit, in accordance with section 9(1) of The Foreign Nationals Act ... The [Komi] FSB provided the court of first instance with [only] information whose disclosure was not limited ...” 27. On 5 May 2016 the Komi Supreme Court examined the appeal and upheld the annulment. In its decision, the court referred to the first applicant’s record of administrative violations committed between 2013 and 2016 and some undisclosed information provided by the FSB, without specifying what the nature of that information was. The court stated that the decision to annul the residence permit had been taken by the FSB within its executive authority, and that the information obtained from classified sources was not subject to judicial control, stating as follows: “... the court takes into account that in accordance with Federal Law no. 40- ФЗ on the Federal Security Service of 3 April 1995, the right to assess the activities of foreign nationals as [people] representing a threat to the State’s defence capacity or national security, or public order or health, is within the competence of the Russian FSB and lies within the discretion of the security service. Within administrative proceedings, the court does not have the right to assess the [information relating to] factors threatening national security which has been obtained in respect of a foreign national ...” As for the first applicant’s allegations regarding the adverse effect of the measure on his right to respect for family life, the court stated as follows: “the annulment did not represent an inadmissible interference by the authorities with the right to respect for family life”. 28. On 28 October 2016 the first applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Presidium of the Komi Supreme Court, and on 25 November 2016 the court rejected it without examining his allegations concerning the violation of his right to respect for family life. 29. On 13 February 2017 the Administrative Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to examine a further cassation appeal lodged by the first applicant. 30. On 17 February 2016 the Komi FMS issued a decision banning the first applicant from re-entering the Russian Federation until 19 September 2018 (the entry ban) and ordering him to leave Russia within five days of receiving the decision, under the threat of deportation. The first applicant was informed of that decision on 7 April 2016 (see paragraph 15 above). 31. On 18 April 2016 the first applicant appealed to the Town Court against the above entry ban. He stated, in particular, that the decision referred to his record of administrative infractions for speeding and failing to comply with minor immigration regulations and sanitary rules at the farm, but the ban imposed had been issued on national security grounds which he still did not know about. The first applicant further stated the ban was a disproportionate punishment, as he was a law-abiding resident of good standing who paid all his taxes and employed Russian nationals. The first applicant stressed that when imposing the sanction, the authorities had failed to balance the public interests with his right to respect for his family life with his son and wife. 32. On 19 July 2016 the Town Court rejected the first applicant’s appeal, referring to his administrative infractions and stating that “the impugned decision had been taken in accordance with the law and within the authority of the Komi FMS”. 33. On 30 March 2017 the Komi Supreme Court upheld the above decision and on 22 August 2017 it rejected a cassation appeal by the first applicant.

6. Ms Damani Kaimova, Ms Maryam Moldyyevna Kaimova, and Ms Zarina Tamiyevna Maskhurova were born on 16 February 1953, 13 January 2005, and 18 September 1981, respectively. They live in the Chechen Republic. The first applicant is the mother, the second applicant is a daughter, and the third applicant is the widow of the late Mr Kaimov. 7. On 23 September 2006 Mr Kaimov was arrested for being a member of an illegal military organisation in the Chechen Republic. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial. On 1 November 2006 the Achkhoiy-Martan District Court of the Chechen Republic found him guilty of charges related to the military organisation and illegal acquisition of weapons. He was sentenced to two and a half years’ imprisonment. 8. In the meantime, he was charged with attempted murder of law‑enforcement officials, with making a homemade explosive, and other offences. He was convicted as charged by the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic on 28 October 2008 and sentenced to six and a half years’ imprisonment. 9. Prior to his detention Mr Kaimov had been diagnosed with tuberculosis for which he had been receiving outpatient treatment in a local hospital. 10. On admission to a remand prison Mr Kaimov informed the custodial authorities of his history of tuberculosis. A chest X-ray in January 2007 examination revealed the signs of that disease. A standard treatment with first-line medication was prescribed. 11. In early 2009 Mr Kaimov was sent to serve his sentence to the Republic of Tatarstan. In March 2009 he was admitted to prison medical institution no. 1 in Nizhnekamsk, where his tuberculosis was cured as confirmed by a medical board on 7 June 2009. 12. On 2 October 2009 Mr Kaimov was discharged from the prison medical institution to remand prison no. IZ-16/2 in Kazan. Shortly thereafter his health worsened. 13. On 28 October 2009 the prison authorities ordered his admission to prison medical institution no. 2 in Kazan (“the prison hospital”) where Mr Kaimov was diagnosed with tuberculosis of the right lung at the stage of tissue destruction. Treatment with second-line drugs was prescribed. 14. In February and March 2010 doctors noted progression of the disease. At that time Mr Kaimov started coughing up blood. An amended intense treatment brought his condition under control. 15. On 14 April 2010, in response to Mr Kaimov’s “negligent attitude towards his treatment”, a doctor talked to him about the importance of taking his drugs regularly. On 22 April and 1 May 2010 the doctor had repeated talks with him on the issue. 16. In late May 2010, the first applicant visited her son. Mr Kaimov was in a poor health. He claimed that no treatment had been given to him and that “the medical staff [had] paid absolutely no attention to his condition”. 17. On 22 April, 31 May and 8 June 2010 the doctor responsible for Mr Kaimov’s treatment again noted in the medical file that the patient was not taking his drugs as prescribed and insisted that he should follow medical instructions properly. The medical records were not signed by Mr Kaimov. 18. By mid-June 2010 Mr Kaimov’s condition became serious. He was no longer able to leave his bed. 19. On 24 June 2010 an inmate of the remand prison allegedly informed the first applicant that her son’s condition had become very serious and that no medical care was being given to him. 20. Four days later Mr K., a lawyer working with the Russian Justice Initiative, interviewed Mr Kaimov in the prison hospital. He said that he had not received the medicines, as the prison hospital did not have them. The prison hospital’s management refused to accept parcels with drugs for detainees. 21. Mr Kaimov died of heart failure caused by tuberculosis on 1 July 2010. The first applicant did not allow an autopsy to take place. 22. According to the Government, the investigating authorities carried out a criminal inquiry into the circumstances of Mr Kaimov’s death, which ended with a decision of 21 July 2010 not to open a criminal case. 23. On 22 November 2010 Mr K. asked the head of the Investigative Committee of the Republic of Tatarstan to investigate the circumstances of Mr Kaimov’s death. He pointed out that the detainee had complained of the lack of treatment in detention. A copy of the interview record of 28 June 2010 was attached to the request. 24. The investigating authorities interviewed Mr K., who confirmed his statements, and Ms I., the head of the tuberculosis unit responsible for Mr Kaimov’s treatment in 2009 and 2010. The doctor stated that the patient had received tuberculosis treatment until late May 2010, when he had refused to take any drugs. 25. On 6 December 2010, citing statements by Ms I., the investigating authorities concluded that there had been no appearance of negligence on the part of the medical authorities. They decided not to open a criminal case. 26. Three weeks later a higher-ranking investigator overruled that decision, noting that the investigation had not been thorough, in particular, because no medical documents had been collected. 27. The investigator again refused to open a criminal case on 5 January 2011. That decision was annulled by the higher-ranking authority on 15 March 2011 for want of necessary investigative measures, in view of the investigator’s failure to rectify the shortcomings already identified in the previous review decisions. 28. Twelve days after the annulment of his previous decision, the investigator again refused to open a criminal case, having based his new decision on the same evidence and arguments as before. 29. In the meantime, Mr K. submitted a new criminal complaint to the Central Inter-district Department of the Investigative Committee in the Republic of Tatarstan. The authorities were called on to verify whether the alleged inaction of the medical authorities had amounted to the deprivation of medical care, an offence under the Russian Criminal Code. On 10 May 2011 the case was forwarded to the Promyshlennyiy district police station in Kazan. 30. A police investigator interviewed a tuberculosis specialist, who had treated Mr Kaimov, and a prison nurse. They unanimously stated that the patient had refused treatment. 31. On 29 May 2011 the investigator refused to open a criminal case. Relying on the above statements and Mr Kaimov’s medical history, he found that the latter’s death had resulted from his own careless decision in not taking the prescribed drugs, and that the medical authorities had taken all reasonable steps to convince him to re-initiate the treatment. 32. The first applicant appealed against the decision of 29 May 2011. Her appeal was rejected, in the final instance, by the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic on 11 October 2011. The courts concluded that the investigation into Mr Kaimov’s death had been thorough and comprehensive. The decision refusing the institution of criminal proceedings had been based on the examination of the medical file and statements by a number of witnesses, including the medical personnel of the prison hospital. The courts endorsed the investigator’s conclusion that Mr Kaimov had refused treatment and had not followed the recommendations of the medical personnel. The courts also noted that the first applicant had been aware of Mr Kaimov’s behaviour and had not made any complaints about the quality of the treatment at that time. 33. Following the communication of the application to the Russian Government, they submitted that on 13 and 26 February 2015 the decisions of 27 March and 29 May 2011, respectively, had been overruled by higher‑ranking officials and additional investigative measures had been ordered. In particular, a medical expert examination was to be performed. 34. According to the applicants’ correspondence of 3 July 2015, the criminal investigation was pending. There is no further information about the outcome.

5. The first and third applicants were born in 1941, the second applicant was born in 1974, and the fourth applicant was born in 1967. The first, second and third applicants live in Kazanlak and the fourth applicant lives in Sofia. 6. Ms Maria Kopankova and her grandson, the fourth applicant (son of the first applicant) co-owned a house with a garden in Kazanlak. At the time Ms Maria Kopankova lived in the house with her two sons, the first applicant and Mr Kancho Kopankov, and their families, which included the remaining applicants (the second and third applicants are Mr Kancho Kopankov’s wife and son). 7. By a decision of the town mayor of 18 July 1988 the property was expropriated under the Territorial and Urban Planning Act with a view to constructing a residential building. The decision stated that each of the two owners (Ms Maria Kopankova and the fourth applicant) were to be compensated with a flat in a building which the municipality planned to construct. 8. After the expropriation the municipal authorities opened a blocked housing savings account with the State Savings Bank in the name of Ms Maria Kopankova and the fourth applicant and transferred to it 13,420 old Bulgarian levs (BGL) – the equivalent of the expropriated property’s value as assessed at the time. 9. In 1989 Ms Maria Kopankova and the applicants were moved out of the expropriated property and the house was pulled down. Construction work started on the plot of land and the foundations of a future building were laid. However, the site was soon after that abandoned. 10. Throughout the years that followed Ms Maria Kopankova and the applicants petitioned on many occasions the municipal authorities to provide them with the compensation due, but to no avail. The mayor never took a decision specifying the exact future flats to be offered in compensation (see paragraph 20 below). 11. In 1998 Ms Maria Kopankova passed away and was succeeded by her sons, the first applicant and Mr Kancho Kopankov. The latter passed away in 2011 and was succeeded by the second and third applicants. 12. On 16 February 2009 the applicants and Mr Kancho Kopankov made a request to the mayor under section 9(2) of the transitional provisions of the Territorial Planning Act of 2001 (hereinafter “section 9(2)”) for the revocation of the expropriation order of 18 July 1988. As no response followed, they applied for judicial review of the mayor’s tacit refusal. 13. The Stara Zagora Administrative Court (hereinafter “the Administrative Court”) gave a judgment on 27 May 2010. It found, firstly, that the fourth applicant and Ms Maria Kopankova, and subsequently her heirs, had not received the compensation due to them, namely two flats. It pointed out in this connection that the transfer of money to a blocked housing savings account in their name (see paragraph 8 above) was not equivalent to the provision of compensation. The Administrative Court found further that the authorities had not “taken possession” of the applicants’ property, within the meaning of section 9(2), because there had been no formal decision to take possession (as had been required at the time), and because in any event the construction work which had started on the plot had eventually been abandoned. Thus, the preconditions for the revocation of the 1988 expropriation under section 9(2) had been fulfilled. On that basis the Administrative Court quashed the mayor’s tacit refusal and revoked the expropriation order. 14. The judgment above was not appealed against and became final. 15. In 2011 the applicants brought a tort action against the Kazanlak municipality under section 1 of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 23 below). They claimed the value of the house and of other objects (such as trees, the pavement and outbuildings) which had stood on the plot of land and had been destroyed, but for which they had never received any compensation. The applicants also made claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 16. In the context of the ensuing proceedings the Administrative Court, examining the case, appointed experts, who estimated the value of the house and the remaining objects at 37,868 new Bulgarian levs (BGN – the equivalent of approximately 19,370 euros (EUR)). 17. In a decision of 26 January 2012 the Administrative Court found the applicants’ claims inadmissible and refused to examine them on the merits. It reasoned that the applicants’ situation had been regulated by sections 9(1) and 9(2) of the transitional provisions of the Territorial Planning Act of 2001 (see paragraph 22 below, hereinafter “section 9(1)” and “section 9(2)”), and that the existence of such a special avenue of redress meant that the general tort provisions of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act did not apply. 18. These conclusions were upheld in a final decision of 20 April 2012 of the Supreme Administrative Court, which added that since the expropriation of the applicants’ property had been quashed and the expropriation proceedings completed, the municipality could not be liable for any damage stemming from these proceedings. It pointed out in addition that the applicants’ claims did not fall to be examined by the civil courts, under the general rules of tort, and that the administrative courts remained competent to examine them, even though the claims were inadmissible. It thus refused to apply Article 135 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (see paragraph 25 below) and transfer the case to the civil courts, as the applicants had requested.

5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. The 1,646 applicants natural persons live in the villages of Doroțcaia, Pîrîta, Molovata Nouă, Pohrebea and Cocieri, situated on the left bank of the Dniester in the region of Dubǎsari. These villages are under Moldovan control. Part of the land belonging to the applicants is situated in areas near these villages, across a road which links the northern and southern parts of the self-proclaimed “Moldovan Transdniestrian Republic” (the “MRT” – see for more details Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 28-185, ECHR 2004‑VII) and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, §§ 8‑42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). That road, which cuts through two zones controlled by the Moldovan Government, is controlled by the authorities of the “MRT”. 7. The applicants obtained titles to these plots of land from Moldova as part of the “Pamântul” (Land) privatisation programme. In a letter dated 2 December 1999 the “MRT” local administration informed the Moldovan Department of privatisation that it “did not have any objections to the creation, on the basis of agricultural entities in the villages of Doroțcaia, Pîrîta, Molovata Nouă, Coșnița and Cocieri, the lands of which are situated on the territory of the [“MRT”], of peasant farms within the framework of the ‘Pamântul’ reform”. 8. Title to some of the land was subsequently transferred to others through gift or inheritance. The details of each applicant natural person are set out in Annexes nos. 1-9. 9. The applicants Posedo-Agro S.R.L., Agro-Tiras S.R.L. and Agro‑ S.A.V.V.A. S.R.L. are companies which rented land from owners during the relevant period of time. 10. On 15 August 2007 the applicant company Posedo-Agro S.R.L. ceded all of its rights and obligations to Serghei Popa Farming Proprietorship (FP). Both of those companies are solely owned by Mr Serghei Popa. On 30 October 2007 Posedo-Agro S.R.L. was liquidated. On 10 October 2013 Serghei Popa FP asked the Court to substitute itself for the original applicant company in respect of application no. 41569/04 and declared that it maintained that application before the Court. 11. The applicants’ main source of income is the working of the land owned or rented by them. In order to reach their land, they have to cross the road controlled by the authorities of the “MRT”. 12. Between 1992 and 1998 the applicants used the land in question or rented it without interference. In 1998 the “MRT” authorities set up checkpoints to monitor the movement of agricultural products across the “border” coinciding with the above-mentioned road. From then on the applicants had to pay various taxes and fees to the “MRT” authorities. 13. In August 2004 the “MRT” authorities declared that the land owned or rented by the applicants was the property of the “MRT”. The applicants could continue working it, on condition that they paid rent to the local “MRT” authorities. The applicants refused to sign rental contracts because they were already the lawful owners (or renters) of that land. As a consequence, all access to their land was blocked and the harvest was lost. Some of the agricultural machines belonging to those who tried to work their land were also seized. No work was done on the land in the following two years, which made it difficult to bring it back to its former capacity. 14. The applicants made numerous complaints to the “MRT” authorities, asking for a right of passage. Such a passage was refused because the authorities considered the land in question to be the property of the “MRT”. 15. The applicants also complained to the Moldovan authorities, who replied that they had no means to compel the “MRT” authorities to allow them free passage. They asked the Moldovan Prosecutor General’s Office to start a criminal investigation against the people responsible for blocking the applicants’ access to their land. 16. The applicants complained to the Russian embassy in Moldova and to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (the “OSCE”), to no avail. On 26 April 2005 a group of landowners, including some of the applicants, protested in front of the Russian embassy in Moldova, asking the authorities of that State to intervene as a guarantor of peace and stability in the region. A similar protest took place on 11 May 2005. 17. The applicant company Agro-S.A.V.V.A. S.R.L. submitted a document issued by the Moldovan tax office, which showed that it had paid tax on plots of land rented from 281 owners. According to a certificate from the mayor of Pîrîta village, the applicant company had rented plots of land (104 hectares) from people in the village between 1998 and 2006. The applicant company also submitted copies of its tax and statistics reports for 2004, as well as an audit report by a company called Total Consulting dated 15 November 2013, which showed that in 2004-2005 the applicant company cultivated 359 hectares of land, of which 104 hectares were situated in the area concerned by the present case. On 3 May 2005 the applicant company complained to Dubăsari Regional Council (a Moldovan local authority) about the situation, and it confirmed on 17 May 2005 that it was unable to cultivate 105 hectares of land rented from 320 landowners. Similar complaints and requests to allow cultivation of the land were made to the “MRT” local authorities, for instance on 19 July 2005. 18. The applicant company Agro-Tiras S.R.L. submitted a certificate from the mayor of Molovata Nouă village dated 11 October 2004, confirming that it rented 450 hectares of land from the villagers there, all of which were situated across the road, between Dubăsari and Rîbnița (the relevant area). According to a decision of the “MRT” Customs Office of 15 October 2004, a tractor with agricultural accessories and 5.8 tonnes of wheat had been seized from the applicant company owing to a failure to properly declare the importation of such items into the “MRT”. According to the decision, the tractor was travelling from Molovata Nouă village in the direction of “plots of land of the ‘MRT’ under Moldovan jurisdiction”. 19. According to a certificate dated 13 November 2013 from the mayor of Cocieri village, the applicant company Posedo-Agro S.R.L. rented land from 782 villagers during the period 2004-2006. The applicant company submitted a copy of a decision taken by the “MRT” Customs Office of 4 August 2004, which stated that 16 tonnes of barley had been seized from it owing to a failure to properly declare the importation of such items into the “MRT”. A fine (approximately 1,450 United States dollars (“USD”)) equal to the market price of the barley was imposed and additional costs had to be covered, otherwise the truck carrying the barley, which had also been temporarily seized on 30 July 2004, would be confiscated. A similar decision was taken on 16 August 2004, by which the applicant company lost 6.1 tonnes of apples. It also had to pay a fine (approximately USD 250) equal to the market price of the apples or risk the confiscation of three tractors temporarily seized on 11 August 2004. According to a certificate dated 12 October 2004, the applicant company rented 1,377 hectares of land from 820 people in Cocieri, of which 1,256 hectares were situated in the area concerned by the present application. On 4 August 2004 the applicant company complained to the Moldovan Government, the OSCE and the Dubăsari prosecutor’s office (belonging to the “MRT”) about the fine and seizure, stating that it rented 1,256 hectares of villagers’ land situated in the relevant area and that despite having temporary registration with the “MRT Customs Office” it was not allowed to take the harvest to storage. 20. According to the Moldovan Government, the Moldovan Parliament passed a number of laws aimed at compensating the inhabitants of villages under Moldovan control on the left bank of the Dniester (in the area concerned by the present cases) for losses caused by various actions of the “MRT”. The compensation included differences in natural gas and electricity prices, increasing pensions, giving tax breaks and preferential credits to agricultural companies in the region, and allocating diesel fuel for agricultural activities. Moreover, a number of laws and decisions were implemented in 2004-2007 providing for the payment of compensation to villagers who had sustained losses owing to their inability to cultivate their land in the relevant area, with the total amount of aid reaching almost 39 million Moldovan lei (MDL) (approximately 2.3 million euros (EUR)). In 2006 the Moldovan authorities managed to negotiate with the “MRT” authorities a temporary “MRT” registration mechanism for owners of land in the relevant area, which allowed them to cultivate the land and be exempt from making payments to the “MRT”. The temporary registration system is renewed each year in negotiations between Moldova and the “MRT” authorities.

4. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Orsk. 5. On 28 May 2005 the applicant, who was walking home after an evening drinking, was stopped on the street by police officers from the patrol and inspection service and driven to the Sovetskiy district police station of Orsk (Советское РОВД г. Орска). He attempted to run away, but was stopped and assaulted by the police officers, who kicked him in the stomach. He felt unwell and lost consciousness. The police officers placed him in a cell and did not react when he demanded that they call an ambulance. 6. The applicant was released the next morning. On the evening of 29 May 2005 he was admitted to hospital with internal bleeding. He spent six weeks in hospital. 7. According to forensic medical expert report no. 3634 of 25 July 2005, the applicant had blunt abdominal trauma with a ruptured intestine, which had provoked the development of serofibrinous peritonitis. This injury had been caused by impact with a hard, blunt object, possibly one to two days before the applicant’s hospitalisation, and had caused him “serious health damage”. The applicant also had abrasions on his back and forearms, and circular abrasions on his wrist joints, which had originated from impact with hard, blunt objects during the same period, and had not caused him any “health damage”. 8. Forensic medical expert report no. 5684 of 14 December 2011 contained similar information concerning the applicant’s injuries. The expert considered that the injuries had been caused several hours to several days before the applicant’s hospitalisation. The expert excluded the possibility that they had been caused as a result of him falling over. 9. On 29 May 2005 the Orsk police received information about the applicant’s hospitalisation in Town Hospital no. 2 with blunt abdominal trauma and abrasions on his body. 10. On 14 June 2005 an investigator from the Orsk Sovetskiy district prosecutor’s office opened a criminal case under Article 111 § 3 of the Criminal Code (physical assault causing “serious health damage”). 11. On 11 July 2005 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. 12. On 14 October 2005 the preliminary investigation into the criminal case was suspended under Article 208 § 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, owing to the inability to identify the individuals to be charged. 13. On 31 January and 25 April 2012 the preliminary investigation into the criminal case was restarted, in view of the need to take additional investigative measures. 14. On 1 March and 18 July 2012 the preliminary investigation into the criminal case was suspended again, on the same grounds as before. 15. In 2012 the applicant brought a civil claim against various State authorities, including the Russian Ministry of Finance, seeking 6,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for his ill‑treatment at the police station and the lack of an effective investigation into his complaint. 16. On 24 July 2012 the Leninskiy District Court of Orsk allowed the applicant’s claim in part and awarded him RUB 150,000 (the equivalent of about 3,800 euros) in compensation. It established that the applicant had been taken into police custody in good health and that his injuries had been caused at the police station, since the State authorities had failed to provide a plausible explanation for the injuries or any evidence showing that he could have sustained them elsewhere. 17. On 9 October 2012 the Orenburg Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.

5. The first applicant was born in 1983. She lives in Vilnius and has three children. The first time she gave birth was in 2009 in a public hospital in Vilnius. According to the applicant, the doctors therein were rude and rebuked her for her wish to give birth at home, and she felt humiliated and for a long time afterwards could not discuss her experience of giving birth at the hospital without tears coming to her eyes. For those reasons, in 2011 she gave birth to her second child at home, with the assistance of an unlicensed doula (pribuvėja), J.I.Š. That birth passed without complications and without the need for medical intervention. 6. After falling pregnant for a third time, and with no possibility of giving birth at home owing to the fact that criminal charges had been brought in respect of the above-mentioned doula, J.I.Š. (see paragraphs 31‑35 below), on 9 May 2012 the first applicant asked two public hospitals – one in Vilnius and one in Kaunas – to provide her with medical assistance during the home birth that she was planning. Both hospitals refused on the grounds that providing such assistance was prohibited under Lithuanian law – namely, under Medical Regulation MN 40:2006 (see paragraph 44 below). 7. On 13 June 2012 the first applicant asked the Ministry of Health to either guarantee the provision of such medical assistance during the birth of her third child or to amend the secondary legislation so that healthcare professionals could be allowed to provide such assistance. She considered that the participation of a healthcare professional in the birth was indispensable in order to guarantee the child’s and her safety. She indicated that she would give birth on 4-5 July 2012. 8. By a letter of 5 July 2012 the Ministry of Health replied that it had already received proposals from several non-governmental organisations that births outside hospitals be regulated. The Ministry then consulted numerous medical organisations – including the Lithuanian Midwives Association (Lietuvos akušerių sąjunga), the Lithuanian Fellowship of Midwives and Gynaecologists (Lietuvos akušerių ir ginekologų draugija), the Lithuanian Doctors Association (Lietuvos gydytojų sąjunga), the obstetrics and midwifery clinics of both Vilnius University and the Lithuanian University of Health Sciences – for their views on home birth. However, the specialists were unanimous in the conclusion that it was safest for a woman to give birth on a maternity ward, even when there was little risk of complications. It was impossible to foresee that any birth would pass without complications, and it was always possible that a woman giving birth or a newborn baby might need urgent medical assistance that could be provided only on a maternity ward. 9. The Ministry also pointed out that Lithuania had made great efforts to ensure that safe healthcare services were provided to women giving birth (gimdyvė), and that the conditions in maternity wards were designed to render them as close as possible to the home environment. For that purpose medical establishments were supplied with modern medical equipment; at the same time, a woman’s family members could be present during birth, and medical institutions were being encouraged to obtain the status of “newborn-friendly”. Over the previous twenty years Lithuania had achieved good results in significantly reducing the mortality rate of pregnant women, women giving birth and babies. To provide midwifery services at home, where there were not all the facilities necessary to be able to provide help to women giving birth and to the newborn, would constitute a step backwards. Similarly, to shift the legal and financial liability onto the healthcare specialist or healthcare institution in question would likewise not be acceptable. Moreover, the question of home birth concerned not only the woman’s, but also the State’s choice; at the same time, it was necessary to balance the interests of society and the rights of the individual. This view was supported by the Court’s judgment in Ternovszky v. Hungary, (no. 67545/09, § 24, 14 December 2010). Accordingly, the Ministry had no plans to initiate changes to secondary legislation that would regulate the provision of midwifery services at home. 10. The first applicant states in her application that on 11 July 2012 she “[gave] birth at home without qualified healthcare assistance and risked her and the baby’s life and health”. 11. The second applicant was born in 1979. She lives in Vilnius and has three children. She indicated in her application that she had given birth at home in 2006, 2008 and 2011, with the assistance of J.I.Š., the above‑mentioned doula. All three births had been “successful”. 12. The second applicant submitted that after she had fallen pregnant for a fourth time, and “not being able to safely give birth at home” owing to criminal charges having been brought in respect of the above-mentioned doula, J.I.Š. (see paragraph 6 above and paragraphs 31-35 below), she in April 2012 asked two public hospitals – one in Trakai and one in Vilnius – to provide her with medical assistance during the home birth that she was planning. Both hospitals refused, on the same grounds as those given in the first applicant’s case (see paragraph 6 above). Afterwards, the Ministry of Health also refused a request lodged by the second applicant for changes to be made to the relevant legislation, for reasons identical to those cited in respect of the first applicant’s case (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). 13. In her application to the Court of 19 October 2012 the second applicant noted that she was “firmly resolved (tvirtai nusiteikusi) to give birth at home, irrespective of whether she would receive qualified assistance during the birth”. Her due date was 17 November 2012. 14. The third applicant was born in 1982. She lives in Vilnius. She noted in her application that she had given birth at home in 2009 and 2010, with the assistance of the unlicensed doula, J.I.Š. Both births had been “without complications [and] successful, and the children [were] growing up and developing healthily”. 15. In her application of 19 October 2012, the third applicant stated that – wishing to have more children and expecting to become pregnant as soon as possible, but also having learned of the criminal charges brought against the doula J.I.Š. – in spring 2012 she became an active member of the movement known as “gimimas.lt” (see paragraphs 26 and 31-35 below). The applicant stated to the Court that during her third pregnancy, having had positive experiences during the first two home births, she could not imagine herself giving birth outside her home, since this seemed to her “the safest, most tranquil [environment] ... for the most intimate of occasions”. 16. In September 2012 she asked three public hospitals in Vilnius to provide her with medical assistance during her home birth. All the hospitals refused, on the grounds that in Lithuania there was no legal basis on which to provide medical assistance during a home birth. The head of the Maternity and Obstetrics Clinics at the Vilnius University Hospital (Vilniaus universiteto Akušerijos ir ginekologijos klinika) also indicated that she did not have the right to oblige medical personnel to provide medical services outside the hospital. Nevertheless, she invited the third applicant to visit the maternity ward of those clinics in order to “get acquainted with the environment, [which is] a cosy [one] for a woman giving birth”. 17. On 21 September 2012 the third applicant then asked the Ministry of Health to either guarantee medical assistance at her home during the birth of her third child or to amend the relevant secondary legislation so that the healthcare professionals were permitted to provide such assistance. She also argued that if the two relevant pieces of secondary legislation were annulled by the Minister of Health (see paragraphs 42 and 44 below), there would remain no obstacles to women receiving medical assistance during home births. 18. This request was refused by the Ministry on 16 October 2012 for the same reasons as those given to the first and second applicants (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). Given that in her request the third applicant insisted on relying on the Court’s judgment in Ternovszky (cited above), the Ministry of Health consulted the Ministry of Justice on the matter. The Ministry of Justice noted that the Court had found a violation in the above‑mentioned case because of its very particular and specific circumstances, which had led the Court to conclude that the situation in Hungary, in as much as it related to healthcare professionals providing assistance during home births, was surrounded by legal uncertainty that gave rise to arbitrariness. Nonetheless, the Court had acknowledged that, as concerned the provision of healthcare services, the States had a wide margin of appreciation, and regulation had to ensure a proper balance between societal interests and the right at stake. The Ministry of Justice pointed out that the Court’s judgment did not mean that a State was under a general obligation to establish a regulatory framework that would allow healthcare specialists to provide services to women giving birth at home. Taking into account the above, and given that Lithuanian law did not contain provisions regarding the provision of healthcare services to women giving birth at home, the Ministry concluded that a pregnant woman could not require that, upon her request, a healthcare institution or a healthcare specialist provide her with childbirth-related healthcare services outside a healthcare institution. Similarly, a healthcare institution or a specialist had no obligation to provide such services, even if a pregnant woman so wished. That being so, the Ministry also emphasised that the third applicant was welcome to visit the maternity wards in Lithuania and to choose the one which had the environment that most suited her. 19. In her application to the Court of 19 October 2012, the third applicant, like the second applicant, stated that she was “firmly resolved to give birth at home, irrespective of whether she would receive qualified assistance during the birth”. She was due to give birth in March 2013. 20. After having lodged the instant application with the Court, the third applicant also started administrative court proceedings in respect of the Ministry’s refusal to grant her request for the changes in secondary legislation (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above). 21. On 8 April 2013 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court rejected the third applicant’s complaint. The court noted that there were no legal instruments explicitly regulating home births in Lithuania. Therefore, the third applicant’s assertion that the two legal instruments adopted by the Minister of Health (see paragraphs 42 and 44 below) directly prohibited home birth was erroneous and unsubstantiated. Those legal instruments only regulated birth in hospitals, not home births. 22. On 22 January 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court’s decision. It rejected the third applicant’s argument that the absence of any legal regulation allowing the provision of healthcare services during home births constituted a breach of the right to respect for one’s private life. The court referred to Article 52 of the Law on the Healthcare System (see paragraph 39 below), which guaranteed a patient’s right to privacy. For the court, such legal regulation thus empowered the third applicant to give birth in a specialised medical institution of her choice, which was equipped in accordance with the requirements for such institutions, so that the health of the mother and the newborn would be protected and they could receive immediate high-quality and effective help, should any danger arise to their health or lives during childbirth. The Supreme Administrative Court held that such legal regulation maintained a balance between two constitutional values: privacy and the protection of health. 23. The Supreme Administrative Court also referred to the content of the Ministry of Health letter of 16 October 2012 (see paragraph 18 above), wherein that institution had reminded the third applicant that her family members could be present during the birth of her child and had offered her the opportunity to visit hospitals with maternity wards and to choose the most suitable one. Accordingly, the third applicant had the right and possibility, guaranteed by law, to choose the most suitable medical institution and to state her wishes regarding conditions of privacy and their scope (dėl privatumo sąlygų ir apimties). There was no information in the file to the effect that the third applicant had ever approached any of the maternity wards or that she had faced obstacles in choosing how to make use of that right to privacy (for example, by requesting certain services, such as a private room) and then instituted court proceedings. One also had to bear in mind the fact that privacy in respect of the third applicant’s personal life (which she had sought by demanding to be provided with medical assistance during her home birth) could not be seen as having a greater value than the health of her and the newborn child, for the purpose of which the State had established a system of personal healthcare and qualified medical assistance. 24. The fourth applicant was born in 1975. She lives in Vilnius. The fourth applicant stated that she had given birth at home in 2001, 2003 and 2011, with the assistance of doula J.I.Š. 25. In her application to the Court the fourth applicant also stated that even though she was of “reproductive age”, she did not dare to become pregnant for the fourth time, owing to the charges pending in respect of J.I.Š., “while the issue of giving birth at home remained legally unregulated in Lithuania” (kol Lietuvoje nėra teisiškai sureguliuotas gimdymo namuose klausimas). 26. In 2012 a non-governmental organisation for promoting childbirth at home, “gimimas.lt”, was established. In April 2012 it published an Internet press release calling on society and the State authorities, including the Ministry of Health, to discuss the question of home birth. The third and fourth applicants were among those who initiated that NGO and were its active participants. 27. In April 2012 the Association of Lithuanian Psychologists (Lietuvos psichologų sąjunga) asked the Ministry of Health to initiate changes in legislation to permit midwives and obstetrician-gynaecologists to provide medical assistance to women choosing to give birth outside hospital. 28. On 26 April 2012, at the Seimas, the Minister of Health was asked to comment about the possibility of providing medical assistance during home births. He replied that his opinion was categorical and negative; he also asked the non-governmental organisations that promoted that issue to be cautious and responsible. The Minister noted that at that time there were criminal investigations pending concerning “impostors” (apsišaukėliai) who had assisted with home births at which babies had died and mothers had suffered serious injuries. He pointed out that it was precisely owing to those criminal investigations that various requests concerning assistance for home births had started reaching the Ministry. 29. In April and May 2012 a group of non-governmental organisations asked the Lithuanian Midwives Association and the Lithuanian Fellowship of Midwives and Gynaecologists for their views on home birth. In its written reply of 17 May 2012, the Lithuanian Midwives Association stated its disapproval of the prospect of midwives assisting with home births. On 19 June 2012 the Lithuanian Fellowship of Midwives and Gynaecologists replied that despite significant worldwide changes in the sphere of maternity care, the question of planned home births remained sensitive and controversial. 30. According to publicly available information, after the death of a baby born at home in June 2011, the police started a criminal investigation. Eventually, the authorities started examining the legality of the actions of a number of persons assisting with home births. The Government were informed by the police that in respect of those criminal proceedings the applicants only had the status of witnesses. 31. On an unspecified date the prosecutors started criminal proceedings under Article 202 of the Criminal Code (Unauthorised Engagement in an Economic Activity, see paragraph 48 below) in respect of doula J.I.Š., who, despite having no medical training whatsoever, between 1999 and 2011 on thirty-six occasions had assisted at home births. The scope of her actions at those home births had varied between merely examining newborn babies to performing certain childbirth-related actions. 32. By a judgment of 23 December 2016, the Vilnius City District Court acquitted J.I.Š., holding that she had revived the old profession of doula, which although not regulated in Lithuania, was also not forbidden by law. The court considered that since J.I.Š. had had no medical training and had not acted as an obstetrician-gynaecologist or as a midwife, or as a medical professional in general, she could not be liable under Article 202 § 2 of the Criminal Code. 33. On 19 July 2017 the Vilnius Regional Court overturned the lower court’s judgment and convicted J.I.Š. under Article 202 § 2 of the Criminal Code. The appellate court held that while taking part in home births J.I.Š. had been providing healthcare services that fell within the competence of an obstetrician-gynaecologist or a midwife, whereas J.I.Š. had neither a medical education nor a licence to provide such services. By acting in such a manner J.I.Š. had acted in breach of the existing legal regulations, under which the only specialists who could assist with births were obstetrician‑gynaecologists and midwives and birth with such assistance could take place (gimdymai priimami) only in a maternity ward. It followed that J.I.Š. had been engaged in prohibited medical activities. She was sentenced to six months of deprivation of liberty, suspended for one year. 34. J.I.Š. lodged an appeal on points of law. 35. By a ruling of 12 June 2018, an enlarged chamber (seven judges) of the Supreme Court noted that activities relating to home births, as a phenomenon, had been neither criminalised nor forbidden by law in Lithuania. Accordingly, the appellate court had erred in holding that J.I.Š. had been engaged in unauthorised professional activity, as understood under Article 202 § 2 of the Criminal Code. That notwithstanding, J.I.Š.’s activity, although it had not been prohibited (jos vykdyta veikla nėra uždrausta), had been unlawful (neteisėta). However, the Supreme Court found that the bill of indictment had failed to establish the precise amount of income that J.I.Š. had received for her activities. It was therefore impossible to establish the element of entrepreneurship, which was necessary in order to hold a person criminally liable under Article 202 § 1 of the Criminal Code. She therefore had to be acquitted.

5. The applicant was born in 1982 and is currently serving a prison sentence. 6. The applicant was a journalist and an active member of the Popular Front Party, which is one of the opposition parties. At the time of the events he wrote for the newspaper Azadliq and participated in various media projects. In particular, he was the presenter of a satellite TV show “Azerbaijani Hour” which was critical of the government. In 2016 the applicant was awarded that year’s “Free Media Awards” by the Fritt Ord Foundation and ZEIT-Stiftung for independent journalism in Eastern Europe. 7. At around noon on 29 August 2014, when the applicant was on his way to work, a certain M.H. approached him near a bus stop, asking him why he had not replied to his messages sent via Facebook. The applicant, who did not know M.H., answered that he had not replied to him because he had probably not seen his messages. According to the applicant, immediately after that answer, M.H. physically assaulted him by punching him in the face. At that moment the applicant began defending himself and hit M.H. with a glass water bottle that he had just bought from the market. The applicant then left the scene of the incident and asked for help. At that moment he saw a police car and immediately asked the police officers for help. 8. At around 12.30 p.m. on the same day the applicant and M.H. were taken to the Absheron District Police Office. 9. At 2.40 p.m. on the same day an investigator issued a record of the applicant’s detention as a suspect. The applicant was suspected of having committed the criminal offence of hooliganism under Article 221.3 of the Criminal Code. 10. On 30 August 2014 the applicant was charged under Article 221.3 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code. In particular, he was accused of having caused minor bodily harm to M.H. by hitting the latter on the head with a glass water bottle and also punching and kicking him in the face. 11. On the same day the Absheron District Court, relying on the official charge brought against the applicant and a request by the prosecutor to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody, ordered the applicant’s detention pending trial for a period of two months, calculating the period of detention from 29 August 2014. The court justified the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody by referring to the risk of the applicant reoffending and obstructing the investigation’s functioning by influencing other participants in the criminal proceedings. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows: “... having examined the preliminary material of the case file (witness statements and forensic expert reports), the court considers that there are sufficient grounds to believe that there is a likelihood that the accused Haziyev Seymur Mashgul oglu will obstruct the investigation’s functioning by influencing other participants in the criminal proceedings and reoffend.” 12. On 1 September 2014 the applicant appealed against that decision, claiming that there had been no justification for the application of the preventive measure of detention pending trial, and that his pre-trial detention amounted to a violation of Article 5 of the Convention. In this respect, he submitted that there was no evidence in the case file proving the existence of any risk of his reoffending or obstructing the investigation’s functioning. He also argued that he could not in any way obstruct the investigation’s functioning, as all the protagonists involved in the incident had already been identified and examined by the forensic expert. He further pointed out that he was a journalist and had always collaborated with the law-enforcement authorities. The applicant also challenged the charge against him, claiming that he had only defended himself against the physical assault by M.H., whom he had not known before the incident. 13. On 12 September 2014 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the first-instance court’s decision was justified. In particular, the appellate court dismissed the applicant’s complaint relating to the legal classification of his action as hooliganism, but remained silent as to his above-mentioned specific complaints concerning the lack of justification for his pre-trial detention. 14. On 30 September 2014 the applicant lodged an application with the Absheron District Court, asking to be released on bail or put under house arrest rather than being held in pre-trial detention. He claimed, in particular, that his pre-trial detention was not justified and that there was no reason for it to continue. In support of his application, he pointed out that he had a permanent place of residence, that he had no criminal record, and that there was no proof that he could obstruct the investigation and reoffend. 15. On 2 October 2014 the Absheron District Court dismissed the application, finding it unfounded. 16. On 13 October 2014 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s decision. 17. On 27 October 2014 the prosecutor in charge of the case filed the bill of indictment with the Absheron District Court for trial. 18. On 11 November 2014 the applicant lodged an application with the Absheron District Court, asking to be placed under house arrest instead of in pre-trial detention. He also complained that despite the fact that his pre-trial detention period had expired on 29 October 2014, he had not been released from detention. 19. On 11 November 2014 the Absheron District Court dismissed the applicant’s application, finding that his detention was lawful. The first-instance court’s decision was not amenable to appeal. 20. On 20 November 2014 the Absheron District Court held a preliminary hearing in which it decided, inter alia, that the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of the applicant should remain unchanged, without citing any grounds. The first-instance court’s decision was not amenable to appeal. 21. On 29 January 2015 the Absheron District Court found the applicant guilty under Article 221.3 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. 22. On 29 September 2015 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. It was further upheld on 15 April 2016 by the Supreme Court.

4. The applicant was born in 1971 and serves his life sentence in a correctional colony in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region of Russia. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 27 March 2003 the applicant was arrested on charges of illegal possession of firearms, two armed robberies of local post offices, murder of three Russian Post Service cash messengers and attempted murder of the fourth one. On 14 October 2003 the case was sent to the Supreme Court of the Buryatia Republic (“the Regional Court”) for trial. 7. Twice, on 20 April 2004 and 22 May 2007, the applicant was convicted as charged. Both convictions were set aside by the Supreme Court of Russia. On 12 September 2008, in the course of the third round of jury trial, the Regional Court decided, upon a request by a representative of the Russian Post, to close proceedings to the public. It dismissed the applicant’s objections made with reference to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In doing so the Presiding judge referred to the case-file documents containing information about security measures and equipment in post offices, weaponry, schedules and routes of cash messengers, etc. Under the relevant Russian Post regulations that information was classified as “for internal use only”. The Regional Court found that that information was a trade secret protected by the Commercial Secrets Act (Federal Law no. 98-FZ of 29 July 2004) and that its disclosure could have harmed public interests. Every hearing after 12 September 2008 was held in camera. 8. On 14 December 2008 the jury convicted the applicant as charged. In the last days of December the trial judge sentenced him to life imprisonment. On 4 June 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the conviction on one count and upheld the remainder of the verdict and sentence. The hearing was public. The court of appeal held, in particular, that the decision to dispense with a public hearing had been lawful and rejected, in a summary fashion, the relevant arguments by the applicant.

5. The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Voluntari. 6. In 2002 he was the legal secretary of Voluntari City Hall in charge of registering applications for restitution of land based on Law no. 18/1991. On an unspecified date in 2003 the prosecutor attached to the Buftea District Court initiated a criminal investigation in respect of the applicant and two other individuals, M.C.I. and N.G. 7. The injured party, M.M. ‒ who filed the criminal complaint ‒maintained that in December 2002, N.G. – who was employed at Voluntari City Hall – had, at the request of the applicant, antedated the registration of six applications for title submitted by M.C.I. 8. On 19 February and 23 July 2004 respectively the prosecutor questioned N.G. On both occasions she stated that she had antedated the registration of the applications submitted by M.C.I. at the applicant’s express request. 9. The applicant gave statements on 27 February and 11 August 2004. He admitted that he knew M.C.I. (“as an acquaintance but not as a friend”) but denied that he had asked N.G. to falsify the date of registration of the applications. 10. An expert report ordered by the prosecutor confirmed the fact that N.G. had antedated the registration of the six applications. 11. The prosecutor charged N.G. with committing intellectual forgery and charged the applicant with acting as N.G.’s accomplice. He decided not to institute a criminal investigation against M.C.I. 12. The injured party stated before the first-instance court that the only fact that she knew was that M.C.I. had asked some civil servants at Voluntari City Hall to antedate the registration of the applications. 13. At a hearing on 11 March 2005 the Buftea District Court questioned the applicant and N.G. in respect of the charges brought against them. N.G. changed the statements she had made initially before the prosecutor and stated that the applicant had only called her and asked her to help M.C.I. to register the applications for title. She also stated that she had antedated the registration at M.C.I.’s request. The applicant did not change his statements and continued to deny any involvement in committing the intellectual forgery. He stated that he had only called N.G. and asked her to help M.C.I. with the registration of the applications as the latter had arrived after closing time. Two other witnesses made statements at the same hearing. However, their statements did not provide any further clarification concerning the applicant’s role in committing any offence. 14. The district court changed the legal classification of the offence with which the applicant had been charged to inciting intellectual forgery. 15. By a judgment of 9 May 2005 the Buftea District Court convicted N.G. of intellectual forgery, imposed a suspended sentence of six months’ imprisonment and placed her on probation. The court noted that N.G. had given contradictory statements to the prosecutor and to the court with respect to the applicant’s role in the commission of the offence. It held that the statement given to the prosecutor, but not maintained before the court – according to which the applicant had asked her to antedate the registration of the applications – was not corroborated by the other pieces of evidence adduced before it. The applicant was therefore acquitted on the grounds of not having committed the offence with which he had been charged. 16. An appeal against this decision was lodged by the prosecutor’s office but was dismissed as unfounded by the Bucharest County Court on 16 December 2005. The applicant, co-defendant N.G. and the witnesses were not heard directly by the County Court. It upheld the decision of the first­instance court, emphasising that there was no evidence that the applicant had asked N.G. to antedate the registration of the applications. 17. The prosecutor lodged an appeal on points of law, pointing to fundamental factual errors in the decisions of the two lower courts regarding the applicant’s acquittal and claiming that the court had made a superficial assessment of the evidence in the file. 18. No new pieces of evidence were adduced before the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 19. On 24 February 2006 the Bucharest Court of Appeal heard submissions from the prosecutor and counsel for the defence and allowed the applicant to address it at the end of the hearing (ultimul cuvânt al inculpatului). 20. By a final decision of 3 March 2006, the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on points of law lodged by the prosecutor’s office, quashing the two previous decisions. It convicted the applicant of inciting intellectual forgery and imposed a suspended sentence of six months’ imprisonment, placing him on probation. 21. The appellate court based its reasoning on the evidence existent in the file. It held that both the lower courts had made a wrong assessment of evidence. However, it did not question the applicant, the co-defendant N.G., or the witnesses, instead merely citing some of the statements they had made before the prosecutor and the first-instance court. It referred in particular to the statements submitted by N.G. to the prosecutor on 19 February and 23 July 2004 and before the district court on 11 March 2005, and to the statements given by the applicant on 27 February and 11 August 2004. Having reassessed the facts without rehearing any evidence, it arrived at the conclusion that the applicant had incited N.G. to commit intellectual forgery. 22. The final written decision containing the court’s reasoning became available on 20 March 2006. The applicant alleged that he had been served with a copy of the decision later but he was not able to state any date.

4. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Grozny, Chechen Republic. 5. According to the applicant, on 7 February 1999 the administrative authorities of the Leninskiy District of Grozny provided her with a housing allocation order no. 842 entitling her to occupy a one‑room municipal flat in Grozny. 6. In 2005 the applicant was registered as living in that flat. 7. In 2007 the authorities decided to conduct an examination of all allocation orders granting occupation of municipal accommodation. The applicant’s housing allocation order dated 7 February 1999 appeared suspicious to the authorities and they commissioned an expert to verify its authenticity. The expert concluded that the allocation order was a forged document. In particular, the order did not correspond to the date on which it had been issued and the impress of a seal on the order had been made with the help of an improvised cliché which in its turn had been made with a help of a computer on the basis of an impress of the authentic seal. 8. Upon receipt of this information the administration of Grozny brought court proceedings against the applicant seeking to declare the allocation order of 7 February 1999 null and void and to evict her from the flat in question. 9. The applicant contested those claims. She submitted that the administration had issued her with the housing allocation order because she had been on the housing list and she was subsequently registered as living in that flat. She had not been aware of the fact that the order had not been printed in the printing office. She also asked to dismiss the claims as time‑barred because according to domestic law the housing allocation order could be declared null and void within three years after its delivery. 10. The administration of the Leninskiy District of Grozny asked to grant the claims submitted by the administration of Grozny. The administration could not say whether the order had been in fact delivered to the applicant, since the archives had not been preserved. However, according to the civil servants of the administration, commissions on allocation of housing had been meeting once a month. The order no. 842 was issued on 7 February 1999. That would mean that 842 orders were issued from the beginning of 1999 until 7 February 1999. However, the administration of the Leninskiy District could not deliver such a number of housing allocation orders during one month. 11. On 24 February 2009 the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny (“the District Court”) declared the housing allocation order of 7 February 1999 null and void and issued an order to evict the applicant. In particular, the District Court held as follows: “...It follows from the materials of the case that the housing allocation order No. 842 of 7 February 1999 in respect of accommodation situated in Grozny...in the name of Darsigova Ruket Magomedovna has been issued as an assignment of housing. It follows from the expert certificate No. 11 of 11 April 2008 that the above order was sent for an expert examination and the experts concluded that the order no. 842 of 7 February 1999 ... did not correspond to the date on which it had been issued. The impress of a seal of the Leninskiy District of Grozny [on the order] had been made with the help of an improvised cliché which in its turn had been made with a help of a computer on the basis of an impress of the authentic seal. It follows from the expert report of 24 October 2008 no. 1397, 1398/1-2 that the formsheet of order No. 842 of 7 February 1999 had been made with the help of electrophotographic imaging on the copy machine. The colour used - dry toner. Therefore, the court has established that the title document order no. 842 of 7 February 1999 ...had not been made typographically. Those circumstances follow from the content of the statement of claim, parties’ submissions in the court, they have not been contested by the parties and are confirmed by evidence submitted [to the court]. The request by the Administration of Grozny for restauration of the three-year time-limit for lodging of their claim for declaring the order null should be granted. The court has assessed the whole of evidence submitted by the parties and finds that it is possible to grant the claimant’s claim...” 12. In her appeal against the judgment of 24 February 2009 the applicant submitted that in taking the decision to evict her the District Court had not examined whether she had been in need of housing or not. In particular, the District Court had not taken into account that she had been provided with a one-room flat on the grounds that she had cumulated a very long term of service and had no other housing. 13. On 9 June 2009 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chechnya (“the Supreme Court”) upheld that judgment. In particular, the Supreme Court held as follows: “... It has been established in the court hearing that order No. 842 of 7 February 1999 issued by the administration of the Leninskiy District of Grozny to R.M. Darsigova and giving her the right to move in flat no. 40 at 42, Kadyrov street in Grozny was sent for an expert examination...The expert examination established that the order did not correspond to the date on which it had been issued. The impress of a seal of the Leninskiy District of Grozny [on the order] had been made with the help of an improvised cliché which in its turn had been made with a help of a computer on the basis of an impress of the authentic seal... ... Having regards to the above, the court of first instance had concluded that the claims submitted by the administration of Grozny had to be granted. In such circumstances, the civil chamber does not find any grounds for quashing the court decision ...” 14. After her eviction the applicant returned living to her mother’s flat and on 26 July 2011 she was registered as living in that flat.

5. The first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants are siblings who were born in 1949, 1944, 1947, 1952, 1955 and 1954 respectively and live in Vilnius. The seventh applicant is the first applicant’s daughter; she was born in 1968 and also lives in Vilnius. 6. In 1991 the fifth applicant applied for restoration of his property rights to his late father’s land, which had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. In that application he indicated that the first, second, third, fourth and sixth applicants, as well as their mother, P.M., and brother, N.M., were also possible candidates to have their property rights to that land restored. 7. On 8 March 2004 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter “the VCA”) restored the property rights of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants, as well as P.M. and N.M., by giving them all joint ownership of 5.80 hectares of agricultural land and 3.20 hectares of forest in Naujakiemis, an area in the Vilnius city municipality. As P.M. and N.M. had died by then, the applicants inherited their share of the land. 8. On 31 March 2006 the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants signed two preliminary agreements (preliminariosios sutartys) with the seventh applicant by which they undertook to sell her the two plots and the seventh applicant paid them 1,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 290 euros (EUR)). However, final sale agreements were not concluded and the seventh applicant did not become the owner of the plots. 9. On 29 August 2008 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter “the prosecutor”) lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants’ property rights to the nine hectares given to them annulled. The prosecutor submitted that the two plots given to the applicants were covered by forest which, being situated within a city, was considered a forest of national importance and could therefore only be owned by the State (see the relevant domestic law cited in Beinarovič and Others v. Lithuania, nos. 70520/10 and 2 others, §§ 86-89, 12 June 2018). According to the information provided by the prosecutor, forests of national importance covered the entire plot of 3.20 hectares, as well as 1.37 hectares of the other plot (see paragraph 7 above). In view of the circumstances, the VCA’s decision had to be declared unlawful and its effects annulled. The prosecutor asked that after annulling the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants’ property rights to the two plots, their preliminary agreements with the seventh applicant (see paragraph 8 above) also be annulled. 10. The applicants and the VCA disputed the prosecutor’s claim. However, on 1 September 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed the claim. It underlined that transferring forests of national importance to private ownership was contrary to the law (ibid., §§ 89-91) and therefore the VCA’s decision had to be annulled. The court held that the applicants could not be considered as having acquired their property rights in good faith (sąžiningi įgijėjai) because the information about the presence of forests on their land had been available in a public register and any diligent person should have known that, under the Constitution, forests of national importance could only be owned by the State. 11. The court annulled the restoration of the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants’ property rights and ordered them to return the two plots to the State. It also annulled the preliminary agreements between them and the seventh applicant and ordered them to return to the seventh applicant the LTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 290) which she had paid them pursuant to those agreements (see paragraph 8 above). 12. The applicants and the VCA lodged appeals against that decision. However, on 22 April 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and upheld the lower court’s decision in its entirety. The applicants then lodged an appeal on points of law, but on 23 July 2010 the Supreme Court refused to accept it for examination, holding that it raised no important legal issues. 13. On 23 February 2012 the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants received a letter from the National Land Service (the institution which took over the relevant functions of the VCA after an administrative reform – hereinafter “the NLS”) confirming that, after the courts had annulled their property rights to nine hectares of land, they had retained the right to have those property rights restored. The applicants were informed of the forms of restitution provided for by the domestic law (ibid., § 92) and asked to inform the authorities of their preferred form of restitution. 14. On 8 and 30 May 2012 the first applicant sent letters to the NLS on behalf of all the aforementioned applicants, asking that land in the original location which was not covered by forest be returned to them. 15. On 26 July 2012 the NLS sent a letter to the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants which stated that it might be possible to give them two plots in Naujakiemis, measuring 4.44 and 0.07 hectares, so if they wished to receive those plots, their requests would be considered when the land plan was being prepared. As for the restoration of property rights to the remaining land, the applicants were asked to consider alternative forms of restitution (ibid., § 92) and to inform the authorities of their choice. It is unclear whether the applicants replied to that letter. 16. On 19 August 2012 the second applicant died (see paragraph 4 above). The third applicant was issued with a certificate of inheritance with respect to the second applicant’s estate on 12 December 2012. 17. On 19 February 2015 the NLS approved a list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius, including Naujakiemis. The first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants were included in that list as candidates to receive two plots measuring a total of 4.4115 hectares. 18. On 6 May 2015 the NLS adopted decisions to restore the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants’ property rights by giving them two plots of agricultural land, measuring a total of 4.4115 hectares. The decisions stated that the rights to the remaining 4.5885 hectares would be restored at a later date. 19. On 28 August 2017 the NLS adopted decisions to restore the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants’ property rights to the remaining 4.5885 hectares by means of monetary compensation of EUR 5,307, corresponding to the indexed value of the land (that is to say, the value established by relevant public authorities).

5. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Limay. 6. On 24 September 2008 the Société Générale bank lodged a criminal complaint against a person or persons unknown for forgery, uttering forged documents, and fraud, following complaints by Mr Nicolas Sarkozy, the then President of France, about four fraudulent payments to mobile telephone companies from his bank account for a total amount of 176 euros (EUR). 7. On 25 September 2008 the preliminary investigation was entrusted jointly to the fraud squad and the serious crime squad. On the same day Mr Sarkozy himself filed a criminal complaint, which was joined to the investigation. On 23 October 2008 the public prosecutor of Nanterre opened a judicial investigation in respect of fraud committed as a premeditated joint enterprise, to the detriment of the companies concerned, Mr Sarkozy and eight other individuals including relatives of his. During the judicial investigation Mr Sarkozy applied to join the proceedings as a civil party. 8. On 11 June 2009 the investigating judge committed the applicant and six other individuals to stand trial before the Nanterre Criminal Court on a charge of fraud committed as a premeditated joint enterprise. They were accused of having obtained 148 telephone lines, mobile telephones and the payment of subscriptions using the references of payment cards and bank accounts belonging to a third party. 9. Before the trial court, the applicant claimed that Mr Sarkozy’s application to join the proceedings as a civil party was inadmissible. He argued, first, that the possibility for the serving President to intervene as a civil party, when it was impossible to bring proceedings against him or to have him summoned as a witness during his term of office (see Article 67 of the Constitution, paragraph 17 below), would create an imbalance in the proceedings. Secondly, he contended that the President’s power to appoint judges and prosecutors under Articles 64 and 65 of the Constitution (see paragraphs 17, 22 and 25 below) cast doubt on the impartiality of the judicial proceedings to which he was a party. 10. In a judgment of 7 July 2009 the court found the applicant guilty of the charges against him and sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment, after establishing his participation in the preparatory acts and his role in the organisation of the fraud. It held that Mr Sarkozy’s application to join the proceedings as a civil party was admissible on the basis of his right of access to a court, but deferred its decision on his claim for damages until the expiry of a one-month period after the end of his term as President (see Article 67 of the Constitution, paragraph 17 below). The court took the view, with reference to Article 6 of the Convention, that the President’s status before the court would entail a breach of the equality of arms principle because, as a civil party, he could not, for the duration of his term of office, be the subject of any sanction for bringing unjustified proceedings or be prosecuted for malicious or rash accusations, or be questioned or confronted with the defendant (ibid., see also, paragraph 31 below). It further emphasised that the President’s power to appoint judges and prosecutors was capable of creating the appearance, for the defendant, that he was not being tried by an independent and impartial tribunal. 11. In a judgment of 8 January 2010 the Versailles Court of Appeal varied the judgment and sentenced the applicant to eight months’ imprisonment. It found the applicant guilty, based on his own confessions and the statements of other defendants, together with the material discovered during searches. In respect of the civil claim, it ordered the applicant to pay EUR 1 to Mr Sarkozy in respect of non-pecuniary damage and, jointly with the other defendants, EUR 2,500 for costs at first instance and on appeal: “... L.S., [the applicant] and F.T. contend that the special status of the Head of State rules out, in the present proceedings, any summons, interview, confrontation, investigative act or adversarial debate concerning Mr Sarkozy. It is not so much the securing of equality in the factual or legal arguments which matters, but the equal opportunity, for each of the parties, to submit its own ‘arms’ and to discuss those of the other party. In the present case, it is clear that this submission and discussion were effective throughout the proceedings, both during the judicial investigation and first-instance proceedings and before this court. A fair hearing has thus been guaranteed, not only in the balance between the parties but also through the effectiveness of the adversarial debate. As regards the second aspect, concerning the impartiality of the tribunal which has allegedly been undermined by the supposed partiality of the public prosecutor and the President’s intervention in the proceedings when he is the guarantor of judicial independence and authority, a distinction must be made. On that first point, the submissions by the public prosecutor of Nanterre rightly observe that the criminal proceedings were brought by the public prosecutor’s office, which is not subject to any application for withdrawal, and the proceedings did not therefore depend on a civil-party intervention. On the second point, many civil or criminal courts, in particular in press-related matters, have, on many occasions, admitted proceedings brought by the serving President of the Republic, who in that capacity is also chair of the National Legal Service Commission, without at any time considering that he was in any way contravening his constitutional duties.” The Court of Appeal further sought to ascertain whether the impartiality of the tribunal could also be called into question in the light of the theory of appearances. It pointed out the ambiguity of the Head of State’s status, which “[came] from the fact that it [was] wholly intended to protect him from attacks before the courts, but [did] not prevent him from acting as an ordinary litigant when he decide[d] to have recourse to judicial proceedings”. It emphasised, however, that the public prosecutor’s office was not affected by the guarantee of the right to an impartial tribunal and that the President’s powers of appointment had not infringed the right to a fair trial: “... the fact that, in the present case, the public prosecutor’s offices both of Nanterre and of Versailles had endeavoured to ensure that the case was examined as quickly as possible, and exceptional means of investigation were deployed (serious crime squad and fraud squad), could no doubt be attributed to the identity of the victim, but also to the fact that members of his family were affected by the same offences, those factors suggesting that a large-scale action targeting the Head of State and his family was likely to have been organised on account of their identity. Thus, without there being any evidence that the President intervened directly in the proceedings, it is certain that the local public prosecutor’s office, of its own initiative, showed a manifest zeal, which could not, however, have undermined the legitimate interests and fundamental rights of those concerned. The defendants have not demonstrated that they have suffered as a result of any breach by the French institutions of the principles which must govern a fair trial. Moreover, ... Article 64 of the Constitution states ... that the President is the guarantor of the judicial authority, and this provision legitimises, at the highest level of the hierarchy of legal norms – and even when the President of the Republic is a party to the proceedings – his powers over the public prosecutor’s office, while also ruling out any doubt as to the independence of the judiciary ... [The applicant] cannot dispute the President’s capacity to act as an ordinary citizen. In addition, even supposing that French judicial organisation and the Convention are incompatible, only a reform of the Constitution would be capable of resolving that contradiction. In those conditions, as there is nothing to show that the public prosecutor’s office or the power to appoint judges and prosecutors caused any concrete impairment of the independence or impartiality of the judges, the objection is unfounded.” 12. The applicant appealed on points of law and, in addition to complaining of a breach of his right to a fair trial, argued that Article 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 31 below) was unconstitutional as it did not preclude the President of the Republic from joining criminal proceedings as a civil party. In the meantime, in pleadings of 16 August 2010, the applicant asked the Court of Cassation to refer a question to the Constitutional Council for a preliminary ruling on constitutionality (question prioritaire de constitutionnalité – “QPC”) relating to the compatibility of the above-mentioned Article 2 with the principle of the separation of powers and the rights of the defence, and with the right to a fair trial. 13. In a judgment of 10 November 2010 (Bull crim., no. 180) the Court of Cassation decided not to seek a preliminary ruling on constitutionality on the following grounds: “The question, which does not pertain to the interpretation of a constitutional provision that the Constitutional Court has not yet had occasion to apply, is not a new one. The question raised does not have any serious merit in so far as it seeks, in reality, to clarify the scope of Article 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the light of Article 67 of the Constitution, and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.” 14. In his opinion before the Court of Cassation, the Advocate-General called for the partial quashing of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in so far as it had not stayed its ruling on Mr Sarkozy’s civil action until the end of his term of office. The Advocate-General took the view that the fact that no proceedings could be brought against the President (for malicious, improper or de facto fanciful accusation), or that he could not be summoned to testify, had not created, in the circumstances of the case, any inequality between the parties, while acknowledging that this inability could cause serious difficulties in other proceedings if mainly based on accusations or evidence emanating from the President. However, in the Advocate-General’s view, the President’s power to appoint judges and prosecutors was such as to cast doubt on the objective impartiality of any private disputes to which the President might be a party during his term of office. He nevertheless indicated that the fact of declaring inadmissible the President’s application to join the proceedings as a civil party would have the effect of depriving him of his right of access to a court and concluded that it was necessary to opt for a compromise solution in the form of suspending any civil action brought by the President for the defence of his personal interests until the end of his term of office. 15. In a judgment of 15 June 2012 the Plenary Court of Cassation quashed the Court of Appeal’s judgment in so far as it had not given sufficient reasons for the prison sentence handed down against the applicant. For the remainder, it found as follows: “First, the President of the Republic who, in his status as victim, is entitled, under Article 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to exercise his rights as a civil party during his term of office, joined proceedings that had already been initiated by the public prosecutor, and the appellant has not been granted a discontinuance or an acquittal. Secondly, the judgment observes that the appellant was found guilty on the basis of both his own confessions and the statements of other defendants, together with the evidence gathered during searches. Thirdly, the Court of Appeal, in assessing, without contradiction, the particulars of the case, found that the public prosecutor’s action had not breached either the legitimate interests or the fundamental rights of the accused persons. Fourthly, the judgment finds in precise terms that the guarantee of the right to an independent and impartial tribunal, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, applies only to judges and not to the prosecution. Lastly, the mere fact that judges are appointed by the President does not render them subordinate to him, since once they have been appointed, they enjoy tenure and are not subjected to any pressure or instructions in the exercise of their judicial duties. After finding that each party was able to present its arguments and discuss those of the opposite party throughout the judicial pre-trial investigation and the hearings both at first instance and before the Court of Appeal, the judgment indicates that the defendant had not demonstrated that he had sustained a breach of his right to a fair trial on the part of the French institutions. The Court of Appeal thus rightly concluded that the principle of the equality of arms had not been infringed. ...” 16. In a judgment of 24 January 2014 the Versailles Court of Appeal set aside the applicant’s sentence, replacing it with a suspended term of ten months’ imprisonment.

4. The applicant was born in 1987 and was detained in prison in Rustavi at the material time. 5. On 3 December 2007 a taxi driver reported to the police that he had been robbed of a mobile phone and twenty-six Georgian laris by two young men at knife-point. He claimed that he could identify both of them. On the next day, the applicant was arrested on suspicion of the armed robbery of the taxi driver. Neither a body search of the applicant nor a search of his apartment revealed any unlawful items. On the same date an identity parade was held, during which the taxi driver identified the applicant as one of his assailants. 6. During his initial questioning as an accused, the applicant gave a detailed statement providing an alibi and naming all the people with whom he had spent the evening of the crime, or who had seen him on that evening. In particular, he claimed that he had spent that evening with his girlfriend and her friend out walking the streets and that he had been seen by several people in the area. 7. On 7 December 2007 the applicant’s lawyer wrote to the investigator in charge of the case requesting that he question twelve persons who could confirm the applicant’s alibi. By a decision of 9 December 2007 the investigator rejected the request as unsubstantiated. In his reasoning he noted that the applicant’s girlfriend and her friend had an interest in the outcome of the case. As for the remaining potential witnesses, according to the investigator, they had not been with the applicant at the time of commission of the offence in question. The rejection of the applicant’s request was confirmed on appeal by a supervising prosecutor. 8. The trial opened on 22 April 2008. In the absence of the applicant’s lawyer, who had failed to appear for the hearing, the trial judge decided to adjourn it. The trial resumed on 30 April 2008, when the applicant was represented by a new lawyer. The latter requested an adjournment of the hearing, claiming that she had not had sufficient time to prepare the defence. Her request was granted and the hearing was re-scheduled for 6 May 2008. 9. On 5 May 2008 the applicant’s lawyer filed a written request with the trial judge complaining that the pre-trial investigation into the circumstances of the armed robbery of the taxi driver had been incomplete and one-sided. She noted that the applicant’s alibi should have been verified and she requested, in that connection, on the basis of Article 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”), that seven witnesses be questioned. In support of her request she submitted written statements for those witnesses. 10. The next day, at the hearing of 6 May 2008, the prosecutor asked the trial judge to dismiss the defence’s application as out of time. He claimed that the request for the examination of defence witnesses should have been submitted five days before the opening of the trial. In reply, the lawyer noted that she had only been instructed in the case on 29 April 2008 and accordingly could not have filed any requests beforehand. Having heard the parties, the trial judge rejected the request of the defence on the basis that it did not comply with Article 475 of the CCP. He accepted the prosecutor’s argument that any such request should have been lodged five days before the opening of the trial. 11. On 22 May 2008 the Tbilisi City Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to seven years and six months’ imprisonment. The applicant’s conviction was based on the evidence given in court by the taxi driver, the investigator in charge of the case, the results of the identity parade and the results of two forensic examinations. The first forensic examination established a similarity in fibres of black cotton removed from the front and back seats of the taxi and micro-particles removed from the applicant’s coat. The report stated that both fibres had a similar nature, colour, colour tonality, fibre structure and type of dye. The second expert examination was an odour recognition examination which established that the samples of the odour trace taken from the taxi corresponded with the odour sample taken from the applicant. The court also relied on the report on the examination of the crime scene, and the reports on the arrest and the searches of the applicant’s person and his apartment. 12. The applicant appealed against his conviction. He alleged that the pre-trial investigation and the first-instance court proceedings had been unfair, in violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention; and specifically that his defence rights had been violated as he had been prevented from showing his innocence by proving his alibi before the court, and in that connection had not been allowed to examine witnesses on his behalf. He reiterated his request for the examination of the witnesses. 13. On 15 July 2008 the appeal proceedings started. The appeal court rejected the applicant’s request for the examination of defence witnesses, concluding that it had not been submitted as required by Articles 231 and 475 § 4 of the CCP (as cited in paragraph 17 below). 14. On 18 July 2008 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction. The court concluded that the applicant’s guilt had been proven on the grounds of the statement of the taxi driver, the statement of the investigator, the report on the identification parade, the report on the applicant’s arrest and the search of his person, the report on the search of the applicant’s apartment, and the forensic conclusions, among other grounds. None of the defence witnesses was questioned during the appeal proceedings. As for the applicant’s version of the events, the court concluded that it had been fabricated with the sole purpose of evading criminal liability. 15. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He maintained that his defence rights as envisaged in Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention had been violated on account of the lower courts’ refusal to hear the defence witnesses. He claimed in that connection that he had been put in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the prosecution and had been prevented from proving his innocence. 16. By a decision of 13 February 2009 the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as inadmissible.

8. The applicant, who belongs to the German-speaking minority in Belgium, was born in 1957. He is detained in the Paifve social-protection facility (établissement de défense sociale, or “EDS”). 9. In 1997 the applicant was convicted of indecent assault of a minor aged under 16, rape of a minor aged under ten, theft, destruction and damage, and possession of prohibited firearms by the Liège Court of Appeal and the Eupen Criminal Court. The prison terms were due to expire on 20 February 2004. 10. While in prison the applicant committed other offences, in respect of which fresh proceedings were brought, in particular for threats, harassment and making false accusations against members of the judiciary. In consequence, on 16 June 2003 the Committals Division (chambre du conseil) of the Liège Court of First Instance ordered that he be placed in a psychiatric institution, pursuant to section 7 of the Law of 9 April 1930 on Social Protection in respect of Mental Defectives, Habitual Offenders and Perpetrators of certain Sexual Offences (the “Social Protection Act”), applicable at the material time, and on the basis, inter alia, of a neuropsychiatric report by Dr L., dated 15 December 2001, and a report by psychologist H., dated 20 August 2002. 11. On 1 August 2003 the Indictment Division of the Liège Court of Appeal upheld that decision. The applicant did not appeal on points of law. 12. On 15 January 2004, based on, among other information, a psychiatric report by Dr V. dated 23 September 2003, the Minister of Justice also ruled that the applicant was to be placed in compulsory confinement, pursuant to section 21 of the Social Protection Act, in continuation of the sentences imposed in 1997. 13. On 21 January 2004, further to a decision of 16 October 2003 by the Social Protection Board for the Lantin Prison psychiatric wing (commission de défense sociale, or “CDS”), the applicant entered the Paifve EDS, located in the French-speaking region of Belgium. 14. An expert psychiatric report drawn up by Dr Ri. on 5 September 2005 stated, in particular, as follows: “... there is no doubt that Mr Rooman requires treatment which focuses initially on his paranoiac psychosis. Here, therapy must be undertaken simultaneously at psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic level. ... Long-term therapy over several years is required. The psychotherapy must be carried out by therapists specialising in the treatment of chronic psychosis, with, in the present case, support meetings and psycho-educational and pedagogical aspects. It is essential in this context that the therapies are administered in parallel; that is, that the psychotropic drugs help to prepare the patient for the psychotherapy and that, in turn, the psychological sessions enable the patient to respond to the psychotropic drugs. ... The therapy should therefore begin in a secure institution; treatment might then be possible in the closed unit of a long-stay institution, before envisaging treatment in an open unit. Confirmation that [the applicant] has achieved the required level in order to vary the [place of] therapy must be given by a psychiatric expert. ... With regard to practical implementation of the therapy, the language raises a significant problem. The psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic treatment must take place in German. ...” 15. On an unspecified date the applicant made an initial application for conditional discharge. 16. On 27 January 2006 the CDS postponed its examination of the request for conditional discharge until March 2006, holding that it was necessary to identify an institution that could admit the applicant and provide him with therapy in German, the only language that he understood and spoke. 17. On 9 June 2006 the CDS examined the application. At the hearing, the director of the Paifve EDS acknowledged that the institution was unable to provide the therapeutic care recommended by the experts who had already been consulted, given that no German-speaking doctor, therapist, psychologist, welfare officer or custodial staff member was employed in the institution. 18. In consequence, the CDS issued the following conclusions: “It is undisputed that the detainee speaks only German, and that the medical, welfare and prison staff in the institution in which he is detained are unable to provide him with any therapeutic or welfare assistance; that he has been abandoned to his fate without any treatment since his arrival in Paifve (on 21 January 2004), although some individuals have, on a voluntary basis, made considerable efforts to explain to him his situation, which he experiences as an injustice; In the present case, the two-fold legal aim of the compulsory confinement, namely protection of society and of the patient’s health, can only be achieved if the deprivation of liberty is accompanied by the treatment necessitated by the detainee’s mental health; since this dual condition is not fulfilled, [Mr] Rooman’s detention is unlawful; ...” 19. The CDS postponed its examination of the application for conditional discharge until a hearing to be held in September 2006, pending the appointment of German-speaking employees to the Paifve EDS. 20. In accordance with an order by the chairperson of the CDS of 24 September 2006, the applicant was transferred to Verviers Prison so that its German-language psychosocial team could assess his mental health and ascertain whether he posed a danger to the public. On 30 October 2006 the CDS confirmed this order and postponed the case to a later date. 21. On 26 January 2007 the CDS dismissed the application for conditional discharge. A report of 24 January 2007, drawn up by the German-language psychosocial team in Verviers Prison, indicated that the applicant had a psychotic personality and paranoid character traits (high self-esteem; lack of respect for others, whom he used only for his own purposes; a feeling of omnipotence; lack of self-criticism; use of threatening remarks), and that he was refusing any treatment. Furthermore, the CDS noted that there was no institution in Belgium which could meet the security and language requirements arising from the applicant’s specific profile, and that the only German-language hospital which could be considered was an open hospital, and had thus to be ruled out in view of the applicant’s mental health. 22. On 14 April 2008 the applicant applied for day release. On 5 June 2008 the CDS noted that it had proved impossible to provide any treatment and that the search for a German-language institution had proved fruitless. Accordingly, it ordered the Eupen remand prison to prepare a plan for conditional discharge, and ordered a new expert report to assess the level of danger posed by the applicant. It adjourned examination of the request sine die. 23. Having received a new application from the applicant for conditional discharge, the CDS issued a decision on 5 May 2009, finding as follows: “There has been no progress in Mr Rooman’s situation; progress cannot occur until he is in a setting where he can be understood in his own language, like any citizen of this country. A single member of the prison staff, a nurse [A.W.], is temporarily providing him with social contact, whereas a psychiatrist and/or a psychologist should be made available to him. For years, the prison authorities have failed to put forward any kind of solution to this problem, of which its services are fully aware. Worse, as those authorities are unable to provide him with the necessary treatment, they seem to have resigned themselves to a role that extends no further than an unfair repressive detention. The medical reports and [Dr Ro.’s] expert report [of 21 January 2009] indicate that Rooman, who continues to present a danger to society, cannot be discharged without support and preparation in an institutional setting, something that cannot currently be provided in Belgium, but is available abroad.” 24. In view of those findings, the CDS invited the Eupen remand prison to prepare, together with the applicant, a plan for conditional discharge, and requested that the authorities rapidly take the necessary measures to improve the applicant’s situation. 25. On 13 October 2009 the CDS found as follows: “In the years since this file was opened (October 2003), the persons involved in this case have been thwarted by the fact that the individual in compulsory confinement speaks and understands only one language, and that the authorities have no German‑speaking staff available for him, with the exception of one nurse [A.W.] (who is apparently due to retire in the near future); In September 2005 Doctor [Ri.], expert, wrote that changes to the detainee’s regime ‘are possible only in parallel with successful treatment, assessed by predefined steps. The treatment must begin in a secure establishment, then in a closed institution...’ Given that treatment in Germany is impossible, it was to begin in Paifve with German-speaking psychiatrists and therapists; Since that time the detainee’s situation has not changed: he converses and leaves the building only with the sole German-speaking member of staff, and a treatment programme has not even been put in place. No satisfactory follow-up has been given to the requests by the [Social Protection] Board for an end to be put to this unlawful situation for Mr Rooman, who is deprived of his freedom in order, on the one hand, to protect society from possible dangerous conduct by him, and on the other, to provide him with the treatment necessary for his reinsertion; ... In the light of the authorities’ failure, the question now before the Board is whether there exists, outside the social-protection facility, a unit or persons who could provide home-based therapy for Mr Rooman; ...” 26. In consequence, and pointing out that German was one of the national languages of Belgium and that the applicant was thus entitled to speak, be understood and receive treatment in that language, the CDS asked the Eupen remand prison to search in and around Verviers and Eupen for either a mental health unit, or a doctor or clinic, which could provide home‑based therapy for the applicant in his mother tongue. It reserved its decision on the application for conditional discharge. 27. On 12 January 2010 the applicant submitted pleadings in support of his application for discharge. He criticised the failure to provide him with therapeutic care and complained about the effect on his health of the absence of any prospect of improvement in his situation. As his main submission, he requested his immediate discharge on the grounds of the illegality of his deprivation of liberty. Alternatively, he asked that the CDS impose an obligation on the relevant authorities to take all necessary measures so that he would receive, in his mother tongue, the treatment required by his mental-health condition. 28. In an interlocutory decision of 13 January 2010, the CDS noted that the applicant’s situation had not changed and that the reply from the Eupen judicial assistance unit gave no grounds for hoping that he could receive appropriate treatment, in a secure establishment or elsewhere, in the foreseeable future. It considered that it was necessary to attempt one last plea to the Minister of Justice, whose intervention had previously yielded some fruit, even if this had been insufficient to resolve the problem. The CDS accordingly ordered that an “official report” on the applicant’s situation be sent to the Minister of Justice. 29. On 29 April 2010 the CDS noted that the Minister of Justice had not responded to its submission and that the applicant’s situation had worsened, since he was no longer assisted by the German-speaking nurse A.W., who had left the Paifve EDS. It found as follows: “It follows from the report [from the psychosocial department] of 30 March 2010 that, except for occasional meetings with a welfare officer “who speaks German”, the detainee has no social contact in his language and that he has had no opportunity for several months to converse and to gain a fresh perspective in the outside world; the doctor and psychologist who signed this report do not seem particularly convinced of progress in the ‘ongoing measures (taken) by the department to enable a German‑psychologist to intervene occasionally to provide care for the German‑speaking patients in the EDS’; Mr Rooman’s situation is deadlocked: an ill individual, he is detained in a prison medical institution where no one is able to provide the treatment to which he is entitled; the Minister and his departments are turning a deaf ear, with no concern for the despair to which this manifestly unjust attitude may lead; In spite of the unlawfulness of Mr Rooman’s detention, his health condition means that discharge cannot be envisaged unless it is accompanied by therapy and practical support; The [Social Protection] Board has no powers, firstly, to restore the detainee’s basic rights, namely, the rights to liberty, health care and respect for his humanity; and secondly, to compel the Minister to put an end to this situation, which his administration has been fully aware of for more than six years.” 30. The CDS decided, while “remaining open to any proposals”, to leave the applicant’s situation unchanged; in other words, it rejected his application for discharge. 31. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Higher Social Protection Board (Commission supérieure de défense sociale or “the CSDS”). 32. In parallel, he made an urgent application to the President of the Liège Court of First Instance, asking that his detention be declared unlawful and requesting his immediate discharge, or, in the alternative, that a decision be issued ordering the Belgian State to provide him with the medical care required by his situation. 33. By an order of 12 May 2010, the president of the court held that he did not have jurisdiction to hear this application, on the grounds that the CDS was the legally competent body to decide on the applicant’s discharge or his continued compulsory confinement. 34. On 27 May 2010 the CSDS upheld the decision of 29 April 2010 by which the CDS had held that the applicant was to remain in compulsory confinement. Unlike the CDS, it held that the applicant’s detention was perfectly legal, given that he had been lawfully placed in compulsory confinement and that he did not meet the necessary conditions for definitive or conditional discharge. It noted that, under section 18 of the Social Protection Act, discharge could only be ordered if the detainee’s mental condition had improved sufficiently and if the conditions for his reintegration into society were satisfied. It considered, however, that this was not the situation here. It also found that the mere fact that the applicant spoke only German did not mean that the authorities had not taken all the necessary steps to provide him with the treatment required by his condition. 35. The applicant appealed on points of law, alleging a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. 36. On 8 September 2010 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law. In response to the argument alleging a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, it held that legal reasons had been given for the CSDS’s decision and that it had been justified in law. It argued as follows: “As compulsory confinement is primarily a security measure, the therapeutic action necessitated by such detention is not legally required in order for the deprivation of liberty to be lawful, even if a secondary aim, after that of protecting society, is to provide the detained person with the necessary treatment. Under section 14(2) of the Act, the social protection boards have the power, rather than the duty, to order, in a decision giving specific reasons, placement in an appropriate institution, corresponding to the relevant security measures and treatment required. It follows that execution of the compulsory confinement measure does not become unlawful solely because it is implemented in one of the institutions created by the government for that purpose, rather than in another institution specifically designated for the treatment it may provide.” 37. The Court of Cassation declared inadmissible the argument alleging a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, on the grounds that examining it would require a factual verification of the conditions in which the applicant was detained and such an examination fell outside the scope of its jurisdiction. For the remainder, it considered that the CSDS had replied to the applicant’s complaint in stating that the fact that he spoke only German did not mean that the relevant authorities had not taken all the necessary steps to provide him with the required treatment. 38. On 13 November 2013 the applicant again applied for discharge. 39. A report by the psychosocial department of the Paifve EDS, dated 13 January 2014, reiterated that the applicant had a poor command of the French language, speaking only a few words of French which were insufficient to enable him to conduct a conversation; in consequence, he had very little contact with the other patients and members of staff. The report also indicated that the applicant had met a German-speaking psychologist on a single occasion, in June 2010; his behaviour had improved, he was less aggressive and intolerant than before, and he had recently been moved from the cell wing to the community wing; in addition, he had never expressed a wish to meet members of the psychosocial team on a regular basis. The report concluded that the applicant should remain in the Paifve EDS, citing among other reasons his “untreated mental health problems”. 40. On 24 January 2014 the CDS issued its decision. It noted, firstly, the content of the reports by Dr Ri., dated 5 September 2005, and Dr Ro., dated 21 January 2009, finding that it was necessary for the applicant to receive psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic treatment in a secure establishment, then in a closed institution, before his admission to an open facility could be envisaged. It noted that, since those reports were drawn up, the various attempts to resolve the language problem had not succeeded in securing a significant improvement in the applicant’s health: his rare outings accompanied by a German-speaking member of the prison staff had been abandoned, since this employee was no longer available and had not been replaced; attempts to find a German-language institution, doctor or therapist had met with failure; no follow-up seemed to have been given to the commitment that a minimum number of German-speaking staff were to be recruited, and the applicant had, of his own accord, declined the assistance of the German-speaking welfare officer with whom he had occasionally met. Nonetheless, the CDS rejected the application for conditional discharge, finding that the conditions for discharge, namely an improvement in the applicant’s mental state and guarantees for his social rehabilitation, were not met. With regard to the absence of treatment in German, complained of by the applicant, it held: “The detainee claims that he is not receiving the appropriate treatment for his mental health condition in German, his mother tongue, without however describing or even referring to the treatment allegedly denied to him, and that he would agree to accept or participate in. The mere fact that he only speaks German does not mean that the Paifve social-protection facility has not taken all the necessary steps to provide him with the treatment his condition requires. While, as [the applicant] points out in his submissions, it is for the relevant authorities to take all the necessary measures for his health, it is not, however, within the [Social Protection] Board’s powers to discharge a detainee who claims to be the victim of shortcomings on the part of the authorities... Nor does the Board have jurisdiction to issue orders to the authorities or to third parties, [or] to reprimand them for their actions or shortcomings ...” 41. On 3 April 2014 the CSDS upheld the CDS’s decision. It held, inter alia, as follows: “Contrary to what he alleges in his pleadings, the detainee receives all the treatment required by his condition from competent and qualified staff in the Paifve EDS, and his specific medical needs are fully taken into account. In spite of the treatment given, the detainee’s mental condition has not yet improved sufficiently, on account of his paranoid and psychopathic character traits, his lack of self-criticism and his constant demands. The detainee is thus clearly wrong in attributing the lack of improvement in his mental condition to the language issue alone. The continued compulsory confinement in an EDS suited to his medical condition of an individual who would represent a danger to the public in the event of discharge, when his mental condition has not sufficiently improved and the conditions for his social rehabilitation are not met, is not unlawful and does not amount to a violation of the provisions of the [Convention].” 42. On 25 June 2014 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision by the CSDS on the grounds that it had not addressed the applicant’s argument that he was not receiving care appropriate to his situation, in view of the fact that he spoke and understood only German and that no German-speaking staff members were available in the facility where he was being held. The case was sent back to the CSDS with a differently constituted panel. 43. On 22 July 2014 the CSDS issued an interlocutory order, requesting the CDS to appoint a group of German-speaking experts to update the psychiatric report of 21 January 2009. It invited the director of the Paifve EDS institution to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the requisite care was made available to the applicant, by at least providing the services of a German-speaking psychiatrist and psychologist. It ordered that the case be reopened and scheduled a hearing for 17 October 2014. 44. In a decision of that date, the CSDS took note of the fact that the applicant had been treated by a German-speaking psychologist since 11 July 2014 and by a German-speaking psychiatrist since 16 September 2014. It ordered that a panel of experts be appointed; assisted by a German interpreter, it was to update Dr Ro.’s report of 21 January 2009. 45. The updated report, prepared by three experts who had each examined the applicant separately, was submitted on 27 March 2015. The experts concluded that the paranoia-like delusional disorder persisted, that the psychotic aspect of the applicant’s personality was also still present, and that his neuropsychological condition was practically identical to what it had been in 2009 when Dr Ro. had drawn up his report. 46. By a decision of 20 May 2015, the CSDS dismissed the request for final or conditional discharge, considering that the applicant’s state of health had not improved sufficiently and that the conditions for his reintegration into society were not met. It also specified that it had not been established that this lack of improvement in the applicant’s situation was due solely to the fact that he had not had an opportunity to be in contact with German‑speaking individuals, particularly in view of the treatment provided by medical staff since 11 July 2014. 47. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against that decision, which the Court of Cassation dismissed in a judgment of 28 October 2015. The Court of Cassation restated the CSDS’s conclusions and specified that, having regard to the reasons given by it, it was not necessary to examine the applicant’s submissions alleging a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. 48. In the meantime, on 28 March 2014 the applicant had brought proceedings against the Belgian State before the President of the French‑language Brussels Court of First Instance, as the judge responsible for hearing urgent applications in accordance with Article 584 of the Judicial Code. He requested his discharge or, in the alternative, that the authorities be ordered to take the measures required by his state of health. 49. By an interlocutory order of 4 July 2014, the president of the court asked the director of the Paifve EDS and Dr B. from that EDS’s psychosocial unit to inform him, firstly, about the treatment available in that EDS and, secondly, about the treatment that had in fact been provided to the applicant. 50. In their respective replies, dated 28 August 2014, the director of the Paifve EDS and Dr B. indicated that the applicant now had access to consultations with a German-speaking psychologist and that the authorities had made contact with a German-speaking psychiatrist who had agreed to meet the applicant. Dr B. stated, in particular: “Psychiatry is a branch of medicine which deals with mental disorders, and its modus operandi entails, first and foremost, a specific dialogue between a patient and his or her therapist, the doctor. This implies the use of language; it also implies, of course, that there is mutual understanding; it implies that the two sides have access to a common language, enabling them to communicate and allowing the psychiatrist to assess accurately all the nuances of the patient’s condition and its development. From this perspective, however, we have constantly emphasised that [the applicant] is essentially German-speaking. Admittedly, he occasionally comes out with a few simple words in French, but, clearly, the years spent in Paifve have not persuaded him to learn to use French more fluently so as to communicate more meaningfully with those caring for him. Alternatively, as certain examinations seem to indicate, he is so cognitively disadvantaged that he cannot achieve this. ... One can of course always hope that in [the applicant’s] case, permanent support and appropriate treatment in the German language could improve his personality disorder somewhat, but, to repeat, I am more of the opinion that with this type of paranoid personality disorder, paranoia with anti-social traits, positive progress is unlikely.” 51. In an order of 10 October 2014, the president of the court noted that, until September 2014, the applicant had had no access to a psychiatrist who could communicate with him in German. He had had access to an external German-speaking psychologist between May and November 2010. The president noted that the consultations with that psychologist had ended, not because the applicant no longer wished to attend them, as alleged by the State in its pleadings, but because of the Belgian State’s late payment of the psychologist’s fees and expenses, and that the consultations had resumed in July 2014. He noted that, until April 2010, the applicant had benefitted from the presence and care of a German-speaking nurse, who had in the meantime left the Paifve EDS, but that since August 2014 the same nurse had been authorised to accompany the applicant on outings. Lastly, he noted that the applicant had met a German-speaking welfare officer, but had declined the latter’s services in February 2014. 52. With regard to the main request, the president held that he did not have jurisdiction to order the applicant’s discharge, holding that only the social protection bodies had power to do so. Ruling on the subsidiary request, the president noted that the applicant had not had access to the mental-health treatment required by his condition, and considered that, prima facie, there had been a breach of his right of access to health care and that he had sustained inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. In consequence, he ordered the Belgian State to appoint a German-speaking psychiatrist and medical auxiliary to treat the applicant, subject to a penalty in the event of non-compliance, and to initiate the treatment routinely provided to French-speaking persons in compulsory confinement who suffered from a similar mental illness to the applicant. 53. No appeal was lodged against that order. According to the applicant’s representative, the Belgian State appointed a German-speaking psychiatrist and psychologist, who visited the applicant several times. However, those visits appear to have stopped towards the end of 2015. 54. In the meantime, on 2 May 2014 the applicant had filed a negligence claim against the Belgian State on the basis of Article 1382 of the Civil Code. 55. By a judgment of 9 September 2016, the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance held that the failure to provide the applicant with psychological treatment in his mother tongue between 2010 and 2014 had been negligent. It held, in particular: “It is undeniable that the psychiatric and psychological treatment which must be provided to [the applicant] must be provided to him in German, the only language in which he is fluent and, moreover, one of the three national languages in Belgium. However, between 2010 and 2014 [the applicant] received no medico-psychological treatment in his own language. Whatever the quality – which is, indeed, undisputed – of the care provided to detainees in the Paifve [EDS], it is totally inappropriate for [the applicant’s] mental‑health condition purely and simply on account of the fact that it is not given in German. In spite of the official and repeated denunciations of this situation by the Social Protection Board to the Belgian State since 2010, the latter has taken no measures to correct it. In addition, it has produced no evidence of the slightest step taken by it to that end. This failure to act amounts to negligence within the meaning of Article 1382 of the Civil Code. ... Moreover, and as [the applicant] also submits, Articles 3 and 5 [of the Convention] require the Belgian State to take the necessary measures to provide him with access to the basic care necessitated by his mental health. ... In the present case, the applicant’s vulnerability on account of the very nature of his psychological disorder and the absence of any real possibility of contact in his language have necessarily exacerbated his feelings of distress and anxiety. It is immaterial that, in any event, the [applicant’s] state of mental health does not permit his discharge. The mere fact of having been detained for an indefinite period without appropriate treatment amounts in the present case to a violation of Articles 3 and 5 [of the Convention]. Contrary to the submissions of the Belgian State, the fact that [the applicant] is not always receptive to psychological, medical and social therapy does not permit minimisation of the Belgian State’s negligent attitude towards an individual suffering from a mental disorder, and whose discernment is, by assumption, uncertain. Equally, at the risk of disregarding the lived experience of the person suffering from a mental disorder, [the applicant’s] stable conduct within the institution does not suffice to establish that he received appropriate treatment for his condition.” 56. Finding that this absence of treatment had caused the applicant mental suffering, the court ordered the State to pay him 75,000 euros (EUR), an amount assessed ex aequo et bono, in compensation for the period from January 2010 to October 2014. It is unclear from the case file on what date this judgment was served on the parties. 57. On 24 January 2018 the applicant lodged an application with the Brussels Court of Appeal requesting legal aid in order to appeal against the judgment of the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance. By an order of 26 January 2018, the Brussels Court of Appeal granted that request. 58. For its part, the Belgian State appealed against the same judgment on 19 February 2018, arguing that the applicant’s complaints were inadmissible and/or ill-founded. A preliminary hearing was held before the Brussels Court of Appeal on 22 March 2018. 59. At the date of adoption of the present judgment those proceedings were still pending. 60. In their observations to the Grand Chamber, the parties produced documents showing that fresh proceedings had been brought for the applicant’s discharge, under the new Law of 5 May 2014 on compulsory confinement (“the Compulsory Confinement Act”, see paragraphs 91‑97 below). In this context, on 12 January 2017 a team from the psychological and welfare service of the Paifve EDS, which included a psychiatrist, a psychologist and a welfare officer, drew up a multi-disciplinary psychiatric and psycho-social report on the applicant’s situation. It stated that the information set out in its report had been drawn from various psychiatric examinations conducted during the applicant’s period in compulsory confinement, and that in view of the language barrier, it had been impossible to obtain other information or compare the information from previous expert reports with the applicant’s statements at the time the report was being prepared. It then confirmed that the patient spoke only German and that he knew only a few words of French, which were not sufficient to enable him to hold a conversation, with the result that he had limited contact with the other patients and with members of staff. The team which produced the report added that this language barrier had restricted and complicated the clinical observation, and that, in view of this shortcoming in the assessment, it was unable to provide a sufficiently informed psychiatric opinion on the application for discharge. Nonetheless, in spite of this difficulty in providing an objective assessment of the applicant’s dangerousness, the likelihood of his reoffending, and his capacity for autonomy, it considered it possible to state that grey areas still remained. It indicated, in particular, that the applicant continued to display an obsession with vengeance, as highlighted in the 2015 expert report, and that the risk of his harassing the victims could not be ruled out. It therefore gave an unfavourable opinion in respect of the applicant’s application for discharge. 61. On 5 May 2017 the director of the Paifve EDS prepared a separate report in which she indicated that the applicant continued to require an institutional setting, given his pathology and the fact that he remained dangerous in that he was still likely to commit offences or harass the victims. She considered that, in order for “the conditions for conditional discharge to be satisfied, and given Mr Rooman’s personality, the only safe option was [conditional] discharge to an institution [a structured facility]”. She also expressed the view, in light of the existing situation, that the applicant should not be discharged. 62. Basing its decision on the arguments contained in these two reports, on 29 May 2017 the public prosecutor at the Liège Post-Sentencing Court (TAP) issued an opinion in favour of maintaining the applicant in compulsory confinement and opposing the request for conditional discharge. 63. On 28 July 2017 the Social Protection Division (CPS) at the Liège TAP, sitting in a different composition, which now had jurisdiction under the new 2014 Compulsory Confinement Act (see paragraph 97 below) to rule on whether to extend compulsory confinement and, if appropriate, to order the applicant’s discharge, issued an interlocutory decision. It ordered that the proceedings be reopened, so that the parties could submit relevant information on whether the situation which had led the European Court of Human Rights to find a violation of Article 3 in the Chamber judgment of 18 July 2017 persisted. Pending receipt of that information, the CPS adjourned its examination of the case. It also summoned the Director General of Prisons to a hearing fixed for November 2017. 64. On 16 November 2017 the CPS held a hearing, in private, at the Paifve EDS, at which the applicant was present; he was assisted by his lawyers and an interpreter. In its judgment, delivered on 27 December 2017, the CPS found as follows: “... According to the information submitted to the Division, [the applicant] can now contact a German-speaking psychologist (3 visits since August 2017). If he so wishes, he can also request a visit from a German-speaking psychiatrist. He has one outing a month, accompanied by a German-speaking nurse. Contact with German-speaking psychological and welfare assistants has been organised. A German interpreter will be called upon whenever necessary (CAP, disciplinary hearings, expert reports). Clinical consultations have been scheduled in order to assess the treatment plan and to adapt it as necessary (one meeting has already taken place, another is scheduled). ... It is established that [the applicant’s] detention, during those periods when he was not being treated by German-speaking medical staff, was in breach of Article 3 of the [Convention]. It was demonstrated in the hearings on 16 November 2017 that that violation has now ceased, as the Paifve EDS and the prison authorities have done what was necessary to ensure that German-speaking care providers are available, both in terms of his psychological and psychiatric treatment and with regard to welfare assistance and supervised outings. An interpreter is also called upon whenever required. ... ... while accepting [the applicant’s] argument that the failure to provide treatment in his mother tongue broke the link between the compulsory confinement and the illness at its origin, so that the detention became unlawful ..., it should again be noted that the unlawful nature of the detention ended following the measures currently put in place. [The applicant’s] current detention is justified by his mental health, and the conditions of his detention make it possible to provide him with treatment while at the same time ensuring his safety and that of others. ... there remain obstacles to [the applicant’s] discharge, namely: - the lack of prospects for social reintegration, given his mental disorder ... - the risk that offences will be committed ... - the risk that he will harass the victims, and his attitude towards the victims of the offences which resulted in his compulsory confinement ...” 65. On those grounds, the CPS dismissed the main request for final discharge and held that it was also inappropriate to grant conditional discharge. With regard to the subsidiary request for treatment in German, it added that this had become devoid of purpose. It ordered an eight-month observation period, at the close of which the director of the Paifve EDS would be required to provide a fresh opinion on the applicant’s situation. 66. By a judgment of 28 February 2018 the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant against the CPS’s judgment of 27 December 2017. 67. In support of the observations submitted in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, the Government attached a chronological summary of the treatment administered to the applicant since he was placed in compulsory confinement in the Paifve EDS in 2004. They also provided factual clarifications at the public hearing on 6 June 2018. 68. With regard to psychiatric treatment, the document submitted by the Government indicates that the applicant was treated by various French‑speaking psychiatrists. The frequency of the consultations is not specified. From 2004 to 1 February 2014, a German-speaking nurse assisted the psychiatrists during those meetings by providing interpretation. Between March 2008 and August 2009 the applicant was monitored by a psychiatrist who spoke elementary German. On 20 May 2015 the applicant met with Dr V., a German-speaking psychiatrist. This meeting did not give rise to regular meetings. The psychiatrist noted that the applicant had expressed no particular requests or asked for psychiatric assistance. She had nonetheless agreed to return if necessary. She had reiterated her availability on 23 March 2016, then at the end of 2017, in a telephone conversation with the in-house psychiatrist at the Paifve EDS. At the public hearing before the Court, the Government stated that the applicant, who was deemed to be capable of forming his own views, did not wish to enter into regular contact with the psychiatrist. 69. With regard to psychological treatment in German, the applicant had attended nine meetings with a psychologist in 2010, and nine other meetings in 2014-2015. Between 18 August 2017 and 12 March 2018, the date on which the Government’s observations were submitted, the applicant had had monthly meetings with this psychologist, the most recent, according to the information provided to the Court at the public hearing on 6 June 2018, being on 20 March and 27 April 2018. For his part, the applicant stated that he had had no further meetings since March, and submitted that the last meeting had taken place in February 2018. 70. With regard to welfare assistance, the Government stated that since 1 October 2006 the applicant had received welfare assistance from a German-speaker, except for the periods from May to September 2014 (on account of maternity leave), and from 1 April to 1 November 2017 (on account of a change in post). Since November 2017, the German-speaking welfare assistant had returned to her post in the Paifve EDS and continued to meet the applicant several times a month. She had essentially dealt with the applicant’s requests for administrative help, or for practical help in his contacts with the outside world, especially with his lawyer. 71. With regard to psychiatric nursing care, the document submitted by the Government indicated that, from his arrival at the Paifve EDS, the applicant had been assisted regularly by a German-speaking male nurse. In addition to his somatic nursing skills, this nurse had specialised psychiatric care skills and had been able to spend time with the applicant, mainly to support him and help him deal with his stress. According to the Government, this nurse’s listening skills had enabled him to assess the applicant’s state of mind and report his observations to the psychiatrist. The nurse had been transferred to the prison on 1 February 2014 and retired on 1 December 2016. After that date, he had continued to meet the applicant in order to maintain contact with him and accompany him on outings, the last of these having taken place on 24 April 2017. 72. Moreover, the applicant was able to see a general practitioner once a month. Since 30 November 2017, an interpreter had been called in to translate at these meetings. 73. On 25 November 2017 a multidisciplinary meeting of the care team had taken place, in the presence of the applicant and an interpreter. At the public hearing, the Government stated, without submitting any document in support of this assertion, that a coordination meeting of the various actors involved in the applicant’s treatment both inside and outside the Paifve EDS had been held, in the applicant’s presence. At that meeting, the team had, in particular, sought the applicant’s permission for the external German‑speaking psychologist to transmit to the in-house psychosocial team information obtained in her monthly meetings with him, as well as her conclusions regarding developments in his state of health, given that the psychosocial team was responsible for preparing an assessment of the degree of danger posed by him and of the prospects for his rehabilitation. The applicant had refused to consent to this transmission of information. 74. Lastly, the applicant had been authorised to leave the institution on day-release, accompanied by the nurse. The number of these daytrips had progressively increased from one in 2007 to six in 2017. Since 2015 the applicant had made regular visits to Germany. In 2016 he had resumed contact with his family. It appears from other information in the file that the applicant has a brother with whom he has renewed contact in the past few years.

4. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Chișinău. 5. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, the applicant worked as a cashier in the main office of a bank. Her duty was to count cash money brought in bags from the bank’s branches. 6. On 18 September 2015 the applicant came to work at around 7.40 a.m. and started counting money in bags of cash. After having counted the money from four bags she went to the toilet and, upon her return, she heard one of her colleagues saying that one of the uncounted bags lacked its seal. She did not pay much attention to that, since that was not the first time when a seal was missing. The colleague who found the bag without a seal was instructed by her superior to count the money in the bag. It appeared that forty-seven thousand euros (EUR) was missing from that bag. 7. Another superior was called in and a search of the premises was carried out. The branch from which the bag of money came was contacted; however, its employees stressed that the bag had been sealed upon its dispatch. Later, the applicant went again to the toilet and then left for lunch. 8. On 2 October 2015 a search was carried out at the applicant’s home but nothing of interest for the investigation was found. 9. On the same day, the applicant was arrested and placed in detention. 10. On 5 October 2015 the applicant was charged with the offence of theft in the amount of EUR 47,000. It was alleged that, together with other employees of the bank, she had stolen the aforementioned amount of money from the bag in question. The indictment order did not point to any evidence capable of proving the applicant’s involvement in the offence. It appears that one of the applicant’s colleagues was also accused of the same offence. 11. On the same date, namely on 5 October 2015, the prosecutor in charge of the case applied to the Buiucani District Court for the applicant’s remand in custody for a period of thirty days. The prosecutor alleged that there was a risk that the applicant could tamper with evidence, influence witnesses and reoffend, which therefore warrant her detention on remand. 12. On 5 October 2015 the Buiucani District Court found that the prosecutor in charge of the case did not specify in his application the reasons giving rise to the suspicion that the applicant might have committed an offence. Nevertheless, the court noted that during the hearing the prosecutor had indicated that the other co-accused had stated that the money could have been stolen by the applicant because she had taken bags from the stack of bags in which the unsealed bag had been found and she had had a suspicious behaviour. Moreover, the security camera in the room was turned away from the place where the applicant was sit. The court concluded that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed an offence. The court noted that some thirteen days had elapsed since the day of the theft. The applicant had a permanent abode, a job, family and no criminal record. There were no reasons to believe that she would hinder the investigation in circumstances in which her involvement in the offence was unclear. The court considered that the risk of reoffending had also not been proven by the prosecutor which would warrant placing the applicant in detention. Therefore, the court ordered the applicant’s house arrest for a period of twenty days. 13. The applicant appealed against the above decision and argued that the measure of house arrest was unnecessary because even the court of first instance had found that the reasons adduced by the prosecutor had not been convincing. The prosecutor also appealed. 14. On 15 October 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld the appeal lodged by the prosecutor. It quashed the decision of 5 October 2018 and ordered the applicant’s remand in custody for a period of thirty days. The court considered that there was a risk of absconding, interference with the investigation and collusion with the other co-accused persons. The court observed that unjustified manifestations of clemency would encourage anti‑social behaviour of the sort and would affect the peoples’ trust in the law enforcement organs and that the measure of pre-trial detention was called to punish and discourage anti-social behaviour. As to the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence imputed to her, the court noted that the applicant had not contested its presence. 15. The next day the applicant was arrested and placed in detention. 16. On 26 October 2015 the Chișinău Court of Appeal examined the appeal lodged by the applicant, upheld it and ordered her release under judicial control. The court found that there were no reasons to believe that the applicant would abscond, hinder the investigation or reoffend. 17. It appears that the criminal investigation into the circumstances of the alleged theft of 18 September 2015 is pending to date.

6. On 17 April 1936 the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (“the USSR”) entrusted the management of the network of recreational facilities for workers in the USSR to the Union-wide Central Council of Trade Unions (“the Union-wide Council”), the central authority for the USSR’s official State-controlled trade unions. 7. By a resolution of 17 April 1956 the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic (“the Ukrainian SSR”) obliged the Ministry of Healthcare of the Ukrainian SSR to “take” (прийняти) from the trade unions and other ministries and State agencies various assets (including the Sanatorium). 8. By a resolution of 23 April 1960 on transferring to trade unions sanatoria and recreational resorts of the Ministry of Healthcare of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic, the Council of Ministers obliged the above-mentioned Ministry to transfer “for free use” (безоплатно передати у відання) to the Ukrainian Republican Council of Trade Unions (a Ukrainian entity functioning under the charter of trade unions of the Soviet Union and under the auspices of the Union-wide Council; “the Republican Council”) all functioning self-supporting sanatoria, recreational resorts and health centres (including the Sanatorium). 9. On 6 October 1990 the XV Congress of Trade Unions of the Ukrainian SSR adopted a decision whereby it transformed itself into the First Founding Congress of Independent Trade Unions of Ukraine. That congress founded the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Ukraine (which subsequently became the Federation) and declared its independence from the State and from commercial bodies of the Ukrainian SSR and the Soviet Union. It also declared its refusal to function under the charter of trade unions of the Soviet Union. The Federation was also declared the Republican Council’s legal successor. 10. On 18 November 1990 the Council of the General Conference of Trade Unions of the Soviet Union approved an agreement of 18 November 1990 between the General Conference of Trade Unions of the Soviet Union and the Federation, whereby various assets (including the Sanatorium) were “reserved” (закріплені) for the Federation. 11. By a resolution of 29 November 1990 on the protection of sovereign property rights of the Ukrainian SSR, the Parliament of the Ukrainian SSR ordered that until a law on privatisation (роздержавлення) of property was enacted, a moratorium on the State authorities making any change to the title to State property and owners thereof was to be introduced. 12. On 24 August 1991 Ukraine declared its independence. 13. On 10 September 1991 the Law on Enterprises, Establishments and Organisations of the Soviet Union located on the Territory of Ukraine was enacted. The assets and financial resources of enterprises, establishments, organisations and other entities subordinated to the former Soviet Union and located on the territory of Ukraine were declared State property of Ukraine. All contracts concluded in breach of the 1990 moratorium were declared null and void. 14. On 22 November 1991 the Federation decided to create UPO, a joint-stock company (currently, a private joint-stock company). Pursuant to that decision, the Federation transferred to UPO various assets (including the Sanatorium). On 4 December 1991 the Federation and the Social Insurance Fund of Ukraine (“the SIFU”) ratified UPO’s articles of association and statute. 15. On 23 December 1991 the local authorities registered UPO. 16. By a resolution of 4 March 1992 on the implementation of the Law of Ukraine on Privatisation of Property of State Enterprises, the Parliament of Ukraine repealed the resolution of 29 November 1990 and instructed the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to draw up, by 15 March 1992, a list of enterprises which had concluded contracts whereby title to State property had been transferred, in breach of the 1990 moratorium. 17. By a resolution of 10 April 1992 on property complexes and financial resources of civic organisations of the former Soviet Union located on the territory of Ukraine, Parliament ordered that, until a list of legal successors of Union-wide civic organisations of the former Soviet Union had been drawn up, the assets and financial resources of enterprises, establishments and entities, which were located on the territory of Ukraine and which were under their central bodies’ authority, were to be temporarily transferred to the State Property Fund of Ukraine (“the SPFU”), an authority managing State property. 18. By a resolution of 4 February 1994 on the property of Union-wide civic organisations of the former Soviet Union, Parliament further ordered that, until the owners of the above-mentioned assets had been determined in legislation, those assets were to be regarded as State property. No such legislation has been adopted to date (see paragraph 40 below). 19. On an unspecified date the SPFU brought a claim against the Federation, the SIFU and UPO, arguing that the assets the Federation had transferred to UPO had not belonged to it, but had belonged to the Union-wide Council, and the SPFU had therefore been their managing authority. 20. By a judgment of 20 January 1997 (case no. 137/7), the Higher Arbitration Court of Ukraine (“the HACU”; in 2001 renamed “the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine”, “the HCCU”) rejected the claim. Referring to the resolutions of 10 April 1992 and 4 February 1994, it stated that the SPFU had not established what had constituted assets under those legal acts. The assets on the basis of which UPO had been created had been transferred to the Republican Council, succeeded by the Federation, as was evident from the latter’s founding documents. Since the assets had not been transferred to the Union-wide Council, they were not covered by those resolutions. Moreover, since their transfer to trade unions, the assets had not been “recalled” (не вилучалися) by the State in accordance with the established procedure. The trade unions’ title to those assets had not been challenged and had therefore been lawful. Under Article 92 § 7 of the 1994 Constitution of Ukraine, the legal regime applicable to property was to be determined by the laws of Ukraine only. Since a special law governing the legal regime of assets belonging to Union-wide civic organisations of the former Soviet Union had not been adopted when the case was examined, there had been no legal restrictions on the creation of UPO on the basis of sanatoria’s assets. Accordingly, UPO had been founded lawfully, there was no basis for annulling its founding documents and the SPFU’s allegation that it was the managing authority of UPO’s assets was at odds with the law and the circumstances of the case. 21. On 17 June 1997 the HACU review panel upheld the above judgment. It held that assets which had formed the basis for the creation of UPO had been transferred to the Republican Council pursuant to the resolution of 23 April 1960. They had not been in the Union-wide Council’s use and were not, therefore, covered by the resolution of 10 April 1992. 22. On 27 June 2000, at UPO’s request, the local authorities registered its title to assets transferred to it in accordance with its founding documents. 23. By a decision of 22 November 2007, which is available to the public, the Supreme Court of Ukraine refused to allow a request submitted by the Prosecutor General for a review of the decision of 17 June 1997. The Supreme Court did not provide the details of its decision. 24. In 2000 the applicant founded the “Kovcheg” Social Rehabilitation Centre (“the Centre”). According to the latter’s Statute, its activities include “social protection, social-pedagogical and psychological rehabilitation of children between the ages of six and eighteen, who are in difficult life circumstances[, and] assistance with the provision of complex social, psychological, pedagogical, medical, legal and other types of individual and family assistance.” 25. On 30 August 2002 the applicant and the Centre purchased from UPO certain premises of the Sanatorium (dormitory blocks, cafeteria, library, medical block, laboratory and some other premises). Their price under the contract was 1,915,200 Ukrainian hryvnias[1] (UAH). According to the contract, the premises were owned by UPO on the basis of the title certificate of 27 June 2000. 26. The applicant subsequently registered its title to the above-mentioned premises with the local authorities, and the Centre has been using the premises for its activities and is based there. In particular, the premises have been used as accommodation for children from “difficult” families and from families of internally displaced persons (“IDPs”). 27. In August 2011 a prosecutor acting on behalf of the State lodged a claim with the Kyiv City Commercial Court against UPO, the applicant and the Centre, seeking the annulment of the 2002 contract. He argued, in particular, that the premises that had been sold were State property and had never been transferred from the State to UPO’s ownership. The 2002 contract had thus breached State interests. The prosecutor also stated that he had only learned about the 2002 contract in July 2011. 28. On 19 September 2011 the court allowed the claim. It held that in 1960, the State had transferred sanatoria and recreational facilities, including the disputed property to trade unions for their free use but not their ownership. Therefore, when UPO had been created, the disputed premises had belonged to the State. The 2002 contract had thus been invalid. The court dismissed UPO’s reference to the judgment of 20 January 1997, stating that the parties in that case and in the present one were not the same, and that judgment contained value judgments rather than facts as regards the owner of the disputed property. Furthermore, that judgment had not been in accordance with the Supreme Court’s findings in its decisions of 25 September 2007 and 16 September 2008, in which it had held that property transferred for free use under the resolution of 23 April 1960 had been State property (the parties did not provide copies of those decisions). Lastly, the court rejected the prosecutor’s argument that the resolutions of 10 April 1992 and 4 February 1994 had been breached, holding that they were inapplicable in the present case, as they concerned property owned by civic organisations of the former Soviet Union (including trade unions), whereas the disputed property had not been transferred from the State (that is to say, trade unions had never gained title to the property). 29. The applicant appealed, stating that UPO had a title certificate to the disputed property. Even assuming that UPO had had no right to sell that property, the applicant was a bona fide purchaser. Moreover, it had spent around UAH 5 million on renovation of the purchased premises. 30. On 1 April 2014 the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 19 September 2011 and found for the applicant, stating that there were no legal grounds to conclude that the disputed premises belonged to the State. In particular, the resolutions of 10 April 1992 and 4 February 1994 had not concerned the Federation’s trade unions, because the latter had left the Union-wide Council as early as 1990. Moreover, those legal acts had been in breach of Article 92 of the Constitution of Ukraine, pursuant to which the property regime could be regulated by laws of Ukraine only. UPO had therefore become the owner of property transferred to it. The court also referred to the judgment of 20 January 1997 and decisions adopted in case no. 48/202-20/191 (see a summary of the latter decisions in paragraph 42 below), holding that facts established by a decision of a commercial court were not to be proved again when deciding other disputes with the same parties. The applicant had been a bona fide purchaser as it could not have known about the existence of any obstacles for concluding the 2002 contract, and such obstacles had not been present when it had been concluded. 31. On 24 July 2014, following an appeal on points of law lodged by the prosecutor, the HCCU quashed the judgment of 1 April 2014 and upheld the judgment of 19 September 2011. It held that following a systematic analysis of various legal acts, including the law of 10 September 1991 and the resolutions of 10 April 1992 and 4 February 1994, there were no grounds to conclude that under the resolution of 23 April 1960 the State had transferred title to the disputed property to the trade unions. The latter resolution contained no indication that the disputed property would be transferred to the ownership of the Republican Council, nor any intention on the part of its owner (the Ukrainian SSR) to alienate it to the Republican Council. The resolution of 29 November 1990 had set a moratorium on any change of title to, and owners of, State property until the enactment of a law on privatisation of property. Accordingly, the disputed property which had been transferred to the Republican Council and used by it had been State property. The HCCU also held that its position was confirmed by its own decisions and those of the Supreme Court given in 2007-2014 (the parties did not provide copies thereof). 32. In October 2014 the applicant applied to the Supreme Court for a review of the decision of 24 July 2014. On 4 February 2015 the Supreme Court rejected its request. It referred, inter alia, to the resolution of 23 April 1960, the resolution of 29 November 1990 and the law of 10 September 1991, and stated that it did not follow from them that the transfer of property to the Republican Council had entailed a change in the State’s title to it. Trade unions had been operating under the charter of trade unions of the Soviet Union and had been Union-wide civic organisations. Therefore, the Sanatorium had been the property of a civic organisation of the former Soviet Union located on the territory of Ukraine and, when UPO had been created, the Sanatorium had belonged to the State and could be alienated only with the State’s consent. The Supreme Court also referred to the resolutions of 10 April 1992 and 4 February 1994 in support of its findings. In particular, it held that the question of holders of title to property of Union-wide civic organisations had not yet been regulated by domestic law and the property of such organisations was at present regarded as State property. Accordingly, there had been no legal grounds for the Federation to dispose of the property of Union-wide civic organisations. 33. On 2 April 2018 relevant changes were entered in the register of ownership rights to real estate. The State, as represented by the SPFU, was indicated as the new owner of the disputed property. 34. Despite the judgment of 19 September 2011, the applicant is still able to use the disputed property and children from “difficult” families and IDP families still live on those premises. The applicant also informed the Court that on 1 February 2018, at its request, the Kyiv City Commercial Court decided to postpone the execution of the judgment until 31 May 2018. As it appears from the decision of 1 February 2018, the representatives of the State did not object to that postponement.

5. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Koper. 6. After going missing on 4 November 2007, X was found dead near the local Komen-Branik road, close to the town of Komen, on the morning of 5 November 2007. He had been repeatedly stabbed and cut with a knife and then run over by a car. The police were called to the scene, as were the district state prosecutor and the duty investigating judge. 7. On examining the crime scene, X’s mobile telephone was found in his car. The incoming and outgoing calls and the text messages sent to and from X’s telephone number were checked by police officers at the scene. It appeared from the telephone records that on 4 November 2007 X had communicated only with a person using a certain telephone number, from which a message of an explicitly sexual nature had also been sent to X. After the telephone directory was checked it was established, presumably by the police, that the telephone in question belonged to a woman who happened to be the applicant’s grandmother, with whom, as established on the basis of the official records, the applicant lived. Furthermore, having been informed that X’s mobile telephone had been found, the district state prosecutor requested the duty investigating judge to order the S company – the mobile network operator in question – to produce records of telephone calls made and text messages sent from the telephone. 8. On the same day (5 November 2007) the investigating judge of the Koper District Court issued an order for a search of X’s home and ordered the S company to provide data concerning communication undertaken via X’s mobile telephone. The S company on the same day submitted to the Koper District Court a disk containing X’s telephone records. 9. On the morning of 6 November 2007 the police stopped the applicant’s car and subjected him to a so-called “security check” (varnostni pregled), finding a knife (allegedly bearing traces of what could be blood) and a mobile telephone in the applicant’s pocket. After examining his telephone they established that he had used the aforementioned telephone number from which the aforementioned calls had been made and the aforementioned message sent to X. They seized these objects and arrested the applicant. 10. On the same day (6 November 2007), relying mostly on information found in X’s and the applicant’s telephones pointing to a link between X and the applicant, the investigating judge issued a search order in respect of the applicant’s home and the cars he was using. The state prosecutor furthermore requested that a court order for the obtaining of the applicant’s comprehensive telephone records be issued. 11. On 7 November 2007 the investigating judge issued an order that the M company – a mobile network operator – provide data concerning the applicant’s mobile telephone record. The M company provided a disk containing the requested data on the same day. 12. In the course of the preliminary inquiry, the investigating judge ordered a post-mortem examination of X, a DNA analysis and a comparison of biological traces found on the applicant’s clothes and other objects seized during the home search with those found on X’s body. She also ordered a medical examination of the applicant with a view to establishing any injuries. 13. The applicant, represented by counsel, was heard on 8 November 2017 and was subsequently detained on remand. 14. On 16 November 2007 the investigating judge opened a judicial criminal investigation against the applicant in respect of the criminal offence of aggravated murder. She, inter alia: ordered that a reconstruction be carried out at the crime scene; appointed a psychiatrist and a psychologist to examine the applicant and prepare opinions; ordered forensic experts in vehicle science and car crash investigations to prepare reports on specific aspects of the case; and again ordered that the M company and the S company provide traffic data relating to X’s and the applicant’s telephones. She also examined a number of witnesses. 15. On 29 November 2007 the applicant was, at his request, heard by the investigating judge, to whom he admitted to running over X, but submitted that this had merely been an accident. 16. On 24 December 2007 the state prosecutor filed an indictment for aggravated murder against the applicant, alleging that he had killed X by stabbing him thirteen times and cutting him at least nine times on his head, neck, chest and other parts of the body and running over him in his car. 17. Following his unsuccessful objection to the indictment, the applicant was put on trial for aggravated murder. A number of hearings were held at which witnesses, experts and evidentiary material were examined and various expert reports ordered and subsequently read out. 18. On 10 June 2008 the Koper District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to thirteen years in prison. 19. On 12 December 2008 the Koper Higher Court, after an appeal by the applicant, quashed the first-instance judgment, finding that the lower court had failed to clarify the facts surrounding a possible shoe imprint on the victim’s back, which could have indicated the presence of a third person at the scene of the crime. The case was remitted to the Koper District Court for fresh examination. 20. In the retrial proceedings, several hearings were held and the applicant lodged an application for the exclusion of all evidence from (i) the records of the crime-scene investigation until (ii) the records of the last hearing in the first set of proceedings, on the grounds that that evidence had allegedly been tainted by the unlawful examinations of his and X’s telephones. He argued that the examinations of his and X’s telephones had violated his and X’s rights under Article 37 of the Constitution (see paragraph 32 above) and that the relevant court orders had been issued a week too late. He also requested that the police officers who had subjected him to a security check (see paragraph 9 above) and arrested him be examined in this connection. Both requests were refused by the court. 21. On 4 September 2009 the Koper District Court convicted the applicant for the aggravated murder of X and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. In view of (i) the expert opinions regarding the shoe traces on X’s back which had led to the conclusion that the presence of another person at the crime scene prior to X’s death could not be excluded, and (ii) the fact that the knife with which X had been stabbed and cut had not been found, the Koper District Court held that there was insufficient proof that the applicant had stabbed and cut X. However, the court found on the basis of the forensic medical evidence that X had still been alive before he had been run over by the car and that the injuries to X’s chest, spine and aorta, which had been the direct cause of his death, had been caused by the applicant having intentionally run him over with his car. It further found it proven on the basis of the evidence at the scene – such as (i) a piece of rubber tube belonging to the applicant’s car, (ii) the applicant’s biological traces found on X’s body, (iii) X’s biological traces found on, inter alia, the applicant’s clothing (which was blood-stained) and on the outside of the applicant’s car – that the applicant had been beyond doubt at the crime scene and had had contact with X. Referring, in particular, to the findings of the experts in vehicle science, who had performed reconstructions at the scene testing the applicant’s versions of events, the court discounted the possibility that the applicant had run over X by accident. The court furthermore found that the applicant and X had known each other, which was confirmed by the applicant’s statements as well as by telephone records and witness testimony. Lastly, the court referred to the telephone records, together with other evidence such as medical evidence and X’s petrol bill, when elaborating on the time of death, finding that it had undoubtedly occurred on 4 November 2007 – probably sometime after 6.24 p.m., when the last (missed) call from X’s telephone had been recorded on the applicant’s telephone. 22. As regards the procedural decisions taken during the proceedings the court gave the following explanation: - It refused a request lodged by the applicant for access to the police notes on the examination of his telephone because it would have been unlawful to include in the file evidence obtained without a court order. - In view of the foregoing conclusion that the examination of the applicant’s telephone could have not been admitted to the file, the court refused as unnecessary a request by the applicant for the examination of the officers who had seized the applicant’s telephone (see paragraph 20 above). - As regards the exclusion of evidence (see paragraph 20 above) the court explained that the applicant had become a subject of investigation following the examination of the data in X’s telephone, which had not interfered with the applicant’s rights under Article 37 of the Constitution (see paragraph 32 below). It further noted that the examination of the applicant’s telephone had amounted to a violation of the said provision but carried no evidentiary weight, as at that point the police had already obtained the necessary information from X’s telephone. In addition, the court noted that the results of this examination had not been included in the file and had not been relied on by the court. 23. On 9 November 2009 the applicant appealed, complaining, inter alia, that the judgment had violated his defence rights. In particular, he alleged that the district court should have excluded all evidence from the file because it had been based on the police’s examinations of X’s and his own mobile telephone without the necessary court order. He further stated as follows: “It is irrelevant that the police, by [their] unlawful interference with [X]’s mobile telephone, did not directly violate the appellant’s right under Article 37 of the Constitution [“Privacy of correspondence and other means of communication”], because the fact remains that the police obtained that evidence (data from [X]’s mobile telephone) without a court order – that is to say unlawfully.” 24. The applicant moreover argued that the examination of X’s telephone alone had not adduced enough evidence to arrest the applicant and that that had been possible only after the applicant’s telephone had been examined. Thus, in his view, the impugned judgment should not have concluded that the examination of his telephone had had insignificant evidentiary value. 25. On 27 January 2010 the Koper Higher Court allowed the applicant’s appeal in part and reduced his sentence to nine years in prison. The court agreed with the applicant that the act of which he had been convicted – that is to say running over X with his car – did not in itself constitute murder with aggravating factors (that is to say aggravated murder), as the first‑instance court had not proved that X had sustained severe physical pain or psychological suffering. However, all the other applicant’s complaints, including the one regarding the unlawful examinations of his and X’s mobile telephones, were dismissed. 26. As regards the examination of X’s telephone the higher court found that, regardless of whether the police officers had examined X’s telephone before the issuance of the court order, what was crucial was that they had received the court order for the telephone records to be produced before they had identified and located the applicant. Therefore, the examination of X’s mobile telephone, which had constituted an urgent step in the police inquiry, had not been conducted in violation of his constitutionally guaranteed right to protection of the privacy of communication. As regards the examination of the applicant’s mobile telephone, the higher court agreed with the lower court that “the examination of the applicant’s telephone [had been] ... unconstitutional, but this violation had not been important in the evidentiary sense”. The higher court also upheld the lower court’s decision not to obtain from the police their notes on the examination of the applicant’s telephone. 27. On 8 April 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, complaining of, inter alia, the allegedly unlawful examinations of X’s and the applicant’s telephones and reiterating the arguments he had put forward in his appeal (see paragraphs 23 and 24 above). In particular, he argued that the police had obtained crucial evidence – that is to say the message with explicitly sexual content – when examining X’s telephone without having a court order to do so, and that his arrest had been based on a subsequent unlawful examination of his telephone. 28. On 22 December 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. Firstly, as regards the police examination of X’s mobile telephone, the Supreme Court pointed out that the applicant had not even argued that the examination of X’s telephone had directly violated his own right to privacy. While not excluding the possibility that the examination of a deceased’s person’s telephone might impinge upon the most intimate spheres of his or her dignity, it considered that in the case at hand it had not interfered with X’s right to privacy, as personality rights ceased at death. Neither had, in the Supreme Court’s view, the applicant’s own constitutionally guaranteed privacy rights been interfered with, as the examination had not revealed his identity. Moreover, the district state prosecutor and the duty investigating judge had been present at the scene of the crime when the police had discovered the telephone in X’s car, and the applicant had been arrested only after the court order for the examination of X’s telephone had been issued. The Supreme Court concluded that the police’s examination of X’s mobile telephone had not interfered with the applicant’s right to privacy and that the impugned examination had not been causally related to the incriminating evidence. 29. Secondly, with regard to the police’s examination of the applicant’s mobile telephone, the Supreme Court noted that it had been undertaken without a court order and referred to the Koper Higher Court’s finding that the examination had been unconstitutional. However, in the Supreme Court’s view, the information on whether the text message with sexual content had been sent from the applicant’s telephone would have inevitably been discovered, either (i) by means of a simple call to the number from which the message had been sent, (ii) by checking the applicant’s telephone’s SIM card (for which, in the Supreme Court’s view, no court order would have been necessary), or (iii) on the basis of a court order, which had in point of fact later been issued. In view of this conclusion, the Supreme Court considered that, regardless of the fact that the police had examined the applicant’s telephone without a court order, the identification of the applicant’s mobile telephone number as the one from which the text message in question had been sent did not constitute inadmissible evidence that should have been excluded from the case file. 30. The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, reiterating the allegations made in his previous appeals. Relying on Article 37 (see paragraph 32 below) the applicant argued that the examinations of his and X’s telephone had been unlawful and that the examination of his telephone had violated the aforementioned provision, as well as Article 8 of the Convention. Relying on Article 15 of the Constitution (again, see paragraph 32 below), the applicant argued that the lower courts should have excluded the evidence obtained unlawfully. In particular, as regards the examination of X’s telephone, the applicant argued that he “had not sought redress for the violation of X’s right to privacy (mental integrity) and freedom of communication as he had not been entitled to do so [... but rather] had exclusively pointed out that the violation had occurred and the [trial] court had based its decision [to convict the applicant] on the consequences of that violation ...” In this connection he, referring to X’s “right to piety” (pravica do pietete), disputed the Supreme Court’s view that X’s right to privacy had ceased with his death and pointed out that a court order had been nevertheless subsequently issued. With regard to the Supreme Court’s finding that the evidence in question would have been inevitably discovered, the applicant argued that the domestic law contained a strict rule requiring the exclusion of all evidence obtained by means violating human rights (“the domestic exclusionary rule”). He furthermore argued that there had been a violation of Article 29 (see paragraph 32 below) of the Constitution because the first-instance court refused to obtain from the police their notes on the examination of his telephone. 31. On 28 January 2013 the Constitutional Court decided not to accept the applicant’s constitutional complaint for consideration, pursuant to section 55b(2) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 37 below).

5. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Noviy Engenoy. 6. On 1 April 2006 the applicant’s husband, Mr Vakhid Magamedov (in the documents submitted also spelt as Magomadov), went fishing with his fellow villagers, Mr Z., Mr D. and Mr Yu., near the village of Sary-Su in the Shelkovskiy district of Chechnya. The four men arrived at the fishing spot in the VAZ-2107 car of Mr Z. Three of them then went to the other side of the pond (in the documents submitted also referred to as a “lake”), while the applicant’s husband fished near the car. Mr Z., Mr D. and Mr Yu. fished about 40 to 60 metres from each other and about two hundred metres or so from Mr Magamedov. 7. At about 9 p.m. Mr Z., Mr D. and Mr Yu. heard gunfire coming from the direction of the car. They went in that direction and saw six or seven men in military camouflage uniforms next to their car and heard them speaking Russian. Those men had arrived in armoured personnel carriers (“APCs”) and were using flashlights. Mr Z., Mr D. and Mr Yu. hid in the bulrushes. Then they saw the servicemen trying to push the car into the pond and, when their attempt failed, set it on fire. Then the perpetrators noticed the three men hiding in the bulrushes and opened gunfire in their direction. 8. Mr Z., Mr D. and Mr Yu. ran to the village of Sary-Su to warn the police. On the way they got lost in the dark and only arrived at the village at about 4 a.m. on 2 April 2006. They knocked at the door of the house of a local resident, Mr Kh.V., and told him about the incident. Mr Kh.V. took them by car to the local police station. Then Mr Z., Mr D. and Mr Yu. returned to the pond, accompanied by the police. They found Vakhid Magamedov’s burnt body in the car. At about the same time three cars and two APCs belonging to the federal military forces arrived at the scene. The servicemen told the police that they were carrying out a special operation in the area. Mr Yu. told to the policemen that he would be able to identify the servicemen who had killed Vakhid Magomedov. 9. In response to the Court’s request for a copy of the entire contents of the file of the criminal investigation into the killing of Mr Vakhid Magomedov, the Government furnished a copy of its contents, amounting to 378 pages, which could be summarised as follows. 10. On 2 April 2006 Mr Z., Mr D. and Mr Yu. were taken by the police to the prosecutors’ office and questioned about the incident. Each of them provided a statement similar to the applicant’s submission to the Court and stressed that the perpetrators had been in military camouflage uniforms and that they had opened fire on them without any warning. 11. On 2 April 2006 the Shelkovskiy district prosecutor’s office (“the investigators”) opened criminal case no. 61010 into the murder of Mr Vakhid Magomedov. Mr D., Mr Yu and Mr Z. were granted victim status in the proceedings and questioned. They reiterated the statements that they had previously given. 12. On 2 April 2006 the investigators also granted Mr Kh.M., the brother of Vakhid Magomedov, victim status in the criminal case. 13. On the same date, 2 April 2006, two other local residents, Mr A.A. and Mr S.A., were questioned by the police. Their submissions were similar: both of them stated that on the morning of 1 April 2006 they had gone to the lake to fish. On the way there they had stopped to change a flat tyre when two APCs with Russian-speaking servicemen had pulled over. The servicemen checked their identity documents. About five minutes later, another military-type vehicle, a light-coloured UAZ car, had also pulled over. The military servicemen who had arrived in it, requested identity documents and then ordered that both Mr A.A. and Mr S.A. go with them to Sury-Su for a further identity check. 14. On 2 April 2006 the investigators also questioned a local resident, Mr Z.Kh., who stated that at about 8 p.m. on 1 April 2006 he had been driving to the pond to go fishing when he had seen three APCs driving in the same direction and that about two hours later he had seen those APCs driving back. 15. On 2 April 2006 the investigators also questioned a resident of Sary‑Su, Mr Kh.V., and his neighbour, Mr Sh.K., whose statements were similar to the applicant’s submission before the Court. Both witnesses also confirmed that the night before they had taken the three men, who had arrived at their village in a shaken state, to the local police station. They had also gone with the three men and the police officers to the pond, where they had seen a burnt-out car with a human body in it. 16. On 2 April 2006 the investigators examined the crime scene at the lake. They found the car, which had been completely burnt out, with traces of gunshots in the boot and a burnt corpse on the front seat. As a result, a number of spent cartridges and one bullet were collected, among other things, as evidence. 17. On 2 April 2006 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 12 April 2006) the investigators ordered a forensic examination of Vakhid Magamedov’s body (to be conducted as part of the crime-scene examination report). On 25 May 2006 the experts concluded that it was impossible to establish the exact cause of death owing to the forensic examination’s shortcomings in the description of the state of the corpse. 18. On 12 April 2006 the investigators ordered an expert ballistics examination of the evidence collected at the crime scene. On 28 April 2006 the experts concluded that the bullets and cartridges had most probably been shot from Kalashnikov machineguns and that that those guns – were they ever to be found – could be identified as those that had fired and contained, respective, those bullets and cartridges. 19. On 2 June 2006 the investigators suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. Those granted victim status in the criminal case were informed thereof. 20. From the documents submitted it transpires that following the applicant’s complaint, on 22 January 2007 a prosecutor from the Chechnya prosecutor’s office requested that the investigators inform him of the reasons for the suspension of the criminal proceedings and the theories they had examined in order to identify the perpetrators; he also requested the entire contents of the relevant criminal case file. On 20 February 2007 the investigators forwarded the case file relating to criminal case no. 61010 to the Chechen prosecutor’s office. Neither the applicant, nor her relatives were informed thereof. 21. Between February 2007 and September 2009, the criminal case file remained with the Chechen prosecutor’s office to be checked by the prosecutor’s superiors. 22. On 3 July 2009 the applicant wrote to the investigators requesting information on the developments in the criminal proceedings. She complained that neither she nor her relatives had been kept informed about progress in the investigation and that she had not been granted victim status or questioned. On 9 July 2009 she sent a similar letter to the Chechen prosecutor’s office. 23. On 25 September 2009, following the applicant’s request of 9 July 2009 to the Chechen prosecutor’s office, the latter returned the file regarding criminal case no. 61010 to the investigators, together with a list of steps to be taken in the criminal case. Inter alia, the list stipulated that: amongst other things, for the followings steps: “... it is necessary to: 7. Send requests to the law-enforcement agencies asking for their assistance in identifying the perpetrators of or witnesses to the crime; 24. On 5 October 2009 the investigators informed the applicant that the investigation in the criminal case had been suspended on 2 June 2006 for failure to identify the perpetrators. 25. On 7 October 2009 the investigators’ supervisor allowed the applicant’s complaint of 3 July 2009, after finding that the investigation had been ineffective and ordering that it be resumed. The applicant’s complaint to the investigators of 3 July 2009 concerning her victim status remained unanswered until 2015 (see paragraph 54 below). 26. On 8 and 9 October 2009 the investigators questioned Mr Sh.K. and Mr Kh.V., who reiterated their previous statements (see paragraph 15 above). 27. On 2 November 2009 the investigators questioned Mr Z., who reiterated his previous statement (see paragraph 10 above) and added that the perpetrators had completely burnt out his car. 28. On 3 November 2009 the investigators questioned Mr Kh.M., the brother of Vakhid Magamedov, who stated that he had not witnessed the incident and had only learnt of his brother’s murder on 2 April 2006. 29. On 7 November 2009 the investigators suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators (see paragraph 32 below). 30. On 10 and 13 December 2009 the applicant again wrote to the investigators and the Chechen prosecutor’s office asking for information about the progress in the investigation and the outcome of the examination of her previous request, and complaining that she had not been kept informed about progress in the proceedings. 31. On 21 December 2009 the investigators informed the applicant that the investigation had been resumed on 2 October 2009. 32. On 15 January 2010, in reply to the applicant’s request for information, the investigators informed her that they had suspended the proceedings on 7 November 2009. 33. On 1 and 6 March 2010 the applicant complained to the investigators and the Russian Prosecutor General that the investigation had been ineffective and that she had not been kept informed of progress in the proceedings. 34. On 26 March 2010 the investigators informed the applicant that her complaint had been rejected as the criminal case file had been transferred to the Southern Federal Circuit Investigative Committee. 35. On 7 June 2010 the applicant again complained to the investigators of the lack of information in respect of the proceedings. On 30 June 2010 they replied that the suspension of the investigation on 7 November 2009 has been overruled as unlawful and that she would be informed of any further decision taken. 36. On 30 June 2010 following the applicant’s above-mentioned complaint, the investigators’ supervisor (the deputy prosecutor of the Shelkovskiy district) criticised the investigators and ordered that a number of shortcomings in the criminal proceedings be remedied. In particular, he requested that the previously-given orders should be carried out (see paragraph 23 above). 37. On 5 July 2010, following the above instructions, the investigators resumed the investigation. 38. Between 13 and 26 July 2010 the police questioned several neighbours of Vakhid Magamedov, all of whom stated that they had either no information about the incident or had heard about it from others. 39. On 16 July 2010 the investigators questioned two police officers, G. and T., who stated that they had been on duty at the police station when they had been informed about the incident at the pond. They had not gone to the crime scene and therefore had no information concerning “either the spent cartridges found at the scene or the three APCs there”. 40. On 7 July 2010 Mr Z. and Mr Yu. sent to the investigators written affidavits describing the events of 1 April 2006. Copies of those documents were not furnished to the Court with the copy of the criminal case file. 41. On 5 August 2010 the investigators again questioned Mr Kh.M., the brother of Vakhid Magamedov, who reaffirmed his previous statement. 42. On 7 August 2010 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 7 August 2013) the investigators again suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. 43. On 3 July 2013 the applicant requested information on the progress of the investigation in respect of case no. 61010. No reply was forthcoming. 44. On 27 November 2013, following a complaint lodged by the applicant, the deputy prosecutor of the Shelkovskiy district again criticised the investigators and ordered that a number of shortcomings in the proceedings be remedied. In particular, he instructed that the previously-given orders should be carried out (see paragraphs 23 and 36 above). 45. On 25 December 2013 the investigators resumed the investigation. 46. On 31 December 2013 the investigators again suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. 47. On 20 October 2014 the investigators’ supervisor ordered that the investigation be resumed, having found that it had been suspended unlawfully, without the prescribed steps having been taken. 48. On 31 October 2014 the investigators resumed the investigation. 49. On 1 November 2014 the investigators questioned Mr Kh.M., the brother of Vakhid Magamedov, who reaffirmed his previous statement and added that his relatives had refused to allow the exhumation of his body as it had been burnt and it had been clear that he had died from gunshot wounds. 50. On 8 November 2014 the investigators questioned several residents of Sary-Su who stated that between 1999 and 2008 the federal military forces and law enforcement agencies had been based in their village. 51. On 15 November 2014 the investigators again questioned Mr Z. and Mr Yu. and Mr D., who reiterated their previous statements (see paragraph 10 above). 52. On 23 November 2014 the investigators questioned the head of the Shelkovskiy district police, who stated that he had participated in the crime‑scene examination in 2006 but could not recall the details, owing to the passage of time. 53. On 31 November 2014 the investigators again suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. 54. On 20 April 2015 the investigators resumed the investigation in order to take a number of steps, including granting the applicant victim status in the criminal case and questioning her. 55. On 17 April 2015 the investigators’ supervisor ordered that a number of steps be taken, including the questioning again of the witness who had seen the APCs in the vicinity of the crime scene on the day of the incident. 56. On 20 May 2015, in reply to a request lodged by the applicant for information, the investigators informed her that on 20 May 2015 the proceedings had been suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 57. There is no further information on the criminal proceedings. They appear to be still pending.

5. The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Moscow. 6. On 21 August 2007 the applicant’s wife, Ch., gave birth to a son, A. 7. The family lived at the applicant’s flat, where A. had his registered residence. He received ongoing paediatric care at the neighbourhood children’s clinic and attended a neighbourhood nursery school. 8. In November 2009 Ch. decided to leave the applicant. She moved back to her parents’ residence and took A. with her. A. has been living with her ever since. 9. On 9 March 2010 the applicant applied to the Justice of the Peace of the 339th Court Circuit of the Vostochnoe Dergunino District of Moscow for a residence order under which A. would live with him. He was instructed to make corrections to his claim, which he did on 8 April 2010. On the same day the case was transferred to the Timiryazevskiy District Court of Moscow. It registered the case on 26 April 2010 and scheduled the first hearing for 13 May 2010. 10. On 26 April 2010 Ch. lodged a counterclaim, asking for a residence order under which A. would live with her, and for an interim measure pending the proceedings. She claimed, in particular, that there was a risk that the applicant might kidnap A. and take him to Belarus, where his stepfather had a house. She stated that he had already tried to take A. away from her and had in particular attempted to pick him up from the boy’s nursery school. 11. On the same day, 26 April 2010, the Timiryazevskiy District Court allowed Ch.’s request for an interim measure and forbade the applicant from contacting A. or picking him up from the nursery school without Ch.’s prior permission. It held as follows: “The subject matter of the case is the residence of a child [A.] born in 2007. The parents have been unable to come to an agreement on this matter. The child is now living with his mother [Ch.]. The court therefore considers that the requested interim measure would be proportionate to the claim. Otherwise, failure to take interim measures might complicate or make impossible the execution of the forthcoming judgment.” 12. The applicant learned of the interim measure on 30 April 2010. On that day he came to visit A. at the nursery school and the teachers refused to let him see the boy, citing the interim order. 13. In April and May 2010 the Lyublino and Dergunino childcare authorities examined the applicant’s and Ch.’s flats and found their living conditions satisfactory and suitable for a small child. 14. The first hearing was scheduled for 20 May 2010 but it was adjourned until 24 May 2010 at the applicant’s request. The next hearing was scheduled for 9 June 2010 but it was also adjourned until 23 June 2010 for the purposes of “obtaining evidence”. 15. On 22 June 2010 the Lyublino childcare authority issued its report on the case. It considered that, by reason of his very young age, A. should reside with his mother. The childcare authority considered that it was particularly important for a child to be raised by the mother until the age of five or six. A lack of maternal care during that period, and in particular during the behavioural crises that a three-year-old typically undergoes, could result in the child developing negative character traits, such as stubbornness, surliness, hysterical reactions and inadequate social adaptation. The residence arrangements could be reconsidered after A. had reached the age of five or six years. 16. On 29 June 2010 the Timiryazevskiy District Court ordered an expert psychological examination and adjourned the proceedings. The experts were asked their opinion on what residence arrangements would be in A.’s best interests. 17. On 6 July 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Moscow City Court against the decision of 29 June 2010 ordering an expert examination. The appeal hearing was scheduled for 29 July 2010 but was adjourned until 17 August 2010 because the parties did not appear. On 17 August 2010 the Moscow City Court upheld on appeal the decision of 29 June 2010. The case file was sent to the experts on 8 September 2010. 18. Meanwhile, as Ch. had prevented him from seeing A., the applicant applied to the childcare authority for a contact order. On 15 July 2010 the childcare authority rejected the application, referring to the interim measure imposed by the Timiryazevskiy District Court. 19. On 9 August 2010 the District Court received by post the applicant’s appeal, dated 6 May 2010, against the decision of 26 April 2010 ordering the interim measure. The applicant submitted that there had been no justification for the interim measure, which had been motivated solely by the prevailing belief that a child should be raised by the mother rather than the father. He further submitted that the interim measure was contrary to A.’s best interests. A lack of contact with his father and the paternal family – A.’s grandparents, uncle, aunt and cousins – to whom he was very attached might cause A. psychological trauma. It might, moreover, result in A.’s estrangement from his father or, given his very young age, even his forgetting his father altogether. It also created a risk that Ch. might turn A. against his father. It might in turn mean that the results of any future expert examinations – and, by extension, any future judicial decision on the child’s residence – would be biased against the applicant. Lastly, the applicant submitted that the interim measure breached his right to maintain contact with his son. 20. On 17 September 2010 the Justice of the Peace of the 133th Court Circuit of the Mytichshinskiy District of the Moscow Region convicted Ch. of assault and battery, a criminal offence under Article 116 of the Criminal Code. In particular, the court found it established that on 20 June 2010 the applicant had approached Ch. and A. while they were playing at the local public beach and had hugged his son. Ch. had immediately snatched the boy away from him and had hit the applicant at least two times, causing him bodily injuries, before carrying the boy away. A fine was imposed on her. 21. On 11 November 2010 the experts issued their report. They found that it would be beneficial for A. to maintain contact with both parents. He was equally attached to both of them. Both parents were equally capable of raising the child. The serious conflict currently persisting between the parents could negatively affect A.’s psychological development. 22. On 12 November 2010 the proceedings were resumed. Hearings were scheduled for 24 November and 7 December 2010 but could not take place because some of the participants did not appear. 23. On 23 December 2010 the Dergunino childcare authority issued its report on the case. It found that A. should reside with his mother, referring to A.’s young age and the fact that he had lived with his mother for some time already and was attending a neighbouring nursery school. 24. During the hearing of 24 December 2010 the applicant lodged an objection against the judge of the Timiryazevskiy District Court, submitting that she (that is to say the judge) had stated on several occasions that she would rule against the applicant because according to the established practice of the Timiryazevskiy District Court a residence order was always made in favour of the mother. The judge dismissed the applicant’s objection. 25. On 18 January 2011 the Timiryazevskiy District Court allowed a request lodged by the applicant for the proceedings to be stayed; it accordingly stayed the residence order proceedings pending the criminal proceedings against Ch. 26. On 26 January 2011 the Mytishchi City Court upheld Ch.’s criminal conviction on appeal. The conviction acquired binding force. 27. On 8 February 2011 the Moscow City Court quashed on appeal the decision of 26 April 2010 ordering the interim measure. It found that the interim measure had been unconnected to the subject matter of the case and had therefore been disproportionate. There had been no evidence that the execution of the forthcoming judgment might be complicated or impossible. By applying the interim measure, the judge had prejudged the case. The City Court remitted Ch.’s request for an interim measure for fresh examination by the Timiryazevskiy District Court, which rejected it on 1 April 2011 as unsubstantiated. 28. Meanwhile, on 16 March 2011 the childcare authority instructed Ch. that she should stop preventing A. from seeing his paternal family. 29. On 30 March 2011 the Timiryazevskiy District Court granted the divorce of the applicant and Ch. 30. On 7 April 2011 the Moscow City Court, acting by way of supervisory review, quashed the judgment of 26 January 2011 upholding Ch.’s conviction and remitted the criminal case for fresh examination by the appellate court. 31. On 12 April 2011 the Timiryazevskiy District Court resumed the residence order proceedings and held a hearing. 32. During the hearings the applicant stated that he possessed a comfortable flat in a safe and ecologically clean neighbourhood, with parks and schools in the vicinity. Before the applicant’s separation from his former wife, A. had attended a nursery school in that neighbourhood. The applicant also had a countryside residence. Being the owner of his own business, he had flexible working hours and could therefore devote a lot of time to his son. He had always paid child maintenance and his income permitted him to give the child a good education. There was a strong personal attachment between the applicant and his son; A. was also very attached to his paternal family – especially his cousin, who was of the same age. The applicant had positive character references: he was calm, polite and affectionate towards his son. By contrast, Ch. was aggressive and irresponsible. She had physically assaulted him in front of A. and had been criminally convicted in connection with that incident. She had also been convicted of the administrative offence of leaving the scene of a road accident and had had her driving licence suspended for a year. As could be seen from the documents submitted by the applicant to the court, she lived in a severely polluted and criminally unsafe neighbourhood in the vicinity of an oil refinery plant and a prison. Moreover, Ch. shared her flat with her mother, who smoked and abused alcohol and could therefore have a bad influence on A. Until recently, Ch. had prevented the applicant and his relatives from seeing A., and currently she allowed occasional contact only. 33. The applicant’s mother and sister stated that Ch. prevented them from seeing A. Ch. was often aggressive and occasionally abused alcohol. All her family smoked, even in the child’s presence. A. was very attached to his father and obviously suffered from their forced separation. 34. Ch. stated that the applicant would have no time to take care of the child as he was managing a business, was following a distance-learning course at a university and had earlier stated his intention of building a countryside residence. Ch. had a higher education and was working. The alleged defects in her character and behaviour to which the applicant had referred had been confirmed by his relatives only. 35. A teacher from A.’s current nursery school stated that she had seen the applicant once and that he had made a bad impression on her. On 30 April 2010 he had come to the nursery school and had told her that he wanted to take A. home with him. When she had refused to let him in, referring to the court order prohibiting any contact between them, he had become agitated and had talked about taking A. away with him when the children went out for a walk. 36. The director of the nursery school gave a similar description of the incident. She said that the applicant had become angry when he had learned of the court decision ordering the interim measure, had asked for a copy of that measure and had called his lawyer. 37. The following documents were submitted by the parties for the court’s examination: (i) the applicant’s and Ch.’s pay statements, (ii) documents showing that the district where Ch. lived was among the most polluted districts of Moscow, (iii) documents from the criminal case file against Ch., and (iv) documents relating to A.’s medical history and A.’s pre-school education both at the applicant’s place of residence prior to his parents’ separation and at the mother’s place of residence after the separation. 38. On 12 April 2011 the Timiryazevskiy District Court granted Ch.’s application for a residence order in her favour and dismissed a similar application by the applicant. It held as follows: “Having examined the entirety of the evidence, the court finds that there is a very serious conflict between the parties as regards the child’s residence arrangements, ... which has a negative impact on the child by creating a psychologically unhealthy and tense atmosphere around him. At the same time, each parent, taken alone, possesses moral, personal and other qualities rendering each of them capable of raising a small child. According to the expert report, the child is equally attached to both of them. It also follows from the expert report that the parents’ improper behaviour towards each other may have negative psychological consequences for the child. The court notes that [Ch.’s] criminal conviction for assaulting [the applicant] has not yet acquired binding force. It however takes into account the criminal charges brought against her. It is clear that the incident was prompted by the personal hostility [between the applicant and Ch.] caused by a disagreement on the issue of their son’s residence and education. In the court’s opinion, these charges cannot constitute a decisive reason for making a residence order in favour of the father. There is an accumulation of reasons on the basis of which the court considers that the child should live with the mother. In the present case the court is guided by the best interests of child [A.], who at the moment of the judgment has not yet reached the age of four years old and who has an established way of life. For a long time the child has lived with his mother at her place of residence and has attended a nursery school there. Given his age, a change of residence and a separation from the mother will have a negative impact on the child’s general and psychological state. The court considers that [the applicant’s] arguments that the district where [Ch.] lives is polluted and that close members of her family smoke cannot serve as a basis for making a residence order in favour of the father because, as mentioned above, a change of residence will have a negative impact on the child. [The applicant’s] arguments that he has better living conditions and a better financial situation than [Ch.] are not decisive for granting a residence order to the father either. The childcare authorities are unanimous that it is in [A.’s] interests to live with the mother. The court agrees with that finding. The court also finds that [the applicant’s] request for a residence order is at the moment premature. [The applicant] is entitled to apply for a reconsideration of the issue after A. has reached a more conscious age [по достижению сыном более сознательного возраста].” 39. The applicant appealed, repeating the arguments he had raised before the District Court. He relied, in particular, on the right to equality between spouses. 40. On 30 June 2011 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 12 April 2011 on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. 41. On 6 December 2011 the Lyublinskiy District Court of Moscow found it established that Ch. was preventing the applicant and his family –namely his mother, brother and sister – from seeing A. It held that A. was entitled to maintain contact with his father and his paternal family and determined the contact schedule as follows. The applicant should be able to have contact with A. (i) on the first and third weekend of each month from 10 a.m. on Saturday until 8 p.m. on Sunday at the applicant’s place of residence, in the mother’s absence and with the right to attend outdoor activities for children, and (ii) for two weeks during the summer and two weeks during the winter on dates agreed with the mother, provided that the child is in good health, with the right to leave Moscow and to go abroad. The applicant’s mother, brother and sister should be able to have contact sessions with A. from 11 a.m. until 1 p.m. on the first and third Saturdays of each month at the applicant’s place of residence. 42. On an unspecified date the Moscow City Court upheld that judgment on appeal. 43. On 2 February 2012 the Mytischy Town Court upheld Ch.’s conviction for assault and battery on appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Rijeka. 6. On 10 December 1995 the applicant’s employment as an unqualified worker was terminated as a result of her employer becoming insolvent. At that time she had twenty-four years and ten months of service (radni staž) recorded in her “employment book” (radna knjižica). 7. The medical documentation submitted by the applicant shows that since 1993 she has been suffering from a psychiatric condition – depression and neurosis. The medical documents from various dates show her continuous incapacity of working. 8. On 5 November 1996 the Regional Office of the Croatian Employment Bureau in Rijeka (Hrvatski zavod za zapošljavanje, Područna služba u Rijeci, hereinafter “the Rijeka Employment Bureau”) granted the applicant unemployment benefits in the amount of 410.89 Croatian kunas (HRK – about 55 euros (EUR)) for 468 days, starting from 11 December 1995. There was no appeal, so that decision became final. 9. On 17 June 1997 the applicant lodged an application with the Rijeka Employment Bureau for the extension of the duration of unemployment benefits due to her ongoing temporary inability to work. She submitted a medical certificate that she had been ill and thus temporarily incapable of working. 10. On 27 June 1997 the Rijeka Employment Bureau, relying on section 25(1)(2) of the Employment Act, renewed her entitlement to unemployment benefits until further notice. She was to receive HRK 441 (about EUR 59) per month. This entitlement was to continue unless any legally prescribed conditions for withholding the payments occurred before the entitlement period expired, or until her right to compensation ceased to exist. 11. In December 1997 two additional pensionable years of service (staž osiguranja) were entered into the applicant’s employment book. However, that did not mean that the applicant was actually employed, but only that contributions for her pension and invalidity insurance had been paid. Such contributions are regularly paid by employers. However, since the applicant was not employed, these contributions were paid by the Croatian Employment Bureau. 12. On 26 May 1999 the Rijeka Employment Bureau provided the applicant with an “employment benefit card” (kartica korisnika novčane naknade). 13. On 27 March 2001 the Rijeka Employment Bureau terminated the applicant’s entitlement to unemployment benefits with effect from 10 June 1998. It held that the deadline prescribed in section 25(1)(2) of the Employment Act had expired on 9 June 1998. 14. On 3 April 2001 the Rijeka Employment Bureau established that the applicant was to repay it the amount of HRK 19,451.69 (about EUR 2,600). 15. The applicant lodged appeals against both decisions with the Central Office of the Croatian Employment Bureau (Hrvatski zavod za zapošljavanje, Središnja služba, hereinafter “the Central Employment Bureau”). She argued that she had the right to unemployment benefits until she retired. She also relied on her family circumstances and submitted that she was married and that her husband’s pension was HRK 1400 (about EUR 188), and that they had a child of school age and an older son who was employed. However, that body dismissed both her appeals as unfounded on 11 May 2001 and 15 May 2001. It held that she had been entitled to unemployment benefits for as long as she had been unable to work, but subject to a limit of twelve months. 16. On 25 July 2001 the applicant then lodged two administrative actions with the Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the Central Employment Bureau’s decisions of 11 and 15 May 2001. She claimed that she had twenty-seven years of service, and as such was entitled to unemployment benefits until she was next employed or until she retired. 17. On 22 September 2004 the Administrative Court dismissed the claim concerning the decision of 11 May 2001 upholding the decision of 27 March 2001 (see paragraph 10 above) as ill-founded, endorsing the arguments and conclusions of the lower bodies. 18. In a separate judgment of the same day the Administrative Court quashed the decision of 15 May 2001 which upheld the decision of 3 April 2001 by which the applicant had been ordered to repay the sum of HRK 19,451.69 (see paragraph 14 above). It instructed the parties to seek relief in civil proceedings before a competent municipal court. 19. On 25 March 2005 the Rijeka Employment Bureau contacted the applicant by letter, proposing to reach an out-of-court settlement within fifteen days regarding the repayment of the unemployment benefits which she had received between 9 June 1998 and 27 March 2001, in total HRK 19,451.69. She was cautioned that the Rijeka Employment Bureau would otherwise be compelled to institute civil proceedings against her for repayment of the amount claimed. 20. The applicant replied that she was in poor health, unemployed and without any income, and that in these circumstances she could not accept the obligation to repay the money sought. 21. On 14 April 2009 the applicant lodged an application with the Rijeka Employment Bureau, seeking to overturn its 27 March 2001 decision to terminate her entitlement to unemployment benefits. It was dismissed on 29 June 2009 and this decision was upheld on appeal on 10 July 2009 as well as by the High Administrative Court on 5 July 2012. 22. A subsequent constitutional complaint by the applicant was declared inadmissible on 19 December 2012. 23. On 3 August 2005 the Rijeka Employment Bureau brought a civil action against the applicant for unjust enrichment, seeking repayment of HRK 19,451.69, together with statutory interest, on the basis of the unemployment benefits she had received between 10 June 1998 and 27 March 2001. 24. On 16 November 2005 the applicant responded to the civil action, alleging, inter alia, that the Rijeka Employment Bureau’s actions violated her human rights. She also submitted medical documentation demonstrating her fragile state of health, numerous health problems caused by her difficult personal situation due to long-term unemployment, the poverty in which she and her family lived, and her inability to work. She also brought a counterclaim against the Rijeka Employment Bureau, seeking payment of unemployment benefits from 31 January 2011 to the date of her future retirement, in the amount of HRK 55,680.15. 25. On 26 June 2006 the Rijeka Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Rijeci) dismissed the Rijeka Employment Bureau’s claim as unfounded, relying on section 55 of the Employment Mediation and Unemployment Rights Act (see paragraph 36 below). It held that the applicant could not be held responsible for the bureau’s errors and negligence, particularly bearing in mind that she had not concealed any fact or misled it. The same court also rejected the applicant’s counterclaim, given that a final and binding decision on her entitlement to unemployment benefits had already been adopted in the administrative proceedings, and that such a decision could not be contested in the context of civil proceedings. 26. Both the applicant and the Rijeka Employment Bureau lodged appeals against the first‑instance judgment. 27. On 25 February 2009 the Rijeka County Court (Županijski sud u Rijeci) dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment with regard to her counterclaim. It also allowed the Rijeka Employment Bureau’s appeal and, relying on section 210 of the Civil Obligations Act, reversed the first-instance judgment in respect of the unjust enrichment claim, and ordered the applicant to pay HRK 19,451.69 plus statutory interest running form 3 August 2005 (the date of lodging the claim against the applicant) to the Rijeka Employment Bureau. It held that the applicant was obliged to return the amount in dispute in view of the fact that a legal basis for the unemployment benefits had ceased to exist on 10 June 1998. 28. The applicant then lodged both an appeal on points of law and a constitutional complaint. 29. On 28 April 2010 the Supreme Court declared her appeal on points of law inadmissible. The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint against that decision. 30. On 14 March 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed both of her constitutional complaints as unfounded. It served its decision on the applicant’s representative on 27 March 2013. 31. Meanwhile, on 5 December 2012 the applicant had replied to the Rijeka Employment Bureau’s letter offering her an out-of-court settlement for the amount owed to be reimbursed in sixty instalments. She had stated that she was not able to repay the amount due because she was unemployed, in ill health and had no income. She asked the Rijeka Employment Bureau for debt relief. 32. On 22 April 2013, before the Rijeka Municipal Court, the Rijeka Employment Bureau lodged an application to enforce the Rijeka County Court’s judgment of 25 February 2009 against the applicant. 33. On 20 June 2013 the Rijeka Municipal Court issued a writ of execution in respect of the applicant’s bank account(s). 34. On 26 June 2013 the first-instance court ordered the applicant to pay court fees in the amount of HRK 540 (about EUR 72), on account of the enforcement application and the writ of execution. 35. By a letter of 14 August 2013 the Financial Agency (FINA) informed the first-instance court that there were no records of the applicant’s active bank accounts. 36. By a conclusion (zaključak) of 30 September 2013 the Rijeka Municipal Court informed the Rijeka Employment Bureau about the Financial Agency’s letter and ordered it to give the court information about the applicant’s bank account or make a further proposal. 37. On 22 October 2013 the Rijeka Employment Bureau lodged an application to change the object of the enforcement (prijedlog za promjenu predmeta i sredstva ovrhe), and requested enforcement in relation to the applicant’s movable property, given that she was unemployed and had no income, real property or motor vehicle. 38. By a decision taken on 8 December 2014 the Rijeka Municipal Court declared the application of 22 October 2013 inadmissible on the basis that it was premature, since changing the object of enforcement is not possible before a writ of execution becomes final. 39. The enforcement proceedings are still ongoing.

5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Tauragė region. 6. Since 1999 she has been diagnosed with several mental disorders, such as schizo-affective disorder, depression, mania, and panic disorder. She has been admitted to psychiatric hospitals multiple times. However, during the events described below, she retained full legal capacity (see paragraph 37 below). 7. From February to September 2014 the applicant was given administrative penalties for insulting another person in a public place (minor hooliganism under Article 174 of the Code of Administrative Offences), for threatening a teenager with an electroshock device and for scaring a minor (infringement of children’s rights under Article 1813 of the Code of Administrative Offences). 8. In 2013 the applicant bought a tear-gas dispenser. According to her, she had done so in order to defend herself against some inhabitants of her village who often insulted her because of her mental illness. On 16 November 2013, at around 7.30 p.m., the applicant sprayed tear gas at a fifteen-year-old called E. It appears that the tear gas caused E. physical pain but she did not suffer any injuries. 9. The Tauragė police opened a pre-trial investigation against the applicant for breach of public order under Article 284 § 1 of the Criminal Code. Between November 2013 and January 2014 the police interviewed E. and several other teenagers who had been with her on the evening of 16 November 2013. They all stated that on that evening they had been “hanging out” near one of the residential buildings in the village when E. had decided to go to another friend’s house. When she had started walking, the applicant had suddenly appeared from around the corner, quickly approached E. and sprayed her in the eyes with tear gas. E. herself and the other interviewed teenagers stated that although E. had had some verbal conflicts with the applicant in the past, on that evening she had not done anything to provoke the applicant. 10. On 18 December 2013 the police asked a court psychiatric centre in Klaipėda whether, in the light of the applicant’s history of mental illness, it was necessary for her to undergo a psychiatric assessment in order to determine whether she could be held criminally responsible for the offence. A psychiatric expert, having examined the applicant’s medical file, concluded that such an assessment was necessary. 11. On 10 January 2014 the applicant was served with an official notice that she was suspected of having committed the offence provided under Article 284 § 1 of the Criminal Code. She was given State‑guaranteed legal aid. She was interviewed on that same day and admitted to having sprayed tear gas at E. However, she claimed to have done so in self‑defence – she stated that on the evening of 16 November 2013 E. had kicked the door of her apartment and had thrown a stone at her window. 12. On 28 March 2014 the Tauragė district prosecutor informed the applicant and her lawyer that, in line with Article 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 42 below), it was necessary for the applicant to undergo a psychiatric assessment. The prosecutor appended a list of questions to be submitted to the psychiatric expert and informed the applicant and her lawyer that they had the right to submit additional questions and material for the assessment, as well as to ask for the appointment of a particular expert. The applicant and her lawyer did not respond. 13. On 3 April 2014 the Tauragė District Court ordered a psychiatric assessment of the applicant. A copy of that order has not been provided to the Court. The applicant later submitted to the domestic courts that she had not been notified of it (see paragraph 22 below). 14. It transpires from the parties’ submissions that on the morning of 15 April 2014 the applicant was present at the Tauragė police station for unspecified reasons, when two police officers handcuffed her, took her to a police car and drove her to the court psychiatric centre in Klaipėda, approximately 110 kilometres from Tauragė. 15. A report drawn up on that same day by one of the officers who had seized the applicant read as follows: “I hereby inform that on 15 April 2014 during the general morning meeting of the Prevention Sub-division, an oral instruction was received from [the chief] to execute the order of the Tauragė District Court, which ordered that [the applicant] be brought (atvesdinti) to the Klaipėda court psychiatric centre where she was to undergo a psychiatric assessment, in connection with an ongoing pre‑trial investigation. [The chief] announced that [the applicant] was waiting outside the Operative Management Division. At around 8.40 a.m., together with [Officer D.P.], we ordered [the applicant to] go with the police officers into a police car, so that she could be taken to the Klaipėda court psychiatric centre to undergo a psychiatric assessment. However, [the applicant] mockingly responded that police officers did not have the right to take her anywhere, and threatened to have everyone who touched her fired. It was repeated several times [to the applicant] that coercion and special measures could be used against her for refusing to comply with lawful orders of police officers. As [the applicant] was not paying attention to these warnings, I took her hand, but [she] tried to bite my left palm; she did not succeed, so I did not need medical help. [The applicant] began to resist by jostling, stiffening her hands, and trying to get away. By doing so [she] resisted and disobeyed lawful orders. As [the applicant] continued disobeying officers’ lawful orders, with the help of [three other officers] [she] was handcuffed and taken to a [police] car.” One of the other officers who had participated in the applicant’s seizure submitted a report with essentially the same wording. 16. It is not clear when the applicant was released from the court psychiatric centre and how she returned to her home. The Government submitted that the psychiatric assessment had been completed on the same day and the applicant had not been detained any longer (see paragraph 64 below). 17. According to the applicant, the police officers did not explain to her why she was being seized and did not draw up a record of provisional arrest (see paragraph 61 below). 18. On 15 April 2014 the applicant was examined by two court‑appointed psychiatrists. The report of the assessment, drawn up on that same day, stated the following: “The patient was brought to the assessment by police officers. At the beginning of the assessment she was hostile, outraged by the behaviour of the police, she spoke in a raised voice and refused to provide her anamnestic data. Having calmed down, she provided information about the main events of her life but her narration was characterised by strong emotional reactions (afektas) [which were] inappropriate to the situation, elevated mood and overestimation of herself. She had no complaints about her health, she thought that she was healthy and did not need any help. ... The patient’s mental state during the assessment. [She had] a complete grasp of the time, the place and herself (orientuota pilnai laike, vietoje ir savyje). [She was wearing] bright make-up and clothes. At the beginning of the assessment [she was] outraged and loudly expressed dissatisfaction that police officers had brought her to the assessment by force, without her consent. She understood the purpose of the assessment. She stated that she did not have any illnesses and did not require treatment. She actively expressed discontent with the law-enforcement authorities and the inhabitants of her area. The patient’s mental condition is characterised by angry mania: joyful moods [which are] not appropriate to the situation, accelerated [mental] associations, excessive activity, at the same time expressions of anger, irritation, short temper. When talking about the major events in her life, she overestimates herself, underlines her achievements in her former professional life, her significant role in educating children at school. She expresses anger at the lifestyle of asocial families in the neighbourhood and the wider area [and says that] she is ready to not put up with it and to fight against it. [She does not display] a critical view of her illness (be esminės kritikos susirgimo atžvilgiu). She speaks loudly about the criminal allegations against her, denies them and blames the victim, her parents and the surroundings.” 19. The report concluded that the applicant had a chronic mental disorder ‑ schizo-affective disorder with a type of mania (lėtinis psichikos sutrikimas ‑ šizoafektinis sutrikimas, manijos tipas), that because of that disorder she had been incapable of understanding and controlling her actions at the time of the alleged criminal offence, and that those circumstances persisted at the time of the assessment. The psychiatrists recommended that the applicant not be called before a court, nor subjected to any procedural measures, and that she be admitted to Rokiškis Psychiatric Hospital for compulsory inpatient treatment. 20. On 22 April 2014 an administrative-violation report was drawn up against the applicant for having violently resisted police officers on 15 April 2014 (see paragraph 14 above). The Tauragė District Court held an oral hearing on 2 June 2014 in which the applicant was present. Relying on the abovementioned psychiatric assessment (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above), the court discontinued the administrative proceedings on the grounds that the applicant could not be held liable for the offence. 21. On 3 June 2014 the prosecutor referred the case to the Tauragė District Court and asked the court to order compulsory medical treatment for the applicant (taikyti priverčiamąsias medicinos priemones). 22. On 11 June 2014 the applicant sent a letter to the Tauragė District Court, stating that she was not aware whether there were any ongoing criminal proceedings against her and asking the court to inform her of any such proceedings and of her procedural status in them. She also stated that she had not been notified of any court order to take her for a psychiatric assessment against her will (see paragraph 13 above) and asked to be provided with a copy of such an order. The following day the applicant received a response from the court informing her of the proceedings concerning compulsory medical treatment (see paragraph 21 above). The court also stated that the file of that case did not contain any order to take her for a psychiatric assessment against her will. 23. On 17 June 2014 the applicant sent another letter to the Tauragė District Court. In it she asked to be given an opportunity to attend the court’s hearing in the case concerning compulsory medical treatment which would be held on 30 June 2014. She did not receive any response from the court. 24. On 26 June 2014 the applicant was voluntarily admitted to a psychiatric hospital in Klaipėda. 25. On 30 June 2014 the Tauragė District Court held a hearing in the case against the applicant concerning compulsory medical treatment. The applicant was absent from the hearing but her lawyer was present. 26. The court heard one of the psychiatrists who had examined the applicant (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). He gave the following responses to the questions submitted to him by the judge and the applicant’s lawyer (the questions were not included in the minutes of the hearing): “I stand by my responses given in the assessment report.” “As of this moment, I cannot say if procedural steps can be conducted with [the applicant]. As I understand from [the documents provided by the court], she is currently undergoing treatment ... I understand that she underwent treatment already in May ... at a psychiatric hospital. The treatment was not effective because [later] she was hospitalised again. I think that it is necessary to order compulsory medical treatment.” “Right now I cannot say precisely if inpatient treatment at Rokiškis Psychiatric Hospital is necessary because she is currently being treated at [Klaipėda hospital]. [It appears] that that treatment is not sufficiently effective. I recommend inpatient treatment.” The psychiatrist also stated that the treatment provided to the applicant at the Klaipėda hospital constituted “psychiatric supervision” (psichikos priežiūra) which was different from compulsory treatment; the applicant had undergone outpatient treatment before and it had not been effective. He further considered that compulsory treatment was necessary because the applicant lived alone and refused to take medication, and there was nobody to take care of her if her mental health deteriorated. 27. The applicant’s lawyer argued before the court that since the psychiatric assessment the applicant’s mental health had improved considerably because she was undergoing treatment (see paragraph 24 above). He submitted that it would not be appropriate to order compulsory treatment without examining the effects of that treatment and that it was therefore necessary to conduct a fresh psychiatric assessment. 28. On 1 July 2014 the Tauragė District Court adopted a one-and-a-half page decision ordering the applicant’s inpatient treatment under general supervision at Rokiškis Psychiatric Hospital (see paragraph 46 below). The court held that the applicant’s guilt in respect of the criminal offence had been proved by witness testimonies and the applicant’s own statements (see paragraphs 9 and 11 above). It then referred to the findings of the psychiatric assessment that the applicant had a chronic mental disorder which rendered her incapable of understanding and controlling her actions, unable to participate in the pre-trial investigation and the hearing, and for which she required hospitalisation (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). The court also cited the statements of the psychiatric expert given during the hearing, who also recommended compulsory inpatient treatment for the applicant (see paragraph 26 above). It concluded that at the time of the offence, as well as at the time of the decision, the applicant could not be held criminally responsible (buvo ir šiuo metu yra nepakaltinama). The court exempted the applicant from criminal responsibility and ordered her hospitalisation at the psychiatric hospital in Rokiškis. 29. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. She submitted that she had been informed of the possibility to subject her to compulsory treatment only on 12 June 2014 (see paragraph 22 above) and complained that she had not been summoned to the hearing, despite having expressed a wish to attend (see paragraph 23 above). She complained that the first‑instance court had not adequately assessed her mental condition because it had not examined her in person, had not heard evidence from the doctor treating her and had not ordered a fresh psychiatric assessment, despite the fact that since June 2014 she had been voluntarily undergoing psychiatric treatment. The applicant pointed out that the psychiatrist interviewed by the court had acknowledged that he had been unable to comment on her mental condition at the time of the hearing (see paragraph 26 above). The applicant further complained about the court’s decision to hospitalise her rather than order outpatient treatment. She submitted that the court had not assessed whether she had posed a danger to society – the applicant submitted that the offence which she had committed had not been serious and that she had committed it because of the pre‑existing conflict between E. and herself and not because of her mental disorder, so the disorder had not made her a danger to others. The applicant also complained about the court’s decision to commit her to a hospital in Rokiškis (more than 200 kilometres from Tauragė) and not one which was closer to her home. 30. In the appeal the applicant also raised complaints about being taken for a psychiatric assessment without her consent on 15 April 2014. She submitted that she had not been informed that a psychiatric assessment had been ordered and had not been provided with a court order to that effect, that a record of provisional arrest had not been drawn up, a lawyer had not been present during the assessment, and she had not been informed about her right to request the removal of experts. She also submitted that the experts’ conclusions had not indicated what kind of assessment had been performed and that they had not been adequately reasoned. 31. On 26 September 2014 the Klaipėda Regional Court held a hearing in which the applicant was absent but her lawyer was present. 32. On that same day the Klaipėda Regional Court adopted a decision which was slightly over two pages long and dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It held that the first-instance court had correctly established all the essential circumstances of the case and had adequately reasoned its findings. The court considered that the danger posed by the applicant to society had been proved by the conclusions of the psychiatric assessment (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above) and the psychiatrist heard by the first-instance court (see paragraph 26 above). It also observed that the applicant had been previously treated in psychiatric hospitals seventeen times, which demonstrated that the treatment had not led to any long-term improvement of her mental health. The court concluded: “All the aforementioned circumstances demonstrate that [the applicant] is a danger to society, her actions present a threat to others, [and] she cannot ensure adequate medical treatment and care for herself because she lives alone, so outpatient treatment would not be sufficient. The appellate court considers that the arguments in [the applicant’s] appeal confirm that she cannot critically assess her disorder [and] does not understand the danger presented by her mental condition, nor the need for treatment (apeliaciniame skunde nurodomi argumentai patvirtina, jog ji nėra kritiška savo ligos atžvilgiu, nesuvokia savo psichinės būklės pavojingumo ir poreikio gydytis).” The court did not address the arguments presented in the applicant’s appeal (see paragraphs 29 and 30 above) any further. 33. On 31 October 2014 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal on points of law submitted by the applicant on the grounds that it raised no important legal questions. 34. On 13 November 2014 the applicant was taken by the police to the psychiatric hospital in Rokiškis for compulsory treatment. On 22 May 2015 the Rokiškis District Court ruled, on the basis of the information provided by the hospital, that her mental health had not sufficiently improved, and extended the hospitalisation; the applicant did not appeal against that decision. On 6 November 2015 that same court found that the applicant’s mental health had sufficiently improved, ended her hospitalisation and ordered compulsory outpatient treatment. On 25 April 2016 the Tauragė District Court, relying on the recommendation of the doctor in charge of the applicant’s treatment, ended her compulsory outpatient treatment. 35. On 27 September 2016 the Klaipėda Psychiatric Hospital asked a court to order the applicant’s hospitalisation. It submitted that the applicant had been taken to the hospital by the police, at the referral of a psychiatrist in Tauragė, because her mental health had deteriorated. On that same day the Šilutė District Court ordered the applicant’s hospitalisation for thirty days. 36. On 28 November 2016 the Tauragė District Court found the applicant guilty of terrorising others and breaching public order, but considered that she could not be held criminally responsible and thus ordered her psychiatric hospitalisation. However, on 13 April 2017 the Klaipėda Regional Court quashed that decision. It found that those offences had not been committed, and discontinued the proceedings against the applicant. 37. In May 2017 the social-care authorities of the Tauragė municipality applied to a court to restrict the applicant’s legal capacity in certain areas, relying on her mental disorder and her inability to take proper care of herself. The applicant objected to that request. On 10 August 2017 the Tauragė District Court, in a hearing in which the applicant and her lawyer were present, declared the applicant legally incapacitated in certain areas, and partly restricted her legal capacity in certain other areas. According to the information submitted to the Court, the applicant appealed against that decision and at the time of the present judgment the appellate proceedings were pending. 38. On 17 November 2014 the Tauragė District Court found E. (see paragraph 8 above) guilty of hitting the applicant in the face and causing her minor bodily harm. The court found that on 3 April 2014 the applicant had tried to take E.’s mobile phone from her and had scratched her face, and E. had then hit her. The court considered that E.’s actions could not be characterised as self-defence but as a deliberate attempt to injure the applicant. E. was sentenced to four months’ deprivation of liberty. The applicant was awarded 300 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 87 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

5. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Kaliningrad. 6. On 17 January 2007 the applicant’s son, Mr Pavel Agarkov, was taken to the Kaliningrad Emergency Hospital (больница скорой медицинской помощи г. Калининграда) with a severe head trauma. He lapsed into a coma a week later, and died on 1 February 2007. 7. On 5 February 2007 the Moskovskiy District Prosecutor’s Office of Kaliningrad (“the District Prosecutor’s Office”) received a pre-investigation inquiry file containing evidence of the elements of a crime under Article 111 § 4 of the Criminal Code (intentional infliction of serious bodily harm causing the victim’s death). 8. The pre-investigation inquiry established that at about 5 a.m. on 17 January 2007 the applicant’s son had started a fight with a certain V. In the course of the fight the applicant’s son had inflicted several blows on V. with a wooden baseball bat. On the third blow the bat had struck a wall and had broken into two pieces. The applicant’s son had continued to beat V. with his bare hands and kick him with his feet. V. had then managed to pick up a fragment of a broken bat and had hit the applicant’s son several times on the head, causing the latter the physical injuries that resulted in his death on 1 February 2007. 9. On 15 February 2007 an investigator of the District Prosecutor’s Office issued a decision refusing the institution of criminal proceedings against V., being of the opinion that V. had acted in necessary self-defence. 10. On 26 February 2007 the District Prosecutor set aside the above decision. Criminal proceedings into the death of the applicant’s son were instituted on the same day (criminal case no. 030292/07). 11. On 7 March 2007 V. confessed to having inflicted on the applicant’s son bodily injuries which caused his death. On the same day a preventive measure in the form of an undertaking not to leave the town and to behave properly was imposed on him. 12. On 14 March 2007 V. was charged with homicide committed as a result of exceeding the limits of necessary self-defence (Article 108 § 1 of the Criminal Code). He was questioned as an accused and fully acknowledged his guilt in relation to the actions with which he was charged. 13. On 19 March 2007 two fragments of the baseball bat were seized and examined by the investigator. 14. On 22 March 2007 the applicant was admitted to the proceedings as an aggrieved party. She was questioned by the investigator the same day, but could not submit any information regarding the circumstances of her son’s death. During her additional questioning as a victim on 7 April 2007 she stated that her son had told her that he had been beaten by police officers from the Moskovskiy District Department of the Interior of Kaliningrad (ОВД Московского района г. Калининграда). 15. The investigation established that on 17 January 2007 officers from the Moskovskiy District Department of the Interior of Kaliningrad had arrived at the scene of the incident in order to stop a disturbance of public peace caused by the applicant’s son’s unlawful actions. Upon his arrival at the police station the police officers, having assessed the victim’s medical condition as critical, called an ambulance for him. 16. On 6 April 2007 during an on-site verification of his testimony, V. demonstrated with the help of an assistant and an improvised object how the applicant’s son had struck him with a wooden baseball bat, how this bat had broken when it struck the wall, and how he had afterwards inflicted several blows on the applicant’s son’s head with a fragment of this bat. 17. On 23 April 2007 the forensic medical examination was carried out, establishing that the applicant’s son’s death had been caused by an open blunt traumatic brain injury accompanied by contused head wounds and bruises, haemorrhages in the soft tissues of the head, fractures of the skull bones, haemorrhages above and under the layers of mater, complicated by brain oedema and compression (forensic medical report no. 39/696). 18. On 10 May 2007 the District Prosecutor approved the bill of indictment and referred the case to the Moskovskiy District Court of Kaliningrad (“the District Court”) for examination on the merits. 19. On 22 October 2007 the District Court returned the criminal case to the Prosecutor for re-drafting of the bill of indictment and remedying of deficiencies that prevented examination of the case, in particular, the formulation of exactly how V.’s actions had exceeded the limits of necessary self-defence. 20. On 29 December 2007 the chief investigator from the Kaliningrad investigative division of the Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee at the Russian Federation’s Prosecutor’s Office for the Kaliningrad Region (“the Kaliningrad investigative division”) discontinued the criminal proceedings, having arrived at the conclusion that the injuries resulting in the death of the applicant’s son on 1 February 2007 had been inflicted by V. as actions of necessary self-defence. The decision was not supported by reference to any evidence. 21. On 18 January 2008 the Deputy Head of the Kaliningrad investigative division set aside the above decision and ordered a fresh investigation. 22. Subsequently, between 23 February 2008 and 29 October 2009 the criminal proceedings were discontinued and resumed on nine occasions. Three of the decisions, namely those of 23 February, 23 May and 30 June 2008, repeated word for word the previous decision of 29 December 2007. The following six decisions, namely the decisions of 22 November 2008 and 8 January, 20 February, 15 July, 29 August and 29 October 2009, reached the same conclusion, relying on: - forensic medical report no. 39/696 of 23 April 2007 (see paragraph 17 above); - statements by V. submitting that on 17 January 2007 he had had a fight with the applicant’s son and had administered to the latter at least two blows to the head with a piece of broken baseball bat, following which he had called the police, who had taken the applicant’s son to the police station; - statements by witnesses T. and P. who were present at the scene of the fight and confirmed V.’s statements; - statements by police officer Erk, who arrived at the scene and saw the applicant’s son squatting down, with blood streaming from his head and a bruise below his eye; he submitted that the applicant’s son, V., T. and P. had been taken to the police station, following which an ambulance had been called for the applicant’s son as his head was bleeding; no violence had been used against the latter; - statements by duty officer Tr., who had received information about the fight and had seen the applicant’s son brought to the police station in a state of alcoholic intoxication, with a lacerated wound in the region of one eye and several abrasions, following which an ambulance had been called to take him to hospital; he submitted that nobody in his presence had subjected the applicant’s son to any beatings; - similar statements by duty officer Ser.; - statements by operative agent Mir., who saw the applicant’s son at the police station with injuries to his body; he submitted that he had not seen anybody beating the applicant’s son at the police station; - statements by witness F., who arrived at the police station having been told that the applicant’s son had been taken there; however, she had then been informed that the latter had been taken to hospital to be treated for his injuries; she further submitted that in the hospital the applicant’s son told her that he had been beaten up by the police in the entrance to V.’s house; - statements by witness G., who had accompanied the applicant’s son in his car to the scene of the fight; he submitted that the applicant had told him that he had a score to settle with a man called “Erik” who had cooperated with the police; he had seen the applicant’s son knock on a window and enter the building with a baseball bat in his hands; about fifteen minutes later he had seen the police arrive at the exit from the building; the applicant’s son had been walking unassisted, he had not been handcuffed, but had been holding his head; one of the police officers had been holding a plastic bag containing two fragments of the baseball bat; the applicant’s son had got into the police car and been taken to the police station; he had not seen anybody hitting the applicant’s son or threatening him; - statements by the applicant, who submitted that her son had told her that he had been beaten up by the police; - statements by witness Min., who had heard about the fight from V.; - statements by witness Mot., who had heard about the fight from T.; - statements by neighbours Sukh. and Tishch., who knew nothing about the events in question; - statements by witness Gor., the applicant’s son’s partner, who had been told by the applicant’s son that he had been beaten by the police; - statements by witness Ven., who was receiving treatment in the hospital at the time when the applicant’s son was admitted and who submitted that the latter had told him that he had sustained the injuries through being beaten with a baseball bat; - the police station’s registration log, which contained no mention of the applicant’s son being arrested on the 17 January 2007; - expert report no. 366, according to which V. had an abrasion on his right forearm which could have been caused on 17 January 2007 by a blow from a hard blunt object; - expert report no. 250 on the examination of a sample of the applicant’s son’s skin from the left half of the parietal region of the head containing well-defined diffuse microinclusions of iron; - expert report no. 52 of 2 July 2008 stating that the applicant’s son’s open blunt brain injury had been caused by a combination of traumatic impacts in the region of the head which could have resulted from the circumstances described by V., that is to say by the infliction of multiple blows by a baseball bat fragment in the region of the head. 23. In the meantime, the applicant repeatedly challenged the adequacy of the investigation alleging the involvement of police officers in the death of her son. In particular, she complained about the failure of the investigator to inform her of the decisions taken in the case and to explain the possible avenues for appeal. She further complained about the refusal of her requests for information about the exact time when V.’s call was registered at the police station, the exact time when her son was brought to the police station and when the ambulance was called for him. The applicant also sought to have clarified the reasons why her son had not been questioned about the circumstances of the incident during the week before he lapsed into a coma, to obtain an expert examination of the bloodstains on his clothes which could have clarified whether he had been standing up or lying down when he sustained his injuries, and an expert examination which could have clarified the origin of metal particles found in the wounds of her son. 24. In response to her complaints, the District Court on 18 August, 5 September, 26 September and 12 December 2008 found the investigator’s refusals and lengthy inactivity unlawful and unjustified and ordered him to remedy the above deficiencies by conducting a thorough and comprehensive investigation. 25. On 16 December 2008 the applicant’s son’s clothes were seized from the applicant for expert examination. 26. On 14 September 2009 the District Court found the investigator’s inactivity unlawful, having noted that when taking the decision of 15 July 2009 the investigator had failed to comply with his own ruling of 10 July 2009 granting the applicant’s requests. 27. On 13 January 2010 the Deputy Head of the Investigative Committee at the Russian Federation’s Prosecutor’s Office for the Kaliningrad Region set aside the decision of 18 January 2008 (see paragraph 21 above) as having been taken in violation of the criminal procedure. As a result, all the evidence obtained after 18 January 2008 was found inadmissible. 28. On 15 January and 22 January 2010 forensic biological and forensic trace examinations of the applicant’s son’s clothes were ordered, which duly established that the latter had been in an upright position, or close to such a position, when the bloodstains appeared on his clothes (report no. 32 of 12 February 2010). 29. On 22 January 2010 a forensic medical examination by an expert commission was ordered. The examination established that the open blunt traumatic brain injury inflicted on the applicant’s son had been caused by at least five traumatic impacts, and that it could have arisen in the circumstances indicated by the accused V. during his questioning on 7 March 2007 and the on-site verification of his testimony on 6 April 2007 (see paragraphs 11 and 16 above) (report no. 13 of 9 February 2010). 30. On unspecified dates the applicant and the witnesses were questioned for a second time and confirmed their previous statements. 31. Between 14 February 2010 and 21 February 2012 the criminal proceedings were discontinued on five occasions on the grounds of absence of the constituent elements of a crime under Article 108 § 1 of the Criminal Code in the actions of V., and were subsequently resumed. 32. On 4 May 2012 the District Court found the decision of 21 February 2012 unlawful and unsubstantiated. The District Court also found unlawful the investigator’s failure to notify the applicant of the procedural decisions taken in reply to her requests. 33. On 6 July 2012 the acting head of the Moskovskiy District of the Kaliningrad investigative division set aside the decision of 21 February 2012. 34. On 6 August 2012 the investigator for the Moskovskiy District from the Kaliningrad investigative division discontinued the criminal proceedings. The decision noted that the investigation had identified the constituent elements of a crime under Article 108 § 1 of the Criminal Code in the actions of V. However, since the crime belonged to the category of minor crimes and had been committed over two years earlier, in 2007, V. was to be exempted from criminal liability pursuant to Article 78 § 1 (a) of the Criminal Code (exemption from criminal liability due to expiration of statutory time-limits for criminal prosecution). 35. On 5 December 2012 the acting head for the Moskovskiy District of the Kaliningrad investigative division took the decision to resume the proceedings in view of the necessity of conducting psycho-physiological expert examinations − using a polygraph − of the police officers who had brought the applicant’s son to the police station so as to verify the veracity of their statements. 36. According to information contained in the case file, the proceedings were still pending in December 2012. 37. The case file contains no information regarding further developments in the investigation of the circumstances surrounding the applicant’s son’s death. 38. On 28 December 2007 the applicant sought the institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers allegedly involved in the death of her son. 39. On 6 June 2008 the chief investigator of the Kaliningrad investigative division issued a decision refusing the institution of criminal proceedings against officers Erk., K., Tr. and Ser. of Kaliningrad’s Moskovskiy District Department of the Interior under Articles 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code (abuse of power by an official, actions of a public official which clearly exceed his or her authority). 40. On 14 July 2008 the Deputy Head of the Kaliningrad investigative division set aside the above decision and ordered a fresh pre-investigation inquiry. In particular, the investigator was instructed to assess the actions of the police officers under Articles 125 (leaving without help a person in danger) and 306 (knowingly false accusation) of the Criminal Code. 41. On 24 July 2008 the investigator of the Kaliningrad investigative division again issued a decision refusing the institution of criminal proceedings against officers. 42. On 26 September 2008 the District Court found the above decision unlawful. The District Court established that no fresh inquiry had been conducted and that the instructions given in the decision of 14 July 2008 had not been complied with. 43. On 18 November 2008 the Kaliningrad Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld the decision of 26 September 2008 on appeal. 44. On 8 February 2010 the Kaliningrad investigative division’s investigator refused to open criminal proceedings against the police officers under Articles 125, 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code on the grounds that the constituent elements of a crime were absent in their actions. 45. On 19 August 2010 the District Court found the above decision lawful. The applicant did not appeal. 46. On 25 December 2008 the applicant brought civil proceedings against the Ministry of Finance seeking compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage caused to her by the failure of the domestic authorities to investigate her son’s death. 47. On 31 March 2009 the Tsentralniy District Court of Kaliningrad dismissed the applicant’s claims. 48. On 20 May 2009 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.

6. The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Gyöngyöspata. He is of Roma origin. 7. On 12 August 2010 at about 1.50 a.m. the applicant was taken to Gyöngyös Police Department after he and his accomplices had been apprehended while driving a car containing goods apparently stolen from a nearby summer house. 8. The applicant submitted that shortly afterwards, for about twenty minutes, he had been ill-treated by two police officers; at about 4.30 a.m. the two officers had returned and had continued hitting and kicking him for another thirty minutes or so. Some two hours later the two officers had escorted the applicant to another room for questioning, but had then continued beating him, together with several other officers. In the applicant’s account of the events, altogether six officers and two security guards took part in the ill-treatment, with the apparent intention of extracting his confession to further offences. He stated that he had been hit in the face, forced to his knees and kicked repeatedly; a paper bag had been pulled over his head and the soles of his feet had been hit many times with a piece of wood. The officers had insisted that he admit to at least three counts of theft in order for them to stop hitting him, and they had repeatedly insulted him, making references to his Roma origin. One of them had said that they would not mind if he died – there would just be one Gypsy less. 9. The applicant eventually signed the record of the questioning, which stated that the questioning had taken place between 5.51 a.m. and 6.33 a.m. 10. Later that morning, at about 6 a.m., the applicant was allegedly escorted to the toilet, where he said the officers had again started hitting and kicking him. One of them had removed a towel-holder from the wall and hit the applicant’s hand with it. Again, references were allegedly made to the applicant being a Roma. 11. The applicant was released at about 2 p.m. 12. Later that day, at the request of the applicant’s mother, the general practitioner of the neighbouring village, Dr C.S., came to the applicant’s house and examined him. Since she had apparently been told only about chest complaints, she did not examine the applicant’s legs or feet. She did not identify any marks indicating external injury on the applicant but found that his ribs were sore and suggested that he go to hospital if he wished to obtain a medical certificate recording his injuries. Dr C.S. herself did not produce a medical report on the premises. 13. On the same evening the applicant went to the emergency room of Bugát Pál Hospital in Gyöngyös. At 7.34 p.m. he was issued with a medical certificate, for which he paid the fee due, stating that he had bruises on the forehead, the nose and the left shoulder and an abrasion on the right hip; both his hands and arms were swollen and hyperaemic; and the rear surface of both thighs, as well as the soles of his feet, were swollen, red and sore. According to the certificate, the applicant had numerous contusions that had been inflicted by other persons. 14. Still on the same evening, at 8.38 p.m., X-rays were taken of the applicant at Albert Schweitzer Hospital in Hatvan, a town at a distance of 32 kilometres, where the applicant was driven by his family members. He was diagnosed with a “chest contusion”, a “skull contusion” and “bodily injury inflicted by human force”. 15. The applicant stated that he had been unhurt at the time that he had been taken to the police department. He added that between his release and the medical inspection, he had been continuously accompanied by his relatives, who testified in the ensuing proceedings that he had not suffered any injuries outside the police department. 16. On 27 September 2010 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint alleging that he had been brutalised by police officers. The applicant alleged that during the ill-treatment the officers had made repeated references to his Roma origin. The case was being investigated by the Miskolc Public Prosecutor’s Office. 17. On 8 November 2010 the applicant was heard as a witness and shown, for the purposes of his identifying his alleged assailants, the photos of police officers serving at the Gyöngyös Police Department. The applicant acknowledged from the outset that he would be able to identify with certainty only three of the several perpetrators. Nevertheless, he finally identified eight persons as the perpetrators – six police officers (T.B., M.Z., Gy.K., K.V., F.I. and H.A.) and two security guards employed by the police department (P.G. and Z.A.). Subsequently, the applicant became uncertain about the involvement of K.V. and H.A. 18. The prosecutor’s office appointed a forensic expert. This expert had at his disposal the medical reports issued by Bugát Pál and Albert Schweitzer Hospitals. In his opinion given in retrospect, he made the following statement as to the time when the applicant’s injuries had been sustained: “The exact time of the infliction of the injuries cannot be established. Given that the doctor examining the applicant did not document any lesions characteristically pointing to an inveterate injury, it can only be said that the injuries had been sustained within a 24-48-hour-time-frame preceding the medical care. Since, according to the police report on the application of coercive measures, the local police constable handed the applicant over to the officer on duty without any complaints or injuries, the injuries were likely to have occurred after this point in time.” “A sérülések pontos keletkezési ideje nem határozható meg. Tekintettel arra, hogy a vizsgáló orvos idősülőben lévő sérülésre jellegzetes elváltozásokat nem dokumentált, az valószínűsíthető, hogy a sérülések az orvosi ellátást megelőző 24-48 órás időtartamon belül alakultak ki. Mivel a kényszerítő eszköz alkalmazására írt rendőri jelentés adatai szerint a körzeti megbízott panasz és sérülésmentesen adta át nevezettet az ügyeletes tisztnek, a sérülések valószínűsíthetően ezen időpontot követően keletkeztek.” 19. On 28 December 2010 the Miskolc Investigating Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the investigation, holding in essence that the applicant’s version of events was not plausible. The prosecutor emphasised the fact that since the applicant had been apprehended just after he had committed the crime in question (and still in possession of the proceeds of that crime), coercive interrogation by police officers with the intention of extracting his confession to the offence in question seemed pointless and thus hardly plausible. Relying on the internal records of the police department recording the shifts of the officers, the prosecutor was satisfied that three of the alleged perpetrators, Gy.K., F.I. and H.A., had alibis for the time of the incident, in that early in the morning of that day, they had been assigned to patrol service. Therefore, they could not possibly have been present at the applicant’s questioning. Furthermore, the two security guards (P.G. and Z.A.) were not allowed to leave their station and thus could not have been present at the incident. The prosecutor also observed that a general practitioner had examined the applicant between his release from the police department and the first hospital inspection, but had recorded no injuries. The prosecutor also found it material that the applicant had been uncertain of the identities of the alleged perpetrators when shown photos of the Gyöngyös police officers; that he had contradicted himself on several occasions; and that he had complained about the alleged incident only on 27 September 2010, not before. 20. On 16 January 2012 the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Public Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the discontinuation order. The prosecutor was satisfied that the investigation had been adequate and comprehensive, and that the obtaining of further evidence – in particular, by questioning the applicant’s brother and friend, who were present at his release – was superfluous. The applicant’s allegations about racist motives behind the ill-treatment were not addressed. This decision was served on the applicant on 23 January 2012. 21. On 21 March 2012 the applicant brought a substitute private prosecution against the eight presumed perpetrators – that is to say, six police officers and two security guards – on charges of coercive interrogation. The motion included assertions about racial insults being uttered during the incident. 22. The Eger High Court held a hearing on 26 September 2012. At that hearing the applicant stated that he did not recognise the defendants P.G. and Z.A. and that he was not certain if K.V. had beaten him, so he dropped the charges against them. Accordingly, the court terminated the proceedings against these three defendants. 23. The remaining defendants either denied the charges or refused to make any statements. The High Court heard Dr C.S., who confirmed that she had not seen any marks of external injury on the applicant’s body when examining him on the day of the incident. A court-appointed medical expert stated that if the applicant had had the injuries in question when examined by Dr C.S. then the latter must have noticed them. The court also obtained testimony from the applicant’s mother and brother and a friend (the two latter had not been heard during the investigation), who had been waiting for him in front of the Gyöngyös Police Department on his release. They all stated that the applicant had already had those injuries at the moment of his release. 24. The High Court was satisfied that Gy.K., F.I. and H.A. had alibis for the time of the incident. As to the charges against the two other officers, T.B. and M.Z., the court highlighted that even though the applicant said that he had been ill-treated in order to force him to admit to at least three counts of theft – which he finally did – there was actually no reference in the record of the questioning to any further counts of theft. The court also emphasised that, contrary to the statements of the applicant, the two officers could not have been continuously present in the Gyöngyös Police Department because between 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. they had been carrying out some onsite inspections in another town, Gyöngyöspata. 25. On 28 November 2012 the Eger High Court acquitted the officers for want of sufficient evidence. According to the reasoning of the judgment, the court relied on documentary evidence relating to the applicant’s apprehension and questioning, documents relating to the service particulars of the officers involved, the testimony of the applicant, medical documentation, and the testimony of the officers. 26. The applicant did not appeal. 27. As a consequence of the applicant lodging, but subsequently withdrawing, a criminal complaint against K.V., criminal proceedings on charges of false accusation were conducted against the applicant. On 7 November 2013 the Eger District Court found him guilty as charged and placed him on three-year probation. The judgment was upheld in essence by the Eger High Court on 10 June 2014; however, the applicant’s sentence was altered to 180 days of community work.

4. The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Kalush. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. In 1996 V.D., the applicant’s future husband and his parents living in corporate housing (“flat A”) owned by “K.T.”, a State company (hereinafter “the K.T. company”), were offered the chance by the latter to exchange this accommodation for larger corporate housing accommodation (“flat B”), which was also owned by the same Company. Having accepted this offer, the three of them signed a written undertaking to vacate flat A when they moved to flat B. 7. In July 1997 the applicant married V.D. and joined him, his parents and brother to live in flat A. 8. In 1998 the applicant’s and V.D.’s son was born. Along with the applicant, he was registered by the local authority as a co-tenant of flat A on the grounds that both of them had become members of the original tenants’ family. 9. In 1999 the K.T. company transferred ownership of flat A to the municipality. 10. At various subsequent dates the applicant’s husband and parents-in-law moved out into flat B and registered their residence at the new address. 11. According to the Government, the applicant and her son also moved into flat B at the material time. 12. According to the applicant, she and her son remained residents in flat A, as her marriage with V.D. was falling apart and living together had become intolerable. 13. In August 2004 V.D. and the applicant divorced. 14. On 20 July 2005 the K.T. company decided to reallocate flat A to the family of R., its employee, who lived in an accommodation hall (гуртожиток). 15. In October 2005 the K.T. company lodged a claim in the Kalush Town Court, seeking, in particular, to evict the applicant and her son from flat A. It argued that there was no legal basis for them to remain in the property, which had been reallocated to a new tenant (R.). 16. On 25 July 2006 the court dismissed the claim for the eviction of the applicant and her son. It found, in particular, that the applicant had lawfully moved into flat A as a member of the original tenants’ family and so had acquired all the rights of a social tenant, within the meaning of Article 64 of the Housing Code (1983). She and her son had never promised to relocate and had remained residents of flat A at the material time. They had not been included in the occupancy voucher («ордер») of flat B and had not been provided with any other housing. They could therefore not be evicted without being provided with alternative accommodation. Moreover, in 1999 the K.T. company had transferred flat A to municipal ownership. It had therefore had no standing in 2005 to reallocate the same flat to R.’s family or to bring the present proceedings. 17. The K.T. company appealed, referring to Article 55 of the Housing Code. 18. On 14 September 2006 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 25 July 2006 and ordered the applicant’s and her son’s eviction “without provision of any other accommodation”. It held that the Kalush Court, having properly established the relevant facts, had interpreted the law incorrectly. Notably, according to Articles 55 and 99 of the Housing Code, the applicant (together with her son) – having settled in flat A as a member of the original tenants’ family – was bound by the duty of the original tenants to vacate the flat. There was therefore no legal basis for the applicant’s and her son’s continued residency in flat A, and this fact constituted a sufficient basis for their eviction without the provision of any other housing. Furthermore, the Kalush Court had erred in respect of the K.T. company’s legal standing. Under Article 55 of the Housing Code, notwithstanding the transfer of the property to the municipality, the K.T. company had retained the right to allocate the flat to one of its employees. It had therefore had legitimate standing to seek the vacation of the flat by its previous tenants. 19. The applicant lodged a request for leave to appeal in cassation. She noted that she and her minor son had been lawful and registered residents of the disputed flat for eight years. During this period, she had dutifully engaged in the payment of all expenses relating to her occupancy of the flat. Unlike her former husband and in-laws, she and her son had not given any promises to vacate flat A and had not acquired any rights to live in flat B with them. Accordingly, her and her son’s eviction would effectively render them homeless. 20. On 16 November 2006 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal in cassation, ruling that her submissions did not contain any argument creating an appearance that there could be a problem under applicable law. 21. On 15 December 2006 the applicant requested the Kalush Court to postpone her eviction, in particular, because she had no other accommodation and her salary was too small for her to rent private-sector housing. 22. On 21 December 2006, while the applicant’s request was pending consideration, the State bailiffs arrived at flat A and had the applicant vacate it and surrender the keys. 23. On 25 December 2006 the local registration authority annulled the applicant’s and her son’s registration as residents of flat A. 24. On 29 December 2006 the Kalush Court allowed the applicant’s request for her and her son’s eviction to be postponed; it postponed their eviction for three months, referring to her indigent status and the interests of a minor child. 25. According to the applicant, after her eviction she had to seek emergency refuge in the home of a colleague and subsequently rented odd accommodations at various places. She submitted testimony given by various acquaintances and copies of some fixed-term lease agreements. 26. The Government contested this account, insisting that the lease agreements were fictitious and the applicant had de facto lived in flat B permanently since 2004 without proper registration.

5. The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Moscow. 6. The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, §§ 7-65, 5 January 2016) and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, §§ 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties’ submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7. On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the “March of Millions” was held in central Moscow to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it transpired that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd, a police cordon forced the protesters to remain within the barriers. There were numerous clashes between the police and protesters. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered that the meeting finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protesters from the square. 8. The applicant took part in the demonstration on 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square. She was arrested at the venue of the event and taken to a police station, where she was charged with an administrative offence. After a night in detention the applicant was released; on 8 May 2012 she was convicted as charged but exempted from administrative liability. 9. According to the applicant, on 6 May 2012 she participated in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square. She conducted herself peacefully and did not take part in any acts of violence prior to her arrest. At 6 p.m. she was arrested by the police and at around 9 p.m. was taken to Taganskiy district police station of Moscow. 10. According to the Government, the applicant was arrested at 6 p.m. at Bolotnaya Square because she had been participating in breaking the police cordon. At 7.20 p.m. she was taken to Taganskiy district police station, which was also indicated in the record of her transfer to the police station for the purpose of compiling an administrative file. She was released on 7 May 2012. 11. The record of administrative arrest indicated that the applicant had been arrested at 8.45 p.m. at the police station. It contained no mention of the date or time of her release. It indicated that the applicant had not asked to notify anyone of her arrest. She signed an undertaking that she would attend court if ordered by the judge to do so. 12. After that an on-duty officer drew up an administrative-offence record on the basis of the reports and explanatory notes of G.S. and M.S., the police officers who had arrested the applicant. These reports and notes were drawn up using an identical template and contained no individualised information except the police officers’ personal information and the applicant’s name. The latter was accused of disobeying lawful orders of the police, an offence under Article 19.3 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The administrative-offence record reiterated the reports and notes of the police officers, stating as follows: “... [the applicant], acting as part of a group of 1,500 citizens, took part in an authorised meeting ... during the event [the applicant] committed a breach of the rules on holding public events, [that is to say] she broke the police cordon ... thereby preventing police officers from carrying out their service duties, in breach of Article 19.3 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences.” 13. According to the applicant, at the police station she was not allowed to make a phone call, despite making insistent requests. She told the police that she was the mother of a fifteen-month-old child left at home with a babysitter and requested that her family be notified of her arrest, but this was also refused. Her passport contained no information about her baby. At the police station she was detained in a small overcrowded cell with no sanitary facilities, sleeping place or bedding. She had no access to drinking water and was given no food. 14. The administrative case file also contained an explanatory note by the applicant. She stated that during the demonstration she had happened to be in the middle of the crowd, which had pulled her towards the police officers. At some point she had been arrested and taken to the police station, even though she had not chanted any slogans. 15. At around 6 p.m. on 7 May 2012 the applicant appeared before a justice of the peace. However, her case could not be examined that day and she was taken back to the police station. According to the applicant, she was released at about 10 p.m. that day. She signed an undertaking that she would attend the court hearing of the administrative case. 16. On 8 May 2012 the Justice of the Peace of circuit no. 100 of the Yakimanka District examined the charges against the applicant. On the basis of the police officers’ reports and explanations and the records of administrative transfer and arrest, the court established that the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 19.3 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, as described in the administrative-offence record. The applicant repeated the statements she had given in the explanatory note, but they were dismissed. The court decided, however, to absolve her from administrative liability on the grounds that her offence had not entailed serious consequences and that she had a baby born in 2011. The Justice of the Peace issued her a warning. She did not appeal against the judgment. 17. On 26 July 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure with the Dorogomilovskiy District Court of Moscow about her allegedly arbitrary arrest on 6 May 2012 and detention until 7 May 2012, the termination of the rally at Bolotnaya Square and the conditions of her detention at the police station. 18. On 3 September 2012 the court refused to examine the complaint on the grounds that the contested acts of the police had been the matter of the administrative proceedings and could not be challenged separately. It did not examine the complaint about the conditions of detention. 19. On 20 May 2013 the Moscow City Court quashed the part of the decision of 3 September 2012 concerning the refusal to examine the complaint about the conditions of detention, and upheld the remaining part. 20. On 23 October 2013 the Dorogomilovskiy District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint about the conditions of her detention at the police station as unsubstantiated. On 28 February 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld that judgment.

4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Novi Sad. 5. The proceedings began on 19 November 1999 when a third private party brought a lawsuit concerning his tenancy rights in respect of a flat owned by a respondent. The applicant acted as an intervener in these proceedings on the side of the respondent since she had previously signed a tenancy agreement with him. 6. On 8 April 2003 the first instance court suspended the proceedings (mirovanje postupka). 7. On 20 August 2003, 20 October 2005 and 13 May 2009 the first instance court terminated the proceedings having deemed the lawsuit as withdrawn due to the fact that the parties had failed to appear at the scheduled hearings. All three of these decisions were subsequently quashed on appeal. 8. On 29 March 2012 the first instance court rendered a judgment in favour of the respondent and the applicant. 9. On 22 August 2012 this judgment was upheld on appeal. 10. On 28 September 2012 the applicant lodged a further appeal with the Constitutional Court alleging a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. 11. On 10 February 2015 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time, but rejected her claim for non-pecuniary damages stating that the finding of a violation alone constituted sufficient redress for the said breach. In so doing it noted, inter alia, that the applicant had significantly contributed to the length of proceedings in question.

5. The applicants, who are police officers, were born in 1967, 1978, 1976, 1979 and 1964 respectively. The first and second applicants live in Chișinău and Caușeni and the remaining applicants live in Bender. 6. On 14 June 2006 officers Mangîr, Vasiliev and Condrea, who were conducting a criminal investigation in Tiraspol, were arrested by the secret service of the self-proclaimed “Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria” (“MRT”)[1]. During their arrest they managed to call the Bender police station. 7. The other two applicants (officers Daţco and Pohila) went to Tiraspol to clarify the reasons for the arrest of their colleagues, but were also arrested upon their arrival. 8. The applicants were placed in the Tiraspol Remand Centre (IVS Tiraspol). 9. On 17 June 2006 officers Pohila, Daţco and Vasiliev were released without charge and without any explanation for their arrest. 10. On 18 June 2006 officer Mangîr was allegedly beaten up and injected with an unknown substance, which rendered him unconscious for four days. After his release he was admitted for in-patient treatment in the hospital of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, where he was diagnosedwith, inter alia, concussion. 11. On 20 June 2006 the Tiraspol City Court issued a warrant for officer Mangîr to be detained for thirty days. On 23 June 2006 the “MRT” authorities released officers Mangîr and Condrea. The head of the “MRT” secret service declared in an interview that the officers had been released after Russian authorities had “given assurances” that Moldovan authorities would not “kidnap people” in the “MRT”. 12. The applicants were accused in the “MRT” media of being members of “black squadrons” created for the purpose of kidnapping politicians and other persons causing nuisance to the Moldovan authorities. According to the applicants, during their detention they were questioned by the “MRT” secret service and forced to declare that in Tiraspol they had been trying to kidnap “MRT” politicians. Officers Pohila, Daţco and Vasiliev were allegedly beaten on the soles of their feet and threatened with the killing of members of their families, as well as with being transferred to cells occupied by common criminals, where they would be ill-treated or even killed. 13. Officer Condrea was allegedly subjected to so-called “Palestinian hanging” for up to seven hours and was taken to his cell unconscious thereafter. 14. The applicants described as follows their conditions of detention at the Tiraspol Remand Centre. The cells in which they had been held had been in the basement and had not had access to natural light. In the absence of ventilation and because of overcrowding it had been difficult to breathe. Officer Condrea submits that he was detained in the same cell as that in which Mr Ilie Ilaşcu had been detained (for more details see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004‑VII). 15. During their detention the applicants did not have any daily exercise and were not given access to a shower; they could not receive parcels containing food from their relatives, they did not have bed linen and they were not allowed to be seen by doctors. 16. After the applicants’ release the Moldovan authorities initiated two sets of criminal proceedings concerning their unlawful detention and their alleged ill-treatment while in detention. However, several years later the investigation was discontinued. 17. The applicants were also subjected to medical check-ups, which found no traces of violence on their bodies. Only one applicant, Stefan Mangîr, was found to be suffering from the consequences of concussion.

4. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Nizhnevartovsk, in the Khanty-Mansiyisk Region. 5. At the material time the applicant leased a flat in a block of flats in Noyabrsk (a town in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region). On 16 February 2006 at about 6 a.m. the applicant’s neighbours called the police. They informed the police of loud screams that they had heard from the applicant’s flat. Two police officers arrived at 6 a.m. and took the applicant to the Noyabrsk police station (“the police station”). 6. According to a logbook of people taken to the police station, the applicant arrived at the station at 7.05 a.m. and was handed over to an investigator “for further proceedings” at 7.55 a.m. on 16 February 2006. According to the applicant, the investigator, Ch., repeatedly questioned him as “a witness to the incident”. 7. According to the applicant, he was released on 16 February 2006 at about 11 p.m. and summoned to appear before the investigator the next day at 2 p.m. The applicant alleges that he was under the constant supervision of police officers between 6 a.m. and 11 p.m. on 16 February 2006 and was not allowed to leave the police station. 8. In 2011 the applicant sued the police station, claiming compensation for unrecorded detention. 9. On 5 August 2011 the Noyabrsk Town Court of the Yamalo‑Nenetskiy Region dismissed his claim. 10. On 5 September 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. However, he was required to correct some errors in his claim. 11. On 28 September 2011 the Noyabrsk Town Court returned the claim to the applicant, stating that he had failed to correct the errors in his claim. 12. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against that decision. 13. On 17 February 2006 the investigator opened a criminal investigation into an offence of rape. The applicant formally became a suspect. On the same day the investigator arrested him and drew up formal records of his arrest. Between 18 February 2006 and 22 June 2006 the applicant was kept in the temporary detention centre of the Noyabrsk police station (“the IVS”). 14. The applicant provided the following description of the conditions in the IVS. He was held in cell no. 9 measuring 15 sq. m. The cell housed between nine and twelve inmates who took it in turns to sleep. The overcrowding caused a lot of conflict and tension between the inmates. 15. The window of the cell measured 0.6 m by 0.3 m and was covered with metal blinds blocking access to daylight and fresh air. There was no ventilation in the cell. The lack of air was aggravated by the detainees’ smoking. 16. There was no sink with a tap or toilet. The inmates had to use a bucket, which smelled very bad and was only emptied once a day in the morning. The bucket was not separated from the main area. The dining table was only 1.5 m away from the bucket. The detainees were provided with meals once a day. The quality of the food was completely unsatisfactory. There was not enough drinking water for everybody. 17. The detainees were allowed to take a shower once every ten days for fifteen minutes, and there were three shower heads for nine to ten people. The drains in the shower room did not work, and the water temperature was not adjustable. There was no changing room, the detainees had to undress before the shower and dress after it in a corridor. Only twice during the applicant’s detention in the IVS was he allowed to have outdoor exercise. 18. The ceiling of the cell was covered with mould. The cells were infested with bugs, lice, cockroaches and rats, and the administration did nothing to disinfect the facility. 19. It was cold in winter (there was a maximum temperature of 6˚C) and hot in summer (a maximum temperature of 45˚C). 20. The detainees were provided with neither bedding nor items of personal hygiene. They were also unable to buy them in the IVS. Mattresses had tar stains, and there was no possibility to wash clothes. Inmates were not provided with newspapers, reading material, or any information concerning their rights. The applicant was held in a cell with persistent offenders and ill persons. 21. On 15 June 2006 the Noyabrsk Town Court convicted the applicant of rape and sentenced him to six and a half years’ imprisonment in a “strict‑regime correctional colony”. 22. On 28 August 2006 the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Regional Court upheld the judgment of 15 June 2006 on appeal. Between 29 September 2006 and 16 June 2011 the applicant served his sentence in correctional colony IK-8 located in Labytnangi, in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. (a) The applicant’s account 23. The applicant provided the following description of the conditions of his detention in the correctional colony, and submitted a detailed plan of the accommodation, with a description. The dormitory where he lived consisted of two sections measuring 132 and 144 sq. m respectively and accommodated 230 to 250 individuals. 24. The sanitary facilities were extremely busy: all the detainees had to use five taps and four toilets. There was not enough water. Water was only available from 5 a.m. to 7 a.m. and from 8 p.m. to 11 p.m. While there was no running water, the detainees had two water tanks at their disposal – one which contained drinking water and the other which contained water which was not drinkable. Per day, they could use 50 litres of drinking water and 300 litres of water which was not drinkable. This was clearly not enough, since the water in the tanks would be used up by about 10 a.m. The toilets smelled extremely unpleasant, since there was no water to flush them after 10 a.m. 25. The floor of the dormitory was based on a frame made of used railway sleepers impregnated with creosote. It smelled so strongly that the detainees had to leave the windows open permanently, even in winter, to get rid of the smell. The smell caused headaches and the open windows caused colds. The roof of the dormitory had at least eighteen visible leaks and there would be puddles on the floor if it rained. The dining room in the dormitory measured 32 sq. m and was equipped with one electric stove with four burners, one refrigerator and four sockets. The dormitory was infested with rats. 26. The detainees were allowed to take a shower once a week for fifteen minutes, and there were ten shower heads for up to forty people. Just before the applicant’s release, four extra shower heads were installed, but the time for washing was reduced to ten minutes. 27. According to the applicant, in 2008 the detainees were provided with winter clothes only at the end of November when the temperature dropped below minus 28˚C. (b) The Government’s account 28. As regards the conditions of the applicant’s detention in IK-8 in Labytnangi, the Government submitted information which can be summarised as follows: Period of detention Unit no. Dormitory surface area in sq. m Number of sleeping places Number of inmates assigned to the dormitory Number of washbasins and lavatories 29 September 2006 – 15 March 2007 9 330 No information No information 8 and 12 15 March 2007 – 19 September 2008 1 143 No information No information 5 and 6 19 September 2008 – 30 October 2009 7 321 No information No information 6 and 4 30 October 2009 – 14 May 2010 10 (accommodated in building previously occupied by units 7 and 8) 321 122 119 6 and 4 18 May 2010 – 20 April 2011 10 321 96 95 6 and 4 25 April 2011 – 16 July 2011 10 321 84 81 6 and 4 29. They also submitted that the toilets had been separated from the canteen and dormitory, and the units had been naturally ventilated and regularly disinfected. No failures in the water or electrical supply system had been identified. Detainees had taken showers weekly and had been provided with food and clothes “in accordance with the established schedule”. 30. On an unspecified date in 2010, while serving his sentence in the correctional colony, the applicant brought civil proceedings against the Noyabrsk police station and the Russian Ministry of Finance, seeking compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage resulting from the poor conditions of his detention in the IVS in 2006. The applicant was not represented in those proceedings. 31. On 23 July 2010 the Noyabrskiy Town Court dismissed the applicant’s claim in his absence. 32. On 30 August 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 23 July 2010. He complained in particular that he had not been allowed to personally address the court, despite a request he had made to this effect, and he asked the appeal court to arrange for him to attend the appeal hearing. 33. On 25 November 2010 the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Regional Court upheld the decision of 23 July 2010 on appeal. It stated that the law did not make provision for transporting detainees to a civil court hearing.

5. In 2005 the applicant, an information technology specialist, moved from Kazakhstan to the Krasnodar Region in Russia to live with his parents and brother, O.Z., who were Russian citizens. He resided there on the basis of visas and temporary residence permits. 6. In January 2007, the applicant married Ms M.K., a Russian national, with whom he had a son in June 2009. 7. On 23 December 2008 the Kazakh authorities provided the applicant, upon his request, with an official statement certifying that he had no criminal record in Kazakhstan. The applicant had requested the document with view to applying for Russian nationality through the simplified procedure for spouses of Russian nationals. 8. In January 2009 the applicant submitted his application for Russian nationality to the Federal Migration Service in the Krasnodar Region (Управление Федеральной миграционной службы по Краснодарскому краю (ФМС)) (hereinafter “the Krasnodar FMS”). 9. In May 2009 the Krasnodar FMS rejected the application, referring to information provided by the Federal Security Service (Федеральная Служба Безопасности (ФСБ)) (hereinafter “the FSB”) that the applicant posed a threat to Russia’s national security. 10. On 13 August 2009 the FSB informed the applicant about a decision it had made on the undesirability of his presence (residence) in Russia and on prohibiting him from re-entering the country until July 2014 (hereinafter “the exclusion order”). The applicant was to leave Russia within fifteen days of receipt of the letter. He was not provided with the reasons for the decision, its date or number. 11. On 13 November 2009 the applicant appealed against the exclusion order to the Oktyabrskiy District Court in Krasnodar, which forwarded it for examination to the Krasnodar Regional Court (hereinafter “the Regional Court”), which had jurisdiction under domestic legislation to look at cases involving State secrets. In his complaint, the applicant alleged, inter alia, that the exclusion order was arbitrary, that it had been taken on the basis of undisclosed information and that his removal from Russia would disrupt his family life. In particular, the applicant stated that he was ethnically Russian, had no connection with Kazakhstan and that his wife and child, as well as his brother and parents, were Russian nationals residing in Russia. He was the family breadwinner and his exclusion would entail distress and financial hardship for his wife and son. 12. On 24 March 2010 the Regional Court examined the applicant’s appeal in camera. The applicant testified before the court and stated that in 1999 his brother O.Z. had been prosecuted by the United States’ authorities for a computer crime perpetrated in that country; after serving his sentence in the United States, in 2004, his brother had returned to Russia, of which he was a national, and had been offered a job by the FSB. Meanwhile, the applicant and his parents had been pressured by the Kazakh security services to convince his brother to return to Kazakhstan and collaborate with them. Shortly thereafter, in 2005, the Kazakh authorities had opened a criminal case against the applicant on suspicion of computer fraud. Later that year, due to the Kazakh authorities’ pressure and his Russian ethnic origin, the applicant had decided to move to Russia. In 2006, the Kazakh authorities had pardoned the applicant and his criminal record had been expunged. The applicant stressed that throughout his time living in Russia he had been a law-abiding person, had been in full compliance with immigration regulations and had a wife and child who were Russian nationals. He pointed out that he was an ethnic Russian, that he did not speak Kazakh, had no family in that country, and that he had neither a place to live in Kazakhstan nor the financial means to move there with his wife and infant son. 13. Also at the hearing on 24 March 2010, the applicant’s counsel requested that the court examine the factual grounds for the exclusion and allow him to access the documents which had served as its basis. He stressed that the FSB had failed to produce a single item of evidence to substantiate their allegations about the threat the applicant posed for national security. Referring to the case of Liu v. Russia (no. 42086/05, 6 December 2007), he pointed out that the authorities had to provide evidence proving the applicant was a threat to national security, given that the sanction against him, the five-year exclusion, would lead to the disruption of his family life. The court examined and dismissed the request, stating that as the matter was within the FSB’s exclusive competence it fell outside the scope of judicial review. From the documents submitted to the Court, it is unclear whether the FSB presented the Regional Court with any evidence concerning the applicant’s case, other than its letter to the applicant of 13 August 2009 (see paragraph 10 above) and copies of the relevant legal provisions governing the activities of the FSB and the applicable immigration regulations. 14. On the same date, 24 March 2010, the Regional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the exclusion order. Its decision stated, amongst other things, the following: “ ... in July 2009 the Federal Security Service took a decision on the undesirability of Mr Zezev’s presence (residence) in the Russian Federation and on prohibiting his re-entry into the country until July 2014 ... In his complaint, Mr Zezev seeks to have the decision of the Federal Security Service declared unlawful and for it to be overruled, referring to the following: He has resided in the Russian Federation for five years. He has never committed any crime, either in Russia or Kazakhstan. He does not have a criminal record. His character has been described in positive terms. He does not represent a threat to the security of the Russian Federation. He does not have a place to live in Kazakhstan. He is ethnically Russian and wants to work and live in Russia. The FSB’s decision is unlawful and unsubstantiated ... ... [According to the applicant] the court should examine [his] case in the light of the right to respect for his private and family life and respect for a citizen’s choice of the place for his family life. There is no evidence of any alleged criminal activities ... ... the FSB decided on the undesirability of Mr Zezev’s presence (residence) in Russia and on prohibiting his re-entry into the country until July 2014. The application of such preventive measures is within the Federal Security Service’s scope of discretion. The decision [in respect of the applicant] was taken by FSB officials within the scope of their authority and the procedure defined by federal legislation and was approved by the competent official. Given the circumstances, Mr Zezev’s request to have the FSB’s decision on the undesirability of his presence (residence) in Russia and on the prohibition on his re-entry until July 2014 declared unlawful should be rejected ...” 15. On 5 April 2010 the applicant appealed against the above decision to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (hereinafter “the Supreme Court”). He referred, in particular, to the Court’s case-law on Article 8 of the Convention concerning the right to respect for family life. He stated that the Regional Court had failed to examine whether the FSB decision had been substantiated by proof. He pointed out that the FSB had not furnished any evidence to the court of alleged activities by him that posed a threat to national security. The applicant further stated that even though he was a Kazakh national he was an ethnic Russian, did not speak Kazakh, and had nowhere to live in Kazakhstan as his parents had also moved to Russia in 2005. He further stressed that he had married a Russian national in 2007 with whom he had had a son in 2009 and that all his family members were Russian nationals. Lastly, the applicant pointed out that he was the sole breadwinner for his wife and infant child. 16. On 2 June 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court’s judgment stating, amongst other things, the following: “...On 22 July 2009 the Federal Security Service issued a decision on the undesirability of the presence (residence) of the Kazakh national Mr Zezev in the Russian Federation and on the prohibition of his re-entry ... In the cassation appeal Mr Zezev seeks to have the judgment of the Krasnodar Regional Court overruled as unlawful. The court sees no basis for granting that request ... When deciding to reject Mr Zezev’s request, the Regional Court had in its possession information which served as the basis for the [FSB] order. Mr Zezev’s arguments concerning the unlawfulness of the FSB order were examined by the Regional Court. In those circumstances, the Chamber finds that the applicant’s right to a proper defence was fully complied with and that the reasons for the decision concerning the undesirability of his presence (residence) in Russia and on the prohibition of his re-entry, which was taken owing to the real threat he posed to national security, have been confirmed by concrete facts. As for the applicant’s arguments concerning a violation of his private interests as a result of the decision on the undesirability of his presence (residence) in Russia and on the prohibition of his re-entry, the Chamber does not agree with him as it finds that in the circumstances of the case public interests should outweigh private interests. In those circumstances, the decision of the Krasnodar Regional Court should remain unchanged ...” 17. On 17 August 2010 the FMS issued an order for the applicant’s deportation. It appears from the case file that the sanction was not enforced as, according to the applicant, he informed the local authorities that he had an application pending before the Court. He continued to reside in Russia. 18. In May 2011 the applicant and his wife had another child. 19. On 19 November 2013 the police arrived at the applicant’s home and fined him for a breach of immigration regulations under Article 18.8 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the COA”). Then the police detained him on the spot and took him to the court. 20. The applicant was then taken to the Sovetskiy District Court in Krasnodar, which on 21 November 2013 ordered his deportation and placed him in a special centre for the detention of foreigners. 21. On 26 December 2013 the applicant was deported from Russia. 22. On an unspecified date in February 2014 the applicant attempted to re-enter Russia but was informed at the border that he was banned from entering until 31 July 2014. 23. The applicant has submitted that on 30 July 2014 police officers arrived at his wife’s home in Russia and informed her that he was wanted on suspicion of a crime. The applicant’s wife explained that he had been deported from Russia in December 2013. 24. It is unclear whether the applicant returned to Russia after the expiry of his re-entry ban on 31 July 2014. According to the Government, the applicant neither applied for a temporary residence permit nor sought Russian nationality between 2014 and 2016. 25. In their submission to the Court, the Government stated that on 12 December 2008 and 25 November 2012 the applicant was fined for being intoxicated in public and then on 19 November 2013 for a violation of immigration regulations (see paragraph 19 above). The Government further stated that on 31 July 2014 the police in Krasnodar had opened a criminal case against the applicant on suspicion of involvement in computer fraud. As of October 2016 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were still pending. 26. In reply to a request by the Court for a copy of the documents which served as the basis for the decision to exclude the applicant, the Government only furnished a thirteen-page copy of the transcript of the hearing of the applicant’s appeal by the Krasnodar Regional Court on 24 March 2010 (see paragraphs 12-14 above).

5. The applicant is a non-governmental organisation which promotes tolerance and condemns all types of racially motivated discrimination. It was established under Swiss law and registered in Zürich. 6. On 5 November 2009 the youth wing of the Swiss People’s Party (Junge Schweizerische Volkspartei) held a demonstration in the train station square in the town of Frauenfeld concerning a public initiative to support the prohibition of the building of minarets in Switzerland. After the event the party published a report on its website, including the following excerpts: “In his speech in front of the Thurgau government building [Thurgauer Regierungsgebäude], B.K., the president of the local branch of the Young Swiss People’s Party [“the JSVP”], emphasised that it was time to stop the expansion of Islam. With this demonstration, the Young Swiss People’s Party wanted to take an extraordinary measure in an extraordinary time. The Swiss guiding culture (“schweizerische Leitkultur”), based on Christianity, cannot allow itself to be replaced by other cultures, B.K. added. A symbolic sign, such as the prohibition of minarets, would therefore be an expression of the preservation of one’s own identity.” 7. In response, the applicant posted an entry on its website in the section called “Chronology – Verbal racism”, entitled “Frauenfeld TG, 5 November 2009”, including the following extract: “According to the report of the event, B.K., the president of the local branch of the Young Swiss People’s Party, emphasised that it was time to stop the expansion of Islam. He added further: ‘The Swiss guiding culture, based on Christianity, cannot allow itself to be replaced by other cultures. A symbolic sign, such as the prohibition of minarets, would therefore be an expression of the preservation of one’s own identity.’ Swiss People’s Party of Switzerland canton representative H.L. also spoke to the few people who attended; nevertheless, the Young Swiss People’s Party speaks of a great success. (Verbal racism)” 8. On 29 November 2009 the popular initiative against the construction of minarets was accepted in a referendum and a constitutional amendment banning the construction of new minarets was introduced. 9. On 21 August 2010 B.K. filed a claim for the protection of his personality rights with the Kreuzlingen District Court (Bezirksgericht Kreuzlingen). He applied, firstly, to have the applicant organisation withdraw the entry in question from its homepage and, secondly, for it to be replaced with the court’s judgment. The applicant organisation replied that the title of the Internet entry had to be considered as a value judgment, which could only lead to an infringement of personality rights if it entailed an unnecessarily hurtful and insulting attack on the person concerned. 10. On 15 March 2011 the Kreuzlingen District Court dismissed B.K.’s action. It held that the publication of the impugned article on the applicant’s website had been justified since it had related to a political discussion on a matter of public interest. 11. On appeal, on 17 November 2011 the Thurgau Cantonal High Court (Obergericht des Kantons Thurgau) reversed the first-instance judgment. It held that classifying B.K.’s speech as “verbally racist” had been a mixed value judgment, which could lead to an infringement of personality rights if it was based on untruths. The High Court concluded that B.K.’s speech itself had not been racist. It therefore ordered that the impugned article be removed from the applicant’s website and replaced with the court’s judgment. 12. On 25 January 2012 the applicant organisation filed an appeal with the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgericht), reiterating its argument that any interference with B.K.’s personality rights had been justified. One of the applicant’s main aims was to fight racism and to inform the public about hidden and open racist behaviour. Its website stated that public comments would be documented, even if they did not fall within the scope of the prohibition of racial discrimination enshrined in Article 261bis of the Swiss Criminal Code. To fulfil its role of watchdog in that sense, it published articles and interviews concerning current events relating to racism and anti‑Semitism. 13. On 29 August 2012 the Federal Supreme Court dismissed the applicant organisation’s appeal, finding as follows (unofficial translation): “3. The classification of and commenting on a person’s statements as ‘verbal racism’ violate that person’s honour. Not only in the context of the criminal offence of racial discrimination (Article 261bis of the Criminal Code) but more generally, the term in question is, in the eyes of the average reader, capable of deliberately debasing the person whose comments have been classified as ‘verbally racist’, accusing him or her of behaviour which is frowned upon by society in the form of an act which is, at the very least, questionable in constitutional terms (cf. BGE 127 III 481 E. 2b / aa p. 487, 129 III 49 E. 2.2 p. 51 and 715 E. 4.1 p. 722). The appellant referred to the respondent’s speech at the public demonstration of 5 November 2009 on its website ... freely accessible on the Internet, commenting on the term ‘verbal racism’. It thereby violated the respondent’s honour as part of his personality within the meaning of Article 28 § 1 of the Civil Code. The infringement is unlawful if it is not justified by the consent of the injured party, by an overriding private or public interest or by law (Article 28 § 2 ZGB). 4. The main point in dispute is whether the appellant can rely on an overriding interest in classifying the respondent’s comments as ‘verbal racism’. 4.1. The case-law on press statements, on which the appellant relies, distinguishes between statements of facts on the one hand and value judgments on the other, and can be summarised as follows: ... 4.2. The appellant assigned the respondent’s statements to the section entitled ‘verbal racism’ ... That was a mixed value judgment. It contains a substantive core and, at the same time, a value judgment. In order to justify the substantive core, it is necessary to examine whether the respondent’s comments were indeed racist. 4.3. The term ‘racism’ is understood as ‘a doctrine’ which states that ‘certain races or nations are superior to others in terms of their cultural capacity’, and, on the other hand, a ‘certain attitude, manner of thinking and acting towards people of (certain) other races or nations’ (cf. Duden, The Great Dictionary of the German Language in Six Volumes, Vol. 5, 1980, p. 2099). The adjective ‘verbal’ describes racism as ‘[occurring] with words, with the help of language’ (cf. Duden, The Great Dictionary of the German Language in Six Volumes, Vol. 6, 1981, p. 2730). Verbal racism is, therefore, no longer merely a certain attitude, but an attitude in the instant case which was expressed publicly through language (as opposed to, for example, through deeds). ‘Verbal racism’ could therefore mean racial discrimination in the criminal sense, as the respondent claims. What is decisive, however, as the second-instance court correctly stated, is that the mere demonstration of a difference between two individuals or groups does not constitute racism. Racism begins where the difference amounts simultaneously to denigration of the victims and where the highlighting of differences is ultimately only a means to represent the victims negatively and to show disregard for their dignity. 4.4. The statements that led the appellant to conclude that there had been ‘verbal racism’ are the core phrases ‘it is time to stop the spread of Islam ... The Swiss guiding culture (“schweizerische Leitkultur”), based on Christianity, cannot let itself be repressed by other cultures ... A symbolic sign, such as the prohibition of minarets, is therefore an expression of the preservation of one’s own identity’. 4.4.1. In his public speech, the respondent expressed his opinion on the prohibition of minarets, which, in the opinion of the High Court, would not be compatible with freedom of religion and non-discrimination. He has, in that connection, compared his own beliefs (‘Christianity’) with foreign beliefs (‘Islam’), delimited them (‘to halt’, ‘preserving one’s own identity’) and described his own as worthy of protection and defence (‘Swiss leading culture’, ‘not to be repressed’). For the average listener, that does not result in the blanket denigration of the followers of Islam or show fundamental contempt for Muslims. 4.4.2. On the whole, it cannot be said that the comments made by the respondent, as understood by the average listener, could be described as ‘verbally racist’. Therefore, the substantive core does not apply and the assessment is not acceptable. It shows the respondent in the wrong light. Therefore, the mixed value judgment, which infringed personality rights, cannot be justified by any overriding interest within the meaning of Article 28 § 2 of the Civil Code. 4.4.3. That assessment cannot be altered by the fact that in the general interest of informing the public, there is an increased degree of publicity and a reduced level of protection for personality rights for people who engage in a political debate, such as the respondent in the campaign for the minaret initiative (see BGE 105 II 161 E. 3b p. 165, 107 II 1 E. 3b p. 5). That special framework allows for the assessment of breaches of honour on a somewhat different scale, but it can neither justify the dissemination of untruths nor the publication of value judgments that do not appear to be justified with regard to the underlying facts.”

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Smederevo. 6. On 26 March 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the Žabari Municipal Court against his employer, the Ministry of Interior, seeking payment of certain benefits. 7. On 23 April 2012 the Požarevac First Instance Court the Žabari Court Unit ruled in favour of the applicant. 8. On 4 October 2012 the Belgrade Appellate Court revised the First Instance Court’s judgment and rejected the applicant’s claim. The applicant received the said judgment on 5 November 2012. 9. On 12 November 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal.

6. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Leipzig. 7. On 30 October 2009 the Munich II Public Prosecution Office charged the applicant with coercion to engage in sexual activity in at least 300 cases and with sexual coercion in another eighteen cases. 8. On 20 July 2012 the Munich II Regional Court, after taking evidence at seventeen days of hearing, issued a decision limiting the prosecution to charges concerning four incidents which had taken place between 19 and 25 August 2007. The court provisionally discontinued the proceedings in respect of all the other offences the applicant had been charged with (see paragraph 7 above), in accordance with Article 154 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 17 below), in view of the penalty the applicant could expect for the four remaining incidents. The applicant was further informed that if he was convicted the court could take into account findings made in respect of the other incidents when setting his sentence. 9. In a judgment delivered on the same day, the Regional Court convicted the applicant of four counts of coercion to engage in sexual activity, committed between 19 and 25 August 2007, and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. 10. In its findings of fact, the Regional Court stated that between January 2001 and October 2007 the applicant had forced P., aged between 29 and 35 at the relevant time and suffering from a moderate mental disorder and an autistic and speech disorder, to satisfy him manually or orally on at least fifty further occasions (out of the at least 300 offences the applicant had initially been charged with, see paragraph 7 above). The court had regard to P.’s extensive description of different incidents, which happened either in the house the applicant and P. were both living in or in the applicant’s car. P. had notably explained how the applicant had regularly, when his wife and son were absent, brought her into his apartment or in the basement boiler room, had undressed himself and had instructed her how to satisfy him, partly while playing pornographic films. The applicant had systematically threatened P. that she would have to return to a home for the disabled if she did not comply with his requests. From 19 to 25 August 2007, when the applicant’s wife and son were on holiday, the applicant had forced P. to satisfy him orally at least twice and to satisfy him manually on two further occasions in their house or in the basement boiler room. The veracity of P.´s consistent statements was confirmed by further witnesses and three psychological expert opinions on P.´s credibility and ability to testify. 11. The Regional Court explained that it had restricted the conviction to the four events that had taken place between 19 and 25 August 2007. It had discontinued the proceedings in respect of the at least 300 further charges under Article 154 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but was convinced that in at least fifty cases there had been incidents comparable to the four of which the applicant was formally convicted. It had simply been impossible to determine their exact time and place due to the victim’s speech disorder. 12. In the impugned passages of the judgment, the Regional Court found as follows: “The chamber is convinced on the basis of the credible statement by the injured party that in addition to the four cases between January 2001 and October 2007 on which judgment was passed, at least 50 other comparable cases occurred. The injured party herself said that the applicant had coerced her to perform sexual acts from as early as 2001. From 2003, the frequency of these incidents had increased and the applicant had demanded sexual gratification from her approximately every 1½ weeks. Even if one were to disregard the years 2001 and 2002 and August and October 2007 in favour of the applicant and also to presume that from 2003 onwards, such incidents occurred only once a month there are 56 cases. Following the deduction of a further safety margin the chamber assumes that there were at least 50 more, comparable cases during the total period from January 2001 to October 2007. ... On the other hand, the chamber considers as an aggravating element that it is convinced that, in addition to the four incidents in August 2007 which the accused has been convicted of, there have been at least 50 comparable incidents since January 2001. A conviction for those events was only made impossible by the victim’s incapacity to substantiate them in terms of the time and the place where they happened in a manner making it possible to define them as procedural offences (offences in the procedural sense). As it could no longer be determined with certainty in which cases the accused, by his threats, made the victim satisfy him orally or manually, the chamber will proceed on the basis that there were 50 further cases of manual satisfaction.” (“Die Kammer ist aufgrund der glaubhaften Aussage der Geschädigten davon überzeugt, dass es neben den vier abgeurteilten Taten im Zeitraum Januar 2001 bis Oktober 2007 zu mindestens 50 weiteren, vergleichbaren Fällen kam. Die Geschädigte selbst gab an, der Angeklagte habe sie bereits ab dem Jahr 2001 zu sexuellen Handlungen genötigt. Ab dem Jahr 2003 sei die Frequenz dieser Vorfälle gestiegen und der Angeklagte habe ungefähr alle 1 ½ Wochen sexuelle Befriedigung von ihr verlangt. Selbst wenn man zugunsten des Angeklagten die Jahr 2001 und 2002 sowie den August und Oktober 2007 unberücksichtigt lässt und zudem davon ausgeht, dass es ab dem Jahr 2003 lediglich einmal im Monat zu derartigen Vorfällen kam, so ergeben sich 56 Fälle. Nach Abzug eines weiteren Sicherheitsabschlags geht die Kammer von mindestens 50 weiteren, vergleichbaren Fällen im gesamten Zeitraum von Januar 2001 bis Oktober 2007 aus. ... Andererseits wertet die Kammer zu Lasten des Angeklagten den Umstand, dass es nach Überzeugung der Kammer neben den verurteilten vier Vorfällen im August 2007 bereits ab Januar 2001 zu mindestens 50 vergleichbaren Vorfällen gekommen war. Eine Verurteilung dieser Vorfälle scheiterte lediglich an der mangelnden Fähigkeit der Geschädigten, die Vorfälle zeitlich und örtlich so zu konkretisieren, dass diese als prozessuale Taten abgrenzbar waren. Da sich nicht mehr mit Sicherheit aufklären ließ, in welchen Fällen der Angeklagte die Geschädigte durch seine Drohung zu einer oralen und in welchen zu einer manuellen Befriedigung brachte, geht die Kammer insoweit von 50 weiteren Fällen der manuellen Befriedigung aus.”) 13. In an appeal on points of law to the Federal Court of Justice, the applicant complained that the Regional Court had breached the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the Convention by taking fifty unproven incidents into account as an aggravating factor meriting a more severe sentence, despite the fact that the proceedings in relation to them had been discontinued under Article 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14. The Federal Public Prosecutor General argued that the Regional Court had been entitled to take account of the sexual offences committed previously by the applicant as an aggravating element as part of his previous history (Vorleben) and thus as one of the elements in setting his sentence under Article 46 § 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 18 below). In accordance with the Federal Court of Justice’s case-law, the Regional Court had made sufficient findings of fact establishing a minimum level of guilt in respect to those offences. 15. On 6 February 2013 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal as ill-founded, without giving specific reasons. 16. In a decision of 16 May 2013, which was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 28 May 2013, the Federal Constitutional Court, without giving reasons, declined to consider a constitutional complaint by the applicant, in which he had again complained of a breach of the presumption of innocence (file no. 2 BvR 575/13).

6. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Istanbul. He was the owner and the editor-in-chief of a publishing house, namely Aram Basım ve Yayıncılık, at the time of the events giving rise to the present application. 7. In June 2001 and March 2003 the applicant’s company published two books entitled Dağlarda Yaşamın Dili (“The Language of Life in the Mountains”) and Tufanda 33 Gün (“33 Days in the Deluge”), respectively. 8. On 29 August 2001 the public prosecutor attached to the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court charging the applicant with aiding and abetting the PKK, an illegal armed organisation, under Article 169 of the former Criminal Code, on account of the publication of the book entitled The Language of Life in the Mountains. 9. On 24 July 2002 the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant as charged. 10. On 1 May 2003 the Court of Cassation, on appeal, upheld the judgment of 24 July 2002. 11. On 23 September 2003 the public prosecutor attached to the Istanbul State Security Court requested that the court revise its judgment of 24 July 2002 since Article 169 of the former Criminal Code had been amended on 7 August 2003. The Istanbul State Security Court accepted that request. 12. By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, state security courts were abolished. The case against the applicant concerning the book entitled The Language of Life in the Mountains was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 13. On 16 August 2003 the public prosecutor attached to the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court charging the applicant with aiding and abetting the PKK under Article 169 of the former Criminal Code on account of the publication of the book entitled 33 Days in the Deluge. According to the indictment, on pages 129, 130 and 135 the struggle of the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was praised and the applicant had therefore aided the PKK through the medium of the press. 14. On 30 April 2007 the Istanbul Assize Court decided to join the proceedings concerning The Language of Life in the Mountains and 33 Days in the Deluge. 15. On 7 December 2007 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) for disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK twice, because he had published two books, and sentenced him to a total of twenty months’ imprisonment. With regard to the publication of 33 Days in the Deluge, the assize court considered that on pages 129, 130 and 135 the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, were praised and the offence of dissemination of propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation had therefore been committed. The assize court furthermore found that the book allowed for the transmission of the opinions of the PKK to the public and was aimed at bringing more sympathisers into that organisation. 16. On 25 June 2009 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 7 December 2007, holding that the first-instance court should not have joined the two cases, since the case concerning The Language of Life in the Mountains was a re-qualification of the applicant’s previous final conviction (uyarlama yargılaması). 17. On 7 December 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant once again under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 on account of the publication of The Language of Life in the Mountains and sentenced him to a fine. 18. On 3 June 2013 the Court of Cassation quashed the first-instance judgment. 19. On 13 November 2013 the Istanbul Assize Court decided to suspend the execution of the sentence pronounced in its judgment of 7 December 2009. 20. In the meantime, the Istanbul Assize Court resumed the trial concerning the publication of 33 Days in the Deluge following the Court of Cassation’s decision of 25 June 2009. 21. On 21 October 2009 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 for disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK on account of the publication of 33 Days in the Deluge and sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment. In its judgment, the assize court reiterated that on pages 129, 130 and 135 the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, were praised and the offence of dissemination of propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation had therefore been committed. The court held that the turns of phrase used on those pages were not protected by Article 10 of the Convention and constituted an abuse of the right to freedom of expression. The assize court further found that the book permitted the opinions of the PKK to be transmitted to the public and was aimed at bringing more sympathisers into that organisation and thus at destroying the unitary nature of the State of the Republic of Turkey. 22. The applicant appealed. 23. On 15 February 2012 the Court of Cassation decided to discontinue the proceedings concerning the publication of 33 Days in the Deluge, holding that the prosecution was time-barred.

5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Tallinn. 6. On 27 May 2010 the Harju County Court determined that the applicant’s son, O.T. (born in 1984), had restricted active legal capacity (piiratud teovõime). It appointed the applicant as O.T.’s guardian to protect his interests in social and legal matters and in matters concerning property. The court relied on a forensic psychiatric expert opinion of 14 March 2010 according to which the applicant’s son suffered from permanent paranoid schizophrenia and was incapable of understanding or controlling his actions. 7. On 25 October 2010 O.T. committed acts of a sexual nature in respect of a ten-year old girl and threatened to kill the victim. 8. Criminal proceedings were initiated and O.T. was examined by a forensic psychiatric expert who confirmed, in an expert report dated 8 November 2010, the earlier expert findings (see paragraph 6 above). The expert furthermore added that O.T. posed a danger to society and needed coercive psychiatric treatment (psühhiaatriline sundravi). On 6 May 2011 the Harju County Court terminated the criminal proceedings and ordered that O.T. undergo coercive psychiatric treatment, which commenced on 6 June 2011. 9. On 14 December 2012 the applicant lodged an application with the Tartu County Court for O.T.’s coercive psychiatric treatment to be discontinued or for his inpatient treatment to be replaced by outpatient treatment. In her request, she referred to an opinion given by a medical committee – comprised of O.T.’s attending doctor and the acting head of the coercive treatment department (Dr E.K.) of the hospital where O.T. was being detained – dated 14 June 2012, which stated: “substantial contact [sisuline kontakt] with O.T. deficient [puudulik], his answers to questions are sparse, poses counter-questions. Denies the committed offence, does not consider himself mentally ill. In need of continued treatment as he poses danger to society.” The applicant considered that the opinion was not impartial and asked for a new independent expert assessment to be carried out with respect to O.T. 10. On 6 February 2013 the Tartu County Court dismissed the application. It relied on an opinion dated 11 December 2012 drawn up by a medical committee comprised of O.T.’s attending doctor and the head of the coercive treatment department (Dr S.K.), according to which O.T.’s mental condition had not changed. According to the opinion, substantial contact with him had been deficient, his answers to questions had been sparse, he had posed counter-questions and had made incoherent statements. During the course of the interview his facial expression had become angry from time to time, he had laughed inappropriately, and he had faked psychotic experiences. On the basis of the above, the medical committee concluded that O.T. was in need of continued psychiatric treatment. The court decided that no additional expert opinion was necessary, as under Article 403 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kriminaalmenetluse seadustik – “the CCrP”) (see paragraph 21 below) the opinion of the medical committee sufficed as evidence. 11. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 5 March 2013 the Tartu Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned decision because, contrary to the CCrP, the first-instance court had not examined the case in oral proceedings. The Court of Appeal noted that under Article 402-1 § 3 and Article 403 § 5 of the CCrP (see paragraph 21 below), the ordering of a new expert report had not been compulsory and the first-instance court had been entitled to rely solely on the written opinion of the medical committee or to question the attending doctor at a hearing. 12. On 30 April 2013 the Tartu County Court granted State-funded legal aid to O.T., and a lawyer (advokaat) was appointed to assist him. 13. The Tartu County Court re-examined the case at a hearing on 8 May 2013. It had at its disposal the medical committee opinion of 11 December 2012 (see paragraph 10 above). The head of the coercive treatment department, Dr S.K., who had participated in the drawing up of the medical opinion in question, was also heard by the court. He submitted that O.T. had not recovered: he did not have an understanding of what was going on, did not adhere to his treatment, and had accused his mother of poisoning him. In the doctor’s opinion, outpatient treatment was out of the question. The applicant and O.T’s legal aid lawyer expressed a wish for O.T. to be released. O.T. himself stated that he did not understand anything and did not wish to make statements. 14. By a decision of 8 May 2013 the County Court dismissed the applicant’s request, considering that O.T. had not recovered to such an extent that it would be possible to discontinue the coercive treatment or change from inpatient to outpatient treatment. It observed that there was no reason to doubt the conclusions of the medical committee’s opinion of 11 December 2012 or the reliability of the head of the coercive treatment department. 15. The applicant appealed to the Tartu Court of Appeal on 29 May 2013. She argued that it had not been established that O.T. posed a danger to himself or to society and that no independent expert assessment had been carried out. She considered the opinions given by the hospital’s own medical committee (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above and paragraph 22 below) to be superficial and repetitive in their wording. She also invoked Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, claiming that the patient himself should have been entitled at reasonable intervals to initiate proceedings during which the continued need for treatment would be assessed. She made reference to Article 402-1 § 1 of the CCrP (see paragraph 21 below) and the explanatory annex to the relevant draft legislation (see paragraph 23 below), according to which persons subjected to coercive psychiatric treatment had no such right (see paragraph 23 below). 16. On 4 July 2013 the Tartu Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that the applicant’s complaint about the lack of impartiality of the doctors treating O.T. was unfounded and that the County Court had rightly relied on the opinions of the medical committee and the head of the coercive treatment department. The Court of Appeal noted that an independent expert examination was mandatory in proceedings related to the initial ordering of coercive treatment. The danger to society posed by O.T. and the preconditions for applying coercive treatment had already been independently established by a court on 6 May 2011. In the proceedings at issue – which concerned the proposed discontinuation of inpatient coercive treatment or its replacement with outpatient treatment – it was not mandatory to obtain an alternative expert opinion (see paragraph 21 below). The Court of Appeal held that in a situation where the state of O.T.’s health and adherence to the treatment had not improved and the discontinuation of his inpatient treatment or its replacement with outpatient treatment was in the doctors’ opinion excluded, ordering another expert examination would have been irrelevant. 17. On 19 July 2013 the applicant lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Court, reiterating the complaints made in her first appeal. She also requested legal aid, since an appeal before the Supreme Court could be lodged only by a lawyer, for the hiring of whom she had no financial means. 18. By a decision of 16 September 2013 the Supreme Court refused the applicant’s request for legal aid. The Supreme Court noted that although the applicant had asked for legal aid for herself and not for O.T., she had justified her request by arguing that there was a need to protect O.T.’s rights – primarily his right to liberty. The Supreme Court went on to add that the applicant did not herself have rights in the proceedings in question that she could protect by means of securing legal aid and that there was therefore no need to recognise her right of appeal. The Supreme Court noted that the legal aid lawyer appointed for O.T. by a decision of the Tartu County Court of 30 April 2013 (see paragraph 12 above) could have lodged an appeal in his client’s interests. 19. On 18 September 2017 the Government notified the Court that the psychiatric treatment of the applicant’s son had been terminated, at the request of the applicant, by a decision of the Tartu County Court of 21 September 2016.

4. The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Skopje. 5. On 7 May 2005 a person holding a handgun stopped a car driven by F.N. and fired several shots in his direction, as a consequence of which F.N. died on the spot, and J.T., an Albanian national who had been in the passenger seat, was injured. J.T. was taken to hospital, where he was interviewed by the police. An on-site examination was also carried out. 6. On 8 May 2005 the police presented J.T. with photographs of potential suspects, from which he identified the applicant as the person who had fired at him and F.N. 7. The next morning the police conducted a search of the applicant’s house, where he lived with his parents, and recovered a handgun. Subsequent to the search, the applicant was arrested. 8. On the same day an identification parade was organised by the police, in which J.T. identified the applicant as the perpetrator. 9. On 11 May 2005 J.T. gave a statement before an investigating judge and a prosecutor. According to the record of the examination, the applicant’s lawyer had agreed to the interview taking place in his absence. J.T. stated that he had been asked to work on F.N.’s house as a handyman. He had arrived in Skopje on the day of the murder and he had been picked up by F.N. On their way to the house, a young man holding a handgun, around 24-25 years old, had intercepted the car. When F.N. had tried to open the car door the man had fired several times, killing F.N. and injuring J.T. The man had been standing in close proximity to the car when he had fired and J.T. had been able to see his face clearly. 10. On 6 July 2005 the applicant was indicted for murder and attempted murder before the Skopje Court of First Instance (“the trial court”). The prosecution proposed to call J.T. as a witness. 11. On 30 September 2005 the trial court requested that the Ministry of Justice (“the Ministry”) summon J.T. via diplomatic means, as he had returned to Albania. The trial court was not informed as to whether J.T. had received the summons. 12. At a hearing held on 22 November 2005 the applicant testified. He was disoriented and claimed to have no knowledge of the murder. A psychiatrist who attended the hearing as an expert clarified that that was as a result of his reduced mental capacity. Given the severity of his condition, the expert expressed concerns about how the applicant could have arrived at the place of the crime, which was located some 8-9 kilometres from his house (не би можела да тврдам како се случило да се оддалечи). 13. At the same hearing two of the applicant’s neighbours testified. M.J. stated that he had seen the applicant at home at the time of the murder. A.M. stated that he had seen the applicant in front of his house at about the same time, adding that the applicant could only walk very short distances unaccompanied. 14. On 23 November 2005 the trial court sent another summons to J.T. through the Ministry. 15. A hearing scheduled for 16 February 2006 was postponed on account of J.T.’s absence. There was no information as to whether he had received the summons. On the same day the trial court requested information regarding the summons of 23 November 2005. The Ministry responded that it had forwarded the summons to the Albanian authorities and that the trial court should allow more time between hearings to ensure a timely delivery of the summons. 16. A hearing scheduled for 14 March 2006 was postponed owing to the absence of J.T., who had not been summoned properly. The trial judge sent another summons to J.T. via diplomatic means. The Ministry again informed the trial judge that she should allow more time between hearings. 17. The trial court held four hearings and sent four summonses to J.T. in the period between June 2006 and December 2007. One summons was not delivered to him until after the hearing had taken place. He was properly summoned for another hearing, but he did not appear. 18. On a hearing dated 29 January 2008, the trial court admitted into evidence the statement that J.T. had given before the investigating judge, stating that it had made numerous attempts to secure his attendance. It concluded that J.T. had been properly served with several summonses, but had failed to appear. In view of the above, it ruled that there were justified reasons to admit his statement into evidence. In his closing argument, given at the same hearing, the applicant’s lawyer protested against that decision. He argued that admitting J.T.’s statement into evidence was a violation of section 351 of the Criminal Proceedings Act, by which the trial court had to provide the defence with an opportunity to cross-examine him. Failing that, a judgment could not be based merely on his statement. 19. On 7 February 2008 the trial court acquitted the applicant, holding that there had been no nitrate particles found on his body, the handgun that had been seized from the his house had not been the one used in the murder and there was no fingerprint evidence to suggest that he had been the perpetrator. The sole evidence in support of the prosecution had been the evidence provided by J.T., which was insufficient for a conviction. 20. The Skopje Court of Appeal (Апелационен суд Скопје) quashed the judgment, finding that the lower court had not given adequate weight to the evidence provided by J.T. 21. After two more remittals, on 24 October 2013 the trial court convicted the applicant as charged and ordered him to undergo compulsory psychiatric treatment. It reiterated its earlier findings (see paragraph 19 above), but concluded that the applicant had been guilty of the crimes on the basis of the on-site examination, the statement of J.T., the identification parade and the fact that J.T. had identified the applicant from the photographs. 22. The applicant appealed, asking that J.T. be cross-examined. He further stated that there was no basis in domestic law to admit J.T.’s statement into evidence and that all remaining evidence pointed to his innocence. 23. On 4 July 2014, after holding a public hearing, the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld the judgment finding that the evidence produced by J.T. had been admitted in compliance with section 351 of the Criminal Proceedings Act.

5. The applicants were born in 1981 and 1966 respectively and live in Ecemiş village near the town of Lice, located with the administrative jurisdiction of the province of Diyarbakır. 6. The facts of the case as submitted by the parties, and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. 7. At the time of the events the first applicant’s brother and the second applicant’s nephew Murat Tekdal was thirty years old and lived in Ecemiş village. 8. On 12 September 2008 Murat Tekdal returned to his village of Ecemiş after having visited his uncle, the second applicant. Later the same day he left his home to walk to the nearby Şenlik village. 9. Between 5 and 7 p.m. the same day, villagers in Ecemiş village heard gunfire. The following day the headman of the village (“muhtar”) was informed that a person had been killed. The headman, accompanied by 20‑30 villagers, went to Lice, where he was handed the body of the applicants’ relative, Murat Tekdal. 10. According to a report drawn up on 13 September 2008 by seven members of the military, a military operation was being carried out in the area near the applicants’ village on 12 September 2008 when at 11.15 p.m. soldiers encountered 3-4 persons in the area whom they considered to be members of the PKK. The soldiers asked the persons to stop and surrender, but the persons opened fire on the soldiers. The soldiers returned fire and a clash ensued which continued for a period of approximately five minutes. 11. At 5 a.m. the following morning the soldiers conducted a search in the area and noticed the footsteps of four persons. The footsteps disappeared some two kilometres away, next to a little brook in a valley. At that location the soldiers also found supplies of food. The soldiers continued their search to the north of the brook, and found the body of Murat Tekdal in Karaçay hill area. Next to the body was a hunting rifle still loaded with two unexploded cartridges. 12. The soldiers concluded in their report that there had been five PKK members in the area the previous evening who had either been planning to attack the security forces or transporting food supplies to PKK bases. Having regard to the particular brand of the glue which some people used for sniffing, as well as to the hunting rifle, the seven soldiers concluded in their report that the applicant’s relative had been a “terrorist posing as an ordinary citizen”. 13. The Lice prosecutor and a crime scene officer arrived at the scene at 10.45 a.m. on 13 September 2008 and searched Murat Tekdal’s pockets, where they found his identity card and a tube of glue. The body was then taken to the Lice State Hospital. They then took the body to the Diyarbakır State Hospital and subsequently drew up their own reports pertaining to the incident. 14. According to the crime scene officer’s report, a bullet had entered Murat Tekdal’s abdomen. A cursory examination of the barrel of the hunting rifle found next to the body did not reveal any smell of gunpowder. There were also no fingerprints on the rifle. In a small bag found next to the body there were personal effects such as toothpaste, a toothbrush, a flick-knife, a packet of cigarettes, two sim cards, gloves, a tax‑payer’s identity card and a bank card. Swabs were taken from Murat Tekdal’s hands and face and from the barrel of the hunting rifle, in order to verify the existence or otherwise of gunpowder residue. He was fingerprinted and his jacket through which the bullet had gone was sent for forensic analysis. The body was photographed and taken to the hospital. It was subsequently established by a police laboratory that there was gunpowder residue on the outside of his left hand. It was also established that he had been shot at close range. 15. It appears from the report prepared by the prosecutor that an autopsy was carried out at the hospital. The prosecutor stated in his report that he had gone to the scene after having been informed by the military that “a terrorist had been killed”. The headman of the applicant’s village formally identified the body as that of Murat Tekdal, and told the prosecutor that Murat lived in Ecemiş village. 16. During the autopsy the doctor observed two bullet holes on Murat Tekdal’s lower left abdomen. He also noted that bullets had skimmed both hands and the lower right side of the abdomen and caused superficial injuries. There was also a superficial injury on the front of the right axilla. The internal examination of the body revealed injuries to the stomach, liver, diaphragm, spleen, intestines and lungs, all caused by bullets. A bullet measuring approximately 0.7 centimetres was found inside the body. Samples taken from the body were sent for further forensic analyses. An x‑ray of the body showed a large number of metallic objects inside the abdomen. The doctor concluded that death had been caused by bullets which had either entered or exited from the lower left abdomen. He also recommended that the clothes with bullet holes in them be sent to the forensic authorities with a view to determining the distance and the direction from which he had been shot. 17. On 16 September 2008 the second applicant applied to the Diyarbakır branch of the Human Rights Association of Turkey, and asked for assistance in bringing the perpetrators of the killing of his nephew to justice. He also stated that since the killing, soldiers had been setting fire to the area where his nephew had been killed, and deliberately destroying the evidence. 18. On 6 October 2008 the Lice prosecutor sent the investigation file to the Diyarbakır prosecutor who had jurisdiction to investigate incidents perpetrated by illegal organisations. In his letter accompanying the file the Lice prosecutor named the first applicant Fatma Güler as the “victim of a crime”, and her deceased brother Murat Tekdal as the “deceased/suspect”. The offence in question was stated as the “destruction of the unity and integrity of the State and the country”. The Lice prosecutor stated in his letter that on the evening of 12 September 2008 a number of soldiers from the Lice Infantry Brigade had had an armed clash with a group of five PKK members and that the body of Murat Tekdal had been found in the search conducted by the soldiers the following morning. 19. On 22 October 2008 the Diyarbakır prosecutor decided not to bring any criminal proceedings against Murat Tekdal for the above-mentioned offence, because he was dead. 20. On 24 November 2008 the applicants sent a letter to the Diyarbakır prosecutor and stated that the Lice prosecutor had started an investigation into the killing of their relative, but had subsequently decided that he had no jurisdiction to continue the investigation because the deceased had been a member of a terrorist organisation. In their letter the applicants denied that their relative had been a member of the PKK, and informed the Diyarbakır prosecutor that their relative had been living in the village of Ecemiş for the previous seven years and that all his fellow villagers knew him. They argued that there was no evidence to show that an armed clash had taken place prior to his killing. Indeed, the fact that his hunting rifle had been found loaded with unfired cartridges showed that there had been no armed clash. They asked the prosecutor to identify and prosecute those responsible for the killing of their relative. 21. On 5 October 2009 the applicants lodged an objection against the prosecutor’s above-mentioned decision of 22 October 2008. In their objection petition they repeated their arguments of 24 November 2008 and referred to, inter alia, Article 2 of the Convention. They alleged that no effective investigation had been conducted into the killing, and urged the Assize Court to order the investigating authorities to carry out an investigation. 22. The applicants’ objection was rejected by the Malatya Assize Court on 9 April 2010. The Assize Court stated that the prosecutor’s decision had concerned an offence which the applicants’ deceased relative was suspected of having committed. The objection lodged by the applicants, on the other hand, concerned the killing of their relative. The Assize Court stated that there was no on-going investigation into the killing of Murat Tekdal and that there had not been a decision not to prosecute anyone in respect of his killing. As there was no on-going investigation into the killing, the applicants had no standing to bring an objection against the Diyarbakır prosecutor’s decision. The Assize Court’s decision was communicated to the applicants on 30 April 2010.

5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Zagreb. 6. On 20 December 2012 at 4.55 p.m. V.B. and I.J., police officers of IV police station in Zagreb, caught the applicant in the act of attempting to rob an exchange office in Zagreb. The applicant started to run and fell. The police officers then arrested him. During his arrest some money fell out of the applicant’s pockets. 7. According to the Government, since the applicant was resisting arrest, the police officers had to apply force (the so-called armlock technique). 8. According to the applicant, he was beaten by the police officers while lying on the ground. 9. At 5 p.m. officers D.P. (the chief officer on duty in the IV Zagreb police station) and N.V. (the deputy head of IV Zagreb police station) were informed of the use of force against the applicant. The applicant was taken to the police station at 5.15 p.m. The applicant complained to Officer S.P. that his shoulder hurt. S.P. informed D.P. of this and the latter ordered that the emergency medical service be called. At 5.56 p.m. D.P. informed the Zagreb police operative centre about the use of force against the applicant. The applicant was seen by an emergency doctor between 7.40 p.m. and 7.57 p.m. He was transferred to the Sisters of Charity Hospital in Zagreb (Klinički bolnički centar Sestre milosrdnice) and was seen there by a surgeon at 8.11 p.m. An X-ray examination revealed that the applicant’s right shoulder was broken. The applicant told the doctor that he had fallen during his arrest. He was provided with medical assistance for these injuries and then returned to the police station at 9.40 p.m. Officer D.P. questioned the applicant in connection with the criminal offence for which he had been arrested and the applicant stated that he wished to remain silent. 10. The applicant was again seen by a surgeon in the same hospital on 24 December 2012 and surgery was recommended. 11. The applicant was hospitalised in the Sisters of Mercy Hospital between 27 and 31 December 2012. He underwent surgery and it was established that his shoulder was broken in four places; his upper arm was also broken. He had an artificial shoulder implanted. 12. An internal investigation into the use of force against the applicant was immediately initiated within the Zagreb police on 20 December 2012. Officer D.P. took a statement from the applicant who said that he had sustained an injury “by the police officers” and that he did “not want to say anything else”. Officers V.B. and I.J. compiled a joint report on the use of force against the applicant. Later on, each of them provided a separate report. All these reports alleged that the applicant, in attempting to flee from the police officers, had fallen and that while on the ground had actively resisted the police officers, who had then applied the armlock technique and handcuffed him. 13. On 21 December 2012 an internal police investigator of the Zagreb police, officer A.L., compiled a report on the basis of the documents, statements from Officers V.B., I.J. and D.P. and his interview with the applicant. In his report A.L. stated that the applicant had attempted to run from the said officers and had fallen. While on the ground he had actively resisted arrest and the officers had applied the armlock technique. A.L. concluded that the applicant had resisted the police officers since some money had fallen out of his clothes. A.L. was of the opinion that the force applied by officers V.B. and I.J. against the applicant had had a “basis in law and [had been] justified”. 14. On 21 December 2012 the head of IV police station in Zagreb, S.T., compiled a report for the public-order division of the Zagreb police, on the basis of the report of A.L. S.T. stated that the applicant had said that he had fallen and that the police officers had caught him and applied force against him and denied that he had resisted arrest. In a short report of 28 December 2012 the head of the Zagreb police, G.B., concluded that the information gathered had shown that the use of force by Officers V.B. and I.J. against the applicant had been lawful and justified. 15. On 28 December 2012 the head of the Zagreb police informed the head of IV police station in Zagreb that, on the basis of the report of A.L., he considered the force used by officers V.B. and I.J. against the applicant to have had a “basis in law and [to have been] justified” 16. On 3 January 2013 the head of the Zagreb police sent the case file concerning the internal police investigation to the Internal Control Service of the Ministry of the Interior. Upon inspecting the file the Internal Control Service instructed the police to forward the file to the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney’s Office (hereinafter the “ZMSAO”) for further assessment. 17. On the instructions of the head of the Zagreb police, on 5 February 2013 the IV police station in Zagreb sent a report on the events at issue together with the applicant’s medical report to the ZMSAO. The documents in the case file do not indicate that the ZMSAO carried out any further steps at that time. 18. On 6 February 2013, upon a request by the applicant’s lawyer, the head of the IV police station in Zagreb shortly informed the applicant’s lawyer that the force used against the applicant by the two police officers had had a basis in law and had been justified. The applicant’s request to have access to the internal report on the use of force against him was denied on 11 February 2013 on the grounds that it was a classified document. 19. On 15 May 2013 the head of IV police station in Zagreb compiled a report for the legal, financial and technical tasks division of the Zagreb police, where he described in detail the events at issue and the results of the internal police investigation with a final conclusion that the use of force against the applicant had had a basis in law and had been justified. 20. On 28 July 2014 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the ZMSAO against Officers V.B. and I.J. 21. The applicant alleged that during his arrest on 20 December 2012 police officers V.B. and I.J. had forced him to the ground and then hit, kicked and verbally insulted him and unnecessarily twisted his arm, owing to which he had sustained injuries, such as a broken arm and shoulder. The officers had then taken him to a police station where they continued to beat him. Only after three hours had he been taken to hospital. The doctors had recommended urgent surgery but the police officers had not allowed it. Instead, they had taken him back to the police station where they had continued to hit and insult him. In the evening he had been admitted to Zagreb Prison. 22. The prosecuting authorities obtained the statements previously given by the applicant and the police officers involved. 23. The ZMSAO attempted to contact the applicant on six occasions between 27 November 2014 and 15 September 2015. However, these attempts were unsuccessful since the applicant had changed his address and had not replied to the telephone calls on the mobile telephone number provided by his lawyer. 24. In July and August 2015 the ZMSAO obtained the medical documentation concerning the applicant’s injuries and medical treatment. 25. On 13 October 2015 the ZMSAO interviewed the applicant, who said that during his arrest on 20 December 2012 one of the police officers, when applying the armlock technique, had broken his right arm. He had complained to the officers of intense pain but they had ignored his complaints. During his transport to the police station he had again complained about the pain in his arm but the officers had only told him to shut up. Upon his arrival at the police station he had continued to complain about the pain in his arm, but had been ignored. Only after a few hours had a doctor been called. The applicant admitted that he had told the doctor that he had sustained the injury to his right arm and shoulder when he had fallen during his arrest. He also said that during the arrest and later on in the police station, none of the police officers had hit or kicked him. He said that in the relevant period he had been abusing both alcohol and drugs. 26. On 2 and 3 December 2015 Officers V.B., I.J. and D.B. also gave their statements denying any excessive use of force against the applicant. 27. On 8 January 2016 the ZMSAO interviewed J.H., an employee of the exchange office where the applicant had attempted the robbery. She had also witnessed the applicant’s arrest and said that she had not seen the police officers hitting or kicking the applicant. 28. On 13 January 2016 the ZMSAO interviewed B.Z., a witness to the applicant’s arrest, who said that the applicant had attempted to run from the police and had fallen and that he had not seen any police officers hitting or kicking the applicant. 29. The investigation is still pending. 30. On 28 August 2013 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu) against the State claiming damages in connection with his alleged ill-treatment by the police during his arrest and stay in the police station. 31. Those proceedings are still pending.

4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Moscow. 5. On 27 August 2002 the applicant brought civil proceedings against the Administration of the Mirninskiy Ulus of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic (“the Administration”), a private person S., her husband B., and a private company A. claiming a title to a flat, damages, and S.’s eviction from the flat. 6. On 18 September 2002 the Mirninskiy District Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic (“the District Court”) refused to consider his action, because there already had been a decision of 6 February 2001 taken by the District Court concerning the same dispute. 7. On 13 November 2002 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic overruled the refusal and remitted the case for a new examination, as the action included a new co-defendant, and, therefore, it could not be said that the dispute was among the same parties. 8. On 15 January 2003 the District Court ordered eviction of S. and her family from the flat and dismissed the claim against the Administration. 9. On 3 March 2003 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic quashed the judgment on appeal and returned the case for a fresh examination, as the lower court had failed to address issues related S.’s property rights. 10. On 29 July 2003 the District Court ordered an expert examination of the flat in order to determine its market value. 11. On 14 August 2003 the court proceedings resumed. 12. In the meantime, the applicant amended his claims and sought to obtain compensation for his belongings allegedly stolen in 1999, non‑pecuniary damage, legal costs, travel expenses and reimbursement of the rent he had to pay after his eviction from the disputed flat back in 1999. 13. On 29 August 2003 the District Court examined the case, ordered the Administration to pay the applicant 800,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of the flat’s market value and dismissed the remainder of the claims. In particular, the claim for compensation for the allegedly stolen property was dismissed as unfounded. 14. On 20 October 2003 the judgment was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) and entered into force. 15. On 11 June 2004, upon the applicant’s request, the bailiffs initiated the enforcement proceedings. 16. On 27 August 2004 the District Court granted the Administration’s request for suspension of the enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2003 until 15 January 2005 due to financial difficulties encountered by the debtor. 17. On 15 November 2004 the applicant’s appeal against the above decision was dismissed. 18. On 18 March 2005 the monetary award in accordance with the judgment of 29 August 2003 was paid to the applicant. 19. On 29 September 2005, upon the applicant’s extraordinary appeal, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) quashed the judgment of 29 August 2003 and the decision of 20 October 2003 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. The Presidium found that the courts had incorrectly applied the material law to various aspects of the case, and had failed to join the appropriate financial body as co-defendant. 20. It appears that the amounts paid to the applicant under the quashed judgment of 29 August 2003 have not been reclaimed. 21. On 15 November 2005 the District Court suspended the proceedings, due to B.’s illness and asked the applicant to clarify his claims. 22. On 21 December 2005 the applicant submitted the amended claims. 23. On 16 February 2006 the District Court joined, at the defendant’s request, the Ministry of Finance as co-defendant in the proceedings and suspended the examination of the case on account of B.’s poor state of health. 24. On 14 February 2007 the case was assigned to a different judge of the District Court, for the sake of the court’s impartiality. 25. On 21 March 2007 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s action. 26. On 4 June 2007 the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) upheld the judgment on appeal except for the parts concerning the eviction of S. and B., reimbursement of the rent, payments for utility services, a commission fee, and recovering of the cost of the apartment. The decision in those parts was remitted for a fresh examination due to failure by the lower court to assess certain evidence and misapplication of the material law. 27. On 27 August 2007 the District Court suspended the proceedings pending S.’s return from vacation. 28. On 26 October 2007 the court ordered the applicant to clarify his claims and scheduled a new hearing on 23 November 2007. 29. On 23 November 2007 the court issued a special writ ordering the bailiffs to obtain clarifications of the claims from the applicant. 30. It appears that at some point the applicant provided the required information. 31. On 30 April 2008 the District Court dismissed the action as unfounded. The court explained that the applicant had other remedies to use under the civil law in order to protect his property rights. In particular, he could claim that an equivalent apartment or a compensation be provided to him. 32. By the final judgment of 13 August 2008 the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) upheld the lower court’s findings on appeal. 33. In the meantime, the applicant sued the Administration for statutory interest for the delay in enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2003. 34. On 7 February 2007 the District Court discontinued the proceedings as the judgment of 29 August 2003 had been quashed and a new decision in the case had not yet been adopted.

5. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Trinca. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. Having divorced his wife, the applicant has continued to live in an annex to the same house as her and their children, some of whom are adults. He has a hostile relationship with them and all of his former in-laws. 8. On 30 May 2005 he wrote to the Prosecutor General’s Office, listing the many complaints that he had previously lodged with various authorities (including the police) of having been ill-treated by his ex-wife and children, the destruction of his property by them, and the failure of the local police to react in any manner. In reply, on 21 June 2005, he was informed that the local prosecutor’s decision not to initiate a criminal investigation had been annulled; the case was then sent for re-examination by the local prosecutor’s office. 9. On 31 March 2006 the applicant was examined by a medical expert, who found an excoriation on his right hand. He explained that he had been struck by his son. 10. On 15 May 2006 the applicant was examined by a medical expert, who determined that three of his teeth were loose and found a contusion of one of the fingers on his right hand. He explained that he had been again struck by his son. On 26 June 2006 the Edineț prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that it had decided not to initiate an investigation into the alleged attack by his son (D.V.). 11. The applicant lodged another complaint with the Edineț prosecutor’s office on 31 August 2006, stating that he had been again attacked by his children and ex-wife; during that attack they had also threatened to kill him and destroy or throw away his property if he did not leave the house. He lodged a further complaint on 19 September 2006, but was subsequently informed that it had been decided not to initiate a criminal investigation. 12. In a letter dated 12 December 2006 the head of Edineț police station informed the applicant’s brother that, on a date not indicated in the letter, “a cautionary discussion” had been conducted with the applicant’s ex-wife and that she had been “officially warned to change her conduct” towards the applicant and his brother. 13. On 27 December 2006 the applicant’s ex-wife and children allegedly assaulted him at their home. His left elbow was allegedly broken. According to the applicant, he called the police immediately after the incident and was told that they did not deal with such matters. The next day he went to the local doctor, B., who referred him to Edineț Polyclinic for examination (including an X-ray examination, which was carried out on 28 December 2006). With the results of that examination he went to a medical expert on 29 December 2006. 14. According to a medical report dated 29 December 2006 the applicant sustained a fracture of the upper third of the radial bone in his left elbow, as confirmed also by the X-ray images. The injury was considered to be of medium severity and requiring more than twenty-one days of treatment. According to the report, the injury had been caused by a blunt object, possibly in circumstances such as those described by the applicant. According to medical documents submitted by the applicant, he saw a doctor, T., on 28 and 29 December 2006, and on 4 and 17 January, 7 and 22 February and 6 March 2007 and was given prescriptions for medicine to treat his left elbow. 15. On 5 January 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the police about ill-treatment by his ex-wife and three of his children, including D.V. On 12 January 2007 he was informed that it had been decided not to initiate a criminal investigation. On 29 January 2007 the investigating judge of the Edineț District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding that the facts complained of were being investigated by the Edineț police. On 2 February 2007 a prosecutor initiated a criminal investigation into the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment by his ex-wife and children (including D.V.). On 1 March 2007 he was officially recognised as the victim of the alleged crime. 16. On 6 March 2007 the prosecutor requested that a new expert medical report be drawn up in order to assess the severity and origin of the applicant’s injury. He noted that the applicant had alleged that he had been struck by his ex-wife and children (including D.V.). On the same day a new medical report was drawn up which confirmed the previous report’s findings. 17. On 23 March 2007 the prosecutor interviewed a witness who stated that he had worked with the applicant on 12 January 2007, cutting wood at the local priest’s house. He had not seen any injury or sign of pain on his hand. A similar statement was given on 3 March 2007 by another participant in the wood-cutting. Another witness stated that he had seen the applicant cutting wood on 12 January 2007 at the local priest’s house, while three other persons were taking a rest. On 10 April 2007 T., the doctor who had seen the applicant on 28 December 2006 (see paragraph 14 above), was questioned as a witness and declared that he had seen a contusion on his body and another contusion on the left elbow, but had not identified any broken bones. He stated that the description contained in the medical report dated 29 December 2006 of the X-ray images taken on 28 December 2006 (see paragraph 14 above) was incomplete, as it did not indicate the exact location of the broken bone. T. himself did not see in the X-ray any sign of such trauma. 18. On 2 May 2007 the prosecutor ordered another medical report to be prepared by a medical commission, because the applicant’s wife disagreed with the results of the first two reports and argued that he had been fit after the alleged assault. On 7 May 2007 the head of the Forensics Department at the Centre of Forensic Medicine (“the Centre”) asked the prosecutor to submit the X-rays of the applicant’s elbow in order to allow the report to be prepared. In the absence of a reply, the doctor repeated his request on 14 September 2007, adding that the report could not be prepared without the X-ray results. 19. On 20 September 2007 the applicant was questioned by the investigator, who proposed that he submit the X-ray images taken on 28 December 2006 for examination by the medical commission. The applicant refused, stating that he did not trust the police. 20. On 4 December 2007 the Centre returned all relevant documents to the prosecutor, informing him that, in the absence of the applicant’s X-ray results, it had been impossible to carry out the examination. 21. On 19 March 2008 the prosecutor discontinued the investigation, finding that the applicant had often provoked quarrels with his ex-wife and children, and that they denied having caused him any injuries (they were examined as witnesses on 19 January and 8 February 2007, and on 15 March 2008.) The prosecutor also referred to the statement given by doctor T. (see paragraph 17 above), whom the applicant had asked for help and who had found bruising on the applicant’s body and on his left elbow, but no bone fractures. The prosecutor furthermore noted that the applicant had only gone to the medical expert on 29 December 2006 and not immediately after the incident. Lastly, the applicant had refused to submit his X-ray results, thus preventing the medical commission from drawing up its report. 22. On 10 April 2008 a higher-ranking prosecutor annulled the decision of 19 March 2008 as premature and taken without the origin of the applicant’s injury having been established. 23. On 17 May 2008 the prosecutor again discontinued the investigation, essentially for the same reasons as those for which he had discontinued it earlier. On 23 June 2008 the investigating judge of the Edineț District Court annulled that decision. The judge found that the investigator had ignored the prosecutor’s conclusion in the decision of 10 April 2008 and had limited his investigation to interviewing the applicant’s children and members of his ex-wife’s family, who all had a hostile relationship with him and who, moreover, had given somewhat different versions of the incident of 27 December 2006. Furthermore, one of the doctors (T.) had been interviewed only superficially, another doctor who had seen the applicant after the incident had not been interviewed at all, and a third doctor who had taken the X-ray of the applicant’s elbow had also not been interviewed. Another expert medical report had been ordered on 2 May 2007 without first observing the victim’s rights, such as being able to contribute to the questions asked of the experts. Lastly, the applicant had not been informed that he could submit the X-ray results directly to the Centre. 24. On 21 November 2008 the prosecutor again discontinued the investigation, essentially for the same reasons as those for which he had discontinued it earlier. On 3 December 2008 a higher-ranking prosecutor annulled that decision for reasons similar to those relied on by the investigating judge (see paragraph 23 above). He also found that the investigative actions had been “extremely superficial” and had had a “tendentious, unilateral character”. 25. On 20 March 2009 the applicant agreed to submit the X-rays taken on 28 December 2006 to the investigator. On 7 April 2009 the prosecutor ordered that a new expert medical report be drawn up by the Centre, to be based on those X-rays. 26. On 21 October 2009 the Centre informed the prosecutor that the applicant’s X-rays were of poor quality and that the applicant would have to have a new X-ray taken. On 2 December 2009 the applicant was asked to undergo a fresh X-ray examination. The medical commission drew up its report on 9 December 2009 and found signs of a fracture in the upper third of the applicant’s radial bone in his left elbow. The commission also concluded that this type of injury could have been caused in the manner described by the applicant, but could also have been self-inflicted. 27. On 30 June 2010 the prosecutor discontinued the investigation, essentially for the same reasons as those for which he had discontinued it previously, adding that the medical reports did not exclude the possibility that the injury had been self-inflicted. That decision was confirmed by a higher-ranking prosecutor on 17 December 2010. 28. On 25 July 2011 the investigating judge of the Bălți District Court upheld the decisions of 30 June and 17 December 2010. The judge found that the investigator had undertaken all possible measures to investigate the case, and that the witnesses had not confirmed the applicant’s version of the events and had even contradicted it by stating that on 12 January 2007 they had been out cutting wood with the applicant and had not observed any injury to his elbow. 29. In a medical report dated 15 August 2007 a doctor recorded an oval light-violet ecchymosis measuring 6 cm by 4 cm on the applicant’s forehead and an excoriation measuring 2 cm by 1 cm and covered with a red crust, as well as pain in the cervical column and the right side of the thoracic region. The applicant explained that he had been beaten by his ex-wife and daughter. 30. In another medical report dated 21 August 2007 a doctor recorded an excoriation on the applicant’s head measuring 2 cm by 1.5 cm and covered with a red crust. He explained that he had been hit on the head by his ex-wife the day before. 31. The applicant submitted similar medical reports, dated 13 September and 12 November 2007, which recorded various excoriations and bruises. Each time he explained that he had been beaten by his ex-wife and children.

10. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Barcelos. 11. The High Council of the Judiciary (Conselho Superior da Magistratura, hereafter “the CSM”) decided to open three sets of disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, who at the time was a judge at the Vila Nova de Famalicão Court of First Instance. 12. On 8 October 2009 Judge H.G. was instructed by the CSM, in his capacity as a judicial inspector (inspetor judicial), to conduct the applicant’s performance appraisal. As the applicant was due to start maternity leave at the end of June 2010, she asked him to carry out the appraisal before her departure so that she would be in a position to apply for vacant posts in 2010 (movimento judicial). On 13 September 2010, while she was on maternity leave, the applicant telephoned H.G. to ask him again to conduct her performance appraisal, which had still not been carried out. The following day she sent a request to the same effect to the CSM. The same day, H.G. asked to be relieved of responsibility for the applicant’s appraisal, stating that she had made disrespectful remarks about him during the telephone conversation. 13. On 16 November 2010 the Permanent Council of the CSM decided to open disciplinary proceedings against the applicant (disciplinary case no. 333/10) for insulting a judicial inspector. 14. On 12 January 2011 the judicial investigator (juiz instrutor) Judge F.M.J. was placed in charge of the investigation. The applicant was represented by a lawyer. 15. On 27 January 2011 the judicial investigator informed the CSM that he was about to begin the investigation in accordance with section 114(3) of the Status of Judges Act (Law no. 21/85 of 30 July 1985 – hereafter “the Act”). The applicant was also informed. 16. On 8 February 2011, on the basis of the evidence heard from H.G., Judge F.M.J. drew up an indictment against the applicant, of which she was notified on 9 February 2011. The indictment stated, in particular, that in a letter to the CSM dated 9 June 2010 the applicant had accused the judicial inspector H.G. of “inertia and lack of diligence” and that she had called H.G. a “liar” during the telephone conversation of 13 September 2010. 17. On 11 February 2011 the applicant appealed against the indictment, arguing that it was null and void because she had not given evidence before the judicial investigator. In an order of 19 February 2011 the judicial investigator allowed the appeal. He set aside all the steps that had been taken in the investigation and summoned Judge H.G. and the applicant to appear before him to give evidence. They gave evidence on 22 and 23 February 2011 respectively. 18. During the investigation various documents were examined and witnesses were questioned. One witness called by the applicant stated that he had been present during the telephone conversation in question and had not heard the applicant make the alleged remarks. However, he retracted his statement on 21 March 2011. 19. On 13 March 2011 the judicial investigator drew up a fresh indictment against the applicant, again finding the facts set out in the previous indictment to be established. Taking the view that the applicant had acted in breach of her duty of propriety, he proposed a penalty of twenty day-fines. In accordance with section 118 of the Act, the applicant was given notice of the indictment and had fifteen days to present her defence. As required by section 120 of the Act, the indictment specified where the applicant or her lawyer could consult her disciplinary file. 20. On 29 March 2011 the applicant submitted a request to the CSM for Judge F.M.J. to be withdrawn from her case on the grounds that he had breached her right to be presumed innocent and had close ties to the judicial inspector whom the applicant was accused of insulting. 21. On 30 March 2011 the applicant filed her defence pleadings, contesting the facts and submitting that the disciplinary proceedings were null and void as there had been a breach of the principles of equality and impartiality and of her right to be heard. With regard to the breach of the principle of equality she observed that she had lodged a complaint with the CSM against the judicial inspector H.G. for making false accusations and that, in an order of 15 February 2011, it had been decided not to institute proceedings in that regard, despite the fact that the complaint concerned the same facts giving rise to the current disciplinary proceedings against her. As to the facts, the applicant stated as follows: (a) that she had indeed telephoned the judicial inspector H.G. on 13 September 2010 to ask him to carry out her appraisal while she was on maternity leave. She had explained that she wished to be able to apply for the vacancies arising in 2011 since she had been unable to apply the previous year because her appraisal had not been carried out before she left on maternity leave; (b) that the inspector had expressed surprise, claiming that she had previously told him that she did not wish her appraisal to be carried out while she was on maternity leave; (c) that he had then asked her to submit her request in writing given that they were unable to agree; (d) that she had replied that it was he who had failed to keep his word hitherto; and (e) that she had at no point accused him of being a liar. She attached some items of evidence and requested that a further witness be examined. 22. On 10 April 2011 Judge F.M.J. requested leave from the CSM to stand down from the case, saying that he was the applicant’s “sworn enemy” following the accusations she had made against him in the context of her request for him to be withdrawn. 23. In an order dated 3 May 2011 the Permanent Council of the CSM granted Judge F.M.J.’s request to stand down and replaced him with another judicial investigator, Judge A.V.N. 24. In his final report dated 23 September 2011 Judge A.V.N. proposed that the applicant be ordered to pay fifteen day-fines for acting in breach of her duty of propriety. 25. In a decision of 10 January 2012 the CSM, sitting in plenary session, found the truth of H.G.’s allegations to be established. It found that the applicant had acted in breach of her duty of propriety and that, given the seriousness of her remarks, a heavy penalty should be imposed. Accordingly, it ordered her to pay twenty day-fines, corresponding to twenty days without pay. 26. The decision of 10 January 2012 was adopted by a majority of the fifteen-member formation, comprising six judges and nine non-judicial members. Four of the non-judicial members issued a joint dissenting opinion expressing the view that it was not possible to establish, solely on the basis of H.G.’s statement, that the applicant had called him a “liar”, and finding that the remarks referring to his “inertia” and “lack of diligence” came within the scope of the applicant’s freedom of expression. 27. The applicant lodged an appeal against the CSM’s decision with the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court (Secção do Contencioso administrativo do Supremo Tribunal de Justiça). She submitted in particular: (a) that the CSM had not taken into consideration a number of facts on which she had relied in her defence and which were corroborated by various items of evidence; (b) that in its establishment of the facts the CSM had made no reference to the intentional element of the disciplinary offence; (c) that the disciplinary penalty was based on insufficient or irrelevant evidence; (d) that the conduct complained of had not amounted to a disciplinary offence, that she had simply been exercising a legitimate right and that the authorities had disregarded the principle of administration in good faith; (e) that the CSM had failed to give reasons for its decision not to suspend enforcement of the penalty; and (f) that the penalty imposed had been disproportionate to the acts of which she had been accused. 28. In a final judgment of 21 March 2013 the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. 29. The Supreme Court began by emphasising that appeals against disciplinary decisions of the CSM were not full appeals on fact and law but concerned only the lawfulness of the decisions in question. It went on to find as follows: “Effective protection by the courts of citizens’ legally protected rights and interests, which is guaranteed by Article 268 § 4 of the Constitution, affords them, in the specific context of the decisions of the CSM in disciplinary proceedings, the right to a review of lawfulness rather than a review by a body with full jurisdiction. Hence, any appeal will be aimed at obtaining a declaration that the impugned act is null and void or non-existent, rather than a fresh assessment of the criteria employed by the administrative body or of the question whether those criteria were applied correctly, with particular regard to the establishment of the key facts ... The position taken by the Judicial Division is that, although the Supreme Court has the power to assess and sanction a failure to take necessary and relevant steps in disciplinary proceedings, it cannot take the place of the competent administrative body – the CSM – in gathering the evidence (aquisição da matéria instrutória) or establishing the key facts. Its task is solely to set aside the impugned decision, if appropriate, in order for that body to carry out or order a particular investigative measure in the proceedings and re‑examine the case accordingly ... According to the case-law of the Supreme Court regarding administrative cases, it may not reassess the evidence examined by the authority [whose decision is contested]. Its sole task is to ascertain, on the basis of the available evidence, whether the establishment of the facts was reasonable, and hence to verify whether the authority [whose decision is contested] examined (or re-examined) the facts set forth in the indictment and those submitted by the defence, [and whether it] gave adequate reasons for the establishment [of the facts], which the Supreme Court has no option but to uphold ... According to the Supreme Court’s case-law, an appeal may relate to the sufficiency or otherwise of the evidence and facts on which the decision to impose a disciplinary penalty was based. However, ascertaining whether these were sufficient does not entail reassessing the factual evidence or drawing a new and different conclusion from the available evidence. The Supreme Court may only assess the reasonable and coherent nature of the relationship between the facts as established by the authority [whose decision is contested] and the evidence on which its decision was based ... The extent of the Supreme Court’s review of the facts is confined to ascertaining that the assessment [made by the authority whose decision is contested] was not defective; it cannot re-examine the evidence relied on and deliver a fresh judgment on the basis of that evidence. In other words, it is not the task of the Supreme Court to deliver a fresh judgment after assessing the evidence, but solely to verify whether the evidence was valid and lawful and whether the facts were reasonably and coherently established. It must therefore, against this background, examine any contradictions, inconsistencies and insufficiency in the evidence and any manifest errors in the assessment thereof, in so far as these defects are apparent ...” 30. In the case at hand the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s arguments regarding the establishment of the facts, finding as follows: “There were no errors in the assessment of the facts on which the decision [by the CSM] was based, or in the interpretation of those facts. It is clear from the reasoning that the evidence was examined in a coherent and logical manner. The reasoning was based on facts which, once established in accordance with the principle of the free assessment of evidence, do not preclude the assessment made in the present case ... [the assessment of the facts] was not arbitrary, haphazard, obscure or incoherent.” 31. The Supreme Court also dismissed the remainder of the applicant’s arguments, to the effect that the conduct complained of did not amount to a disciplinary offence, that she had simply been exercising a legitimate right and that the authorities had disregarded the principle of administration in good faith. The Supreme Court therefore upheld the reasoning leading to the CSM’s finding that the applicant had acted in breach of her duty of propriety. 32. With regard to the penalty imposed, the Supreme Court found: (a) that in contrast to the provisions of criminal law, where a custodial sentence was at stake, the statutory provisions governing disciplinary proceedings did not empower or require the authorities to suspend enforcement of the penalty. In any event, in the present case, suspending enforcement of the penalty would have run counter to its purpose; and (b) that the penalty had not been disproportionate. The Supreme Court ruled as follows: “In the context of disciplinary proceedings, it is for the CSM to decide on the severity of the penalty to be imposed, where it is variable in the abstract. It is not the task of the Supreme Court to reconsider this decision, but merely to verify whether it was appropriate to the offence committed and whether the penalty imposed was proportionate to that offence ... The determination of the penalty falls within what is known as the technical and administrative [margin of] discretion, which is not subject to judicial scrutiny except in cases of gross and manifest errors and particularly of failure to comply with the principle of proportionality as regards the appropriateness of the penalty ... Having regard to the foregoing, and since it has been established that a fine, set at twenty days, should be imposed by way of a penalty, there is no basis for finding that the sanction imposed is disproportionate to the disciplinary offence or to the relevant legislative framework.” 33. On 29 March 2011, following information received from the judicial investigator F.M.J., the Permanent Council of the CSM decided to open a second set of disciplinary proceedings against the applicant (case no. 179/11) for the use of false testimony in the first set of disciplinary proceedings. The investigation also concerned the witness in question. 34. On an unspecified date Judge R. was placed in charge of the investigation as judicial investigator. 35. During the investigation evidence was heard from the applicant, F.M.J., the applicant’s co-accused and one witness. 36. On 26 May 2011 the judicial investigator drew up the indictment against the applicant. He found that she had acted in breach of her duty of loyalty, but did not specify in what manner she had been involved in committing the offence. Likewise, he did not propose any penalty, taking the view that the applicant’s defence arguments should first be examined. He noted in that regard that section 117(1) of the Act, concerning the indictment, did not require a penalty to be proposed at this stage. 37. The applicant was given notice of the indictment and filed defence pleadings. She contested the allegations, submitted documents in support of her arguments and called two witnesses in accordance with section 121 of the Act. She also submitted that she could not be prosecuted as an accomplice to the offence as the law made no provision for that possibility. 38. On 14 July 2011 the judicial investigator submitted his final report under section 122 of the Act. He found that the facts in question had been established and that the applicant had therefore acted in breach of her duty of loyalty. He specified in that connection that she should be regarded as the co-perpetrator of the offence, given that in disciplinary case no. 333/10 she had knowingly called a witness who had not been present during the conversation in question. Accordingly, he proposed by way of a penalty that the applicant be suspended from duty for sixty days. 39. On 19 July 2011 the applicant lodged a complaint against this report with the judicial investigator. She argued, in particular, that the indictment had not proposed this heavy penalty and that her defence rights had therefore been infringed. She requested that the indictment be set aside and that she be given additional time to prepare her defence. 40. In an order of 31 August 2011 the judicial investigator dismissed the complaint on the grounds, in particular, that the applicant had not raised a plea of nullity in respect of the indictment in her defence pleadings (see paragraph 37 above). 41. On 11 October 2011 the CSM, sitting in plenary session, gave its decision, which was adopted unanimously by a twelve-member formation comprising seven judges, including the President of the CSM, and five non‑judicial members. It found that the applicant had acted in breach of her duty of honesty, which it regarded as “a more practical manifestation of the wider duty of loyalty referred to in the indictment” and which should govern judges’ personal and professional conduct not just in the strict performance of their duties but also in their relations with society. The CSM noted that in disciplinary case no. 333/10 the applicant had knowingly agreed to use testimony containing false statements concerning the acts of which she had been accused. It observed that those acts had been established on the basis of calls made by the applicant on her mobile phone, the records of which had been obtained with her consent at the request of the judicial investigator F.M.J. In view of the scope of the duty of honesty, which it considered to be a personal duty, the CSM found that the applicant had been the perpetrator of the acts in question, rather than the co-perpetrator as indicated in the judicial investigator’s final report, and imposed a disciplinary penalty of 100 days’ suspension from duty. Noting that the indictment had conformed to the requirements of section 117(1) of the Act, it dismissed the applicant’s argument that it was null and void. The CSM also held that the applicant’s defence rights had not been infringed given that, after examining the evidence, the judicial investigator had set out in his final report the facts he considered established and their legal classification, and had proposed a specific penalty under section 122 of the Act. 42. On an unspecified date the applicant appealed to the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court against the decision of 11 October 2011. She submitted that: (a) there had been errors in the establishment of the facts. In particular, she had not been acting in the performance of her duties, and a new witness questioned during the investigation had confirmed that she had not made the alleged remarks in the course of the conversation in question, during which that witness had indeed been present; (b) her conduct had not amounted to a disciplinary offence. In the alternative, she submitted that it had been driven by “necessity”, in view of the avowed hostility of the judicial investigator F.M.J. towards her; (c) she had not been questioned about the planned disciplinary penalty, which had not been proposed in the indictment; (d) the CSM had altered the legal classification of the facts and the manner of her involvement in the disciplinary offence, in breach of her defence rights, including her right to be heard; (e) the CSM had failed to give reasons for its decision not to suspend enforcement of the penalty; and (f) the penalty imposed had been disproportionate to the facts. 43. On 23 January 2012 the CSM submitted its memorial in reply, which was notified to the applicant on 27 January 2012. 44. In a final judgment of 26 June 2013 the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 45. The Supreme Court began by defining its jurisdiction in the following terms: “The longest-established guarantee is the right to appeal or to challenge administrative acts; [this guarantee] is aimed at ... individuals’ legally protected rights and interests, and generally encompasses the possibility of applying to have an administrative act set aside or declared null and void or non-existent, on grounds of unlawfulness. Hence, Article 50 § 1 of the Administrative Courts Code concerning appeals against administrative acts provides that ‘an appeal against an administrative act is aimed at obtaining the setting-aside of the act in question or a declaration that it is null and void or non‑existent’. Even though, since 1997, the Constitution no longer refers to ‘unlawfulness’ as a ground for appealing against an administrative act, this should not be construed to mean that the courts now have powers to examine the ‘well-foundedness’ of the administrative action: the unlawful nature of the act stems from the infringement of the individual’s legally protected rights and legitimate interests[1]. Under the Constitution, the administrative courts have jurisdiction to determine disputes arising in legal relationships in the administrative sphere. Article 212 § 3 provides that ‘the administrative and fiscal courts shall rule on actions and appeals aimed at determining disputes arising out of legal relationships in the administrative and fiscal spheres’. However, Article 3 § 1 of the Administrative Courts Code provides for one limitation[2], according to which ‘within the limits imposed by the principle of separation of powers, the administrative courts shall examine compliance with the legal rules and principles by which the administrative authorities are bound, but shall not examine the appropriateness or expediency (conveniência ou opportunidade) of their actions’. Article 3 § 1 of the Administrative Courts Code makes very clear that a degree of discretion is left to the authorities, an administrative sphere of activity that is not governed by legal rules or principles and falls outside the scope of the administrative courts’ scrutiny. ... Accordingly, in view of this discretion on the part of the authorities, the courts’ scrutiny of administrative activity must be confined to examining whether or not the authorities have complied with the legal principles by which they are bound. In principle, this will entail a negative review (proceedings to set aside rather than a full review), in which the court may not substitute its assessment for that of the administrative authorities with regard to elements falling within the scope of that discretion.” 46. With regard to the establishment of the facts by the CSM, the Supreme Court pointed to its case-law according to which judicial review could encompass only the insufficiency of the evidence and the facts in disciplinary proceedings; this did not entail conducting a fresh assessment of the available evidence or reaching a new and different conclusion on the basis of that evidence. Furthermore, the Supreme Court could not remedy possible omissions in the disciplinary proceedings. In the event of such an omission it was empowered solely to set aside the disciplinary body’s decision and refer the case back to that body for any further steps in the investigation. In the instant case the Supreme Court found that the CSM had indeed examined the factual evidence which, according to the applicant, it had disregarded. The Supreme Court pointed out in that connection that the issue whether the applicant had been acting in the performance of her duties was more in the nature of a legal issue and that, in any event, in assessing whether a judge had complied with his or her duty, it was necessary to take into account the judge’s relations with society and with the CSM, which was the profession’s management and disciplinary body. The Supreme Court found that the CSM had been right to dismiss the witness evidence presented by the applicant, in view of its content and the fact that the truth of the insult allegation had already been established in the earlier proceedings (see paragraphs 25 and 30 above). 47. The Supreme Court also considered that the CSM had not committed any manifest error in its assessment of the applicant’s conduct in finding her to have acted in breach of her duty of honesty. 48. With regard to the applicant’s remaining arguments, concerning the procedural safeguards in proceedings before the CSM, the Supreme Court found: (a) that the fact that the judicial investigator had not proposed a penalty until the final report was in line with the statutory requirements and had been sufficient in view of the fact that the report had been duly notified to the applicant so that she could make whatever comments she deemed necessary; (b) that the rights of the defence, and in particular the right to be heard, had not been infringed in the applicant’s case, given that her defence had related to the facts of the case rather than to the proposed penalty and the fact that it had been open to the CSM to impose a heavier penalty than the one proposed; and (c) that the legal reclassification of the facts had likewise not damaged the defence, given that it was in the context of the same facts that the applicant had breached her duty of honesty. 49. As to the applicant’s arguments in relation to the penalty imposed, the Supreme Court found: (a) that in contrast to the provisions of criminal law, where a custodial sentence was at stake, the statutory provisions governing disciplinary proceedings did not empower or require the authorities to suspend enforcement of the penalty. In any event, in the present case, suspending enforcement of the penalty would have run counter to its purpose; and (b) that the penalty imposed had not been disproportionate. 50. On 7 June 2011, following information received from the judicial investigator F.M.J., the Permanent Council of the CSM decided to open a third set of disciplinary proceedings against the applicant (case no. 269/11) on the grounds that she had asked that judicial investigator, in the course of a private conversation on 18 March 2011, not to institute disciplinary proceedings against the witness on her behalf whom she had called in the first set of disciplinary proceedings. 51. On an unspecified date Judge R. was placed in charge of the investigation as judicial investigator. 52. On an unspecified date the applicant received notice of the indictment, which proposed that she be removed from her post for acting in breach of her duties of loyalty and propriety. 53. The applicant filed defence pleadings in accordance with section 121 of the Act and attached evidence. She argued, in particular, that the proposed penalty was manifestly disproportionate to the acts of which she was accused. She admitted having had a private conversation with F.M.J., but denied having made the request in question. 54. During the investigation evidence was heard from the applicant, F.M.J., and thirty-two witnesses. Written statements from witnesses were added to the file. The judicial investigator R. also organised a confrontation (acareação) between the applicant and F.M.J. 55. On 21 December 2011 the judicial investigator R. submitted his final report. Deeming Judge F.M.J.’s testimony to be credible, he concluded on that basis that the facts were established and therefore proposed that the applicant be removed from office for acting in breach of her duties of loyalty and propriety. 56. On 17 January 2012 the applicant requested that a public hearing be held. As it emerges from the minutes of the plenary sitting of the CSM held on the same day, the applicant’s request was refused on the ground that the statutory rights of the defence had been respected and that there was no legal basis for holding a public hearing before the CSM sitting in plenary. 57. On an unspecified date the applicant submitted that the final report was null and void, and requested that it be rectified. On 30 January 2012 the judicial investigator rectified various errors in the report. 58. In a decision of 10 April 2012 the CSM, sitting in plenary session, found that the applicant had acted in breach of her duties of loyalty and propriety. First of all, it rejected the applicant’s argument that the proceedings were null and void on account of a breach of the adversarial principle. The CSM took the view that, despite the various items of evidence to the contrary adduced by the applicant, F.M.J.’s statements remained credible. Taking into account the applicant’s personal circumstances and her professional attributes, it found that a lesser penalty than that proposed in the final report was sufficient, and ordered that the applicant be suspended from duty for 180 days. 59. The decision of 10 April 2012 was taken by fourteen of the seventeen members of the CSM (eight judges, including the President, and six non-judicial members). One of the judges issued a dissenting opinion to the effect that the facts as established, given their seriousness, warranted a penalty of compulsory early retirement or removal from office under section 95 of the Act (see paragraph 71 below). 60. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against the CSM’s decision with the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court. In her appeal, she submitted: (a) that the relevant facts had not been taken into account, that the CSM had committed a manifest error in its assessment of the evidence, and that it had used factual evidence obtained by fraudulent means; (b) that the CSM’s decision had been unlawful, especially on account of the definition of the alleged disciplinary offence; (c) that there had been a breach of her right to a fair trial, as the CSM had refused to provide her with information which, in her submission, would have made it possible (i) to clarify certain allegations made by the judicial inspector F.M.J. or cast doubt on their credibility, and (ii) to establish which member of the CSM formation had made public certain details of the deliberations in the case before the decision had been delivered; (d) that no reasons had been given for the refusal to suspend enforcement of the penalty; and (e) that the penalty imposed had been disproportionate to the acts of which she had been accused. 61. In her memorial the applicant requested that a public hearing be held in accordance with Article 91 § 2 of the Administrative Courts Code, so that she could present new evidence, namely a witness and some documents. 62. On an unspecified date the CSM submitted its memorial in reply. 63. In a judgment of 8 May 2013 the Judicial Division of the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. 64. The Supreme Court found at the outset that the applicant’s request for a public hearing should be refused on the ground that it was not that court’s task to reassess the facts. Rather, its role was confined by law to verifying that the CSM had complied with the rules and principles governing the examination of evidence, and in particular that its decision regarding the establishment of the facts had been coherent and reasonable. The Supreme Court held as follows: “Whether or not the provisions governing a special administrative action [ação administrativa especial] to set aside an administrative act permit the holding of a public hearing at an appellant’s request will naturally depend from the outset on the extent of the Supreme Court’s powers of review, as fashioned and regulated specifically by the Status of Judges Act, with regard to the establishment of the facts and the taking of evidence in connection with the appeal. In reality, it is clear that such a hearing, devoted to the production of evidence and discussion of the facts, would be useful and meaningful only if the Supreme Court, in determining the appeal, had broad-ranging jurisdiction to review without restriction all the facts and evidence relied on in the impugned decision. If that were the case the Supreme Court would repeat and add to the examination of the evidence produced in the disciplinary proceedings in order to ... form ... its own opinion as to the conclusions to be drawn from it ... However, as it follows from the uniform, settled case-law of the Judicial Division, this is manifestly not the legal position that is continuing to emerge, primarily, from the reinforced law represented by the Status of Judges Act.” With regard to the evidence which the applicant proposed to produce during the hearing, the Supreme Court found that it was inadmissible and irrelevant, stressing in particular (a) that the applicant’s request for evidence to be heard from the witness had been aimed at establishing the content of the draft decision of the plenary CSM in the applicant’s disciplinary case; this ran counter to the confidentiality of the proceedings leading to the final decision; and (b) that the documents submitted by the applicant went beyond the subject-matter of the disciplinary proceedings. Lastly, the Supreme Court observed that the applicant had produced a lengthy memorial. Under Article 91 of the Administrative Courts Code, this made it unnecessary to hear legal arguments in oral proceedings. 65. On the merits, the Supreme Court noted (a) that there had been no manifest error or inconsistency in the establishment of the facts, or any indication that the evidence had been obtained unlawfully; (b) that the CSM had considerable discretion regarding the definition of the disciplinary offence, which was described in broad terms in the Act, and that the Supreme Court could alter that legal classification only in the event of a gross, manifest error, which was not the situation in the present case; and (c) that the applicant’s arguments that the proceedings before the CSM had been unfair were unfounded, as the refusal to provide certain items of information had been duly reasoned. 66. As to the penalty imposed, the Supreme Court observed (a) that in contrast to the provisions of criminal law, where a custodial sentence was at stake, the statutory provisions governing disciplinary proceedings did not empower or require the authorities to suspend enforcement of the penalty. In any event, in the present case, suspending enforcement of the penalty would have run counter to its purpose; and (b) that the penalty imposed had not been disproportionate. On this last point, the Supreme Court found as follows: “Nevertheless, as ruled uniformly and consistently in this Division’s case-law, ‘when it comes to fixing penalties in the context of disciplinary proceedings, a degree of [administrative] discretion exists which should be overridden only in cases of gross, manifest error ...’ ... In the light of the Supreme Court’s powers with regard to the scale of the penalty – which falls wholly within the discretionary powers [of the administrative authorities] in accordance with the above-mentioned case-law – we do not consider that the CSM’s value judgment regarding the specific factual circumstances and the accused’s misconduct was apt to infringe the principles of proportionality and equality. Furthermore, there is nothing in the case file to indicate that the choice of the [type] of sanction or its severity was based on any criteria other than the need to protect the public interest and the requirements of judicial ethics; accordingly, [the complaint concerning the] alleged abuse of powers is manifestly ill-founded ...” 67. In a final decision of 30 September 2014 the CSM, sitting in plenary session, after deciding that the penalties incurred by the applicant in the three sets of disciplinary proceedings referred to above should be imposed cumulatively (cúmulo jurídico das penas disciplinares aplicadas), unanimously ordered a single penalty of 240 days’ suspension from duty. 68. The decision of 30 September 2014 was taken by a formation comprising twelve of the seventeen members of the CSM (seven judges, including the President of the CSM, and five non-judicial members). 69. The applicant stated that she had actually been suspended from duty for only 100 days, as enforcement of the remainder of the penalty had become time-barred.

4. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Kaunas. 5. In October 1991 the applicant asked the authorities to establish that her father had had 7.06 hectares of land in Kaunas Region before nationalisation. The applicant indicated that she and her sister were their father’s heirs. It was indicated in her request that she and her sister would accept land in another location. A document proving that their father had owned 6.79 hectares of land was also attached to the request. 6. It appears that the applicant and her sister agreed that the applicant had a right to have her property rights to 3.40 hectares of their father’s land restored. 7. On 3 March 1993 the authorities issued a document containing a decision to return 0.66 hectares to the applicant in natura and to return the remaining 2.74 hectares to her by paying compensation. 8. On 16 March 1993 the Ministry of Agriculture repeated the authorities’ decision of 3 March 1993 (see paragraph 7 above). 9. In December 1993 and April 1994 the authorities decided to give the applicant eleven plots, each measuring 0.06 hectares. 10. In February 2003 the Kaunas Land Reform Division informed the applicant that she could, before 1 April 2003, declare or change her intentions regarding the method by which her property rights would be restored. She was informed that property rights to land that had been an urban area were to be restored by: giving plots of land to the citizens who had buildings on those plots – the maximum plot size was limited to a 0.2 hectares; giving plots of land in cities and rural areas where a citizen did not have land, except for the cities of Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipėda, Šiauliai, Panevėžys, Alytus, Marijampolė, Druskininkai, Palanga, Birštonas and Neringa; legally voiding a citizen’s liabilities to the State; and paying compensation in securities. 11. In March 2003 the applicant asked the authorities to pay her monetary compensation “in a convertible currency at world market prices” (konvertuojama valiuta pasaulinėmis kainomis) for the remaining 2.74 hectares of land. 12. In January 2007 the applicant asked the authorities to pay her monetary compensation for the remaining 2.74 hectares of land or return a part of the land in natura. The applicant specified that monetary compensation should be paid in a “convertible currency at market prices”. 13. In September 2007 the authorities informed the applicant that they had addressed the Kaunas municipality regarding vacant plots of land in the area where her father had had the land, and had been told that the restitution process had to be carried out in accordance with the detailed plan for restitution approved in 1991. 14. In July 2008 the applicant complained to the authorities that her previous requests (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above) had gone missing. 15. In November 2008 the applicant asked the authorities not to give her any land burdened by any kind of easement. 16. In August 2009 the applicant wrote a letter to the authorities and stated that, in accordance with the Constitution, not only did she have a right to receive fair compensation for the land, but a vacant plot of land situated in the same area where her father’s land had been had to be returned to her. She stated that she had to be paid compensation at market prices and in accordance with the land value map for 2009. She also wrote that if the land returned to her was burdened by any kind of easement, the authorities would have to pay her compensation at full market value for her inability to use it. It appears from the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court’s decision that the authorities indicated in August 2009 that compensation at market prices was not possible (see paragraph 33 below). The value of 2.5469 hectares of land was assessed at 20,167 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 5,841 euros (EUR)) if the applicant preferred to acquire land in another area, and at LTL 32,267 (approximately EUR 9,345) if the applicant preferred compensation in securities (see paragraph 36 below). 17. On 21 October 2009 the Kaunas County Administration changed the decision of 16 March 1993 on the restoration of the applicant’s property rights (see paragraph 8 above) and decided that her property rights to the remaining 2.74 hectares of land would be restored at a later date. By that order, the applicant’s property rights were restored by giving her two plots of land measuring 0.0807 hectares and 0.1124 hectares respectively. 18. It appears from the courts’ decisions that in June 2010 the authorities asked the applicant to make a decision regarding the method of restitution in respect of the remaining plot of land (see paragraphs 35 and 36 below). 19. In June 2010 the applicant asked the authorities to pay her monetary compensation for the remaining 2.5469 hectares of land, plus 15% interest because she was the daughter of a military volunteer. 20. In September 2010 the applicant asked the authorities to remove all the underground telecommunications cables that were situated on one of the plots of land that had been returned to her. 21. On 4 October 2010 the authorities informed the applicant that the remaining plot of land of 2.5469 hectares was State redeemable, and she could be compensated for it by receiving securities or by a new plot of land of equal value in a rural area being transferred to her. The applicant was asked to inform the authorities about her decision before 18 October 2010. Should she fail to make a decision, the compensation would be paid in securities. 22. On 13 October 2010 the applicant repeated her request to be paid monetary compensation plus 15% interest. Her letter also contained some other requests regarding increasing the size of one plot, transferring a pond (kūdra) to her, and paying her compensation at market prices for another plot of land. 23. The authorities replied in November 2010 that, when deciding on issues of restitution, they were obliged to follow the requirements of domestic law. The applicant was asked to come to the Kaunas City Land Reform Division on 6 December 2010 to deal with the issue of restoring her rights to the remaining part of her father’s land. 24. In December 2010 the Kaunas City Land Reform Division asked the Kaunas Municipal Administration to prepare a plan of vacant land in the area where the applicant’s father’s land had previously been situated. The same month, the Kaunas Municipal Administration replied that it was not possible to prepare additional plans of vacant land, because the schemes relating to vacant plots of land had already been approved, and a similar request submitted by the applicant’s son had already been examined. 25. In November 2014 the authorities informed the applicant that as of 1 November 2014, Article 21 § 4 of the Law on Restitution provided that a citizen who had already asked for his or her property rights to a plot of land to be restored could, by 1 March 2015, express or change his or her wish regarding the form in which the ownership rights to the real property were to be restored, and choose a plot of forest of equal value, provided that a final decision on restitution had not been taken or, if taken, had not yet been executed or had been executed in part. 26. The applicant started court proceedings, demanding compensation in respect of pecuniary damage from the Kaunas municipality. She alleged that the plot of land of 0.1124 hectares which had been returned to her (see paragraph 17 above) had electricity and gas equipment installed on it (see paragraph 20 above), and that she was prevented from using it. The applicant also asked the court to oblige the authorities to remove the underground telecommunications cables installed on her plot within two months of the court decision becoming final. 27. On 22 June 2012 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant had not complained about the decision of the authorities of 21 October 2009 by which her property rights to the specific plots of land had been restored (see paragraph 17 above). Moreover, the applicant had claimed that she was not able to use the land, more specifically, to construct buildings on it, but she needed to have a detailed plan of the land prepared in order to start any construction on the land, which she had not done. The court further held that the applicant’s request that the authorities be obliged to remove the underground telecommunications cables was unfounded, because the cables had been installed in accordance with the provisions of domestic law. The applicant’s claim was thus dismissed. 28. The applicant appealed, and on 18 December 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. The court held that the applicant had signed a document informing her about the borders of the land and restrictions regarding its use. There was no information indicating that either the applicant or her representative had been misled by the authorities regarding the status of the land. Moreover, the State was not obliged to restore her property rights to land with no restrictions regarding its use. 29. It appears that a plot of land measuring 0.0498 hectares which had been situated in the area where the applicant’s father had had his land was sold to R.N. in 1994. In November 2011 the National Land Service informed the applicant’s son that the purchase contract regarding the plot of land sold to R.N. in 1994 had been concluded in breach of the requirements of domestic law, and that the issue would be referred to a prosecutor. 30. In January 2012 the Kaunas Division of the National Land Service informed the prosecutor that, in accordance with domestic law, one family could purchase or rent only one plot of land for construction of an individual home in the absence of an auction. If the family was provided with a plot of land before 15 March 1992, no other member of that family could acquire another plot of land for construction of an individual home without participating in an auction. R.N. had been provided with a plot of land of 0.06 hectares for construction of an individual home in 1992. In 1993 she had purchased that plot from the State. Moreover, in 1994 R.N. had been allowed to purchase another plot of land of 0.0498 hectares in the absence of an auction, which had not been allowed. In 2002 R.N. had sold the plot of land to R.Z. The prosecutor was thus asked to start court proceedings on the matter. 31. In February 2012 the prosecutor decided that the National Land Service could start court proceedings, and referred the matter to it. Subsequently, the National Land Service lodged a complaint with the Kaunas District Court, asking it to annul the relevant administrative acts by which the plot of land of 0.0498 hectares had been provided to R.N. and to annul the purchase agreements regarding that plot. The complaint was dismissed by the Kaunas District Court on 8 July 2013 because the limitation period had expired (see paragraphs 49 and 51 below). That conclusion was upheld by the Kaunas Regional Court on 14 October 2013. 32. On 13 March and 20 June 2013 the applicant brought a claim and an amended claim for LTL 30,000 (approximately EUR 8,688) in respect of non-pecuniary damage relating to the length of the restitution proceedings. She asked the court to oblige the authorities to restore her property rights within one month of the court decision becoming final, or to pay her fair monetary compensation, calculated in accordance with the land value map for 2013. The applicant also stated that she had sustained pecuniary damage in the amount of LTL 3,616,598 (approximately EUR 1,047,439), but she was not asking for any award in this respect. 33. On 7 October 2013 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court held that there was no dispute that the applicant’s rights to 2.5469 hectares had not been restored. However, it also held that her request for damages could only be satisfied if the State had acted unlawfully. The court stated that the national authorities had taken various steps: they had provided data about unoccupied land and had asked the applicant to decide how she wished her property rights to be restored. The applicant’s requests submitted to the authorities for compensation “in a convertible currency at world market prices” and for compensation at market prices in accordance with the land value map for 2009 (see paragraphs 11, 12, 16, 19 and 22 above) could not constitute a proper way of expressing her decision, because such methods of compensation had not been defined in the domestic law. The court found that her property rights had not been restored because of her inactivity. As regards her request that the authorities be obliged to restore her property rights within one month, the court noted that she had to use an out-of-court procedure, and left that complaint unexamined. 34. The applicant appealed and also asked to be awarded compensation in respect of pecuniary damage amounting to EUR 1,047,439. On 24 July 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court held that the first-instance court had been obliged to examine the applicant’s request to have her property rights restored, but it had not examined all the documents submitted. It therefore returned the case to the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court for fresh examination. 35. On 24 February 2015 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court held that on 9 October 1991 the applicant had submitted a request to have her property rights to 7.06 hectares of her father’s land restored (see paragraph 5 above). In 1992 the applicant and her sister had agreed that the applicant had a right to have her property rights to 3.40 hectares of her father’s land restored (see paragraph 6 above). The authorities had restored her property rights to 0.66 hectares of land on 16 March 1993 (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above), and on 21 October 2009 her property rights to another 0.1931 hectares of land had been restored (see paragraph 17 above). The latter decision indicated that the applicant’s property rights to the remaining plot of 2.5469 hectares would be restored at a later date, when the land reform project had been prepared. No land reform project had been prepared, because the land in question was in an area that had been within city boundaries before 1 June 1995, so the indication in the decision about the land reform project being prepared had been a mistake. In June 2010 the applicant had been asked to choose the form of compensation (see paragraph 18 above), but she had sent several letters submitting requests that were not possible under domestic law. The court further held that the authorities had examined numerous complaints submitted by the applicant and her son. The court further referred to the administrative proceedings regarding the applicant’s alleged inability to use one plot of land that had been returned to her (see paragraphs 26-28 above), and the civil proceedings regarding the sale of the plot of land of 0.0498 hectares to R.N., started by the National Land Service (see paragraphs 29-31 above). The court also noted that the applicant had been informed about the possibility of receiving a plot of forest of equal value (see paragraph 25 above). The court held that there was no dispute that the applicant’s property rights to 2.5469 hectares of land had not been restored. However, the applicant’s claims for compensation could only be satisfied if unlawful actions by the authorities had been established. The restitution process was carried out by the National Land Service and its territorial divisions. The court decided that, in the applicant’s case, the authorities had carried out their functions by: sending information about the methods by which the applicant’s rights could be restored; providing information about vacant land; and asking the applicant to express her choice as to the method of restitution. The relevant domestic law valid at the time the applicant had asked for compensation “in a convertible currency at world market prices” in March 2003 had provided that, before 1 April 2003, a citizen could declare or change the method of restitution. If no method was chosen, the authorities could choose for the citizen. The relevant domestic law valid at the time the applicant had asked for compensation at market prices and in accordance with the land value map for 2009 had provided that, before 31 December 2005, a citizen could change the method of restitution and choose compensation in securities instead of monetary compensation. The relevant domestic law valid at the material time when the case had been examined had provided that, until 1 March 2015, citizens could change the method of restitution and ask to have their property rights restored by being provided with a plot of forest of equal value in a rural area. If no method was chosen, property rights were restored by means of monetary compensation. The court held that the authorities could only choose the method of restitution for a citizen if he or she had not expressed his or her decision before 1 April 2003. In the applicant’s situation, the National Land Service had not issued any decision within the required six-month time-limit, and thus the applicant had a right to receive compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The court held that the applicant’s right to have her property rights to 2.5469 hectares restored had not been denied, and decided to award her EUR 600 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The remaining part of the applicant’s complaint was dismissed as unfounded. 36. The applicant, the National Land Service and the State, represented by the National Land Service, appealed. On 10 July 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court held that it was clear from the case material that there was no more vacant land in the area where the applicant’s father had had his land. For this reason, the applicant’s demand that the authorities be obliged to return her father’s land in natura within one month of the court’s decision becoming final (see paragraph 32 above) was unfounded. As regards the applicant’s argument that her father’s plot of land of 0.0498 hectares had been sold to R.N. owing to unlawful actions by the National Land Service, the court held that this argument had been rebutted by the decisions issued by the domestic courts in other proceedings (see paragraph 31 above). As regards the length of the restitution process, the court decided that there was no information indicating that the authorities had acted unlawfully, and thus the first‑instance decision to award the applicant compensation of EUR 600 had been unfounded. In 1991 the applicant had expressed her wish to have her father’s land returned to her in natura (see paragraph 5 above). In 2003 she had asked for compensation “in a convertible currency at world market prices” (see paragraph 11 above); in 2009 she had asked for compensation at market prices in accordance with the land value map for 2009 (see paragraph 16 above); in 2010 she had asked for compensation at market prices plus 15% interest (see paragraphs 19 and 22 above); and in 2015 she had stated that her choice as to the method of restitution had been expressed in 1991, and she was not going to change her mind (see paragraph 37 below). The authorities had informed the applicant several times that her requested methods of compensation were not possible under domestic law. In 2003 the applicant had been informed that if a citizen did not express a decision as to a method of restitution before 1 April 2003, the authorities had to issue decisions taking into account the method indicated in the citizen’s last request (see paragraph 10 above). In June 2009 the authorities had indicated the method by which the compensation would be calculated and had stated that the value of the 2.5469 hectares of land which had to be restored to the applicant would be LTL 20,167 (approximately EUR 5,841) if the applicant preferred to acquire the land in another area, and LTL 32,267 (approximately EUR 9,345) if she preferred compensation in securities (see paragraph 16 above). In June 2010 the authorities had asked the applicant to choose the method of restitution: receiving either an area of land, forest or water of equal value (see paragraph 18 above). In October 2010 the authorities had repeatedly explained that the applicant could receive either a plot of land of equal value or compensation in securities, and should she fail to make a decision then she would be paid compensation in securities (see paragraph 21 above). In November 2010 the applicant had been asked to come to the Kaunas Division of the National Land Service to discuss the issue of restitution (see paragraph 23 above). In November 2014 the authorities had informed the applicant that it had become possible to have a plot of forest of equal value in a rural area (see paragraph 25 above). The court further held that the actions of the National Land Service had been lawful, considering that the applicant’s requests had not been possible under domestic law. Moreover, the authorities had stated that a decision to pay the applicant monetary compensation would be issued. The court therefore decided to change the first-instance decision and not award the applicant any compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 37. In February 2015 the applicant sent a letter to the authorities stating that she had expressed her decision on the method of restitution in 1991 when she had asked for the return of her father’s land in natura. She also stated that she was not going to change her mind and would require her father’s land to be returned to her. In March 2015 the authorities replied that the remaining part of the land to which the applicant’s property rights had to be restored was State redeemable and could not be returned in natura. The authorities further stated that the applicant would be paid monetary compensation. The applicant replied to this letter in April 2015 and accused the authorities of unlawfully expropriating property. The authorities replied in May 2015 and repeated that it was not possible to return the applicant’s father’s land in natura. The applicant replied, stating that the authorities’ letter contained no substantive reasons and could not be taken into account. The applicant stated that the issue of restitution in her case would be considered in the courts, and asked the authorities not to bother her with letters containing no substantive reasons. 38. In November 2016 the authorities asked the applicant to come to a meeting on 5 December and familiarise herself with the draft decision restoring her property rights. 39. On 6 December 2016 the National Land Service issued a decision to restore the applicant’s property rights to 2.5469 hectares of land by paying her monetary compensation of EUR 9,359. 40. In March 2017 the applicant asked the authorities to provide her with copies of plans of vacant land plots situated in the area in which her father had had his land, and to explain how and when her father’s land had been used. The authorities replied in April 2017 that the Kaunas Municipal Administration provided information in map form about vacant land that was not State redeemable. The relevant Kaunas division had to mark the borders of land which an owner had owned before 1940 in accordance with the information received from the Kaunas Municipal Administration. In the applicant’s case, the Kaunas Municipal Administration had provided the relevant Kaunas division with information about vacant land plots. The Kaunas land reform division had then asked the Kaunas Municipal Administration to prepare land plans. Two plots of land had been returned to the applicant in natura in 2009. In 2010 the Kaunas land reform division had asked the Kaunas Municipal Administration to additionally examine whether there was vacant land in the area where the applicant’s father had owned land before 1940, but it had been established that there was no more vacant land. 41. The applicant lodged a claim with the domestic court, asking it to annul the decision of the National Land Service of 6 December 2016 by which her property rights to 2.5469 hectares of land had been restored and it had been decided that she would receive monetary compensation of EUR 9,359 (see paragraph 39 above). The applicant thought that the land that had not been returned to her had not been used for public use, and that the National Land Service had not provided any information as to why all of her father’s land had not been returned in natura. 42. On 21 August 2017 the Kaunas Regional Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s complaints. The court held that her father’s land was not vacant, as it was occupied by cadastral areas with or without buildings, areas containing infrastructure that was relevant for roads, side roads, underground infrastructure and the protective zones surrounding them, and recreational areas. There was a public interest in using that land, thus the land was State redeemable and compensation had to be paid for it. The court further assessed the actions of the National Land Service and held that the authorities’ actions had been lawful. This was because the applicant had not agreed with the information indicating that her father’s land was not vacant, and because on one hand she had asked for her property rights to be restored in natura, and on the other hand had asked for compensation at “market” and “world market” prices, although there was no such possibility under domestic law. Fair compensation was also a way to restore property rights, as confirmed by the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 53 below). The value of the land had been calculated in accordance with the method approved by the Government (see paragraph 52 below), and the amount calculated for the applicant had been in accordance with that method. Moreover, the court referred to the case-law of the Court, where it had been established that no right to receive a higher amount of compensation was guaranteed under the applicable domestic law or by a decision of the domestic court (see paragraph 54 below). The compensation calculated for the applicant was in line with domestic law and the practice of the Court. 43. In October 2017 the authorities asked the applicant to provide them with her account number so they could pay her the monetary compensation of EUR 9,359. In the event that the applicant failed to do that, the monetary compensation would be transferred to a notary’s deposit account. 44. In November 2017 the applicant sent a letter to the National Land Service stating that she would not give the authorities her account number. Should the compensation be transferred to her or the notary’s account nevertheless, it would be transferred back to the authorities.

5. The applicants were born in 1985, 1988 and 1984 respectively. The first and second applicants live in Moscow. The third applicant lived in the Moscow region and died there on 10 December 2007. 6. On 11 March 2007 elections to the Moscow City Duma were held. The applicants came to a polling station at about 10.30 a.m. They started to loudly criticise the elections and were immediately (at about 10.35 a.m.) arrested and brought to the Odintsovo police station. 7. At 3.30 p.m. on the same day the local prosecutor’s office opened criminal proceedings against the applicants. It follows from its decision that at 10.30 a.m. on 11 March 2011 at polling station no. 1763 the applicants had unrolled banners, turned on smoke jets and distributed leaflets in an attempt to disturb the work of the polling station. Their unlawful actions had been interrupted by the police. 8. At 6.30 p.m. on the same day the police started to draw up arrest records in respect of the applicants. According to those records the applicants were arrested at the Odintsovo police station. The first applicant was arrested at 6.30 p.m., the third applicant at 7.00 p.m. and the second applicant at 7.30 p.m. 9. On 13 March 2007 the investigator asked the Odintsovo Town Court to remand the applicants in custody. 10. During the hearings on the same day - which lasted from 11.30 a.m. to 1.00 p.m. for the first applicant, from 9.40 a.m. to 10.25 a.m. for the second applicant and from 10.30 a.m. to 11.25 a.m. for the third applicant – the judge heard the prosecutor, the applicants and their counsel. She also read the prosecutor’s applications for remand. No other documents were examined at the hearings. 11. On the same day, 13 March 2007, the Odintsovo Town Court ordered that the applicants be remanded in custody. The court found that the prosecutor’s applications had been supported by evidence showing the necessity of placing the applicants in custody in view of the risks of absconding, reoffending or interfering with the investigation. 12. On the same day the applicants prepared their preliminary appeal submissions against the detention orders and asked the detention facility administration to dispatch them. It follows from a document issued by the detention facility administration that the first applicant’s submissions were dispatched on 14 March 2007. However, the submissions by the second and third applicants were not dispatched until 23 March 2007. 13. On 20 March 2007 counsel for the applicants lodged additional appeal submissions. They complained that they had not still received copies of the detention orders of 13 March 2007. They further argued that the Town Court had disregarded the fact that the offence imputed to the applicants was not a serious one, that they had permanent places of residence, had positive references and studied at a university. On the same day counsel asked for permission to study the case-file. Their request was however rejected because the case file had been taken by the judge who was currently on leave. 14. On 27 March 2007 counsel for the applicants complained before the Odintsovo Town Court that the investigators had denied them access to the case file and had refused to give them copies of, in particular, the prosecutor’s applications for remand and of the detention orders. 15. On 29 March 2007 the second applicant received a copy of his detention order. The first and third applicants received copies of their respective detention orders on 30 March 2007. The delay in serving the detention orders on the applicants was due to the fact that the judge had sent the documents to the Mozhaysk detention facility, although the applicants were held at the Odintsovo detention facility. 16. On 3 April 2007 the Odintsovo Town Court found that the investigators had unlawfully restricted counsel’s access to the case file and had thereby violated the applicants’ defence rights. However, it was not until 6 April 2007 that counsel were ultimately granted access to the case file. 17. On 9 April 2007 counsel lodged additional appeal submissions in which they complained about the belated access to the case file. They further complained that the detention order had been based on insufficient reasons and that no time-limit for detention had been fixed. The evidence showing the existence of the risks of absconding, reoffending or interfering with the investigation to which the Town Court had referred in its detention orders had not been examined during the hearings and the applicants had not been given an opportunity to challenge it. They also complained that the investigator who had lodged the application for remand had acted outside his competence and that the detention orders had been issued more than forty-eight hours after the arrest. Moreover, the applicants’ arrest had been unlawful because the arrest records had been drawn with several hours’ delay. Finally, the applicants asked to be brought to the courtroom for the appeal hearing. 18. On 11 April 2007 the Moscow Regional Court held an appeal hearing. The applicants were not brought to the courtroom. On the same day the Regional Court quashed the detention orders of 13 March 2007. It found that the detention orders had been based on insufficient reasons. The Town Court had disregarded the facts that the charges were not serious, that the applicants had no criminal record, had a permanent place of residence and studied at a university. There was no evidence that they had threatened witnesses or had attempted to destroy evidence. The Town Court’s finding that the applicants might abscond, interfere with the investigation or reoffend had not been therefore supported by relevant facts. The Regional Court ordered the applicants’ immediate release. 19. Counsel for the applicants asked the court to give them copies of the appeal decisions so that they could bring it to the detention facility and have the applicants immediately released. Their request was refused. 20. On 12 April 2007 counsel asked for a second time for copies of the appeal decisions. By letter dated 18 April 2007 the President of the Moscow Regional Court informed them that under the domestic law copies were to be sent by post to the detention facility, which had been done on 12 April 2007. Copies of the detention orders could not be given to counsel. 21. On the same day, 12 April 2007, counsel asked the director of the detention facility to release the applicants, referring to the Regional Court’s order to release them. However, the director refused to release the applicants because the appeal decisions had not yet been received by the detention facility. 22. The appeal decisions were received by the detention facility on 13 April 2007. On the same day the applicants were released.

4. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Moscow. 5. S. was the owner of a one-room flat located at 6-60, Smolenskaya Street, Moscow. On 7 February 2008 S. died. 6. An unidentified person presenting a passport in the name of M. and claiming that she was S.’s sister and heir applied to G., a notary, seeking the recognition of her rights in respect of the flat. In support of her claim she submitted a copy of her birth certificate. 7. On 18 March 2009 G. issued a certificate confirming, inter alia, M.’s title to the flat. The city authorities registered M.’s title to the flat in the State land register. 8. On 19 May 2009 an unidentified person posing as M. sold the flat to the applicant. According to the documents submitted by the applicant, the purchase price was 6,499,999 Russian roubles (RUB). The city authorities registered the sale of the flat and the applicant’s title to it in the State land register. 9. On an unspecified date the police opened a criminal investigation into the fraudulent acquisition of the flat. It was established that the document presented to the notary as M.’s birth certificate had been forged. 10. On 23 September 2009 the police informed the Department of Housing and Housing Policy of the City of Moscow (the “Housing Department”) of the pending criminal investigation. 11. On 1 December 2009 the Housing Department brought an action seeking the transfer of the applicant’s flat to the City of Moscow (“the City”). 12. On 11 March 2010 the criminal investigation was suspended. 13. On 27 December 2010 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow allowed the Housing Department’s action. It reasoned that M. had died intestate with no surviving kin and that her flat should have been considered bona vacantia. It annulled the applicant’s title to the flat and ordered its transfer to the City of Moscow. 14. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 14 July 2011 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 27 December 2010. 15. On an unspecified date the judgments of 27 December 2010 and 14 July 2011 were enforced. Subsequently the City of Moscow sold the flat to a private party under a social assistance scheme that permitted the buyer to pay the purchase price in instalments. 16. On 12 October 2017 the criminal investigation into the fraudulent acquisition of the flat was reopened.

5. The applicants, who belong to the Roma ethnic group, were born in 1970 and 1957 respectively and live in Mănăstirea (Călărași). 6. At the relevant time they were living together in a de facto partnership and were the parents of seven children: – E. and E.S., a boy and a girl, twins, born on 27 March 2004; – T., a boy, born on 7 March 2005; – A.-M., a girl, born on 31 March 2006; – S., a girl, born on 15 June 2007; – E.L., a girl, born on 29 June 2008; – I., a boy, born on 8 October 2009. 7. The second applicant has been classified as suffering from second‑degree permanent disability on account of psychological disorders. 8. On 3 October 2013 the applicants married. 9. In August 2010 the first applicant sent a complaint to the Romanian president, claiming that her father had subjected her to abuse; she stated that he had raped her and threatened her children. She attached to her complaint a medical certificate attesting that in 2008 one of her children had sustained injuries necessity seven to eight days of medical treatment. 10. Following an investigation, the authorities dealing with the matter established that the first applicant’s allegations had no basis in fact and that the complaint had been drawn up in the context of a conflict between the first applicant and the representative of the religious organisation in her village, who had allegedly excluded her from that community. 11. The first applicant’s complaint was then transmitted to the authority responsible for monitoring the situation of maltreated or abandoned children, namely the Călăraşi Directorate-General of Social Assistance and Child Welfare (“the DGASPC”, paragraph 12 below), in order to verify the circumstances of the applicants’ children. On 16 September 2010 the DGASPC asked the Social Services Department of the Mănăstirea municipality (“the SPAS”) to look into the education provided to the family’s seven children, verify their welfare situation and their health, and to provide it with all relevant information (see paragraph 12 below). 12. In September 2010 the SPAS visited the applicants’ home. It noted that the family lived in an insalubrious house provided by the first applicant’s father and that the applicants took no interest in their children’s health or education. The family’s monthly income amounted to 774 Romanian lei (RON) and this sum was composed of the second applicant’s disability allowance, child allowances and an allowance paid to the first applicant as a single parent. The SPAS’s report also mentioned that the applicants refused to enrol their children in school or with a doctor, and that they restricted their access to outdoor activities and any other activity which could potentially stimulate their integration or adaptation to life within the community. According to the SPAS, the applicants had refused assistance from social-service employees who wished to advise them about their responsibilities towards their children. 13. Based on the SPAS’s findings (see paragraph 12 above), on 20 September 2010 the DGASPC sent the applicants a letter informing them that, as parents, they had a duty to provide the minimum conditions necessary for their children’s development and also to ensure that they did not neglect them. The DGASPC recommended that the applicants take the following measures: “ – provide [their children] with an appropriate level of physical cleanliness and clean clothes, [and guarantee the cleanliness] of the house and a proper diet; – sign up all the children with a family doctor, have them vaccinated and follow any recommended treatment; – enrol the children aged from three to seven years in a nursery school; – allow the children to create relationships with [the other children/] ([through] walks, games); – refrain from subjecting the children to physical and/or verbal violence and from giving them emotionally traumatising messages (do not create [feelings of] fear, isolation, [do not create in them a] lack of confidence).” 14. In the same letter, the DGASPC informed the applicants: “The manner in which you fulfil these obligations will be monitored by ... the DGASPC. Should the neglect of the children persist, and if this affects their safety within the family and [if] there is a breach of certain of their rights, urgent protection measures will be taken in respect of the children, even without [your] agreement, in accordance with sections 64, 65 and 66 of Law no. 272/2004 (the Protection of Children’s Rights Act). ...” 15. A schedule was drawn up to ensure regular monitoring of the applicants’ family by the social services. On 11 October 2010 the committee responsible for providing support to the Mănăstirea municipal guardianship and welfare office visited the applicants’ home. It submitted a report stating that the applicants claimed not to have signed up their children with a doctor and had no intention of doing so; in addition, although they had enrolled one of the children in nursery school, they did not take him there for fear he would be kidnapped. The committee’s report also noted that the house was made up of two rooms, an entrance corridor and a kitchen, where clothes and wood were piled up together. It added that the house was heated and clean, and that a meal had been prepared. 16. It further indicated that the second applicant had become anxious and begun raising his voice to complain that he was not receiving allowances for all of his children. Informed that the monitoring of his family would last for several months, the second applicant apparently became agitated and informed the municipal employees that they were not to return to his home. The committee proposed in its report that the monitoring of the applicants’ family should continue. 17. On 22 December 2010 and 18 January 2011 the SPAS went to the applicants’ home in order to assess the children’s situation and advise the applicants about the measures to be taken in order to meet the DGASPC’s recommendations (see paragraph 13 above). According to the SPAS, the second applicant was very recalcitrant, insulted the social-service employees, refused access to the children and declined to provide them with information about the children. In the reports drawn up after these two visits, the SPAS mentioned that the house was still poorly maintained, that the windows were covered with plastic tarpaulins, and that the door was damaged. It indicated that the children’s situation did not seem to have improved since the monitory of the family had begun, and emphasised the applicants’ refusal to cooperate with the social services and their failure to fulfil their parental obligations. In view of these findings, it suggested that a protective measure be imposed in respect of the children. 18. On 28 January 2011 a set of measures was prepared in the context of protecting the applicants’ children, “as a result of the parents’ lack of investment in their role, consisting in providing the minimal conditions necessary to raise [their children], care for them, oversee their satisfactory development, educate them and monitor their health”. The SPAS continued to monitor the children’s situation and ensure that welfare benefits were paid to the applicants. 19. A new report, drawn up on 25 February 2011, indicated that the applicants’ family had little contact with others and that the parents were not collaborating with the social services in respect of the monitoring of their children; their neighbours alleged that they behaved aggressively and that their children were still neglected. This report recommended that a protective measure be adopted in respect of the children. 20. On 16 and 17 March 2011 the DGASPC drew up two reports about the applicants’ children. These noted the unsanitary conditions in the house, the very poor hygiene conditions and the applicants’ neglect of their children. With regard to this last aspect, the DGASPC noted that the applicants took little interest in their children’s health and refused to send them to school, to participate in social activities and to have contact with others. In its view, the applicants were refusing to cooperate with the authorities in improving the children’s situation. The reports concluded that, given the seriousness of the state of neglect faced by the children and the parents’ lack of agreement to protective measures, emergency placement of the underage children was recommended. 21. On 21 March 2011 the DGASPC drew up individual protection plans for the applicants’ children, specifying their needs, the persons responsible for them and the support to be provided to the family. 22. At the DGASPC’s request, in two separate judgments of 6 April 2011 the Călăraşi County Court (the “county court”) ordered the children’s emergency placement and transferred parental rights in their respect to the president of the Călăraşi County Council. 23. In the absence of appeals, these judgments became final. 24. On 4 August 2011, in spite of the applicants’ objections, employees of the DGASPC, assisted by a bailiff, police officers and a psychologist gave effect to the judgments of 6 April 2011 (see paragraph 22 above). In consequence, the youngest child, I., was placed with a child-minder in Călăraşi, a town situated about 38 km from the village in which the applicants lived; the oldest children were placed together in a residential centre situated about 88 km from the applicants’ home. 25. The children underwent psychological and medical tests after being taken into care by the authorities. The test report noted that serious deficiencies had been observed in the children, “resulting from neglect by the parents”. Thus, according to the report, I. was suffering from “recent cerebral paroxysmal events, microcytic hypochromic anaemia and weight‑related hypotrophy”, as a result of which she had been admitted to hospital urgently. As to the children’s intellectual development, the report noted “slight delayed development ... in all the children; speech issues, a limited vocabulary, a minimal level of socialisation, [and] a tendency to withdraw from others”. 26. On 5 August 2011 the DGASPC drew up a report on the six oldest children, noting as follows: “... The conclusions of the social services’ report indicate shortcomings in the place of residence (the dwelling belongs to C.G.; ..., the habitable area is insufficient and it is furnished and equipped to a minimal standard; the hygiene conditions are precarious, there are significant shortcomings [in housework and in maintaining] cleanliness in the house and also in terms of personal hygiene, clean clothing and food hygiene); financial [difficulties] – [the family’s income] is made up of an allowance for a person with second-degree disability [on account of a] psychological disorder, amounting to 234 [RON], and of State child benefit, amounting to 540 [RON]. It should be noted that although both parents live in the village of Mănăstirea, [the second applicant] has never taken steps to be registered as resident in this municipality... [The first applicant] did not attend school and is not in any paid employment. ... the parents’ conduct was found to be negligent...: [they] did not look after or take elementary steps to provide for [their children’s] health (none of the children was registered with a doctor); provided no educational stimulation to their children, had not registered them in nursery school and had limited their right [to take part in] socialisation [activities]. In this context, [the social inquiry report has indicated] language difficulties in six of the children and anxious behaviour (dread, remaining on the side-lines, retreating from strangers, lack of confidence) on account of [their fear] of being kidnapped for organ trafficking. ... [The applicants] are known in the community as individuals who generate conflict and tensions, and who frequently accuse, criticise and insult the local authorities and their neighbours for financial reasons (they ask for additional benefits, etc.)... Similar tensions exist in the relationship between the [applicants] and members of their extended family ... The latter have stated that they are unwilling and unable to take care of [the applicants’] children, with whom they have no contact. Although [the applicants have] received psychological and educational assistance to help them fulfil their role, meet their parental obligations and to make conscious provision for the [essential] needs in raising [the children], overseeing their satisfactory development and educating them, their case has continued to be monitored by the SPAS representatives; [however,] they have been unable to enter the [applicants’] home, as communication has always been difficult and accompanied by accusations and threats. [The applicants] have been informed of the effect of neglect on the children’s development and about the option [that is available to the authorities] to limit their parental rights where cases of abuse through negligence are found. The protection measures available have been described to them, including maintaining normal relationships with the children throughout the period of separation from the family. The parents have vehemently rejected the appropriate protection measures and have refused to accept the intervention of specialised authorities.” 27. Also on 5 August 2011, I. was examined by a DGASPC psychologist. It was established on that occasion that the child suffered, among other problems, from delayed motor development and language acquisition, and emotional shortcomings. The psychologist recommended cognitive stimulation, particularly in terms of language. Having regard to the findings of this report, the family’s precarious financial position and the parents’ lack of cooperation in spite of the psychological and educational advice provided by the social services, the DGASPC considered that it was necessary to replace the emergency placement measure in respect of I. by a temporary placement order. 28. The DGASPC submitted two requests to the county court, seeking to have the emergency placement measure replaced by a temporary placement order. It presented the children’s situation as described in the reports of 5 August 2011 (see paragraphs 26 and 27 above) and indicated that no alternative form of care by a family member had been identified. 29. The applicants, who were present at the hearing and represented by a lawyer acting pro bono, called for the action brought by the DGASPC to be dismissed. They submitted that, in spite of their lack of resources, they were bringing up their children satisfactorily and that the children were not ill. 30. In two judgments of 7 September 2011 the country court, basing its decision essentially on section 66 of Law no. 272/2004, ordered that the children be temporarily placed in care: by an initial judgment, I. was placed with a child-minder; by the second judgment, the six other children were placed in a special residential centre. Parental rights in respect of all the children were assigned to the president of the Călăraşi County Council. 31. In reaching this conclusion, the county court noted in its two judgments that the evidence in the case-file indicated that the applicants’ home was not a suitable place to bring up children, as the floor space was too small and poorly equipped, and there was no guarantee that it was clean. It also noted that serious shortcomings had been observed with regard to the personal hygiene and diet of family members. It noted the parents’ negligence with regard to the children’s health and their refusal to send them to school or allow them to take part in social activities. It also noted that, according to the documents in the files, the children’s language development was delayed; they displayed anxiety-related behaviours which, in the county court’s view, had been transmitted by their parents; and there were delays in the development of I.’s motor skills. 32. The county court added that although the applicants had received psychological and pedagogical advice to help them fulfil their parental duties, they had difficulties in grasping the children’s needs and, through their conduct, still demonstrated negligence towards the underage children. It held that, for the time being, the applicants were not providing the necessary conditions for their children’s satisfactory development and that it was in the children’s best interests to be placed in care on a temporary basis. 33. The applicants lodged appeals against those judgments. They asked for the action brought by the DGASPC to be dismissed and submitted written evidence. 34. On 22 and 23 September 2011 the applicants’ six oldest children underwent individual psychological tests. These revealed that all of the children were slightly behind their age cohorts in terms of social and educational development and indicated that they required cognitive and educational stimulation. The children began attending school. 35. By a final judgment of 7 November 2011, the Bucharest Court of Appeal (“the appeal court”) dismissed the applicants’ appeal against the judgment of 7 September 2011 concerning their six oldest children. It held that the placement measure was justified by the precarious nature of the applicants’ living conditions and by their attitude towards their children. It noted the temporary nature of the measure, which was due to be lifted once the applicants had submitted the necessary financial and non-financial guarantees with regard to raising their children. 36. By a final judgment of 28 November 2011, the appeal court dismissed the applicants’ appeal against the judgment of 7 September 2011 in respect of I.’s placement. After endorsing the reasoning set out in the first-instance judgment, the appeal court considered that the lawfulness of its findings was confirmed by other evidence added to the case file, such as, for example, the medical report in respect of this child (see paragraph 22 above). 37. Following the temporary placement of their children in care, the applicants had work done on the house to improve their living conditions. 38. At their request, on 10 January 2012 the DGASPC carried out a social inquiry visit to their home. In its subsequent report, it was noted that the applicants had improved their living conditions by furnishing the house to a minimum level and that they now had electricity and access to drinking water. However, the DGASPC noted that the toilet area was not equipped in such a way as to permit privacy and that various sections of the roof had been visibly damaged by storms. After drawing attention to the family’s income, it noted that the applicants had made efforts to maintain contact with their children, whom they had visited on two occasions since they were placed in care, and that the first applicant, at her initiative, had accompanied one of the children to hospital when he was ill. It added that the applicants had stated that they could not afford to travel more frequently to visit the children. 39. The above-mentioned report further indicated that the municipal authorities, through their representative, had contacted the applicants to propose assistance, which the second applicant had refused. However, the applicants had apparently begun to cooperate with the authorities and to show an interest in maintaining contact with their children and in what they had to do so that the placement measures could be ended. In this connection, the local authorities had encouraged the second applicant to register his residence at the first applicant’s address so that they could receive financial assistance from the municipality, and had informed him of the formalities to be completed. They had been offered psychological testing with a view to joining, as appropriate, a family-support programme to develop and consolidate their parenting skills. The applicants had apparently refused to undergo this testing. 40. Having regard to those factors, the DGASPC concluded that, for the time being, the conditions for ensuring the children’s safe return to the applicants had not been met: it emphasised the lack of fuel for heating the house and the second applicant’s lack of cooperation with the authorities. It explained that it would be better to delay the children’s return to their family and that the parents needed to achieve a certain level of progress, under the SPAS’s supervision, to acquire the necessary skills to ensure their children’s safety and to be informed of the potential risks to the children. It added that the children’s return to their family in the near future was not to be ruled out; in its view, however, given the need to improve certain conditions so as to ensure their safety, the applicants’ fluctuating attitude in their communication with the authorities and the applicants’ difficulties in grasping and responding to the children’s needs, the placement measure ought to be maintained for the time being. 41. On 17 January 2012 the DGASPC asked the SPAS to continue to monitor and advise the applicants’ family and to indicate to it those aspects that it still considered deficient in the visit that had been carried out on 10 January 2012 (see paragraphs 38 to 40 above). It also asked the SPAS to inform it of the measures taken to improve the applicants’ living conditions. 42. On 14 February 2012, following the DGASPC’s request (see paragraph 41 above), the SPAS made another visit to the applicants’ home. On this occasion, it was noted that the applicants were maintaining contact with their children by telephone, since it was difficult for them to travel to the residential centre on account of the wintery weather conditions. The visit report established that the applicants’ physical living conditions had improved and that they had had work done to clean the house. The applicants had promised to enrol the children in school, register them with a doctor, and cooperate with the authorities. The SPAS concluded that the applicants’ living conditions had improved in comparison with those existing when their children were placed in care and that the return of all the children to their family could be envisaged. 43. In the meantime, on 11 January 2012 the applicants had brought an action against the DGASPC before the county court. They requested that the emergency placement order in respect of their seven children be lifted and that they be returned to the family home. They argued that their living conditions were of a satisfactory standard for raising their children, and submitted to the case file a copy of the agricultural register showing that they had free accommodation, and also an electricity bill, evidence of their income and documents stating that three of their seven children were enrolled in school. They added that the children were not being cared for properly in the residential centre. 44. The DGASPC did not follow the SPAS’s recommendation (see paragraph 42 above) and asked for the action to be dismissed on the grounds that, although the material living conditions in the applicants’ home had improved, this aspect was not sufficient to ensure the children’s safety. Nonetheless, the social inquiry report on the SPAS’s visit of 14 February 2012 (see paragraph 42 above) was included in the case file. 45. By a judgment of 15 February 2012, the county court dismissed the applicants’ action on the ground that, in spite of the improvement in their living conditions, they had no other income apart from the allowances they received for their children and that there was no guarantee that these were used exclusively to care for the children. The court stated that those allowances had to cover the needs of the whole family. 46. The applicants lodged an appeal. They argued that they provided appropriate living conditions to ensure their children’s physical, intellectual and moral development. In addition, the county court had wrongly concluded that their only source of income was from the child allowances, whereas, in their submission, the second applicant was in receipt of two allowances and of income for day-work carried out for various inhabitants of the village. They added that they believed that the family’s income ought to benefit the parents, but more especially the children. 47. The DGASPC requested that the temporary placement measure be maintained. 48. No new evidence was added to the case file. 49. By a judgment of 20 March 2012, the appeal court dismissed the applicants’ appeal. Referring to sections 2, 66 and 68 § 2 of Law no. 272/2004, it considered that the circumstance which had led to the children’s temporary placement in care had changed only in part, and held that the contested measure was to be maintained. 50. In its judgment, the appeal court began by setting out the reasons justifying the temporary placement measure (see paragraphs 31 and 32 above) and stated that since the children had been placed in care the applicants had visited their six children in the residential centre twice and had visited I. once. 51. It further noted that, since being placed in care, the children had been examined and treated by a doctor and had joined nursery or primary schools, depending on their age. It noted that the children were all receiving assistance in school from a specialised educator who was monitoring each child’s situation and involving them in specially selected activities to enable them to catch up in those areas where academic delays had been observed when they were placed in care. It stated that, on the basis of the documents in the case file, the children had progressed in terms of independence, personal hygiene and diet since being placed in care and were developing positively. 52. The appeal court then described the first meeting that had taken place in November between the applicants and the six children who were housed in the residential centre. After describing the children’s reactions, it concluded that the meeting had proceeded normally; the applicants had eaten a meal and played with the children. It noted that the applicants had not expressed any dissatisfaction to the staff about their children’s condition. It further noted that, since that meeting, the applicants had contacted the children by telephone and continued to express their fear that their children would be kidnapped for organ trafficking. However, it noted that the second applicant had refused to give his personal telephone number to the child-care staff so that he could be informed about any issue concerning the children, and that communication was possible only when he himself called the residential centre. 53. The appeal court then compared the conditions considered necessary by the DGASPC for the children to be returned to their family (see paragraphs 38 and 39 above) with the SPAS’s findings during the social inquiry visit of 14 February 2012 (see paragraph 42 above). It noted that although the applicants had satisfied certain of the conditions imposed by the DGASPC, there remained room for improvement. It held: “The conditions for the children’s reintegration [into the family] have not been met, given that the other criteria laid down by the DGASPC to ensure the children’s safety are not fulfilled: [namely,] the parents’ involvement and cooperation...; the repair of the roof; registration of the [second] applicant’s home in Mănăstirea in order to be able to receive welfare payments; maintenance of links with the children by increasing the regularity of visits; acceptance of their parental responsibilities (registering the children with a doctor, enrolling them in primary and nursery school); the fact of finding employment; improved relations with the other members of the community; undergoing the psychological tests proposed by the DGASPC’s specialists to ascertain their level of parental skills, so as to be able to include them, if appropriate, in a parental support programme and thus develop and consolidate their parental skills; the prevention of major risks to the underage children by accepting monitoring by the Mănăstirea SPAS. .... At the same time, the appeal court notes that it has not been conclusively shown that the applicants have sufficient financial resources to support all of their children and to request [the latter’s] return to their family. The two allowances ... received by the [second] applicant, amounting to a total of 646 RON per month, do not represent a source of income that is sufficient to raise and educate seven children, who currently live in better conditions that those that their parents could provide them with. In addition, no evidence has been submitted proving that the applicants have received additional income through day-work carried out in the municipality by the second applicant ....” 54. The appeal court concluded that, in any event, the improvements in the applicants’ living conditions noted in the social inquiry report which had been added to the case file (see paragraph 42 above) was not the only condition that the applicants had to fulfil before being able to request their children’s return. According to the appeal court, the applicants had still to fulfil the other conditions laid down by the DGASPC, which were intended to ensure that the children’s best interests were protected. 55. A social inquiry report drawn up on 2 April 2012 noted that the family’s material conditions had improved, that the applicants were maintaining contact with their children by telephone and that they visited them once a month, the municipal authorities having provided them with fuel for these journeys. The report stated that the family’s monthly income consisted in two allowances received by the second applicant, amounting to a total of RON 646. It was suggested that the municipal authorities make an emergency payment of RON 1,800 to the applicants for repair of the house’s roof and the installation of toilets. 56. By a decision of 4 April 2012, the municipal council granted the first applicant the above-mentioned RON 1,800 in emergency aid. 57. On 10 April 2012 the applicants had a confidential interview with a psychologist from the DGASPC. Having been informed of the purpose of the interview, namely to assess their parental skills with a view to the children’s return to the family, the applicants replied to questions. The report drawn up after this interview indicated that the applicants had low parenting skills: they met only their children’s basic needs and were unaware of the effects that their conduct could have on the children’s development. It suggested that the applicants be included in a psychological support programme so as to develop and consolidate their parental skills, inform them about how to exercise their rights, put their parental responsibilities into practice and improve their skills in developing relationships with the wider community. 58. On 17 April 2012 the second applicant registered his home address at the first applicant’s home. 59. A visit to the applicants’ home by social services on 26 April 2012 revealed that their living conditions had improved, that the applicants had cooperated with the authorities and that they had begun to take the steps recommended to them for the children’s well-being. The DGASPC suggested that the six children who had been placed in the residential centre be reintegrated into their family. 60. In May 2012 the children underwent psychological tests, which revealed an improvement in their general condition since they had been placed in care. 61. By a report of 5 May 2012, the DGASPC noted that the family’s situation had improved, that the applicants had visited their son regularly, shown an interest in his health and displayed affection towards him. It also indicated that meetings had been organised not only between I. and his parents but also with his brothers and sisters. Emphasising the clear interest shown by the applicants towards their child, the DGASPC proposed that the placement measure be ended. 62. On 7 May 2012 the DGASPC brought an action before the county court requesting that I. be returned to the applicants’ home. 63. By a judgment of 23 May 2012, the county court decided that it was in I.’s best interests to be returned to his family, especially as the conditions for his satisfactory development had been met and his relationship with his family was very strong. 64. On 21 June 2012 I. was returned to the applicants’ home. 65. On 7 May 2012 the DGASPC and the applicants brought an action before the county court requesting that the temporary placement order in respect of the six other children be lifted. 66. By a judgment of 23 May 2012, the county court dismissed the action. The applicants and the DGASPC lodged an appeal against that judgment. 67. While that appeal was still pending, the six children spent the summer holiday at the applicants’ home, at their parents’ request. On 10 July 2012 the social services visited the applicants’ home, in the presence of the children. This visit indicated that the children would be able to live and develop in satisfactory conditions in the home. The report on this visit was added to the case file before the appeal court. 68. By a final judgment of 22 August 2012, the appeal court set aside the first-instance judgment and ordered that the children be returned to their family. It pointed out that Law no. 272/2004 sought to protect the best interests of the child and that the public authorities were required to help ensure that children developed and were raised within their families, and explained: “... although the provision of a certain level of material comfort is an essential element for minors’ development, [it is nevertheless the case that] an inadequate income does not in itself represent an insurmountable obstacle to the children’s return to their family, provided that the parents show a genuine interest in raising the children themselves...”. 69. The appeal court held that, given the improvement in the applicants’ living conditions through assistance from the public authorities, and the change in their conduct towards their children, it was in those children’s best interests to re-join their family. ...

4. The applicants are serving either life sentences or whole-life sentences in different prisons in Bulgaria. 5. The applicant is currently serving a whole-life imprisonment sentence in Belene Prison. The sentence was delivered by the Dobrich Regional Court in 2003. It was confirmed on appeal in February 2004 and, subsequently, by the Supreme Court of Cassation in a final judgment of 19 October 2004. 6. As it is apparent from documents in the file, the applicant had unsuccessfully sought presidential clemency several times since 2007. He was initially placed in the high-security wing of Varna Prison where he started serving his sentence; since 2004 he has been under the “special regime”. 7. He described, and the Government did not comment on, the conditions under which he had been detained there as follows. His cell measured 5.5 by 3 metres and had a small grilled window which did not let much light in during the day. The lighting at night was also insufficient. The cell was humid, badly heated during the winter and deprived of ventilation during the summer. Given that in the cell there was neither running water, nor toilet facilities, the applicant had had to use a bucket to relieve himself. He was allowed to leave his cell three times a day, during meal times, for about forty-five minutes each time, in order to slop out, eat, wash himself and re-fill his water bottle from the tap. The prison was infested with cockroaches and rats, and he was only allowed to shower once a fortnight. The food was insufficient in quantity and of poor quality. During visits, he was separated from his family and lawyers by a grill and the meetings always took place in the presence of prison staff. His correspondence was routinely read by prison staff as he was obliged to transmit his letters to the outside world in open envelopes. The envelopes carrying correspondence with his lawyer bore a stamp showing that they had been checked. 8. Both parties submitted that the applicant had been transferred to Belene Prison on 17 February 2009, where he continued to serve his sentence under the “special regime”. He was detained in the high-security wing of this prison, alone in a cell. 9. According to the Government, since the beginning of his time in that prison, the applicant had gone on several hunger strikes. According to documents in the file, at the beginning of his stay in Belene Prison he demonstrated suicidal intentions and was identified as aggressive and hostile, as well as prone to attempting to escape. On the basis of an order of the prison governor of 19 February 2009, he did not take part in collective activities with other inmates, even those in his own category. In addition, the Government submitted that owing to lack of physical space in the prison, it was impossible to organise collective sport activities, or gather inmates for the purposes of reading, listening to music, playing board games or using the computer. Also, they emphasised that the impossibility was underpinned by the personal characteristics of the inmates which made them incompatible with each other and were an impediment to the authorities’ organising joint activities for them. 10. The parties submitted that the applicant’s cell in Belene Prison was secured by a door and an external grill, both of which were locked. The light bulb remained on throughout the night, for security purposes, which the applicant claimed interfered with his sleep. His daily walks in the open air took place in a grilled space measuring, according to the applicant and not disputed by the Government, about 15 sq. m, where only persons serving life sentences were taken. According to the applicant, its floor was partially made of bare cement and there was no sports equipment there. According to the Government, there was a climbing wall, a bench and a fixed-height bar. Both parties submitted that each time the applicant left the high-security wing of the prison, he was handcuffed and the handcuffs were shackled to a belt. He claimed that his correspondence was routinely checked. According to the Government, prisoners’ correspondence was checked out of security considerations. However, the authorities only checked the contents of the envelopes which the applicant received and not the text of the letters in them. 11. In a final judgment of 15 May 2005 the Supreme Court of Cassation sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment. The documents in the case file indicate that he had been initially imprisoned in Lovech Prison and was transferred to Belene Prison on 6 October 2009 where he was placed in the high-security wing. 12. The Government submitted that he had been serving his sentence under the “special regime” since 5 May 2005. 13. The applicant submitted that he had been kept in isolation in Belene Prison under the “special regime” and that the living conditions in his prison cell were inadequate. In particular he claimed that he spent about twenty-three hours a day locked up in a very small, poorly lit cell with a non-secluded toilet close to his bed. 14. The Government did not dispute his claims. They specified that the size of his cell was 6 sq. m, that it was a “normal” as opposed to a “punishment” cell, that he had a bed, a drawer, a sink and a toilet in his cell, and that there was enough space for him to move about in it. 15. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment in a final judgment of 10 December 2001 of the Supreme Court of Cassation. 16. The applicant complained that, in accordance with the “special regime” under which he had been serving his sentence, he had been permanently locked up in a cell which he had only been allowed to leave for no more than one and a half hours a day. He also alleged very poor living conditions, the presence of rats, insufficient lighting, tainted water, limited space and time for outdoor activities, and consistent overuse of handcuffs. 17. The Government submitted that the applicant had been serving his sentence under the “special regime” in Bobov Dol Prison between 5 February 2002 and 19 April 2007 when his regime had been changed to “severe”. He had spent the following two years under the “severe regime” and on 1 June 2009 his regime had been changed to “strict”. During his stay in Bobol Dol Prison between 2002 and 2012 the applicant had been in the high-security wing, alone in a cell measuring just under 13 sq. m. The cell had contained a sink and a toilet separated from the rest of the space. Hygiene in the cell had been satisfactory; the bed sheets had been washed weekly and the prisoners had been provided with sanitary products once a month. The cells had been disinfected and treated against mice with the same frequency. 18. The Government submitted that the applicant had been kept in a permanently locked up cell in Bobov Dol Prison, in strict compliance with the relevant legal provisions and in particular section 71(2) of the Execution of Punishments and Pre-trial Detention Act. As of February 2016, they specified that the applicant had formally satisfied the conditions for being detained together with other prisoners but that the applicant had considered himself not ready for it. 19. On 24 July 2012 the applicant was transferred to Pazardzhik Prison upon his request and was placed in the high-security wing, in a cell measuring 7 sq. m. He expressed an interest in working but the authorities were not in a position to provide him with work. He had not committed disciplinary breaches to the time of application. As to the conditions of detention in Pazardzhik Prison, the Government submitted that he had not raised related grievances with the authorities. 20. The applicant was sentenced for a number of offences and was given a total sentence of whole-life imprisonment in 2000. He complained that his sentence had amounted, from the time of its imposition, to inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and that he did not have an effective remedy in this connection. 21. In a final judgment of 15 March 2010 the applicant was sentenced by an Austrian court to life imprisonment. He was transferred from Austria to Bulgaria on 15 July 2010 in order to serve his sentence. On 8 November 2010 the Vratsa Regional Court confirmed the sentence and accepted it for enforcement. This was upheld on appeal by the Sofia Appellate Court in a final decision of 9 February 2011. The applicant has been serving his sentence under the “special regime” since 18 February 2011. He is kept in a permanently locked cell in Vratsa Prison, in the high-security wing, in accordance with applicable rules for life prisoners under the Execution of Punishments and Pre-trial Detention Act. 22. The applicant was sentenced to whole-life imprisonment on 28 February 2011 in a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation. 23. The applicant complained that his sentence had amounted, from the time of its imposition, to inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and that he did not have an effective remedy in this connection. 24. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment in a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 13 November 2008. He has been serving his sentence under the “special regime” in Varna Prison. He alleged that he spent his time almost permanently locked up in isolation from the other inmates, while the Government claimed that he was in “almost permanent contact with other inmates” without submitting more details. The applicant submitted that he had had to relieve himself in a bucket in his cell where there had been no running water. The Government clarified that this changed in 2012 when a toilet had been built in his cell. The food, according to the applicant and disputed by the authorities, was insufficient and of poor quality. 25. The applicant was sentenced for different offences and given a total sentence of life imprisonment in a final judgment of 17 November 2011 by the Supreme Court of Cassation. The applicant has been serving his sentence in Stara Zagora Prison under the “special regime” in a permanently locked cell located in the high-security wing of the prison. The Government submitted that he was allowed to leave his cell twice a day for an hour at a time when he could see and communicate with other inmates detained in the same prison wing. He was also allowed to use sanitary facilities outside of his cell five times a day, and to shower twice a week. There was no toilet in the applicant’s cell and no ventilation system had been installed. 26. The applicant had been serving a sentence of whole-life imprisonment in Pleven Prison since 1999 under the “special regime”. In 2003 he was placed under the lighter “severe regime” and a year later under the even lighter “strict regime” when he was also placed in a cell together with other inmates. 27. He complained that his sentence had amounted, from the time of its imposition, to inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and that he did not have an effective remedy in this connection. 28. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment and has been serving his sentence under the “special regime” since 2009. Until 2009 he was detained in Varna Prison and since 18 February 2009 he has been detained in Plovdiv Prison. He complained in respect of his detention after February 2009, the conditions of his detention before 18 February 2009 having been examined by the Court in an earlier case with application no. 16391/05, which was decided in a judgment of 10 January 2012. 29. Both the applicant and the Government submitted that he was detained in a permanently locked cell and isolated from the other prisoners. The Government pointed out that the applicant left his cell for an hour in the morning and for an hour in the afternoon every day for exercise and to spend time in the open air. 30. The applicant also claimed that the material conditions in which he had been serving his sentence were inadequate and that he had been offered no collective activities or other forms of occupation. 31. The Government stated that he was enrolled in the following weekly activities: a catechism course lasting an hour-and-a-half per week; and a course in basic computer skills with hour-long sessions; he also had an additional hour in the open air, as well as half an hour to take a bath on Wednesday evenings. Furthermore, when various competitions had taken place in the prison, or there had been concerts or recitals, inmates serving life sentences had been offered a chance to attend them as spectators. The Government further clarified that the applicant’s regime had been changed to “strict” in 2015 but he had continued to be in the high-security wing; according to the Government, he had repeatedly stated that he had not wished to be placed together with other prisoners.

4. The applicants were born in 1997 and 1999 respectively and live in Bucharest. 5. On 20 July 2010 X, the applicants’ sister, nine-year-old at the time, was grievously injured in a car accident. She was immediately admitted to hospital where, after four days of intense suffering, she died. 6. A criminal investigation for involuntary manslaughter was initiated against the driver of the car. It was established that while driving at about ninety‑two kilometres per hour (when the speed limit was fifty kilometres per hour) she lost control of her car and mounted the pavement where the applicants’ sister was situated. 7. On 26 September 2010, during the pre-trial investigation stage, the applicants, their mother and their older brothers brought a claim for damages in the criminal proceedings. 8. On 24 October 2011 the Bucharest District Court severed the civil claims from the criminal proceedings. 9. On 6 December 2011 the Bucharest District court awarded each civil party (including the applicants) 100,000 euros (EUR) in compensation for non‑pecuniary damage. It ordered the driver’s insurance company to pay the damages. 10. The court held that between the civil parties and the nine‑year‑old girl there had been a strong emotional relationship and the girl’s violent death had caused intense pain to her family. The wording of the court judgment read as follows: “...the brothers of the deceased suffered non-pecuniary damage, consisting of the pain caused by the loss of their nine-year-old sister in violent circumstances and by their sister’s suffering in the hospital until her death; from the evidence adduced before the court (the statements of the civil parties were corroborated by the statements of three witnesses) it can be determined that between the civil parties and the nine-year-old girl there was a strong emotional relationship. Therefore, having regard to the negative consequences, the importance of the infringed moral values, the way in which they were perceived by the civil parties, and the impact of their loss on the stability of their family, the court will grant to each civil party the equivalent of 100,000 euros”. 11. All the parties appealed against the judgment. 12. No new pieces of evidence were adduced before the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 13. On 9 April 2012 the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on points of law lodged by the insurance company. It ordered the driver of the car to pay the damages, holding that the insurance company’s liability was only contractual and therefore subsidiary. The court further dismissed the applicants’ claim for non-pecuniary damages on the ground that at the time of their sister’s accident they had been younger than fourteen and had therefore been unaware of the negative consequences of her death. In relation to the claims lodged by their older siblings, the court decreased the awards to EUR 25,000 each. The wording of the court judgment read as follows: “The court will dismiss the civil claims lodged by Cosmin Mihai Deaconu and Alexandru Bogdan Deaconu on grounds other than those invoked by the insurance company. In the present case, the applicants’ situation should be assessed in a different way, having regard to the fact that at the time of their minor sister’s accident they were younger than fourteen and therefore they were not aware of the negative consequences of her death. This aspect was apparent to persons who had a close relationship with the deceased’s family; thus, witness N.G.G. contended in her statement before the court that the younger brothers were less aware than their older brothers, who suffered...” 14. The court also decreased the award for their mother in respect of non‑pecuniary damage to EUR 50,000.

6. The applicant, Mr Fabian Gjini, a Croatian citizen of Albanian origin, was born in 1972 and lives in Crikvenica, Croatia. 7. On 22 August 2008 the applicant was arrested by the Serbian police on suspicion of having attempted to pay a toll at Tovarnik border crossing (a border crossing between Serbia and Croatia) with a counterfeit ten‑euro (EUR) banknote. 8. Upon his arrest, the applicant was taken before an investigating judge. The applicant was unable to provide the EUR 6,000 security for his bail, and the investigating judge ordered his detention. 9. The applicant spent 31 days in custody in Sremska Mitrovica Prison and was released from detention on 22 September 2008. 10. On 30 September 2008 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were discontinued by the prosecuting authorities, because the expert tests performed on the allegedly counterfeit banknote showed that it was actually genuine. 11. The applicant alleges that in Sremska Mitrovica Prison he was placed in a four-bed cell which already housed four other inmates. Because of the lack of space, the applicant had no proper bed and had to sleep on the floor, on a sheet of foam material. 12. According to the applicant, the ill-treatment and humiliation started immediately. His cellmates forced him to mop the cell floor. While he was mopping, they did not allow him to raise his head, and would kick him sporadically. After he had mopped up, the cellmates would slap and kick the applicant for his “failure” to mop the floor properly. The applicant was compelled to clean the floor again and again. He could not remember how many times he had mopped the cell floor. He remembered, however, that his cellmates poured the water containing detergent over him to teach him how to get “things” clean. 13. According to the applicant, his cellmates thought that he was an informer. They did not believe that he had been put in their cell because of a counterfeit note. Rather, they thought that he had been placed there to spy on them and find out about their crimes. 14. The cellmates threatened the applicant by saying that they would stage his suicide if he told anyone what was happening in the cell. At night, the applicant was put in the toilet. There, the cellmates forced him to keep his feet in cold water for the whole night. He was not allowed to move. The morning after, the skin on his feet tore off and open wounds appeared. 15. The situation worsened after the applicant’s cellmates found out about his origin. Upon learning that he lived on the Croatian coast, they said that they wanted to test him to see how well a person from the coast could “dive”. They filled a bucket with water and put the applicant’s head in it. Afterwards, they would shower the applicant with cold water. This test was performed over and over again. 16. On one occasion, the applicant’s cellmates gave him a wet towel and forced him to fight with another prisoner. After the applicant had managed to hit his opponent, his four cellmates jumped on him, punched and kicked him, and abused him for daring to hit a Serb. 17. They made him sing Serb nationalist songs (četničke pesme). After he said that he did not know any, they taught him some and forced him to sing them for several nights. The applicant could not remember whether he had also been forced to sing Croat nationalist songs (ustaške pesme). 18. According to the applicant, his cellmates raped him. Although he could not remember the rape itself, he assumed that it happened as follows. One day the cellmates gave him a glass of water. The water caused him to feel dizzy, and he felt unable to walk and quickly lost consciousness. The next morning, he had pain in his anus and saw blood in his faeces. On that day his cellmates shaved him and shaved his eyebrows. Later, he discovered that shaved eyebrows were a sign that he had become someone’s “girl” (curica). Being a “girl” meant that he had been sodomised. 19. According to the applicant, the prison guards were perfectly aware of what was happening to him. In particular, all the events happened while one guard – who appeared to be a school friend of one of the applicant’s cellmates – was on duty. The applicant remembered that the prison guards laughed at him openly during his walks in the prison yard. He also had impression that everything that happened to him was because of his origin and nationality. 20. Several days after the start of his detention, the applicant’s lawyer noticed changes in the applicant’s behaviour and sensed that something was wrong. The applicant was afraid to say anything to his lawyer. Nevertheless, the lawyer urged the prison authorities to move the applicant to another cell. 21. After his relocation, the applicant was no longer ill-treated. 22. The Government contended that the applicant’s version of the events was not supported by evidence. They did not provide a separate description of the events from 22 August 2008 until 22 September 2008 when the applicant was detained in Sremska Mitrovica Prison. 23. On 29 October 2008 the applicant invited the Ministry of Justice to make a payment in respect of his allegedly unlawful detention. He received no reply. 24. On 1 September 2009, the applicant amended his proposal, adding a request for compensation for the ill-treatment he had suffered during the period of detention. Again, he received no reply. 25. On 25 December 2009 the applicant lodged a civil complaint against the Republic of Serbia with the Second Municipal Court (subsequently renamed the Court of First Instance) in Belgrade. He requested compensation for his detention, and in respect of the non-pecuniary damage he had sustained in terms of fear, physical pain and mental anxiety owing to the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected during his time in detention. 26. On 12 March 2010 the Republic Attorney General’s Office (Republičko javno pravobranilaštvo) contested the applicant’s claims. The office underlined that the applicant had failed to submit any medical evidence in support of his claims concerning the alleged ill-treatment. 27. On 15 June 2010 a hearing was held before the Court of First Instance. The Republic Attorney General’s Office was not present. The applicant was represented by his lawyer. However, owing to the nature of the applicant’s complaints, the domestic court decided that the applicant had to be present at hearings. The applicant was summoned to attend the next hearing, scheduled for 21 October 2010, subsequently rescheduled for 2 February 2011. 28. At the hearing of 2 February 2011, and the further hearing on 20 May 2011, the judge interviewed several witnesses: (i) P.S., who had been serving a sentence in Sremska Mitrovica Prison at the same time when the applicant had been there; (ii) D.Ž., who had represented the applicant in the criminal proceedings and was familiar with the events in prison; and (iii) M.Č., the applicant’s uncle. 29. P.S. stated that he had met the applicant in Sremska Mitrovica Prison. The applicant was placed in a cell in the part of the prison where he was imprisoned. P.S. remembered hearing someone singing Serb and Croat nationalist songs at night. That was before the applicant was transferred to another part of the prison. P.S. and the applicant used to talk during the morning walks in the prison. One morning P.S. observed that the applicant’s eyebrows had been shaved. On that occasion, he also noticed haematomas behind the applicant’s ears and on the upper part of his arm. He could see the injuries because it was summer and they were all in T-shirts. The applicant had a strange look in his eyes and seemed very scared. The applicant avoided the company of other prisoners and complained to P.S. regarding the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected by his cellmates. The applicant also complained that his anus was bleeding and that he had been given some medicine which had made him lose consciousness. P.S. could not remember whether someone had screamed at night. Their cells were 10-15 metres apart. P.S. confirmed that shaved eyebrows in prison meant that the person had been raped. He also saw the damaged skin on the applicant’s feet. The guards in prison must have heard that somebody was singing songs, and they must also have noticed other signs of maltreatment. The guards knew what shaved eyebrows meant. Prison guards patrolled the prison corridors day and night. Through peepholes, they controlled what prisoners did in their cells. There were cameras placed in the corridors, but there were no cameras in the cells. The applicant was moved to another cell after his lawyer urged the prison authorities to relocate him. P.S. left Sremska Mitrovica Prison seven to eight days before the applicant. 30. D.Ž. met the applicant in 2008 when he represented him in the criminal proceedings concerning the use of an allegedly forged banknote. He visited the applicant in prison. On that occasion, D.Ž. noticed that the applicant had been shaved and his eyebrows had also been shaved. The applicant looked disorientated and scared. D.Ž. asked the applicant whether there was any problem, but the applicant could not give him a clear answer. The applicant seemed frightened and confused. D.Ž. urged the prison authorities to transfer the applicant to another cell. Specifically, D.Ž. called the prison authorities, expressed his concern about the applicant’s treatment, and underlined that the authorities should respect the laws and regulations concerning the placement and status of detainees. D.Ž. also talked to another client, V.D., who informed him what had happened to the applicant. 31. M.Č. had known the applicant since birth. He was the applicant’s uncle. He visited the applicant once during his time in prison. On that occasion, he could not recognise the applicant. The applicant was bald, with shaved eyebrows. M.Č. also noticed bruises on the applicant’s right arm, as well as bruises on his head. M.Č. stated that he wanted to know what had happened to the applicant, yet the applicant was evasive and avoided eye contact. M.Č. had previously known the applicant to be a happy and cheerful person, but said that the applicant had never fully recovered from what had happened to him in prison. 32. Between the two hearings, a statement was taken from another witness, V.D., who was still serving his sentence in Sremska Mitrovica Prison. This witness remembered the applicant, but was not exactly sure what had happened to him during his time in the prison. V.D. recalled seeing him with shaved eyebrows and a strange haircut. He also recalled hearing the applicant singing or screaming at nights, but he could not remember what he had actually been singing. 33. At the hearing of 9 November 2011 two expert witnesses – an expert on traumatology and a neuropsychiatrist – submitted their reports. They found that, due to his suffering in prison, the applicant had suffered certain physical pain and had sustained an overall loss of 10% in his “vital activity” (umanjenje opšte životne aktivnosti). 34. The Republic Attorney General’s Office denied the events in Sremska Mitrovica Prison as alleged by the applicant. It, in particular, referred to the absence of medical evidence. 35. On 9 November 2011 the Court of First Instance in Belgrade accepted the applicant’s complaint concerning the request for compensation for his detention, but rejected his request in respect of compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by ill-treatment in a State-owned institution. The court found: “[The applicant has] no medical certificate proving the injuries. Medical expert witnesses testified on the basis of the claimant’s statement. The testimonies of other witnesses are based on what the claimant told them. The claimant, if injured at all, should have gone to see the doctor in the detention unit; he ought to have visited the doctor, who would have confirmed the injuries, or he should have said something in order to be transferred to another cell and protected. The claimant has no medical certificate concerning any injuries.” 36. On 17 October 2012 the Court of Appeal in Belgrade upheld the Court of First Instance’s decision as regards the compensation for detention, but quashed the rejection of the claim for compensation in respect of the ill‑treatment. The case was remitted to the Court of First Instance for reconsideration. As regards the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal stated the following: “[It] failed to properly evaluate the evidence in accordance with Article 8 of the Law on Civil Procedure, in accordance with which a court must decide on the facts established as proven, but on the basis of a conscientious and meticulous assessment of each particular piece [of evidence] and of all the evidence together, as well as in relation to the outcome of the whole proceedings. Given that such an evaluation was not carried out in this particular case, the findings of the first-instance court that it had not been proved that the claimant had been ill-treated and molested by other cellmates during his time in detention – causing him to sustain different types of non-pecuniary loss for which the [State] could be held responsible as defined in Article 172 of the Obligations Act (Zakon o obligacionim odnosima) – cannot be accepted with any certainty.” 37. In the reopened proceedings, the Court of First Instance re-examined the applicant’s first lawyer, D.Ž., as well as the two expert witnesses. The court also considered reports produced by a psychologist and a psychiatrist from Rijeka, Croatia concerning the applicant’s current mental health and emotional distress. Those reports confirmed that, because of the ill-treatment he had sustained in Sremska Mitrovica Prison, the applicant was still in a state of mental anxiety. 38. On 10 May 2013 the Court of First Instance awarded the applicant 200,000 Serbian dinars (RSD – approximately EUR 1,900) in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the 10% loss in his general vital activity associated with the events in detention. However, the claim for the applicant’s physical suffering was rejected because, in the court’s view, his suffering had not constituted grievous but rather slight bodily harm, for which no compensation could be awarded, according to the law. Also, the court refused to award the applicant compensation for non-pecuniary damage for his fear. 39. On 10 December 2013 the Court of Appeal in Belgrade upheld the decision of the Court of First Instance in part and reaffirmed the findings of that court that the applicant had suffered from an acute stress disorder as a result of being detained and harassed by other inmates, which, in general, had led to his experiencing post-traumatic stress and a loss in his general vital activity. However, the Court of Appeal awarded the applicant an additional RSD 50,000 (approximately EUR 450) for the fear arising from the events during his detention, and explained its reasoning in the following manner: “Taking into account the established factual situation and all the circumstances of the present case, as well as the findings of the neuropsychiatrists, according to which the claimant suffered post-traumatic stress during and after his detention, this being, in itself, a complex reaction when a person’s physical and personal integrity is threatened, which [in this case] lasted for days and involved fear, emotional distress, a feeling of sadness, distraction and despair, and being a reaction which, by its nature, is more complex than a fear of strong intensity, the Court of Appeal finds that, in accordance with Article 200 of the Obligations Act, the claimant is entitled to a just award for non-pecuniary damage for the fear he experienced.” 40. On 18 January 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He complained under Articles 21, 23, 25, 28, 29, 32, 35 and 36 of the Constitution (articles corresponding to Articles 3, 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention). In particular, his complaint was as follows: “The domestic courts have unlawfully and unconstitutionally rejected the claimant’s clearly justified claim for compensation in respect of the non-pecuniary damage he suffered on account of the violation of his human dignity after being placed in illegal detention, where he was molested for days by a group of prisoners as a person of Croatian and Albanian origin, being beaten and kicked all over his body, drenched with water, beaten with wet towels, tortured, battered, raped and thereafter shaved all over his body, which was the symbol of a raped person, and being subjected to real and serious threats that he would ‘commit suicide by hanging [himself] over the door handleʼ, or be cut with a razor blade and similar items. And all this was done with the silent approval of prison officers who knew which cell they had put the claimant in, and who knew or ought to have known about everything that happened to him.” 41. On 9 June 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal. It only considered his complaint under Article 6 of the Convention, and found it to be manifestly ill-founded. The Constitutional Court did not address any other complaint raised by the applicant. 42. About the ill-treatment he had suffered during the period of detention, the applicant also complained to the President of the Republic and to the Minister of Justice herself. No one ever replied to those complaints. 43. On 24 February 2010 the applicant’s representative complained to the Provincial Ombudsperson (Pokrajinski ombudsman) regarding the applicant’s ill-treatment in prison. On 16 March 2010 the Provincial Ombudsperson replied that he had no jurisdiction over the case, as the applicant was no longer in detention. 44. On 1 March 2010 the applicant’s representative also informed the State Ombudsperson (Zaštitnik građana Republike Srbije) about the detention and ill-treatment of the applicant. He particularly highlighted the fact that even if State authorities knew or ought to know about the applicant’s ill-treatment in detention, none had ever launched an investigation into the case. The State Ombudsperson replied on 26 April 2010 that he had no jurisdiction over the work of the public prosecutor’s office or the courts, and accordingly had no jurisdiction over the case.

5. The applicants were born in 1979 and 1987 respectively. 6. On 5 April 2009 general elections took place in Moldova. On 6 and 7 April 2009 a large crowd protested in the streets against alleged electoral fraud. Hundreds of young persons were arrested on 7 April 2009 and later dates; many of them were ill-treated during arrest (for more details, see Taraburca v. Moldova, no. 18919/10, §§ 7-10 and 33-37, 6 December 2011, Buhaniuc v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 56074/10, § 7, 28 January 2014 and Iurcu v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 33759/10, §§ 7-9, 9 April 2013). 7. On 7 April 2009 the applicants were returning from Chişinău to their home village when the minibus in which they were travelling was stopped by masked armed men at 11.10 p.m. The men ordered the bus driver to drive to the police headquarters in Chişinău (“the police headquarters”), where the applicants, together with other passengers, were ordered to stand with their hands behind their heads. 8. Upon entering the detention centre in the police headquarters, the applicants were taken to a room where five police officers registered their arrest. The applicants and other female detainees were ordered to stand with their faces to the wall and not to look to the sides. When one of them (N.) looked to the side, Officer A.C. hit her head against the wall. 9. The first applicant was asked to identify her bag. According to her, A.C. threatened to throw away the bag instead of registering all of the items inside. She then proposed to register only the documents, the mobile phone and the contents of her wallet. The first applicant noticed that her arrest had been wrongly mentioned as having taken place at 2.20 p.m. and told that to the officer. A.C. allegedly threatened her with death if she did not sign, after which she signed the arrest record. In the meantime, several young men were lined up against the wall and were periodically hit if they tried to look around. The applicants heard sounds of people being beaten from the adjacent room, following which A.C. escorted one young man out of there. 10. After signing the arrest record, A.C. took the applicants one by one to another adjacent room. Two officers were there (V.D., a male officer, and M.T., a female officer). V.D. ordered each of the applicants to undress. After they initially removed only a part of their clothes, V.D. shouted at them to fully undress. Each of the applicants was also ordered to do sit-ups while naked, while both officers smiled. The door remained partly open throughout the procedure. M.T. allegedly called the first applicant a prostitute. 11. The applicants were placed, together with five other female detainees, in a cell, where they were held until 9 April 2009. No food was provided for them and they were not allowed to contact anyone outside the detention centre. During 7 and 8 April 2009 the officers would come every three hours to the cell where the applicants were being detained, officially in order to verify their presence. All those inside had to stand up, their hands behind the back. During one of such visits on 8 April 2009, A.C. told everyone in the applicants’ cell to be thankful to President Voronin, who had not ordered shots to be fired into the crowd during the unrest of 7 April 2009. 12. On the morning of 9 April 2009 a prosecutor visited their cell and asked whether anyone had been ill-treated or had any other complaints. Several police officers from the police headquarters were standing just behind the prosecutor, which, according to the applicants, prevented them from complaining. The first applicant asked for permission to call home to see how her child was doing, but the prosecutor replied that he could not help and that she needed to negotiate that with the head of the detention facility. 13. On the same day at 3.30 p.m. the applicants were taken, one by one, to a room in the police headquarters where a judge asked each of them their names. After finding their files and reading them for several seconds, the judge declared that five days of detention for each of the applicants would suffice. The entire “trial” took not more than five minutes. 14. On the same day at around 11 p.m. the applicants and five other female detainees were ordered to enter the back section of a police minivan measuring 2.5 square metres and were taken to an unknown destination, without any explanation of the reasons for the move. Four hours later they arrived at Drochia police station. They spent the remainder of their detention at that police station and were released on 13 April 2009. After their release the applicants were so afraid that they did not leave their houses for a week. 15. On 16 April 2009 a Moldovan news agency reported the allegation that three young women had been ordered to fully undress in front of male police officers. Following that the Internal Security Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs conducted, in April-May 2009, an internal investigation into the matter in order to verify the allegations. The applicants and N., another person detained together with the applicants, made statements to the investigator on 23 and 22 April 2009 respectively and recounted the facts as summarised in the preceding paragraphs. N. noted that she had been taken by Officer A.C. to the room in which she had been verbally abused and forced to fully undress by V.D., in the presence of a uniformed woman. 16. On 18 May 2009 a prosecutor interviewed the applicants, who repeated their statements made to the police. These statements were then forwarded to the Prosecutor General’s Office. On 20 May 2009 the results of the internal investigation (see paragraph 15 above) were also submitted to the Prosecutor General’s Office. It would appear that the latter did not take any decision in respect of the material submitted to it. 17. On 23 July 2009 the applicants made a complaint to the Prosecutor General’s Office, referring to the verbal abuse to which they had been subjected, as well as to the order to undress in front of male officers. 18. On 18 and 20 August 2009 a prosecutor interviewed A.C. and V.D., who declared that they had not been at work on the relevant night. 19. On 10 September 2009 the military prosecutor’s office, which had been tasked with examining all complaints of ill-treatment during the events of April 2009, decided not to launch a criminal investigation in response to the applicants’ complaint of 23 July 2009 to the Prosecutor General’s Office, in the absence of any evidence that an offence had been committed. He noted that M.T. had declared that she alone had conducted body searches of the applicants and that A.C. and V.D. had not been at work that day. The applicants found out about that decision on 14 October 2009. On 15 October 2009 their lawyer challenged the decision, noting that the investigation had not been prompt or thorough; that they had not undergone any expert psychological examination to verify whether it could be concluded that they had suffered psychological trauma; that the decision had been based solely on the declaration by the officers involved that they had not been at work on the relevant day, without verifying whether they had been urgently called in to work to deal with the emergency situation on 7 April 2009; and that no criminal investigation had been launched by that date. This complaint was rejected by a more senior prosecutor on 9 November 2009. 20. On 16 November 2009 the applicants’ lawyer received a letter from the prosecution informing her of the decision of 9 November 2009. On 20 November 2009 the applicants challenged the decisions of 10 September and 9 November 2009 before the Rîşcani District Court. On 19 January 2010 the court allowed their application and annulled both those decisions. The court found that the investigation had been superficial and listed a series of actions which had not been carried out, such as interviewing the arresting officers and those responsible for escorting them and registering their arrest; verifying the reasons for their transfer to Drochia police section, the person who had ordered the transfer and the reason why the prosecutor had not established a breach of applicable legislation as a result of that transfer; determining the reason for the prosecutor’s failure to examine the applicants’ complaint within the statutory seventy-two hours. (b) Criminal proceedings against the police officers 21. On 2 February 2010 the Chişinău prosecutor’s office launched a criminal investigation on suspicion that Officers A.C., V.D. and M.T. had ill-treated the applicants by means of psychological intimidation and forcing them to undress in front of persons of the opposite sex. (i) Proceedings against Officers V.D. and M.T. 22. On 15 March 2010 the prosecution charged V.D. and M.T. with ill-treating the applicants. 23. On 23 April 2010 the case against V.D. and M.T. was submitted to the Centru District Court for trial. 24. The Centru District Court scheduled hearings in the case approximately once a month. From the beginning of the trial, that court had held four hearings and postponed five others for various reasons such as the absence of the prosecutor, of one of the applicants or of their lawyers, as well as annual leave taken by the prosecutor and the judge. 25. On 15 July 2011 the Centru District Court of Chișinău found the two police officers guilty of ill-treating the applicants. It sentenced V.D. to six years’ imprisonment and M.T. to five years’ imprisonment, conditionally suspending the execution of both sentences for a probation period of five years. The officers were also prohibited from holding positions in the police for five years. Although the operative part of the judgment was read out on 15 July 2011, the applicants were sent the fully reasoned decision by post on 7 December 2011. 26. On 3 May 2012 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld that judgment, reducing V.D.’s imprisonment term to five years and maintaining all the other sanctions. The court found that the law did not allow suspension of a sentence for which the punishment exceeded five years’ imprisonment and that the lower court had made an error. It corrected the error by reducing V.D.’s sentence to five years’ imprisonment. 27. On 23 October 2012 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the judgment of 3 May 2012 and ordered a rehearing by the Chișinău Court of Appeal. 28. On 13 March 2013 the Chișinău Court of Appeal adopted a judgment, convicting V.D. and M.T. and sentencing both to five years’ imprisonment, conditionally suspending the execution of both sentences for a probation period of five years. The officers were also prohibited from holding positions in the police for five years and were sentenced to 240 hours’ community service. In reply to the applicants’ arguments in respect of the leniency of the lower court’s judgment and about impunity, with reference to the Court’s judgments in Valeriu and Nicolae Roşca v. Moldova (no. 41704/02, 20 October 2009) and Pădureţ v. Moldova (no. 33134/03, 5 January 2010), the court found that those cases were not applicable to the present case since in both of them serious physical ill-treatment had been caused, while the applicants in the present case had only been psychologically ill-treated. Moreover, one witness who had been subjected to the same treatment as the applicants during the relevant events had refused to completely undress and had not been ill-treated as a result. The court also noted that the accused had committed the offence “owing to the situation obtaining on 7-8 April 2009 in Chișinău, [when] peaceful protests [had] escaped the control of law-enforcement authorities ... result[ing] in mass disorder, with the destruction of sites of national importance”. 29. In their appeal the applicants argued, inter alia, that suspending the sentence imposed on V.D. and M.T. was unlawful since it was contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, which was effectively part of domestic law. They relied on the judgments in Roşca and Pădureţ (cited above) and referred to Gäfgen v. Germany ([GC] no. 22978/05, ECHR 2010) as evidence that even threats of torture were sufficient to constitute ill-treatment. They added that following the Moldovan judgments mentioned above the Criminal Code had been amended so as to exclude the possibility of suspending the serving of sentences imposed for torture. Sentencing the officers to the minimum allowed by law, with the effect of shielding them from serving any prison time and in view of their persistent denial of having committed the crime, had not ensured the required preventive effect. 30. On 13 September 2013 the Supreme Court of Justice found “no grounds for doubting the [victims’] statements”. However, it upheld the judgment adopted since the applicants had not indicated any specific errors in the application of the law by the lower court, which had taken a lawful and reasoned decision and had properly individualised the sentences in view of the nature and seriousness of the offence. 31. During the criminal investigation and the trial V.D. and M.T. were not suspended from their duties. (ii) Proceedings against Officer A.C. 32. On 16 April 2010 the criminal investigation that had started on 2 February 2010 against the three police officers (see paragraph 21 above) was discontinued in respect of A.C. The prosecutor summarised the applicants’ statements and referred to the results of the identity parades during which each of the applicants had identified A.C. as the person who had taken them to the room in which they had been ordered to undress and do sit-ups. The first applicant stated that A.C. had ordered everyone to face the wall and not to look back. When one young woman (N.) had looked away, he had hit the back of her head, as a result of which her forehead had struck the wall. The first applicant added that when another officer had been describing the personal items in her purse, A.C. had threatened to throw it away. Subsequently she had been ordered to sign a document. When she had pointed out that the time of arrest had been noted incorrectly, A.C. had told her “I’ll give you one [that is to say ‘hit you’] so that you’ll join your grandmother in the grave”. The second applicant had given a similar description, noting that when she had entered the detention facility she had seen many persons against the wall, many of whom had been beaten by the police, while not offering any resistance. The prosecutor found that A.C. had clearly exceeded his powers as a police officer, but that the applicants had not sustained such serious damage as to qualify as torture. Accordingly, his actions were qualified as excess of powers under the Contravention Code (Codul contravenţional). Since the three-month prescription period for this administrative offence had already expired, the case against A.C. could not be pursued. He continued to work as a police officer throughout the proceedings. 33. On 22 April 2010 the applicants’ application to have the decision of 16 April 2016 annulled was rejected by the prosecutor who had adopted it. On 4 June 2010 the lawyer asked a more senior prosecutor to annul the decisions taken on 16 and 22 April 2010. She argued, inter alia, that A.C. should not have been relieved of criminal responsibility since he had acted at least as an accomplice of V.D. and M.T., in respect of whom the prosecution had continued to press criminal charges. In particular, A.C. had been fully aware of V.D.’s presence in the room to which he had escorted the applicants and three other female detainees and had known that they would be subjected to a strip search. Moreover, he had acted brutally towards the applicants, humiliating them and hitting one of the female detainees (N.) and other persons in their presence. This treatment had had a considerable effect on the applicants, taking into consideration their gender and age (the second applicant was 21 at the relevant time) and the dominant position held by the police officer. Moreover, having witnessed A.C.’s openly hitting N. in front of the applicants had caused them to fear being subjected to similar treatment. In addition, the applicants’ will to resist police intimidation had been completely broken since the reason for their detention had not been explained to them, nor had they been informed of the rights which they had had, in the absence of a guarantee of being able to defend those rights. They had thus been forced to sign documents which had subsequently led to their detention. It had been also unclear why the prosecutor had not charged A.C. with the criminal offence of excess of powers (Article 328 of the Criminal Code, see paragraph 37 below), but had preferred to examine the case under the Contravention Code, with the effect of letting A.C. go unpunished. 34. On 10 June 2010 her lawyer was informed that her complaint had been rejected and that the decision could be appealed against to the investigating judge. 35. On 26 July 2010 the applicants challenged in court the decisions of 16 and 22 April 2010, as well as that of 10 June 2010. The lawyer formulated essentially the same arguments which she had made in her complaint to the prosecutor (see paragraph 33 above). 36. On 15 October 2010 the investigating judge of the Rîşcani District Court rejected the applicants’ complaint as unfounded. The court found that under Article 287 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a criminal investigation lawfully discontinued by a prosecutor could be reopened only if new circumstances had been discovered or where the decision had been affected by a fundamental defect in the proceedings. Since the prosecution had decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings against A.C. and in the absence of any new circumstances warranting the reopening of the investigation, it was contrary to Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the court to order the reopening of the criminal proceedings against him. The judge also found that the prosecutor had fully and objectively examined the case, taking into account all the evidence available. That decision was final.

4. The applicants were born in 1958, 1977, 1956, 1981 and 1979, respectively (see appendix). 5. On 2 March 2010 the first applicant was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment by a panel of the Fourth Section of the Audiencia Nacional for encouragement of terrorism (enaltecimiento del terrorismo). He was also acquitted of the charges of unlawful assembly and association (reunión ilícita y asociación ilítica). 6. The first applicant brought a cassation appeal before the Supreme Court, challenging, inter alia, the impartiality of the President of the Fourth Section of the Audiencia Nacional and judge rapporteur of that judgment (hereinafter “the presiding judge”), as she had displayed hostility towards him during those criminal proceedings. 7. In particular, the first applicant argued that during the oral hearing, and once the applicant had finished his statement, the presiding judge had asked him whether he condemned ETA’s (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, the former armed Basque nationalist and separatist organisation) violence. The first applicant had refused to give an answer. The presiding judge had then replied that she “already knew that he was not going to give an answer to that question”. 8. On 2 February 2011 the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the first applicant, finding that the presiding judge’s declarations during the trial had cast doubts on the absence of prejudice or bias. The Supreme Court stressed the following: “The significance of the Judge’s action...cannot be reduced to an isolated assessment of the question raised by her, yet it must be put in direct connection with the comment that she made after the appellant refused to give an answer, as well as the nature of the charges, their legal characterization and the moment the question and the answer take place... The question put by the presiding judge and, very particularly, her reaction to the appellant’s refusal to give an answer, can be interpreted, from an objective perspective, as an expression of a previously formed opinion...about the significance assigned to the words spoken by the appellant...The appellant had objectives reasons to think that the judge was precipitately voicing out a value judgment on the criminal nature of [his statements]” 9. The Supreme Court, assessing the proceedings as a whole, found that there were “objective reasons” to consider that the presiding judge (and judge rapporteur of the case) was expressing a prejudice against the first applicant about the significance that should be given to the phrases and words expressed by him, which had also led to a preconceived idea as to his guilt. This had taken place before the oral phase had terminated, i.e, before the presiding judge (as well as the whole panel) had had an opportunity to assess all the pieces of evidence brought before her and prior to the applicant’s right to have a last word. Thus, the applicant’s doubts as to the impartiality of this judge were “objectively justified”. Consequently, the Supreme Court declared that the judgment was void and ordered a re-trial by a new panel formed by three other judges different from the ones that were part of the composition of that panel. 10. As a result, a new and different composition of the Fourth Section of the Audiencia Nacional tried the applicant on the charge of encouragement of terrorism. On 22 July 2011 the Audiencia Nacional acquitted the applicant. 11. In 2009, criminal proceedings were brought against all the applicants before the Audiencia Nacional, on the grounds that a political party that the applicants intended to create was in fact under the control of the terrorist organisation ETA. The applicants were accused of being members of this terrorist organisation. The facts have been referred to as the “Bateragune Case”. These proceedings were allocated to the Fourth Section of the Audiencia Nacional, whose composition consisted of the same judges that had taken part in the first set of criminal proceedings followed against the first applicant, which ended with the judgment of 2 March 2010, finally declared void by the Supreme Court on 2 February 2011. This time the presiding judge was not the judge rapporteur. 12. The first applicant initiated proceedings to challenge the whole panel, arguing that the Section’s composition did not offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in respect of its impartiality, for the presiding judge had already showed signs of partiality and bias in previous criminal proceedings against him. According to the first applicant, the bias previously shown by the presiding judge created an objective situation which contaminated the impartiality of the judges. This also created a subjective situation of mistrust on the Section’s composition. 13. On 26 April 2011 a special chamber of the Audiencia Nacional (a chamber that, according to Article 69 of the Judicature Act is ex professo formed to deal with challenge proceedings) ruled against the first applicant. According to the Audiencia Nacional, these new proceedings had a different object, i.e. his belonging to a terrorist organisation and the existence of strong and permanent links with ETA, which had nothing to do with his previous charge of encouragement of terrorism. Neither the question previously put by the presiding judge (see paragraph 7 above) nor her subsequent reaction showed any sign of prejudice against the first applicant. 14. On 16 September 2011 the Audiencia Nacional delivered its judgment and sentenced the first and third applicants to ten years’ imprisonment for being a member and leader of a terrorist organisation. The second, fourth and fifth applicants were sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment for belonging to a terrorist organisation. All applicants were further disqualified from taking part in elections for the same length of time as their respective prison sentences. 15. All the applicants brought a cassation appeal before the Supreme Court. The first and fifth applicants contested in particular the impartiality of the panel of the Fourth Section of the Audiencia Nacional reiterating the same arguments that were brought during the challenging proceedings before the Audiencia Nacional. 16. On 7 May 2012 the Supreme Court, in a 3 to 2 decision, partially upheld the applicants’ appeals and reduced their sentence to six years and six months’ imprisonment in respect of the first and third applicants and six years in respect of the second, fourth and fifth applicants. The disqualification from taking part in elections was confirmed. However, the Supreme Court rejected the applicants’ arguments concerning the alleged violation of the their right to an impartial tribunal by declaring that the bias displayed by the presiding judge against one of the applicants during previous and different proceedings did not reach the necessary threshold to believe that the judges (and, specifically, the presiding judge) had become again biased or prejudiced, not only against the first applicant but against all of them. According to the Supreme Court, there was no evidence apart from what happened in previous proceedings that supported the alleged partiality of the judges. The Supreme Court stressed the following: “To presume that every judge that has been declared biased in previous proceedings must be forcefully contaminated in any other further proceedings...implies to issue a universal judgment on bias that lacks a minimum objectives proofs ad causam...The question of subjective partiality or impartiality and even in many cases of objective impartiality is a very delicate one since it directly affect the composition of the Tribunals subject to the rule of law. Consequently, the appearances can only be relevant if they have a connection with the legal causes to challenge a judge as established by the lawmaker...in the sense that it is not possible to established different causes according to an analogic criterion or treating the appearance as an autonomous cause with its own procedural life...Therefore, the complaint must be rejected” 17. Two of the Supreme Court’s judges issued two separate dissenting opinions. According to the first dissenting opinion (which was endorsed, in substance, by the second dissenting judge), the applicants’ right to an impartial tribunal had indeed been violated, because the preconceived idea showed by the presiding judge in previous criminal proceedings against the first applicant also affected her judgment during subsequent proceedings. This lack of impartiality also had affected the other two judges of the panel. Consequently, a new trial before a different panel of judges should have been ordered. According to the second dissenting opinion, however, there was not enough evidence to support the applicants’ conviction. Consequently, the fact that the Fourth Section of the Audiencia Nacional lacked impartiality, although true, was irrelevant, for the applicants should have been acquitted by the Supreme Court. 18. On 21 June 2012 the third applicant lodged a separate amparo appeal against the judgments of 16 September 2011 and of 7 May 2012, arguing, inter alia, that there was not sufficient evidence to substantiate the applicant’s conviction. On 27 June 2012 the first, second, fourth and fifth applicants lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court against these judgments, arguing, inter alia, that the panel composition of the Fourth Section of the Audiencia Nacional fell short of the requirements of an impartial tribunal. 19. On 22 July 2014 the Constitutional Court, in a 7 to 5 decision, ruled against the first, second, fourth and fifth applicants. The majority of the Constitutional Court found that the doubts as to the presiding judge’s impartiality were neither subjectively nor objectively justified. The Constitutional Court observed that the doubts on the presiding judge were in connection with previous proceedings dealing with a different subject, i.e. the determination on whether the first applicant had committed the crime of encouragement of terrorism, which differed from the charges they were all accused of in the framework of the second set of criminal proceedings. The two proceedings did not present enough similarities as to cast doubts on the judges’ impartiality. 20. The five dissenting judges were of the opinion that the applicants’ right to an impartial tribunal had been violated. In particular, they considered that the presiding judge’s conduct in previous proceedings was a clear sign of a preconceived idea regarding the first applicant’s guilt, which made her impartiality during the proceedings against all applicants questionable. 21. On 22 September 2014 the Constitutional Court ruled against the third applicant in a 4 to 2 decision.

5. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Podgorica. 6. On 29 or 30 January 2013 the applicant telephoned the police and reported X for threatening him. 7. On 1 February 2013 X entered a coffee-bar owned by the applicant and asked him to come outside. Once outside, X started punching the applicant. Some passers-by separated X from the applicant, after which X left the scene saying “I will bring a knife and a hammer to kill you”. Shortly afterwards, X returned to the bar with a kitchen hammer and started hitting the applicant on his head and all over his body, saying “I will kill you”. One of the waiters and some of the customers separated X from the applicant and took the applicant for emergency treatment. The doctor in charge of the emergency ward noted that the applicant had suffered a head injury measuring 4 cm by 1 cm inflicted by a hammer. 8. The same day the applicant lodged a criminal complaint in written form against X, after which X was arrested. On 6 February 2013 X was charged with violent behaviour. In the processing of the indictment it transpired that there was another indictment pending against X, issued on 30 October 2012, in which he had been charged with stabbing V.J. and inflicting light bodily injuries on him. The proceedings on those two indictments were joined into a single set of proceedings. 9. On 30 May 2013 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica found X guilty of inflicting light bodily injuries on V.J. on 9 October 2012, and of violent behaviour against the applicant on 1 February 2013. The court ordered the mandatory psychiatric treatment of X in a hospital (mjera bezbjednosti obavezno psihijatrijsko liječenje i čuvanje u zdravstvenoj ustanovi), and the confiscation of two knives and a kitchen hammer. 10. During the proceedings it transpired that X had been a long-term psychiatric patient, suffering from schizophrenia, and that he had been treated several times in a special psychiatric hospital. It also transpired that on several occasions he had attacked some of his neighbours, had set his flat on fire, and had caused a flood in the next-door flat. In the course of the proceedings X’s aunt submitted that about three months before attacking the applicant, X had become more aggressive and that she had reduced contact with him to a minimum. The court also established that X had stabbed V.J. without any reason. It transpires from the case file that after that attack, X had been arrested and then released, but there is no information as to the exact dates. 11. The court found that there was a direct causal link between X’s mental state and the criminal offences he had committed, that there was a serious danger that he might commit a more serious offence (neko teže djelo), and that he required psychiatric treatment in order to prevent that from happening. 12. That judgment became final on 20 June 2013. On 24 June 2013 the Court of First Instance requested the prison authorities to transfer X to a special hospital in Kotor. On 16 November 2015 the Court of First Instance discontinued (obustavio) the enforcement of mandatory inpatient psychiatric treatment and replaced it with mandatory psychiatric treatment on an outpatient basis, as long as there was a need for treatment but no longer than three years. On 12 April 2016 the Court of First Instance issued an order (nalog) directing X to undergo outpatient psychiatric treatment in a healthcare centre (Dom zdravlja). He was readmitted to hospital between 22 August and 21 October 2016, apparently at his own request. Between 18 April 2016 and October 2017 X had regular monthly check-ups by a specialist. 13. On 27 May 2013 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the State, seeking 1,700 euros (EUR) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. He submitted, in substance, that X had already attacked other people before attacking him, including V.J. four months earlier. Moreover, the applicant had reported X to the police for threatening him before the attack. Owing to the failure of the State to undertake any preventive measure in respect of X, the applicant had been attacked by him and had suffered injuries. 14. In the course of the proceedings, on 20 December 2013 the court heard Z.Ɖ., a police officer, who had been patrolling for more than ten years in the neighbourhood where X lived and where the applicant’s bar was located. He stated that two to three days prior to the attack, the applicant had called the police to report X who had been “causing him problems” (stvarao mu problem) and who had told the applicant that he “would see who the boss in the neighbourhood was”. Following that complaint, Z.Ɖ. had looked for X in order to talk to him but had been unable to find him for the next two days. After the applicant had been attacked, Z.Ɖ. had gone to the scene and, “knowing that X always carried a knife or some other cold weapon”, asked him whether he had a knife. In response, X had taken a knife from behind his back and handed it in. Z.Ɖ. further submitted that the police often received complaints of noise, disturbances (neredi) and attacks by X. The police would always have “an informative talk” (informativni razgovor) with X, and would duly notify the State prosecutor (Osnovni državni tužilac) thereof. He did not know, however, whether those complaints had been further processed. 15. On 19 February 2015 the Court of First Instance ruled against the applicant. The court held that the police had acted as required, notably by taking X’s statements and forwarding them to the competent prosecutor for further processing. In addition, after the attack X had been criminally prosecuted and found guilty. Therefore, there had been no lack of action and thus the State was not liable for the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant. Relying on section 148(1) of the Obligations Act, the court held as follows: “The court dismisses as factually and legally unfounded the applicant’s submissions that the State ought to have hospitalised X before the event here in issue, as the State bodies did order his hospitalisation as soon as the conditions for that had been met. The fact that it was only after the case at issue does not affect the court’s conclusion. The court has concluded that the State bodies acted in accordance with the law and their powers both pursuant to this event and other preceding events, and therefore the conditions for an award of compensation have not been met.” 16. On 20 April 2015 the High Court upheld the first-instance judgment. It considered, in substance, that there was no causal link between the State’s actions and the damage caused, given that the applicant’s injury was a result of an attack by a third person. Therefore there was no liability on the part of the State to compensate him for the said damage. The court stated that it had examined other submissions but found that they did not influence its verdict. 17. On 12 June 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. In substance he maintained that: (a) the State had failed to react appropriately after X had attacked V.J.; (b) four months thereafter, X had attacked and injured the applicant; and (c) three days before the attack the applicant had complained to the police that X had threatened him. The State was thus responsible, as it had had knowledge of the kind of person X was, but had failed to react. The applicant relied on Article 28 of the Constitution (see paragraph 22 below), and on the Court’s findings in the case of Branko Tomašić and Others v. Croatia in respect of Article 2 of the Convention. 18. On 14 October 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected (odbacuje se) the applicant’s constitutional appeal, holding, in particular: “[the applicant] complains of a violation of his rights in substance by challenging the established facts. The Constitutional Court reiterates that it is not competent to substitute the regular courts in assessing the facts and evidence, but that it is the task of the regular courts to [do so] (see the European Court’s judgment in the case of Thomas v. the United Kingdom, 10 May 2005, no. 19354/02). The task of the Constitutional Court is to examine whether the proceedings as a whole were fair within the meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention and whether the decisions of the regular courts violate constitutional rights. Therefore, the Constitutional Court is not competent to replace the assessment of the regular courts by its own assessment, as it is up to those courts to assess the evidence and establish the facts relevant for the outcome of the proceedings. Therefore, the constitutional appeal here at issue is manifestly (prima facie) unfounded.” That decision was served on the applicant on 13 January 2016 at the earliest. 19. On 10 June 2003 X was found guilty of a serious traffic offence and was sentenced to six months in prison, suspended for two years. On 28 June 2006 he was found guilty of setting his flat on fire and was ordered to undergo mandatory outpatient psychiatric treatment. 20. Before 24 June 2013 (see paragraph 12 above) X had been hospitalised on several other occasions: (a) for an unspecified period in 1997; (b) from 29 November to 19 December 2001; (c) from 25 July 2003 to 8 July 2004 (following a court decision of 21 July 2003 to that effect, after he had set his flat on fire; once it was considered that he had achieved a stable clinical condition, X was discharged from the hospital); (d) from 31 January to 21 February 2006; (e) from 23 July to 29 September 2006; (f) on 15 February and 13 March 2007 (on the recommendation of the healthcare centre in Podgorica following complaints from X’s neighbours); (g) from 5 June to 25 July 2008; and (h) from 24 September 2012 to 3 October 2012. That period of hospitalisation would appear to have been prompted by an attempt by X to commit suicide by taking a large quantity of medication. The discharge note of 3 October 2012, however, noted that X “[did] not want to remain in hospital in spite of the persistent insistence of the doctor in charge (ordinarijus) that he continue hospital treatment. He [was] prescribed a check-up in seven days’ time with a competent psychiatrist in a health care centre”. There is no information as to whether X had any treatment or a medical check-up thereafter. It is clear from the case file that between the periods of hospitalisation in 2008 and 2012, X had seen a psychiatrist on at least three occasions: on 1 November 2010, 22 September and 11 October 2011. Two of the three medical reports state that X had regularly been taking medication. 21. On 13 December 2013 X was deprived of his legal capacity following a proposal to that effect by the local social work centre of 14 November 2013. On an unspecified date thereafter, the social work centre was appointed his legal guardian.

4. The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Chișinău. 5. On 24 August 2011 the applicant was taken into police custody on charges of murder and unauthorized possession of a firearm. He was remanded in custody by the Centru District Court on 28 August 2011 and his detention was subsequently extended every thirty days until 21 January 2012 on the grounds that given the seriousness of the charges against him, he might abscond, re-offend and interfere with the investigation. The applicant did not appeal against those decisions. 6. On 17 January 2012 the applicant’s case was committed for trial and his detention was extended by the court every three months, finding that the grounds which justified his initial detention had remained valid. 7. In his appeals against the decisions of 12 April, 10 June and 10 July 2013 the applicant complained, inter alia, about the length of his detention which, in his view, was no longer justified. He argued that his detention pending trial had already exceeded the twelve-month time-limit set under Article 186 (8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the courts had not put forward any exceptional circumstance justifying such a long detention period, while the seriousness of charges could not by themselves constitute sufficient ground for his extended deprivation of liberty. 8. By decisions of 23 April, 20 June and 25 July 2013 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals. 9. By a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 17 September 2014 the applicant was found guilty on all charges and sentenced to twenty‑three years of imprisonment. 10. On 28 September 2011 the applicant was transferred to prison no. 13 in Chișinău where he was detained until 4 December 2014. 11. According to the applicant, he was detained in cells with poor lighting, damp walls, and accommodating six inmates in an area of 6 square metres. Due to overcrowding, the applicant had to share a bed with another inmate with whom he took turns to sleep. During his detention the applicant did not receive any bedding or clothing. Certain inmates were diagnosed with tuberculosis or HIV and had bleeding wounds. He was allowed to walk outside the cell only one hour per day. Without a functional ventilation system, in summer the air indoors was hot, humid and smelly which made it difficult to breathe. In cold weather the heating was not turned on and the temperature in the cells was extremely low. The squat toilet was not separated from the rest of the cell. The prison laundry was not operational and the applicant was unable to wash his clothes. 12. On 18 April 2014 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Prosecutor General’s Office about the applicant’s detention conditions in prison no. 13. By a letter of 15 May 2014 the Department of Penitentiary Institutions denied the complaints on overcrowding, TB infected inmates, insufficient food and medical assistance.

5. The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Stari Mikanovci. 6. The applicant was an employee of the State’s railway company, Hrvatske željeznice. He suffered a work-related accident and became unable to work. 7. On 26 April 1977 the Osijek County Court (Okružni sud u Osijeku) awarded the applicant a lump sum in compensation and ordered the defendant – Hrvatske željeznice – to pay him monthly payments in respect of the difference between his disability pension and the salary he would have been earning were it not for his inability to work. 8. On 5 May 1988 the Vukovar Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Vukovaru) increased the above-mentioned monthly payments. At the same time, it established that the applicant’s inability to work was only 50% due to the above-mentioned accident, and 50% due to a pre-existing illness. 9. On 24 December 1990 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against Hrvatske željeznice, seeking that the above-mentioned monthly payments be increased on the grounds of changed circumstances. 10. The defendant did not oppose an increase in the monthly payments, but disputed the amount requested. 11. The Vukovar Municipal Court commissioned a report from an accounting expert, and on 13 February 1991 the expert witness submitted his report. 12. At a hearing held on 20 February 1991 the expert witness gave oral evidence. 13. On 24 April 1991 the first-instance court allowed the applicant’s claim in part, but on 16 August 1991 the Vukovar County Court (Županijski sud u Vukovaru) quashed the first-instance judgment in part, because it found that the first-instance court had failed to correctly establish the facts. It remitted the case for fresh consideration and ordered the first-instance court to establish, in terms of a percentage, how much the applicant’s inability to work was due to his pre-existing illness. 14. In the resumed proceedings, the first-instance court commissioned a report from an accounting expert and ordered the applicant to pay costs in advance in the sum of 696.55 Croatian kunas (HRK). 15. On 5 June 2003 the expert witness submitted his report and the defendant objected to the expert’s findings. 16. On 15 October 2003 the expert witness submitted his observations in reply to the defendant’s objection. 17. At a hearing on 28 November 2003 the court heard oral evidence from the expert witness. He stated that he could not precisely determine individual amounts until the Croatian Pension Fund adjusted the applicant’s pension. 18. On 22 December 2003, after the Croatian Pension Fund had adjusted the applicant’s pension, the expert witness submitted an additional report. 19. At a hearing on 23 January 2004 the expert witness again gave oral evidence. 20. On the same date, on the basis of the expert witness’s report, the first-instance court issued a judgment allowing the applicant’s claim in part. 21. On 3 May 2005 the Vukovar County Court quashed the judgment of 23 January 2004 for substantial violation of the civil procedure rules and ordered a fresh consideration of the case. It held that the first-instance court had failed to take into account the fact: that the first-instance judgment of 24 April 1991 had become final as regards an amount of 63.80 former Yugoslav dinars (YUD) per month payable for the period from 1 January 1991 onwards; the applicant had turned 60 on 15 August 1994; and he should have lodged an application for his disability pension to be recalculated as an old-age pension. 22. At a hearing held on 15 September 2005 the first-instance court commissioned a further report from an accounting expert, in accordance with the instruction given by the second-instance court. Specifically, it ordered the expert witness, in calculating the monthly amount, to take into account the amount of 63.80 dinars which had already been awarded, as well as the fact that the defendant was 50% responsible for the damage at issue, and to establish whether the applicant had used his right to have his disability pension recalculated as an old-age pension when he had turned 60. 23. Meanwhile, the defendant split into four companies, and the first‑instance court ordered the applicant to correct his claim by accurately identifying the defendant. 24. On 2 November 2007 the first-instance court declared the claim inadmissible, because it held that the applicant had failed to properly correct the claim. 25. Upon an appeal by the applicant, on 9 September 2008 the Vukovar County Court quashed the first-instance decision, because it held that the applicant had already identified the defendant. 26. In the resumed proceedings, at a hearing held on 22 December 2008 the first-instance court commissioned a report from an accounting expert in accordance with the second-instance court’s instruction given in its judgment of 3 May 2005, and ordered the applicant to pay the related costs in the amount of HRK 2,578 in advance. 27. On 15 January 2009 and 3 February 2009 the applicant asked for an exemption from paying the costs of the expert witness, claiming that, given his financial situation, and the fact that his pension was HRK 2,313 per month and his wife was unemployed and without any income, he was unable to pay those costs without putting his own and his wife’s subsistence at risk. He asked for those costs to be covered by the first-instance court’s funds, a possibility provided for by the Civil Procedure Act. He submitted a certificate from the Croatian Pension Fund concerning his pension and certificates demonstrating his and his wife’s income. 28. At a hearing on 3 February 2009 the applicant reiterated all the arguments and repeated that he had not been able to pay for the costs of the expert report. He asked the court to allow his claim as specified in his submissions of 16 February 2007. Neither party put forward any new evidence. The court set aside its decision of 22 December 2008 regarding a further report from an accounting expert, because the applicant had failed to pay for the costs, and concluded the hearing. 29. On 16 February 2009, relying on the rules regulating the burden of proof, the first-instance court issued a judgment dismissing the applicant’s claim. It held that, owing to his failure to pay for the costs of the expert report, the court had not been able to establish the exact amount of the monthly payments. In its reasoning, the first-instance court stated that the Vukovar County Court, in its decision of 11 November 2008, had awarded the applicant HRK 20,000 for the violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time, and that he could have paid for the costs of the expert witness with that money. 30. The applicant lodged an appeal, claiming that the amount awarded to him for the violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time had been paid to him on 13 March 2009, namely after the first-instance judgment had already been delivered. 31. On 4 February 2010 the second-instance court upheld the first‑instance judgment. In addition, it held that the applicant failed to demonstrate when the State had deposited the amount of HRK 20,000 on a bank account of his representative. 32. The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija), which the Supreme Court declared inadmissible on 10 January 2011. 33. The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court, and on 11 July 2012 the Constitutional Court declared it inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.

5. The applicant was born in 1974 and is detained in Diyarbakır. 6. On 8 March 1995 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of Hizbullah, an illegal organisation. The applicant’s right of access to a lawyer was restricted during his police custody according to the now defunct Law no. 3842. On the same day he was examined by a doctor at his own request. The doctor noted, in a police document, that there was no sign of physical violence on the applicant’s body. 7. On 16 March 1995 the applicant was taken part in “an identification parade with statements (ifadeli yüzleştirme tutanağı)” with other accused persons and identified, in the absence of a lawyer, certain persons as members of the said organisation and confessed to committing a murder. 8. On 26 March 1995 the applicant further participated in the reconstruction of the events (olay ve yer gösterme) in the course of which he had confessed, in the absence a lawyer, having carried out an arson attack. 9. On 29 March 1995 the applicant was questioned by the police officers in the absence of a lawyer. In his statement, the applicant gave a detailed description about his involvement in Hizbullah. 10. On 5 April 1995 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge respectively, again in the absence of a lawyer. Before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied his police statements claiming that he had been subjected to torture. The investigating judge ordered the applicant’s detention on remand. On the same day and before his statements were taken, he had been examined by a doctor at the request of the police. The doctor noted, in a police document, that there was no sign of physical violence on the applicant’s body. 11. On 12 April 1995 he was examined by a doctor at his own request claiming that he had been subjected to torture while in police custody. The doctor noted that there was no sign of physical violence on the applicant’s body. 12. On 2 May 1995 the applicant gave evidence as complainant before the public prosecutor and stated that the had been subjected to various forms of torture, which included beatings, electric shock treatment, blindfolding, hosing with cold water, and being stripped naked. 13. On 23 May 1995 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicant and several other persons. The applicant was accused of carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, proscribed by Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. 14. On 19 October 1995 the State Security Court held the first hearing in the case. 15. By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 16. On 31 March 2005 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant of attempting to undermine the constitutional order, proscribed by Article 146 § 1 of the former Criminal Code, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 17. On 11 December 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 31 March 2005 in respect of some of the accused, including the applicant, and remitted the case to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 18. On 9 November 2007, the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant of attempting to undermine the constitutional order, proscribed by Article 146 § 1 of the former Criminal Code, and sentenced him to life imprisonment again. 19. On 19 January 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance court’s judgment.

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and is detained in Diyarbakır. 6. On 23 December 2001 the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody on suspicion of being a member of Hizbullah, an illegal organisation. During his detention in police custody, the applicant was allegedly subjected to ill-treatment by police officers. In particular, electric shocks were administered to his testicles. 7. On 25 December 2001 the applicant was interrogated by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During his interrogation, he confessed in detail to his involvement in the activities of the illegal organisation and gave detailed information about the organisation and its members. 8. On 26 December 2001 the applicant gave a statement to the public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer in which he denied the statements he had given to the police. 9. On the same day the applicant was brought before the investigating judge at the Diyarbakır State Security Court, who questioned him in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant again denied his statements to the police. During his questioning, the applicant alleged to the investigating judge that he had been subjected to ill-treatment while in police custody and that his statements had been taken under duress. However, a medical report issued by Bağlar Health Clinic dated the same day stated that there was no sign that he had been subjected to violence. At the end of the hearing, the court ordered that the applicant be placed in pre-trial detention. 10. On 9 January 2002 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with attempting to undermine the constitutional order of the State. 11. On 19 March 2002 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case. During the hearing, the applicant repeated his allegations of having been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody and denied his statements to the police. 12. On 27 January 2004 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Diyarbakır public prosecutor’s office against the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated him. He stated that electric shocks had been administered to his body through his testicles and that his testicles had been squeezed, which had caused serious harm. He attached a medical report dated 20 September 2002 from Fırat University on the state of his testicles. The report stated that the applicant had a dilation of the veins in his left testicle of up to 2.6 mm, which had resulted in a varicocele. 13. State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004. The case against the applicant was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 14. On 25 June 2004 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor issued a decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the police officers on account of a lack of evidence. 15. During the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the first-instance courts examined the applicant’s continued detention at the end of the hearings, either on their own motion or at the applicant’s request. The courts ordered that he be kept in detention owing to the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the contents of the file. 16. On 12 June 2008 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The sentence, however, was reduced to twenty years of imprisonment as the applicant was a minor at the time of the offence. 17. On 18 January 2010 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision for procedural reasons. 18. On 2 April 2010 the applicant asked the Diyarbakır Assize Court for his release pending trial. On 9 April 2010 the court dismissed his application for release on the grounds of the nature of the offence. 19. On 30 September 2010 the Diyarbakır Assize Court issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction (görevsizlik kararı), pursuant to section 8 of Law no. 6008, which provided that juveniles could not be tried before assize courts, which had special jurisdiction to try a number of aggravated crimes enumerated under Article 250 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the material time. The case was thus referred to the Diyarbakır Juvenile Court. 20. On 2 November 2010 the applicant was released pending trial. 21. On 5 June 2012 the Diyarbakır Juvenile Court found that, inter alia, on the basis of the applicant’s statements to the police, the applicant had committed the offence under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced him to sixteen years and eight months’ imprisonment. 22. On 17 June 2014 the Court of Cassation upheld the Diyarbakır Juvenile Court’s judgment.

6. The applicants, Mr Ömer Yaman (first applicant), Mr Mustafa Ürek (second applicant), and Mr Kerem Bilen (third applicant) were born in 1956, 1967 and 1977 respectively. 7. On 20 June 1999 the applicants were arrested in the course of a military operation in Şırnak. They were subsequently interrogated by the gendarmes in the absence of a lawyer. In their statements, the applicants accepted the charges against them and gave a detailed account of their involvement in the PKK (the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan, an illegal organisation). 8. On 23 June 1999 the applicants were brought before the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor and subsequently before the investigating judge. The first and second applicants were provided with an interpreter during their interrogation. Before the public prosecutor and the judge, the applicants denied the charges against them. They further stated that they had signed their gendarmerie statements without reading them. Following the questioning, the investigating judge remanded the applicants in custody. 9. On 2 July 1999 the Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment with that court and accused the applicants of carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, under Article 125 of the Criminal Code. 10. The proceedings resumed before the Diyarbakır State Security Court and the first and second applicants were authorised to have the assistance of an interpreter. In their defence submissions before the trial court, the applicants retracted the statements they had allegedly made during the preliminary investigation stage. They submitted that the gendarmes had made them sign their statements without reading them. 11. On 7 May 2002 the Diyarbakır State Security Court found the applicants guilty as charged and convicted them under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code with carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. It further sentenced the applicants to life imprisonment. In convicting them, the court had regard to the applicants’ statements taken by the gendarmes. 12. On 25 March 2003 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court on the ground that during the trial certain witness statements, which had been taken on commission before other courts, had not been read out to the applicants for comment during the trial. The case was accordingly remitted to the Diyarbakır State Security Court. 13. In the meantime, State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and therefore, the case against the applicants was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 14. On 7 March 2005 the Diyarbakır Assize Court complied with the decision of the Court of Cassation and witness statements that had been taken on commission were read out to the applicants for their comments. At the end of the trial, the Diyarbakır Assize Court found the applicants guilty as charged and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 15. On 17 June 2005 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation decided that the case file should be remitted to the Diyarbakır Assize Court for examination of whether the new Criminal Code which had entered into force on 1 June 2005 (Law no. 5297) provided more favourable provisions for the applicants. The case was thus once again examined by the Diyarbakır Assize Court in view of the recent legislative changes. 16. On 25 October 2005 the Diyarbakır Assize Court once again convicted the applicants under Article 125 of the former Criminal Court, finding that this provision was more favourable to them than the corresponding provision of the new criminal code. 17. On 30 May 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment on procedural grounds, holding in particular that certain documents which had been relied on by the first-instance court in its judgment were not of an official nature. 18. On 24 April 2007 the Diyarbakır Assize Court, after obtaining official copies of all the documents in the case file, convicted the applicants under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 19. On 11 December 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.

5. The applicant was born in 1995 and lives in Moscow. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On an unspecified date the applicant was diagnosed with schizotypal personality disorder and was undergoing voluntary treatment for his condition. 8. On 24 April 2014 he was apprehended by the police on the street in the Bibirevo district of Moscow. The police report stated that the applicant had been “harassing an underage teenager” without providing a detailed account of the events. It is not clear from the material available to the Court whether the intervention by the police had been triggered by any complaint from that teenager or any other person. 9. He was then taken to the local police station and later transferred by the psychiatric ambulance service to the Central Clinical Psychiatric Hospital of the Moscow Region (ГКУЗ МО «Центральная клиническая психиатрическая больница») (“the Hospital”). The report of the ambulance service stated the following: “[T]aken to [a police station] for [on several occasions] sexually harassing ... [and] stalking an underage teenager and not allowing him to walk away [from such encounters] ... Mentally alert. Aware of his surroundings. Unwilling to engage in contact. Reserved, secretive, tense, but during the conversation acknowledges the existence of the teenager and the repeated instances of sexual harassment ...” 10. The psychiatrist who admitted the applicant to the Hospital made the following record: “Tense, exhibits [exaggerated and pretentious facial] mannerisms. No eye contact. Selective in answering questions, answers [only] after some pause. Asks for some time to “spend with boys”. Distracted. Not reflective [about his mental state]. Diagnosis: schizotypal disorder.” 11. On 25 April 2014 the applicant was examined jointly by the attending psychiatrist and the head of one of the Hospital’s departments. They made the following record: “Follow-up patient history: According to the patient, about three years ago [in 2011] he started feeling the desire to be in contact with boys, to look like a girl. He dyed his hair to attract attention. He started watching television shows to observe how a woman moves; he uses make-up, dresses up. Since the beginning of last year he has become fixated on these thoughts, and started contemplating the possibility of gender reassignment. During this period he has had mood swings, has been anxious, irritable, [and had] difficulties in focusing his attention. Given these circumstances he was hospitalised in [a psychiatric facility]. After his discharge his condition improved. He continued his studies. In the past year he has started paying more attention to his appearance, using lipstick, wearing women’s jewellery, [and has] sometimes tried on women’s clothing at home. He became acquainted with a boy, a ninth grade student, during one of his walks in the city. He started meeting him, talking to him, tried to ‘have physical contact’, touched his hand, fondled it. Had a desire to be ‘caressed’. According to the supporting documents – [a report to the head of the police station, the order for a psychiatric ambulance] – he was apprehended by police officers on the street, where he had been sexually harassing an underage teenager, having stalked him for four months, repeatedly not allowing him to walk away from such encounters. Transferred to [the police station] where he was examined by a psychiatrist on duty, subsequently involuntarily admitted [to the psychiatric hospital] ... During his examination in the reception ward he signed [a document consenting] to treatment ... Psychiatric state: Self-aware. Subdued mood. Somewhat distracted. Looks untidy, unkempt hair, dyed ginger. Soft, high-pitched voice. Indisposed to conversation, replies [only] after some pause, does not answer certain questions, asks for some questions to be repeated. While replying he gulps with an expression of pain. Excessive facial expressions during conversation. States that he feels uncontrollable attraction to boys, to be liked by them, to have contact with them. Requests a “space to meet with a boy”. Blushes while saying this. Considers himself a “female person”. Considers in-patient treatment necessary for himself in order to improve his mood, reduce irritability and “perplexity of thoughts”. Denies hallucinations. Denies suicidal thoughts. Diagnosis: Schizotypal disorder.” 12. On the same day the applicant, after conferring with his father, demanded to be discharged from the Hospital; however, his request was denied. 13. On the same day a medical counselling panel composed of the resident psychiatrists of the Hospital examined the applicant and diagnosed him with organic delusional disorder. The panel also found that the applicant was a danger to himself and others and that there was a risk of significant damage to his health due to the deterioration or aggravation of his psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance. The full text of the panel’s report and conclusion read as follows: “25.04.2014 12.00 Panel examination due to refusal of treatment. Lethargic, sluggish. Subdued mood. Attributes [the cause of] his subdued mood to [his] inability to meet up with a boy he is attracted to. Unsure whether that boy also is attracted to him. Goes across the city to see that ‘boy’. He wants to be ‘treated gently, to be caressed, fondled’. Admitted that he goes to women’s clothing stores [because he likes the clothing], which is ‘soft and bright’. For a long time has been visiting the neighbourhood where he met the boy; previously he had been going to other neighbourhoods to watch boys. Diagnosis: Organic delusional disorder. Conclusion: needs involuntary placement and treatment, in accordance with section 29(a) and (c) of the 1992 Psychiatric Assistance Act.” 14. On the same day the Hospital applied for judicial authorisation of the applicant’s involuntary hospitalisation under section 29(a) and (c) of the Psychiatric Assistance Act 1992, since the applicant was a danger to himself or others and there was a risk of significant damage to his health owing to the deterioration or aggravation of his psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance. The application restated the findings of the earlier joint examination (see paragraph 11 above) and set out the following conclusions: “On 25 April 2014 was examined by the panel of resident psychiatrists of [the Hospital] and diagnosed with organic delusional disorder. The patient needs to be involuntarily hospitalised and treated under section 29 (a) and (c) of the Psychiatric Assistance Act of 1992. The examination and treatment of the patient can take place only under an in-patient regime ... [It is requested] 2. That the request for authorisation be assessed on the premises of the Hospital, since because of his mental state [the applicant] cannot be produced in court ...” 15. On 5 May 2014 the Savyolovskiy District Court of Moscow (Савёловский районный суд г. Москвы) held a hearing on the premises of the psychiatric facility. The hearing was attended by the applicant, his father and mother, the attending psychiatrist Mr P., the head of one of the Hospital’s departments (Mr L.), the representative of the Hospital (Mrs K.) and the local prosecutor. 16. During the hearing Mr P., Mr L., and Mrs K. generally advanced the same arguments as those presented in the application for judicial authorisation (see paragraph 14 above), maintaining that the applicant needed to be hospitalised and treated, that he posed a danger to himself and others, and that there was a risk of significant damage to his health in the event of a deterioration in or aggravation of his psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance. Mr P. also reported that the applicant considered himself to be healthy and refused treatment, while at the same time “being confused, replying to questions with other questions, and being exceptionally insincere”. They also emphasised the fact that the applicant had been apprehended by the police for sexually harassing an underage person. 17. The applicant’s parents had conflicting opinions about the need for hospitalisation. The mother stated that the applicant did “not feel well” and had been “irritable lately”, that her communication with him was restricted by the father and that she had not seen him since 10 February 2014. In her opinion, in-patient treatment was necessary. The applicant’s father, acting as his representative, objected to involuntary hospitalisation and did not agree that his son posed any danger to himself or to others. He stated that Mr X was voluntarily following the treatment prescribed by a neurologist and a psychiatrist, that his condition showed signs of improvement and that hospitalisation would interfere with his studies and future career. In his opinion his son had only tried to become friends with “the boy”, not sexually harass him. He furthermore stated that the police report referred to by the Hospital contained no information on the alleged sexual harassment or other unlawful acts. 18. The applicant stated the following during the hearing: “I refuse treatment and feel myself to be well ... There is nothing special about me. I dyed my hair ginger because that colour suits me, I do not like black. I only wanted to become friends with that boy, nothing special; I tried no clothes on; that is all nonsense. [I want to finish my studies]; I have only two months left and I do not want to be in hospital. I made no statements concerning trying on womens’ clothing or changing gender.” 19. The District Court, having considered the above-mentioned statements, medical evidence, a police report, and the applicant’s educational records, the same day authorised the applicant’s involuntary hospitalisation. The authorisation issued by the court in a succinct manner stated that, while the applicant and his father objected to hospitalisation, the evidence presented by the medical panel of the Hospital demonstrated that the applicant was a danger to himself and others and that his mental state might deteriorate in the absence of treatment. 20. The applicant’s father appealed. The statement of appeal indicated that the District Court had relied exclusively on the evaluation of the resident psychiatrists, had not addressed inconsistencies in evidence, had failed to substantiate the assertion that the applicant’s condition was severe and that he posed a danger to himself or others, and, lastly, had failed to demonstrate the absence of any alternative treatment options. 21. On 20 May 2014 the applicant was discharged from the Hospital after an improvement in his mental state. 22. Certificates issued by the local police station in May 2014 stated that the applicant had not committed any administrative or criminal offence and that he had been referred to psychiatrists because of mental disorders. 23. On 18 July 2014 the appeal was dismissed by the Moscow City Court (Московский городской суд). The relevant parts of the decision read as follows: “... The case file shows that on 24 April 2014 [a policeman apprehended the applicant]. The police report indicates that [he] had been harassing underage persons ... Since the behaviour of [the applicant] exhibited symptoms of mental disorder, [he was taken to the Hospital], where he initially agreed to hospitalisation, stated that since 2013 [he had been subject to] mood changes, and that he [suffered from] anxiety, irritability and difficulties in focusing his attention. Previously he had been hospitalised in [a psychiatric facility]; following his discharge from [that facility] his mental state improved, [and] he had continued his studies. However during the last year the condition re-appeared. [According to the medical evidence] on 25 April 2014 [the applicant] was lethargic, sluggish, and had a subdued mood, which he attributed to his inability to meet up with a boy he is attracted to. During the hearing the representative of [the Hospital] stated that [the applicant] had been brought in in a delusional state, and had talked about ‘a boy’ who did not [in fact] exist. In this state he had been travelling long distances, presenting a danger to himself and others ... The evidence [submitted to the first-instance court] substantiating the need for involuntary hospitalisation – including information on previous treatment for his delusional disorder and somatic condition (a second-degree disability) – constituted legal grounds for involuntary hospitalisation. Since the reaching of conclusions regarding the mental health of a person is within the exclusive competence of psychiatrists, the [district] court reasonably gave due regard to the report on the need to provide in-patient treatment to [the applicant] ... The appeal does not refer to any factual information demonstrating that the relatives of [the applicant] or other persons are capable of ensuring his and other persons’ safety without an in-patient treatment regime ...” 24. The applicant’s subsequent attempts to initiate a review of the above-mentioned judicial decisions proved unsuccessful.

5. The applicants were or are still detained in Korydallos Prison Hospital (“the Prison Hospital”). They all suffer from HIV infection, apart from the third applicant who suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. 6. The first applicant, Dimitrios Zabelos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 6 March 2014 until 17 June 2015, when he made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code. 7. The second applicant, Adriatik Berberaj, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 6 April 2010 until 21 January 2011 and from 7 February 2012 until 1 July 2015, the date on which he was released following use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015, having served one third of his sentence. 8. The third applicant, Dimitrios Berberidis, was detained in the Prison Hospital on 6 December 2012 and was released on 11 June 2015 following use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015, having served one third of his sentence. 9. The fourth applicant, Pola Honein, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 18 December 2012 until 1 July 2015. He was released after having made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code. 10. The fifth applicant, Theodoros Iliopoulos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 8 January 2013 until 2 June 2015, the date on which he was released following use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015, having served two fifths of his sentence. 11. The sixth applicant, Marouf Kamoli, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 30 December 2013 until 19 May 2015, the date on which he was released following use of the remedy provided by section 11 of Law no. 4274/14, having served two fifths of his sentence. 12. The seventh applicant, Davit Khutsishvili, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 1 July 2014 until 27 October 2016. He was released after having made use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015. 13. The eighth applicant, Roustam Konstantinidis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 23 August 2013 until 14 December 2015. He was released following an application on the basis of section 3 of Law no. 4322/2015. 14. The ninth applicant, Ioannis Machos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 1 November 2012. He was still in detention when the parties submitted their observations. 15. The tenth applicant, Andreas Martzaklis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 28 May 2013 until 3 August 2015, when he was released after he lodged an application on the basis of section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015. He was again detained in the Prison Hospital from 22 January 2016, and was still in detention there when the parties submitted their observations. 16. The eleventh applicant, Saeed Hamo Moradyan, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 8 February 2013 until 27 January 2016, the date on which he was released on the basis of section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015, having served one third of his sentence. 17. The twelfth applicant, Antonios Oikonomakos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 27 November 2013 until 30 September 2015, when he was released, having served one tenth of his sentence, on the basis of section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015. He was again detained from 6 November 2015 until 23 December 2015 when he was released, having served two fifths of his sentence, on the basis of the same provision. 18. According to the documents before the Court, the thirteenth applicant, Nikolaos Papadopoulos, was detained in the Prison Hospital for significant periods of time from 4 April 2014 until 16 July 2015. 19. The fourteenth applicant, Spiridon-Xenofon Pirpiniadis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 20 December 2013 until 13 August 2015, when he was released on the basis of section 12 of Law no. 4322/2015, having served two fifths of his sentence. 20. The fifteenth applicant, Sabri Sabrioglou, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 22 January 2013 until 24 December 2014 and from 11 February until 20 October 2015. 21. The sixteenth applicant, Dimitrios Samlidis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 8 July 2014 until 26 February 2015, when he was released, after having made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code. 22. The seventeenth applicant, Emmanouil Toufektsis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 30 October 2013 and was still in detention there when the parties submitted their observations. 23. The eighteenth applicant, Chrisovalantis Tsiriklos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 4 July 2013 until 8 July 2015, when he was released after having made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code. He was again detained on 21 August 2015 and was still in detention there when the parties submitted their observations. 24. The applicants submitted that the Prison Hospital had been overcrowded which, in addition to causing poor sanitary conditions, had resulted in the deterioration of their already fragile health. They maintained that all of them had been detained in hospital wards which had measured 44 sq. m and which had been occupied by twelve detainees on average for the period between 2013 and 2015. In addition, the second and third applicants had been detained in cells measuring 17 sq. m and which had held four inmates. They further argued that they had not been able to move freely within the wards owing to the space occupied by furniture. In particular, bunk beds were not used in the Prison Hospital and extra furniture, such as medical equipment, was required; therefore half the area of each ward had been occupied by furniture, which had resulted in them having a personal space in which they could move freely of below 2 sq. m. 25. The above-mentioned conditions had led them to receiving inadequate health care. There had been a high risk of infection with contagious diseases as there had not been effective separation of detainees according to the disease from which they had suffered. In addition, only four toilets had been available for the detainees in a total of five wards on the first floor. 26. Meals had been insufficient and of poor quality and the absence of recreational activities had affected their psychological health. Central heating had been inadequate and collection of rubbish, especially in the kitchens, had not been sufficient, creating hygiene problems and resulting in bad smells and the presence of pests. The applicants also complained of the lack of medical staff and properly equipped laboratories for their medical examinations. In particular, during the period 2013-14 only one general practitioner had been available to the hospital. 27. The applicants acknowledged that the conditions of their detention had improved in mid-2016 and that the medical-staff numbers had increased, resulting in conditions which met the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention but only for the period after June 2016. 28. On 18 December 2014 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Prison Board under Article 6 of the Penal Code (Law No. 2776/1999), to which they have not received any reply to date. 29. According to the Government, the Prison Hospital’s official capacity was sixty patients and at the time of the applicants’ detention the hospital had held between 180 and 220 patients. Specifically as regards the applicants, some of them had been detained in wards 7 and 8 on the first floor of the hospital and some others in wards 1, 2 and 3 on the second floor. The wards measured 44.40 sq. m each, and each of them hosted eight to thirteen detainees. Therefore, the personal space available to them ranged from 3.4 sq. m to 5.5 sq. m. It was also noted that toilets had been in the corridors, not inside the wards, which had remained unlocked so as to ensure unobstructed access to the bathrooms. 30. The Prison Hospital was an establishment providing primary medical care by operating as a clinic. Detainees who required more intense or specialised care were referred to public hospitals, a procedure which was used for the third, fourth, ninth, fifteenth and seventeenth applicants. The patients were separated by disease. They were examined regularly by doctors and they were submitted often to general and specialised laboratory examinations. 31. Wards were sufficiently ventilated and heated and had adequate natural light via six large windows. Hot water was ensured by solar water heaters and by boilers which operated for four hours per day. Wards were regularly cleaned by cleaning crews consisting of detainees and disinfected by specialist companies. The hospital’s social service provided personal hygiene products to detainees who could not afford them. All wards and corridors had rubbish bins which were emptied regularly. 32. As regards detainees’ meals, they were designed under medical supervision to ensure that patients received all necessary nutrients. The Government submitted the menu of two random weeks to demonstrate that they had been comprised of a variety of food. 33. According to the Government, detainees were not obliged to spend all day in the wards; on the contrary, they could move along the corridors and spend time in the yard. Various recreational activities were organised and detainees had had the opportunity to enrol in educational programmes since October 2015. Detainees were also granted days of leave that they could spend outside the prison hospital; the third, fifth and eleventh applicants had benefitted from such leave. 34. Lastly, according to the Government, during 2015 and 2016 conditions of detention in the Prison Hospital were drastically improved. That was mainly due to measures taken to reduce overcrowding in prisons under Law no. 4322/2015, which provided for early release schemes. In November 2014 a women’s ward had been opened at the hospital and work had been carried out to improve the facilities. In addition, new and updated medical equipment was procured and medical-staff numbers had been reinforced by the recruitment of three new doctors of various specialties. The Government specified that all the above-mentioned improvements had made the Prison Hospital a detention facility significantly different to the image given in the Greek Ombudsman’s (Συνήγορος του Πολίτη) report, which had been prepared on the basis of a visit in February 2012, that is to say on a date that had no relevance to the present case.

6. The first applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Prague. 7. On 17 October 2003 he married B., a Ukrainian national, in Prague. On 23 May 2004 their son, the second applicant, was born. 8. Between 2004 and 2007 the applicants and B. lived together as a family at the first applicant’s residence in Prague. 9. In 2007 the couple divorced. B. continued to live with the child at a different address in Prague. 10. By the decision of the Prague 10 District Court adopted on 6 November 2008, which was upheld on appeal on 19 May 2009, the first applicant and B. were granted alternating custody of the second applicant (with a change of parent each week). 11. On 27 June 2009 B. took the second applicant at her residence pursuant to the above alternating custody scheme. Without the consent of the first applicant, she moved to Ukraine with the second applicant and settled in Demeshkivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk Region. 12. The first applicant initiated a procedure under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction of 25 October 1980 (“the Hague Convention”) for the return of the second applicant to the Czech Republic. 13. In October 2009 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Department of Justice, acting in the interests of the first applicant, lodged a claim with the Ivano-Frankivsk Town Court for the return of the second applicant to the Czech Republic, pursuant to the Hague Convention. 14. On 2 July 2010 the court granted the claim, finding that the removal of the second applicant from the Czech Republic and his retention in Ukraine had been wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. The court ordered B. to return the child to the first applicant’s residence in the Czech Republic. The child was to be returned by B. whilst accompanied by the first applicant. 15. On 14 September 2010, the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment on appeal, and it became enforceable on that date. 16. On October 2010 B. lodged an appeal on points of law. 17. On 25 February 2011 the Supreme Court of Ukraine suspended enforcement of the return order, pending the examination of the appeal on points of law. 18. On 15 March 2011 the Supreme Court of Ukraine dismissed B.’s appeal on points of law, finding no proof that the lower courts had incorrectly applied the law or violated any procedural rules. 19. Further to its earlier decision granting the parents alternating custody of the second applicant, the Prague 10 District Court reconsidered the matter in the light of new developments in the case, especially the child’s abduction by B., his retention in Ukraine, and the first applicant’s lack of access to the child. On 10 November 2010 that court found that it was in the child’s best interests to live with the first applicant, who was therefore granted the sole custody of the child. 20. On 28 June 2011 that decision was upheld on appeal. 21. On 9 December 2013 the Halych District Court of Ivano-Frankivsk Region decided B.’s claim concerning determination of the second applicant’s place of residence. The court noted that the judgment of 2 July 2010 ordering the return of the child had not been enforced, and found that the child had in the meantime settled in a new environment in Ukraine. In that regard the court referred to the psychological and pedagogical report which concluded that the child was attached to his mother and that discussion about his father caused him feelings of fear. It also examined reports by the local childcare authorities suggesting that the child should live with his mother. The court found that the child was being given appropriate care by his mother and that it would be in his best interests to stay with his mother. It therefore ruled that the child should live with B. at her place of residence in Ukraine. 22. The first applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that the Ukrainian court did not have competence to determine the child’s place of residence because the custody rights had to be determined by the Czech authorities. 23. On 6 March 2014 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the first-instance court, finding that the child had settled in a new environment since his arrival in 2009 and that B. was entitled to bring that action in order to ensure the best interests of the child. 24. The first applicant did not appeal on points of law against that decision. 25. On 27 September 2010 the bailiffs of the Halych District Department of Justice started proceedings to enforce the judgment ordering the return of the child and contacted the parties to that effect. During the short period allowed for the voluntary execution of the return order, B. refused to comply with it. For that reason, on 6 October 2010 she was ordered to pay a fine of 170 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH)[1]. Two days later, she was ordered to pay a further fine of UAH 340[2]. 26. On 3 November 2010 the Halych District Court of Ivano-Frankivsk Region dismissed the bailiffs’ request to put the child on the search list. The court found that there was no evidence that the bailiffs had made attempts to identify the whereabouts of B. and the child. The hearing was attended by B., who submitted that the child was living with her and that she had not received any notices from the bailiffs concerning the enforcement of the return order. 27. As B. continued to avoid the enforcement of the judgment, in November 2010 the bailiffs requested that criminal proceedings be initiated against her on charges of deliberate non-compliance with a court decision under Article 382 § 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which provided for a maximum penalty of three years’ imprisonment. 28. On 25 January 2011 the bailiffs, accompanied by the police, a vice‑consul of the Czech Republic and the first applicant’s lawyer, visited state school no. 7 in Kalush after receiving information that the second applicant was a pupil there. There they met the second applicant, B. and B.’s lawyer. B. initially agreed to move to the Czech Republic and settle there and to bring the second applicant to live with her. Several days later B. informed the other parties that she had changed her mind. 29. As B. and the child could not be found at their residence and the child’s whereabouts were unknown, the bailiffs requested that the court put the child on the search list and place him temporarily in care. On 23 August 2011 the Halych District Court granted the requests. However, on 29 September 2011 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal examined an appeal lodged by B. and partly quashed that decision as regards the temporary placement of the child in care, considering – in view of the submissions by the local childcare authority – that such a measure would be excessive and detrimental to the child. 30. On 21 November 2011 B. informed the bailiffs that she and the child were living at their home in Demeshkivtsi. However, when the bailiffs attempted to enter the house on 28 November 2011, B. refused to open the door. 31. As B. and the child were not present at their address when the bailiffs made further visits, the bailiffs applied to the court to have them put on the search list and to have the child placed in temporary care. On 5 March 2012 the Ivano-Frankivsk Town Court refused to grant the requests, holding that the bailiffs had not taken sufficient steps to identify the whereabouts of B. and that the child was living in suitable conditions which made it unnecessary to place him in temporary care. The court heard B., who was present for the hearing and who informed the court that she and the child were living in Kalush in a flat of suitable quality and that the child was still attending school no. 7 in that town. The court also examined submissions from the local childcare authorities to that effect. 32. On 26 March 2012 the bailiffs discovered that the child – who by now was almost eight years old − had stopped attending school and was being instructed at home by a teacher from the Kalush school. 33. On 5 July 2012 the Ivano-Frankivsk Town Court refused to grant the bailiffs’ requests to put B. and the child on the search list and to place the child in temporary care. That decision was appealed against and on 4 October 2012 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal granted their requests. However, B. lodged an appeal on points of law and on 26 December 2012 the Higher Specialised Court on Civil and Criminal Matters upheld the first-instance court’s ruling and dismissed the bailiffs’ requests. It found that the judgment of 2 July 2010 to return the child to Czech Republic did not include the requirement to remove the child from B., who was “the debtor” in the enforcement proceedings. The court held that the bailiffs had the power to impose fines on B. and to request other measures of legal liability. However, if the judgment could not be executed without the “debtor”, the bailiffs would have to terminate the enforcement proceedings. 34. On 7 February 2013 the bailiffs discontinued the enforcement proceedings, noting that B. had been subjected to fines in those proceedings and that on 18 May 2011 she had been convicted of the crime of non‑compliance with a court decision and had been punished with a fine of UAH 1,000[3]. On 5 September 2013 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal reversed the bailiffs’ decision, finding that the enforcement measures had been insufficient. 35. On 20 June 2014 the bailiffs once again discontinued the enforcement proceedings. On 22 August 2014 the Ivano-Frankivsk Town Court reversed the bailiff’s decision as unfounded. However, in response to an appeal lodged by B., on 16 December 2014 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 22 August 2014 and ordered a fresh hearing in the first-instance court. On 23 February 2015 the first-instance court upheld the bailiffs’ decision to discontinue the enforcement proceedings. On 9 April 2015 the Court of Appeal quashed the bailiffs’ decision and ordered further enforcement proceedings.

5. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Sunzha, Ingushetia. The applicant is the father of Mr Maskhud Makhloyev, born in 1982. 6. At the time of the events in question the applicant, his wife and their children, including Mr Maskhud Makhloyev, resided at 55 Pavlov Street (a family house comprising two buildings and a shared courtyard), in the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya, Ingushetia. At the relevant time, two police checkpoints were located in the vicinity of the village. 7. On 26 December 2006 Mr Maskhud Makhloyev was arrested and detained on suspicion of involvement in an attack on local policemen. On the same date the Sunzhenskiy District prosecutor’s office ordered a search of the applicant’s family house. During the search Mr Maskhud Makhloyev’s passport was seized, together with several other items. 8. The applicant submitted that he had had no news about his son following the arrest. It was only after four days that he had found out that his son had been kept in the Sunzhenskiy District’s temporary detention facility. 9. On 27 December 2006 the Sunzhenskiy District Court declared that the search of 26 December 2006 had been lawful (see paragraph 7 above). 10. On 26 April 2007 the criminal proceedings against Mr Maskhud Makhloyev were terminated for lack of evidence of his guilt and he was released from custody. 11. The applicant submitted that law-enforcement agents had searched his house again on 31 October 2008 and 5 January 2009. On the first occasion they had looked for weapons but had not found anything. On the second occasion, the search had been conducted at 3 a.m. and the applicant and his family had been requested to present their passports. Mr Maskhud Makhloyev had not been at home at the time. 12. On 14 August 2009 Mr Maskhud Makhloyev was wounded by an unidentified person on the street. The applicant submitted that police officers had visited his son in hospital and had threatened to kill him and his family members. 13. On the night of 29 October 2009 the applicant and his wife were sleeping in their family home with their children, including Mr Maskhud Makhloyev. They were awoken at about 3.30 a.m. when seven to eight armed men in camouflage uniforms, wearing masks and carrying machine guns (Kalashnikov) and bullet-proof shields, broke into the applicant’s courtyard. 14. Having heard the noise, the applicant and his wife ran out of their house to the courtyard. The armed men pointed the guns at them and ordered them to stand up against a wall. They did not identify themselves; according to the applicant, they spoke Russian with no accent. The applicant asked what they wanted from them, but the men did not reply. They used portable radios to communicate with each other. 15. The armed men then broke into the house in which the applicant’s daughters were sleeping. They took his two daughters into the courtyard and put them next to their parents. They then forced them all into one room of their house and ordered them to stay there. 16. In the meantime the men went upstairs to the room shared by the applicant’s sons, Ibragim and Maskhud. During all that time his third son, A.M., remained in his room. After approximately ten minutes the men left. The applicant, his wife and daughters went up the stairs and found their son Ibragim on the floor, tied up with adhesive tape, his shirt pulled over his head and his mouth covered with adhesive tape. He told them that around seven to eight men had broken into the room, beaten up him and Maskhud, and then taken Maskhud away. 17. The applicant’s neighbour, L.S.M., later told the applicant that she had seen four vehicles driving away from his home: a Gazel minivan, a UAZ minivan and a UAZ car. She had been unable to see the model of the fourth vehicle. 18. On 29 October 2009 Mr Ibragim Makhloyev underwent a medical examination which confirmed that he had sustained bodily injuries. 19. The applicant has had no news of Mr Maskhud Makhloyev since his abduction. 20. The Government were invited to provide an entire copy of the case file opened into the abduction of Mr Maskhud Makhloyev. The relevant information from the criminal case file and that provided by the applicant can be summarised as follows. 21. On 29 October 2009 the applicant complained of his son’s abduction by unidentified persons to the Ingushetia prosecutor’s office. 22. An on-site investigation was conducted on the same day. Photographs were taken of the applicant’s house and various objects therein, including the adhesive tape which had been used on Mr Ibragim Makhloyev. 23. On 2 November 2009 an investigator of the Sunzhenskiy District investigations department of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Ingushetia (“the prosecutor’s office”) sent numerous requests concerning the disappearance of the applicant’s son to various State bodies, such as local police departments of different districts of Ingushetia and the Department of the Federal Security Service in Ingushetia (“the FSS”). 24. On 10 November 2009 the prosecutor’s office instituted criminal proceedings into the disappearance of the applicant’s son under Articles 126 § 2 (aggravated kidnapping) and 222 § 2 (illegal possession of firearms) of the Russian Criminal Code. The case file was assigned number 09600131. 25. The investigation established that at around 3.30 a.m. on 29 October 2009 about ten to twelve unidentified armed men in masks and camouflage uniforms had broken into the applicant’s house, inflicted bodily injuries on Mr Ibragim Makhloyev and kidnapped Mr Maskhud Makhloyev. The latter’s whereabouts were unknown. 26. On 11 November 2009 the applicant’s neighbour, L.S.M., was questioned as a witness. She said that at around 3.30 a.m. on 29 October 2009 she had heard the noise of vehicle engines. Looking from her window she had seen four cars – a Gazel minivan, a UAZ minivan and a UAZ car (she had been unable to discern the model of the fourth vehicle) – driving in the direction of Rabochaya street in the village. She had been unable to see the colour of the vehicles or their registration plates. 27. On 12 November 2009 the applicant’s wife was questioned as a witness. Her account of the events of 29 October 2009 was the same as the applicant’s (see paragraphs 13-16 above). 28. On 13 November 2009 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. His account of the events of the night in question was the same as the one presented to the Court (see paragraphs 13-16 above). He further stated that their family had not been in a blood feud with anyone and that to his knowledge his son had not had any enemies. In response to the investigator’s question whether he had suspected why his son had been abducted, the applicant answered in the negative. 29. On the same date Mr Ibragim Maskhudov was questioned as a witness. His account of the events of 29 October 2009 was the same as the one presented to the Court by the applicant (see paragraphs 13-16 above). 30. On 13 and 14 November 2009 the registration logs of the police checkpoints “Angara – 120” and “Kerch-Kavkaz 1”, located in the vicinity of the applicant’s village, were examined. 31. On 14 November 2009 the prosecutor’s office asked the Ministries of the Interior of the Chechen Republic, Karachayevo-Cherkessiya, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Alania to check whether Mr Maskhud Makhloyev had been detained on their respective territories or whether his dead body had been found there. They also asked for information concerning any compromising material about the applicant’s son which might have been found. It transpires that those requests yielded no relevant information. 32. On the same date an analogous request was sent to the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia. It was also asked to identify the police officers who had been on duty at the “Angara – 120” and “Kerch-Kavkaz 1” checkpoints on the night of 28 to 29 October 2009 and to request that they report to the prosecutor’s office for questioning. The same request was sent again on 5 April 2010. 33. On 15 November 2009 the applicant’s third son, A.M., and a daughter, R.M., were questioned as witnesses. They both said that they did not know why their brother had been kidnapped; they were not aware of any conflict he might have had with anyone. A.M. stated that during the events in question he had stayed in his room (see paragraph 16 above). 34. On 16 November 2009 the applicant was questioned again. He said that after the abduction his family had noticed that his son’s mobile phone was missing. Other than that, the applicant confirmed his previous statement. 35. On the same day the prosecutor’s office ordered the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 68799 to examine the vehicle registration logs kept at the FSS’s checkpoints in order to check whether UAZ vehicles and a Gazel vehicle had left or entered the FSS on the night of 28 to 29 October 2009. If so, the military prosecutor’s office was to ask the FSS servicemen who had been on duty at the checkpoints at the relevant time and the servicemen who had travelled in those vehicles where they had been driving to and whether they had detained Mr Maskhud Makhloyev. 36. On 17 November 2009 a medical examination of Mr Ibragim Makhloyev was ordered. A forensic expert’s opinion produced on an unspecified date concluded that he had sustained moderate damage to his health. 37. On the same day the investigator in charge of the case applied for judicial authorisation of access to all call logs for the night of 28 to 29 October 2009 kept by mobile-phone providers operating in the area. On 18 November 2009 he also applied for access to the logs of all incoming and outgoing calls to and from Mr Maskhud Makhloyev’s mobile phone as from 29 October 2009. 38. On 18 and 19 November 2009 the investigator in charge of the case requested Mr Maskhud Makhloyev’s medical information and his criminal record from the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia. 39. On 19 November 2009 the FSS informed the prosecutor’s office that they had not arrested Mr Maskhud Makhloyev and had not carried out any special operations at the applicant’s family house (see paragraph 23 above). 40. On the same day the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia informed the prosecutor’s office that Mr Maskhud Makhloyev was known to the police as a follower of Wahhabism, an extremist religious movement. He had not been known for alcohol or substance abuse. 41. On 20 November 2009 the Sunzhenskiy District Court granted the investigators’ requests and ordered the mobile-phone providers to submit the information sought (see paragraph 37 above). It would appear that no relevant information was gathered from the inspection of the call logs. 42. On 23 November 2009 two FSS officers, Y.I.G. and P.Y.I., were questioned as witnesses. On the night in question they had been on duty at the single checkpoint controlling vehicular access to the FSS. They both stated that from 11 p.m. on 28 October to 4 a.m. on 29 October 2009 no vehicles had passed through the checkpoint. Their statements were confirmed by copies of the entries in the car registration logs. 43. On the same day two other FSS officers who served in the Sunzhenskiy Unit, T.R.E. and L.Y.Dz., were questioned. They testified that at the material time no special operation had been carried out in respect of Mr Maskhud Makhloyev. 44. On 24 November 2009 the prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that the investigation was ongoing and that the measures taken thus far had not been able to establish the whereabouts of his son or the identity of the alleged perpetrators. 45. On 8 December 2009 the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Chechnya informed the prosecutor’s office that according to their information, Mr Maskhud Makhloyev was a member of an illegal armed group led by a certain A.M.B.Y., which was operating in Sunzhenskiy District in Ingushetia. 46. On the same day the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia informed the prosecutor’s office that they had not carried out any special operation at the material time at the applicant’s family house. 47. On 10 December 2009 the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia informed the prosecutor’s office that according to their information, Mr Maskhud Makhloyev was a member of a criminal group called “Caliphate” led by A.M.B.Y. 48. Between 3 March and 15 June 2010 several of the applicant’s neighbours were questioned as witnesses. They all stated that they had heard about the abduction of Mr Maskhud Makhloyev from his family, but had no direct knowledge of the event themselves. 49. On 5 April 2010 the prosecutor’s office requested a copy of the case file and medical documentation concerning the incident of 14 August 2009 (see paragraph 12 above) from the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia. On 6 April 2010 they were informed that the case file had been destroyed in a terrorist attack on 17 August 2009. 50. On 6 April 2010 the police officers who had been on duty at checkpoint “Angara 120” at the material time, M.A.L., Z.M.M. and M.I.M., were questioned as witnesses (see paragraph 32 above). They all stated that on the night of 28 to 29 October 2009 a convoy consisting of a Gazel minivan, a UAZ minivan and a UAZ car had not passed their post. 51. On 7 April 2010 the same statements were given by the police officers who had been on duty at checkpoint “Kerch-Kavkaz 1” at the material time, A.R.O. and Kh.A.Kh. 52. On 19 April 2010 the head of the prosecutor’s office instructed a special investigator, M.A.K., to establish the whereabouts of the adhesive tape which had been shown in the photograph included in the minutes of the inspection of the crime scene (see paragraph 22 above), to remove it and, if necessary, to order its expert analysis. It would appear that those instructions were not carried out. 53. On 5 June 2010 the applicant was questioned again by the prosecutor’s office. The questions concerned the charges brought against Mr Maskhud Makhloyev in 2006 and the incident of 14 August 2009 (see paragraphs 7 and 12 above). The applicant reiterated his previous statements and added that he did not know who had shot at his son on 14 August 2009 and for what reason. 54. On 2 July 2010 the prosecutor’s office requested all regional ministries of the interior to perform operational search activities to establish the whereabouts of Mr Maskhud Makhloyev. It would appear that no response was received to those requests. 55. On 27 July 2010 the applicant submitted a request to the prosecutor’s office to inform him about the results of the preliminary investigation. On 9 August 2010 he was informed that he could consult the case file on any day except at weekends. 56. On 10 August 2010 the investigator in charge of the case suspended the preliminary investigation for failure to establish the identity of the alleged perpetrators. It was stressed that the investigation had followed two possible versions of the incident in question: that the reason for abduction could had been a blood feud or hostility towards Maskhud Makhloyev; or that he had been detained by the law-enforcement agencies and kept in a military or other detention facility. Despite the investigative measures taken, the investigation had been unable to establish the identity of the alleged perpetrators. 57. On 8 October 2010 the applicant submitted another request to the prosecutor’s office, asking for permission to make photocopies of the documents in the case file. The applicant claimed that it was on this occasion that he had found out that the investigation had been suspended. 58. On 13 October 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Magasskiy District Court of Ingushetia (“the District Court”) under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the decision of 10 August 2010 to suspend the investigation. 59. On 26 October 2010 the District Court rejected his appeal. 60. On 3 November 2010 the applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court of Ingushetia (“the Supreme Court”). On 28 December 2010 the Supreme Court rejected his appeal and upheld the decision of 26 October 2010. 61. According to the latest information available to the Court (dated 28 June 2018), there have been no new developments in the case and Mr Maskhud Makhloyev’s whereabouts remain unknown. 62. On 25 February 2010 the prosecutor’s office instituted criminal proceedings concerning the bodily injuries caused to Mr Ibragim Makhloyev. On the same day those proceedings were joined to the proceedings concerning the abduction of Mr Maskhud Makhloyev. 63. On 1 March 2010 Mr Ibragim Makhloyev was granted victim status. 64. On 3 March 2010 Mr Ibragim Makhloyev was questioned again. He reiterated his previous statements.

5. On 7 July 2000 the applicant company and the Ukrvuglegeologiya State Company (“the UVG”), an administrative entity of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine represented by its own administrative entity, the Sevastopol‑based Izumrud Recreation Centre (“the IRC”), concluded a ten‑year rental agreement, under which the applicant company rented bedroom block no. 3 (“block no. 3”) in the IRC from the UVG. 6. Subsequently, the applicant company and the IRC concluded an additional agreement under which the former undertook to repair block no. 3, as previously approved by the UVG. The applicant company duly repaired it. 7. On an unspecified date the applicant company applied to the Sevastopol office of the State Property Fund of Ukraine (“the Fund”) seeking the privatisation of block no. 3. In turn, the latter sought approval from the Ministry, which in a letter of 6 August 2003 stated that it did not object. 8. By a decision of 8 December 2003 the Fund included block no. 3 in the list of property to be subjected to privatisation. 9. On 26 December 2003 the Fund’s Sevastopol office adopted a decision to privatise block no. 3 by entering into a contract selling it to the applicant company for 552,756 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH). This sum represented the block’s market value minus the value of the repairs made to it by the applicant company (UAH 375,295), as established in an expert report prepared on 30 November 2003 by the I. company at the office’s request. On the same date it concluded a sale contract with the applicant company, and the latter registered its title to block no. 3 with a notary. 10. In view of the above-mentioned contract, on 12 February 2004 the applicant company and the IRC terminated the rental agreement of 7 July 2000. 11. According to the applicant company, despite the above-mentioned contract, the UVG retained block no. 3 on its books. Moreover, in 2005 the block was disconnected from the IRC’s electricity and water supplies. 12. In August 2005 the applicant company lodged a claim with the Donetsk Regional Commercial Court against the UVG, asking the court to oblige the UVG to remove block no. 3 from its books and to reconnect it to the IRC’s networks. In turn, the UVG lodged a counterclaim against the applicant company and the Fund’s Sevastopol office, seeking the invalidation of the contract of 26 December 2003, alleging that the IRC and block no. 3 had not been eligible for privatisation. 13. By a judgment of 1 February 2006, the court partly allowed the claim and dismissed the counterclaim. It stated that the applicant company was the owner of block no. 3, having obtained title to it following its privatisation, which had not been declared invalid. As regards the alleged invalidity of the contract of 26 December 2003, it held that: (1) it was the Fund itself, rather than its Sevastopol office, which had made the decision on privatisation, and that decision was not being contested; (2) block no. 3 was privatised not as an “integral property complex” (цілісний майновий комплекс) but as an “individually determined immovable property” (індивідуально визначене майно – об’єкт нерухомості) which, in accordance with the law, could be privatised; and that (3) the UVG had failed to prove that block no. 3 belonged to the category of objects of cultural, historical or national importance which, under the law, could not be privatised. The court thus ordered the UVG to remove block no. 3 from its books and to reconnect it to the IRC’s utility networks. 14. On 21 March 2006 the Commercial Court of Appeal of the Donetsk Region quashed the above-mentioned judgment on the grounds that the case had to be examined by the Sevastopol City Commercial Court. On 21 June 2006 the Higher Commercial Court quashed that decision as erroneous and upheld the judgment of 1 February 2006. On 23 August 2006 the Supreme Court refused to allow an appeal by the UVG against the decision of 21 June 2006. 15. In the meantime, on 20 December 2005 the Ministry for the Coal Industry (the successor to the Ministry of Fuel and Energy) decided to reorganise the UVG by singling out its structural unit, the IRC, and creating on its base the Izumrud Recreation Centre State Enterprise (“the IRC State Enterprise”). The IRC State Enterprise was stated to be UVG’s successor in relation to the activities connected with its former structural unit, the IRC. 16. On 23 October 2006 the Donetsk Regional Commercial Court allowed a request by the applicant company and replaced the UVG with its successor, the IRC State Enterprise, as a party in proceedings instituted for the enforcement of the judgment of 1 February 2006 which remained unenforced. 17. On 4 June 2007 bailiffs informed the applicant company that they had two mutually exclusive writs of execution: one concerning the judgment of 1 February 2006 and another one concerning a judgment of 13 October 2006 (see paragraph 21 below). They sent a letter to the Donetsk Regional Commercial Court, asking it to clarify how the judgment of 1 February 2006 was to be enforced. It appears that they did not receive any reply and accordingly stayed the enforcement proceedings. 18. On 24 April 2007 the IRC State Enterprise lodged a request with the Donetsk Regional Commercial Court for a review of the judgment of 1 February 2006 under a procedure relating to newly discovered circumstances. Referring to findings made in the judgment of 13 October 2006, it considered that the judgment of 1 February 2006 had lost its legal effect and asked the court to quash it. 19. On 4 June 2008 the court returned the request unexamined, as the IRC State Enterprise had subsequently withdrawn its request, having failed both to explain the reasons for it and to send a representative to the court hearings. 20. In September 2006 the IRC State Enterprise lodged a claim with the Sevastopol City Commercial Court against the Fund’s Sevastopol office and the applicant company, seeking the invalidation of the contract of 26 December 2003. In response, the applicant company sought the discontinuation of the proceedings, arguing, with reference to Article 80 of the 1991 Code of Commercial Procedure, that the same dispute between the same parties had already been resolved by the judgment of 1 February 2006. 21. By a judgment of 13 October 2006, the court partly allowed the claim. It stated that the UVG, a geological-service enterprise, was a company of national importance. It thus belonged to the category of State property that had not been eligible for privatisation. At the moment of conclusion of the contract of 26 December 2003, block no. 3 had been part of the UVG’s integral property complex. The IRC was a structural unit of the UVG and its property could not be privatised. Therefore, the Fund’s inclusion of block no. 3 in the list of objects for privatisation had been in breach of the law. The court thus invalidated the contract of 26 December 2003, ordered the applicant company to return block no. 3 to the State and ordered the State to refund UAH 552,756 to the applicant company. As to the applicant company’s request, the court held that by the time the case had been resolved by the Donetsk Regional Commercial Court, the IRC had been reorganised into an independent legal entity and its property rights had been transferred to the IRC State Enterprise. The UVG had not therefore been a proper party to the proceedings and it could not have put forward any counterclaims seeking the invalidation of the contract of 26 December 2003. The applicant had thus failed to prove that the courts had already decided a claim by the IRC State Enterprise in relation to the same object and grounds. 22. On 10 November 2006 the Sevastopol Commercial Court of Appeal upheld the above judgment. As to the applicant company’s objections, it stated that it was the IRC State Enterprise, and not the UVG, which should have been the proper respondent (counterclaimant) in the case when the judgment of 1 February 2006 was adopted, and that the applicant company had failed to prove that the same dispute with the IRC State Enterprise had already been decided by the courts. 23. On 21 December 2006 the Higher Commercial Court partly amended the judgment of 13 October 2006 and removed from it an order that UAH 552,756 be refunded to the applicant company. It held that under domestic law in the event of the invalidation of a sale of privatised objects, money paid by buyers for such objects was to be refunded, on the basis of a court decision, from the proceeds of their onward sale. 24. On 20 February 2007 the Supreme Court upheld the above decision.

5. The details of the applicants are available in the Annex. 6. The applicants are owners of a property situated at 8, Flat 1, Old Prison Street, Senglea, (hereinafter “the property”) which they inherited from their ancestors. The property had been conceded to third parties by a title of temporary emphyteusis for a period of seventeen years, at an established ground rent of 40 Maltese liras (MTL - approximately EUR 98) per year, which was to expire in 1990. 7. On 1 September 1986 the Government issued a requisition order on the property. In October 1988 the Government derequisitioned the property and returned the keys to the applicants. 8. On 15 April 1989 the Commissioner of Land took over (occupied) the property. 9. In spring-summer 1989 the applicants became aware that the property had been demolished at some point between March and September 1989 in connection with a slum clearance project, in order to make way for the development of social housing. 10. By means of a President’s declaration of 27 October 1989, that is after the property was demolished, the Commissioner of Land formally took over the property under title of possession and use (see relevant domestic law). 11. By means of a President’s declaration of 4 October 1991 the Commissioner of Land issued an order to convert the title from one of possession and use into one of public tenure (see relevant domestic law). 12. On 22 March 1999, the Commissioner of Land submitted a notice to treat to the Land Arbitration Board (LAB), by means of which the sum of MTL 15.62 (approximately EUR 36.39) per year was offered to the owners (the Zammit family) as a yearly recognition rent. The sum was based on an estimate of the Land Valuation Office in line with their policies, but did not take account other factors, and was significantly lower than the rent at which the property had been leased prior to its demolition. 13. By means of a judicial letter of 12 April 1999 the owners refused the offer. 14. On 22 May 2000 the Commissioner of Land instituted proceedings before the LAB requesting them to order the transfer of the property and set the relevant compensation. 15. On 29 November 2006, the second and seventh applicants intervened in the proceedings as heirs of their deceased parent. 16. During these proceedings, the technical experts, appointed before the LAB, considered that in 1986 the property had been valued at MTL 1,000 (approximately EUR 2,320). On 10 August 2005 the applicants’ ex‑parte architect estimated the fair rent of the property in 2005 at the equivalent of EUR 229.64 per year, and its sale value at MTL 7,500 (approximately EUR 17,470.30) – the property having been demolished, his estimate was based on the plans of the building from which it transpired that it had a depth of 14.5 metres and a width of 5.5 metres. In 2011 the technical experts of the LAB considered that the rental value for the property was EUR 158.40 per year, and its sale value (according to the terms of possession and use) was EUR 10,575.36. 17. By a decision of 7 March 2012, acknowledging that the property had been demolished prior to the formal taking by the Government, the LAB considered that it was inconceivable that rent be paid for a property which had been demolished in order to be built anew, and that the right course of action would have been to acquire the property by outright purchase. Nevertheless, given that Article 19 of Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta concerning expropriation by public tenure did not preclude such an action, the LAB fixed the recognition rent at EUR 158.40 per year. 18. On 27 March 2012 the Commissioner of Land appealed against the amount of rent established. On 16 April 2012 the applicants filed a reply asking the court to declare the appeal null and void as appeals could only be lodged on points of law. It was also noted that constitutional redress proceedings were being lodged by the applicants concerning the illegalities in the procedure and the alleged unconstitutionality of the law. Following the constitutional redress proceedings (described below) the Commissioner of Land’s appeal was withdrawn. 19. On 16 April 2012 the applicants filed constitutional redress proceedings. They claimed that the demolition of the property was illegal and amounted to a de facto expropriation contrary to the Constitution and the Convention and its Protocols; that Article 19 of Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta and related articles were in breach of the Constitution and the Convention and its Protocols; they requested the court to annul the LAB’s decision and to award them damages as well as any other relevant remedy. 20. The defendants filed their reply and produced a valuation by an architect appointed by the Commissioner of Land who estimated the sale value of the property at EUR 45,000. The report noted that the property had been demolished and was replaced by new residential apartments. 21. By a judgment of 12 February 2014 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence delivered a partial judgment where it rejected the defendants’ plea that the applicants had not exhausted ordinary remedies, and found a violation of the applicants’ rights in so far as the recognition rent established for the taking under public tenure, which was not subject to any future increases, was too low and thus disproportionate. It rejected the remainder of the claims, and left the liquidation of damage to be established in the final judgment. 22. In particular the court was of the view that ‑ despite the applicants’ claim that the property had been demolished prior to it having been taken under possession and use ‑ the period in which the property had allegedly been taken and demolished must have been the same as that when it had been taken under title of possession and use, and thus the latter taking could not be considered illegal. According to domestic law the State could also have taken the property under title of public tenure in exchange for a recognition rent, to eventually demolish it. The demolition was thus lawful pursuant to Article 19 of Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta. As to the impugned law, this could not be found to be incompatible with the Constitution since it had been in force before 1962. As to its compatibility with the Convention, the court found that the taking had pursued a public interest namely a slum clearance project. However, the recognition rent established in line with LAB policies, which was not subject to any future increases, was too low and thus disproportionate. There had therefore been a breach of the applicants’ right of property. 23. During the continuation of the proceedings the applicants submitted an ex‑parte architect valuation dated 2014 which established the sale value of the property at EUR 50,000 and its rental value at EUR 250 per year. The report noted that the property had been demolished, and that it had had the measurements identified above, which resulted in an area of 80 square metres for the apartment which was located in a block of two apartments. The defendants declared that they did not object to this valuation. 24. By a judgment of 27 May 2015 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence awarded EUR 15,000 in non‑pecuniary damage, bearing in mind the value of the property, that no compensation had been paid since its demolition, that the applicants would never get their property back and the recognition rent would never increase. The court further held that pecuniary compensation would be decided by the LAB, when deciding on the Commissioner of Land’s appeal. Costs were to be shared equally between the parties. 25. The defendants appealed and the applicants cross‑appealed. By a judgment of 18 February 2016 the Constitutional Court varied the first‑instance judgment by limiting the basis of the violation, and reducing the compensation to EUR 1,500. 26. The Constitutional Court held that in view of the evidence, it could not agree with the first‑instance court that the demolition had taken place after a legitimate taking. Indeed there had been relevant witness testimony to the effect that the property had been demolished around three months prior to the first taking, the LAB had accepted that it was so, and the Government had not objected to such fact, nor had they shown when the demolition took place. It followed that the demolition had taken place prior to the taking under possession and use and at a time when the Government had no title over the property. However, even if this were not so, and that it had been demolished when it was under title of possession and use, the demolition would still have been unlawful, since according to law it was not possible to demolish a property under a title of possession and use the rights attached to which were limited. That illegality persisted until the Commissioner of Land acquired the property under title of public tenure; however, despite the passage of three years since the demolition the applicants did not challenge that measure. In any event that was no longer an issue, as the situation was sanctioned when the State took the property under title of public tenure (as provided for in Article 19 of Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta). The measure thus became lawful, and pursued the general interest of slum clearance. 27. Moreover, the applicants were entitled to recognition rent for the property and, more importantly, for the land at issue. Indeed the fact that the taking consisted of land (as the property above it had been demolished) made it feasible to apply the taking under public tenure procedure. The Constitutional Court further rejected the applicants’ claim that it would have been more appropriate to take the property by means of outright purchase, as they had not requested the LAB to order the Commissioner of Land to take such a course of action under the mentioned Article 19. The law granted the Commissioner of Land discretion as to which form of taking it would undertake and the Constitutional Court’s role was limited to verifying whether the form of taking which was actually used breached the rights of an individual. 28. As to the proportionality of the measure, the Constitutional Court noted that the applicants had claimed recognition rent of EUR 229.64 yearly and were awarded by the LAB a rent of EUR 158.40 yearly which the applicants had not appealed. Thus, given the award, in the light of their claim, it could not be considered that there arose such a disproportionality leading to a violation of the applicants’ property rights. Nevertheless, a breach did arise as a result of a failure to pay compensation since 1989, given that the applicants’ refusal to accept the offer of MTL 15.62 (approximately EUR 36.39) had been entirely justified. The Constitutional Court noted that as the breach had occurred and continued to persist, there was no reason to await the outcome of the LAB proceedings. 29. As to redress the Constitutional Court considered that the applicants were to be awarded non‑pecuniary damage for the violation suffered. It furthered considered that the taking had pursued two legitimate aims, firstly social housing, and secondly slum clearance. While the applicants claimed compensation of around EUR 50,000 the Constitutional Court noted that the sale value according to the applicant’s ex-parte architect in 2005 was EUR 17,470.30 and that in 2011, according to the technical experts of the board, it was EUR 10,575.36. Thus, given the small size of the property, the area in which it was in, the fact that it had been demolished at the expense of the Government and the fact that the recognition rent was adequate, the Constitutional Court considered that EUR 1,500 was an adequate amount of compensation to be shared by the applicants jointly. It further considered that it needed not examine the Convention compatibility of the relevant law in abstracto, it having already determined that its application in the present case constituted a breach. Costs of the first‑instance proceedings were to remain shared by the parties, as were those of the main appeal; and costs of the cross appeal were to be paid by the applicants. 30. At the date of lodging the application with the Court, the applicants had not received any compensation, nor had they received any recognition rent since the date of the demolition of the property. The property has been rebuilt as apartments for social housing. 31. Section 5 of the Land Acquisition (Public Purposes) Ordinance (“the Ordinance”), Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta (now repealed), provided for three methods of acquisition by the Government of private property. It reads as follows: “The competent authority may acquire any land required for any public purpose, either - (a) by the absolute purchase thereof; or (b) for the possession and use thereof for a stated time, or during such time as the exigencies of the public purpose shall require; or (c) on public tenure: Provided that after a competent authority has acquired any land for possession and use or on public tenure the conversion into public tenure or into absolute ownership of the terms upon which such land is held shall always be deemed to be an acquisition of land required for a public purpose and to be in the public interest: Provided also that, subject to the provisions of articles 14, 15 and 16, a competent authority may acquire land partly by one and partly by another or others of the methods in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c): Provided further that where the land is to be acquired on behalf and for the use of a third party for a purpose connected with or ancillary to the public interest or utility, the acquisition shall, in every case, be by the absolute purchase of the land.” 32. Section 13 regarding compensation read, in so far as relevant, as follows: “(1) The amount of compensation to be paid for any land required by a competent authority may be determined at any time by agreement between the competent authority and the owner, saving the provisions contained in subarticle (2). (2) The compensation shall in the case of acquisition of land for temporary possession and use be an acquisition rent and in the case of acquisition of land on public tenure be a recognition rent determined in either case in accordance with the relevant provisions contained in article 27.” 33. The Ordinance provided that compensation in respect of absolute purchase was to be calculated in accordance with the applicable “fair rent”, as agreed by the parties following the Government’s offer or as established by the LAB. In respect of public tenure, Section 27(13) of the Ordinance provided as follows: “The compensation in respect of the acquisition of any land on public tenure shall be equal to the acquisition rent assessable in respect thereof in accordance with the provisions contained in subarticles (2) to (12), inclusive, of this article, increased (a) by forty per centum (40%) in the case of an old urban tenement and (b) by twenty per centum (20%) in the case of agricultural land.” 34. In so far as relevant, Section 19(1) and (5) read as follows: “(1) When land has been acquired by a competent authority for use and possession during such time as the exigencies of the public purpose shall require, the owner may, after the lapse of ten years from the date when possession was taken by the competent authority, apply to the Board for an order that the land be purchased or acquired on public tenure or vacated within a period of one year from the date of the order, and the land shall either be vacated or acquired on public tenure or purchased upon compensation to be determined in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance or of any Ordinance amending or substituted for this Ordinance. (5) Public tenure shall of its nature endure in perpetuity, without prejudice to any consolidation by mutual consent or otherwise according to law of that tenure with the residual ownership of the land; and the recognition rent payable in respect thereof shall in every case be unalterable, without prejudice to the effects of any consolidation, total or partial. The residual ownership of land held on public tenure with the inherent right to receive recognition rent, shall, for all purposes of law, be deemed to be an immovable right by reason of the object to which it refers and shall be transferable according to law at the option of the owner, from time to time, of that right.” 35. Thus, while a taking under title of “possession and use” was intended for a determinate period of time, a taking under title of “public tenure” was for an indeterminate period of time, possibly forever, and the relevant recognition rent was to remain unaltered for its duration.

6. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Tolyatti. 7. On 8 May 2007 the applicant’s daughter, Z., was found hanged in the apartment where she had been living with her husband, Ch., and their two minor children. 8. On the same day the law-enforcement bodies of the Nenetskiy Autonomous Region were informed of Z.’s death. An on-site inspection and an initial examination of Z.’s body were carried out. Statements were obtained from those who had had contact with Z. shortly before her death and a post-mortem examination of Z.’s body was ordered. 9. The post-mortem examination (in a report of 1 June 2007) established that Z. had died as a result of mechanical asphyxia caused by deliberate self‑harm by means of hanging. Apart from a strangulation mark, multiple bruises and abrasions were discovered on Z.’s face, forearms and shins which could have manifested shortly before Z.’s death as a result of impacts from blunt objects, such as blows inflicted on her face, arms and legs at the hands of another person. Ethyl alcohol was found in Z.’s blood and urine, which confirmed that she had been in a state of alcohol intoxication. 10. In May to June 2007 the applicant lodged complaints with the Nenetskiy Regional Prosecutor’s Office, seeking to have criminal proceedings instituted against her son-in-law, Ch., who she alleged had incited Z. to commit suicide by inflicting regular beatings and other violent actions on her. 11. Between 18 May 2007 and 14 October 2009 nineteen decisions were taken by an investigator refusing to institute a formal criminal investigation into Z.’s death. The pre-investigation inquiry established that Z., in a state of alcohol intoxication and after having had a row with Ch., had committed suicide by hanging herself. The above decisions were subsequently set aside by the supervising prosecutor and by the Naryan-Mar Town Court of the Nenetskiy Autonomous Region (“the Town Court”) as unlawful and unsubstantiated. On each occasion it was noted that the instructions, given to the investigator by the prosecutor and the head of the criminal investigations department, to carry out procedural measures aimed at establishing the existence of the circumstances mentioned in the applicant’s complaint and the circumstances surrounding Z.’s death, had not been complied with. 12. On 13 November 2009 the applicant complained to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office of the failure of the criminal investigations department and the police department to carry out comprehensive and prompt inquiries into the death of her daughter. 13. On the same day the first deputy prosecutor of the Regional Prosecutor’s Office held that there had been a failure to comply with the law and the requirement of promptness in carrying out the inquiry into Z.’s death by the officers of the criminal investigations department and the police department, which had violated the applicant’s rights. 14. Subsequently, on 15 December 2009 the investigator took another decision refusing to institute a criminal investigation into Z.’s death. 15. On 16 September 2011 the chief of the Inter-District Investigative Department of the Investigation Committee of the Russian Federation for the Arkhangelsk Region and the Nenetskiy Autonomous Region set aside the decision of 15 December 2009 as unlawful and unsubstantiated. He noted, in particular, that the investigator had not given due consideration to information received from several persons to the effect that Ch. had regularly subjected Z. to beatings and humiliation. In order to establish the circumstances of the incident and the reasons and the motives for the suicide, the chief investigator considered it necessary to carry out investigative measures involving, in particular, specialists and experts in psychology and psychiatry, which was only possible in the framework of a criminal investigation. 16. On 19 September 2011 criminal proceedings were instituted against Ch. under Article 110 of the Criminal Code (incitement to commit suicide). 17. On 20 September 2011, however, the deputy prosecutor of the Nenetskiy Autonomous Region set aside the above decision. 18. Following another round of pre-investigation inquiries, on 24 October 2011 the institution of a criminal investigation into the death of Z. was again refused under Article 24 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in view of a lack of the constituent elements of a crime under Article 110 of the Criminal Code in Ch.’s actions and the absence of any crime under Article 105 § 1 of the Criminal Code (murder). The investigator arrived at the conclusion that Z.’s decision to commit suicide had not been provoked by any actions of Ch. amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment. Z. had been in a state of severe alcohol intoxication and could not have fully understood her actions when taking the decision to take her own life. The bruises and abrasions on Z.’s face and body could have originated during a heated altercation with Ch. shortly before the former’s death. No direct evidence in support of the theory that Ch. had ill-treated Z. had been discovered. Even assuming that the two disclosed instances of Z. being beaten by Ch. (in 2005 and 2007) had indeed taken place, they would have been one-off unrelated events occurring under unspecified circumstances and could not have been connected to Z.’s decision to take her own life. Furthermore, Z. had not been fully dependent on Ch. or particularly vulnerable. According to Z.’s relatives, she could have left Ch. at any time, divorced him, taken the children and changed her place of residence. She could also have sought medical assistance, and/or complained about Ch.’s actions to the police. However, she had not done so. At the same time she had told her relatives that she loved her husband and did not want to divorce him. The case file further contained information indicating that Ch. had inflicted beatings on Z. in June 2006, of which Z. had complained to the police. However, Z.’s submissions had been inconsistent and she had eventually refused to pursue those proceedings. The applicant’s theory that Ch. had staged the suicide had been checked and found to be unsupported by the material in the case file. 19. Following a complaint by the applicant, on 10 September 2013 the Town Court found the decision of 24 October 2011 lawful and justified. 20. In the meantime, on 8 May 2008 it had been established by the investigator that Ch.’s actions in respect of Z. contained the elements of a criminal offence under Article 117 § 1 of the Criminal Code (causing physical suffering by inflicting regular beatings) for the period between 19 June 2006 and 8 May 2007. The relevant material was submitted for a pre-investigation inquiry to the Nenetskiy Autonomous Region police department. 21. Between May 2008 and March 2010 at least seventeen decisions were taken by the police department refusing to institute criminal proceedings against Ch. under Article 117 § 1 of the Criminal Code, all of which were subsequently set aside by the supervising prosecutor as unlawful and unsubstantiated. 22. On 24 June 2010 criminal proceedings were instituted against Ch. under Article 117 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 23. On 7 July 2010 the applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. 24. On 13 April 2011 Ch.’s actions were reclassified as inflicting beatings, thus coming under Article 116 § 1 of the Criminal Code, but charges under this Article could not be pursued in the absence of an application by the victim. Accordingly, the criminal proceedings were discontinued on the basis of Article 24 § 1 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 25. In April 2009 the applicant brought civil proceedings against the Ministry of Finance seeking damages for the non-pecuniary harm caused to her by the failure of the domestic authorities to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances of her daughter’s death. 26. On 5 June 2009 the Naryan-Mar Town Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. 27. On 16 July 2009 the Nenetskiy Autonomous Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.

6. The applicant was born in 1954. He lived in the Republic of Dagestan and was the mayor of Makhachkala between 1998 and 2013. He is currently detained in correctional colony no. 6 in Orenburg Region (“the correctional colony”). 7. In June 2013 the applicant was arrested and placed in custody pending criminal proceedings against him. He suffered from several illnesses, including a urinary condition, a rectal prolapse, hepatitis C, and type 2 diabetes. He was confined to a wheelchair and had to use catheters and enemas to urinate and defecate. 8. On 12 August 2013 he lodged an application with the Court complaining that he was not receiving adequate medical assistance in detention. Four days later the Court indicated to the Russian Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that he should be examined by medical experts. 9. On 27 November 2014 the Court delivered a judgment in the case, finding, inter alia, that there had been violations of Articles 3 and 34 of the Convention on account of the authorities’ failure to provide the applicant with adequate medical care or to comply with the interim measure indicated (see Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857/13, §§ 75, 93, and 94, 27 November 2014). 10. Relying on Article 46 of the Convention the Court held that the authorities should admit the applicant, at that time detained in remand prison no. 4 in Rostov-on-Don, to a specialised medical facility where he should remain under constant medical supervision and should be provided with adequate medical services corresponding to his needs; alternatively, the authorities could place him in a specialised prison medical facility, if the facility could guarantee the requisite level of medical supervision and care. (see Amirov, cited above, § 118). 11. After 27 November 2014, the date of the Court’s judgment in the applicant’s first case, he continued being detained in the remand prison pending the completion of his trial. 12. According to the information from the Government, in 2014 the applicant’s cell was re-equipped to take account of his needs as a wheelchair user. Handrails were installed near his bed and the toilet, and the furniture was put at a lower level in order to be accessible. Wheelchair ramps and a lift were installed in the detention facility. A room for personal-hygiene procedures needed by the applicant was located opposite his cell with all the necessary equipment. 13. In 2015 he was examined by various doctors, such as a general practitioner, a neurologist, a surgeon, a urologist, and a proctologist. He underwent basic medical tests and received the treatment he had been prescribed. The prison doctors found his overall condition to be satisfactory. 14. The applicant’s lawyers noticed, however, that his state of health had worsened. They solicited medical opinions on the treatment required. 15. On 14 July 2015 Dr W., a specialist in neurology, examined the applicant. He noted progressive muscular dystrophy, the development of leg convulsions, and urinary problems. An immediate admission to a specialised hospital for long-term treatment and urological surgery was recommended. The doctor said that further detention in prison would put the applicant’s life at risk. 16. On 30 October 2015 the applicant was examined by a forensic expert, Dr N., who confirmed the deterioration of his medical condition, and noted the development of bedsores. The doctor suggested that the applicant’s state of health might warrant early release on medical grounds and stated that he needed constant medical care. 17. On 22 January 2016 Dr N. assessed the quality of the medical care in the remand prison. He noted the absence of exercise therapy, physiotherapy, and massage, and was concerned that the prison premises were not sterile enough for hygienic procedures. 18. In the meantime, on 27 August 2015 the Military Court of the North‑Caucasus Circuit found the applicant guilty of having organised an act of terrorism and an attempt to murder an investigator in his case. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in a high-security correctional colony. The Supreme Court of Russia upheld the conviction and sentence on 24 March 2016. 19. On 1 April 2016 the applicant was sent to serve his sentence in the correctional colony. 20. He spent the first two weeks of his detention in an ordinary cell in the quarantine wing. According to a letter from the chairman of the Committee for Civil Rights sent to the applicant’s lawyer on 20 April 2016, the cell was not adapted to the needs of a wheelchair prisoner. The applicant depended on his fellow inmates, who assisted him in his daily needs, including helping him to perform enemas on himself. 21. Every day the applicant was taken, handcuffed and blindfolded, to the prison yard for exercise. 22. On 2 April 2016 he was examined by several prison doctors: a tuberculosis specialist, an infectious-diseases specialist, a dentist and a general practitioner. The latter recorded his illnesses, ordered blood and urine tests, and prescribed treatment, comprising of a special diet and drugs. He noted that the applicant needed regular catheterisation and enemas. Examinations by specialists in endocrinology, ophthalmology, gastroenterology, neurology, cardiology, urology, and surgery, and exercise therapy were recommended. 23. The applicant was regularly visited by the prison general practitioner in the quarantine wing and underwent blood and urine tests. The doctor was satisfied with his medical condition and the results of his treatment. 24. On 14 April 2016 the applicant was moved to medical unit no. 56 and placed in cell no. 12. He shared its space of 14 sq. m with one cellmate. The applicant was provided with a wide bed, a sink installed at a low level, and a medical couch, which he used during self-catheterisation procedures. Enemas were carried out in a separate room twice a week with the assistance of the medical unit staff. The custodial authorities continued handcuffing and blindfolding him while he was escorted to the yard. 25. On 11 May 2016 he was examined by several doctors: a general practitioner, an endocrinologist, a neurologist, and a urologist from the civilian hospital in Sol-Iletsk. According to the medical records kept by the doctors, his medical condition was acute. No recommendations for inpatient treatment or urgent medical measures were made. The endocrinologist ordered tests of his thyroid-gland hormones, which were carried out on the same day. The neurologist prescribed exercise. The latter prescription was endorsed by a prison doctor on 19 May 2016. 26. On 23 May 2016 the applicant was again examined by the endocrinologist, who noted, inter alia, the risk due to a low level of thyroid hormones. Another hormone test was prescribed for August 2016. 27. The applicant was examined by a medical board to establish whether he was entitled to early release on medical grounds. The board concluded that his medical condition did not warrant it. 28. From 6 to 8 June 2016 a commission of officials from the Russian Ombudsman’s Office, the Orenburg Ombudsman’s Office, the Orenburg prosecutor’s office, the Federal Service of the Execution for Sentences in Orenburg Region and medical unit no. 56 came to the applicant’s detention facility and examined the quality of his medical care. The commission concluded that it was adequate. 29. On 8 June 2016 the applicant was visited by an exercise-therapy specialist, who taught him exercises to support his health. It appears that this visit was a follow-up to previous visits by the specialist, in April and May 2016. However, the medical record does not disclose particular details of the recommendations made on those two previous occasions. 30. On 4 July 2016 two members of the Orenburg Regional Public Commission for Monitoring the Protection of Human Rights in Detention (Общественная наблюдательная комиссия Оренбургской области) inspected the colony. It appears that by the time of the inspection the applicant had been moved to another cell. The inspectors noted in particular, that the cell was divided into three sections by metal bars and housed six inmates. The applicant’s section measured 10.8 sq. m; it had a bath, a medical couch, a sink, and a bedside table with television set. The toilet was not partitioned from the rest of the cell and the applicant could be observed by his cellmate while using it. The correctional colony lacked wheelchair ramps, so the applicant could not freely access the yard or meeting rooms. He complained that the necessary drugs had had to be supplied by his relatives, owing to a lack of funds, which were to be allocated in the near future. Medical supervision was carried out by the general practitioner as regular examinations by other specialists had not been considered necessary. Allegedly owing to the applicant not having received medical massages, the applicant’s legs started convulsing. He was assisted by his cellmate, who helped him to get into bed. The applicant was not given a special diet. 31. On 11 August 25 October and 16 December 2016, and 19 April 2017 a special medical board of highly qualified civilian and prison doctors, and specialists in cardiology, endocrinology, neurology, and urology examined the applicant. They concluded that there was no need to admit the applicant to a specialist medical facility and that he could continue receiving treatment in the medical unit. The doctors were satisfied with the quality of medical care given to the applicant. 32. In the meantime the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation of the applicant’s detention conditions and the poor quality of his medical treatment. The complaint was forwarded to the prosecutor’s office for the supervision of detention facilities in Orenburg Region. Having carried out enquiries, on 5 July 2016 the Office replied as follows: “It has been established that on admission to [the correctional colony the applicant] was placed in [a cell of the quarantine wing]. It was designed for two persons and measured 12 sq. m, which satisfied the requirements of the Execution of Sentences Act ... [The applicant’s] cellmate assisted him in his daily needs, which included hygienic procedures and moving around the cell. Accordingly, [the applicant] was not restricted in his rights ... The allegation that [the applicant] was not provided with special conditions [needed in his situation] is not true. His cell in the medical unit is furnished with a specially designed table, a bed and a sink, so he can easily access them and move freely about the cell. [The applicant] is assisted by the medical unit staff members and inmates in his movements within the medical unit, in particular when entering/leaving buildings in a wheelchair, and in his daily needs. As called for by [the applicant’s] disability and illnesses, he is examined by the prison doctors on a daily basis, he receives medical treatment as prescribed to the relevant medical standards, and he is provided with dietary nutrition. In May 2016 [the custodial authorities] provided him with a mattress [to prevent] bedsores. [The applicant] urinates with the help of a catheter which he inserts six to seven times per day (as recommended by [a urologist]). He defecates with the help of enemas performed every three days by medical staff from the medical unit. Detainees, who work in the medical unit, escort [the applicant] to a special room for that procedure and clean it afterwards. The regional medical standard “Procedures for simple medical procedures, desmurgy and immobilisation”, approved by an Order of the Ministry of the Health Care and Social Development of Orenburg Region on 5 March 2010 does not require catheterisation or enemas to be carried out in a sterile room. Sterile catheters and enemas tips are used by [the applicant]. In breach of Article 30 of the Penal Institutions Act (Federal Law no. 5473-1 of 21 June 1993), [the applicant] was escorted for walks handcuffed and blindfolded until 24 May 2016. Moreover, the inquiry, which had been performed earlier, revealed breaches of Article 101 § 7 of the Russian Code on the Execution of Sentences and Articles 10, 11, and 11.1 of the Social Protection of the Disabled in the Russian Federation Act (Federal Law of 24 November 1995 No. 181-FZ). [In accordance with the aforementioned Regulation, the applicant] should have been given the necessary devices (a wheelchair for mobility, an indoor wheelchair, a gel pillow to prevent bedsores, nappies for adults, and urinals). However, the custodial authorities have not provided him with those items. [Moreover,] the detention facility did not take measures to provide the exercise and sport therapy [for the applicant] indicated in his rehabilitation programme. In the light of the above, on 2 June 2016 the prosecutor’s office for supervision of detention facilities in Orenburg issued a formal order to the head of the correctional colony to rectify the identified shortcomings. The order has been ... complied with ... There are no grounds for a further intervention by the prosecutor ...”

5. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Odesa. 6. At the time of the events the applicant was the director general of a joint venture V. (“company V.”), which had its office in the premises belonging to a joint stock company Y. (“company Y.”). 7. In March 2001 the owner of company Y. changed. The new management questioned the legality of the use of its premises by company V. More specifically, they challenged the lease contract of 12 January 1999 in respect of those premises, which had been signed by the applicant, on the one side, and N., the chairman of the board of directors of company Y. at the time, on the other side. Under that contract, company V. could use the office space in question from 12 January 1999 to 12 January 2020 without any payment, but in exchange for certain services for company Y. 8. Starting from April 2001, company Y. no longer allowed access to its premises to company V. As a result, the applicant transformed his flat in a temporary office of company V. 9. In June 2001 company V. brought commercial proceedings against company Y. seeking compliance with the lease contract. Company Y., in turn, lodged a counter-claim seeking invalidation of that contract. By a final decision of the Supreme Court of 25 September 2003, the national courts rejected the claim of company V. and discontinued the proceedings as regards company Y.’s counter-claim. It was concluded that “there [was] no subject matter of the dispute”, given that the impugned contract failed to stipulate basic terms inherent in a lease contract and could not therefore be regarded as a lease contract. 10. On 3 October 2001 a criminal case was opened in respect of suspected forgery of the lease contract of 12 January 1999, without being targeted against any particular persons. 11. On 8 October 2001 the Odesa Prymorskyy District Prosecutor’s Office (“the Prymorskyy Prosecutor’s Office”) issued a warrant for seizure of fifteen documents relevant for the investigation, such as the original of the lease contract itself, related correspondence and several statements of acceptance of the services indicated in the contract (see paragraph 7 above). The seizure was to be carried out in company V.’s office. 12. On 11 October 2001 the seizure took place in the applicant’s flat, in the presence of his wife. It appears that the applicant was not present. Eleven of the fifteen documents listed in the warrant were seized. The seizure report did not contain any information as to whether it had been handed to any person occupying the premises. The applicant did not specify in the domestic proceedings, or in the present proceedings, how the seizure of the documents had taken place. 13. On 15 October 2001 the seizure warrant of 8 October 2001 was served on the applicant. 14. On 22 October 2001 the investigator decided that a forensic expert examination of the signatures on the contract of 12 January 1999 was required in order to establish their real date. 15. On 7 November 2001 the Odesa Prymorskyy District Court (“the Prymorskyy Court”) ordered a search of the applicant’s flat, which was also company V.’s office, with a view to collecting samples of his handwriting and signatures. As stated in the court’s ruling, “notebooks, correspondence and other personal records with [the applicant’s] handwriting” were required for the above-mentioned expert evaluation. That decision was not amenable to appeal. 16. On the following day the search took place in the applicant’s flat in his presence and resulted in a seizure of eleven documents. The applicant did not provide any description, be it in the domestic proceedings or in the present proceedings, as to how the search had been carried out. 17. On 24 December 2001 the investigator ordered a seizure of company V.’s constituent documents from the company’s office. It appears that the seizure was carried out on the same day in the applicant’s flat. 18. On 9 January 2002 the above seizure warrant was served on the applicant. 19. On 6 May 2002 company V. founders’ meeting decided to suspend the applicant from the exercise of his duties as its director general pending the ongoing criminal proceedings. 20. On 20 August 2002 the prosecutor discontinued the proceedings for the absence of unequivocal evidence of a criminal offence. Although a forensic expert examination had established that the signatures on the impugned contract had been antedated (namely, it was established that they had been made no earlier than in February 2001), the official approval of the technical methods used by the expert was previewed only for the autumn of 2002. 21. On 1 September 2002 the applicant resumed his duties in company V. 22. On 28 August 2002 the applicant brought proceedings against the Prymorskyy Prosecutor’s Office claiming compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage allegedly caused by its unlawful actions. The applicant based his lawsuit on the fact that the criminal proceedings had been terminated, without raising any specific complaints about the search and seizures. He contended that the institution of the criminal proceedings had been arbitrary, which had led, inter alia, to the unlawful search of his flat and the seizure of documents. 23. On 9 December 2002 the Prymorskyy Court rejected the applicant’s claim as unfounded. The case file does not contain a copy of that decision. It appears that the court’s conclusion was that the applicant had not suffered any non-pecuniary damage. 24. The applicant appealed. He argued, in particular, that the impugned measures had been devoid of any legitimate purpose given the impossibility at the time to carry out the forensic handwriting examination ordered by the investigator. He further submitted that, in ordering the seizure of documents, no differentiation had been made between the company’s premises and his home. The applicant maintained that the first-instance court had left those matters without consideration. 25. On 11 September 2003 the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal. It held, in particular, that the company’s office had de facto been located in the applicant’s flat. As regards his complaint about the court’s failure to assess all the circumstances of the case, the appellate court dismissed it as ungrounded. 26. On 3 February 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ decisions.

5. The applicants were born in 1948 and 1963 and live in Istanbul and Ankara respectively. 6. They held a certain amount of shares in Türkiye Tütüncüler Bankası Yaşarbank A.Ş. (hereinafter “Yaşarbank”) - a private bank established in 1924 - which they had bought on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 7. By a decision dated 21 December 1999 (no. 99/13765), the Council of Ministers decided to transfer the management and control of Yaşarbank as well as all of its shareholder rights (except for dividends) to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduat Sigorta Fonu – hereinafter “the Fund”), pursuant to section 14(3) and (5) of the Banking Activities Act (Law no. 4389) as amended by Law no. 4491. With the same decision, the Council of Ministers also decided to transfer the ownership of Yaşarbank’s shares to the Fund under section 14(5) of the same Act. 8. At the time of the transfer, 48.48% of Yaşarbank’s shares were owned by Yaşar Holding A.Ş., 32.85% by companies belonging to the Yaşar Group, 2.08% by foundations belonging to the Yaşar Group, and 0.12% by the Yaşar family. Lastly, the remaining 16.47% of capital was held by the public, including the applicants. 9. On 21 December 1999 Yaşarbank’s shares, which were open to the public, sold on the Istanbul Stock Exchange at a price of 1,950 former Turkish liras (TRL) each. 10. A financial report prepared by a private audit company on 22 December 1999 noted that Yaşarbank’s assets and liabilities amounted to TRL 385.46 trillion and TRL 947.16 trillion respectively. 11. On 26 January and 18 February 2001 respectively the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu - hereinafter “the Agency”) decided that Yaşarbank would be consolidated under Sümerbank and that the former’s banking licence would be revoked. 12. On 4 February 2000 the main shareholders of Yaşarbank, including Yaşar Holding A.Ş., brought an administrative case against the Agency, seeking the annulment of the decision of 21 December 1999 regarding the bank’s transfer to the Fund. They argued, inter alia, that the conditions set forth by section 14(3) of Law no. 4389 as regards the transfer of a bank to the Fund had not been satisfied and that accordingly the Council of Ministers’ decision had been unlawful. In that connection, they argued that following its amendment by Law no. 4491, section 14(3) provided for more detailed measures which would be implemented gradually. However, the bank had not been invited to take those measures and the authorities had failed to take account of the recovery plan it had submitted which, according to them, could have strengthened the bank’s financial situation had it been implemented. They also claimed that the transfer of the bank had been disproportionate in view of the other measures provided for by section 14 of Law no. 4389. Lastly, they raised a plea of unconstitutionality. 13. On an unspecified date the main shareholders initiated administrative proceedings, challenging the revocation of Yaşarbank’s banking licence. 14. On 27 February 2002, after examining a number of expert reports, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the main shareholders’ action for the annulment of Yaşarbank’s transfer to the Fund. Firstly, the court rejected the main shareholders’ request to refer the case to the Constitutional Court for a preliminary ruling, finding that section 14 of Law no. 4389 did not contravene Article 35 of the Constitution, which guaranteed the right to property. As to the merits, it found that in line with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of section 14 of Law No. 4389 the administration had discretion to choose the measures to be adopted according to the severity of the financial problems involved and that the measures provided for by the different paragraphs of section 14 need not be implemented in order. Moreover, in view of its deteriorating financial situation, Yaşarbank had been placed under the close supervision of the authorities pursuant to the former Banking Activities Act (Law no. 3182). However, it had failed to apply the measures pointed out in the relevant audit reports issued during that period of supervision. Nor had the recovery plan prepared by the bank been sufficient to improve its financial situation. The Supreme Administrative Court concluded that the continuation of Yaşarbank’s activities would have jeopardised the rights of its creditors and undermined the reliability and stability of the banking system. 15. On 27 October 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court also dismissed the action regarding the annulment of the revocation of Yaşarbank’s banking licence. 16. By two separate decisions delivered on 29 April 2004, the General Assembly of the Administrative Proceedings Divisions of the Supreme Administrative Court (Danıştay İdari Dava Daireleri Genel Kurulu - hereinafter “the General Assembly”) upheld both judgments. On 8 February 2007 the General Assembly rejected an application for rectification by the main shareholders. 17. A detailed description of the facts surrounding the State’s takeover of Yaşarbank and the proceedings initiated by the main shareholders may be found in the case of Yaşar Holding A.Ş. v. Turkey ((merits), no. 48642/07, 4 April 2017). 18. On an unspecified date the first applicant bought a number of shares in Yaşarbank on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 19. Following the transfer of Yaşarbank to the Fund, the first applicant initiated proceedings, requesting the annulment of the transfer and claiming compensation of TRL 2 trillion, the approximate value of his shares at the time, together with interest. He maintained that he had bought the shares on the stock market, relying on the financial statements of the bank, which had been supervised by the Capital Markets Board (Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu) and approved by independent auditing agencies. He argued accordingly that no fault could be attributed to him for Yaşarbank’s transfer to the Fund and that he should have received the same protection as that granted to the creditors of the bank. The first applicant pointed out that the main shares of banks and shares bought on the stock market were subject to different legal provisions and thus should have been dealt with separately during the State’s takeover of the bank. In that connection, he argued that the relevant legislation, in particular section 14(5) of Law no. 4389, was unclear in that it referred to the transfer of the shares of the main shareholders and the transfer of all shares of the bank in the same sentence, making it difficult to understand the scope of the transfer covered by that provision. He concluded therefore that the transfer of his shares to the Fund, without any compensation in return, had violated his right to property. The first applicant also raised a plea of unconstitutionality as regards section 14 of Law no. 4389. 20. On 18 June 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant’s case. Referring to its judgment of 27 February 2002 regarding the main shareholders’ action for the annulment of the impugned transfer, the court found that the Council of Ministers’ decision to transfer the bank to the Fund had been lawful. In that connection, it reiterated that taking account of reports drawn up following inspections of Yaşarbank over a five-year period, instructions given to the bank by the State authorities, and the failure of the bank to improve its financial situation following these instructions, it had become clear that further activity of the bank, whose assets had been insufficient to cover its liabilities, would disrupt the stability of the financial system and make it impossible for the authorities to protect its creditors’ rights. With regard to the first applicant’s compensation claim, the court noted that the administration was not liable to pay compensation for any loss resulting from the transfer of Yaşarbank. It noted that the applicant should be considered a partner of the bank as he had owned shares in it, and that although the aim of commercial activity was to make profit, one could not remove the risk of loss from such activity. The court also rejected the first applicant’s request to refer the case to the Constitutional Court. 21. The first applicant appealed, stating that the Supreme Administrative Court had violated his right to a fair trial as it had not addressed his main argument, that is, the transfer of his shares as a minority shareholder. In that connection, he maintained again that the State authorities had failed in their duty of supervision, in that they had not informed the public of Yaşarbank’s deteriorating financial situation and had caused the deprivation of his shares by their wrongful actions. 22. On 29 April 2004 the General Assembly upheld the judgment. The final decision was served on the applicant on 20 July 2004. 23. On various occasions between 3 and 20 December 1999 the second applicant bought a certain amount of shares in Yaşarbank on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 24. Following the Council of Ministers’ decision to transfer Yaşarbank to the Fund, on 18 February 2000 he brought a case against the Fund, requesting the annulment of that decision. He maintained that he reserved the right to request compensation at a later stage. He argued, inter alia, that section 14(5) of Law no. 4389 as amended by Law no. 4491 did not cover the shares of minority shareholders and its application in Yaşarbank’s case had been unlawful as it had resulted in the transfer of all of the bank’s shares, including those of minority shareholders such as himself, who had bought their shares on the stock market, relying on information provided by the authorities. In that connection, he maintained that the deprivation of his property had resulted from the authorities’ failure to comply with their duty of supervision, and in particular the failure of the Capital Markets Board to inform the public of Yaşarbank’s deteriorating financial situation, as required by the Capital Markets Act (Law no. 2499). The second applicant also raised a plea of unconstitutionality regarding section 14(3) to (5) of Law no. 4389. 25. On 8 October 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the second applicant’s request to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court. The court also dismissed the action for the annulment of Yaşarbank’s takeover by the State, finding that the Council of Ministers’ decision to transfer the bank to the Fund had been lawful. In doing so it repeated the reasoning it had provided in the first applicant’s case. 26. The applicant appealed, arguing that the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment had merely pointed out that the transfer of the bank had been lawful, without addressing his main argument, namely the unlawfulness of the application of section 14(5) and the resulting transfer of the shares obtained on the stock market together with those of the main shareholders. 27. On 7 October 2004 the General Assembly upheld the judgment. 28. On 3 May 2007 the appellate court rejected a rectification application lodged by the applicant. That final decision was served on the applicant on 3 July 2007.

4. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Smolyan. 5. In two final judgments of 28 February 2005 and 8 May 2006 the Supreme Court of Cassation awarded the applicant pecuniary damages in respect of breach of contract for construction works which she had carried out. The awarded damages comprised BGN 52,784 for the principal amount, plus BGN 17,685 in default interest and BGN 5,433 in costs and expenses, or a total amount of BGN 75,902.93, the equivalent to 38,000 euros (EUR). The damages were awarded to the applicant against the National Centre for Recreation, Rehabilitation and Sport – Ministry of Education and Science (“the Centre”, a State body subsidised by the Ministry of Education and Science and exercising certain functions delegated by the Ministry). 6. By an order of 25 May 2005 the Minister of Education closed down the Centre and ordered that its remaining property be managed by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry then established a State-owned joint‑stock company with part of the Centre’s property, including the real estate in which the applicant had carried out the construction works. 7. On 13 May 2005 and 15 March 2007 the applicant was issued with two writs of enforcement for the amounts awarded in the final judgments of 2005 and 2006 (see paragraph 5 above) and on 6 February 2008 she presented the writs to the Ministry of Education asking it to pay. 8. The Ministry replied in writing that it was not the successor to the Centre and did not owe payment to the applicant. In October 2009 the applicant reiterated her request but received a similar reply by the Ministry. The Ministry also pointed out that payment could not be sought from the State-owned joint-stock company either as it had a legal personality separate from that of the Ministry. By a letter of 23 September 2010, the Minister provided a similar explanation to the applicant. 9. The applicant brought judicial review proceedings challenging the Minister’s refusal. In a final decision of 8 April 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the appeal as inadmissible. 10. As of 19 March 2015, the date of the applicant’s last communication to the Court, no change in the above circumstances had been reported.

5. The applicants were born in 1964, 1957 and 1947 respectively. The first and third applicants live in Ankara. The second applicant left Turkey subsequent to his criminal conviction giving rise to the present application. 6. On 21 August 2006 the applicants took part in a religious ceremony (mevlüt)[1] on the premises of the Altındağ district branch of the Party for a Democratic Society (Demokratik Toplum Partisi – “the DTP”) in Ankara, at which they paid tribute to three members of the PKK, an illegal armed organisation, who had been killed by the security forces. One of the deceased was the first applicant’s nephew. The second applicant was the head of the Ankara branch of the DTP at the relevant time. The third applicant was a member of the DTP and a friend of the first applicant. 7. On 23 November 2007 the Ankara public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Ankara Assize Court, charging the applicants and a number of other persons with dissemination of propaganda in favour of the PKK, under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), on account of their participation in the ceremony of 21 August 2006. According to the indictment, during the ceremony photographs of the deceased and the PKK’s flag were displayed at the venue and a film about the lives of the deceased was shown. In addition, the second applicant, the head of the Ankara branch of the DTP, made the following statement: “Our fears and worries continue. People are still being killed. In such a context, we would like this mevlüt to be a moment of peace and fraternity.” 8. On 24 September 2008 the Ankara Assize Court convicted the applicants of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK and sentenced them to ten months’ imprisonment each. In its judgment, the Assize Court observed, firstly, that the persons in whose memory the ceremony had been held were members of a terrorist organisation and that they had been killed by the security forces during an operation against that organisation. It also took the view that the choice of venue for the ceremony – the premises of a political party – and the fact that the PKK flag had been spread over the tables and photographs of members of the organisation had been displayed, contributed to raising serious doubts as to the applicants’ submissions that they had taken part in the ceremony in observance of their religious duties. The court considered that the applicants had committed the offence of dissemination of propaganda given that they had shared the feelings of mourning and sorrow for the deceased who had been involved in terrorism. It further considered that the venue where the ceremony had been held had turned into a propaganda venue in favour of the PKK. 9. Following an appeal lodged by the applicants, their conviction was upheld by a final decision of the Court of Cassation on 8 March 2010. 10. The first and third applicants served their prison sentences.

5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Diyarbakır. 6. On 30 September 2007 a reading out of a press statement and a march were held in Diyarbakır in order to protest about the conditions of detention and alleged poisoning of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), an illegal armed organisation. The protesters gathered in front of the building of the Diyarbakır branch of the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) (DTP) where a press statement was read out. They then marched. The applicant, as a member of the DTP, participated in the gathering and the ensuing march. According to a police report dated 9 October 2007, the applicant was seen while carrying a banner which read “İnsanlık zehirleniyor” (“The humanity is being poisoned”) and applauding together with other demonstrators in the police video footage. 7. On 9 October 2007 the applicant was taken into police custody. On the same day she was detained on remand. 8. On 17 October 2007 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor charged the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) on account of the content of the banner she had carried during the demonstration of 30 September 2007. 9. On 4 December 2007 the applicant was released pending trial. 10. On 18 March 2008 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged. The court found it established, on the basis of an expert report on the police video footage, that the applicant had been together with other persons who had chanted the slogan “Be Serok Jiyan Nabe” (“There is no life without the leader”) and that she had carried a banner which read “The humanity is being poisoned”. The applicant was sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment. 11. On 9 January 2012 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 18 March 2008. 12. On an unspecified date the applicant started serving her prison sentence. On 17 July 2012, upon the applicant’s request, the Diyarbakır Assize Court ordered her release from prison, in accordance with Law no. 6352 which had entered into force on 5 July 2012 and which had amended certain provisions of Law no. 3713.

5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Oradea. 6. On 29 November 2000 the prosecutor’s office attached to the Bihor County Court (“the prosecutor’s office”) discontinued the criminal proceedings which it had opened against the applicant on 24 November 2000 for bribe taking. 7. On 10 January 2001 the prosecutor’s office attached to the Bihor Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned decision of its own motion and ordered that the proceedings against the applicant be reopened. 8. On 5 February and 11 June 2001, respectively, the prosecutor’s office reopened the criminal proceedings against the applicant for bribe taking and opened criminal proceedings against him for abuse of office. 9. On 29 July 2002 the State Agency for Capitalisation of Banking Assets (Autoritate Pentru Valorificarea Activelor Bancare – “AVAB”) joined the criminal proceedings against the applicant as a civil party. It sought the recovery of 27,863,805,105 Romanian lei (ROL) (approximately 1,758,753 US dollars (USD)), the damage that it had allegedly incurred as a result of the applicant’s abuse of office. 10. On 16 August 2002 the prosecutor’s office ordered the seizure of the applicant’s movable and immovable assets up to the value of the damage allegedly incurred by AVAB. The order was enforced by the Bihor Police Department on 19 December 2002 by seizing part of the immovable properties owned jointly by the applicant and his wife, in particular four plots of intra muros agricultural land, a home and annexes. 11. On 29 August 2002 the prosecutor’s office indicted the applicant for bribe taking and for abuse of office and sent his case for trial. 12. Between 7 October 2002 and 6 February 2006 the Bihor County Court (“the County Court”) adjourned the proceedings twenty-four times to allow the parties to prepare their defence, for the court to summon the parties and the witnesses, to hear evidence, and for deliberations. Also, at a hearing on 10 February 2003, the court dismissed the applicant’s challenge against the order of 16 August 2002 on the grounds that the measure was temporary and had been enforced correctly. This decision was upheld by the Oradea Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) on 11 March 2003 following an appeal by the applicant. 13. On 13 February 2006 the County Court examined the applicant’s case on the merits and acquitted him of abuse of office. However, it held that the applicant had to pay AVAB the damages it claimed because AVAB had suffered damage as a result of his actions. Consequently, the court maintained the measure imposed on the applicant’s assets. It also convicted the applicant of bribe taking and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment, suspended. 14. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal. 15. Between 20 June and 11 July 2006 the Court of Appeal adjourned the proceedings twice to allow the parties to prepare their cases. On 19 September 2006 the court quashed the judgment of 13 February 2006 and referred the case back to the first-instance court for re-examination on procedural grounds. 16. Between 30 November 2006 and 1 April 2010 the County Court adjourned the proceedings thirty-two times to allow the parties to prepare their defence, for the court-assigned expert to produce two expert reports, and for the court to summon the parties and the witnesses, to hear evidence, for deliberations, and to allow the judges to exercise their right to strike. Also, at a hearing on 4 June 2007 the court adjourned the examination of the applicant’s request for the measure imposed on his assets to be lifted pending the court’s determination of the case. 17. On 8 April 2010 the County Court examined the applicant’s case on the merits, acquitted him of abuse of office and dismissed AVAB’s civil claim. Consequently, it lifted the seizure measure from his assets. The court convicted the applicant, however, of receiving bribes and gave him a suspended sentence of three years’ imprisonment. 18. The applicant and AVAB appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal. 19. Between 21 September and 16 November 2010 the Court of Appeal adjourned the proceedings twice to allow the parties to prepare their cases, to summon them, and for the court to deliberate. On 23 November 2010 the court dismissed the appeals of the parties and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. 20. The applicant and AVAB appealed on points of fact and law against the judgment to the High Court of Cassation and Justice (“the Court of Cassation”). 21. Between 23 February and 20 April 2011 the Court of Cassation adjourned the proceedings once to allow the applicant to prepare his case. 22. By a final judgment of 4 May 2011 the Court of Cassation allowed the applicant’s appeal on points of fact and law in part. It held that he was guilty of bribe taking, but his criminal liability for that offence had become time-barred. The court upheld the remaining parts of the judgments delivered by the lower courts. 23. On 4 March 2012, once the applicant had submitted certified copies of all the courts’ judgments, the Bihor Land and Immovable Property Register removed the annotation concerning the seizure measure imposed on his immovable property from the above-mentioned register, which had prevented him from freely disposing of it.

5. The first applicant was born in 1975 and lives in St Petersburg. X, the second applicant, was born in 2012 and lives in the Moscow region. 6. The applicants are father and son. The first applicant lodged the application on his own behalf and on behalf of his son, who is a minor. 7. Until April 2013 the first applicant, his wife M. and their son X lived together in St Petersburg, where X had his residence registration and his continuing paediatric and specialist care for his chronic illness, and where he was on the waiting list for a local nursery school. 8. On 28 April 2013 M. left the first applicant and took X with her. According to M., she left the first applicant because of frequent disputes between them during which the first applicant had shouted at her. She left a note promising to contact him shortly. She went directly to her flat in Nizhny Novgorod. She sent him an email on 30 April 2013, indicating her whereabouts. According to the first applicant, she did not leave an address and did not answer her mobile phone. The first applicant unsuccessfully searched for her in Nizhniy Novgorod, where she possessed a flat jointly with her parents, and in Moscow, where her parents lived at that time. 9. On 30 April 2013 the first applicant contacted the St Petersburg childcare authorities and asked for assistance in finding his son and returning him to his registered place of residence in that city. 10. Later on the same day the first applicant learned that M. and the second applicant were in Nizhniy Novgorod and on 17 May 2013 M. allowed him to visit them there. 11. Since that date M. has allowed the applicant to see his son on average six days per month for two hours each time. However, sometimes she has not allowed the first applicant to see his son for weeks at a time or has taken him out of town for long periods without informing the first applicant about his son’s whereabouts. For example, on 29 December 2013 the first applicant complained to the Nizhniy Novgorod childcare authorities that M. had taken X away to an unknown location and had cancelled a meeting that had been scheduled by mutual agreement for 27 December 2013. 12. On 30 August 2013 M. instituted divorce proceedings before the Nizhegorodskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod, and asked for a residence order in respect of X. She submitted, in particular, that she was on parental leave and was still breastfeeding her son. She was a part‑owner of her parents’ flat where she and her son occupied a room. She also argued that she could create better conditions for the development of the child because she had a university diploma and good references from her previous place of work and also because she was calm and loving. 13. M. submitted an opinion by a psychologist, L., whom she and the first applicant had consulted once before their separation regarding their marital problems. L. noted that the first applicant’s supressed aggression towards M. and his wish to dominate her had been the cause of their marital issues. L. considered that in the event of divorce, it would be in X’s best interest to live with his mother. 14. The first applicant asked that M.’s request for a residence order be rejected and that X be returned from Nizhniy Novgorod to St Petersburg. He submitted that it would be better for the child if he and both his parents lived in St Petersburg for the following reasons. Firstly, considerable amounts of money would be spent by the first applicant travelling to Nizhniy Novgorod to visit his son. If the entire family lived in St Petersburg, that money could be better spent on the child’s needs. Secondly, living conditions in St Petersburg were better than in Nizhniy Novgorod. The first applicant had three spacious flats in St Petersburg and a dacha in the surrounding region, while in Nizhniy Novgorod M.’s family possessed only a small one-bedroom flat. St Petersburg provided better development and educational opportunities having more sports centres, better schools and universities, and world-famous cultural heritage. It also had better medical services, less air pollution and a lower crime rate than Nizhniy Novgorod. Thirdly, the second applicant had been born in St Petersburg and had lived there until taken away by M. He had his residence registration and his continuing paediatric and specialist care there and was on the waiting list for a local nursery school. Moreover, X’s paternal grandparents and other relatives lived in St Petersburg. If M. agreed to move back to St Petersburg, the first applicant proposed donating one of his three flats to her. He proposed an arrangement according to which X would live one third of every month with him and two thirds of every month with M. until the age of three, and half of every month with each of the parents after that. He argued that that arrangement would ensure that the second applicant maintained family ties with both parents. 15. Subsequently, the first applicant lodged a counterclaim, applying for a residence order in respect of the second applicant. He submitted that X’s young age alone could not justify his residence with his mother. He was older than one and a half years and there was no longer any need to breastfeed him. He submitted a copy of X’s medical records from which it was apparent that the breastfeeding had stopped in May 2013. The first applicant further submitted that he had a stable income from bank‑deposit interest while M. had no income and lived on the child maintenance that he paid her. He worked as a volunteer in a number of social NGOs and had flexible working hours and could therefore devote a lot of time to his son. Indeed, while they had lived together, he had spent as much time with the child and had been responsible for his everyday care as much as M. They had a very strong mutual attachment. Given his education and background, the first applicant could provide the child with a better upbringing. For example, he had teaching experience – in particular he had worked as a teacher in children’s summer camps. The first applicant further submitted that M. had abducted the child. She had restricted the first applicant’s contact with his son and had sometimes taken him away for long periods of time without informing the first applicant of his whereabouts. He vowed that if the child were to reside with him, he would not in any way hinder his contact with his mother. 16. The Nizhegorodskiy District Court refused to accept the first applicant’s application for a residence order, finding that he should have submitted it at the beginning of the proceedings. It also refused to accept X’s medical records in the file, finding that they were irrelevant and that M. was the only one who could tell whether she was still breastfeeding. 17. Lastly, the first applicant asked that the court appoint a psychological expert to examine him, M. and the second applicant to assess each parent’s suitability for raising the child and each parent’s relationships with him. The Nizhegorodskiy District Court rejected that application. It however asked the Nizhniy Novgorod and St Petersburg childcare authorities to assess the first applicant’s and M.’s living conditions and to express an opinion on the issue of the second applicant’s residence. 18. The first applicant’s parents applied to intervene as third parties and that the second applicant’s residence be set as St Petersburg. They submitted, in particular, that they had not seen their grandson since March 2013 because M. had refused to bring him to St Petersburg for a visit. They could not visit him in Nizhniy Novgorod because the first applicant’s mother was disabled and could not travel there, a distance of more than 1,000 km. The first applicant’s father could not leave his wife alone and unassisted and could not therefore go to Nizhniy Novgorod either. The decision to set the second applicant’s residence as Nizhniy Novgorod with his mother would therefore most likely mean that they would never be able to see him again. The Nizhegorodskiy District Court dismissed their application to intervene as third parties, finding that they could lodge a separate suit. 19. On 20 November 2013 the Nizhegorodskiy District Court adjourned the examination of the case until 20 February 2014, enjoining the first applicant and M. to attempt marriage reconciliation. 20. On 18 February 2014 the St Petersburg childcare authorities issued their opinion on the case, finding that it was in the second applicant’s best interest to live with his father. It noted that M. had taken the child away and had for some time concealed his whereabouts from the first applicant. She had restricted the first applicant’s contact with the child. She was unemployed and had no income except the child maintenance paid by the first applicant. Her only pecuniary asset was a share in her parents’ one‑bedroom flat in Nizhniy Novgorod. M.’s parents lived in Moscow. By contrast, the first applicant had a stable and sufficient income from bank‑deposit interest and did not need to work. He could therefore spend most of his time with the child. He owned a one-bedroom flat in St Petersburg and part-owned two other flats. The first applicant’s parents lived in St Petersburg. His mother was confined to a wheelchair, which restricted her ability to travel to Nizhniy Novgorod to see her grandson. 21. On 31 March 2014 the Nizhniy Novgorod childcare authorities also issued their opinion on the case, finding that it was in the second applicant’s best interest to live with his mother. It found that M. had good living conditions and received child maintenance from the first applicant and financial help from her parents. According to M., she was breastfeeding and was on parental leave devoting all her time to the child. She did not wish to return to St Petersburg. It was true that the first applicant also had good living conditions and had actively participated in the child’s upbringing and care. However, taking into account X’s young age, it was better for him to live with his mother for the time being. In reply to the applicant’s question, the Nizhniy Novgorod childcare authorities explained, in a letter of 12 May 2014, that a child was considered to be of “young age” until 18 years old and that “for the time being” meant until a change of circumstances, for example the child’s reaching the age of ten or fourteen. 22. On 4 April 2014 the Nizhegorodskiy District Court granted the divorce and M.’s application for a residence order in respect of the second applicant. The court firstly cited the opinion of 31 March 2014 of the Nizhniy Novgorod childcare authorities. It then noted that the family had lived in St Petersburg until M. had left her husband and moved to Nizhniy Novgorod taking the child with her. M. co-owned the flat in Nizhniy Novgorod where she currently lived with X; that flat had everything necessary for a small child. The District Court continued: “It is apparent from [M.’s] submissions that she is still breastfeeding the child. [M.] is on parental leave and devotes all her time to the child. [M.]’s parents help her take care of and [financially] support the child. The [first applicant] pays [M.] 15,000 roubles [RUB] every month of his own accord. The child is on a waiting list for a nursery school. The [first applicant] ... takes an active part in his son’s life. He wants the child to live in St Petersburg, where he has created all necessary conditions for him. [M.] however categorically refuses to move to St Petersburg. Both parents have positive character references and wish to live together with the child and participate directly in his upbringing. In such circumstances, and based exclusively on the interests of the child and on the situation in which he is now, taking into account the child’s age, the court considers it opportune [целесообразно] to grant the residence order in respect of [X] to his mother [M.] for the time being. The court reminds the parties that in accordance with Article 66 of the Family Code the parent residing separately from the child is entitled to maintain contact with the child and to participate in his or her upbringing and education. The parent with whom the child resides may not hinder the child’s contact with the other parent, unless such contact undermines the child’s physical or psychological health or moral development. [The first applicant]’s ... financial situation allows him to visit the child in Nizhniy Novgorod (according to [the first applicant’s] submissions his monthly income is about RUB 60,000). The [first applicant]’s arguments that St Petersburg has less air pollution, a lower crime rate and better local infrastructure for children than Nizhniy Novgorod are legally irrelevant because the child’s place of residence is with his parents. In the present case the court grants the residence order to the mother [M.]; [M.’s] place of residence is currently in Nizhniy Novgorod.” 23. The first applicant appealed, repeating his previous arguments. He further complained that the District Court had not conducted an in-depth examination of the case. In particular, the District Court had not taken into account the opinion of 18 February 2014 of the St Petersburg childcare authority. It had not even cited the opinion, let alone explained why it disagreed with it. The only reason advanced by the District Court for its decision to grant the residence order to the child’s mother had been the child’s age. The child’s age was only one of the criteria mentioned in Article 65 of the Family Code (see paragraph 58 below) that the domestic courts were to take into account when deciding on a child’s residence arrangements. The District Court had not taken into account the other criteria mentioned in Article 65. Nor had it ordered a psychological expert examination to establish the child’s relationship with each parent and his best interests. Moreover, given that the second applicant had been more than one and a half years old at the time of the District Court’s decision, there had been no justification for automatically preferring residence with his mother over residence with his father. Such automatic preference of the mother over the father in a case where the father could provide better living and development conditions for the child had amounted to discrimination on grounds of sex. The first applicant also disputed some of the facts established by the District Court. In particular, the second applicant’s medical documents indicated that breastfeeding had stopped at the age of one. In any event, the official medical guidance recommended that breastfeeding be stopped at the age of one and a half years old at the latest. Moreover, M. was unemployed rather than on parental leave because she had not been in employment since 2009. In any event, M. had returned to work in December 2014 and since then the second applicant had been taken care of during the day by his maternal grandmother. By contrast, the first applicant had sufficient non-work income and a flexible schedule for his social-volunteer activities and could therefore take care of the child himself. Lastly, the first applicant argued that inherent in the concept of the child’s “best interests” was the right for a child not to be removed from one of his or her parents and retained by the other (he referred to Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05, 6 December 2007). M. had abducted the second applicant and had restricted the number and the length of the first applicant’s visits, including during the period after the District Court’s judgment. In total, during the previous nineteen months he had been allowed to see his son 122 times only. Lastly, the first applicant complained that the refusal to examine his counterclaim – that is his application for a residence order in his favour – had been unlawful. 24. On 2 October 2014 the first applicant complained to the Nizhniy Novgorod childcare authorities that M. had continued to restrict his contact with his son. In particular, on several occasions she had agreed to a visit but after he had travelled from St Petersburg to Nizhniy Novgorod she had changed her mind and refused to let him see his son. 25. On 10 March 2015 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the judgment of 4 April 2014 on appeal. It held: “Having analysed the entirety of the evidence in the case file, including the child authorities’ opinions on the merits of the case, [the District Court] made a reasoned finding that granting a residence order in respect of [X] to the father was not in the interests of the child who, after the parents’ separation, had been brought up by his mother. The court rejects [the first applicant’s] appeal submissions ... which in essence convey a disagreement with [the District Court’s] assessment of evidence. It notes that a parent’s better financial or social situation or professional position are not decisive factors in deciding the question of the child’s residence ... In the present case [the District Court] made a thorough assessment of the evidence presented by the parties in support of their claims and objections. The court’s findings were based on the evidence in the case file. There is no reason to doubt the impartiality of the examination and assessment of evidence ...” The court also added that the issue of the child’s contact with his grandparents was to be examined in separate proceedings. Furthermore, the refusal to examine the first applicant’s counterclaim had not breached his rights as the domestic courts had to give a residence order to the parent who could better meet the needs of the child, irrespective of which of the parents had been the first to apply for a residence order in his or her favour and of whether the other parent had lodged a counterclaim or not. 26. On 13 March 2015 the Nizhniy Novgorod childcare authorities informed the first applicant that they had had a meeting with M. during which she had been told that she had to keep the child’s father informed about the child’s whereabouts and that the child was entitled to maintain contact with his grandparents and other relatives. 27. On 12 June 2015 the first applicant’s mother died. She had not seen her grandson since April 2013. 28. On 6 October 2015 a judge of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court refused to refer the first applicant’s cassation appeal against the residence order to the Presidium of that court for examination, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. It noted, in particular, that the main reason for granting the residence order to M. had been the second applicant’s young age. In such circumstances, the first applicant’s argument that it was in the child’s best interest to live with his father had been unconvincing. M.’s actions in taking the child away from St Petersburg had not amounted to abduction, a criminal offence under Article 126 of the Criminal Code. M. had not committed any criminal offence by moving to Nizhniy Novgorod with her son. Lastly, the judge found no evidence of discrimination. 29. On 27 October 2015 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to refer the case to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court for consideration, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. 30. On 9 September 2015 M. moved to Moscow where she had found a job. X remained in Nizhniy Novgorod with his maternal grandmother. 31. On an unspecified date the first applicant applied to the Nizhegorodskiy District Court for contact rights, claiming that M. decided whimsically on the days when she would allow him to see his son without taking into account that he lived in another town, and that she occasionally prohibited any contact between them for long periods of time. 32. On 29 September 2015 the Nizhegorodskiy District Court allowed the first applicant’s application for an interim contact order. It determined the contact schedule as follows. While the main contact proceedings were pending, the applicants should be able to have contact for no more than ten consecutive days starting on the first Wednesday of each month, from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 5 to 8 p.m., unless otherwise agreed between the parents. The contact should take place at X’s place of residence, in the mother’s presence, or in her absence if she agreed, and with the right to attend outdoor activities for children if X was in good health. The court also ordered that M. should inform the first applicant immediately by telephone if X were suffering from illness, and inform him two days in advance about any temporary change of residence. If the applicants had not seen each other for more than ten days, M. should ensure their communication through IP telephony for no less than five minutes every two days. M. should not hinder the first applicant’s attendance of X’s medical procedures or educational and recreational activities in which X participated. She should also consult the first applicant in writing before taking any decisions concerning X’s medical treatment or education. 33. On 8 December 2015 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the interim contact order on appeal. 34. On an unspecified date the Nizhegorodskiy District Court ordered an expert report to determine X’s relationship with each of the parents. 35. On 19 January 2016 a panel of psychology and psychiatry experts examined the applicants and M. and found that X was attached to both parents and was emotionally close to both of them. They were both involved in X’s education, although their educational methods were different: M. was milder, more permissive and more supportive, while the first applicant was more domineering and controlling and was not always capable of taking into account X’s age and stage of development. X was more excitable and capricious in his father’s presence, while his mother’s presence had a soothing effect on him. According to X, his family included his mother and his maternal grandparents. The experts found that it was important that X should have stable residence arrangements; shared residence was not advisable at his age. At the same time, regular contact with the father was necessary for a balanced psychological development. Irregular contact with any of the parents would be detrimental to his relationship with that parent. 36. On 1 February 2016 M. and X moved to Moscow Region. 37. On 29 March 2016 the Nizhegorodskiy District Court found that the bailiffs service had not taken any actions to enforce the interim contact order of 29 September 2015 and ordered that the bailiffs service should redress the consequent breach of the first applicant’s rights. 38. It therefore ordered that M. consult the first applicant before taking any decisions concerning X’s medical treatment or education. It further determined the contact schedule as follows. The applicants should be able to have contact (i) on Saturdays and Sundays of even weeks, from 11 a.m. to 6 p.m. at X’s place of residence with the right to attend outdoor activities for children; (ii) for two weeks during the summer at the first applicant’s place of residence with the right to travel to other places within Russia. The schedule was valid until X’s seventh birthday and was to be revised afterwards. 39. On 8 July 2016 the Nizhegorodskiy District Court rejected the first applicant’s request for immediate enforcement of the contact order of 27 April 2016, finding that it did not belong to the category of cases where immediate enforcement was prescribed by law. There were no special circumstances justifying immediate enforcement, such as circumstances in which a delay in enforcement could lead to serious damage or make future enforcement impossible. 40. On 31 August 2016 the Petrogradskiy District Court of St Petersburg allowed an application for a contact order lodged by X’s paternal grandfather and grandaunt. It found that M. had been preventing them from seeing X. It held that they should have contact with X for five consecutive days every two months. In view of their advanced age and consequent inability to travel, contact should take place in St Petersburg where X should be brought either by M. or by the first applicant. 41. On 13 September 2016 M. was fined for hindering contact between the applicants in breach of the interim contact order of 29 September 2015. 42. On 14 September 2016 the Nizhegorodskyy District Court found that, despite its decision of 29 March 2016, the bailiffs service had still not taken any actions to enforce the interim contact order of 29 September 2015 and again ordered that the bailiffs should redress the first applicant’s rights. 43. On 25 October 2016 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the contact order of 27 April 2016 on appeal. It amended the contact schedule, holding that in addition to the contact time determined by the District Court, the applicants should also have contact (i) from 3 to 7 p.m. on X’s birthday each year at X’s place of residence; (ii) on the first Wednesday and third Friday of each month from 3 to 7 p.m. at X’s place of residence; and (iii) for half an hour every day by means of Internet communications. 44. On 13 March 2017 a judge of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court refused to refer the first applicant’s cassation appeal against the contact order of 27 April 2016, as upheld on appeal on 25 October 2016, to the Presidium of that court for examination, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. 45. On 4 April 2017 the St Petersburg City Court amended the contact order of 31 August 2016 on appeal, finding that the contact schedule was too onerous for X and M. It held that X’s paternal grandfather and grandaunt should be able to have contact with him for seven days every six months at the grandfather’s place of residence. 46. On 18 April 2017 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to refer the first applicant’s cassation appeal against the contact order of 27 April 2016, as upheld on appeal on 25 October 2016, to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. 47. On 1 March 2018 the Zheleznodorozhniy Town Court of Moscow Region granted the first applicant the right to bring X to St Petersburg for ten additional days during the summer holidays. It also increased the time the applicants were to spend together on X’s birthdays. On 11 July 2018 the Moscow Regional Court quashed that judgment on appeal and rejected the first applicant’s request to amend the contact schedule, finding that the contact schedule established by the judgment of 27 April 2016 was valid until X’s seventh’s birthday and that there was no reason to change it before that date. 48. According to the Government, X now lives in Moscow Region with his mother. The first applicant is renting a flat in the vicinity of X’s new place of residence and regularly comes from St Petersburg to visit him. M. does not hinder the contact between the applicants. The first applicant pays child maintenance but does not give any other financial help. 49. On 27 April 2015 the first applicant, acting on his own behalf and on behalf of the second applicant, lodged a claim with the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court seeking compensation for the non‑pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the excessively long examination of the child residence dispute, and costs and expenses. He submitted, in particular, that the nature of the dispute had called for particular expedition on the part of the domestic courts. Indeed, the case had concerned a residence dispute in respect of a very young child who, owing to the delay in examining the case, had unlawfully resided with his mother for almost two years. 50. On 8 May 2015 a judge of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court declared the claim lodged on behalf of the second applicant inadmissible. The court found that the second applicant had not been a party to the residence proceedings and could not therefore claim compensation for their allegedly excessive length. 51. The first applicant appealed, submitting that the residence proceedings had directly affected the second applicant by determining his residence arrangements. The length of the residence proceedings had therefore breached the second applicant’s rights. 52. On 8 July 2015 the Administrative Chamber of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the decision of 8 May 2015 on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. 53. On 9 July 2015 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court awarded the first applicant 30,000 Russian roubles (RUB – about 475 euros (EUR)) for non‑pecuniary damage and RUB 12,886.40 for costs and expenses against the Ministry of Finance. The court noted that the proceedings had lasted one year, six months and seven days before two instances. It found that the first applicant had not contributed to the length of proceedings. It further held that the case had been simple, no expert opinions had been ordered nor witnesses questioned. There had been important delays in the proceedings attributable to the District Court, in particular excessively long intervals between hearings, adjournments caused by repeated failures to inform the parties of the dates of scheduled hearings and substantial delays in serving the reasoned judgment of 4 April 2014 and the hearing record on the parties and in forwarding the parties’ statements of appeal to the Regional Court. Accordingly, the first applicant’s case had not been heard within a “reasonable time”. When deciding on the amount of compensation, the Regional Court noted that the case had concerned a child residence dispute and that the delay in its examination had created legal uncertainty as to the child’s residence and had hindered the exercise by the first applicant of his contact rights. 54. On 19 August 2015 a judge of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court refused to refer the first applicant’s cassation appeal against the decision of 8 May 2015, as upheld on appeal on 8 July 2015, to the Presidium of that court for examination, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. 55. On 30 September 2015 the Administrative Chamber of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the judgment of 9 July 2015 on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. 56. On 27 November 2015 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to refer the first applicant’s cassation appeal against the decision of 8 May 2015, as upheld on appeal on 8 July 2015, to the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. 57. On 5 July 2017 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court awarded the applicants RUB 30,000 (about EUR 475) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and RUB 11,398.34 for costs and expenses against the Ministry of Finance for the excessive length of the contact proceedings. The court found, in particular, that the delay in determining a definite contact schedule between the applicants had resulted in insufficient contact and had undermined their personal bond.

4. The applicant was born in 1967 and was detained at the Tekirdağ F‑type prison when the application was lodged. 5. On 9 April 2003 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of being a member of a terrorist organisation. 6. On 13 April 2003 the applicant was brought before the judge at the Istanbul State Security Court who placed him in detention on remand taking into consideration the nature of the offence, and the state of evidence. 7. On 23 July 2003 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court, charging the applicant with membership of a terrorist organisation, and attempting to undermine the constitutional order of the Republic of Turkey by force. The criminal proceedings against the applicant commenced. 8. On 10 November 2008 the court held a further hearing, in which both the applicant and his lawyer were present. At the end of that hearing, the court ordered the continuation of the applicant’s detention. 9. On 10 November 2008 the applicant’s lawyer filed an objection against this decision. On 27 November 2008 the 13th Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court dismissed the objection without holding a hearing. In delivering its decision, the court took into consideration the written opinion of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicant or his representative. 10. On 4 May 2011 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 11. On 25 September 2012 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.

4. The first applicant, Ms R.I., was born in 1975 and lives in Bucharest. She was in a stable relationship with R. She had two children with him: the second applicant, M.I., born in 2006, and the third applicant, I.I., born in 2009. In 2010, the relationship broke down and R. moved out of the family home. The parents agreed that the children would remain with the first applicant, in their family home. The parents also decided that R. would have unrestricted access to the children and would play an active role in their education. 5. On 28 October 2013 the children and their maternal grandmother were involved in a traffic accident, as a result of which only the grandmother needed medical care and attention. In November R. took the children from the first applicant’s home without her consent. According to the first applicant, from that time until May 2014, she managed to see the children only occasionally and always in their father’s presence. After 5 May 2014 (see paragraph 9 below) contact between them became even more scarce, and after 6 June 2014 (see paragraph 11 below) all contact stopped. 6. On 25 November 2013, the first applicant instituted custody proceedings against R. before the Bucharest District Court (see paragraph 26 below). At the same time she applied for an interim injunction (ordonanţă preşedenţială), seeking to have the children’s residence set at her place during the custody proceedings (see paragraph 9 below). 7. On 20 December 2013 the first applicant also brought the situation of the second and third applicants to the attention of the Bucharest Directorate General for Social Welfare and Child Protection (“the Bucharest child protection authority”). She feared that they were showing signs of emotional abuse caused by their father. 8. In two official reports of 21 January and 5 February 2014, the Bucharest child protection authority observed that the children were well taken care of, were enjoying optimal conditions at their father’s home, and manifested affection towards their father and his new partner. The reports concluded that no signs of abuse had been identified. The experts noted, however, that the children experienced a considerable degree of anxiety and distress because of the conflicts between their biological parents. They recommended counselling. 9. Deciding in the interim proceedings (see paragraph 6 above), in a final decision of 5 May 2014 the Bucharest County Court ordered that the children should reside with their mother and that R. should pay monthly child support of 1,000 euros (EUR) for each child until the end of the custody proceedings. 10. On 4 June 2014 the first applicant applied to the bailiff’s office for enforcement of the decision of 5 May 2014. Her request was approved by the bailiff on 6 June 2014 and by the Bucharest District Court on 16 June 2014. 11. On 6 June 2014 the first applicant went to the children’s school to pick them up and take them home. R. showed up as well and became abusive towards the first applicant. The police had to intervene. The first applicant was unable to take the children home. Advised by the school administration, she returned on 9 June to pick them up, but on that day the children were absent. 12. On 13 June 2014 the first applicant wrote to the Bucharest child protection authority to ask for help, but the authority could not intervene as the father was not found at home. 13. In a letter of 26 June 2014 the bailiff asked R. to comply with the court order and to return the children to their mother within ten days. As he failed to comply, the bailiff summoned him to bring the children on 17 July 2014 to the bailiff’s office, where the first applicant, two police officers and representatives of the Bucharest child protection authority would be present. R. and the children did not attend. 14. On 4 August 2014 the first applicant contacted the Bucharest child protection authority again and complained that R. was manipulating the children into fearing and rejecting her, and was forbidding any contact between her and her children. She also informed the authority about the incident of 6 June 2014 (see paragraph 11 above). The authority could not verify her allegations as R. was not at home and did not contact the authority, despite being invited to do so. 15. The bailiff scheduled a second meeting for 14 August 2014. This time, R. went with the children. As noted by the bailiff in his report drafted on the same day, the children refused in absolute terms to return to their mother. They alleged that she used to shout at them and had occasionally beaten them when they had lived together. The enforcement could not take place. 16. Following the meeting of 14 August 2014, on 9 September 2014 the Bucharest child protection authority asked the Bucharest District Court to order a two-month psychological counselling programme for the children, under the provisions of Article 912 of the Code of Civil Procedure (psychological counselling for children who refuse contact with the estranged parent). The first applicant contacted the child protection authority with a similar request on 16 and 19 September 2014. On 2 October 2014 the District Court allowed the request made by the Bucharest child protection authority. 17. Between 7 November 2014 and 2 January 2015, a psychologist met the children and their parents ten times. On 22 January 2015, she drafted a final report, recommending as follows: “Bearing in mind the numerous relationship problems identified, I consider it opportune to recommend an immediate[1] clinical psychological evaluation of the children and the parents, of the current relations between them, as well as their continued psychological counselling.” 18. On 28 January 2015 the first applicant contacted the Bucharest child protection authority again and explained that the behaviour exhibited by the children during their recent encounter made her fear that they were suffering from parent alienation syndrome because of their father’s influence over them. 19. Acting upon the first applicant’s request, a social assistant from the Bucharest child protection authority interviewed the children. On 17 February 2015 he drafted his report, finding that the children refused to see their mother because allegedly she used to beat them and be mean to them. The social assistant asked the father to take the children for a psychological evaluation. He also sent his report to the Bucharest child protection authority’s service for violence against children. 20. On 14 May 2015 the Bucharest child protection authority drafted a two-month plan for the rehabilitation of the two children “with the aim of ensuring their harmonious physical and psychological development and protecting their dignity and their best interests”. The plan required cooperation between the social assistant responsible for their case, a psychologist, the school administration and the two parents. 21. On 30 June 2015 R. complained to the Bucharest child protection authority that the psychologist had put pressure on the children and induced a state of stress which had required the children’s hospitalisation after one of their meetings. He demanded to know on what grounds the children continued to be subjected to psychological counselling. 22. Acting upon an application made by the first applicant (asigurarea probelor), on 7 July 2015 the Bucharest District Court requested a psychological evaluation of the children and their parents. After meeting with them on several occasions between 13 August and 30 October 2015, the psychologist rendered a report on 17 November 2015. She found that there was no indication of physical abuse from the mother but that there was an indication of psychological abuse in the form of parental alienation exercised by the father. The relevant parts of the report read as follows: “(1) During the expert evaluation there was no relevant information from the children that would confirm the existence of physical abuse by their mother. The evaluation only highlighted the children’s and their father’s statements as well as the resistance of both children in relation to their mother. (2) Because they are involved in the parental conflict, the children exhibit emotional and behavioural indicators frequently associated ... with psychological abuse. ... (3) There are ... several symptoms of parent alienation syndrome, in particular in respect of [the second applicant]. ... In particular concerning underage children, the father’s behaviour corresponds to the profile of the ‘alienator parent’ who behaves in this manner out of a genuine conviction that he can protect and care for the children better than their mother. His behaviour may also be connected to a profound aversion to, and hostility towards, the children’s mother, which has more to do with the relations between the adults than with their parenting abilities. According to the specialised literature, the alienated parent also plays a role in losing his or her ties with the child. It appears from the information offered during the interview by Mrs [R.I.] that she has experienced occasional doubts and insecurities concerning her maternal role which might have undermined her relationship of secure attachment with her children in their early childhood. Recommendations 1. It is recommended that the parents undertake psychological counselling, in order to receive assistance in finding methods of cooperation for the present and future well-being of their children. ... Parents must be aware that parental alienation has negative consequences for the children’s development; without specialised intervention and the conscious participation of both parents, children can develop emotional or behavioural problems. 2. It is recommended that the two children be no longer involved in the conflict between the parents. Their exposure to the parental conflicts has had a traumatising effect on them and left painful marks in their emotional development.” 23. On 23 November 2015, the first applicant asked the bailiff to resume the enforcement proceedings. New meetings were convened for 7 and 23 March 2016 in the bailiff’s office. R. and the children did not appear. 24. On 18 December 2015 the first applicant contacted the Bucharest child protection authority again and reiterated her fears that the children’s father was alienating the children from her. 25. R. contested the enforcement proceedings, but on 9 November 2016 the Bucharest District Court dismissed his complaint. An appeal lodged by him was also dismissed in a final decision of the Bucharest County Court on 18 September 2017. 26. On 24 September 2014 the Bucharest District Court decided on the application for custody (see paragraph 6 above). It granted the mother physical custody of the children and ordered R. to pay child support of 5,000 Romanian lei (RON – approximately EUR 1,100 at the relevant time) per month until the children reached the age of majority. R. appealed, but on 18 January 2016 he informed the Bucharest County Court that he did not wish to maintain his appeal. The first applicant appealed on points of law, arguing that the County Court had unlawfully reduced the award for costs. In a final decision of 2 June 2016 the Bucharest Court of Appeal rejected her appeal as inadmissible. 27. On 27 July 2016 the first applicant applied for enforcement of the decision of 24 September 2014 on the payment of child support and legal costs. On 19 August 2016 the first applicant asked the bailiff to extend the enforcement order to the return of the children. Her request was granted by the bailiff’s office on 8 September 2016 and by the Constanţa District Court on 20 September 2016. 28. In March 2017 R. informed the authorities that he had moved with the children to Năvodari, Constanţa County, where they would be spending weekends and school holidays. The Constanţa Directorate General for Social Welfare and Child Protection (“the Constanţa child protection authority”) visited R. and the children in the new location and kept in touch with the Bucharest child protection authority. R. informed the Constanţa child protection authority that he was willing to pursue counselling for his children in Năvodari and reiterated that he had not prohibited the first applicant from seeing the children. 29. On 7 March 2017, the Constanta District Court partially allowed R.’s opposition to the enforcement, finding that he had complied in full with the obligation to provide for the children since they lived with him and that he could not be asked, in addition, to pay child support in their favour. 30. In August 2017 the first applicant reinitiated the enforcement proceedings in respect of the return of the children, but on 12 September 2017 R. appealed against the enforcement order. On 19 September 2017 R. sought a stay of the enforcement, pending the outcome of his appeal; his request was granted by the Constanţa District Court on 25 September 2017. On 8 May 2018 his appeal was dismissed by a final decision rendered by the Constanţa County Court and the decision was notified to the first applicant on 31 May 2018. 31. On 18 July 2018 the applicants’ representative informed the Court that on 16 July 2018 the applicants and R. had met in the bailiff’s office. The children had refused in absolute terms to move in with their mother. 32. Meanwhile, the first applicant had lodged a criminal complaint against R., accusing him of disobeying the court order concerning the custody arrangements. On 17 June 2014 the police started investigating the case under the supervision of the prosecutor’s office attached to the Bucharest District Court. 33. On 16 August 2016 the first applicant asked the prosecutor to extend the investigation to also cover allegations of ill-treatment of minors, arguing that R. was subjecting the children to psychological abuse. In a decision of 28 June 2016 the prosecutor’s office refused her request on the grounds that no evidence of ill-treatment had been found. On 10 October 2016 an objection lodged by the first applicant was dismissed by the prosecutor‑in‑chief and on 13 October 2016 the Bucharest District Court’s preliminary chamber rejected as inadmissible a complaint lodged by the first applicant against the prosecutor’s decisions. 34. On 17 August 2016 R. had applied for physical custody of the children. On 20 March 2017 the Bucharest District Court decided that the children should live with their father. It based its judgment on the fact that the children had been living with him for the past three years and that he represented the only parental figure in their life. A sudden change in their life would cause them more distress. Based on the conclusions of the expert report of 17 November 2015 (see paragraph 22 above), the court noted that the children felt uncomfortable in their mother’s presence and refused to move in with her, preferring their father’s presence. The court also noted that the first applicant had never been prevented from visiting them, but had chosen not to and had instead demanded that the children be returned to Bucharest. The court further observed that the first applicant had not sought enforcement of the custody order, limiting her request to the enforcement of the child-support allowance and costs. It concluded that it would be in the children’s best interests to remain with their father. It advised the parents to put an end to their conflict for their children’s sake and to allow the mother‑children relationship to be rebuilt. 35. The first applicant became aware of the content of that decision on receiving the Government’s observations in the case (sent to her by the Registry of the Court on 28 July 2017). At her request, she was notified of the decision on 1 September 2017. On 7 September 2017 she lodged an appeal against it. 36. In a final decision of 24 April 2018 the Bucharest County Court allowed the appeal, quashed the previous decision and dismissed R.’s request to be granted physical custody of the children. It found as follows: “... the [first applicant] is not at fault in the non-enforcement of decision no. 590A/5 May 2014, in so far as the Romanian State had a positive obligation to urgently take all necessary legal measures in order to protect the [first applicant]’s right to family life, by immediately returning the children to their mother’s home, in order to avoid the parental alienation exhibited by the children towards the [first applicant]. Therefore, by penalising [the first applicant] with losing the possibility of having her children live with her, for circumstances for which she is not responsible, ... would affect the substance of her right of access to a court and [the right] to respect for her family life. ... The court notes that the first-instance court’s decision to set the children’s home with their father on the grounds that they were attached to him by strong affection and that they refused to communicate with [the first applicant], is the direct consequence of the non-enforcement of decision no. 590A/5 May 2014. [R.] had a real possibility to influence the children to see their mother as a stranger, as a danger to the father‑children family relationship, and as a danger to their health. ... The break of the family ties between the mother and her children will without any doubt become permanent if the children are to live with their father, and therefore any visiting programme for the mother and the children will be illusory and formal in so far as the mother was unable to obtain the enforcement of a final decision for more than four years and as during that time she practically could not even speak with the children.”

5. The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Zagreb. 6. In 2004 the applicant occupied a flat in Zagreb situated in a decayed building in the wider city centre of Zagreb. 7. In 2005, in the context of the denationalisation process, a certain V.W-M. became the owner of the building. 8. Soon afterwards the area in which the building was located attracted the interest of real-estate investors, and many residential and commercial buildings were built there. V.W-M. took certain measures with a view to selling her property. 9. In the early hours of 22 December 2005 the applicant informed the police that a bullet had been shot into her flat. The police immediately responded at the scene and found that a bullet had entered the applicant’s flat though a window. The scene was secured and the applicant spent the night with a friend. 10. A further onsite inspection was carried out by the police, but the bullet was not found. The applicant was interviewed about the circumstances of the shooting but she could not provide any further details, as she had been sleeping at the time when the bullet had entered the flat. 11. On 18 January 2006 the police lodged a criminal complaint with the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu – hereinafter “the State Attorney’s Office”) against an unknown perpetrator in relation to charges of endangering life and property through dangerous acts or means (shooting). 12. There is no information to indicate that any further investigative steps have been taken. The perpetrator remains unknown. 13. On 10 November 2010 the applicant called the police to report that she had recently heard noise from the neighbouring building, where nobody was supposed to be living. She feared that something suspicious was happening. The police carried out an inspection of the scene but only found in the vicinity a homeless person, who argued that he had never been in the building in question. 14. On 22 November 2010 the applicant and her neighbour, T.O., reported to the police that a certain M.B. had often visited the applicant’s building, explaining that he represented an investor. He had offered to the applicant 1,000 euros (EUR) to leave her flat. After she had refused that offer, he had threatened to move into her flat when she was absent. 15. In connection with the applicant’s allegations, on 21 December 2010 the police interviewed M.B. He explained that he had been interested in buying the building containing the applicant’s flat, and that for that reason he had entered into negotiations with the tenants. However, he denied threatening or otherwise harassing them. M.B. also explained that he had abandoned the idea of buying the building as it would have entailed many legal disputes with the tenants. 16. On 22 December 2010 a fire broke out in the building where the applicant lived. The police attended at the scene and found that the fire had started in the premises of an abandoned retail store. The police recorded that there was no threat to people or particular damage to property. The fire was extinguished and no further action taken. 17. The next day, the tenants found a Zippo cigarette lighter at the scene which, according to the applicant, they immediately wanted to hand over to the police, but the police refused to accept it (see also paragraphs 20-21 below). 18. On 25 December 2010 the applicant informed the police that somebody was trying to break into the premises in which the fire had broken out few days earlier. The police attended at the scene but found nobody. 19. On 4 January 2011 a fire broke out in one of the flats (occupied by G.K.) in the applicant’s building. 20. Firefighters and the police immediately responded at the scene. They found traces of forced entry into the flat and a lighter of the same model as that found by the tenants following the fire of 22 December 2010 (see paragraphs 16-17 above). They also found that a pile of old clothes had burned in the living room. In the first interviews conducted with the tenants, one of them stated that G.K.’s former husband had threatened to move by force into the flat in question and had also harassed neighbours. 21. The next day, the police carried out an onsite inspection and seized a plastic bucket and clothes which they found in the flat. The police furthermore seized a lighter found at the scene and the lighter found by the tenants following the incident of 22 December 2010. The police also took samples from various objects in the flat. The seized material and samples were sent to the police forensic centre for further analysis. 22. On the same day, the police interviewed the applicant and her neighbours. They reported the following: - the applicant argued that M.B. had often visited the building accompanied by several men and had exerted pressure on the tenants to move out of the building. He had offered to the applicant different amounts of money, and at one point one of his men had said that they would easily get rid of the tenants. The applicant knew that some of the tenants had accepted M.B.’s offers. She also heard that some other investors had been interested in the building but that they had changed their mind when they had realised that M.B. had decided to invest there; - G.K. stated that she had had problems with M.B., who had threatened her since she had refused to move out of the building. She suspected that M.B. was behind the fire; - T.Đ. explained how the tenants had big problems with the investor to whom the owner wanted to sell the house and who wanted to throw them out of the building. She furthermore stated that G.K.’s former husband had said that he would move into the above-mentioned flat (see paragraph 19). She also explained how, following the fire of 22 December 2010, she and her husband had found a lighter of the same type as the one found after the fire of 4 January 2011. This was confirmed by T.Đ.’s husband; - LJ.O., who is T.Đ.’s mother, stated that at the time of the incident she had been in her flat when she had heard an explosion and smelled petrol, after which she had seen fire in G.K.’s flat. LJ.O. also stated that the tenants had been often visited by M.B., who had introduced himself as the representative of the owner and who had offered them money to leave the building; - M.D. stated that around Christmas two men had knocked on her window but as she had not opened the door to them they had gone to see the applicant and said something to the effect that they had done what she (the applicant) had asked for and that the building was now on fire. 23. On 5 January 2011 the police lodged a criminal complaint with the State Attorney’s Office against an unknown perpetrator in relation to charges of endangering life and property through dangerous acts or means (arson). 24. On 11 January 2011 the applicant went to the police station as she wanted to add to her previous statement. The applicant stated that at the time of the 2005 incident she had had problems with her former husband. Moreover, in April or May 2010, M.B. had started coming to the building and talking to the tenants with a view to removing them from the building. He had offered to the applicant different amounts of money to move, but as she had refused he had threatened to move into her flat when she was absent. In December 2010 more men had come in a car to inspect the building. They had said that they represented a certain Ma.Be., who had become the owner of the building. Previously, the applicant had managed to get in touch with Ma.Be. and on that occasion he had stated that he would sell the building and that he did not care about the tenants. Then on 22 December 2010 several men had come with the same car that had been used by those who had come earlier to inspect the building. They had asked about a certain person and left. That evening the fire had broken out in the abandoned retail store. 25. According to the note of her interview, the applicant also stated that she had heard that a certain person, who at the time of the fire in G.K.’s flat had been carrying out some work there, had been dangerous and had participated in an incident of arson. She also stated that she had heard that a certain L.Č. had become the owner of the building and that a certain O.Č. was also associated with her[1]. 26. On 17 January 2011 the applicant went to the State Attorney’s Office and alleged that L.Č. (who according to the applicant had become the owner of the building on 21 December 2010) and Ma.Be.[2] had been behind the fires on 22 December 2010 and 4 January 2011. 27. On 18 January 2011 the applicant informed the police that people, whom she considered to be behind the arson, were trying to break into the building. The police responded at the scene, where they found O.Č., his lawyer and a business associate. 28. In his interview with the police, O.Č. explained that a few months earlier (on 14 December 2010) his wife, L.Č., had bought the building from V.W-M. He also stated that he had started negotiating with the tenants through a lawyer about the possibility of their removal from the building. He denied threatening them or otherwise being associated with the arson. He refused to participate in a polygraph test, arguing that he had certain psychological problems and was under medication. Moreover, he could not prove his alibi for 4 January 2011. 29. The police also interviewed O.Č.’s lawyer and his business associate, who explained the circumstances of their business engagement with O.Č. They had no information concerning the arson. The applicant was also interviewed, and she repeated her earlier statement to the police and the State Attorney’s Office. 30. On 20 January 2011 a fire inspector produced a report according to which the fire on 4 January had been caused by an inflammatory liquid being first spread over the flat and then set on fire using an open flame. 31. In the period between September and November 2011 the police forensic centre produced reports which found that the material seized from the flat had contained traces of gasoline and that no fingerprint traces had been identified. However, a sample of male DNA had been identified on one of the objects. The DNA sample did not correspond to any of the samples stored in the centre’s database. 32. In September 2012 the police informed the State Attorney’s Office of the results of the investigation. 33. In the meantime, on 28 February 2011 the applicant signed a contract with L.Č., represented by her husband O.Č., under which she would move out of the house in exchange for EUR 6,000. She also accepted that she had received the amount in question and that she had no other claims towards L.Č. The applicant argued before the Court that she had signed the contract as a result of threats made by O.Č. According to the applicant, he had promised to pay her an additional EUR 40,000, which he had never done. 34. On an unspecified date in March 2011 the applicant and the other tenants moved out of the building, following which the building was demolished and a hotel was built on that location. 35. On 10 July 2011 O.Č. informed the police of a message which he had received from the applicant in which she suggested that O.Č. still owned her money and that she would ensure that he ended up in prison for trying to kill her. Two days later, the applicant called the police and asked them to be present while she took some of her belongings from the flat. 36. On 9 April 2013 the applicant reported to the police that during 2012, and again between March and April 2013, O.Č. had several times threatened her with violence. 37. On 20 April 2013 the applicant reported to the police that she had learned that a certain B.N. and D.V. had started the fire in the building where she lived. She also stated that she had talked to D.V., who had on that occasion said that they should have also spilled gasoline on the applicant and set her on fire and that it was not excluded that they would do so. 38. On 3 June 2013 the police interviewed O.Č., who argued that the applicant was harassing and threatening him in connection with an amount of money that she expected to receive for the flat. However, O.Č. considered that the payment had been settled and that he did not owe anything to her. 39. Meanwhile, in May, and then in October 2013, the applicant lodged further complaints against O.Č., alleging that he had threatened her in connection with the above-mentioned debt in respect of the flat. 40. On 9 November 2013 the police informed the State Attorney’s Office of the applicant’s complaints, and the State Attorney’s Office requested that a further interview be conducted with O.Č. 41. The police interviewed O.Č. on 15 January 2014. He denied making any threats against the applicant but argued that she had harassed and threatened him over the debt, which he considered did not exist. 42. After making a number of enquiries into the status of her case, on 6 October 2014 the applicant received a letter from the State Attorney’s Office indicating that O.Č. had been questioned and that he had denied all of the applicant’s allegations and that there was no evidence to refute his statement. The State Attorney’s Office also stressed that an investigation into the arson was still pending. 43. On 6 November 2014 the applicant received a letter from the Zagreb County State Attorney’s Office (Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu) reiterating the information provided by the State Attorney’s Office. 44. On 17 December 2014 the applicant was questioned by the police concerning her numerous complaints regarding the ineffectiveness of the investigation into her allegations of harassment and threats made by O.Č. On that occasion, she alleged that a number of other individuals were associated with O.Č. and the events leading to her forceful removal from her flat. 45. On 12 May 2015 the State Attorney’s Office rejected the applicant’s criminal complaints against O.Č. in relation to charges of threats on the grounds that there was no evidence to suggest that he had committed the offence in question. The applicant was instructed that she could take over the prosecution as a subsidiary prosecutor. 46. The investigation into the two instances of arson is still pending.

6. The applicants were all employees of the Ministry of Justice’s directorate for the execution of criminal sanctions in Serbia. Because of the hardships prison staff endure during service at penal institutions in Serbia, Serbian law provides that they are eligible for certain employment benefits, such as benefits concerning the calculation of their old-age pensions and salary increases. 7. In general, pension and work-related issues in Serbia are regulated by two laws: 1) the Old-Age Pension and Disability Insurance Act (Zakon o penzionom i invalidskom osiguranju, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia no. 34/2003, as amended); and 2) the Labour Act (Zakon o radu, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia no. 24/2005, as amended). However, in regards to employees of correctional facilities, pension and work-related issues are also regulated by: 1) the Execution of Criminal Sanctions Act (Zakon o izvršenju krivičnih sankcija, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia -OG RS- no. 85/2005, amendments published in the Official Gazette no. 72/2009); and 2) the Directive on personal coefficients for the calculation and payment of salaries to individuals employed within the Ministry of Justice’s directorate for the execution of criminal sanctions (Uredba o koeficijentima za obračun i isplatu plata u Upravi za izvršenje krivičnih sankcija, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia -OG RS- no. 16/2007, amendments published in the Official Gazette nos. 21/2009, 1/2011 – Constitutional Court decision (implementing decision of the Constitutional Court of 18 November 2010), 83/2011 and 102/2011 – hereinafter “the Directive”). 8. Under Article 262 of the Execution of Criminal Sanctions Act, the director and other employees of the directorate for the execution of criminal sanctions are entitled to an accelerated accumulation of pension rights: this means that twelve months of full-time employment is counted as sixteen months of full-time employment in the civilian economy when their old-age pensions are calculated. Also, the personal coefficient of employees in correctional facilities may, according to the said Article, be increased by up to 30%. The posts to which the accelerated accumulation of pension rights applies are determined by the minister responsible for the judiciary and the minister responsible for pension and disability insurance. 9. In accordance with Article 7 § 3 of the Directive, in the period between 1 January 2007 and 14 January 2011 the personal coefficients of the applicants and their colleagues were increased by 10% instead of 30% as provided by the Execution of Criminal Sanctions Act. 10. On 18 November 2010, the Constitutional Court adopted a decision (no. IU 63/2007) stating that Article 7 § 3 of the Directive was unconstitutional. The said Article was struck down. The amendments to the Directive entered into force on 14 January 2011. As of 14 January 2011 the personal coefficients were increased by 30%. 11. Between 1 January 2007 and 14 January 2011, while this unconstitutional norm (neustavna odredba) was in force, the employees of the Ministry of Justice’s directorate for the execution of criminal sanctions received lower salaries that they had been entitled to. For that reason, their old-age pensions were also reduced. 12. Throughout 2011, 2012 and 2013 the applicants, as well as many of their colleagues, lodged with various courts of first instance (osnovni sudovi) separate civil claims against the Republic of Serbia, asking for compensation for the damage caused while the four-year-long unconstitutional norm pertained. 13. Some of the courts of first instance upheld the claimants’ applications for compensation, while others dismissed them. Decisions of the courts of first instance were appealed against either by claimants or the defendant. 14. Certain claimants were successful before the courts of appeal; yet all the applicants were unsuccessful. In particular, the applicants’ complaints were rejected by the courts of appeal in Belgrade and Kragujevac for the applicants’ failure to pursue the proper avenue of redress. In the view of these courts the applicants should have first initiated administrative proceedings and afterwards lodged a complaint with the civil courts. In any event, the Belgrade and Kragujevac Courts of Appeal also held that they did not have jurisdiction to decide on the applicants’ cases. 15. In contrast, in the following cases other courts of appeal or chambers thereof ruled in favour of the applicants’ colleagues: 1) The Kragujevac Court of Appeal (for example: decisions nos. Gž1. 43/11 of 15 March 2011 and Gž1. 3034/14 of 2 October 2014); 2) The Niš Court of Appeal (for example: Gž1. 2444/13 of 27 December 2013); 3) The Novi Sad Court of Appeal (for example: Gž1. 3549/13 of 24 December 2013 and Gž1. 2379/14 of 7 November 2014). 16. In the above-mentioned decisions the courts of appeal upheld the claimants’ requests, stating that the applicants’ colleagues should be paid the differences in their salaries together with interest on the unpaid amounts, and the contributions in respect of the their old-age pensions, for the period during the which unconstitutional norm had been applied. (b) Decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation (Vrhovni kasacioni sud) no. Rev.2 393/2013 of 26 September 2013 17. Given the differences in adjudication on the matter, on 27 March 2013 the Novi Sad Court of Appeal requested, in accordance with Article 395 of the Civil Procedure Act (Zakon o parničnom postupku, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia – OG RS – 125/04 and 111/2009), that the Supreme Court of Cassation amend its judgment no. Gž1-2352/12 of 12 December 2012 and harmonise the case-law of the courts of appeal in matters concerning the payment of the differences between the salaries claimants had received and those they had been entitled to. 18. On 26 September 2013, in response to the said request, the Supreme Court of Cassation found, acting in accordance with Articles 395 and 399 of the Civil Procedure Act, that there was an interest of general concern to deal with this issue. It held that the Novi Sad Court of Appeal in delivering the judgment of 12 December 2012 had incorrectly applied and interpreted domestic law. The Supreme Court of Cassation held that the judgment should have been rendered in the claimant’s favour and, accordingly, set the judgment of the Novi Sad Court of Appeal aside. 19. After the impugned decision, the Courts of Appeal in Novi Sad, Niš and Kragujevac assumed the following approach: “... as the Supreme Court of Cassation explicitly stated in its decisions nos. Rev. 2 br. 393/2013 of 26 September 2013 and Rev. br. 983/2012 of 26 September 2013, State organs [were engaging in what had to be considered] unlawful work, as the Constitutional Court failed to adopt a decision [regarding] in which manner the consequences of the unconstitutional norm should have been overcome[, and] the Government of the Republic of Serbia, as the regulatory authority, within the scope of their jurisdiction did not secure the execution of the impugned decision of the Constitutional Court concerning the disputed period during which the claimant’s salary was unconstitutionally and illegally reduced, the claimant had a right to lodge a claim for compensation for damage with the civil courts, and the civil courts are in charge of deciding on the matter in accordance with Article 1 of the Civil Procedure Act.” (cited from the judgment no. Gž1. 2444/13 of 27 December 2013, p. 4) (c) Decisions of the Constitutional Court 20. In the period between 26 September 2012 and 13 May 2014 the applicants appealed to the Constitutional Court. 21. They complained, inter alia, of the inconsistent domestic case-law of the Serbian courts which had caused the rejection of their claims and the simultaneous acceptance of identical claims lodged by their colleagues. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention or Articles 32 and 36 of the Constitution (provisions that correspond to Article 6 of the Convention) the applicants asked the Constitutional Court to find that there had been a breach of the principle of legal certainty as an integral part of the right to a fair trial. 22. Between 23 October 2014 and 25 March 2015, the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants’ constitutional appeals as unsubstantiated. 23. The facts relating to each applicant may be summarised as follows: (a) As regards application no. 27471/15 (Ms Aleksandra Mirković – the first applicant) 25. On 20 December 2011 she lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court (Prvi opštinski sud) in Belgrade asking for payment of the difference between the salary she had received and the one she had been entitled to. 26. On 3 June 2013 the first-instance court rejected her claim. On 3 October 2013 the Belgrade Court of Appeal upheld that judgment following an appeal by the applicant. 27. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal on 25 November 2013 complaining, inter alia, of the existence of inconsistent domestic case-law of Serbian courts, in particular the rejection of her own claim and the simultaneous acceptance of identical claims lodged by her colleagues, and asked the Constitutional Court to find that there had been a breach of the principle of judicial certainty as an integral part of her right to a fair trial. She provided the Constitutional Court with copies of several judgments in support of her allegation regarding the inconsistent case-law. 28. On 12 June 2014 she provided the Constitutional Court with the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013. 29. On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal and decided not to evaluate the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013 because it had been adopted after the judgment of the Belgrade Court of Appeal of 3 October 2013 had been adopted in the applicant’s case (Ustavni sud nije posebno cenio imajući u vidu da ona potiče iz perioda nakon donošenja osporene presude Apelacionog suda u Beogradu GŽ1 556/13 od 3. oktobra 2013. godine.) (b) As regards application no. 27288/15 (Ms Biljana Sarić – the second applicant) 30. At the relevant time, the second applicant was an employee of Belgrade Special Prison Hospital. On 20 December 2011 she lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court in Belgrade. Her complaint was rejected on 8 February 2013. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 15 May 2013. 31. On 24 July 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. She amended her appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013 on 12 June 2014. 32. On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant. (c) As regards application no. 27751/15 (Ms Sanja Popović-Radivojeviċ – the third applicant) 33. At the relevant time, the third applicant was an employee of Juvenile Detention Centre (Kazneno-popravni zavod za maloletnike) in Valjevo. On an unspecified date in 2011, she lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Valjevo. On 16 March 2012 the Basic Court ruled in her favour. This judgment was overturned by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 15 August 2012. 34. On 26 September 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. She provided the Constitutional Court with the copy of one relevant judgment in which the Kragujevac Court of Appeal had accepted a similar claim to her own. 35. On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected her appeal for failure to adequately substantiate her complaint. In particular it held that one relevant judgment submitted by the applicant could not amount to proof of either profound or long-standing differences in the adjudication of the courts’ ruling at final instance in cases similar to the applicant’s. (d) As regards application no. 27779/15 (Mr Branislav Marković – the fourth applicant) 36. At the relevant time, the fourth applicant was an employee of the prison in Požarevac-Zabela (Kazneno-popravni zavod Požarevac-Zabela). On 14 July 2011, the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Požarevac. On 8 February 2012 the Basic Court ruled in his favour. This judgment was overturned by Belgrade Court of Appeal on 29 August 2012. 37. On 13 November 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, alleging a violation of his right to a fair trial. He failed to provide the Constitutional Court with copies of any of the judgments in which the civil courts had allegedly accepted claims similar to his own. 38. On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal as unsubstantiated. (e) As regards application no. 27790/15 (Ms Milica Bogićević – the fifth applicant) 39. At the relevant time, the fifth applicant was an employee of Belgrade Special Prison Hospital. On 20 December 2011, the applicant lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court in Belgrade. On 23 January 2013 the First Basic Court ruled in her favour. This judgment was overturned by Belgrade Court of Appeal on 19 March 2014. 40. On 13 May 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. She provided the Constitutional court with the copy of one relevant judgment in which the Novi Sad Court of Appeal had accepted a claim similar to her own. 41. On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected her appeal for the same reason as in the case of the third applicant. (f) As regards application no. 27288/15 (Ms Gordana Maslovarić – the sixth applicant) 42. At the relevant time, the sixth applicant was an employee of Belgrade Special Prison Hospital. On 20 December 2011 she lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court in Belgrade. Her complaint was rejected on 25 December 2012. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 20 March 2013. 43. On 17 May 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. She amended her appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013 on 12 June 2014. 44. On 30 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant. (g) As regards application no. 28418/15 (Mr Velimir Vidić – the seventh applicant) 45. At the relevant time, the seventh applicant was an employee of Penitentiary institution in Belgrade-Padinska Skela (Kazneno-popravni zavod u Beogradu – Padinska Skela) and the prison in Požarevac-Zabela. On 30 November 2011 he lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court in Belgrade. His complaint was rejected on 3 December 2012. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 1 March 2013. 46. On 16 May 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He amended his appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013 on 21 March 2014. 47. On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant. (h) As regards application no. 30893/15 (Mr Nebojša Nejković – the eighth applicant) 48. At the relevant time, the eighth applicant was an employee of the prison in Požarevac-Zabela. On an unspecified date in 2013 he lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Požarevac. His complaint was rejected on 21 August 2013. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 30 October 2013. 49. On 10 December 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He amended his appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013 on 27 February 2014. 50. On 13 November 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant. (i) As regards application no. 30906/15 (Ms Aleksandra Pešić – the ninth applicant; and Ms Jelena Jevremović – the tenth applicant) 51. At the relevant time, the ninth and the tenth applicants were employees of Penitentiary institution in Požarevac (Kazneno-popravni zavod za žene). On an unspecified date in 2011, the applicants lodged a joint civil claim with the Basic Court in Požarevac. On 13 January 2012 the Basic Court ruled in their favour. This judgment was overturned by Belgrade Court of Appeal on 4 April 2013. 52. On 21 May 2013 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal. They amended the appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013 on 27 February 2014. 53. On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants’ constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant. (j) As regards application no. 32933/15 (i) Mr Željko Gradiška – the eleventh applicant 54. At the relevant time, the eleventh applicant was an employee of the women’s prison in Požarevac. On an unspecified date in 2011, the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Požarevac. On 24 February 2012 the Basic Court ruled in his favour. This judgment was overturned by Belgrade Court of Appeal on 16 October 2013. 55. On 10 December 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He subsequently amended the appeal with the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013. 56. On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal because in its view the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation could not have been considered as proof of inconsistent case-law of courts ruling at final instance (revizijsko rešenje ne može biti dokaz o različitom postupanju sudova najviše instance). (ii) Mr Milan Vučićević – the twelfth applicant 57. At the relevant time, the twelfth applicant was an employee of the prison in Požarevac-Zabela. On an unspecified date in 2012, the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Požarevac. His complaint was rejected on 2 October 2012. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 22 November 2012. 58. On 15 January 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He failed to provide the Constitutional Court with copies of any of the judgments in which the civil courts at final instance had allegedly accepted claims similar to his own. 59. On 23 March 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal as unsubstantiated. The Constitutional Court failed to separately address his complaint concerning the divergent case-law. (iii) Mr Draško Veljković – the thirteenth applicant 60. At the relevant time, the thirteenth applicant was an employee of Kraljevo District Prison (Okružni zatvor u Kraljevu). On an unspecified date in 2011, the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Kraljevo. On 23 December 2011 the Basic Court ruled in his favour. This judgment was overturned by Kragujevac Court of Appeal on 12 March 2013. 61. On 13 May 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. On several occasions, between 30 December 2013 and 19 August 2014, he amended the appeal, adding copies of a few other judgments in which the civil courts at final instance had accepted claims similar to his own, and adding the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013. 62. On 23 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant. (k) As regards application no. 35780/15 (Ms Branislava Stojanović – the fourteenth applicant) 63. At the relevant time, the fourteenth applicant was an employee of the women’s prison in Požarevac. On an unspecified date in 2012 she lodged a civil claim with the Basic Court in Požarevac. Her complaint was rejected on 22 May 2012. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 13 September 2012. 64. On 22 October 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. She subsequently amended the appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013. 65. On 29 January 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant. (l) As regards application no. 40646 (Ms Nevenka Bijelić – the fifteenth applicant; Ms Vesna Vulević – the sixteenth applicant; and Ms Zorica Jovanović – the seventeenth applicant) 66. At the relevant time, the fifteenth, the sixteenth and the seventeenth applicants were employees of the women’s prison in Požarevac. On an unspecified date in 2012, the applicants lodged a joint civil claim with the Basic Court in Požarevac. Their complaint was rejected on 29 May 2013. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 11 September 2013. 67. On 16 October 2013 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal. They subsequently amended the appeal, adding copies of a few other judgments in which the civil courts ruling at final instance had accepted claims similar to their own, and adding the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013. 68. On 11 February 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants’ constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant. (m) As regards application no. 55066/15 (Mr Dejan Stepanović – the eighteenth applicant) 69. At the relevant time, the eighteenth applicant was an employee of Belgrade Special Prison Hospital. On 20 December 2011 he lodged a civil claim with the First Basic Court in Belgrade. His complaint was rejected on 26 February 2013. The judgment of the first-instance court was upheld by the Belgrade Court of Appeal on 5 June 2013. 70. On 5 August 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He amended his appeal following the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 26 September 2013 on 12 June 2014. 71. On 25 March 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal for the same reason as in the case of the first applicant.

5. The applicant was born in 1972 and is currently detained at the Corradino Correctional Facility, Paola. 6. On 11 December 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of having murdered his former partner. 7. On 13 December 2010 he was charged before the Court of Magistrates, as a Court of Criminal Inquiry, with inter alia, wilful homicide. He was remanded in custody thereafter. 8. It appears from the acts of the proceedings that from the applicant’s arraignment until August 2012, the applicant filed ten requests for bail which were all rejected after the relevant submissions were made, including oral hearings. Apart from the hearings related to the bail applications and other specific requests, fourteen hearings were held where scores of witnesses gave evidence and another six hearings were held where nothing happened and the case was adjourned. 9. In the meantime on 10 April 2012 the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence. He complained of a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in so far as he had been detained for more than fifteen months since his arrest. 10. By a judgment of 27 June 2012 the Civil Court (First Hall) rejected the applicant’s claims. By a judgment of 23 November 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal and confirmed the appealed judgment. 11. After the applicant had been held in custody for the maximum period of detention allowed by law, he became entitled to bail in accordance with Article 575(6)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code (see relevant domestic law). 12. Consequently, following his request of 17 August 2012, by a decree of 22 August 2012, the Court of Magistrates granted the applicant bail subject to the following conditions: that he appears for all the scheduled hearings in the criminal proceedings; that he does not go abroad or abscond; that he does not contact or approach, directly nor indirectly, witnesses for the prosecution; that he does not commit a crime of a voluntary nature while released on bail; that he present himself at the District Police Station every day between eight a.m. and eight p.m.; that he be home not later than ten p.m. and that he does not leave home before six a.m. of the following day; that he inform the Police of any change of address by not later than twelve hours of such a change; that he deposit by way of security the amount of 15,000 euros (EUR) in the court registry; and that he undertake a personal guarantee of EUR 25,000. In the event of any bail condition being breached, the entire amount of EUR 40,000 would be forfeited in favour of the State. 13. On 3 September 2012 the Attorney General appealed against the decision of 22 August 2012, as he considered the conditions too lenient and that they would not serve as a sufficient deterrent against absconding or interfering with the proper administration of justice. He requested the court to set a higher deposit reflecting the nature of the crimes with which the applicant was accused and to amend the conditions by disallowing the applicant to be in locality R. where the victim and her family resided. 14. On 6 September 2012 the applicant objected to the Attorney General’s appeal, noting that he had remained in detention precisely because he could not fulfil the conditions imposed. At the same time he filed an application requesting the court to reduce the amount to be deposited by him. He explained that since he had been detained for more than twenty months he was unemployed, and thus he could not pay the relevant amount. He submitted two documents showing that he received unemployment benefits in the sums of EUR 1,262.22 and EUR 1,573.34 in 2009 and 2010 respectively and offered to explain his financial situation ( if necessary with further documentary evidence) during an oral hearing. It appears from the acts of the proceedings that he then submitted tax assessment forms of the previous twelve years. 15. By a decision of 7 September 2012 the Criminal Court, having examined the documents submitted by the applicant, rejected the Attorney General’s request to increase the deposit but added the condition that the applicant could not be in the vicinity of locality R. It also rejected the applicant’s request considering that the Court of Magistrates had correctly applied its discretion. 16. On 9 October 2012 the applicant filed another application requesting the court to reduce the amount of the deposit. He complained that although he had been in detention for twenty-two months, and was entitled to bail, he had nevertheless remained in detention since he (and his family) could not afford to pay such an excessive amount by way of deposit. He further noted that the main witnesses had already been heard in the committal proceedings. 17. On 10 October 2012 the Attorney General objected to the applicant’s new request, noting that the applicant was not reliable, and that his inability to pay the deposit showed that he would be unable to pay the personal guarantee if he were to breach his conditions. Moreover, the family of the victim, particularly her daughter, lived in fear of the applicant. 18. By a decree of 18 October 2012, having seen the request and the reply submitted by the Attorney General, the court rejected the applicant’s request. 19. On 4 December 2012 the applicant filed another application requesting the court to reduce the amount that he had to deposit. He noted that he had remained in detention for three and half months since the decree granting him bail due to his inability to pay. The Attorney General objected in view of the seriousness of the crime. 20. On 7 December 2012 the court again rejected the applicant’s request; it noted that its previous decisions had determined the deposit in order to strike the requisite balance between, on the one hand, the seriousness of the crime and the potential punishment, and, on the other hand, the obligation of the accused to fulfil the imposed conditions. 21. On 29 January 2013 the applicant filed yet another application requesting that the amount of deposit be reduced. He noted that he had been in detention for another five months since the decree granting him bail, and yet he was still not in a position to benefit from such bail - to which he was entitled by law - since he could not pay the deposit imposed. The Attorney General objected considering that the amount imposed was adequate in view of the severity of the crime and the circumstances of the case. On 5 February 2013 the applicant filed a note reiterating his request. 22. By a decree of 5 February 2013 the court, having considered the parties submissions, as well as its decree of 7 December 2012, was of the view that it should not alter the considerations made in the latter decision. It, thus, rejected the applicant’s request. 23. On 22 July 2013 the applicant requested the court to accept his mother Ms J.G. (and other relatives) as surety in lieu of the deposit. He referred to a property the relatives had inherited which they were willing to put forward as a guarantee instead of the deposit. The Attorney General requested that the applicant submit relevant evidence of the inheritance and the value of the property and that the court hear relevant witnesses in this connection, before making his final submissions. He further highlighted that a public deed would be required for the purposes of the relevant hypothec. 24. On 30 July 2013 the applicant submitted all the relevant documents concerning the property at issue which was valued at EUR 95,000. 25. On 2 August 2013 the court accepted that the applicant’s mother stand as surety by means of a hypothec on the above-mentioned property which she owned together with other relatives. Such property was to serve as a guarantee for the applicant observing the conditions imposed; in the event of a breach of any of those conditions, the property would be forfeited in favour of the Government of Malta. 26. Subsequently on 6 August 2013 the applicant having signed a personal guarantee of EUR 25,000 and his mother having effected the relevant hypothec as guarantee, the applicant was released from custody after thirty-two months of pre-trial detention. 27. In the meantime the committal proceedings and hearing of witnesses continued throughout this time; further witnesses were heard during three hearings and another four hearings were adjourned. On 31 July 2013 the prosecuting authority had declared that it did not have further evidence to produce. 28. In the meantime on 6 February 2013 the applicant instituted a new set of constitutional redress proceedings, complaining of a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in connection with the “exorbitant sum” requested (in particular reference to the sum set as deposit) which did not allow him to effectively enjoy bail. 29. By a judgment of 3 July 2013 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence rejected the applicant’s claims. It held that when a court accepted that an applicant had to be granted bail, that court had to establish the proper conditions which the applicant had to satisfy to be released and yet appear for court proceedings. If the guarantees included the deposit of a sum of money, such pecuniary condition had to be considered by reference to the person of the accused and his means as well as his relation with the person who would act as his surety. The court referred to the Court’s judgment of Iwanczuk v. Poland (no. 25196/94, § 66, 15 November 2011) where it had been held that the accused whom the judicial authorities declared themselves prepared to release on bail must faithfully furnish sufficient information, that can be checked if need be, about the amount of bail to be fixed. The court noted that the applicant did not satisfy this obligation. It was his duty to provide the courts with information on his income, savings and list his assets. Nevertheless, the applicant had only provided copies of self-assessment forms for purposes of income tax for the years between 1998 and 2011. According to the court, if an applicant argued that the deposit was too high, he had to show the court what he could afford by providing a list of his assets and property, even if this meant that he had to conduct researches in the Public Registry, and provide the relevant documentation. In its view an applicant had to show not only that he did not have the necessary means to deposit the sum requested but also that he was in an objective impossibility of finding the necessary means. He further had to show that he was unable to find persons who offered to act as surety. It was only when all this was shown that an applicant would have satisfied his duty to furnish sufficient information, thus enabling the court to make an objective assessment. 30. In the court’s view, in the present case, bearing in mind the seriousness of the crime and the potential punishment, the applicant had not brought enough evidence before the courts of criminal justice to substantiate his claim that those courts had imposed excessive conditions (including that referring to the amount of deposit). It further noted that the Constitutional Court [in the first round of proceedings] had not been convinced that there would be no tampering with evidence. Indeed even though the collection of evidence had come to an end, one had to guarantee that the evidence remained intact and thus relevant guarantees were necessary. 31. The applicant appealed. 32. By a judgment of 31 January 2014, the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal and confirmed the judgment of the first court. 33. The Constitutional Court referred to its judgment in the case The Police v. Austine Eze and Osita Anagboso Obi, of 25 October 2013, where it had held that there must be proportionality between the amount to be deposited by the applicant for his release on bail and his financial circumstances. The level of bail set out should not be too high and it should ensure the presence of the accused at the various stages of the criminal proceedings. It also made reference to the Court’s judgment in Mangouras v. Spain ([GC], no. 12050/04, § 79, ECHR 2010) as well as the Constitutional Court’s judgment Salvatore Gauci v. Attorney General, of 31 July 1998, where it had been held that in establishing the amount to be deposited as security, the court must also consider other circumstances such as the seriousness of the offence and the danger to society. 34. The Constitutional Court held that the onus of proving that the amount of deposit was too high for the applicant when considering his financial means lay with the applicant himself. An applicant must provide information to the court on his financial situation and on the real possibility of finding a surety able to guarantee the observance of the conditions imposed. In the present case, the Constitutional Court held that the latter option had not been contemplated by the applicant and it was only after various requests to have the amount reduced that he eventually proposed his mother to act as a surety. It noted that although the applicant’s mother did not own the tenement she had used for the purposes of the guarantee, it was already in her possession for a period of time before the last application for the reduction of the amount was filed. Thus, the applicant could not argue that he could not have taken this course of action before. Although the applicant relied on the Court’s judgment of Iwanczuk (cited above), where a violation had been found on the basis that it took four months for the Polish authorities to adjust the conditions for bail, the Constitutional Court held that (even if this were the case), the applicant – who was legally represented ‑ had not explored all avenues to satisfy the courts with an adequate guarantee for the observance of the conditions of bail. No explanation as to why he only obtained a guarantee in the form of a surety at a subsequent stage was provided by the applicant. 35. Noting that the applicant had stated that at times he worked as a bus driver and as a horse trainer, apart from other activities, the Constitutional Court distinguished the applicant’s case from that of a person who was living on relief payments. The fact that the applicant had at times worked and had a salary or wage made the need to provide information to the court on his means more relevant. 36. On the fixing of the amount of the deposit, the Constitutional Court referred to Article 576 of the Criminal Code (see relevant domestic law below) which provided the factors to be considered for this purpose. Under Maltese law these included the seriousness of the offence and the applicable punishment. The Constitutional Court considered that although the law also referred to the financial situation of the person accused, this factor was not to be taken in isolation – it was for the court fixing the amount of deposit to consider all the factors taken together and not separately. In the present case bearing in mind those factors, the amount of deposit of EUR 15,000 was justified especially since the law provided for the opportunity to provide a surety – a course of action subsequently undertaken by the applicant. 37. In the Constitutional Court’s view the criminal courts’ concern that the applicant did not give the necessary guarantees that there would not be any tampering with evidence, subsisted throughout the whole criminal proceedings. 38. By a decision of 7 April 2014 the applicant was found guilty of breaching his bail conditions and his bail was revoked. Further bail requests were lodged and rejected until 26 January 2015 when a bill of indictment was issued against the applicant. From August 2013 until his indictment some ten hearings were held where nothing happened and the case was adjourned. 39. On 16 June 2015 the Criminal Court was informed that a plea bargain had been concluded between the applicant and the prosecution. 40. On 20 July 2015, following the applicant’s admission to all the charges against him, the Criminal Court pronounced a guilty verdict and sentenced the applicant to thirty-five years imprisonment and to the payment of court experts’ fees.

8. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Kiev, Ukraine. 9. In his application to the Court the applicant stated that at the relevant time he had been employed as a journalist by a Ukrainian television channel. In July 2006 he had volunteered to cover the G8 Summit, which was being held in the St Petersburg region, for Libertarian Information and News Collective (LINC), disseminating press-releases and information on the Internet about protests, connecting journalists and protesters, and providing coverage about the issues raised by activists. In his comments on the third-party submissions before the Court, the applicant added that at the time he had been “involved with” the Independent Media Centre (Indymedia); prior to the G8 summit, he had taken leave from his television assignments and had “focused on media work” in the framework of LINC. 10. According to the applicant, at 8.30 a.m. on 16 July 2006 he happened to “be around” when a so-called “anti-globalism” march was taking place in Nevskiy Avenue in St Petersburg (see also paragraphs 19 and 20 below). He was not wearing any distinctive clothing or insignia to designate him as a journalist. He did not take part in the protest; rather, his actions were limited to observing people and taking photographs, including when the police started to disperse the gathering and to arrest some of the participants. One of the police officers spotted him taking pictures and ordered him to switch off the camera. According to the applicant, he complied and no further order was given to him; he did not show any resistance to the police. In his observations before the Court the applicant said that he had presented his press-card issued by the International Federation of Journalists, and explained his presence at the venue. 11. It follows from the identical reports of two police officers that they approached the applicant and ordered him to cease his “unlawful actions”; despite several warnings, the applicant refused; he was then ordered to follow them to the police vehicle in order to be taken to the police station. Despite several warnings, he refused, grabbed their uniforms, behaved defiantly and shouted. He was then taken to the police vehicle by force. 12. A record of administrative escorting was drawn up under Article 27.2 of the Federal Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter “the CAO”). The record contained no reasoning. 13. The applicant was then subjected to the procedure of administrative arrest under Article 27.3 of the CAO. The following pre-typed text was underlined in the record: “arrested in order to put an end to the offence, to compile the record of administrative offence, to examine the case and so on, as required by the CAO”. According to the record, the applicant was not subjected to the procedure involving a personal search or an examination of his belongings. 14. According to the Government, when the applicant was arrested and held in the police station, he was in possession of an immigration card indicating “a private visit” to Mr T. residing in Moscow as the aim of his presence in Russia, as well as photocopies of his Ukrainian passport and Shengen visa. The applicant was then interviewed and said that he was a journalist and worked as an editor for the Studio1+1 television channel. The Government pointed out, in this connection, that the administrative case file contained no photocopies of any document confirming the applicant’s status as a professional journalist. 15. Apparently, the applicant managed to contact a lawyer. In the applicant’s submission, the lawyer arrived at the police station at 9.15 a.m. but was not allowed to see him until 2 p.m. 16. At around that time, the applicant was allowed access to the administrative-offence record. The record compiled by Officer F. indicated that the applicant had been arrested because of his “participation in a non‑authorised demonstration in Nevskiy Avenue, thus creating a risk of accident threatening his own and others’ lives and limb”. The record also stated: “A police officer approached [the applicant], introduced himself and asked [the applicant] to cease his unlawful actions. Despite repeated and lawful orders to cease unlawful actions, [the applicant] refused. Despite repeated and lawful orders to get into the police vehicle, he also refused while grabbing the police officers’ clothes and shouting. Physical force had to be used against him to make him get into the vehicle.” The record also had the following pre-typed line with added handwritten text: “Witnesses, attesting witnesses, victims: Go., [address]; So., [address] ...” 17. Several hours later, a new administrative-offence record was compiled by Officer D. The applicant read and signed it at around 7 p.m. According to the record, the applicant was arrested because he had “disobeyed a lawful order from a police officer”. The record also had the following pre-typed line with added handwritten text: “Witnesses, attesting witnesses, victims: Bo., [address]; Ka., [address] ...” 18. At around 8.30 p.m. the applicant was brought before a justice of the peace. He was accused of disobeying two orders from the police: (i) to cease his participation in the non-authorised demonstration; and (ii) to get, “voluntarily”, into the police vehicle, as stated in the judgment of the justice of the peace. 19. The applicant stated before the court that while having a walk with his friend, Ms K., he had seen people running along Nevskiy Avenue with banners and posters; he had followed them to take some photographs. 20. The applicant’s lawyer pointed out that the second record drawn up by the police was substantially different from the initial one. His efforts to have it admitted to the file, however, were unsuccessful. The judge heard Ms K., who stated that she had been taking a walk together with the applicant at 8.30 a.m. on 16 July 2006 when they had seen people running along Nevskiy Avenue; the applicant had started to follow them; she had lost sight of him and had eventually caught up with him when he had been placed in a police vehicle; at that point, he had not been showing any resistance to the police. 21. According to the applicant, the court refused to hear the officers who had arrested him (“the arresting officers”), the officers who had compiled the initial and the amended administrative-offence records or anyone mentioned in the record (see paragraphs 16-17 above). According to the Government, the applicant made no request to have the arresting officers examined at the trial. 22. On the same evening, the justice of the peace convicted the applicant under Article 19.3 of the CAO and sentenced him to three days of detention, to be counted from 10 a.m. on the same day. 23. The court relied on (i) the (second) administrative-offence record, compiled by the authority initiating prosecution against the applicant, and (ii) the written statements made by the arresting officers prior to the trial. 24. The applicant was held in a police cell for a night and then transferred to a special detention facility to serve the sentence. 25. Although the trial judgment was amenable to appeal within ten days, the applicant chose to lodge an appeal without delay. He also made a written statement, which read: “Acting as a journalist, on 16 July 2006 I took photographs during a public event. I did not think I was breaching any law. If I did so unknowingly, I am sorry about that. On the same day I was sentenced to three days’ detention. I ask the appeal court, when examining my appeal, to grant it as regards my release. I would ask you to examine the appeal in my absence but with the participation of my counsel and a representative from the Ukrainian Consulate.” 26. On 18 July 2006 the applicant was visited by an official from the Ukrainian Consulate and signed a document authorising the Consul to represent him on appeal. 27. The Consul asked the appeal court to examine the appeal without delay. 28. On 18 July 2006 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court of St Petersburg heard the representative, upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to two days’ detention. The appeal court held as follows: “[The applicant] argued in his statement of appeal that the trial court had not taken into account that as a journalist he had not taken part in the so-called “anti-globalist” protest; the trial court had not examined prosecution witnesses while the judgment was solely based on the written reports made by the police officers who had arrested him ... The trial judge gave a proper assessment of the officers’ reports and testimonies, including the testimony by K. who had been examined at the defendant’s request. It followed from K.’s statement that she had not observed the moment of the defendant’s arrest. This court has no reasons to doubt the officers’ reports because they had not been previously acquainted with the defendant and had no reason to commit perjury.” The appeal court indicated that its decision was “subject to immediate enforcement”. 29. According to the applicant, he was released at 4 p.m. on the same day. Referring to a logbook of detainees (a copy of the relevant extract from which has not been submitted to this Court), the Government submitted that the applicant had been released at 10 a.m. on 18 July 2006. 30. The applicant sought a supervisory review of the judgments before the City Court. He argued, inter alia, that he had been refused an opportunity to examine the arresting officers whose pre-trial reports had constituted the main adverse evidence. On 13 November 2006 the deputy President of the City Court upheld the conviction in a summary manner.

4. The applicants were born in 1967, 1965 and 1972 respectively and at the time of lodging their applications they were serving their prison sentences in the Muş E-type prison. 5. On 6 and 7 March 2006 each applicant sent a letter to the Ministry of Justice, referring to the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, by using the honorific “sayın”, meaning esteemed. 6. Pursuant to the Regulations on the administration of penitentiary institutions and the execution of sentences, the applicants were found guilty of breaching prison order by the Erzurum H- type Prison Disciplinary Board (referred hereafter as “the Board”). 7. On 5 April 2006 the applicants were each sentenced to 12 days’ solitary confinement on the orders of the Board, on account of the statements in the above mentioned letters. 8. On 17 April 2006 the Erzurum Enforcement Judge rejected the applicants’ objections. 9. On 30 June 2006 the Erzurum Assize Court upheld the judgment of 17 April 2006. 10. Furthermore, on 4 July 2005 a disciplinary sanction was imposed on the first applicant, as he avoided visits and telephone calls to protest against the detention conditions of Öcalan. He was accordingly banned from receiving visitors for 2 months. On 21 October 2005 and 14 November 2005, respectively, the Erzurum Enforcement Court and the Erzurum Assize Court rejected the first applicant’s appeal requests.

5. The applicant was born in 1974 in Khabarovsk and is serving a life sentence in the Sverdlovsk Region. 6. From 25 May 2012 to 10 April 2014 the applicant was held in penal colony IK-56 in the Sverdlovsk Region. He was able to have five short visits in 2013 and one short visit in 2014. 7. On 15 July 2013 the applicant asked the governor to allow him a short meeting with four adult relatives, his mother, sister and two cousins. He also asked for the meeting to be held without a glass partition between him and his visitors or the presence of a prison officer. The governor signed his decision on the petition: “Rejected. Not allowed under the Code of Execution of Sentences”. 8. From 15 May to 16 July 2014 the applicant was transferred to remand prison SIZO-1 in Khabarovsk – where his family still lived – to take part in another investigation. 9. On the day after his arrival at the prison, he asked the prison governor to authorise a short meeting with four family members – his sister, two cousins and aunt – without a physical partition between him and the visitors or the presence of prison officers. By a letter of 21 May 2014, the governor rejected his request. He pointed out that, pursuant to section 18 of the Pre‑trial Detention Act, visits are subject to written authorisation from the official or authority in charge of the criminal case. Furthermore, the Rules of Internal Order in Remand Prisons required that visiting rooms be equipped with a physical partition and that visits be supervised by a prison officer. 10. On 3 June 2014 the applicant asked the governor to authorise a long meeting with his mother and sister. He relied on Article 89 of the Code of Execution of Sentences (CES) and emphasised that the remand prison was equipped with rooms for long-stay visits which could be used by convicted prisoners serving their sentence in that prison. Three days later the governor replied that the applicable law did not make a provision for long-stay visits in respect of remand prisoners. He referred the applicant to Article 77.1 of the CES. 11. The applicant subsequently asked the authorities in charge of the criminal case to authorise short visits from his family members. On 11 June and 1 August 2014 the investigator and the deputy head of the investigations department, respectively, rejected his request. They informed the applicant that “the authorities in charge of the investigation were not preventing [him] from having short visits from his family members as long as it did not contradict Russian law, including the Code of Execution of Sentences”. 12. The applicant challenged the restrictions on family visits before a court of general jurisdiction. According to the information from the Government, all of his challenges were dismissed as unfounded. 13. According to a certificate issued by the governor on 27 April 2017, the applicant did not have any short or long-stay visits during his time in the Khabarovsk remand prison.

4. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Tbilisi. 5. On 29 March 2006 the applicant was convicted of conspiracy to commit extortion and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. The sentence was upheld on appeal on 30 June 2006. Pursuant to Article 5 § 2 of the Electoral Code and Article 28 § 2 of the Constitution, the applicant was debarred, as a convicted prisoner, from participating in any elections. 6. On 25 July 2007 the applicant challenged the constitutionality of the ban under Article 5 § 2 of the Electoral Code in relation to Article 28 of the Constitution. He referred to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on prisoners’ voting rights and submitted, among other things, that he would be unable to participate in the parliamentary elections in 2008. 7. On 31 March 2008 the Constitutional Court declared the application inadmissible in view of an identical restriction contained in the Constitution. It noted the following: “It would be absolutely futile for the Constitutional Court to abolish the impugned provision [Article 5 § 2 of the Electoral Code] as this will not relieve the complainant of the restriction placed upon him by Article 28 § 2 of the Constitution. To achieve [this latter result] it would be necessary to introduce amendments with respect to the relevant provision of the Constitution, which is beyond the Constitutional Court’s competence. ... ... the Parliament of Georgia has directly copied the prohibition contained in Article 28 § 2 of the Constitution into Article 5 § 2 of the Electoral Code. The impugned provision is [thus] analogous to the rule contained in Article 28 § 2 of the Constitution and its constitutionality ‒ which implies the assessment of a constitutional norm’s constitutionality ‒ is not within the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction.” 8. As a result, the applicant was unable to vote in the parliamentary elections held on 21 May 2008.

4. Details concerning the applicants can be found in the appendix. 5. The applicants are part-owners of the property named “Assunta” in Nazzarenu Street, Paola, Malta, which is a twentieth century corner town house with three floors and a total area of approximately 135 square metres. The first applicant owns one seventh undivided share thereof. The second and third applicants each own one of twenty‑eight undivided shares thereof and the fourth applicant owns one of twenty‑one undivided shares thereof. 6. The applicants’ ancestor, L.M., as owner of the property, had granted it on temporary emphyteusis to J.S. on 31 March 1962 for a period of seventeen years at a yearly ground rent of 45 Maltese liras (MTL), approximately 105 euro (EUR). In 1971 a certain C.C. had obtained the sub‑utile dominium (by way of sub-emphyteusis) of the property from J.S. 7. In March 1979 when the temporary emphyteusis came to an end C.C. continued to live in the property as a result of Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta which provided for the conversion of temporary emphyteusis contracts into lease contracts. The rent under the new lease regime was MTL 86.54, approximately EUR 200 annually. 8. On 9 April 1986 the property was requisitioned by the State and C.C. was given other accommodation. He handed in the keys to the Housing Department on 29 September 1986. 9. On 30 October 1986 the Housing Department allocated the property to D.L. for residential use, at the annual rent of MTL 86. To the applicants’ knowledge, at the time when the property was allocated to D.L., there was no pressing social need for such an allocation. D.L. and her husband (thereinafter “the occupants”) had come to Malta from the United Kingdom three months before, and had been living in a house in Senglea. The husband had a job and the house they were previously residing in was not in danger of being requisitioned, nor had it been granted to them on account of old age. The Government noted that the applicants had not submitted any proof in this respect. The applicants also noted that the Government, in whose possession all the relevant documentation was, had failed to submit any evidence concerning D.L.’s need for the premises in question. Nevertheless, from the order itself it transpired that this was a normal case, and not one founded on homelessness, old age, or a risk of danger. 10. The owners refused the rent and did not recognise the occupants as tenants. 11. The occupants thus started paying rent directly to the Housing Department. 12. Eventually the owners became aware that the occupants were also occupying a portion of an adjacent property (a room previously used as an office), also owned by the applicants in the above‑mentioned shares, and which was not covered by the requisition order. 13. The owners informed the authorities of this but no action was taken. 14. On an unspecified date, following the death of D.L. (in whose name the requisition order had been issued) the owners asked for the property to be returned to them. They offered the occupants a smaller property in the vicinity as part of a settlement proposal. The deal did not go through. 15. In 2001 D.L.’s husband also died and on 30 January 2002 their son L.L. requested to be recognised as tenant of the requisitioned premises. On 16 September 2003 the authorities recognised L.L. as tenant despite the owners’ objections of 27 March 2002. 16. Rent continued to be paid on the terms mentioned above. 17. The owners complained to the ombudsman who, on 29 October 2003, considered that the authorities had not given sufficient attention to the owners’ complaints. 18. On an unspecified date, L.L. applied for a grant to make alterations to the premises, including to the commercial room the occupants had been occupying without legal title. 19. When the owners became aware that this application had been lodged, they filed, on 21 February 2007, an objection to the proposed development. 20. The relevant permit to make structural alterations was issued by the Malta Environment and Planning Authority (MEPA) on 16 April 2007. In the applicants’ view these structural changes affected the character of the property as well as its value. 21. On 28 May 2007 the owners (including the applicants or their predecessors in title) instituted constitutional redress proceedings. They complained of a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and requested that the requisition order be annulled, that the property be returned to them and that compensation be awarded for any damage suffered as a result of the occupation of the premises and the breach of their right to property. 22. Pending proceedings, on 11 February 2010, the property was derequisitioned; however the Government admitted that although the property had been abandoned by the occupants the Government had not recovered the keys. On 8 April 2010 the Government offered the owners EUR 4,507.30 as rent for the occupation of the premises from 9 April 1986 until 11 February 2010. The owners refused the offer which they considered was too low compared to the rental value of the property and the long number of years during which it had been occupied by third parties. 23. On 28 April 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence found in favour of the owners. It found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and, being unable to annul the requisition order ‑ it having come to an end pending the proceedings ‑ it ordered the defendants to return the property, free and unencumbered, to the owners. It also awarded EUR 7,535 in compensation, with costs against the Government. 24. The court considered that while the requisition order had been lawful and pursued a legitimate aim, it had failed to strike a fair balance for the purposes of the invoked provision. The owners had received a low amount of rent for twenty-four years which had remained unvaried. In establishing compensation, the court had regard to the rental value submitted by the owners’ expert [in a report of 2007] of MTL 250 (approximately EUR 582) a month, in other words MTL 3,000 (approximately EUR 6,988) yearly, which however included a room which was not subject to the requisition order and thus its rental value had to be deducted. This estimate was however not binding on the court. It noted that had the property not been requisitioned, according to Chapter 158 of the laws of Malta, rent would have increased every fifteen years according to the index of inflation (but never amounting to double the original rent). Thus, the owners would have been due a yearly rent of MTL 86.45 (from 9 April 1986) until 31 March 1994, of MTL 141.09 (approximately EUR 329) until March 2009, and thereafter a rent of MTL 207.39 (approximately EUR 483) until date of judgment, amounting to a rounded up sum of EUR 7,535. 25. The Government appealed in so far as they had been forced to return the premises (over which they no longer had control) and the owners cross‑appealed in connection with the award of compensation. The latter noted that although L.L. had vacated the premises and offered to return the keys, the Government had failed to recover the keys. 26. By a judgment of 28 April 2014 the Constitutional Court considered that the first‑instance court could not have ordered the return of the property which had already been de-requisitioned. As to the compensation it found that the amount awarded by the first-instance court had been low. Indeed the award of EUR 7,535 reflected the sums that the owners would have been entitled to as rent for the premises according to the provisions of Chapter 158 of the Laws of Malta, and thus it was not an award in compensation for the violation of their property rights, nor did it reflect an award for the occupation of the premises at undervalued rents. Bearing in mind the social aim pursued by the measure and the fact that the rent paid had been in accordance with the law, as well as the fact that the measure persisted for twenty-four years during which the owners received a low rent compared to its market value, it awarded non-pecuniary damage of EUR 5,000 to be added to the pecuniary damage already awarded. Thus, in total it awarded compensation of EUR 12,535 covering both pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage, without prejudice to any claims the owners may have for material damage caused to the property, and it ordered that the costs of the proceedings at both instances be split equally between the contending parties. 27. Pending these proceedings, on 21 October 2013, L.M., predecessor of the second and third applicant, died. 28. Eventually, in or around August 2014, the keys were also returned to the owners, and the property was returned to them in a poor state. The applicants claimed that the property was not habitable and the works started by L.L. were never completed. They considered that the Government’s lack of regard towards the situation had contributed to the degeneration of the property and that a considerable expense would have to be incurred and relevant permits obtained to reinstate the building for habitation. 29. According to an architect’s valuation dated 19 August 2014, the property was abandoned halfway through a refurbishment project, leaving it in an uninhabitable and unfinished state, with visible damage, most pertinently as a result of severe water penetration. According to the same report the sale market value of the property with vacant possession, as it stood, was EUR 145,000 and the market value upon completion of works would be EUR 175,000. The estimated rental value of the property (in an unspecified state) in 2014 was EUR 665 a month (EUR 7,980 a year). On the basis of a process of interpolation, rental values for previous years were calculated to be as follows: Year Monthly rent (in EUR) Annual rent (in EUR) 1971

6. The applicants were born in 1974, 1978 and 1980 respectively. They all live in Sri Lanka. The first applicant lives in Colombo, the second applicant in Kochchikade, and the third applicant in Pannipitiya. 7. The applicants all went to Cyprus for employment purposes. 8. The first applicant arrived in Cyprus on 20 April 2001 in order to take up employment as a domestic worker. He was granted a temporary residence permit, initially until 20 April 2005. This was renewed until 10 May 2011. 9. The residence permit stated that it could be revoked at any time with fourteen days’ prior notice to the holder. 10. During the above period the applicant left Cyprus twice to go back to Sri Lanka: on 12 November 2001 and in January 2004. The first time, he stayed in his home country for about eleven months, and the second time, he stayed for just over a month. On 21 February 2004, during his second visit home, he married a Sri Lankan national. 11. His wife joined him in Cyprus on 16 September 2004, in order to work as a housemaid. She was granted a temporary residence permit until 16 September 2008. 12. On 13 December 2007 their daughter was born. 13. On 17 September 2008 the first applicant’s wife abandoned her work and her place of residence. Her whereabouts at the time were not known to the authorities. She had not applied for the renewal or extension of her temporary residence permit, which had expired the day before. 14. On 10 December 2008 all competent authorities were given orders by the Police Aliens and Immigration Unit to trace the first applicant’s wife. 15. On 30 November 2010 a lawyer acting on behalf of the first applicant’s wife wrote to the Minister of the Interior requesting a visitor’s residence permit for her based on humanitarian grounds, a permit of the same duration as that held by her husband. The lawyer noted that the couple had a young daughter, that both the wife and the daughter were supported by the first applicant, and that she could not return to Sri Lanka without him, as she did not have family there with whom she and her daughter could stay. She also needed time to obtain travel documents for their daughter. The lawyer informed the authorities that the couple’s intention was that the whole family would return to Sri Lanka upon the expiry of the first applicant’s temporary residence permit. 16. The second applicant arrived in Cyprus on 5 February 2010 and was granted a temporary residence permit until 4 May 2010. This was renewed until 19 October 2011. 17. The residence permit stated that it could be revoked at any time with fourteen days’ prior notice to the holder. 18. The third applicant arrived in Cyprus on 4 March 2002. He was granted a temporary residence permit until 3 May 2002. This was renewed until 12 February 2009. Following the expiry of his permit, he remained in Cyprus on an irregular basis. The third applicant submitted that he had applied for a renewal of his permit. 19. The residence permit stated that it could be revoked at any time with fourteen days’ prior notice to the holder. It also stated that it was final and non-renewable. 20. According to the first and second applicants, on 6 January 2011, while in the first applicant’s car, they passed through the Ayios Dometios district of Nicosia and saw a group of Sri Lankans. They got out of the car and saw people holding swords and iron rods. Fearing for their lives, they abandoned the car and ran in different directions. The second applicant was injured during the clashes: his index finger was cut off and his middle finger injured. After the clashes, the first applicant took the second applicant to the Nicosia General Hospital, where the latter underwent surgery. According to the second applicant, the police came to the hospital and arrested him. He remained in the hospital after the operation, and on 9 January 2011 he was taken to Lakatamia police station, where he was detained. According to the first applicant, on the morning of 7 January 2011 six people who had taken part in the clash attacked his residence and threatened to kill him if he went to the police. However, half an hour later, when he went to the police station to report the incident, he was arrested and detained on suspicion of being involved in the clashes. 21. According to the third applicant, he was also passing by that area with his car and stopped to see what was going on, but, fearing for his life, he ran away and left his car behind. He informed his employer and the latter informed the police about the clash. The police asked the third applicant to come to the police station to make a statement and take his car back. On 7 January 2011 the third applicant went to Lakatamia police station and was arrested and detained on suspicion of being involved in the clashes. 22. On the evening of 6 January 2011 the police received information that about twenty aliens carrying offensive weapons (swords, clubs and Molotov cocktails) were in the Ayios Dometios district of Nicosia. The police immediately went to the site and discovered that a number of aliens had attempted to set fire to a house there by throwing Molotov cocktails at it. The police carried out an investigation into the events. They examined and collected evidence found in the area (including the first and third applicants’ cars). They reached the conclusion that the applicants, along with six other individuals from Sri Lanka, were likely to have been involved in the clash. A number of suspects, including the second applicant, had sustained injuries which had been treated at Nicosia General Hospital. 23. On 7 January 2011 the police arrested all nine Sri Lankans, including the applicants, on the basis of arrest warrants issued on the same day by the Nicosia District Court under section 18 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155) and Article 11(3) of the Constitution, on reasonable suspicion that they had taken part in a fight in a public place, contrary to section 89 of the Criminal Code (Cap. 154). 24. On 8 January 2011 the Nicosia District Court convened at Nicosia General Hospital. The applicants were remanded in custody for six days under section 24 of the Criminal Procedure Law and Article 11(5) and (6) of the Constitution, to enable the investigation into the commission of various criminal offences to be concluded. The offences included: intending to inflict grievous bodily harm, unlawful wounding, an unlawful attempt to set fire to a building, and taking part in a fight in a public place (sections 228, 315 and 89 of the Criminal Code). The first applicant was detained in Paphos Gate police station in Nicosia, and the second and third applicants in Lakatamia police station. 25. On 13 January 2011 the police investigation file, which included written statements by the applicants concerning the incident, was transmitted to the Attorney General. The Nicosia Crime Investigation Department informed the Attorney General that that there was sufficient evidence against all the nine individuals arrested, including the applicants, in relation to the offence of taking part in a fight in a public place contrary to section 89 of the Criminal Code, but not as regards the remaining offences, which were more serious. The third applicant had also committed the offence of staying in Cyprus unlawfully, as his temporary resident permit had expired on 12 February 2009. At the suggestion of the police, the Attorney General decided not to prosecute the applicants, but to deport them instead. 26. On 14 January 2011 the residence permits of the first and second applicants were revoked by the Director of the Civil Registry and Migration Department under section 6 of the Aliens and Immigration Law (Cap. 105), on the grounds that their conduct had posed a danger to the public order of the Republic. Deportation and detention orders were issued against the applicants on the same day: under section 6(1)(g) of the above Law in respect of the first and the second applicants, on the grounds of public order, and under section 6(1)(k) in respect of the third applicant, on the grounds of unlawful stay. 27. On the same day three letters were prepared by the Minister of the Interior informing the applicants of the decision to detain and deport them. The letters stated that the applicants were illegal immigrants: the first and second applicants under section 6(1)(g) of the Aliens and Immigration Law, because their “conduct had been considered dangerous for reasons of public order”, and the third applicant by virtue of section 6(1)(k), on the grounds of “illegal stay”. Consequently, their temporary resident permits had been revoked and deportation and detention orders had been issued against them. 28. Consequently, on 14 January 2011, upon the expiry of the remand warrant, the applicants were released but re-arrested at once on the basis of the deportation and detention orders that had been issued against them. The Government submitted that, in accordance with standard police practice, the applicants would have been informed orally of the decision not to prosecute them and the decision to deport them. Although the Government did not have evidence as to the exact date on which the applicants were notified of the letters of 14 January 2011 or the exact manner in which they were notified, this happened sometime between 14 and 18 January 2011. 29. On 18 January 2011 a Cypriot lawyer acting on behalf of the applicants sent two letters by fax to the Minister of the Interior, referring to the letters of 14 January 2011 sent to the applicants. He objected to the deportation of the first and second applicants; he also requested a review of the decision taken with regard to the third applicant. The lawyer requested a meeting to discuss the matter with the above-mentioned Minister. 30. The Government submitted that the applicants’ case had then been reviewed by the Minister of the Interior, who had noted their lawyer’s objection, read the administrative file and maintained the decision to deport the applicants. 31. Although the first applicant called his wife several times during his detention, she did not come to visit him at the police station. 32. The first and third applicants were deported on 19 January 2011 and the second applicant was deported on 21 January 2011. 33. There were signed notes by a police officer on the copies of the letters of 14 January 2011 stating that the letters had also been served on the applicants on the day they were deported. 34. The applicants were included on the authorities’ “stop list” (a register of individuals whose entry into and exit from Cyprus is banned or subject to monitoring). 35. The documents submitted by the Government indicate that the first applicant’s wife continued to stay in Cyprus illegally following her husband’s deportation. On 3 December 2012 she lodged an asylum application, which was dismissed on 31 January 2013. She left Cyprus for Sri Lanka on 5 July 2013 and she was included on the authorities’ “stop list” (see paragraph 34 above). She returned to Cyprus that same month with a new passport with different identity details, and was granted a residence and employment permit until 15 November 2016. However, the authorities realised that she was the same person and arrested her on 10 September 2014 with a view to her deportation. No further details have been given by the Government in this respect.

4. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Bielsk Podlaski. 5. The facts of the case were not in dispute and may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicant was detained in Siedlce Prison from 26 January to 19 April 2007 and from 15 July to 15 October 2009. 7. The applicant submitted that, during his detention in Siedlce Prison, he had been held in cells where the amount of space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 m². He also submitted that he had been held in cells with smokers. Moreover, he raised the problems of humidity, lack of hygiene and warm water and limited access to make telephone calls. 8. The domestic courts found that the applicant had been detained in an overcrowded cell during his detention in Siedlce Prison from 15 July to 15 October 2009 (91 days), when he had been assigned to cell no. 616 (15.94 m²) with 5 other prisoners (2.65 m² per person). 9. The courts further found that the toilet areas had been separated from the rest of the living space in the cells in compliance with the relevant law. The toilet annex had only cold running water. It was further noted that the cells were adequately equipped. The applicant was held in cells in accordance with his declaration about his tobacco habits. 10. On 13 July 2013 the applicant brought a civil action against the State Treasury for infringement of his personal rights and for compensation on account of his detention in an overcrowded cell in Siedlce Prison. He claimed 43,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (10,750 euros (EUR)) in compensation. 11. On 30 May 2014 the Siedlce District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) dismissed the applicant’s action. It confirmed, however, that the applicant had been detained temporarily in an overcrowded cell, from 15 July to 15 October 2009. 12. On 17 February 2015 the Siedlce Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the applicant’s appeal.

5. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Ștefan-Vodă. 6. In 2007 the applicant was charged with trafficking in human beings, together with another co-accused, B. In particular, he was charged with the attempt to organise the transfer of S. to a foreign country for the purpose of sexual exploitation. 7. On 8 June 2007 the Ștefan-Vodă District Court found the applicant guilty on the strength of the statements made by B. (a co-accused), S. (a victim), and C.E. and C.T., who were witnesses. 8. The applicant never admitted his guilt and stated that his involvement had been limited to driving S. to an apartment in Slobozia as requested by B. to pick up her passport without knowing the purpose of this action. 9. B. admitted her guilt and declared that she had had an arrangement with the applicant to transfer S. to Turkey for the purpose of sexual exploitation. She said that S.’s passport had been kept by the applicant so that he could prepare the documents necessary for S.’s transfer. She said the applicant had promised her money for this and that she had received an advance payment. 10. S. declared that she had met only B., who had promised to find her employment in Russia; that B. had arranged accommodation for her in the apartment she had been renting in Slobozia; that B. had taken her passport and that another roommate, C.T., had informed her about B.’s intention to transfer her to Cyprus for the purpose of sexual exploitation. It had been upon learning this that she had gone to the police. 11. C.E. stated that she had been the landlord who had rented her apartment to B. and that S. and C.T. had also lived in that apartment. She said that B. had told her about her arrangement with the applicant to transfer S. to Turkey, that the applicant had intended to take care of all the formalities and that he had promised a reward for each woman she had found who could be moved to Turkey for the purpose of prostitution. 12. C.T., a witness, declared that she had shared the apartment with B. and that the latter had not told her about any intention to transfer S. to Turkey, but that she had intended to find employment for S. in Russia or Ukraine. During the court proceedings, she denied having told S. about B.’s criminal intentions. The court noted that C. had changed her depositions given during criminal investigation, in which she had stated that B. had revealed her criminal intentions, and had chosen to rely on those initial depositions. 13. The District Court convicted both B. and the applicant on all counts, sentencing B. to seven years’ imprisonment, but absolving her from the execution of the sentence because she was infected with HIV, and sentencing the applicant to eight years’ imprisonment. The prosecutor and the applicant appealed against this judgment. 14. On 6 December 2007 after having heard the prosecutor, the applicant and the victim, the Bender Court of Appeal concluded that the prosecution had failed to provide reliable evidence in support of the contention that the applicant had indeed acted together with B. and that the first-instance court had based its findings essentially on B.’s statements. The Court of Appeal noted that B.’s statements alone had been unreliable if unsupported by other witness statements and evidence. According to the court, the evidence gathered by the prosecution had been insufficient to determine the applicant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court therefore allowed the applicant’s appeal, acquitted him of all charges and released him. The court upheld B.’s conviction and ordered that she serve her sentence only after her child had turned eight years of age. The prosecutor appealed against this judgment. 15. On 1 April 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice held a hearing at which the applicant and his lawyer were absent. It appears from the material in the domestic case file that a summons was sent to the applicant’s address on an unknown date; however, the post office did not deliver it and returned it with a note to the effect that that the applicant did not live on that address. During the proceedings the applicant was represented by a pro bono lawyer and no witnesses gave evidence. According to the applicant, his chosen representative never received a summons for this hearing. The court quashed the judgment of the Bender Court of Appeal, upheld the applicant’s conviction by the first-instance court and ordered a fresh examination of the case in respect of B. It did not examine directly any evidence and based its findings on the case file as established by the lower courts. On the basis of the case-file material, it found the testimonies of B., S. and E. to be reliable and directly incriminating in respect of the applicant and to be sufficient to prove his guilt. The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeal had reached incorrect conclusions on the basis of the file. 16. On 20 October 2008 the Chișinău Court of Appeal held a hearing in the absence of the applicant and of his representative. The court re‑examined and dismissed as ill-founded the applicant’s appeal against the judgment of Ștefan-Vodă District Court of 8 June 2007. It allowed the prosecutor’s appeal and sentenced B. to seven years’ imprisonment in a closed-type detention facility, without allowing any adjournment for serving the sentence. 17. On 27 November 2008 the applicant was arrested at his place of work and only then was he informed of the judgments of the Supreme Court of Justice of 1 April 2008 and of the Chișinău Court of Appeal of 20 October 2008. The applicant appealed against the latter, arguing, inter alia, that he had not been legally summonsed and that in his absence the court had adopted a decision relying on assumptions rather than on factual evidence. 18. On 28 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Justice held a hearing in the presence of the applicant, his representative, the victim and the prosecutor. The court allowed the applicant’s appeal and found that the Chișinău Court of Appeal had been entitled to examine the case in respect of B. only, because in respect of the applicant a final judgment had been delivered on 1 April 2008 by the Supreme Court of Justice. The court removed any reference to the applicant from the judgment of the Chișinău Court of Appeal of 20 October 2008 but did not change in any way the sentence in respect of him. 19. On 2 June 2009 the applicant submitted an extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Court of Justice, arguing, inter alia, that there had been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention as he had not been legally summonsed to the Supreme Court of Justice hearing of 1 April 2008 and to the Court of Appeal hearing of 20 October 2008, and complaining of the lack of evidence and reasons for his conviction. S., a victim, also submitted an extraordinary appeal, arguing that the proceedings had been unfair because she had also not been summoned and that because the applicant had been convicted unfairly because he was not guilty. On 28 October 2010 the Supreme Court of Justice rejected the appeals, noting, inter alia, that the applicant had not appeared in court despite the fact that he had been summoned to the hearing of 1 April 2008, and that the applicant had been represented at that hearing by a pro bono lawyer.

5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Novocheboksarsk. 6. The facts of the applicant’s ill-treatment in police custody were established in a judgment of the Novocheboksarsk Town Court of the Chuvash Republic (“the Town Court”) of 22 August 2008 and upheld on 11 November 2008 by the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic. The facts are as follows. 7. On 10 April 2007 the applicant was stopped by police officers on a street near his home and taken to district police station no. 1 of Novocheboksarsk to have his identity checked. At the police station a district police officer (участковый уполномоченный милиции), Officer M. from the Novocheboksarsk town police station, who wore a police uniform, threatened the applicant by saying that a criminal case against him would be opened, grabbed him by his clothing, violently pushed him backwards against a wall several times and punched his left ear. 8. According to a forensic medical expert’s report, the applicant had a traumatic rupture of the left eardrum with a haemorrhage, which caused a short-term – lasting between six and twenty-one days – health disorder. Accordingly, this qualified as “insignificant” health damage. 9. Officer M. was convicted under Article 286 § 3 (a) of the Criminal Code (abuse of power with the use of violence) and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and a two‑year ban on exercising official power. 10. In January 2009 the applicant brought a civil claim in the amount of 312,487 Russian roubles (RUB) against the Ministry of Finance of the Chuvash Republic in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He argued, inter alia, that his ill‑treatment by the police had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”), and that, in accordance with the Plenary Supreme Court Resolution no. 5 of 10 October 2003, the domestic courts were to apply the Convention in accordance with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”). He also argued that, in calculating the amount of compensation due in respect of non‑pecuniary damage for a violation of the Convention, the domestic courts therefore had to take into account the sums awarded by the Court under Article 41 of the Convention in similar cases. He stated that his claim had been calculated based on the sum awarded by the Court in the case of Ribitsch, in which a violation of Article 3 of the Convention had been found on account of inhuman and degrading treatment in police custody (see Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, Series A no. 336). 11. On 6 April 2009 the Town Court allowed the applicant’s civil claim in part. It noted that, under Article 61 § 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a judgment in a criminal case which had become enforceable was binding on a court examining the civil-law consequences of the acts of a person against whom the judgment had been delivered, in so far as it established whether those acts had taken place and whether they had been committed by that person. Article 53 of the Constitution and Articles 151 and 1069 of the Civil Code provided for State liability for harm caused to individuals by State agents. Relying on Articles 1099-1101 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation and section 8 of the Plenary Supreme Court Resolution no. 10 of 20 December 1994, the Town Court held that RUB 20,000 would be just and reasonable satisfaction for the applicant’s mental suffering as a result of his ill-treatment by the police officer, treatment which had undermined his honour and dignity and caused him insignificant health damage. 12. The applicant appealed against the judgment. On 6 May 2009 the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic upheld the judgment on appeal, fully endorsing the Town Court’s calculation of the amount of compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. It disagreed with the applicant that, in determining the amount of compensation for non‑pecuniary damage, the domestic courts had to be guided by the amounts of such compensation awarded by the Court in similar cases, stating as follows: “Indeed, in accordance with Article 15 § 4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, commonly recognised principles and norms of international law and international agreements of the Russian Federation are an integral part of [the Russian Federation’s] legal system. However, this does not mean that the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage determined by the European Court of Human Rights in a specific case has a binding effect on national courts examining other cases where a violation of similar norms and principles can be found. The determination of the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage in specific cases is the prerogative of national courts examining such cases.”

5. Since 2002, following their ancestors’ demise, the applicants have been the holders of the utile dominium (by way of sub-emphyteusis which expires in 2047) of a portion of land in Zabbar, Malta. The directum dominus (direct owner) is the State. 6. The applicants’ ancestors acquired the utile dominium of the property also through inheritance from a certain X. who had held the property under title of temporary sub-emphyteusis of 150 years. On the said property there was a shop which was rented out to third parties as a snack bar. 7. By a Governor’s declaration of 7 May 1965 published in the Government Gazette on 14 May 1965 (no. 290), a part, amounting to 80 sq. m. (including the shop of an area of approximately 50 sq. m.), of the applicants’ property (as well as other land not held by the applicants) was declared to be needed for a public purpose under the Land Acquisition (Public Purposes) Ordinance, Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta (hereinafter, “the Ordinance”). 8. The Government took possession of the entirety of the property mentioned in the declaration and demolished the shop in order to build a local civic centre and service roads (in connection with a development project for the locality). However, in 1972 changes were made to the plan (pjan regolatur). Specifically it was decided to reposition the road which had to be built on the part of the land on which the shop had stood. Thus, it was decided that on that plot of land which adjoined another larger plot of land (not owned by the applicants), a new shop would be built at the Government’s expense in order to serve the square and the civic centre, as well as government offices and for use as a bus terminus. The civic centre at that time hosted the Zabbar Local Council, a social-security office, a police station, a post office, a snack bar, a butcher’s shop, a draper’s shop, a beauty parlour and a grocer’s shop. 9. The new shop (of larger dimensions than the previous one) was built mostly on the applicants’ land and leased to the same third party mentioned above for use as a snack bar. The remaining small area of land, belonging to the applicants’ ancestors, which had been taken but not used, was returned to them in 1988. 10. Extra-judicial requests to obtain the return of the property used for the purposes of the snack bar were to no avail. 11. Pending the constitutional-redress proceedings (below), on 13 April 2010 the Commissioner of Land (hereinafter “the Commissioner”) extended the lease in favour of the third party until 31 January 2020, at a rent of approximately 2,100 euros (EUR) per year. 12. In the light of Article 9 of the Ordinance and Act I of 2006, on 6 October 2010, by a President’s declaration of 3 September 2010, the sum offered for the taking of 7 May 1965 was EUR 13,000 in accordance with an architect’s valuation dated 1 January 2005. 13. In 2010 the bus terminus was moved as a result of changes in the transport system. Currently, within a radius of 300 m of the civic centre there are eleven establishments offering take-away food services (bars, snack bars, confectioners’, pizzerias, pastizzerias, and so forth). 14. On 2 March 2010 the applicants instituted constitutional redress proceedings. They complained that they had suffered a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, in so far as their land had not been taken in the public interest, and of Article 6 of the Convention, as well as the corresponding provisions of the Constitution of Malta. They requested that the court annul the Governor’s declaration in respect of their property, order that it be returned to their possession and award adequate redress. 15. By a judgment of 26 June 2012 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional jurisdiction, upheld the applicants’ claims. 16. The court noted that pursuant to the Ordinance, as it was at the time, it had been the Commissioner who had had to make an offer, and in the event that the offer had been refused, the same Commissioner had had to institute proceedings before the Land Arbitration Board (hereinafter “the LAB”). Pursuant to the Ordinance as amended, it was still for the Commissioner to make an offer. It was open, however, for the receivers of the offer, if they disagreed, to institute proceedings to challenge the offer before the LAB. Nevertheless, in the present case, it had taken forty‑five years for the Commissioner to make an offer, during which time the applicants had had no possibility of initiating proceedings, and thus had no ordinary remedies to exhaust in connection with their request for compensation. The same applied concerning their complaint of a lack of public interest despite amendments to the law in 2009 (Act XXV of 2009) ‑ which had introduced the possibility of challenging the public interest of an expropriation before the LAB, within twenty-one days of the declaration – in the court’s view it was unlikely that an individual would be able to challenge a public interest which had not been mentioned in the declaration. 17. As to the complaint concerning the applicants’ property rights, having extensively referred to domestic as well as Strasbourg case-law, the court held that the taking had not been in the public interest in so far as the property had been leased to third parties as a snack bar and thus for commercial purposes. It had solely and intrinsically served private interests, specifically those of the third parties who had been leasing the property merely for commercial purposes, irrespective of the fact that the snack bar had been regularly used by bus drivers. Furthermore, the applicants had received no compensation in forty-five years, and the offer made to them in 2010 (solely after constitutional redress proceedings had been commenced) had been based on a valuation from 2005. In the court’s view, based on the rent as submitted by the Commissioner, “capitalised” at the rate of 3.5% applicable in such cases, the value of the property was approximately EUR 60,000, that is to say five times the sum offered by the Commissioner. The situation was made even worse by the lack of procedural safeguards (as mentioned above) through which they could challenge their situation, which also meant that they had not had any access to court in order to claim compensation, as required by Article 6 of the Convention. 18. The court annulled the Governor’s declaration of 7 May 1965 and the President’s declaration of 6 October 2010 as well as any other action, affecting the property, taken by the defendant pending the proceedings. It ordered the return of the property (vacant possession) in favour of the applicants and awarded EUR 40,000 in compensation including non‑pecuniary (moral damage as known in the domestic system) and pecuniary damage (material damage) covering occupation of the premises until the date of return, in connection with the breach suffered. 19. The defendants appealed, arguing that there was a public interest and challenging the award of compensation and the return order. 20. By a judgment of 26 April 2013 the Constitutional Court allowed the appeal in part and quashed the first-instance judgment in part. It considered that at the time of the declaration the taking (of the land on which the shop had stood) had been certainly in the public interest, specifically the building of roads giving access to the public. It was true that use of that plot of land had changed in 1972, as it had been decided to build a snack bar (and later to lease it) to see to the needs of the users of the square, as well as the civic centre, government offices, and a bus terminus. Thus, in the Constitutional Court’s view the fact that it had been rented out to third parties had not diminished the public interest in the taking. Nevertheless, there had been a violation of the applicants’ property rights in so far as they had been deprived of their property for a number of years without any compensation. In particular they had received no compensation whatsoever for the part of the property taken and not used, which had been returned to them only after twenty-three years, and in respect of the remaining part which was used, the applicants were still awaiting compensation. The Constitutional Court however disagreed with the redress given by the first-instance court, in so far as that court had also awarded pecuniary damage. It considered that that court should have awarded compensation without prejudice to the pecuniary damage due in accordance with the relevant law (Article 12 § 3 of the Ordinance, specifically interest of 5% on the value of the property). Thus, without prejudice to any such claim for pecuniary compensation in respect of the property taken and the relative interest, the Constitutional Court awarded EUR 10,000 in non‑pecuniary damages for the violation suffered, bearing in mind that the value of the property was EUR 13,000, and it annulled the return order for the property. 21. As the applicants refused to collect the award made by the Constitutional Court, in January 2014 the Commissioner deposited the award in court by means of a schedule of deposit. 22. On 3 September 2015 the Government sent the applicants a letter reminding them to send evidence concerning their title in connection with the President’s declaration of 6 October 2010.